EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR V. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B.

ZAMORA,
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and Gregorio R. Vigilar,
Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways
G.R. No. 149335 July 1, 2003
Ponente: Puno, J.
An unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995 addressed by Luis Bundalian to
the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, United States of America. The
letter-complaint and its attached documents were indorsed by the Philippine Consulate
General of San Francisco to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC)
Luis Bundalian accused Edillo C. Montemayor, OIC-Regional Direcor of DPWH Region
III, accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Bundalian alleged that in 1993, Montemayor and his wife purchased a house and lot at 907
North Bel Aire Drive, Burbank, Los Angeles, California, Making a down payment of US $
100,000.00. and amassed wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.
Montemayor pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar case
filed before the Ombudsman.
PCGAC concluded that Montemayor could not have been able to afford to buy the
property on his annual income of P 168,648.00 in 1993 as appearing in his service record. It
likewise found that Montemayors explanation during his participation in the investigation
as unusual, largely unsubstantiated, unbelievable and self-serving. Thus, it recommended
Montemayors dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.
On August 24, 1998, The Office of the President , concurring with the findings and
adopting the recommendation of PCAGC, issued Administrative Order No. 12, ordering Edilo
C. Montemayors dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits.
Montemayors motion for reconsideration was denied. His appeal to the Court of
Appeals was likewise dismissed.

Issues:
1. Whether he was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC
2. Whether his guilt was proved by substantial evidence
3. Whether the earlier dismissal of similar case before the Ombudsman as res judicata
rendered the administrative case before PCAGC moot and academic
Held:
1.

No. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity

to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of action or ruling complained of. In
the case, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant but could not be
located; however, Montemayor cannot argue that he was deprived of due process
because he failed to confront the complainant. His active participation in every step
of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency.
The lack of the verification of the administrative complaint and the nonappearance of the complainant at the investigation did not divest the PCAGC of its
authority to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. Under Section 3 of

Executive Order NO. 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and
corruption may be filed before it in any form or manner against presidential
appointees in the executive department. This policy of investigating and taking
cognizance, of unverified and anonymous complaints filed has been adopted in line
with serious effort of the government to minimize graft and corruption in the service.

It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of

procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the
party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.

2.

Yes. On the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in
administrative
investigations.
a. The burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations
in his complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.
b.
In reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the
government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to
weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the
sufficiency
of
evidence.
c.
Administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be
set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These
principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of
the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not
authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the
administrative
agency
concerned.

3.

No. The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the
PCAGC case. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. In the case PCAGCs
investigation is administrative in nature; thus, the doctrine of res judicata finds no
application in the case.