1

The effectiveness of Regional Organizations Diplomatic Interventions in Promoting Regional

Peace-The Case of IGAD

A research proposal submitted in partial fulfillment for the award of Masters Degree of
Arts from Oxford University

2016

Declaration
I declare that this research proposal is my original work and has not been presented for award of
any degree in any university.
This research project has been prepared under my supervision as a University supervisor.

Abstract
The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the regional organization of seven
Eastern African countries with a stated ambition to achieve peace, prosperity and regional
integration among its member states. Each of these objectives is challenging, but none more so
than prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts in a region that has been steeped
in warfare for decades. This study will thus be focused on the effectiveness of regional
organizations diplomatic interventions in promoting regional peace. The role of IGAD in
promoting peace through diplomatic intervention in its member states will thus be greatly
reviewed. The role of IGAD in promoting regional peace through diplomatic interventions will
be compared to that of other Organizations in Africa. The study will additionally be looking to
compare past interventions by the IGAD with what it is doing currently. For this objective
Somalia and South Sudan will be used as sound case studies. The results of this study will
provide a basis for regional integration policies formulation and improvement of existing ones.
This will ensure a more seamless integration of all involved parties. It will give them a better
understanding of regional peace promotion strategies and their effectiveness. This will make
their interventions more targeted and therefore more successful. Finally this study will be useful
to the governments of countries experiencing conflicts either internally or externally since they
will know the best way to seek for interventions and from where.

Contents
Abstract..........................................................................................................................................iii
List of Figures..................................................................................................................................v
List of Tables...................................................................................................................................v
List of Abbreviations.......................................................................................................................v
Chapter One.....................................................................................................................................1
1.0

Introduction.......................................................................................................................1

1.1 Back ground of the study.......................................................................................................1

1.2 Statement of the problem.......................................................................................................2
1.3 Overall objective....................................................................................................................3
1.4 Research Objectives...............................................................................................................3
1.5 Research Hypothesis..............................................................................................................3
1.6 Significance of the study........................................................................................................4
Chapter Two: Literature Review......................................................................................................5
2.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................5
2.2 History and Mandate..............................................................................................................5
2.3 IGAD and its role in the Horn of Africa................................................................................6
2.4 The Effectiveness of IGADs Contribution to Peace and Security........................................7
Chapter 3: Methodology................................................................................................................15
3.0 Introduction..........................................................................................................................15
3.1 Research Philosophy............................................................................................................15
3.2 Research Approach..............................................................................................................16
3.2.1 Strategy of Inquiry.........................................................................................................16
3.2.2 Reasoning of this Research...........................................................................................16
3.3 Research Methods................................................................................................................17
3.4 Literature review..................................................................................................................17
3.5 Data collection technique.....................................................................................................17
3.5.1 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques.........................................................................18
3.6 Validity and Reliability........................................................................................................18
3.7 Confidentiality and Ethical Considerations.........................................................................19
3.8 Summary..............................................................................................................................19

List of Abbreviations
ECOWAS

Economic Commission for West African States

SADC

South African Development Corporation

IGAD

Inter-Governmental Agency on Development

EAC

East African Community

AU

African Union

AMISOM

African Union Mission in Somalia

IGASOM

IGAD Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia

TFG

Transitional Federal Government

UNOSOM

United Nations Operation for Somalia

Chapter One
1.0 Introduction
This chapter discusses the background of the study, statement of the problem, overall
objectives, research hypothesis, assumptions, significance and justification, scope of the study,
research limitations and definition of terms.
1.1 Back ground of the study
The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the regional organization
of seven Eastern African countries with a stated ambition to achieve peace, prosperity and
regional integration among its member states (Stealy, 2009). Each of these objectives is
challenging, but none more so than prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts in
a region that has been steeped in warfare for decades, Stealy observes.
The horn of Africa is the most militarized and conflict-ridden region on the African
continent. For many decades, armed conflicts have raged within states, between states, and
among proxies-whether at the center or peripheries of the region (Mulugeta, 2014). Among these
conflicts are a failed state in Somalia, the continued stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the
unresolved border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea, persistent tensions between Sudan and
South Sudan and within South Sudan. Mulugeta, (2014) notes that, many armed groups-from
Sudans Darfur region to Somalis vast ungoverned areas-also violently oppose regional
governments.

With many actual and potential armed conflicts in the horn of Africa region, it was
inevitable for Africa and particularly the region comes up with at least one organization that
could intervene diplomatically and impartially to try and bring peace and unity between or
among involved parties both internally and externally. IGAD has a clear mandate of intervening
and solving conflicts peacefully.
1.2 Statement of the problem
Successful diplomatic interventions by a nation or a group of nations in conflict ridden
countries are critical in promoting or ensuring that regional peace and stability exist. Oricho,
(2007) notes that, a brief look at some documented historical and current information on the
issues of post-colonial Africa shows that the continent has experienced a lot conflicts and civil
wars. Some of these wars have been very difficult to resolve while others have been successfully
resolved with Sudan being the current case.
Africa is a host to a number of regional organizations that have taken upon themselves
the responsibility to ensure peace and stability in their regions, in addition to other political and
economic objectives. The said organizations include the ECOWAS, SADC. IGAD in the horn of
Africa and the East African Community (EAC). At the continent level the sole organization is the
African Union (AU).
The study aims to assess the extent of success achieved by the regional organizations in
promoting lasting peace and prosperity with a special focus on IGAD which has been involved in
several peace processes in the region.

1.3 Overall objective.

Broadly, this study will aim at analyzing the effectiveness of regional organizations
diplomatic interventions in promoting regional peace, stability and prosperity.
1.4 Research Objectives.
Specifically the study will address the following objectives:
1. To assess the significance of regional organizations in promoting peace, stability and
prosperity.
2. To find out the diplomatic strategies employed by regional organizations in conflicts
resolution processes.
3. To examine other factors that promote and enhance regional peace and stability.
1.5 Research Hypothesis
In the context of stated problem and objectives, this study will aim at validating the following
null hypothesis;
HO1: There is no significant relationship between regional regional organizations and
peace promotion.
HO2: There is no significant statistical relationship between strategies employed by
regional organizations and promotion of regional peace, stability and prosperity.
HO3: There are on other factors that promote regional peace.

1.6 Significance of the study.

The results of the study will be important to academicians in diplomatic and international
relations studies as well as diplomats in both government and international organizations such as
the UN and the AU.
The results of this study will have implications and implications to various stakeholders as
follows:
1. To the regional organizations and governments, the research will provide a basis for
regional integration policies formulation and improvement of existing ones. This will
ensure a more seamless integration of all involved parties.
2. This study will be of great significance to diplomats and peace mediators since it will
give them a better understanding of regional peace promotion strategies and their
effectiveness. This will make their interventions more targeted and therefore more
successful.
3. Finally this study will be useful to the governments of countries experiencing conflicts
either internally or externally since they will know the best way to seek for interventions
and from where.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction
The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the regional organization
of seven Eastern African countries with a stated ambition to achieve peace, prosperity and
regional integration among its member states.
2.2 History and Mandate
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in eastern Africa was created
in 1996 to follow the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) that
was supported in 1986. (African Union, 2006b).The revenant and severe droughts and different
natural disasters between 1974 and 1984 caused widespread famine, ecological degradation and
economic hardship within the eastern Africa region. Though individual countries created
substantial efforts to deal with things and received generous support from the international
community, the magnitude and extent of the downside argued powerfully for a regional approach
to supplement national efforts (Korwa, 2000).
In 1983 and 1984, six countries in the Horn of Africa - Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Somalia, Sudan associated Uganda - took action through the global organization to determine an
intergovernmental body for development and drought management in their region. The Assembly
of Heads of State and Government met in Djibouti in January 1986 to sign the Agreement that
formally launched IGADD with Headquarters in Djibouti. The State of Eritrea became the
seventh member when attaining independence in 1993 (IGAD, 2005; IGAD, 2007)

In April 1995 in Addis Ababa, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government created a
Declaration to revitalize IGADD and expand cooperation among member states. On twenty-first
March 1996 in the capital of Kenya the Assembly of Heads of State and Government signed
'Letter of Instrument to Amend the IGADD Charter / Agreement was establishing the revitalised
IGAD with a replacement name The Intergovernmental Authority on Development". The
revitalized IGAD, with expanded areas of regional cooperation and a replacement structure, was
launched by the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on twenty fifth November
1996 in Djibouti, the Republic of Djibouti (UNSC, 2006).
2.3 IGAD and its role in the Horn of Africa
The horn of Africa is the most militarized and conflict-ridden region on the African
continent. For many decades, armed conflicts have raged within states, between states, and
among proxies-whether at the center or peripheries of the region (Mulugeta, 2014). Among these
conflicts are a failed state in Somalia, the continued stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the
unresolved border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea, persistent tensions between Sudan and
South Sudan and within South Sudan. The region continues to be the venue of most of intense
interstate and intrastate conflicts in the post-colonial Africa (Medhane, 2002; Kinfe, 2006).
Hence, it is a tragic scene of endemic conflicts and political fragmentation.
Lack of democratic political institutions which allow people to participate in making
decision has been triggering civil war and political turmoil in the region(Markakis, 2003).The
region, however, is also one the penetrated parts of the globe by external forces (Chaliand, 1978).

2.4 The Effectiveness of IGADs Contribution to Peace and Security

The linguistic communication of the Sudan-Somalia peace agreements that were in fast
succession in 2004 and 2005 created a state of affairs that IGAD was doing even higher in its
new mandate as a conflict- resolution body (Francis 2006). A couple of the agreements were at
intervals 3 months were clearly AN open action for the IGAD. As such, these were thriving
during a method that they were centered in long and sophisticated conflicts that had been
antecedently tough to resolve. Wanting closely at the character of the involvement of IGAD
shows that the agreements were on an additional nuanced judgment of its institutional role.
In origin, the IGAD peace initiatives in Sudan and Somalia were political initiatives,
planned and for the most part dead by one or additional member states. The lead regional
mediators were additionally interested parties (Khadiagala 2007). They failed to entrust the
mediation to the IGAD Secretariat, which had neither the capability nor the authority to guide
and manage the peace processes that were applied in its name. Indeed, at the purpose, once the
Sudan method began in 1993 the organization had no remit to figure on peace and security
problems and had nevertheless to develop its conflict resolution mandate.
Once afoot, the peace talks needed a structure and logistic effort that was on the far side the
capability of IGADs modest secretariat in Djibouti. The Sudan and Somalia peace processes
each relied heavily on Kenyan diplomatic capability. Kenya equipped the chief communicator in
every case: General Sumbeiwyo as go-between within the Sudan method and Ambassador
Bethwell Kiplagat for the Somali method. The importance of Kenya to the success of the peace
processes wasn't confined to its provision of diplomatic and organizational capability. Its ability
to take care of political neutrality was very important. While not Kenyas neutrality when 1995
IGADs Sudan method may not have survived. Kenya went on to play a key role in securing
government agreement on the Declaration of Principles once Khartoum was the most pressure.

Equally, Kenya provided a neutral venue in 2002 for the various Somali parties backed by
Abyssinia and Djibouti (African Union, 2006b).
Notwithstanding its institutional weakness and lack of authority over member states, the
IGAD Secretariat with success institutionalized donor support through the IPF. The temperament
of external donors to hold the monetary burden of the social process was each a blessing and a
burden. The extent of their involvement generated frictions over the possession of the method
and also the imposition of spurious deadlines (deadline diplomacy) tied to finance (IGAD
2007a). This was particularly apparent in the Sudan negotiations (Sumbeiywo 2006). The robust
involvement of the Troika (US, UK, Norway) has additionally been everlasting for maintaining
AN exclusionary top-down method approach to the Sudanese social process (Young 2005).
Within the Somali case, U.S.A. involvement was a lot of less apparent and there was less clarity
over what the Western donors expected from the method despite the fact that they were willing to
foot the bill.
As well as drawing in support from the West, IGADs nominal possession of the peace
processes helped to secure the exclusion of secondary actors from outside the region. All of those
countries have clearly distinctive interests within the Horn of the continent, however, IGADs
collective intent was to determine a monopoly over the peace processes within the region. it's
noteworthy that new initiatives invariably arose within the Arab world whenever IGAD peace
processes stalled (Healy, 2008).
IGADs peace-making activities helped to secure legitimacy for the organization and
build wider international acceptance of IGAD because the solely acceptable forum for grappling
conflict within the Horn of Africa (Francis 2006). So as to take care of this importance, IGAD

has required securing one in every of 2 things: either actual success in conflict resolution (as in
Sudan); or the power to align its peacemaking activity with the interests of powerful external
actors (as in African country and also the world war on terrorism).
Looked at within the context of the general regional conflict setting it's clear that IGAD is a way
from providing AN institutional basis for regional security within the Horn of the continent. The
region continues to expertise exceptionally high levels of violent conflict. The comparatively
thriving mediations in Sudan and African country in 2004 and 2005 stand aboard IGADs
inability to forestall or resolve the Abyssinia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000 or to take care of violent
conflict in Darfur and rumbling conflicts in Northern Republic of Uganda and Ethiopia. Even
throughout the Sudanese and Somali peace processes IGAD member states incontestable their
temperament to arrange for and have interaction in the war at the identical time as organizing for
peace (Okoth, 2008).
In the case of Sudan, regional relationships had off to such AN extent that by 1996/7 the peace
process resembled a hostile blockade by IGAD neighbors in support of the SPLA. This wasn't
unhelpful for the IGAD processes. Action by Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Republic of Uganda
provided the grade of pressure that persuaded the government of Sudan to barter seriously with
the South. In later years, once regional alignments had modified, external (particularly the US)
pressure helped to take care of the incentives for a settlement. Similarly, the Somali method
amply demonstrates the temperament of IGAD member states to keep on with military means
that to realize their most well-liked conflict-resolution outcomes. The reports to the world
organization Security Councils Sanctions (Interpeace, 2009).

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Board on the Somali arms ban reliably recorded the presence of military help from Ethiopia to its
partners among the Somali groups all through 2003/4 when the Somali National Peace
Conference was in progress (Expert Group and Monitoring Group on Somalia 2003-2005).
Eritrea's help to Islamist rivals of the TFG scaled up from 2005 onwards, achieving a crest in late
2006 just before Ethiopia's mediation (Expert Group and Monitoring Group on Somalia 2006).
The two-part states therefore effectively undermined the IGAD peace process (IGAD, 2007).
The marvel of mobilized 'peace procedures' can be seen as a major aspect of a local
society in which a high extent of IGAD pioneers came to power through rough means and a few
demonstrate a proceeding with affinity to venture military force past their own particular
outskirts. This makes an especially troublesome environment in which to manufacture provincial
structures for peace and security. These require part states to surrender a level of power, either by
consenting to be bound by provincial guidelines and choices or by giving the IGAD Secretariat
some independent authority. Also, IGAD's pioneers have not felt obliged by the restrictions of
the association's dispatch and have been willing to carelessness IGAD's lawful structure and to
receive strong activities that were in fact outside its command. Cases incorporate dispatching the
Sudanese peace process in 1993 and the authorization of an intercession power to bolster the
TFG in Somalia in 1995 (Expert Group and Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2006).
The dictator political society of the locale militates against the IGAD secretariat
endeavoring to play a proactive or self-governing part in peace and security. Administrations that
appreciate liberated force in the residential field are not all around arranged to acknowledge local
requirements that depend principally on consensual courses of action. IGAD part states look for
rather coordinate IGAD action in the quest for their own particular advantages. This thus
bargains IGAD's ability to keep up the lack of bias required of a local intervention body. Besides,

11

the IGAD district does not have a plainly recognizable lead nation proficient, by the prudence of
its prevalent size and quality, to assume unchallenged the part of a hegemon as South Africa and
Nigeria can in their particular areas (Mwaura and Schmeidl, 2002). Ethiopia's late endeavors to
secure this position for itself (e.g. in Somalia) seem to have aggravated matters.
The area's most persisting disappointment since the foundation of IGAD's peace and security
order has been the powerlessness to prevent Ethiopia and Eritrea from settling their disparities on
the combat zone in 1999 and 2000. In spite of the fact that the two sides consented to a peace
arrangement under OAU sponsorship in December 2000, usage has been slowed down
subsequent to 2002 over the topic of the limit outline. IGAD has been feeble to convince
Ethiopia and Eritrea to standardize relations or to conclude a peace settlement. Their extreme
common antagonistic vibe keeps on harming territorial relations and fuel different clashes. It
remains the key impediment to any advancement towards building up an enhanced territorial
security structure (Menkhaus, 2008).
At the specialized level, IGAD's Secretariat keeps on doing imaginative work on peace
and security. The system assets of the IPF have generated examination and undertaking work that
develops investigation and suggests activity. It has built up an early cautioning instrument, the
Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), which is observing three
territories of peaceful fringe strife (Apuuli 2004). A second IGAD security-part program is the
IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT), entrusted with 'building national
ability to oppose fear mongering, and advancing provincial security co-operation' by fixing
outskirt control and improving legal measures against psychological oppression (ICPAT 2006).

12

Whatever the estimation of such projects, the IGAD Secretariat has assumed no
unmistakable part in containing the genuine clashes of the most recent five years in Darfur, in the
Ogaden, in Mogadishu, in Kenya, in South Sudan or amongst Eritrea and Djibouti. Measuring
Success in Sudan and Somalia IGAD's contention determination exercises have shown a
reasonable, uncertain pressure between IGAD, the political discussion described by common
suspicion, collusion building and strategic maneuver among part states and IGAD, the provincial
association looking to build up the institutional ability to enhance peace and security and give
down to earth help towards struggle determination. Where IGAD has possessed the capacity to
claim some achievement it has all the more regularly wound up harvesting the hurricane of
territorial and worldwide force legislative issues than propelling established intercession and
peace-building forms (Cliffe, 2004).
The key inquiry is the thing that effect IGAD's compromise exercises have had in
upgrading peace in the area, among states and in addition inside Sudan and Somalia. On account
of Sudan, an evaluation of the achievement of the CPA can't overlook the contention that ejected
in Darfur towards the end of the CPA transactions. The arrangement of the CPA could be seen as
a contributing reason for the Darfur resistance since it gave a case to other minimized gatherings
that furnished battle could secure politically preferred standpoint (Woodward 2004).
It likewise stirred fears among the Darfuris that their own particular underestimation
would be dug in since the CPA transactions indicated to be a national settlement yet included just
two gatherings (Nathan 2007).
Regardless of conveying a conclusion to the war in the South, the CPA has been broadly
reprimanded for the restricted extent of the arrangement to address the issues of Sudan all in all

13

It was limited toward the Northern government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(barring other key voting demographics in the nation, incorporating into the South) and neglected
to include common society or different partners who were expected to construct a maintainable
peace (Young 2007). Some of its shortcomings are verifiably a result of how the issue was
encircled when the association was initially seized of the matter (Cliffe 2004). As befits a
discussion for territorial co-operation, IGAD's edge of reference was to settle a troublesome
clash as opposed to accomplishing the change of Sudan. It was about enabling the South,
maintaining their privilege not to live under Sharia law and giving them the alternative to pick up
freedom. On every one of these scores, the CPA can be viewed as an extensive achievement.
In the thirteen years since IGAD added peace and security to its order, there has been no
obvious lessening in the level of contention in the Horn of Africa. The area still does not have the
most simple local security system. IGAD part states keep on flouting the out-dated between state
principles of admiration for regional power and non-impedance in each other's undertakings,
'casualties of their neighbor's insecurities, or alternately, as dangers to the neighbors' (Khadiagala
2008b). Up 'til now, there are few indications of their moving towards aggregate security game
plans or truly supporting institutional procedures of the provincial conference or basic
leadership. This could indicate the conclusion that IGAD is deadened by the struggle among its
part states and unrealistic to succeed in progressing local clash determination.
The presence of IGAD, in any case, conveys another strategic measurement to peace
promotion in the Horn of Africa. This is a gathering that secures in the territorial states
additionally bolts out other invested individuals past the locale. The new fixing is the globally
presented authenticity that IGAD has to address strife inside the locale.

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Incomprehensibly, the acknowledgment that national security interests are personally associated
with the district suggests that however defective and traded off, IGAD's territorial peace and
security exercises will stay set up and pick up incrementally in significance. On the off chance
that IGAD is to combine its part, its establishments, including the Secretariat, will, in the end,
should be reinforced with the goal that it can state some independence. In any case, the
association has officially played an urgent motivation setting part in guiding African and more
extensive global reactions to strife in the locale. Over the more drawn out a term, and gave that
other part states perceived its utility, IGAD additionally can possibly serve as the gathering in
which unequal connections and confined administration could be overseen without the plan of
action to brutality (Laurie, 2007).

Chapter 3: Methodology
3.0 Introduction
This section of the paper concentrates on the methodology that was used in the research.
The section also briefly gives an analysis of the various tools of analysis used for the research.
Moreover, the section is aimed in effectiveness of regional organizations diplomatic
interventions in promoting regional peace-The case of IGAD. The section gives a detailed
description of the research philosophy, methods and collection of data. The same section
analyses the validity and reliability of the research methods. It also has a part that describes the
way matters of privacy and ethics were handled in the research.
3.1 Research Philosophy
A design for research can be defined as the arrangement of the conditions of how data
was collected and analyzed. It does so in a manner that has an objective of the papers relevance

15

with the nature of the data collection. It is a conceptual structure which the research is based on.
It include the processes of data collection, measuring and then finally analyzing the data. The
design is categorized into two groups based on the approaches used in the collection of data.
These approaches are the communication and observational means. Observation consists of the
methods of monitoring activities that are either behavioral or non-behavioral. It also includes
reading, smelling, listening, touch and visual data collection (Babble, E. 2010).
The communication approach consists of carrying out surveys on people and recording
their responses for the purpose of analysis. It is basically the method that is most reliable. It helps
one learn intentions, motivations, attitudes, expectations and opinions of most of the subjects. It
is also critical in getting data that is internal to the respondent. This is the most efficient method
for surveys. Using a case study is also used to get qualitative information by conducting careful
and complete observation of a specific unit of a social nature (Jernigan, 2008).
3.2 Research Approach
3.2.1 Strategy of Inquiry
This research will be carried out to get information that gives a description on an existing
phenomenon. This will be done by having consultations with experts and clients that are directly
involved in the field of study. The researcher will review the objectives of this study on other
international and diplomatic interventions in the Horn of Africa. Somalia and the republic of
South Sudan will be used as case study examples. The research will be aimed at capturing their
opinions, perceptions and values on the effectiveness of regional organizations diplomatic
interventions in promoting regional peace focusing on the role of IGAD (Yates, 1960).

16

3.2.2 Reasoning of this Research

The reasoning of this research will be to ensure that the researcher develops a model that
will investigate the role of IGAD and its effectiveness to promote diplomatic intervention in
countries torn by civil unrest. Following suggestions by Dowdy (1983), the researcher will
collect data from other literary sources. The data that will be collected will be subjected to a
qualitative analysis. The data will then be presented in tables, charts and graphs. It will then be
discussed in prose. The data was also presented in essay form.
3.3 Research Methods
It is a general fact that most research processes and methods are mainly compromises and
generalizations. This research will, at least, be a little bit narrowed down. The research will be
based on collecting opinions and details from literary sources. As a consequence most of the data
gathered will be of a qualitative nature. There will also be data that will be obtained by computer
and internet research.
3.4 Literature review
The literature review will mainly obtained from online and library sources. There is a
huge amount of articles, books and journals in the internet and various libraries. The research
material will additionally be referenced in the bibliographic section of this paper. This will be the
main method of data collection.
3.5 Data collection technique
Handing out of questionnaires would have been the main technique that the researcher
used for this paper. This would have collected the views, opinions, perceptions and attitudes on
the effectiveness of regional organizations diplomatic interventions in promoting regional peace-

17

The case of IGAD. However, this method will not be used due to tactical issues regarding the
availability of knowledgeable respondents (Dowdy, 1983). The researcher will, therefore, opt to
use existing data from previously done studies. The researcher will then use this data and
compare it to the current situations in How IGAD is handling diplomatic interventions in
promoting regional peace.
3.5.1 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques
By large, sampling can be described as the process where samples for a study are selected
in a manner that the selected individual represent the larger group from where they were chosen.
Sampling can be describes as one of the most important part of any research. Sample surveying
is arguably the most practical technique to collected data on social sciences studies. The method
requires one to collect data that is original on very large population sizes. The population being
studied and the nature of the research method used will tell the method of sampling to be used.
The purpose of the study can also dictate the nature of the sample that is finally selected for the
study.
3.6 Validity and Reliability
This research was targeted at most sections of the construction industry. It focused on
peace-keeping motives of the IGAD by looking at the current issues it is handling. The current
issues will then be compared to the previous handling of diplomatic and peace missions for both
the IGAD and other regional blocks. Additionally, it will look at the way other bodies are
handling diplomatic interventions for the peace of member states that could be in political and
civil unrest . The researcher will also be looking to see how the international blocks like IGAD
are handling the civil crisis in both Somalia and South Sudan.

18

Based on the information delivered in this section, it is valid to say that the information
collected will true, representative of the region and organizations in it. As thus, it will not be
biased.
3.7 Confidentiality and Ethical Considerations
Based on the method used to collect data from the sample selected it will prudent to
ensure the highest level of confidentiality of the information collected. Data that will be collected
will be stored in a locked drawer. The data that will be entered into spreadsheets will be
password protected and the computer locked in a secure room.
3.8 Summary
The research methods to be used in this study will have served their purpose well as
accurate data will be collected. The results will, thereafter, be analyzed to give a clear
representation of the effectiveness of regional organizations diplomatic interventions in
promoting regional peace-The case of IGAD. Since the role of regional bodies is mostly
homogenous, the results from the study can be said to represent the entire worlds diplomatic and
peace-keeping objectives of regional blocks and organizations. The results from the study will
also be coupled with review of other studies and compared. The research will not in any way be
skewed. Thusly, it will be acceptable to base a valid conclusion from the data acquired.

19

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