FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

Editor
David C. Humphrey

General Editor
David S. Patterson

United States Government Printing Office

Washington
1998
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 10517
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

Preface
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary
historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the
United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the
formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the
policy positions ultimately adopted.
The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the
preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau
of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This
documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of
historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and
editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B.
Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series
through 1991.
A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was
signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a
new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et
seq.).
The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable
record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States
diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide
comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United
States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary
Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity
and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the
published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that
were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the
purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign
Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editor is
convinced that this volume, which was compiled in 1993, meets all regulatory, statutory,
and scholarly standards of selection and editing.
Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that
documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the 5 years (1964-1968) of the
administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. The subseries presents in 34 volumes a documentary
record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of President Johnson's administration.
In planning and preparing the 1964-1968 subseries, the editors chose to present the official
record of U.S. foreign policy with respect to Vietnam in seven volumes. Volume IV
(presented here) documents U.S policy during 1966. Volumes I through III and V through
VII document U.S. policy toward Vietnam during the following periods: I, 1964; II, January
1, 1965, through June 12, 1965; III, June 13, 1965, through December 31, 1965; V, 1967;
and VI and VII, 1968.
These seven volumes focus on Vietnam. They do not record activities in the rest of
mainland Southeast Asia except as they may relate immediately to the conduct of the war in
Vietnam. U.S. relations with Laos are documented in volume XXVIII; U.S. relations with
Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and SEATO are documented in volume XXVII.
Principles of Document Selection for the Foreign Relations Series
In preparing each volume of the Foreign Relations series, the editors are guided by some
general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the
General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be
documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary.
The following general selection criteria are used in preparing volumes in the Foreign
Relations series. Individual compiler-editors vary these criteria in accordance with the
particular issues and the available documentation. The editors also tend to apply these
selection criteria in accordance with their own interpretation of the generally accepted
standards of scholarship. In selecting documentation for publication, the editors gave
priority to unpublished classified records, rather than previously published records (which
are accounted for in appropriate bibliographical notes).
Selection Criteria (in general order of priority):
1. Major foreign affairs commitments made on behalf of the United States to
other governments, including those that define or identify the principal foreign
affairs interests of the United States;
2. Major foreign affairs issues, commitments, negotiations, and activities,
whether or not major decisions were made, and including dissenting or
alternative opinions to the process ultimately adopted;
3. The decisions, discussions, actions, and considerations of the President, as
the official constitutionally responsible for the direction of foreign policy;
4. The discussions and actions of the National Security Council, the Cabinet,
and special Presidential policy groups, including the policy options brought
before these bodies or their individual members;
5. The policy options adopted by or considered by the Secretary of State and
the most important actions taken to implement Presidential decisions or

policies;
6. Diplomatic negotiations and conferences, official correspondence, and other
exchanges between U.S. representatives and those of other governments that
demonstrate the main lines of policy implementation on major issues;
7. Important elements of information that attended Presidential decisions and
policy recommendations of the Secretary of State;
8. Major foreign affairs decisions, negotiations, and commitments undertaken
on behalf of the United States by government officials and representatives in
other agencies in the foreign affairs community or other branches of
government made without the involvement (or even knowledge) of the White
House or the Department of State;
9. The main policy lines of intelligence activities if they constituted major
aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward a nation or region or if they provided key
information in the formulation of major U.S. policies, including relevant
National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates as
may be declassified;
10. The role of the Congress in the preparation and execution of particular
foreign policies or foreign affairs actions;
11. Economic aspects of foreign policy;
12. The main policy lines of U.S. military and economic assistance as well as
other types of assistance;
13. The political-military recommendations, decisions, and activities of the
military establishment and major regional military commands as they bear upon
the formulation or execution of major U.S. foreign policies;
14. Diplomatic appointments that reflect major policies or affect policy
changes.
Sources for the Foreign Relations Series
The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations
series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S.
foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that
government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in
foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State
Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy
decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most but not all of the
sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available
for review at the National Archives and Records Administration. The declassification
review and opening for public review of all Department of State records no later than 30
years after the events is mandated by the Foreign Relations statute. The Department of State
and other record sources used in the volume are described in detail in the section on Sources

below.
Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume IV
The editors developed the following thematic areas of focus for research and the selection
of documents for inclusion in this volume:
1) formulation of policy in Washington by the President and his advisers, the
Cabinet, and other responsible officials, with particular emphasis on decisions
concerning the air and the ground wars, the pacification program, peace
negotiations, and relations with the Government of South Vietnam;
2) the advisory process, including recommendations from key advisers in
Washington, intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam, and reporting
and advice from U.S. officials in Saigon;
3) diplomatic efforts to initiate peace negotiations and other key diplomatic
contacts;
4) efforts to make contact with officials of the National Liberation Front;
5) military planning and strategy, including pacification;
6) Executive-Congressional relationships in Washington and opposition to the
Johnson administration's conduct of the war;
7) the relationship between the U.S. Government and the South Vietnamese
Government, including meetings of political and military leaders and the issues
of political instability and constitutional government in South Vietnam;
8) the implementation in South Vietnam of major foreign policy decisions of
the President and ancillary policy actions directed by the Secretary of State.
Editorial Methodology
The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case
of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Memoranda of conversation are placed
according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum
was drafted.
Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows
Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief
technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia
or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed
according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the
limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each
document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as
found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected.
Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a

correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the
source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in
the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.
Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated
subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic
type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of
lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for
declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes,
and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. The amount of material
omitted from this volume because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume, however,
has not been delineated. All brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by
footnotes.
The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification,
distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important
documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers
read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been
previously published, and, if so, this information has been included in the source footnote.
Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the
volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to
important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide
summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed
documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used
when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.
Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation
The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the
Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations
concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall
compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation
and declassification of the series. Although the Advisory Committee does not attempt to
review the contents of individual volumes in the series, it does monitor the overall process
and makes recommendations on particular problems that come to its attention.
The Advisory Committee did not review this volume.
Declassification Review
The final declassification review of this volume, which was completed in 1996, resulted in
the decision to withhold less than one-half of one percent of the documentation selected. No
documents were withheld in their entirety. The documentation provides an accurate account
of the main lines of U.S. policy toward Vietnam during 1966.
The Information Response Branch of the Office of IRM Programs and Services, Bureau of
Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the
documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the
standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information and

applicable laws, which was superseded by Executive Order 12958 on April 20, 1995.
Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following
categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the
national security, requires classification:
1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans
relating to the national security;
3) foreign government information;
4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or
methods;
5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
8) cryptology; or
9) a confidential source.
The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to
the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation.
Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and
functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S.
Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of
those governments.
Acknowledgements
The editor of this volume, David C. Humphrey, wishes to acknowledge the assistance of
many of his former colleagues at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, in particular Regina
Greenwell and Charlaine Burgess, who provided key assistance during every phase of the
project. He also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Central Intelligence
Agency, in particular Scott Koch; the Department of Defense, in particular Sandra Meagher
and David Phelps; the National Defense University, in particular Susan Lemke; and
officials at other specialized repositories who assisted in the collection of documents for this
volume.
David W. Mabon began the research for this volume prior to his retirement. David C.
Humphrey completed the research and selected and annotated the documents for
publication. Edward C. Keefer provided guidance during the project and reviewed the
manuscript. David H. Herschler, David C. Geyer, Kerry E. Hite, and Donna C. Hung
coordinated the declassification review. Rita M. Baker and Vicki E. Futscher did the copy
and technical editing, and Barbara-Ann Bacon of the Publishing Services Division oversaw

the production of the volume. Max Franke prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
January 1998

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

Sources
The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of
the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of
the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive
Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits,
correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of
conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of
overseas diplomatic posts. When this volume was being compiled, all Department of State records
consulted were still under the custody of the Department, and the footnotes citing Department of State
files indicate that the Department is the repository. By the time of publication, however, all the
Department's indexed central files for the 1964-1968 period have been permanently transferred to the
National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Many of the
Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period will also be transferred from the
Department's custody to Archives II over the next several years.
The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Johnson and
other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the
Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the
Department of State and other Federal agencies, including the National Security Council, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security
Agency.
The Department of State arranged for access to the many audiotapes of President Johnson's telephone
conversations that are held at the Johnson Library. These audiotapes include substantial numbers of
telephone conversations between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense
McNamara, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, and key members of Congress. The editor of
this volume listened to the audiotapes of President Johnson's 1966 telephone conversations dealing with
Vietnam. Transcriptions were then prepared for those portions selected for use in the volume. Although
the transcriptions give the substance of the conversations, readers are urged to consult the recordings for
a full appreciation of those dimensions that cannot be captured fully in a transcription, such as the
speakers' inflections and emphases that convey nuances of meaning. At the time of the publication of
this volume, the 1966 portion of the Johnson audiotapes had not yet been opened for public review but
such opening is expected as part of the program that included the release of the audiotapes for the 19631964 period.
Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the
records of the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Central Intelligence Agency provides access to Department of State historians to high-level

intelligence documents from those records in the custody of that Agency and at the Presidential
Libraries. This access is arranged and facilitated by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding.
Department of State and CIA historians continue to work out the procedural and scholarly aspects of
identifying the key portions of the intelligence record.
All of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the
consent of these agencies, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the
National Archives and Records Administration.
The following list identifies the files and collections the editor used in the preparation of this particular
volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of these records is in process. Many
of the records are already available for public review at the National Archives. The declassification
review of other records is going forward in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12958,
under which all records over 25 years old, except for file series exemptions requested by agencies and
approved by the President, should be reviewed for declassification by 2000.
Unpublished Sources
Department of State
Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.
Lot Files
Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272
Files of Under Secretary of State George Ball, 1961-1966.
Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240
Files of William P. Bundy as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1964-1969.
EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lots 69 D 277, 69 D 412, and 70 D 380
Files on Vietnam peace negotiations, including material on the positions and efforts of Communist and
non-Communist countries and groups, international organizations, and individuals, 1964-1968.
EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167
Files on political and military issues in Vietnam and on trips and meetings of President Johnson,
Secretary Rusk, and others, 1963, 1965-1969.
EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lots 70 D 102, 70 D 233, and 72 D 219
Files of the interagency Vietnam Working Group, 1964-1967.
INR Files: Lot 81 D 343
Consolidated files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99

Copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates.
INR/IL Historical Files
Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1980s,
maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271
Files of Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, 1966-1969.
Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163
Correspondence between Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Soviet Union and between other high officials of the two countries, 1961-1969.
Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192
Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961-1969, including texts of speeches, miscellaneous
correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone
conversations.
S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 305
Files on Secretary Rusk's trip to the Far East, January 1966.
S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586
Files on the Manila Conference and the President's Asian trip, October-November 1966, and on
Secretary Rusk's Asian trip, December 1966.
S/S-Miscellaneous Vietnam Reports: Lot 70 D 48
Miscellaneous Vietnam reports and briefing books for the years 1949-1968.
S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265
Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position
papers, and administrative documents for the years 1961-1966.
S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207
Negotiation books, negotiation background papers, briefing books, and miscellaneous documents on
Vietnam, 1965-1968.
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files
ORG 7 S, trips by Secretary Rusk
POL UK-USSR, political relations, United Kingdom-Soviet Union
POL US-USSR, political relations, U.S.-Soviet Union
POL VIET S, political relations, Vietnam
POL 7 CAN, visits and meetings, Canada
POL 7 US/LEONHART, visits, William Leonhart
POL 14 VIET S, Vietnamese elections
POL 15 VIET S, Government of Vietnam
POL 15-1 VIET S, Vietnamese head of state/Executive Branch
POL 23-8 VIET S, demonstrations, riots, and protests in Vietnam
POL 27 VIET S, military operations in Vietnam
POL 27 VIET S/PINTA, peace negotiations during the 37-day bombing pause
POL 27-3 VIET S/LOUISIANA, use of foreign country forces in Vietnam
POL 27-7 VIET, prisoners of war
POL 27-14 VIET, truce, cease fire, armistice
POL 27-14 VIET/ASPEN, peace negotiations code named Aspen
POL 27-14 VIET/ELMTREE, negotiations code named Elmtree
POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD, peace negotiations code named Marigold
POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ, peace negotiations code named XYZ
POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH, defectors from the National Liberal Front
Center of Military History, Washington, DC
William C. Westmoreland Papers
Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia

DCI Executive Registry: Job 80-B1676R

DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80-B01285A
DDO/EA Files: Jobs 78-000032R, 85-00329R, 92-00428R
George Carver Files: Job 80-R01720R
GAC Chron
O/DDI Registry: Job 79-R01012A
Department of Defense, Washington, DC
Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas
Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson
National Security File
Agency File
McGeorge Bundy Files
Country File, Vietnam
International Meetings and Travel File
Robert W. Komer Files
Komer-Leonhart File
Memos to the President
Name File
National Intelligence Estimates
National Security Actions Memorandums
National Security Council Histories
National Security Council Meetings File
Walt W. Rostow Files
Bromley Smith Files

Office Files of the White House Aides

S. Douglass Cater
Harry C. McPherson
Bill D. Moyers
Special Files
Meeting Notes File
Office of the President File
President's Appointment File (Diary Backup)
President's Daily Diary
Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings
White House Central Files
Confidential File
Subject File
Other Personal Papers
George Ball Papers
McGeorge Bundy Papers
Public Statements of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Dean Rusk Papers, Personal Appointment Books
Paul Warnke Papers, John McNaughton Files
William C. Westmoreland Papers
Hoover Institution, Palo Alto, California
Edward Lansdale Papers
Library of Congress, Washington, DC
Averell Harriman Papers
National Defense University, Washington, DC

Maxwell Taylor Papers

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland
Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470
Files of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1961-1968.
McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075
Vietnam files of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1961-1968.
OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 70 A 4662, 70 A 6648, and 70 A 6649
Subject files on Vietnam, 1966, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs.
OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 70 A 4662, 70 A 6649, 70 A 6648, and 71 A 6489
Subject Files on Vietnam, 1966, of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Published Sources
Documentary Collections
Herring, George, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the
Pentagon Papers. Austin, 1983.
The Pentagon Papers: The Department of Defense History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam.
The Senator Gravel Edition. 4 vols. Boston, 1971.
United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense.
Washington, 1971.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (Historical Series). Volume XVIII. Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, 1966.
Washington, DC, 1993.
U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966. Washington, 1969.
--------. Department of State Bulletin. Washington, 1966.
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966. Washington, 1968.
The Vietnam Hearings. New York, 1966.

Memoirs
Ball, George. The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs. New York, 1982.
Bui Diem, with David Chanoff. In the Jaws of History. Boston, 1987.
Colby, William. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam.
Chicago, 1989.
Cooper, Chester. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. New York, 1970.
Gittinger, Ted, ed. The Johnson Years: A Vietnam Roundtable. Austin, Texas, 1993.
Humphrey, Hubert. Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics. Garden City, N.Y., 1976.
Johnson, Lyndon Baines. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969. New York,
1971.
Komer, Robert W. Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance in
Vietnam. Santa Monica, California, 1972.
McNamara, Robert S., with Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lesson of Vietnam.
New York, 1995.
McPherson, Harry. A Political Education. Boston, 1972.
Nguyen Cao Ky. Twenty Years and Twenty Days. New York, 1976.
Rostow, W.W. The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History. New York, 1972.
Rusk, Dean, as told to Richard Rusk. As I Saw It. New York, 1990.
Salisbury, Harrison E. Behind the Lines-Hanoi, December 23, 1966-January 7, 1967. New York, 1967.
Taylor, Maxwell. Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir. New York, 1972
Thant, U. View From the UN. Garden City, New York, 1978.
Valenti, Jack. A Very Human President. New York, 1975.
Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, New York, 1976.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

Abbreviations and Terms

AAA, anti-aircraft artillery
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AFC, Armed Forces Council
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States
AID, Agency for International Development
AP, Associated Press
Arc Light, code name for U.S. B-52 bombing strikes in Southeast Asia
ARVN, Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
ASA, Association of Southeast Asia
ASPAC, Asian Pacific Council
Aspen, code name for U.S. peace negotiations through Swedish channels
Barrel Roll, code name for U. S. air operations over northern Laos
CAP, series indicator for outgoing White House telegrams; combat air patrol; combined action platoon
CAS, controlled American source
ChiCom, Chinese Communist
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIAP, Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress
CIDG, Civilian Irregular Defense Group
Chieu Hoi, South Vietnamese Government's repatriation program for the Viet Cong

CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific

CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUSARPAC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific
CIP, Commercial Import Program
CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
COMUSMACV, Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CONUS, Continental United States
CY, calendar year
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DepSecDef, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DepCOMUSMACV, Deputy Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
DirGen, Director General
Dissem, dissemination
DMZ, Demilitarized Zone
DOD, Department of Defense
DTG, date-time-group
DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs prior to November 1,
1966), Department of State
EA/ACA, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of
State

EA/DDO, East Asia Division, Directorate for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
EA/VN, Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Elmtree, code name for U.S. contacts with Nguyen Khanh and Le Van Truong in Paris
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EST, Eastern Standard Time
EW, electronic warfare
Exdis, exclusive distribution
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FE/VN, Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FNL, National Liberation Front
FMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FRC, Federal Records Center
FULRO, Unified Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, a movement for Monta-gnard autonomy
FW, Free World
FWF, Free World Forces
FWMAF, Free World Military Assistance Forces
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
George, code name for Paul Sturm in Elmtree contacts
GOF, Government of France
Gp, Group
GRC, Government of the Republic of China

GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

HEW, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
HMG, Her Majesty's Government
Hop Tac, South Vietnamese Government's program for pacification of Saigon and surrounding
provinces; literally "victory"
ICC, International Control Commission
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF, International Monetary Fund
Info, information
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
JCRR, Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum
JGS, Joint General Staff, Vietnamese Armed Forces
JUSPAO, Joint United States Public Affairs Office
KIA, killed in action
Limdis, limited distribution
LOC, line of communication
Louisiana, code name for U.S. effort to secure additional foreign country forces for the Vietnam War
M, million
MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP, Military Assistance Program
Marigold, code name for U.S. peace negotiations through Polish and Italian channels
McN, Robert McNamara

MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MIG, Soviet-built fighter aircraft
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO, non-commissioned officer
NFLSV, National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
NLF, National Liberation Front
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
Nina, code name for Department of State communications concerning the decision in late June 1966 to
bomb POL installations
NM, nautical miles
Nodis, no distribution
Noforn, no foreign distribution
NSA, National Security Agency
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
NVA, North Vietnamese Army
NVN, North Vietnam
OAS, Organization of American States
OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
O/B, order of battle
O/DDI, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
ONE, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
OCO, Office of Civil Operations
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
P, President; piasters

PAT, Political Action Team

PAVN, People's Army of (North) Vietnam
PF, Popular Forces
PFF, Police Field Forces; usually referred to as National Police Field Forces (NPFF)
Pinta, code name for U.S. peace negotiations during the 37-day bombing pause
P.L., Public Law
PM, Prime Minister
POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants
POLAD, Political Adviser
POW, prisoner of war
PW, prisoner of war
PX, post exchange
Ray, code name for Nguyen Khanh in the Elmtree contacts
RD, Revolutionary Development
Recce, reconnaissance
Reftel, reference telegram
RF, Regional Forces
RG, Record Group
ROK, Republic of Korea
Rolling Thunder, code name for long-running program of U.S. air operations in North Vietnam
RT, Rolling Thunder
RVN, Republic of South Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
S, Secret
SAM, surface to air missiles

SANE, National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy

SAR, search and rescue
SAVA, Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from Washington
Septel, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
Sitrep, situation report
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
Steel Tiger, code name for U.S. air strikes against the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos
SVN, South Vietnam
SYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Tac, tactical
TAOR, tactical area of responsibility
TCC, troop contributing countries
Thich, Venerable (title for Buddhist monk)
Thrush, code name for U.S. operation to secure the defection of National Liberation Front Chairman
Nguyen Huu Tho
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State while away from Washington
TS, Top Secret
U, Unclassified
UBA, Unified Buddhist Association

UK, United Kingdom

UN, United Nations
Uncle, code name for Nguyen Huu An in the Thrush contacts
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UPI, United Press International
Urtel, your telegram
USAID, United States Agency for International Development Mission (in Vietnam)
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations
VC, Viet Cong
VIP, very important person
VIS, Vietnamese Information Service
VN, Vietnam; Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
VNAF, (South) Vietnamese Air Force
VNCC, Vietnam Coordinating Committee
VNQDD, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnamese Nationalist Party)
VP, Vice President
WAC, Women's Army Corps
WAVES, Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service
WH, White House
X, code name for Mai Van Bo
XYZ, code name for unofficial U.S. contacts with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam through Mai

Van Bo
Y, code name for Paul Sturm in the XYZ contacts
Z, Zulu or Greenwich Mean Time

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

Persons
Acheson, Dean, Secretary of State, 1949-1953
Akalovsky, Alexander, Political Officer at the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Albert, Carl, Representative (D-Oklahoma), House Majority Leader
Alsop, Joseph W., journalist, author, and syndicated columnist
Arends, Leslie C., Representative (R-Illinois), House Minority Whip
Armstrong, Oscar Vance, Consul in Hong Kong until August 1966
Ayub Khan, Field Marshal Muhammad, President of Pakistan
Baldwin, Hanson W., author and Military Editor for The New York Times
Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State until September 30, 1966
Bates, William H., Representative (R-Massachusetts), ranking Republican on the House Armed Services
Committee
Bell, David E., Administrator of the Agency for International Development until July 1966
Black, Eugene, Special Adviser to the President for Southeast Asia
Blouin, Rear Admiral F. J., USN, Far East Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Boggs, Hale, Representative (D-Louisiana)
Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France
Bolton, Frances P., Representative (R-Ohio), ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs
Committee
Bow, Frank T., Representative (R-Ohio), ranking Republican on the House Appropriations Committee

Bowles, Chester, Ambassador to India

Bradley, General Omar N., USA, Ret., former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Brown, George, British Foreign Minister from August 10, 1966
Bruce, David K. E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Bui Diem, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister and then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Ambassador to the United States from December 1966
Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until February 28,
1966
Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (retitled Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs on November 1, 1966)
Byrnes, James F., Secretary of State, 1945-1947
Byroade, Henry A., Ambassador to Burma
Califano, Joseph A., Jr., Special Assistant to the President
Cao, see Huynh Van Cao
Cao Van Vien, General, ARVN, Chief of the Joint General Staff
Carver, George, member of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, until late
September 1966; thereafter Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency
Castello Branco, General Humberto de Alencar, President of Brazil
Christian, George, Press Secretary to the President from February 1, 1967
Chuan, see Nguyen Van Chuan
Church, Frank, Senator (D-Idaho)
Clifford, Clark M., lawyer and one of the "Wise Men" who served as unofficial advisers to President
Johnson
Co, see Nguyen Huu Co
Colby, William E., Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
Cooper, Chester, member of the National Security Council Staff until April 1966; Special Assistant to
Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman from September 1966
Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister

Dang Van Quang, General, ARVN, Commander of IV Corps until November 1966
De Gaulle, Charles, President of France
Dean, Arthur, lawyer and one of the "Wise Men" who served as unofficial advisers to President Johnson
Dean, Sir Patrick, British Ambassador to the United States
Denney, George C., Jr., Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State
Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, President of Mexico
Dirksen, Everett McKinley, Senator (R-Illinois), Senate Minority Leader
Do, see Tran Van Do
Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States
D'Orlandi, Giovanni, Italian Ambassador to Vietnam
Douglas, Paul H., Senator (D-Illinois)
Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1961
Emrick, Lieutenant General Paul S., USAF, Chief of Staff, Pacific Command
Fanfani, Amintore, Italian Foreign Minister
Fenoaltea, Sergio, Italian Ambassador to the United States
Ford, Gerald R., Representative (R-Michigan), House Minority Leader
Fortas, Abe, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court and unofficial adviser to President
Johnson
Fowler, Henry H., Secretary of the Treasury
Franco y Bahamonde, General Francisco, Spanish Prime Minister and Chief of State
Freeman, Orville H., Secretary of Agriculture
Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D-Arkansas), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Gandhi, Indira, Indian Prime Minister from January 24, 1966
Gardner, John W., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Gaud, William S., Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development until August 1,

1966; thereafter Administrator

Gavin, Lieutenant General James M., USA, Ret., author of War and Peace in the Space Age and former
Ambassador to France
George, see Sturm, Paul
Giap, see Vo Nguyen Giap
Ginsburgh, Colonel Robert, member of the National Security Council Staff from summer 1966
Gleysteen, Culver, Political Officer at the Embassy in France until September 1966
Goldberg, Arthur J., Representative to the United Nations
Gonard, Samuel, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross
Goodpaster, Lieutenant General Andrew J., USA, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to July 31, 1966; Director of the Joint Staff from August 1, 1966
Gore, Albert, Senator (D-Tennessee)
Greene, General Wallace M., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister
Gronouski, John A., Ambassador to Poland
Gullion, Edmund, unofficial U.S. envoy ("X") in the XYZ negotiations with Mai Van Bo
Habib, Philip C., Political Officer at the Embassy in Vietnam
Hammarskjold, Dag, former Secretary-General of the United Nations
Harkins, General Paul D., Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1962-1964
Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador at Large
Hayden, Carl, Senator (D-Arizona), President Pro Tempore and Chairman of the Senate Appropriations
Committee
Helble, John J., Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Helms, Richard M., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until June 30, 1966; thereafter Director of
Central Intelligence
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., Senator (R-Idaho)
Hoang Xuan Lam, General, ARVN, Commander of I Corps from May 1966

Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Ho Giac, Buddhist leader and orator
Holt, Harold, Australian Prime Minister from January 26, 1966
Holyoake, Keith, Prime Minister of New Zealand
Hoopes, Townsend W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Hornig, Donald F., Special Assistant to the President
Hughes, Thomas L., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States
Huynh Van Cao, General, ARVN, Commander of I Corps from mid-May to late May 1966
Janczewski, Zbigniew, Polish Foreign Ministry official
Javits, Jacob K., Senator (R-New York)
Jean, see Vo Van Sung
Jenkins, Walter E., Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Poland from July 1966
Johnson, General Harold K., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States
Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until October 9, 1966;
Ambassador to Japan from November 8, 1966
Jorden, William J., member of the National Security Council Staff from May 1966
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Attorney General until September 1966; Under Secretary of State from
October 3, 1966
Kennan, George F., author and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
Kennedy, John F., President of United States, January 20, 1961-November 22, 1963
Kennedy, Robert F., Senator (D-New York)
Keppel, Francis, Assistant Secretary for Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare until
April 1966
Khanh, see Nguyen Khanh

Kissinger, Henry, professor of Government at Harvard University and Consultant to the Department of
State
Kistiakowsky, George B., professor of Chemistry at Harvard University and Vice President of the
National Academy of Sciences
Kohler, Foy D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until November 14, 1966; Deputy Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs from November 29, 1966
Komer, Robert W., Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until March
28, 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the President; Acting Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs during March 1966
Koren, Henry L. T., Deputy to Deputy Ambassador Porter from July 1966
Kosygin, Alexei N, Soviet Premier
Kraft, Joseph, journalist, author, and syndicated columnist
Krulak, Lieutenant General Victor H., USMC, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Kuchel, Thomas H., Senator (R-California)
Ky, see Nguyen Cao Ky
Lam, see Hoang Xuan Lam
Lansdale, Edward G., Special Assistant to Ambassador Lodge
Leoni, Raul, President of Venezuela
Leonhart, William K., Deputy to Robert W. Komer from March 28, 1966
Le Van Truong (code named "Mr. Out"), Vietnamese proponent of Cochinchinese autonomy residing in
Europe in 1966
Lewandowski, Januscz, Polish Representative to the International Control Commission
Lippmann, Walter, author and journalist
Loan, see Nguyen Ngoc Loan
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Ambassador to Vietnam
Long, Russell B., Senator (D-Louisiana), Senate Majority Whip
Lovett, Robert A., banker and one of the "Wise Men" who served as unofficial advisers to President
Johnson

Lynd, Staughton, history professor at Yale University

Lucet, Charles E., French Ambassador to the United States
Mahon, George H., Representative (D-Texas), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee
Mai Van Bo (code named "Rupert"), Commercial Representative in Paris of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam
Manac'h, Etienne, Director of Asian Affairs, French Foreign Ministry
Mann, Charles A., Director of the USAID Mission in Vietnam until August 1966
Mansfield, Mike, Senator (D-Montana), Senate Majority Leader
Marcos, Ferdinand, President of the Philippines
Marks, Leonard H., Director of the United States Information Agency
Martin, Graham A., Ambassador to Thailand
Martin, Paul J., Canadian Foreign Minister
McBride, Robert H., Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in France
McCafferty, Arthur, Supervisor of White House Situation Room
McCarthy, Eugene J., Senator (D-Minnesota)
McCloy, John J., lawyer and one of the "Wise Men" who served as unofficial advisers to President
Johnson
McConaughy, Walter P., Ambassador to Pakistan until May 17, 1966
McConnell, General John P., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
McCormack, John W., Representative (D-Massachusetts), Speaker of the House
McDonald, Admiral David L., Chief of Naval Operations
McGovern, George S., Senator (D-South Dakota)
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense
McNaughton, John T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
McPherson, Harry C., Jr., Special Counsel to the President
Meeker, Leonard C., Legal Adviser to the Department of State

Menzies, Robert G., Australian Prime Minister until January 26, 1966
Michalowski, Jerzy, Director-General, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Miller, Robert H., Director, Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of
State
Molotov, Vyacheslav M., Soviet Foreign Minister, 1946-1949
Morgan, Thomas E., Representative (D-Pennsylvania), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee
Morse, Wayne, Senator (D-Oregon)
Moyers, Bill D., Special Assistant and Press Secretary to the President
Mundt, Karl E., Senator (R-South Dakota)
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, President of the United Arab Republic
Nehru, B. K., Indian Ambassador to the United States
Nguyen Cao Ky, Air Vice Marshal, VNAF, Vietnamese Premier
Nguyen Chanh Thi, General, ARVN, Commander of I Corps until March 10, 1966
Nguyen Chi Thanh, General, Head of the Central Office for South Vietnam, the headquarters for North
Vietnamese control of Vietcong forces
Nguyen Duc Thang, General, ARVN, Vietnamese Minister of Rural Construction/Revolutionary
Development
Nguyen Huu An, Permanent Secretary of the Vietnamese Red Cross (code named Uncle in the Thrush
contacts)
Nguyen Huu Co, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister
Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front
Nguyen Khanh, former Vietnamese Premier and intermediary in the Elmtree contacts with Le Van
Truong
Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Colonel, Director of the Vietnamese Military Security Service; Director General of
the National Police from April 1966
Nguyen Van Chuan, General, ARVN, Commander of I Corps, March-April 1966
Nguyen Van Thieu, General, ARVN, Vietnamese Chief of State

Nhuan, see Pham Xuan Nhuan

Nilsson, Torsten, Swedish Foreign Minister
Nkrumah, Kwame, President of Ghana until February 24, 1966
Out, see Le Van Truong
Owen, Henry D., Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from June 19, 1966
Park, Chung Hee, President of Korea
Pearson, Lester, Canadian Prime Minister
Pell, Claiborne, Senator (D-Rhode Island)
Pham Van Dong, Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Pham Xuan Nhuan, General, ARVN, Commander of the 1st Infantry Division from March to June 1966
Phan Huy Quat, Vietnamese Premier, February 16-June 11, 1965
Pike, Douglas E., Attache and Assistant Chief of the Planning Division at the Embassy in Vietnam
Poats, Rutherford, Assistant Administrator for the Far East, Agency for International Development
Pompidou, Georges, French Premier
Porter, William J., Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam
Quang, see Dang Van Quang
Quat, see Phan Huy Quat
Raborn, Vice Admiral William F., Jr., USN, Ret., Director of Central Intelligence until June 30, 1966
Rapacki, Adam, Polish Foreign Minister
Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the
Department
Reedy, George E., Special Assistant and Press Secretary to the President until July 8, 1965
Reischauer, Edwin O., Ambassador to Japan until August 19, 1966
Reston, James B., journalist and Associate Editor,The New York Times
Ridgway, General Matthew B., USA, Ret., Army Chief of Staff, 1953-1955

Rivers, L. Mendel, Representative (D-South Carolina), Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee
Roche, John P., Special Consultant to the President from September 8, 1966
Ronning, Chester, retired Canadian Foreign Service officer who met with North Vietnamese leaders in
March and June 1966
Ropa, Donald W., member of the National Security Council Staff
Rostow, Eugene V., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from October 14, 1966
Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
until March 31, 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the President
Rupert, see Mai Van Bo,
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State
Russell, Richard B., Senator (D-Georgia), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee
Sainteny, Jean, former French colonial official in Indochina who met with North Vietnamese leaders in
July 1966
Saltonstall, Leverett, Senator (R-Massachusetts)
Sato, Eisaku, Japanese Prime Minister
Sharp, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Shastri, Lal Bahadur, Indian Prime Minister until January 10, 1966
Shelepin, Alexandr N., Secretary of the Central Committee, Soviet Communist Party
Shiina, Etsusaburo, Japanese Foreign Minster until December 3, 1966
Sieverts, Frank, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State from March 1966
Smathers, George A., Senator (D-Florida)
Smith, Bromley K., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
Sorensen, Theodore, Special Counsel to President Kennedy and Special Counsel to President Johnson
until February 1964
Souvanna Phouma, Prince, Laotian Prime Minister
Sparkman, John J., Senator (D-Alabama)

Springsteen, George S., Jr., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until September 1966
Starbird, Lieutenant General Alfred D., USA, Director, Defense Communications Agency
Steadman, John M., Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense
Stearns, Monteagle, Special Assistant to Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman
Stewart, Michael, British Foreign Minster until August 10, 1966
Stewart, Michael N.F., Minister, British Embassy in Washington
Sturm, Paul, unofficial U.S. envoy ("Y") in the XYZ negotiations with Mai Van Bo and Vo Van Sung;
unofficial U.S. envoy ("George") in the Elmtree contacts with Le Van Truong
Sullivan, William H., Ambassador to Laos
Symington, Stuart, Senator (D-Missouri)
Tam Chau, leader of Buddhists in Saigon
Tam Giac, Buddhist leader
Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA, Ret., Special Consultant to the President
Thai, see Vu Van Thai
Thanat Khoman, Colonel, Thai Foreign Minister
Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal, Thai Prime Minister and Defense Minister
Thang, see Nguyen Duc Thang
Thant, U, Secretary General of the United Nations
Thi, see Nguyen Chanh Thi
Thien Minh, Buddhist leader
Thieu, see Nguyen Van Thieu
Tho, see Nguyen Huu Tho
Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., Ambassador at Large until December 26, 1966
Thomsen, Samuel B., Principal Officer at the Consulate in Hue until August 1966
Thomson, James C., Jr., member of the National Security Council Staff until September 1966

Tran Quoc Buu, Vietnamese labor leader

Tran Van Do, Vietnamese Foreign Minister
Tri Quang, Buddhist leader and key figure in the direction of the Struggle Forces
Tubby, Roger W., Representative-designate to the European Office of the United Nations
Unger, Leonard S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Valenti, Jack, Special Assistant to the President until May 15, 1966
Vance, Cyrus R., Deputy Secretary of Defense
Vien, see Cao Van Vien
Vinh Loc, General, ARVN, Commander of II Corps
Vo Nguyen Giap, General, PAVN, Minister of National Defense, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Vo Van Sung (code named Jean), Deputy to Mai Van Bo
Vu Van Thai, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States
Walt, Lieutenant General Lewis W., Commander of the U.S. III Marine Amphibious Force and I Corps
Senior Adviser
Wehrle, Leroy S., Associate Director and Economic Counselor, USAID Mission in Vietnam
Westmoreland, General William C., USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until March 23, 1966
Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister
Wilson, Samuel V., Saigon Mission Coordinator
X, see Gullion, Edmund
Y, see Paul Sturm
Zorthian, Barry, Minister-Counselor for Information at the Embassy in Vietnam and head of the Joint
U.S. Public Affairs Office

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
January 1-31: Peace Negotiations During the Bombing Pause;
The Decision to Resume Bombing
1. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 1, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The
source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:04 a.m.
2343. For the Secretary from Lodge.
1. Thank you for your 1851/2/ and 1853./3/ It is good to know of the efforts which we are making to end
the bloodshed and bring this war to the conference table. I only hope we are successful.
/2/Dated December 31, 1965, telegram 1851 was a retransmission of telegram 1073 from Warsaw,
December 30. For text of telegram 1073, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 751-753.
/3/For text, see ibid., pp. 753-755.
2. However, one thing in your messages is most disturbing. That is the reference to possible independent
Viet Cong participation in the talks.
3. Our traditional--and commendable--position on that subject has been that the Viet Cong can then
[participate?] as part of the Hanoi delegation or that they would have no difficulties making themselves
heard, presumably through the Hanoi delegation or some other indirect means. This position combines
firm adherence to principle with a demonstrated desire to be conciliatory and not to let little things stand
in our way.
4. Actually inviting the Viet Cong to the table, however, under any formula, would be no little thing. It
would have the most serious consequences here in Viet Nam and of our international position, and
would be very unwise, for the following reasons:
A. Even if the Viet Cong did not join the talks, our invitation would automatically give an aura of
legitimacy to the apparatus of terror and intimidation which the Viet Cong have set up in South Viet
Nam. Viet Cong cells and agents would immediately stand up and claim to represent the true
government. They would initiate an even more ruthless campaign of terror in the country and would also

rapidly take over administrative functions. The population would be at their mercy. Nobody would dare
to resist them because they would be able to claim that they are no longer bandits but members of a
legitimate organization whose claim to speak for the people of South Viet Nam has been recognized by
the United States. The result is that we would find the country literally swept out from under us.
B. Affirming the position of GVN as sole legitimate government of South Viet Nam will be pretty
empty talk if we have accepted a Viet Cong regime competitive with it. We should realize that such a
blow is one which the present [government?] cannot survive. It would produce political chaos among
democratic elements in South Viet Nam, and would prompt fence-sitting elements to go neutralist
quickly and pave the way for a Communist take-over. It would thus undercut our military effort.
C. The formula suggested by Rapacki is even more dangerous. If the Soviets invite the Viet Cong to sit
at the table, and we invite the GVN and the Buddhists, Catholics, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and others, then
the Viet Cong, which claim to represent all South Viet Nam political, religious, and minority groups,
would be unaffected by the other invitations. Only the power and influence of the GVN (if it could even
consent to such an arrangement) would suffer from such a situation. The Viet Cong, having been
legitimized by our invitation to the conference table, would claim to represent the wave of the future.
Other groups would try to make their peace with them, and we would have no choice but to accept
defeat and to leave Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, equating the Viet Cong, which is a rebel
murder group, with peaceful law abiding organizations, in particular the great and noble Roman Catholic
Church can only make sense to a Communist. It strikes at the heart of our moral position in Viet Nam. If
"world opinion" believes otherwise, it is up to us to educate world opinion rather than yield to it. We
cannot in good conscience ignore the facts.
D. We appear politically and morally unaware when we take at face value and unquestioningly accept
the Viet Cong description of themselves as a "National Liberation Front" or Hanoi's description of itself
as the "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam." Actually, the Viet Cong is an "enslavement front," and the
Hanoi regime is not only not democratic nor republican but dictatorial and Communist.
E. In attaching importance to the role of the Viet Cong we are focusing on a question which does not
concern Hanoi very much but which does concern Saigon and our position vitally. Hanoi has often told
us that it does not consider the presence of the Viet Cong at the bargaining table to be as important an
issue as several other questions. Therefore, if we cave in on the Viet Cong representation question, we
are not going to get much in return from Hanoi but we will have struck a deadly blow at the nonCommunists in South Viet Nam.
F. By offering recognition and a direct voice to the Viet Cong, we would be making another concession
in an effort to bring about talks, whereas Hanoi so far has made none. Hanoi would assume that we are
anxious for talks, that we would make further concessions, and they would toughen their attitude rather
than soften it. We would therefore be strengthening the voice of those elements in Hanoi which claim
that America is a paper tiger and that we cannot maintain our determination in a long struggle.
5. I cannot help but be reminded of the Communist effort in 1953 to get the Soviet Union seated as a
neutral at the Korean peace conference. It was a particularly outrageous and thoroughly impotent
attempt inasmuch as the Soviet Union had actively sided and abetted the Chinese Communists and the
North Koreans. But Krishna Menon and others were able to wrap it up in the cotton wool of sophistry
and some of our "enlightened" press and politicians discussed it more solemnly and respectfully than
they did most State Department proposals. We had to work hard for several months to get rid of it. To
propose treating these murderous Viet Cong dragon's teeth in Viet Nam as a respectable government is
just as outrageous and it would be wiser to step on it early rather than let it gain currency--and
respectability--among the unthinking.

6. I have discussed this issue at great length in this telegram because I believe it is so vital to our
position here that we cannot afford to yield on it if we want to keep our position in Southeast Asia and to
maintain the integrity of our commitments around the world. It would collapse the GVN, would be
regarded as the beginning of a Communist take-over, and would disintegrate virtually everything that we
have worked so hard to create. This is not a simple matter of stubborn adherence to meaningless
legalism but a crucial issue of substance. I hope that you and our emissaries abroad at this critical
juncture will quickly and unequivocally reaffirm our previous stand.
7. If I may comment on 1851, let me submit that para 3 (A) is dangerously unrealistic. All experience
shows that "a period of calm and tranquility" is not conducive to Communist cooperation. On the
contrary, results can only be expected in negotiations with the Communists by the application of
military pressures before the talks begin and while they are in progress. See Panmunjon.
8. The statement in 3 (A) of 1851 that "the U.S. expects that the Vietnam side will reciprocate with a
parallel gesture" is an unsound expectation which would only be valid if Hanoi consisted of Americans
who value human life and deeply want peace, but, as Hanoi consists of Communists who are
contemptuous of human life and want to conquer, the expectation is false. Also, the reference to "mutual
desire" is not clear since the Communist side has made none.
9. Para 3 (C) of 1851 states that the U.S. is "flexible" concerning the Viet Cong and "is ready to consider
the possibilities of talks in all variations and with different participants including also the National
Liberation Front." This is dangerous for the reasons stated above. This is one issue on which flexibility
can be fatal./4/
/4/In telegram 1865 to Saigon January 1, Rusk thanked Lodge for telegram 2343 and responded: "Your
reasoning is compelling and reflects my own evaluation of problem of Viet Cong
representation." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Lodge
2. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 3, 1966, 11:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18.
Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
The Peace Offensive--where we are today
1. With the Communists
The Communists directly engaged--Moscow, Peking and Hanoi--have made no diplomatic comment and
their propaganda continues to be negative. But only Peking takes an absolute position. The most recent
semi-official Hanoi statement/2/ should not be taken as final. It is an excellent example of the continuing
effort by Hanoi to secure major concessions on the four points,/3/ while seeming to be reasonable. The
key word this time is that the U.S. should "acknowledge" the points. Hanoi also asks for a complete and
unconditional cessation of all attacks on North Vietnam.

/2/Probably a reference to the commentary by "Observer" in the January 3 issue of Nhan Dan, which
was carried by Hanoi radio in English at 12:31 a.m. EST on January 3. (Department of State, EA/ACAVietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives)
/3/The four points were set forth on April 8, 1965, by North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong; for
text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, pp. 544-545.
The Communists who are interested in getting negotiations started--the Hungarians, the Poles, and the
Yugoslavs--are still at work, and we have no reports back. All three of them have emphasized the need
for time--the Hungarians speak of the problem of communicating with the jungle; Tito speaks of the
need to let differences ripen in Hanoi.
2. Less direct mediators
These include the British, the Canadians, the Vatican, U Thant and Nasser. The British are simply
telling the Russians how serious and sincere we are, and the Canadians have already done likewise. The
Vatican is sending Monsignor Rodhain to Saigon, and if possible to Hanoi. The Algerians have agreed
to talk to all their Communist contacts, including the NLF. Harriman sees Nasser tomorrow. Here again,
the lines are nearly all out, but we have no diplomatic answers back. One additional possibility is Japan.
3. The French
De Gaulle is in a class by himself. He has been fully informed and has expressed his warm appreciation.
At the same time, he has made clear his conviction that nothing will happen until we announce that we
will definitely withdraw at the end of negotiations./4/ His Foreign Minister emphasizes the importance
of a recognized role for the NLF. De Gaulle has sneered at our efforts in a private conversation with the
British Ambassador./5/ We have not asked the French for anything. This was wise.
/4/De Gaulle's views on Vietnam were reported in telegram 3701 from Paris, December 31; for text, see
ibid., vol. III, pp. 757-760.
/5/Reported in telegram 3709 from Paris, January 3. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
4. Our Pacific allies
These are more sympathetic to the peace offensive than we might have expected. There was slight
nervousness in Taipei and Bangkok, but the Vice President has calmed one and the Secretary of State
the other. There is deep understanding and support for our effort in Japan, the Philippines, Australia and
New Zealand. So far we have not sent presidential messages to Menzies and Holyoake, and I have
requested drafts today. Their governments have been kept very fully informed and there has been no
complaint.
5. The Latin Americans
Here we have had unusually strong response from Diaz Ordaz, Leoni, and others, but no reply yet from
Castello Branco. It remains for consideration whether we should follow up one suggestion and have an
OAS meeting to reaffirm the need for peace.
6. The Africans

The response to Governor Williams' trip/6/ has been excellent so far. He has been in Morocco, Tunis,
Algiers, and Ethiopia, and is in Kenya and Tanzania today. Except for Algiers, there is no active interest
so far in joining the diplomatic game, but there is general support.
/6/Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams visited Africa January 3-6. His
draft conclusions and recommendations were transmitted in telegram 501 from Dakar, January 7. (Ibid.,
EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol. 1)
7. The United Nations
This is a special case. Goldberg recommends a letter which would become a Security Council document,
and a draft will be at hand at noon./7/ It has also been suggested that U Thant be asked to organize an
advisory group of neutrals. I find the strongest opposition to this idea from McNamara and Rusk. Both
of them feel that we must not hand over the diplomatic scales to this kind of a third party. Most of the
world would like nothing better than to recognize the NLF in ways that would be very damaging in
Saigon. This is only one of a number of issues on which we must do our own bargaining, because no
one else can be relied on to do it for us.
/7/Goldberg's January 4 letter to U Thant is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1966, pp. 744-745.
Issues for Discussion
1. Immediate tactical steps
a. Harriman to Japan
b. Letters to Menzies and Holyoake
c. Letter to U Thant
2. Public position for this week
Our 14 points/8/ have only begun to get the attention they deserve, and they have had a reaction of
affirmative interest from such surprising quarters as Algiers, and even indirectly the New York Times.
We should develop and expand them on a background basis, and we should challenge all concerned to
say why they are not a perfectly solid basis for discussion. This job will best be done under the direct
supervision of the Secretary of State.
/8/Drafted by Secretary Rusk in late December 1965, the fourteen points were included in an "Outline of
U.S. Position on Viet-Nam" made available to the press on January 3 by Vice President Humphrey and
released separately by the Department of State on January 7 under the title "United States Official
Position on Viet-Nam." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 704-707, and
Department of State Bulletin, January 24, 1966, p. 116.
We should continue to avoid any discussion of the duration of the pause, and we should continue to bat
down any discussion of an ultimatum.
By the end of the week, attention will begin to move toward the State of the Union message./9/ We
should have a firm position as to what we do and do not say ahead of time on that subject.

/9/Delivered January 12; see footnote 3, Document 19.

So far we have had almost no public criticism of the pause. But Senator Symington's cable/10/ is a
sample of what we will get more of as the days go by. Since it is entirely clear that the diplomatic power
of the pause is directly related to its length, we need to study additional ways of maintaining its
momentum. Properly orchestrated, the 14 points can help us through this week. Can the State of the
Union take us as far as Tet?
/10/Not further identified.
McG. B.
3. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 3, 1966, 12:55-2:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes by
hand; they were typed later, apparently shortly after President Johnson left office. The editor has
checked this typescript and the typescripts of all subsequent Valenti notes for accuracy against Valenti's
handwritten notes and has made minor corrections. (Ibid., Office of the President File, "Valenti, Jack,
Notes Taken at Various Meetings During 1965 and 1966") The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)
PRESENT
President, Rusk, Bundy, McNamara, Ball, Moyers, Valenti/2/
/2/According to the President's Daily Diary, Vice President Humphrey was also present. (Ibid.)
Rusk: Been in touch with all 113 nations/resp. from 40. Gen. reaction good. DeGaulle unsatis. Question:
President: Did DeG. exp. this to Goldb.
Rusk: Yes, in substance. He says we underestimate Hanoi. They won't give up. FMin of Fr. has not seen
Chaval--and won't let our people see Chaval.
President: Chaval made some statements, didn't he.
Rusk: Yes, but it was out of context.
Rusk: In Korea, Formosa, Thailand, there was some worry about their security.
President: How did Ky take it.
Rusk: He took it well when Lodge told him.
President: How about Lodge, any roadblock.
Rusk: Not yet, perhaps later. We got a telegr. from Symington./3/
/3/See footnote 10, Document 2.

President: That prob. comes from Air Force people.

President: You see anything from any of these conversations that would be encouraging?
Rusk: Not yet. But Yugoslavs say we have put Hanoi under tremendous pressure. I take a little
encouragement that Hanoi and Peking have not commented directly on the peace offensive. Little too
early. Need to wait to see effects of Shelepin trip./4/ Thompson says ought to see Dobrynin about time
Shelepin leaves.
/4/Shelepin led a five-man Soviet mission that visited Hanoi January 7-12. For speculation in the
Department of State about the purpose of his visit, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 753754.
Have to watch Brit. a little. They'd be inclined to give away too much. We don't want to lose cards we
need to deal with.
We must be clear with Brit.
President: A little amazed that Brit. would be puzzled. I would want to talk to Wilson while at same
time, Wilson says he was pleased.
Rusk: A little snafu. Don't think PM was involved.
Next prob. is whether we send Harriman to Japan.
Bundy: We've been playing it that VP was doing this. Perhaps we could say VP wanted him to go.
Rusk: Shall we continue the pause. Do you see any prob.
President: I see lots of problems, but we should continue.
Rusk: Don't think we should resume it while Shelepin is in Hanoi.
McNamara: I told Chiefs I would advise to resume the bombings if Chiefs could show me how we were
being hurt in the So. No answer from them, which is very encouraging.
We have re-instituted full reconnaissance of NVN.
Rusk: The Speaker, Hickenlooper seem relaxed. Mrs. Bolton likewise. Ball talked to Mansfield, Dirksen
and Fulbright.
McNamara: Talked to Rivers, he is ready to resume bombing. He is in foul mood with me because we
have cut back a const. project in S.C.
President: Orig. intended to go to New Yr. After a couple of weeks, intended to go back, now, what do
you advise we do--wait until we hear-Rusk: So far as other side, they've had reasonable assurance, the pause will go to middle of next week.
President: Any significance that on the first pause, they said NUTS. Now they haven't said anything.

Rusk: Yes, that is good.

President: Are all your senior officials asking?
Rusk: Yes.
Bundy: Pres. recollection is precise and right. (reads P. telegram to Lodge which pinpoints the pause
continues til middle of this week.)/5/
/5/Telegram 1805 to Saigon, December 28, 1965; for text, see ibid., pp. 717-719.
Rusk: Perhaps we ought to give Lodge a country-by-country rundown on resp. to peace offensive.
President: Anything to be gained by Lodge talking to Harriman. Maybe Harriman can tell him exactly
what he has learned. It would give us time.
President: Think we might want to think about it. Though it would appeal to Lodge to want to find out
what H. [Harriman] found out.
(Rusk, Ball, McN and B. all agreed this was good idea to send Harriman.)
(Vice Pres. entered the room at this time.)
President: Been talking about how to keep Saigon in with us--before hard liners move in on us. Thinking
to send Harriman to Japan, then on to Saigon with Lodge and Westmoreland.
How long will Shelepin stay in Hanoi--(to Rusk).
Answers: 5 days.
Could it be Hanoi is gaining any substantial military adv. while we are pausing.
McNamara: No. We can knock out any bridges they repair. Bombing them has not reduced infiltration.
Bundy: When we will resume bombings and when we lose planes (?) some will blame the pause.
President: Any question that we have to go back to bombings after a pause.
(No objections)
McNamara: I am very encouraged by resp. political leaders Goldb. and H. talked to. You will lose this if
you resume bombing on Wednesday.
If we resume, people will say it's a fraud.
President: What do the pause advocates say?
Bundy: For the first time we have made headway with NY Times.

Rusk: I told Reston that no matter how long we stopped bombing it will never be long enough for
Times.
Ball: I think this will disarm our critics in the Congress.
President: I believe we'll have to go on over for several days. See no real reasons for starting it now.
Conversations with others give me hope and we'll continue. Our big problem will be they'll let us stew
in our own juice. Then we'll stew in theirs.
This will be a bad week, a bad month.
What do you do with Goldberg?
I think the "I told you so" boys will say it wasn't handled right. I brought in VP, H., G. [Goldberg] and
Williams. Think they will say it wasn't handled properly in the beginning.
Rusk: The resp. from all over the world has converted everyone.
President: I think Alsop and Reston are unhappy because they weren't consulted.
Rusk: 50/50 chance we'll get something back from some Comm. country by Wed.
President: How to get Goldberg to report--without being dramatic, or building up hope. You know how I
feel about keeping this at low key.
See nothing wrong with saying they told all the people they saw we were ready to talk instead of fight.
Bundy: I think the resp. from Poland and the Vatican is worth entire expedition.
Rusk: Tomorrow, suggest Goldberg report to you tomorrow, and then report to U Thant. Perhaps later, a
letter from Goldberg to U Thant.
Moyers: Goldberg thinks it is time to get out Pope's letter-President: Does that pump up things--like we are dramatizing it all.
Moyers: No.
Rusk: Another element is timing. Harriman is 74. He needs a day's rest.
President: I agree.
Rusk: Question of OAS resolution--can probably get a resolution. But worried that some like Frei/6/
would feel constrained about saying the pause shouldn't be resumed.
/6/Reference is to President Eduardo Frei of Chile.
President: Counter the suggestion--compliment them--and suggest they talk to other countries on their
own. Better way to serve the cause of peace.

Then you will take steps to get in Goldberg tomorrow.

Rusk: Releasing Pope's letter/7/ tomorrow will give good cause for not resuming bombing.
/7/Transmitted in telegram 1661 from Rome, December 30, 1965, the Pope's letter was released on
January 4, 1966. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/PINTA)
President: Do we want to release Pope's letter?
Rusk: Might put pressures on you to release other messages. I gather the Pope is already putting out this
kind of message.
Rusk: Then we'll meet with Goldberg tomorrow. (to B. [Ball], McN) What do you think Hanoi is doing
now?
McNamara: Possibly daylight traffic on the roads, and rebuilding bridges. I am concerned over inc.
infiltration into SVN. This is not a result of cessation of bombing.
Ball: Also a situation of MIG 21 coming in.
McNamara: I believe that when we resume bombing--in six mo. we'll be in air battles with Hanoi
aircraft--and in year we'll battle Chinese aircraft.
Ball: Thais are also worried that we didn't push China to the wall.
(Pres. asked HH to give any views he had on trip)
President: What else can we do--we have dispatched people all over the world. What can we do further?
We know that our bombing resp. has not done the job.
Valenti: Why not direct contact--possibly thru the Frei types?
Bundy: We are doing a great deal of this. We need to do more.
President: If we try to hold too long without backgrounding, to let everyone [know] we are (genuine?),
they're going to hammer at us that we over-dramatize.
Let the press know about the shape of responses.
Bundy: Could tell press to go after the Ambassadors and it would be more persuasive to let them say it,
not us.
President: All right, we wait to see Goldberg.
4. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, January 3, 1966, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis;
XYZ. Drafted by Paul Sturm (identified as "Y" in the telegram) and authenticated by Culver Gleysteen.
For documentation on earlier contacts of Edmund Gullion ("X") of the United States with Mai Van Bo
("Rupert") of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 312316, 319, 328-332, 334-337, and 367-371.
3732. Literally Eyes Only Secretary from McBride.
1. Vo van Sung (henceforth referred to as Jean) received Y at 4 afternoon third at 6 Rue Vineuse in
apartment double living room of which arranged as office; Jean on one side closed French doors,
unidentified French woman secretary remained on other side. Y expressed regret Rupert's illness and
hope his early recovery. Jean indicated illness no more than a cold.
2. Y handed over text Rangoon aide-memoire, typed on plain paper, together with hand-written French
translation. Y said instructions to Ambassador had been to pass to DRV representation Rangoon./2/ Jean
quickly described this as Consulate General. Fast response plus failure indicate any surprise or particular
interest suggest he may have had prior knowledge of transmittal, but this is only supposition Y's part. In
any case, Jean read document carefully and raised no question about accepting it. Y carefully spelled out
what possession this document meant with regard Y's bona fides. Y added he could henceforth be
considered authentic spokesman and Paris channel for any USG communications with DRV. Jean
registered comprehension. Y said X's role and his hitherto dictated by need maintain entire secrecy of
contacts. Jean murmured agreement such need existed. (At end of interview Y said he was seeing no
French in Paris and no other Vietnamese.)
/2/For text of the aide-memoire and instructions to Ambassador Byroade, see ibid., pp. 721-722.
3. Thereafter Y handed over French translation X's version of DRV four points,/3/ with explanation of
background. He added USG continued ready serious conversations and spoke of amended version of
four points as offering good point of departure, since it included what seemed to us as essentials, i.e.,
eventual US military departure and reunification country in accord freely expressed wishes people of
Vietnam north and south. Jean asked why USG unable accept DRV four points as they were published.
Y replied USG unable accept proposition South Vietnam could be bound to program of NLF. Jean said,
"Then you ignore wishes of the people". Y rejoined NLF was far from constituting all the people, but
that they could be consulted like anyone else. He then reminded Jean this was same old ground trodden
many times, and perhaps it would be useful pass on to other matters. In conclusion he referred to
President Johnson's statement US was putting everything in basket of peace except liberty of people of
South Vietnam./4/ Jean snorted at this, saying "You talk of peace and negotiations, but all your actions
are warlike. What about McNamara's statement after bombing Haiphong power plant that war would go
on?/5/ What about the reinforcements that are pouring in?" Y replied that the business of the military
and of defense ministers was to wage war until they were told to wage peace. The same was true of his
military as of ours. Ardent wish of President and American people was to find acceptable end to
Vietnam war, but until this was found, there was no option but to continue military build up, for our own
sake and sake of our friends. Jean queried sourly, "Do you think government of South Vietnam really
exists?"
/3/For text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 97.
/4/This statement appeared in a paper prepared by Rusk on December 27, 1965, for use by U.S. officials
sent abroad to promote the peace process; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 704707.

/5/Reference is presumably to McNamara's statement at a press conference on December 16, 1965; see
Public Statements of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 1965, vol. V, p. 2237. (Johnson
Library)
4. Y mentioned visits of presidential emissaries to various capitals and explained carefully purpose of
missions was to indicate to heads of government that USG intention was to give DRV opportunity make
useful response which could be first of series of steps leading to peace talks. While war could and no
doubt would be resumed, this was only a fact of life and near certainty of resumption in absence DRV
response could not be interpreted as ultimatum.
5. Jean wondered aloud what response would be possible so long as USG refused accept DRV four
points. Y said he had always been puzzled by sense and importance DRV attached to four points. Of
course we agreed that anybody's four points, assuming the anybody to have a valid interest in the matter,
could be considered in negotiations. Was admittance of them to an agenda enough? If so, there was no
problem. Jean said, quite clearly, DRV four points must be basis of solution.
6. Jean indicated he would pass papers to Rupert but added that if Y were at any time unable reach
Rupert, Y could reach Jean at Trocadero 08-23. Comment: this may indicate Rupert is away from Paris
or does not wish personally continue contact. On other hand, it may be evidence of desire maintain
contact unbroken. Y told Jean he could be reached at any time at his hotel and that if for any reason he
left Paris he would inform Rupert in writing how he could be reached.
7. At no time did Jean indicate he had other than a listening brief, despite comments he made. He was
entirely willing to accept papers passed to him. He had no message to transmit. Making polite
conversation at end interview, Y asked Jean which part of Vietnam he came from. Jean said he came
from the south but had been north since 1955; for this reason he knew what the people of the south were
thinking.
McBride
5. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, January 4, 1966, 9:42 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Secret;
Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Unger and by McGeorge Bundy in substance,
and approved by William Bundy.
1889. For Ambassador and David Bell.
1. President is most anxious to show in every possible way our concern for peaceful development and
progress of SVN and our emphasis on non-military measures. To this end, we would like to be able to
announce on Bell's return constructive and visible initiatives in economic and welfare areas. One such
initiative has been proposed by Secy Freeman in the form of visit of agricultural experts who might
dramatize what is being done now in SVN, how VC are striking at the chance for peaceful progress, and
what could potentially be done in future if VC menace were removed. This might include demonstration
of potential for electric power in local areas and demonstrations of such possibilities as timber
development using simple equipment.
2. This is one example of kind of public visits by experts that would both assist in present task and

dramatize our whole peaceful emphasis. Would greatly appreciate it if Ambassador and Bell could
consider other possibilities so that Bell could be prepared consider early initiatives that might be
announced by President shortly after his return.
3. We are well aware of great economic burden of current construction and other activity, and are not
necessarily considering any immediate dramatic additional action projects. However, technical visits on
comparatively small scale might have dramatic impact and show by example what would now be
possible but for VC, and what could become possible in future.
Rusk
6. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 5, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Pinta. The
source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:20 a.m. and passed
to the White House at 9:40. McGeorge Bundy forwarded it to President Johnson at 2:30 p.m. under a
covering memorandum that stated: "Here is an important dispatch from Lodge. As you can see, he is still
pulling hard for a quick end to the pause." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the
President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18)
2399. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:
1. Bombing Pause
The following are straws in the wind as regards Viet Cong and Vietnamese reaction to the bombing
pause:
A. On Christmas day, about 1,000 North Vietnamese soldiers were reliably observed entering South
Viet Nam.
B. Incidents during the period December 26 through January 1 total 1,133. This is the highest total of
incidents ever recorded in one week since the Communist aggression began. This includes the bombing
of an American enlisted men's billet at Dalat.
C. Prime Minister Ky told me Monday that one result of the bombing pause was sharply to reduce the
number of returnees coming into the Chieu Hoi camps. He said that when bombing resumed, more
people would come into the camps. As you know, we are planning a big Chieu Hoi effort at Tet time for
which we have great expectations. I am glad to say that for the week just ended the number of returnees
has shown a modest increase in line with the general trend.
D. Vietnamese newspaper Tien Vang saw the bombing pause as an invitation for Hanoi to appraise the
United States as weakening in its determination to carry on the war.
E. The Vietnamese newspaper Saigon Daily News carried four column cartoon showing masses of B52's flying over the Vietnamese countryside with two Vietnamese men standing looking up at them. One
of the men says to the other: "Are they going north"? The other says: "No." And the first man says: "Let
us move to the north then."

F. The Vietnamese newspaper Tu Do, referring to VC peace gestures, warns: "You can make any
concessions you want on your part, but you cannot depart from what has been held dear to us: South
Viet Nam must be the place for Vietnamese nationalists only. Under no circumstances can any
Communist be allowed to set foot here."
G. Col. Pham Van Lieu, Director of National Police, seemed unhappy with the pause saying that the
United States should not try to talk with Hanoi. "You Americans should talk to the Russians and the
Chinese, and if there is any talking to be done with Hanoi, we should do it."
H. If resumption of bombing is delayed much longer, you may find that, when you decide to resume the
strikes, it will be near the beginning of Tet--a celebration full of meaning for all Vietnamese.
Resumption near Tet--say within the week or so immediately preceding it--might subject us to the
criticism that while the United States observed the Christian spirit of Christmas, we violated the spirit of
Tet. Such criticism could well force you to postpone resumption of the bombing until the very end of
January or early February.
2. Letter to Menzies
In telegram transmitting text of your letter to Menzies/2/ you ask for my comments, which are as
follows:
/2/Telegram 1882 to Saigon, January 4. President Johnson's letter to Prime Minister Menzies
summarized the progress of the peace offensive and discussed the possibility of continuing the bombing
pause "at least into next week." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Seen from Saigon, the bombing pause is not only not evoking any reciprocal cessation of Communist
military activity, it is marked by a definite increase. It is also interpreted as a sign of weakness, although
Vietnamese in the government familiar with American ways understand the motivation behind it.
The presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Viet Nam added to the increase in VC incidents
seems to me to make the bombing indispensable. It creates the need to hit this NVN army wherever we
can hit it: in the sources of its power in the north, along its line of communication through Laos, in the
high plateau of SVN and, if need be, on the SVN coastal plane. The resumption of bombing is,
therefore, necessary from the standpoint of the purely military action against the army of North Viet
Nam. It is also highly desirable as regards the psychological war against the Viet Cong, which, until the
bombing pause, was definitely going in our favor.
My last talk with General Ky on this subject, other than his casual comment on January 3 repeated
above, was on December 29. At that time, I told him, based on Deptel 1805,/3/ that the bombing would
probably resume by the middle of this week.
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 717-719.
Of course, I have no first hand contact with whatever results the bombing pause may be achieving
outside of this area and do not know how widespread the appeal of the pause is as regards American
public opinion and Congress. I realize that you must measure results here against results achieved
elsewhere. But in this area, the pause has not only done us no good; it has definitely caused losses, as the
"straws in the wind" mentioned under paragraph 1 clearly shows. From this vantage point, therefore, it
would be well if you followed intentions set forth in Deptel 1805 and resumed bombing now.

3. U.S. opinion re Viet Nam

A. I try to share your worries in the hope that I can produce some helpful advice. In this spirit I cogitate
about American public opinion and the attitudes in Congress. I recognize that I am far away from home
and yet I see a great many Congressmen and I have quite a lengthy experience in back of me, notably as
a U.S. Senator during the Korean war when I was closely in touch with public sentiment in the face of
mounting casualties.
B. I will of course, always exert maximum pressure for the speediest possible results. I believe that as
prudent men we must also make plans on the basis that the Vietnamese struggle will not be quickly
ended. I notice that even Senator Morse admits that we cannot withdraw from Viet Nam. Also, I believe
the Communists are determined to drag this thing out until the '68 elections.
C. This raises the question of whether an effort should not be made to get the American people to
understand that this Chinese Communist imperialism, which manifests itself in so many subtle and
disguised forms, is something with which we are going to have to live year in and year out./4/ I
remember in the late 40's and early 50's we thought in terms of "cleaning up" the situation in Europe. I
can remember that dates were discussed by which time the situation in Europe should be cleaned up. We
were impatient and somewhat petulant. Then we learned how to live with the cold war. I think one of
General Eisenhower's contributions as President was educating people to the idea that we had to live
with the cold war, year in and year out. In those days when we said cold war, we meant the Soviet
Union.
/4/Lodge qualified this comment in telegram 2514, January 13, Document 20.
D. I realize that public opinion will support greater or lesser casualty figures depending on the degree of
feeling and conviction which it holds about the war. Also, for some reason, it accepts casualties on the
highways for no particular cause more easily than it does casualties on the battlefield for causes that are
noble and deserving of sacrifice. Psychologically, the thing is complicated because, concurrently with all
these feelings is the view that we must "fish or cut bait or row ashore" and this argues for more drastic
measures. And more drastic measures in turn can sometimes mean fewer casualties.
E. I believe it simplifies thinking to have a clear idea in one's own mind of what constitutes a
satisfactory outcome. I do not say a "perfect" outcome. I notice one administration spokesman described
a satisfactory outcome recently as one in "which the people of South Viet Nam can determine freely
their own government in the future." Does this mean elections which are free from intimidation all over
the country? If so, I do not think we need to go that far in order to feel that we have achieved a
satisfactory result. Neither do I think that we should insist on such goals as utterly destroying the North
Vietnamese military potential or seizing the valley of the Mekong in the Laos panhandle. "Satisfactory
outcome," as the U.S. Mission tried to define it in Saigon 1377,/5/ still seems one reasonable definition,
although undoubtedly not the only one. But even this implies heavier punishment of North Viet Nam.
/5/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 470-473.
F. One conclusion from all this is that if public opinion is accustomed to the idea that we have to live
with this dangerous and complicated Chinese Communist aggression year in and year out, it will stand
casualties better and will not be as impatient because quick results have not been achieved. Also
casualties will probably be fewer. And if we should get a few breaks and things started to go our way
rather quickly, success would be especially sweet if it came at a time when no one really expected it.

4. David Bell
I am most grateful to you for sending David Bell. His visit has been a great success because he brought
with him from Washington carefully thought out, constructive and concrete measures for the problems
which are bothering the GVN most. His recommendations concerning the port of Saigon and the threat
of inflation are sure to make a tremendous difference. We can always use visitors like him.
5. Economic
Retail prices in the Saigon area rose slightly in the week ending December [garble], but these increases
represented more or less normal market fluctuations. USOM's index of both food and non-food prices
remains virtually the same as it was one month ago. Gold and dollar prices receded from last week's
high level.
Saigon's power situation was much improved on December 27 when a new plant producing 20
megavolts eliminated almost 50 percent of the power shortage which has prevailed for the last 7-1/2
months. Another big American contribution!
Lodge
7. Summary Notes of the 555th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, January 5, 1966, 5:45-6:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the
President Only. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
Peace Offensive Regarding Vietnam
The Vice President: reported on a recent trip, to Japan, Korea, Formosa, and the Philippines./2/ (Copies
of the Vice President's memoranda are attached.)/3/ He said the theme of his report was expressed in a
sentence in Philippine President Marcos' speech: "Those who fight for liberty fight for us." This
sentence describes the attitude of the four countries visited.
/2/Humphrey returned to Washington on January 3 from a 5-day tour.
/3/Attached but not printed.
There is recognition by Asian leaders that Asians must do much more about their own problems in the
Asian area.
The Japanese are elated over our peace offensive and are supporting it by talking to the Russians.
The Philippinos are prepared to commit additional forces in Vietnam but they welcome the peace
offensive.
In Taiwan, skepticism was expressed about the peace offensive. They believe the enemy is Communist
China more than North Vietnam.
In Korea, the attitude toward the war is the best of the four countries. If the Koreans are asked to send

more troops to Vietnam, they will want assurances covering their security. They doubt that the peace
offensive will affect morale. Negotiations do not affect the commitment to South Vietnam.
In general, the peace offensive is supported, but doubts are expressed that it would produce any results.
Ambassador Goldberg reported on his conversations with UN Secretary General U Thant, the Pope,
Italian leaders, de Gaulle, and Prime Minister Wilson.
a. UN Secretary General U Thant said the peace offensive would test whether Hanoi was dominated by
Communist China.
b. The Pope accepted our sincerity, said he believed we were sincere in seeking peace, adding that he
would do everything he could to work for a settlement.
c. Italian leaders favored the bombing lull. They believed our action had been helpful to the Moro
government.
d. De Gaulle was polite but expressed his lack of confidence in the peace offensive. For him, the only
course of action is U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. Foreign Minister Couve took a slightly
different position, arguing that the National Liberation Front should be part of a coalition government
before negotiations could be undertaken.
e. Prime Minister Wilson spoke of a new British initiative as ICC co-chairman. He asked that the peace
offensive be prolonged long enough for the Soviets to react on the basis of Shelepin's visit.
USIA Director Marks summarized world press reaction to the peace offensive. The USIA summary is
attached./4/
/4/Attached but not printed.
In general, the peace initiative is welcomed but doubts are expressed that it will produce results. Some
writers think the peace offensive is merely a prelude to further military action.
The Japanese press is not helpful despite the favorable view of its government. In Latin America, the
press gives unreserved support. In the Middle East, press reaction is mixed.
Secretary Rusk summarized the scope of the peace offensive.
Of the 113 countries which have been contacted since the offensive was launched December 28, 70 have
responded. Of these, 57 countries have responded favorably, six countries received our representations
without comment, two countries (Thailand and South Korea) have indicated they think the U.S.
suspension of bombing is a mistake. The South Vietnamese are noncommittal, having stated no
objection so far.
Special emissaries have been sent to 34 foreign governments. (Further details are contained in a State
Department memorandum attached.)/5/
/5/Attached but not printed.
The reaction from the other side is not what it was last May when Hanoi rejected our note,/6/ Soviet

Foreign Minister Gromyko said the note was insulting, and the press from the first day said the pause
would not lead to negotiations. This time, none of these things happened.
/6/For text of the note, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, pp. 637-638.
Twenty-five secondary demarches are under way. The Yugoslavs tell us that Hanoi is under great
pressure.
Diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation in Southeast Asia began in Vienna with President Kennedy. A
serious effort is being made to find a solution and it is generally believed that if this fails, our full
military effort in South Vietnam will be renewed. However, if we resume the bombing, we will lose the
support of almost all those who now support us. Mr. Shelepin leaves tomorrow but we do not know how
long he will stay.
On the political side, we have had a plus for the last ten days, but the situation in South Vietnam has not
improved.
Our position will erode here if we wait much longer to resume the bombing but abroad we will lose
support if we resume.
Secretary Rusk said he wished to discuss privately with the President on the next moves./7/
/7/The President met in his office at 6:45 p.m. on January 5 with Rusk, Humphrey, McNamara, Ball,
McGeorge Bundy, Valenti, and Goldberg to discuss two possible moves: 1) taking the issue to the
United Nations, and 2) calling a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, Soviet Union,
DRV, GVN, and Communist China. Ball proposed the second alternative in a January 5 memorandum
to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy,
vol. 18) Valenti's brief notes of the meeting are ibid., President's Appointment File.
Secretary McNamara said the problem of timing the resumption of the bombing was serious. The
American people looked at the situation soberly. The Administration is speaking with one voice. It is
very helpful that divergent views are not being publicized.
The President: We are in a difficult position but it is a much better position than if we had not responded
to the urging that we hold off bombing to see whether this would lead to peace. We have made the
record clear. We can return to the earlier situation if the pause does not work. We have a better basis to
call on the U.S. people not only for their sons, but also their treasure. Americans feel better if they know
we have gone the last mile even if we have had grave doubts about doing so. The basis for a
supplemental budget to pay the increased costs of the war has been laid. Secretary Rusk and
Ambassador Goldberg will pursue whatever leads they may get.
We don't intend to become weaker in Southeast Asia. We are following a course to unite our people and
make possible a follow through. The diplomatic offensive boils down to saying that we are ready to
reason this out. One poll shows that 73 percent of the American people wanted us to increase our
diplomatic efforts. In the last twelve months, 200 conferences have been held by Secretary Rusk in an
attempt to get negotiations going. But his efforts are not known publicly. Tonight, more people in the
U.S. and the world think we want peace than thought so two weeks ago. This is an asset.
Bromley Smith

8. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to the
Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge)/1/
New York, January 6, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. In a January 7 covering
memorandum under which he forwarded the letter to Read for dispatch to Saigon, Sisco noted that it had
been requested by the President and read and approved by Rusk and Ball. (Ibid.)
Dear Cabot:
I am writing you from your old hot seat, having just returned from my brief trip to the Vatican, Paris and
London, which I undertook at the President's request./2/ From these two vantage points, I thought you
might be interested in my own feelings regarding the key decisions ahead--particularly those relating to
the resumption of the bombing.
/2/Goldberg returned to Washington on January 2 following his European tour.
First, and of overriding importance: the envoys and messages despatched by the President during the
past two weeks, as well as current discussions with foreign diplomats in Washington, have one essential
purpose: to enlist the aid of others in finding out whether, as often claimed by both our friends and foes,
our bombing of North Vietnam has in fact been a decisive obstacle to Hanoi's agreement either to begin
negotiations or to reduce its military activities against South Vietnam.
In my view, it is vital that the initiatives we have thus set in train be allowed a reasonable time to
produce a convincing answer to this question. Further, I believe that during this period it is essential the
United States avoid any action which would lay us open to charges of insincerity or bad faith in our
current peace offensive or, at the minimum, of being too impatient to permit adequate time for a
meaningful response from Hanoi. I am convinced that an immediate resumption of the bombings would
lay us open to such charges--not only from friend and foe, but also from some of the very parties whose
assistance we have sought in the past two weeks. Finally, along this same line of thought, I believe that a
resumption of the bombing prior to or during Shelepin's forthcoming trip to North Vietnam would not
only be widely considered provocative but would be almost certain to rule out whatever chance there
may be of his advising Hanoi that it should react in a forthcoming way to our current peace offensive.
Second: It goes without saying that the Administration is approaching a time of great decision
concerning our future actions in Vietnam--decisions which will directly and substantially affect the lives
and fortunes of all Americans. While I do not doubt the American people will accept whatever sacrifices
are necessary to protect vital national interests, I think it would be a serious political mistake for the
Administration to make and carry out these decisions--without first demonstrating beyond any
reasonable doubt that no stone has been left unturned in the effort to begin negotiations on Vietnam. To
do this, I consider it necessary that the suspension of bombings be continued long enough so that no
significant number of Americans will believe or can claim the Administration has not fully tested
Hanoi's willingness to negotiate. As you have probably seen, the latest opinion poll shows that over 70%
of the American people favor the bombing pause.
In my view, a full test of its impact is even more necessary if, as you suggest, the Communists are
determined to drag out the conflict in Vietnam until the 1968 elections./3/ If such is the case, our task at
home will not be to convince the American people they must live with a cold war--as in Europe during
the late 1940s and early 1950s; rather, it will be to convince them to learn to live with a hot war of

growing proportions and costs for three more years.

/3/See paragraphs 3A and 3B of telegram 2399, Document 6. For Lodge's response to Goldberg's
comments, see Document 20.
Let me say in conclusion that I would, of course, want to reconsider the position I have outlined above if
there were convincing evidence that the political disadvantages, both domestic and international, which I
see to an immediate resumption of bombing were outweighed either by the military disadvantages of
prolonging the suspension or by the growth of significant dissatisfaction with our actions among South
Vietnamese leaders. In all frankness, however, I must say that the information available to me from
Washington sources is far from convincing me that such is now the case. I shall of course follow your
future reports with the closest attention, particularly in regard to these two points.
Sincerely,
Arthur J. Goldberg
9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, January 6, 1965, 5:07 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Literally Eyes Only;
Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and in substance by U. Alexis Johnson,
and approved by Rusk. Repeated to the White House.
1907. For Ambassador from Secretary.
1. We have all read and carefully noted your 2399/2/ concerning the current position and Vietnamese
reaction to it. Also your comments on the President's letter to Menzies.
/2/Document 6.
2. As the Menzies letter indicates, we have reaped very considerable dividends from this whole effort in
terms of both present and future support. At the same time, the intense activity already evident in the
Communist bloc, and particularly Shelepin's visit to Hanoi,/3/ have convinced us that suspension must
continue for the present, partly on the slight chance that Hanoi may respond, and also to maintain and
solidify domestic and international support. In reaching this decision, we have of course weighed the
serious arguments contained in your 2399, but believe that the wider factors must be over-riding for the
time being including strongly affirmative response from 40 or 50 nations and widely encountered pleas
that we give adequate time for response from Hanoi.
/3/Indian Prime Minister Shastri reported to President Johnson in a January 6 letter that Kosygin had
told him that Shelepin's visit was "intended to help the cause of peace." (Telegram 1218 to New Delhi,
January 7; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. Accordingly, we believe you yourself should now see Ky to get his understanding and concurrence in
continuation, and that message should also reach Thieu, Do, and others, as you think best, so that
possibilities of misunderstanding are minimized. Following are points you may draw on in your
presentation.
a. You may draw fully on account of diplomatic activity in Menzies letter. You may explain that this

activity has in itself greatly strengthened worldwide support and understanding for GVN/US position
and has created situation in which, if Hanoi fails to respond and we resume, we will do so with very
wide and strong worldwide and domestic support. In short, we are clearing the decks for whatever action
may be necessary, and GVN should have no doubt that we will in fact do whatever is necessary as we
have done in the past.
b. We need the additional time period to drive this point home, particularly in light of Shelepin visit.
c. You should frankly explain, to extent you may not already have done so, that one major purpose of
our effort is to exploit differences of view within Communist bloc. While we have no concrete reason to
expect that Sovs will in any way be helpful, this suspension may well have sharpened divisions between
Sovs and their friends, on one hand, and Chicoms, with favorable implications for the future of a free
South Viet-Nam.
d. As stated in Menzies letter, there has been no change in Hanoi position and we have no intention of
being taken in by mere gestures. Our military action in the South and our reinforcements have continued
and will continue. We believe Hanoi is under no delusion that our action has reflected any change
whatever in our determination to see this thing through.
e. Next week President will submit supplemental appropriation for all aspects of effort in Viet-Nam at
level presently estimated to be $13 billion. This sum for over-runs in Fiscal 1966 will bring home to
Congress and country full magnitude of stakes in Viet-Nam and Congress needs full demonstration that
every possible opening for peace is being explored.
f. We of course recognize that suspension of bombing gives other side some temporary military
advantages. At same time, Ky well knows that we have continued heavy attacks on infiltration routes in
Laos. He should also be aware that resumed bombing can deal fairly quickly with any repairs Hanoi has
been able to make in communications routes and other military targets that we would expect to attack
promptly upon resumption.
g. There may well be some sort of climax during Shelepin visit. If there should be any sign of a
substantive change in Hanoi's position, or on other hand if Hanoi's lack of response becomes clear, we
will be in urgent consultation with GVN. They can count absolutely on our maintaining fundamental
positions stated in 14 points (which you should give them).
Rusk
10. Memorandum From James Thomson and Donald Ropa of the National Security Council Staff
to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, January 7, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Secret.
SUBJECT
The New Year in Asia
VIETNAM
The Program Front

Political Dynamics. South Vietnam, under the rule of a ten-man military Directorate, for almost seven
months has experienced greater political stability than at any time since early 1963. However, the
political rivalries and conflicts within the Vietnamese social fabric have not been resolved nor
eliminated. Rather, the absence of serious political turmoil appears in large part a result of the
assumption of authority by the one element currently strong enough to wield it--the leaders of the armed
forces. Additionally, political improvement is the result of the more concrete U.S. military and political
commitment of the past year, which has checked the previous prospect of accelerating internal collapse
and Communist takeover.
The present military regime's surface display of unity to date is largely the result of a diffusion of real
power among four or five generals. None of these seems so far to have sufficient personal strength or
motive to upset the balance. This alliance, however, clearly remains tenuous, and the strains among the
ruling generals have resulted, in recent weeks, in renewed rumors of coup plotting. Ky's government is
not in imminent danger, but an eventual coup attempt cannot be discounted. Our people in Saigon
believe that Ky would step down if so requested by the Directorate, but he displays no obvious signs of
discouragement and voices no concern over possible coup attempts.
To date Ky's government has been notably unsuccessful in developing significant popular enthusiasm or
positive political support. Ky grasps the country's problems in general, but his ambitious programs of
political, social and economic reforms have made only marginal headway. Neither increased security
nor government presence have been brought to any significant new portion of the rural population. Still,
conditions have not deteriorated. Ky has demonstrated considerable adroitness in balancing competing
pressures from Buddhists and Catholics and other factions. Civilian groups at present appear reluctant to
take political initiatives without adequate power to assure the outcome. However, a greater test of the
government may come as the war intensifies and demands on it increase, particularly in the economic
and pacification fields.
Already, the government is under growing pressure from religious and political groups to broaden the
area of civilian participation and to provide some legal framework toward the eventual restoration of
civilian control. Although some generals, particularly Ky, are reluctant to open up any official channel
for disruptive civilian tactics, the Directorate intends to establish early this year a council with some
advisory authority. The advisory council will be tasked with drafting a permanent constitution.
Although Embassy surveys have so far uncovered little adverse popular reaction to the U.S. military
role--including air-strikes--in intensifying the war, the Embassy has reported considerable public
apprehension over growing civilian casualties. There is some danger that prolonged and more intensive
fighting will generate resentment against the U.S. or the Saigon government, and pressure for peace-atany-price by pacifistic elements such as the Buddhists. Currently, Saigon's ruling generals continue to
express opposition to any negotiations under conditions of near-stalemate, or to any settlement in which
the South Vietnamese would be forced to compete politically with the Viet Cong.
Economic Dynamics. The Economy of South Vietnam operated under considerable inflationary pressure
during 1965, and this pressure is expected to intensify during 1966. A large deficit in the GVN budget,
the increase in U.S. forces, and the increase of local spending for military and civilian construction
placed new demands on the economy during 1965. Supply problems were exacerbated by port
bottlenecks, Viet Cong interdiction of transportation routes, and a shortage of labor. The resulting
imbalance between demand and supply generated price rises of at least 35 to 40 percent in Saigon and in
areas where Viet Cong activity and the U.S. force buildup were intensified.
During 1966, the GVN budget deficit could rise from 15-18 billion piasters estimated for 1965 to 20
billion piasters or more. U.S. and other foreign troops spending and local purchases for construction

may jump from about 10 billion piasters in 1965 to an estimated 30 billion piasters in 1966. The total of
50-55 billion piasters for budget deficit and foreign spending (compared to about 29 billion piasters in
1965) is equivalent to about one-third of all goods and services available in Vietnam in 1965 and is
substantially more than the present money supply of 42 billion piasters. Since these inflationary
pressures will be working against a far smaller stock of idle resources in the economy, their impact will
be more severe and more difficult to contain than during 1965.
The major factor restraining inflation has been the supply of AID-financed commercial imports and PL
480 commodities. A second factor has been the willingness of the Vietnamese to hold a part of
additional income in the form of money. During 1965, there was some evidence that price rises have
begun to discourage money holdings and to increase the demand for goods. This trend poses an added
threat during 1966.
Shortages of construction materials and luxury items resulted in sharp price increases during 1965, and
specific material resources will continue to be in short supply during 1966. Anticipated increases in
1966 U.S. expenditures for construction in Vietnam will have additional repercussions in the manpower
sector of the economy. Wage rates for most categories of skilled construction workers have doubled
during the last year. Wages for unskilled labor have not increased as sharply but are estimated to have
increased by at least 50 percent in Saigon. With the exception of rural labor in isolated areas,
Vietnamese manpower resources are now fully employed.
Control of the inflationary threat to economic (and hence political) stability during 1966 is clearly
dependent on U.S. and GVN countermeasures. For example, the U.S. could meet the bulk of the
requirements for skilled labor and critical commodities needed to expand port facilities and for military
construction, from sources outside of South Vietnam. Additional measures to control in-country
spending by foreign personnel are possible. Similarly, new GVN fiscal measures, such as increased
taxes, are under consideration to soak up excess purchasing power. But even under the best of
circumstances, the problem is to limit inflation to manageable levels in 1966, not to aim for price
stability.
Pacification. Pacification on a nationwide basis made very little tangible progress during the past year.
The pacification program in the Hop Tac/2/ area around Saigon, which was fairly active until May 1965,
was one exception. Overall, however, much of the military manpower necessary to provide security as
well as to clear areas in the initial phases of pacification operations was diverted to replace battle losses
inflicted by the stepped up pace of Viet Cong military action. Moreover, assets devoted to pacification
have been largely diverted to handling the large flow of refugees.
/2/A program initiated in 1964 to pacify six provinces around Saigon.
With the general deterioration of the security situation in many parts of I, II, and III Corps, pacification
has largely been confined to areas immediately adjacent to centers of government control such as major
urban areas and provincial or district capitals. At best, pacification efforts in these three Corps areas can
only be termed minimal. In the IV Corps area, government control expanded somewhat. In this region,
however, the Viet Cong still control large amounts of territory which have not experienced any
government influence or presence for several years. The pacification effort has also suffered from the
successive changes of government that occurred in 1965.
Advances have been difficult to measure. However, plans have been made and initiated which could
have a beneficial effect on the pacification effort. The Ky government has decided to institute three high
priority programs which will point the way for a greater overall effort in years to come. These areas are

the Qui Nhon area of Binh Dinh Province, Quang Nam Province, and a showcase area near Saigon-located in the now dormant Hop Tac area. Other planned improvements include reorganization to effect
more direct civilian control down to the province level, and the restructuring and consolidation of the
various cadres now existing into a single national pacification cadre corps.
Much of the GVN's thinking is still in the formative stage, and it remains to be seen whether this can be
translated into effective action. Some laudable steps have been taken to get the 1966 program underway
on time, but many problems remain to be solved before an effective pacification program can be
effected.
Land Reform. The Ky government is giving renewed emphasis to the land reform program begun under
the Diem regime in 1955, and is making limited progress. The present program is still plagued by the
dissatisfaction of expropriated landlords, numbering only about 2,000, and their political backers. The
major obstacles to a psychologically and politically productive program, however, continue to be the
lack of security in the countryside, which inhibits the work of surveyors and investigators, the slow
trickle of funds from Saigon to the provinces, and a shortage of manpower resulting from the stepped-up
military draft.
Under the new government policy, permanent titles are being granted to farmers who purchased land
under the old ordinance, and the period of payment has been extended to 12 years. Additionally, former
French lands, totaling 225,000 hectares, are being subdivided and sold to the farmers who till them.
State-owned lands, totaling some 300,000 hec-tares, are also to be distributed to 180,000 farmers now
occupying them as squatters. Changes have been made in the terms governing rental of farm lands, with
all leases being extended to five-year contracts, and collection of back rentals has been eliminated in
newly secured areas. Finally, competitive bidding for the rental of communal land--a procedure devised
by the Diem regime to raise national and local taxes--has been eliminated, but new procedures for
making this land available to landless farmers have not yet been worked out.
These recent changes are designed as short-term measures. A long-term program contemplates reduced
retention of land by landlords, further extension of tenancy contracts, and further distribution of public
land. A major unresolved problem is that of conflicting ownership rights resulting from land distribution
activities by the Viet Minh during the Indochina War and by the Viet Cong more recently in areas under
their control. The problem is under study, but the government program, with its provisions for farmer
payments for the purchase of expropriated land and its collection of land rentals, has long been at some
disadvantage vis-a-vis the Viet Cong program. Increasingly harsh Viet Cong taxation policies of the past
two years, and increased Communist requisition of rice from the peasants, will probably help the
government in this problem area.
The Refugee Problem. This has expanded to tremendous proportions during the past year, particularly
since July. At latest report, a cumulative total of 745,800 persons has been processed by the government.
More than half of the present refugee population--463,000--is still living in temporary refugee shelter
areas at what is little more than a subsistence level of existence.
The large influx of refugees has been caused by a combination of circumstances: natural disaster, a
decline in security which has resulted in mass movement of people to safer areas, and the increased level
of large-scale friendly operations. At the present time over ninety percent of the current refugee
population is concentrated in the coastal lowlands area of I, II, and III Corps zones and is a serious strain
on the refugee relief machinery.
Although the refugee situation remains serious, it had not reached the proportions by the end of 1965

that GVN and U.S. officials had anticipated. However, most of the effort that would have been devoted
to pacifying and developing the countryside has had to be diverted to care for refugees. This situation
will prevail until refugees can either be relocated to permanent settlements or returned to their home
areas. Moreover, the large refugee population remaining in temporary shelters is fertile ground for the
Viet Cong to sow discord. It may be expected that the refugee problem will intensify if the tempo of
military operations, particularly in the central coastal lowlands, continues to increase.
Chieu Hoi./3/ The Chieu Hoi program has shown signs of improvement in techniques of exploitation
and programming in the past several months with several significant and successful psychological
warfare operations being mounted against the Viet Cong. This has been especially true in rapid followup action to ground operations. However, the program still has several glaring weaknesses, especially in
processing and providing for the Chieu Hoi returnee. Crowded returnee centers, a shortage of
administrative personnel, and a lack of facilities to rehabilitate the returnee have hampered the total
effectiveness of the effort. Some first steps have been taken by the government to correct these
inadequacies, but much work remains to be done.
/3/The Government of South Vietnam's amnesty program designed to win back the allegiance of Viet
Cong.
During 1965, according to government reports, a total of 42,552 persons returned to the government
side. Although the majority were civilians, there were a total of 10,391 military personnel who also
"rallied" to the government cause. In 1964, there was a total of 14,465 returnees, of whom only 1,903
were military defectors.
The Montagnards. Although an uprising by dissident tribesmen in the central highlands area in midDecember was promptly quashed, there is little prospect of an early resolution of the problem of tribal
unrest and loyalty. Mutual antipathy and distrust between ethnic Vietnamese and the approximately
500,000 ethnic Malayan tribesmen inhabiting the highlands has deep historic roots.
The appeal among the Montagnards of FULRO, the tribal autonomy movement, is traceable not only to
long-standing tribal aspirations for autonomy and preservation of tribal customs, but to a series of
grievances with the Vietnamese governments of the past 10 years. These grievances range from ethnic
Vietnamese encroachment on their communal lands during the Diem regime, to lack of fulfillment by
Diem's successors of promises of increased aid and political representation in Saigon. Although the
current Saigon officials apparently plan to deal leniently with most of the rank-and-file FULRO
sympathizers, the execution of four FULRO leaders, and the sentencing of about 30 others, have
probably stirred new tribal resentment and anticipation of harsh government treatment. There is
evidence that Montagnard leaders previously supporting the government are increasingly sympathetic to
FULRO.
There is no evidence to date that FULRO leader Y-Bham Enoul or his top lieutenants are cooperating
with the Viet Cong. On the contrary, reports indicate that propaganda attacks, and a few minor clashes,
have occurred between FULRO and the Communists, who have long sponsored their own tribal
autonomy movement. There are nevertheless reports of some Communist penetration of FULRO's
second-level hierarchy. Such elements may be deliberately seeking to harden FULRO's demands and
force a final break with the government.
At present, even a renewed government determination to carry out reforms and aid programs for the
Montagnards seems likely to have little prospect of banishing tribal suspicions--or Vietnamese
snobbery--in the early future. The reliability and effectiveness of the numerous tribal paramilitary units

will thus probably remain uncertain for the next year or so, and the opportunities for the Viet Cong to
exploit the situation, or to win increasing cooperation from the tribes, may be enhanced.
[Here follows discussion of Northeast Asia, the "two Chinas," the Southwest Pacific, and Southeast
Asia.]
11. Memorandum From Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Fortas to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 7, 1966.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075,
Vietnam, 1966. Secret. The source text is stamped: "Sec Def has seen, 8 Jan 1966."
RE
Viet Nam
Suggestion:
The U.S. by formal note, perhaps to U Thant, would state that:
1. We will commence withdrawal from Viet Nam as soon as a cease-fire is agreed to and we will
complete withdrawal within the shortest reasonable time, not later than 3(?) years thereafter. (We might
express the hope or "assumption" that appropriate provision for U.N. inspection or other implementation
will be made.)
2. We have no interest in acquiring, establishing or maintaining any military bases in Southeast Asia
(with such restrictions or qualifications as need be made).
3. I would hope that we could go further and say that we would accept a cease-fire on terms acceptable
to a representative group of states. This could be defined in various ways: The Geneva Conference
group as reconstituted; a group designated by the Secretary General or elected by the Assembly; etc.
Appraisal of Present Situation:
1. There persists widespread doubt as to the integrity of our intentions--despite all that has been done.
The articulate doubts are principally based upon (1) the ambiguity of our statements as to the time of
withdrawal, and the interpretation that we will not withdraw until a non-Communist Government is
established for South Vietnam; and (2) our continued silence as to whether we will "deal with" the NLF.
2. I anticipate that the Soviet Mission will result in a Soviet bomber and missile buildup in North
Vietnam. The net effect may be a substantial Soviet "presence" in North Vietnam. This is a threat, but it
may have advantages as follows:
(1) It will accentuate the Soviet-Chinese confrontation.
(2) It may reduce the disadvantages of U.S. withdrawal and result in a positive benefit, perhaps confined
to the short-range. Substantial Soviet "presence" in North Vietnam would mean that (a) the Chinese
route to domination of Southeast Asia would be in check by the Soviet Union; (b) the two great
Communist powers would be in potential conflict at a new and critical point; (c) the Soviet Union would
have an additional and vexatious burden. It is necessary to realize that, long-range, this, or anything

short of our military victory in the theatre may underline the danger of Communist (Soviet or Chinese)
domination of Southeast Asia. But it is possible that we can deal with the long-range, with future
problems, more advantageously if we are out of Viet Nam than if we are there, engaged in what appears
to be a long war of dubious extent and debatable outcome.
A.F./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
12. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State/1/
Tokyo, January 8, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The
source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:18 a.m. and passed
to the White House at 10. McGeorge Bundy forwarded this telegram to President Johnson at 1:30 p.m.
on January 8 under cover of a memorandum stating: "Harriman fires all his arguments at us on keeping
the Pause going." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy,
vol. 18)
2391. For the President and the Secretary from Harriman.
1. Having found myself with my first relatively free day here in Tokyo, I feel that it might be useful to
summarize my reactions to my trip so far./2/
/2/Between December 29 and January 7, Harriman met with foreign leaders in Poland, Yugoslavia,
India, Pakistan, Iran, the United Arab Republic, Thailand, and Japan.
2. Reischauer tells me that the reaction here during the first several days of what everyone now calls
President Johnson's peace offensive was tinged with a certain amount of skepticism. The government in
Japan has supported our efforts in Vietnam, but even in Foreign Ministry circles, I am told, there was
some feeling that the bombing pause and the peace offensive might be aimed more at justifying to the
American people a subsequent expansion of military action than at a real desire and expectation that
peace might be attained. As the facts have come out about what we have done and are doing to bring
about negotiations and a peaceful settlement, there has been a steadily growing acceptance of the
President's effort. This is being accompanied by a willingness on the part of the Japanese Government to
seek ways in which they can help to bring influence to bear on Moscow and Hanoi, and perhaps on
Peiping, to reduce the tempo of fighting and move towards a peaceful solution.
3. This experience in Japan is generally similar to what I have observed at other stops along the way. All
the government leaders I have seen have agreed to use their influence where they considered useful but
have said time was necessary to achieve results and they urged patience.
4. I do feel the tide of support and understanding for our position in Vietnam is rising. During the past
two weeks, I believe, the seeds of the President's peace offensive have been planted and are showing
promising signs of healthy growth.
5. It is too early, however, to expect a real harvest either in the form of consolidating world opinion on
our side or of bringing North Vietnam to the conference table. If we were to cut short our efforts at this
time and resume the bombing we would end up with few if any gains. In fact those leaders who had

started to take actions on behalf of the peace offensive would feel let down and there might be such
general disillusionment as to leave us in no better position in world opinion and perhaps worse in some
countries than we were before.
6. On the other hand enough progress has been made in world public opinion to justify continuation of
the pause long enough to allow this opinion to solidify on our side. This in turn would increase pressures
on Hanoi that might produce some favorable response now or in the future.
7. I hope very much, therefore, that, barring a major provocation clearly attributable to the initiative of
Hanoi, the pause in the bombing will be continued until the end of the Vietnamese new year period (Tet,
which I understand ends January 23) particularly since there are, I hear, proposals for a cease-fire during
the Tet period. Reischauer strongly agrees with me, pointing out that we are making more progress with
Japanese public opinion during this period than in the whole of the preceding twelve months. I believe
that all the other U.S. Ambassadors I have visited would also be in agreement. I realize the pause is
being bought at the cost of certain military disadvantages but I feel that these are definitely outweighed
by the importance of gaining the support of governments and worldwide public opinion.
Reischauer
13. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-16-66
Washington, January 8, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. McNamara forwarded the
memorandum to Rusk on January 19. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Air Operations Against North Vietnam (U)
1. (C) This memorandum provides the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on air
strikes against North Vietnam (NVN). It reflects their conviction that continuation of the stand-down is
placing our forces under serious and progressively increasing military disadvantage.
2. (S) Air strikes against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) are an essential complement to
US/Free World military operations in South Vietnam (SVN). The direct pressure of these air strikes is a
principal means of persuading the DRV to cease its support and direction of the insurgency in SVN. The
present stand-down contravenes that purpose and greatly weakens US negotiating leverage. Increased
military actions in Laos or in SVN do not compensate for the loss of this leverage on the DRV nor for
cessation of interference with the lines of communication (LOCs) in the DRV.
3. (S) There is increasing evidence that considerable effort to repair damaged LOCs in NVN is now
underway. Air defense capabilities are being improved, and a general recovery program is underway.
While intelligence is lacking, DRV self-interest dictates that an increased flow of personnel and war
material is moving to SVN. On the basis of past experience, confirming evidence may not become
available until personnel and material are identified in SVN or until new units make contact with
friendly forces. Of additional concern is the growing ability of the DRV, through reconstitution of its
LOCs, to support overt aggression in the south. Thus, the results of our costly air effort against the north
will have been negated unless operations of expanded scope are soon resumed. The decision to resume

air strikes should be based on enemy capabilities to improve their posture. It should not be contingent
upon obtaining hard evidence of infiltration and build-up in SVN.
4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the merits of peace offensives, especially with respect to their
impact on US and world opinion. However, experience cautions against the substantial risk in an all-out
effort for negotiations during a stand-down. As time passes, it will become increasingly difficult to
disengage from the stand-down. Protracted negotiations under these circumstances may, as in the
Korean case, prove costly in American lives.
5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the early resumption of offensive air operations essential if we
are to avoid a misinterpretation of US resolve in Southeast Asia, redress advantages accruing to the
DRV from the stand-down, and enter into meaningful negotiations from a position of strength.
6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommended that a policy decision be taken now to
terminate the stand-down of offensive air operations against the DRV 48 hours subsequent to Shelepin's
return to Moscow from Hanoi, by which time the Soviets would have had opportunity to communicate
to us any substantive results of his visit.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/2/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
14. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 10, 1966, 1:10-2:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes.
PRESENT
President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Taylor, Helms, Ball, Wheeler, Moyers, Valenti
SUBJECT
Peace Offensive, discussions with Congressional leadership, next steps, diplomatic and military
Rusk: Will brief Congressional leadership. Need to work out some procedures in conjunction with
peace. Some hardening of Soviet position since Chicom attacks on them.
President: Have 25 men who advise on foreign policy. Lippmann, Alsop, etc. All these fellows will be
speaking their judgment.
A minority will recommend their own too.
535 members have to give their report. Hardest thing is to say: "I don't [know] anything."
Ought to give serious thought not to getting the leaders down here but have the men around this table to
appear at as many hearings as possible--and give them something to have to chew on before their mind
hardens. To lay our case before them.
We have asked each person who has come back to town (Congressmen). Of the 104 who have been
queried, only 8 or 9 have problems economically. What most interests him is Viet Nam; 80 feel we
ought to follow current course, 10% want out, 10% want to go on.
Rivers wants us to go on with bombing. Morse wants us to get out. and you'll have this dichotomy.
Think Russell will be less likely to comment on his opinions after Rusk testifies.
People will be upset and AP and UPI will provoke them.
Sat down with Dirksen and Mansfield--and if we can get our story over to appropriate committees, it

would be better.
McNamara: Supposed to start the 19th.
President: I guess that's all right. They will start talking the Mansfield report/2/ on Friday 14th.
/2/Presumably a reference to a report made by Mansfield and Aiken on a trip that they and three other
Senators took to Vietnam in December 1965. Mansfield and Aiken reported to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in excutive session on January 11. For text, see Executive Sessions of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. XVIII, pp. 3-38. Mansfield sent the President a
written report, "Vietnam: The Situation and Outlook," December 17, 1965. (Johnson Library,
Confidential File, MC/CO) A modified public version, "The Viet Nam Conflict: The Substance and the
Shadow," was published as a committee print by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January
1966.
What better way do we have to tell our story except through the Secretaries and the Committees?
Rusk: Perhaps give a luncheon for official leadership of two Houses--and talk with them.
President: That is excellent:
Speaker
Boggs
Long
Ford
Dirksen
Kuchel
Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations
Mansfield
Albert
Russell
Fulbright
Hayden
Rivers
Morgan

Mahon
Now what about our military and diplomatic situation? When do we announce Harriman's visit to Viet
Nam?
Bundy: We'd rather have VN Government announce this.
President: I'd like to get it out today.
Bundy: If we go out there right now, it will be out here this evening.
President: Should we say anything about a proposal in VN in our Soviet message?
Rusk: No, unless we get something concrete today from Goldberg.
President: Can we summarize where we are now?
Rusk: Good deal of activity on the other side. Some statements are aimed at each other as well as us.
Some Soviet statements have been aimed at Peiping. Don't have clear answer to what we've been doing.
Don't think we are going to get a clear cut answer--probably some complicated answer. 5-10% chance
we'll get something less than a harsh rejection.
Will take a few days to get anything. Shelepin will wind up by Wednesday/3/ I believe. Leave SOTU/4/
for revision pretty close to actual delivery in case of Hanoi and Shelepin developments. About 3:00 p.m.
will be satisfactory.
/3/January 12.
/4/State of the Union message.
Bundy: You can announce Harriman this afternoon--if you choose.
President: Good.
Rusk: We have word of 600-700 suspects picked up by Koreans--how many are actually guilty?
Wheeler: About 10-15% turn out to be VC or sympathizers. Vietnamese and village chiefs do the
interrogating.
President: What do you think about VN, General Taylor?
Taylor: Extension of bombing pause after Christmas was good--if only to show Government sincerity.
But now value is wearing off--danger of extending it--and get trapped into premature negotiations. We
need to get word of caution out--2 years of negotiating in Korea. Being successful in getting a
conference might be a failure.
President: Why can't we get on with bombing after Shelepin leaves?
Rusk: Serious political disadvantages if we break the Christmas through Tet pause. If we start bombing
again, we would have to start all over again. There is no political advantage. There may be military

advantage to bombing again.

McNamara: Don't think there is a military disadvantage in starting up 3 or 4 days earlier. We are ready
to bomb again within 12 hours. We are running all sorties over Laos instead of NVN. Weather.
President: Reconnaissance show anything alarming?
McNamara: Renewing daytime operations--building bridges. Even during bombing they were building
up infiltration.
Wheeler: Disagree, Bob. Every day makes a difference. We know both arms of railroad are operational.
Assume getting full benefit of supplies. Full scale daylight operations are going on. Every day increases
their capability in the South. Chiefs conclude we should make policy decision to resume air operations
against Hanoi as soon as Shelepin leaves. They are improving anti-aircraft defenses.
Rusk: We have to keep this on a day-to-day basis. Keep looking.
Bundy: Real problem is we decide on interval basis to bomb again. We need to put out the Wheeler info
before we bomb again. While it was right to get the pause going, we need now to be saying all these
things to clear the way for bombing resumption. As you pointed out, we have done enough to satisfy the
world, but no matter when we start someone will say we should have waited one week longer. At least
30% of our accredited nations will protest bombing resumption.
Taylor: We have 3 blue chips--bombing--large number of troops--withdrawal.
Under what circumstances do we continue cessation of bombing--which means no way of pushing
pressure on the other way. No way of proving cease-fire violations.
Wheeler: We simply cannot prove that NVN are there--until we absolutely capture them.
Taylor: We could adjust our bombing to the ratio of incidents.
President: What's the net of your testimony to the Congress, Dean?
Rusk: On VN, run over the summary of diplomatic negotiations. Key question is how much we tell them
in so far as sensitive info is concerned. Problems posed by Lynd./5/
/5/Telegram 1947 to Saigon, January 9, reported: "New York Times today carried Moscow story of Lynd
interview in which Lynd claims that he and others asked Pham Van Dong whether USG had approached
DRV through Ambassadors or directly since Dec. 20. Pham Van Dong is quoted as answering in
categorical negative." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Staughton Lynd elaborated
on his interview with Pham Van Dong in a debriefing by James Leonard of INR on January 11.
(Memorandum of conversation, January 13; ibid.)
Pres: I would answer "No good purpose to be served by going into details. Lynd is uninformed man."
Ball: We have avoided official confirmation of any direct contact in VN.
15. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 11, 1966, 1:05-2:05 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. In a
memorandum written at 1 p.m. on January 11, McGeorge Bundy told President Johnson that the "main
point" of the meeting with Bell was "simply to emphasize the importance of the non-military effort by
having Bell report on the record to you." (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18)
PRESENT
The President, McNamara, Bill Bundy, Mac Bundy, David Bell, Alexis Johnson, Bill Moyers, Jack
Valenti/2/
/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that Ball was also present. (Johnson Library)
SUBJECT
David Bell's return/3/
/3/Bell visited Vietnam January 1-5. For his written report to the President, see Document 28.
Bell: Four essentials: 1. Pacification for rural construction. 2. Resources allocation and inflation. 3.
Emphasis on non military aspects. 4. Miscellaneous.
Number one problem is rural pacification. Today SVN army can no longer clear any area; must have our
troops. But even so can't hold it. Difficult problem. Must restore some kind of government system that
serves the people. A new spirit is needed--local security is needed. Is not being done now. Some areas
are thoroughly pacified but have always been historically.
We are not yet following up and increasing hold so people can see positive future for themselves.
Nothing new--but did find neither the SVN nor Americans are adequately on top of this problem.
General Khanh has done a good job to learn this task. His deputy Col. Chon is one of the best--now
recruiting and training Vietnamese teams.
Ben de Pugh on our side understands the problem. Col. Sam Wilson also good. Plans to concentrate in 4
limited priority areas. If they accomplish even this, they will have affected 1/20 or 1/10 of rural
population but it will be first time this has happened. Key question--can we get even this little done.
Will take 80 man teams to go into each hamlet and village and stay for months at a time. Begin to build
a political system and root out VC. Takes heavy volume of VN manpower to do this. Strong back-up
needed also--(AID, CIA, USIA, etc.).
Disturbed because in general setup of U.S. mission, no one is really in charge of this sort of operation.
Tentative conclusion is (agreed to by Westmoreland, Mann, Lodge) to place responsibility on
Ambassador Porter, give him small staff, integrate the overall program. Can bring in wholly new man
but this has drawbacks.
This is number one objective save for the actual fighting to be undertaken in coming year.
Resource Allocation
VN economy has changed--now in boom situation. Resources over-strained, prices going up. Plans are
not made as to how to distribute manpower. Can't do anything about land reform because no men

available. Need someone in U.S. mission akin to James Byrnes' job in WW II. Would identify resources
and spotlight issues. Requires office and man not now in VN. Checked with Ambassador Lodge but
neither of us are sure about this.
Did a lot of work on inflation. Laid out a complete set of measurements to control inflation. Principal
one is to limit VN budget expenses. Increase taxes (agreed not yet done). Limit to maximum possible
extent the spending by American troops. (Budget deficits, troop spending, military construction program
are three big sources of inflation.)
Difficult to really prevent American troop spending.
Think we have the impact of spending and construction as low as possible.
U.S. and VN are agreed on approximate volume of imports required. About double the imports over last
year. From $200M to $400M AID. Demand for increased imports are already on us. Already have to
transfer funds to get us through January.
Finally, over and above this will be necessary to take monetary action, even to devalue currency. Not
now because of volatile situation. Meantime, series of actions suggested--putting some money through
black market in Hong Kong. VN wanted to sell gold but told them it was out of the question. Inflation
problem is not fully met today.
Ports
Badly jammed. Coastal ports are being worked on and in few months will be able to handle traffic.
Saigon is another problem. 500,000 tons by next October. We have man out there from New York Port
Authority who is good man.
Through the coming year need to take series of steps which will improve the port. Can't be done now
because of administrative set up.
Recommend Ky establish a single-headed Port Authority--put tough guy in charge. Put high ranking
military man along side him. Ky accepted recommendation in principle--has not carried it out.
Non military aspects
Satisfied that Lodge, Zorthian, Mann et al. doing all they can in field. American reporters file a good
deal of this non military work but little of it gets printed. Lodge says it would be helpful to have series
of visits--if they are well prepared and substantive. But there is plenty for such groups to do. Careful
preparation can be done.
Recommend such groups go out: Agriculture-Education-Health--in that order. First visit by Freeman be
held in February. Other visits later.
Miscellaneous
Checked on refugee camps. Rather pleased at what I found. Refugees being fed, not hungry, reasonably
clothed. Housing varies. Some very good, some very bad. Too crowded, dangerous from health view.
Refugees relatively static. Coming in, but others re-settled. Around 700,000 now. Can handle that
number okay.

Economic Warfare
Diversion of American materials to VC--Committee working on this. Difficult to manage. VC can send
purchasing agent to Saigon and buy what they need. It is difficult to get to VC. Easier to block it via
transportation rather than marketplace. Long, detailed process to find out about the flow--and to stop it.
AID expanding--1,000 Americans and 200-300 contract people. Bulk of additional people going in the
field. All this, of course, has nothing to do with military.
President: Mac, analyze written report and let us find out what we need to do.
Bundy: Most important is pacification./4/ Not clear we can handle resource allocation in as
straightforward way as David suggests. Two kinds of civilian leadership problem--pacification and
resource allocation.
/4/In a memorandum to the President written at 5:30 p.m. on January 11, Bundy stated: "My basic
conviction is that the things Dave Bell was talking about this morning are very much more important
than bombing the North. This is why I think the State of the Union should keep attention focused on the
effort in the South." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge
Bundy, vol. 18)
President: Gather pacification has gone backwards.
Bell: Possibly--though not much. Asked provincial men how much of their area is reachable--varied-much by day--less by night. Reporters I talked to didn't seem to know much.
AID people (Roy, Wehrle) are worried. Worried about thinness and weakness in VN government. Only
2 or 3 strong men in government. General Thieu and two others.
When you talk as I did for long hours with these men, you find they are not broad gauged. Wehrle is
troubled by this. But people in the country side are not worried--high morale and working like dogs.
Superb morale. Far better understanding displayed today by VN leaders in the "village campaign." VN
men in charge do see the problem, making plans but they are still plans.
McNamara: Don't think there's single area pacified.
President: What about Lansdale?
Bell: Has good effect on VN side--divisive effect in American community. His personality is the reason-Deutsch is real problem. Key question is whether he is worth the cost. Lansdale however is rated
valuable above his cost.
President: What is relationship between the American leaders?
Bell: Excellent.
President: Anyone make any contribution to the pause?
Bell: Didn't go into that. Thailand problem is troublesome--corrupt man in charge. Everyone in Thailand
is aware of it. Pleased with AID program in N.E. Thailand. Still a long way from a popular based

program and government. Still handing down largesse from on high.

Laos not hopeless--real base to build on in terms of development. No Taiwan, but clearly not a sinkhole, hopeless. They can improve in a good many ways.
Ball: Just spent three hours before House Foreign Affairs Committee. And it's not the same committee I
knew before.
President: I think it is going to get worse. Viet Nam is number one thing on their mind. But when you
get to specifics they wind up doing the same thing. Don't think the polls are far wrong--55-45. Senate
will be worse than House. Must ride out the waves created by 100 experts who visited there.
Ball: One question: Why doesn't Adm. allow it to debate? Told them they could debate anytime.
President: Are they critical of pause?
Ball: No, on the whole they rather like it. This has been Gung Ho committee but now they are softer-looking for a way out.
President: What would your conclusion be?
Ball: They have no solutions--just deeply troubled.
Bell: Followed Harriman--and his visits were excellent. Complimentary of what he is doing. Committee
not critical of peace effort--worried about where we go.
President: Articles in last few days have spurred them on (Lippmann, etc.).
16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, January 11, 1966, 8:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Secret; Immediate; Nodis-XYZ.
Drafted by Read, Springsteen, and William Bundy and approved by Ball.
3176. For Ambassador from Acting Secretary. Refs: Your cables 3897, 3912, 3913,/2/ 3914./3/
/2/In telegram 3913, January 11, Bohlen discussed Mai Van Bo's ("Rupert's") considerable interest in
encouraging intermediaries other than Sturm ("Y"), including the contacts reported by Bohlen in
telegrams 3897 and 3912, January 10 and 11. Bohlen proposed that Sturm seek another appointment
with Mai Van Bo. (All ibid.)
/3/In telegram 3914, January 11, Bohlen proposed informing [text not declassified] Paris about the XYZ
operation. (Ibid.)
Agree with you it would be timely and useful for Y to seek early appointment with Rupert, even though
latter probably lacks definitive instructions pending conclusion Shelepin Hanoi visit. We assume
Rupert's "illness"/4/ is over since he met with Manac'h at Quai January 6 and kept other appointments
reported by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Gottlieb. If Rupert still claims indisposition,
Y should seek appointment with Jean/5/ but from here appears Rupert would be more desirable target.

/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, p. 371, footnote 6.

/5/Vo Van Sung. See Document 4 regarding the designation of Vo Van Sung as "Jean."
At such appointment Y should take following line:
(1) Indicate that USG has received information that Rupert has been receiving a number of American
visitors and exchanging messages with them. Among these messages there appeared to be a suggestion
that Rupert would be happy to receive a "mandated" US representative./6/
/6/This message was reported in telegram 3897 from Paris, January 10. (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ)
(2) Y should make clear that he is the "mandated representative of the USG" suggested by Rupert and
that none of his other contacts can claim similar credentials. Y should express surprise that Rupert
should be talking to Americans who apparently include journalists about this desire, since USG had
assumed that if conversations were to have any usefulness they should be private in first instance and
not used by other side for propaganda purposes. Y is and has for long time been prepared to discuss in
detail situation in Viet-Nam and its people as Rupert has requested.
(3) Y should then repeat what he told Jean earlier/7/ that USG continues ready for serious discussions
and remind Rupert that we have had no response to written copy of French translation of 4 points
discussed on November 18 and handed to Jean subsequently. Y should ask again whether Rupert and his
superiors cannot address themselves to some such formulation which prejudges nothing and
emphatically reaffirms such points as USG readiness for ultimate withdrawal and acceptance of
principle of reunification resulting from freely expressed will of people in both NVN and SVN.
/7/See Document 4.
(4) Y should note that suspension of bombing of DRV is now in (Blank) day from its origin on
December 24 and note the complete absence of private Hanoi responses in words or deeds and reiterated
public negative statements issued by DRV during suspension. Taking care to avoid any implication of
an ultimatum, Y should note that unilateral restraint by USG cannot continue indefinitely without clear
affirmative response of some kind by Hanoi which would give us basis for continuing present
suspension or taking further actions leading towards peaceful solution.
(5) Y has been advised that Rupert told recent French visitor (FYI: Director of Center of American
Studies (CHEA), who may use story in CHEA newsletter) that DRV is ready to participate in, but not
initiate, an international conference taking into consideration 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords and
attempting to establish basis for lasting Indo-China peace. Could Rupert confirm whether this is correct
statement of his views, which would be of interest to USG?
(6) Y should be aware Rupert also reported in same contact to have insisted negotiations be preceded by
complete "cessation of hostilities" though not US troop withdrawal. Since cessation of hostilities
involves numerous pitfalls, Y should not refer to that as reported condition of Rupert's but be alert to
report any such qualification. If pressed Y could note without amplification US Point 5: "a cessation of
hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be subject of preliminary
discussion."
(7) If Rupert criticizes USG spokesman statement that it is a "safe deduction" that there has been a direct

US-DRV contact,/8/ Y should respond that this minimal admission, which USG has been careful not to
expand on, was necessitated by Pham Van Dong's flat statement for publication to Professor Lynd in
Hanoi earlier this month that there had been no such contact./9/
/8/At a White House press briefing on January 10, Bill Moyers stated that Staughton Lynd and two
associates were "incompletely informed" in asserting that the United States had failed to make direct
contact with the North Vietnamese Government (see footnote 5, Document 14). Asked whether a
conclusion could thus be drawn that there had been direct contact, Moyers stated: "That's a safe
deduction." (The New York Times, January 11, 1966)
/9/See footnote 5, Document 14.
Comment: We are concerned by Rupert's increasing contact with French and now US newsmen in
preference to contact with Y. We believe he may be building record for use against us in charging
openings which we have not taken advantage of following resumption of bombing of DRV./10/
/10/Telegram 3992 from Paris, January 13, reported on Y's meeting on January 13 with Jean (rather than
Rupert, who indicated he was "too busy" to receive Y). Y made the points outlined in his instructions,
but for the most part the "conversation consisted of little more than dropping letters in mailbox."
Nevertheless, "Jean on surface seemed friendly," and "one cannot avoid the thought that this is the end
of a very long line leading to Hanoi." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ)
Re your 3914, you are authorized to give [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Chief on
purely personal basis minimum knowledge of this operation you think desirable. We have spoken here
with Helms who will advise [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Chief that he should discuss
with you or McBride knowledge that comes to his attention regarding this operation. You should file his
reports directly bearing on XYZ contacts with Rupert through XYZ channel. Other contacts relating to
Mai Van Bo he may file through his regular channel, but when in doubt on these types of reports, should
consult with you or McBride who will have discretion on deciding on appropriate channel. As practical
matter, however, reports on Bo's contacts, such as those relating to "mandated" representative or
discussion with CHEA Director, should be filed preferably through XYZ channels only, in order that we
can appropriately funnel them promptly into consideration of XYZ operation.
Ball
17. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/
Honolulu, January 12, 1966, 0205Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Top Secret;
Limdis. Repeated to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and COMUSMACV, and passed
to the State Department and White House.
JCS 46895. The Relationship of Military Operations Against NVN to the Overall Strategy of the War in
SVN (U).
1. One of the key elements of the strategy in Vietnam has been the application of steadily increasing
military pressure against North Vietnam to force cessation of support to the VC, and to bring NVN to
the negotiating table. Surely a negotiated solution to the problem of peace and security for SVN is
infinitely preferable to a long, bitter and costly war. We recognize that the effectiveness of military

pressure depends partly on a significant combination of moves toward negotiation which clearly
indicates to the DRV our continuing readiness to negotiate. The current pause is such a move, and it is to
be hoped that it will be quickly successful.
2. Based on reactions so far, however, Hanoi has shown no inclination to negotiate and may continue to
spurn all our efforts unless forced to take some other course. We should plan now to resume effective
operations against NVN, as indeed we must if negotiations do not bring an early cease fire.
3. It is essential, therefore, that the vital relationship of military operations against NVN to a coherent
overall strategy for Vietnam be recognized. This overall strategy is based on three undertakings. These
are:
A. To deny to the Communists in SVN the effective direction and assistance from NVN so vital to their
war making capability.
B. To assist the RVN in providing protection of the South Vietnamese people from Communist
subversion and oppression, to liberate areas dominated by the VC, and to assist in the establishment of a
stable economy and the continuation of an independent non-Communist government.
C. To defeat the VC and PAVN forces and destroy their base areas in the RVN.
Germane to the interdependent nature of these three elements of strategy is the necessity that success be
achieved in each and that each of the three undertakings be subject to a simultaneous application of
appropriate military force.
4. When we resume operations against NVN, the air campaign should be conducted in the most effective
manner to accomplish sub para 3.A. above. This will require operations quite different from the precease fire pattern. The vital external assistance to NVN required to sustain effective internal military
operations and external aggression must be denied. Resources already in NVN most needed to support
aggression should be destroyed in depth. All known military material and facil-ities should be destroyed
and military activities and movements should be continuously harassed and disrupted.
5. It appears that the very foundation of the enemy's morale and resultant tenacity stands squarely on the
belief that our patience will run out before his. Hanoi has publicly stated that the enormous costs of long
lines of communications and the casualties they intend to inflict on U.S. forces will cause us to negotiate
on their terms. We should consider the consequences of NVN secure from attack, supported by both
Russia and China, infiltrating into SVN troops equipped with the latest weapons, fully trained, and
continuously supplied. Of even greater importance would be the freedom of Hanoi to exercise
unhampered direction of operations in SVN and the concomitant beneficial morale effects upon the
PAVN/VC forces. Vietnam Communist history and doctrine and current experience lead only to the
conclusion that they are willing to expend lives at a rate which we would consider unacceptable to
achieve their objectives. Therefore, we must accept as reality that an exorbitant expenditure of lives by
the enemy in SVN over a long period of time would be endured as long as success appeared possible.
The implications of this fact are enormous. Viewed in this context then, Hanoi may not have been idly
boasting when they claimed that Operation Starlite,/2/ near Chu Lai, and the battle of Ia Drang/3/ were
actually victories for their side. Unfortunately, this could be true in a strategic sense unless our strategy
makes full use of our superior air power to reduce casualties and foreshorten the time required to
achieve our limited objectives.
/2/In Operation Starlite, August 1965, U.S. Marines trapped a major portion of the 1st Viet Cong

Regiment on a peninsula near Chu Lai, 100 kilometers southeast of Da Nang.

/3/The Battle of Ia Drang took place in November 1965 in the Ia Drang Valley of South Vietnam's
Central Highlands.
6. Again, as they did in one phase of the war against the French when faced with superior regular
military forces, the Communists are currently avoiding costly engagements at our initiative in SVN and
are concentrating on terrorism and destructive attacks on small outposts and garrisons. This technique
can be used any time success seems to elude them temporarily. A PAVN/VC force using this strategy
and supported as visualized can extend the time period before we gain any real military successes or
reconstruction progress. A long stand-down in air attacks against NVN while NVN continues to support
PAVN/VC intensive operations in SVN would vitiate U.S. strategy for bringing the war in Vietnam to
an acceptable conclusion. For political, economic and psychological reasons of great importance in both
the U.S. and SVN there is an urgent need to make rapid progress toward security for the SVN people
and the destruction of PAVN/VC forces and base areas. The adverse consequences, both in the U.S. and
SVN of very slow progress in the war, could be incalculable.
7. The Communists have a total disregard for the human values held by the Western world. By our
standards, they will endure staggering losses of human lives to achieve their objectives. They are keenly
aware of our attitudes and have announced that U.S. troop casualties, rather than victory in battle, will
govern their strategy in SVN. At the same time, they know that we would choose to exploit full use of
air power as a technological alternative to human loss. To prevent this, they have staged a remarkable
world-wide political and propaganda campaign. They anticipate that the VC, fully supported by NVN,
can inflict sufficient casualties to generate internal U.S. pressures to end the war far short of the
objectives we seek. They have correctly determined that a crucial battle of the war is the political battle.
They are not fighting to attain a permanent stand-down. We must not permit them to win it.
8. With these thoughts in mind, a review of the changed situation since RT operations began is in order.
We began RT with very limited objectives, at a time when PAVN infiltration was of less significance
than it is now. Our build up in SVN was visualized as a moderate and sustainable assist to the ARVN in
maintaining effective mobile reserve forces and in gaining and maintaining security for reconstruction. It
was visualized that such assistance was politically and economically supportable for an indefinite period
while the GVN made the required progress.
9. When RT began, there was considerable hope of causing Hanoi to cease aggression through an
increasing pressure brought to bear through carefully timed destruction of selected resources,
accompanied by threat of greater losses. Presumably this would cause Hanoi to decide to cease support
of the VC. But in Feb of last year CINCPAC stated a view substantially as follows: We must face the
fact that punitive attacks and the threat of destruction of the capital resources in NVN probably will not
bring Hanoi to the conference table. Ho Chi Minh has never doubted ultimate victory. We said that from
his point of view the prospect of eventual defeat in SVN would be the unacceptable threat to his long
term objectives. Therefore, in order to win in SVN, the immediate objective of RT should be to make it
as difficult and as costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the VC and Pathet Lao,
thereby contributing directly to our ultimate objective of winning in SVN.
10. However, Rolling Thunder has been conducted with the primary objective of increasing pressure to
cause Hanoi to "decide" to cease support of the VC and Pathet Lao and the objective of making it
difficult to export aggression has been pursued in a very limited manner. On the credit side, there has
been significant disruption upon which we can capitalize when operations are resumed. NVN has had to
expend great effort to repair roads and bridges and to prepare defense of urban areas for possible attack.
Necessary internal operations have been severely disrupted and military support to the VC and Pathet

Lao has been somewhat slowed but not slowed enough. Reconstruction of communication links has
been designated as a number one strategic problem and large numbers of people have been organized
into repair gangs. The Army has been given supervision of reconstruction in Zone IV, no doubt
detracting from their military duties. And as a reflection of the pressure the Vietnam news agency in
Hanoi has been increasing the tempo of propaganda relating to U.S. air attacks. These facts and others
indicate that Hanoi has felt the pressure and that we were presenting the government with growing
internal problems. In light of the limited objectives of the air campaign, RT has done quite well.
11. On the other hand, RT operations have not been conducted in such a manner as to increase the
pressure on Hanoi in recent months. Targets vital to effective military operations have not been struck in
significant numbers; military and civilian activities have accommodated to the limited operations; and,
in fact, the psychological pressure has decreased. But regardless of how RT has been conducted, the
important fact now is that the nature of the war has changed since the air campaign began. RT has not
forced Hanoi to the decision which we sought. There is now every indication that Ho Chi Minh intends
to continue support of the VC until he is denied the capability to do so. He has the unstinting support of
the ChiComs which has increased his obligation to that regime. This, together with the pressure from
that direction to continue support probably leaves him little alternative. This resolve has caused a
significant change in the complexion of NVN support to the VC, while U.S. commitments have
dramatically increased. In the light of these greatly increased commitments and the factors already
discussed, and with due regard to political realities and current resources, we must do all that we can to
make it as difficult and costly as possible for Hanoi to continue direction and support of aggression. In
good conscience, we should not long delay resumption of an RT program designed to meet the changed
nature of the war.
12. In consonance with the overall concept, military operations against NVN should:
A. Deny to NVN assistance from external sources.
B. Destroy in depth those resources already in NVN that contribute most to the support of aggression;
destroy or deny use of all known permanent military facilities; and harass and disrupt dispersed military
operations.
C. Harass, disrupt, and impede movement of men and materials through Southern DRV into Laos and
SVN.
Denial of external assistance requires interdiction of land LOC's from China and closing of the ports.
Occasional attacks against bridges on the LOC's in the northeast quadrant has had only limited success
in disrupting the flow. This area must be opened up for armed recce with authority to attack LOC targets
as necessary. In initiating action to close the ports, particularly Haiphong, Hon Gay and Cam Pha, it is
recognized that political considerations are involved. Highly selective strikes and political action on the
international scene to indicate our intentions to continue to deny use of the ports should be undertaken.
Reaction of ChiComs while the program gets underway should provide indications of their actual
intentions. Nevertheless, if we are to realize our aims, we must take these steps, bold as they may seem.
Destruction of resources within NVN should begin with POL. Every known POL facility and
distribution activity should be destroyed and harassed until the war is concluded. Denial of electric
power facilities should begin at an early date and continue until all plants are out of action. Complete
destruction is not required. All large military facilities should be destroyed in Northern NVN as they
have been in the Southern area.
13. We should mount an intensified armed reconnaissance program without sortie restriction, to harass,

disrupt and attrit the dispersed and hidden military facilities and activities south of 20 deg which have
been identified and are continuing to be identified as a result of detailed intelligence analysis. We should
concentrate on LOC centers, attacking trans-shipment points, vehicle/boat concentrations, and LOC
exits into Laos on a nite and day basis. The initial effort should be followed by sustained armed recce
surveillance and attack against known and predicted traffic flow areas in order to maintain the
harassment and disruption desired.
14. Paralleling an increased tempo of RT operations CINCPAC will maintain intensified photo
reconnaissance with all available assets. Previous RT operations have forced the enemy to hide,
disperse, and camouflage his military support base, and to take maximum advantage of darkness to
move personnel, supplies and equipment over the infiltration routes. All available exploitation resources
will be applied to detailed readout and analysis of the frequent coverage that must be obtained, but more
may be required. When RT operations are resumed, security of our forces should be given the attention
required. We must neither accept losses that could be prevented nor interference with operational
flexibility. Plans have been drawn up for constant surveillance of the airfields and their destruction when
required. Soon they should be authorized for attack. It will be far too costly to an intensive air campaign
to permit the enemy to maintain a SAM capability. Operational commanders will require authority to
deal with this threat wherever it jeopardizes operations.
15. In summary, we strongly believe that air operations against NVN should be resumed as one of the
three main elements of our strategy in Vietnam. We should use all available force, with due regard to the
President's intention at this time not to destroy the NVN people and nation, to eliminate Hanoi's
capability to support the VC. The complementary course in SVN is to employ the combined in-country
military force to better protect the South Vietnamese people, liberate areas dominated by the Viet Cong,
institute and maintain a pacification rural construction program, destroy enemy base areas, and defeat
regular enemy military forces. Success in all three elements of this strategy promises the most rapid
progress toward achieving our objectives. Viewing this prospect from both sides, and in consideration of
factors discussed, these three tasks well done will bring the enemy to the conference table or cause the
insurgency to wither from lack of support./4/ The alternative appears to be a long and costly
counterinsurgency--costly in U.S. and SVN lives and material resources./5/
/4/In a 12-page paper, "Viet Nam Prospects," also dated January 12, Goldberg sought to convince the
President that the "limited though considerable escalation now contemplated" would "probably achieve
no significant results except to escalate casualties, destruction, costs, and political
liabilities." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075,
Vietnam, 1966)
/5/William Bundy responded to Admiral Sharp on January 14, concurring "on the importance of
combining political moves toward negotiation with military pressures" but noting that "the key question
which always faces us is that of timing." As for denying assistance from the North to the enemy in the
South, Bundy felt that the problem was "to find exactly the right combination of military measures and
political initiatives to accomplish this result." (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB
Chron)
18. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 12, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. The source text does not
indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:33 a.m.

2503. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Outlook for 1966.
This is the period before the Vietnamese new year and may be a good time for a backward glance, and a
look ahead.
2. The change in the situation here since your decision to commit U.S. troops has been spectacular.
3. Before your decision, we were at a smoldering stalemate which was gradually slipping us over the
edge. The GVN was even worrying as to whether it could survive or would be forced to give up. The
politically minded Vietnamese, being unsure of our position, were trying to make hedges for their own
future, with government instability the result. There was real worry as to whether the Viet Cong would
succeed in cutting the country in two and setting up a separate "capital" at some place like Kontum or
Pleiku. The VC main force units were absolutely impregnable in their jungle underground redoubts and
could be counted upon always to destroy the government's efforts to rebuild the countryside and
eliminate terrorism. Underlying all these troubles was the doubt as to whether or not we would stay.
4. Your decision signified an American commitment and, after it, the Vietnamese said to himself in
effect, "If the Americans can commit themselves, then I can commit myself." The present government
has thus been in power more than six months instead of the three weeks that was predicted (to be sure,
no predictions can yet be made about government stability). Our military have learned how to cope with
the main force units of the Viet Cong and with the redoubts, which has created an unprecedented
opportunity for pacification and rebuilding the countryside. There is ground for some solid satisfaction
because of signs of demoralization of the Viet Cong, which is reflected in the highest monthly total of
defections on record during November. If the above paragraph were a complete report, we would all be
feeling pretty good today.
5. But on the unfavorable side is the entrance of the Army of North Vietnam into South Vietnam. This
has transformed the nature of the war. It is in effect a new war. I believe, however, that while this can
delay success, it cannot prevent it. The VC main force and the NVN Army, [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] as of January 6, aggregate about 43,630--about 25 percent of the total Communist
manpower. We know much more about how to handle the Communists militarily and we also have
made progress on a formula for dealing with Communist subversion/terrorism by means of pacification
and rebuilding the countryside. If, therefore, we remain steadfast, I look for fundamental progress in
1966--decisive, perhaps, in the strictly military field and solid achievement as regards pacification.
6. You can thus take tremendous satisfaction from your decision of last summer. Even the bad part--the
entrance of the Army of North Vietnam into South Vietnam--is still a direct consequence of the fact that
your decision created a favorable balance which they simply could not redress by Viet Cong troops from
South Vietnam. Their only chance, therefore, of winning the war was to bring in the soldiers from
outside the country. This is a real escalation of the war, and it is grim for us. It richly justifies a new look
at the whole scene, as you are wisely doing. But it entails grave risks for them.
7. Hanoi or Peking?
Thich Tam Chau is the head of the Buddhist Institute and by any standard is one of the very top
Buddhists in Vietnam. I find him sagacious, well-balanced and politically minded. He comes originally
from Hanoi and has many connections there, religious and personal. For various reasons, I have built up
a very good footing with him over the years. Last week, he surprised me by saying flatly that the Hanoi

regime would like to stop the war, and that it was Peking which is stopping Hanoi from doing so, and
that Peking had enough influence to stop Hanoi. He felt we were making a mistake when we thought in
terms of Hanoi and did not realize that the real problem was Peking. Nothing would ever be settled until
we had solved "the problem of China." He frankly did not know how to solve it but he knew that was
where the trouble was. He also published the above in his newspaper.
8. Political.
The government plans to announce policies and programs for rural construction, a constitution, and the
budget at a convention of the Armed Forces on the eve of the lunar new year holiday (Tet).
9. There were no overt signs of discontent among the Montagnards but the situation remained highly
unsettled and potentially dangerous. The government has privately acknowledged the failure of its
previous approach.
10. There has been increasing speculation among Vietnamese as to the basic objectives of the GVN and
the US. Bill Moyers' statement referring to a direct US-Hanoi contact has caused concern/hope the visit
of Secretary Rusk and Gov. Harriman will clarify the problem. It is potentially a great danger to the war
effort./2/
/2/In his memorandum forwarding Lodge's telegram to the President on January 12, McGeorge Bundy
commented that paragraph 10 "argues against a direct reference to our contact with Hanoi in the State of
the Union." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol.
18) Regarding Moyers' statement, see footnote 8, Document 16.
11. American reporters have also begun to speculate about serious differences between the US and the
GVN on the issue of negotiations, and I have instructed everyone here not to discuss the subject with the
press.
12. Economic.
Retail prices in Saigon rose to their highest level in the week ending January 3. The price increases
reflected normal pre-Tet increases plus the consequences of Viet Cong action in cutting the road to
Dalot, the center of vegetable production.
13. Dollar and gold prices, which had declined last week, returned to their previous high level.
14. Rice stocks on hand increased, reflecting both imports and increased deliveries from the ricegrowing delta area which reached a three-year high in December. It is expected that there will be enough
pork for Tet.
15. Military.
The level of Viet Cong activity declined during the week while combined Vietnamese-Free World task
forces mounted major assaults in Phu Yen Province of Central Vietnam and in the Plain of Reeds
southwest of Saigon. In the Phu Yen area, Republic of Korea forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy
while suffering their own first serious losses.
16. Statistically the total of Viet Cong incidents dropped from 1,133 for the preceding week to 973. Of
this total 17 were attacks or ambushes while 645 were acts of terrorism. The remainder were acts of

sabotage, propaganda or anti-aircraft fire.

17. The total number of returnees under the Chieu Hoi program dropped from 705 to 484, a figure which
included 285 military and political cadre.
Lodge
19. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under
Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
Washington, January 12, 1966, 2:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam II. No classification marking.
Pres. cited Lodge's Jan. 12 telegram/2/ giving outlook for 1966. Read paragraph 3 as against paragraph
10 and asked if this would cause us to rework our State of the Union message--the portion on direct
contact. B felt it was a matter of how we word it. The fact there was a communication is in public
domain. Pres. said they had used the language suggested by B this morning. B said he would look at the
message and call the Pres. back./3/
/2/Document 18.
/3/In a 2:25 p.m. conversation with President Johnson, Ball indicated that his preference was not to refer
to direct contact between the United States and the DRV. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam II) In
his State of the Union message delivered to a joint session of Congress that evening, President Johnson
reviewed the peace offensive but did not mention direct contact. For text of the message, see Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 3-12.
Pres. asked how B got along this morning with the SFRC./4/ B told him he had met with them over 3
hours. He got the feeling it was a serious and honest effort to get to the base of the subject. They are
troubled; there is not unfriendliness; they are sympathetic with the President's problems. B said he had
mentioned some of the President's thoughts of this morning. B said his testimony was against the
background of Mansfield having been with the Committee yesterday in long session. They were aware
of the problems and don't see any solution other than the course being followed. Ball said one of the
Senators told him the Committee suggested to Mansfield that they would like an opportunity to talk
privately with the President--to consult in a friendly and sympathetic way, to give the President their
ideas. B didn't think this would be desirable because it would lead to every other committee wanting to
do the same thing. Pres. agreed this wouldn't work. B said Mansfield had not promised it to them and B
knows he will protect the Pres. on it. So far as the general tone is concerned, B didn't get the same
feeling that he had before House Committee of an undercurrent of criticism. Their problem is they don't
know how to talk to their constituents. They don't know whether we see the light for a permanent
advantage for the US at the end of the road. They are not convinced there is a way out. They are
working hard on it and B hadn't heard anything about blowing everything up. Pres. asked about
Fulbright; B replied he took his familiar line--he didn't see where we were going and why the
commitment.
/4/For text of Ball's testimony, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(Historical Series), vol. XVIII, pp. 39-104.
B continued most questions were on the relationship between the Communist world--the split and what

it meant in terms of settlement. They are seeing the whole problem in larger context than they did
before. They see it as a serious problem of American policy vis-a-vis Communist effort. There was a
much higher level of understanding than in the past and B believes over time we can bring them along
on a sympathetic basis. This was true with not only Hickenlooper but Mundt as well.
Pres. said he would hate to rewrite the speech and asked that B look at it and give him his judgment.
20. Telegram From the Embasy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 13, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:52 a.m. McGeorge Bundy
forwarded the telegram to President Johnson at 11 a.m. on January 13 under cover of a memorandum
stating that Lodge "is as optimistic as McNamara is pessimistic about the timing and likelihood of
straight military success as against pacification. But I think he is right in his notion that the two should
be kept separate in our minds." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18)
2514. For the President from Lodge.
1. In my weekly telegram no. 2399 of January 5,/2/ I referred to the idea of the American public learning
to live year in and year out with the Communist China style cold war in Asia as we had learned to live
with the Soviet style cold war in Europe. I realize that I may have appeared unaware that it is not
reasonable to expect American public opinion to live year in and year out with a hot war, in which
substantial numbers of casualties are being incurred.
/2/Document 6.
2. Let me therefore add to my telegram of January 5 this thought:
3. The purely military war against the main force units of the Viet Cong and against the units of the
North Vietnamese Army must really have its back broken within the year 1966. (I assume we have the
military wherewithal to do it.) But the pacification-uplift program to rebuild the countryside, which the
Viet Cong have been systematically destroying for five years, necessarily will take longer. This
pacification program, however, is a program which cannot involve heavy American casualties. While it
does involve violence and killing, it is of a kind which must be done by the Vietnamese, and largely
with police type techniques. The American participation is indispensable, but it is in the way of advice,
providing the straight economic and social programs and being political catalysts for the whole.
4. I recommend, therefore:
A. That in this new war, which the North Vietnamese have recently inflicted on us and the South
Vietnamese by bringing in NVN troops, we take extremely drastic action against everything that
pertains to North Viet-Nam, wherever it may be, so as completely and rapidly to neutralize and render
harmless their military potential; and
B. In South Viet-Nam, continue to help the pacification-countryside-rebuilding-uplift program (which
would not involve substantial American casualties) but which would go on for several years and which,
I hope, the American public could learn to live with. Your handling of public opinion is so able--

particularly at this difficult time--that I do not doubt your ability to do this.

5. I'm sorry if I was obscure on this point, but I try in all my telegrams to give you the thing that is
preoccupying me at the moment--in a way, to think out loud--hoping that this may be suggestive and
helpful.
Lodge
21. Report Prepared by the Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Porter) and the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger)/1/
Washington, January 13, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Vietnam, Jan 1966. Secret.
Drafted by Unger. The report was addressed to Rusk, McNamara, Raborn, Bell, McGeorge Bundy, and
Lodge.
SUBJECT
Warrenton Meeting on Viet-Nam, January 8-11, 1966
1. The Warrenton meeting was originally called for mid-December, 1965 in order to bring together
senior representatives of the U.S Mission Saigon, the Viet-Nam Coordinating Committee,/2/
Washington, and several other individuals (see Annex A)/3/ to a) review the joint GVN-US
pacification/rural construction program and seek to promote its more effective operation and b) address
the problem of the increasingly serious shortages and bottlenecks in manpower, materials and transport
in Viet-Nam and to designate priorities and machinery for resources control and allocation.
/2/The Viet-Nam Coordinating Committee, chaired by Unger, was a Washington-based interagency
group established in 1965 to coordinate non-military programs in Vietnam.
/3/Annexes A-E are attached but not printed. Among the attendees from Saigon were Habib, Jorgensen,
Lansdale, Charles Mann, Porter, Zorthian, and Brigadier General James Collins of MACV. Among the
attendees from Washington were Colby, Chester Cooper, DeSilva, Alvin Friedman of OSD/ISA, Stanley
Marlowe of USIA, Major General William Peers of JCS, and Unger.
2. Before the meeting convened on its postponed date (January 8) it had also been agreed to take
advantage of the presence here of the Saigon representatives to hold an additional day of meeting in
Warrenton to discuss the problems, inter alia, of Montagnards, Chieu Hoi, land tenure and urban
questions such as Labor and Youth and to meet 2 days more in Washington on, inter alia, Prisoners of
War, Economic Warfare, Free World Assistance, and Elections and Political Parties. This latter set of
Washington meetings is still underway as this report is being written. Meanwhile, Messrs. Bell, Poats
and Chester Cooper and Mr. Richard Cooper's group have visited Saigon to develop emergency
programs to meet the grave inflationary threat, the problem of port congestion and to review the
organization of the U.S. Mission to handle economic problems. For this reason the Warrenton meeting
did not address the first two problems at any length.
3. On the basis of the several days' discussion, considerably assisted by numerous reports from the
Saigon representatives, the general conclusions were reached that: a) the military situation although not
critical nevertheless continues grave in Viet-Nam with a prospect under the present strategy of several
years' more fighting at least on the current scale before the GVN will be in a position to exercise

effective control over substantially all of South Viet-Nam except over Viet Cong base areas; b) there
have been some instances of weakening Viet Cong morale, but the Viet Cong, buttressed by continuing
infiltration from the North, continue to be a dangerous and effective fighting force; c) the Ky
Government continues in relative stability with its collegial division of responsibility, is willing and in a
limited degree able to take certain measures long considered necessary to improve its domestic and
international position but remains fragile and is failing to live up to its "revolutionary" billing as
originally presented by Prime Minister Ky or to produce a fighting force appreciably larger or more
aggressive than earlier.
4. In view of this evaluation in general and, in particular, the inter-dependence of military operations and
rural construction, it is recommended that a SNIE be promptly produced on the likely development of
the politico-military situation over the next two years, based upon present estimates of enemy
capabilities and Vietnamese and allied deployment plans, with particular attention to certain outside
factors which could produce unanticipated shortfalls in the execution of present plans (identified at
Annex B).
5. The sense of the participants also was that it would be advisable to review the current politicalmilitary strategy in Viet-Nam and related areas. Such a study (also see Annex B) should include: a)
scope and phasing of force deployment (U.S., Free World and GVN), b) alternative concepts for the
employment of forces in South Viet-Nam; against infiltration through Laos and by sea; and related
actions against North Viet-Nam. (The projected Honolulu meeting/4/ at the end of this January might
serve this purpose among others.)
/4/Reference is to a military conference in Honolulu involving General Westmoreland and Admiral
Sharp, not to President Johnson's meeting with General Thieu and Prime Minister Ky in Honolulu
February 6-8.
6. In its deliberations on rural construction/pacification ("the reconstitution of the social and
governmental fabric") the Warrenton meeting noted some encouraging actions by the GVN: a) to
develop, in frequent consultation with the U.S. Mission, promising concepts to provide an agreed basis
for this effort (see Annex C), b) to issue detailed instructions about the operation of the rural
construction program including provision for continuous coordination between the civilian and military
branches at national, corps, division and province levels and c) to organize cadre teams and groups
designed to see the effort through from the conclusion of large-scale military action to the point where
reconstituted governmental and social institutions can resume their functions in cooperation with a
receptive population.
7. On this same subject conclusions and recommendations were adopted (see Annex D) on the following
aspects:
a. concentration of effort and resources on the four already designated rural construction priority areas
for 1966, with lower priorities in turn for the extensive remaining areas where that program is also
underway and for other kinds of U.S. programs in rural areas (a report will be submitted to the VNCC
by the Mission by March 31 on the prospects for successful execution of the plans for the four priority
areas in 1966),
b. continued direct U.S. funding to support the most crucial aspects of the rural construction program
(i.e. cadre for the teams in the Rural Construction 80-man Groups),
c. the importance of encouraging the development of representative bodies at the hamlet or village level,

as well as the development of non-government institutions such as cooperatives and labor unions,
d. the optimum organization of the U.S. Mission for its support of the rural construction/pacification
program--a senior official with a supporting staff with full-time responsibility in this field was
considered necessary. (Coordination is also required with Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Bell's conclusions
on this point.) It would also be desirable for such an official to have in Washington a high-level point of
liaison to assure the expeditious discharge here of urgent Viet-Nam business in this field (See also items
10 and 14 below.),
e. the proper relation of the respective roles and missions of rural construction teams, police and regional
and popular forces, and with the missions of the regular forces, and the requirement for a police force of
adequate size and charged with an appropriate mission,
f. the collation both in Washington and Saigon of available material on the primary needs and
requirements of the rural population (e.g. as reflected in findings of the Census Grievance Teams)--(See
Annex D.).
8. The need to be prepared for an expanded role of the police in a situation of ceasefire (and eventual
peace) was also noted and Mission Saigon will prepare a contingency plan for the immediate
incorporation of some element of the various paramilitary forces into the police in anticipation of such
circumstances.
9. On the matter of resource allocation the meeting took note of the grave danger to essential GVN and
U.S. programs of insufficiently controlled construction and free bidding for scarce manpower and the
contribution of these activities to the inflation problem. In this connection, the Saigon Mission
representatives described the setting up of the Deputy Ambassador's committee on construction
priorities and the joint GVN-US committees on manpower, construction, logistics, construction material
and wages. Measures recently taken to relieve port congestion were also noted.
10. It was the sense of the participants that Ambassador Lodge be invited to consider the appointment as
his own direct adviser or assistant of a high-level resource allocation official to devote full time to the
anticipation and elimination of resource stringencies; such an official might chair the U.S. side of the
joint GVN-US committees mentioned above and serve as principal adviser to the Deputy Ambassador
on the construction priorities committee. He should also have a Washington counterpart to follow up
such business here (see also paragraphs 7d above and 14 below). For guidance in this field, it was
proposed that the Mission regard combat operations, the rural construction program and the logistical
support for both of these, and measures for economic stability as having top priority; other GVN-US
activities will take second place. Pending the preparation of the strategy paper mentioned in paragraph
13, the meeting did not attempt to agree on any further refinement of priorities for resource allocation.
11. On the other subjects treated at Warrenton the following conclusions, which are elaborated in Annex
E, have been drawn:
a. The U.S. should take advantage of General Co's recent invitation (see Embtel 2451)/5/ to submit
suggestions on a GVN program for the Montagnards as an opening to press hard for concrete
improvements in GVN-Montagnard relations in the economic, social and, as soon as possible, political
fields.
/5/Dated January 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

b. At present the Chieu Hoi program most requires effective reception and resettlement of returnees. The
Mission will seek to stimulate this through the provincial authorities, perhaps through the occasional
direct application of funds; it will also continue to press the GVN for recognition of the importance of
the program at national level and continue to urge the designation of an effective head.
c. Studies of land tenure, credit and related programs will be expedited to enhance their use as support of
the rural construction program.
d. While rural construction takes priority over urban programs in general, the U.S. Mission will examine
how the U.S. might expand its educational and cultural activities directed at youth in urban as well as
rural areas.
12. On a number of occasions during the meeting there was discussion of the intensity of pressure the
U.S. should seek to exert on the GVN to adopt or vigorously pursue policies or programs which we
favor. In principle the U.S., by paying attention to forms, should take care to maintain the full
appearance of GVN independence, but in view of the U.S. involvement and commitment in South VietNam, it may be necessary to exert considerable pressure. Ambassador Lodge and the Saigon Mission
will have to be the judges of how pressure, persuasion and manipulation are managed in any specific
case. (Some of the participants believe that unless this basic issue--the U.S. ability to influence the
GVN--is resolved satisfactorily, our already questionable chances of success in South Viet-Nam will be
significantly reduced.)
13. Finally, with regard to policies and programs in Viet-Nam, the absence of any recent strategy paper
was noted and the Saigon Mission will undertake the preparation of a first draft to cover the coming 3-5
year period. This should correlate political, military, economic and prop-aganda policies and future
activities, assure that they are in harmony with each other and best serve U.S. objectives. Such a paper
will have to be related to several alternative assumptions provided by Washington.
14. Note was taken also of the inadequacy of present U.S. Government machinery in Washington to
handle Viet-Nam problems quickly and decisively. The need for referral of too large a number of
problems to the Secretarial level was one of the problems mentioned. While the meeting did not have
time to come to any firm conclusions, there was a view that the VNCC because of its coordinating rather
than decision-cum-enforcement powers could not perform this task except in part. If endowing the
VNCC or its Chairman with larger powers, and with a staff associated with no one agency, is not a
feasible solution, it was considered that the required directing position might have to be set up at a
higher level, perhaps related to the National Security Council. (See also paragraphs 7d and 10 above.)
22. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 14, 1966, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18.
Secret.
SUBJECT
Top Level Reorganization in Saigon
Dave Bell, Bob McNamara, George Ball and I have now had a chance to talk some more about top level
organization in Saigon which you asked me to work on at the end of December.

There is fairly general agreement now that the most important gap in Saigon is in the overall command
of the pacification effort and establishing real security in a growing number of villages. According to
Bell and others this is more critical than the task of resource allocation.
There is also considerable agreement that the right man to run this pacification job is Deputy
Ambassador Porter. He has fully lived up to the expectations of his backers, and McNamara and I have
both decided that our doubts of last summer are unjustified.
Porter's only trouble is that he has become fully indispensable to Lodge in a lot of day-to-day
administration and hand-holding. The pacification job is a full time task, and if we settle on Porter, we
shall have to get another senior diplomat type to support Lodge on the things that Porter is doing now. A
lot of us lean toward Leonard Unger for this job.
In addition to a pacification chief, we need a stronger requirements planning group in Saigon to deal
with the real problem of resource allocation. But we think this could be done by finding the right firstrate bureaucrats. We do not see room in Saigon for a business executive. There is agreement that MACV
and AID have plenty of management. What they lack is coordinated planning and control, and we are
now inclined to think that this job can be done by Lodge, Westmoreland and Porter with the right staff
support.
A pacification chief in the field will need a back-up man here. We are still working on that problem of
organization and should have a concerted recommendation for you soon.
To persuade Lodge of the virtue of these changes is likely to mean a trip to Saigon for one of us, and I
would like to do this myself. There is a slight problem of timing, however, as I do not think I ought to go
to Saigon while the pause is going on because my last trip was so intimately associated with the
initiation of the bombing. My current thought, therefore, is that Porter (who is here now) should go out
and talk this matter over with Lodge in a preliminary way, and that I might follow early in February.
None of this requires immediate decision, but it is background for the suggestion that you might wish to
see Porter briefly before he goes back. He will be here until Monday morning./2/ Quite aside from the
organization problem, he has a lot of interesting things to say about the situation in Saigon today, and he
will give you good value for a fifteen minute appointment.
/2/January 17.
McG. B.
Arrange an appointment/3/
Let him go back
/3/The President checked this option. He met with Porter from 12:36 to 1:01 p.m. on January 17.
(Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found, but Bundy's
briefing memorandum for the President, January 17, on "Possible topics for your talk with Porter" is
ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18.
23. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Saigon, January 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Exdis; Pinta. Prepared by Habib. The
meeting was held at the Gia Long Palace in Saigon. A memorandum of Secretary Rusk's conversation
with Prime Minister Ky on the same day is ibid. On January 16 Rusk and Ky issued a joint
communique, which is printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 31, 1966, pp. 155-156. Rusk's
stopover in Saigon followed his visit to New Delhi January 12-13 to attend Prime Minister Shastri's
funeral and his meeting in Bangkok on January 14 with senior Thai officials. Rusk met with President
Marcos in Manila on January 16 and returned to Washington on January 19.
PARTICIPANTS
General Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman, National Leadership Council, Viet-Nam
Lt. General Pham Xuan Chieu, Secretary General, National Leadership Council
Tran Van Do, Foreign Minister
Secretary of State Dean Rusk
Ambassador Lodge
Ambassador Harriman
Philip C. Habib
The Secretary said that he brought the greetings of President Johnson to General Thieu. The President
was pleased that the Secretary would have the opportunity to meet with General Thieu. Such a meeting
provided a valuable opportunity for the President and his colleagues to get General Thieu's personal
impression of the situation and problems in Viet-Nam. The Secretary asked for General Thieu's
assessment of the situation and said he was prepared to express his own views.
General Thieu said he would be frank in his comments. He had been following the recent peace
offensive closely. At this time he believes the communists have rejected the offer and he expected that
they would continue to be stubborn. If the communists do not accept going to the conference table it is
because they will never accept appearing guilty before the world. When one looks at their purpose it
would appear that they would not like to negotiate at this time but might rather wait until after the rainy
season so as to use at the conference table any gains that they make. They continue to infiltrate more and
more troops even during truce periods--whether it is the Christmas truce which had just taken place or
the Tet truce which will take place. Since the stopping of the bombing in the North, the enemy has
benefited by reorganizing in the rear, moving in troops, and reinforcing troops already infiltrated. In
Vietnamese opinion if we decide to bomb again, we will have to be more aggressive.
General Thieu said the Government is in difficulty with public opinion on peace moves or meetings with
the communists. The Army and the general public have the feeling the GVN has not been kept informed
of all measures the USG has taken in the peace offensive. This has made it difficult for the Government.
Viet-Nam has the right to conduct war because it is opposing aggression. If they ask for help it is to give
more strength to their struggle. If Vietnamese public opinion or VC propaganda look upon the war as
one between the U.S. and the VC it would be bad. While welcoming the moves of the U.S., other allies
and the Pope, the GVN calls for a common policy. At any time there are proposals for a truce or
negotiations or decisions on bombing, the Vietnamese should be consulted.
Secretary Rusk said he would like to make a few general observations. To look at the matter in its most
simple aspect, if Hanoi and Peiping continue to push into Southeast Asia we will have two choices:
either get out of their way or meet them. We have decided to meet them. This is not simply amiability or
philanthropy. It derives from U.S. national interest. We cannot see Southeast Asia seized by the
communists. If one looks at the situation locally we have committed substantial forces, with more on the
way. We do not know how much more will be required, but communist aggression will be met and will
not succeed. Beyond purely local considerations is the world where one billion communists are opposed

primarily by 190 million Americans. If the war in Viet-Nam moves into a larger war, it is the U.S. that
will have to take it on. Viet-Nam's resources are occupied in full. The U.S. has the problem of making it
clear to one billion communists that they are on the wrong track and cannot succeed. We are interested
in dividing the communist world; that is one of the main reasons for the recent move we have taken.
While we have not seen the success of these moves there are some signs that the communist world is not
solid and this is particularly important when you look at the overall situation. The communists have
rejected negotiations. They are afraid that they will not succeed in getting at the table what they have not
been able to succeed in getting militarily. They are afraid that they will not be able to get Viet-Nam by
negotiations. They are the ones who are afraid to negotiate. We should not be. Unless they are prepared
to give up their aggression, they will hesitate to negotiate. We will not negotiate in a way that will
impair the independence of Viet-Nam.
The Secretary said that the last three weeks have made it clear the burden for peace lies on Hanoi and
Peiping. Throughout the world there is understanding that if peace is to come, Hanoi must change.
Neither Viet-Nam nor the United States stands in the way of peace. Even the communist world is subject
to international opinion. In 1948 the Soviets brought the Berlin blockade to an end because world
opinion went against them. In various crises since 1945, during which the U.S. had suffered 160,000
casualties, we have not given in to the communists' objective to take over people by force. The Secretary
cited the cases of Iran, Berlin, Korea and the Cuban Missile crisis. In the post war period, the U.S. has
spent $800 billion on peace in aiding nations. The American people will do what is required if they
understand that the alternatives have been exhausted. This is important to the President who secures his
resources and his men from Congress. American support for the necessary effort is very strong. VietNam need not be concerned about the determination of the U.S. to see it through.
The Secretary commented that there have been elements in the press which have called exaggerated
attention to the U.S. effort here. We know the burden Vietnamese forces carry is great. But with U.S.
troops here, the U.S. press tends to concentrate on the U.S. effort. This is not to distract from the
Vietnamese effort. Ambassador Lodge noted that in President Johnson's State of the Union Message, he
made note of the fact that Vietnamese casualties in 1965 were 8 times those of the U.S.
The Secretary said that we will try to keep in close touch with the GVN as the situation develops. There
have not been any significant signs from the communist capitals. He agreed with General Thieu that
there was no change in the communist intention to pursue their objectives. If Hanoi continues along
these lines, it will have to suffer the consequences. Hanoi must stop trying to impose its will on South
Viet-Nam by force. That is the essence of the matter; all the rest is decoration on the Christmas tree. The
U.S. and Viet-Nam have a common objective and we need to find out how best to get on with the job.
The problem of peace is in Hanoi and Peiping; that has been clearly demonstrated to the world.
Governor Harriman said that it would be fair to say that until the peace offensive there had been a
feeling that this is a civil war. Now in many countries they recognize the President's sincerity and peace
has become Hanoi's problem. Communist China may find it in its interest to keep the war going, hoping
that we will tire and get out. One thing that is important is that there has been no sign that our peace
offensive has been taken to be a sign of weakness. Secretary Rusk commented that rather than being
taken to be a sign of weakness, the Communists have taken it as an ultimatum. Governor Harriman said
we were driving a wedge in the communist world. Countries like Poland and Yugoslavia want peace and
don't want to see Communist China expand its influence. This is an advantage to our worldwide
objectives as well as to Viet-Nam. If Hanoi wants to stop it can; there is no doubt that Eastern Europe
would like to see it stop. But Eastern Europeans do not control Hanoi, and Hanoi has given no sign of
changing its way.
General Thieu said that all the members of the Leadership Council in the Government are confident of

the U.S. determination to support Viet-Nam. He had read President Johnson's State of the Union
Message with great interest and this confirmed their understanding. Vietnamese are waiting for the
world to condemn the aggression of Communist China and Hanoi. The Vietnamese believe that Hanoi
doesn't want negotiations, not only because of military reasons but also because they fear their ability to
maintain the morale of their people. If they go to the table, they feel they will not be able to maintain
their regime in the North or the confidence of the communists in the South. General Thieu thought that
when Hanoi finds it no longer has the ability to take over the South, the most logical way would be for
them to just quietly stop. Secretary Rusk commented it was a possibility that they would not make peace
at a table but would just stop. General Thieu said there were many points of view in South Viet-Nam. In
order to maintain morale, the Government would not offer a soft position. When anyone talks about the
four points of Hanoi or about the National Liberation Front, this has an effect on morale, and helps those
who wish to weaken the Government or those who wish to offer an easier solution. The Vietnamese
Government does not doubt the U.S. commitment but it is concerned with the psychological impact of
what is going on.
Secretary Rusk said that in a way this is more a problem for us. Quite frankly the world position of
South Viet-Nam is weakened when a sense of disunity is shown. We know that there are differences
between various elements in Viet-Nam: Buddhists, Catholics, Montagnards and others. But we do know
that there is unity in that they all do not want Hanoi. The more one can find fanatical unity in South
Viet-Nam, the more will one get support. This sort of fanatical unity of people under attack is important,
as has been demonstrated in such places as Berlin and Korea, and anything that can be done to promote
it is for the better. General Thieu said that the Government has been trying for seven months to do its
best in this regard. The Government is seeking to develop a democratic viewpoint and promote
constitutional development in the future. But the basis of unity is a strong national policy. Offers of
neutrality or other solutions arise but if the country stays strong it can fight. The position of the
Government and the position of its friends must stay strong. Secretary Rusk replied that the Vietnamese
people must know that we haven't put in 1/4 million troops to run away. The U.S. is not going to
abandon Viet-Nam.
Secretary Rusk said he knew President Johnson would be most interested in General Thieu's remarks.
The President spends an enormous amount of time day and night thinking about Viet-Nam. The
Secretary noted that a Communist Foreign Minister at the UN recently told him that the single most
important question in the world is to require Peiping to turn to peaceful coexistence. The U.S. has
commitments all over Asia: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Australia. Peace in the Pacific is vital to
the U.S. and is in no way second to peace in the Atlantic. We need peace in both oceans. The persistent
policy of militancy in Peiping will have to change or they would have to pay the price. They must pull
back. Governor Harriman commented that in particular Tito had spoken to him of the danger to peace
from Peiping, and the need for a buffer between Communist China and the rest of the world. Governor
Harriman has asked Nasser if he wanted to turn over Southeast Asia to Communist China. Nasser has
said "Oh, no." They all want us to stay here to insure peace.
Secretary Rusk said a major disappointment has been that more nations have not helped. The issues have
been confused, the nature of the war which involves movement by infiltration, rather than across the
17th parallel with divisions, has caused many people to believe that South Viet-Nam was not a problem.
The issue was now more clear. It concerned Hanoi's willingness to live in peace with its neighbor.
General Thieu said Vietnamese recall the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. They knew that the
Communists would not respect them. The Communists have a war all over Indo China. They are now
putting in more troops in Laos. One must think of a concept of defending the entire area. We must not
only defend Viet-Nam, we must defend Laos and the whole area with a complete strategy. Secretary
Rusk added we would have to include Thailand as well.

24. Editorial Note

On January 15, 1966, Prime Minister Ky delivered a state-of-the-nation address to the Second Congress
of the Armed Forces. The text of the speech was transmitted in telegram 2544 from Saigon, January 15.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S) Ky announced three major objectives of his
government during 1966: 1) "to win the war" and "to pacify and to reconstruct the rural area"; 2) "to
stabilize the economic situation"; and 3) "to build democracy." He declared that a "Democracy Building
Council" would be appointed shortly to draft a constitution, which would be reviewed by local groups
and then submitted to a national referendum in October 1966. Ky pledged that the constitution would
serve as the basis for a democratic regime and promised democratic national elections in 1967.
25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, January 17, 1966, 7:16 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted
by William Bundy, cleared by Thompson, and approved by Ball. Repeated to the White House.
1745. 1. Although we have prodded Sov Embassy here on possible significance Shastri report that
Kosygin suggested to him you make direct contact with DRV Ambassador Moscow, we have had no
response./2/ In meantime, there are some indications Hanoi may try make propaganda capital by
claiming no direct substantive contact was made by US with DRV during current diplomatic activity and
pause. On balance, we have therefore concluded that you should seek to make such direct contact and to
carry out instructions below.
/2/In telegram 1781 to Moscow, January 20, the Department relayed the Soviet Embassy's response:
Kosygin had told Shastri on January 4 that if the United States was sincerely interested in peace it could
seek direct contact with DRV representatives, but Kosygin did not recommend any specific place. (Ibid.)
2. You should send message to DRV Ambassador that you wish direct conversations./3/ You should
suggest meeting in some inconspicuous location that would not come to notice of press, since you
assume that they would not wish contact to become publicly known. (We virtually assume Sovs will
learn of it.) We leave to your judgment place of meeting and would not want possibility of meeting to
break down on this issue, so that you are authorized to meet at place DRV representative may suggest if
he accepts. Please inform us immediately his reaction.
/3/In telegram 2228 from Moscow, January 18, Kohler reported that the DRV Ambassador was not in
Moscow and he proposed meeting with the DRV Charge instead. The Department concurred in telegram
1756 to Moscow, January 18. (Both ibid.)
3. In event meeting is arranged, you should conduct substance of conversation along following lines:
a. USG suspended bombing of DRV on December 24 and as DRV knows, notified DRV officially of
this in Rangoon on Dec. 29. As was made clear in that message, suspension might continue for limited
period in absence of major provocation, and further extension would depend on response and action
from DRV. Since suspension X days have elapsed and we have had no indication of Hanoi response.
b. DRV rep may take line that suspension amounts to ultimatum or propaganda prelude to increased US
actions. You should counter by saying that it should be considered rather as opportunity and responsive
to repeated suggestions by Hanoi itself and others that suspension of bombing might create conditions in

which moves could be made toward peaceful solution. This is basic and serious purpose of US in taking
suspension action. It is in no sense ultimatum. If pressed as to actions US will take in absence of
response, you should say that, in face of continued DRV military actions such as introduction of regular
forces, US will of course have to take necessary military actions to continue assisting SVN toward
objectives thoroughly defined in our statements of position. This is simple statement of fact, not
ultimatum, and does not change basic USG view that suspension constitutes opportunity for responsive
action by Hanoi.
c. You should then go on to say that there seemed to you to be two possible purposes to be served by
direct conversation between USG and DRV. One would be to explore possibility of reciprocal
reductions of hostilities (not cease-fire). As we have repeatedly said, we could continue suspension if
there were significant reciprocal actions by DRV. At same time, we have recognized difficulty DRV
might see in admitting that it had ceased these actions or that it was responsible for action in South to
degree to which we believe it to be the case. Direct contact could provide opportunity for private and
confidential indication by DRV of actions it was taking, so that these would be fully understood by USG
and appropriate action taken on US and GVN side. Does DRV rep wish to use contact for this purpose?
In making this point, you should initially not indicate what types of actions we have in mind. You
should however indicate that since bombing was suspended we have had evidence that supply activity
through Laos is continuing at substantial rate and that there has been high incident rate in South but low
level of large-scale attacks. In the absence of contrary indication, we must conclude that DRV is
continuing infiltration on substantial scale, and that level of activity in South is normal fluctuation. If
DRV rep pursues subject, you could indicate that "significant reciprocal actions" could relate to sending
of men and equipment from DRV to South, level of military activity and terrorism in South, and
withdrawal of regular DRV military units in South in particular. However, we do not wish to get too
specific except to leave clearly in record our present reading of military actions, and invite their
comment.
d. Unless answer indicates desire to pursue this topic, you should go on to say that second possible
purpose in direct contact might be to explore conditions under which more formal negotiation might
take place. This would be appropriate point, if you have not already done so, to hand over copies of
Viet-Nam portion of State of Union address,/4/ fourteen points/5/ and Goldberg letter of Jan. 4 to U
Thant,/6/ which you might run over briefly touching on point relating to economic aid which might
include DRV in conditions of peace. You would then go on that, as to conditions for negotiation, USG
has repeatedly made clear it would be prepared for negotiations either without conditions or on basis
Geneva Accords of 1954. However, USG has interpreted Hanoi position, both public and private, as
insisting on prior acceptance by USG of Hanoi four points/7/ as basis for negotiation, and perhaps also
even withdrawal of US forces prior to any negotiation. USG has also understood Hanoi to be insisting
that NLF be recognized as sole representative of SVN or at least as independent party. USG has
interpreted these Hanoi positions as amounting in effect to prior conditions before negotiation. Is this
understanding of past Hanoi position correct, and if so, what would DRV rep now suggest to remove
obstacles?
/4/See footnote 3, Document 19.
/5/See footnote 8, Document 2.
/6/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 744-746.
/7/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, pp. 544-545.

4. Second point would probably lead to general discussion of Hanoi and US positions, in which you
should deal with possible points that might arise as follows:
a. Four points. USG has no serious difficulty with first two points as basis for negotiation, provided it
clearly understood that all elements introduced by DRV will be considered as foreign forces in SVN,
and subject to withdrawal. As to fourth point concerning reunification, USG has no difficulty in
envisaging reunification by peaceful means but would prefer formulation that specifically called for free
popular determination (elections) in both North and South under international supervision to be agreed
upon by the governments of North and South, as basis for eventual resolution of question of
reunification. This we believe to be true meaning of Geneva Accords, as well as consistent with best
answer to this and similar problems as in Germany and Korea. In sum, US regards differences as not
serious on first, second, and fourth points. Real US problem is and has always been Hanoi's third point,
which we interpret to mean insistence on immediate NLF major and probably dominant role in coalition
government that would replace present government in Saigon, prior to any election process. This would
be imposed and arbitrary solution which we cannot accept in principle as basis of negotiations and for
which we see no warrant in Geneva Accords. Of course Hanoi would be free in any negotiations to put
forward this, rest of four points, or any proposal it wished, and USG would of course discuss such points
if raised, along with its own points. If Hanoi insists that its four points, especially the third, are authentic
interpretations of Geneva Accords, then solution might be to base discussions or negotiations on Geneva
Accords and argue in negotiations about valid interpretations.
b. NLF representation. USG does not regard NLF as independent entity, but as created and in last
analysis controlled by DRV. This point aside, USG cannot regard NLF, even in SVN terms, as
representing more than one interest group within SVN. Most basically, whole USG concern in SVN
arises from DRV role, and this can only be discussed and negotiated with DRV itself. At same time,
USG in President Johnson's State of Union message and statement of July 28/8/ (repeated in point 13)
suggested that ways might be found for NLF to be represented and to pre-sent its views. We would be
interested in any suggestions DRV might have along these lines.
/8/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II,
p. 803.
c. Negotiating forum. USG would accept Geneva Conference of those nations represented in 1954, or
any appropriate grouping of governments having major concerns with issue.
d. US withdrawal. As indicated in discussion of Hanoi's first point, we are prepared envisage US
withdrawal as soon as DRV role itself eliminated. However, any insistence on prior US withdrawal is
obviously unrealistic, and we have understood some private Hanoi messages to mean that DRV does not
thus insist. Could DRV confirm this or clarify its government's position?
5. If discussion becomes deeply involved in nature and meaning of four points, you could say that there
was third possible basis of negotiations in addition to our suggestions of unconditional negotiations or
negotiations on basis of Geneva Accords. This would be to frame four-point declaration following
subject matter of Hanoi's four points but stating third and fourth points somewhat differently to meet our
objections. Acceptance of such formula would be minimum change from apparent present DRV
position, and might create acceptable common basis. If DRV rep were interested, we have possible text
such formulation which could be subject further discussion.
6. Other than as elaborated above, you should stick closely to State of Union message, fourteen points,
Goldberg letter, and related previous US statements. As indicated, you should in any event indicate that

you will report Hanoi views promptly to USG and will await further instructions with view to further
early contact, if desired.
Ball
26. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, January 17, 1966, 9:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between
Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.02, Side A, PNOs 1 and 2. No classification marking. The transcript
was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
[Here follow brief opening comments.]
LBJ: What's your thinking these days. I haven't talked to you. What's happening to our pause? What are
our Generals saying?
RSM: I sat with George Ball and Mac Bundy late Saturday/2/ to consider what's happening on the pause
and I think we agreed that we still aren't sure and that there are a number of leads that we should follow
up so that by the end of this week we'd be in a position to make some kind of a recommendation to you.
We should go back to Rangoon and have our Ambassador there approach that Consul and say, "Three or
four weeks ago I gave you a note to send to your government. I haven't heard. When will I get an
answer?" We should go to Kohler in Moscow and say, "Shastri told us Kosygin said you should contact
the North Vietnamese. What does he tell you?" We should go through Rapacki in Poland and say, "You
promised to go to North Vietnam. We haven't heard a word from you." And, follow each one of these
hot leads or warm leads so that by the end of the week we can tell you that we've checked them off and
there's nothing more to expect from them.
/2/January 15.
I think that there's a feeling in some parts of State, particularly George [Ball], that we shouldn't resume
bombing at the end of Tet. Of course, over here among the Chiefs, there's a feeling that we should have
resumed before this. I think, my own feeling is, and I think Cy's [Vance] as well, that we were well
advised to continue to pause through Tet in order to allow an ample period of time to elapse for North
Vietnam to respond to any one of these several lines of contact and to establish firmly in the minds of
our own public and in the minds of the international public that we gave a reasonable time for them to
respond. And that reasonable time, in my incline, will elapse with the end of Tet. I think you'll get some
criticism if you resume bombing at that point, but unless something develops between now and then I
would certainly urge that you do so. That's a week from today or a day or two later.
I had just gotten the memo you had Jack Valenti send me from Arthur Goldberg./3/ I was just reading it.
I'll be prepared to comment on it to you later today.
/3/Entitled "Viet Nam Prospects," January 12, it was forwarded to McNamara by Valenti under cover of
a January 15 memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files:
FRC 77-0075, Vietnam, 1966)
LBJ: I'm rather amazed at the minimum amount of hell-raising that's come forth on the pause. Aren't
you?

RSM: Not really. I think that the Republicans read the same poll the rest of us did that showed the wives
and mothers of this country don't want war. And they're just scared as hell to come out and say, "He
should have started bombing last week." And I noticed Jerry Ford, this morning and yesterday, was
very, very careful on this point simply showing the support you have for it in this country.
LBJ: Do you get anything in your cables from Westmoreland or any of his people?
RSM: Yes. It's clear they would like to see it resumed as promptly as possible, although they're being
very quiet and very well disciplined, I think. I talked to a number of members of the press in the last
week and over the weekend including yesterday, and they're just not getting any bitching, as far as I can
tell, from the military either here or in South Vietnam about the extension of the pause.
LBJ: Jack Sutherland told me that he had been to lunch with a General last Friday. He's US News and
World Report. I haven't seen it this week. Said he was raising hell and said we were throwing the war
away. I didn't ask him what-RSM: I'm sure there are many that feel that, Mr. President, but I've noticed very, very little reflection of
that view in the press attributed to military personnel.
LBJ: Well, do you think then we're going to have a sentiment that will support our resumption if
everybody feels this way about it?
RSM: I think so, Mr. President, particularly among the great majority of the people in this country. I
think you'll find some foreign leaders will criticize you if you resume bombing on, let's just say the 26th
as an illustration. I think Nasser will feel that it would have been wiser to continue the pause. I think
probably Aiken and Mansfield and Church and McGovern certainly will feel that way. But I think the
great majority of the people in the country will believe that you gave them a reasonable time, over a
month, and there was no movement at all on their part.
As a matter of fact, the intelligence information that we get back doesn't indicate that they're even
thinking of moving at this point. We haven't yet had any reflection of Shelepin's visit from Moscow and
that might throw a somewhat different light on the statement I just made. But no other intelligence
source that I've seen indicates that Hanoi is even considering that--moving toward negotiation in order to
lead us to extend the pause. I keep thinking they will give some indication of that. It would just seem
smart bargaining on their part to do so. They could get a continuation of the pause with very, very little
action. Even if they came in with some questions, we'd almost be forced to extend it. But I haven't seen
any evidence that they'll move in that direction.
I was so concerned about it that I had brought over here, Friday or Saturday,/4/ the leading British
authority on North Vietnam, a man named Honey, Professor Honey,/5/ and he has been following them
for years and years and years and we have found him useful in the past, and I talked to him Saturday, as
did Cy, and his own analysis was that the balance of power in Hanoi and among the Politburo there is
such that it's in the hands of what I'd call hard-liners. And particularly it's in the hands of the First
Secretary of the Communist Party, a man named Le Duan, who was in command in the South in 1954 at
the time of the Geneva Accords and who always felt that Ho Chi Minh made a serious tactical error at
that time. He had the war won. He let himself be negotiated out of it at Geneva. And who today,
therefore, is putting considerable pressure on Ho Chi Minh and others to ensure continuing a war that he
thinks they either are winning or can win. But in any event, whether that's a proper interpretation or not,
and I'm not prepared to say it is, I don't see the signs of movement toward negotiation by them, as much
as I have been looking for them and as much as I'd like to see them.

/4/January 14 or 15.
/5/P.J. Honey, author of Communism in North Vietnam: Its Role in the Sino-Soviet Dispute (Cambridge,
Mass., 1963), was a lecturer at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London.
LBJ: Do you see any signs of dangerous build-up during this period or that we've sacrificed much?
RSM: I don't, Mr. President. I do see signs of dangerous build-up, but I don't think that it's a result of the
pause nor do I think it would have been prevented if we had not had a pause. But, I do definitely see
signs of-LBJ: You sure want to watch that and be prepared on it because I think that's gonna be a campaign issue.
RSM: Mr. President, I'm sure it is. And I think the longer you extend the pause, the more dangerous a
campaign issue it becomes.
LBJ: That's right.
RSM: But I am prepared to say that the action they have taken, which has led to this build-up, was
decided upon and originated prior to the start of the pause.
LBJ: What about their defections and their desertions?
RSM: Well, we've had an interesting report from a man named Goure,/6/ who works for the Rand
Corporation. And we hired the Rand Corporation to go out there and carry on, over a period of months,
an extensive interrogation of Viet Cong prisoners and defectors. And his report shows what I think
you've heard from other sources. First, that the number of defections has increased substantially, I've
forgotten exact figures, but it's on the order of 10,000 for 1965 versus 2,000 for 1964. The 10,000, still
being a rather low number of defections from a force that's at least two hundred and some odd thousand,
250,000, in total. And these 10,000 may include Viet Cong sympathizers as well as members of that
force. So that it's not a great number, but it's a substantially larger number than in 1964.
/6/Leon Goure. For a summary of a report later in 1966 by Goure on Viet Cong motivation and morale,
see Document 198.
Much more important than the number of defectors is the attitude that they reflect of the morale of those
who haven't defected. They say, for example, that they're ridden with disease. They're harassed by air.
They're constantly forced to move. They have no sanctuary in which they can rest and recuperate. The
bases that they formerly used, with the deep underground tunnels and caves, are under constant attack.
They never know when they're safe. They find it difficult to obtain hot food. They find it difficult to
move. They're short of medicines. The rate of incidence of malaria and other diseases, particularly in the
Viet Cong in the highlands, appears to run between 24 and 35 percent. And that many of them are
discouraged and many who did believe that they were winning or would win now question whether they
will. Now I don't want to indicate to you the morale is shot. I just want to indicate that the pressure that
is being applied to them by air and by constant offensive probing by the government and U.S. forces is
beginning to appear in morale.
LBJ: What do you hear from the Kennedy boys on this?
RSM: I haven't talked to Teddy. I called him over the holidays to wish him holiday greetings. But, I

haven't talked to him since he got back. I have talked to Bobby about it. He was very pleased to see the
pause started. I think he feels that we've got to continue to increase our forces there, but that we ought to
carry on efforts toward negotiations or some form of non-military settlement. As do I. I think if we
resume the bombing, Mr. President, we ought to continue to carry on a number of these diplomatic
moves. You remember the suggestion for the Six Nation meeting that came up in your office when Dean
Rusk and George were present one day about a week or ten days ago? Well, that kind of action, it seems
to me, ought to be initiated even after we resume bombing, if we do.
LBJ: Will Bobby oppose resuming bombing in light of the New York Times? I assume they will.
They're gonna oppose anything we do, aren't they?
RSM: Well, I don't know if they'll oppose it. I think they'll say we didn't wait long enough or we didn't
handle it right during the intervening period. They may oppose it as well. I talked to Scotty Reston,
Friday or Saturday. My impression was that he personally would oppose it. While-LBJ: Oppose the resumption?
RSM: Oppose the resumption.
LBJ: What's his thinking?
RSM: Well, it just isn't militarily effective and therefore by continuing the pause you don't suffer a
military penalty and you may obtain a political advantage.
LBJ: That's not correct, though. You think you do suffer a military penalty don't you?
RSM: I think you suffer a military penalty in the sense, Mr. President, they can carry on the war in the
South at a lower cost to their society. It doesn't cost them nearly as much to infiltrate the men and the
equipment without our bombing as it does with our bombing. And I am absolutely certain in my own
mind, beyond that, that the bombing represents a political pressure which we benefit from. The very fact
that we're talking about negotiation, the very fact that the Soviets put pressure on them, and other
nations of the world have put pressure on them, is a result of our bombing, which pressure would not
have been put on them if we hadn't had the bombing. The bombing represents something we can give up
in return for something they'll do at some point. Apparently, this isn't the point.
LBJ: Tell me about the women out there, Bob. I'm getting some--The Post is starting nagging at me.
RSM: The lack of women?
LBJ: Yeah. In the services. There ain't nothing but nurses. Say that you won't let any of the WACs go, or
any of the WAVEs go, or any of the rest of them. You reckon' we can sprinkle any of them out there?
RSM: Frankly, the question of WAVEs and WACs hasn't been brought to me, Mr. President. I would
oppose it. I think it would just cause a tremendous amount of unrest and trouble. We won't let the wives
go out there, of officers or enlisted men or diplomatic personnel. And to introduce WAVEs and WACS,
in the first place, they don't add anything in the way of efficiency to the operation. In the second place,
they require a lot of special quarters and special handling. In the third place, it causes morale problems
because of apparent discrimination. The wives in Bangkok are just sore as hell that there are wives of
civilian employees and female employees out there. And beyond that, the wives of foreign diplomats
allied with us, for example, the Australian diplomats, are allowed in Saigon and they take pictures of

young American women in the area and they wonder what their husbands are doing. It seems to me that
to send WAVEs and WACs will simply accentuate that problem. And I haven't felt any pressure for it.
As a matter of fact, none of the serv-ices have even raised the question with me, but I'll look into it.
LBJ: No. No, I wouldn't stir it up. But, they're raising hell with me and I assume that it's coming from,
they say, some Major Bonnie somebody at the Air Force, whatever they are, I guess WACs, Air Force,
whatever you call 'em. I asked [indecipherable] told me they didn't want them unless they were a nurse;
say they got about 250-300 nurses.
RSM: Well, I noticed an article or two a week or so ago about it. I didn't follow it up then because I just
wanted to let sleeping dogs lie on this thing. But I can do so anytime.
LBJ: No, I think we'll just let it go. I'll tell them. I got a question in a press conference about it, and said
they were very distressed, from a lady at The Washington Post. So I just anticipated I'd get that. Do you
think we ought to have a meeting? When's Dean coming back? Do you know?
RSM: He should be back tomorrow, I believe. He's stopping in the Philippines yesterday.
LBJ: Are we doing everything we can now with the Philippines and with the Koreans to get them to
come in?
RSM: Yes we are, Mr. President.
LBJ: Got any indication they're gonna come?
RSM: Well, the Koreans at least. There's no question but what the Koreans will come. It's just a matter
of price. And they turned in a request for several hundred million, it's about $600-$700 million worth of
cumshaw that they wanted from us in order to send that division. Both State and we have refused that
and have gone back with an instruction to the Ambassador to negotiate the movement of the division in
return for what amounts to something on the order of $70 million worth of extra equipment and
payments. But Westmoreland didn't ask for the division to be landed in South Vietnam until about July.
So we've got reasonable time to work that out. He won't be ready to have them until then. He does want
a brigade by some time in April and that's our first requirement there for him.
In the case of the Philippines, the problem's more complicated by the fact that the President's just come
in. He's trying to get his government organized. We're not making nearly the progress there that we are
in the case of Korea. But, in Korea we're talking about an additional, maybe, 17,000 men. In the case of
the Philippines, we're talking about a couple of thousand. So, it's much more important that we push on
Korea than the Philippines, but we must have some Philippine contribution as well. They're talking
about construction engineers at the moment, military construction engineers.
LBJ: The Germans coming through with anything?
RSM: Not a damn thing except the hospital ship. The Ambassador came in the other day and asked if
the hospital ship was satisfactory as the substitute for combat troops and I told him absolutely not. I
don't think it's going to make any difference to him, having said that. But at least I didn't think we ought
to give in after the strong efforts you made to get combat units. I told him that you had personally asked
the Chancellor for a medical unit and a combat construction battalion, done it twice in my presence, and
I saw absolutely no excuse whatsoever for their failure to send it. Well, he didn't indicate they would.

[Here follows discussion of base closings, the deferment of authorized military construction funds, and
the Springfield Armory.]
LBJ: I'm gonna rely on you heavily now in this decision this next week. I think you know where my
leanings are and how I feel about it, and except for you, I doubt we'd have gone on as long as we have
gone and I'm not sorry for it at all. I want to be patient and understanding and reasonable. On the other
hand, I think you know my natural inclinations. You were down there when we made the decision. But I
sure do want you to start building your case for a resumption and be able to discuss it before we really
make the decision so I get every angle of it.
RSM: Right, right.
LBJ: OK.
27. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-41-66
Washington, January 18, 1966.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 54, Folder B, "Joint Staff Papers, 1965-66."
Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Air Operations Against North Vietnam (NVN) (U)
1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in JCSM-16-66, dated 8 January 1966,/2/ forwarded to you their
recommendation to resume offensive air operations against North Vietnam (NVN). They consider these
operations a principal element of our strategy in Southeast Asia. This memorandum provides their
recommendations for the conduct of offensive air operations when resumed.
/2/Document 13.
2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the air strike program against NVN, taking into account
the recent views of CINCPAC. They have concluded that restrained air strikes against the north, as
conducted thus far, will not achieve the primary military objective of causing the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV) to cease its support and direction of the aggression in South Vietnam (SVN). The
piecemeal nature of the attacks against the DRV has permitted the enemy greater freedom to replenish
and disperse his stocks, redirect the flow of materials, and improve his defenses. The geographic
restrictions and limitation on the number of armed reconnaissance sorties authorized have limited
effective interdiction of the extensive rail, highway, and inland waterway LOCs. Moreover, these
restrictions and the requirement for single coordinated attacks on specified targets have exposed our
forces to greater risks.
3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that offensive air operations against NVN should be resumed
now with a sharp blow and thereafter maintained with uninterrupted, increasing pressure. This course of
action, as recommended in JCSM-982-64, dated 23 November 1964,/3/ offers the best probability of
achieving our objectives at the least risk, casualties, and cost and with the least probability of enemy
miscalculation. These operations should be conducted in such a manner and be of sufficient magnitude
to: deny the DRV large-scale external assistance; destroy those resources already in NVN which

contribute most to the support of aggression; destroy or deny use of military facilities; and harass,
disrupt, and impede the movement of men and materials into SVN.
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 932-935.
4. (TS) The denial of external assistance to NVN requires closing of the ports as well as sustained
interdiction of land LOCs from China. Approximately 67 per cent of all imports in 1965 entered NVN
through seaports (principally Haiphong). Military considerations would dictate that mining be conducted
now; however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the sensitivity of such a measure and recognize that
precise timing must take into account political factors. Moreover, present sanctuaries should be reduced
to permit more flexibility in interdicting major LOCs and striking key military targets.
5. (TS) The destruction of resources already in NVN would include the entire POL bulk and dispersed
storage, distribution, and transportation system which contributes directly to the movement of supplies
to the south. Large military facilities in the northern part of NVN would be destroyed. An intensified
armed reconnaissance program, without sortie limitation, would be mounted to harass, disrupt, and
attrite the dispersed supply and transport activities which have been identified through detailed
intelligence analysis. Day and night air operations would concentrate on LOC centers, predicted traffic
flow areas, transshipment points, vehicle/boat concentrations, and LOC exits from the DRV. Electric
power would be disrupted in order to hamper command and control as well as bring home to the DRV
leadership and populace the heavy price of continuing the war. As in the past, these attacks would be
designed to minimize civilian casualties and damage to population centers.
6. (TS) The increasing DRV air capability is a continuing threat to the security of our military forces and
should be destroyed. In the execution of the air campaign, continuous surveillance of DRV airfields
would be maintained. The neutralization of these airfields must be authorized whenever interference
with our planned air operations, or offensive air actions against our military forces in SVN, is initiated.
Further, the operational commander must be furnished the authority to deal with the SAM threat, as
required to prevent interference with planned air operations.
7. (TS) Operations against additional target systems would be the subject of separate authorizations as
the air campaign develops.
8. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the likelihood of adverse international reaction in response to
sharply intensified air strikes and particularly to mining of the DRV ports. However, they believe that
responsible Free World leadership will understand the necessity for these actions. Recognized also is the
possibility of Communist China's direct entry into the war either through miscalculation or gradual
escalation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that continued US restraint may serve to increase rather than
decrease the likelihood of such intervention by encouraging gradual responses on the part of the Chinese
Communists. This is in addition to the probable interpretation of such restraint as US vacillation by both
the Communist and Free World leadership.
9. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that:
a. The authorized area for offensive air operations be expanded to include all of NVN less the area
encompassed by a ten-mile radius around Hanoi/Phuc Yen Airfield, a four-mile radius around
Haiphong, and a twenty-mile China buffer zone. Exceptions to permit selected strikes within these
restricted areas, in accordance with the air campaign described herein, will be conducted only as
authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Numerical sortie limitations on armed reconnaissance in NVN be removed.

c. No tactical restrictions or limitations be imposed upon the execution of the specific air strikes.
d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff be authorized to direct CINCPAC to conduct an air campaign against the
DRV as described herein. Upon your approval of the above concept, a JCS directive of execution to
CINCPAC will be prepared and submitted to you separately for approval.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original.
28. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 19, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19.
Secret; Limited Distribution. In his January 20 covering memorandum forwarding Bell's report to the
President, McGeorge Bundy stated: "I think you will find it well worth reading all the way through. I
agree with nearly all of it, and so does Bob McNamara." (Ibid.) See Document 15 for Bell's oral report
to the President on his trip.
SUBJECT
Non-military aspects of the effort in Vietnam--January 1966
I spent the period January 1 to 5 in Vietnam, accompanied by Chet Cooper of the White House staff,
Rud Poats and others of A.I.D., and Dick Cooper of the Bureau of Economic Affairs in State. We
concentrated on the problems of inflation, port congestion, and the pacification of the countryside. Our
principal conclusions and recommendations are reported in this memorandum. I would be glad to
amplify them in any way you may wish.
1. Pacification/Rural Construction.
Now that the introduction of U.S. troops has arrested a deteriorating military position, the highest
priority problem in Vietnam, in my opinion, is to develop a tested and reliable system for "pacifying"
the countryside. "Pacification" means, once major VC or NVN military units have been swept from an
area, to establish effective local security against terrorism, to identify and eliminate the hidden VC cells
(the "invisible government"), to establish effective institutions of local government including means for
popular participation, and to commence solid programs of economic and social development (education,
health, agricultural improvement, etc.).
The joint GVN-US objectives in Vietnam require a steady widening of the "pacified" areas, behind the
shield of military protection. And yet it is a striking and melancholy fact that no significant progress has
been made in pacification for the past several years, despite a great deal of effort.
Now a new effort is underway under the title of "rural construction." In some ways the new effort is

more promising than anything that has gone before: it has good leadership and backing within the GVN,
and is based on more realistic plans and timetables than anything tried previously. There is as yet,
however, no basis for optimism. The pacification task is inherently very complex and difficult and will
require years to complete under the best conditions. The new effort is still almost entirely on paper. And
neither the GVN nor the U.S. approach to the pacification effort, in my opinion, is yet strong enough or
well enough organized to get the job done.
In view of the importance of this subject, I attach to this memorandum as Annex A/2/ a fuller discussion
of the present situation.
/2/Attached but not printed.
In summary, my recommendations are:
--that higher priority--second only to that given the seeking out and destruction of major enemy troop
units--be given to the pacification program by all U.S. elements in Vietnam;
--that, since all elements of the U.S. Mission in Vietnam are necessarily involved in pacification, a
single point of responsibility be established in the Mission for managing the U.S. effort in support of the
GVN rural construction program. My own suggestion for accomplishing this is to assign this
responsibility to Ambassador Porter as his first priority assignment. Under this concept, Ambassador
Porter, supported by a small staff and working with the heads of the country team units (MAC/V, A.I.D.,
JUSPAO, etc.), would be responsible for preparing integrated plans and schedules for the various action
programs and, when they have been approved by Ambassador Lodge, for supervising their execution.
(In preliminary discussions of this recommendation in Saigon, General Westmoreland and Mr. Mann
expressed agreement with it, and Ambassador Lodge seemed to receive it favorably.);
--that, in view of the experimental nature of the pacification effort at present and the need to develop as
soon as possible a proven system, a strong, continuing program of evaluation and analysis be undertaken
with the objective of building a tested doctrine for Vietnamese pacification. I would suggest that this
should include a thorough review of progress and problems in Saigon at least once a quarter, with high
level participation each time from Washington. Ambassador Porter has been asked for a first report of
this type on March 31st.
2. Economic problems of the war effort.
With the step-up in the scale of fighting and the involvement of more U.S. troops over the last nine
months, the economic situation has changed radically--from a position of some underemployment of
resources and relative price stability to one of severe shortages of resources, particularly of skilled labor,
and strong inflationary pressures which have already resulted in price increases on the order of 40 per
cent since the beginning of 1965. The prospects are for even stronger inflationary pressures this year,
stemming from large GVN budget deficits, more spending by U.S. troops, and a larger military
construction program, and for even greater pressure on scarce resources--labor, transportation facilities,
etc. Remedial action of at least three kinds is required.
(1) There is now serious port congestion in Saigon and in the coastal ports. The latter problem should be
short lived; actions now underway are expected within three or four months to enable the coastal ports to
handle the anticipated traffic.
The port of Saigon is a different matter. There is agreement in the U.S. country team on the steps that

are necessary to enlarge the capacity of the port of Saigon, but these steps will require strong and
continuous managerial energy in the GVN, which is not now in sight. Accordingly, with Ambassador
Lodge's approval, I recommended to Prime Minister Ky that he name a single, strong port manager,
reporting directly to him, with sufficient authority to get the job done. The U.S. would name a single
senior U.S. adviser to the port manager, who would have such staff as he needed and who would have
authority over both the MAC/V and A.I.D. resources needed to improve port efficiency.
The Prime Minister accepted this recommendation in principle. If he carries it out, there will still be
needed steady and continuing effort over a period of months to raise the capacity of the port to what is
required. And beyond the problem of port expansion as such there will be further difficult problems of
warehousing, internal transport, and other logistics elements.
(2) A strong and vigorously executed anti-inflation program will be necessary for the foreseeable future
to prevent what could become a runaway inflation. The GVN leaders are seriously concerned, as they
should be, by this prospect, and Bui Diem gave me unequivocal assurances, "speaking for the Prime
Minister," that the government intends to do whatever is necessary to meet the problem.
The GVN has already taken the most important single step in an anti-inflation program, namely, to
decide on an austerity expenditure budget for 1966. While I was in Saigon, a number of additional steps
were agreed on: raising GVN taxes, requiring advance deposits of piasters by importers, eliminating the
grace period on customs duty payments, increasing government bond sales, and at least doubling the rate
of imports financed by the GVN and by our economic aid (both A.I.D. and P.L. 480). Moreover,
General Westmoreland has been most cooperative in seeking ways to limit troop spending on the
Vietnam market, and to limit the impact on the Vietnamese economy of the military construction
program.
Nevertheless, GVN and U.S. economists are agreed that the meas-ures adopted thus far are not sufficient
to hold price increases during 1966 to a reasonable figure (say 20-25 per cent). We discussed with the
GVN a number of possible monetary measures, some of them rather unorthodox, which might help, but
could not reach agreement on proposals which promised both to be useful and to be politically
acceptable.
Accordingly, it is necessary to regard the inflation problem as unfinished business, and to keep working
urgently with the GVN to reach agreement on a sufficient program.
(3) The underlying problem of resource allocation also remains a very important one for which neither
GVN nor U.S. programs and actions are yet strong enough. On the GVN side, the government is roughly
in the position of trying to run a war without a War Production Board or a War Manpower Commission.
The overall demands on men and on material are not gathered in one place, examined in relation to each
other, and the hard choices made of what to eliminate when it is plain that not all demands can be met.
(For example, I was told that little progress can be expected on land reform this year because the
technical men in the Department of Agriculture needed to carry on the work have been drafted into the
army or have gone to work for construction companies--not as a result of conscious decision as to
priorities but simply the haphazard working of the present system. The same is true of our village health
station program.)
On the U.S. side there are the beginnings of arrangements to deal with issues of resource allocation,
principally country team committees to consider competing demands on the ports and on construction
materials and skilled labor. Stronger arrangements will clearly be needed both in the GVN and in the
U.S. country team. I suggest:

--that a small staff be established in the U.S. country team to study anticipated requirements and
availabilities for key resources, and to propose means for enlarging resources and for allocating scarce
items according to proper priorities;
--that the U.S. country team develop a proposal for establishing staff and organizational arrangements in
the GVN to deal with problems of resource mobilization and allocation.
3. As one means for improving the non-military aspects of the U.S. program in Vietnam, I discussed
with Ambassador Lodge the idea of sending high-level teams from the United States to examine our
work in such fields as agriculture, education, and health. Such teams could achieve three valuable
results:
--to provide expert appraisals of our present programs and recommendations for improvement-particularly as to how these non-military activities can better support the pacification/rural construction
effort;
--to emphasize to senior GVN officials the importance of these non-military fields and the nature of the
program they ought to be supporting;
--to re-emphasize the importance that the U.S. gives to these fields.
As you know, the Ambassador agreed with the idea of sending out such teams, provided their trips were
carefully prepared and focused on what it is practical to do in Vietnam under present circumstances.
While I was in Saigon, the Ambassador discussed with the GVN the proposed visit of the first such
team, to be headed by Secretary Freeman. GVN officials welcomed the proposed visit, which is now
planned for sometime in February.
I recommend that we plan now to send further teams in the field of education (headed perhaps by
Assistant Secretary Keppel) and in the field of health (headed perhaps by Dr. Boisfeullot Jones of
Atlanta and by Assistant Secretary Philip Lee of HEW). The possibility of additional teams could be
examined in the light of the experience gained in sending these three.
4. A few miscellaneous observations.
(1) I visited three camps for refugees--one at Hoi An, south of Danang, and two at Qui Nhon--and talked
at length with the A.I.D. people in charge of refugees nationwide. At present, the number of refugees is
fairly static at around 400,000 in recognized camps, with some still arriving but some also returning to
their villages or becoming resettled in urban areas. All are receiving food and are under shelter. Much
remains to be done to provide schooling for the children, training for adults, and assistance in
resettlement.
(2) At Averell Harriman's request I looked into the matter of help and advice to other free world aid
donors. In order to improve our performance in this area, the A.I.D. Mission is now establishing a
special office whose sole job will be to act as liaison with other donors--to offer advice on the kinds of
aid that will be most valuable, to arrange for logistic support for aid teams from other free world
countries, etc.
(3) I talked with staff of A.I.D., Embassy, and General Lansdale's group about the problem of economic
warfare, that is, the effort to deny medicines, food, and other items to the VC. This is a very complex
problem on which the combined U.S. Mission is beginning to focus. We are proposing to assign an

experienced senior officer to work full time on this task, which will require strong coordinated efforts by
the police, the military, and the economic agencies in Vietnam.
(4) The A.I.D. Mission in Vietnam is being expanded rapidly from about 650 Americans to around 9001000. It is by far the largest A.I.D. mission in the world, and has a much faster-moving, more
operational set of responsibilities than most other missions. We are striving hard to find the executives
we need, by reassignment from within A.I.D., by borrowing from DOD, by recruiting from outside. We
have not yet caught up with the workload, and I expect that for months to come our top management in
Saigon will be spread very thin. This is basically the result of the fact that A.I.D. has less of a career
personnel system than any of the other U.S. agencies in Vietnam.
Nevertheless, I was for the most part impressed and pleased with the calibre of the A.I.D. personnel in
Vietnam. We agreed on some replacements while I was there, and on some improved and simplified
organizational arrangements. My present judgment is that if we are careful not to add low priority
assignments to their present workload, the A.I.D. Mission in Vietnam will be able to carry out its
assignments successfully.
David E. Bell
29. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 19, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19.
Secret. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson at 7 p.m. on January 19,
noting in his covering memorandum that he agreed that it was right to follow up quickly Hanoi's
approach to Souvanna but that he thought that Ball "somewhat overstates its significance." (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Possible Signal from Hanoi
Many of us have believe that at the last moment before the Communists think we may resume bombing,
Hanoi will try to muddy the water by an ambiguous response. It is possible that this is now occurring
through Vientiane.
Souvanna Phouma has told Ambassador Sullivan that the North Vietnamese Charge approached him on
Monday/2/ to deliver a demarche under instructions from Hanoi./3/ This demarche consisted of four
general headings, two of which related directly to our fourteen points:
/2/January 17.
/3/Sullivan reported on the approach to Souvanna in telegrams 773 and 774 from Vientiane, January 19.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
a. The DRV cannot accept the accusation that their troops are guilty of aggression, since there are no
DRV troops in SVN (Point 13).
b. Peace can only be restored if the people are permitted to exercise free choice concerning their political
and social future. There can be no free choice while US troops remain in the South (Point 8).

c. The US will never leave the South because of its agreement with Saigon and the extension of SEATO
protection to the South.
d. The DRV denies any violation of Laos territory by the sending of 4,500 troops per month over the Ho
Chi Minh trail. Again, there are no DRV troops in SVN.
Souvanna asked the Charge why he did not make these points directly to the Americans. The Charge
replied that Souvanna was particularly familiar with Indochinese affairs. Souvanna then asked whether
the North Vietnamese wished him to act as intermediary between Hanoi and the Americans. The Charge
replied that he would seek further instructions on this point.
Souvanna raised the question as to Sullivan's authority to participate in a meeting directly between
Sullivan and the Charge. Sullivan has asked for instructions and we have authorized him to talk with the
Charge if Souvanna arranges it. Our telegram to Sullivan is attached at Tab A./4/
/4/Attached but not printed. The message was transmitted in telegram 478 to Vientiane, January 19.
(Ibid.)
Why This May Be Hanoi's Response to Our Peace Offensive
There are several reasons it is logical for Hanoi to approach us through Souvanna:
1. It would be consistent with past conduct to use an Asian. In 1950 Peiping communicated to us
regarding Korea through an Asian, the Indian Ambassador Panikkar, rather than through Eastern
European Communist allies or neutrals.
2. A communication through Vientiane is less likely to be listened in on by the Soviets or Chinese than a
communication through Moscow or one of the Eastern European capitals.
3. Communications with Hanoi from Vientiane are quicker and more secure than from Rangoon since
the ICC plane goes back and forth three times a fortnight.
4. The North Vietnamese know Bill Sullivan since he was at the Geneva Conference of 1962. They also
know that Averell Harriman (also associated with the 1962 Conference) was recently in Vientiane.
5. Since our pause began Sullivan has reported that the North Vietnamese Charge has twice made
friendly social noises to him.
The Content of the Message
The Charge's message is significant in that it is addressed to our Fourteen Points. (Peiping has publicly
denounced this formulation with the phrase "to hell with the Fourteen Points.")
The most interesting point in the message is that there can be no free choice (meaning quite possibly free
elections) until American troops are withdrawn. We have never taken a position on the timing of troop
withdrawal but have insisted only that conditions must first be created and guarantees provided under
which elections can be held free of all outside interference.
The question of our withdrawal prior to elections has been very much on Hanoi's mind as the following
facts disclose:

1. The Polish ICC representative, who was in Hanoi on January 10 to 11, is reported by an authoritative
Western source to have said that Shelepin had tried to persuade the Hanoi Government that unification
should come about in two stages.
Under the Soviet plan the first stage would be an election in South Viet-Nam in which all representative
parties including the Liberation Front would participate in the creation of a new government.
The second stage would be an election in which both North and South Viet-Nam would determine the
issue of reunification.
The Hanoi leaders reportedly told Shelepin that they disagreed with this two-stage approach but put
special emphasis on the United States desire to take part in the supervision of elections.
2. The fact that the Polish ICC representative was in Hanoi and purported to know about the Shelepin
proposal suggests that the Poles may have participated in planning--or at least were familiar with--the
approach that the DRV has now made to Souvanna. This may explain the implication in Rapacki's
conversation on January 18 with Ambassador Gronouski that something was moving on which he could
not comment./5/
/5/Gronouski reported on this conversation in telegram 1172 from Warsaw, January 18. (Ibid.)
3. On January 16, the DRV official newspaper, Nhan Dan, discussed the issue of troop withdrawal in a
manner similar to that employed by the Charge to Souvanna:
"Everyone knows that there can be peace and free elections in South Viet-Nam only when American
troops have withdrawn from there. . . . US troops would never get out of South Viet-Nam or they would
withdraw only on condition that the elections in South Viet-Nam are held under the US aggressors'
control and will lead to the domination of South Viet-Nam by their lackeys."
Where Do We Go From Here?
Ambassador Kohler has asked for an appointment with the North Vietnamese Charge in Moscow./6/ He
has been advised of Souvanna's conversation in Vientiane but we are instructing him not to mention it
unless the other side raises the question. If in fact Hanoi has selected Vientiane as the channel of their
choice we do not wish to confuse the situation.
/6/See Documents 25 and 37 regarding Kohler's contacts with the DRV in Moscow.
Certainly what has been said through Souvanna so far offers no basis for a solid dialogue. It is possible,
however, that it may be the prelude either to the opening of conversations through Souvanna or a direct
exchange between Sullivan and the North Vietnamese Charge. We are giving Sullivan full instructions
in the event such an exchange becomes possible.
As you will see from Tab A Sullivan will suggest that Souvanna go back to the DRV Charge promptly
in the hope that we can get clearer evidence within the next two or three days whether the North
Vietnamese Government is serious or just trying to confuse the situation.
George W. Ball

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
30. Intelligence Memorandum/1/
OCI No. 0490/66
Washington, January 20, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam--Intelligence Estimates. Secret; No
Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency. A copy is also in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, vol. XLV.
COMMUNIST REACTION TO THE US PEACE OFFENSIVE
Attached is a brief assessment of Communist views of the present state of the conflict in Vietnam.
Attached also are compilations of selected Communist statements on the current US diplomatic
campaign and the lull in bombing North Vietnam./2/
/2/Attached but not printed.
Attachment
COMMUNIST VIEWS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM
North Vietnam
The halt in US air strikes on North Vietnam, coupled with intensive US efforts to elicit a positive
response from Hanoi on negotiating an end to the war, have thus far produced only biting denunciations
of US motives by the North Vietnamese and a stiffening of previously stated North Vietnamese
demands. Hanoi's failure to show interest in discussions with the US on any but its own terms probably
stems largely from its belief that the military situation in South Vietnam is still in its favor. Based on
this belief, the North Vietnamese apparently feel that ultimately the US will be forced to accept
Communist demands.
The North Vietnamese apparently see the current standdown in US air attacks mainly as a welcome
opportunity to repair bomb damage and to step up the shipment of supplies to depots which support
Communist operations in South Vietnam. Hanoi probably hopes that by delaying an official response to
the US peace overtures it can prolong the lull in air strikes.

The North Vietnamese public response to the US "peace offensive" also appears to be calculated to
reassure the Chinese Communists and the Viet Cong of Hanoi's determination to continue the fight. To
this end a series of propaganda statements out of Hanoi during the past three weeks have set forth three
"actual deeds" which the US must perform to "prove" its acceptance of North Vietnam's "four points."
These deeds are: unconditional cessation of air strikes on North Vietnam, unconditional withdrawal of
US forces from South Vietnam, and US recognition of the National Front for the Liberation of South
Vietnam (NFLSV) as the representative of the South Vietnamese people. In its propaganda statements,
Hanoi has come closer than ever before to suggesting that these "actual deeds" are preconditions for
negotiations.
Hanoi is doubtless also concerned over the success of the US peace effort in convincing world opinion
of US willingness to seek a quick and reasonable end to the war. To counter this, Hanoi has attempted to
impugn US motives. A constant stream of propaganda since the standdown in air strikes began has
stressed the theme that the bombing lull and the "peace offensive" are only a "cover up" for further US
escalation of the war.
NFLSV
The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam has largely ignored the US moves. In its limited
response, it has echoed Hanoi's attacks on the US peace effort, characterizing it as a "trick" designed to
cover up further escalation of the war. Front spokesmen have defiantly reaffirmed the determination of
the Viet Cong to continue fighting. The Front central committee has voiced its full support for Hanoi's
position on the US peace moves.
Communist China
Peking has responded to the US peace campaign and suspension of bombing with a mounting
propaganda attack which suggests that the Chinese are uneasy about the possibility that their position is
being undercut in the non-aligned world--and perhaps also in Hanoi. The Chinese have pumped out a
flood of caustic editorials denouncing the US effort as a "peace hoax" designed to prepare for further
escalation of the war if the Vietnamese Communists do not knuckle under to US "blackmail." Hanoi is
repeatedly urged to continue the fight until victory, and to reject any negotiated settlement except on
Communist terms.
This public position which is almost certainly being conveyed privately to Hanoi, reflects Peking's view
that if the Communists press on resolutely, the war in Vietnam can only end in victory. Such a victory
would take the Chinese a long way toward their ultimate goal of driving the US out of Asia, and at the
same time strike a heavy blow at Moscow--Peking's other principal enemy--by validating Mao's formula
for world revolution through "people's war."
USSR
Moscow has assumed a notably cautious attitude with regard to the US "peace offensive." Soviet party
secretary Shelepin's speeches during his recent visit to Hanoi provide a good illustration of Soviet
reserve on this point. Despite the North Vietnamese leaders' repeated and virulent denunciation of
Washington's diplomatic efforts as "deceitful," Shelepin let pass the opportunity to echo this view. He
did point out, however, in keeping with standard Soviet propaganda treatment, that the "so-called peace
initiative" coincides with a continued US buildup in South Vietnam.
If, as seems likely, Shelepin encouraged the North Vietnamese to give more serious consideration to

recent US moves toward a political solution, he was apparently unable to persuade them to modify their
tactics. The lack of any reference in the communique following Shelepin's visit to recent US probes is a
sign that the two parties were unable to achieve a consensus or even a compromise.
Soviet party chief Brezhnev, at a 15 January rally in Ulan Bator, expressed doubt over Washington's
"sincerity" and maintained that if the US really wanted to end the war in Vietnam, it need only agree to
the "just demands" of the Vietnamese people.
Soviet propaganda has generally avoided any extensive commentary on US diplomatic efforts, but has
accompanied factual reportage of the travels of US envoys with a moderate amount of routine remarks
alleging they were "cover" for further "aggression." In reporting North Vietnamese statements on the US
diplomatic offensive and the bombing standdown, Moscow has toned down Hanoi's particularly abusive
commentary. Privately, Soviet leaders have adopted a generally non-committal stance on US peace
initiatives, avoiding the sharp, negative reaction Moscow has expressed over such moves in the past.
While reacting with caution and reserve to the "peace offensive," the Soviet leaders apparently have not
been overly optimistic regarding its chances for success. Soviet president Podgorny is reported to have
told the French ambassador on 30 December that he was skeptical that current US diplomatic efforts
would induce Hanoi to negotiate.
31. Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Meeker) to
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, January 20, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Exdis; Pinta. Also sent to Ball.
SUBJECT
Length of the Pause in Air Attacks on North Viet Nam
There has been a background assumption lying behind the pause in air attacks on North Viet Nam: that a
pause lasting through the period of the lunar New Year would allow sufficient time to pursue the US
peace offensive to a conclusion, whether affirmative or negative. A reading of the current situation
indicates to me that more time is required. I think we are not now in a position to decide that the pause
should end. There are a number of efforts in train at the present time which need to be completed:
(a) Ambassador Kohler has sent word to the DRV charge in Moscow requesting a discussion with the
charge. The DRV Embassy is evidently now seeking instructions.
(b) In Vientiane the DRV representative has undertaken a substantive discussion with Premier Souvanna
Phouma, evidently on instructions from Hanoi. A cable has been sent to Bill Sullivan to prepare for
further developments in this dialogue./2/
/2/For a summary of the cable, see Document 29.
(c) We have not directly questioned the Soviet Government about the end results of the Shelepin visit to
Hanoi, after Moscow would have had a chance to digest the outcome. Through Ambassador Kohler, we
should put some questions to Premier Kosygin as soon as feasible.
(d) Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina has been in Moscow since Saturday. He was to have another

discussion on Viet Nam with Gromyko today. We need to talk with Shiina as soon as he has returned
from Moscow.
(e) Secretary General U Thant has discussed with Ambassador Goldberg some procedural ideas for
launching an international discussion on Viet Nam. The Secretary General has now been given US
comments. He is in the process of refining his thoughts and considering in what way his proposal should
be launched--perhaps by someone other than the Secretary General.
A review of the available information does not disclose any military reason why the pause needs to be
terminated now rather than sometime hence. The INR review of Viet Cong activity indicates that the
level of activity has not changed materially since the Christmas truce. The level may have been
somewhat higher in early January than the weekly average for 1965. It appears to have been a little
lower than in the three or four weeks before Christmas. The locations and activity of PAVN units is
unclear. There have been no confirmed PAVN attacks since November 1965, although a POW
interrogation suggests that a PAVN battalion may have been involved in the January 17 attack in Binh
Dinh province. We may assume that resupply and reinforcement of the Viet Cong from North Viet Nam
has been proceeding during the period of the pause. Reconnaissance indicates that such activity has
continued. During the same period, the United States has, of course, augmented its own forces in the
South. The available evidence does not show that there are military reasons why we need to end the
pause just now in order to prevent the Communist side from obtaining some marked advantage.
Conversely, there is nothing to suggest that a prolongation of the pause would require us to forgo some
significant military opportunity in the immediate or near future.
On the other hand, there are powerful political reasons for deferring, for the present, any decision to
terminate the pause in air attacks on North Viet Nam:
(1) While four weeks may seem to us a lengthy period in which to await an answer to our overtures, we
should bear in mind the likelihood that the debate in Hanoi, and between Hanoi and Moscow and Hanoi
and the Viet Cong, has probably been extensive. That debate may not yet have run its course. In this
connection, we should remember that it took the United States nearly nine months--from the President's
Johns Hopkins speech last April until December 1965--to formulate its own statement of an approach to
peaceful settlement. Now that we have been through this process, it may be unrealistic to expect the
Communist side to coordinate fully with our timing and to respond promptly after the fourteen points
have been communicated.
(2) We want to know, ourselves, the answers that will be produced by the initiatives still in progress. If
we do not wait to get these answers, our action may not only prevent the answers from being given, but
also wipe out the practical possibilities of further efforts at peaceful settlement for quite some time to
come. A whole new phase of escalation and much higher military costs would ensue.
(3) Terminating the pause now would probably end the efforts at prisoner exchange which have been
started in Berlin and Algiers,/3/ and thus also cut off whatever hopeful developments might flow
collaterally from the prisoner discussions.
/3/See Document 47 for a summary of the negotiations through Algiers.
(4) One of our great disabilities around the world in the Viet Nam situation has been a lack of
agreement, and even understanding, on the part of many governments and large opinion groups, in
regard to our policies and actions. President Johnson's peace offensive has had major political impact in
building both understanding and confidence for the United States. We ought not to jeopardize any of this

gain, or fail to maximize it, by coming to a decision too quickly on the length of the pause. It is known
around the world that the peace offensive is still actively in progress. It would be harmful to our political
interests to end the pause before the returns are in and the result is plain to the rest of the world. We
have been criticized in the past for impatience in regard to the pause of May 1965 and for lack of
sufficient interest and responsiveness to earlier moves characterized at least by some as peace initiatives.
We need to take special care this time.
(5) It is greatly in our interest to have the onus for a failure of peace efforts placed on the Communist
side. If we were at this moment to resume bombing of North Viet Nam, the United States would
probably incur, justly or not, a large share of the onus for bringing peace efforts to an end.
(6) Within the United States there is very strong support for the President's peace offensive. In the
interest of having the country united so far as possible behind him, the President would be well advised
to carry the peace offensive a further distance before concluding that it has failed. People in this country
also will want to be convinced that the possibilities of a reasonable peace settlement have been
exhausted before the war is fully resumed and in all likelihood escalated./4/
/4/On January 19 Sisco sent a similar memorandum to Rusk and Ball, outlining a number of
"compelling" reasons "why the pause should continue at least a while longer." (Department of State,
Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) Meeker sent a supplemental memorandum to Rusk and Ball on
January 22, arguing that public pressure to resume the bombing was slight and proposing eight steps to
consider "before the peace offensive is judged to have run a full course." (Ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D
272, Viet-Nam, Misc. Notebooks) In a January 25 memorandum to Ball, which Ball drew on in
preparing Document 41, Meeker contended that resumption of the bombing entailed a high risk of
Chinese intervention and rendered illusory "for a long time" any meaningful peace efforts. (Department
of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Misc. Viet-Nam, Vol. VI)
32. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 20, 1966, 5:54-6:31 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary.
(Ibid.)
Return of Rusk and Harriman
PRESENT
The President, Rusk, Harriman, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, Valenti/2/
/2/Moyers was also present. (Ibid.)
President: Assuming we are going to stay there--and that's a safe assumption. Want in order of priority
all we should do--go after this railroad--that POL, this trail, would take so many planes--and here are
estimated results.
If our military can say if we do certain things we can interrupt their supplies and hurt them--or at the end
of 8 months they will need reinforcements, etc. In other words, I want the coach to give me the season's
schedule--what the other teams will do--and what we will do.

Bob, you need to get from Westmoreland his plan for using our resources and what results--what
happens July--and next January. What is estimate of NVN response?
Rusk, give much thought to this--think we'll be subjected to immense propaganda over next weeks from
peace lovers. They told us bombing cease would help us--now they'll say "another month or so."
Don't want to be impetuous. Must be careful and cautious. Honestly believe we all talk too much. Only
useful purpose is it might confuse Ho so much he'll go crazy. The newspaper articles only serve no
useful purpose. Tom Wicker says he has it on high authority that President will wait 10 days and then let
them have it.
(What President wants Rusk to tell press)
"It's been 26 days since cease bombing. Harriman has been to 11 Capitals. Goldberg and I, too, plus 113
nations. We know we've done everything we can do and should do to talk rather than fight. Adequate
time to reply--nothing encouraging--we don't want to mislead American public."
Then stop there. Don't say any more. We have done everything that is within the bounds of self respect-we will not grow weary. Then you have given a signal--but without dramatics. Then I would hope they
would break out--show their bottom before we showed ours.
When other nations come in asking more time, tell them to go talk to the other side. It takes two to
tango. I read we have a commitment that we will not bomb until H. Wilson has departed Moscow.
We're going to have to double our manpower. At the same time, we must surface all our peace moves.
We can't hold much longer than 30 days. I've told State to tell all other nations we've heard nothing.
Bundy: Since that order, U Thant and Vientiane had intruded. My own curbstone reaction is that a "no
answer" ought to go on the record.
President: Rusk, now that you are back, you tell the press that whatever the hopes, there has been no
response. We think 26 days is long enough. The aggressors don't want to talk.
Rusk: Can see some advantage in starting with Baltimore/3/--the 5-day pause--and go on through all the
other moves-/3/Presumably a reference to the President's Johns Hopkins speech on April 7, 1965. See Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 394-399.
But the whole question is the bombing pause. They want me to tell them about the pause. I have to say
nothing has happened. What am I going to do? They ask. I have to say I can't say except our men will
give a good account and will not run.
Bundy: Would strongly say that these 26 days have proved that we have done all we can do--and the
other nations in the world know this.
President: These Russians are the same ones who told us there were no missiles in Cuba. They let us
believe good would come from pause. But we can't endure this indefinitely. McGovern and his crowd
always want you to go further than you do.

Bundy: You'll have two pieces of paper--Ball on the case against resumption--also an intelligence report
on the pros and cons of bombing resumption./4/ Hope you won't start bombing the day after Tet.
/4/McGeorge Bundy forwarded the two papers to President Johnson at 7:30 p.m. on January 20. Ball's
memorandum, dated January 20, argued that resumption of the bombing would "substantially increase
the risks of escalation" but would not "substantially contribute to persuading Hanoi to stop the
aggression." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol.
10) The intelligence memorandum, dated January 19 and prepared by CIA's Office of National
Estimates, estimated probable reactions both to resumption of the bombing and continuation of the
pause. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV)
President: I'm not going to start now. I just want McNamara to get the decks clear. We have to think
about getting our story out quickly.
Rusk: Having a press conference tomorrow./5/
/5/For text of Rusk's news conference on January 21, see Department of State Bulletin, February 7,
1966, pp. 189-197.
President: It would be good if you can do in the Senate what you are doing in the House. Get the hawks
and the doves together at the same time. Perhaps get Armed Services, Appropriations, and Foreign
Relations.
McNamara: Let Rusk ask Fulbright to bring in other committees.
President: Main thing is to drive the nail in. They have had sufficient time and have not responded.
None of the nations we have talked to have anything to report.
Rusk: But U Thant will probably say that Souvanna Phouma talked to him--and will say we threw it out.
Ball: I'll make a prediction this will get a dirty answer from Hanoi.
Rusk: Even a dirty answer is better than nothing.
Moyers: Story I'd like to see on Monday is that though Rusk has spoken, the President hasn't decided.
President: I'd like to see "the peace jig is up." We don't have to say everything we know to newspapers. I
might be turned around tomorrow, so we have to be able to talk to each other.
33. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State/1/
Rangoon, January 21, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The
source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:46 p.m. and
forwarded to President Johnson by McGeorge Bundy at 4:15 p.m. with the observation that "the man
from Hanoi has nothing to say." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19)
365. Eyes only for the Secretary.

1. Called upon DRV Consul General Vu at his residence at 8:00 p.m. tonight./2/ Participants on both
sides the same as at our Dec 29 meeting/3/ and atmosphere of our talks was much the same as reported
at that time.
/2/In telegram 227 to Rangoon, January 20, Rusk instructed Byroade to seek an appointment with the
DRV Consul General "as part of our effort to close all circuits." (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27-14 VIET; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 135-136)
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 736-737.
2. Vu did not wait for any introductory remarks on my part but remarked as soon as we were seated that
I had delivered an aide-memoire to him recently which I had said I would keep confidential. He said he
had transmitted document to his government as he had promised. He wanted me to know however that
in his own personal opinion the tone and contents of the aide-memoire were such that he considered it an
ultimatum.
3. I said I was sorry to hear him say this as I could assure him that this was a misunderstanding on his
part and that no such impression had been intended. Told him that for my part I had kept our meeting
secret even though I had been pressed by several Ambassadors for information. I told Vu that exact
understanding of his remarks most important to me and asked if his opening remark was also the view of
his government. He repeated again that it was only his personal view. (This I wonder about.)
4. I reminded him that when I last saw him I had said I would stand by for a reply from him. So far none
had been received and there was no indication of any response either related to military action or to
obstacles to negotiation. I asked if he had any reply for me. He said he had had no instructions from his
government to reply. He said that in the meantime his government had issued public statements which
indicated its position.
5. I said my government wanted me to make sure, through direct contact with him, that there was no
misunderstanding and no chance of mishap on this very important matter in any attempt they may have
made to contact us. Vu shook his head and sat silent for a while. I told him for my part I would continue
to stand by for any contact he wished. He nodded his understanding.
6. I said there was one other aspect I would like to mention. The world's attention was focused on
Vietnam. The press of most capitals of the world was alert to any new sign and in this atmosphere it was
probably expecting too much to think our contacts could long remain secret. (I had learned of U Thant's
Jan 20 press conference remark/4/ minutes before seeing Vu but did not mention it and he apparently
had not heard of it.) I said if leaks occurred that we had met that this should not discourage us. We need
not admit what we talked about. Rangoon would still be a quiet place and we could still meet secretly. I
said that I would find a place where we could meet with complete secrecy and he might wish also to
give this some thought.
/4/For a summary of U Thant's comments at his January 20 press conference, see Yearbook of the United
Nations, 1966, pp. 146-147.
7. Vu said he had read press reports from the White House which hinted at our direct contact. I said I
was aware of this statement/5/ but Rangoon had not been singled out. He said "such news should not
have been disclosed, if you sincerely wish to exchange views." I said I understood and would do all I
could to preserve secrecy our contacts.

/5/See footnote 8, Document 16.

8. I said I wished to revert to his opening remark. Told him I know President well personally as well as
his important advisers. From this knowledge and based upon the most intimate knowledge US policy, I
was absolutely certain that President was sincere in wanting peace to come to Vietnam. I said it would
be a great tragedy in the end if there was any misunderstanding on this point.
9. I made remark that I hoped I received a telephone call some day from him and was preparing to
depart when he said he was ready to listen if I had anything more to say. I said I had no instructions to
say more but would make one more comment. I said from Washington viewpoint it was obvious that VC
initiated military activity in South Vietnam had remained at a high level. We also had reliable evidence
of major truck movements continuing to South Vietnam through Laos. It seemed we had no alternative
but to assume that DRV was continuing to support large scale military effort in South and send regular
units there.
10. Vu said that as we were now speaking informally he would comment. He said that immediately after
the US made its 14 points public, 4000 US soldiers had landed in South Vietnam. He also mentioned the
figure of 9000 more arrivals (but I never got period of time to which he referred). He said there are
reports that 20,000 more South Koreans may come. This was ample proof that our President was not
sincere.
11. I said we both had had military experience, and therefore we both knew the advance planning that
had to go into major movements of military units. Certainly it was obvious that the actual decision to
move these troops was made long before the time they arrived. This however was not the major point.
Anyone who understood the President's position clearly would not be surprised that more troops should
be sent to help the South protect itself. We are constantly faced with military action against the South.
There was evidence of unrelented build-up from the North. Our youth were being attacked and killed.
The President had made himself quite clear as to what he considered his obligations to be as long as this
situation continued.
12. I said I hoped he and his government would study most carefully our 14 points and the President's
more recent State of the Union message. Vu said our 14 points contained nothing really new. I said I
hoped he would find it a useful summary of our views for study.
13. I said while it was obvious we could not agree on many things I thought that it was good
nevertheless that we could talk together in this fashion and that I hoped we could meet again in the
future. He was personally quite friendly in escorting me to my borrowed Volkswagen and in saying
goodbye.
Byroade
34. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 22, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19.
Secret.
SUBJECT

Your noon meeting today

I think we have three basic problems, two of which need not concern us much today. The first is whether
to resume bombing. The second is when to resume bombing. The third is what targets to bomb.
I think question one should clearly be answered in the affirmative, and that question three can be pushed
ahead of us, although I think it would be helpful to decide today that this is a very important question
and should be most carefully reviewed. The easiest way to do this is to resume bombing on a pattern
very much like that which existed before the pause. The Chiefs will not like this, but they will sit still for
it in the context of a definite decision to resume.
The immediate problem and the hard one for today is when and how to start the bombing again. My
brother Bill is bringing a timetable of diplomatic and political actions./2/ I have not seen it, and he has
been so busy that I have not wanted to interrupt for an advance description. But I think that the
following questions are those that need to be considered.
/2/"Scenario and Checklist for Possible Resumption of Bombing," January 22. (Ibid., Country File,
Vietnam, vol. XLVI)
1. Have we given adequate public warning that the pause is failing? I do not think we have, and I attach
a paragraph/3/ that Harriman or Rusk or both might work from tomorrow, on television.
/3/Attached but not printed.
2. Are we doing everything we can to close all the circuits? It is already clear that Hanoi is trying to
pretend that its Vientiane demarche was a serious response. Joe Kraft telephoned me this morning to say
that he has reliable information from Paris that there has been a request for clarification from Hanoi on
the 14 points. This can only refer to Vientiane and he admits that it comes from a Frenchman (whom he
refused to name) who has talked to Bo in Paris.
3. How much private warning should we give to friends before the bombing actually begins? I think it is
most important that men like Wilson and Pearson and Sato have advance notice even at the risk of leaks.
This diplomatic advantage conflicts with the desire of CINCPAC and others to catch Hanoi off guard
with a surprise resumption, and thus hit some rewarding targets in daylight.
4. What degree of Congressional consultation should there be before resumption? My own suggestion is
that we should make it very clear that the pause has failed through such devices as the Tuesday
leadership meeting but not engage in any formal consultation about any resumption any more than we
did about starting the pause.
5. In addition to special friends who get a day or two of advance notice, we must have diplomatic notice
to everyone at the time the bombing resumes. I assume this item will be in Bill's scenario.
6. There should probably be a major statement on the results of the pause and on our continuing purpose
of peace by the Secretary of State as it is on the record that the bombing has begun.
This memorandum does not address the question of the date of resumption. I think you will want to keep
a free hand on that. I think you will find that Goldberg and Harriman are strong for another two weeks
of delay and that Bob McNamara wants to get cracking. My own view is that once we have made the
definite decision that we will resume, we are not in a hurry about the particular day. On the other hand,

if you don't give the State Department a deadline, I doubt if they will get all their homework and wire
closing done as fast as you want. So I think I would tell them today that I wanted to be free to send out
the bombers by Thursday,/4/ and that in fact I would plan to hold my hand for another few days and tell
no one.
/4/January 27.
McG. B.
35. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 22, 1966, noon-2:12 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
PRESENT
President, Rusk, Helms, McNamara, Harriman, Taylor, Ball, Raborn, Thompson, Goldberg, Mac
Bundy, Valenti/2/
/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that William Bundy was also present. (Ibid.)
President: Want to survey what has happened--and see what is ahead of us. Want to feel I have options
to proceed on what is the best interest of the United States. Hope we can keep what we say totally secret.
Want McNamara to give report on what happened in his testimony./3/
/3/On January 20 and 21, McNamara testified in support of a request for supplementary military
appropriations before a joint committee composed of members of the Senate Armed Services Committee
and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Defense.
McNamara: Generally 15 to 20 members present. Committee split--Gavin approach--and--the other:
expand the bombing--even to taking on China.
Believe it is possible to bring the poles together--same thing can be done, I believe, with public.
President: Is there much criticism of what we have done?
McNamara: Not so much in the pause. Eight to twelve are critical of our bombing policy. My answer:
not fundamental to what we do in the South. Difference between McNamara and Chiefs is very minor.
POL and power plants are only difference.
Far too much time directed at these minor differences rather than direction of the war.
No changes in pattern of activity in pre-pause period. (What has happened in last 30 days.)
PAVN building up response for future. We'll have 220,000 by first of March. Commanders tell us they'll
need 400,000 by end of year.
Westmoreland requests 75 battalions instead of 45--99 by end of year.

President: Anticipate Chinese coming in?

McNamara: No. This based on China not coming in. This month we'll drop twice the level of bombs as
in peak Korean months. Will expand this further.
By end of year, we'll be in roughly same balance with VC as we are now. All this assumes China will
not come in.
President: Rusk, what are we waiting to hear from? What suggestions do you have?
Rusk: Only live contact still open is Laos. DRV rep there seems nervous. This is delicate contact--has
become known. Souvanna dropped it at dinner party.
Austrian Foreign Minister says he has high level Kremlin contact.
If US continues pause and discontinues force buildup, North Vietnam will talk.
But doesn't say what North Vietnam will do in regard to military side.
General advice from Yugoslavs is: take more time to do anything.
General international approval on pause period. But this is thin, and resumption of bombing would
produce disappointment internationally.
Key point to be tested: whether or not there has been response from other side.
President: Admiral Raborn, any information you have? Movements in the last 30 days?
Raborn: Indications are North Vietnam is rebuilding all repairs--resumed normal daylight infiltrations to
South--food, men, etc. 4500 a month. Roads improved to take 250 tons a day, roughly double the
number of troops required in North Vietnam.
Some indication that VC are getting a bloody nose. Morale may be deteriorating. Commencing to feel
effects of military actions against them. VC unhappy that Hanoi (unreadable) worldwide--frightens
them.
Goldberg: I have confirmation of Rusk and McNamara. U Thant anxious to make a proposal. His public
statement/4/ was not good but could have been much worse. He said he would like a coalition
government reflecting his French conversations. Privately, he is willing to propose the five powers plus
North and South Vietnam--including the National Liberation Front. This very best we can get him to do.
U Thant has feeling something may come of all this.
/4/See footnote 4, Document 33.
Have checked Ambassadors at UN. UK wants pause continued. Italy has crisis. Moro has been loyal
friend. Needs pause to shore him (up) domestically.
Canada for pause.
Thailand doesn't want U.S. to show weakness.

France pushes pause for three months.

Bloc countries need time, they say.
Latin Americans support pause longer if military situation permits.
Indians talk about initiative on their part.
Yugoslavs believe Soviets need more time.
U Thant places great importance on Laos move. Thinks it is definite forward step.
Friends want us to go along more--nonaligned want more then more.
Bloc countries stress you need more time from communist countries than other countries.
President: General Taylor, what do you think?
Taylor: Events have developed about as we anticipated. Profitable move but now at resumption point. I
think the longer we wait to tidy up loose ends, the harder it is to resume.
President: Therefore, you recommend . . .
Taylor: We ought to resume bombing.
President: If we can, we ought to say to all countries--we have gone 30 days--and that's longer than any
of us agreed to do or thought. Thus, tell them we've had no response--we are not obligated or well
advised to keep one hand tied behind us. Without saying we are resuming bombing, we must get this
across. We can talk to military people to find out how to exert maximum strength at minimum danger.
Do we have pledge to tell anyone what we do?
Rusk: Notify British, Canadians, one or two others if we resume.
President: Tell them today we feel free to move whenever we judge it to be required since others have
not responded.
Rusk: Effect of my statement yesterday/5/ was that string has run out.
/5/For text of Rusk's news conference on January 21, see Department of State Bulletin, February 7,
1966, pp. 189-197.
McNamara: Think it wise to send out message as President suggests to go on record.
Harriman: We must build up case of what has moved forward since cessation of bombing--need to show
men and materiel moving down--or use some provocative act as reason. We have built much good will,
we must try to preserve as much as possible. Try to get public opinion to isolate Hanoi.
President: Important before we take action we carefully consider every step we could take to hold what
approval we can. Think we'll keep little because the countries don't want the war to go on. They really

want unilateral disarmament. If other people respond at all, we could carry the pause further. I'm of the
mind to continue it anyway--but we've had no indication of any success at all. We can't impose
hardships on our soldiers much longer. How to do this is what I want State to work on.
Now I gather we gave no indication that we haven't done what we promised. I think we have gone much
longer than we said.
Bundy: We said 12 to 20 days.
Goldberg: I want to add Pope and U Thant to those we consult.
President: Are we keeping in touch with the Pope?
Bundy: Yes within 48 hours.
Goldberg: I am told that there have been no North Vietnamese soldiers involved this month--or since
November.
Bundy: That's a Times story.
President: What do you hear from Westmoreland and Lodge? Their fears from military standpoint?
McNamara: Unanimous view of military commanders we must resume bombing. If not, can expect
higher level of infiltration.
My impression is Lodge feels this way. All officers from second level feel this way. Even getting
emotional. They see North Vietnamese actions to reconstruct bridges, moving substantial units through
Laos.
All indications are of substantial buildup during pause--and preparing for intensified action in South
Vietnam. My own appraisal--they overestimate the effect of North bombing in stopping infiltration.
Helms: May I interrupt? We have report of economist. Increased bombing in the North would not stop
movement of supplies to the South.
McNamara: We need to really search this out. I think it essential to resume the bombing. We've had
good fortune with the pause. Consider more peace moves, but unless we resume bombing, we will give
wrong signal to Hanoi, Peking and our own people.
Strongly recommend bombing resumption.
Raborn: Our reports support McNamara. View about wrong signal.
Thompson. We have given impression we would not continue pause unless something happened.
Soviets told me pause wouldn't be considered sign of weakness.
How could we be weak when we are bringing in additional troops and money?
Raborn: Hanoi might believe domestic pressures and international opinion cause us to hold back.

Ball: Let me utter minority view. Only one systematic way to resolve this--list pros and cons.
President. I would think you are wrong. I read your excellent brief./6/ Is the pause continuation a sign to
Saigon that we are pulling out?
/6/See footnote 4, Document 32.
Taylor: Yes. I think they are beginning to suspect things and it is causing them difficulty.
McNamara: Also my opinion. Seen signs of it in the cables. We haven't told Saigon anything at all about
our buildup. They also see controversy in this country. They don't understand why we don't punish those
who foster [protest?] the war.
Ball: If that is the case, why don't we sit down with Ky and tell him.
McNamara: Because it would leak. We haven't told the U.S. people.
Rusk: I think we'll see a drop in morale if we don't resume. Ky told me we talk about their country
without telling them. It embarrasses them.
President: I have a feeling Ky, Lodge, Westmoreland were against the pause. We did it. Once done they
were good soldiers and enduring it as long as they can.
I'm distressed when I see frantic attitude on part of some of our Senators and Congressmen. I've always
known we're on thin ice. I'm aware of this. Go ahead, George.
Ball: Question: On evidence I've seen, bombing is not effectively going to interdict supply requirements.
Needs are too small.
What effect bombing on will of Hanoi? Experience in the past shows it doesn't erode will of a people.
Comes down to this: most reasonable argument is that it gives a bad signal to Hanoi. That is a
possibility.
1. Effect on morale in Saigon, hard to evaluate.
2. Wrong signal to Hanoi. This is persuasive.
We don't know what the flash point is if we escalate.
McNamara About flash point, we can carry on level of bombing of last November without hitting flash
point. If we go beyond that point, we may draw them in.
President: If we go back in, the pressure will be on us to go further. Your Senators proved that.
McNamara: That's true. But I think I persuaded them that differences in bombing targets will not affect
the course of the war. Our bombing has evolved slowly--slowly we were successful in interdicting rail
lines between China and Hanoi.
President: What do we signal to the enemy if we resume?

Thompson: Peace moves may be more important than stopping bombing. What Russians do hinges on
China. If we take out Hanoi airfields, pressure on China to use their fields. If China decides to let their
fields be used, they will no doubt try to get Russians to come in.
Peace moves have eased pressure on Russians.
President: If we didn't resume it, would they assume we are weak at home and would have to pull out?
Thompson: No. The Soviets have indicated that what we do in the South doesn't affect them.
Bundy: How would Asian countries view it?
Thompson: Don't know.
Rusk: Sat around the table during Korean War. Was with MacArthur when he made mistake about
China coming in. But because we have moved slowly, we have been able to do a great deal. If we don't
resume, China will think a sanctuary has been approved and they can do more than ever. This could be
important.
Goldberg: This move might involve more cooperation between Soviets and China, dampening their
ideological conflict.
If we draw Soviets and China closer together, it puts a wedge at helping nonproliferation. I get much
evidence of this in my talks. "Don't push us into cooperation," they say.
Ball: Must do what we can to make an independent peace with Hanoi. This is more difficult if North
Vietnam becomes more dependent upon on China. Hanoi under pressure from China to do more. To
extent we direct an attack on Hanoi, we build up pressure to continue war and achieve Chinese
objectives.
Realistically, we are not going to let Ky make a separate deal with Hanoi.
Eventually, if we bomb, we'll see Chinese--not fighting men but coolie workers--all over Hanoi. There is
a difference between bombing in the North and fighting in the South.
President: I feel that we have given away a trading point without getting anything in return.
Next, the cry will be not to bomb in the South.
Ball: There is a fundamental difference. We are in South Vietnam--we are helping them. But we bomb
in the North to punish them. We are big, powerful; they have no air force and are small. It's like Italy
bombing Ethiopia.
If we make clear this is not done from weakness, and that we are going ahead--it is supportable.
Taylor: If we give up bombing, we will seriously hurt the war effort. We should punish Hanoi, else we
will (be) there 20 years.
Goldberg: But evidence shows that rate of infiltration continues with bombing.

Rusk: In the Korean War, we destroyed everything east of Yalu. Every time they attacked they had to
wait and restock. Prisoners told us it took them five days to go 45 miles.
Taylor: I confirm the Secretary's comments about Korea. Bombing has an effect on the number of troops
the enemy can commit on the front lines.
W. Bundy: I believe we should resume. Believe we need a few days to tidy up though I'm in sympathy
with Taylor's remarks.
We need to run through the Vientiane thing. On January 17 the North Vietnam Charge d'Affaires went
to Souvanna--and raised questions about 14 points. Went into detail about the points.
Souvanna asked him if he should pass this on. Said no.
Souvanna mentioned this at dinner on January 18 and it leaked. Sent message that Souvanna could act as
mediator and answered questions about 14 points./7/
/7/See Document 29.
Souvanna called in North Vietnam Charge today and reported to our Ambassador. North Vietnam asked
further questions such as why we are reinforcing our troops.
Until we probe further on this, we ought not start.
Ball: Problem of communication. Few planes going to and from Hanoi and Vientiane.
Bundy: Also have circuit to close in Paris.
Kohler has instructions to seek appointment with Charge in Moscow. Have no response. He has
instructions when he sees him to make full statement of our position./8/
/8/See Document 25.
Rusk: The Vice President and I probed Kosygin hard on this and got no reaction. The Soviets have
denied they mentioned Moscow as site of meeting place.
Bundy: I asked Dobrynin about Kosygin and Shastri. He had no information.
W. Bundy: General suggestion by number two Soviet man here was to be in direct communication with
Hanoi.
President: Have Soviets retreated from what they told us?
Bundy: Not formally. But they don't assert they have tried to get Hanoi to the table.
Goldberg: Dobrynin says "I can't commit my government. You have made a good move."
President: Aren't you going back to Kohler and Souvanna and see if we can close that circuit?
Bundy: Yes, we intend to do that today.

Rusk: U Thant is a man of no principles.

Goldberg: Yes, but we may get a man of less principle.
If we get Sawicki (the African), U Thant will look like a shining star.
President: We ought to get out to all the countries we need to notify.
We haven't bombed in thirty days. But they have done nothing. They are reinforcing--rebuilding-reinfiltrating-Even bombed us (unreadable) Saigon. We went into this in good faith. We wanted to examine every and
any chance for peace. We have gone longer than anyone thought necessary. Now, this is what they have
done.
Not telling them we will begin bombing again but here is the picture.
Now, George, go on.
Ball: You have made it clear we are searching for peace. I think there would be value for you to write
the six governments and tell them Rusk is willing to meet with them. This would be a formal act by you-not just a speech.
President: Let the State Department get together and see if there's anything we can do along this line.
And have this back at our next meeting.
36. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 24, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII, Late Vietnam. Top
Secret. Neither the original nor a copy of the memorandum has been located in the White House files at
the Johnson Library.
SUBJECT
The Military Outlook in South Vietnam
You have asked for my comments on the outlook for military operations in South Vietnam. This
memorandum addresses that question.
1. Expansion of Forces and Levels of Operation. The following statistics summarize our best estimates
of force levels and operational rates for the next twelve months:
Strength: VC & PAVN:
June '65
Men, 187,000
Batns, 63

Dec '65/a/
Men, 236,900
Batns, 107
June '66
Men, ?
Batns, 150
Dec '66
Men, ?
Batns, 155
Strength: RVN (excl police):
June '65
Men, 522,400
Batns, 128
Dec '65/a/
Men, 573,000
Batns, 133
June '66
Men, 631,457
Batns, 168
Dec '66
Men, 661,000
Batns, 173
Strength: US:
June 65
Men, 59,900

Batns, 9
Dec '65/a/
Men, 178,800
Batns, 34
June '66
Men, 277,800/b/
Batns, 46
Dec '66
Men, 378,800/b/ /c/
Batns, 75
Strength: 3d Country:
June 65
Men, 3,300
Batns, 1
Dec '65/a/
Men, 3,300
Batns, 1
June '66
Men, 22,400
Batns, 10
Dec '66
Men, 44,600
Batns, 23
Aircraft: US Fixed wing (in SEA)
June '65

886
Dec '65/a/
1,487
June '66
1,684
Dec '66
1,879
Aircraft: US Helicopter
June '65
508
Dec '65/a/
1,483
June '66
1,853
Dec '66
2,391
Attack Sorties per Month: NVN:
June '65
Sorties, 2,401
Losses, 9
Dec '65/a/
Sorties, 2,198
Losses, 12
June '66
Sorties, 4,000

Losses, 18
Dec '66
Sorties, 4,000
Losses, 18
Attack Sorties per Month: SVN
June '65
Sorties, 7,234
Losses, 6
Dec '65/a/
Sorties, 13,114
Losses, 9
June '66
Sorties, 12,000
Losses, 8
Dec '66
Sorties, 15,000
Losses, 12
Attack Sorties per Month: Laos
June '65
Sorties, 511
Losses, 2
Dec '65/a/
Sorties, 3,047
Losses, 3
June '66

Sorties, 4,500
Losses, 4
Dec '66
Sorties, 4,500
Losses, 4
Total
June '65
10,146
Dec '65/a/
18,359
Tons Dropped
June '65
30,510
Dec '65/a/
31,341
June '66
51,500
Dec '66
68,800
/a/December activity figures are reduced by Christmas Cease-fire and Pause.
/b/The JCS believe that it would be necessary to have a selective call-up of reserves and a selective
extension of terms of service to achieve the personnel strengths shown at the times indicated.
/c/Would rise substantially above this if estimates of CINCPAC are accepted.
2. The Enemy Force Build-up. The Communists appear to have decided to increase their forces in South
Vietnam both by heavy recruitment in the South (especially in the Delta) and by infiltration of regular
North Vietnamese forces from the North. The infiltration from the North is mainly by truck. It is on
greatly improved routes--routes, some of which are new and some of which have been widened, or

upgraded for truck use, or all-weathered, or built to by-pass points vulnerable to choke-point bombing,
or constructed under jungle canopy and bamboo-trellised camouflage to prevent aerial observation.
General Westmoreland estimates that, through 1966, North Vietnam will have the capability to generate
and infiltrate 3 regiments (9 battalion-equivalents, or 4500 men) a month, and that the VC in South
Vietnam (now with 85 battalion-equivalents) can recruit and train 7 new battalion-equivalents a month-together adding 16 battalion-equivalents a month to the enemy forces. Despite serious attrition-desertions and increasing combat casualties--the enemy can be expected to enlarge his present strength
of 107 battalion-equivalents to more than 150 battalion-equivalents by the end of calendar 1966, when-by our deployments and aggressive strategy--hopefully his losses can be made to equal his input.
3. The Enemy's Supply Requirement. The 107 battalions of PAVN and VC forces in South Vietnam
need only 20 or so tons a day of supplies from North Vietnam to sustain "1964" levels of activity and
only approximately 80 tons' a day to sustain "light combat" (1/5th of the force in contact once every 7
days using 1/3d of their basic load). The requirements from the North after the expansion of enemy
forces to 150+ battalions at end of 1966--assuming that the enemy refuses, as it can, to permit the level
of combat to exceed "light"--should approximate 140 tons a day.
4. The Enemy's Supply Capability. As for the Communists' capability to supply their forces in the South,
it is clear that our program of bombing North Vietnam has caused them difficulties. It has destroyed
many of their infiltration-oriented facilities (e.g., bridges, roads, railroads, trucks, rolling stock, barracks,
storage centers, etc.), increasing the cost and difficulty of infiltration of both men and materiel. There is
evidence that the volume of infiltration that the system could otherwise handle has been halved; that
approximately 50-100,000 men have been diverted from normal activities to defense and repair work;
that government activities are being decentralized, causing inefficiencies and political risks in a
totalitarian state; that mobility within North Vietnam has been reduced; and that the reduction in enemy
initiatives in Laos may be attributable to their need to husband their resources for their South Vietnam
effort.
Nevertheless, despite our anti-infiltration efforts at pre-Pause levels, it is estimated that the enemy is
capable of generating in the North and infiltrating to the South not only the 4500 men a month
mentioned above, but an average of 200 tons of supplies a day depending on the season--considerably
more than the perhaps 40-140 tons a day required to maintain activities at "1964" to "light-combat"
levels.
5. The US Interdiction Capability. It is not clear that the US 1966 bombing program will cut the flow of
men and materiel from the North to the South to a point below the VC/PAVN minimum needs. It is
clear that the success of the interdiction program is contingent upon a cumulative and sustained effort.
The interdiction can be while the supplies are en route into North Vietnam from the outside world,
inside North Vietnam, en route from the North by sea or through Laos or Cambodia to South Vietnam,
or inside South Vietnam; it can be by destruction or slow-down; the effectiveness can be prolonged by
exhausting the North's repair capability, and can be enhanced by complicating their communications and
control machinery. At a minimum the bombing program against North Vietnam should include 4000
attack sorties a month as compared with 3125 in the month of November 1965 before the Pause,
intensive day-and-night armed reconnaissance of road and rail lines of communication throughout North
Vietnam (except for the cities and the strip alongside China), and destruction of POL storage targets.
(The efforts in North Vietnam are to be added to intensified bombing of the lines of communication in
Laos, tight surveillance of the sea, increased efforts on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers from Cambodia,
harassment of the lines of communication in South Vietnam, and destruction of base areas in South
Vietnam.)

Recognizing that the estimates as to enemy needs and capabilities and as to our interdiction results may
be wrong by two either way, all that can be said now--before some studies are completed--is that the
increased program probably will not put a tight ceiling on the enemy's activities in South Vietnam, but
probably will reduce the flow of supplies to the point where the enemy receives too little for full
flexibility and for frequent offensive actions, too little to defend themselves as often against aggressive
US/GVN forces, and too little to permit Hanoi to continue to deploy forces with complete confidence
that they can be supplied.
Furthermore, as very important by-products, the program will keep the pressure on North Vietnam--to
condition them toward negotiations and an acceptable end to the war--and will maintain the morale of
our South Vietnamese allies.
6. The US Force Build-up. The US force build-up plan is to deploy additional US and third-country
forces, raising the battalion strength from 44 in December '65 to 98 in December '66. This should do
several things. According to General Westmoreland's estimates, the deployments of the additional forces
will:
a. Result in destruction of one-third of the enemy's base areas, i.e., in-country resources.
b. Permit friendly control of just under one-half, as compared with the present one-third, of the critical
roads and railroads.
c. Attrite VC/PAVN forces at an increasing rate, leading to the leveling off of enemy forces at the 150+
battalion level mentioned above (provided the Chinese do not supply "volunteers").
d. Ensure that friendly bases and government centers are defended under any foreseeable circumstances
(though some district towns may be overrun and have to be retaken).
e. Lead to government control of an estimated 50 per cent of the population.
(In this last connection, Prime Minister Ky has stated that the Government now controls 25 per cent of
the population and that it will take two years to raise the control to 50 per cent. The Mission and the
Government have just initiated a 4-area priority pacification effort--emphasizing the Danang (389,000),
Qui Nhon (650,000), Hoa Hao (800,000), and Saigon (3,500,000) areas. They believe that, taking
account of the concentration of effort and resources required to make progress in pacification, these
quite limited areas are all we can hope to handle during the next year.)
7. Evaluation. The situation at year's end could be either better or worse than implied by the above
information. The reported drop in enemy morale and in quality of his recruits together with interdiction
successes and continuity of the Ky government could lead to the start of snow-balling in our favor
before December. On the other hand, if the enemy force build-up is as predicted and if attrition of that
force and of its supplies fall short, we could find ourselves "behind the power curve" going into 1967;
we could be faced with the requirement to deploy at least an additional 3-division corps (27 battalions)
in 1967.
Our intelligence estimate is that the present Communist policy is to continue to prosecute the war
vigorously in the South. They continue to believe that the war will be a long one, that time is their ally,
and that their own staying power is superior to ours. They recognize that the US reinforcements of 1965
signify a determination to avoid defeat, and that more US troops can be expected. Even though the
Communists will continue to suffer heavily from our ground and air action, we expect them, upon

learning of any US intentions to augment its forces, to boost their own commitment and to test US
capabilities and will to persevere at a higher level of conflict and casualties (US killed in-action with the
recommended deployments can be expected to reach 1000 a month.)
If the US were willing to commit enough forces--perhaps 600,000 men or more--we could probably
ultimately prevent the DRV/VC from sustaining the conflict at a significant level. When this point was
reached, however, the question of Chinese intervention would become critical. (We are generally agreed
that the Chinese Communists will intervene with combat forces to prevent destruction of the Communist
regime in North Vietnam; it is less clear whether they would intervene to prevent a DRV/VC defeat in
the South.) The intelligence estimate is that the chances are a little better than even that, at this stage,
Hanoi and Peiping would choose to reduce the effort in the South and try to salvage their resources for
another day.
It follows, therefore, that the odds are about even that, even with the recommended deployments, we
will be faced in early 1967 with a military stand-off at a much higher level, with pacification hardly
underway and with the requirement for the deployment of still more US forces./2/
/2/The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe "that the evaluation set forth in paragraph 7 is on the pessimistic side
in view of the constant and heavy military pressure which our forces in Southeast Asia will be capable
of applying. While admittedly the following factors are to a degree imponderables, they believe that
greater weight should be given to the following:
"a. The cumulative effect of our air campaign against the DRV on morale and DRV capabilities to
provide and move men and material from the DRV to South Vietnam.
"b. The effects of constant attack and harassment on the ground and from the air upon the growth of Viet
Cong forces and on the morale and combat effectiveness of Viet Cong/PAVN forces.
"c. The effect of destruction of Viet Cong base areas on the capabilities of VC/PAVN forces to sustain
combat operations over an extended period of time.
"d. The constancy of will of the Hanoi leaders to continue a struggle which they realize they cannot win
in the face of progressively greater destruction of their country." [Footnote in the source text.]
RMN/3/
/3/The source text bears these handwritten initials indicating McNamara signed the original.
37. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, January 24, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The
source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:30 p.m. and passed
to the White House.
2306. Ref: Embtel 2297./2/
/2/In telegram 2297, January 24, Kohler provided a brief report of his meeting with the DRV Charge.
(Ibid.)

1. I met with Le Chang at 11:30 this morning accompanied by Akalovsky. I attempted establish whether
there was some common language between two of us. He seemed to understand some English but
insisted that conversation be conducted through his Russian interpreter; thus bulk of one hour 35 minute
meeting consumed by double interpretation.
2. I opened by noting we had suspended bombing of DRV one month ago and had notified DRV
officially of this in Rangoon. Pointed out our message had made clear suspension might continue if there
was no major provocation and further extension would depend on response and reaction of DRV Govt.
Expressed hope willingness DRV Govt to have Charge meet with me today might mean he had some
response to transmit.
3. Le Chang said DRV position had been repeatedly stated, most recently in Jan 4 statement by their
MFA spokesman./3/
/3/For excerpts from the January 4 statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966,
pp. 742-744.
4. I noted there had been many suggestions from Hanoi itself, as well as from many others including
Soviets, that cessation of bombing would create opportunity and conditions in which moves could be
made towards peaceful solution in Vietnam. In seeking this meeting today, we thought there might be
two possible purposes in direct conversations between DRV and US Govts. One such possibility might
be to explore whether or not there could be reciprocal reduction of hostilities. As we have said, we could
continue suspension of bombing if there were reciprocal action by DRV. We prepared recognize that
there might be difficulties for DRV to make public statements admitting cessation of certain actions or
responsibility for them; therefore, we thought if two sides had direct and confidential contact DRV
could communicate to us re actions it proposed to take so that they would be fully understood by us. If
this of interest to DRV, we prepared continue contact for this purpose.
5. In response my direct question whether there was such interest, Le Chang said DRV position
remained unchanged and his govt adhered consistently to Geneva Accords. DRV position and its
adherence to provisions of Geneva Accords reflected in DRV's four points. Those points recognize basic
right of Vietnamese people to peace, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. In accordance
with Geneva Accords, US Govt should withdraw from Vietnam all troops and all armaments of any
kind, as well as liquidate its military bases in, and military alliance with, South Vietnam.
6. I asked Le Chang whether he was talking about Pham Van Dong's four points and got affirmative
reply. Le Chang continued that US Govt refused accept this position. As to suspension of bombing, US
Govt has no right to bomb or strafe North Vietnam, and DRV regards such actions as act of war against
its sovereign govt and as gross violation of Geneva Accords. Although US has said it had suspended
temporarily bombing of North Vietnam, US Govt has been sending reconnaissance planes for
intelligence and provocative actions. All these actions severely condemned by DRV. Indeed, temporary
suspension of bombing of North Vietnam is for purpose of preparing new stage of escalation and
expansion of war in Vietnam. In conducting such maneuvers, US pursuing objective of forcing other
side to sit down at table and of forcing Vietnamese people accept conditions favorable to US and based
on position of strength. During past month, while conducting so-called peace campaign, US has taken
other actions as well. It has actually expanded its effort and sent to South Vietnam about 13,000
additional troops; it has sent Generals there to develop new plan for widening war; US and South
Vietnamese puppet forces have conducted large scale operations, including use of gas and other toxic
agents; and B-57's have been used to bomb and destroy villages in South Vietnam. Can all these actions
be called peaceful initiative? While conducting so-called search for peace, US continued reconnaissance
and provocative flights into North Vietnam and sending additional contingents to South Vietnam. All

this creates serious tensions in this area. Therefore DRV position remains as stated and has not changed.
US Govt should recognize position DRV Govt because DRV four points reflect all basic provisions
Geneva Accords. It should not only recognize that position but also prove such recognition through
practical deeds. At same time, US Govt must cease, unconditionally and forever, bombing of DRV.
Only on this basis can a way be found for solving Vietnam question.
7. I said we had to recognize fact there military conflict between North and South Vietnam, in which US
committed help South against what we regard as aggression from North. Even during period of
suspension of bombing, during past month, we have had evidence of further DRV forces infiltrating to
South Vietnam through Laos. Thus there is state of conflict and this is what we discussing here today.
This sending of troops is also regarded by US as infringement Geneva Accords, which specifically state
there should be no such troop movements and no use of force. In suspending bombing, however, we
discontinued one aspect of hostilities and, as I had said, we could continue discussions of reduction of
hostilities if DRV Govt interested in exploring such mutual reduction. Far from seeking to widen war,
very fact I here today shows we interested in reducing and limiting war.
Even better than that, we could, if DRV Govt ready, use this contact to explore more formal possibilities
for moving toward peace in Vietnam. Suspension of bombing in no sense effort to force other side sit
down; rather it responsive to many suggestions we have had even from North Vietnamese sources that
such suspension could lead to creation of conditions for peaceful settlement. Thus this is opportunity
and not ultimatum. Fact my presence here today intended to indicate to him and his govt that we
sincerely want peaceful solution in Vietnam. I then handed him 14 points, State of Union message, and
Goldberg letter to U Thant, noting that they public knowledge but I wished give him texts officially.
8. Le Chang said DRV had those documents. Referring to my remark that we defending South Vietnam
from aggression by North Vietnam and that we committed to South Vietnam, asserted US is distorting
fight of Vietnamese people in order create pretext for expanding war in Vietnam, for maintaining hold
on Vietnamese people and for retaining South Vietnam puppets, who have no popular support, do not
represent anyone, and merely small group of traitors their fatherland.
9. I then said I very much wanted hear what Le Chang had to say and myself had many additional points
to discuss, including DRV four points. However, I had diplomatic luncheon at 1:15 pm and therefore
wondered whether this conversation could perhaps be continued at 4:00 pm today, or perhaps tomorrow,
or at any time convenient to Le Chang, either at his Emb or, if more convenient, at my residence. I
pointed out that it very important keep these discussions confidential and my absence from luncheon
would require explanations which I wished avoid.
10. Le Chang said their Emb suitable meeting place. However, he had said everything he wished to say
and therefore saw no need for further meeting unless I had some additional remarks to make.
Specifically, he wished to know whether I had anything new to convey. I said that among other things I
also wished discuss DRV four points and believed what I had to say would be new and important to Le
Chang and his govt. After repeated inquiries by Le Chang whether I had something new to convey, and
repeated affirmative responses from me, he finally said they would call us when they ready to meet
again.
11. Le Chang then resumed what seemed like prepared statement, saying Vietnamese people love peace,
which necessary for building their life, but peace connected with independence and freedom. Vietnam
and its people far away from US and Vietnam has made no aggressive action against US. Source of, and
immediate reason for, situation now obtaining in Vietnam is aggression by US. For 11 years it has
systematically violated all provisions Geneva Accords acceptance of which it had solemnly stated. US
has no right send troops to Vietnam or bomb or strafe North Vietnam. Therefore, if US ceases

aggression peace will prevail on Vietnamese soil. Repeated that DRV position as formulated in four
points reflects all basic provisions Geneva Accords, and therefore only basis for solution Vietnam
question is acceptance by US Govt of DRV position and cessation forever of bombing and strafing
DRV. Only then could one count on finding way for settlement. Also reiterated US Govt must prove
acceptance DRV position through practical deeds. Asserted if US did so, that would be in accord with
interest and honor of US, interest Vietnamese people and peoples throughout world.
12. I said I would be glad continue discussion as soon as possible since I had many important points to
make, some of them also relating to what he had said.
13. Le Chang then said that if US had anything to say it could meet with DRV reps in Rangoon in order
to do so or to learn DRV position. DRV reps in Rangoon prepared clarify DRV position if necessary.
14. In response my question whether this meant Rangoon preferred place of contact, Le Chang said he
wished repeat that if our Amb Rangoon wanted say something on behalf his govt or obtain clarification
DRV position he could do so with DRV reps there. However, this did not mean that he, Le Chang, not
prepared meet me, although such meetings difficult to set up; his Emb had a very heavy schedule these
days and he had had to cancel some commitments to meet with me today. I said I would promptly report
his remarks, particularly re Rangoon. He then returned three papers I had given him, saying that in
addition to already being available to his govt they also referred to aggression by DRV. He could,
however, accept any formal communication from my govt to his govt I might wish to give him. He
repeated that there would be no point in having further meetings if I had nothing new to say and that
DRV position had been consistent and remained unchanged. This position reasonable, and if US Govt
recognized it and stopped bombing way for settlement could be found. He noted that he agreed our
discussions should be kept confidential, as stated in my letter to him (Embtel 2239)./4/
/4/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
15. In leaving at 1:10 pm, I told him I would await a call at his earliest convenience.
Kohler
38. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 24, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Dept. of State, vol. VIII. Secret. The
source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. For text of Rusk's
testimony, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol.
XVIII, pp. 133-187.
SUBJECT
Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee January 24, 1966
Thirteen Members of the Committee, including Senator Mansfield and excluding Senator Morse, were
present for a large part of this morning's briefing, in which the atmosphere was frankly more friendly
and less critical than I expected. A number of the Senators were complimentary about the "Meet the
Press" TV show last evening. My opening statement was confined to the present negotiating situation
and our assessment of the attitudes of the various parties, which I repeatedly cautioned was
extraordinarily sensitive.

Senator Fulbright opened the questioning with a considerable discussion of the problem of dealing with
the National Liberation Front, attempting to draw out, by a discussion of the history since 1940, that it
might represent a continuity of the basic opposition to French colonialism, and that our willingness to
deal with the NLF might be the key to satisfactory negotiations. This subject was referred to throughout
the questioning by several other Members, and we had a full airing of the difference between
recognizing the NLF on an equal footing with governments, and bringing it into the picture as just one
minority element in South Vietnam. Senator Fulbright remained sceptical of the difference.
Senator Hickenlooper aired some concerns that the continued bombing pause, which he feared might be
extended through Prime Minister Wilson's visit to Moscow in February, might give the enemy an
undesirable chance to regroup and strengthen themselves. I informed him that Wilson had not asked us
to postpone the bombing through his visit and that the decision would be taken on its merits after
weighing all factors.
There was extensive discussion of alternatives of all sorts. In an obvious effort to be helpful, Senator
Lausche asked where we would draw the line in Southeast Asia, if we don't hold it in Vietnam. The view
was also expressed by Senator Case that we are getting in a position where we will have to shoulder the
responsibility of containing every war of national liberation without assistance from our Allies. While I
have no illusions of having changed any positions (although Senator Clark seemed a little less
withdrawal-minded than usual), I again feel that the subject was thoroughly aired.
There was considerable discussion about our willingness to accept free elections without anything very
much new having been added, and with Senator Fulbright quoting General Eisenhower's book to the
effect that if there had been free elections in 1956, about 80% of the South Vietnamese would have
voted for Ho Chi Minh./2/
/2/In his 1963 memoir The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, Eisenhower stated, "I
have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not
agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population
would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao
Dai." (p. 372)
Senator Symington requested my estimate of whether the Chinese would be brought in if we bombed
Hanoi or Haiphong and landed troops at Vinh to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail, saying that many of the
American officials he consulted during his travels in Southeast Asia did not think they would. I replied
that while it is difficult to predict with certainty what the Chinese would do, in my judgment such action
would increase the chances of Chinese Communist intervention.
Several questions in a similar vein brought a reasonable degree of consensus on my statement that our
present general course of measured action was ultimately less likely to provoke a nuclear war than either
of the major alternatives of either abandoning Vietnam or a major escalation on our part.
Senator Pell advanced the Gavin theory of perimeter defense/3/ as an alternative to which I noted some
objections, but the question was not completely explored.
/3/For an analysis of Gavin's theory by the JCS, see Document 61.
Senator Symington raised the question of adequate control of CIA, referring to the Sunday/4/ editorial in
the Washington Post. He had earlier confided to me that his question would be designed to pre-empt and
undercut a similar question by Senator McCarthy.

/4/January 23.
Senator Pell was somewhat obdurate in questioning the credibility of the Administration's view that
there have been no peace initiatives by Hanoi and cited the Schoenbrun article last November/5/ to try to
prove his point. I hammered the point that the original initiatives were taken by third parties and not by
Hanoi, but Pell remained unconvinced.
/5/Not further identified.
Consultation: Perhaps the single matter most concerning the Members was the extent and method by
which they would be consulted prior to taking crucial decisions on the conduct of the conflict. There
was general agreement that we were right in not declaring war, but all felt we should bring the Congress
in on major decisions. Several Members, primarily on the Democratic side, requested consultation by
you with the whole Committee, before resuming bombing of North Vietnam. Senator Pell went so far as
to suggest that you should also consult with the Committee, before substantially increasing our forces
and also on the relative merits of holding a few enclaves versus more aggressive action by our forces in
South Vietnam. Senator Mundt, on the other hand, favored consultation with you on policy, but opposed
consultation on tactical questions, among which he characterized resuming the bombing in North
Vietnam and Laos, the selection of targets, etc. He observed that the war could not be won by
Committee quarterbacking. Nonetheless, almost all Members of both parties specifically mentioned the
feeling that the Chairman of the Committee was not always included with the Leadership in consultation
on key decisions. I was requested, and promised, to transmit their views to you.
Senator Case asked some questions about long-term objectives, if we were going to make a greater
physical commitment. I offered to set up an informal session myself with those who might wish to
discuss the broader philosophical implications, including such thorny questions as "spheres of influence"
and our own posture in the world.
I came away with the impression that what most of the Members most wanted was a chance to sit down
with you on a give-and-take discussion basis rather than for formal presentations and disclosures of
pending decisions. While I am aware of the great difficulty of doing this with this Committee as a
whole, given the several other Committees in both Houses, who would consider themselves entitled to
equal treatment, I do feel that the time is perhaps ripe for us to take another look at the problem of
Presidential consultation./6/
/6/On January 25 Rusk sent a memorandum to President Johnson summarizing his briefing of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee that morning, noting that both Chairman Morgan and Representative
Zablocki raised the issue of Presidential consultation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency
File, Dept. of State, vol. VIII)
DR
39. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 24, 1966, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19.
Secret. The memorandum was attached to a note from Juanita Roberts, the President's secretary, dated
January 24, 6:10 p.m., that reads: "For your meeting at 6:15 p.m."

SUBJECT
Pros and cons of immediate resumption of the bombing
I think this question narrows to one of timing. The arguments for a complete end of the bombing are
unacceptable, and no one wants to bomb Hanoi tomorrow morning.
The real question is whether it is better to resume within the next two days or to wait another week or
two.
The argument for prompt resumption has the following elements:
1. We can get started just ahead of a chorus of restraining voices which talk of delay but which really
will always oppose any resumption.
2. The Saigon cables tell us that we will have real trouble with the GVN if we wait much longer.
3. The enemy has it within his power to give us a troublesome and ambiguous signal any minute, and it
is a wonder he hasn't done it already.
4. The Republicans will begin to make headway if we keep hesitating.
5. Every day of delay is that much of trouble to our own troops.
6. We have already done more than we set out to do, and we will show weakness in patience if we
continue.
The arguments for a delay are more subtle but they are not feeble.
1. There are still a lot of people of genuine good will who think that another week or two might show
real progress. They cite the discussions on prisoner exchanges, the Vientiane open wire/2/ the pressure
from nearly all our friends abroad. (Goldberg rehearsed these points on Saturday.)/3/
/2/The following words were typed after "Vientiane open wire" but then crossed out: "(a pretty feeble
one)."
/3/January 29.
2. It is quite possible that Hanoi really wants us to resume the bombing and is trying to push us into that
position while pretending to keep the Vientiane line open.
3. There has not been any important military action by Hanoi in the South, and until there is, we can
easily say to our friends in Saigon that the suspension of bombing has in fact lowered the rate of
aggression.
4. The country knows very well that the President is not weak, and is quite ready to stay with him
another two weeks on the present peace effort.
5. It is quite possible to delay from day to day with no real loss and to wait for the Communists to stir up
the fighting by a more impressive outrage than the one in Danang today.

Whenever the bombing resumes, it seems to me that the case is persuasive for a very carefully selected
set of targets which should combine, as far as possible, the following characteristics: (a) low risks; (b)
consistency with previous bombing patterns; (c) immediate relationship to the aggression against South
Vietnam.
McG. B.
40. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 24, 1966, 6:30-7:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
PRESENT
President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Taylor, Valenti
Bundy: Westmoreland says (through Porter) that he can wait a few days after Tet before resuming, but
not longer. Increasing risk. "Undue risk particularly in IV Corps zone."
President: What danger waiting for day or two?
Taylor: No danger in day or two, but no longer.
McNamara: I feel exactly that way. Don't see the political gain in waiting.
(Bob Anderson told me that Ike told the Koreans he was tired of nothing happening and he was ready to
drop the A bomb. Sent word through Nehru that there would be no sanctuary.)
(Rusk gave President a memo to read from Doug MacArthur on Rusk's meeting with Senators.)/2/
/2/Not found, but see Document 38.
Rusk: Important problem as to whether you see Fulbright. You would shore up some opposition if you
saw Fulbright. Committee would have no serious problem if you see Fulbright.
President: Today we had five leaders--four for us and Mansfield against us.
In the House we'd get Ford, Arends, and Mahon. Don't know about Bow. Rivers and Bates are with us.
We'll lose only Fulbright and Mansfield.
How long does it take to communicate an order through Westmoreland? If we tell them we're ready,
how long before target selected and ready to go?
McNamara: 24 hours, I'd say. It would be better if we gave them the kind of target.
President: Are they doing us any damage now?
McNamara: After Tet, I can't say. They have thrown mortars at us.

President: What do you recommend, Dean?

Rusk: Make firm decision to resume on Friday or Saturday./3/
/3/January 28 and 29.
Full report submitted to Security Council beginning with Laotian Conference in 1962.
Wilson's appointment to Moscow was announced before the pause, so he has no critical reason to hold
us back.
President: Bob, what do you recommend?
McNamara: I'd go sooner. Political delay can be damaging. Start Wednesday. Don't feel strongly
Wednesday or Thursday./4/
/4/January 26 and 27.
Taylor: The sooner the better. Wouldn't want longer than 48 hours.
Rusk: Reaction to our Ambassadors' cables is that most governments are expecting this.
President: I think we'll spend a good deal of political capital in resuming. I don't agree with Bob or
General Taylor in that we'll gain politically from this.
I think we ought to--quietly--visit with Dirksen and see how he feels. Quietly talk to a couple of
Republicans in the House. Then next morning, meet with leadership, when I'm ready to go--so they can't
leak anything.
Suggest we talk briefly now about type of target and weight.
(McNamara?): (1) Small attack on infiltration point--advantage of directly relating to infiltration route.
Disadvantage--it alerts the enemy--and ruins surprise. (2) Perishable targets. (3) POL. Advantage is
surprise and antiaircraft will be less alert. Recommend against POL though, and recommend perishable
targets. Recommend against targets north of Hanoi.
President: Why don't we tell the leaders that if we continue to get pictures of supplies coming down, we
must stop them. It will make it difficult for Fulbright to argue against this. I won't say anything specific,
but I will say I can't wait forever for these supplies to come down.
Bundy: I'm having a sanitized document prepared to show communist activity. It is a persuasive
document (Bundy showed President the document)./5/
/5/Entitled "Evidence of Continuing Vietnamese Communist War Preparations," undated. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI)
Only problem is the one which we haven't closed down. All else shows nothing.
We are left with Vientiane. My brother went over it with the British and Australians. Both said, "You'll
have to hold off until you hear more."

Rusk: If you are going to see Dirksen, I urge you to see Fulbright and Hickenlooper before you make a
decision.
Taylor: On the bombing program, I hope we'll get back to hitting the key rail and bridges. POL will help
stop the trucks, too.
Rusk: Think we ought to knock out the power stations and POL south of the 24th parallel.
McNamara: We have.
President: Be prepared to meet tomorrow afternoon. Bring Wheeler.
Rusk: Got to give thought to a statement with the communist world in mind.
Bundy: How many friends ought to get a pilot message that we have just about made up our minds?
Rusk: We probably already have done that with our previous cables.
(Decided--with the lead of Bundy--that a White House statement be issued--and Rusk to hold a
backgrounder citing chapter and verse.)
President: When you go to Sharp, Bob, tell him we are thinking along these possibilities--and get their
views.
Rusk: Tragedy about situation is that Fulbright statement urging extending the pause and recognizing
the Viet Cong. Times will pick it up and applaud it.
Bundy: And denounce us for smothering debate.
McNamara: Ask Sharp to reply by 5 p.m. our time tomorrow. They can be ready after . . .
(Discussion on whether to send Vice President with Freeman to Saigon. Taylor, McNamara worried
about security. Bundy and Rusk join in to advise against sending him.)
About leadership:
Instead of having all together, bring into Mansion the Senate group--and later in the day, bring in House
group.
Meeting ended at 7:30.
41. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 25, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. Secret; Nodis.
During a telephone conversation at 9:20 a.m. on January 26, President Johnson discussed this
memorandum briefly with Ball and Rusk and indicated that he had read it. (Department of State, Rusk
Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)

SUBJECT
The Resumption of Bombing Poses Grave Danger of Precipitating a War With China
In my recent memorandum to you/2/ I expressed the conviction that--if the war is to be won--it must be
won in the South. In my view, the bombing of the North cannot win the war, only enlarge it. The most
important item on the balance sheet against resumption of bombing is the danger of escalation.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 32.
I recognize the difficulty and complexity of the problem and I do not wish to add to your burdens. But
before a final decision is made on this critical issue, I feel an obligation to amplify and document my
strong conviction: that sustained bombing of North Viet-Nam will more than likely lead us into war with
Red China--probably in six to nine months. And it may well involve at least a limited war with the
Soviet Union.
This is necessarily a view based on personal judgment. It cannot be proved as one proves a mathematical
proposition. But I have not arrived at it lightly. It stems from a conviction that there are forces at work
on both sides of the conflict that will operate in combination to bring about this result.
I have tried in this memorandum to describe these forces as I see them.
I.

Why Our Bombing Will Escalate

No matter how firmly we intend to limit our air offensive against North Viet-Nam, we will move
inexorably toward the destruction of increasingly sensitive targets. This is not a question of bad faith on
anybody's part. It is part of a process demonstrated over time: that a sustained bombing program
acquires a life and dynamism of its own.
There are several reasons for this:
A. Our philosophy of bombing requires gradual escalation.
Admittedly, we have never had a generally agreed rationale for bombing North Viet-Nam. But the
inarticulated major premise has always been that bombing will somehow, some day, and in some
manner, create pressure on Hanoi to stop the war. This is accepted as an article of faith, not only by the
military who have planning and operational responsibilities but by most civilian advocates of bombing
in the Administration.
Yet it is also widely accepted that for bombing to have this desired political effect, we must gradually
extend our attack to increasingly vital targets. In this way--it is contended--we will constantly threaten
Hanoi that if it continues its aggression it will face mounting costs--with the destruction of its economic
life at the end of the road.
B. We have given effect to this philosophy in the pattern of bombing so far.
In the eleven months that we have been bombing North Viet-Nam, we have gradually shifted from

military targets located in the southern part of North Viet-Nam and directly associated with infiltration
to targets in the Northeast Quadrant associated more with the economy of the country and its lifelines to
China than with the movement of men and supplies to the South.
This progression is graphically shown on the attached chart./3/ As the chart discloses, we have been
bombing closer and closer to the Chinese border. At the same time we have been closing in on the
Hanoi-Haiphong area, steadily constricting the geographical scope of immunity.
/3/Attached but not printed.
C. Chinese-Soviet and DRV action will force escalation.
The inevitable escalation of our bombing will result not only because of the dynamics of the process but
because the enemy will not stand still.
Our bombing of North Viet-Nam cannot be conducted in a vacuum any more than it has been in the past.
We began bombing as an act of response to an incident of terror in the South. More of those incidents
will occur--presumably at an increasing pace as our deployments grow larger.
Chinese and Soviet aid will also tend to increase the pressures for bombing escalation. As more SAMs
are installed, we will be compelled to take them out in order to safeguard our aircraft. This will mean
killing more Russians or Chinese and putting greater pressure on those two nations for increased effort.
Each extension of our bombing to more sensitive areas will increase the risk to our aircraft and compel a
further extension of bombing to protect the expanded bombing activities we have staked out.
D. The pressures to bomb sensitive targets will increase.
Unless we achieve dramatic successes in the South--which no one expects--we will be led by frustration
to hit increasingly more sensitive targets:
1. to mine Haiphong harbor;
2. to destroy POL supplies;
3. to destroy the system of power stations; and
4. to attack airfields.
Each of these target objectives has already been recommended to you by one of your principal military
or civilian advisers in Washington or Saigon; each has a special significance for the major Communist
capitals.
The mining of Haiphong harbor would impose a major decision on the Soviet Union. Could it again
submit to a blockade, as at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and thus lose its only link with Hanoi
that does not cross Chinese territory or air space? Or should it retaliate by sending increased aid or even
volunteers to North Viet-Nam or by squeezing the United States at some other vital point, such as
Berlin?
Would North Viet-Nam accept the blockade of its harbor without launching some kind of attack against

the crowded harbor of Saigon? Or would the Soviet Union feel compelled to provide surface-to-surface
missiles with conventional warheads targeted on Saigon harbor or US fleet units?
The bombing of POL would put great pressure on North Viet-Nam (with the possible assistance of
China) to launch some kind of attack against the exposed POL in Saigon harbor.
Any attack against Saigon harbor or our POL supplies would in turn put enormous pressure on the
United States to retaliate with some further act of escalation.
The bombing of the airfields would very likely lead the DRV to request the use of Chinese air bases
north of the border for the basing of North Vietnamese planes, or even to request the intervention of
Chinese air. This would pose the most agonizing dilemma for us. Consistent with our decision to bomb
the North, we could hardly permit the creation of a sanctuary from which our own planes could be
harassed. Yet there is general agreement that for us to bomb China would very likely lead to a direct war
with Peiping and would--in principle at least--trigger the Sino-Soviet Defense Pact, which has been in
force for fifteen years.
To bomb the energy sources of North Viet-Nam would threaten the industrial life of the country. Yet, as
noted by the Special Memorandum of January 19, 1966/4/ approved by the Board of National Estimates,
none of these attacks--on the harbor or POL or the power stations--"would, in itself, have a critical
impact on the combat activity of the Communist forces in South Viet-Nam."
/4/See footnote 4, Document 32.
It would not, in other words, impair the fighting capabilities of the Viet Cong. But it would profoundly
affect the pressures on the major Communist powers to engage themselves more deeply in the war.
II.

How the War Can Start

We must judge the possibility of war with China not only in light of the forces that are at work to
enlarge and intensify the bombing on our side, but the forces at work on the other, as well.
Quite clearly there is a threshold which we cannot pass over without precipitating a major Chinese
involvement. We do not know--even within wide margins of error--where that threshold is. Unhappily
we will not find out until after the catastrophe.
We did not measure the threshold adequately in Korea. We found out how low it was only after 300,000
Chinese descended on us.
I think it quite clear that both China and the Soviet Union recognize a major distinction between the loss
of a War of National Liberation and the capitulation of a sister Socialist state under direct air attack by
an "imperialist" power. We can do almost anything we like in the South, with little if any danger of
directly involving the big Communist powers. But there are several things that we cannot, in my
judgment, do in North Viet-Nam without the practical certainty of involving at least Red China.
a. I do not think that China can stand by and let us destroy the industrial life of North Viet-Nam without

increasing its assistance to the point where, sooner or later, we will almost certainly collide with Chinese
interests in such a way as to bring about a Chinese involvement.
b. At some point our bombers are likely to be so harassed by MIGs that we will feel compelled--to save
the lives of pilots--to take out the North Vietnamese airfields and the planes that are on them. Recently,
we have received reports of MIG-21s in North Viet-Nam. I cannot believe that we can go on much
longer bombing more and more sensitive targets without increasing MIG encounters.
Yet when we do take out DRV air bases, we can reasonably expect Hanoi to ask assistance from the
Chinese, either in the form of airfields in China or the actual use of Chinese planes and pilots. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff recognize this possibility. They have already requested permission to engage in hot
pursuit over Chinese Communist air space "in light of the increasing Chicom MIG threat" and because
of "the likelihood that other hostile air forces will utilize Chicom bases as a sanctuary."
III.

Both the Soviet Union and Red China are Increasing Their Commitments to North Viet-Nam and Red
China Is Making Active War Preparations
A. The Soviet Union
Mr. Shelepin's visit to Hanoi resulted in promises of increased aid. The exact nature of the aid was not
specified. Less than a month before, on December 22, the Soviet Union had promised increased
economic aid. Almost certainly Shelepin's promise contained a substantial component of military
assistance. Our intelligence indicates that large ships are already en route.
B. Red China
Our resumed bombing will almost certainly bring stepped-up Chinese aid to the DRV. The Board of
National Estimates has recognized this. They state, in their memorandum of January 19 (page 9), that "It
is likely that [the Chinese]/5/ would respond to enlarged air attacks on the DRV with greatly increased
logistic support, including large additional numbers of engineer and supply troops and, possibly, antiaircraft units."
/5/Brackets in the source text.
Peiping has steadily increased its covert cooperation. It has sent regular army engineer units into North
Viet-Nam, is sending Chinese Communist fighters over North Viet-Nam, and is improving both sea and
land communication routes to North Viet-Nam.
War Preparations in China
Even more significant than its stepped-up aid to Hanoi are the increased signs that China is making
materiel as well as psychological preparations for war, particularly in the South and Southwest parts of
the country.
The Weekly Intelligence Digest (WID) 52-65 December 24, 1965, of the Pacific Command states (page
11):

"Current activities include increased military use of the railroads with concurrent restrictions on civil
use, stepped-up efforts to complete vitally needed rail links in Yunnan Province, recall of railroad
personnel to duty, military build-up, intensified indoctrination of the population and evacuation of
women and children from the cities. Curfews and travel restrictions are in effect. Efforts to speed the
development of air warning and installations of air defense systems, including emplacement of antiaircraft guns, have been indicated. Some key industries are reportedly being relocated and the
government is said to be developing contingency plans for the emergency evacuation of its offices from
the cities. New airfields are also being built."
Air Fields and Air Defense
Communist China's military preparations since the Gulf of Tonkin have focused upon the correction of
its major weaknesses, notably air facilities and air defense in South China.
The focal point of this effort has been an all-out drive to construct or radically improve half a dozen
large airfields in South China. Some of these are clearly not positioned solely for the defense of China
but appear related to the Vietnamese war. (See accompanying map.)/6/
/6/Attached but not printed.
Simultaneously with this construction program, a high proportion of Peiping's advanced jet fighters has
been deployed to South China. Eighteen months ago there were virtually no MIG-19s or 21s in this area.
As of January 1966, more than one-half of China's estimated 230 MIG-19s and one-third of its 35-odd
MIG-21s were based in South and Southwest China. In all, some 350 jet fighters are based on Chinese
Communist fields within two hundred miles or less from North Viet-Nam.
Accompanying these twin developments has come evidence of growing coordination between the air
defense systems of North Viet-Nam and South China as well as of more aggressive air patrolling by
Chinese fighters, not only along their southern border, but over North Viet-Nam as well.
Troop Deployments
Chinese ground forces already in South China are not only adequate for local defense, but they exceed
the number that can be readily transported over existing lines of communication into mainland Southeast
Asia. An estimated 151,000 troops are in the Kunming Military Region (Yunnan and Kweichow
Provinces) opposite Burma, Laos, and western North Viet-Nam. Another 317,000 are deployed in the
adjacent Canton Military Region (Kwangtung, Hunan and Kwangsi Provinces) bordering North VietNam.
The Weekly Intelligence Digest of 24 December estimates that for a Chinese attack into Southeast Asia
in conjunction with North Vietnamese forces, less than half of the nearly one-half million troops now
located in the Canton and Kunming Military Regions would be required. Reinforcing divisions could be
provided from elsewhere in China. Though there have been no indications of large-scale redeployments
of Chinese forces toward Southeast Asian borders, this could be accomplished in a relatively short time
with little strategic warning. The flow of military supplies to South and Southwest China is believed to
have increased in recent months.
Improvement of LOCs
The same Weekly Intelligence Digest also points out (page 11) that it is the capacity of lines of

communication for logistic support into Southeast Asia, not the size of forces available that control the
magnitude of a Communist invasion. In Yunnan Province, the Chinese are improving logistic lines to
provide better access to North Viet-Nam and to the China-Laos and China-Burma border areas.
Similarly the rail construction program in Southwest China has been greatly intensified in the past year.
A new line between Kueiyang (Kweichow Province) and Liuchou (Kwangsi Province) which connects
with the main railroad between the DRV and Central China became operational in late 1965.
While ninety percent of China's bulk storage of POL is in the eastern and coastal provinces, a separate
military reserve storage program was recently identified of which a large proportion is in South China.
Construction was begun on these facilities several years ago, but it was considerably increased in tempo
during the past year.
Political Preparations
In contrast to military and civil defense contingency preparations which have been undertaken behind a
curtain of secrecy, the psychological preparation of the population has been, in large part, out in the
open. "War preparation" conferences and neighborhood briefings have been held in secret; apparently,
however, they tend to take their cue from public pronouncements. Since Spring 1965, there has been a
barrage of propaganda on the "people's war". These preparations and the level of warning have tended to
increase in recent months.
Since year-end, there are indications that Peiping considers the prospects of war with the United States
have increased. Chen Yi acknowledged that the Third Five-Year Plan to begin in 1966 would have to
take into account both the war in Viet-Nam and its implications for China. Another regime spokesman,
Liao Cheng-chih, in a January 20 message to overseas Chinese, stated: "We are planning all our tasks on
the basis of the assumption that US imperialism will forcibly impose a war upon us." And a Peiping
radio domestic broadcast on January 18, describing a recent military political work conference, stated in
regard to the US imperialist threat: "A test of strength with us is inevitable and this will come only in a
matter of time."
IV.

We Cannot Count on the Chinese Thinking as We Do

We face the real and present danger that we may miscalculate the threshold of Chinese intervention as
we did in Korea by assuming that the Chinese think as we do. In dealing with a people as complicated
and remote as the Chinese, logic is not enough, since it may rest on quite mistaken premises. We must
look at the evidence as well.
This becomes sharply clear when we consider the usual arguments against the possibility of Chinese
intervention./7/
/7/In analyzing the "usual arguments," Ball drew heavily on a January 24 memorandum from Allen
Whiting of INR. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam)
A. "If Peiping were intending to intervene it would have done so by now."

It is constantly argued that since--by escalating slowly--we have got away with our bombing attacks so
far, we can continue to escalate with relative impunity.
The argument runs, in a more sophisticated form, that if Peiping were prepared to intervene it would
have done so long since. By standing down it has suffered loss of prestige--particularly in the face of
increasing Soviet help--and has permitted North Viet-Nam to suffer severe damage.
The answer to this is that until recently--after the arrival of our massive deployments--we were taking a
licking in South Viet-Nam. Now the situation has changed and the need for Chinese intervention has
greatly increased.
Moreover, one should never forget the behavior of the Chinese during the first five months of the
Korean War. No Chinese troops came to give North Korea the punch necessary to push UN forces from
their toe hold at Pusan. The Chinese erected no defenses along the 38th parallel to stop a UN invasion
when the Inchon landing turned the tide. Even Pyongyang was sacrificed, as was virtually all of the
industrial and agricultural area of North Korea. The general estimate in Washington by October 1950
was quite logical: if Peiping had intended intervention it would have done so by then.
Yet Chinese Communist troops crossed the Yalu October 14, engaged UN forces October 26, and
massively counterattacked General MacArthur's armies November 26.
Today only the most reckless will assure you that we know when Peiping will feel it necessary to
intervene to safeguard its own military and political interests.
B. "Peiping fears war with the United States and seeks to avoid it."
Another popular contention is that the Chinese are unwilling to expose their hard-won industry and
nuclear capability to US air attack. They, therefore, will avoid any measures that might lead to such
retaliation.
The Chinese have, however, watched the slow escalation of our bombing for eleven months and they
must assume that if bombing is resumed it will be at an increasingly higher level of intensity. If they
were fearful of being put in a position where they might be compelled to intervene, one would expect
them to encourage measures (a) to bring about a prolongation of our pause, and (b) to facilitate
negotiations.
Instead, Peiping has done everything possible to prevent such measures being taken. It has denounced
the pause as a "peace swindle". It has vehemently and incessantly attacked each of our Fourteen Points.
It has gone much farther in vilifying United States actions and intentions than has Hanoi.
C. It would make no sense for Communist China to intervene with air support."
Another popular argument is that if China intervened it would use its massive ground forces and would
not risk its relatively small obsolete air force against United States air power. Thus, it is contended, there
is little chance that Peiping would either use its air to attack US aircraft over Viet-Nam or would provide
safe haven for DRV fighters.
The logic of this analysis was shared by almost the entire Washington intelligence community until
recently. Now, however, the increasing evidence that Hanoi and Peiping are preparing to cooperate in
defending North Viet-Nam against air attack has led the representatives of NSA, INR and the Assistant

Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, to conclude:

"That the chances are about even that the Chinese, if requested by the DRV, would permit DRV aircraft
to intervene from Chinese bases, or would even do so with their own aircraft in the event of continued
US air attacks near the Chinese border. They would not expect any of these measures, of themselves, to
repel the US attacks militarily, but would hope to make our operations increasingly costly and possibly
deter further US escalation while running high but acceptable risks of being bombed themselves." (SNIE
10-12-65, Probable Communist Reactions to a US Course of Action, 10 December 1965, p. 6)/8/
/8/Not printed. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)
D. "Even if the Chinese did intervene with air support we could take out the bases in South China with
little trouble."
The consequences of our attacking Chinese bases would be far-reaching. In calculating Communist
responses to such attacks, the United States Intelligence Board has stated:
"There is an almost even chance that the Chinese choice would be to break off the air battle and make
political moves designed to dissuade the US from continuing its bombings of the DRV. On balance,
however, we think it somewhat more likely that they would make a major military response to the
continuation or expansion of US strikes against China.The exact combination and timing of military
moves would vary greatly. If they had not already done so, Chinese Communist forces would probably
move into North Viet-Nam. Chinese or additional DRV forces would probably move into Northern
Laos. The DRV armed forces, with Chinese support, would probably open an offensive against South
Viet-Nam. Thailand would be threatened, especially if its bases were used in air attacks against
China." (SNIE 10-5-65, Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions, 28 April 1965, pp. 8-9)/9/
/9/Not printed. (Ibid., INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99, SNIE 10-5-65)
V.

Have Been Burned Once Before

In October, 1950, in Korea, we faced a similar question as to Chinese intentions. The intelligence
community at that time was confident that the Chinese would not intervene. We should never forget the
implications of the following colloquy between President Truman and General MacArthur:
"'In your opinion,' President Truman asked General MacArthur, 'is there any chance that the Chinese
might enter the war on the side of North Korea?'
"MacArthur shook his head. 'I'd say there's very little chance of that happening. They have several
hundred thousand men north of the Yalu, but they haven't any air force. If they tried to cross the river
our air force would slaughter them. At the most perhaps 60,000 troops would make it. Our infantry
could easily contain them. I expect the actual fighting in North Korea to end by Thanksgiving. We
should have our men home, or at least in Japan, by Christmas.'
"At the very moment that President Truman and General MacArthur were talking, there were already
more than 100,000 Chinese Communist troops in North Korea, and another 200,000 were ready to cross

the Yalu. By mid-November at least 300,000 Chinese would be poised to strike--and the ROK,
American and other UN forces would not even be aware of their presence. Before the war was over, the
Chinese Communist armies in Korea would reach a peak strength of more than a million
men." (Lawson's "The United States in the Korean War," pg. 79).
George W. Ball

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
42. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 25, 1966, 1:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. Top Secret.
Let me capsule some thoughts on the problem confronting you.
Recommendation: That the bombing resume--on a surgical basis--picking out strictly military targets,
and avoid, if we can, any target that summons up a direct response from the Chicoms or NVN Air Force.
Why Resume?
--We lose an option, a bargaining point, when we stop the bombing without any equal concession on the
part of the VC. Now, with resumption, we are back at the playing table, with chips to use if it looks like
a conference table can be had.
--If casualties mount or continue, we are hard put to explain our softening attitude, politically to our own
people, when the VC still kicks us, refuses to talk with us.
--It's common sense, confirmed a thousand times in the history, that we never win at the conference
table what we have lost on the battlefield. It is not now in the best interests of the VC or Hanoi to talk to
us. The Chicoms want us to bleed--the VC believe we will tire and grow weary--and Hanoi remembers
the story of the French. Unless we hurt them, why should they talk?
Dangers to the resumption:
The minute we resume, there will be two vital points we must nail down, else the doves, the Lynd-liners
and the Times will shriek:
1. Did we have a response? The Secretary is on record as saying no "serious response." What is serious?
Does it mean we rejected something? Thus, it is absolutely imperative that we close every circuit, and
close it tight so our record is visibly clean.
2. Did we have to start bombing again? We need evidence--hard, photographic, verifiable evidence that
the infiltration, the reconstruction, the unimpeded training of troops really hurts us--and puts our own

troops in jeopardy. This must be clear so that anyone who denounces the resumption is saying in effect,
"I don't care what happens to American troops, I just don't want to bomb again."
What's Ahead:
The Lynd-line--on page A7 of Tuesday Post/2/ is going to be the new line, i.e.
/2/"Lynd Urges Talks With Viet 'Front,'" Washington Post, January 25, 1966.
Stop the bombing forever--recognize the Viet Cong--(and soon, it will be: organize a Popular Front or
coalition government, then get out troops out and let the Vietnamese decide their own fate. This surely
will come next as the line).
After this will come cries of anguish over our place losses, and ground casualties. I suspect we will hear
a number of those who want the pause to continue, cite the horrible cost of resumption.
Then you will hear "why not accept the four VC points" because "they don't really mean what they say."
I have a hunch this will be the next real thrust on our position.
Pell, Fulbright, McGovern and Lippmann are advocating the Gavin "retire to the enclaves" thesis as well
as the Lynd-line . . . more will take up this line because it looks like an easy way out.
So it is all of a piece. Slowly, but like lava pouring over a volcano, the flow is resistless--first, one
concession, then another, and then another, and as we adjust to each new position, the Lynd-liners go
onto the next retreat point.
Perhaps we must harden ourselves to the realism of the problem:
There is no easy way out. We can never achieve a settlement that is honorable until we have
demonstrated to the VC and Hanoi they can't win--and we are hurting them.
If we resume, consider this as a scenario:
1. A re-statement of the long list of peace moves we have made.
2. A re-statement of our objectives: why are we there--what do we want to happen before we get out.
3. A clear declaration of what happens if we allow the Hanoi "Liberation Front" to win in Vietnam. As
Mr. Durant said, the loss of S. Vietnam will lead to the loss of Malaysia and Singapore, restore the
subserviency of Indonesia to China, weaken our positions in Formosa, Philippines and Japan, cause the
Australians to live precariously, allow the funds of a strengthened Communist bloc to pour into South
America, and for a long time force us to live with hostile governments.
4. The President, within a week (or earlier) after resumption, go before a TV press conference--and state
our case to the nation. Only the President can really nail our case to the sticking point . . . and expose the
phony arguments of the Lynd-liners.
43. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 25, 1966, 5:30-7:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
PRESENT
Bipartisan Congressional Meeting from Republican-Democratic Leadership. Chairman and ranking
members of Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs. Senate and House. President, Rusk,
McNamara and Valenti/2/
/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that Ball, Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, Raborn, Wheeler, and
Taylor were also present. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Resumption of Bombing
Rusk recounted peace efforts--and their fruitlessness.
McCormack: Must protect our soldiers. Use means available to do it. Time has arrived--unless other side
does something.
Ford: What are the alternatives you face right now?
President: Could pull out.
Bomb on heavier scale.
Sit and do nothing.
Decision: When to resume bombing.
Ford: What do your advisers suggest?
President: State, Defense, Joint Chiefs all agree to resume in near future.
Ford: What kind of bombing do they recommend?
President: Security problem. Don't want to telegraph our shots.
Ford: If your advisers say bombing is necessary--I'm for it.
Mansfield: Does McNamara say that infiltration reached 4500 a month?
McNamara: This is dry season. Usually associated with larger infiltration. Indications of larger
infiltration.
Mansfield: Instead of 22 per cent under control, only 18 per cent is under control of VC.
Bombing lull should be continued. We have little to lose by lull. Time is on the side of the enemy. Best
chance of getting to peace table is to minimize our military action.
President ought to issue statement: "Favor cease-fire now. Call for meeting of all interested parties. Call

for elections within three to six months. Contemplate withdrawal of our forces after secure amnesty.
Favor resumption in conjunction with Geneva Accords."
Lull is to be preferred:
1. Our casualties go up with escalation.
2. Bombs mean civilian deaths--possibly gas or atom bombs.
3. Increase isolation of U.S.
4. More we destroy North Vietnam, the more we treat with China instead of North Vietnam.
Dirksen: (Recounted Wilson's declaration of war, and how people applauded his declaration of death.)
I am sensitive to young blood as any man.
You can withdraw. This would be a disaster.
You could let this be a war of attrition. Keep what we have. Be patient. But this is expensive and
wearing. It doesn't reduce casualties. Country wouldn't support you. Patience is like a holiday in war.
Or you can fight. You go in to win. If we are not winning now, let's do what is necessary to win. I don't
believe you have any other choice. I believe the country will support you.
The enemy would be foolish not to use every pause to build up his forces.
Russell: This is the most frustrating experience of my life. I didn't want to get in there, but we are there.
I don't think the American people take this war seriously. I don't credit the polls on Vietnam. Those
people have been ground under so long, all they want is peace.
I don't know if our Defense Department is adequate enough to meet all our obligations around the world.
We are prepared to fight a war we are not fighting.
I think we have gone too far in this lull--although I recognize the reason. This pause has cost you
militarily. We are going to lose a lot of boys as a result--casualties of our care for peace.
For God sakes, don't start the bombing half way. Let them know they are in a war. We killed civilians in
World War II and nobody opposed. I'd rather kill them than have American boys die. Please, Mr.
President, don't get one foot back in it. Go all the way.
Saltonstall: It's clear to me if we have our boys there, we have to go forward with bombing. Don't want
to broaden the targets so much as to include civilians, but there are enough targets there.
I believe we must take risks--but we must take them. All four Chiefs believe the Chinese will not come
in. That's a risk that must be taken. You must give our boys full support. I will support you in any
decision you take.
Albert: You and your advisers have my trust.

Arends: You have proven to the world you want peace. Should resume in future, near future.
Fulbright: One comment about Russell that the lull cost us. It helped us, too, in matter of supply.
(McNamara said this didn't matter at all for us.)
Fulbright continued: Concur in Mansfield statement. This is not similar to World Wars I and II. We have
never tried to reimpose colonial power on anyone before. We undertook to help France with her
colonies. Precedents don't appeal to me. We are in a false position now. We are properly accused of
taking the place of the French.
We ought (to find?) a way to negotiate a way out. No possibility of negotiation except with the help of
the Russians. Need their help. They could reconvene the Geneva Conference.
Maybe our dialogue with the Russians has been exhausted. If we win, what do we do? Do we stay there
forever?
There has never been a war where there has been American discontent like this.
Therefore, I think we should play for time. Nobody believed the Chinese would come in in Korea--but
they did.
Hope we would not resume the bombing--and try to find a way out. After large casualties, we will come
to a negotiation.
President: Perhaps if we took the Majority Leader's paper/3/ point by point--and see what it says.
/3/Not further identified.
McNamara:
1. Bombing lull should be continued--minimize military activity.
At what level should military action be continued to bring peace? At present the lever to negotiations is
continued military action. If we adopt the Gavin line,/4/ the initiative would pass to the VC. The balance
of opinion is that minimal military action would be costly--and not lead to peace.
/4/For an analysis of Gavin's enclave strategy by the JCS, see Document 61.
Rusk: Under guerrilla action, it is difficult to get a frozen cease-fire. We have said to the other side that
we will try for a cease-fire.
President: We can't get anyone to the table. If you produce them, we'll meet them.
Fulbright: What have the Russians been told?
(President:) They can't deliver the Hanoi (people?).
(President read letter from Shastri.)/5/
/5/Transmitted in telegram 1218 to New Delhi, January 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27

VIET S)
Rusk: At New Delhi the Vice President asked the Russians what they could do. They had nothing to
offer.
Russell: Of course, the Russians cannot do anything. They are vying with the Chinese and can't bring
any pressure. But the problem is, not to fight this war with one hand behind us. The American people
won't stand for it. This is an unpopular war but the people want us to win.
Rusk: We are prepared to rely on the Vietnamese people in free elections. Perhaps the cease-fire would
cause a little procedural difficulty.
President: We have said we would talk about their four points, but we won't agree to preconditions.
(Fulbright and President had a little exchange about the four points and the Russians. What did we say
and vice versa?)
Boggs: North Vietnam knows they can't run us off. If it were just a localized war, we wouldn't be there.
The colonial argument is fallacious. They have tried the same thing in Thailand and there is no colonial
history in Thailand.
If ever been a demonstration of dedication to law and rule of law, it is what we have been doing.
Decision: a military one. We are going to stay there, and I'm for whatever is necessary to bring an
honorable peace. We have made progress in the last six months. And we will defeat them.
Bill Bates: From military standpoint--support our troops.
Bow: I agree.
Morgan: I'm for resumption of bombing.
Rivers: Senator Russell has stated my position. The American people are afraid of land war in Asia. We
need air protection. We need to stay there. It would be disastrous to leave. The American people will not
follow indecision. Win or get out. Let the military select the targets. My Committee will follow you. Be
decisive.
President: Always seek counsel of military.
Hickenlooper: If only Vietnam were concerned, I'd get out. But we are confronting the Communist
world. Either get out or lick them. I've been restless with our light bombing. If we win, we must take out
their ability to make war.
Don't go for this enclave philosophy. It doesn't make sense.
Get out and get ready to fight somewhere else. Or go lick them. It involves risk but all war requires risk.
If we are in it to win, resume bombing and win.
Fulbright: If we follow Hickenlooper's advice, it will get us into World War III.

Mahon: In Congress, we have been oversimplifying. We are there for a long time. No easy answer.
I think we ought to resume bombing, but we are oversimplifying. I will follow your leadership.
Hayden: Proceed promptly to bomb all areas in North Vietnam that contribute to carrying on the war-and do it quickly.
Long: We get into some trouble by letting the communists believe we are weak. Only way China will
keep out is that we'll lick her, too. Unless we let them know we aim to be strong, and to win, we are in
for trouble. When the communists take one country, they'll take them all over. Every democratic leader
will know he is doomed. All Southeast Asia will fall.
President: Thank all of you. Senator sent me Never Call Retreat. Read passage from one page. Disturbed
not by differences but by the interpretations placed on these differences by the enemy.
(Picked up an intercept--read it to the assembly of those present.)
Ready to talk to anyone, at any time. Goldberg has urged U Thant to take any initiative. We have tried to
take it to the Security Council.
Appreciate your advice and views. Will take whatever action is necesary. I always keep your resolution
in mind. I know you can take it away from me anytime you want, and I can't veto.
Mrs. Bolton: My people feel as I do. We have let our enemies think we wouldn't fight, as we have so
many times. We must bear in mind we build an image of cowardice. Can't we fight? Don't let them think
we won't fight.
Saltonstall: Keep that resolution in your pocket. We won't take it away from you.
President: I urge you to let me [not] jeopardize our options by discussing this in the newspapers. Too
many lives depend on our security.
I want to discuss with you further my problems. I hope you will not discuss this. At appropriate times,
decisions will be made. I want to feel that I can talk Top Secret matters without (their) being divulged.
44. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
RFE-3
Washington, January 26, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam: INR & Other Studies, 1966. Secret;
No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.
SUBJECT
Why Is Hanoi Reluctant to Negotiate?
It is a commonplace observation that Hanoi has responded inadequately to our peace offensive and
pause because of its confidence that time is on its side and that victory is ultimately attainable through

persevering on the path of aggression. Less discussed, however, are inhibiting factors which may delay
Hanoi's hand should it be tempted to seek through a mixed political-military strategy that which it no
longer sees as attainable through military efforts alone. Because the men in Hanoi are professional
military planners whose lives have been almost wholly devoted to the battlefield, we believe they must,
by now, have a fair appreciation of what faces the Viet Cong even should US force levels remain at
200,000 in South Vietnam--to say nothing of what is foreshadowed by authoritative reports of planned
increases to 400,000. Therefore we have turned our attention to the possible factors which inhibit
Hanoi's willingness to embark on systematic discussions with the US or intermediaries. This query
assumes, of course, that at least some weighing of this alternative has occurred in Hanoi, however
limited and recent such deliberations may have been.
Negotiations: More Risk Than Gain
The advantages of making some concession to US demands, of entering into some sort of discussions,
however informal, are so obvious that Hanoi's reluctance is puzzling. Even the most indirect and
insubstantial dialogue, once begun, would raise serious obstacles to a resumption of US bombings and
would have disquieting repercussions in Saigon. The North Vietnamese are not stupid; they see the
possibility of these tactical gains even if they have no intention of themselves sincerely working for a
negotiated settlement or do not in the least credit us with such a sincere intention. Why then do they not
seize the opportunity to advance their cause? Clearly they perceive grave dangers when they analyse the
negotiatory track.
The most fundamental obstacle probably lies in their understanding of the nature of "negotiations." They
look on diplomatic deals as dishonorable haggling or what is now called a zero-sum game: anything that
A gains must be exactly what B loses. Moreover, as Marxists they are idealists (though they can be very
pragmatic) and they look on every concession made to the imperialists as a derogation from the ideal
course of history, a detour on the road to the perfect society. It is their duty to reject all detours unless
absolutely unavoidable. Thus they are deadly serious when they say that matters of principle are not
subject to bargaining; only the "details" can properly be compromised. These philosophical positions
combined with the profoundly suspicious character and instrumental attitude toward "truth" which
foreign observers of the Vietnamese have long remarked (most recently Professor Kissinger), make the
very word "negotiations" an extremely negative one for the leaders in Hanoi as well as those in Saigon.
Past Experience: Negotiations Never Work Out
On top of this underlying distrust of diplomacy has been superposed a series of bitter experiences with
negotiations. From 1945 to 1947 the Viet Minh reached a series of agreements with the French, all of
which certainly worked out badly for the Viet Minh, whether or not one agrees that the French simply
violated them. The subsequent military successes against the French led to Geneva where the Viet Minh
were pressured by the Soviets into accepting much less than they thought they had won. And even the
terms of Geneva were, they feel, openly violated in 1956 by their adversaries, notably the Americans
who by then were Diem's principal support.
These general arguments against any negotiations are reinforced in present circumstances by a number
of specific considerations. For one thing, it is at least as difficult for Hanoi to conceive of a middle
course (neither victory nor defeat) as it is for the US/GVN side. Their objective has always been victory-not some modest reform of the Saigon government but its outright replacement by a regime in
fundamental rapport with Hanoi. Reunification under Hanoi might not come immediately, a Front
government might maneuver slowly and carefully in that direction, but the direction would not be in any
doubt. With an objective framed in such terms, anything less is defeat and to accept anything less is
capitulation. What then is there to negotiate? The Hawks in Hanoi are saying to the putative Doves: "If

we are beaten, we simply withdraw. At least that way we do not publicly acknowledge our defeat and
we have a better posture for another try later."
We may presume, however, that not all the policymakers in Hanoi categorically rule out an "indirect" or
"political" approach to their objective in the South. Some of them must be entertaining the idea that the
US can be enticed or duped into withdrawing and leaving Saigon open to another, perhaps more subtle
subversion effort. But even these more flexible minds show real concern over the problem of a US
withdrawal. Can the US possibly be trusted to keep any promise to withdraw? Will not its desire for
bases, its neo-colonialist impulses, make it as treacherous as the French?
Hostages Against Negotiations: The NFL/VC
Still another very practical concern in the minds of the Vietnamese communist leaders is the hostility
toward negotiations among those most directly involved in the insurgency in the South: the military and
political cadres who have been the backbone of the effort. These are the officials whose policies would
be most sharply repudiated if Hanoi shifts to negotiations. It is they who miscalculated in 1964 that the
Saigon government was in its death throes, who urged the introduction of PAVN forces to give the VC
more punch, who then advocated a PAVN escalation to meet the increased American presence, and who
have insisted that the Ia Drang Valley battles were a communist victory. An eloquent statement of their
position by General Nguyen Chi Thanh was made public just before Christmas. (Thanh is reputed to be
Hanoi's commander in the South.) To what extent the policymakers in Hanoi have their freedom of
action constrained by these Hawks is not clear--there is no evidence at all on which to identify the
leaders of this group or to gauge their strength--but at least the Politburo must move circumspectly and
avoid impairing its authority and control.
Military morale and the esprit of all elements of the Viet Cong operation are still another factor to be
carefully weighed by Hanoi. Forward momentum and the conviction that victory will come--and will
come within a year or two--are important, probably vital elements in such a movement. Already there
are intelligence reports that the expressed determination to "fight 10 or 20 years" has impaired VC
morale. A switch to a radically different, possibly very extended political effort could not fail to have
grave repercussions among the VC. Yet even after entering on a political track, Hanoi would want to
retain as long as possible its option of reviving the insurgency--certainly until a considerable measure of
American compliance with the terms of any accord had been registered. A very careful preparation of its
cadres for any such shift in strategy is thus of primary importance for Hanoi. Hanoi must be able to
present whatever it agrees to as a "victory" when it explains its shift to its supporters. This concern for
VC morale is at least part of the explanation for the extremely rapid and vigorous denials which all DRV
and Front representatives automatically issue whenever the press attributes some softening to one of
them.
China: Anchor to Windward
Finally there is China. The DRV is no doubt capable of deciding unilaterally whether or not it wants to
begin negotiations; but does it want to assert its independence so bluntly? Peking is Hanoi's nearest
neighbor, a gigantic power which has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to dominate the Red River
valley. It is thus something to be feared. But it is also something to be loved: the Vietnamese
communists have clearly shown that ideologically (one could almost say spiritually) they are closest to
the Chinese. Many of them spent years in China, generally in the heroic Yenan period. The essential aid
that defeated the French came from China. And it is Peking with its massive armies which, far more than
it threatens, ultimately guarantees the survival of the North Vietnamese regime against even the most
total US ground invasion. Compared to China the USSR is very remote indeed. It is therefore only
common sense for Hanoi to make every effort to keep its position in line with that of Peking. There is no

doubt, of course, where Peking stands on negotiations, and we should perhaps be surprised at the gap
that has developed between the positions of Hanoi and Peking, rather than disappointed that there has
not been an outright break.
As the US knows very well, junior partners also have their leverage against their more powerful allies
and in the end Peking must accommodate to Hanoi's decisions on matters which directly involve Hanoi;
there remains a question of how Peking is to accommodate and when. Moreover, the discrepancy
between Hanoi and Peking has even a certain tactical utility to the former. Having decided (if it does) to
negotiate, Hanoi might want Peking to drag its heels, to play the reluctant dragon, to extract whatever
additional concessions the US might have held back from Hanoi. Then with the bird in its hand, Hanoi
would signal to Peking that the moment had come to change to a new strategy.
This complex of problems--their conditioned reflex against "negotiations," their inability to envisage
any acceptable compromise, their problems with their hard-liners and with VC morale, and the question
of the Chinese--is complex indeed, so tangled that a decision to negotiate may be impossible for Hanoi.
Yet such a decision is clearly under consideration: there has been no acceptance of our invitation to
negotiate, no unambiguous signal has come through any of the many channels available, and at the same
time there has been no rejection of our invitation, either. It would have been very easy for Hanoi in the
early stages of the pause or at any time since to slam the door even more resoundingly than last May.
And if a negative diplomatic response proved inconvenient, there have been other channels available: a
vigorous offensive in South Vietnam by PAVN forces, for example. (We do not look on the inaction of
the PAVN as a positive "signal" that negotiations and de-escalation have been chosen, but rather
consider the inaction as a negative indication, a sign that Hanoi does not yet want to close the door to
negotiation.) While Hanoi wrestles with these problems, we can expect a certain amount of confusion,
inconclusive, even contradictory evidence as to what course they are selecting. In fact, they may try to
have their cake and eat it--for example, to engage us in negotiations while they go on the offensive in the
South. Until a clear decision is made--if indeed one ever is--we can only be sure that their irresolution is
producing strains in Hanoi, and particularly acute problems with the VC and Peking.
45. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 26, 1966, 10:40 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19.
No classification marking. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the
memorandum.
I think you will want to read this important cable from Bangkok before our luncheon meeting/2/--it
represents the summary of the view of Lodge and Westmoreland, Sharp and Bill Sullivan, General
Stilwell and Ambassador Graham Martin, as they survey the prospects for 1966.
/2/Following a meeting in the Cabinet Room (see Document 46), the President met for lunch at 2:01
p.m. in the family dining room with Rusk, Ball, Raborn, McGeorge Bundy, Valenti, and Moyers. No
record of the discussion has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Bob McNamara is very annoyed by the reference to the shortage of iron bombs./3/ He says there is no
shortage except in the context of a perfectly fantastic rate of B-52 drops.
/3/Iron bombs are unguided high explosive bombs.

But this is not the main point. The point is rather that this cable gives the best summary we have had
from the field of the plans for the next year as the men in the field see it.
Paragraphs 6 and 7 are of particular interest in the context of the decisions immediately ahead, but the
whole telegram is worth reading.
McG. B.
Attachment/4/
/4/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, vol. IV. Top Secret. The
telegram was transmitted from Bangkok at 5:36 a.m. on January 25 and retyped in the White House on
January 26 especially for the President. The Department of State copy is in Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S.
(Text of cable from Embassy Bangkok 1470)
1. During the course of a restricted session of the Southeast Asia Coordination Meeting we examined the
limitations facing both the U.S. and North Vietnam in prosecuting the Vietnam war. As far as the U.S. is
concerned, we defined our limitations as those imposed by:
A. The current mobilization base;
B. Current and foreseeable weapons shortage (e.g., iron bombs);
C. The marginal capacity for logistical and air bases in Southeast Asia;
D. U.S. public opinion;
E. Free world attitude;
F. Political and military considerations affecting Vietnam's neighbor countries, and
G. The fact that, although improving, the Government of Vietnam is still ineffective by western
standards.
As far as North Vietnam is concerned, we defined the limitations as:
A. Logistical;
B. The requirement for clandestinity;
C. Consideration of Sino-Soviet differences; and
D. Morale.
2. In light of these evaluations, we attempted to project our view of the manner in which we expect the
war to develop over the next year. As far as enemy action is concerned, we expect we may see a shift in
his strategy. Rather than attempting to pursue his earlier campaign to seize control of the highlands from
Pleiku to Qui Nhon, we may find him instead concentrating on Quang Tri and Thua Thien in the First

Corps Zone, attempting to bite off the consolidated piece of territory immediately south of the
Demilitarized Zone.
3. We feel that the enemy may have been impelled to move to this strategy as a result of several factors:
A. Difficulty of maintaining forces in the Kontum-Pleiku complex against increasing concentrations of
U.S. forces;
B. Difficulties encountered in operating a long Line of Communication through Southeast Laos in the
face of increasing air attack;
C. Relative sparsity of U.S. and South Vietnam units in the northernmost regions of South Vietnam;
D. Relatively simple logistic lines across western regions of the Demilitarized Zone and the adjacent
territory of Eastern Laos;
E. The need for some demonstrable military success to give a political stimulus both to Hanoi and to
Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam.
4. Consequently we would expect to see the enemy concentrating infiltration effort on a rather limited
area of terrain, partly within the Demilitarized Zone and partly in a shallow sector of Eastern Laos.
While other more traditional elements of the Ho Chi Minh trail will continue to be used, we have
evidence which suggests that an immediate concentration of effort will be in this strip of territory
contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone. The enemy's motivation in this concentration is largely political,
in his hope to precipitate an equivalent of Dien Bien Phu by taking significant territory, which we would
have great difficulty in wresting back. The enemy would hope that this development would deliver such
a blow to our public opinion and to our will to continue that we would be prepared to accept North
Vietnam peace terms.
5. As for ourselves, we believe that the limitations imposed on us do not permit many imaginative
options beyond those which already govern our current operations. With troops on hand or deployable,
we cannot contemplate large scale ground operations outside South Vietnam territory, even if political
considerations should permit. In any event we do not foresee any changes in those political
considerations.
6. As far as air actions are concerned, we recognize that the sortie rate may have to be curtailed because
of existing and foreseeable shortages in the supply of iron bombs. Although these sorties are not
concentrated within South Vietnam and Laos, we assume their pattern will have to be realigned again
when and as Rolling Thunder operations are resumed. In the resumption of Rolling Thunder, we expect
that there will be a removal of previous restrictions and an expansion of allowable targets to include a
number of North Vietnam installations directly affecting the enemy's ability to sustain the infiltration
effort. Among these are the Port of Haiphong, petroleum facilities, power plants, etc. While we do not
believe that hitting these targets will have an immediate dramatic effect upon that enemy's ability to
continue the war in the South, we nevertheless feel that the cumulative effect will be significant.
Therefore, in moving to these new targets we should avoid giving the public impression that this is a
panacea, but merely indicate that it is part of the bombing pattern required to reduce infiltration
effectively.
7. Given these assumptions, we foresee the war in 1966 as a mutual effort to make the most of the
resources at hand within the known limitations of both sides. For the U.S. this means three general

features:
A. A more effective bombing campaign in North Vietnam and in Laos. Less resort to random sorties,
especially in Laos. We must make the maximum use of intelligence assets in target acquisition and
selectively control air strikes through the greater use of forward air controllers.
B. We must continue to destroy enemy forces wherever they can be found, attempting to make his
casualty rate greater than his ability to replace casualties by infiltration and recruitment.
C. We must press forward actively with pacification and rural reconstruction efforts in expanding areas
of South Vietnam.
8. We believe that if we can demonstrably increase enemy casualties well over and above his abilities to
replace them, if we can significantly hamper his logistics system, and if we can prevent his seizure of
any major new territorial gains, then we may effectively break his will to continue. If such a
development could be combined with genuine pacification progress we might expect a rather rapid
disintegration of the enemy's campaign in 1967.
9. At the same time we must expect, if and when the North Vietnam campaign begins to falter, that the
Chicoms will turn to other fronts in order to occupy our attention and dissipate our strength. Their
ability to stir up trouble in Thailand is not yet fully exploited and they can seriously harass Laos through
direct support to Pathet Lao elements there. These areas therefore will require constant attention as we
move through 1966.
10. The eventual cessation of hostilities in South Vietnam is unlikely to diminish the need for a U.S.
presence in Thailand. On the contrary, for an indeterminate period there may be a reaction from
Thailand that diminution would be evidence of U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia, which would in
turn permit renewal of Chinese Communist pressures. U.S. planning should, therefore, assure the need
for a continuing military investment in Thailand, as a premium for maintaining the U.S./Free World
position in Southeast Asia. In this connection it was emphasized that whatever future arrangements or
official statements may be made by the U.S. regarding its willingness to withdraw from military bases,
should be strictly limited to those in South Vietnam and the formulation "Southeast Asia" should be
avoided. Care should be taken to avoid the implication that we would not continue to fulfill our SEATO
commitment to Thailand.
46. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 26, 1966, 1:25-1:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
SUBJECT
Resumption of Bombing
PRESENT
The President, Rusk, McNamara, Mac Bundy, Raborn, Ball, Valenti/2/
/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that Moyers was also present. (Ibid.)

Rusk: Souvanna has problem--possibility of NVN coming back this weekend.

Considerable strength if you resume the bombing as much in sorrow as in anger.
You've thought very hard about everything they said.
And beneficial to let Michael Stewart get out of town before bombing.
We are a little thin about VC activity on the ground. This may cause some trouble when we start.
If you think you can stand the pressure--recommend you wait until Sat./3/
/3/January 29.
President: Worried not about pressure--am worried about another Souvanna item. Each time they will
bring up something to delay us. J.S. Cooper (Senator from Kentucky) wants to wait. I asked him if he
could deliver VC if I gave him more time. He couldn't answer.
Rusk: But the central policy issue is embarrassment over some thin issue-McNamara: We can't start before Friday their time--and according to Dean he wants Saturday their time.
Only a matter of 24 hours.
President: Must emphasize how sorrowful we are--we must let this be known. If you understand
Fulbright he wants us to get out. Mansfield wants us to hunker up.
Rusk: Am disturbed as much by other statements as much as M. and F.
President: I agree.
Rusk: No one can look you in the eye and tell you where we are going if we don't get peace.
President: Do you really belive Souvanna will pull something off?
Bundy: No. Odds are nine to one nothing will happen. We ought to lean on Souvanna hard and tell him
we're his friends and we'll wait til Saturday.
President: I'm afraid they'll give us some peace treatment that will be phony--and put us in a box.
McNamara: It is only 24 hours--and we ought to wait. We need that 24 hours.
President: Could you go tomorrow if we had to?
McNamara: Yes, we can--12 hours from now, but it may be a little ragged. Better on 24 hour lead.
President: What's your answer to PM Wilson telegram/4/ (Prime Minister Wilson)?
/4/Wilson's message was transmitted in telegram 4352 from London, January 26. Stating that he thought
the Johnson administration had made an honest and commendable effort to avoid further conflict,

Wilson indicated that he would support a decision to resume the bombing and suggested that the United
States help those who wished to defend its actions by releasing as much evidence as possible about the
military use to which the North Vietnamese had put the bombing pause and the two holiday truces.
Telegram 1447 to all diplomatic missions, January 31, summarized enemy military activity in South
Vietnam and infiltration from North Vietnam during the pause. (Both in Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S)
McNamara: He accepted our view, it seems to me, putting it on a military basis.
(Bundy read Wilson telegram.)
McNamara: What disturbs me is feeling the fire of the heavier bombing boys. I'm not sure we can shut
off supplies with bombing.
President: Bring me all you have of military evidence during the pause.
Ball: Let the Ambassadors show it to governments and not put it out to the American press.
President: That's good. Let's do it that way.
McNamara: When should we have this evidence (compiled by CIA)?
Bundy: In 24 hours.
President: When will we hear from Souvanna?
Rusk: Friday night our time.
Bundy: He's supposed to go Thursday and come back Friday.
(Discussion about Fulbright and his position.)
President: I don't want to be in Asia but if we tuck our tails and run . . .
How do you answer Ball's memo on China (coming) in the war?/5/
/5/Document 41.
McNamara: I believe we can tell China we do not intend to destroy the political institutions in NVN.
Ball: What we need is a philosophy of the bombing. We don't have any now.
McNamara: I disagree.
(McNamara had to leave to testify on the Hill.)
President: There is something wrong with our system when our leaders are testifying instead of thinking
about the war.

Let's re-write the "Why Vietnam" booklet./6/ Bring it up to date.

/6/Why Vietnam, containing statements on Vietnam by the President, Rusk, and McNamara, was printed
by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1965 and widely distributed.
47. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, January 26, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
U.S. Prisoner Exchange with NLF
The NLF has closed the door on prisoner exchange by reversing its position. It has informed the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that it will not meet with U.S. and ICRC
Representatives to discuss prisoner exchange.
Following is the chronology leading up to the present negative NLF position:
1. December 12, 1965, Ky approved U.S. proposal of exchange, under auspices of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of prisoner Hai (one of two terrorists who bombed our Embassy)
for USOM civilian employee Hertz./2/
/2/Gustav Hertz had been captured by the Viet Cong in February 1965 while working in Vietnam for the
Agency for International Development.
2. In response to our request, ICRC sent a representative to Algiers to convey Hertz-Hai exchange
proposal to NLF representative Tam./3/
/3/Huynh Van Tam.
3. January 4, ICRC representative met with Tam for two hours; Tam rejected the Hertz-Hai exchange
and countered with proposed meeting under ICRC auspices of NLF, ICRC and USG representatives to
discuss "broad prisoner exchange."
4. NLF willingness to discuss prisoner exchange with us was confirmed from a private source, Sanford
Gottlieb, Washington representative of SANE, who saw Tam in Algiers January 13. Tam told Gottlieb:
"The Front is prepared to discuss the exchange of all prisoners, including Mr. Hertz" and if the U.S.
wants to discuss prisoner exchange it should contact Tam.
5. Ky's concurrence was sought to the NLF offer to meet with U.S. and ICRC representatives to discuss
prisoner exchange. At a meeting with Secretary Rusk on January 15 Ky expressed his concurrence to
our proceeding with meeting with NLF on subject of prisoners under ICRC auspices.
6. January 15, we informed ICRC Geneva of our willingness to meet, preferably at ICRC Geneva
Headquarters, with ICRC and NLF representatives to discuss questions relating to U.S. prisoners,
including broad prisoner exchange as suggested by NLF representative Tam in Algiers.

7. January 18, ICRC dispatched its representative to convey our response to Tam in Algiers.
8. January 19, ICRC representative was received by Tam in Algiers. Tam accepted from ICRC
representative an ICRC Geneva letter indicating U.S. willingness to meet with NLF and ICRC
representatives, preferably at ICRC Geneva Headquarters, to discuss broad prisoner exchange. Tam told
ICRC representative that he must now wait for definitive instructions from the Front which might take
up to fifteen days; and requested ICRC representative to handle this matter with the "utmost discretion
and secrecy".
9. On the evening of January 25 ICRC Geneva received a letter from the NLF representative Tam dated
Algiers, January 21, which was two days after his meeting with ICRC representative on January 19 at
which Tam stated that he now had to receive definitive instructions from the Front which may take up to
fifteen days.
10. Tam's letter of January 21 reflects a complete change of attitude and is completely negative. It has
four main points:
(1) Refers to January 4 meeting between Tam and ICRC representative; states that Tam had said to
ICRC representative that NLF would not accept nor even consider a meeting with representatives of the
U.S.
(2) Refers to a press release issued by Red Cross of NLF of October 2 and states that according to the
press release the NLF is not authorized to entertain any relations with ICRC and therefore NLF
representative Tam returned to ICRC the letter which ICRC representative delivered to Tam on January
19 (that letter advised the NLF that the USG was prepared to meet with representatives of the NLF and
the ICRC to discuss broad prisoner exchange, as suggested by Tam to the ICRC representative on
January 4).
(3) A general statement warning the ICRC to make no announcement on the exchange of letters and
indicating that the NLF will deny the entire matter if it becomes public.
(4) States that Tam already indicated to the ICRC representative that the NLF cannot receive visits from
the ICRC or accept letters.
Benjamin H. Read/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Read signed the original.
48. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 26, 1966, 7:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312. Secret.
I talked to McCloy and Lovett. Acheson is in Antigua and Art Dean was on his way to the West coast by
air. I have asked for him to call me early in the morning. Though they differ from each other in
important ways, McCloy and Lovett are in favor of prompt resumption and a prompt Presidential
statement thereafter.

McCloy thinks the pause has been good and useful on political and military grounds, but it has had no
response. It makes no sense now to let the highways and bridges be repaired and put in use again after
we have spent so much time bombing them. He thinks the risk of escalation is low and cites a recent
conversation with Dobrynin to indicate that the Russians would also try to keep things cool.
McCloy favors a low key statement but thinks that it should come from here. If it came from anywhere
else the people would think the President was ducking it.
Lovett wishes we had never got into Vietnam because he has such a painful memory of Korea. He says
he was a charter member of the Never Again Club. But now that we are in he would go a long way. He
was against the pause in the first place, and he wold favor a prompt and fairly massive air action in the
North. He thinks we simply must give adequate support to the massive forces we have placed in
Vietnam. In addition to air activity he would consider what he calls "a friendly blockade" of North
Vietnam. He thinks keeping the pressure on is a kind of negotiation. He thinks the risk of escalation is
low but he does report that his French contacts think the top Chicom leadership is getting a little edgy.
(This conflicts with what the French Ambassador Chauvel reported from his trip to Peking and may
reflect Couve's stern instruction to Chauvel to say nothing in public that would give any comfort to the
Americans.)
Both Lovett and McCloy would find it extremely difficult to come down here tomorrow because each of
them has an important board meeting. But they agreed to telephone me in the morning if they have any
second sober thoughts and of course they will come if you want them to. Rusk and McNamara are pretty
well pinned down with the British all day tomorrow from 10:00 until about 5:30 but could be pulled out
for about half and hour about 12:30 if you want them.
I myself see no need for a meeting until 6:00, when we ought to issue orders subject to a later
confirming execute message on Friday afternoon./2/ At that time I will try to have necessary diplomatic
messages and a preliminary outline of the content of a statement for use on Saturday/3/ if you choose./4/
/2/January 28. Bundy added "or later" in handwriting.
/3/Bundy added "or later" in handwriting.
/4/Bundy added a handwritten note: "I still notice that we have only 'incidents,' not 'attacks' in South
Viet Nam--Mortars and sabotage, not attacks by military units on military units. And Vientiane is still
loose, in N.Y. Times terms." Regarding the Vientiane contact, see Document 51.
McG. B.
I have also talked to Clark Clifford and he feels that the pause has now clearly failed with Hanoi as we
all thought it would. He concedes that it has been helpful here and abroad. He says he wants to get out of
Vietnam more than any other man he knows but the only way to do it is to use enough force and show
enough determination to persuade Hanoi that a political contest is better than a military one. He would
resume promptly with carefully measured attacks at first, and he would keep up the pressure until the
other people decide that we are not the French. Clifford thinks the French experience is overwhelmingly
important to the thinking in Hanoi.
I have not reviewed with any of these gentlemen the delicate problem of day-to-day timing that relates
to Vientiane and the level of VC activity in the South.

McG. B.
49. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 27, 1966, 10:55 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19.
No classification marking. In response to a request from the President, General Wheeler prepared a 2page commentary on the message from Pakistani President Ayub Khan, explaining why he disagreed
with Ayub's major points and noting that the Joint Chiefs had "previously given such alternatives full
consideration" and had "rejected them." (CM-1146-66, January 31; Washington National Records
Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, Vietnam 381, Jan-Sept 66)
Mr. President
Here is an extraordinarily interesting dispatch from Ayub which makes the best case against the
resumption of bombing that I have seen. I still don't agree with it but I am sure you will want to read it.
McG. B.
Attachment/2/
Washington, January 27, 1966, 10:25 a.m.
/2/Secret.
Text of Message from Ambassador McConaughy--Karachi 1510
I met on the evening of January 25 with President Ayub at my request. Our half-hour discussion was
devoted entirely to Vietnam.
The meeting was at the Ayub residence, and he appeared informal, cordial, and candid in a manner
reminiscent of our conversations prior to the rocky course of Pak-U.S. relations during 1965. In
discussing Vietnam, President Ayub appeared desirous of imparting through me to President Johnson
the views of a sympathetic and concerned friend who, while gratified at having been consulted in a
matter of such serious import, also sought to offer as straightforward and responsible a response as
possible.
Noting the seriousness and criticality of Vietnam, I said President Johnson and Secretary Rusk had
instructed me to inform him that we had received no indication whatsoever of interest from Hanoi in our
current effort to promote the cause of peace in Southeast Asia. Quite the contrary, there had been
considerable Viet Cong military activity even during the Tet New Year, continued infiltration from
North Vietnam, and an evident wish to continue hostilities without regard for the suffering and welfare
of the Vietnamese people, and a generally threatening and provocative posture. The U.S. has tried
through a large number of approaches, including the initiative which Ayub had kindly taken with
Premier Kosygin at Tashkent, to open a constructive dialogue with Hanoi. Now in view of the great
seriousness of the problem, the U.S. Government is undertaking last minute soundings bearing on the
question.

President Ayub agreed the Vietnam problem is an extremely serious and critical one which he had hoped
might have been reviewed in light of some constructive Hanoi response. He assumed President
Johnson's military advisors must now be pressing him very hard to resume bombing North Vietnam.
Nonetheless, "As I told you before, I have a personal conviction, based on no evidence but a strong
feeling, that among Vietnamese Communist ranks there must be some desire to talk. I say this for your
and our own sake, once you resume bombing there will be a desperate situation and escalation. I would
still advise waiting with the hope of getting some response. The Chinese are telling them not to
negotiate, but it is the Vietnamese whose lives are at stake. You can bomb hell out of them or just sit
tight, but they can't throw you out. Looking at the situation as a statesman as well as a soldier, I would
say 'Come on you bastards, what can you do to us!'"
I remarked that to sit tight would still mean numerous allied casualties. Ayub agreed but responded,
"What can you do to that enemy in any event. The Vietnamese terrain doesn't lend itself to quick
military decisions." Ayub then implied his understanding and sympathy for the criticism to which his
recommended sit tight policy would subject President Johnson by remarking, "Look, I am being
criticized for Tashkent, which I agree was a very important decision. But people are emotionally aroused
and don't understand." With feeling and stress Ayub continued, "If you could get this message across, it
is not in your own interest to escalate. Personally, I think you have such a large military force in South
Vietnam the Communists couldn't do anything to you. Their boast to throw you out is nonsense. I still
advise that you not start things up again. As Kosygin said to me at Tashkent, "Yes, we are giving a bit of
aid there, but you cannot fly aircraft off a penny, and it takes months to get into the front lines whatever
we may decide to send." In my opinion if you start bombing again, you won't see them coming to the
conference table. On the contrary, those inclined to negotiate would be silenced, and you would have to
fight on for three or four years. If you just sit tight there, in six months or a year that will convince them.
But if bombing starts again, moderate elements will be silenced and you will have to move up the scale
of military operations."
I asked Ayub if he thought we could stand idly by and allow supply routes to be built up and thereby
expose our forces to that buildup. Ayub argued that U.S. could interdict supply routes within South
Vietnam as effectively as in North Vietnam. When I mentioned Laos, Ayub admitted that is a difficult
problem, but he stood by his view that concentrated interdiction is possible within South Vietnam. I
referred to the military doctrine of attacking a problem at its source, but Ayub maintained such a
doctrine during the present situation would require isolating North Vietnam not only from South
Vietnam but from China as well. Commenting again that he was speaking only as a friend, Ayub pointed
to the extreme military difficulties of solid interdiction and reiterated his opinion that, "If you want to
convince them they must come to the conference table, let them throw themselves against your superior
fire power and sooner or later they will see the light."
I asked Ayub if he didn't think the Viet Cong could spin out indefinitely a U.S. sit tight policy such as he
proposed, and bog us down inconclusively in Vietnam for years. Ayub pointed to the limiting factor of
Viet Cong logistics which cannot support a major fighting force without air and sea supply routes.
Despite being a soldier, Ayub again deprecated the primacy of the military factor in Vietnam, arguing
that history has proven repeatedly the fallacy of seeking to enlarge one's area of operations for military
reasons. It is necessary, he continued, to work backward from political-strategic considerations to the
conference table. "Sit it out. Why present targets? Why move out into the country in vulnerable files? I
spent six years under such conditions. You can't win on their terms; they always get in the first shot.
You can't search a jungle area with fire. Therefore, I would adopt a different course and wait them out."
I referred to our experience in Korea and the critical role of our heavy military pressure in forcing
negotiations beginning in 1951 which culminated in 1953 Armistice Agreement. Ayub agreed military
pressure had been successfully employed in Korea. But he argued that the Vietnam situation was much

different from Korea, what with larger armies, visible military actions, essentially non-Communist
South Korea, distinction between friend and foe. He concluded, "In Korea you had to bring them to the
conference table by fighting hard; in Vietnam you should wait them out." Commenting on the American
penchant for resolving the dirty business of war quickly and decisively, Ayub said, "Your enemies
expect you to be impatient, to commit more and more forces, and finally to weaken your resolve in the
face of unsatisfactory military results and your own democratic pressures." While acknowledging there
is always room for debate in such a matter, I suggested that General Westmoreland apparently had
different ideas on the necessity of keeping down the military back-up activities in Vietnam. At the same
time, I assured Ayub that President Johnson would give greatest care to all considerations as he
contemplated the painful decisions facing him in Vietnam. Ayub then cited successful strategy in the
Greek-Turkish War in 1922 in which Mustafa Kemal Pasha insisted upon remaining on the defensive
and wearing down the enemy as they came in. This was an extremely unpopular strategy, particularly
among his soldiers who wanted to seize the initiative and attack, but Mustafa waited for his opportunity
and was successful.
I referred to the full report on Vietnam given to the Foreign Minister by Stull on January 25./3/ I noted
that the report made it quite clear there had been no real let down in Viet Cong military activities. Ayub
indicated he had studied that report carefully and had it with him at the time. He said he assumed that
Viet Cong military activity during the Tet period indicated the Viet Cong did not have complete control
of all such activities throughout South Vietnam. He then reiterated his view that the U.S. has only the
basic alternatives of sit tight until negotiations, or escalate and fight on for years.
/3/Not further identified.
I said that I took it he had no word from the Soviets or any other Communist Source of interest to the
U.S. Peace Initiative. Ayub replied there had been nothing other than what he had related during our
January 18 meeting about the talk with Kosygin at Tashkent. I remarked that this absence of
constructive response was the same in all quarters. Ayub said, "Those who want the war to go on must
nonetheless be worried by your initiative. They must be hoping that the bombing will start again in order
to win over those who may wish to stop fighting." I then drew Ayub's attention to Secretary Rusk's
January 23 internationally-televised interview./4/ I gave Ayub a transcript of Rusk's remarks relating to
Vietnam, and drew his special attention to the Secretary's observation that the U.S. does not consider
itself "Gendarmes of the Universe," but we do have commitments on which we are determined to make
good.
/4/Rusk appeared on "Meet the Press" on January 23.
50. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 27, 1966, 6:20-8:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
SUBJECT
Resumption of Bombing
PRESENT
President, McNamara, Rusk, M. Bundy, General Wheeler, Moyers, Valenti

Rusk: Nothing to report on diplomatic front. Plane to Hanoi has been delayed from Vientiane.
I can't honestly say I see any taker from the other side. One thin thread that hasn't played its course-from Souvanna.
President: Did you ask McNamara and Bus Wheeler to see Ayub letter?/2/
/2/Document 49.
Bundy: Yes.
Bundy or Rusk (not clear): From a diplomatic view only, the general reaction to a few days more pause
would be good--balanced off against the military.
Don't know how much you think the 15 Senators' view/3/ will take hold.
/3/Fifteen Democratic Senators sent a letter to President Johnson on January 27 opposing resumption of
the bombing. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI)
President: What do you recommend?
Rusk: Resume bombing--but bombing policy be kept under firm control. The dangers of the Chinese
coming in.
Very little initiative on part of Viet Cong.
Resume this weekend.
President: What significance do you attach to low level of VC initiative?
Rusk: If it went on longer perhaps it would be significant--reports are they will draw back to guerrilla
type warfare. Perhaps if this continues, we can let our bombing intensity reflect this.
Wheeler: Westmoreland said he is afraid of what is developing in First Corps area--may be getting ready
to mount major effort in northern provinces.
Also reports of sizable concentration in Quag Ny (probably Quang Ngai). ROK battalions are there.
Fact there haven't been number of sizable attacks is meaningless.
Bundy: It is unusual for (so) few attacks so long.
(Wheeler:) Not so, really.
McNamara: Rate of activity is off since Tet. Don't know why nor will we for at least a week. but they
are continuing to reinforce at rapid rate.
President: Don't know "why"--but the "why" is probably not to our advantage.

McNamara: I agree. Further delay on resumption of bombing can polarize opinion in this country. I feel
we should resume--and send execute order tonight.
President: Does it make any difference if we start on Sunday?/4/
/4/January 30.
McNamara: No, not really.
Rusk: Senior officers in my Department would vote holding off a while longer. Can't find any solid
basis, however, to recommend to you we refrain.
Wheeler: Dean, how much would it take to get a definitive answer from Souvanna's man?
Rusk: Probably a week--or never.
Bundy: We won't get this man to make any definitive . . . odds are very long if he came back in a week,
he would have anything.
Only reason for prolonging is the low level of VC activity--and opinion of Ayub and others that it would
create confusion on the other side.
Rusk: But with these trucks coming South, how do you justify refraining?
President: What are the latest facts on infiltration?
(President read report on ______)
(Agreed we would not send execute order until we are absolutely ready to go.)
President asked: "What's different in bombing on Saturday as compared to Monday?"
McNamara: There's a difference in number of perishable targets. They might be off the roads by
Monday.
President: Are we doing any good on our bombing in South Vietnam and Laos?
McNamara: Yes, we are. Running 1900 sorties a week in Laos.
Wheeler: In area just opposite Laos, in the Delta area, destroyed 5 trucks, took out anti-aircraft plus
others. This is the only day we haven't hit a secondary explosion.
Rusk: Can planes going to Laos bring bombs back?
Wheeler: Yes, they can bring bombs back. They don't like to bring ordnance back to carriers.
McNamara: Cable/5/ came in saying operations have been limited by bomb shortage. Laotian planes . . .
/5/See Document 45.

Wheeler: But the cable didn't make sense-McNamara: Cable came out of meeting in Bangkok--of a meeting of military personnel. Sent out cable
saying I wasn't informed of any shortage in bombs./6/
/6/Not further identified.
Only shortage is 750 pound (bombs) used in B-52s. Nobody in right mind thought we'd drop these
bombs in B-52 on Vietnam. But we are working hard on this.
President: What's wrong with Ridgway?
Wheeler: He's probably bitten by bug that we should never get involved in land war in Asia.
President: Do you think our failure to bomb the North will materially affect the balance out there?
Wheeler: Yes, Sir. We should decrease by every pound we can to stop movement of supplies. In
interdiction, you start at the beginning and go all the way through to finally stopping it in-country. Is
like stopping water after it comes out of the hose.
President: What are we cutting off?
Wheeler: We hit the power plant. Hitting LOC (lines of communication)--and have raised the cost to
them of moving supplies southward. We cannot apply interdiction to stop the supply of troops they are
supplying today--about 80 tons a day. But we can stop the supplying of a larger force.
McNamara: This is a very important question but I'm not sure of the figures. They need up to 80 tons to
supply them--but if they increase troops they will need 165 tons but they have capabilities of 200 tons a
day. But these figures are very rough. Our Air Force has learned all over again to do iron bombing.
There is much to learn-President: We really pay a price--if we are not getting a payoff.
(Either Wheeler or McNamara): We know it is costing them--and to feel pain. But I cannot tell you
today that our bombing will cut down their operations in the South.
Rusk: Purpose of bombing ought to directly help our troops and break the will of the other fellow. My
own priority would be to concentrate on operational connections in the South.
President: When you go back in here, Dean, we're going to have to go in closer--and do more risky
bombing than we have before. You could see that the other night./7/
/7/Presumably a reference to the January 25 meeting with the Congressional leadership; see Document
43.
Are we getting closer to danger points by resuming our bombing--and shoving it--or by not resuming it?
McNamara: By resuming, we increase military action with Communist China (presume he meant risk of
military action). We must seek to avoid this at all costs. The burden is on us. Some of the programs
recommended cause excessive risk.

If we don't resume, the risk is more political than military. I personally think this is a high risk.
The CIA estimators feel this way.
Bundy: All estimators say that cessation will strengthen the will of the enemy.
McNamara: People in this country believe that supplies will demand we protect our boys.
President: Did we make a mistake in starting to bomb in the North?
McNamara: No.
Bundy: I share the view that we don't need to take the suggestions of those around the table the other
night. We never said we would bomb cities.
Wheeler: I must take issue. I agree with the political argument. But I think it is important to bomb
militarily.
We never had a heavy enough interdiction program. It has to be heavy. Day after day. We have had only
86 a day. Nothing at night. Now we can do a better job at night.
POL is absolutely vital to interdiction.
But the problem is not the 155 battalions they will have; it's what they could have if we allow them to
continue supplying. The only industrial target is the iron works in Hanoi. We ought to take that out.
But we need to expand our interdiction campaign.
President: Will that materially increase the danger of pulling China in by increasing bombing program?
Wheeler: Highest possible danger is if we make amphibious landing in North Vietnam. I could be wrong
but I don't believe it. Don't think the Soviets will get involved.
McNamara: Don't think we know how many sorties we need to stop the flow of supplies. We could
apply quadruple intensity on certain targets. We need more facts.
President: Do we need another 35 days of pause to get them?
McNamara: This has nothing to do with resuming bombing.
President: What have we lost during these 35 days? What are we getting out of these bombings? What
reports do we get out of North Vietnam?
Rusk: We get no real reports except from reconnaissance. We are old-fashioned in our spying.
We ought to hit only those targets directly involved in support of troops.
President: Who are people in your Department--their background--and what are their reasons for not
resuming?

Rusk: Ball, Thompson. Thompson wants at least two more weeks--to confuse [?] each other. Each of the
enemy is afraid to get caught laying down their commitment. Thompson is concerned about Russian
involvement.
Bundy: His fundamental point is that Russians know they have a constraining influence on us.
President: Doesn't it worry you that Russia might heat up the world somewhere else?
McNamara: No. I think Russians are less a risk than China. And we are strong enough to handle other
commitments. I don't agree (that) Senator Russell is right.
Wheeler: I think we are strong enough.
McNamara: He may be saying this in context of being a world policeman.
Rusk: Bill Bundy is ready to go--but is worried over the Souvanna thing.
President: What will U Thant say?
Rusk: Some danger. U Thant will say "too bad". "Some negotiations were in progress and they could
have worked."
Goldberg and Sisco are hoping for holding off. Harriman would be more comfortable with some more
time.
President: What is the logic of Goldberg's position of three weeks more?
Bundy: He says no damage militarily. Makes no claim that we would get peace.
President: Does he want to pull out?
Bundy: No. He wants to compromise it out.
President: But the only way to get a fellow to talk to you is to show strength. To show daring and
imagination and find a way to get to the table.
Are we doing any good playing with the Viet Cong?
Bundy: VC never said they would sit down and talk about prisoners. The door was slammed in our face.
Rusk: It's true we can give wrong decisions to Hanoi. But we don't know what they would do with the
right signal.
Bundy: One thing the bombing has done is to serve as an umbrella for 200,000 men.
President: I think if you stop bombing they will go for something else. If you let them run you out of
your front yard, they'll run you out of the house.
I don't want war with Russia or China. I feel less comfortable tonight than I felt last night. I don't want
to back out--and look like I'm reacting to the Fulbrights.

We must realize the price we pay for going back in. We will lose a good part of the Senate. I thought of
chucking that resolution back to them.
Do we want to take on the Senators--or let others take them on?
McNamara: I think the longer we delay the more controversy we produce.
Bundy: We ought to be sure we hit only trucks and highways until later.
President: We don't have anyone defending us.
Bundy: Yes, that's right, and we don't have anyone of stature.
President: Douglas/8/ could do it. He's got the standing to do it.
/8/Presumably a reference to Senator Paul Douglas (D-IL).
What I don't have is evidence.
--Turn loose 115 nations and having them shout at us. Suppose we would not announce a resumption.
We would keep the nations off us. Can we take this same firepower and use it in the South?
McNamara: Why wouldn't we be better off applying all the sorties in the South?
One, we don't need them in South Vietnam.
Two, are we using them in Laos? I don't know. They are blind bombing and I'm sure we are getting
benefit from this.
President: We have to be sure--we must be sure.
McNamara: I am sure we need to resume bombing.
President: What did Bobby/9/ say?
/9/Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-NY).
McNamara: He says the burden of proof is on us.
President: What will he say when we resume?
McNamara: I don't know. I'll see him 10:30 Saturday/10/ morning.
/10/January 29.
President: I think we'll carry a big burden when (we) resume with the Senate, peace lovers, ministers,
etc.
McNamara: We cannot use the same firepower elsewhere. I can prove that.

President: I don't think we have the case made to resume bombing. What will the papers say?
What I think we ought to do is to be prepared with statements--let the wise men chase it around.
Ought to talk to all the people we need to talk to Saturday.
And will send order--prefer Monday.
McNamara: Will do it so it will be announced on Tuesday.
51. Memorandum/1/
Washington, January 28, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. The source text is
unsigned but the memorandum was presumably prepared by William Bundy.
DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE RESUMPTION OF BOMBING
A. Third Country Situation
1. We have sent a circular message during the week which has now been delivered to all countries with
which we have had any meaningful exchanges during the suspension. This has covered every country
except for the Soviet Union and two other very minor ones. We have every indication that the Soviets
have received word of the contents through the Poles or Hungarians. In essence, this message served
notice that we had not had a response and that we could not continue to refrain from steps required to
protect our forces. It has been widely construed as our notice of imminent intent to resume.
2. We have had even closer exchanges with such key countries as the UK, Canada, and Australia.
3. Our various messages have been received with remarkably little protest and with considerable
understanding. The British and Australians are solidly aboard. Among significant countries, only Japan,
Canada, Poland, Pakistan (a very fervent plea from Ayub),/2/ and about five lesser countries have
expressed the hope that we could continue the pause to give something a chance to develop. None of
these has indicated that they have any concrete expectation or grounds for belief that it will.
/2/See Document 49.
U Thant fully understands that we may be resuming shortly. However, he has appealed publicly for a
virtually indefinite continuation, and will doubtless be critical in almost any event.
4. There is no pending third country initiative which hinges on delay in resumption. U Thant is working
on a proposal to have the ICC members propose a conference, and the Japanese and Canadians are
considering sending high-level emissaries to key countries. Nkrumah has also concocted the idea of his
going to Hanoi. However, all of these are well aware that we may resume before these actions were
underway.
B. Status of Contacts with Hanoi
1. Rangoon.

We had originally delivered a message there on December 29 simply informing Hanoi that the
suspension was underway and could be extended if there were a response. The message was accepted.
On January 21, we sent Byroade back to see the Hanoi man, who said he had no instructions and made
certain other comments, not calling for reply./3/ On January 24 the Hanoi man sent Byroade a written
aide-memoire, pre-dated January 21, which simply repeated the same points./4/
/3/See Document 33.
/4/Byroade transmitted the text of the aide-memoire in telegram 370 from Rangoon, January 24, which
is printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 138-139. McGeorge Bundy forwarded
telegram 370 to President Johnson at 10:45 a.m. on January 24 under cover of a memorandum stating
that Byroade had "received a very tough memo from the Hanoi Charge which pretty well closes that
circuit." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19)
On January 26, Byroade acknowledged the written message. He asked again whether the Hanoi man had
any instructions, and said he would remain available./5/ There has been no response./6/
/5/Byroade reported this information in telegram 374 from Rangoon, January 27, printed in Herring,
Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 139.
/6/The DRV representative responded on January 31, presenting an aide-memoire to Byroade during a
meeting that began 10 hours after resumption of the bombing. Byroade transmitted the aide-memoire in
telegram 392 and reported on the meeting in telegram 394, both dated January 31. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 140142) William Bundy analyzed the timing of the January 31 DRV approach in a memorandum to Rusk,
February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy
of the Vietnam War, pp. 150-151)
2. Moscow.
Based on Shastri's report that Kosygin had suggested direct contact in Moscow, Kohler sought an
appointment with the DRV Charge on January 19, and the DRV Charge finally accepted the meeting on
January 24. We gave Kohler substantive instructions,/7/ particularly inquiring whether this confidential
contact might be used for Hanoi to make clear what military actions it was taking. Kohler also raised
Hanoi's Four Points but was able to make only general comments.
/7/See Document 25.
The over-all reaction of the DRV Charge was completely negative./8/ He reiterated the Four Points and
standard statements of Hanoi's position and attacked the sincerity of our suspension.
/8/See Document 37./8/
At the end of the conversation, the Charge said that he had nothing further to add. Kohler replied that he
still had points he could discuss, but the DRV man showed no enthusiasm for a further meeting. He
finally suggested twice that we could talk in Rangoon if we wished. The initiative was left to the DRV
man to request a further meeting, and there has been no further word.
The DRV man's mention of Rangoon led us to the Byroade reply of January 26, nailing Rangoon down
tight as well.

3. Vientiane.
On January 17, the DRV Charge called on Souvanna at the Charge's request. Speaking from notes, he
raised rather niggling questions about the meaning of our Fourteen Points. Souvanna pressed him
whether Hanoi was asking Souvanna to act as an intermediary, and the Charge replied that he had no
instructions.
On the 20th, Souvanna went back to the Charge with a message from us commenting briefly on the
questions raised concerning the Fourteen Points, and saying that we would accept Souvanna as an
intermediary, or that Ambassador Sullivan could meet directly with the DRV man. The DRV man then
made certain "personal observations" about accepting the NLF and the Four Points./9/
/9/Sullivan reported this conversation in telegram 788 from Vientiane, January 22. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
On the 25th, Souvanna conveyed to the DRV man a fairly substantial statement on the NLF and Four
Points, pointing out among other things that we were prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Geneva
Accords and that this might be the answer if Hanoi insisted that its Four Points were "authentic
interpretations" of these Accords. Souvanna himself thought this response quite "forthcoming."
The Hanoi man continued to say that he had no instructions. On January 28, he took the ICC plane to
Hanoi but did not return. The next regular plane would not return until February 4./10/
/10/The DRV Charge did not respond until his meeting with Souvanna on February 8, during which he
read a lengthy demarche. The meeting was reported in telegram 870 from Vientiane, February 8. (Ibid.)
This episode remains puzzling. The substance of the original remarks was quite peripheral, although
Souvanna thinks that there was some serious intent behind it. Since we have now waited twelve days
with no validation of any message, it seems hard to believe that anything significant was intended.
Although the Charge has only limited air communications, we know that he has available cable
communications and has used them. Souvanna himself on the 26th, asked only that we hold off to the
end of the week.
There are some complications to the Vientiane matter in that Souvanna indiscreetly mentioned it to third
country representatives on January 18. U Thant and the British definitely know about it, and we believe
the Soviets, French, and probably the Poles and Thai also do. However, none of these probably know
more than the first conversation.
In sum, we have clear deadlines in both Moscow and Rangoon, and only an unvalidated nibble, now
eleven days old, in Vientiane. The fact that the Moscow and Rangoon negatives were both received after
the Vientiane approach give us a tremendously strong public case, if it should ever be required, that the
total picture was negative.
C. Saigon
Ambassador Porter talked to the Foreign Minister on the 25th, telling him about the Vientiane matter
and saying that it might hold us up for a few days to make absolutely sure. The Foreign Minister
expressed understanding, but also concern that we should not be drawn into a delaying gambit. Our
over-all reading is that Saigon would begin to get seriously edgy if we waited many more days, but that
we are not under pressure in terms of 1-3 days. We would plan to let Saigon know a day in advance of

the planned date of resumption.

52. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 28, 1966, 1:20-3:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The President was out of the room from 2:40 to 2:55 p.m. (Ibid.,
President's Daily Diary)
SUBJECT
Resumption of Bombing
PRESENT
President, Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, Harriman, Mac Bundy, Bill Bundy, General Taylor,
General Wheeler, Ball, Goldberg, Marks, Valenti. Also the Wise Men--McCloy, Dulles, Dean, Clifford
President: Because of large range of judgment and experience you have, I want your evaluation of this.
Fresh approaches can do much sometime. The President's difficulty is not doing what is right--but
knowing what is right.
I see each day serious difficulties, mounting of pressure. It may result in deep divisions in our
government.
A year ago, by 504-2 the Congress told the President to do what was necessary in Vietnam. Today they
could muster probably 40 votes. The Majority Leader and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee are against the general policy of that resolution.
McGeorge Bundy: Situation not essentially different from what is in the press. While we did not expect
any serious response to the pause, we have no answer--only nibbles of an undefined source to confuse
the record.
We have comprehensive evidence of continuing reinforcement from the North.
Clear that PAVN units continue in VN. True, there have been no large-scale operations initiated by the
VC.
The President is not disposed to do anything in a hurry. We need your comments.
McNamara: (President asked McNamara to give military assessment of situation.)
Objective of VC to conquer in 1965 and 1966. US troops defeated this. VC has 27 battalions of PAVN.
Capable of infiltrating 4,500 men a month, about three times the rate of last year.
Our bombing objectives:
1. Lift morale of South Vietnam.
2. Cost the NVN and reduce their supply route.

Perhaps we have reduced the flow by 50 percent.

600 trucks in four-week period beginning December 27. Twice the level of a year ago. Records don't
show, because of lack of accuracy, if this is increased over before the pause.
President: Assuming we were bombing NVN, is it your opinion that fewer trucks would be coming
through?
McNamara: We would eliminate some trucks--but they would probably use human backs.
Ceiling on movement is about 200 tons a day. Can't tell you if air attacks limit movement in toto. They
are reactivating routes, roads through reconstruction. Camouflaging trails and routes. (McNamara used a
number of photographs to show evidence of substantial infiltration.)
We do know they are steadily expanding forces in the South.
President: Any questions for Bob?
Dean: Resume bombing? As we were before or step it up to deter their supply movement?
McNamara: Don't think we can affect their will through bombing. The pressure on VC in the South will
affect their willingness to talk. What kind of bombing should we have. Did have 700 sorties a week. We
could direct more sorties against supply lines by doubling the sorties. No matter what bombing we do
we need more men.
Dean: Assuming not bombing large centers of population. Would you bomb POL? Power stations? etc.
McNamara: Right now that's not as important as infiltration routes.
McCloy: What can we accomplish by doubling sorties? Would this bring us victory?
McNamara: To avoid a weakness, we'll need to increase our forces. A chance that doubling our force
over a period of six months might be sufficient to break their will.
McCloy: Are we on offensive?
McNamara: Yes, we are on offensive.
McCloy: Would this kind of thrust bring about pacification?
McNamara: No, this can't make peace until Vietnam has organized a pacification effort.
Rusk: If there was general drift toward Hanoi, we'd know about it.
McCloy: How about morale of Vietnamese Army?
McNamara: High desertion rate of about one sixth. But they go back to their farms--and not to VC.
Rand Corporation report/2/ shows VC morale problems.
/2/See Document 26 and footnote 5 thereto.

Goldberg: What is meant by "increased cost of bombing?"

McNamara: This does not include China. It does mean . . .
Dean: What effect on bombing installations near Hanoi--mine the harbor of Haiphong?
McNamara: If we mined Haiphong, we would cut off petroleum supplies--don't know if we would
markedly cut down supplies to the South.
Dulles: How do you appraise the Vietnamese Government?
McNamara: Evidence we have is good.
Rusk: Government draws strength from the fact most of the country doesn't want Communism.
Dean: Would it be possible to carry out Gavin's theory?
McNamara:--unstable military situation--also proposed by men who believe it is not against
Communists taking over Southeast Asia.
Carrying on a bombing program against North Vietnam carries risks. Could escalate. And response from
China. Think it is danger that can be avoided--but must consider it.
If not bomb, it is risk. Don't think the American people will long support a government which will not
support by bombing 400,000 troops there.
South Vietnam will not understand why we don't bomb the enemy supplying enemy troops.
Telegraphs the wrong signal to Hanoi, China. Universal opinion of our estimators that cessation of
bombing would cause the enemy to believe their cause was right.
At some appropriate time, we should resume carefully controlled bombing.
Wheeler: We should resume. Reasons about the same as McNamara--although I would place greater
weight on the part bombing would reduce supplies. Campaign against North should be increased more
substantially. I think POL should be attacked. Basic to ability to move trucks and water craft.
Westmoreland reports a continuing buildup in VC forces in, the North area.
President: Is it because of the pause?
Wheeler: Can't tell. On other hand, infiltration has continued. Pause permitted them to move more
freely.
President: Did the infiltration go up?
Wheeler: Don't know.
President: I'm trying to find out if this infiltration has increased.

Wheeler: I think so. But can't tell. But they are moving in daylight now--and before the pause we didn't
see any daylight moving.
President: And if we bomb again, would daylight movement end?
Wheeler: Yes.
President: What proof do you have that our bombing has been effective?
(Source of answer not identified): The very stridency of the screams from the enemy is pretty good
evidence. Diverted large number of laborers to fix up lines of communication.
You estimate 150,000 to 200,000 repairing bomb damage.
We know two Chinese construction companies are in Vietnam to do construction. They would accept
Chinese only under dire circumstances. Reports from defectors indicate disruption to transportation and
general havoc because of bombing.
Figures of actual destruction are impressive.
Vice President: Do I gather that bombing targets should be enlarged from the report of the Secretary?
Wheeler: You hear a lot about industrial targets. There are no worthy industrial targets except for one:
steel and iron works. But even that is low return item in bombing.
Others that are worthy:
1. POL system. Most located at Haiphong.
2. Next storage area near Hanoi.
In my judgment these are vital. Also have thermal power plant system that is not too vital. In Haiphong
and Hanoi area (within 30 miles) certain ammo and other terminals.
Clifford: Can you bomb every target you want to bomb without endangering civilians?
Wheeler: Yes. POL in Haiphong is located on the outskirts of the city. Great majority of bridges can be
attacked without damage to civilians.
President: On the theory that "a hit dog howls" is that evidence that we are hurting?
Wheeler: Yes, Sir.
President: What (do) prisoners tell you?
Wheeler: One thing they cite for defection--the bombing. Afraid of B-52s because they don't know
about it until the bombs fall.
President: If you stopped in North Vietnam, do you think the next step will be to stop in South Vietnam
and finally stop fighting?

Wheeler: Yes, Sir. This always happens.

President: Assuming not bombing civilians, what is argument against bombing in North Vietnam that
wouldn't be true for the South?
Wheeler: Don't know of any.
Rusk: In terms of issues posed to North Vietnam and Moscow and China, there is difference. Russia
feels there is no problem in bombing in South Vietnam.
President: I agree. But if we refrain, will not peace lovers exhibit same instincts towards South Vietnam
as they do towards North Vietnam?
Goldberg: If bombing has caused Chinese construction workers to come in, will not more come in with
more bombing?
Wheeler: Not necessarily. They are there because the railroad they are rebuilding is important to the
Chinese.
Vice President: Considering Moscow's concern over bombing in the North and not in the South, how
many North Vietnamese do you estimate now in South Vietnam?
Wheeler: At least nine regiments--about 12,000-15,000 men. But we are not sure this is all. These are
the only ones positively identified.
Vice President: Then there is little punishment being inflicted in North Vietnam but only in South
Vietnam--which means, what pressures are we bringing on North Vietnam?
(Wheeler:) I think this is true. Until North Vietnam introduced his own men, Ho was fighting this war
cheaply. No trouble in North Vietnam.
Goldberg: Can you bring about an interdiction in Haiphong without retaliation in Saigon port?
Wheeler: They have capability of doing this--and have already caused trouble in this respect. We are on
alert against this kind of attack.
In December we had 87 ships waiting to be unloaded. Now down to 76.
We think we will be out of the woods by end of year.
President: What are U.S. casualties in a month?
Wheeler: Last week 28 or 29 killed. Heaviest month was November--250 plus.
President: How many lost last year?
Wheeler: 1300 plus in 1965.
20,000 VC killed--Vietnam lost about 9,000.

President: How long can they take such losses?

Wheeler: Not too long--or indefinitely. Morale of troops won't stand up to it. VC are having substantial
trouble on their part.
President: Think possible it will break this year?
Wheeler: Don't think so. If people in the South want to continue, might break in next year. Within the
next two years we ought to get favorable results.
President: That means continuing the bombing and doubling the forces.
Taylor: I was with you on the pause, I was against the length.
I don't think Hanoi will ever come forward unless our home front is strengthened. It works against all
our efforts in the war.
President: Our enemy gets great encouragement from the opposition voices here. Is that right?
Taylor: Yes. It's true. Hanoi lives in another world. They really believe we have lost 1200 planes.
President: We've lost 1400 to 1500 men in five years?
Wheeler: Yes.
McCloy: Anything developing in the way of tactics or weapons that give you hope.
Wheeler: Yes, Sir. From a flat start, we inserted 100,000 in Vietnam in three months. No other country
in the world could do this.
Airlift Red Ball Express to bring vital items quickly. Asked every commander if any shortages--and in
every case, no shortages were evident.
Counting on weapons:
1. Choppers
In late May, 400 plus
Today, 1800
At end of year, 2000
2. Using fighter bombers for close support
3. Artillery in quantities--North Vietnamese have never run into before
4. B-52s running close support missions

Vice President: Next argument will be noises to quit using B-52s.

President: Do you think cessation will prolong the war?
Wheeler: Yes.
Rusk: If it were not for the Chinese dispute, Russians would settle for the Geneva Accords. But they are
immobilized. Greatly complicates their problem with China. Peking is completely adamant on this. They
will not talk or do anything. Peking has actively intruded on any talks between Hanoi and U.S. Hanoi
appears to be somewhere between Moscow and Peking--but closer to Peking.
Sufficient differences among them to make them look over their shoulders at each other--so that other
nations find it difficult to bring about a consensus. We've asked every nation, "Have you heard
anything?" The answer is no.
Dulles: If they are willing to stop the subversion, would the bombing cease.
Rusk: This has been talked ad nauseam. But if they respond in some way, we can respond likewise.
McCloy: Puzzled Hanoi hasn't thrown us off balance with some phony probe.
Rusk: We were prepared for this but they haven't been as imaginative as they might have been.
President: Allen, what is your reaction to the pause?
Dulles: Helpful here--but I'm not sure about the other side.
President: What about others? Will they say it is too short?
Dulles: Don't think they can make a case out of it.
McCloy: Been convincing we are eager to talk. But paid a price abroad. Thought this was done largely
for political purpose.
Hasn't been conducive to bringing about talks--we've been too excited, too panicky--an indication of
weakness to the enemy.
General impression abroad is we overdid it. But I'm not criticizing it. It helped us here at home.
I think I would resume the bombing. After having made these efforts--and saying we would if we didn't
get response--talks would be diminished if we don't resume.
Insofar as Hanoi is concerned, they are confirmed in their estimate that we are weak and feeling the
pressures at home.
Dobrynin said that we have complicated Russian objectives. The whole issue of leadership of the
communist world is at stake. He wanted to avoid escalation as much as we did.
Dean: I would resume without question. If you don't American people won't support you--and casualties
will rise. In Korea, we lost more men after truce than before. I would do more than bomb infiltration

points--and at same time keep up peace moves.

Clifford: Only way to get out of Vietnam is to persuade Hanoi we are too brave to be frightened and too
strong to be defeated. We must persuade them we cannot lose--and they will never talk until they are so
convinced.
U.S. attitude is misunderstood in Hanoi. They hear Senators and protests and they are convinced we are
losing the support of our people.
War must be made more costly to Vietnam. If we can accelerate military pressures to the point where
the North Vietnamese people wonder if it is all worth it.
I want to resume the bombing--before we get a phony peace bid.
If we don't bomb, China will be more bold than us. If we keep the strength of our Air Force before them
and make them feel we can destroy them if we come in.
We must fight the war where we are strongest and we are strongest in the air.
Dulles: I would resume the bombing--but we have left impression that bombing has been ineffective.
Our bombing did two things:
--Limited forces VC could put into the field
--Limited momentum of their attacks
Goldberg: Am in disagreement with Clifford.
We have been helped overseas with the pause.
The pause has not been an indication of weakness--we have strengthened our position, particularly in the
communist world. That could not have been done without the Soviets.
Accelerating military pressure in the North has advantages--and great risks--involving China and Russia.
And this would defeat one of our objectives: to keep the split open with (meaning between) Russia and
China. I suggest: don't bomb tomorrow. Think there is a way to handle public opinion. Therefore: out of
deference to world opinion, continued deliberations and have decided to give another short period--but
not under the setting of this one. Think would have great impact on the Hill.
Vice President: The Congress is without leadership. We must take a firm position. The longer you delay,
Congress will run all over the lot.
President: I was the first Congressman to speak up for the Truman Doctrine.
I am not happy about Vietnam but we cannot run out--we have to resume bombing.
53. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 29, 1966, 11:35-12:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the President's office.
PRESENT
President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Wheeler, Moyers, and Valenti/2/
/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that General Taylor was also present. (Ibid.)
Rusk: I talked to Thompson about the Soviets. Not worried about pushing them into a corner right now.
Thinks we ought to break the suspense--it will give Hanoi wrong signal, combined with Fulbright and
his Senators.
Ball would like more time. Think hard about bombing policy, massive support of our troops--stay away
from those things which cause risk. Very careful about immediate Hanoi and Haiphong area. Make it
clear it is the other side who will escalate--not us.
President: Are we trying to hold down statements from other nations?
Rusk: We are sending out wires to Ambassadors.
President: Do we have to let the Canadians know?
Rusk: Would cause them less embarrassment.
McNamara: Believe we should resume--whether Monday/3/ their time or Tuesday their time. Would
recommend Monday their time.
/3/January 31.
Recommend targets south of Hanoi.
President: When is the first we could do it without announcing on Sunday?
McNamara: On Tuesday morning their time. Bombing wouldn't occur until 5 p.m. Monday our time. On
the air probably 7 or 8 Monday night.
Rusk: If we had working day--Monday--to notify governments, it would be better. Need to get
embassies set. Wouldn't tell more than four or five exact time.
Wheeler: When will we tell the South Vietnamese?
Rusk: Tell Ky the evening before.
Wheeler: Would hate to see it go any below that. Leaks would occur.
Rusk: The 11 p.m. news would have it Monday night.
President: What trouble if announced on Sunday?
Rusk: Not consider it a problem.

President: If announced on Sunday, it would close up debate--but Ministers might get noisy.
Moyers: Don't think the Ministers will cause trouble. Problem of waiting till Tuesday will open up more
sores here with questions.
Bundy: Would rather go Monday.
Moyers: Lodge could make the announcement--"began Monday Saigon time." Being Sunday makes it
easier for us.
Bundy: We don't announce until planes are back, do we? Announce midnight Sunday.
President: As soon as you can . . . desirable for Lodge to announce to press there. Prepared statement by
me before cameras. Followed by a prepared statement by Rusk--emphasizing pause--work and failure-answer questions--getting us far away from bombing--and going back to where we were before. Might
keep us away from nuclear war--people like Gore.
Picked out about five men around the country--one man said "have you and Rusk gone crazy--you've
been sitting around doing nothing."
Had talk with Fortas. Net of what he said was that whole communist world was working to prolong the
pause.
Rusk: If that's their object, the communists have been stupid.
President: Don't think we ought to discuss military plans with Senators. Problems with Senate and 76 in
the House. But the thing that worries me are the others who want to go after it.
McNamara: That worries me, too. We must not add fuel to this fire--not to discuss how much they have
done so we can knock hell out of them.
Taylor: I would suggest a joint announcement by the Vietnamese Government and U.S.
Bundy: As soon as first bomb is down, we can announce.
Drafted message to CINCPAC to get any time after 0001 on any day President determines. We can't sit
here and predict when first bomb goes down. Time will vary from early morning til mid-day. It could be
a small operation if weather is bad.
Rusk: Important to hit those infiltration routes--where we lose the fewest planes.
(Wheeler showed armed reconnaissance routes.)
Wheeler: We should mount 500-strike effort--a later 300-strike effort. Weather has been bad.
President: Is it desirable to go in with that heavy an effort?
Wheeler: We've been seeing larger convoys of trucks on these routes. 500-strike sorties is not too heavy
to put on this.

Rusk: I would hope if they see a 50-truck convoy and stay with this target until they finish it off.
Wheeler: They will.
McNamara: I would recommend a lesser quantity, such as 200. I doubt the effect of the advantage of
500 over 200.
To be quite frank, I would be hard pressed to show trucks on the road. Also it may be difficult for the
jets to hit them. Vietnamese are on alert. Problem is exactly what you have outlined--we must control
ourselves without violating the military requirement.
Wheeler: We can go in with any number you want, Mr. President. We need more than targets--pontoons
and other targets. These are hard to see. Pontoon bridges are in place now.
There are a number of truck rest stops--and these will be targets.
President: But if it created a clamor around the world-Moyers: There is a general belief that if you go in with four times the number it will look like escalation.
President: How many can you mount without moving in another carrier?
Wheeler: 300.
President: Let's do that and bring up that carrier later.
Wheeler: Do you authorize us to continue at a rate of 300 a day?
Bundy: What day, Mr. President?
President: I think Monday.
Bundy: Lodge would announce about midnight.
McNamara: Lodge announce after return of first aircraft.
President: Let's get a summary of all we've done and be ready to go with this--so Lodge can background
the press.
Taylor: Will you leave to Lodge to work in the Saigon government?
Rusk: U Thant may scream if we report this to the Security Council. Under the SEATO Treaty we are
obligated to report to SC (Security Council). If we offer a resolution and it is vetoed, Morse will say the
UN has rejected us--and we ought to get out of South Vietnam.
Two difficult points:
1. Pressure to take cease-fire without recognition of other side

2. Recognition of VC.
President: Morse will go to repeal the resolution.
Rusk: If on Monday morning we announce we're reporting to the Security Council, that would mute
Morse.
Moyers: Send message to Pope and say plan seems possible and will work at it. Include this in your
statement.
President: You want to ask for a vote in the Security Council? Don't we want to take initiative in peace
efforts? Maximum initiative on our part.
Rusk: I have statement I want to go over with Goldberg.
President: Was Clifford right about talking about peace as a deterrent to peace?
McNamara and Bundy: Disagree with Clifford.
Wheeler: I agree with Clifford.
President: We have to demonstrate to people we are not Goldwater.
But we must make it clear that our military program will go forward vigorously.
But we can't talk about peace on Saturday morning. We must do it all the time.
(President talked about Morse electing Hatfield because Hatfield is against Vietnam.)
We have to keep shoving on peace. I want Wheeler to have running room. Rusk has got to keep moving
on peace--let's keep Goldberg busy on peace resolutions.
If you can do more than report to the Security Council, I think we ought to do so. Do we have the best
resolution possible?
We would make statement about 9 a.m. Monday. Rusk would have news conference at 10 a.m.
What should we do in Security Council meeting?
Bundy: Intelligence reports--don't tip hand. Don't discuss level of bombing. Report on military and
political situation.
54. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 29, 1966, 12:45-1:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the President's office.

PRESENT
President, Vice President, Rusk, Goldberg, Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti
Rusk: It's up to you and me, Arthur, to draft a first class resolution to the Security Council.
President: Let me tell you my views. I was against the first pause, and the second pause. It has created a
situation of doubt. I don't want to fail to explore every possible avenue. I don't want to fail the men out
there.
After the 12-hour and the 30-hour truce and the Pope's message/2/--I decided on the pause.
/2/See footnote 7, Document 3.
We should write the Pope, encourage him--we must figure out what to do in reporting to the UN--in
accordance with SEATO Treaty.
What can we ask the UN to do? I want the diplomats to keep moving now.
First, letter to the Pope.
Second, a report to the UN.
Third, how can we keep the initiatives going? Don't want to be constantly reacting to Ho.
Goldberg: We have already good reporting on our peace efforts.
Two other moves:
1. Go to Security Council. I favor going because it is demonstration of desire for solution. But don't
think it will get anywhere. Whatever you do there are risks. Wilson did it cleverly. He presented the
resolution. If the resolution did go far, we still have enough strength to defeat a resolution we don't want.
Rusk: The Japanese are dying to do something for peace, so they will be eager.
President: This afternoon and tomorrow figure out what we need to do to emphasize peace.
Goldberg: Our friends will tell us not to go, but we shouldn't let them rule us. The dominant theme is
disengagement between us and the Soviets.
President: I've played out my pause--not from 115 countries have I gotten anything. I want you men to
evolve for me political and peace moves--initiatives of my own.
--Letter to Pope.
--Report to UN--and advocate peace.
Because I certify that the Fulbrights and the Morses will be under the table and the hard liners will take
over--unless we take initiatives.
I can see lot of things developing in the future to distress us. So let us keep peace emphasis on.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
55. Summary Notes of the 556th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, January 29, 1966, 1:20-2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the
President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of
the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) Valenti also prepared notes of the meeting. (Ibid.,
Meeting Notes File)
Vietnam
CIA Director Raborn, reading from notes, briefed on the military situation in Vietnam. Six hundred
trucks are reported in the south--twice the level of a year ago. They are carrying men and equipment.
The North Vietnamese are taking actions in anticipation of a resumption of the bombing. They have
improved their air defense. Equipment is being airlifted to Dien Bien Phu. The Chinese are moving
forces up to their border with North Vietnam. The infiltration of North Vietnamese troops is heavy.
Total North Vietnamese forces number 22 battalions. They are obviously girding themselves for battles
yet to come. A cyclical lull usually follows a period of heavy activity.
Secretary Rusk reported on the peace offensive, lightly referring to one comment alleging that
"McNamara tries to keep us in and Rusk tries to get us out."
The enormous effort made in the last 34 days has produced nothing--no runs, no hits, no errors.
The Ho letter (copy attached)/2/ was the hardest yet. It did not even include a confusion ploy. Hanoi has
done nothing. In all conversations--and we have a telephone on every line--the other party has merely
hung up.
/2/Attached but not printed. Dated January 24, Ho Chi Minh's letter was sent to several Communist
heads of state and broadcast over Hanoi Radio in English on January 28. The letter called the U.S. peace
offensive a "sham peace trick" designed solely to conceal the U.S. "scheme for intensifying the war of
aggression."
We now need to make a report to the UN Security Council and consider whether the Vietnam problem
should be taken to the UN.

Ambassador Goldberg: The tone of the Pope's letter is favorable to us. The peace offensive has had a
good effect on world opinion. However, we have received no encouragement from any source. We have
talked to everyone at the UN--113 representatives.
The President: We should have one last report from our allies to be certain that they have heard nothing.
General Johnson briefed on Operation Masher. (A summary of this operation is attached.)/3/ We are
apparently at the beginning of a major engagement. We now have 197,000 men in Vietnam.
/3/Attached but not printed. Operation Masher, retitled White Wing, began January 25 when U.S. and
allied troops moved into northern Binhdinh Province.
The President: What do you want most to win?
General Johnson: A surge of additional troops into Vietnam. We need to double the number now and
then triple the number later. We should call up the reserves and go to mobilization to get the needed
U.S. manpower. This involves declaring a national emergency here and in Vietnam. The bombing
should be resumed at once to hold down infiltration. By resuming the bombing, we divert North
Vietnamese manpower to repair their LOCs, put pressure on their infiltration and their government, and
destroy their equipment, especially trucks.
General McConnell: There is nothing unusual in the air effort recommended. It involves 330 sorties
weekly, B-52 sorties at the rate of 300 a month, and 1200 weekly sorties into Laos./4/ When we resume
the bombing, our losses will rise because North Vietnam now has a greater anti-aircraft capability.
/4/According to Valenti's notes, McConnell stated: "In South Vietnam attack sorties 1,000 a week and
300 a month for B-52's. In Laos 1,200 a week."
Secretary McNamara: Our plane loss is now running 5 per 1,000 sorties.
General McConnell: We can get better results from bombing North Vietnam than bombing either in
Laos or in South Vietnam.
General Greene briefed on the current Marine Corps operations, including Double Eagle, which involves
the landing of two Marine Corps battalions north of Operation Masher (maps attached)./5/
/5/Attached but not printed.
Air strikes should be resumed by a sharp blow as soon as possible. POL storage areas should be struck
at once. Armed reconnaissance is not enough.
CIA Director Raborn: Our bombing cuts by 50 percent the amount of supplies being trucked from the
north./6/
/6/According to Valenti's notes, the President asked: "Suppose we had been bombing every day. Would
we have had 600 trucks coming down? How many?" Green responded: "Convinced we could have
stopped half of them." Raborn then stated: "With good bombing could have cut down flow by 50 per
cent."
The President: We need evidence for Senator McCarthy.

Secretary McNamara: We have destroyed 400 trucks and damaged 250 since the bombing began in
February. The bombing will not hurt the infiltration of men, but it will reduce the number.
Admiral McDonald: There has been no major infiltration via water of men or materials. We must
resume bombing as soon as possible in order to do what we can to slow down infiltration by land.
The President said he wanted the hardest proof.
General Taylor implied that we cannot get firm proof. He recommended the resumption of bombing as
soon as possible--heavy bombing to slow down infiltration as much as we can. He favored striking POL
supplies, the port of Haiphong, plus railroad lines.
The President said we need to know what we think about how much North Vietnamese traffic increased
during the lull. Planners should go to work now on deciding what we can do if we resume the
bombing./7/
/7/According to Valenti's notes, President stated: "(1) Let's see what we think is happening in increased
traffic since the pause; (2) see what we can do to stop that traffic; (3) see if we are really being
effective."
Secretary McNamara: Four weeks from now we can answer these questions.
The Vice President: General Taylor, commenting on his experience in Korea, pointed out that bombing
did slow down the North Koreans. We should tell the Senators this because some Senators think our
bombing in Korea was poor. We cannot win over Senators by merely citing numbers, but we can win
them over by discussing our overall strategy.
General Wheeler: We should resume the bombing as soon as practicable on infiltration-associated
targets which we have advised on the basis of evidence from the North Vietnamese.
General McConnell: Our bombing is ineffective because of the restrictions placed upon the Air Force.
We should lift these restrictions and we would then get results.
Bromley Smith
56. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 29, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19.
Secret; Nodis; Pinta. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson at 7:30 p.m.
(Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Bringing Viet Nam to the Security Council
On the assumption the bombing of the North has been resumed, Arthur Goldberg and I are agreed that
an almost simultaneous request for a Security Council meeting would help demonstrate that we want to
stop not just the bombing but the whole war by seeking an honorable settlement. Furthermore, the
Pope's appeal for UN mediation provides the United States with a favorable opportunity to convene the

Security Council promptly on the Viet Nam problem. We recommend therefore that you approve a US
move to convene the Council. You could announce this decision on Monday morning;/2/ Ambassador
Goldberg would about the same time submit a formal letter to the President of the Security Council
requesting an urgent meeting, and the Security Council could meet on late Monday afternoon or
Tuesday morning.
/2/January 31.
Our plan is to have the United States preempt the situation in the Council in two ways: (a) a detailed
speech by Ambassador Goldberg laying out the full record of our efforts to achieve a peaceful
settlement, the lack of constructive responses by the other side, and their continued aggression; and (b) a
resolution calling for unconditional discussions among the participants of the Geneva Conferences of
1954 and 1962./3/
/3/Regarding the resolution submitted to the Security Council on January 31, see Document 59.
It is true that our frequent soundings over the past year, including the last one two weeks ago, on the
desirability of bringing the Viet Nam question to the Security Council have produced almost uniformly
unfavorable responses. U Thant said in his press conference January 20:/4/
/4/See footnote 4, Document 33.
"I felt, and I still feel, that at this stage the UN cannot be involved in the conflict". The Soviets and
French whom we consulted as well as the British, Australians, and New Zealanders were decidedly
negative.
The unfavorable reactions have been based primarily on the fact that Hanoi and Peking, because they are
not UN members, have explicitly and repeatedly rejected any UN jurisdiction or involvement in the Viet
Nam problem, and would therefore presumably refuse to participate in the Security Council debate or
accept any decisions the Security Council might take. Consequently, it is assumed, no doubt correctly,
that the Soviets would oppose any Security Council consideration or action, would feel obliged to attack
the United States viciously during the debate, and would veto any substantive resolution that might be
proposed. A debate could further reduce whatever capabilities the USSR may have as an eventual
mediator and could further reduce their freedom to deal constructively with the United States on other
matters such as disarmament. An additional argument against reference to the Security Council has been
that it would cut across whatever moves toward negotiation were being made as a result of our peace
offensive.
Nevertheless, there are two strong reasons for convening the Security Council, one psychological and
one substantive. First, once our bombing of the North has resumed, it will be especially important that it
be clear to the world that our peace offensive is still being vigorously pursued; also such a move would
meet the persistent domestic criticism that the full resources of the UN have not been brought to bear on
the Viet Nam problem.
Second, while we can assume strong Soviet opposition, a Security Council debate focusing on the need
to move the Viet Nam problem to the conference table should at least help stimulate further peace
moves (the Pope, the non-aligned, free world friends) through diplomatic channels whether or not the
Security Council is able to adopt a formal resolution.
This course is not without risks. We can expect that resumption of the bombing of the North will have

dissipated to a degree the present favorable international climate and support for our position. The risks
are threefold:
a. there would be pressure to include in the resolution a call for a ceasefire;
b. we will also be pressed to agree to a formulation on NLF participation in any negotiations which goes
beyond our present publicly stated position; and
c. those who would be willing to support a call for unconditional discussions in some appropriate forum
are also likely to insist that such a proposal be made in the context of further suspension of bombing.
The way to meet this is for the United States to preempt the situation with a resolution which formulates
a number of key points in a manner acceptable to us. The attached resolution/5/ is submitted for your
approval. We estimate there is a majority in the Council for such a resolution. Moreover, because of our
peace offensive we should be able to prevent a majority being mobilized in the Council for a resolution
or an amendment calling for another suspension of the bombing by the United States without any
reciprocity by the other side.
/5/Attached but not printed.
There are two principal likely results:
1. Hanoi and Peking will deny Security Council competence and it may be that as a consequence the
members would decide against pressing any formal resolution to the vote. Such an outcome would be
satisfactory to us since it would then be clear to world opinion and our own that we seek peace but our
adversaries do not.
2. If the members prefer to vote on a resolution, we are likely to have the requisite majority./6/
/6/At 4:30 p.m. on January 30 Rusk spoke by telephone with McGeorge Bundy, who stated that the
President had asked if Rusk was certain that going to the United Nations was the right course.
According to notes of the conversation, Rusk "replied 'yes, he thought so.' Let the Security Council take
it on to see if they can do anything." Asked by Bundy if his "subordinates were on board," Rusk said,
"Goldberg and Sisco think it is all right." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)
Dean Rusk
57. Editorial Note
The United States resumed the bombing of North Vietnam on January 31, 1966, following a 37-day
pause which began on December 24, 1965. President Johnson's statement announcing the resumption of
air strikes was broadcast over radio and television from the White House Theater at 10 a.m. on January
31. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I,
pages 115-116. Later the same morning Secretary Rusk made a statement on the resumption of the
bombing and held a news conference. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 14, 1966,
pages 223-229.
On February 3 the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry released a long memorandum in which it
attacked Washington's "sham" peace negotiations during the bombing pause and defended the DRV's
refusal to respond to U.S. overtures. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In an analysis

of the memorandum prepared for Secretary Rusk on February 5, Thomas Hughes noted that it contained
"Hanoi's most official and definitive rejoinder to the US 14 Points to date." (Intelligence Note 71; ibid.,
EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations Files: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives--North
Vietnam)

JANUARY 31-MARCH 8: THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE;

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON THE WAR
58. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 31, 1966, 3:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. No classification
marking. Valenti sent a copy of the memorandum to McGeorge Bundy on February 2 at the President's
direction.
I think that your statement/2/ of today makes it all the more important to begin immediately on one
peace move right after another. Meanwhile, at the same time, we keep up our military pressure.
/2/See Document 57.
Here are some suggestions about peace initiatives:
1. You write a letter to the Pope in which you thank him for his efforts and suggest your readiness to
dispatch Goldberg or someone else to the Vatican to discuss with the Pope his idea about non-aligned
nations taking an active role in peacemaking efforts.
2. Brief the members of the House and Senate in small sessions as you did in the early days of your
Presidency. As Senator Clinton P. Anderson told me, there are many Senators and Congressmen who
have not had the opportunity to hear the briefings of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.
3. Begin almost immediately the series of task forces on-the-scene in Vietnam--Secretary Freeman and
agricultural experts--Dr. Hornig and health experts--Secretary Gardner and education experts--some
well-known U.S. Mayor and public administration experts. As I outlined in an earlier memorandum,
these task forces could go into Vietnam at two-week intervals to do substantive studies of how to
increase the civil effectiveness of South Vietnam.
4. Have Walt Rostow gather a group of political scientists like James McGregor Burns, Dick Neustadt,
and others to develop a viable political party system in Vietnam.
5. The President travel to Honolulu and meet with General Westmoreland and Prime Minister Ky. Here
the President could get first-hand information on the military campaign. But most important, the
President could appear with Prime Minister Ky and stress the political, economic, and social future of
South Vietnam once the fighting has stopped. Perhaps economic news could be announced here--some
specifics on the Mekong River project--housing projects--land reform--such a meeting could serve as a
focal point for showing how bright the future for South Vietnam could be--and indeed a future for all of
Southeast Asia.
Moreover, it would be very helpful for the world to see the cordial relations between Ky and the

President and their combined faith in the kind of world that can be built without fighting in South
Vietnam.
6. Why can't the President write a personal letter to the heads of governments all over the world telling
them why we are in Vietnam, what we hoped for in Vietnam and how the fighting can be stopped in
Vietnam?
These are some ideas which may or may not be worthwhile.
Jack Valenti/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Below Valenti's signature the President wrote:
"Talk to Bundy and get him to recommend & supplement."
59. Editorial Note
Implementing the plan recommended to President Johnson by Secretary Rusk in Document 56,
Ambassador Goldberg submitted a letter to the President of the U.N. Security Council on January 31,
1966, requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in Vietnam. At the same
time, Goldberg submitted a draft U.S. resolution calling for "immediate discussion without
preconditions . . . among the appropriate interested governments to arrange a conference looking toward
the application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the establishment of a durable peace in
Southeast Asia." Goldberg explained and defended the U.S. proposal at a meeting of the Security
Council on February 1.
On February 2 the Security Council voted to place the Vietnam question on its agenda. The Council then
decided that informal and private consultations be held to determine the most appropriate way of
continuing the debate and adjourned to that end. For text of Goldberg's letter, his statements on February
1, and the draft resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, February 14, 1966, pages 229-239.
Documentation on U.S. efforts to secure a favorable vote in the Security Council and on the ensuing
consultations is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Regarding the outcome of the
consultations, see footnote 2, Document 85.
60. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, February 1, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:21 a.m. McGeorge Bundy
forwarded the telegram to the President at 11:30 a.m. (Memorandum to the President, February 1;
Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19)
2761. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:
1. Bombing resumption.
Resumption of bombing renewed confidence in Vietnam. The govt understood why we had to have the
"peace offensive," but they were relieved when it was over.
I agree that the 37 day pause has indeed "made a record"; and that we should rub this in and make the

most of it, as we plan to do at the U.N. Also I am gratified by the way in which Secretary Rusk took my
views into account. I believe our U.N. resolution is in good shape.
Undoubtedly the fact that we are for peace and they are not is helpful with the U.S. public, with people
in the United Kingdom and some other Western countries.
I doubt if it does us much good with the so-called non-aligned countries--in which I include France. I
don't believe there is a greater waste of time than to try to carry out literally what the non-aligned
countries advise. Even when we do precisely what they specify, they will for many reasons never
applaud us and rarely approve. As was once said of a certain American politician, they are no help to
their friends and no threat to their enemies. Obviously, we must consider their interests and our interests,
but we should not give too much attention to their whims and attitudes.
The bombing pause, however, has created a much bigger opportunity than simply making a showing that
we are for peace and they are not. I wonder if it does not create an opportunity to bring about additional
enthusiastic popular support for your policy in Vietnam. To do this, we need something more than to
prove that we are for peace and they are not. A colorful, somewhat emotion-stirring showing is needed
to dramatize the fact that the Communists are in truth flagrant aggressors and not the moralistic, patriotic
civil war fighters which Communist propaganda has, with considerable success, made them out to be.
The Security Council meeting provides a great chance for this, and, as I have reported, we have dramatic
materials here in the way of NVN uniforms, Chinese firearms, etc. with which to document a strong
speech by Amb Goldberg that this is a clear case of aggression--and that suppression of aggression is the
rock on which the United Nations is founded.
In 1956, at the time of the Suez incident, Dag Hammarskjold said to me that the United Nations must
always condemn the use of force except in self-defense if "it is to be a respectable organization--and I
use the word respectable in the literal sense as meaning worthy of respect."
We face two kinds of aggression here: the Viet Cong with its rank and file recruited by terrorism in the
South, but officered and directed from the North. This is the old aggression which has been with us for
five years. And then we face a new and even more obvious aggression in the form of the Army of North
Vietnam, which wear NVN uniforms, carry NVN identity cards, speak Vietnamese with northern
accents and have Chinese firearms. This second aggression is absolutely flagrant, classic and
conventional, and I don't believe we should be gingerly or apologetic about saying so.
Since writing the above, I have learned of Zorthian's wire to Marks,/2/ which, of course, he has the right
to send, since I hold that Zorthian, like all U.S. Agency Chiefs here, has and should have an open
channel to his agency. It is a statement of Zorithian's opinion which, of course, was sent without my
approval or direction. I want to assure you that I am in no sense a candidate to do this, that I have a great
deal to do here and that I believe Amb Goldberg would handle this whole thing beautifully.
/2/Not further identified.
I believe that the bombing pause also has created other opportunities to educate U.S. public opinion so
that Americans will not make utterly unreasonable judgments, using such asinine phrases as "a no-win"
policy and expecting neat, gaudily packaged solutions. In most of the world today, there are no
solutions, but there is the question of whether these tough problems will be well-managed or not. You
should be judged on the extent to which you enable the United States to have some choice and not be
pushed into a corner with a choice of being "Red" or "dead," which is no choice at all. Your decision to

move into the seaports and your decision to bomb the North has given the United States some real
choices.
It would also be well to accustom the public to the idea that in the modern world you work through a
balance of defense and diplomacy or of military and civil, and that while occasionally a decisive action
at the right time is possible and desirable, there are some things which we must simply weather out.
In his biography of the late President Kennedy, Sorensen cites the case of the British statesman William
Pitt, who was asked in the House of Commons in 1805 what had been gained by the war against France.
He said: "We have gained everything that we would have lost if we had not fought this war." This is
even truer of our war in Vietnam than it was of the British war against France, and, as far as Vietnam is
concerned, what we would have lost had not we fought it is nothing less than a climate in which we as a
free nation can exist at all.
2. Basic political.
We now have the figures for the number of returnees into TTA Chieu Hoi camps for the month of
January. It is 1,426. This compares with a figure of 406 for January 1965 and 446 for January 1964--a
three-fold increase.
Of possibly even greater interest is the fact that since Tet, which fell on January 24, the daily rate of
returnees is 84. The daily rate of returnees in December was 36. If, as some people think, the Tet
campaign should be regarded as a start of a new trend rather than the culmination of a campaign, this
figure of 84 per day could be tremendously significant.
Many of the returnees are coming in with Tet campaign leaflets, but we cannot tell how many.
There appears to have been a significant increase during the past three months of popular willingness to
provide information on the Viet Cong to the GVN. While difficult to ascertain in terms of numbers of
reports, the volume of usable information emanating from the police informant effort has increased 5075 per cent since approximately October 1, 1965.
3. Current political.
The reporters spent a lot of time listening to coup rumors and some of them filed stories based on these
rumors. The most extreme story of this sort was a UPI item of January 7 suggesting that Prime Minister
Ky had mysteriously disappeared. Ky knocked this down by strolling through the streets of downtown
Saigon the next day.
Ky has told me that he knows about what plotting has been going on and that a few people have been
arrested including one Nguyen Bao Kim who was involved in the February 1965 coup which Ky
suppressed. They were aiming either to kidnap or assassinate him--and myself.
The Directorate is expected to meet on February 2 to pass on the membership of the "Democracy
Building Council" whose formation Prime Minister Ky announced in his January 15 speech./3/
/3/See Document 24.
Lodge

61. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-76-66
Washington, February 3, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVII. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Consequences of an Enclave Strategy (U)
1. (U) Reference is made to:
a. Your memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 17 January 1966, on the above
subject./2/
/2/Not found.
b. "A Communication on Vietnam from General James M. Gavin," Harper's magazine, February
1966./3/
/3/Published January 16. Gavin proposed that the United States stop the bombing of North Vietnam and
the escalation of the ground war, limit U.S. troops to the defense of several enclaves along the South
Vietnamese coast, and renew efforts to "find a solution through the United Nations or a conference in
Geneva."
c. JCSM-652-65, dated 27 August 1965, subject: "Concept for Vietnam."/4/
/4/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 356-363.
d. JCSM-811-65, dated 10 November 1965, subject: "Future Operations and Force Deployments with
Respect to the War in Vietnam (U)."/5/
/5/Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, JCS Memos, vol. I)
e. JCSM-16-66, dated 8 January 1966, subject: "Air Operations Against North Vietnam (U)."/6/
/6/Document 13.
f. JCSM-41-66, dated 18 January 1966, subject: "Air Operations Against North Vietnam (NVN) (U)."/7/
/7/Document 27.
2. (U) In response to your request, reference 1 a, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the proposals
outlined in General Gavin's letter to Harper's magazine, reference 1 b. Their analysis of the military
consequences of the adoption of such an "enclave" strategy follows.
3. (S) For this analysis, it has been assumed that the United States would continue to seek a stable,
noncommunist government in South Vietnam (SVN) and would assist the Government of Vietnam
(GVN) to defeat the Viet Cong (VC) and to extend GVN control throughout SVN.

4. (TS) Coordination of current strategy with the GVN is essential to successful operations. If forced to
accede to such an "enclave" strategy, the political/military structure of the GVN is likely to collapse
under the resulting stresses. For example:
a. The GVN would probably lose its existing support and measure of control in areas outside enclaves.
b. Experience to date has established the fact that without military presence the communication among
and movement of people between enclaves, the maintenance of commercial activities and economic
programs, and the day-to-day functions of government would essentially cease.
c. If the RVNAF were to remain In areas beyond the enclaves, they must then combat the increased
VC/PAVN forces essentially without the aid of the United States and other Free World ground forces
and perhaps also without their direct advice and logistic support. Military coordination between the
United States and the RVNAF could collapse.
d. If, on the other hand, the RVNAF were to withdraw to the enclaves, they would abandon the
paramilitary forces, as well as all province, town, and hamlet officials, in areas outside the enclaves to
the enemy and permit the communists to consolidate their control over the entire countryside beyond the
enclaves.
e. The obvious and prolonged concentration of US forces in defensive enclaves could incite anti-US
sentiment.
5. (TS) An essential element of the "enclave" strategy advanced by General Gavin is the requirement for
fewer US forces, presumably not exceeding current in-country strength of about 200,000. CINCPAC
estimated/8/ that this force level could defend essential base areas and key LOCs and secure 10 per cent
of the land area (encompassing about 40 per cent of the population) against the enemy threat existing at
that time. In view of the increased VC/PAVN threat, commitment at the above level of forces to such an
"enclave" strategy would not now insure the military security of essential base areas and population
centers nor protect sufficient food-producing land to feed the population. Thus, a determined defense of
enclaves of adequate size and number could now require US forces well in excess of 200,000.
/8/Appendix C to JCSM-811-65. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. (TS) Such an "enclave" strategy would not necessarily reduce casualties. Ultimately, a defensive
posture in the enclaves might well result in casualties on at least the same scale as a more balanced
strategy. In the '"enclave" strategy, loyal Vietnamese, particularly local officials, must either flee to the
enclaves or face VC reprisals. Permitted to consolidate their forces, their supply system, and their base
areas, the VC and PAVN units would be in a position to launch more carefully-planned and highlyselective attacks--probes or large-scale efforts--against the enclaves. To the degree we surrender control
of the countryside to the VC/PAVN, we facilitate their capability to employ longer range weapons. In
addition, there probably would be a heavy influx of refugees, thus offering a channel for VC infiltration
difficult to close. Such infiltrators could increase casualties.
7. (TS) General Gavin's letter implies that the expansion of our present actions would lead to a direct
armed confrontation with the Chinese communists (ChiComs). In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, such a confrontation is more likely to occur from a gradually increasing ChiCom involvement
which leads almost imperceptibly into such a war than through a deliberate and abrupt decision to take
on the United States. The defensive nature of the enclaves might further stimulate rather than discourage
the ChiComs to exploit what they could regard as a weakening of US resolve in Southeast Asia. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a deliberate ChiCom decision to risk direct armed confrontation,
including the magnitude, character, and time-phasing of the introduction of ChiCom forces, will result
from their assessment of US resolve and inherent risks to the attainment of Chinese objectives. Such a
decision would not be the direct reaction to the deployment of sizable US forces to SVN nor to air
operations against North Vietnam (NVN) which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have proposed. Moreover, the
ChiComs would be invalidating the basic premise of communist "Wars of National Liberation" by
bringing major powers into direct confrontation. However, as US force buildup continues, the likelihood
of ChiCom support of the VC/PAVN will increase, especially as the United States approaches
attainment of its objectives in SVN.
8. (S) The balanced strategy outlined in references 1 c and 1 d is designed to achieve US national
objectives and to assure that, if the United States enters into negotiations to achieve these objectives, it
does so from a position of strength.
9. (S) The Gavin "enclave" strategy, on the other hand, appears to depend upon two underlying
implications: (a) that the withdrawal of US forces to enclaves would bring the communists to the
negotiating table; and (b) that the United States is willing to negotiate itself out of SVN by forfeiting its
objectives. These implications are highly questionable. In contrast, the US/GVN would be bargaining
from a position of weakness due to the cessation of offensive operations in SVN, with only that leverage
afforded by such bombing as might be continued in NVN to persuade the VC/DRV to yield the gains
they acquired by default. Additionally, the VC, having undisputed control of the predominant land areas
in SVN, could seek world recognition as the de facto government of SVN, or, alternatively, annex their
holdings to NVN.
10. (S) General Gavin also proposes that the United States desist from bombing NVN. The serious
consequences of halting air operations in NVN, set forth in references 1 e and 1 f, would be in addition
to those foreseen for an "enclave" strategy in SVN. If the "enclave" strategy were implemented without
air operations in NVN, this remaining major inducement toward negotiations and source of leverage
would thereafter be forfeited, and the VC/PAVN would have unimpeded access to support from the
north. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the offensive air operations against the DRV are an
essential element of a balanced US strategy. They consider it no less so in an "enclave" strategy. These
air operations are a principal military means for inhibiting the buildup and support of communist forces
in SVN and for persuading the DRV to cease its aggression.
11. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not support such an "enclave" strategy since it contains significant
deficiencies, and the advantages claimed are more illusory than real. By forfeiting the initiative,
abandoning solid negotiating leverage, conceding large land areas to the enemy, and alienating the GVN
and other friendly governments, the "enclave" strategy, in effect, abandons national objectives. The
military consequences would, in their judgment, lead to US/GVN defeat in SVN or ultimate US
abandonment of Southeast Asia.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/9/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/9/Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original.
62. Editorial Note

In telegram [document number not declassified], February 3, 1966, Director of Central Intelligence
Raborn sent the following message to the CIA Station Chief in Saigon:
"1. Under Secretary George Ball has asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to undertake
ultra sensitive covert political action program targeted against National Liberation Front. Project
designed to turn myth of NLF against its creators by playing on and exacerbating regional tensions
within Lao Dong/NLF control apparatus and attempting to induce ethnic Southerners within this
mechanism either to act as if they were independent or, at least, to chafe at heightened awareness of the
fact that they are not.
"2. Objectives this program include (1) exploiting and increasing tensions between indigenous
Southerners whose names and faces are necessary to preserve fiction that NLF is spontaneously created
South Vietnamese political group and Tonkinese Lao Dong cadre running show both in South and from
party and DRV reunification committees in Hanoi, (2) inducing outright defections of key NLF
personnel to the GVN, (3) inducing NLF personnel to complain about Northern control even though
they do so within the fold and do not break away to join the GVN, (4) where possible, doubling such
personnel to serve as additional sources of information and centers of political agitation within the NLF,
(5) inducing detachment from NLF, if not outright defection or switch to GVN, of key groups or
individuals at provincial and district levels to fragment NLF in local areas.
"3. HQS well aware difficulty and complexity this program, its high risk and flap potential and its
limited chances of success. These have all been stressed to Messrs. Ball and Alexis Johnson and
acknowledged by them, but they want us to try anyway."
Raborn then discussed implementation of the project. (Central Intelligence Agency, GAC Chron, Job
80-R01720R)
In a follow-up telegram to the Saigon Station, [document number not declassified], February 10, Raborn
amplified the fourth objective, stating that the persons mentioned therein "might perhaps also be useful
as discreet channels for future political communications from the US and/or GVN." Raborn also
outlined the groups to be targeted:
"(1) Upper echelon NLF figures whose names are in some measure known to the world at large (e.g.
Nguyen Huu Tho, Huynh Tan Phat, Phung Van Cung, Nguyen Van Hieu, and Tran Buu Khiem). (2)
NLF overseas representatives outside the bloc. (3) Middle echelon figures such as lesser known
members of the Central Committee and staff officers in COSVN or regional headquarters elements. (4)
Actually or potentially affiliated groups or organizations, particularly ones composed of ethnic or
religious minorities such as Cao Dai and Hoa Hao factions, Khmer Krom, and Fulro. (5) Provincial,
district, village and hamlet leadership and cadres." (Ibid.)
In a telegram sent through CIA communications facilities on February 15, Deputy Under Secretary of
State U. Alexis Johnson notified Ambassador Lodge that the Department of State had developed with
CIA "some new thoughts" on channels through which approaches to the National Liberation Front might
be attempted. Johnson indicated that the Saigon Station Chief could brief Lodge on the details and asked
the Ambassador for his comments and suggestions. (Ibid.)
In a March 18 memorandum for the record, George Carver of CIA's Vietnamese Affairs Staff noted that
the project "had been approved at highest levels within the CIA and the Department of State." (Ibid.)
63. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, February 3, 1966, 4:25 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between
Johnson and Rusk, Tape F66.04, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
LBJ: Hello? Dean?
DR: Yes sir.
LBJ: I don't want any other human to know this--I've talked to you and Bob [McNamara]--but I fairly
think I would like to go out to Honolulu on Saturday night/2/ with you and Bob and meet
Westmoreland, who is there now, and have Sharp give me a briefing on U.S. military matters on
Monday and probably ask for Lodge to come up and, if he can, bring Ky and Thieu with him, the Chief
of State, and talk to them about some of the non-military matters, pacification, and have with me,
probably, Freeman and Keppel and the Surgeon General of Health, to kind of, as a cover and discussion
on--we've been thinking of sending these educational, agricultural, and health missions out there. And I
think it would give me a chance to visit with Westmoreland and get a little bit closer to his problems and
what he envisages out there. And certainly let them see me and let Sharp see me. And I think at the same
time, if I had the proper political diplomatic group with me, I could talk to them about what we could do
to increase our pacification efforts and our economic aid that's pending and so on and so forth. I rather
think, too, that in the briefings that will follow that it would be good to have just visited with
Westmoreland some. Now he's gonna be there for two or three or four days. I know of nothing urgent
that's keeping me here Saturday night. We could leave Saturday night and be there--leave here Saturday
evening--be there at midnight and then stay over 'til about Tuesday and come on back. I want you to
give it a little thought. Unless you have very violent objections, I would like you to send Lodge a cable
without a bunch of secretaries over there knowing it, because I don't want anybody to know it. Just the
most secret thing that we can have in the State Department, if we can have anything secret. And ask him
if he could meet us there. I would be there Sunday on, if he could come up Monday. And for him to
ascertain if he could bring these other two fellows with him. I rather think it might help this fellow in his
own country and I think we'd have a little insurance having Thieu, their Chief of State, so if something
happened to Ky, well we wouldn't necessarily be tied to Ky too much. And I would like for us to be in a
little contact with what's happening as well as Mansfield.
/2/February 5.
DR: Are you alone in your office here?
LBJ: No, I'm alone in my bedroom.
DR: Oh, I see. May I have a word with you about this after our briefing session./3/
/3/The President and Rusk met with the Congressional leadership at 6:17 p.m. for a briefing on the
Indian food situation. Rusk did not meet afterward with the President but did speak with him by
telephone at 8:06 p.m. The conversation was not recorded. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
LBJ: Sure. Sure you can any way. I just want to be sure we get a cable out to Lodge asking him if he can
go.
DR: Well, I'm here at the White House now so I can do this when I get back to the office.

64. Editorial Note

On February 4, 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held the first of five televised hearings on
President Johnson's request for $400 million in supplemental foreign aid funds for Vietnam for fiscal
year 1966. Earlier, on January 28, at an untelevised preliminary hearing on the supplemental
appropriation, the Committee questioned Secretary of State Rusk about the war. Following its decision
on February 3 to hold public hearings, the Committee heard testimony about U.S. involvement in
Vietnam from the following witnesses: Agency for International Development Administrator David Bell
on February 4; General James Gavin on February 8; former Ambassador George Kennan on February
10; General Maxwell Taylor on February 17; and Secretary of State Rusk on February 18. Transcripts of
the hearings are printed in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Supplemental
Foreign Assistance, Fiscal Year 1966--Vietnam (Washington, DC, 1966). Extensive excerpts are printed
in The Vietnam Hearings (New York, 1966). For background information on the hearings, see William
C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and
Relationships, Part IV: July 1965-January 1968 (Princeton, NJ, 1995), pages 222-230 and 239-251.
At 8:27 a.m. on February 5, the morning after the first day of televised hearings, President Johnson
telephoned Larry F. O'Brien and expressed his extreme displeasure at the hearings, calling them "a very,
very disastrous break." A recording of the conversation is in the Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and O'Brien, Tape 66.04, PNO 1.
65. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to Secretary of
Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, February 4, 1966.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80-B1676R, V-1 Vietnam 1966
(Jan.-Feb.). Secret.
SUBJECT
The Managing Hierarchy of the NLF and the Current Political Goals of the Viet Cong
At lunch on Wednesday, 2 February, I mentioned that, by and large, the upper echelons of the National
Liberation Front's managing hierarchy are staffed by second-raters with very little public prestige or
personal following. This is a point to which insufficient attention has been paid in current public debates
about Vietnam and allied current discussion about the NLF's stature as a "southern" political group.
When Hanoi set up the Front in the summer and fall of 1960, it instructed the VC to select people for
overt positions who would lend prestige to the NLF and, by their very names, be capable of winning
some measure of active public support. The Communists, however, had a great deal of difficulty in
meeting this requirement. The first NLF Central Committee, not announced until March 1962, had
places for 52 members but the announcement gave only 31 names, most of them virtually unknown even
in South Vietnam. The second Central Committee, announced in January 1964, had only 41 members,
with no significant improvement in the caliber or personal renown of the announced members. There
may have been additional reasons for leaving vacant slots on the Central Committee (e. g., bait for the
politically ambitious who had not yet joined the NLF, or concealing the identity of covert members); but
even so, the fact of such vacancies--which still exist--demonstrates in some degree that the Communists
have been unable to get the use of the names of the kind of people they want.
How far down in the barrel the Communists were forced to reach becomes apparent if we take a look at

the backgrounds and stature of some of those who now hold senior positions within the NLF, such as the
Chairman of its Presidium, Nguyen Huu Tho; its Secretary General, Huynh Tan Phat; its Public Health
Commissioner, who is also a Central Committee member and Chairman of the NLF's "Committee for
the Protection of World Peace," Phung Van Cung; its External Relations Committee chairman (also a
Central Committee member), Tran Buu Khiem; its principal Traveling Representative (and original
Secretary General), Nguyen Van Hieu; and its Representative in Algiers, Huynh Van Tam.
Nguyen Huu Tho (born in Cholon in 1910) studied law at a provincial university in France during the
1930's, began practicing in Saigon in 1934, was admitted to the Saigon bar in 1939, and practiced law in
Vinh Long in 1947. Some sources claim he was "President of the Tribunal" in Can Tho in 1949, though
this is not certain. His legal career, even at the provincial bar, was far from distinguished, and he is
frequently categorized by his former professional colleagues as a "lawyer without briefs." His career as a
left-wing agitator seems to have begun about 1947, though his Communist associations may have
commenced considerably earlier since he appears to have been a school companion of a number of wellknown Communist figures, including Tran Van Giau (the leader of the Cochin-Chinese Communists in
the 1945-46 period). Tho was Hanoi's dictated choice for Chairman of the NLF Central Committee in
1962. He was not, however, a person of any particular prestige or prominence and, indeed, was regarded
by many South Vietnamese intellectuals and professionals as something of a joke.
Huynh Tan Phat is usually described as an "architect" though we doubt if anyone could point with
certainty to any building he has designed or built. He is supposed to have been born in My Tho in 1913
and educated at the College of Fine Arts in Hanoi, graduating around 1936. He has been a left-wing
political agitator and activist ever since his student days and held posts in a variety of Communist and
Viet Minh front organizations and political splinter groups. Though apparently articulate and possessing
a considerable clandestine organizational skill, Phat was virtually unknown even in South Vietnam
when he became Secretary General of the NLF.
Phung Van Cung was born in Vinh Long Province in 1909 and is said to hold a medical degree from the
University of Hanoi. He has practiced medicine in Rach Gia and in Cholon and appears to have been
mobilized as a major in the medical corps of the French-controlled Vietnamese Army in 1951, though
there is some doubt as to whether he actually served in this capacity. NLF sources claim that Cung was a
high-ranking government official under Diem before he moved his family into a Viet Cong-controlled
area in 1960, but this is simply not true. Cung was never a leading light even in the limited circle of
South Vietnam's doctors and has almost certainly become considerably better known since he was
named Chairman of the NLF Peace Committee and the NLF "Red Cross" than he ever was before.
Tran Buu Khiem was born in Can Tho in 1921 and is said to have studied law at the University of
Hanoi, though there is no record of his ever having practiced or having become a member of the Saigon
or Hanoi bars. He is a long-time Communist activist and appears to have been a senior member of the
"Nambo Resistance and Administrative Committee" in the 1945-1949 period. The record on him is
sketchy. Though it suggests considerable competence as a clandestine organizer and political agitator, it
certainly has not given him any general stature or personal standing in Vietnamese political or
intellectual circles.
Nguyen Van Hieu was born in Camau in 1922. Available details about his educational and professional
career are confused and contradictory. He seems to have studied agriculture or law, or both, at Hanoi
and Saigon universities and is generally described as a "former teacher" (sometimes of biology,
sometimes of mathematics) and a journalist, though it is hard to locate much that he has written. He has
almost certainly been a Communist-Viet Minh activist and propagandist since about 1945. He was the
NLF's first Secretary General but since 1963 has served, in effect, as its principal traveling salesman
abroad. Like his colleagues in the upper echelons of the NLF, Hieu could hardly be described as a non-

Communist Vietnamese of independent professional or political stature.

Huynh Van Tam was born in 1919 somewhere in the southern part of Vietnam and was probably
educated at a Catholic school in Saigon. He seems to have been a secondary school teacher in Saigon
until about 1942 when he began devoting most of his time to Communist political activity. He was
named to the NLF Central Committee when it was first formed in the summer of 1960, but is now the
NLF Representative in Algiers, and, apparently, no longer a Central Committee member. Tam is fluent
in French, knows a good deal of Latin, and is quite polished and articulate. He has made a very strong,
favorable impression on a number of Western journalists who have interviewed him, most notably
Joseph Kraft. In South Vietnam he is little known except as a long-time left-wing agitator.
The above list represents the best that the Communists have been able to come up with, and their best-in terms of political appeal--is not very good. Some, if not all, of these persons are undoubtedly
competent as clandestine organizers or agitators but none can be described with any measure of
accuracy as a leading South Vietnamese professional or political figure, let alone as a non-Communist
leftist or liberal.
Given the facts of Vietnamese political history over the past two decades, there are very few people in
South Vietnam who command the kind of general stature and reputation of, say, such well-known
Americans as Governor Rockefeller, Thomas Dewey, Walter Lippmann, or even Professor Morgenthau.
Even names fairly well-known in the hothouse salons of Saigon do not make magic in the countryside.
The Communists in the NLF, however, have never been able to crack the circle of such "notables" as do
exist, at least not in the sense of being able to persuade any such person to lend their names or prestige
to the Communists' front organization. Nguyen Huu Tho, for example, was far less well known and
regarded as a lawyer than, say, Maitre Trinh Dinh Thao, a political leftist and almost certainly a VC
sympathizer but one who has never been willing to take the public step of joining the Front. All of
Diem's more celebrated political opponents--Phan Quang Dan, Phan Khac Suu, Nguyen Van Can, Pham
Huy Quat, etc.--were united in opposing the VC and the pretensions of the NLF (even if they could
agree on nothing else) and usually justified their opposition to Diem by claiming that they could combat
the Communists more effectively than he. South Vietnamese intellectuals and professionals have a
considerable measure of political sophistication and South Vietnamese interested in political life have
had twenty years of firsthand experience with Communist manipulation of front organizations. Few are
fooled by the NLF's claim to be either "spontaneous" or "indigenous". Within South Vietnam it is hard
to find anyone interested in politics who is not perfectly well aware that the NLF is something set up by
and manipulated from Hanoi. This has made [it] extremely difficult for the Front to attract innocent or
non-Communist political "names" to serve as window-dressing and, so far, that particular political
objective has simply not been achieved. In fact, the Front has not yet been able to include in its overt
roster a single South Vietnamese figure who can accurately be described as a non-Communist of
significant personal, political, or professional standing.
We do not know precisely how much discretionary authority Hanoi has delegated to or allows the NLF
leadership, but the broad lines of NLF policy are patently dictated and rigidly controlled by its DRV
masters. NLF statements on settlement or negotiation conditions have displayed some variations in
emphasis from those emanating from Hanoi but none of substance. Over the past year or so, public NLF
pronouncements have paid rather more attention to the transition phase of "coalition government" in the
South than DRV statements, which generally focus on the ultimate goal of "reunification" (i.e., total
political domination by the Hanoi regime). The NLF, however, has always dutifully echoed Hanoi's
theme that "Vietnam is one" and has consistently depicted "peaceful reunification" as the ultimate
objective of its political endeavors. Some of these differences in emphasis have probably been dictated
by tactical considerations and some have almost certainly been deliberately devised to support the myth
that the NLF is an "independent" political entity indigenous to the South, not a puppet mechanism

controlled from Hanoi.

The Front's most recent pronouncements are just as unyielding as those of Hanoi and play the same
themes. The NLF's 30 January commentary on Ho Chi Minh's 24 January "letter" to various heads of
state/2/ stresses that
/2/Ho Chi Minh's letter was printed in The New York Times, January 29, 1966.
"If U.S. Imperialism stubbornly keeps on intensifying and expanding the war, the South Vietnamese
people will resolutely struggle until the end to liberate South Vietnam, protect North Vietnam, and
reunify the fatherland."
Basically an "us-too" attack on President Johnson's recent diplomatic peace campaign, this Front
statement harps on the current Communist claim that the NLF is "the sole genuine representative of 14
million people in South Vietnam", plays the line that U. S. disregard of the 1954 Geneva Agreements is
the source of all of South Vietnam's present woes, and insists that peace can never come unless the "U.S.
Imperialists recognize the Front's correct platform"--i.e., its Five Point Program of March 1965. (The
Front's "Five Points, the DRV's "Four Points" and the actual relationship of both to the 1954 and 1962
Geneva Accords were analyzed in detail in CIA Research Memorandum No. 0483/66, 5 January
1966.)/3/ The NLF's 31 January comment on the U. S. approach to the U.N. (broadcast by Hanoi radio
on 2 February) is equally intransigent. It condemns the resumption of aerial strikes on the North and
"solemnly declares" that the U.N. "has no right at all to decide problems of the South Vietnamese
people", adding that the NLF will consider "all decisions of the U.N. Security Council on Vietnam as
null and void". The statement concludes by emphasizing that:
/3/Not found.
"The only correct solution to restore peace in South Vietnam is that the U.S. Imperialists must withdraw
all troops and weapons of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam, dismantle all U. S.
military bases there, and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own internal affairs by themselves.
Should the U.S. Imperialists refuse to abandon their aggressive ambition, they will in no way be able to
avoid complete and most ignominious failure, whatever barbarous and perfidious maneuvers they may
resort to."
There are undoubtedly some regional stresses at least latent in the relationship between the VC/NLF
apparatus and its directing supervisors in Hanoi. Within this complex there are almost certainly
differences of opinion between persons with some measure of authority, and varying assessments (at
least private ones) of the risks and probable outcome of continued struggle against the U.S.-supported
GVN. We see no present signs, however, of what could accurately be termed a developing "VC" or
"NLF" position on negotiation, peace or ultimate political objectives that differs in any material way
from the line laid down by Hanoi.
Richard Helms/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.
66. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
SNIE 10-1-66

Washington, February 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Vietnam Intelligence. Top Secret;
Sensitive; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of
AEC, NSA, and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate.
The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members
of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except for the Assistant Director of the FBI, who abstained on the
grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
Raborn forwarded the estimate to McGeorge Bundy on February 4 together with a 25-page study, dated
January 28, on "The Impact of Intensified Air Attacks Against Economic Targets in North Vietnam,"
prepared by CIA's Office of Research and Reports in response to a request from the Department of
State. (Ibid.)
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED US COURSES OF ACTION ON DRV CAPABILITY TO
SUPPORT THE INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Problem
To estimate how DRV capabilities to support the insurgency in the South would be affected by
increasing the scope and intensity of the bombing of North Vietnam, and how long it would take for the
impact to be felt in the South./2/
/2/In a February 11 memorandum, CIA's Office of National Estimates examined the possible short-run
effects and the advantages and disadvantages of four different bombing programs against the DRV.
(Ibid., Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20)
Concept of the Courses of Action
The immediate aims of the bombing would be:
1. To destroy those resources already in North Vietnam that contribute most to support of Communist
forces in the South;
2. To block external assistance to the DRV;
3. To harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and material through the southern DRV into
Laos and South Vietnam.
Course A: The enlarged bombing program would include aerial attacks designed to:
1. Destroy all known POL facilities in the northern DRV;
2. Destroy all large military facilities in the northern DRV, except airfields and SAM sites;/3/
/3/Constant surveillance of the airfields would be maintained and their destruction undertaken whenever
interference with our planned air operations, or any offensive air actions against our military forces in
SVN, might be initiated. Any SAM installations threatening to interfere with these operations would be

attacked. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. Interdict the land LOCs from China and close DRV ports by various means including mining;
4. Put and keep electric power facilities out of action;
5. Carry out armed reconnaissance against land and water LOCs and all identified military facilities.
South of the 20th parallel, such reconnaissance would be particularly intensive and carried out day and
night.
Course B: The program above, but without closing DRV ports by mining or otherwise.
Note
This estimate considers only how DRV physical capabilities to support the insurgency in South Vietnam
would be affected by certain assumed US bombing attacks on North Vietnam; it does not deal with the
possible effect of these attacks on DRV will to continue the war.
Conclusions
A. The combined impact of destroying in-country stockpiles, restricting import capabilities, and
attacking the southward LOCs would greatly complicate the DRV war effort. The cumulative drain on
material resources and human energy would be severe. The postulated bombing and interdiction
campaign would harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and material into South Vietnam and
impose great overall difficulty on the DRV. However, we believe that, with a determined effort, the
DRV could still move substantially greater amounts than in 1965./4/
/4/Major General Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force,
believes that this conclusion and the tone of the estimate reflect an under-estimation of the overall
impact of the postulated bombing program and closing of the DRV ports. He believes that the
cumulative interacting effect of such bombing and port closure on the economy, the military structure
and the political and psychological fabric of North Vietnam would degrade the DRV capabilities to
support the war in the south to a greater extent than this estimate indicates. By excluding consideration
of the North Vietnamese will to continue the war, a very important effect of the postulated bombing and
port closing has been eliminated. [Footnote in the source text.]
B. However, the cumulative effect of the campaign would almost certainly set a limit to the expansion of
PAVN and VC mainforce units and activities in South Vietnam. There are too many uncertainties to
permit an estimate of just where that limit would be set.
C. If the main ports were not closed, supply of DRV needs from the outside would be greatly simplified,
and the problem of moving goods within the DRV would be eased.
[Here follows the 9-page "Discussion" section.]
67. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to
President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, February 5, 1966, 5:08 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, President's
Honolulu Conference. Secret. The President and Rusk were on board the airplane en route to Honolulu;
see footnote 2, Document 68.
CAP 66043. The following rather tart message from General de Gaulle was brought this afternoon by
Lucet. It is a reply to the President's personal message of January 31 informing him of the resumption of
bombing./2/ This message hardly calls for an answer.
/2/Transmitted in telegram 3575 to Paris, January 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
"Dear Mr. President:
Your Ambassador in Paris has passed me your message of January 31 in which you explain to me the
reasons that make you consider it indispensable to resume the aerial bombing of North Vietnam.
I am grateful for the care which you are taking once again to inform me of the situation and of the
purposes of your action.
As far as France is concerned, I think I should make her opinion of this clear to you, taking account of
the experience which she herself went through at an earlier time.
For years now we have believed, first, that only a political solution is possible; further, that this solution
can only be obtained by a negotiation undertaken on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954; and,
finally, that there would be no way to open this negotiation if the United States has not taken and
announced a decision to withdraw its military forces from Vietnam and to end all intervention in the
internal affairs of the country.
Anything which could tend to delay such a result or make it more difficult should, we think, be avoided.
On the contrary, the interest of world peace and the friendship which we feel for the United States make
us wish eagerly that the United States would accept the above conditions as soon as possible; they are
the only ones which would allow an effort for a settlement. As soon as this should happen, you can be
sure that France would be certain to assist in the opening of the necessary negotiations.
With best personal good wishes,
C. de Gaulle"
68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, February 5, 1966, 6:07 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and
approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Canberra and Wellington and repeated to Bangkok and to
CINCPAC for U. Alexis Johnson.
810. 1. Addressees should convey to host governments, with timing and levels at your discretion,
assurance that Honolulu conference will not be aimed at any significant changes in the conduct of the
war, much less at any discussions in depth of the negotiating situation. Primary purpose is, as President
has stated,/2/ to give him opportunity to meet with GVN leaders and to go over with them major non-

military programs including particularly such key elements as rural construction program, economic
difficulties and inflation, and possibility of additional effort concerned with education, health, and
agriculture. Latter elements account for presence of Secretaries Freeman and Gardner and former is
expected to proceed to Saigon with agricultural delegation after meeting.
/2/The President announced at his news conference on February 4 that he planned to attend the Honolulu
Conference, flying to Hawaii on February 5 and returning to Washington on February 8. He stated that
the conference would consider both "nonmilitary and military matters," with "a good deal on the
pacification matters, particularly on agriculture." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 144-146 and 148)
2. President is of course also taking advantage of Westmoreland's concurrent visit in order to discuss
with him the military outlook and to get a general reading on necessary force increases during the year.
However, no decisions are expected in this area,/3/ and we will continue to stay in close touch with
addressee governments as our views and plans mature. Military matters may also arise with GVN, but
we do not expect discussion on this subject to receive nearly as much emphasis as the crucial nonmilitary programs.
/3/Regarding the military discussions at Honolulu, see Document 70 and footnote 2 thereto.
3. In conveying above, you should make clear that we remain well aware of major interest of addressee
governments, as suppliers of military forces, both in respect to strategic decisions and major issues in
conduct of negotiations. As addressees know, bombing suspension ended with no significant change in
outlook, and we do not at present have any reason to believe that UN initiative will produce anything
immediate. We shall continue to stay in close touch.
3. Bangkok may use above in its discretion.
Ball
69. Editorial Note
The first plenary session of the Honolulu Conference convened at 10 a.m. on Monday, February 7, 1966.
The U.S. delegation included President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense
McNamara, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Gardner,
AID Administrator Bell, Ambassadors Harriman and Lodge, and Generals Wheeler and Westmoreland.
The South Vietnamese delegation included Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu, Prime Minister Nguyen Cao
Ky, Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Huu Co, Minister of Foreign Affairs Tran Van Do, Minister of
Economy Truong Thai Ton, and Minister of Rural Construction General Nguyen Duc Thang.
During the first plenary session, members of both delegations made presentations on the situation in
Vietnam, placing particular emphasis on the importance of pacification and other non-military programs.
Prime Minister Ky enunciated four goals: defeat the Viet Cong, eradicate social injustice, establish a
viable economy, and build true democracy. After lunch four working groups convened to discuss rural
construction, economic stabilization, health and education, and the diplomatic track. That evening the
President held private talks with Thieu and Ky, which are described in Document 75.
At the second and final plenary session on February 8, the working groups presented their reports, and
the President summed up the work of the conference and outlined follow-up measures. The conference's
"Conclusions and Decisions for Further Action" are described in Document 83. For text of the Joint

Communique and the Declaration of Honolulu, released in Honolulu on February 8, see Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pages 152-155.
Plenary session records, working group reports, public statements, and other documentation of the
conference are in the Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 305, Honolulu
Meeting. Comprehensive documentation on the conference, including background and follow-up
material, is also located in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the Honolulu
Conference; and ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, Honolulu Meeting Papers and President's
Honolulu Conference. Audiotape recordings of the plenary session on February 7 are ibid., Recordings
and Transcripts. For President Johnson's impressions of the conference, see Document 71. Although the
conference emphasized non-military issues, military discussions also took place during the U.S.
delegation's stay in Honolulu; see Document 70 and footnote 2 thereto.
Upon arriving in Los Angeles from Honolulu on February 8, President Johnson announced that Vice
President Humphrey would fly to South Vietnam the next day, accompanied by Secretary Freeman,
Ambassador Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy, to carry forward the mission agreed upon at the
conference. The Vice President was then to visit other Asian capitals to report on the conference. For
text of the President's remarks in Los Angeles, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pages 155-157. Regarding the Vice President's Asian trip, see
Document 84 and footnotes 3 and 6 thereto. Reaction in Vietnam to the conference and to Humphrey's
visit are described in Document 74. After discussing non-military organization with U.S. officials in
Saigon, McGeorge Bundy presented his observations and recommendations to the President on February
16; see Document 77.
70. Paper Prepared by Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (McNaughton)/1/
Washington, February 10, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, John McNaughton Files, McNaughton VII. Top Secret;
Sensitive. McNaughton forwarded the paper to McNamara on February 10 under cover of a
memorandum stating: "Here is the corrected 'Honolulu Sheet.'" McNaughton also sent copies to Vance
and Goodpaster. A draft of the paper was forwarded to Unger by Blouin on February 12 under cover of a
memorandum that called it "a draft of the US/GVN military objectives for 1966 which were developed
at Honolulu." (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, JCS Working
Papers, 1966-1967)
1966 PROGRAM TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND
ANTICIPATED RESULTS THEREOF
A. Increase the strength of South Vietnamese, US and 3rd-country forces in South Vietnam/2/
/2/In his "Historical Briefing," dated February 16, Westmoreland stated that he spent February 6 with
McNamara, at which time McNamara "made the decision that we would go for the full package of
combat troops that I had asked for, namely 102 total battalions, but that there would be no reserves
called." (Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, #4 History File) For McNamara's report of his
February 6 meeting with Westmoreland, see The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 312313.
1. South Vietnamese National Military Forces

End '65
--Maneuver battalions, 139/**/
--Regular forces, 302,600
--Regional forces, 132,000
--Popular forces, 136,400
End '66
--Maneuver battalions, 162
--Regular forces, 325,000
--Regional forces, 150,000
--Popular forces, 192,500
2. U.S. forces
End '65
--Maneuver battalions, 35
--Strength, 184,300
End '66
--Maneuver battalions, 79
--Strength, /*/429,000
3. Third-country forces
End '65
--Maneuver battalions, 10
--Strength, 22,400
End '66
--Maneuver battalions, 23
--Strength, 45,000
4. US strike sorties per month (includes for end 1966 CAP, SAR, etc.)

End '65
--Tactical air, 16,500
--B-52, 300
End '66
--Tactical air, 27,000
--B-52, 600
/*/30,000 less than MACV's II-A-Revised
/**/Breakdown = Reg 108, Ranger 20, Abn 6 = 139
5. All units are to be at full strength at End '66. (This will require continued programs to stimulate
recruiting, enforce conscription, and minimize desertions.)
B. Expand the offensive actions of such forces while providing essential defense
The South Vietnamese, US and third-country forces, in coordination will:
1. Defend military bases, political and population centers and food-producing areas now under
government control.
2. Open and secure lines of communications required to support military operations and for essential
support of the civilian population.
3. Conduct clearing and security operations to provide military security in the four selected high priority
national construction areas.
4. Conduct intensified offensive operations against major VC/PAVN forces, bases and lines of
communications--almost doubling the number of battalion-months of offensive operations from 40 to 75
a month.
5. Increase the level of attack on the infiltration routes through Laos and North Vietnam by more than 60
per cent--from 5,400 to 9,000 attack sorties a month.
C. Achieve the following results in 1966:
1. Increase the population in secure areas to 60 per cent from 50 per cent.
2. Increase the critical roads and railroads open for use to 50 per cent from 20 per cent.
3. Increase the destruction of VC/PAVN base areas to 40-50 per cent from 10-20 per cent.
4. Ensure the defense of all military bases, political and population centers and food-producing areas
now under government control.

5. Military security needed for pacification of the four selected high-priority areas--increasing the
pacified population in those areas by 235,000.
6. Attrite, by year's end, VC/PAVN forces at a rate at least as high as their capability to put men into the
field.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
71. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Indian Ambassador (Nehru)/1/
Washington, February 10, 1966, 6:14 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between
Johnson and Nehru, Tape F66.04, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
[Here follows discussion of U.S.-Indian relations.]
BKN: I hope you had a very successful visit in [Honolulu].
LBJ: We were very, very pleased in several respects. One, I knew very little about Westmoreland, and
you're having to act on a man's cables here. And it's good, I think, for the commander in chief to know
the man whose cables he has to act upon every day. Second, I knew nothing about Ky and Thieu, the
Chief of State, and what I learned was quite favorable. The impressions, the titles, the military
backgrounds, the generals, the air marshals, the field marshals, so on and so forth. They never have been
very impressive to civilians in Johnson City, Texas, cause we didn't have many storm troopers out there.
And we haven't had many of them in our government. And I was amazed, as Alex Johnson said,
whatever else may be, he [Ky] certainly knows how to talk. Whether he knows how to do as well as he
knows how to talk is different. The declaration/2/ that we wrote was really his speech and it said in
effect that we are going to act to prevent aggression, to defeat aggression. He didn't take in any more
territory. He was defeating aggression. And we're going to defeat social misery, with considerable
details along the line of his January 15th speech./3/ And Ky was a young man who was going to lead the
revolution in his country and build a new society and a stable society, and he was going to seek and
obtain an honorable peace. And there's not anything in those four points that any country, I think,
wouldn't apply to themselves: to prevent an aggressor, and try to defeat social misery, and establish a
stable society, and seek an honorable peace. And it was so eloquent and so simple and so young, [but]
we have no illusions and we've seen a good many governments come and go and we don't know what'll
happen that night. It was quite different from the General marching around with a sword at his side. And
when we had the technicians, sixteen of 'em, with Orville Freeman, sit down and meet with him, they
all, every Ph.D. there, came away rather stimulated at this man's exciting interest in the quality of the
rice seed and how you're going to increase its production. And his demand that we get eight million
more school books in there next year. And his telling us how to handle the economic aid that Dave Bell
has given him. And he just traded back and forth with Dave Bell for an hour on how to build
classrooms. And he said that the American contractors come in and put 'em up overnight, and the Viet
Cong come in and burn 'em down a week later. And they say, "We burned down American schools." But

he said, "You gave me some materials. We took the materials and put our own people to building the
schools and when the Viet Cong came in to get the school they said you cannot touch our school."
/2/See Document 69.
/3/See Document 24.
BKN: That is very important.
LBJ: It becomes our school if they built it. In any event, my point--we have tried for two years to get
these people to thinking in terms of building a better society there and not just strictly a military
operation but a political one, too. And you can't do it unless you can get Lodge and Westmoreland and
the Prime Minister to adopt the baby as their own. And we did that. So they went back to put in the
Lodge-Ky-Westmoreland program. And I sent along the Vice President and the Secretary of
Agriculture, and in about a month from now I'll send out the Secretary of Education and Health. And
then I'll send out the Surgeon General of Medicine. And then I told him we'd meet back in Honolulu six
months from now to just see what we've done in this period of time. So, I'm gonna stay on it and if it's
impossible I'll find it out, but I'm gonna try.
[Here follow closing remarks.]
72. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/
Washington, February 11, 1966, 9 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between
Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.05, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
[Here follows discussion of a telegram from McGeorge Bundy concerning the U.S. Mission in
Vietnam.]
LBJ: I would wish that you would put the best lawyer--this Meeker's been spending his time over here
worrying about what's gonna to happen to the Visa Division. I wish that he'd get busy on something
substantive like analyzing the testimony as a lawyer and making the basic points that Gavin made and
that Kennan made./2/ And they both seem to be unaware that we have a treaty/3/ at all or that we have a
resolution/4/ at all or that we have a commitment at all. And they both would just rather not be troubled
with Asia. And they'd just like to be content in Honolulu if somebody would leave them alone.
/2/See Document 64.
/3/Reference is to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954; for text, see 6 UST
81-86. The treaty established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
/4/Reference is to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Joint Resolution 1145, "To Promote the Maintenance of
International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia," passed by the Senate and the House on August 7,
1964, and signed by the President on August 10, 1964. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1964, pp. 991-992.

UAJ: Yes, yes.

LBJ: And I would like for Meeker or some real expert to prepare for me forthwith today or tomorrow at
the minimum, first--I asked for it yesterday--the shifting positions on the loyal opposition.
UAJ: Yes, Bill Bundy's doing that.
LBJ: Then second, I want somebody to analyze the opposition testimony and just take their whole thing
and say, "Now here's what a lawyer would brief it as and a rejoinder--here's what they have said." And
take the toughest things they've said and say, "Now here is the answer to 'em as we see it." And I would
sure see that somebody follows these television things very, very carefully. I doubt that anybody with
any political sensitivity in the State Department's doing that. Do you know?
UAJ: I don't know if anybody's looking at the television, we're getting the transcripts.
LBJ: Well now, it's very important to watch that and watch the hearing, watch the reaction to it and what
the folks are doing and things like that. [Senator Frank] Church takes the position that we are [in a] very
dangerous position and that we've got to surrender. That's his position this morning on the "Today"
show, Frank Church.
UAJ: Oh, he was on this morning?
LBJ: Yeah and rather effective. They're doing a real job each day now. I don't think that, when you
analyze, if they [were] ever answered--I think it'd just go over like a puff of wind can blow 'em over.
Everything that he said can be just answered in one sentence [which] is that we have a SEATO treaty
and Senator would you ignore it?
UAJ: Yes, yes, yes.
LBJ: And if so, how and what do you do about it? And what effect does it have on the world? And he
acts like he never heard of it. I think that also somebody ought to brief that SEATO Treaty for me. So
let's get about three things for the President and get some staff officers busy doing that instead of
interviewing the press. First thing I'd have 'em do is give me the shifting positions. The second thing I'd
do is have 'em take the position of Gavin and the position of this guy [Kennan ?] and answer 'em. And
the third thing I'd like for 'em to do is brief the SEATO Treaty hearings, particularly for any comments
of members, who are now members of that, with quotes./5/ And particularly people like Fulbright and
Sparkman and folks who apparently were members of the committee at the time it was adopted. And
along with that I'd like to have a good brief of the resolution and what they said about the resolution. I
would gather that we're getting--if we're not, we ought to get--a brief that Rusk or somebody can put in
the record on our legal position. And I think our legal position ought to be that the Commander in Chief
has a right to respond when his forces are attacked and that the Commander in Chief powers--we've
taken that position all along. But then we got the treaty commitment, then we got the resolution
specifically. And we ought to have that legal position ready to put in the record. But in developing that, I
want to see what Fulbright said when SEATO was up. I want to see if he ever asked a question or
answered one. I want to see what questions he asked and what he answered and what he said on the floor
of the Senate when the resolution was up.
/5/The Department of State's 18-page memorandum, February 11, responding to this request was
forwarded to the President by Bromley Smith on February 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20)

UAJ: We started work on that yesterday.

LBJ: And I think that you ought to have the most astute politician you've got in the Department
watching this thing very, very carefully. They're out to destroy Rusk and destroy the Department and
destroy our position. And they're taking the position that what they're doing is going to change the
foreign policy of this country. Now I don't know how they're gonna change this treaty or change this
resolution. But Gore says that we are going over the President's head to the people, that the President has
gone over the Senate's head to declare war without our declaration.
UAJ: I saw him on that yesterday.
LBJ: We're going over the President's head, too.
UAJ: Yes, yes.
LBJ: Now, that's what they're doing and I think that we've got to take a little time and develop this
position. First, I think we've got to develop it pretty clearly in Rusk's statement./6/ And before he goes
he's gonna have to background people on what he's going to say. He's gonna have to summarize what
Kennan said and what Gavin said. "Now this is the substance of what these two men have said and here
are the transcripts, if you want 'em, of what they've said. Now here's the answer to 'em" and let 'em have
their stuff before they go up there. And when he goes in he ought to give 'em copies of his statement so
they can really write because, by and large, these writers up there are unfriendly to our position.
/6/Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 18; see Document 64.
UAJ: Yes they are.
LBJ: The infiltration in the networks and in the press on this is rather serious, I think, and I think it's
more serious than any of us realize.
UAJ: Yes, yes. Wonder about motives on some of this.
LBJ: Yes, I think there's no question but what [1 minute 58 seconds deleted by the Lyndon B. Johnson
Library under the donor's instrument of gift]. I think that they think--the opposition to our system--that
they're gonna win this thing right here in Washington.
UAJ: Yes, yes. I feel that very deeply, Mr. President, as I told you yesterday. That's what they're betting
on.
LBJ: Well now, do you think we've got our first team out working on it?
UAJ: I do sir. Dean got some of these assignments made yesterday. He was already working on this.
LBJ: That's sure what I want done.
UAJ: I think that he's gonna be well prepared to handle them, insofar as they can be handled.
[Here follows further discussion of Vietnam.]
73. Editorial Note

In a telephone conversation with Senator Abraham Ribicoff that began at 4:25 p.m. on February 14,
1966, President Johnson stated the following regarding negotiations with North Vietnam:
"They are under three illusions, our judgment is: first, they think they can win it in Washington like they
did in Paris (we think they think that); two, we think that up until the last ninety days they think they
have been winning; three, we think they have the illusions that we may go a year, may go two years, but
we won't go the distance; four, they think that we can't go the distance if we wanted to because we are
spread thin in the world and we have malaria and we have root rot and we have long supply lines and we
have shipping problems that they read about--at least are talking about--and just general things; and we
think that they are indulging themselves [in] these illusions just like Hitler indulged himself. Now we
may be wrong but that's what our best men think. Now we think until we get over that hump of illusion
that they are not going to talk." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone
Conversation between Johnson and Ribicoff, Tape F66.05, Side B, PNO 1)
74. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, February 16, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not indicate time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:25 a.m. and passed to the White
House at 10:30 a.m.
2985. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:
1. Honolulu aftermath.
We think that a large number of Vietnamese throughout the country knew of the Honolulu Conference
and the events associated with it, including the final Vietnamese-American joint statement and the
subsequent visit to Viet-Nam by Vice President Humphrey.
Among less sophisticated Vietnamese--the farmer and the cyclo driver for example--the focus was
almost entirely on Prime Minister Ky and the Vietnamese delegation. The dominant attitude appeared to
be one of national pride, because the Vietnamese sat as equals with the leader of the world's most
powerful nation. The more knowledgeable were conscious that conference took place at a halfway point
between Saigon and Washington rather than in the American capital.
Among the sophisticated but generally non-political Vietnamese--merchants and provincial capital
businessmen--there was a feeling that the Honolulu Conference, by the mere fact that it was held,
somehow meant that the war in Viet-Nam was destined for an early end. Some members of this group
even said that the war would end by mid-year as the result of decisions, unspecified, taken at the
meeting. Exactly what particular event or statement from the conference should have left this feeling is
not clear. Undoubtedly, the attitude represents wishful thinking rather than a sober, thought-out
judgement.
Among the better-informed Vietnamese--civil servants, middle class and newspaper editorial writers, for
example--the Honolulu Conference had a favorable impact. There was a strong reaction that the nonmilitary aspect of the war--the "other war," as Vice President Humphrey expressed it--had at last gotten
the attention it deserved and that as a result of the meeting, new social welfare and economic
development programs could be expected.

The Vice President's visit contributed heavily to this feeling. It favorably influenced Vietnamese
attitudes toward Americans in general and by all measurements can be considered a singular success.
The Vice President made a particular impression on the average Vietnamese whom he contacted
personally, and struck the rank and file as a man seriously interested in the problems and
sympathetically understanding of their aspirations.
Herewith local press summary for February 6-12:
Tia Sang and Tieng Viet wrote about the "spirit of Honolulu" and urged the government to implement as
soon as possible the programs adopted there. Dan Chu, Tieng Viet, and Ghanh Do applauded the
Honolulu declaration's call for social justice and the building of democracy as priorities in the Viet-Nam
conflict.
Tieng Viet and Xay Dung wrote that the conference was a major step in closer cooperation between
Washington and Saigon. Tieng Vang saw it as reassurance by the United States that she respects South
Viet-Nam's sovereignty.
The papers viewed Vice President Humphrey's visit as an indication of the importance President
Johnson places on the three pledges--building democracy, creating social justice and continuing to seek
peace.
2. Basic political.
Chieu Hoi program figures are almost complete through February 10 (one province not yet recorded for
both February 9 and 10). As of that date, a total of 789 returnees have been reported for February. If this
rate continues, the record high of 1,672 achieved last month will be exceeded on February 22. In the 18
days since the end of the official Tet period (midnight January 23), 1,455 returnees have been recorded
for an average of 81 per day. This compares with 41 per day as the average for September through
December 1965.
3. Current political.
During Thieu and Ky's absence in Honolulu, General Chieu, the Secretary-General of the Directorate,
and number 3 man in the government, started contacting the nominees for the "Democracy Building
Council", which will draft the new Constitution. The Directorate approved part of a list of about 80
nominees at its February 2 meeting, but the names have not been announced.
Low level rumors continued to circulate that certain groups were interested in organizing demonstrations
against the government to take place near the end of the month. These people would key their
demonstrations to protests against the high cost of living. It would be hard to get such demonstrations
going on a significant scale because those who are usually potential demonstrators are doing too well.
The cyclo drivers, taxi drivers and day laborers who usually could be easily persuaded to take to the
streets in the past are all beneficiaries of the full employment resulting from the American build-up. In a
sense they "never had it so good." Junior civil servants and others on fixed incomes, unfortunately, are
another story.
The government apparently has not yet made up its mind regarding the Montagnard problem, which is
still tense and potentially dangerous. But Prime Minister Ky made a speech at Kontum on February 12
in which he restated the government's determination to extend equal treatment to all Vietnamese citizens
regardless of religion, region or ethnic origin and promised to give greater consideration to the

Montagnards in 1966.
4. Economic.
Secretary of Agriculture Freeman met the Vietnamese Agriculture Minister, received extensive briefings
on agricultural programs and visited a variety of agricultural projects. His trip was a real plus.
Saigon retail prices dropped substantially from the post-Tet high level. Rice deliveries from the Delta
increased slightly but imported stocks continued to make up the bulk of the stocks on hand in Saigon.
Wholesale and retail rice prices were rising slowly. Both Viet Cong interference and slackened activity
by merchants hoping for higher prices seemed to be contributing to this situation.
5. Inflation.
Our recent talks with Vietnamese officials convinced me that your message in Honolulu on the
importance of measures to stem inflation was understood by Prime Minister Ky and General Thieu.
They have told top Vietnamese officials, including Ambassador Vu Van Thai, that the economic
problem is now top priority. The next step is that the other Vietnamese Generals understand the
necessity of bold action. We are working closely with the Vietnamese to assure effective action. The
Honolulu meeting has given us a good push forward and we intend to make the most of it.
The economic situation overall has become critical during the last two months. The greatest danger is
that a series of wage increases would be granted which would lead to further price increases and move
into a second and even more dangerous phase of the inflation. This can be prevented if our economic
program can be launched quickly, including appointment of capable personnel by the GVN, increased
imports, increased port capacity, larger tax collections, and a lowering of the black market rate.
The latter step is rather unorthodox but the Economic Counselor feels the rate of 170 piasters to the
dollar must be brought down in order to give hope to the Vietnamese that prices can go down as well as
up. If this price is brought down by U.S. Government purchases of piasters in Hong Kong, he believes
this will have a salutary effect on overall prices in Viet-Nam and, most important, it will give a real
psychological boost to the Vietnamese. In fact, it will be interpreted (somewhat erroneously) as being
evidence of increased Vietnamese confidence in a successful outcome of the war, partly stemming from
the historic meeting in Honolulu. These measures to bring the black market rate down will require
concurrence from Washington and a separate message is on the way requesting specific approval.
6. Pacification.
The first class of rural construction cadre graduated from the National Training Center at Vung Tau after
ten weeks of paramilitary and political training. The 3,095 graduates included 119 women, and
represented 15 southern and 9 central provinces. This class had started training in November 1965.
MACV reports that the greatest single request from the Vietnamese provinces, of all the requests for
U.S. personnel, is for public safety advisers. This would appear to me to indicate the pressing nature of
the criminal (as distinguished from the military) side of Viet Cong violence, requiring police type
measures to cope with it.
7. Military.
Allied forces continued on the offensive with a high rate of activity but major Viet Cong and North

Vietnamese units evaded significant sustained contact in these operations.

Zorthian reports that most Vietnamese were unaware that there had been a 37-day cessation of the air
strikes in North Viet-Nam. Those who were aware of the halt generally did not approve and welcomed
the resumption.
Latest reports on RVNAF desertion rate continue to be unsatisfactory.
Lodge
75. Memorandum From the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) to the Deputy Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/
Washington, February 16, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential.
At the private meeting between the President and Generals Ky and Thieu in Honolulu on Monday,
February 7:
1. The principals agreed that their economists would study again the question of the exchange rate and
make recommendations for resolving the issue.
2. The President pressed Ky and Thieu to implement the measures designed to improve the economic
stabilization of SVN. Ky agreed to announce some of the measures "upon my return and no later than
next week."
3. Ky said he intends to split the Ministry of Economics into a Ministry of Trade and a Ministry of
Industrialization in order to weaken the present Ministry which "has too much power and is prone to
corruption."
4. The President urged stronger support of the "Open Arms" program and Ky and Thieu agreed to place
greater emphasis on it.
5. The President strongly urged Ky to urge the defection of "three or four" prominent VC or VC
supporters and use them on radio for prop-aganda and psychological purposes. He pressed Ky and Thieu
to develop better contacts with the VC in order to gain increased understanding of the movement.
6. President stressed specific implementation of economic, social, and political steps agreed upon during
Bell's visit to Saigon in January and at the Honolulu Conference.
7. The President urged a strong program aimed at the "very young members of the VC."
8. The President told Ky and Thieu they should study more carefully and consistently the criticisms and
policies of anti-Vietnam Americans, including "journals like the New York Times and members of the
Foreign Relations Committee." The President said: "You need to know what our pressures are just as we
need to know what yours are."
9. The President and the Secretary of State made strong appeals that "we all should list those reasons we
think Hanoi believes it will win, and go after them one by one to change their mind about the prospects

of succeeding."
10. The President urged further internal reforms in the South Vietnamese military. He urged Ky to spend
more time in the countryside "acting like a politician instead of just a general."
76. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma/1/
Washington, February 16, 1966, 11:38 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by
William Bundy, cleared by Ball and Bromley Smith, and approved by Rusk. Also printed in Herring,
Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 154-156.
267. You should seek appointment with DRV Consul General to deliver following aide-memoire:
Begin Text:
1. The USG has taken note of the Aide-Memoire delivered to American Ambassador in Rangoon on
January 31, 1966./2/
/2/See footnote 6, Document 51.
2. The USG fully respects the basic rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, independence,
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954. As the USG has
repeatedly said, it believes that these Accords, together with the 1962 Accords concerning Laos, are an
adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia or for negotiations looking toward a peaceful settlement.
3. The USG has repeatedly stated and hereby reaffirms that it is prepared to withdraw its forces from
South Viet-Nam when peace is restored. The US has never stated that it must be the sole judge of when
this condition exists. Plainly, the restoration of peace requires the adherence of all concerned to the
essential provisions of the Geneva Accords dealing with the regroupment of opposing forces to their
respective areas, and dealing with the obligations that the two zones shall not be utilized for the
resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. It is the view of the USG that the
DRV, in introducing armed forces, military equipment, and political cadres into South Viet-Nam, has
breached the provisions of the Accords, and has thus made necessary the actions undertaken by the USG
in support of the legitimate right of the Republic of Viet-Nam to self-defense. The withdrawal of US
forces would be undertaken in the light of the actions taken by the DRV in this regard, and would
necessarily be subject also to the existence of adequate measures of verification.
The USG seeks no military bases of any kind in South Viet-Nam and has no desire whatever to retain its
forces in South Viet-Nam after peace is secured.
4. With respect to the third of the DRV's four points, the US takes note that Chairman Ho Chi Minh in
his letter of January 29/3/ described the program of the NLF as seeking "to achieve independence,
democracy, peace and neutrality in South Viet-Nam and to advance toward peaceful reunification." If
this is all that is intended when it is stated that the affairs of the South Vietnamese be settled "in
accordance with the program of the NLF," the third point would not be an obstacle to negotiations.
/3/Printed in The New York Times, January 29, 1966.

However, it appears that in referring to the program of the NLF the DRV may contemplate that the NLF
arbitrarily be accorded integral participation in a coalition government or be accepted as the "sole
genuine representative of the entire South Vietnamese people" prior to, and without regard to, an
election. If this is what is meant by the third point, we would consider it in contradiction of the very
objectives specified above, and quite without warrant in the Geneva Accords of 1954.
It remains the essence of the USG view that the future political structure in South Viet-Nam should be
determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through truly free elections. The USG is
categorically prepared to accept the results of elections held in an atmosphere free from force,
intimidation or outside interference.
5. In the light of the foregoing and to make clear our understanding of a possible basis for discussions
leading to a peaceful settlement, we submit for consideration of the DRV the following:
Point I--The basic rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and
territorial integrity are recognized as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954. Obtaining compliance
with the essential principles in the Accords is an appropriate subject for immediate, international
discussions or negotiations without preconditions. Such discussions or negotiations should consider,
among other things, appropriate means, including agreed stages, for the withdrawal of military and
quasi-military personnel and weapons introduced into South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam from one
area to the other or into either area from any other outside source; the dismantling of any military bases
in either area, and the cancellation of any military alliances, that may contravene the Accords; and the
regrouping and redeployment of indigenous forces.
Point II--Strict compliance with the military provisions of the Geneva Accords must be achieved in
accordance with schedules and appropriate safeguards to be agreed upon in the said discussions or
negotiations.
Point III--The internal affairs of South and North Viet-Nam must be settled respectively by the South
and North Vietnamese peoples themselves in conformity with the principles of self-determination.
Neither shall interfere in the affairs of the other nor shall there be any interference from any outside
source.
Point IV--The issue of reunification of Viet-Nam must be decided peacefully, on the basis of free
determination by the peoples of South and North Viet-Nam without outside interference. End Text.
6. In delivering text, you should take care not to go beyond its terms in providing explanation to any
questions asked. Naturally, we would be most interested in any comments he may care to make then or
at future date.
7. FYI: Bundy will bring to Baguio some additional material for your background in case of future
contacts. However, for time being, we do not wish to be drawn into extended oral discussion which
might be misunderstood. End FYI.
8. In arranging appointment, you should avoid any impression of undue urgency./4/
/4/In telegram 433 from Rangoon, February 19, Byroade reported that he presented the aide-memoire to
DRV Representative Vu on February 18, who responded that because the United States had resumed the
bombing, it was "inappropriate to continue our contacts." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2714 VIET; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 28-29) In telegram 436

from Rangoon, February 21, Byroade transmitted an aide-memoire from Vu, dated February 19,
explaining why the DRV was discontinuing contact. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14
VIET; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 29-30)
Ball
77. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 16, 1966, 5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20.
Secret. In a covering memorandum to the President, Bundy indicated that he had written this
memorandum on the airplane, presumably while returning from his Asian trip following the Honolulu
Conference. (Ibid.) Bundy provided an interim report on his visit to Saigon, during which he discussed
"strengthened administrative arrangements with Embassy officers," in a memorandum to the President
on February 11. (Ibid.)
Non-Military Organization for Vietnam--in Saigon and in Washington
1. The Ambassador
Lodge has weaknesses and blind spots, but their effects can be minimized by proper staff support. He
has outstanding qualities which are not easily replaced. They make him a very valuable man in Saigon.
He is 64 and he talks of resignation when he is tired or irritated. Since we have to accept the risk of
bothering him on the big things, he should be humored on the little ones
His qualities are these: First and foremost, he is a determined, perceptive, and disinterested servant of
the President and the Secretary of State. He has no axes left to grind. This direct and disciplined loyalty
is of great importance. It means that he always backs up a clearly explained decision and never tries to
undercut. He can be less helpful when he does not know just what is wanted, but that is only to say that
we need to be sure to keep him fully informed. On matters marked as truly sensitive, I believe him to be
reasonably discreet.
Second, Lodge has a clear and strong--if somewhat simplified--view of the war. He knows and respects
its military aspects, but he also knows that it is fundamentally a political and social struggle. He is
receptive to good advice when it comes from men he trusts. He gives strong men wide discretion.
Third, Lodge is trusted and admired by the Vietnamese. He is popular because he stood up to the hated
Diem (this may or may not have been wise as a matter of U. S. policy, but Diem had few Vietnamese
friends in his last days--he had become hated, and his family more so.) He is respected because of his
personal dignity and courtesy (he has never affronted their pride as Max Taylor unintentionally did.) If
he does not make full use of his influence, he does at least work hard for continuity, and he avoids the
error of forcing splits by undue pressure. He is entitled to much of the credit for the relative stability and
good sense of the Ky Government.
Fourth, Lodge has unusual human rapport with the U. S. military. In a country where fully 90% of all U.
S. resources are under Westmoreland, this easy relationship is of great importance. It is not automatic.
When Lodge was first appointed, in 1963, one important point in his favor was that he was presumed to
be able to get along easily with his old friend General Paul Harkins. In fact, the two men did not get on

at all, because they had radically different views of the real situation in Vietnam. (Lodge may not have
been right, but Harkins was surely wrong, and his prolonged tenure was one of our major mistakes.) But
now, with Westmoreland, all is changed. The two men see eye to eye on all fundamentals. They like
each other as well. And now Lodge gets the full advantage of the fact that he did well in World War II,
and knows the Army's ways. He gets much more cooperation from them than he would if he began with
a chip on his shoulder, as too many civilians do.
Fifth, Lodge has the real--if exasperated--affection of nearly all of his staff. His weaknesses can make
him a very difficult boss, but his dedication and decency come through.
Finally, Lodge understands the care and feeding of important visitors, especially Congressmen and U. S.
newspapermen. He spends too much time on this--as he does on diplomatic luncheons--but he does it
well, and he is right about its importance.
His weaknesses are equally real.
First, he has little taste for the hard work that lies between a general assertion of purpose and a concrete
administrative achievement. The only things in Saigon that he really administers are the arrangements
for comfort and security at his own house (they are excellent). He does not manage the U. S. program
himself, and he does not insist that others do it. Because he does not watch details, he thinks many
things are easier than they are (although he is more realistic today than he was a few months back).
Second, his energy level is not high. He can spend two days on a single cable, with time out for social
activity and a daily swim and a couple of diplomatic visits.
Third, he gravely underrates the importance of economics. The subject bores him, and he does not make
it easy for his senior economic advisers to press their concerns. As a result, the voice of the U. S. is slow
and weak at the highest levels on what is now a problem of the first urgency.
Fourth, Lodge frets over trivia. Many great men have this weakness, but Lodge is not a great man, and
he does not have the strength to spare. Seen against the stakes of Vietnam and the sacrifices of the
fighting men (not the Saigon staffs), the matter of wives is a small one, at least for a man whose wife
can take it, but it is never out of his mind and seldom out of his talk. He is loyal to the Rusk-Lodge
understanding, but he frets about it. And the same characteristic shows in many other smaller matters.
This combination of qualities and defects makes Lodge the very model of a man who needs staff
support. He needs a chief of staff; he needs a handholder on political affairs; he needs a second-level
factotum; and he needs a bright young personal assistant--and he needs the sympathetic understanding
of all the top men on the American team. The wonder of the matter is that with the arrangements that the
President has successfully pressed upon him, Lodge will now have exactly this kind of help (with a
single exception noted below).
The first indispensable man in this enterprise is William Porter. Porter is shrewd, cool, strong,
experienced and determined. He understands the war. He is admired throughout the mission. Lodge
trusts him entirely. He knows and is known by Washington. He likes and understands management.
The second indispensable man is Westmoreland--and if I put him second it is only because he has now
set the shape of MACV so firmly that any successor will be guided by many of his standards.
Westmoreland has made 200,000 Americans understand that they must make the Vietnamese be glad of
their presence and not hate it. He has also made his large and strong-minded military command

remarkably responsive to the needs of half a dozen other agencies, all of which would be gravely
hampered if MACV should give them only grudging support. Finally, Westmoreland has never
neglected the critically important task of persistent effort to strengthen the forces of the GVN (in this
last respect his officers are not all as determined as he, and if he were replaced by a more single-minded
U. S. fighting man, the future of the GVN forces could become bleak).
The appointment of Porter to be Chief of Staff for all aspects of pacification/rural construction is a major
forward step. Several valuable secondary changes are already planned. The most important will put
Philip Habib and Sam Wilson on Lodge's small floor of the revamped chancery, in place of Porter (who
will have a staff of his own) and Chadbourn (transferred). The more gently these changes are handled,
the less Lodge will fret--and the less the Vietnamese will gossip about "coups" among the Americans
(the rapid turnover among senior Americans--especially in AID--has been a topic of Vietnamese talk).
But the fact of change is more important than its manner, and the most important thing is speed. Lodge
will fuss about all this until it is done. Then he will like it very much.
The one remaining weakness in the Saigon staff is in Economic advice and resource management. No
easy remedy is at hand. The present head of USAID is Charles Mann, and he is the best officer to hold
this assignment so far. Moreover, he has an excellent economic deputy, Roy Wehrle, who is fully
competent to give good advice both to Mann and the Ambassador. But neither Mann nor Wehrle is
really able to make Lodge listen. Economics irritate him, and so do Mann's teutonisms and Wehrle's dire
warnings (though the latter are fully justified). It would be a mistake to change Mann now (he has many
virtues and would be hard to replace), but Wehrle leaves in June and it is a matter of great urgency to
find an economist to replace him who will have the tact and rank and persistence to make Lodge do
what only he can do--keep a steady and top priority pressure on the GVN. Meanwhile in this field
(unlike others) there is a continuous need for prodding from Washington.
2. Organization in Washington
The best way to attack this problem is to look at it first from Saigon.
The new arrangements in Saigon make a triangle. At the apex is Lodge. He is the President's
representative and the senior American in Vietnam. In particular, he is charged with political advice
both to Washington and to the GVN. He has direct access to the President, but he normally
communicates through the Department of State. The staff agency which supports him is the Far Eastern
Bureau of the State Department. He is currently well served.
One line of the triangle goes from Lodge to Westmoreland. West-moreland is the top military
commander and he has a special responsibility to the President through the Secretary of Defense (the
charts make it more complicated, but on major policy matters this is how it really is and how Westy
thinks of it). He is responsible for U. S. military operations and for military advice to Washington. On
day-to-day matters, he gets his support from CINCPAC and from the JCS. He too is well served.
Porter will now be at the end of the other side of the triangle. He will get overall guidance from Lodge
and from the President. He will have local authority over agency heads. But who will give him prompt
executive support in Washington? That man does not now exist. It cannot be done by any one agency
alone--not AID and not the State Department; it cannot be done by a Committee of Assistant Secretaries;
it cannot be done by the President himself; it certainly cannot be done by the Pentagon (though all of
these means have been tried at one time or another).
My own belief is that we need a Director of Non-Military Operations in Vietnam (DINOMO?)

appointed by the President and responsible to him through the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense together--with advice from the Director of CIA, the Director of USIA, the Administrator of
AID. This officer should keep his military flank clear with DOD and his diplomatic and policy line clear
with State--but as far as possible he should stay out of both areas. His responsibility should be for nonmilitary operations only. He should have the right of direct communication with Porter, and he should
be charged with assuring that no needed action is delayed, for any reason, without a prompt report to the
President. He should be an officer who prefers action to excuses and management to contemplation. He
should count himself successful when both the President and Porter are happy. He will not be successful
at once.
I recommend that the President request the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and myself to
prepare and submit a list of candidates for this appointment before the close of business on Friday,
February 18./2/
/2/In his covering memorandum, Bundy indicated that this procedure was deliberately designed to give
Johnson "a Presidential result," since both Bundy and McNamara had reluctantly concluded that "this
operation cannot be managed through State Department channels alone."
McG. B./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
Yes/4/
No
/4/The President checked this option and wrote: "This is excellent."
78. Memorandum From George Reedy to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 17, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Ex CO 312. No classification marking. Reedy
served on Johnson's Senate and Vice Presidential staffs and was Press Secretary to the President from
March 1964 to July 1965.
1. The unfortunate aspect of the current public debate on Viet Nam is less the impact it is having on
Peking and Hanoi than the effect that it is having on the American people. Persons are being swept by
the force of the debate into categories where they do not belong and if the current trend continues, deep
divisions will result which will hamper the President in the conduct of foreign policy and perhaps make
it impossible to act intelligently.
2. At the present time, the debate is being conducted in the tone of a "hawks" and "doves" clash with the
"hawks" convinced that anyone outside of their ranks is a "chicken" and the "doves" convinced that
anyone outside of their ranks is a "vulture." In reality, this is a very subtle problem with many fine
shadings of emphasis and it is probable that except for the extremists on both sides it would be difficult
to find a clear cut position that commands a national majority on all major points. In a situation like this,
however, people who are in between find themselves pushed into one camp or the other. And it really
does not matter which camp wins--because either way, the Nation loses.

3. The current debate has also, to some extent, limited the Administration's freedom of action. At the
present time, the "doves" are having their innings and therefore the Administration is being presented to
the public as a "hawk." Somewhere along the line the "hawks" will come up to bat and at that point the
scene will shift and the Administration will look like a "dove." Nothing good can come from this as in
either role the Administration is forced on the defensive and distracted from its primary purpose--finding
an honorable way to close out the situation in Viet Nam.
4. In this case, the situation is not helped by the unanimity among the President's advisors. This is an
honest unanimity but to the public it presents the picture of a President who is listening only to advice
from a group of men who are so deeply involved themselves in an enterprise that they have no
alternative other than to agree with him. It would, of course, be foolish to create an artificial discord
among competent and conscientious men where it does not, in fact, exist. But it would be reassuring to
the public if it were thought that the President was giving a real audience to the more respectable and
responsible voices of dissent.
5. The testimony of General Gavin and George Kennan before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee/2/ offers an excellent example of men being placed in categories of opinion which they do
not really hold. In reality, they approached the issue from a moderate standpoint and in a sensible tone.
They made clear their uneasiness and expressed some opinions that are worth considering. They did not
indulge in any personalities or vituperation. Yet, they have become the darlings of the "doves" who are
anxiously hoping that the Administration will blast Gavin and Kennan and thus drive them into the
"dove" camp, which now lacks really respectable leadership.
/2/See Document 64.
6. It would appear (although it is difficult to discern amidst the current partisan bickering) that the
Gavin-Kennan concern really centers about one point--whether the operation in Viet Nam is being
conducted properly as an integral part of an overall United States world strategy. It is possible that they
have a point, in which case somebody should listen to it quietly and reflectively and come up with a
reasoned evaluation. It is possible that they don't have a point--and if this could be demonstrated to them
in a calm, orderly atmosphere, they would be removed as a potential rallying point for the "doves." In
either case, however, neither one of them has said anything unforgiveable and both are responsible,
reputable men to whom any President can turn for advice without demeaning himself.
7. It would have a good effect upon the country if the President were to invite Gavin and Kennan to the
White House for a quiet, but lengthy and thorough, luncheon conference./3/ It may be that out of such a
conference there could come a continuing arrangement in which their advice would be available to the
Government on a continuing basis. If this could be arranged, it would have the following benefits:
/3/The President did not meet with either Kennan or Gavin during 1966. (Johnson Library, President's
Daily Diary)
a. They might have some thoughts that are well worth having.
b. They might have even better thoughts if they had continuing, day-to-day contact with the realities of
the situation.
c. The country would have an example of a President seeking, on a personal basis, advice from men of
demonstrated independence of thought.

d. The "doves" would lose a rallying point that could present some difficulties.
e. The frantic tone of the present debate would be ameliorated and Viet Nam could be discussed in a
calmer atmosphere.
79. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, February 19, 1966, 10 a.m.-1:30 p.m
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80-B0125A, Memos for the Record, 01
Jan 65-31 Dec 1972. Secret. Prepared by Helms on February 22.
SUBJECT
White House Meeting, 19 February
PRESENT WERE
The President
For State: Mr.Rusk (part time) and Mr. Ball
For Defense: Mr. McNamara and General Wheeler
For the White House: Messrs. Bundy and Moyers and General Taylor
For CIA: Richard Helms
1. The meeting convened at 10:00 A.M. and adjourned at 1:30 P.M. without interruption.
2. The following matters were among those discussed.
a. Relations with the Congress on the whole problem of Vietnam. In this connection, there was
considerable discussion of difficulties caused for the Administration by speeches of individuals such as
Senator Stennis which had the effect of scaring other members of Congress./2/
/2/According to McGeorge Bundy's personal notes of the meeting, the President stated: "Real source of
our trouble is Stennis. The wild figures in the papers come from him & that's what scares Mansfield &
Fulbright." Johnson continued, "the problem is that he gets our figures." McNamara stated: "We have
not indicated our plans." Johnson responded: "The real plans do get to Stennis & let's try to prevent
it." (Johnson Library, McGeorge Bundy Papers)
b. Senator Robert Kennedy's responsibility for the first pause in the air bombing of North Vietnam.
c. A detailed discussion of the motivation of those Senators, fifteen in number, who signed a letter to the
President/3/ opposing any escalation of the war in Vietnam.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 50.
d. Constitutional problems connected with presidential authority to wage the war in Vietnam.
e. The President's desire to have cheap TV sets placed in Vietnam for purposes of education and
indoctrination, the cost of this program to run around $3,000,000.
f. A discussion of how to handle the build-up of United States forces in Vietnam.

g. A schedule of meetings with congressional leaders./4/

/4/According to McGeorge Bundy's notes, at one point in the meeting Johnson said, speaking of
Congress, "maybe we consult with 'em too much--that and the press may be the root of our trouble."
h. The problems posed by the testimony of General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan.
i. The advisability of using the White House for large meetings of Senators and Congressmen.
j. A poll on Vietnam taken in the State of Rhode Island and certain counties in New York and New
Jersey.
k. Telegrams to the White House from citizens around the country on General Taylor's testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
l. Discussion of a possible candidate for the back-up job in Washington on the non-military aspects of
United States programs in Vietnam, this individual to be the Washington counterpart of Ambassador
Porter in Saigon.
RH/5/
/5/Helms handwrote the following note below his initials: "A recurrent theme of this meeting was the
question of a Congressional resolution, although no decision was reached. The President is weighing in
his mind whether to stand on the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution or push for a new one in this Session
which would reaffirm his authority." For a discussion of Senator Wayne Morse's amendment, introduced
on January 29, to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and of growing interest among some Senators in
a new resolution to augment or replace it, see William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the
Vietnam War, Part IV, pp. 251-259.
80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, February 21, 1966, 7:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Read;
cleared by President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, and Rusk; and approved by Read. Drafts of the
telegram with the President's handwritten revisions are in the Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVII. Attached to the drafts is a note stating that the President read the
telegram to Goldberg and Moyers for their approval while they were in his office on February 21.
2478. Eyes only for Lodge and Westmoreland from the Secretary. We are sure you will have been
watching the discussions in the Foreign Relations Committee and also the statement of Senator Robert
Kennedy,/2/ with public reactions to it. We are sure that your own understanding of the Administration
position will not have been affected by comments of critics, but it seems important here that Thieu and
Ky should be informed not only of debates and discussions, but of this Administration's position. We
therefore hope that you will make sure that the essentials of the position presented by General Taylor
and myself are fully understood by the government in Saigon. In particular it can be assured that our
position on the NLF has not changed. We do believe that their views can be considered (see President's
statement of July)/3/ but we do not believe that the United States should force a place for them in a
coalition government. We share the hopes and purposes of the GVN for elections with safeguards which
will permit a really free choice without coercion or fraud.

/2/In a statement at a press conference on February 21, Kennedy stated that admitting "discontented
elements in South Vietnam"--including the National Liberation Front-- "to a share of power and
responsibility is at the heart of the hope for a negotiated settlement. For excerpts from Kennedy's
statement, see The New York Times, February 20, 1966.
/3/Reference is to the President's remarks on the Viet Cong made at his press conference on July 28,
1965. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book
II, p. 803.
What we hope you can communicate to the GVN, in short, is a full understanding of both our own
firmness and determination and of the real problems created by critics here who seize upon any minor
difference to exploit. The government in Saigon can rely on us, and at the same time they can help us by
implementing and accelerating the policy and purpose of progressive social action set forth by them in
Honolulu and afterwards./4/
/4/In telegram 3061 from Saigon, February 22, Lodge responded that "Thieu and Ky are well aware of
administration's position arising out of current debate in Washington. Coverage of your statements and
those of General Taylor is good here and I will see to it that they are aware of all you are saying and
what it means." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk
81. Telephone Conversion Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, February 22, 1966, 8:52 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation
between Johnson and Rusk, Tape 6602.05, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
Rusk: I will call Mac [Bundy] and see whether he feels that he's been over the testimony and knows
your view on these matters.
President: What's your evaluation of the Kennedy statement?/2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 80.
Rusk: I think it's bad myself. I was surprised at what it had after Bob told me that he thought it wouldn't
cause us much trouble.
President: I think it's tragic. I just think it's tragic. Everybody I've talked to thinks the same thing. It's so
presumptuous. Some of the things he says--one of the first things is, he says that he doesn't want the
Russians and the Communists to be over-gleeful and expect him to be elected President because if he
were elected President it wouldn't mean that he'd have an easy surrender himself. Ever hear of anything
that presumptuous? Listen to this [reading]:/3/ "The Senator in effect warned Russia, China, and North
Vietnam not to anticipate a turn of events in which he would become President and quickly end the war
on terms more favorable to the Communist side." Well hell, he don't have to become President to do
that--that's what he's trying to do now.
/3/What the President was reading has not been identified.

Rusk: No, I think it has greatly weakened our position with Hanoi and it prolongs the war actually. It's
another one of those things that keeps the other side going.
President: And I think it means a majority in the Senate against us, Dean. I honestly think that. I think
that the Bayhs, and the Tydings, and the two Kennedys, and the Muskies--the general Catholic operation
there--when the chips are down they will pick up enough Cases and perhaps a Javits, with the New York
Times leveling that way, and maybe a Scott, he hasn't yet, but I see the way the ADA and the liberals
and how it flows--the ball--and if the Times keeps hitting us this way, why we're just really going to be
murderous [murdered]. I talked to Clark Clifford a long time last night. He thinks that we would just be
idiotic to ask for a new resolution. He says that that resolution/4/ cannot be plainer than it is, that it is
unlimited, that what you do, you imply that you have questioned yourself about what you've been doing.
You imply to the people that well, hell, you didn't have authority all along. I [He] said that first thing
you've got to do is make abundantly clear that you've got all the authority you need as commander in
chief--160 times you've gone in. Number 2, you've got to make it clear that this treaty/5/ requires you to
stand up to your commitment. Number 3, you've got to make it clear you wouldn't exercise any of these
troops--wouldn't put them out there, wouldn't start the bombing until they said they'd go in with us and
we're all together and we're one nation united indivisible. Now then, he says, you come along and say,
well, I want a new resolution. You imply that there's something wrong with this one and [he ?] said
would this [new] one just last 18 months like the last one? And where the hell would you be?
/4/Reference is to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; see footnote 4, Document 72.
/5/Reference is to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954.
Rusk: Well in the floor debate in the Senate, it was pointed out that the President has this authority and
that this is the case of the Congress joining with the President. A hell of a lot of them made that point.
President: That's right. I think that would be one good thing though, for George to point out--that there
are 160 times the President has gone in without a declaration of war to protect the interests of the United
States--the President has this constitutional power.
Rusk: The figure I have is 125, Mr. President.
President: Well whatever it is--they told me 163--or 23, I don't care. Just assert that he has it, number 1;
then, number 2, that the treaty comes along and everybody debates that. Foster Dulles--the liberals that
were against him are not ever going to be with us anyway but we've to show that this was some of his
handiwork, that he says that we have got to stop subversion and we've got to stop the Communist
aggression and if we notify them ahead of time, we've got a chance to do it. May not do it. We may have
to stop them finally in their boots but we ought to tell them ahead of time so they'll know what they're
doing. And that was generally his position.
Rusk: And that is what the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said in its conclusion.
President: That's right. Now then they did that and Mansfield and all of them signed it. So we have an
obligation there and the President wouldn't be worthy of his salt if he didn't do it or else why have a
treaty. What would the Senate think about a President that wouldn't live up to a treaty. That's number 2.
But this President says now he knows the Senate pretty damned well. I don't think any of you all [who]
would want to be nice to them can afford to say this bluntly but the net effect is that he knows you so
damned well, he knows you're going to run when the going gets tough and therefore he wants you tied,
bound, and delivered beforehand and he says to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense he

will not pee a drop until you come in with a resolution that says, number 1, direct me to respond to
armed attack; number 2, authorize me to enforce this treaty; and number 3, direct me to prevent any
aggression. Now, that's what they did; now he is in the process of doing that and if you don't want any of
those things done, we've provided you a remedy. Anytime you want to change your mind and do a flipflop, you can do it. But until you do, why we've just got to move. I think that ought to be stressed a good
deal so that the people of the country know that this dammed Senate that's wandering around--I was just
talking to a good lawyer in New York and he says what they're doing, they're confusing the people. The
people don't see their alternatives; they can't find what would you do. They don't get it one time. When
you just say it once on television: what would you do if you were President of the United States--that
doesn't get through to them. You've got to repeat it like Hitler did, 20 times and then maybe they do.
And I think we've got to repeat this resolution and say, now we don't say you can't debate, we don't say
you oughtn't to debate, and we don't say you oughtn't to discuss it all you want to. But we do say this is
what you've done. Now if you don't want to do this, if you want to seat Communists, if they want to
surrender to the Communists, if you want to let them go on and have aggression, if you want to abandon
the treaty, or if you do not think this is good national policy you enunciated, then repeal it. And the
President's got no voice in it. Now he'll go on fighting if he wants to, because he has that power anyway.
I don't know, but I'm afraid that Mac and George could today, with this thing as vicious as it is, with the
Kennedy infiltration all over the place, I'm afraid that out of that will come some commitment that will
be a little bit difficult for us. I have a hunch this morning that they're going to say something like Averell
said, that we ought to sit down with the Viet Cong. Now, I thought Averell just made a mistake but in
light of Bobby's statement, he may have kind of been paving the way a little because they're awfully
close and Joe Kraft's awfully close, and every damned time I call Averell to compliment him, he's at Joe
Kraft's house. I don't know how much of this is kind of a wing. You know Bob McNamara has felt that
while we ought to have limited objectives, that we ought to make it abundantly clear that we did not
necessarily have to have everybody of our own choosing in this government, that it could be a
Communist government and we could have some doubtful characters like we had in Laos. And he's said
to me not once but I guess a dozen times that if we would moderate our objectives and what we're
fighting for there, we'd have more chance of succeeding. And he's also felt, which is a very dangerous
position to me (and there's not a man in the government I'd say this to but you, not another one), but he
has said to me a number of times that he thought that we ought to give serious consideration to this. And
then when he said the other day that we only have one chance out of three of winning, it just shocked me
and furthermore it shocked everybody at the table. It shocked Bill Moyer
Rusk: Well Bob, quite frankly, Mr. President, he hasn't had too much experience in dealing with crises,
and I just don't believe that, and I can't pull out a slide rule and prove it, but the boys out in the field are
proving it and are proving that we can do better than that. I am absolutely sure myself that the other side
is going to make some new decisions on this thing.
President: They must be getting great encouragement though. If this is causing us this much trouble,
don't you know that they're enjoying it.
Rusk: Yes. Well I'll get hold of George and Mac right away.
President: And what do you think that our official response is going to be to the Kennedy statement?
Rusk: Oh, I think we ought to go right back to your July statement,/6/ just stay with that.
/6/See footnote 3, Document 80.
President : Well, they'll just say "do you agree with Senator Kennedy that we ought [to] appoint some

Viet Cong ahead of time?" I'm inclined to say--I may be wrong on this--but I'm inclined to say that we
have made it abundantly clear that we're for free elections, that we're willing to let the United Nations
supervise them or anybody else that'll give us an honest free election and we're not in the business, that's
just not our occupation of the moment, going around appointing Communist governments.
Rusk: That's right. That's right.
President: And we believe in self determination and we don't believe in trading with the Communists
and appointing them. Now, what's wrong with that?
Rusk: I think that's right.
President: OK.
82. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, February 22, 1966, 11:45 a.m.-1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record,
01 Jan 65-31 Dec 1972. Secret. Prepared by Helms on February 23.
SUBJECT
White House Meeting, 22 February
PRESENT WERE
The President
For State: Messrs. Rusk, Ball, and Rostow
For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance and General Wheeler
For AID: Mr. Gaud
For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Komer, Moyers, Smith, plus General Taylor and Mr. Clark
Clifford
For CIA: Admiral Raborn and Richard Helms
1. The meeting convened at 11:45 A.M and adjourned at 1:30 P.M.
2. In addition to the items set forth on the printed agenda, attached,/2/ the following items were
discussed at this meeting:
/2/The attached agenda lists three items: 1) Vice President Humphrey's return and the Congress; 2)
Handling any new policy resolution in Congress--alternative administration resolutions and alternative
tactics with the resolutions of others; 3) organization of non-military efforts in Washington. Prior to the
meeting the President discussed the agenda with McGeorge Bundy during a lengthy telephone
conversation. A recording of the conversation is in the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts,
Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, February 22, 1966, 9:04 a.m., Tape
6602.06, PNO 3.
a. The President decided to have the congressional leaders meet with the Vice President at 8:00 A.M. on
Thursday morning followed by a 9 to 10:30 meeting with him for the Foreign Relations, Armed
Services, and Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House in the East Room.

b. A decision was made to have General Taylor make a public statement clarifying the Administration's
disagreement with Senator Kennedy on the subject of a coalition government in South Vietnam.
c. Central points which the Vice President should make in his talks with Congressmen were enumerated:
(1) That this is a limited war.
(2) That the United States is being successful in its prosecution.
(3) That we are receiving help from SEATO countries in the battle.
d. There was a lengthy discussion of non-military programs in South Vietnam with particular reference
to the role to be played by Secretaries Gardner and Freeman. It emerged that the President wants to
make South Vietnam a showcase for Asia as to what the United States can do to make a better life for
the Vietnamese people. He is pushing for a variety of programs, including new teaching techniques,
temporary hospitals, an increased flow of medicines, etc. Concern was expressed over the United States
proceeding too fast and overloading the capacities of the South Vietnamese Government.
e. The resolution question was again discussed at considerable length. Mr. Clark Clifford argued that the
Administration should stand on the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution and should not go for a new one. He
was supported by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and appears to have carried the day./3/
/3/Helms' handwritten notes of the meeting, recorded on the attached agenda, include the following:
"Resolution Question
"a) Stand on '64 resolution, or
"b) Go Morse route, or
"c) Joe Rauh moderating resolution"
"Clifford re resolution problem
"a) admin should go on doing what it's doing
"b) Pres thinking we should guide events
"c) Clifford disagrees--this is Cong problem."
f. Mr. Moyers described a dinner conversation which he had had with Senator Fulbright on Monday
evening.
RH
83. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 23, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret.

HONOLULU MEETING

RECORD OF CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION/2/

/2/As recorded in public communications, records of plenary and working group sessions and notes on
restricted sessions. [ Footnote in the source text.]
[Here follows a table of contents.]
Explanation
The Consensuses recorded in the following text were those jointly reached by the U.S. and Vietnamese
delegations at Honolulu. In some cases these represent a specific form of words as adopted; in others
they are an effort to record the sense of one or several general discussions.
The Further Actions noted are based on specific discussions which involved both Vietnamese and U.S.
representatives. In the parentheses following the action there is noted which agency is primarily
responsible for follow up on this matter; this means in many instances a responsibility is placed on the
U.S. Mission Saigon to keep the Vietnamese Government moving on the agreed action.
I. Diplomatic Track
Consensus: The United States Government and the Government of Viet-Nam will continue to press the
quest for a peaceful settlement in every forum and explore every path to peace. They will stay in close
touch to proceed internationally as closely together as possible.
Further Action
1. U.S. and GVN leaders agreed on full consultation on further action at Security Council. (Resp: State)
2. The Secretary and FonMin Do reportedly agreed on language for Japanese consensus statement./3/
(Resp: State)
/3/Not further identified.
3. It was agreed everything possible will be done to prevent an independent VC role at any future
negotiation. (No more precise decision taken.) (Resp: State)
4. All measures possible will be taken to increase pressure on Hanoi to bring them to the conference
table or persuade them to stop aggression by their tacit acceptance of the fact they cannot win. (See II.
Military Program.) (Resp: DOD, State)
5. The President asked for the GVN's suggestions on further peace initiatives we might take. (Resp:
GVN, Embassy)
6. Vice President Humphrey and Governor Harriman will visit Asian capitals to explain our position and
describe the Honolulu meeting. (Action taken)

II. Military Program

Consensus: U.S. and GVN leaders announced a policy of "growing military effectiveness and still closer
cooperation." We will act with all possible regard for the rights of civilians and respect for the territorial
integrity of peaceful neighboring countries, and will adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1949 on
treatment of prisoners of war.
Further Action
1. Among the measures to be considered to induce Hanoi to move to the conference table will be
Ambassador Thai's idea of feints by GVN sea forces against North Viet-Nam to preoccupy and pin
down North Vietnamese armed forces and to create uncertainty there. (Resp: DOD, State)
2. The Secretary of State will take another look at various possible measures for bringing pressure on
Hanoi which were mentioned, including bombing dikes or water gates in the pre-flood period. (Resp:
DOD, State)
3. The GVN was urged to carry out further internal reforms within the RVNAF. (Resp: GVN, Mission)
III. Free World Assistance
Consensus: The GVN, with strong U.S. support, will press for a maximum number of contributors and a
maximum number of types of assist-ance.
Further Action
1. Free World assistance activities should be more closely coordinated. In addition to close coordination
in Saigon, Washington is to be kept fully informed so that GVN Missions in Washington and New York
can take initiatives with foreign representatives located there. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, all
Washington agencies concerned with FWA)
2. Study will be given to increasing Free World assistance to the GVN agricultural cadre program.
(Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, AID with Dept. of Agriculture and State)
3. Study will also be given to increasing Free World assistance to the GVN's medical programs. (Resp:
GVN, U.S. Mission, AID and Dept. Health, Education and Welfare and State) (See also IV-F.)
4. Top level U.S representatives will be sent to Australia, Korea and New Zealand to thank them for
their assistance and to the Philippines to press for further assistance in the form of an engineer battalion
with an adequate security force. (Resp: White House, State)
5. Ways of gaining further Latin American assistance will be studied. (Resp: State)
IV. Internal Vietnamese Programs
IV-A. Rural Construction Program
Consensus: Building democracy in rural areas is as important as military battles--rural construction is
the central instrument in bringing about the social revolution on which Viet-Nam is now embarked. For
1966, program should concentrate on four priority areas.

Further Action
1. Assure that province chief actually retains operational control over necessary military forces to
support program in his province. (Resp: U.S. Mission Saigon, with reports to Washington if problems
arise)
2. Areas where program under way, and four priority areas in particular, should be placed under superior
province chiefs who should not be removed while program being developed without serious cause.
(Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)
3. Move forward with elected village executive councils as rapidly as feasible. (Resp: GVN & U.S.
Mission)
4. Assure that all Ministries concerned with pacification work out effective coordination among
themselves. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)
5. Adequate military priority should be given by ARVN commanders to priority rural construction areas.
(Resp: GVN, MACV to follow up)
6. General Thang stated provinces should achieve 75 percent of their 1966 plans by the end of the year.
This would involve the pacification of 963 new hamlets, consolidation of 1,083 existing hamlets, and
the building of 2,251 classrooms, 913 kilometers of roads, 148 bridges, 57 dams and 119 kilometers of
canals.
7. Emphasis will be given to increasingly effective cadre training, with emphasis on political
indoctrination and winning the people's sympathy. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)
8. Greater emphasis is to be put on U.S. and RVNAF troop indoctrination to assure better understanding
of how to win over population, with U.S. to study additional support requirements. (Resp: GVN Political
Warfare Directorate, DOD, JUSPAO)
9. Develop more agricultural cadre for greater emphasis on agricultural development, especially in
priority areas; study increasing Free World assistance in this area. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, AID with
Dept. of Agriculture and State) (See also III: Free World Assistance.)
10. Expand the development of handicraft and light cottage industries, emphasizing priority areas.
Handicraft industries should be encouraged to hire refugees, veterans and, in Minister Ton's words,
"people whose livelihood comes from the presence of allied forces in Viet-Nam." (GVN, U.S. Mission
and AID) (See also IV-B. Refugees.)
11. Study formation of a land reform organization in each priority area. (GVN and U.S. Mission)
12. Expand rural electrification program, adding at least 50 new stations if feasible during 1966. (GVN,
USAID, Secy Freeman to investigate)
13. Study improved credit facilities for farmers, and place emphasis on more efficient production. (Resp:
GVN, USAID, Dept. of Agriculture)
14. Study possibilities of joint training program for village and hamlet chiefs, who would presumably be
elected. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)

15. An agreed name for the program should be selected as among pacification, rural construction and
social construction (see Saigon Embtels 2967,/4/ 2997/5/ and 3063)./6/
/4/Dated February 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/5/Dated February 17. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)
/6/Dated February 22. (Ibid.)
IV-B. Refugees
Consensus:
The care of refugees is highly important as a means of including in the social revolution now going on in
South Viet-Nam the large numbers of people who have courageously, of their own free will, left the Viet
Cong. The refugees must be prepared to resume a useful role in society. U.S. aid for refugees is an
important demonstration of the humanitarian aspects of U.S. aid to Viet-Nam, and the U.S. will provide
full support for GVN plans in this area.
Further Action:
1. Special effort will be made to provide schools for refugee children. (Resp: GVN, AID with HEW)
2. In addition to the school effort, the President urged special attention to other refugee projects such as
vocational training, small loan programs and the like. (Resp: GVN, AID with HEW)
3. Refugees should be given employment in light industry and given training in handicrafts. (Resp:
GVN, U.S. Mission)
IV-C. Political Development and Current Politics
Consensus: The GVN affirmed its intention to proceed with the building of democracy and encouraging
a widened and more active popular participation in and contribution to this process. The U.S. affirmed
its support for free elections.
Further Action:
1. The GVN will appoint an advisory council consisting of 80 members selected from a cross-section of
society and all regions of the country. Appointment will be made by the end of February. (Resp: GVN,
U.S. Embassy to monitor)
2. Advisory Council will draft a constitution, which will be taken to the people for discussion and
modification and submitted to a referendum in late 1966. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Embassy)
3. The Council will also discuss electoral laws and political party formation. On the basis of elections,
rooted in the constitution, the GVN will create an elected government. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Embassy)
4. Ambassador Lodge will continue to carry on a dialogue with the GVN on this subject.
5. A Washington representative or group will go to Saigon at some point in the future to discuss political

development with GVN leaders. (Resp: State)

6. The President made it clear we are not pushing the GVN to move more quickly than would be wise or
to change its ideas on the subject. (Resp: U.S. Embassy)
7. General Ky was urged to spend more time in the countryside in the role of a political leader. (Resp:
U.S. Mission)
IV-D. Montagnards
Consensus: General Thang stated that in the new society the GVN was trying to build all groups,
including Montagnards, would be treated equally.
IV-E. Chieu Hoi
Consensus: The GVN is making an appeal to the enemy to leave VC ranks and join with South VietNam in the "national, revolutionary adventure" on which it is embarked. The U.S. pledged its full
support to the principle of open arms and amnesty for all who turn from terror toward peace and rural
construction.
Further Action:
1. Generals Ky and Thieu agreed to place greater emphasis on the Chieu Hoi Program. (Resp: GVN,
U.S. Mission, especially JUSPAO)
2. President Johnson urged a strong program directed at "very young" members of the VC. (GVN, U.S.
Mission, especially JUSPAO)
IV-F. Economic and Social Programs
1. Health
Consensus: The GVN will intensify efforts to meet at least its basic needs in context of mounting
demands upon scarce resources. The U.S. hopes to expand its health program considerably to assist the
GVN to meet these goals.
Further Action: (For details, see Saigon's Toaid 4985.)/7/
/7/Dated February 15. (Ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam, Misc. Notebooks)
a. A team of experts under Secretary Gardner will go to Saigon to clarify specific future goals and agree
with GVN on action assignments. (Resp: HEW)
b. Both governments agreed to make increased efforts to train health personnel. (GVN, USAID, HEW)
c. A more effective medical logistics system will be established. (GVN, USAID, HEW)
d. Increased medical manpower to be sought through the dispatch of U.S. and Free World medical teams
to the provinces. (GVN, U.S. Mission, State)

e. Attempts will be made to stem drain of manpower through adjustment of wage levels, and to gain
manpower through incentive systems, and possibly a release of health personnel with long service in the
Armed Forces. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)
f. Improvement will be sought on epidemic reporting system; U.S. (and hopefully Free World) will
assist in providing modern immunizing equipment. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, State)
g. Increase assistance to refugees, including surveillance, immunization, etc. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)
2. Education
Consensus: Strong emphasis should be put on vocational and technical education, and on assistance to
refugees.
Further Action: (For details, see Saigon's Toaid 4985.)
a. GVN will inform USG of appropriate time for visit of team headed by Secretary Gardner to go to
Saigon. (Resp: GVN, HEW)
b. Efforts will be made to increase vocational training for students finishing primary education. (Resp:
GVN, USAID)
c. Agreement to strengthen cooperation in building elementary schools as rapidly as possible, paying
particular attention to priority areas and refugees, and in training teachers. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)
(See also IV-B.)
d. U.S. will continue supply of textbooks to schools, with 7 million more scheduled for 1966. (Resp:
USAID)
3. Agriculture
Consensus: Increasing food production is a fundamental part of the GVN's effort to create a better life
for its people, and U.S. assistance in this is a fundamental part of U.S. efforts to help the Vietnamese
people build while they fight. It is also part of the U.S. pledge to attack hunger wherever it is found.
Further Action:
a. Secretary Freeman and team of experts to develop enlarged program of agricultural cooperation from
visit to Saigon. (Resp: GVN, USDA)
b. It was agreed that a special effort will be made to move agricultural know-how--particularly new
species of rice and corn and vegetable seeds--from the experimental station to the farmer. (Resp: GVN,
USAID)
c. Steps for more rapid land reform were reviewed and will receive further study. The U.S. pledged its
full support for land reform. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)
d. Production in the agricultural sector will be increased. Top priority will be given to expansion of
agricultural industries such as processing of agricultural products and production of fertilizer and
agricultural implements. (Resp: GVN, USAID)

4. General Economic
Further Action:
a. US agreed to increase its project assistance to the level of at least 150 million dollars. (Resp: USAID)
IV-G. Financial Stabilization
Consensus: South Viet-Nam faces a serious problem of inflationary demand during the current year, but
with appropriate stabilization measures the situation is manageable. The GVN will follow a policy of
economic austerity.
Further Action: (see February 8 Minutes of Understanding, and report on February 7 meeting--Annex IV
G--for details.)/8/
/8/Not attached.
1. U.S will increase commodity import and PL 480 Title I assistance to at least $400 million in CY
1966, subject to market demand and port capacity. (Resp: AID)
2. Subject to market demand and port capacity the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam agreed to
increase imports to a level compatible with a policy of using its foreign exchange earnings in 1966 to
help combat inflation. (Resp: GVN, USAID, Embassy to monitor)
3. Advance deposits by importers will be required. (Resp: GVN, USAID and Embassy to monitor)
4. The 90-day grace period on payment of duties will be eliminated. (GVN, AID and Embassy to
monitor)
5. The customs force will be enlarged, with U.S. technical assistance. (GVN, AID, Treasury)
6. Overall import procedures are to be simplified. Study to be made of the entire system of import
procedures, to begin in the next few weeks. (Resp: GVN, AID)
7. U.S will eliminate present barter requirements with respect to procurement from less developed
countries of commodities other than petroleum products. (Resp: AID)
8. AID will reduce the time required to produce bulk items. (Resp: AID)
9. The GVN will appoint a master port director, responsible directly to the office of the Prime Minister,
and give adequate authority to a single Saigon port director. (Resp: GVN, USAID to monitor)
10. The U.S. will supply technical assistance in port management. (Resp: AID)
11. Security stockpiles will be established as quickly as port facilities allow. Plans will be drawn up at
once for warehousing and management of stockpiles. (Resp: GVN, AID)
12. The U.S. will remove PX supplies from port area warehouses as expeditiously as possible. (Resp:
MACV)

13. The GVN will increase revenues, both from increased taxes and better tax collection, as well as from
other sources. The target for increased tax receipts in 1966 is approximately 4 billion piasters. (Resp:
GVN; USAID to monitor)
14. Non-tax receipts should be increased by greater promotion and sales of GVN lottery tickets,
including sales to U.S. forces, and by flotation of piaster bond issues of approximately 2 billion piasters
in 1966. (Resp: GVN, MACV; USAID and Embassy to monitor)
15. Foreign exchange earnings accruing in 1966 to the Republic of Viet-Nam, will be used promptly to
help combat inflationary pressures, by financing imports or by other appropriate means. (Resp: GVN;
USAID to monitor)
16. The U.S. will support the Vietnamese request to the IMF for technical assistance in the financial
area. Mr. Bell will talk to Mr. Schweitzer of the IMF to press for an IMF group's visit to Saigon by the
end of February. (Resp: AID)
17. High level political consideration of raising the exchange rate for import duties from 35.1 to 60.1
will be initiated promptly, with a view to activating this measure at the beginning of the second quarter
of 1966. It was agreed that this would be the most appropriate and equitable additional measure to
reduce liquidity, expand GVN revenues and reduce excessive wartime profits. (Resp: GVN, U.S.
Mission, AID, State)
18. Discussion will be held and recommendations made before the end of February on modifying the
Special Currency Fund rate of 118 piasters per dollar and on the GVN's possibly increasing and using
the gold component of its international reserves. (Resp: GVN, AID)
19. The U.S. will provide technical assistance where appropriate in support of GVN anti-inflationary
measures, and will moderate the demands of U.S. expenditures in the Vietnamese economy. (Resp: All
agencies)
20. Prime Minister Ky will announce some of the economic stabilization measures to be taken by no
later than mid-February. (Resp: GVN; U.S. Mission to monitor)
21. The GVN agreed to carry out promptly the measures to which it had agreed with Mr. Bell in early
January. (Resp: GVN; USAID and Embassy to monitor)
V. Public Affairs
Consensus: The U.S. and the GVN will both lay stress on their joint efforts to carry out a social
revolution and build a new society in South Viet-Nam.
1. The U.S. and GVN will both publicize the Honolulu meeting. (Resp: GVN, all U.S agencies)
2. The President urged GVN officials and Secretary Gardner to stress at every possible opportunity work
being done in increasing school enrollments, building schools and increasing the number of health
teams. (Resp: GVN, HEW)
3. Generals Ky and Thieu should be encouraged to make more American TV appearances. (Resp:
JUSPAO)

VI. General and Miscellaneous

Further Action:
1. It was agreed that GVN and USG leaders will have similar meetings in the future "for the continued
execution of the policies and purposes of the Declaration of Honolulu." The first such meeting will take
place about June, for the purpose of assessing progress on agreements reached at the Feb. meeting.
(Resp: GVN, all U.S. agencies concerned)
2. The U.S. will try to formulate a way to better our organization in support of the Vietnamese effort.
84. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, February 24, 1966, 8 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No. classification marking. Valenti took these notes
and Bromley Smith also took notes. (Ibid., National Security File, Bromley Smith Files) The meeting
was held in the Cabinet Room.
PRESENT
President, Vice President, Harriman, as well as Congressional Leaders: McCormack, Albert, Smathers,
Ford, Arends, Kuchel, Boggs, Long, Dirksen/2/
/2/Also attending this Bipartisan Leadership meeting were Rusk, Ball, Goldberg, McNamara, Wheeler,
Vance, Rostow, Taylor, Komer, Bromley Smith, O'Brien, Marks, Gaud, Raborn, and Helms. (Ibid.,
President's Daily Diary)
President: The Vice President made report to me./3/ Governor Harriman and Vice President are in
general agreement. Make brief report to you and me now. Make himself available to all members of
Congress.
/3/Vice President Humphrey returned to Washington on February 23 following a 2-week Asian trip
during which he reported on the Honolulu Conference to officials in South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos,
Pakistan, India, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Korea. Humphrey reported orally to the
President at a White House meeting on February 23, which is briefly summarized in the President's
Daily Diary. (Ibid.) A 48-page draft report to the President on the trip, dated March 1, together with a
covering memorandum from Unger to S/S, March 2, discussing the drafting of the report, are in
Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 72 D 272, Vietnam No. 7. A much briefer final report to the
President, March 3, was released to the press on March 6 and is printed in Department of State Bulletin,
March 28, 1966, pp. 489-491.
Had letter from General Westmoreland. Very reassuring. Didn't have shortages--nothing to impair
operations or health of troops.
In due time, Lodge and Westmoreland to come back and make report. Will ask leadership to talk frankly
with them--and various committees also.
Vice President: Objectives are clear. Stop aggression--bring a better life to all people. No one saw easy
solution. No one predicted speedy end. Aggression can be defeated, subversion could be stopped, social
revolution can be started.

Difficult to talk of victory in this country. Some people resent victory. I went as researcher, not as
advocate.
If we don't veer--don't weaken--help South Vietnam build a better society, our objective can be
accomplished.
First two years of the Marshall Plan, six changes of government in France.
While we didn't select the battlefield, it isn't the best place for R.C. (presumably Red China) either,
Westmoreland is great soldier. Backed by high caliber civilian team.
Thieu and Ky are men of high leadership. Don't know how long they will survive. These men are trying
to do what is right. Ky has reorganized Cabinet to deal with problems that need solving. October will be
plebiscite on Constitution.
Went over skeptical about B-52s. They are doing superlative job in blasting VC redoubts that haven't
been reached for 10 years.
When ports are all working this summer, we will be doing much better.
Have plan of pacification--as soon as an area is secured, these pacification teams move in. Training of
cadres to do this goes on.
Philippines will soon be sending engineer construction battalion. Koreans will be sending 25,000 more
men.
Chicoms are pushing hard in Thailand. They (the Thai) are cooperating with us and less said about this
cooperation the better.
In Laos, Souvanna Phouma said he would fight to the death. Army of 80,000--but equipment for only
60,000. If Pathet Lao move to the Mekong, our plans for that river will go away. Talked to Indians and
Pakistanis about implementing Tashkent Agreement.
Famine is real in India. They're trying hard.
President: More people will die this year from hunger in India and Pakistan than all of the people now
living in North and South Vietnam.
Vice President: They are improving agriculture standards and techniques. Indians know that Red China
is the enemy.
Australian Government is with us 100 per cent. Are studying ways to increase our [their?] aid to
Vietnam.
Spent time in New Zealand with opposition. They pledge to keep in Vietnam the battalion already there.
In Manila, found Marcos a real leader. Put his entire political life on the line. Dastardly are the news
stories coming from U.S.--"Philippines are human mercenaries."
Marcos made strong statement--courageous statement--in which he came down firmly on side of U.S.

In Korea, Pak hopes to have more troops there by first week in March. Spent time with government
party and opposition. Not one act of hostility on part of the Koreans.
Vietnam is immediate battleground--part of larger struggle. Tide of battle has turned in Vietnam. We
need to understand that this battle can be won. Realization that improving the lot of the people is the
way to the future.
President: Will ask Gene Black to go back and make another visit to this area where he brought into
existence the Asia Development Bank.
Vice President: No doubt in Asia who the culprit is blocking peace talks--Hanoi. Your peace offensive
showed that.
Only concern about U.S. is our perseverance to stick it out and stay. I tried to persuade them that our
commitment was deep.
If you want to see hopes of people come alive, you must go see those people and their hopes. I did that.
I don't think we have to hold back--and not talk of beating the VC. We can beat them--and are beating
them.
President: Believe non-communist people are willing to resist aggression.
Also believe the communists are ready to take it over.
Dulles signed SEATO Treaty in Manila--which spoke our resolve to resist aggression--82 to 1 (Langer)
in the Senate.
Before we went in, ground forces--and began to bomb--I remember Senator Taft saying Truman should
have gotten resolution from Congress. So I went to the Congress after Tonkin. Wanted Congress to join
me--in "preventing aggression." SEATO ought to be enforced. Resolution was debated after hearings. I
believe that the Congress knew what they were voting on. I've done everything I know how to bring
them to the conference table. They don't want to talk.
We ought to be ready to meet Westmoreland's requests. I intend to carry out the resolution. If you
choose, you can repeal the resolution. I think I have the authority without the resolution.
We aim to do all that's prudent to bring this from the battleground to the bargaining table.
McCormack: Resolution repeal wouldn't get to first base.
Dirksen: Repeal wouldn't get four votes.
Ford: Agree with Speaker. What was impact of those who want to withdraw?
Vice President: I explain when this question is asked that dissent is part of our society. I told them that
when the chips are down the people are firmly resolved to see it through. People in the world need to
know of our unity.
We need to let communists know of our resolve.

It doesn't help.
President: Ambassador Lodge report last night./4/ (Incidentally this is secret and should not be taken out
of this room.)
/4/Reference is to telegram 3075 from Saigon, February 23, major portions of which Johnson read aloud
and which are covered in the next five paragraphs in the notes. (Department of State, Central Files, POL
27 VIET S)
Visited First Cavalry. They just had been through bloody campaign. VC in the 2nd priority area are
virtually cut off. Our boys showed them how to fight hand-to-hand.
Can't understand why Americans who dissent can't do their dissenting in private. Once we are
committed to a program of action, there never has been public dissent. You have to go back to the Civil
War to find this public dissent. Men can't understand why prominent men in the United States continue
to criticize our policy. Our men understand why we are in Vietnam even if our Senators can't.
Government in Vietnam could not survive if VC were brought into Government. What Hanoi wants is
for us to meet their conditions. They have made no concessions whatsoever. We want peace. They want
conflict.
They regard us as weak. Therefore, they think they will win. To treat VC, who are murderers and
assassins, as legitimate government would disintegrate all that we have in Vietnam.
Honolulu Conference has focused attention on the "other war". Now the eyes of a major campaign have
been opened to ending poverty. Newspapers in Saigon are full of comments on the social revolution
going on in Vietnam.
Harriman: Most fortunate you sent the Vice President out at this time. Leaders in all countries were
worried about our commitment. I share everything the Vice President has said. Our allies want to be sure
we're going to stick. Lippmann and The New York Times have contributed to this feeling.
Kuchel: Laos. Another example of how the communist word doesn't amount to much?
Rusk: Much in Vietnam is based on fact we can [not] have a Laos agreement in Vietnam. Look at Laos
agreement--if you want to test what can be done in dealing with communists, look at Laos.
Boggs, Albert (presumably speaking together): Vice President did great job.
Long: Hope Vice President can come before the Foreign Relations Committee and tell this story.
President: Statements about Vice President making commitments:
Congress gave me authority to commit money. We held up India and Pakistan money until Tashkent./5/
/5/In the Declaration of Tashkent, January 10, the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan
agreed on the withdrawal of troops in Kashmir and the normalization of diplomatic relations. For text,
see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 681-682.
Following Tashkent, I told both I would send someone out to talk to them. After Tashkent it was time to

reopen talks. It was decided that it was wise to grant India $100 million, Pakistan $50 million.
I told Ayub, "Are you with us or not--can we depend on you or not?" He said: "As long as I am in
charge in Pakistan, I will do nothing inimical to the United States Government."
I said, "Okay, we'll make no announcements now."
Vice President: I have been accused in editorials of making conditions.
I merely said:
1. Implement Tashkent.
2. Quit throwing dead cats at the U.S. If you disagree, tell us in private.
President: I hope I can talk to you in private--and keep this secret--you are part of this policy.
Smathers: What about the average citizen in Vietnam?
President: No Vice President has ever testified before a Committee--but will talk to any groups you want
to meet with informally.
Vice President: There is no evidence of defection to VC of average Vietnamese people./6/
/6/The meeting ended in time for the President to attend a Congressional briefing in the East Room at
9:07 a.m, during which Humphrey reported on his Asian trip to members of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees, House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and House Foreign Affairs Committee. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) On the
last page of his handwritten notes for the 8 a.m. meeting, Valenti recorded the following: "At briefing in
East Room--Pres: I don't know when this will end. During the battle of Britain, Churchill said we'll fight
in the alleys and in the streets but he didn't say how long."

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
85. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, February 26, 1966, 1:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bromley Smith Files, Meeting on Vietnam. No
classification marking. Drafted by Bromley Smith. For Valenti's notes of the same meeting and an
attendance list, see Document 86. Helms also took notes. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms)
Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record, 01 Jan 65-31 Dec 72)
Meeting with the President on Vietnam, Saturday, February 26, 1966, at 12:45 P.M. in the Cabinet
Room
The President joined the group at 1:10 and suggested that the group might meet every Saturday for an
hour and also during the week, depending on whether the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense felt a meeting would be useful.
There was a discussion about naming a czar to coordinate the Washington end of all non-military
programs in Vietnam. The President, turning to the Secretary of Defense, said he thought the czar should
be a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Secretary McNamara replied that that was agreeable to
him. The President said that a candidate would be picked within the next three or four days.
There was a discussion about the TV program for Vietnam. Both Mr. Gaud and Mr. Marks commented
on the agreement reached between AID and USIA to initiate this program. They noted that the Japanese
might be prepared to give some TV receivers for use in Vietnam.
The President was asked whether he would approach Robert Nathan to persuade him to accept the job of
economic czar in Saigon. The President replied that he would like to have the Vice President take this on
and he would come in if it were necessary in order to persuade him to accept. The job would have the
rank of Minister. The economic czar would not be under the Saigon AID Director, Mr. Mann, but report
directly to the Ambassador. The holder of this position would work on the economic problem directly
rather than with Vietnam officials.
Secretary Rusk said that it was clear the UN Security Council would not be making a statement on
Vietnam. He said that the parliamentary situation in the Council was such that it could do nothing./2/
Even a special session of the General Assembly would not be able to do anything.
/2/On February 26 the Security Council President informed the Secretary-General and Council members

by letter of the results of the private consultations on Vietnam authorized on February 2 (see Document
59). The letter noted that serious differences of views remained unresolved, particularly as "to the
wisdom of the Council considering the problem of Viet-Nam at this particular juncture." These
differences "had given rise to a general feeling that it would be inopportune for the Council to hold
further debate at this time." For text of the letter, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1966, pp. 791-792.
The President then suggested that Ambassador Goldberg explain the full situation on TV this afternoon
and that he give background information to the press about our unsuccessful efforts to involve the UN in
the Vietnam problem./3/
/3/For text of the statement released to the press by Goldberg on February 26, see Department of State
Bulletin, April 4, 1965, pp. 547-548.
Secretary McNamara said that he was drafting a statement which he hoped would appear in the New
York Times rebutting the allegations made by Hanson Baldwin in his New York Times article./4/ He
thought that most of the charges had been answered but more needed to be done to overcome the false
impression which many got from the Baldwin piece.
/4/Baldwin reported in the February 21 issue that U.S. forces were "spread dangerously thin in Vietnam
and elsewhere" and that there were shortages in uniforms, clothing, ammunition, and equipment. At a
March 2 news conference, reported in The New York Times on March 3, McNamara stated that U.S.
armed forces were neither overextended nor suffering shortages and were "fully capable" of meeting
their commitments.
Upon being asked about what our position was on a congressional resolution supporting the
administration's policy in Vietnam, the President said that nothing more need be done now. It was
agreed that Senator Morse's motion to repeal the August 1964 resolution should be allowed to go to a
vote but that Senator Russell's suggestion to get an affirmative vote of support in the Senate should not
be followed up.
CIA Director Raborn reported that his hearing with Fulbright/5/ had been rather rough in that Senator
Fulbright was primarily interested in matters other than intelligence. Mr. Raborn said the intelligence
community did not get into the policy field.
/5/Raborn testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 25 and again on
February 28, mainly concerning the Soviet Union and China. For text, see Executive Sessions of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. XVIII, pp. 333-409.
The President asked how we keep retired military officers briefed on the developments in Vietnam. He
mentioned particularly Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway and Bradley. He asked that we get a list of
retired Generals who may be making public statements and keep all of them currently briefed.
There was an exchange about General Gavin. General Wheeler said he thought we had heard the last of
General Gavin for the time being but acknowledged that Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary
Vance did not agree with him.
There was an exchange between the President and McGeorge Bundy on George Kennan. The President
could not understand why Kennan testified on Vietnam despite the fact that he had never been in the
area and acknowledged he knew nothing about the situation there. McGeorge Bundy defended the

contribution which Kennan had made in Europe, pointing out that Kennan's motivation may be
explained by his extreme Europe-first attitude.
The President discussed the suggestion that an Asian Task Force be organized which would list the
potentialities of the area and recommend solutions to some of the problems. He thought we should direct
intense public attention to Asia such as was done on the civil rights issue. Now that Europe is restored to
economic health and military strength the U.S. should turn to Asia. He thought the Task Force should
study food production, for example, and come up with recommendations. The Asian Development Bank
should be linked to this endeavor.
Mr. Rostow suggested that we should persuade the Asians to come up with their own plan which we
would then say we could support.
Mr. Marks commented that Ambassador Reischauer would be the perfect man to get the Japanese to
come up with their own plan for Asian development. The President responded by saying we ought to get
the Asians to ask us to help them and named in this connection Nehru and Marcos.
Mr. Moyers suggested that a group be organized in Washington to plan our long range strategy toward
Asia.
The President thought that a group of five men should be asked to undertake this task. He said that
McGeorge Bundy should work this out with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara./6/ He added that
there were not enough dreams in the foreign field.
/6/Rusk outlined his proposal for an Asian Development Task Force in a March 2 memorandum to the
President, which Komer forwarded to the President on March 5 under cover of a memorandum giving
his own views. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy,
vol. 21)
The President commented that Senator Russell was insisting on a vote in the Senate to reaffirm the
congressional resolution of August 1964. He then discussed public support of the administration's policy
and cited a Paris [Harris] poll to indicate that the extremists consisted of about ten percent doves and
sixteen percent hawks. He said he thought that the rising cost of living was a major element in
determining public attitudes.
The President concluded the meeting by asking that more effort be placed in working out sales of
commodities now in our strategic stock- pile. He mentioned rubber specifically and suggested that Tom
Mann be assigned to do whatever is required to get on with the reduction of U.S. stockpiles even though
some foreign countries would be unhappy with our actions.
86. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, February 26, 1966, 1:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time and place of the meeting is from the President Daily
Dairy. (Ibid.) For Bromley Smith's notes of the same meeting, see Document 85.
PRESENT
President, Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, Marks, Bundy, Vice President, Raborn, Helms, Gaud,

Johnson, Rostow, Unger, Komer, Valenti/2/

/2/"Johnson" refers to U. Alexis Johnson. According to the President's Daily Diary, Moyers and
Bromley Smith also attended. (Ibid.)
President: Want to meet in limited time on Vietnam--maybe every Saturday--during week--(make) sure
we're doing everything we need to do.
Going to pick someone to be assistant to President or Secretary (of State) to be Porter's counterpart on
peace. Special Assistant to Secretary, probably. Assume no irritation from Pentagon. Will pick him in
next three or four days.
Lots of talk about pacification. Thrilled about General Walt. What he's doing makes you proud. Work
being done by Marines on health, reconstruction, schools.
General Greene was very cooperative. Tribute to military. Need this special assistant in Washington to
carry out peace plans.
Any requests from Freeman?
Bundy: Will come in Monday./3/
/3/February 28.
Need organization to match Porter's. We need that here.
Marks: Gaud will put up money to get TV going in Vietnam.
President: What about TV sets?
Marks: Hope to assemble sets there. Hope Japanese will contribute sets.
Bundy: Need senior American to advise on economic (matters) and inflation. Robert Nathan is our
choice.
President: Vice President talk to him.
Bundy: He ought not to be under Charles Mann. Report directly to Lodge and Porter.
Rusk: President of Security Council at UN has letter to U Thant--amounts to resignation of UN from
problem./4/
/4/See footnote 2, Document 85.
Had hassle over paragraph on mutual reduction of arms. Africans didn't want mutual because of our
bombing. That is now out.
Morse will call for meeting of Assembly but Assembly will do exactly what Security Council did.
President: Let Goldberg find forum to explain this.

Rusk: Would be inopportune to hold debate.

Bundy: Get Goldberg to hold press conference next week with State Department auditorium.
President: Think it ought to be this afternoon, otherwise newsmen will draw conclusions./5/
/5/See footnote 3, Document 85.
Bundy: One loose end in public opinion. Hanson Baldwin article./6/
/6/See footnote 4, Document 85.
McNamara: Statement will be ready Monday. Have to get Times. To be printed in entirely.
Vice President: If statements are ready ahead of time, I can do work quietly with key Congressmen.
Bundy: Resolution matter--President put rose on Morse--willing to have that issue joined.
Raborn: Meeting didn't go as planned./7/ Committee members interested in what I had to say. But
Chairman cut it off and asked questions aimed at finding out how we got our intelligence. Need to
equate intelligence with sources of intelligence. McCarthy tried to get me to admit that F.R. (Foreign
Relations) members ought to be on Russell's committee. Pell interested we didn't overdo covert action.
Hickenlooper and Symington came to my rescue.
/7/See footnote 5, Document 85.
Gaud: Have you read my memo?/8/
/8/Not further identified.
President: Haven't read it yet. Didn't want to predict at press conference any length of time--or victory.
Wheeler: Military actions at same tempo in past. Several satisfactory events--though nothing dramatic to
herald a change.
Rolling Thunder in North hampered by bad weather lately.
President: Want Goodpaster to be in touch with Ike. Want Goodpaster to know what you know.
Ridgway seemed to support us. Yet Fulbright used Ridgway letter to hit us.
McNamara: I think Ridgway letter is a difference.
President: Why don't we send bright colonels to see Bradley and others--and get their statements out.
Wheeler: Gavin wants no part of this anymore. He's ready to retire. It's one of these things where he's a
writer and didn't realize it was going to cause a stir.
President: He thinks he's an authority or geo-political expert. Thinks we can't afford to keep
commitments around the world.

Rusk: Kennan had the same view when he was on Policy Planning Staff. Believes Asia is not worth it.
Bundy: He got in trouble with Russia and Yugoslavia. Wholly unfit for operational duty.
President: Why don't we do a real study on brown men--and Asia--Task Force on Asia--heavy thinking
on Asia--potentialities and solutions--build it up--Asian Task Force. That group ought to be getting up
recommendations on what we ought to be saying and doing.
Rostow: In wake of Asian Development Bank--Asia CIAP--ought to challenge that group of Asian
planners. Would force this Asia CIAP over and above the bank. Need challenge from you to get it going.
President: Perhaps a number of Asian leaders coming here could request us to join with them. Have our
group staff an Asian Task Force. Then try to allow Asians to do these things on their own./9/
/9/See footnote 6, Document 85.
Rusk: Might want to bring in Arthur Dean, and let him take over.
Komer: New York business community feels if we are going to spend $10 billion--let elections take
place--and then bug out--then we ought to get out now./10/
/10/Komer summarized the views of the New York business community on Vietnam, as reported by
Arthur Dean, in a February 23 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Name File, Komer Memos)
President: It was shocking to RFK that after conferring with LBJ aides, he was judged to be wrong.
Vice President: Jack and I agree with Rostow's assessment--they want to do something on their own.
Maybe by the time Black goes out, the Task Force will have something to give him.
McNamara: Russell feels strongly about three things:
1. Resolution giving President the power.
2. Calling up the Reserves.
3. Bombing Haiphong POLs.
Rusk: First thing in Korean war to unleash Stu Symington.
Vice President: Morse repeal resolution will not get four votes. Morse, Gruening--maybe Burdick,
Young. Counter-resolution will lose more votes.
Moyers: Latest in Harris Poll. American people want honorable end. Two to one to see it through. More
in a split--hawks and doves. Support has dwindled--63 per cent to 49 per cent.
Fifty-one fair or poor handling. Policy fails to satisfy either group. Sixty-seven (January) to sixty-two
(February) in job rating.
Gallup--59 to 62 in job rating.

Doves--10 per cent. Hawks--16 per cent, up from 12 per cent.

Great bulk are in between. As result administration is being criticized from both ends.
President is either not moving strong enough or too strong.
January '65--41 per cent excellent or good.
March '65--60 per cent. Pleiku.
May '65--57 per cent.
July '65--65 per cent.
September '65--66 per cent.
October '65--65 per cent.
December '65--66 per cent. Dec. pause.
January '66--63 per cent.
February '66--49 per cent.
In February:
Disagree with policy (carry war to North Vietnam)--16 per cent.
Agree with policy (increased military effort in South)--33 per cent.
Agree with policy (negotiate)--34 per cent.
Disagree (pull out)--9 per cent.
Not sure--8 per cent.
Those who changed--big shift: those who agree but want more bombings--those who agree but want
negotiations.
First signs of American impatience with long war.
President lost five points in popularity:
--Vietnam
--Cost of living
87. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield/1/

Washington, March 1, 1966, 9:42 a.m

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between
Johnson and Mansfield, Tape F66.10, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
LBJ: Mike, Dick Russell called me and I told him, he said that he wanted to offer his substitute, but
you'd talked to him about this tabling,/2/ and that he thought that I was making a terrific mistake by
agreeing with that because he thought there would be doubt left as to my authority and it would be an
open sore and be coming up--the Fulbrights and the doves all the way through. I told him, I didn't think
so, that I would favor letting Morse make his case and try to rescind it, and then, without hurtin'
anybody or getting personal, get up and make a statement that the question's whether you want to
rescind it or whether you don't and this direct vote on it can be had by tabling. But, I sure don't want the
motion to table to imply any dilution of that resolution because if it does I'm in a hell of a shape as head
of the Commander in Chief and with other nations, too.
/2/It was anticipated that Senator Wayne Morse was going to make a motion on March 1 to rescind the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August 10, 1964. Senator Richard Russell proposed making a substitute
motion to reaffirm the resolution. An alternative response under consideration was a motion to table
Morse's motion. Russell called the President at 9:20 a.m. on March 1 about the issue but his
conversation was not recorded. (lbid., President's Daily Diary) Later on March 1, the President discussed
the issue by telephone with Senator Gale McGhee (at 12:49 p.m.) and Senator Russell Long (at 2:40
p.m). Both conversations were recorded and the recordings are ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape
6603.01, PNOs 2, 5, and 6. The Senate voted later in the day to table Morse's motion by a 92 to 5 vote.
For more information, see William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, pp.
257-258.
MM: I don't think that it would in any way.
LBJ: Well, it will unless you make a case for it when you make the motion to table or get somebody to
do it. Either make Russell or somebody say, "Here's what the authority of this resolution is." Now,
Morse wants to take that away. Now, our position is that we're not gonna take it away, because if we
leave me in doubt there, whether I have authority or not, hell I'd rather turn the authority over to
Fulbright. I've got to know what authority I have, and I believe I have unquestioned authority as
Commander in Chief--162 cases according to the Attorney General-MM: Without the resolution.
LBJ: Without the reso[lution]--with the resolution, I've got them in there with me. But is this motion to
table in any way, in the light of what they said, diluting it? Now, if it does, I'm against it.
MM: No.
LBJ: I think the case ought to be made that Morse wants to rescind it and we're not gonna rescind it and
thereby, by not rescinding it, it stays just as it is.
MM: That's right.
LBJ: And that we want every dictator in the world to know, we don't want Peking--

MM: The case is made, Mr. President, without even saying a word. [indecipherable] two or three votes.
LBJ: I don't agree with you without saying a word. I think it ought to be in that record before that roll
call. And, that's the case he makes. And, I'm for tabling it. And I don't what to rub anybody's nose in it
like he does with Nelson and the rest of them. But I do think that they oughta say, Morse wants to repeal
this; now, we're not gonna repeal it; I am gonna move to table it. If you want to repeal it, you vote for
Morse. But, if you want to leave it just as it is, with all the authority that it contains, why, you vote to
table. If you don't, why you go on and vote with Morse. I just don't want some would-be fellow that's
waiting to see what to do, depending on the Senate, to misinterpret this, because I know what happened
to us in a couple of wars by their misjudging our intentions. I'm controlling this thing just as carefully as
a human can. I'm watching it just [indecipherable] but I cannot have them in doubt about my ability as
Commander in Chief.
MM: No, but you have you that responsibility and authority even without a resolution.
LBJ: I agree with it. But all the play, Mike, all the editorials is, what's going to be done this Senate-what this group of twenty or thirty or forty Senators--are they gonna take away authority? Are they
gonna hold it back? And, they may interpret this--and the propaganda in all the morning papers is--that
they've kinda agreed. So, I think that when we make a motion to table, please see that someone points up
the fact that this leaves the President without a bit of his authority changed or diluted.
MM: Ok, Mr. President.
LBJ: Thank you, Mike.
MM: Yes sir.
88. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 2, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:16 a.m. and passed to the
White House.
3159. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:
A. Concerning Senators.
1. From a CIA source, I learn that Prime Minister Ky is writing to Senator Robert Kennedy disputing his
thesis that the Viet Cong should be put in the Government of Viet-Nam, and in effect asking him, "Why
don't you come out here and see the truth?"
2. Rev. Tam Chau, Chairman of the Institute for the Propagation of the Buddhist Faith, said Senator
Kennedy's proposal had renewed uncertainty about U.S. objectives in Viet-Nam and would undermine
anti-Communist morale.
3. In the February 25 issue of The Reporter magazine, Douglas Pike gives an account of the true
situation of the Viet Cong, which I recommend that you read as I believe it will interest and encourage
you. It should be put into the Congressional Record. In this article, he makes this statement:

"Viet Cong theoreticians have traditionally held that there are three routes to victory: (1) the Khoi
Nghia, or general uprising; (2) the famed Mao-Giap three-stage revolutionary guerrilla war; or (3)
coalition government."
It is not so surprising to learn that the Viet Cong themselves regard the creation of coalition government
as one of the three principal routes to victory, since we in USG have long realized that to put the Viet
Cong into the Government of Viet-Nam would disintegrate everything we have worked so hard to
accomplish here and would gravely endanger the security of our own troops. But Communist skill in
selling this idea to distinguished and patriotic Senators is surprising.
4. U.S. Senate debate on Viet-Nam drew heavy attention to American role in the Viet-Nam press. Quyet
Tien asked if Senators Fulbright and Kennedy would accept Communists' price for peace--a disgraceful
American surrender in Southeast Asia. Tien Tuyen wondered what Mr. Fulbright would do if, Viet-Nam
having been abandoned, Communist aggression turned to Thailand, the Philippines, India, and even the
United States. Tien Tuyen labeled Senator Kennedy's proposal for coalition government violation of
principle of self-determination and uncalled for interference in Viet-Nam's affairs. Tieng Van
commented that "While many people think White House cannot ignore . . . Messers. Fulbright, Wayne
Morse, Robert Kennedy, best informed observers think that defeatist camp cannot shake determination
of U.S. number one citizen L. B. Johnson."
B. Communist propaganda success.
5. Persuading U.S. Senators unwittingly to support V.C. victory formula is on a par with Communist
successes in convincing the non-Communist public that:
A double standard about aggression is all right that is--if Israelis attacked Egypt in 1956 it was dreadful,
but for North Viet-Nam to commit aggression against South Vietnam is fine.
Or that the words of the U.N. Charter calling for "suppression of aggression" are somewhat disreputable.
6. I suggest publicity be given to the statement which you made in Honolulu in which you mentioned the
word "aggression" fourteen times in a row. You really put your finger on something very crucial and for
this reason:
7. In the propaganda war, we have been on the horns of a dilemma. If we stressed peace negotiations, we
pleased certain elements in the West but we aroused contempt in Asia and probably hardened the
Communist will to fight. But if, on the other hand, we decided to "play it cool", we would increase the
chances of impressing the Asians with our toughness and improve the chances of peace, but we
appeared bellicose and indifferent to human suffering in the West.
8. The way out is, I think, to stress the idea of aggression and the corollary that we are fighting a limited
war. The thought to get across is that "The North Vietnamese must get out of South Viet-Nam. Then the
war will be over. They are the escalators; we are fighting a limited war."
9. I realize that this has been said many times, but the Communists repeat and so should we. Your stress
on aggression at Honolulu, therefore, hit the bull's eye.
C. "Revolutionary development".
10. Porter is doing superbly in his new job, sharpening the whole U.S. approach to "revolutionary

development". He is boldly and rapidly pulling all the strings together. I frankly admit that I had not
realized that giving him this added status would make such a tremendous difference. My congratulations
for having thought of it.
11. Under your leadership, a corps of men and a body of ideas and procedures are developing here [that]
will be available for use elsewhere to overcome subversion and terrorism and carry out the true
revolution, in freedom, which will be more potent than the Communist revolution. If we succeed here,
we will have men and measures for use in underdeveloped countries anywhere in the world and the
downward spiral of world Communism will have begun. The year that this blow at Communism is
struck in Viet-Nam may well be, in the history of Communism, on a par in importance with 1917--the
year of its birth.
12. We are watching the national priority areas in Quang Nam (no.1) and Binh Dinh (no.2) even more
closely than usual because the GVN changed chiefs of both provinces this week. We are uncertain as to
the effect these changes will have on the revolutionary development effort, though Americans generally
in Binh Dinh feel that the departure of Col. Tuong, the Province Chief and Major Be, his chief deputy
and the guiding hand of provincial revolutionary development efforts, may have an adverse effect on the
program there. But it is too early to tell.
13. Lansdale visited Quang Nam and found General Thi much more involved in revolutionary
development than in conniving against Prime Minister Ky.
14. General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development, spent most of last week visiting provinces
in the IV Corps area checking progress against provincial plans. He plans to continue trips of this sort
until he has visited every province.
15. Prime Minister Ky has issued a decree making trainees at the National Institute of Administration
available for work in the Revolutionary Development Program for one and one half years of their total
three and one half year training program. It is hoped that this arrangement will help meet needs for
trained personnel.
D. Military.
16. Contacts with the Viet Cong increased in both number and intensity and the enemy mounted one
regimental attack and at least three attacks employing one or two battalions. As a result of this harder
fighting, allied casualties reached a new high for the war.
E. Economic.
17. Retail prices in Saigon, including rice prices, increased slightly but the USAID index showed the
general price level three percent below the level of a month ago. The free market price of dollars
remained unchanged and the price of gold rose very slightly. Imports increased rice stocks in the Saigon
area but deliveries from the Delta remained low.
Minister of Economy plans to announce new economic program on March 17.
F. News from Hanoi.
18. Hanoi reports indicate that, while the hold of the Communist government is as ironclad as ever, the
government is disappointed by the failure of the people to have an enthusiastic attitude towards the war.

Apparently the "prospect of protracted conflict with no foreseeable assurance of victory" has created
"lack of confidence", even "pacifism" and perplexity". The pressure of pursuing an expanding war in
South Viet-Nam, while defending the North, and maintaining economic progress is apparently a
problem.
19. For the first time, I note reports from Hanoi that all our military activities plus our psychological
activities have "created much difficulty for the political struggle movement". There are reports of
"confusion about the political struggle", the political movement not developing "apace with the arms
struggle".
20. This undoubtedly does not indicate big trouble, but it is the first time that I have seen reports that
they were having any political difficulties at all. We are accustomed to military success and political
failure. It is cheering to read that we are finally giving them political troubles, however small in number.
21. After talks with North Vietnamese political and military prisoners, General Thi (I Corps) was struck
by the immunity they felt they had. They were "sure there would be no U.S. or GVN invasion".
Therefore, he told Lansdale, "They could afford to send a great mass of their manpower into South VietNam rather than keeping them North for the defense of the homeland, and simply to inundate South
Viet-Nam." They were no longer even pretending to "liberate South Viet-Nam but were quite nakedly
setting out to put their own people in place."
22. Question: Might it not be well to take some action which would make Hanoi think we were planning
an invasion?
Lodge
89. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, March 7, 1966, 9:25 a.m
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between
Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.12, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
[Here follow opening comments.]
LBJ: What's happening in Vietnam?
RSM: Oh, I think we're getting along pretty well. I haven't actually checked up this morning. I did
yesterday and we were getting along pretty well. This big engagement is very favorable to us. And I
keep my fingers crossed but actually the progress is better than I thought it would be at this time. We're
engaging more Viet Cong and the fatalities are Viet Cong.
LBJ: Looks like we're killing a thousand. How many does North Vietnam have? 250,000?
RSM: They have about 250,000 in their regular force, but they also have an ability to expand that very
substantially--I was going to say from reserves; they're not really reserves--to mobilize additional
manpower. But, as I said, we're killing more VC than I thought we would at this time.
LBJ: Now, Bob, you sure you're shooting 'em as fast as they can take 'em, just as quick as we can get

'em out there?

RSM: Absolutely. I'm just sitting here right now with Cy [Vance] and that's exactly what we're working
on.
LBJ: Well, ask each one of your services now, quit belly-aching and do it now or for[ever] hold your
peace. Because there'll be times here when we want to say stop, look, and listen.
RSM: I know that. I know that.
LBJ: And let's get some more men in there, if we can, right now. I think it's a good psychological time to
get 'em in.
RSM: I completely agree with you and that's just exactly what we're doing, Mr. President. We're just
going to send out another instruction today in writing to be absolutely sure that this is clear because
they're conjuring up all kinds of problems that stand in the way of meeting the manpower requirements
out there and there's a tendency to hold back on some unless you're sure you can send all. But our
instructions are very clear. We've made it personally and in writing that we want to accelerate in every
way the movement of men there. Again, I'll call 'em myself personally today.
LBJ: And then make also this notation, do everything we can to cut some lead time off the Australians
and Koreans any way in the world we can, because that'll help us if they are in there when you're gettin'
these big bills through up here along the middle of the year. If they've moved, it'll be some help.
[Here follows a brief discussion of Senator William Fulbright.]
LBJ: Have you ever got settled down on your reserve policy yet? Are they still--?
RSM: Reserve and Guard reorganization?
LBJ: No, on reserve-RSM: Oh, call up the reserves? Well, we're still fighting the battle on that.
LBJ: See you announced that you don't have to, but have you got them to where they're not agitating you
on it?
RSM: No, no. But everyday we're getting a little stronger in our opposition to those that want to call up
the reserves. And this is just exactly what we're working on now, right in my office at the moment. And
I, myself, am convinced, Mr. President, that we will not have to call up the reserves to support some
350,000 or so strength in South Vietnam. And I don't think we'll get much above 350,000 before the end
of this year. So my view is we won't have to call up the reserves before the end of this year.
[Here follows a short discussion of briefings of the President and the public by military personnel from
Vietnam.]
90. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Komer) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 8, 1966, 3:45 p.m

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Chrono. Secret.
Vietnam civil czar: I am not up on where this matter stands, but think the attached worth passing on.
Bundy, Bell, and Alex Johnson all agreed that for such a concept to work, the man involved must have
full authority to operate--and not end up at just the assistant secretary level in State. Also, to get the
calibre of man we want and to enable him to operate effectively, we have to give him the proper base.
True, this goes against the grain of the new State alignment./2/ The counter-argument is that Vietnam
deserves to be treated as an exception which calls for exceptional measures. One way to compromise
would be to designate the czar as both a Special Assistant to Sec State and a Special Assistant to you,
thus making clear that he would have direct access to the President as well as Rusk.
/2/In National Security Action Memorandum No. 341, March 2, the President assigned the Secretary of
State "authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction,
coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas."
NSAM No. 341 and Komer's March 2 memorandum to the President regarding the location of the
"Vietnam civil czar" are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXXIII.
R.W. Komer/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment
Memorandum From Chester Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to President
Johnson/4/
Washington, March 5, 1966.
/4/Secret. Sent through Komer.
SUBJECT
Management of Vietnam Policy
For the past 18 months I have spent much of my time pushing, prodding and needling the various
elements of Government with responsibilities in Vietnam. I have long felt strongly that something more
than a committee arrangement was necessary if we were to win the pacification battle. (I attach a brief
memorandum on this subject that I wrote in March 1965.)/5/
/5/Attached but not printed.
Now that the issue is on the front burner, but in danger of being buried in the State Department, may I
urge the following views:
1. "Mr.Vietnam" should not be located in the State Department, but in the White House complex: the
operating, public information and policy management programs cut across many agencies; they are of
the utmost importance to you personally; they require for efficient, effective and expeditious
implementation the kind of leverage that can only come from the knowledge that "Mr.Vietnam" and his
staff are directly responsible to you. With all due respect to the Department of State, it has never had any
experience in running a war--and your Mr. Vietnam will be spending his time running a very large

chunk of the Vietnamese war. Also, if attached to the White House, he will not be forced to spend time
before Congressional Committees--a matter that might become increasingly important.
2. If the management function is nevertheless assigned to State, it should be regarded as an exception
and not incorporated into General Taylor's reorganization plan. The problems to be dealt with relate
primarily to fast and effective interagency implementation of established policy rather than the
development of interagency policy. Furthermore, if the management of Vietnam policy is to be
incorporated into the Taylor plan, Mr.Vietnam will, in actuality, rank only as an Assistant Secretary of
State. I submit that a "Bureau of Vietnam Affairs" will inevitably become a routine State Department
organization operating under routine State Department procedures. As I understand it, this is just what
you don't want to happen.
3. So if the assignment is made to State, your "Mr.Vietnam" should also be designated, as was Tom
Mann, a "Special Assistant to the President" with direct access to you. In State he should work directly
under the Secretary. Interagency guidance and the resolution of interagency problems should come from
the Saturday Vietnam Group, of which he should be a member. There are few precedents for this, but
there are no precedents to the Vietnam war. Four names that occur to me as candidates are Bob Nathan,
Paul Nitze, Dave Bell and Robert Nelson (Litton Industries).
As one deeply committed to your Vietnam policy (and in many respects the originator of the "Vietnam
Czar" concept), I feel compelled to urge these views.
Chet Cooper

MARCH 9-JUNE 28: BUDDHIST "STRUGGLE

MOVEMENT"; EMPHASIS ON NON-MILITARY
PROGRAMS; ESCALATION OF THE BOMBING
91. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 9, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis. The source text
does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:21 a.m. and passed to the
White House, DOD, and CIA.
3260. 1. General Ky's office called at 11:55 and asked whether I could call at 12:15.
2. When I entered, he first told me he had decided to appoint a woman as the Mayor of Dalat. He then
said he wanted to talk to me about his troubles with General Thi. He was speaking to me in my capacity
as a "friend", and having in mind that he, Ky, is the same age as my son, he spoke as follows:
3. Thi was becoming more and more difficult. His judgment was poor, he had delusions of grandeur, he
did none of the things that were expected of him. For example, he had done nothing about
pacification/revolutionary development. He was deliberately insubordinate; he would receive orders
from the government and return them, scribbling on the order "this crazy government". It was obvious
that one fourth of the country was exempt from the control of the national government. As long as this
condition obtained Viet-Nam could not really call itself a nation.

4. He had had a meeting with all of the Generals this morning, less Thi, Vinh Loc and Quang, and had
told them that he intended to share this burden with them, and asked them to take appropriate steps for
removal of General Thi. If not, he, Ky, would go back to commanding the air force and someone else
could be Prime Minister. He could not go on this way. The Generals this morning had wanted to know
what I thought.
5. A meeting of all ten Generals with Thi present is scheduled for tomorrow, Thursday, morning. He
asked my advice.
6. In reply, I said that as U.S. Ambassador, I could not, of course, interfere in what was essentially an
internal affair, and that for the record I could not say much more than that the United States Government
very much desired the stability of the Government of Viet-Nam which we regarded as indispensable to
successful prosecution of the war.
7. General Ky had, however, said he wished my comments as a friend and that in that same spirit the
Generals this morning had wanted to know what I thought. Speaking in this unofficial and friendly
capacity, I submitted the following thoughts:
8. This was obviously a question of major importance. Being as important as this, it was absolutely
indispensable that every step be carefully prepared so that there could be no possible hitch, and that
General Ky would not stumble and fall flat on his face.
9. If the charge of insubordination was made against General Thi, I asked, could it be substantiated? Did
you have names and dates and specifications to support charges of nonfeasance as well as charges of
insubordination? Were your charges so well documented that they would command the support of
public opinion? Better still, were your charges good enough so that they would stand up in court of law,
and so that General Thi would realize that the jig was up and he had better leave? Did you have plans
made for his successor? Did you feel that you knew how to remove him and install his successor? Can
you put it across? Can you make it stick?
10. Could you insulate I Corps effectively enough so that the removal of General Thi would not result in
a chain reaction in which the other corps commanders and all the members of the Directorate might not
find their tenure shaken?
11. I advised him to get some bright lawyers to go to work immediately and go through all of the
instructions and paper traffic between him and General Thi, and see whether they could document a case
of insubordination and nonfeasance. I thought this was the best way in which the afternoon could be
spent. I agreed to think about the matter and if I had any further views to call on him again later in the
afternoon.
12. Comment: I hope that this search for proof will cool him off and persuade him back away from the
confrontation tomorrow. It was also clear to me that I was being brought in long after a decision had
been made to try to do something. Ky had taken the preliminary steps this morning and was definitely
committed to going ahead with it tomorrow.
13. One must sympathize with his view that he cannot accept responsibility without being able to give
orders that are carried out in all the different corps. As the Department knows, I have long disapproved
of the corps system, although recognizing it as one of the facts of life. Thi, in his recent actions in the
DMZ, reminds one of the Chinese warlords whom I first encountered when I visited China in 1929.
Subordination of corps commanders to central authority may be part of Viet-Nam's march toward

nationhood.
14. In response to questions from me, Ky said (a) that there was no suspicion of Thi playing with
Communists and (b) that Thieu was supporting Ky. If Thieu is supporting Ky wholeheartedly and
actively it might mean much since no one is more expert at elimination of troublesome persons.
15. Had lunch with Marine Generals and the U.S. military all spoke well of Thi, his cooperativeness and
devotion to pacification.
Lodge
92. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Komer) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 9, 1966, 7:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library National Security File, Memos to the President--Robert Komer, vol. 21.
Confidential. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.
1. Likely showdown between Prime Minister Ky and I Corps Commander General Thi. This trouble is
apparently reaching a climax. Ky has called a special meeting of the ruling military directorate for 1000
hours tomorrow (9 p.m. tonight our time) to seek Thi's removal. Ky is convinced that there is no
alternative other than to remove Thi./2/
/2/In telegram 3277 from Saigon, March 10, Lodge reported that the Directorate meeting had ended
about 4 p.m. and that Thi had been relieved of his duties. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
2. Thi is to be accused of insubordination, "war lord" behavior, alienation of the population and general
obstruction of the pacification effort. Recent CIA reports indicate that Thi may have begun conspiring
with such retired officers as General Tran Van Don,/3/ and this may have influenced Ky to seek Thi's
dismissal.
/3/This report appeared in Intelligence Information Cable TDCS-314/02963 from Saigon, March 4.
According to the cable, Ky told several members of the Directorate after its meeting on March 2 that he
had disturbing reports about Thi's activities and that Thi "was attempting to make I Corps his personal
fief." (Central Intelligence Agency, EA/DDO Files: Job 85-00329R, 137-9-23, Government Activities in
SVN)
3. Lodge had two urgent meetings with Ky today. He told Ky that he was not in a position to give advice
on such an internal political matter. But he warned Ky of the disastrous consequences of any
government crisis at this time particularly in the wake of the Honolulu conference. He told Ky that if
there was any possibility whatever that the ruling directorate could not enforce the removal of Thi, then
the confrontation should be put off.
4. But Ky remains adamant, and claims that the removal will be painless since all the generals are with
him. Thi would be given the graceful exit of either a study tour in the U.S. or the post of Ambassador to
Bangkok.
5. State is worried too. If Thi is alerted to the action contemplated he may refuse to attend the March 10

meeting and take unilateral action in his area. Tri Quang and the Central Vietnam Buddhists are also
known to be close to Thi and unsympathetic to Ky's government. Ky has sent an emissary to speak to
Tri Quang, apparently to mollify him in advance of Thi's removal.
6. So State told Lodge to do all possible to avoid a showdown. If Ky and the directorate still choose to
proceed, Lodge is to insure that they handle Thi's removal, to the extent possible, as a normal change in
corps commanders, with Thi's next assignment announced simultaneously. Lodge has clearly done as
much as feasible, and State's instructions/4/ give him the leeway he needs to attempt to cope with the
situation. We will keep you posted.
/4/Transmitted in telegram 2653 to Saigon, March 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1
VIET S)
R.W. Komer
93. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 11, 1966, 12:35-1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the Cabinet Room and Bromley Smith also took notes. (Ibid., National Security
File, Bromley Smith Files)
PRESENT
President, Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, Komer, Gardner, Marks, Helms, Raborn, Bell, Ball,
Bromley Smith, General Goodpaster, J. Valenti/2/
/2/Moyers also attended. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Goodpaster: March 4-10 ground operations (briefed group on latest military action).
President: What accounts for substantial difference in KIA (killed in action)?
Wheeler:
1. Heavier fire power--fighter bombers and artillery.
2. Mobility--choppers.
3. Good troop leadership and aggressiveness.
Killed around 8,000 men since first of year--close to 30,000 casualties.
Taylor: Fair to reduce casualties from 3 to 1 to 2 to 1 because of seriously wounded.
President: How many casualties before they feel it?
Taylor: When casualties are above infiltration./3/
/3/Smith's notes state: "General Taylor pointed out that when we are really hurting the North

Vietnamese is when we are destroying a larger number of their forces than are being infiltrated into
South Vietnam. In answer to the President's question as to when this situation will be realized, Secretary
McNamara predicted it would take more than a year."
McNamara: What parts are coming from main force units? Others are porters, messengers, etc.
Number of battalions are increasing in spite of casualties.
President: If this keeps up for the year?
McNamara: Don't think so. His strength at end of year should be stronger.
They can increase from 105 to 155 (presumably battalions) at this rate.
Rusk: It would require 10,000 a month casualties. Is that right?
McNamara: They are infiltrating at rate of 8,000 a month.
Taylor: All our plans are based on road nets in Laos--and difficult to know about forward supplies.
Marks: (Read report of defectors saying food and material was short--malaria (35 per cent carrying
malaria).)
McNamara: But they carry malaria and fight. They will continue to fight hard.
President: What about malaria for our people?
McNamara: Down dramatically. About 25 per cent rate. Meningitis has dropped, too.
President: Spreading out camps do it?
McNamara: No. Medical help mostly.
Goodpaster: (Continued on air operations.)
McNamara: First time we've had attacks by IL-28s. Shows they're more aggressive and are attacking.
They have not attacked in South Vietnam. Would not recommend knocking out IL-28's now. They are
not that much of a threat.
Goodpaster: As of March 5, strength was:
216,400 (presumably U.S. strength)
690,900 (presumably South Vietnamese)
23,000 (presumably other free world forces)
930,000 Total

225,000 Viet Cong

13,100 North Vietnam
President: Gardner will be leaving tomorrow.
Rusk: How specific can we put to other governments medical assist-ance and health? More detail on
kinds of personnel needed.
Gardner: Assembled 22 people--ready to go. Covers all health and education facilities./4/
/4/Smith's notes state: "Secretary Gardner commented that the trip his group was taking was the first
step in a continuing effort to see how measures of education and health could improve the situation in
South Vietnam."
Komer: Have General Williamson on hand. Should he brief the Governors?/5/
/5/Smith's notes state: "There was a brief discussion of the Vietnam briefing to be given by Rusk,
McNamara and General Wheeler to the Governors who will be attending a conference in the White
House on Saturday [March 13]."
President: Yes. Outline agenda and have him speak and answer questions.
McNamara: General Thi has been removed as I Corps commander./6/ Under control, looks as though it's
coming out alright. I believe he will come out.
/6/According to Smith's notes, McNamara stated that Thi was removed because he "did not cooperate
with the Directorate and was running the First Corps area as if it were his fief."
Helms: GVN paratroopers marched in Saigon in Thi's favor.
McNamara: Some bad taste in mouths of our people. Looks like we're weak in GVN Government.
President: Do our people want him to leave?
McNamara: I do.
Taylor: He's a bad character and good riddance.
Wheeler: General Walt got on well with him. But a conniver. Had to keep eye on him.
President: How do we get Lodge and Westmoreland to stop giving out Top Secret information? The
press is saying they have to go to Saigon (for) Top Secret information and it's available there.
Rusk: Will get a wire off to Lodge.
President: What about inflation problem there?
Bell: They're carrying out some of our ideas, but not enough. New man in charge is bright. Has
announced one step--but not enough. Reaction to first step is good and the Minister is encouraged.

IMF to take mission out there. One assurance from IMF: If this mission finds that radical steps are
needed, will we back him up?
Fowler and Bell believe log jam may be beginning to break. Some evidence of good chance but still
insufficient.
[Here follows discussion of China and NATO.]/7/
/7/According to Smith's notes, prior to the close of the meeting, "Secretary McNamara noted that he felt
that we had broken the back of congressional criticism of shortages of material in Vietnam and he
predicted that critics would now try to prove that there were shortages of personnel."
94. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 13, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Repeated to CINPAC for
POLAD. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:26
a.m.
3321. Ref: Embtel 3319./2/
/2/Dated March 13. (Ibid.)
1. Following is unofficial translation full text communique issued at Buddhist Institute press conference
Saigon 1700 local time March 12:
"In recent days the country has been in a state of crisis. Since the November revolution, our country
does not yet have effective institutions to inspire prestige at home and abroad, nor to settle the
fundamental problems of an independent and democratic country. And also since November 1963 we
have witnessed disputes and purges within our ranks.
"This state of affairs has created disunion and friction in the ranks of the army and obstacles dividing the
people and the army, thus causing harm to the efforts of national salvation and reconstruction and more
suffering to the people who have already borne untold hardships.
"Realizing the danger of destruction, and faithful to the fate of the fatherland, the United Buddhist
Church of Vietnam recognizes the following points:
"1--The Generals and officers who have contributed to the revolution should be restored to their
positions so they can take part in the reconstruction of the country.
"2--To avoid political frictions which can create disunion and cause harm to the spirit of unity within the
army, the Generals serving abroad or at home should return to their purely military duties.
"3--The nation urgently needs fundamental institutions characteristic of independence and democracy, a
National Assembly, and a government of national solidarity.
"4--The government should implement without delay what it has promised--even a small part of its
promises--for the revolution, particularly the social revolution related to the life of the masses.

"Faithful to the spirit of union in this historic period, the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam eagerly
hopes to contribute along with other civic organizations, religious groups, all classes of people and
particularly with the army, toward carrying out the above-mentioned aspirations."
2. While question-answer period was in progress a so-called "proclamation from the movement of the
youths, students and school children, Saigon" was circulated. This document, which bears no Buddhist
Institute seal (as communique does), is sharp attack on Chief of State Thieu, the Directorate, General
Nguyen Huu Co, Can Lao remnants, government's failure to execute Chinese merchant Ta Vinh.
Document was disowned at press conference so it seems likely that certain individuals took advantage of
audience press conference provided to distribute tract.
3. Institute declaration itself is interesting but not necessarily incendiary document. The four points have
obviously been drafted with extreme care and certainly avoid any head-on confrontation with Ky
government. No gauntlet is thrown, no deadline for action is set. No mention is made of Thi's removal
and in fact, during question-answer period, it was stated that there was no connection between
conference and that event. Point one of communique could be read as not necessarily relating to Thi in
view of fact that he was in exile in Cambodia when 1963 coup took place.
4. Nevertheless, point one is most interesting aspect of entire document. It certainly reads as a call for
reinstatement of ousted southern Generals "Big" Minh, Tran Van Don and Le Van Kim. Point may very
well represent bid for southern Buddhist support for UBA. As Dept aware from our reporting, southern
Buddhist elements have become disenchanted with USA to point where leading southern layman Mai
Tho Truyen refused to participate in last UBA biennial convention in December 1965. Point one may
stem from Tri Quang who, though he did not participate in press conference probably had hand in
drafting communique. He had nice things to say about Minh, Don and Kim in mid-February (see para 5,
enclosure 1, Embassy airgram 489, Feb 17)./3/
/3/Not printed. (Ibid.)
5. As for point three case could be made that Ky government is already making progress in this direction
with blueprint for political development outlined by Ky January 15 speech. As for point four, all
Vietnamese can agree with the sentiment.
6. In sum communique appears as cautious testing of political wind. Institute has been politically mute
for some time--to the point where some of its more influential lay and clerical members have
complained about its impotence and inaction. To those critics Chau and his colleagues can now reply
that they have done "something". They have let government know they are still there and that due
attention must be paid them.
7. Ky and Chau have had at least two separate private meetings over past few days. Ky has indicated his
confidence that organized Buddhists are not supporting Thi.
Lodge
95. Editorial Note
In his weekly telegram to President Johnson, dated March 16, 1966, Ambassador Lodge reported on the
events that followed in the wake of the March 10 decision of the Directorate to relieve General Thi of
his duties:

"Unfortunately, many of the subordinate officials and commanders in I Corps are Thi appointees and
when they heard that their commander had been relieved, they began to fear for their own futures. When
certain political elements began to organize demonstrations in support of Thi in I Corps, these officials
gave tacit approval and support. So far the demonstrations have consisted of mass meetings and general
strikes centered in Danang, the largest city of I Corps and second largest in the country. But there have
also been smaller meetings elsewhere in such cities as Hue and Hoi An.
"Now a new and more significant element has been added. The political Buddhists and other elements
who have their main strength in I Corps have now begun to agitate against the government using the Thi
removal as pretext and take-off point. These elements have been quiescent for some time. They have had
no great affection for the Ky government; but neither did they dislike it to the point where they openly
opposed it. It has not, however, been a government subservient to their commands. They obviously read
the new political situation in I Corps as an opportunity to bring pressure on the government hoping
either to transform it into a creature subject to their will or to replace it with a government to their
liking." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, March 16, 1966, 4:13 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by
Unger and U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by Moyers, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson.
2736. Statement attributed Thich Ho Giac, reported by UPI, pledging Buddhist struggle "to last drop of
blood, to last breath" to achieve four-point program,/2/ including replacement present government, has
been noted at highest levels./3/ We must find way to make Buddhists understand that, with profound US
involvement in defense their country against Viet Cong take-over, to say nothing of deep commitment
their own government and armed forces, this is not the time to overturn everything and set back efforts
now beginning to show results. Furthermore US, as well as Ky Government, has also pledged itself to
economic and social progress which Buddhists are also insisting upon but these things cannot be
achieved overnight and certainly would not be achieved at all if the Viet Cong were to win out.
Moreover, their achievement can only be delayed, not hastened, by starting over again with a new
government. Buddhists must be told in fact that our possibilities of continuing to help the Vietnamese to
defend themselves and develop their country depends heavily on their readiness also to put aside
differences among themselves and work together.
/2/See Document 94.
/3/UPI-80, March 16, reporting Thich Ho Giac's statement, was forwarded to Rusk by Read the same
day under cover of a memorandum stating that Moyers had advised Unger "that the President would like
to hear from you by the end of the day concerning the attached ticker." (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 15 VIET S)
In your discretion you are authorized to convey or have conveyed to Thich Tri Quang and such other
Buddhist Institute and lay leaders as you consider desirable the President's considered view that, if they
persist in their present irresponsible and destructive course, not only will they lose the US public and
official sympathy that they have heretofore had, but they may well bring about a situation of chaos and
anarchy in which USG support to Viet-Nam could no longer be effective. The President hopes that they
will most deeply reflect on this, not only as patriotic Vietnamese interested in the future of their country
but also as religious leaders interested in the future of their believers and the religious tenets for which

they stand.
Rusk

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
97. Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President
Johnson/1/
Washington, March 16, 1966, 6:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVIII. No
classification marking.
Mr. President:
The hardest information we have gotten from Hanoi in some time is contained in the attached cable
reporting the views of Chester Ronning, a retired Canadian Foreign Service Officer, with life-long
personal connections with China./2/
/2/Ronning visited Hanoi March 7-11. A memorandum of his March 20 conversation with William
Bundy on the visit, together with his undated memorandum summarizing his principal meetings in
Hanoi, are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/PINTA.
His report to Prime Minister Pearson will be helpful in destroying illusions still held by some in Ottawa.
Bromley Smith
Attachment/3/
/3/Secret; Exdis. The attachment bears no date or drafting information.
Consul Armstrong Reports from Hong Kong:
Results of Mission:
Ronning characterized results of his mission by quoting old Chinese saying: He had "travelled ten
thousand miles to present a feather." He said he is more pessimistic about long-range Vietnamese
problem than before his trip.
North Vietnamese Confidence:

North Vietnamese leaders he spoke to from Pham Van Dong on down convinced they were winning
war, although they concede it will be long struggle. In response my query how North Vietnamese
expected achieve victory (e.g. by military victory, US loss of determination, South Vietnamese
collapse), Ronning said North Vietnamese view not clear. North Vietnamese leaders told him they fully
expected stepped-up US military effort, both in South and in bombing of North, including bombing of
Hanoi, industries, etc. Explained they had few large industries; small industries being dispersed and
plans made for evacuating government offices and populace. Ronning commented to me that he did not
disabuse North Vietnamese leaders of their estimates of increased US military action. Instead, he tried to
impress upon them that US could bring vastly greater military power to bear than could the French in
1950's, and that therefore no chance of history repeating itself (as they seemed to believe).
Negotiations:
North Vietnamese leaders were totally unwilling budge from "Four Points." His remonstrances that strict
adherence "Four Points" would amount to total American surrender and were therefore unworkable as
negotiations formula were greeted with attitude "that's the American's problem."/4/
/4/Following his conversation with Ronning on March 20, William Bundy prepared a note for the
President's Evening Reading that reads: "Ronning reports that his conversations in early March were
friendly in tone but completely obdurate in substance. The only possible glimmer of light was a vague
suggestion by Pham Van Dong that Hanoi might be ready to talk if we would undertake to stop all
attacks on North Vietnam 'unconditionally and for good.' This demand has usually been linked with
acceptance of the Four Points, and we suspect it still would be if the right questions were
asked." (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)
Soviet Ambassador, while expressing full support North, implied there was somewhat greater possibility
for negotiations by telling him that first prerequisite permanent cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.
When Ronning asked why, if this was the case, North Vietnam had made no response during recent
bombing pause, Soviet Ambassador said "they did respond" but refused specify channel or content.
Soviet Ambassador said resumption of bombing came at just the wrong time and gave Ronning
impression resumption had "loused up" overtures Soviets were making to Hanoi at the time.
Sino-Soviet Dispute:
North Vietnamese leaders attempted downplay importance of dispute and particularly its impact on
Vietnam situation.
Geneva Accords:
Ronning said both South Vietnam and North Vietnam leaders talked of return to Geneva Accords but in
completely different terms. South Vietnamese leaders stressed provision for withdrawal of North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, and claimed that reunification would eventually come through
"disintegration" of Communist control in North. North Vietnamese leaders stressed elections and
claimed they were confident election results would pave way to early reunification.
Ronning's Treatment:
Ronning found that as a Canadian he was treated better than British who support American position
fully, but was made politely aware that Canada little more than American satellite. However, Pham Van
Dong appreciative of Pearson's public statement of regret over resumption of bombing in North.

Ronning found his several hours of talks with Hanoi leaders very wearing and frustrating with
conversations wandering down blind alleys and always returning to same intransigent dead end. He got
impression he was object of team effort at wearing him down, as long, hard hours of conversation with
one group of officials would soon be followed, with little rest, by another session with fresh team. Some
talks also scheduled in early morning with scarcely fifteen minutes notice, apparently to keep him off
balance.
Impressions of Hanoi:
People adequately clothed and fed. Ronning made special point of visiting market and found rice, fish,
meat and vegetables in seemingly good supply. Only stall with line of people in front was selling flour.
(He could not tell whether it was Canadian or not, but noticed word "flour" in English on bag.) Streets
were practically empty at night, and Ronning was told that many oldsters, youth, and cadre dependents
had been evacuated.
Ho Chi Minh Out of Sight:
Ho, an old acquaintance of Ronning's, sent apologies explaining that round of meetings in connection
with forthcoming Soviet Congress left no time to see him. It was rumored in Hanoi that Ho planning
attend Congress.
Chinese Not in Evidence:
With exception of banquet room full of Chinese cultural troupers in Sun Yat Sen suits, Ronning saw no
Chinese in Hanoi. Chicom Embassy personnel invited to reception given by North Vietnamese his
honour did not show up.
98. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 19, 1966, 10:20 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2EE, Primarily McNamara
Recommendations re Strategic Actions. Secret. Attached to the memorandum is a note indicating that
the President told his secretary at 11:30 a.m. on March 19: "Tell Brom Smith to try to prepare a
memorandum giving a careful survey and/or study of how to best use the next 60 days to make the
maximum effort with bombs, troops, and everything else against infiltration before the rainy season, and
we ought to provide any extra planes, bombs, etc., and find out how best to use napalm. I want it to be a
good report showing everything and every way being explored . . . very comprehensive study."
SUBJECT
General Westmoreland's Recommendation on Air Operations in Vietnam
General Westmoreland has sent to Admiral Sharp and General Wheeler for their consideration a
proposed reallocation of existing military resources which he believes will more effectively counter the
larger scale warfare which he believes the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are now preparing./2/
/2/Telegram 171037Z from COMUSMACV, March 17. (Ibid., Box 260, Gen. Taylor)
The status of his recommendation is as follows:

1. Admiral Sharp, in a telegram not yet decoded,/3/ raises certain objections to General Westmoreland's
concept and asks for an explanation of some of the points not clear in Honolulu. One suggestion is that
Westmoreland meet with Admiral Sharp and Admiral Moorer at CINCPAC to clarify the details of the
general concept.
/3/Presumably a reference to telegram 190452Z from Sharp to Westmoreland, March 19, which has not
been found. In telegram 190500Z to Westmoreland, March 19, Sharp agreed that there was "pressing
need to intensify the scope and pressure of our air campaign against NVN" as proposed by
Westmoreland in telegram 171037Z. (Ibid., Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)
2. The Joint Staff is at work assembling their views on the recommendations.
3. Secretary Vance will meet with the Chiefs for preliminary consideration of the recommendations on
Monday. He and Secretary McNamara will meet with the Chiefs on Wednesday to arrive at conclusions
which they will want to discuss with you.
The view in Washington is that even if the recommendations were approved, as they stand, they could
be implemented by using aircraft now in the Vietnam Theater. Basically, Westmoreland's plan alters the
bombing pattern now being followed in the Rolling Thunder Program. Some of the authority
Westmoreland requests, he already has.
The timing factor in his recommendations consists of how to use the next month and a half to destroy
the maximum of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops, which his intelligence officers believe are
being moved down during the present dry season.
General Westmoreland makes certain suggestions which he feels will retard the forward movement of
enemy personnel from North Vietnam:
1. Heavier attacks on fixed targets in Northern North Vietnam, such as:
petroleum storage facilities,
power plants,
dams and locks, affecting inland waterways,
airfields,
and selected ports, including Haiphong.
2. Greater flexibility in the number of planes he is allowed to use against specific targets (Westmoreland
apparently has this already, but that point is being clarified).
3. Greater freedom to attack targets in the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.
4. Use of napalm in the area, including Laos, under certain circumstances against trucks and armored
personnel carriers, supply and storage areas, anti-aircraft batteries and air control facilities.
5. Use of B-52's in Laos.

Bromley Smith
99. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
No. 174
Washington, March 19, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret;
Controlled Dissem; No Foreign Dissem.
SUBJECT
GVN-Buddhist Confrontation Hardening But Compromise Seems Possible
Latent Buddhist opposition in South Vietnam has quickly developed into an open confrontation with the
Ky-Thieu leadership unprecedented since the Huong government crisis in late 1964. Both the
government and the Buddhists remain inflexible and appear prepared to test their strength in a
showdown.
Demonstrations Widening. The small rallies by Buddhists, students, and military personnel in Danang
on March 11 prompted by General Thi's dismissal have widened to sizeable demonstrations in Hue and
elsewhere, accompanied by strikes and school shutdowns. Public protests, though still orderly, have now
spread to Saigon, the first in the capital area since those directed against the Huong government in
January 1965. However, almost from the outset, the demonstrations have clearly focussed more on
demands for national elections and return to civilian government than on Thi's fate.
Buddhist Leadership Firmly Committed. It is uncertain how involved Buddhist leaders were in the initial
demonstrations. However, the official Buddhist communique,/2/ announced by Thich Tam Chau on
March 12, placed the Buddhist hierarchy on record against the government in the current crisis. The
communique demanded the restoration of civilian government, a National Assembly and representative
political institutions, reinstatement of retired military officers, and implementation "without delay" of
the revolution, "particularly the social revolution related to the life of the masses." Subsequent
developments, including Buddhist discussions with Premier Ky, now clearly indicate that the position of
the Buddhist Hierarchy is firm and that it is prepared to test its strength against the government. The
Buddhist leaders reportedly are planning further demonstrations and general strikes in Saigon and
elsewhere and attempting to win support for their demands among members of the Military Directorate.
/2/See Document 94.
Buddhist Demands Longstanding. Buddhist demands reflect longstanding grievances against the KyThieu leadership which is felt to have moved too slowly and grudgingly to legalize its status, hold
national elections, and return the reins of government to elected officials--in general reversing rather
than furthering the 1963 revolution. Although advanced particularly by Tri Quang and his Buddhist and
student followers, these views appear to be widely shared among other Buddhists, students, intellectuals,
and out-politicians. Many of these critics are almost certainly motivated by personal and political
ambitions and by their basic antipathy to almost any conceivable government. But many others regard
"the revolution", however vague their understanding of even its broad outlines, as the only means of
achieving any degree of political stability and national unity in the face of the Communist insurgency.
Legalization of the government, therefore, has become an issue synonymous with stabilization among an

increasingly large sector of the politically articulate elements of Vietnamese society. Apparent military
procrastination, coupled with spiraling inflation, have served to strengthen the undercurrents of political
opposition. In addition, the Buddhists, who regard themselves as the major political force in Vietnam,
have been offended by Ky's apparent failure to consult them on the cabinet reorganization that followed
the Honolulu conference where they fear Ky's convictions as to the correctness of his policies and his
political indispensability were hardened.
GVN Appears Equally Rigid. Thus far, Ky and some of the other generals have held fast against any
compromises and have indicated that their position is widely supported within the Military Directorate.
Although the possibility of concessions to the Buddhists was discussed at the March 18 meeting of the
Directorate, first reports indicate that the generals decided on a "hard line." Nevertheless, some officers,
including Generals Chieu and Chuan, new I Corps commander, are apparently inclined toward
compromise or at least prefer cautious handling of the Buddhists. Most of what little information we
have on the attitude of the generals is based on a few sources and Embassy Saigon regards these reports,
whether indicating moderation or firmness, as probably over-stated. Thus, despite the alleged "hard line"
adopted by the Directorate, an appreciable number of the generals are likely to have mixed feelings, at
the very least.
Key Issue: Civilian Government. The central issue of GVN-Buddhist confrontation thus far appears to
be the question of timing the return to civilian government. Suspicious of government intentions, the
Buddhists contend that a National Assembly should be convoked within a month or so from among the
elected representatives of the people--members of the provincial and municipal councils. Such an
assembly would draft a constitution and elect a provisional chief of state and a prime minister. Later
there would be national elections for an executive and a national legislature. No timetable is indicated
for this process and it is not clear whether the drafting of a constitution or the election of a provisional
executive has priority. The GVN position, on the other hand, reportedly reaffirmed by today's
Directorate meeting, calls for the appointment of an advisory council to draft a constitution. This would
be followed by nationwide debate, a popular referendum on the constitution in November 1966, and
national elections sometime in 1967. The government contends that such a procedure is orderly, would
reduce friction and political in-fighting among political groups, ensure broader representation of their
views, and pose fewer obstacles to political development.
Compromise Possible. A GVN plan already adopted but still unannounced for a second round of
provincial and municipal council elections sometime this spring could offer some basis for a realistic
compromise. The timing would appear to accord with the Buddhist timetable for concrete action by the
government. The procedure might overcome two of Ky's principal objections to transforming the
existing councils into an assembly; the claims that Catholics would have disproportionately low
representation and that the councillors have no knowledge of national issues or constitution-making and
were elected largely on local issues and interests. If the government were to announce that members of a
constituent assembly would be selected from among councillors to be elected this spring, it would be
incumbent upon the various political groups to put forward their most qualified candidates and attempt
to ensure the election of as many of their representatives as possible. The realities of Vietnamese politics
suggest that members of a constituent assembly selected on this basis, if no better than those selected by
other means, are unlikely to be worse. Moreover, any such body is likely to call upon intellectuals,
lawyers, and other political notables for suggestions and drafting assistance. Finally, if they win their
point on the creation and powers of a provisional assembly, the Buddhists might be willing to drop or
postpone their demand that the assembly should also elect a provisional executive.
Situation Volatile. Failure to reach a realistic compromise would raise serious dangers of increasingly
widespread and possibly violent demonstrations in the days ahead. The Buddhist leadership, though
lacking the religious issue which they have effectively exploited in the past, are expressing a widely held

position and will probably be able to garner substantial active support among their own followers and
possibly among non-Buddhists. Even if they do not seek to oppose the government in the streets, the
Buddhists are likely to attempt to dissuade government nominees from joining the government's
advisory council and to attack the drafting process throughout as unrepresentative. The opposition will
have further opportunities to attack the government and its procedures during the period of public debate
that is to follow the completion of the draft and during the revision process that will precede submission
of the draft to a popular referendum. In short, rigid adherence by the government to its present plans
seems unlikely to enhance the prospects that the long process of constitution drafting and approval will
be an orderly and constructive one. On the other hand, while there is no assurance that some form of
elected rather than appointive constituent body will do its work with a minimum of political infighting, a
decision to elect rather than appoint would remove at least one potent weapon from the arsenal of the
opposition.
100. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 23, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 11:05 a.m. and passed to the
White House.
3467. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:
A. Governmental stability.
1. From the standpoint of the ability of the Government of Viet-Nam to influence events and promote
stability, last week was bad and so is this week.
2. On the one hand are certain Buddhists who are making impossible and preposterous demands. They
actually say they want to change the government and yet are utterly unable to give the names of anyone
who would be able to step in and run the government. Tri Quang even says: "Overthrow the government
and then elect Ky Prime Minister." These Buddhists actually say that they want to hold elections now
when there is no election law, no suitable election machinery, and when the country is evidently totally
unready.
3. This Buddhist attitude undoubtedly reflects Communist advice, subtly planted among Buddhist
priests, who think themselves very clever but who actually are lacking in knowledge of the world. They
have all been told time and again by me personally and by other Embassy officers that to follow the
course which they suggest would look crazy to Americans. But they are so parochial and so limited in
their outlook that it apparently leaves them indifferent.
4. Now we have the beginning of an anti-American flavor in Hue, with widely untrue and improbable
charges being made, which I am certain reflects Communist activity among the students.
5. If I were required to prove what I said about Communist influence, I could not do it. But the logic of
the situation drives me to that conclusion.
6. So much for the Buddhists. Now, what about the government?
7. The Buddhists have in effect infiltrated the government in many posts. The government radio is

publicizing Buddhist meetings, and government broadcasts are actually stimulating opposition to the
government. I worry lest the Directorate may be coming apart.
8. And what about Prime Minister Ky? He stayed too long in Dalat, and it is absolutely impossible for a
Vietnamese political leader to influence events when he is in Dalat. I was content for him to go up there
for Saturday and Sunday because I believed his stomach was giving him trouble, but I hoped he would
get back Sunday night. I heard that over the weekend the Minister of Youth, Mr. Trieu, who is a close
personal friend, berated him so harshly in Dalat that Mrs. Ky left the room.
9. It is ironic that many Vietnamese are saying the U.S. should "fix things up" without ever saying how,
it being absolutely certain that if we tried to impose anything there would be first an "anti-colonialist"
howl from those with whom we differed and ultimately a howl from everybody.
10. I do not, therefore, think that what is happening now will mean the end of the world, or anything like
it. But I wish to heaven that it wasn't happening.
11. One reason Hanoi thinks it can win, I believe is because it knows the fragility of the government
structure here. They are counting on this to weaken American enthusiasm. They realize that the average
American at home cannot possibly understand the social structure in Viet-Nam and the lack of a
tradition of national government in this country, even though there is a strong sense of peoplehood and a
strong and courageous desire not to be a victim of aggression. This governmental fragility is what Hanoi
is depending on, and if I were advising them, I would advise them to do just what they are doing to
encourage the natural divisiveness in South Viet-Nam.
12. We are at the stage here when everything you try to grab is like quicksilver. Moreover, as the
Buddhists go further, the chances of Catholics and Southerners (Cochinchinese) getting going increases
and instead of the delicate balance we have had for 8 months, the scales will start wildly clashing up and
down.
13. So now I find myself thinking the same thoughts that I was thinking in October 1963, that is: "What
can be done without a civil government?" I think it is clear that military operations could go on for quite
a while but everything which requires forward planning, such as "revolutionary development", would
start grinding down. But also everything else today is so much better than it was in 1963 that there is
scarcely any comparison.
14. I still strongly hope that this government will not fall, and all of us here are leaving no stone
unturned to do whatever we can.
B. Public attitudes.
15. As far as the general public is concerned, it appeared interested in but not worried about the
dismissal of Thi. In the southern delta there appears to be little interest in the maneuverings by the
Buddhists and by various center Viet-Nam personalities. Even in the Hue-Danang area there appears as
yet to have been no genuine popular interest in the strikes, meetings and speeches of the past week
which have been the work of individual Thi partisans, students and certain politicians interested in
stirring things up for their own purposes.
16. Among influential middle and upper class Vietnamese there are both optimistic and pessimistic
views. The optimists believe that the agitation in the wake of Thi's dismissal will blow over after a
certain amount of jockeying for position among the Buddhists and the Generals. The pessimists, most of

whom are journalists or intellectuals fear that the agitation may drag on for several months with
unfavorable effects on government stability.
17. All parties seem agreed that if the government maintains the initiative in moving towards a more
representative base and avoids making a martyr of anyone, the Vietnamese public attitude will not
change appreciably.
C. Economic.
18. Port congestion in Saigon became worse during the first half of March. Slowness in moving goods
on the part of both importers and customs officials seems to be the explanation. We are giving this
question our urgent attention to see what can be done to get things moving.
19. At the same time applications for new import licenses dropped sharply, reflecting uncertainty in the
Chinese business community after the execution of a leading Chinese businessman for economic crimes
and uneasiness about increased police visits to business firms.
20. The overall level of retail prices in Saigon remained unchanged. The piastre price of dollars declined
somewhat while the price of gold rose, slightly indicating some uncertainty among dealers about the
GVN's economic policy.
21. The rice situation improved relatively during the first half of March with deliveries from the delta up
slightly, prices declining and stock levels comparatively high.
D. Military.
22. Large unit operations by friendly forces decreased slightly during the week but the number of large
unit contacts increased reflecting some increase in incidents initiated by the Viet Cong.
F. Killing--and saving--civilians./2/
/2/Telegram 2749, a State-AID-Defense message to Saigon, March 17, noted "increasing Congressional
interest and concern here" in the question of civilian casualties and indicated "a need for more complete
figures which can be used by all agencies here and in SVN in response to queries." (Ibid.)
23. I understand Congressional committees are exercised about U.S. killing of civilians in Viet-Nam/3/
and I make the following comment which may be useful:
/3/Lodge provided a much fuller discussion of civilian casualties in telegram 3594 from Saigon, March
30, approved by COMUSMACV, USAID, JUSPAO, and the Embassy. (Ibid.)
24. There is a moral difference between accidentally killing civilians, as we and GVN sometimes
inevitably do, and deliberately and cold-bloodedly killing civilians as the Viet Cong do through
terrorism, torture and murder, shamelessly acknowledged as an instrument of military policy.
25. It is hard here in Saigon to understand why there is so much distress in the United States about
accidental killings by our side, and apparently so little indignation about the fact that every time an
American is killed here in Saigon about 20 or 30 innocent Vietnamese women and children go down
with him.

26. Innocent civilians have always been killed in wars. I can remember a number in World War II. It is
always an accident. But instances are all too common here of a Viet Cong who was apprehended with a
large load of explosives and who said, when asked, that he realized perfectly well that many innocent
civilians would be killed, but that it was part of the doctrine to do this. In fact, without torture and
murder of civilians, Viet Cong recruiting would shrink to an insignificant dribble.
27. I realize it is quite impossible to get figures on the number of Vietnamese who have been terrorized
by the Viet Cong, and this is perhaps one reason why the press doesn't talk about it or print photographs
of it, as it always so eagerly does whenever we have an accident.
28. But another reason may be found in the following thought: in World War II there was no hue and cry
about accidental U.S. killings of civilians because at that time the extraordinary Communist propaganda
machine aimed at non-Communist opinion, which is emerging today as just about the most successful
Communist activity, was not working against us.
29. Under Communist practice classic international law does not apply since there are no Communist
"civilians." Everyone is supposed to be either "fish" or "water." This would not, of course, apply to the
killing of non-Communist civilians, of which there is undoubtedly some.
30. If Congress wishes to compute civilians killed by Americans, should they not also list civilians
whose lives have been saved by Americans? I refer to Dr. Humphrey's program, which is a great
American success story and a direct personal accomplishment of yours.
Lodge
101. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-189-66
Washington, March 26, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3 (24 Mar 66). Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Air Operations Against North Vietnam (U)
1. (TS) On 21 March 1966, in discussing air operations against North Vietnam (NVN) with the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, you requested that a controlled armed reconnaissance program be
developed against selected LOCs in the northeast quadrant. Such a program conducted within the 8,100
monthly attack sorties currently authorized for NVN and Laos could be combined with strikes against a
small number of bridges and other targets not contiguous to northeast area LOCs. In a subsequent
conversation with the Chairman on 23 March 1966, you requested additional information regarding
attacks on the NVN POL system. This memorandum provides the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
the above.
2. (TS) A controlled armed reconnaissance program in the northeast quadrant would result in placing
additional pressure on NVN and can be accomplished within currently deployed resources. The resulting
interdiction of the main railroad to China and key LOCs to the northeast could reduce significantly the
support NVN is now receiving from external sources. Six hundred attack sorties monthly in the
northeast quadrant would provide an adequate level of attack on the rail lines from Hanoi to Haiphong

and the South China border as well as on three of the principal through highways in the area. A level of
effort of 900 attack sorties per month would provide coverage of these key routes and their principal
alternates. Destruction of key bridges on the main rail and highway routes in the northeast would
complement this armed reconnaissance effort by disrupting traffic flow where density is the highest.
Strikes would be directed against JCS Targets No. 15, 16, and 18.22 as well as restrikes on JCS Targets
No. 11, 17, and 18.21.
3. (TS) Further, since cement and steel are prime materials used in the construction, repair, and
restoration of the LOCs, attacks on the Haiphong cement plant and the Thai Nguyen iron and steel
combine are considered to be militarily remunerative. The Haiphong cement plant is collocated with
JCS Target No. 80, a 10,000 kilowatt thermal power plant. Both facilities should be attacked
simultaneously. Incident to attacks on these targets and to assist in the protection of our strike forces in
the northeast, the early warning and ground control intercept (EW/GCI) radar at Kep, which contributes
to the MIG intercept capability in the area, should be destroyed.
4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that attacks on the POL receiving, handling, storage, and
distribution systems should be undertaken now, whether or not mining of the ports is to follow. Since
the NVN transportation network is heavily dependent on the government-operated, POL-powered
transport system, attacks on POL are required to reduce significantly the NVN ability to move warsupporting material within the country and southward through the infiltration routes. The Thai Nguyen
iron and steel combine manufactures or fabricates 2,000-2,200 gallon POL tanks. Thus it has become an
important element in the POL dispersal and distribution system. Haiphong has the only deep-water
facility for the direct offloading of tankers and follow-on attacks should be made to preclude further use
of its POL facilities. A graphic presentation of the routes and fixed targets discussed above and the
salient features pertaining to the targets and the routes are contained in the Appendix hereto./2/
/2/Attached but not printed.
5. (TS) The North Vietnamese have the capability to launch and control a fighter defense against our
aircraft which would probably vary, depending upon the method and timing of the attacks and the target
selection. If the initial attacks were launched against Haiphong POL and related targets, there probably
would be little, if any, fighter reaction. However, as certain POL facilities closer to Phuc Yen and Kep
Airfields are brought under attack, the probability of strong fighter reaction would increase. The North
Vietnamese have a total of 78 MIGs in the Hanoi-Kep area; at least 60 to 65 per cent of these aircraft
would probably be operational. A lesser number could be effectively committed to air intercept. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff note that if the Chinese communists should react to successive attacks, this would
present a separate problem.
6. (TS) There is no doubt that US forces can defeat the NVN MIG capability in an air battle resulting
from strikes in the northeast quadrant. However, if a strong NVN fighter reaction should take place, it is
probable that there will be US losses, due primarily to the impressive buildup over the past months in
the NVN air capability as evidenced by the presence of MIG 21s and an established EW/GCI net. From
a strictly military point of view, the NVN air capability preferably should be destroyed prior to or
simultaneously with attack of the targets listed in the Appendix hereto; however, in view of the military
importance of these targets and other factors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the risk is
acceptable. When NVN air operations interfere with our strike operations, attacks should be initiated
against the NVN air capability.
7. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the controlled armed reconnaissance program and strikes
against the NVN POL system and other targets discussed above are included in their views as expressed
in JCSM-41-66, dated 18 January 1966, subject as above./3/ Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

recommend as a next step that Rolling Thunder 50 be initiated on 1 April 1966 in accordance with the
following:
/3/Document 27.
a. Controlled armed reconnaissance be conducted at a monthly level of 900 attack sorties over the routes
designated in the Appendix.
b. Attacks be conducted against the nine POL storage areas, six bridges (three restrikes), one cement
plant, one iron and steel combine, one thermal power plant, and one EW/GCI radar site as shown in the
Appendix.
c. CINCPAC conduct these operations within the over-all sortie allocation of 8,100 attack sorties for
Laos and NVN as the operational situation dictates.
d. No tactical restrictions or limitation be placed upon the execution of the specific air strikes.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original.
102. National Security Action Memorandum No. 343/1/
Washington, March 28, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, NSAM. Secret. In forwarding NSAM
No. 343 to the President on March 28 for his signature, Komer noted in his covering memorandum: "Joe
Califano and now Bill Moyers have finally worn down Secretary Rusk and others in State who wanted
to fit the Vietnam job to their conception." (Ibid., Memos to the President--Robert Komer, vol. 21) Rusk
expressed some of his objections and concerns in telephone conversations with Califano on March 24
and with Moyers on March 28. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)
MEMORANDUM TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
In the Declaration of Honolulu I renewed our pledge of common commitment with the Government of
the Republic of Vietnam to defense against aggression, to the work of social revolution, to the goal of
free self-government, to the attack on hunger, ignorance and disease, and to the unending quest for
peace. Before the Honolulu Conference and since, I have stressed repeatedly that the war on human
misery and want is as fundamental to the successful resolution of the Vietnam conflict as are our

military operations to ward off aggression. In recent weeks I have asked those Departments of the
Government with special competence in our continuing attack on hunger, ignorance and disease to bring
their resources to bear in Vietnam. I have expressed my special interest in the progress of these new
initiatives and the effective marshalling of all governmental resources and programs being brought to
bear in the civil sector of our commitments in Vietnam.
In my view it is essential to designate a specific focal point for the direction, coordination and
supervision in Washington of U.S. non-military programs for peaceful construction relating to Vietnam.
I have accordingly designated Mr. Robert W. Komer as Special Assistant to me for carrying out this
responsibility.
I have charged him and his deputy, Ambassador William Leonhart, to assure that adequate plans are
prepared and coordinated covering all aspects of such programs and that they are promptly and
effectively carried out. This responsibility will include the mobilization of U.S. military resources in
support of such programs. He will also assure that the Rural Construction/Pacification Program is
properly coordinated with the programs for combat force employment and military operations.
His functions will include ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters
within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in
Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State.
In carrying out these duties, I want him to act in close and constant liaison with the heads of appropriate
departments and agencies, and to draw on them for such administrative and other support as he may
need. In addition to working closely with the addressee Cabinet officers he will have direct access to me
at all times.
Those CIA activities related solely to intelligence collection are not affected by this NSAM.
Lyndon B. Johnson
103. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington March 28, 1966, 4:44 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between
Johnson and Rusk, Tape F66.13, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
[Here follows discussion of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.]
LBJ: Now in this Westmoreland wire./2/ I just feel like we just haven't done enough to prevent losing
that government out there yet. I don't know what else we can do, but I just--it's gonna be so much more
difficult to rebuild a government than it is to hold the one we've got. If we could do it, I thought that
maybe in view of the fact that Lodge concurred in Westmoreland's wire, that we might say to Lodge,
"This is excellent. We're glad to see that you're getting Westmoreland to do that and we hope that you
will say substantially the same thing to every Buddhist element there." Really put up to 'em high handed
because we can't take this back home. If anybody ever knows beside you and me that Westmoreland
says "abuse of United States military presence in northern reaches of the Republic is inconsistent with
the spirit of solidarity that unites our forces" and "such abuse not only degrades troop morale but places
me in a difficult and embarrassing situation in attempting to explain it," and the "unjustified abuse to

United States policy reflected in a succession of radio broadcasts, with display of English language signs
intended to provoke US military personnel, the same personnel whose sacrifice of life and limb has
played an important role"--if our people got the idea that the Vietnamese are insulting our men--Marines
up in that northern area that are dying for 'em--why they'll jump ahead of Bill Fulbright and Morse and
tell us to get the hell out of there, and Lodge better let these damn Buddhists know that and straighten it
out damn quick or we better make our plans accordingly.
/2/Westmoreland's telegram, forwarded to President Johnson by Arthur McCafferty on March 28,
contained the text of a letter Westmoreland sent to General Vien the same day. The letter sought Vien's
assurance that appropriate steps would be taken to halt the "abuse of United States military presence" in
Hue carried on through radio broadcasts and signs "obviously intended to provoke" U.S. troops. (Text of
retyped telegram from Westmoreland, March 28; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam,
vol. XLIX)
DR: I've got Alex Johnson in the next room. Let me go over this telegram with him and see what we can
say to Lodge on it./3/
/3/See Document 107.
LBJ: All right.
104. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 29, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret. Komer
forwarded the memorandum to the President at 6:15 p.m. on March 29. (Ibid., Memos to the President-Robert Komer, vol. 21)
Mr. President:
As you know, on March 17 General Westmoreland cabled an urgent recommendation/2/ to increase at
once the air effort against targets in North Viet-Nam and Laos in order to limit the accelerated influx of
war materiel into South Viet-Nam in anticipation of the monsoon rains beginning in May. His cable is
causing a comprehensive review of the past effectiveness of our air campaign and a consideration of
possible changes in future target systems and levels of attack./3/
/2/Summarized in Document 98.
/3/On April 2 the Joint Staff prepared a 5-page status report on Westmoreland's recommendations.
(Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075, Vietnam,
1966)
I presume that recommendations on this subject will soon reach you--indeed, a reply to General
Westmoreland, in view of his sense of urgency of the situation, is now overdue. My own conclusion is
that the time has now come to raise significantly the level of pressure on North Viet-Nam by attacking
POL stocks, interdicting effectively the two railways linking Hanoi with China and mining Haiphong
and the two secondary ports in the area. In the eyes of the Hanoi leaders, the ground war in South VietNam must now appear to be going rather badly and it is important that they receive an equally
discouraging impression from the air war. Not until they get a gloomy composite from both is there

much hope of bringing them to negotiations. The risks involved in this course of action appear to me to
be acceptable and, in my judgment, should be undertaken in view of the probable advantages accruing
from a significant increase of pressures on the will of the leaders in North Viet-Nam.
Whatever the decision, I feel that General Westmoreland should have an early answer to his pending
request./4/
/4/Wheeler provided Westmoreland with a status report on his request in a front channel message, JCS
7643, April 4. (Ibid.) Goodpaster advised Westmoreland in a back channel message, JCS 1759-66, April
4, that Wheeler's telegram would not "add much" to what Westmoreland already knew but was being
sent at the President's request so that West- moreland would know his request was getting "high-level
attention." (Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files) The President
advised Taylor of Wheeler's message in an April 5 letter; Johnson also indicated that he was "seriously
considering" Taylor's recommendations. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260,
Gen. Taylor)
MDT/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
105. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 30, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:22 a.m. and passed to the
White House.
3589. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:
A. Current crisis.
1. The delicate balance which has prevailed for nine months having been disturbed, the government now
finds itself caught between two dangerous alternatives:
A. To restore order too soon, and too forcefully, thereby creating opportunities for Communist agentsprovocateurs, for incidents, for bloodshed, and for the creation of martyrs. This is what the Diem
government did three years ago with results which are well remembered.
B. The other danger is that they wait too long, that as time goes by, the "struggle" forces, which I believe
to be subtly but effectively influenced and utilized by the Communists, get more and more boistrous so
that the more time goes by, the greater the danger of agents-provocateurs, incidents, bloodshed, and
martyrs.
2. It is hard for me to conceive that another week can go safely by in Central Viet-Nam with the
government doing nothing to restore order. I said this to the GVN, notably to Foreign Minister Tran Van
Do, at a recent dinner. He was very solemn, but quickly added that he was optimistic, and that he
thought that in "two or three weeks" the Saigon Buddhists and government would get together on a
scheme to move toward constitutional democracy.

3. Frankly, this seems to me to be the merest figment of the imagination. The Buddhist clergy hardly
ever gives its word, and when it does, it doesn't feel obliged to keep it. To make the restoration of order
in Hue-Danang dependent on this will-o-the-wisp is to me fantastic.
4. At this same dinner, I told Tran Van Do that I was specifically worried about the U.S. Marines in
Hue-Danang, if the government continued the policy of not taking effective measures to restore order. I
sense that my remark led to a call from Ky to me the next day in which he asked me to come in and
assured me that he was definitely determined to take all the necessary steps to protect the U.S. troops
from any kind of mob violence.
5. If one omits the very fallacious estimates which Ky and Thieu both made regarding the reaction to the
relief of General Thi, it must be said that, since then, Ky has said many right things and said them quite
well, as regards: moving toward constitutional democracy, restoring law and order, dividing the
Buddhists, and uniting the Directorate. He is thinking hard and seems to be thinking straight. He also
maintains his poise and appears to be in good health.
6. But to me, as a typically impatient American who naturally wants action, most of the things he says
come about a week too late. He seldom gives dates or specifications. Also, one always wonders
whenever a Vietnamese says something intelligent and true, whether he is in any way able to do
anything about it. One must, to be sure, concede the dangers of moving too fast and he is, as he says,
following the advice of Confucius "first to try protocol (negotiations) and then to use force".
(Incidentally, this is his second reference to Confucius.) Maybe his timing is right, although I believe
strength tends to beget strength and that he has lost precious time. But I'm glad to have gotten this
promise out of him as regards our Marines--and I impressed him with the vital necessity of moving
quickly and sure-footedly when the time comes to move.
7. I, therefore, think the situation is precarious and, although there are a few hopeful signs, I fear serious
developments unless the government moves in to restore order.
8. While there is a non-Communist element in all this, brought by the envy which the "outs" feel for the
"ins" and by their reckless selfishness, there is no doubt that the Communists have subtly taken
advantage of the "struggle". There is also a believable report of French trouble-making and Communist
collaboration. Having been hurt on the field of battle, seeing the Chieu Hoi rate going so much against
them, and observing the promising beginnings as regards revolutionary development, they are trying out
their political arm.
9. Buddhist (and presumable VC) agitators have tried--unsuccessfully so far--to start trouble in Saigon.
They will surely keep trying despite some signs that Buddhist moderates such as Tam Chau are exerting
a dampening influence. It is vital to keep Saigon and the South calm. If the pot boils up there, the gravity
of the government's position will increase immeasurably.
10. The government has decided to move toward the "speeded up" establishment of a constitutional
preparatory council (the precise name not yet decided). At a meeting of the Directorate on March 25, it
was agreed this body would be composed of one representative from each of the 43 provincial and
municipal councils, with an equal number of members selected from religious and social organizations.
In addition there would be a small group of lawyers to act as a secretariat to the council.
11. By seeking to settle the national political uncertainties the government hopes to strengthen its hand
in dealing with local disturbances. By seeking to separate the Tam Chau and Tri Quang factions the
government hopes to make its task of dealing with Buddhist agitation easier. By enlisting support of

other political elements, government hopes to limit extent to which it cedes its authority to Buddhists.
Finally, by establishing acceptable national council with firmer schedule for return to civil government,
authorities hope to neutralize those demanding immediate civil government, and to take away what has
become the rallying cry of the agitators. The preservation of the form of the present government would
then become easier, allowing some sense of national unity to be evident, and providing a transition
period in which the job of governing could be pursued with some measure of continuity and efficiency.
These are the optimistic objectives. Difficulties are obvious, and the weakening of government authority
over the past weeks has increased the seriousness of the problem and lessened the chances of success.
12. All of the above must be a real shot in the arm to Hanoi who, according to reports, have been badly
hurt and urgently needed this evidence of the "inner contradictions of capitalism."
13. I do my best to see to it that every contact we have and every bit of influence which we possess is
being brought to bear as rapidly and as effectively as possible. Sam Wilson has returned from HueDanang and I believe every possible preparation has been made for the safety of the American
community.
B. Economic.
14. Saigon retail prices, according to the USAID index, were about 4 percent lower than for the
preceding month. Piastre prices for dollars and military payment certificates fell while gold prices rose,
continuing the trend begun last week. The Minister of Economy announced an increase in government
buying prices for Delta rice--so as to attract more rice from the Delta by paying a higher price for rice
sold to the government and by reducing the fears and hesitancy among the merchants who would
otherwise be selling on the open market at higher than official prices.
C. Military.
15. The tempo of war increased during the week as allied large unit operations reached a peak and Viet
Cong fired on Phan Thiet and Dalat airfields with mortars and carried out a daring raid on an American
training center escaping with a tank.
D. Chieu Hoi.
16. The returnee figures for the month of March are running more than 10 percent higher than those in
the record month of February. As of March 18, with 14 provinces yet to be heard from, the returnees
figure stood at 1,401. This compares with total all-province figures of 817 and 1,402 for January 18 and
February 18, respectively.
E. Reactions to Americans.
17. The newspaper Tieng Vang has this say about American misbehavior here and Senatorial behavior at
home:
"Americans and Viet-Nam.
"The presence of the U.S. is necessary in Viet-Nam, but the U.S. authorities' carelessness has provoked
regrettable misunderstanding.
"The U.S. authorities have overlooked the possible effects of the possible daily conflicts between

foreign soldiers and the population of a country attached to its sovereignty.

"Luckily the U.S. authorities have awakened to the reality and the recent press conference held by the
American captain, it seems, has succeeded in clearing most of the city population's misunderstandings,
which have not been wholly due to the soldiers in Viet-Nam.
"It must be recognized that the defeatist attitude of some U.S. officials showing disrespect for the
sovereignty of Viet-Nam has made smaller discontentments caused by price escalation, house and
transportation shortage become bigger.
"The Vietnamese people, already displeased with higher prices, traffic detours, snack bars mushrooming
everywhere, cannot help being discontent with Mr. Bob Kennedy's advocating a coalition government.
"Coalition or no coalition the problem could not be settled by Mr. R. Kennedy. Recently Mr. R.
Kennedy has even gone further into his violation of Viet-Nam's sovereignty in negotiating with the VC
exchanging the terrorist Nguyen Van Hai with a relative of his, Mr. Gustav Hertz.
"Such a queer attitude of Mr. Kennedy suffices to make the misunderstanding deeper from day to day,
and even a daily press conference could not prevent the misunderstanding from deepening."
Lodge
106. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Unger) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 30, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder
Memos, 1966. Top Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that Rusk saw the
memorandum.
SUBJECT
Increased Military Pressures Against North Viet-Nam
1. You mentioned the possibility that a policy decision may be taken calling for our exerting heavier
military pressure on North Viet-Nam. The purpose of the present memorandum is to provide you with
our recommendations as to what would be the preferable actions and which actions should be avoided if
it is decided that an intensification of activity is required.
2. In general, we believe that our air activity against North Viet-Nam should continue to be directed
primarily at interdicting the infiltration routes (hitting convoys, roads, bridges) and striking the facilities
which support the infiltration (POL storage, depots, repair facilities, etc.). This would speak for a
continuation of the armed recce activity now under way, including action in the Laos panhandle, with
intensification where lucrative targets are available.
3. Action against new kinds of targets is something which should be undertaken on a selective and
individual basis since any significant innovation has great impact in itself quite aside from its military
effects. Our objective continues to be to persuade the powers that be in Hanoi to abandon their efforts
against the south and for a time at least, when we are striking a new kind of target which poses a threat
to a part of their economy or infrastructure hitherto considered immune, we can influence their

calculations by one strike practically as much as by 10.

4. Having these considerations in mind and taking as a point of departure the present pattern of
operations against North Viet-Nam we would recommend the following list of targets, all of which are
understood on the basis of SNIE 10-1-66/2/ to have a military value. Entry on to even the first target on
this list is, of course, premised on a decision having been taken that overall policy considerations require
an intensification of our activity. (Our view on that point will be covered in a separate memorandum.)/3/
This decision in turn presupposes a readiness to increase the risks of Chinese and possibly Soviet
responses up to the point of some measure of direct participation. We would of course wish to keep
those risks as low as possible for as long as possible, and with that as the central criterion, the target list
is arranged in roughly ascending order of risk.
/2/Document 66.
/3/Not further identified.
(1) Destruction of Hai Duong highway-rail bridges between Hanoi and Haiphong. (Already struck prepause)
(2) Interdiction of railway and highway routes leading toward the Nanning area of China. (Such activity
was already underway prior to the pause beginning December 1965)
(3) Extension of armed recce, on basis now operating elsewhere in NVN, to Northeast quadrant,
excluding Hanoi and Haiphong circles and Chinese border areas.
(4) Restrike Uong Bi and other power plants.
(5) POL complex at Haiphong.
(6) Kep airfield and other jet capable fields except Phuc Yen and Hanoi Gia Lam.
(7) Phuc Yen airfield. (Only if MIGs begin to hamper operations)
5. We believe that we should be prepared to accept the introduction of B-52's to carry out strikes in
North Viet-Nam, but only if such strikes are authorized through the same procedures as followed today
for Arc Light strikes in Laos. B-52 strikes would not be objectionable in remote, sparsely inhabited
areas (e.g. the Vietnamese side of the Mu Gia Pass) but would raise serious problems if proposed for
densely inhabited areas.
6. We continue to feel that the mining of Haiphong harbor is undesirable for the reasons set forth in my
memorandum to Ambassador Johnson of March 10, copy at Tab A./4/ Likewise we continue to feel
targets should be avoided, whatever their nature, which lie directly within heavily populated areas in the
Hanoi and Haiphong areas or other urban areas and where there would probably be large numbers of
civilian casualties.
/4/Attached but not printed.
7. Vietnamese Ambassador Vu Van Thai and Foreign Minister Tran Van Do have raised at various
times two other proposals for military action against the north:

(1) A bombing of dikes and/or watergates early in the season of rising river levels (i.e. the spring) as a
means of warning Hanoi of our capability to wreak considerable havoc without in fact seriously
endangering life at this time, and
(2) A feint by Vietnamese craft against the north which would cause Hanoi to immobilize substantial
numbers of soldiers on its coast and would also have an unnerving psychological effect.
The second of these proposals seems to us dangerous in terms of possible provocation of the Chinese
and also out of keeping with our stated policy of not threatening the regime in North Viet-Nam. The first
proposal might, if we must continue to intensify still further, have some utility, and a discussion of this
possibility is appended at Tab B./5/
/5/"Strikes Against Flood Control Dikes in North Viet-Nam," undated; attached but not printed.
8. You will recall that the Joint Chiefs have under consideration some MACV target and operation
proposals regarding NVN on which CINCPAC has not commented fully or definitively. I mention this
since those proposals, which are summarized at Tab C,/6/ may come into any discussion of intensified
action against NVN.
/6/"Summary of MACV's Intelligence Assessment and Recommendations for Counter-actions and
CINCPAC Comments," undated; attached but not printed.
Recommendation/7/
/7/Rusk did not indicate a recommendation on the source text.
9. That targets be selected, if intensification is desired, from the list set forth above in paragraph 4,
approximately in the order listed. No increased measures should, however, be undertaken prior to the
conclusion of the Communist Party meeting now under way in Moscow.
Approved
Disapproved
Suggest following modifications in priority list proposed above
107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, March 30, 1966, 5:21 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by
Rusk, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Rusk.
2884. Eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. I am reluctant to harass you with our anxieties
here when you have your hands full with the political delicacies and dangers on the scene, particularly
since we find it difficult to make really constructive suggestions. Westmoreland's recent letter to General
Vien, sent with your concurrence, puts some fundamental issues to our South Vietnamese colleagues./2/
It is becoming increasingly difficult for us to understand or to explain to the Congress and to our own
people why the Hue Radio (see FBIS 53) can spew forth such vitriolic anti-American propaganda in the
center of an area being defended by American forces. We are deeply distressed by the seeming
unwillingness or inability of the South Vietnamese to put aside their lesser quarrels in the interest of
meeting the threat from the Viet Cong. Unless that succeeds, they will have no country to quarrel about.

Perhaps the very effort announced by the Generals to move toward a constitutional system has
stimulated an active maneuvering for position among South Vietnamese groups. I assume you have
exhausted your possibilities with Tri Quang and other extremists such as Tien Minh to impress upon
them the importance of putting first things first. It seems ironic that, at the very time when all other
efforts were beginning to move favorably, these internal differences among the South Vietnamese
should threaten their and our total effort. Please let us know if you and the Country Team feel that there
are steps which we can take from here which would be helpful. Is there anyone here or any way that we
from here can bring any influence to bear on Tri Quang? Have you discussed with your Japanese
colleagues the possibility of some of the Japanese Buddhists who established relations with him
bringing influence to bear on Tri Quang? Our present impression is that the political differences are not
likely to die away but seem to be gathering momentum.
/2/See Document 103 and footnote 2 thereto.
I note from your 3589/3/ that the government has decided to speed up a Constitutional Preparatory
Council and has given assurances that necessary steps will be taken to protect US forces. We face the
fact that we ourselves cannot succeed except in support of the South Vietnamese. Unless they are able to
mobilize reasonable solidarity, the prospects are very grim. I much appreciate your frank and realistic
reporting and am relying heavily upon your good judgment to exert every effort to get us over the
present malaise./4/ Regards.
/3/Document 105.
/4/In telegram 3614 from Saigon, March 31, Lodge responded that the Embassy had been doing its best
to bring to the attention of all concerned the gravity with which the United States viewed the situation.
Tri Quang, however, refused to listen. "He has embarked on a course deliberately designed not only to
bring down the government, but to have its replacement substantially subject to his
control." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk
108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 2, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Secret; Exdis. The first page
of the source text bears the notation, in Rusk's handwriting, "not used, except orally, DR. "An unsigned
copy of the memorandum, without Rusk's notation but marked "WPB Chron," is in the Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L.
SUBJECT
Political Situation in South Viet-Nam
1. The April 2 reports/2/ further reinforce the picture that Hue and Da Nang are now virtually out of
control and that the themes of the so-called "struggle" movement are spreading to other areas in a
significant fashion. In addition to the Buddhist- backed "struggle" group, the important Cau Dai sect has
now said that the present government is "illegal". Catholic discontent is also evident and would probably
become acute if the government made special concessions to the Buddhists. The only bright spots are
that Saigon has remained under control and that Ky and the government apparently have considerable
latent support in the southern part of South Viet-Nam and to some degree in the central areas.

/2/CIA analyses of the political situation in Vietnam at the beginning of April include a memorandum
on "Struggle Groups in I Corps," April 1, prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, and a 14-page
memorandum on "The Political Situation in South Vietnam: The Current Crisis, Possible Future
Developments, U.S. Options," April 2, prepared by George Carver. (Ibid.)
2. So far the government has been operating by trying to make minimum concessions on the political
timetable for a constitution and elections, in an effort to separate the moderate groups from the more
extreme Buddhists and students. A meeting with the moderate Buddhists on March 31 was supposed to
produce an agreed communique that would solidify moderate sentiment. However, the resulting
communique was extremely general and bland and seems most unlikely to have achieved this effect.
3. Meanwhile, the government has held off in applying force to restore order, and the situation has
reached the point, in Hue and Da Nang at least, where it is absolutely clear that local police and military
forces would not take orders and the introduction of special marine forces from Saigon--which was the
government's plan in the middle of the week--has become known to the "struggle" group and would now
almost certainly produce drastic bloodshed if applied. The most recent reports from Hue and Da Nang
indicate that the police, civil servants, and large elements of the local 1st Division are in total sympathy
with the "struggle" group./3/ Anti-American themes have been increasing, and local civilian employees
of US installations in that area have started to leave.
/3/A CIA field appraisal of the situation in Hue as of April 3 reported: "Governmental authority for
keeping law and order in Hue collapsed this week. "Participants in local demonstrations included
"virtually all police," significantly increased numbers of Vietnamese military personnel, and about 1,000
of the 5,000 civil servants ([document number not declassified], April 4; Central Intelligence Agency,
EA/DDO Files, 137-9-23, Job 85-00392R)
4. What can the government do? The following are at least headings for possible actions:
a. A more explicit political program. We do not believe the government could or should promise
immediate elections or give the Buddhists a predominant role in constitution-making that they are
seeking. But there is one immediate move that would not involve such unwise concessions, namely the
appointment in the next 2-3 days of a constitution-drafting body. Thieu and Ky have talked of doing this
by April 10, and Lodge has already told them that they must make it much sooner. We last night cabled
Saigon (outgoing 2939 attached)/4/ asking whether a Presidential or high-level message from here
would be helpful.
/4/Dated April 1; not attached. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 VIET S.
b. A deal with Thieu. However, now that the "struggle" group so clearly has the bit in its teeth, it seems
most unlikely that even such a political move would in itself bring them to accept government control
again. The "struggle" group seems to be imbued with ideas of "neutralization" and reducing the US role
"though not asking us to get out as of now." These ideas are plainly unacceptable and we could not
support any government gestures in these directions. However, there remains the significant element of
local "central Viet-Nam" sentiment which has for a long time felt that the Annam area (Hue and Da
Nang) was inadequately represented in the government. Thi was the symbol of this local representation,
and his dismissal added this major element to the broader political and corruption grievances on which
Tri Quang and the "struggle" group are capitalizing. At this point, we know of no leaders from this area
who could be brought into the government except for bringing back Thi himself. While Thi is probably
playing for the top spot--which would set off its own train of opposition from other elements notably the
Catholics--it is just possible that some deal could be made that would give him a major Saigon role and

at least partially satisfy the need for representation from central Viet-Nam. This morning's report that
Chieu, the government's emissary to Thi, has been allowed to return to Saigon may indicate that some
deal is in the making. We should certainly lend our weight to doing it.
c. A new I Corps Commander acceptable to the Buddhists. Plainly, the Directory's first choice is not
able to control the situation. A new man is needed with such prestige as to be acceptable to the
Buddhists and yet at the same time with as little risk as possible of again making I Corps a separate
warlord area. Such a man might be found in General Minh, the leader of the post-Diem government,
who is now in Bangkok. It would be a tremendous gesture for the Directory to bring him back, and he
might come in response to this need.
d. Controlling other areas. So far, the "struggle" movement has made only moderate headway in a few
other cities. This must be brought under control by judicious granting of lesser demands combined with
clear capacity to use force. The government seems to be doing this reasonably well in Pleiku and Dalat.
We need to impress this point on them.
e. A face-lifting for the Directory. Both Thieu and Ky have lost tremendous prestige during the crisis,
but Ky probably the most. The replacement of the Directory as a whole would be a tremendous loss in
every respect, but some face-lifting might be possible in two directions. First, Ky might step down as
Prime Minister and be replaced by someone such as Chieu, who is reasonably astute and has handled his
visit to Hue well. Second, to meet the demand for a civilian role, one or more senior civilians might be
brought into the Cabinet, and some defined relationship provided between the Directory and the
Cabinet. This would both meet the Buddhist demand as far as it is now practicable to do so, and this
would help the somewhat demoralized state of the civilian Ministers evident for some time and
apparently virtually amounting to a complete loss of confidence as a result of the crisis.
5. The above would be a prescription that we might now urge forcefully on the GVN, perhaps in the
form of a Presidential message. We suggested this possibility in last night's cable, but have as yet had no
reply. However, it must be faced that the situation has deteriorated to the point where even this program,
applied immediately, would have no assurance of success. The plain fact is that Thieu and Ky have been
drastically weakened by their inability to cope with the crisis, and we must still be prepared for the
worst, namely a complete change of government.
We have had no real exchange with Lodge on the subject of possible alternatives, and the only one that
occurs to us as having any possibility of success would be the possible return of some such figure as
General Minh, who is military but also commands a wide civilian following. From here, we do not see
any civilian, nor do we believe that Thi could be installed without setting off drastic counteraction from
other elements such as the Catholics. However, it is time we started exchanging views with Lodge on
the "least bad" possible alternative.
Dean Rusk/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
109. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 2, 1966, 1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the family dining room on the second floor of the White House.
PRESENT
President, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Moyers, Valenti
President wanted the following done:
1. Invite publishers and editors to state dinners--and have them in earlier to lunch with the President and
Rusk and McNamara.
Perhaps Rusk and McNamara could fly out and meet with various editorial boards--Louisville Courier
Journal Times--the night newspapers--St. Louis Post Dispatch--Providence Journal.
Wants research done: in other emergency periods--isn't our position much better overall, economic, etc.,
than in other such periods.
On Vietnam:
1. Make every effort to keep Ky. But be ready to make terrible choice. Perhaps take a stand in Thailand-or take someone else other than Ky.
2. McNamara said what happens to I Corps is not as important as to what happens to other corps. Thinks
we ought to get rid of Tri Quang.
President said there are two basic things we need to do:
1. What do we do to preserve Ky? Thinks we ought to preserve him if possible.
2. Prepare fallback position. Involves talking to Buddhists and if necessary, get out of I Corps area and
even Vietnam.

McNamara said Lodge ought to have it out with Tri Quang. Quang needs to know what situation is and
how prepared we are to clear out of I Corps area. We need to know if Quang really wants us out--for if
he does, we better get out now. But McNamara thinks that Quang believes that we are committed.
President said to send Lodge a cable telling him to get in touch with Quang now and get tough with
him./2/
/2/Telegram 2950 to Saigon, April 2, passed on the "suggestions" that came out of this 1:30 meeting.
Rusk asked Lodge to consider meeting again with Tri Quang "to disabuse him of idea that the American
commitment will tolerate division or discord from within or will permit Communist leaders or
sympathizers to achieve their purposes through our leniency." (Ibid., National Security File, Country
File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 3)
[Here follows discussion of Indira Gandhi.]
110. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, April 4, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The source
text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:50 a.m. and passed to the
White House, CIA, and Department of Defense.
3698 1. I called on Prime Minister Ky at his request at 1:00 pm, Monday, and, as I entered, thanked him
for his friendly words about American aid. He said that at the meeting yesterday, two resolutions were
adopted: 1) for a political convention and 2) for taking strong meas-ures. After this, General Vinh Loc
said that he thought they ought to say something showing appreciation for American aid. Ky suggested
that Vinh Loc make a motion which he did, so it was the third resolution of the day.
2. He then turned to me with a very serious expression on his face and, looking somewhat shaken, said:
3. "We have waited too long. Now we must be very firm. How can I describe this situation? All these
different groups and minorities and sects make an infernal combination". He used the French work for
"infernal".
4. "I told the Directorate today: either I resign or we all stay together, and we have decided to stay
together. Thieu will speak to the nation tonight. We have decided to declare an 'etat de siege' (state of
siege) in the whole country. Before that we were in an 'etat de guerre'. A state of siege means that we are
authorized to have a curfew all day long all over the country if we want to. We plan temporarily to close
all schools and universities."
5. He asked me whether I had heard that the Dalat radio had been burned, which I had.
6. I said that some thought that Tri Quang was a Communist, but I remembered that Prime Minister Ky
had said he was a "visionary" (un illumine). Ky said that he now thought he was a Communist and that
undoubtedly we face a great Communist conspiracy to take over the government, ask the Americans to
leave, and turn the country over to Hanoi.
7. Ky said he realized now that he had had too much faith in the value of making concessions to the
Buddhists. He had been talking with Thich Thien Minh all day and night. He said you can't satisfy them.

Minh had asked him for two things: one a job for Thi, to which Ky said he was not opposed; secondly
that Thieu would reply to the Buddhists agreeing with everything that they ask for. Ky then said:
8. "I have given Minh until [garble] tonight to issue orders to all the Buddhists to sit down and discuss a
way to achieve our common goal. I wanted him to prove his good will. I did this using the Secretary of
Health, Kha, as an intermediary.
9. "The Directorate meeting today was a very good meeting--thoroughly military and professional--with
everything staffed out. We have plans for psychological warfare, leaflets, mobile radio. I want to move
three battalions to Danang and bring up one division from the Fourth Corps for security in Saigon.
10. "I, myself, will go to Danang and be at the command post tonight with General Vien who will stay
after I come back to Saigon, presumably tomorrow. I would like to have more aircraft to reinforce
Danang. We have not enough Vietnamese Air Force planes. I know that MACV is ready and that they
need an order from you. Will you give it?"
11. I said that I would and I notified General Westmoreland to that effect at 1:30./2/
/2/At 1135Z on April 4, Westmoreland informed General Walt that two Vietnamese Marine battalions,
field police and military security elements, psywar teams, and a command group would move to Danang
under cover of darkness that evening and that Lodge had agreed to Ky's request for airlift. (MAC 2667;
Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files) Subsequent events
during April 4-10 and the role of U.S. forces can be followed in Jeffrey Clarke's Advice and Support:
The Final Years, 1965-1973 (Washington, DC, 1988) pp. 131-133.
12. Ky said he had received members of the VNQDD who wanted to help and asked what is the
government going to do.
13. Ky looks for a "mass effect", quickly and simultaneously. The strategy for the nation is to have a big
success in Danang first and then the people in the other communities in Viet-Nam will see it. For the
time being he will isolate Hue, but believes he will have no trouble with Hue once Danang is disposed
of.
14. If necessary he will move M-113s from Quang Nam. All Saigon troops are 100 percent restricted to
their camps.
15. General Thieu will send invitations to representatives of all the different groups in Viet-Nam to
organize meeting to be held "the day after tomorrow". There will be two to three hundred people and
everybody will be given a chance to talk. He believes he has put the Buddhists on the defensive.
16. There is now no doubt in his mind that the Communists are striving for a "soulevement", that is a
general uprising. He said:
17. "If I am weak they will succeed, but if I am strong they will not. History will judge whether I have
done well or not, but I am ready to make the supreme sacrifice."
18. He was deeply moved and so was I.
Lodge

111. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 4, 1966, 8:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L. No classification
marking. In his April 4 covering memorandum to the President, Valenti noted that there was one vital
piece of information that he had not yet seen concerning the "so-called mutiny of SVN troops." (Ibid.)
You are being counseled by those far wiser than I, but I pass along these thoughts to you for whatever
value, if any, they may have. These are troubling times for you and I am only trying to help clear the
dark alternatives that seem to be available.
Where are we?
1. The Ky government will hold on or
2. The Ky government will fall and
a) Either another government takes over that will choose to continue both the fight and the peaceful
reconstruction
or
b) Another government will determine to strike a bargain with the Viet Cong.
Two questions present themselves:
1. How can we help preserve Ky?
and
2. What do we do if Ky falls?
I. Preserve Ky:
1. We can help with the use of United States force. This would be dangerous. It would erode our moral,
even our treaty obligations. It would smack of colonialism.
Thus, the decision is how to preserve Ky without the deployment of United States force.
A. Elections Now.
This is hazardous. The Viet Cong may win in the heat of the anti-government demonstrations; a public
whipped up to march against the government is likelier than not to vote against that government.
But if Ky were to set a date--say June 1--for a national election it may take the starch out of the
demonstrations. At least it would give Ky some breathing room to present the case for a unified central
government whose objective is to defeat the Viet Cong, not commit suicide.
B. Bring in four to five Buddhist-Catholic leaders as part of the directorate.

This might ease the pressures, if this move were coupled with a definite election date.
C. Surface Viet Cong agents as provocateurs--and link them to the demonstration leadership.
The drawback to this is the lack of time available to make the case. Communicating with the Vietnam
public is not as easy as in this country.
But suppose we airlifted 100 soundtrucks to Vietnam (or sound gear to put in South Vietnamese trucks)
and the government put on a campaign (U.S. style) to convince the people the Viet Cong were inciting
the demonstrations? Suppose we didn't indict the Buddhist leadership, but focused on a known enemy
(the VC), and the perils that would come if the VC intrigue won (i.e. if the central government fell). It is
a long shot, but it might work.
D. Split the Buddhist leadership.
This has possibilities. There is no durable cohesion in the Buddhist leadership. Can we pit some of the
leaders against Tri Quang? Can we use the Dalai Lama and Buddhists outside Saigon, Hue and Da Nang
to our advantage?
As a corollary to this--why can't Ky ask that all the Buddhist factions--indeed all religious factions-gather together for a meeting to discuss the future of the government. Perhaps Ed Lansdale and his
group could be useful in getting this meeting together. Object of the meeting: To try to drive a wedge
between the leadership groups--and to bring to bear the argument that the real enemy is the Viet Cong
and if the leaders would allow the government to have an orderly free election all groups would benefit.
It might be worth a try.
E. Urge Ky to use force.
Only those on the scene can assess the value of this. It looks like this would not work for the
demonstrators have seemingly gathered too much momentum. Before it would work, Ky must restore
the usefulness of the 1st. Corps soldiers.
Is it possible to restore Thi--and back him in efforts to retrieve the sagging loyalties of the 1st Corps?
This is admittedly dangerous, but as a final, totally last resort it could be tolerated.
II. If Ky Falls:
1. We could wait and see what a new government would bring. Past history indicates it would have the
same durability as Quat--or even worse.
A new government will
a) Be a weak reed, but insist that we stay. At least we retain our credentials as an invited guest rather
than an interloper.
b) Demand that we leave--which is unlikely since the Buddhists have an irrational goal of destroying
central governments but under our over-all security.
c) Be satisfactory to us for the moment, but leave a sour taste in the domestic mouth. Our antagonists
would seize this change-in-government as final evidence we are fighting windmills and pour the steam

on for us to get out. It would be a cheerless several months in the White House.
2. We could announce we were going to leave Vietnam because of a lack of national will to secure
stability and freedom./2/
/2/At 9:30 p.m. on April 3, Valenti drafted a personal note to the President that began, "I truly believe
we need to find some way out of Vietnam. All that you strive for and believe in and are accomplishing is
in danger, as long as this war goes on. If there were a way out, some hint of the end with honor, I would
believe it best to stay there til the bitter conclusion. But there is no reasonable hope. All your military
advisors insist you must double your force, and still they give you no prophecy of victory, however
shapeless, however mild." No record has been found that Valenti sent the note to Johnson. (Ibid., Office
of the President File, Jack Valenti)
If we did this, our reasons are, as follows:
a) We adhere to our beliefs in self-determination--and in our resolve to protect a small country from
being chewed up by its neighbors, but we cannot force anyone to choose stability and liberty. We can
only aid when the people are determined to help protect themselves.
b) We would, if the Thais invited us, assist them, for as long as they chose to have our aid, to help them
resist intrusions on their national sovereignty.
Thus, we should withdraw from Vietnam, not because our resolve or our objectives are shaken, but
because there existed no longer a central authority with a desire to remain free of aggression.
This would have the following effects:
1. The Vietnamese might be so shocked it would cause even the erratic Buddhist leaders to sober up.
Perhaps a really stable government could then be formed. Thus, we could turn political catastrophe into
a hopeful direction.
Or
2. We could rid ourselves of the Vietnamese- bone-in-our-throat and at the same time give sustenance to
those allies and friends where a truly nationalistic spirit and tradition exists.
At the same time, we would call for a neutral zone along the Mekong to get on with the development of
that region. United Nations authority would be asked for--with our troops supporting much of the force.
In this way, we get rid of the South Vietnamese albatross, secure the rich Mekong, and hold the Thai
resolve to resist. We would have demonstrated that we will stick with an ally and a commitment until
the one becomes insane and the other no longer has real meaning.
Jack Valenti/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
112. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 4, 1966, 7:10-8:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Liberary, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The
meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The President returned to the Oval Office from the Cabinet
Room at 8:42 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
PRESENT
President, Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, General Taylor, Bill Bundy, Justice Fortas, J.
Valenti
President said Westmoreland thinks [there is] "prospect of success in Danang." Said he didn't think so.
McNamara and Rusk agree with President.
President thinks it important to keep our troop and equipment out of riot area. We don't want to become
involved.
President approved telegram (first one)/2/ on what posture our Vietnam people should take--hands off.
/2/Telegram 2965 to Lodge and Westmoreland, transmitted at 9:03 p.m. on April 4, stated that "US
forces should not be used in any way within Da Nang or Hue or against dissident GVN forces." Nor
should any endorsement be given to the GVN claim that the Struggle Movement was "Communistdominated," a claim "contrary to any evidence we have." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, NODIS , vol. 3)
President wonders about (second telegram)/3/ on political situation. Says appeasement never wins.
Worried about a constitutional assembly--rather have someone we can control rather than a communist
takeover at the Assembly.
/3/Not found.
Rostow: Government has not been credible.
President: Why and how?
Rostow: Ky was going to call a group to draft a constitution--and hasn't done so.
President: What are problems in calling it?
Rostow: Not getting agreement on total list.
Bundy: Working on a list since January.
When I was in Saigon four weeks after Honolulu, difficulty in getting groups organized to take part.
Now we urge something to get the government off dead center.
Vice President: Who is in touch with Thi?
Bundy: No one, really.
What about Cochran, Consul General at Danang?
President gave approval for second telegram to go out (Now he looked at third telegram on alternative

governments)./4/
/4/Telegram 2966 to Saigon, transmitted at 9:05 p.m. on April 4, discussed "Possible Alternative
Governments," stating that "if worst comes to worst, our first choice would be the one you suggest,
keeping the Directory united and bringing in someone else to replace Ky," with "Chieu at top of
tentative list for this purpose." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS,
vol. 3)
General Taylor: Worried about Thi. Tri Quang is back of him and we cannot take a Tri Quang
government. He will tear down everything.
(President said to insert this caveat in the telegram.)
Rusk: Alternatives are less desirable than what we have now, so we are trying to save what we have.
President: Need to do more planning on how to pick a man before he takes over so we won't have to get
out when the wrong man gets in.
Time has come when the alternative is to get out--or do what we need to do to get the government
shored up--move in with power and stay there.
Vice President wanted to know more about Thi. Taylor says he is flamboyant, rash, and an associate of
Tri Quang--but a brave commander--troops like him.
Vice President: Thi is pleasant, Buddhist and clever. Ky is jealous of Thi. Some of our Mission people
think Thi is able. Sam Wilson thinks he is competent.
President: Isn't he out of our hands now?
Vice President: I don't know. But we ought not let him get out of our hands. We need to know more
about the Buddhists.
President: We need a Garcia-Godoy type--with an advisor by his side.
McNamara: We need a Bunker in Vietnam.
President: Don't rely on polls on D.R. (Dominican Republic). They're not very accurate 60 days from
now. Keep Camano in London. Don't let him out. Camano could win. Keep that poll going. Know every
week what is happening. Don't lose an hour's contact.
The way I see it, Ky is gone, the last gasp. Doubt he can pull it off. When he goes, there'll be hell in this
country. Let's get a government we can appoint and support. We need a tough advisor.
President: What do we tell the world?
General Taylor: We can minimize our losses if Ky goes and the Directory stays. We have to take sides
this time.
President: Thought Ky made bad judgment in saying the Mayor of Danang ought to be shot./5/ Any
other bad judgment we know about?

/5/While speaking at a news conference in Saigon on April 3, Ky threatened to shoot the Mayor of
Danang, Dr. Nguyen Van Man. (New York Times April 4, 1966)
Taylor: The Hitler statement/6/--but I thought he had matured.
/6/Not further identified.
113. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 5, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-VN Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Vietnam, Mar-Aug '66. Secret.
Drafted by J.J. Helble of FE/VN.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam Sitrep as of 1000 April 5
1. General Situation:
Saigon--The situation in Saigon is apparently quiet although press ticker this morning indicates a
demonstration was broken up near the Buddhist Institute by Vietnamese troops which employed rifle
fire over the heads of the demonstrators. Curfew has been extended from 2100 hours to 0500 hours.
Danang--ARVN troops which are unidentified, regional and popular forces, and "Struggle Forces" and
civilians are reported manning roadblocks from the air base into the city of Danang. No estimate of the
number of these forces has been received. Three Marine battalions have been air lifted from Saigon and
are presently located on the Danang air base. There is no indication that these forces have attempted to
leave the area of the air base. I Corps commander General Chuan reportedly made two trips to the air
base to confer with Prime Minister Ky during the day of April 5. Late ticker items state that Ky has now
returned to Saigon, after broadcasting in Danang that he was now convinced the city was not in
Communist hands. General Chuan has told newsmen that Prime Minister Ky, prior to his departure for
Saigon had assured him that his forces would not attempt to leave the air base, and as a result General
Chuan had ordered a Ranger battalion, which had been deployed to defend Danang, back to its post.
Posters have been put up in Danang signed by General Chuan stating that the situation is in hand, that
troops are to return to their camps, and civilian demonstrators should stay home.
Hue--A small demonstration of about 600 students took place in front of MACV billets in Hue April 5
demanding the removal of barbed wire barricades which were impeding traffic on a main route. The
barbed wire was removed and the demonstration quietly dispersed. On the orders of the commanding
general of the III MAF, the MACV senior advisor to the I Division has ordered the removal of all
advisors to the I Division and has informed the Division commander General Nhuan that he is
withdrawing all American fixed wing and rotary air craft support for the Division. Consul General
Corcoran in Hue has stated that the removal of the MACV advisors may provoke hostile action on the
part of the Struggle Forces toward American civilans in Hue and Quang Tri and is, therefore, ordering
all American civilians with the exception of Consulate and CAS staff to be evacuated.
Nha Trang--Press ticker items report the USIS library and adjoining Vietnamese Information Services
offices have been sacked and burned in Nha Trang. No confirmation has been received from the
Embassy.

Dalat--The situation in Dalat remains uncertain, although late press ticker indicates that the Government
has regained control of the Dalat radio station.
2. Ky-Buddhist Negotiations:
Embassy Saigon reports that Ky has been actively negotiating with the top Buddhists including Tri
Quang and Thien Minh. Ky reportedly gave Minh a letter with a GVN promise to convene an immediate
political conference to consider: a) the establishement of a constitution-drafting council, or b) the
establishment of a constitutional assembly./2/ The Buddhists stated that with this letter they would try to
calm the situation.
/2/In telegram 3746, April 5, Lodge reported that Thieu had shown him a statement he was issuing that
announced the convening within 1 week or 10 days of a National Political Congress. (Ibid., Central
Files, POL 15 VIET S)
3. Over-all Outlook:
The negotiations which Ky has been engaged in with General Chuan and with the Buddhists, together
with the avoidance so far of any armed engagements in the Danang area, give rise to some cautious
optimism that a settlement satisfactory to the Government and the Struggle Forces may emerge.
Agreement allegedly reached between Ky and the Buddhists would appear to represent substantial
compromise on the part of the Buddhists. At the same time, it is clear that tensions have not been
substantially reduced and the possibility for an outbreak of violence either between military units or
between the GVN and civilian demonstrators remains very real./3/
/3/Bundy forwarded this memorandum to Rusk on April 5 under a covering note in which he stated:
"My net judgment is that the worst possible outcomes have been avoided, but that Ky essentially
capitulated to the combination of local Buddhist sentiment represented by General Chuan. I would guess
that this would seriously damage his position." (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)
114. Draft Scenario Prepared in the Department of Defense/1/
Washington, April 5, 1966.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075,
Vietnam, 1966. Top Secret; Sensitive. Presumably drafted in OASD/ISA. The source text is stamped:
"Sec Def has seen, 9 Apr 1966." Attached to the source text is a 14-page draft paper, "Some Thoughts
About Vietnam," dated April 4. Referring to the paper printed here as "a possible scenario," the paper
concludes: "All factors taken into account, we should seriously consider seizing the opportunity offered
by the I Corps crisis to change our policy with respect to Vietnam and to disengage from the war there."
POSSIBLE "FALL BACK" PLAN
1. Most Important: Change objectives from do-what-it-takes-to-make-the-North-stop-it to do-what-ittakes-to-force-a-GVN/VC-compromise.
2. Recognize that we are on a losing wicket in Vietnam. While the military situation is not going badly,
the political situation is in "terminal sickness" and even the military prognosis is of an escalating
stalemate.

3. Make private Presidential decision to seize upon the I Corps troubles as the vehicle for disengagement
by the United States. Success will require secrecy and completely loyal execution. (Query how to bring
Lodge on board and how to deal with Congressional leaders.)
4. Choose between two approaches: (a) Fast ("fed up") withdrawal, and (b) slow ("patch up but squeeze
the GVN") approach. The former would be wise only if GVN left-footedness or anti-Americanism
becomes extreme./2/
/2/At their meeting on April 15, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took note of a report, JCS 2343/805-1, April
14, "Assessment of Political Unrest in SVN As It Affects US Military Efforts," which concluded: "The
United States should continue to prosecute the war in Vietnam as long as requested by the South
Vietnam Government and confront the prospect that a regime could come to power which would seek to
end the war and request the withdrawal of US forces. The United States should plan accordingly." The
Chiefs then agreed to direct the Joint Staff to draw up terms of reference for a study on how to withdraw
U.S. forces from Vietnam, if required. (Note by the Secretaries, April 20, and attached report;
Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3. (30 Mar 66) IR 6091)
5. While a new Saigon government is being formed (now), deliver a US "ultimatum" to all interested
parties (including Buddhists) that they must shape up or we will ship out. We could either (a) insist now
that they compromise with the VC or (b) assume that they will be be able to shape up, so that
compromise with the VC would come later.
6. Ensure that US civilian and military personnel in Vietnam can be protected.
7. Initiate an effort to re-educate US and world opinion:
a. That our commitment is to support a representative government and a people who help themselves
(and that the GVN has now shown itself not to be representative and that the people of South Vietnam
have demonstrated that they will not help themselves).
b. That the South Vietnamese case is unique--unlike the case of our other "clients" (giving the reasons in
detail).
c. That we have more than delivered the goods in blood and treasure in Vietnam--enough to honor our
guarantee and enough to cause any aggressor to pause lest an equivalent amount be delivered against
him in another case.
8. Consult with key allies--ROKs, Australians, New Zealanders, Japanese, etc.
9. Continue US aid and deployments to and actions in "cooperative" areas and continue strikes against
North Vietnam and Laos if and only if solid efforts are being made toward working out a compromise
with the VC. (Of course, if we were surprised by the appearance of a Magsaysay, we could change our
strategy.) If no such efforts toward compromise are made, stop new deployments, move into a unilateral
US ceasefire, and withdraw into enclaves preparatory to departure from Vietnam.
10. Press for an international conference, moves in the UN and an election.
11. Be prepared for serious deterioration in Vietnam, shock in Asia, damage to our influence throughout
the world, gloating by the Communists, and political back-lash at home.

12. Take initiatives in Asia and elsewhere to offset and diffuse the issue.
115. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 5, 1966, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1.
Top Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Moyers and Valenti.
I drafted the attached comment on Sunday,/2/ in the midst of the worst of the Vietnam political crisis.
/2/April 3. Rostow gave his April 3 draft memorandum to Taylor, who commented on it in a
memorandum of April 4 to Rostow. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor)
As a little light--only a little--breaks through,/3/ I would summarize its conclusions as follows:
/3/Valenti's notes for the President's meeting with his advisers at 1 p.m. on April 5 include the following
brief discussion of Vietnam: "Information from Vietnam seems unclear. Taylor thinks situation in
Danang is better, but what will Buddhists do? Rostow feels this morning is much better than we
anticipated last night." The meeting mainly dealt with foreign policy issues other than Vietnam. (Ibid.,
Meeting Notes File)
1. If the Vietnamese work their way out of this--and a civil constitution-drafting group is born--we will
have passed a great turning point; although there will be plenty of trouble before they actually find their
political feet.
2. The Communists are serious and understand the importance of politics: they will take it as a major
defeat.
3. Then will be the time to pour it on and see if we can't force, in the months ahead, a resolution of the
conflict. The strain on our political and economic life and the strain on the South Vietnamese is all but
intolerable. Specifically, as the memo suggests, we should on the military side:
--continue maximum effort to impose attrition on VC and PAVN forces in South Vietnam;
--work more effectively from the air on the supply routes from the North;
--increase the costs to Hanoi of continuing the war by going for oil or other precision target systems that
hurt without killing an excessive number of civilians.
4. On the diplomatic side we should:
--keep close to the Russians, but not hope for too much until Hanoi and the VC are persuaded by the
situation itself that the jig is up;
--keep lines open to Hanoi;
--begin to get word to the VC that their destiny is: to sit on the Hanoi delegation at the international
conference; and to talk to Saigon about how to end the war and get back into the national life of South
Vietnam.

--request Mr. Rusk to conduct a high level review of negotiating papers developed at the working level.
5. On the side of the Honolulu program the memo argues that the most critical dimension is political.
--We should, of course, continue our present program of concentrated effort in four areas of rural
reconstruction--full blast;
--but we should concentrate more effort, once they hire a hall and begin to talk, on political
development; how to keep the Directorate together; the political party clause in the constitution; how to
balance majority and minority interests; the formation of a national wide-ranging party, etc.
Walt
Attachment
Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson
Washington, April 5, 1966.
You ask for comments on the attached./4/ They follow:
/4/Attached but not printed are: 1) Valenti's memorandum to Komer, March 28, outlining four "nonmilitary" questions, which Valenti had asked the President and which the President wanted Komer to
comment on; and 2) Komer's March 29 memordandum to Valenti in reply, which the President asked
Rostow to comment on.
1. The USSR and Negotiations./5/
/5/Valenti's first question was: "Are we pursuing the one key to settlement in Vietnam--the Soviet
Union?"
I believe Russian leverage on Hanoi depends mainly on our persuading Hanoi that negotiation is the best
course. Aside from what we do militarily and politically in Vietnam, the Russians have little leverage.
They can keep a presence by assisting with arms--notably arms to defend Hanoi from the air.
Hanoi wants them as a presence: to balance Peking; to supply arms; and as an insurance policy, should
negotiations be undertaken.
But only we--not Moscow--can push them over the hump into negotiations.
That means, in my view, that we must push harder on the second and third elements in the military
equation.
The first element, which is going quite well, is to impose heavy attrition on the VC and PAVN main
force units.
The second element is harassment of their supply lines from the North. Here I would be prepared to take
the risks of B-52 bombing of Mu Gia pass and other elements of that supply route in North Vietnam and
Laos. I would press to the maximum production and use of special interdiction weapons.

The third military element is making the war more expensive in the North to Hanoi. There I prefer oil to
bombing the Northeast supply lines. The latter justifies more and more Chinese engineering and
logistical forces. Oil hits the over-all military logistical capacity in the North, as well as industrial and
civil operations. I'm certainly not the last word on this; but I do believe we should lean harder on Hanoi,
on a precision bombing basis.
It is not, Mr. President, that I'm bloody-minded or a hawk. But the strain of trying to do the job
principally by attrition of main force units places almost intolerable burdens on the political life of our
country and on the war-weary South Vietnamese. We've got to try to shorten this war without doing
unwise or desperate things.
I believe the Russians would fully understand and accept this course; although they are keeping their oar
in Hanoi as a contingency whether we succeed (for negotiations) or whether we fail (to balance the
Chinese).
In short, I would suggest that, if we survive the present political crisis, we do more about the supply line
from the North and we increase Hanoi's costs for continuing the conflict.
Meanwhile, we should remain close to the Russians; because none of us is so smart--certainly not me--to
be absolutely sure they won't help end this earlier rather than later.
2. Peace Talks./6/
/6/Valenti's second question was: "Have we really sorted out the sticky problems and issues of peace
talks--so that we are absolutely clear on our objectives and trading points?"
The negotiating papers are pretty good./7/ They move toward what I have called a "two-track"
negotiating plan: an international negotiation, involving the Geneva Accord powers, with the NLF on
the Hanoi delegation, dealing with the restoration and strengthening of the 1954 and 1962 agreements;
an internal negotiation, between Saigon and NLF to end the war and create the conditions for absorbing
the South Vietnamese now caught up in the VC insurrection into the life of the Country.
/7/Presumably a reference to negotiating papers drafted during late 1965 and 1966 by the Vietnam
Planning Group, chaired by Unger, and in particular to the group's paper on "A Settlement in Vietnam,"
to which Komer referred in his memorandum of March 29. A copy of the paper, together with Unger's
discussion of it in a memorandum to Ball, March 15, is in Department of State, EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D
167, Vietnam Coordinating Committee and Working Group, 1964-66.
There is some fuzziness about this high in the government. Some of our public talk suggests we might
settle internal South Vietnam affairs at an international conference; some suggests no one would ever
talk to the VC--ever. The surfacing of a two-track policy is a delicate matter. But in the meanwhile what
we say should be consistent with it. Incidentally, the Vietnamese portion of the Honolulu Communique
was consistent with a two-track negotiation.
The reason for the fuzziness is that the preliminary papers have been developed at the working level;
and you may wish Mr. Rusk to render you a personal judgment on existing plans, negotiating concepts,
and ways of talking about the problem.
It follows from this line of thought that it may be wise to find some way of suggesting to the NLF that
we think they ought to be talking with the government in Saigon.

3. Political Tutelage and Organization./8/

/8/Valenti's third question was: "Why shouldn't we organize in Vietnam a highly skilled group of
political professionals to work with the current government in teaching them how to become democratic
leaders--and build a durable democratic party?"
Organization comes first. If there is one thing I regret about Honolulu it is that we didn't nail Ky down
harder on a date for implementing the political side of his January 15th speech.
The unrest in Vietnam doesn't come from hungry people. The folks carrying banners and organizing all
this eat regularly. And that's the way it is in most political disruptions in developing countries--and even
in our race troubles.
What they want is either personal power (Tri Quang and Thi) or participation in politics, which is the
application of power. And the Communists are, of course, in there trying to make the most of it.
The most urgent non-military business is to cut the radicals out of the herd by getting the literate, urban
leaders--and others--into a hall and around tables talking about the political future. Some force may well
be necessary in this crisis; but essentially we're trying--and the Directorate is trying--to get the
moderates off the streets and into a position where they have to think and talk responsibly about the
future of their country.
Once they are there, we have a number of ways we can help them think along the right lines;
Washington and Saigon are in pretty good shape, if and when we get over that historic hurdle which is
what today's crisis is about.
There may be ways of beefing up Saigon's adminstrative capacity through a relatively few first-rate
advisers working for the Vietnamese and acceptable to them; but we need a government with a bit of a
future first.
4. The Four Key Areas./9/
/9/Valenti's fourth question was: "Are we keeping close tabs on the Lodge plan for pacifying four key
areas in SVN?"
Bob Komer will report.
I don't need to tell you that I support increased economic and social development in South Vietnam as
elsewhere.
And I'm sure that something like the Lodge Plan--and the four key areas--is the right way to proceed; by
concentration of effort.
But I don't think this war is going to end by pacification of most of the country.
It will end--if we win it--when some combination of the following four things leads Hanoi to knock it
off:
--sufficient attrition on the main force units to break up structures, produce a marked deterioration of
morale, and an enlarged flow of defectors--to our side and back home to their VC-controlled areas;

--sufficient obstruction to the supply lines to make replacements expensive and, if possible, less than
attrition of men, equipment, and ammunition;
--sufficient cost to military, civil and economic life in the North to help tip the attrition-supply equation
further in our direction;
--sufficient order, unity, and stability in the South to rule out a Communist political takeover in the
midst of chaos.
If this view is right, the war will not end when we have pacified every district, village, and province.
When it ends there will still be a hell of a mess in South Vietnam--as there was in Greece, Malaya, and
the Philippines.
There will probably still be some last-ditch VC to mop up; but, if other guerrilla wars carry any lesson, it
is that when the organizational structure cracks, it cracks pretty well down the line. And the VC is the
most tightly organized guerrilla structure we've seen except that of the Chinese Communists. For
example, they are now feeding local guerrillas up to the main force units, in order to keep them up to
strength. The main force and local guerrilla units are interlocked; if the main forces go, it will have a
profound effect on the local forces.
In short, we should carry forward rural reconstruction on orderly concentrated lines; but we should not
measure the probable length of the war by the rate of successful pacification.
The real job of rural reconstruction will be post-war.
Walt
116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, April 6, 1966, 7:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by
William Bundy, cleared by Rostow and McNamara, and approved by Rusk.
3001. For Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: Embtels 3755/2/ and 3761./3/ Over-all situation has been
reviewed at highest levels today and I wish to give you clear flavor of our thinking./4/
/2/In telegram 3755 from Saigon, April 6, Lodge reported that if negotiations then underway with
Struggle committees in Hue and Danang did not bring immediate results, Ky planned to return to
Danang that afternoon, move into town with tanks at midnight, install a new mayor, and "reoccupy" the
major public buildings. (Ibid.)
/3/In telegram 3761, April 6, Lodge reported that the GVN had decided to seek a political solution
before a military one and had accepted the Buddhist proposal offered to Ky the previous evening to hold
a constitutional convention within 6 months. (Ibid.)
/4/According to Valenti's brief notes of the President's meeting from 5:20 to 6:20 p.m., April 6,
McNamara stated: "Struggle movement may be too strong to throw off. We don't know much about their
objectives. They obviously have strength we didn't know about, and I don't want to go to war against
them." Humphrey agreed, stating that it was "too uncertain to judge who will line up on top." (Johnson

Library, Meeting Notes File)

1. Basic decision GVN faces is as stated in para 2 your 3761, whether to seek "over-all political soultion
before attempting local military solution in Da Nang." Our own strong view here is that in existing
situation this is right course for GVN to follow and that we should not seek to turn them from it in the
direction of an immediate showdown in Da Nang. While we recognize there may be Communist
influence at work in Da Nang, our overall reading is that Ky's charges of Communist domination and his
announced intent to take over Da Nang and shoot the Mayor made it almost inevitable that Chuan would
act as he did./5/ From previous reporting it had been apparent that large numbers of 1st Division troops
were in sympathy with Struggle Movement and that significant elements in Da Nang and major
sentiment in Hue were likewise. Whether Chuan was a weak man or not our reading is he would have
forfeited his position and probably been unable to get the support of his troops if he had tried to carry
out the original plan. We also note that the use of pro-GVN demonstrators, envisaged in the original
plan, was tried on the morning of April 5 and clearly failed. Accordingly, under present changed
circumstances our overall reading is that Da Nang operation would be unwise unless and until GVN has
prepared the way by visible political moves and hopefully by obtaining agreement at least of moderate
Buddhist elements led by Tam Chau to such moves. We reach this conclusion simply on our assessment
of all available information from Embassy, CAS, and MACV reporting. But we must also bear in mind
that our action in supporting Da Nang operation through airlift, including the decision to send tanks
during April 6,/6/ have heavily involved USG so that if Da Nang operation were undertaken and failed-as we believe overwhelmingly likely under present circumstances--it would result not merely in
tremendous criticism of USG here and elsewhere but could mean that our whole position within SVN
would be gravely damaged and we might be virtually unable to resume any kind of cooperative relation
with major elements particularly in I Corps area.
/5/In telegrams 3755 and 3761, Lodge passed on reports that General Chuan, ARVN Commander of I
Crops, had lost control, did not follow orders, and had come under Communist domination.
/6/In telegram 3755, Lodge reported that Ky had thanked him for U.S. support, "especially the tanks
which he said were of the greatest psychological value in awing the crowds."
2. Accordingly, we believe you should not urge immediate Da Nang operation at present, but rather that
entire focus of your efforts at all levels should be to get political process started. Your offer to Thieu to
sit down quietly with Directory and to help in lining up any recalcitrant groups struck the right note, and
we believe you should be proceeding in these directions in every useful way. We share your doubts
whether Tam Chau and much less Tri Quang can in fact make or stick to a bargain, but the only way to
find out and to put Tri Quang in the wrong is for GVN to get ahead urgently with its projected national
political moves. It appears possible that these moves may satisfy Tam Chau at least without any
dangerous acceleration of the Constitutional timetable. GVN appears to be in position where by
convening visible group immediately to work toward Constitution-making body it can satisfy at least
moderate Buddhist elements while in fact it is merely fulfilling its earlier commitments. Whether, as
national political script unfolds, GVN may have to accelerate timetable is something that we will both
have to assess as occasion arises. But for time being at least we see no alternative but maximum support
of immediate measures.
3. We recognize of course that situation in I Corps must be faced as soon as possible. However, visible
political measures and, we hope, endorsement and possible participation by some or all Buddhist
elements offer at least the hope that much of the wind would be taken out of the sails of the Struggle
Movement. This could create entirely different environment in I Corps, both aiding and justifying any
eventual use of force GVN may feel compelled to take.

4. As to our involvement in supporting GVN build-up in Da Nang, we still believe that our justification
for this must be that GVN was and is entitled to defend country and thus to restore its authority over
intolerable and unreasonable regionalistic opposition movement which cannot be tolerated in critical
wartime situation. But, as I have indicated at the outset, it is our strong feeling that any showdown in I
Corps should now await further national political measures, and that latter should be the focus of our
immediate efforts./7/
/7/At the President's 5:20 p.m. meeting on April 6, it was also discussed "whether Lodge should say
struggle movement is infested with communists." (Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File) In telegram
3759 from Saigon, April 6, Lodge had proposed telling the press that Communists "had a good deal of
influence" in the opposition movement. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L) In
telegram 2996, transmitted to Saigon following the meeting, Rusk urged Lodge not to "underwrite
personally the extent of communist involvement in the struggle movement," due both to the lack of
convincing evidence and the likelihood that such charges would prove counter-productive. (Ibid.,
NODIS, vol. 3) In a telephone conversation with McNamara at 7:45 a.m. on April 7, the President said
that it looked to him like "there's a very serious danger that there's been a complete infiltration of the
[dissidents'] power base by the Communists." McNamara responded that he felt the same danger,
"particularly in that first corps area." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone
Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.14, Side A, PNO 3)
Rusk
117. Telegram From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to President Johnson/1/
April 8, 1966, 1757Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L. Secret. The source
text does not indicate where Vance's telegram originated.
DEPSECDEF 1886-66. The principal conclusions which I reached as a result of my recent visit to South
Vietnam are as follows:
1. We are doing well militarily and are continuing to impose heavy losses on both the VC and North
Vietnamese. We are putting heavy pressure on their base areas and on the movement of men and
supplies within South Vietnam. The campaign is going best in the 2nd and 3rd Corps areas.
2. The North Vietnamese are making a massive effort to move the maximum number of men and
equipment into South Vietnam before the rainy season. They have even resorted to moving on the roads
in North Vietnam during the daytime. We are taking a substantial toll, but the North Vietnamese will be
able to move in more men and supplies than they require for the present level of operations.
3. The political situation is confused and chaotic. It is not clear whether Ky will survive. There is a
division within the Directorate as to whether military force should be used in Danang. Both Co and
Chuan are against using military force at this time, while Ky leans in favor of doing so. Thi continues to
be a thorn in our side in the 1st Corps area, and I received varying reports from the Mission as to his
power base and influence on the situation in that area. The political situation has not yet affected our
military operations except unloading munitions at Danang, but may well do so in the future.
4. The civilian reconstruction program is lagging [behind] the military effort. South Vietnamese
manpower is limited, and in my judgement priority on manpower should be given to the civil program. I

was much impressed by the PAT program and feel that we must make sure that they get the required
manpower, even if this means failing to meet the South Vietnamese military force goals.
5. The logistics situation is continuing to improve daily. Officers from the top down to the battalion
level all told me that they had not been impeded in carrying out their mission in any way by the shortage
of any item. There have been shortages of air munitions during the last four days due to Danang
disturbances. Action is being taken to correct the situation. There are, of course, some internal
distribution problems with respect to supplies, but these are being met by ingenuity and hard work. The
situation will continue to improve as the new ports are completed and we begin to open up the roads.
6. The morale of our forces is magnificent. Even the men in the hospitals are in good spirits. They have
a sense of dedication and display a professional competence which makes one proud to be an American.
In addition, the morale and competence of our Korean, Australian and New Zealand allies are
outstanding. They are proud to be fighting with us in the common cause.
118. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk
and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, April 9, 1966, 7 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN II. Secret. Copies were sent to
Vance, U. Alexis Johnson, Helms, McNaughton, William Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti.
SUBJECT
Breaking Tri Quang's Momentum
1. We are a nation that cannot use force to shoot people apparently demanding a constitution and free
elections; and we cannot support for long governments that do this.
2. But we can use force to suppress disorder designed to disrupt or pressure a Constituent Assembly, if it
is decently representative; and we can support a government that is protecting such an Assembly.
3. It follows that it may be better to accept a constitutional gathering heavily weighted with provincial
and municipal officials, as the Buddhists claim they want, than it is to try first to suppress the disorder in
the streets. There is, in any case, no evidence that the present Directorate commands the unity, will, or
force capable of achieving the latter result.
4. This means:
--substantial concessions to the Buddhist formula for a constitutional gathering;
--maintenance of the unity of the Directorate;
--probably--but not necessarily--the replacement of Ky, who has shown guts and some political
sensitivity;
--then, at the right moment, a countrywide curfew, backed, if necessary, by U.S. forces, to permit the
constitutional group to work.
5. Right now, with the latest Buddhist communique,/2/ we are faced with a classic revolutionary

situation--like Paris in 1789 and St. Petersburg in 1917. What we desperately need is a pause in its
violence and momentum. So long as a constitutional gathering is not in place, we can neither achieve
that pause nor try, politically, to separate the sheep from the goats.
/2/Not further identified.
6. Tri Quang's tactics at the moment seem clear. He smells the indecision of the Directorate and its
weakness. He sees the Directorate has managed to place in the hands of his organization the northern
regional interests, idealistic students interested in democracy, even a part of the military itself. He is
going for the jugular through the tactics of street agitation he knows best. Assuming he is not a VC
himself, the VC obviously regard him as as a potential Kerensky.
7. I see no power capapble of stopping, by force alone, the revolution he has organized; the Vietnamese
military cannot; and we are immobilized by the nature of our deepest commitments. We are on a road to
disaster unless we can get a pause and create a situation where we can bring counterforce and counter
politics to bear.
8. It is evident that Tri Quang and his men--for example, the rector of Hue University (Saigon's
3846)/3/--have some ideas about the tactics they will use in a constitutional gathering. Both Lodge and
we are under no illusion that we will be in the clear once the clan can be gathered--if it can be. But it's
my hunch that Tri Quang will have less leverage and we will have more in those circumstances than
either of us now imagine. And, as I say, the alternative is sleep-walking into disaster.
/3/Dated April 9. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI)
9. The gut of the issue is to get enough Buddhists into the convention to give the Directorate--and
perhaps us--a credible basis for suppress-ing disorder. To that end, we should be prepared to make
compromises that do not leave us without a Directorate. Some deal with Thi may be a critical element.
10. There is no major literate struggle leader--let alone the VC leadership--who is not now thinking in
terms of the Russian revolution: a war-weary people; an unrepresentative government; the beginnings of
disintegration in the armed forces; the issue of a constituent assembly; etc. If we are to prove Marx's
dictum--that "history never repeats itself except as farce"--we have to bring into play the factor in the
equation that was not present in Russia in 1917: the presence of U.S. force. (I believe Khoa is right in
Saigon's 3842 from Thomsen,/4/ that the VC would have long since taken over Hue if the U.S. Marines
were not there.) The problem is for Lodge and Ky to create the political setting in which this factor can
be brought into play. The only way I can perceive this can be done is if we take considerable risks in
assembling a constituent group and then unite with the Directorate in creating around it an environment
of order.
/4/Dated April 9. (Ibid.)
11. If I rightly remember, the Russian Constituent Assembly gathered in June 1917; in July Lenin's first
coup aborted; in the face of defeat in the field and Kerensky's weakness, Lenin took over in November.
This is about what would happen in Saigon if we were not there; but we are there. And right now we
have to try to find the ways to make that fact count.
W
119. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 12, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor.
Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk and McNamara. Attached to the source text is a note indicating that the
President told his secretary on April 13: "I want reactions right away. See what they are doing to carry
out the suggestions made--as soon as possible." Unger commented on Taylor's memorandum in a
memorandum to Rostow, April 15. (Ibid.) Rostow jotted his own reactions on a copy of the
memorandum located ibid., vol. LI.
SUBJECT
Current Situation in South Viet-Nam
1. Over the weekend, I reviewed the available information on the current sitution in South Viet-Nam and
developed the following thoughts which I am passing to you for what they are worth. I am always aware
of the danger that an idea derived from cables may look well in Washington but be wide of the actual
mark on the ground.
2. The pertinent facts as known here.
The factors which have dominated the situation from the outset remain the same: the Tri Quang-Tam
Chau Buddhist Institute, the Center malcontents in Danang-Hue, General Thi and his friends, and the
Viet Cong. These remain the sources of our troubles but we must not forget two other national elements
of vast importance though presently quiescent, namely, the Armed Forces and the other minority groups
which are watching with intent concern the Buddhist maneuvering.
3. At this stage, the most impressive fact is that Tri Quang and his associates have united all their
resources to pull down the Ky Government and to replace it with one which they can control pending
the creation of a constitutional successor equally subservient to Buddhist interests./2/ They have formed
their own political party for the first time and are in open revolt against Ky and the Directorate under the
guise of supporting the "popular demand" for an immediate change to civilian government. With the
support of General Thi and the Center malcontents, they are in de facto control of the I Corps area north
of Danang and seem to have subverted at least a part of the 1st Division. Any attempt by force to restore
government control of this region is likely to result in bloodshed (although there are lots of rabbits
among the Vietnamese who will run from force).
/2/In a 12-page memorandum to Rostow, April 11, which was requested at a White House meeting on
April 8, Carver analyzed what South Vietnam's Government might look like if the current cirsis ended
with a complete Buddhist victory. (Ibid.)
4. Ky has had no success in placating or buying off his enemies. The Buddhists are out to win big and
will not be placated by anything short of capitulation--at least, that seems to be their present mood. I do
not find evidence in the cables that Ky has made any atttempt to contact Thi directly and to find out
what his price really is. On his recent visit to Danang last week, Ky talked only to General Chuan and
apparently did not try to see Thi.
5. Ky has shown good judgment in refusing to be rushed into general elections as the Buddhists desire.
He knows the risks the country would run in its present state of political unpreparedness and foresees the
political turmoil which elections with their attendant factional struggles would generate in South VietNam, probably to the detriment of the conduct of the war.

6. The Ky Government has not yet used any real force to restore order, hence, its ruggedness as well as
that of its opponents remains untested. While Ky has won good marks for prudence, he has appeared
vacillating on occasion and has certainly not yet shown himself capable of ordering the "whiff of
grapeshot" which may be necessary some day if his government is to survive. He may be influenced (as
General Khanh was when challenged by the Buddhists) by a recollection of the American reaction in
1963 to Diem's strong actions against these same Buddhists.
7. We know very little about the attitudes within the Armed Forces toward the current situation. We do
not know the degree of unity within the Directorate--how do the Generals view the Buddhist revolt?
What about the younger officers? There has always been considerable resentment among them toward
the senior generals and present conditions with indiscipline in the air might favor a new "Young Turk"
outbreak. (Ky presumably is now regarded as an "Old Turk.") My point is that we can not take the solid
support of the Armed Forces for granted in this resistance to the Tri Quang challenge. We need to take
recurrent sensings of military attitudes, using the far-flung U.S. advisor net as a source of on-the-spot
reports. I am not aware of use being presently made of this system.
8. In summary, the Ky Government is in real danger as are American interests. We can not work with
anarchy or, in my judgment, with the kind of government which Tri Quang is likely to install. The
problem is to restore order in South Viet-Nam under a cooperative government capable of an effective
prosecution of the war, while progressing toward a constitutional, freely elected government. The ideal
would be an indigenous Vietnamese solution without visible U.S. participation. This does not mean U.S.
neutrality toward the issues involved--we have too much at stake. But we can do little in the open other
than support the principle of an eventual constitutional government without incurring the charge of
intervention and the blame for Vietnamese governmental failures.
Possible Courses of Action
9. After considering the facts as known here, I conclude that, acting from the wings and using all
available leverage, we must prevent Tri Quang from overthrowing the Directorate (with or without Ky
who personally is expendable) and support a conservative, feasible schedule for a transition to
constitutional government. In execution of such a program, the GVN (Ky, for the present) should be
encouraged to use the necessary force to restore and maintain order, short of attempting to reimpose
government rule by bayonets on Danang-Hue which, for the time being, should be merely contained and
isolated.
10. More specifically, the following measures should be considered and those which appeal to you
should be referred to Saigon for comment and, in appropriate cases, for subsequent implementation.
a. With regard to the Buddhists
(1) The government should first make clear what attitude it intends to take toward further politcal
demonstrations and toward the harboring of illegal demonstrators. I am not sure now what the law is but
it should be strengthened as need be to meet the current situation, then be thoroughly publicized, and
afterwards rigorously enforced. To get strict enforcement, Saigon will have to give clear, specific orders
to police and military commanders (something rarely done in the past) and then punish ineffective
performance by responsible officers.
(2) If rioters and suspect characters continue to seek sanctuary in the pagodas, after due warning the
police should raid them, looking not only for malefactors but also for evidence linking the Buddhists to
the Viet Cong. I strongly suspect such evidence would be found.

(3) If Tri Quang, Tam Chau et al. violate the law, they should be arrested and tried.
(4) At home, we are allowing ourselves to be trapped by the unqualified use of the term, "the
Buddhists." Our spokesmen should reiterate that we are confronted by a power grab by a small group of
political bonzes who constitute a sort of Tammany Hall which speaks for only a minority of one wing of
the Buddhists.
b. With regard to the Center
(1) If the Center leaders continue to resist, the dissident area should be isolated and brought to terms by
withholding various kinds of government assistance. For example, the area of the I Corps could be
reduced in size to those provinces north of Danang and all troops, except perhaps the 1st Division,
withdrawn south into a special zone created out of the southern part of the I Corps. The command of this
zone might be given to be 2nd Division commander who appears to be loyal. There would be Homeric
justice in giving the reduced I Corps with its problems to General Thi or to General Nhuan of the 1st
Division in order to fix responsibility on them for the security and welfare of the area which they have
led into trouble. Then, by controlling troop reinforcements, air support and economic aid, the
government could bring increasing pressures to bear on this area. Such a program should, of course, be
accompanied by a public explanation of the reasons why the people in the Center are suffering for the
misdeeds of their leaders. Meanwhile, in the procedures for setting up a new government, great pains
should be taken to give evidence of sincere consideration for the legitimate interests of the Center.
(2) Once the present crisis is settled, we should urge the GVN to change the practice of having military
units in the Hue-Danang area composed of officers and men from that region. It is always going to be a
center of political unrest and needs to be guarded by military forces without local ties.
c. With regard to General Thi
(1) I would like to see a final effort made to placate Thi who may be retrievable (whereas Tri Quang is
not). The government could also give some assurance to his friends with regard to jobs and physical
security. If this effort fails, we might try the proposal contained in subparagraph b above of putting him
in charge of the mess in the North.
d. With regard to the Armed Forces
(1) I should think it very important to get an advisors' report on the attitudes in the principal military
units toward this situation. Such a report would probably suggest actions which should be taken with
regard to the Armed Forces. I suspect it would show that the troop information provided has not been
enough to keep the Armed Forces properly informed and hence properly oriented toward current events.
(2) A few senior American officers should take a similar reading of attitudes within the Directorate.
e. With regard to the U.S. position
(1) We know that the motives of the United States Government are being misstated and misinterpreted
by many elements involved in this struggle. The question is whether we can or should try to say
something useful, addressed both to the Vietnamese and to our own public. I would think it desirable to
try a draft to see what might be said. Points for possible inclusion are such things as our attitude toward
the establishment of constitutional government, our concern over current disorders, our feeling for the
heavy responsibility devolving upon the Armed Forces and our confidence in their continued loyalty and

devotion to duty. More difficult to decide would be the inclusion of words of warning about the
impossibility of our assisting South Viet-Nam in conditions of political chaos and the futility of
continuing to introduce additional means if these disorderly conditions continue.
11. As I said at the outset, the foregoing observations have the fault of being formulated far from the
scene of action and without personal contact with the principal actors. The suggestions are moderate
because I feel it in my bones that over-reaction at this time either in Washington or Saigon is more
dangerous than a continuation of restraint. Hence, I would recommend a prudent use of force within the
law against the Buddhists, and an effective isolation of the dissident part of the Center while trying to
buy off Thi and urging the military to close ranks. In Washington, we should continue to reject the
slogan "take over or get out" which, unfortunately, will gain in advocates if the political situation does
not soon stabilize.
12. Meanwhile, I feel that we should pursue with increased vigor the military campaign on the ground in
the south and in the air in the north. If we are suffering a reverse on the political front, we need to seek
compensations on the military front.
Maxwell D. Taylor
120. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 13, 1966, 1813Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June
1966. Secret; Eyes Only. Komer dated his message April 12, but it was not sent to the President at the
LBJ Ranch in Texas until April 13.
CAP 66187. Herewith my preliminary Vietnam views,/2/ to be taken with grain of salt as coming from a
one-week expert. Even so, the insights from a full speed week on the ground were invaluable. To do the
job you want done there is no substitute for periodic base touching in Saigon. McNamara told me so
before I left, and Porter redoubled in spades.
/2/Komer sent the President his full report on his Saigon trip, together with a Special Annex, on April
19. (Ibid.)
I. To report first on my primary mission--backing up pacification/rural construction--have established
close working relationship with Lodge/Porter/Westmoreland and return confident can build effective
non-military effort to complement military push. Porter doing outstanding job in starting to pull together
loose, uncoordinated civil programs in way simply not done before.
As Vance reported,/3/ "the civil reconstruction program is lagging [behind] the military effort." A key
reason is that military effort got underway last summer and fall, and got top priority, while a coordinated
civil program really dates from Honolulu. So I quite agree with him that it must now be given priority,
especially in the competition for ever tighter manpower. Westy is naturally less eager (though agreed in
principle), but I think it can be demonstrated that PATs can largely replace popular forces (local
defense) which are the last remaining big manpower pool. We need to help GVN rationalize its
manpower structure in manner which will meet essential civil as well as military needs.
/3/Document 117.

Other major area of civil/military competition is for clogged port space. Since US military port
operations more efficient than AID/GVN, Lodge thinks draconian solution of former taking over whole
Saigon port might be necessary as crucial anti-inflation measure. But civil port operations are improving
and this may not be necessary.
Basic reason why Vance, Porter and I are convinced that key elements of civil program must have
priority is that without a coordinated pacification effort to secure and energize the rural areas which the
military sweep, either the military will get bogged down holding terrain or the VC will come back in
again once the military move out. Thus military and civil efforts must be closely coordinated and move
in tandem--better coordination of forward planning may be needed here.
Next problem--and perhaps the greatest bottleneck of all--is the sheer weakness of the GVN. It can do
only so much at one time. In sharp contrast to our largely self-contained military effort, civil program
necessarily must be operated through GVN. We must try to build up a stable progressive GVN--not take
it over, and this imposes severe restraints. Instead of overloading the circuit, we need to focus it as well
as ourselves on first things first and plan rationally for doing other desirable things only after the
essential base has been laid.
Indeed my key conclusion is that we may be trying to do too many things on civil side and not yet doing
anything well. One gut problem is that we have a scattergun rather than a rifle approach. Porter and I see
the answer as a system of priorities designed to put first things first. If we don't pacify the countryside
and control inflation all our other grand enterprises will go for naught. So certain basic programs-cadres, police, and anti-inflation--need to be promptly and sharply stepped up. Others may need to be
postponed until there is more of base on which to build.
Porter and I will submit--after checking out with Lodge and Cabinet level--a directive aimed at giving
effect to the above principles./4/ We also have detailed recommendations on new program emphases.
This job can be done--if we have a halfway decent GVN to work with.
/4/A draft of the directive on Civil Reconstruction in Vietnam was sent in Porter's back channel telegram
to Komer, 1944 from Saigon, April 19. Komer wrote "'Draft NSAM" on the telegram, but no such
NSAM was issued. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President,
March-June 1966)
II. On the military side, our effort is magnificent. It is like trying to kill mosquitoes with an elephant
gun, but the thing is that we're doing it. The trend is still clearly upward. However, I would gently
caution against undue optimism about the quality of the ARVN or about how much of the countryside is
really cleared of VC. Statistics--especially GVN statistics--can be notoriously unreliable. So we have
established a new province reporting system--direct to Porter--which will give us a better line.
III. On the third factor critical to our success in Vietnam--a GVN which functions at least quasiefficiently and generates enough popular commitment to be regarded as preferable to the VC--the
outlook is naturally less encouraging. Lodge and the Mission believe the present regime--perhaps with
some reshuffling--is far more effective militarily and is administering the country better than any likely
successor. They are deeply pessimistic about being able to work with the Buddhists, whom they mistrust
from direct experience.
Lodge asked me to tell you personally that he foresees a period of painful jockeying, leading probably to
"elections" and a weak civilian government, but then doubtless culminating in another military coup ( if
it does not happen earlier). But Lodge also says that we can--and must--live through this cycle and can

still achieve our aims if we stick it. He insists he is of good heart (but Porter worries about this--I'll
report orally).
We cannot just take over from the Vietnamese--the growing US presence is already creating its own
problems. Yet with 230,000 Americans in Vietnam and more coming, nor can we afford to sit by and let
the Vietnamese foul their own nest without a greater effort to keep them on the right track. Thus--despite
the risks--there is a growing case for discreet exertion of greater leverage on the GVN, perhaps using the
power of the purse more boldly.
IV. Personnel. Over half the top people on the civil side are due to come home over the next few
months. This talent drain would be a real setback. Some of them might be prevailed on to stay. I am
looking into the matter.
Finally, I claim at least one accomplishment--getting into and out of Saigon with almost no press notice,
as proof that I can operate quietly.
Though this report is eyes only at your request, may I send copies to Rusk, McNamara and Bell?
121. Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, April 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. Copies were
sent to McNaughton, Komer, Carver, William Bundy, Valenti, and Moyers.
HEADINGS FOR DECISION AND ACTION:VIETNAM, APRIL 14, 1966
With the apparent sorting out of the political crisis in Vietnam, the following appear to be the headings
under which we ought to consider our strategy for the next phase.
1. A high-level U.S. statement.
We should consider a statement which would express satisfaction at the forward movement toward
constitutional democratic government; link that movement to Ky's January 15 speech and the Honolulu
Declaration; but also indicate that our capacity to assist South Vietnam is dependent upon the
demonstration of unity and responsibility in the widening circle of those who will now engage in
politics, including the maintenance of order; the effective prosecution of the war; the vigorous
prosecution of revolutionary development. The statement might include a passage suggesting that the
historic problems which now confront South Vietnam in making a constitution and democratic political
parties is like that which other nations have faced in their history, including the U.S. at the end of the
18th century, and many contemporary developing nations. It might be wise for the South Vietnamese, as
they make arrangements suitable to their unique situation and history, to examine some of the successful
experiences of developing nations in the contemporary world.
2. Bombing the North.
a. Was the Mu Gia pass operation sufficiently successful to make it a milk run?
b. Is this the time for oil?

3. Accelerating the campaign against main force units.

Is a step-up desirable and possible? When and how can we get the I Corps back fully into the game?
Could the GVN in general do more?
4. Stabilization.
From all evidence, inflation is the most corrosive immediate factor on the domestic front. We need a
vigorous and imaginative program urgently.
5. Revolutionary construction.
We need to accelerate the whole track on the principle of concentration of effort. Are we prepared to let
the South Vietnamese put more of their manpower into all dimensions of pacification (including PAT
teams and police) while we continue our build-up?
6. Vietnamese politics.
There are at least three major dimensions:
a. Intelligence.
As the political process widens out, we need to use all our resources in the cities and in the provinces
(including military advisers, AID, etc.) to understand better the personalities and interests that will be
reflected in the members of the constituent assembly. We should crank up a systematic effort which
would yield us the same kind of knowledge of the local interests and personalities as we would for a
U.S. national political convention.
b. Political education.
We must use every device that is not counter-productive to get the Vietnamese to examine other nations'
solutions to the constitutional and political party problems they now face. The notion of a junket for a
group of representative leaders to Korea, Japan, Mexico, etc., should be now seriously considered. In
addition, we might see if some part of the local press might be willing to run a series of articles for
discussion on the constitutions and political party organization of such countries. Seminars in the
universities might be helpful. What the Vietnamese need are their own Federalist Papers.
c. Constitution-making.
As in the case of Korea, we should try to get, in the most discreet way possible, some professional
outside (preferably U.S.) experts to help.
7. Negotiation.
Following on from the appeal to the VC in the Vietnamese portion of the Honolulu Communique, we
should consider whether, when, and how we might suggest to the government that they try to open a
covert dialogue with the VC and perhaps, when the constitution and party-making process is firmed up,
an open invitation to the VC to stop their terror attacks and join in making a democratic nation,
including a willingness to have them take part in constitution-making. This would be a political warfare
measure, unless there are some unexpected results from Saigon/VC contacts. Nevertheless, it might be

useful to get some captured or defected VC into the constitution-making game.

WR
122. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/
Washington, April 14, 1966, 7:33 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by D.A. Engel in
FE/VN, cleared by Miller, and approved by Unger. Sent for action to 26 posts and repeated to Saigon.
2014. Ref: Dep Cir Tel 1995 (Notal)./2/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)
1. This is second Viet-Nam sitrep for use as appropriate with host government officials.
2. Chief of State Thieu appeared morning April 14 before National Political Congress, convened by
GVN to determine form of body to draft constitution,/3/ and signed decree providing that free, universal
elections for a constitutional convention be held within three to five months. Details as to election date,
number of delegates and election regulations to be subject of later decree. Delegates to Congress greeted
Thieu's action with enthusiastic cheers.
/3/The Congress convened on April 12. The GVN's decision to convene the National Political Congress
was reported in telegram 3746 from Saigon, April 5. (Ibid.)
3. Before adjourning, Political Congress produced 10-point declaration, representing areas of agreement
reached among delegates (attend-ance grew to almost 120 out of 168 invited), including: that present
government agree to resign as soon as constitutional convention formed; that government issue decree
providing for elected constitutional convention within 4 months (this subject of Thieu's decree); that
communist and neutralist elements not be allowed to join constitutional convention; that GVN promise
amnesty for those who participated in struggle movement; and that agitation and disturbances stop.
4. Reaction of militant Buddhist opposition to these developments not yet clear. Moderate Buddhist
leaders reported to be satisfied for time being, and large planned demonstration in Saigon took place in
somewhat abbreviated fashion, in good order and discipline. However, question in fore at moment is
nature of government to hold power in interim until permanent institutions established. Buddhists still
demanding immediate change in government on grounds present GVN cannot be trusted to carry out
promises. This attitude stated in Congress by Buddhist Institute observer, who had been persuaded to
attend final sessions of Congress by other members./4/ Ky himself had opened floodgates to discussion
by addressing Congress to effect that form of interim government up to Congress. Congress tackled this
problem inconclusively during final session. Chairman termed Congress very successful.
/4/The Buddhist Institute boycotted the Congress. Lodge summarized the observer's comments in his
report on the Congress' morning session on April 14. (Telegram 3968 from Saigon, April 14; ibid.)
5. Hue and Danang radios, in hands of "struggle forces," continued attacks on GVN and Political
Congress. Situation in those cities and elsewhere in country generally calm.
Rusk

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 16, 1966, 1140Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to
CINCPAC for POLAD. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at 9:25 p.m. on April 18 under
cover of a memorandum stating: "This is a first class stock-taking by Saigon which I commend to you
for reading at your first relatively easy moment. It underlies the discussions we will be having later in
the day and over the next week." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1) Also passed to Defense, CIA, USIA, and NSA.
4033. 1. The results of the National Political Congress make the political situation in Viet-Nam calmer
than it has been for several weeks. We can look a little farther ahead than was true a week ago. But there
is still much uncertainty. There are many pitfalls. Explosive forces still exist particularly in the HueDanang area where the anti-government "struggle forces" remain in control.
2. The Political Congress appears to have been a success and well justified our faith in it. The
government came out of it rather better than could have been expected, given the Buddhist boycott for
the first two days. The issues between the Buddhist Institute and the government appear to be fewer in
number and less angry in tone. The Congress changed the bilateral--and the dangerous--nature of the
conflict and, by involving other groups, seems to have given the government a chance to develop some
political allies to help it contain Buddhist demands.
3. The Buddhists find themselves, for the first time in the current crisis, unable to call the shots
exclusively. The government gained time and it spared itself damage by using the shield of the Congress
to deflect the direct impact of Buddhist demands.
4. While not yet certain, it appears tonight as though the danger of a complete turnover of the
government has been averted. The Buddhists may be in the process of modifying, if not abandoning,
their move to get rid of the Directorate and the military regime which flowed from it. Whether this
probability will be sustained will emerge more clearly within a few days. It is still not clear what line Tri
Quang will take and he could upset arrangements which have been laboriously and precariously
achieved.
5. There are a series of factors which should operate to sustain a shaky, weakened, but nevertheless
substantially unchanged regime for a transitional period. The Buddhists were not able to whip up a mass
reaction in Saigon against the government. The Saigon demonstration did not get rolling as might have
been hoped by their instigators. In fact, there was a visible reaction against agitation and violence, not
only in the expected quarters, but among many Buddhists not associated with the Vien Hoa Dao.
6. Moreover, a reasonable solution has been agreed upon and is being put into effect, so that the
government can defend itself against charges of unwillingness to work towards constitutional
democracy.
7. A base of military power for political support for the government has been preserved outside of the
Hue-Danang area. It is undoubtedly true that Ky's ability to count on a substantial military force in the
Saigon area gave the Buddhists considerable pause. In addition, the relative solidity of the government's
authority in II, III and IV Corps undoubtedly served to contain its adversaries. The government's control
over the major military formations south of Danang is intact.

8. Finally, the arousing of Catholic fears of the Buddhists, and the support derived from the sects,
minorities, and political party remnants, added momentarily to the government's ability to maneuver.
There was also a Southern reaction, although unorganized and ill-defined, against what had become
identified as a struggle dominated by Buddhist leadership from the so-called central provinces around
Hue and Danang.
9. The government now faces a set of problems deriving from the events of the past month. These are:
A. How to bring Hue and Danang back under control now that the first steps towards a generally
acceptable political solution at the national level have been agreed to and begun. The situation in I Corps
is not good and it will take considerable time to correct it. Military involvement in the Struggle forces is
extensive, as is participation by police and civil servants. The writ of the GVN in Saigon definitely does
not run.
B. How to exercise authority in the transitional period while continuing to execute utterly vital military,
economic and social programs.
C. How to develop political institutions which can canalize normal political disagreements in an orderly
way and produce a rational constitutional convention free from intimidation which is able to do its
assigned task.
D. How to find a way in which the present military leadership can play its most useful role in the
political future of the nation.
E. How to mollify a potent reaction among younger officers (the so-called Baby Turks) who are on the
verge of a radical revolt against civilian political ambitions./2/
/2/On April 14 Raborn forwarded to Rostow a message received that day through CIA channels from
Saigon summarizing Colonel Loan's description of the "Young Turks'" plans and intentions. (Ibid.,
Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI)
F. How to settle differences which have caused strains within the ruling Directorate, while fending off
possible further threats to continuity of the government.
10. Attempts must be made to solve each of these problems. Their solution is going to keep this country
in a state of sustained political ferment for months to come.
11. It now looks as if the elections for the constitutional assembly will be held in August, barring any
sudden upsets. Fortunately, the fact that a total change, or even a major change, in the government has
not occurred will make it less difficult to get through the process. If the Directorate and the Ky
government had fallen (or will fall), the situation would have been (will be) much worse.
12. With all the above considerations and circumstances in mind we suggest the following as sagacious
ideas for the immediate future:
A. We should work through the Ky government as much as we can--not in the sense that we are
opposing its opponents and entering into domestic political contests, but because it is the established
government.
B. We should continue to persuade the GVN to be calm, patient and persistent in its task of re-

establishing its authority in Hue and Danang. A military campaign against that area should not be
mounted. But should not mean supine acquiescence. Clever police-type steps should be taken to shrink,
whittle and subdivide. We should also consider what political and possibly economic measures can be
safely used. First moves should be in I Corps area of Hue-Danang. This could involve non-Struggle
forces in the countryside, and should be part of the process of isolating Hue and Danang, reserving them
for later action. There are signs of a difference between extreme Struggle forces and their less radical
supporters, which can perhaps be exploited by the government. The problem of General Thi should be
solved, probably by finding him a place in the government but removed from his base in I Corps. Little
by little the gas should be let out.
C. We should divert the energies of the "Baby Turks" away from radical solutions to more normal
political pursuits (see para H below), and continue to advise Ky to avoid recourse to their emotional
support. It appears that Ky can control these elements, and needs to be influenced to do so. Given their
temperament they will need to be watched very closely.
D. We should look for further and sustained involvement of various civilian elements with the
government in the process of political evolution. The government would be wise to enlist their
participation in the preparations for elections, using well-known methods of political organization, with
specific allocation of a large number of small tasks to a large number of workers. This could be the
nucleus of the presidential campaign to follow under the constitution.
E. If the situation looks as though it were becoming unglued again, we should immediately consider
reconvening of the Political Congress in the hope that it can once again exert a moderating influence.
F. If possible, there should be little or no change in the Directorate. Whatever changes in the Directorate
or cabinet may come about should be gradual and selected so as not to prevent the re-establishment of
equilibrium. Every addition or subtraction must be worked out in sharp focus on its individual merits, be
it military or civil. If a proposed change seems to threaten a chain reaction it should be dropped at once.
G. Political energies outside the government should be channeled into preparation for politics before and
after the constitutional convention. They should not be focused on upsetting the transitional framework,
but on working within it and gearing up for a longer term role.
H. We should consider what form of political organization could be fostered involving an alliance
between civil and military elements, to include the "Baby Turks". This could hopefully form the basis
for a political successor to military government which would act as a check on any tendency to military
coups. A political role for the military probably cannot be avoided. Nor should it be, seeing that the
military is the only major group in Viet-Nam thoroughly imbued with a national spirit. Perhaps a
combination of military leaders, veterans, cooperating political leaders and groups of certain sects and
minorities will emerge with a national organization based on rural construction cadre. The purpose
would be to build a strong pro-government party before the end of 1966. We would seek the emergence
of a unifying political group made up of nationalist elements. We will need to examine this in some
detail before a clear-cut answer can be given as to its feasibility. There should be an election law to
encourage development of a two party system.
I. Finally, we should maintain the closest possible contact with all shades of political opinion,
leadership, and groupings. Our ability to influence events needs to be strengthened and then exercised
with prudence. Our contacts with unofficial Vietnamese must grow.
13. We are now faced with the prospect that political forces will be at work in Viet-Nam in great variety

and without clear direction. The uncertainties are apparent. The consequences are not so visible. We
must, as always, be pragmatic on method, while steadfast on the need to ward off the VC aggressors and
to build an independent modern state.
14. We will undoubtedly not be able to control events but we should be able to influence them. We must
expect that civil administration will suffer, particularly in the fields of economics and revolutionary
development although there will be some progress. We do not believe that we need to suffer from lack
of military progress where our own role is more definitive and where our influence can be brought to
bear more directly.
Lodge
124. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington April 18, 1966, 8:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
1. Force ceilings.
Secretary McNamara will wish to ask that you raise our force ceiling in Vietnam from 260,000 to
325,000 men. That would take us to September on the present schedule. Although he could raise the
ceiling less at this time and meet requirements, this would mean his coming back to you again before
September.
2. Your decision on force levels in Vietnam relates to the policy you wish to pursue over coming
months. We have a good appraisal from Lodge in Saigon's 4033./2/ Briefly, the situation is much better;
although the Danang/Hue problem is not solved, we are working to bring Thi and Ky together.
/2/Document 123.
3. By Thursday/3/ the special group under George Ball will be prepared to present to you the alternatives
open to us as they see them./4/
/3/April 21.
/4/In an April 14 memorandum, Rostow informed the President that "the contingency planning exercise
you directed inside the government is now underway. With George Ball as chairman, it will examine
four policy options." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI) Rusk
reported the results of the exercise in an April 24 memorandum, Document 126.
4. Briefly, what will emerge is roughly this: in the months ahead, as the political transition takes place,
we face, say, a 10 to 15% chance of chaos and total paralysis; a lower percentage possibility that a
government might emerge that would seek to end the war on almost any terms and that would ask us to
leave; a 50% probability that the government continues somewhat weakened and in no position to
prosecute with full vigor the non-military programs; and a modest, perhaps 25% possibility, that with
the political process going forward quietly and the First Corps brought back into the game, we will have

an even better situation than in the past.

5. On these possibilities, you should know that there are relative optimists and relative pessimists.
George Ball and John McNaughton, for example, are relatively pessimistic. George Carver is relatively
optimistic; Bill Bundy and Len Unger fall somewhere in between.
6. The question is what shall our policy be in the face of this situation where there is a possibility of
moving toward constitutional government, which has many attractions in Vietnam and abroad, but
considerable dangers as well.
7. Into this situation must be introduced the assessment that we are likely to have a Viet Cong offensive
in May, when the monsoon takes hold, and they bring to bear the supplies and forces they have been
accumulating down the trails in Laos.
8. The Ball group paper will examine several options:
Option A would continue along present lines; protect the political transition with vigorous military
action; and look relatively hopefully to the future. It might involve measures that would increase our
forces in Vietnam; increase the weight of our attack on North Vietnam, including oil; and increase our
effort to limit supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail, including the further use of B52's. Economically, we
would move forward as far as we can, exploiting the fact that we can work in the provinces quite well
even if the central government is weak. Politically, we would do everything we could to maximize the
cohesion of the moderates in South Vietnam and help them emerge with a good constitution and a
sensible party structure. A part of this track would be to convey the message to all political groups that
the maintenance of this track requires that they conduct their political differences without disorder and
while permitting the transitional government to operate.
Option B would consist of Option A plus a purposeful effort to encourage the South Vietnamese to
explore the possibilities of opening negotiations on a settlement with the Viet Cong.
There are several versions of this option. Secretary McNamara, for example, believes that while putting
maximum military pressure on the Viet Cong and on the North, we should try to start a Viet
Cong/Saigon dialogue while not committing ourselves to exactly how tough or hard our terms would be
until we see if that track could be opened up. Others would recommend our pressing Saigon to open a
dialogue even if there were some risk that our pressure might fragment and weaken the non-Communist
South Vietnamese political groups. All groups recognize the danger that a negotiation and a negotiated
settlement between Saigon and the Viet Cong may not pass successfully between the upper millstone of
excessively dangerous concessions to the Viet Cong (NLF) and the nether millstone of being
insufficiently attractive to make the Viet Cong consider it worthwhile to negotiate.
Option C, which George Ball will draft, would begin by deciding that the chances of bringing about an
independent non-Communist South Vietnam have shrunk to the point, on an overall basis, that the U.S.
effort is no longer warranted. It would purposefully set about to begin setting the stage for U.S.
disengagement and withdrawal irrespective of whether any negotiation would work or not.
9. Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk are, I believe, supporters of Option B, with, perhaps,
Secretary Rusk more cautious about the possibilities of starting now a Viet Cong/Saigon dialogue that
would be consistent with our stated objectives; but you will wish to hear from them directly.
W.W. Rostow/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

125. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 21, 1966, 11:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1.
Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam--The Critical Issues
In Vietnam we face an enemy whose main hope is that American political life cannot stand the strains of
protracted war and of baffling political turbulence in Vietnam.
They are playing us as they did the French in 1953. They know we are militarily stronger than the
French. They are not yet convinced we have more stamina.
They do not believe they can defeat us in the field.
They do not believe they command majority support in Vietnam.
They are counting, like all the Communists before them, on the power a determined, disciplined
minority can wield against a split and distracted majority.
Our task is to convince them at the earliest possible moment that they are wrong; and that time is their
enemy, not their friend.
Our tasks break down into two groups:
--those things we must do to avoid defeat;
--those things that might help them decide to end the war sooner rather than later.
Minimum Essentials.
--to maintain present relatively favorable casualty rates with respect to VC and PAVN main force units;
--to keep supplies through Laos down to a level that prevents a major build-up of VC/PAVN forces;
--to keep sufficient Vietnamese military unity to maintain the ARVN as a reasonably effective force in
the field;
--to avoid political violence and chaos during the transitional phase through which we are now passing;
--to keep inflation (and the weight of U.S. military and civilian personnel and expenditures) from tearing
South Vietnamese society apart.
If we do these things we can stay in the game; but war-weariness in Vietnam and the domestic strains of
the whole affair might well cause a break in Saigon or in Washington at some point, if it appears

endless. We must, therefore, look to measures which will force a favorable decision in Hanoi soon rather
than later.
To Force a Decision to Negotiate on Terms Relatively Favorable to Us.
1. Increase the cost to Hanoi of continuing the war by hurting them badly around Hanoi-Haiphong.
2. Find a way to block or radically to inhibit the supply roads through Laos.
3. Increase sharply the attrition rates against VC-PAVN main force units to the point where they begin
to disintegrate.
4. Produce a relatively stable consolidation of anti-Communist political groups.
5. Get inflation under control and steadily build up rural reconstruction in the provinces.
4 and 5 (counter-inflation; stable politics) we must obviously try to do; but, unless we are extremely
lucky, they will proceed at a pace not likely in themselves to impress the VC and Hanoi that they should
give up their effort.
3 (higher attrition of VC-PAVN) could happen, if our build-up proceeds and we are extremely
successful in finding, fixing, and destroying VC/PAVN main force units. But it depends on their not
evading us and also on their rate of replacement and supply flows through Laos.
We are, therefore, brought back to look afresh at the Laos supply line and the Hanoi-Haiphong targets.
It is right that we should look hard at these. The Communists have obviously made an assessment much
like this one. They have invested great military resources and diplomatic vigor in trying to keep us out
of Hanoi-Haiphong; and, with Souvanna both incapable of closing the corridor and nervous about our
moving troops into the corridor, Hanoi has felt free to build roads and mount a formidable truck-based
supply line.
Hanoi-Haiphong Targets.
I am conscious of the international issues these raise; and there can be only one target officer in this
government. I would only recommend a fresh look, bearing in mind that many of the targets can be
attacked with relatively few planes: it took two aircraft to take out the Haiphong power plant the other
night. They bombed at night on radar and were lucky. But for precision targets small well-planned
operations often do better than big ones, due to smoke and dust obscuring the target.
The Laos Trail.
Here I'm sure we ought to concentrate our best brains and efforts. The VC are now dependent on that
trail for ammunition. Since manpower reserves are low in VC-controlled areas, they are also dependent
on the trail for fighting men. It is a true jugular. But it's tough to cut and hold cut. Roads can be repaired
overnight. Trucks are hard to find. Nevertheless, we are improving due to spotter teams; small spotter
aircraft; more sorties; more experience. The number of trucks shot up is increasing. The number of
trucks seen coming down the road decreased in the past month rather sharply. We should push the new
denial weapons program to the hilt.

The equation of victory in Vietnam is as complex as anything this nation has ever faced. No element in
the equation can safely be neglected. But the key to shortening the war lies not merely in trying harder
on items 3-5; but focussing sharply on Hanoi-Haiphong and, especially, the Laos Trail.
Against this background we could go to work to stimulate VC-Saigon contacts, dialogue, and,
ultimately, negotiation.
Now a word about the home front. At some stage the moment will come for you to speak again on
Vietnam. The theme might be: We are all being tested by this crisis.
--The Vietnamese by their desire to move towards constitutional government despite the war. We
support this; but it will require great restraint and mutual accommodation, as democracy always
requires. Our support can only be effective against the background of such restraint and mutual
accommodation.
--The Vietnamese military, ourselves, and other fighting allies: to maintain military unity and
effectiveness in the face of a difficult, thoroughly professional form of aggression. We're doing well.
Pride should be expressed in U.S., as well as Korean, Australian, and Vietnamese forces.
--The Vietnamese and ourselves in carrying forward the Honolulu program for the people, despite the
war. Again the Vietnamese have a great responsibility to improve the quality and vigor of their
administration.
--Finally, the American people: we are being tested to understand the nature of the war; to understand
the confusing but essentially constructive struggle of a democratic nation to be born; and, above all, by
the fact the Communists are counting on us to despair and give up.
After such a statement we would need to follow up by a systematic campaign to make clear the
constructive--if precarious--process of political development going forward in Vietnam. If our people
really understood, I believe they would be quite tolerant of the birth pangs.
Walt
126. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 24, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret; Sensitive.
The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
Basic Choices in Viet-Nam
At your direction, an informal working group chaired by Mr. Ball has analyzed our basic choices in
Viet-Nam and has prepared the enclosed report.
Three principal choices are discussed.
(A) To continue roughly along present lines;

(B) To continue along present lines but possibly reducing the rate of entry of United States troops and
stimulating contact between the Saigon Government and the Viet Cong, and
(C) To cut our losses.
I should point out that option C is based upon the possible emergence of a factual situation outlined in
the statement on the basic assumption. I do not believe that we are faced with that factual situation and
neither Secretary McNamara nor I recommend option C.
I do believe that we should discuss with Lodge upon his return the possibility of probing individuals or
groups in the Viet Cong in an effort to create divisions among them. Such efforts have been attempted in
the past but have not produced results. Otherwise, my recommendation would be that we stay on option
A.
We see some advantage in broadening the international base for what may be difficult decisions lying
ahead. I believe we should consider a Ministerial meeting of those having combat troops in Korea soon
after the Philippine Senate concludes action on the Philippine contribution. Such a meeting would
include South Viet-Nam, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and the United States. The
purpose of such a meeting would be to make four points clear:
(1) The reaffirmation of the commitment to fend off aggression;
(2) The continued interest in moving the problem from the battlefield to the conference table;
(3) A clear signal to the South Vietnamese that we expect them to show maximum solidarity in resisting
the Viet Cong, and
(4) To stimulate and emphasize once again the non-military programs.
We can discuss these matters further at our meeting on Monday./2/
/2/April 25. In a memorandum for the record, April 26, Rostow noted that "at a meeting April 25, 1966,
starting at 6:30 p.m. in the Cabinet Room, the President made the following decisions: 1. We shall stay
on course and explore with Lodge a cautious Track B." (Ibid.)
Dean Rusk
Attachment/3/
Washington, April 25, 1966.
/3/Drafted by William Bundy. His second draft, April 19, is in Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D
272, Vietnam (Reference Papers).
BASIC CHOICES IN VIET-NAM
Assessment of the Situation
The political crisis in South Viet-Nam has avoided outright disaster up to this point, but the temporary
equilibrium appears to be uneasy and the crisis has meant a setback to the essential non-military

programs. The Embassy's cable of April 16, Saigon 4033,/4/ is a highly competent summary of the
present situation and of the more immediate problems we face.
/4/Document 123.
Most basically, the mere fact that such crisis could come as close as it already has (and may again) to
disastrous civil strife and chaos or could raise, as it also has, the spectre of a government's coming to
power which would ask us to leave forces us to look hard at our basic position and policy in South VietNam. We must now recognize that three contingencies of the utmost gravity are, in some degree, more
likely than our previous planning has recognized:
1. There may be a state of chaos and total paralysis. This is what was threatened if the GVN had moved
forcibly in Da Nang. It might still come about if the political Buddhists push in an extreme fashion,
which in turn would probably trigger counteraction by Catholic and other groups. Even without
continued extreme "Buddhist" pressures (i.e., Tri Quang), the vehement elements in the Vietnamese
armed forces--the so-called baby Turks--could attempt a military coup against a continuing situation of
moderate political unrest and confusion. In short, the situation is still precarious, and there is a chance of
some action that would produce chaos and total paralysis at some time in the next several months.
2. There could emerge a government that would seek to end the war on almost any terms and that would
ask us to leave, with such broadly based support that we would virtually have to accept or take what
seems to most of us the practically impossible alternative of continuing the struggle on our own. This
nightmare appeared quite vivid in the early April activity of the struggle movement in Hue and Da
Nang. Subsequently, the anti-American element appeared to die down, partly in response to the sobering
effect of the withdrawal of our people from Da Nang. Our present assessment here (which we should
check out with the Embassy) is that even a Buddhist (i.e., Tri Quang dominated) government would
probably acknowledge the need for continued US cooperation and support. We believe this is Tri
Quang's personal position; but even if it is not, the center of gravity of the broader groups whose support
he would need to hold (if not obtain) true power does not now advocate ending the war or asking us to
leave. However, the inevitable continued frictions of a major US presence, the continued moderate
political unrest and confusion which must be expected in any event, and the possibility that there may be
specific military or other setbacks and reverses--all these mean that the nightmare cannot now be
excluded to the degree that we would have done six weeks ago.
The members of the working group generally believe that the chances of the first contingency are not
high but cannot be disregarded (i.e., perhaps 10-15%), and that the chances of the second contingency
are less. Mr. Ball would place the chances of the first contingency substantially higher than the
percentage indicated. All members of the group agree that if either of these contingencies should
materialize, we would have virtually no choice but to start withdrawing, and that in these circumstances
we would have little bargaining leverage in connection with our presence or withdrawal.
3. The government continues weak and ineffective, especially in its prosecution of the non-military
programs that are crucial to eventual success. The present crisis has somewhat weakened the already
inadequate cohesion and drive of the GVN in carrying out these programs. While the III and IV Corps
areas have been only slightly affected, there has been a real setback in I Corps. Even if the Directory
government stays in power it will take some time to get the machinery in I Corps properly cranked up
again. If the present Directory government should be replaced the dislocation could last longer. In any
event the accelerated timetable for elections will almost necessarily mean a continued state of moderate
political unrest and confusion. Thus, even in the absence of the first and second contingencies described
above, we face a high probability that the GVN will be less effective than we had hoped for many
months to come, particularly in programs that depend heavily on central government leadership, such as

the taking of essential measures to meet inflation. And we face a significant chance, perhaps 50 percent,
that this state of weakness will persist for a longer time even if the political process is carried on without
disruption. A countervailing possibility--that the political process will produce greater maturity, a more
broadly based government and wider popular appeal--does exist, and we should do all we can to further
it. But it is unlikely that this countervailing trend could begin to take major effect within the next six
months.
Basic Policy Alternatives
Faced with these prospects, we have tried in this exercise to assess three possible lines of action:
Option A: To continue roughly along present lines, in the hope that the setback is temporary.
Option B: To continue roughly along present lines, perhaps with a decrease in the rate of entry of US
troops, but moving more actively to stimulate contact between the Saigon government and elements in
the Viet Cong. Such contact could either begin with a public call for negotiations by the GVN or with
covert tentative feelers. After the rough outlines of the VC position had been determined, the US would
then decide on whether to press the GVN to continue negotiations or to support the GVN in its
reluctance to accept difficult terms.
Option C: To decide now that the chances of bringing about an independent and non-Communist South
Viet-Nam have shrunk to the point where, on an over-all basis, the US effort is no longer warranted.
This would mean setting the stage where, at the proper moment, steps can be taken that would probably
lead to a disengagement and withdrawal.
The specific elements of Option A, Option B, and Option C have now been spelled out in supporting
papers attached to this paper./5/
/5/Attached but not printed.
It should be noted that in varying degrees all Options include indicating more clearly than in the past
that our continued support is contingent upon adequate unity and effectiveness on the part of the
Vietnamese.
Broader Factors
In approaching a decision on which line of action to follow, the framework for decision plainly includes
broader elements that would have been present in the situation with or without the political difficulties
that have now produced an increased likelihood of the conditions described earlier in this paper. These
broader elements cut, as they always have, in deeply contradictory directions. Nonetheless, it may assist
to have at least a checklist of them as follows:
1. Within the US popular and Congressional support for the conflict had been at adequate levels prior to
the recent difficulties. This support has certainly been shaken, how much we cannot yet tell. The
contingencies of "chaos" and "being asked to leave" would certainly reduce domestic support to the
unacceptable level. Moreover, the contingency of continued GVN weakness and moderate political
unrest is itself bound to cut down support. As we look a year or two ahead, with a military program that
would require major further budget costs--with all their implications for taxes and domestic programs-and with steady or probably rising casualties, the war could well become an albatross around the
Administration's neck, at least equal to what Korea was for President Truman in 1952. It does not seem

likely that the American people will wish to quit under pressure, as the French did, but the scars of a war
conducted in an atmosphere of growing malaise and backbiting could be very serious indeed.
2. Among our key allies--notably Britain and Japan--the present general level of acceptance could
degenerate into a predominantly critical attitude that could seriously affect our ability to work with these
countries in wider projects.
3. Vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, we would face a continuation of the present inhibiting effect of Viet-Nam
on any move toward agreements in the disarmament area and in other fields. However, this consequence
probably attaches to any continuation of the war, and is not materially affected by the internal
contingencies that may make the war much harder to handle.
4. Vis-a-vis Hanoi and Peiping the continuing political difficulties will almost certainly prevent any
moderating influences from becoming effective in Hanoi. However, this is inherent in the over-all
assessment that these political difficulties make an ultimate reasonably good outcome less likely. As to
Communist China, the continuation of the war is the essential fact, and we could not in any event have
anticipated any significant change in Communist Chinese attitudes in the next few years. As to the
question of Chinese representation in the UN, it is hard to see that continuing the war under more
difficult circumstances would have an impact, one way or the other, that would materially differ from
the consequences of continuing the war in the circumstances we had hoped were developing. If we were
to end the war on some basis, or withdraw, there might well be an immediate rush to admit Communist
China to the UN.
5. Vis-a-vis the threatened nations of Asia, we must ask ourselves whether failure in Viet-Nam because
of clearly visible political difficulties not under our control would be any less serious than failure
without this factor. The question comes down, as it always has, to whether there is any tenable line of
defense in Southeast Asia if Viet-Nam falls. Here we must recognize that the anti-Communist regime in
Indonesia has been a tremendous "break" for us, both in removing the possibility of a Communist pincer
movement, which appeared almost certain a year ago, and in opening up the possibility that over a
period of some years Indonesia may become a constructive force. But for the next year or two any
chance of holding the rest of Southeast Asia hinges on the same factors assessed a year ago, whether
Thailand and Laos in the first instance and Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma close behind, would--in the
face of a US failure for any reason in Viet-Nam--have any significant remaining will to resist the
Chinese Communist pressures that would probably then be applied. Taking the case of Thailand as the
next key point, it must be our present conclusion that--even if sophisticated leaders understood the
Vietnamese political weaknesses and our inability to control them--to the mass of the Thai people the
failure would remain a US failure and a proof that Communism from the north was the decisive force in
the area. Faced with this reaction, we must still conclude that Thailand simply could not be held in these
circumstances, and that the rest of Southeast Asia would probably follow in due course. In other words,
the strategic stakes in Southeast Asia are fundamentally unchanged by the political nature of the causes
for failure in Viet-Nam. The same is almost certainly true of the shockwaves that would arise against
other free nations--Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines--in the wider area of East Asia. Perhaps
these shockwaves can be countered, but they would not be mitigated by the fact that the failure arose
from internal political causes rather than any US major error or omission.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
127. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 27, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1.
Secret. Rostow forwarded this memorandum to President Johnson on April 27 under a covering
memorandum asking whether he could pass the memorandum to William Bundy and urge that the
Department of State be prepared to present its views during the Lodge discussions in May. The
President gave his approval and wrote on Rostow's memorandum: "I think we should have public
statement if all agree." (Ibid.) On April 28 Rostow forwarded Taylor's memorandum to Rusk,
highlighting in his covering memorandum "one critical question" raised by Taylor: "do you trade a
cessation of bombing in the north for a cessation of infiltration or for an end to terrorism in the south. It
hinges substantially on whether a cessation of infiltration could be monitored." (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET) For William Bundy's response, see Document 129. For Lodge's
comments, see Document 158.
SUBJECT
Assessment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips
While favoring all efforts to open discussions on Viet-Nam with the Communist leadership, I have
always been afraid of certain pitfalls which will beset the path of negotiations. For example, there is the
danger that, from all the public discussion of our desire for negotiations, our people will assume that the
initiation of negotiations is the advent of peace and will expect a cessation of all hostilities as soon as
talks begin. You will remember that, during the long negotiations at Panmunjom, we remained on a
passive defensive to avoid casualties with peace just around the corner, while the enemy attacked us at
will and probably inflicted more U.S. and allied casualties than would have been lost had we retained
the military initiative.
One of the reasons that the Panmunjom negotiations dragged was that our adversary had no incentive to
come to a prompt settlement. If we are to avoid this pitfall under present conditions, it will be essential
to bring the Communists to the peace table this time convinced of the need for a prompt, negotiated
settlement and, furthermore, to keep the military pressure on them until a settlement is reached.
Another pitfall is one which is always an imminent danger. Any day, Hanoi may indicate a willingness
to negotiate provided we stop permanently our bombing attacks against the north. In this case, our
Government would be under great pressure at home and abroad to accept this precondition whereas to
do so would seriously prejudice the success of subsequent negotiations.

A somewhat similar pitfall is the appealing quality of a "cease-fire" to all peace-lovers and the attraction
of a slogan such as: "Stop shooting and start talking." Some of our best friends indulge in this kind of
language and need to be put straight as to the significance of a cease-fire in a situation of guerrilla war
such as we have in South Viet-Nam.
Obviously under such conditions, a cease-fire can not mean literally a cessation of the use of fire-arms
by both sides. The principal activities of the Viet Cong--sabotage, terrorism, propaganda, impressment
of recruits, collection of taxes, infiltration from the north, etc.--do not depend on the use of fire-arms and
could go on to the great advantage of the guerrillas if the government forces were deprived of the use of
their weapons. While it might be possible to agree to a cessation of military activities by formed bodies
of Viet Cong and by government units, we can never accept an unqualified cease-fire which would
prevent the use of weapons by the forces of law and order and allow Viet Cong depredations to go
unchecked and unpunished.
To avoid such pitfalls, we need to consider what we will want from the Communist side and what they
will want from us in the course of negotiating a cease-fire or a final settlement. What are our negotiating
assets, what is their value, and how should they be employed? As I see them, the following are the blue
chips in our pile representing what Hanoi would or could like from us and what we might consider
giving under certain conditions:
a. Cessation of bombing North Viet-Nam.
b. Cessation of military operations against Viet Cong units.
c. Cessation of increase of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam.
d. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam.
e. Amnesty and civic rights for Viet Cong.
f. Economic aid to North Viet-Nam.
The Viet Cong/Hanoi have a similar stack of chips representing actions we would like from them:
a. Cessation of Viet Cong incidents in South Viet-Nam.
b. Cessation of guerrilla military operations.
c. Cessation of further infiltration of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam.
d. Withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres.
e. Dissolution or repatriation of Viet Cong.
If these are the chips, how should we play ours to get theirs at minimum cost? Our big chips are a and d,
the cessation of bombing and the withdrawal of U.S. forces; their big ones are c and e, the stopping of
infiltration and dissolution of the Viet Cong. We might consider trading even, our a and d for their c and
e except for the fact that all will require a certain amount of verification and inspection except our
bombing which is an overt, visible fact. Even if Hanoi would accept inspection, infiltration is so elusive
that I would doubt the feasibility of an effective detection system. Troop withdrawals, on the other hand,

are comparatively easy to check. Hence, I would be inclined to accept as an absolute minimum a
cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military operations (Hanoi a and b) which are readily verifiable in
exchange for the stopping of our bombing and of offensive military operations against Viet Cong units
(our a and b). If Viet Cong performance under the agreement were less than perfect, we can resume our
activities on a scale related to the volume of enemy action. This is not a particularly good deal since we
give up one of our big chips, bombing, and get neither of Hanoi's two big ones. However, it would
achieve a cease-fire under conditions which are subject to verification and, on the whole, acceptable. We
would not have surrendered the right to use our weapons in protection of the civil population outside of
Viet Cong-controlled territory.
After a cease-fire on the foregoing basis, we should seek the necessary additional agreements for a final
settlement, undertaking to stop increasing U.S. forces (our c) for a cessation of infiltration (Hanoi c) and,
thereafter, to withdraw our forces (our d) in phase with a similar, inspected withdrawal of infiltrated
North Vietnamese Army units and cadres (Hanoi d). The final step (and perhaps the most important)
would be to obtain the dissolution or repatriation of the remaining Viet Cong (Hanoi e) in exchange for
some combination of our e (amnesty and civic rights for the Viet Cong) and f (economic aid to North
Viet-Nam). The latter is an overall "sweetener" which can be used to facilitate any step in the
negotiations.
Such a tabulation of negotiating blue chips and their purchasing power emphasizes the folly of giving up
any one in advance as a precondition for negotiations. Thus, if we gave up bombing in order to start
discussions, we would not have the coins necessary to pay for all the concessions required for a
satisfactory terminal settlement. My estimate of assets and values may be challenged, but I feel that it is
important for us to go through some such exercise and make up our collective minds as to the value of
our holdings and how to play them. We need such an analysis to guide our own thoughts and actions and
possibly for communication to some of the third parties who, from time to time, try to get negotiations
started. Some day we may be embarrassed if some country like India should express the view to Hanoi
that the Americans would probably stop their bombing to get discussions started and then have Hanoi
pick up the proposal as a formal offer. To prepare our own people as well as to guide our friends, we
need to make public explanation of some of the points discussed above. Particularly, we need to make
clear that, to the Communists, the negotiating table is simply an extension of the battlefield and the start
of negotiations does not mean by any means that peace is at hand.
I would suggest that a discussion of the foregoing matters be put on the agenda of the meetings with
Cabot Lodge when he returns next month.
Maxwell D. Taylor
128. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, April 29, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. Prepared in
the CIA at Desmond FitzGerald's request and forwarded to Rostow on April 30.
1. In considering the role of CIA in the elections to be held for the Constituent Assembly,/2/ we started
from the following premises:
/2/In an 8-page memorandum to Rostow, dated April 25, Ropa analyzed the upcoming electoral process
and projected the following timetable: "May 1: Electoral commission convenes; May 20: Electoral law

completed; May 30: GVN promulgates electoral law; Aug 1: Electoral campaign begins; Aug 15:
Voting; Sept 1: Convening of constituent assembly." (Ibid.)
a. It will be unwise to attempt either the creation of a broadly based political party or to give support to
the Directorate, to the exclusion of others, before the Constituent Assembly elections: time is against
one and the danger of driving the Buddhists again into the streets is against the other.
b. It would be impossible to engage in a truly covert operation of large-scale support to a political
movement. In the goldfish bowl atmos-phere inherent in the present situation and under constant
examination by the large press corps present, any large campaign support effort would probably be
exposed with resulting damage to the U.S. Government and particularly the CIA, exceeding any hopedfor benefits.
c. The best action for the U.S. is in the direction of selecting a limited number (perhaps five or six)
Vietnamese to run for the Assembly, assisting their individual campaign efforts on a limited and
clandestine basis, as and if necessary./3/ The selection would be made on the basis of (1) the individual's
known following and ability to organize and (2) his stated or known willingness to cooperate in the
Constituent Assembly after it is convened. During the course of the Assembly the five or six could
commence the organization of a broadly based national political movement activated by close
cooperation in the Constituent Assembly and leading to the presentation of candidates in the elections to
be held after the new constitution is promulgated.
/3/In an April 26 memorandum to Rostow, Ropa recounted the first meeting on April 25 of the Political
Development Working Group, chaired by Unger, at which Colby suggested supporting "individual
prominent persons" for election to the constituent assembly rather than working through "a broad
political front." Ropa faulted Colby's view and expressed support for Rostow's position that the electoral
process be used to "further the coalescence of a broad political front to include significant elements of
the Buddhists." (Ibid.) Summary records of several Political Development Working Group meetings
during 1966 are in Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 70 D 102, Political
Development Working Group.
2. The CIA role under Ambassador Lodge's direct supervision would be limited to:
a. Providing immediately an expert on election laws to advise the Embassy and Station, said expert to
visit Saigon under natural cover as a community development specialist who can consult with Embassy
officers without arousing press interest.
b. Making a concerted effort to provide soundings and assessments on individuals under consideration
for selection to the group of five or six (1 c, above), and providing limited financial and other support to
those selected as candidates.
c. Providing soundings and assessments on all or most other candidates.
d. Providing such other limited assistance as the Ambassador may direct.
3. In support of the over-all effort it is suggested that during the campaign for the Constituent Assembly:
a. MACV's cooperation be sought to concentrate on providing security for as many places as possible in
order to permit the largest possible number of Vietnamese to vote free from coercion.

b. A behind-the-scene election advisor such as Mr. Richard Scammon be made available to Ambassador
Lodge, and through him to such Vietnamese as may be desirable./4/
/4/In telegram 3268 to Saigon, April 30, the Department of State transmitted guidelines that restricted
the U.S. role to non-partisan advice on political processes but did not rule out "special covert
support." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) In telegram 4352 from Saigon, May 3, Lodge responded
that the proposed guidelines were "so restrictive as to inhibit effective exercise of U.S. influence on
political development process." (Ibid., POL US VIET S)
129. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, May 4, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Papers, McNTN II. Secret; Nodis.
SUBJECT
General Taylor's Memorandum of April 27 on Negotiation Blue Chips
General Taylor's memorandum/2/ is an excellent summary of the problems of a negotiating sequence
and particularly of the problem of determining what we would accept in return for a cessation of
bombing the North. You may recall that this issue was extensively reviewed last March and April, when
Max Taylor himself was here on consultation and we had a fairly thorough discussion of the problem.
/2/Document 127.
Essentially, the issue has always been whether we would trade a cessation of bombing in the North for
some degree of reduction or elimination of Viet Cong and now North Vietnamese activity in the South
or a cessation of filtration from the North, or a combination of both.
In his memorandum, Max argues for combining cessation of bombing and GVN/US offensive military
operations in the South, as a trade for a complete cessation of VC/NVA incidents and military
operations in the South. He would then trade cessation of infiltration against our stopping any further
increases in our forces, and move thereafter to reciprocal withdrawals and finally to the necessary
solutions, somehow absorbing the remaining Viet Cong into the life of the South on some amnesty
basis.
The present Taylor proposal has the great virtue of simplicity and ready verification. At the same time, it
might permit the VC/NVA forces to form solid hunks of territory in the South and reinforce them so that
they became major bargaining counters for an NLF explicit role in government. Moveover, it would be
most difficult under these circumstances to define exactly what the GVN was free to do about extending
its writ in the countryside.
For these reasons, I have myself been more inclined to an asking price, at least, that would include both
a declared cessation of infiltration and a sharp reduction in VC/NVA military operations in the South.
Even though we could not truly verify the cessation of infiltration, the present volume and routes are
such that we could readily ascertain whether there was any significant movement, using our own air.
Moreover, DRV action concerning infiltration would be a tremendous psychological blow to the VC and
would constitute an admission which they have always declined really to make.

Whichever form of trade might be pursued if the issue ever arose--as it conceivably might through such
nibbles as the present Ronning effort--I fully agree with General Taylor that we should do all we can to
avoid the pitfalls of ceasing bombing in return simply for a willingness to talk. Yet we must recall that
during our long pause in January, we pretty much agreed among ourselves that as a practical matter, if
Hanoi started to play negotiating games that even seemed to be serious, we would have great difficulty
in resuming bombing for some time. This was and is a built-in weakness of the "pause" approach. It
does not apply to informal talks with the DRV, directly or indirectly, on the conditions under which we
would stop bombing, nor does it apply to possible third country suggestions. As to the latter, I myself
believe that our past record sufficiently stresses that we could stop the bombing only if the other did
something in response. Thus, I would not at this moment favor any additional public statement by us,
which might simply highlight the issue and bring about the very pressures we seek to avoid.
As you can see, these reactions are tentative as to the form of the trade, but quite firm that there must in
fact be a trade and that we should not consider another "pause" under existing circumstances. If we
agree merely to these points, I think we will have made some progress. But it may also be highly useful
to get Ambassador Lodge's thinking on the Taylor form of trade versus some alternative such as I have
suggested. I agree with Max that this would be a useful topic to discuss with Lodge while he is here, and
we should at the same time inform him fully on the Ronning effort, which directly involves this issue.
I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Walt Rostow for his personal use, and also to Mr. Ball and
Ambassador Johnson.
William P. Bundy/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, May 7, 1966, 6:32 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by
Miller and approved by Unger.
3343. Ref. Embtel 4453./2/
/2/Dated May 7. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
1. Press here giving wide play to Ky's blunt remarks to journalists in Cantho, particularly his statement
that he expects his government to stay in power for another year, until national assembly elected in
1967. Ky's plain talk in this regard, and his statement that constituent assembly will not be transformed
into national assembly but kept only for drafting constitution, touch on two key issues with Buddhist
militants. We can understand that Ky may wish to take strong position privately for negotiating purposes
to counter Buddhist militant pressure. However, his placing it on public record cannot but be red flag to
latter and will undoubtedly render their truce with GVN even more fragile than it already is. His
comments to Buu (Embtel 4412, para D)/3/ reinforce our concern on this score. Moreover, such
statements by Ky get wide international play and add to existing skepticism in international circles
regarding Ky's intentions to carry through with elections.
/3/Dated May 6. Paragraph D reported that Ky confided to Tran Quoc Buu that he now realized that the
Buddhists were the "'dirtiest of all' and that their actions 'lead to Communist takeover' and he intends to

crush them." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII)
2. You should get these points across to Ky, making it clear that we are not taking any position
regarding life of his government or of constituent assembly, but simply arguing for his not complicating
political picture by ill-advised public statements.
3. We are also concerned at Mission spokesman's comment on Ky's statement to effect it not
unexpected, plus background elaboration (Embtel 4449, paragraph 3)./4/ Spokesman should not
comment on matters which are clearly sensitive issues in way suggesting U.S. has taken position on
them. If queried on Ky's statements, Department spokesman will reply: "GVN and representatives from
leading political and religious groups in Viet-Nam outlined a program on April 15 for a return to civilian
government. We assume that as they proceed step by step a schedule will be worked out which will
include, among other things, the matter of governmental succession. Obviously, this is a matter for
decision by the Vietnamese."
/4/Dated May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, PPB 9-5 VIET S)
Rusk
131. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, May 9, 1966, 1515Z./2/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables Between Porter
& Komer, May-June 1966. Secret. The President was at the LBJ Ranch.
/2/Z refers to Greenwich Mean Time.
CAP 66279. Before this next week's Vietnam meetings and discussions with Lodge, here are my own
private views on the uphill task of galvanizing the civil side. If I have not been much in evidence, it is
because I have been trying to operate full tilt--as a flood of traffic and resulting anguished screams will
attest.
This job badly needs doing,/3/ because in a word the civil side is a mess. The reasons are illuminating.
First and foremost, our emergency military buildup simply pre-empted most of the port space, resources,
and manpower in Vietnam, Westy has the big battalions and the top priority, while the civil side makes
do with what is left.
/3/Komer's new job is described in NSAM No. 343, Document 102.
Second, unlike our largely self-contained US military effort, the civil side has to work through a weak
and apathetic GVN. Nor would I urge otherwise. Suggestions that we just take over Vietnam miss the
very purpose of the exercise, though a lot more can be done behind the scenes. But we have to recognize
the limits of the possible in a country divided and torn by war, where the Government's writ is ignored
in over half the countryside.
Third, our US civilian agencies (unlike our military) are just not geared up to wartime emergency
operations. Soldiers go where they are told, but about three key civilians turn us down (funny how they
develop physical disabilities) for every one who accepts. Our best FSO candidate for Economic
Counselor in Saigon suddenly turns out to have diabetes. AID, which has the biggest job, is in the worst

shape--it was never set up to handle emergencies of this sort.

Fourth and least, Lodge is no manager, and has little interest in or knowledge of the civilian side. He has
failed to arbitrate civil US military operations. Let me warn candidly that his grandiose proposals--e.g. a
whole PX/commissary system for ARVN officers and civil servants--just won't fly. If I sound bitter, I
just pushed the town hard on the new land reform program Lodge so enthusiastically endorsed till I
found it so vague and half-formed that it will require complete redoing.
This is not a tale of woe. Porter and I can and will bring order out of chaos on the civil side--and
maintain good relations with Lodge in the process. But as your man on Vietnam, I owe you a candid
picture of what I've discovered in a month on the job.
As I see it, our continuing military buildup will prevent disaster but cannot guarantee a win in a largely
"political" war. It buys us time, and it may convince Hanoi that it can't win and better negotiate. But at
present the enemy is just about matching our own buildup.
Meanwhile our military buildup is generating some quite dangerous side effects. First is the inevitable
anti-Americanism induced by an ever more visible US presence. Adding to this is the growing pressure
of inflation, created primarily by our own buildup. We could end up sinking this feeble country under
our weight.
I am 100 per cent behind the decisions we have taken. There was no other sensible option in 1964-1966.
But what I see as needed is a better balance between a military effort of $15 billion (added cost only)
and a civil effort of only $500 million odd in FY 1966. You emphasized this "second war" at Honolulu,
but Porter and I can point to mighty little progress as yet. Of course the recent political unrest--which
will continue--got in the way. But it only points up the need for measures to generate more popular
commitment to our side.
The papers coming to you via Walt Rustow contain my recommendations. But they naturally lack the
real flavor of my private view.
A. Lodge must be told to insist on a better balance between military and civil needs. He must back
Porter in getting port space, cadging MACV resources, and competing for a bigger share of GVN
manpower.
B. We must borrow heavily from our own military till we get the civil side rolling under its own steam.
Crudely put, borrowing five percent of Westy's resources might beef up Porter's effectiveness by 50
percent. McNamara is eager to help, but the gun-shy civilians in Saigon are reluctant to ask (here is
where Lodge comes in). And it must be effective help. In February MACV agreed to provide aid with
1800 tons a month of in-country airlift, but less than a third was used because it wasn't available when
USAID wanted it.
C. We must come to grips with inflation before it undermines our whole effort. I am trying to overscare
everyone in town right now, because we've lost six months in grasping this nettle and I know that it will
take months more in lead time before results will show.
D. To flood the country with goods requires that we get them in through the ports, warehoused, and
delivered in-country. McNamara licked his port congestion problem partly by giving military cargo
priority and preempting port space. He was right, but it didn't make the civil side any easier.

E. As you well know, I'm cast in a role where I'll have lots of friendly fights with McNamara to cadge
resources and elbow the military. Unless we can further limit the inflationary impact of the military
buildup, I may have to argue for limiting it. There is a legitimate case that we may be robbing Peter to
pay Paul.
F. Finally, given all the limits within which the civil side must operate, we must do first things first and
do them more effectively before building monuments. I have on my desk many imaginative ideas for
urban reconstruction, industrial development, people-to-people projects, educational schemes. These
make sense in time, but not until we control inflation and pacify more of the countryside. At present a
lot of our aid is servicing the VC. So while keeping a sharp eye out for dramatic initiatives and
imaginative ideas, Porter and I feel that we must stress the basic building blocks. If we can't get
pacification going in the villages and contain inflation, the rest won't help much. Nor can we overload
the GVN--it can't yet do the minimum we've already asked. So bold ideas that can't be carried out have
little lasting value.
I earnestly hope that you'll press these points on Lodge and back my hand in the inevitable fights with
the Pentagon.
I also have some thoughts on the political side. We badly need a strategy to optimize the chances of
coping with the open campaign season now upon us. Above all, we must take "the American issue" out
of this campaign, so that we can live with whatever regime emerges. I am convinced that few
Vietnamese want us to leave. This simply would mean that the VC would take over. Rather both the
Directory and the factions are using the American issue to pressure us to favor them. In return for
insisting on genuine elections, and proclaiming our willingness to work with whatever government
emerges, we should be able to get all sides to lay off agitation. We should tell them privately that if they
insist on making our presence an issue in the elections, nothing would be more likely to convince US
opinion we ought to leave. There are risks in this approach, but even greater risks if we don't move.
132. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive/Registry, Job 80-B01676R, V-1, Vietnam 1966
(May-Dec.). Secret. Forwarded to Rostow by Helms on May 10 under cover of a memorandum stating:
"Here is the study you requested." Copies were sent to Taylor, Rusk, McNamara, and Komer under
covering memoranda indicating that Rostow had asked that the copies be provided in preparation for the
NSC meeting on May 10. (Ibid.)
SOUTH VIETNAM: AN APPRAISAL OF CURRENT POLITICAL DYNAMICS WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS
Summary
Under goading political pressures by the Buddhist leadership, dominated by Tri Quang, the military
government in South Vietnam has been forced unwillingly into commitments and actions which, at this
reading, seem destined to produce a new constitution and civilian government, certainly within a year's
time. These political pressures, spawned in an environment of heightened armed conflict and effective
Viet Cong political agitation, have created new tensions and fragilities in the Vietnamese military
establishment. The clear Communist content of the propaganda lines used by the Struggle Groups in the
I Corps area symptomize the continuing gravity of the turmoil there, in spite of a seeming easing of

tensions there in recent weeks. General Dinh's command and leadership have brought about this
superficial easing, but have not yet dominated the more fundamentally divisive forces at work in the
area. His own objectives and motivations remain unclear as well.
Odds would seem to favor the military establishment's observing their present political commitments
and going along with the constituent assembly and the subsequent formation of a civil government. Real
risk remains, however, that military elements, not yet coalesced, may unite in action against suspect
Buddhist motives. This risk is increased if a civil government begins to move toward a neutralist
position of disengagement.
The other religious sects and groupings appear at this time to have no decisive political impact. The
contest is essentially one between the military establishment and the Tri Quang hierarchy. It appears that
the U.S. does not have any significant leverage at its disposal in this contest. The imperative factors now
at work in the social structure of Vietnam are deeply indigenous in their character and roots. If a
Buddhist-dominated civil government emerges, and does not provoke military reaction by moving to the
left we may indeed witness the forging of a new and intrinsically more natural Vietnamese national
character, a development which could strengthen the national fabric in our joint endeavor. If a new
government does move to the left, additional and greater political convulsions can be expected.
[Here follows the main body of the paper.]
133. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 10, 1966, 3:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII. Top Secret;
Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.
THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF BOMBING POL
The Situation
Secretary Rusk believes that our launching of POL attacks in the North will greatly heighten
international tensions. Although this is debatable (Gen. Taylor, for example, disagrees), the Secretary is
probably correct if for no other reason than the Communists will, at the minimum, pull out their
propaganda stops on a worldwide basis.
Some of us believe systematic oil attacks could have a major effect on the military and economic
position of North Vietnam. Although this is also debatable, it is a contingency worth taking into account.
Taken together we may, therefore, be in a position where we:
a) need a softening political-diplomatic track to reduce the noise level;
b) have a better chance than ever before of inducing a serious negotiation with Hanoi.
There is a third element: U.S. domestic politics.
The polls show that something more than 30% of our people want a tougher policy: about the same
percentage want a harder try for peace.

Bombing POL will look like an Administration move to the hard side--giving in to the JCS, etc.
We need something new on the dove side to balance our account.
Recommendations
Taking all these elements into account, here are the elements we need for a political-diplomatic scenario.
1. A first-class television briefing by Secretary McNamara on:
a) the Laos logistical build-up;
b) the location of targets and low expected civilian casualties.
2. Secretary McNamara and I believe you should override the inhibitions of the intelligence people and
permit publication of the communications net controlling operations in the South from Hanoi. [1-1/2
lines of source text not declassified]
3. A lucid statement of what the Geneva Accords of 1962 said about transitting Laos by Secretary Rusk.
4. Prior notification of the U.K., Australia, Korea, and New Zealand of our intentions and the reasons for
them.
5. A Pen-Pal note to Kosygin of the kind I drafted./2/
/2/Not further identified.
6. Possibly a similar communication to the Chinese Communists indicating our intentions remain
limited.
7. Possibly an open offer along the lines which Myrdal evolved from my prodding:/3/ to stop bombing
the North if infiltration stops and stoppage is effectively monitored--perhaps by the Swedes; plus a
parley of the four fighting elements to bring this about as a preliminary to more general peace talks. Any
formula for talking with the VC--even on a limited military basis--would be complex to arrange in
Saigon; but it would also have a political wallop at home and abroad. I like the commitment to enter into
talks because some infiltration is not via Laos but through Cambodia and even (a little) over the 17th
Parallel. It only really makes sense to stop the bombing in the North if the war is going to stop. We need
to hinge our commitment on a general intent of the four fighting parties to stop the killing.
/3/On May 8 Rostow forwarded to the President a memorandum of his conversation with Gunnar
Myrdal on May 6, during which the two men discussed Myrdal's ideas about how to end the war in
Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII)
8. Although we shall have to return to the key oil targets after repair and mop-up smaller ones--including
some underground storage--we would do better, I think, to hit the major ones hard in a short space of
time--for political as well as military reasons--rather than space them out.
Walt
P.S. I have started some more detailed work on a political scenario in my shop; but you may wish to ask

Secretary Rusk for his suggestions.

134. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to the Central Intelligence Agency
Station in Saigon/1/
Washington, May 10, 1966, 2210Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DOD/EA Files, Job 92-00428R, File 137-6-72/3, TUBRACE,
Buddhist Operations. Secret.
DIR 03194. 1. There still remains considerable concern here with regard to real intentions of Buddhists
as they jostle for and acquire political power in South Vietnam. [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] has done several studies on this subject, most recent pouched to you under [document
number not declassified]./2/ For most part, studies conclude that Buddhists, while desiring to lessen
American impact on Vietnam society, would probably realize that American presence is necessary to
defend South Vietnam against DRV aggression. At same time, studies caution that Buddhists, while
grasping for political power, may make certain deals with DRV or VC, find themselves hopelessly
entangled with opposition and, therefore, became involved in a neutralist movement/request our
departure/make deal with NLF, etc.
/2/Not found.
2. All this being said, we still do not really know what real intentions of Buddhists are. Request Station
pay particular attention to acquiring necessary information through Buddhist assets so that a more
definitive assessment of Buddhist intentions will become possible./3/ Would be most helpful if current
requirements levied [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would include acquiring information
on specific intentions of Buddhists should they achieve a dominant position in a civil govt or should
they fail in their bid for power. Perhaps if we hammer away in a concentrated manner for next several
weeks we can clarify this murky picture.
/3/A CIA report on its religious project in South Vietnam dated May 1966, [text not declassified]. The
objectives of the project included obtaining "information on the organizations, including factional
differences, personalities, activities, and intentions" and channeling their energies "toward social,
educational, and anti-communist political activities." Buddhist operations included past successes at
moderating the attitudes of the "radical factions in the Buddhist leadership." (Central Intelligence
Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 92-00428R, File 137-6-72/3, TUBRACE, Buddhist Operations)
135. Summary Notes of the 557th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, May 10, 1966, 5:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the
President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. The meeting, which ended at 7:32 p.m., was held in the
Cabinet Room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Vietnam
General Wheeler gave a briefing on the military situation in Vietnam. The tempo of ground operations
will continue at a low level until the monsoon arrives in two or three weeks in the south, at which time
the tempo will step up.

In response to the President's questions, General Wheeler gave these answers:

a. Infiltration from North to South Vietnam is estimated at about 4,500 men per month.
b. Air operations in the north have hurt the North Vietnamese. They are having transportation
difficulties and are using at least 80,000 men to repair their LOCs. They are calling for more trucks and
have stepped up their imports of POL.
c. Some 7,000 men have defected from the South Vietnamese forces since January 1. The rate has been
high, but is now lower.
d. During the pause, the North Vietnamese repaired the damage to their LOCs which we did during
earlier bombing, expanded their infiltration routes, and improved their road nets.
e. Morale is down in Viet Cong ranks and is uncertain in the North Vietnamese army. It is not yet at the
breaking point.
Secretary McNamara read from a Rand report/2/ on the extensive damage done to the Viet Cong and
North Vietnam during the past three months.
/2/Not further identified.
General Wheeler: The effect of political events on U.S. troops is small, but the effect on the South
Vietnamese forces is large.
We have no supply problems.
The President asked for a special report from General Westmoreland on Senator Mansfield's allegations
concerning drinking and irregular activities of our forces.
Ambassador Lodge/3/ praised the decision to deploy U.S. troops to Vietnam. The recent overthrow of
the Communists in Indonesia is a direct result of our having taken a firm stand in Vietnam./4/
/3/Lodge returned to Washington in early May for consultations and departed on May 17. In a May 3
memorandum to Rusk and McNamara, Rostow forwarded an agenda of 19 Vietnam items for possible
discussion with Lodge during his visit and requested briefing papers on each item. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Komer Files, Walt Rostow) Copies of the briefing papers are ibid., Meeting
Notes File.
/4/Responding to a Presidential request stemming from this statement, CIA produced an intelligence
memorandum, May 25, on the "Relationship of US Stand in South Vietnam to Stability in Southeast
Asia," which found a direct relationship between U.S. firmness in Vietnam and the relative stability of
some Southeast Asian countries, but not Indonesia. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, vol. LIV)
Analyzing the situation in the past few months, he said the events of March were really a counterattack
on U.S. successes. The Saigon Government is now almost paralyzed but we will have to learn to work in
this atmosphere. Military activity can go ahead and pacification can proceed, apart from developments
in Saigon. Complicated things cannot be undertaken now by the Saigon Government. The word for the
future is evolution rather than stability.

Secretary Rusk: We base our support of South Vietnam on their desire not to have the Viet Cong take
them over by force. A broad-based constituent Assembly is now required. It would be a real setback for
us if this Assembly does not come out of the present political activity in Saigon. In order to ensure that
Saigon will act, we may have to go so far as to use the threat to get out of Vietnam.
Our military assistance to Vietnam is based on the SEATO treaty and the Tonkin Gulf resolution of
August. We must oppose the serious effort which is being made to downgrade these two commitments.
We must staunchly support the SEATO treaty commitment. If they get us out from under these two
commitments, then they get us out of our basic Southeast Asian policy.
The President: To those who are testifying on the Hill, we should give a summary of the speeches and
Congressional reports issued at the time of the approval of the SEATO treaty and of the August
resolution.
Secretary McNamara: Political events in Saigon are causing trouble in the military area. There are fewer
Vietnamese casualties. We hope that heavy pressure by U.S. forces will carry us over the present period.
The President reviewed three years of involvement in the Vietnam problem, expressing doubt that an
unusually large amount of time was spent considering new proposals or changes in policy. Our strategy
has been the same for three years. There are island hoppers who jump from issue to issue and there are
those who would put a bag of cement on the back of the man running the race. We are committed and
we will not be deterred. We must accept the fact that some will always oppose, dissent and criticize. We
want results.
It is acceptable that we referee some of the fights between General Ky and others in the Saigon
government.
Robert Komer: There are three harmful effects arising out of our military effort in Vietnam.
a. Anti-Americanism.
b. Inflation caused by the military buildup of both the U.S. and South Vietnam.
c. Our pacification program has been out-run by our search and destroy capability.
If the United States is blamed for these effects, real harm will be done to us during the forthcoming
election period in Vietnam. We must have a program to avoid runaway inflation, and we must limit the
inflationary effect of our military buildup at once. We must double the number of those in the Rural
Development cadres. The manpower needed a small claim on military resources.
Bill Moyers: Current press speculation is harmful. No comment should be made to the press until
Ambassador Lodge completes his consultation here.
The President: There are 26 men in this room. There must be no comment to the press about our
discussions. Don't make it more difficult for me to make a decision.
Bromley Smith
136. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (McPherson) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 13, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Harry McPherson. No classification marking.
The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.
For the President:
I was disturbed by the speech last night in the Armory./2/ I felt it was harsh, uncompromising, overmilitant. It seemed you were trying to beat Fulbright's ears down before an audience of Democrats who,
I am told, had earlier applauded him strongly.
/2/The President spoke to 6,000 Democrats at a fundraising dinner on May 12 at the National Guard
Armory in Washington. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 502-505.
The speech does not read as bad as it sounded. The combination of tone, emphasis and frequent glances
down at Fulbright made it (for me) wrong. There was nothing of Baltimore/3/ or subsequent assurances
that we want to negotiate an honorable way out.
/3/Reference is to the President's Johns Hopkins speech on April 7, 1965. For text, see ibid., 1965, Book
I, pp. 394-399.
If the purpose was only to tell Democrats that the policy line is hard, that is one thing. But most of them
know it. Those who agree can only holler yes when it is reiterated. Those who disagree feel further
estranged by high-powered shouting. Even in the first group there are those who think Fulbright is a
luminary of our Party, although wrong on this issue. I talked to couple of these who were embarrassed to
see him gored like that.
Lastly, there was nothing perceptive or careful or restrained in it. Even a political speech by the
President ought in my judgment to make some distinctions. I am sure we are not going to fight Uganda
if she attacks Rwanda and "oppresses her freedom." Yet the speech sounded that way. Wherever it
touched on foreign policy it was militant--if not in language, then in delivery. Nothing about the U.N.
Nothing about food or education or health. Nothing about the willingness to talk without conditions.
Standing in Viet Nam is the only issue for America.
Mr. President, I am one who believes we are right to stand in Viet Nam. I abhor the kind of vapid
sophomoric bitching Fulbright is producing nowadays. But there are questions about Viet Nam, and
about our appropriate role in the world, that are extremely difficult for me to resolve--difficult for
anyone, I think, who gives them serious attention. They cannot be shouted out of existence.
Churchill rallying Britain in 1940 is not the only posture a wise and strong leader can assume today,
especially an American leader with half of the world's power at his disposal. The speeches you make,
even on the stump, ought to pay some attention to the complexity and diversity of the questions America
faces. To stand or not to stand is simple. After that nothing is. I hope what you say, and indeed, sir, how
you say it, will reflect that; for you set the tone for all who follow your banner.
Harry
137. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the
Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/

Washington, May 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 486, McNamara, Robert S.
Personal & Secret; Absolutely No One Else To See. Prepared by Harriman.
Bob McNamara believes the Government in Saigon will become weaker and weaker as time goes on.
On the other hand, the Viet Cong are showing signs of poor morale and also the bombing seems to have
caused more difficulties in the North.
Under these circumstances, he feels we should get in touch direct with the NLF, also the North
Vietnamese, but particularly the NLF, and begin to try to work up a deal for a coalition government.
I brought up the question of Moscow, and he said, "Well, can't we get Moscow to go along if we make it
plain we are willing to take all of our troops out if the North Vietnamese do the same?" I said, "But can
we trust them?" He said, "We have to get international guaranteeing machinery. What about Swedish
division?" I didn't have the occasion to comment on the latter, but pointed out that in Laos the North
Vietnamese didn't respect their agreement for a single day.
He agreed with me that we must have some way of forcing the South Vietnamese government to avoid
taking these disastrous actions, such as firing Thi or Ky's recent press conference./2/ He is satisfied that
the Buddhists expect the Ky Government to be finished when the Constituent Assembly convenes, not
simply to draft a constitution, but to be responsible for forming a civilian government, although not
continuing in the function of a National Assembly for which, of course, elections would have to be held.
/2/See Document 130.
I asked him why we shouldn't get the military committee to put someone else in as Prime Minister,
rather than Ky, and he at first seemed to agree, and then said perhaps we better wait until after
September 15 when the elections are held.
On bombing, I impressed on him the desirability of postponing a decision on bombing the oil storage at
Haiphong and showed him my memo of May 10 to Secretary Rusk./3/ I maintained that it would
adversely affect our position in the world. It was a mistake to escalate as dramatically in the North and
get ourselves more committed when things were so weak in the South. He admitted that it was a
dramatic step and didn't argue against my position, but did indicate that he felt it would create further
difficulties for the North Vietnamese government.
/3/Not found.
I told him that I had not been satisfied with the political actions in Vietnam, that I couldn't understand
why Lodge hadn't prevented the firing of Thi, and it certainly was a mistake to carry Ky's troops to the
North. He agreed. He said he would be quite willing to tell Ky we would take our troops out if we really
meant it. I suggested we devise sanctions, tough, but less complete than that. He stated that the First
Corps was completely out of control, and the Fourth Corps was very much more in Viet Cong hands
than we admitted, and that in the Fourth Corps deals were being made to send rice to the Northern area
to support the Viet Cong operations there. There were a lot more dealings with the Viet Cong in the
South than we would accept.
WAH

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, May 15, 1966, 1:29 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 3. Secret;
Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by William Bundy, Rostow, and McNamara; and approved by
Rusk.
3448. Personal for Porter from the Secretary.
1. It is intolerable that Ky should take such far reaching move as that against DaNang/2/ without
consultation with us.
/2/In Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973, p. 136, Jeffrey Clarke summarizes the situation
as follows: "Government forces, commanded by Vien, seized Da Nang in the early morning hours of
Sunday, 15 May [early evening hours of May 14, EST]. Two South Vietnamese Marine Corps
battalions, supported by tanks of the South Vietnamese Army and covered by planes of the South
Vietnamese Air Force, moved quickly into the city and secured the mayor's office, the radio station, the
I Corps headquarters and other military installations, and the police stations. Two airborne battalions
under the command of General Dong provided reinforcements. Little fighting transpired, as most of the
dissidents fell back inside several Buddhist pagodas, which the troops refrained from attacking. Ky and
Co later joined Vien, and during the next four days an uneasy truce prevailed inside the city."
2. However, immediate problem is how to pick up pieces and prevent a major debacle. Most urgent need
is to insist that principal figures in DaNang area (such as Ky, Vien, Dinh, Lam, Nhuan and Thi) agree at
once to prevent further fighting among SVN elements pending further discussion of more lasting
solution. This may require rough talk with several of them but United States can not accept this insane
bickering. I recognize this is tall order but you, MACV, General Walt, Thomsen and others must do
your best in next few hours.
3. I cannot emphasize strongly enough that the disarray among South Vietnamese leaders has been
rapidly undermining support of American people for war effort. The question "what are we being asked
to support?" is becoming insistent and is becoming more and more difficult to answer.
4. We must rely heavily upon you at this moment and assure you of our full confidence./3/
/3/In telegram 4613 from Saigon, May 15, Porter reported on his meeting that evening with Thieu and
Ky, during which he stated that the U.S. Government was "extremely annoyed that they would carry out
operation of this importance without in any way consulting or informing us." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII)
Rusk
139. List Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, May 15, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII. Secret. The source
text is handwritten. The President's Daily Diary indicates that at 2:35 p.m. on May 15 he met in his
office "re recent developments in Danang" with Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, William Bundy, U. Alexis

Johnson, Unger, Habib, Raborn, Helms, Taylor, Rostow, Komer, and Jorden. The meeting ended no
later than 3:02 p.m., when the President went to the Mansion in the White House. (Ibid.)
MEETING ON VIET NAM, MAY 15, 1966
Action Items
1. Do everything possible to discourage any move against DaNang by the dissidents.
2. Minimal comment on situation by U.S., here and in Saigon.
3. Encourage all Vietnamese elements to settle differences without resort to force.
4. Do what is possible to keep Tri Quang in main stream of political development.
5. Work toward bringing Thi and others into the GVN fold.
6. Get out press guidance (draft approved with minor modifications).
7. Convey our thinking to Tri Quang;/2/ no Presidential message.
/2/Responding to a message from Tri Quang contained in telegram 4610 from Saigon, May 15, the
Department proposed in telegram 3453 to Saigon, May 15, that Tri Quang be told orally that the U.S.
Government fully supported the elections for a Constitutional Assembly announced in mid-April and
would use its influence to establish unity in South Vietnam and persuade all groups to resolve their
difficulties. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII)
8. Play it cool!
140. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, May 16, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII. Secret. Prepared by
Jorden and sent to Rostow. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room from 12:20 to 1:05 p.m. (Ibid.,
President's Daily Diary) On May 12 and again on May 14 Rostow forwarded briefing papers to the
President for the meeting, one by Komer on coping with inflation and a second by Unger on "Principles
Governing U.S. Operations Concerning Elections and Constitutional Assembly in South VietNam." (Ibid., Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 2)
SUBJECT
Meeting with the President on Viet-Nam, May 16, 1966
ATTENDING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Lodge
Mr. Moyers

Mr. Rostow
Mr. Komer
General Taylor
Mr. Bell
Admiral Raborn
Mr. Helms
Mr. Bundy
Mr. McNaughton
Mr. Leonhart
Mr. Jorden
Secretary Rusk described current situation. Main new item was report of formation of revolutionary
committee including Generals Thi, Dinh, Nhuan and Don. Emphasis was on need to work on all
elements to encourage Vietnamese political solidarity.
Ambassador Lodge's schedule:
House Committee on Foreign Affairs--3:00 pm
Backgrounder for press--5:00 pm
Dinner with President--8:15 pm
Depart for Seoul and Saigon Tuesday/2/
/2/May 17.
Bill Moyers read proposed statement for the press./3/ Approved with minor changes.
/3/Not further identified.
Discussion of non-military programs:
Komer outlined major problems.
General agreement on overall approach.
Defense has agreed to take steps to reduce the impact of military outlays.
Port congestion is major headache, particularly Saigon. Ambassador Porter has come in with negative
reaction. MACV says it does not have necessary manpower.
Two steps were agreed: get coordinated position from Mission in Saigon, and get report from MACV on
what kinds and numbers of manpower and other materiel would be needed for U.S. military operation of
port.
President said we should "get recommendation and let's move."
Short discussion of package on monetary and fiscal policy. Need for effective sanctions stressed.

Ambassador Lodge stressed need for care in kinds of pressure and for our willingness to carry through.
He also pointed out his desire to combine granting help for GVN's desired programs with putting
pressure on for reforms.
Three programs noted as GVN preferences: wage increases, supply stores for military and others, and
land reform.
Ambassador Lodge also expressed desire to get increased American control over expenditures and
programs, perhaps through requirement for "one American signature" on all such items along with
Vietnamese.
Mr. Bell also underlined inflation problem and need for corrective action but also firm decision by U.S.
on how far it willing to go in exerting pressure.
Need for manpower controls agreed with Defense.
Land reform planning moving forward but we are waiting for results of a study on this matter from
Mission in Saigon.
WJJ
141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, May 19, 1966, 1:46 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Text
received from the White House; cleared by Bell, William Bundy, and McNaughton; and approved by
Unger. Repeated to CINCPAC.
3531. For Porter from Komer. Non-military programs reviewed at highest level with Ambassador Lodge
present 16 May./2/ The following measures were decided upon:
/2/See Document 140.
1. Make urgent three-pronged attack on inflation.
a. DOD and AID will each make all-out effort to reduce to minimum inflationary impact of further US
buildup. DOD is analyzing possibility of keeping demands on local economy and manpower at FY 1966
rate, despite increase in deployments and construction program--the analysis and a plan for
accomplishing an agreed-upon goal will be completed about 1 June (breakdown of FY 66 target ceilings
explained in JCS 2227, 17 May, para 1a.)./3/
/3/Not found.
b. US will make all-out effort to eliminate bottlenecks to massive flow of aid commodities, especially
port and in-country transport congestion. US military will assist in providing shipping, port aid, and incountry lift as required. US will insist that GVN take essential steps speed flow of goods, if necessary
using leverage of suspension aid shipments and/or new aid tranches till bottlenecks removed. DOD will
make prompt contingency study of US military takeover Saigon port and deliveries to importers.
Instructions are being sent Embassy and MACV (septels)/4/ for coordinated mission council

recommendations by 31 May.
/4/Not further identified.
c. As soon as IMF recommendations available, US will present to GVN revised Honolulu package of
maximum realizable fiscal measures designed to sop up at least 10 billion piasters during the last six
months of CY 1966.
d. Negotiating strategy will be planned in light of IMF recommendations as reviewed Saigon and
Washington, with appropriate consideration desirable carrots as well as sticks. Possible carrots might
include US approval of wage increase, US financial support of new GVN land reform initiative, and
help in establishment GVN PX system if current analyses establish their feasibility in time. FYI. Though
not discussed, US provision of CIP security stockpile might be an added carrot. End FYI. Sticks to
provide leverage might include withholding approval further CIP tranches or other means to be studied
promptly.
2. We will increase annual rate of RD Cadre output from 19,000 to 39,000 as fast as instructors are
available to maintain quality. DOD will provide construction resources as needed to construct new
training center. Komer will resolve with appropriate agencies issue of how added cost is apportioned.
3. We will expedite expansion police forces to 72,000 end CY 1966 goal, and promptly study further
expansion of police as the preferred longer term internal security instrument.
4. Aside from RD Cadres, SecDef and Komer will defer approval of any FY 1967 GVN manpower
increases until overall agreement is reached on civil/military allocation. This means in effect a
temporary freeze on all force ceilings at end FY 1966 approved levels until manpower budget can be
worked out.
5. Foregoing FYI and should be closely held.
Rusk
142. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, May 19, 1966, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 70 D 102, POL 7, Bui Diem
Visit. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Miller and cleared by Unger. A memorandum of Bui Diem's
conversation with Rostow on May 20 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, vol. LIII.
SUBJECT
Current Political Crisis in Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
Bui Diem, GVN Deputy Foreign Minister
Vu Van Thai, Vietnamese Ambassador
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary, FE
Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE

Robert H. Miller, Director, FE/VN

Bui Diem opened the conversation with a long apologia for the recent GVN action against Da Nang and
with an assessment of future prospects which overplayed the positive and underplayed the negative. Bui
Diem minimized the threat of civil war between I Corps and the GVN, but recognized that finding a
political solution would take some time. He said the GVN had shown its good will in respecting the date
set by the National Political Congress for elections and by cooperating in the preparations for those
elections. He said that the election law drafting committee had worked reasonably well for two weeks
and in fact better than the GVN had expected. The GVN felt that the committee's conclusions so far
were reasonable and that if it continued in this fashion the GVN could accept the committee's
conclusions without change. Diem emphasized that the GVN was not trying to delay elections and that
Thieu and Ky recognized that elections must be carried out as promised.
However, Bui Diem stated the GVN was faced with the problem of how to carry out the elections when
its authority was not respected in I Corps. Diem pointed out that the GVN had to take into account not
only the militant Buddhists' views but also the views of Catholic elements and of young military officers
who are getting impatient with the militant Buddhists. Diem noted that many elements were displeased
that the GVN had agreed to proceed with the elections and that these elements were very concerned at
developments in Central Viet-Nam. In view of this situation, General Dinh had been taking too long to
restore the GVN's authority in I Corps; the 11th Ranger battalion had asked for GVN assistance in
restoring the Central government's authority in Da Nang; and the GVN had no choice but to back the
11th Rangers even though it was well aware of the risks involved. At the same time, Bui Diem said, Ky
had asked the election law drafting committee to finish its work by the end of the month, while the
militant Buddhist representatives were trying to influence the committee to stop its work.
Bui Diem emphasized repeatedly that the GVN intended to keep its promise to hold elections and its
intention to deal with the I Corps problem as a local military problem. He emphasized also that a lack of
confidence had unfortunately been created between the government and the militant Buddhists. He cited
Ky's remarks to the press in Cantho, and observed that one issue undermining confidence between the
government and the struggle forces was the question of whether or not the constituent assembly would
be transformed into a legislative assembly. The GVN says that it is too soon to decide this issue, and the
Buddhists use this position to charge the GVN with being insincere.
Diem said that the GVN still felt that it had handled the situation correctly, that the Directorate and
military establishment generally were still basically unified and that the problem in I Corps was created
by a small group of 20 to 25 officers close to General Thi who had gone too far and could not pull back
from an extreme position.
Mr. Bundy expressed the belief that the situation was more serious than as described by Bui Diem. He
cited several explosive elements in the situation, in particular the GVN siege of the main pagoda in Da
Nang. Mr. Bundy noted that we had already expressed to the GVN our concern that we had not been
consulted or informed in advance of the GVN's plan to move against Da Nang. He stressed that we
understood the GVN's dilemma in agreeing to elections and working for their realization without being
able to guarantee its authority of I Corps, but said that we could not understand why the GVN chose to
move against Da Nang when the election law drafting committee was working well in Saigon and might
have resolved these problems itself.
Bui Diem explained that, from a military point of view, the GVN was dragged into the affair in Da Nang
by the actions of some younger officers. According to Diem, the GVN had planned to replace the marine
battalion in Quang Ngai with one from Saigon but that the latter was diverted to Da Nang when the
GVN learned that the 11th Rangers, probably at Col. Loan's instigation, was plotting to move to re-

establish GVN authority in Da Nang. Bui Diem said that the GVN had no choice but to back the
Rangers at the last minute and that this was why Ambassador Porter was informed of the operation so
late on Sunday morning.
In response to Mr. Bundy's query, Bui Diem pointed out that Col. Loan had been furious when he was
not allowed to crush the struggle movement with the three marine battalions in the earlier crisis. Diem
also claimed that the battalion commanders themselves reacted very emotionally when they were held
back from occupying Da Nang. He claimed that in a ceremony the commanders mingled their blood,
drank it, and swore that they would return to Da Nang. Bui Diem noted that Ky had to take this kind of
thinking and acting into account.
Mr. Bundy asked what ideas Ky and Diem had to resolve the present situation and to make progress
toward elections. He pointed out that, although the elections drafting committee was still carrying on its
deliberations, it would be immensely difficult to arrive at conclusions on some of the difficult election
issues unless arrangements were made in some fashion for Tri Quang's representatives to participate.
Diem said that Ky did not plan to reoccupy Hue and that he was only trying to establish a position in Da
Nang which would permit him to bargain with Hue. In response to Mr. Bundy's question, Bui Diem said
that in resolving the political problem Ky would have to deal solely with Tri Quang in Hue and Thien
Minh in Saigon. (Diem did not mention General Thi at all.) Diem said that contacts with these leaders
had not been completely broken. For example, he said, the day before he had left Saigon Thien Minh
had asked Tam Giac to see Ky. Ky, who had for some time refused to see Minh, said that he would be
willing to see Minh at this time. Diem dined with Tam Giac and told him that it was up to him to get
Thien Minh to talk to Ky. Tam Giac promised to do so. (Bui Diem left Saigon before any such meeting
materialized.) In this connection, Bui Diem noted that U.S. influence could act as a catalyst to get the
different sides together since the U.S. presence had to be taken into account by all sides, both by
elements which accepted U.S. influence and by those which did not like to accept it.
At the end of the conversation Mr. Unger noted that U.S. officials would like to discuss the serious
economic situation with Bui Diem and that it would be discussed with him later that evening.
Mr. Bundy and Mr. Diem agreed that, in response to press queries, it would be noted that Diem's trip
had been long planned and that it was both for the purpose of visiting Vietnamese Embassies abroad and
for discussing Vietnamese problems with foreign governments such as the U.S., and that the current
situation in Viet-Nam made it even more important that the trip be carried out.
143. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
Washington, May 20, 1966, 2158Z.
/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Secret.
Repeated to Admiral Sharp.
CJCS 2837-66. 1. I believe that both of you should have my reading of the effect here in the United
States of the continuing political turmoil and backing and filling of the several contending parties in
RVN. We have had adverse reactions here in the past arising from the numerous political imbroglios in
that country; however, in my judgment, the effect of the present situation on the public and in the press
and in the Congress (both of the latter in this instance reflecting early and muted public opinion) is far
more adverse than heretofore. There are a number of reasons for this but the principal reasons, I think,

are the facts that we have committed a quarter of a million men to combat in South Vietnam; the
prestige of the United States is at stake; and U.S. casualties are mounting. I note that, for the third
successive week, our casualties have exceeded those of Vietnamese forces. Rightly or wrongly, this
latter fact is taken by the American people as proof positive of assertions continuously made by those in
opposition to our Vietnamese policy that United States forces are fighting the war against VC/NVA
forces while the South Vietnamese, whose freedom and country are at stake, squabble pettily among
themselves to achieve political advantage.
2. To illustrate my point, I made an Armed Forces Day address yesterday in Houston, Texas, to an
overflow luncheon audience of the Houston Rotary Club and the Military Affairs Committee of the
Chamber of Commerce of Houston. As you would expect, the audience and the local press rather
unanimously support an American policy of strength and opposition to Communist initiatives.
Nevertheless, I was impressed during my conversations with civic leaders and during the following
press conference by the dissatisfaction and uneasiness of all as to our future in Vietnam. For example, I
was questioned sharply as to whether, in view of the Vietnam situation, we were reducing or would
cease our deployments to RVN. To widen the field a bit, Senator Javits yesterday expressed the view
that we should stand down our military efforts in both North and South Vietnam. In brief, he advocated
that we should stop our air campaign against North Vietnam and should, in agreement with the GVN,
instruct our ground combat forces to desist offensive operations and fight only to defend themselves
against attack. The demerits of Senator Javits' proposal from the military point of view are so obvious
that I will not discuss it further. You should be aware, however, that, as farfetched as this proposal to
abandon the initiative to the enemy may seem to us in the military, it will have a distinct appeal to all
flocks of doves and, even more importantly, to the relatives of our men in South Vietnam whose lives
are at risk. The rationale of this latter group (for whom I have much sympathy) will be why should my
son or brother or husband be killed fighting against the VC/NVA while the South Vietnamese whose
country and freedom are at stake engage themselves in political bickering to the detriment of the effort
against the enemy.
3. As I read the cables from Embassy Saigon and from Headquarters MACV reporting upon the actions,
the statements and the proposals of the two sides, I get two distinct impressions: (a) all parties to the
controversy appear to be convinced that the United States is so firmly hooked in Vietnam that nothing
they do, or any circumstance arising therefrom, will cause us to disengage from our commitments; and
(b) both parties to the confrontation are acting in bad faith, are cemented in fixed positions which they
will not undertake to modify by compromise and that the GVN, at least, is proceeding without having a
clear-cut objective in mind.
4. A further item in this devil's stew is Colonel Loan who, if the cables are reasonably correct, is a
continuing troublemaker. I note that at last he has departed the Da Nang area for Saigon; based on the
past, I wonder how long he will remain absent from the scene. Moreover, I recall that in response to an
earlier query from me, you stated that the Directorate continued to be a cohesive body. Do you judge
that cohesiveness continues? I note that General Thi at first agreed to, and has now backed out of, a
meeting with General Ky at Chu Lai for reasons which at best seem specious. I note also the public
statements of General Dinh calling for the ouster of Thieu and Ky. Does this reflect personal outrage or
political conviction?
5. I really do not expect that either of you have answers to the questions I have posed or any reassurance
of the early resolution of this mess. My purpose in addressing you is to convey my own deep distress
and concern that the lives, the resources, and the political capital we have expended in our effort to
preserve South Vietnam as a part of the free world approach the point of having been in vain. Very
frankly, I am greatly worried, the more so because in all logic one cannot expect the American people to
suffer indefinitely the continuation of this truly sickening situation.

6. As you know, I am usually pretty much of an optimist; but always, I hope, on the realistic side. This
time, however, I think I can feel the first gusts of the whirlwind generated by the wind sown by the
Vietnamese. Westy, I know that you will exert to the full your influence to set things once more on a
proper course. If any of the above views will be of use to you, you have my full permission to use them
as and how you think best. Even so, even if we get some semblance of solidarity and common purpose
among the contending factions, we must all recognize that we have lost irretrievably and for all time
some of the support which until now we have received from the American people. In other words,
regardless of what happens of a favorable nature, many people will never again believe that the effort
and the sacrifices are worthwhile. Warm regards./2/
/2/In telegram MAC 4070, May 22, Westmoreland responded that he believed the situation in Vietnam
had been "blown out of perspective" by the press. While it was "serious," it was "not desperate," and the
GVN seemed "to be making positive headway in restoring government authority in the I Corps area." In
a telegram transmitted to Wheeler at 0929Z on May 23, Sharp concurred with Westmoreland's
assessment. (Ibid.)
144. Editorial Note
In a briefing memorandum dated 8 a.m., May 21, 1966, Special Assistant Walt Rostow advised
President Johnson that in Danang "heavy exchanges of fire between GVN and struggle forces [had] led
to VNAF bombing of the latter" and that mortar fire, "possibly from struggle forces," had injured 13
U.S. servicemen. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII) In its lead
story that morning, datelined Danang, May 21, The New York Times reported that "government marines
today took over one of the pagodas used as a refuge by dissidents here after four hours of bitter fighting
in which two Buddhist monks were killed." The Times stated that "dissident soldiers and Buddhists were
still holding out in two other pagodas."
At 10:10 a.m. on May 21, White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers telephoned Secretary of State Rusk
and indicated that the President was "deeply disturbed" about Vietnam. "It seems to him that internally
we cannot permit this thing to go on, it will tear us to pieces and [he] thinks time has come for us to try
to push whatever buttons we have to push." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)
In telegram 3575 to Saigon, transmitted at 6:29 p.m. on May 21, the Department of State advised
Ambassador Lodge that the press was giving the events in Danang "full play with pictures of GVN tanks
trained on pagodas." The Department stated that the "situation now appears to American public to be
getting out of hand with US in helpless position. While we should not be driven to actions not wise in
themselves by these attitudes, fact is that they make resolution of crisis matter of drastic urgency from
any standpoint. FYI: Gallup Poll being published tomorrow will indicate 54% saying US should
withdraw from SVN if internal squabbling continues." The Department then outlined a series of issues
for Lodge to raise with Prime Minister Ky and concluded by asking Lodge whether he thought the
United States should assert its power "forcefully and drastically" to end the crisis. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII) Lodge replied in telegram 4829 from Saigon,
May 22. He summarized his lengthy discussion with Ky earlier that day, noting that Ky claimed that his
government "had virtually complete control over the city of Danang." (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 15 VIET S)
In a Vietnam Situation Report summarizing events in the Struggle crisis dating from May 22 to June 7,
the Department of State reported that "the main Struggle base, the Tinh Hoi pagoda, fell to GVN troops
on May 23 without a fight, and the GVN reasserted its authority over the city. Those dissidents who
were not captured or who did not surrender either left the city or went underground. The total number of
Vietnamese dead in the battle for Danang was between 60 and 75 although Struggle forces in Hue

claimed the figure to be much higher." (Ibid., EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167, Viet-Nam Situation Reports,
1966) In Advice and Support: The Final Years, page 141, Jeffrey Clarke states that "according to rough
U.S. estimates, casualties for both sides included 150 South Vietnamese dead and 700 wounded, and
another 23 American soldiers wounded."
145. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 24, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June
1966. Secret.
Curbing Inflation in Vietnam. Now that Ky has Danang at least temporarily under control, I am pushing
for quick GVN action on anti-inflationary measures. The IMF mission, there now, is manfully pushing
the GVN toward at least modest devaluation, plus related measures. It is just possible that Ky might bite
the bullet in the next week or so.
I have been taking a hard line, because without someone pushing neither Lodge nor Ky will face up to
the inflationary threat. We have authorized the use of both carrots and sticks. One carrot would be to tell
the GVN that we will increase FY 1967 economic aid enough to help cover any loss to it of foreign
exchange from devaluation (estimated at $30 million). This is not a new add-on since we are already
programming such increased aid anyway to help flood Vietnam with goods. But we haven't told the
GVN yet.
The only credible stick we have is to withhold disbursement of economic aid till the GVN acts. This can
be done discreetly, I believe, if it becomes necessary.
I am also pushing a set of major reforms in our chief aid instrument, the Commercial Import Program
(CIP), to meet the rising tide of criticism over loose administration, windfall profits, corruption and the
like. We hope to face down the GVN by simply telling it that from now on our aid will have to be
handled according to the new rules. If not, new allocations may somehow get held up till the GVN
complies.
R.W. Komer/2/
/2/To the left of Komer's signature the President wrote: "Bob, I applaud you, good. Keep it up & Keep it
Hot." In telegram CAP 66323 to Porter, May 23, Komer stated that the President was "eager to put
positive face on our VN effort and balance press horror stories by publicizing progress on civil side. We
will probably have to produce some headline-catchers by mid-June." (Ibid., Back Channel Cables
between Porter and Komer, May-July 1966)
146. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, May 25, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:20 a.m. Rostow forwarded the
text of the telegram to President Johnson at noon on May 25 under cover of a memorandum stating:
"This is Ambassador Lodge at his best. There is a good deal to be said for the approach he suggests for a
fireside chat." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol.

6)
4952. For the President from Lodge. We are in such a fast moving situation here that I had just about
decided not to send you a weekly telegram at all. On the other hand, I wrote what follows and thought it
might interest you in the hopes that you would make allowances for the turmoil we are in.
A. Crisis
1. Following is an effort to put things here in proportion:
2. The troubles centering on Danang and Hue seem to be stabilizing with regard to the former city with
fair prospects of reestablishing government authority in the second, although not without considerable
uproar. Contrary to the press portrayals which I have seen, the rest of the country has been relatively
quiet. The Buddhist inspired demonstrations in Saigon have not yet assumed political importance. I try
to be alert to opportunities to bring the government and the "Strugglers" together by talks, and General
Westmoreland has in fact, talked with General Thi, with no apparent result./2/ The "Strugglers", in
characteristic Southeast Asian fashion, having apparently been unsuccessful, seem now to be turning
toward fanaticism. They evidently realize that the most influential segments of the U.S. press take all
their fanatic actions--riots, stone throwings, fires, signs telling Americans to go home, and selfimmolation--at face value, however cynical these same journalists may be about the U.S. Government.
But if we assume that the government establishes its sway in Hue and Danang and then maintains order
in Saigon and the rest of the country, the following could be in prospect during the next few months:
/2/Lodge reported on Westmoreland's conversation with Thi in telegram 4966 from Saigon, May 25.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)2
B. Military
3. Westmoreland and his Vietnamese colleagues may well inflict heavy losses on the North Vietnamese
Army and the big units of the Viet Cong. He is extremely alert to the possibilities.
4. We have put it out to the press, but they have apparently taken no interest in the fact, that throughout
this period of crisis, combat troops of the 1st Vietnamese Division in the Hue area have not behaved
badly. I refer particularly to the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Regiment, and the 2nd Troop (Company) of the
7th Cavalry Squadron, an armored personnel carrier unit. The logistic and headquarters troops which
have been demoralized by the Buddhist chaplains have behaved badly, but that does not justify the
unmitigated gloom of recent days.
5. As far as chaplains are concerned, the government has put out an order that they shall cease and desist
from talking politics and engaging in political activity. If they disobey the order, they are to be
transferred. The government is talking about abolishing the Chaplains' Corps, but I do not believe this
will happen. There are about 70 Buddhist and 60 Catholic chaplains in the Vietnamese Army today.
C. Casualties
6. The following has been prepared by the staff regarding casualties:
"While U.S. casualties have exceeded those of the GVN for 9 of the past 16 weeks, not counting this
week (U.S. figures are incomplete), in only two of those weeks have more Americans than Vietnamese
soldiers been killed, and in those two weeks the total killed was very low compared to normal weeks.

One reason why our casualties have been higher than Vietnamese is that we are much more thorough in
counting wounded, with even small scratches being included in the totals, while the Vietnamese only
include those who have to leave their units to be treated. We count all the 'band-aid' cases; they count
only the 'hospital' ones. Over the long term, Vietnamese casualties have far exceeded our own. For
instance, since the beginning of August 1965, when our forces began heavy involvement in combat, the
Vietnamese have suffered 29,973 casualties, including 8,151 killed, while our soldiers have had 16,267
casualties, including 2,574 killed. When one compares the loss of life on the Vietnamese side to South
Viet-Nam's total population of about 15 million, including the Viet Cong, their suffering is seen to be far
greater proportionately than ours. Roughly speaking, for each family in the U.S. which lost a son in the
fighting in Viet-Nam in 1965, there were 200 Vietnamese families who suffered such a loss. And this
leaves aside all those who suffered the loss of loved ones who were not soldiers through V.C. terrorism
or by being caught in the cross-fires of this war. Thus there can be little doubt that the Vietnamese are
carrying the major burden of suffering in this struggle, in both absolute terms and proportionate to our
respective situations."
D. Elections
8. The elections which should take place in September, assuming that this rickety government can hold
together, may finally produce something which we can support on the basis that it represents the popular
will, although it could be denounced as null and void by the Army or the Buddhists or by some other
group. By no stretch of the imagination could it end the political uproar which can be expected to go on
as long as Viet-Nam evolves into a modern nation-state. But it might establish a "standard to which the
wise and honest may repair"--in short, something to show them where north is. This is a good thing to
do--even if they don't always steer straight course.
E. Revolutionary Development
9. As regards revolutionary development, Porter reports that 90 more teams are now being inserted into
the villages and hamlets and that these should be followed about September 1 by 100 more. This
infusion of personnel is concurrent with the insertion of the first police field force units who will work
in the areas between the villages and hamlets, thus complementing the work of the revolutionary
development teams inside those places. Together with the self-help programs, which are now
functioning on a wide scale, it appears that by mid-September, we may, with luck, have some interesting
progress to report. This is all brand new and highly creative. In fact, if it actually happens, it would not
be too much to say that nothing more imaginative than this would be going on in the entire field of
government.
F. U.S. Opinion
10. I have been mulling over the state of American opinion as I observed it when I was at home. I have
also been reading the recent Gallup polls. As I commented in my Embtel 4880,/3/ I am quite certain that
the number of those who want us to leave Viet-Nam because of current "internal squabbling" does not
reflect deep conviction but a superficial impulse based on inadequate information.
/3/Dated May 23. (Ibid.)
11. In fact, I think one television fireside chat by you personally--with all your intelligence and
compassion--could tip that figure over in one evening. I am thinking of a speech, the general tenor of
which would be: "We are involved in a vital struggle of great difficulty and complexity on which much
depends. I need your help."

12. I am sure you would get much help from the very people in the Gallup poll who said we ought to
leave Viet-Nam--as soon as they understood what you want them to support.
13. You and the administration have done big things in educating public opinion. When I consider the
degree of information today compared to what it was a year or two years ago, I applaud. But there is still
more to be done--and only you can do certain parts of it. Of course, I am glad to help in any way I can.
14. Your own statement to the press about Viet-Nam was excellent in tone and substance./4/
/4/Presumably a reference to the President's remarks on Vietnam at his press conference on May 21. For
text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp.
531-539.
G. Vietnamese Notes
15. Chieu Hoi returnees are up from the April slump but below the average during February and March.
There was an increase in the number of veterans which were returned.
16. The newspapers Dan Chung and Thoi Su Mien Nam take issue with Fulbright's brothel statement/5/
and write that though thankful for American help, we don't have to tolerate such inconsiderate remarks
by a politician like Mr. Fulbright--remarks that no self-respecting Vietnamese can forget. Many papers
carried the wire story that Senator Fulbright "regrets" his statement.
/5/At a speech delivered on May 4 at Johns Hopkins University, Fulbright stated that "both literally and
figuratively, Saigon has become an American brothel." (The New York Times, May 6, 1966) Fulbright
publicly expressed his regrets about the statement on May 17. (Ibid., May 18, 1966)
H. Economic
17. Retail prices in Saigon continued to rise, especially foodstuffs. The index is up 5 per cent from a
month ago. These price increases are evidently due to not only the political unrest but also to rumors of
devaluation of the currency.
18. The Saigon free market rate for U.S. currency and gold rose to an all-time high.
19. On May 19, General Ky and Porter signed a memorandum of understanding concerning the use of
counterpart funds. This agreement should give us control over the use of part of these funds and increase
our ability to exert badly needed influence.
20. One disturbing note is that the Saigon Special Court sentenced to death an iron and steel importer of
Chinese origin whom it convicted of selling above official prices. If the sentence is carried out, it would
have a seriously adverse affect on the business climate, which is greatly affected by the Chinese
merchants. I plan to urge GVN to grant clemency in this case.
21. The Minister of Economy has announced that the GVN will make sure that sufficient personnel are
available to operate the port 18 hours a day. This decision should help alleviate the problems we have
had in moving cargoes through the port.
Lodge

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, May 25, 1966, 1:09 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Helble, cleared
by Miller, and approved by Unger.
3626. During recent consultations in Washington of Ambassador Lodge following outline was basis for
highest level discussions of elections and political development and its contents generally agreed upon.
Outline, entitled "Principles Governing U.S. Operations Concerning Elections and Constitutional
Assembly in South Viet-Nam," is transmitted herewith FYI and for your general guidance.
Begin Text:
A. General Principles of U.S. Action
The U.S. Mission should seek to exert maximum influence toward the achievement of the substantive
objectives stated in B below. At the same time, this must be done with recognition that a key objective is
to avoid anti-Americanism becoming a major issue; we shall be accused of interference in any event, but
it is vitally important not to give potential anti-American elements (or the press and outside observers)
any clear handle to hit us with.
B. Objectives
1. Elections should be held as announced by GVN on April 15th, that is by September 15 of this year.
2. The issue of anti-Americanism should be kept out of the election campaign as far as possible.
3. The question as to whether the constitutional assembly will only have the role of drafting the
constitution or will have some further function should not be allowed to become an active pre-election
issue and the U.S. should take no position on this question.
4. The elections should be conducted so as to produce a constitutional assembly fairly representing the
various regions and groups within South Viet-Nam (except those actively participating with the Viet
Cong), including the Army, Montagnards, Khmer minorities, et al.
5. The elections should be conducted so as to gain a maximum improvement in the image of the GVN in
the United States and internationally; this calls for a wide turnout, scrupulously correct conduct of the
voting and counting process, as little political limitation on voter eligibility as possible and vigorous
efforts to avoid voter intimidation from any quarter. Ideas to be explored are a brief election period
ceasefire, international observation of the elections, students participating as poll watchers, etc.
6. The emphasis in the campaign should be on the selection of good men to draft the constitution;
political parties are not expected to play a major role although the campaign may provide the occasion
for laying foundations for future party organization. We will wish to work quietly with selected
promising candidates all across the political spectrum in the expectation that some will be elected to the
assembly and provide useful continuing contacts.
7. Unless new developments change our assessment, major efforts should be devoted not to stimulating
the formation of a large nationalist party but rather to the adoption of the concept that these elections

bring together all non-communist groups who are pledged, among other things, to their country's
independence and the continuing need to defend it with American help. Specifically, efforts should not
be made to split the Buddhists or isolate the militant Buddhist faction.
8. The election process should be a vehicle for educating and engaging the population in the democratic
process and it should be used to launch political and psychological initiatives with youth groups,
students, labor, etc.
9. Restore as far as possible the unity of the Directorate and promote a reconciliation between Generals
Ky and Thi. However, discourage efforts by the Directorate to form a government party designed purely
to perpetuate the Directorate in power to the exclusion of other significant political groups. End Text.
Rusk
148. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the
Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/
Washington, May 28, 1966.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 486, McNamara, Robert S.
Secret; Personal. Prepared by Harriman on May 30.
I saw Bob McNamara Saturday morning, May 28. He said he had spoken to the President about my
going to Moscow and was very keen that I should go.
He hopes for some settlement, and gave me the impression he didn't see any value in escalation. He said
he thought a good settlement would be: if North Vietnam would pull its troops out, we should do the
same; and establishment of an expanded ICC to assure no evasion.
From the Russian standpoint, they would not want to have escalation which eventually might affect
them, and he thought I should underline the dangers.
On the plus side, he thought we could agree to a parallel reduction in the Defense budget, which he was
sure the Kremlin wanted. He said he thought it might be a good idea for me to tell Kosygin that whereas
on June 30, 1965 we had in the Army 968,000 men, this year we would have 1,217,000, and in June
1967, 1,600,000. We could certainly agree with the Kremlin to reduce our troop level.
On interim steps, we might stop bombing if the North Vietnamese stopped infiltration of men and
perhaps supplies.
We should agree, he thought, to let the South Vietnamese decide their own future even if it meant a
coalition government with the Viet Cong, which might or might not take over.
WAH
149. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 30, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIV. Secret. Copies

were sent to Rostow and Taylor. Leonhart was Komer's deputy in the White House office established by
NSAM No. 343 (Document 102) to oversee pacification and other non-military programs in Vietnam.
SUBJECT
Report on Visit to Vietnam: May 17-29, 1966
1. I returned yesterday from a ten-day visit--my first in fourteen years since a 1950-52 tour of duty in the
Saigon Embassy.
2. Three general impressions from this quick trip:
a. Our key programs have not been materially hampered by the recent political disorders. These
programs may not be bounding forward but they are moving ahead--in revolutionary development,
nationwide self help projects, and politico-military coordination. On the military side, the recent ARVN
disaffections have largely involved rear support troops and headquarters units. The combat forces, even
in I Corps, have kept up far better than press reporting from Saigon indicates.
b. Ky's ability to cope with the intestinal discords of Vietnam remains in doubt, but since his original
political blundering against Thi, his touch has improved. There are additionally strong possibilities that
Vietnam will look considerably brighter by late September. The controlling factors: (1) a reasonable
chance for substantial progress in our arms, on which all else chiefly depends, if Westmoreland finds, as
he expects to do, the new VC regiments and their built-up supplies; (2) better prospects for healthier
politics that the September Constitutional Assembly elections should bring; and (3) the political impact
of the completion of the first village assignments by the 100 new RD cardre teams which grad-uated on
May 25.
c. To increase the new momentum in RD programs and to exploit these favoring possibilities, we have
much to do over the next few months.
3. The original Komer priorities, as seen on the ground in Vietnam, seem sound and essential.
Immediate requirements are:
a. Anti-inflation. The problem is as bad as--or worse--than we had thought it. Retail prices continue to
rise at 5% per month. In one year local construction materials have skyrocketed: lumber up 600%, rock
500%, sand 300% (USAID is now letting a 610,000 ton tender for sand to Taiwan--61 unbudgeted
Liberty ships). Last week in Saigon the black market in US $10 bills reached an all-time high at 182
piasters. We should hit hard, and early. The GVN is now softened up by the visit of the IMF team.
Delay in devaluation will only involve it more in the elections. We can try for the deeper range of
devaluation around 120 or the lesser around 80 with special exchange surcharges. The IMF appears to
favor the latter and it is important to keep it out in front. But a deeper devaluation would be cleaner,
simpler to administer, and less subject to subsequent unravelling. My own view is that the door should
be held open for a negotiating entry at about 110 and an exit at about 100.
b. Port Congestion. At the end of May the number of non-military ships waiting off Saigon for their turn
at unloading was 36. Average waiting time was 26 days. Civilian cargo clearances have been overstated
through errors in reporting methods by about 20% or 50,000 tons a month. Westmoreland now seems to
favor military operation of the Saigon port jointly with ARVN units which will provide some cushion
for political sensitivities while letting the US do the real work. He will need full authority over US civil
employees at the port, improved arrangements to remove warehoused goods, and a system to schedule
and control outbound cargo from the States. Lack of such control is one of the basic deficiencies of the

present AID system. He should be given what he needs to make the port function.
c. Cadres. The new 59-man RD cadres are the most promising element in the country. The first 100
teams were graduated at the end of May. A second class of 115 teams will graduate in September. The
decision to double the cadre this year was of basic importance. By June 1967, if the program goes well,
10,000 cadre will be trained each thirteen weeks. Westmoreland is now prepared to convert PF troops
into cadre providing no villages are left uncovered in the process and CIA auspices can be reasonably
concealed. We must work to insulate the cadre from changes in GVN regimes; hold the existing training
facilities at Vung Tau at least until the new camp at Long Hai is fully operational and its surrounding
area secured; improve our infiltration security as numbers increase rapidly; and keep a close cross-check
on our training methods against cadre performance and experience. But if there had been imagination
enough to form these teams fourteen years ago, Vietnam would be much different today.
4. The next steps are well understood as between Washington and the Saigon mission. We should aim
for next-phase decisions in June on:
a. A manpower survey, decently done, as a basis for overdue judgments on new allocations of
increasingly scarce Vietnamese manpower. The Mission will need help, and we should get a manpower
team out to Saigon soonest.
b. Priorities guidelines for the pacification and developmental phases of rural reconstruction based on
NSAM 343.
c. Redefinitions of roles and missions to rationalize the hodgepodge of present security forces. The
critical area is the 350,000 man agglomeration of RF, PF, Police, Police Field Forces, CIDG, special
force units, and RD cadres now competing for money, manpower and material.
d. Land Reform. A mission interagency group is now working on feasibility, but will probably favor a
selective and gradual approach.
5. Ahead lie further priority actions. The most important of these seem to me:
a. Urban Programs. We have tended to ignore urban areas and then find time and again that our political
difficulties arise from the cities. Each of the eight districts of Saigon increased in population by 6070,000 last year. Another 500,000 will probably be added in the next twelve months. Some form of
political action team or an extension of the RD cadres to urban areas may be useful. Measures to repair
the breakdown in urban services--particularly public health and refuse disposal--are urgently required.
This is one of the few areas susceptible of visible results before the September elections.
b. USAID Vacancies. Of a total of 3931 approved positions, USAID has 2991 on board. In its field
operations staff, it is authorized 203 positions and had 128 present on May 23. Obviously recruitment
programs need to be pressed, and there is an urgent need to fill certain vacancies at once--in auditors and
commodity analysts, where weaknesses in control procedures are attracting adverse comment. In
general, the USAID personnel structure needs reexamination (Lodge would favor a 25% cut). My own
view is that reform and slenderizing should be undertaken against the new decisions on revised
priorities.
c. Joint Operations. We may need to move more toward joint boards and commissions with the GVN. In
the period immediately ahead, the GVN seems unlikely to improve administratively quickly and
sufficiently enough to carry out its programs with only liaison guidance. In the military area, we need to

find a more effective means for advance consultation on plans and political actions. Westmoreland's
project for joint operations of the ports and storage facilities seems promising. For the cadres, some
adaptation of the JCRR, which did effective work on Taiwan, may be useful. Its key provisions were a
direct appropriation of Congressional funds and the appointment of its members (three Chinese, two
Americans) by the respective Presidents for fixed terms. Independence of tenure and funds may be
needed to insulate the cadres--and to preserve the present dynamic chief, General Thang--from GVN
politics.
6. Finally, press relations. The resident Saigon press corps by and large is young, inexperienced, and
sensationalist minded. It will be a difficult group to work with at best, but I am convinced that more can
be done. Barry Zorthian, the head of JUSPAO, will be in Washington for two weeks in mid-June. I
strongly recommend that Mr. Moyers and Mr. Komer meet with him and that we work out an
informational strategy and operational plan for the next several months on story lines, press treatment,
and greater emphasis on third country programs in behalf of Vietnamese freedom and development.
William Leonhart/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Leonhart signed the original.
150. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, June 2, 1966, 1135Z.
/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Secret.
Repeated to Admiral Sharp.
MAC 4508. Subject: Meeting with Prime Minister Ky between 1600 hours and 1655 hours, this date, in
his office at VNAF Headquarters.
1. Ky reflected his usual self-confidence and was obviously pleased with the success with the Buddhists
yesterday./2/ The Buddhists now realize that their position is very weak since they have no issue, have
gone too far, lost control over the demonstrators, have little public sympathy, and no real support from
the press or international Buddhist groups./3/ The Buddhists have admitted penetration by the VC.
Today Ky received an official letter from a Buddhist leader asking the government to provide security to
protect pagodas (Ky viewed this as a significant development). Most of the Buddhists are moderate
people but there are a few "hawks" who have caused the trouble. Ky believes these "hawks", led by Tri
Quang and Thien Minh, are in the process of being isolated by the moderate monks who are in the
majority. At the meeting yesterday the monks stated that Tri Quang would go along with their decision.
The Buddhist chaplain problem is being handled according to plan and field commanders have been
alert in dealing with the matter.
/2/In telegram 5178 from Saigon, June 1, Lodge reported that Ky had reached an understanding with the
Buddhist leaders at their meeting on May 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Buddhist and Directorate leaders, including Ky, met again on June 1 to complete their agreement.
(Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, p. 330)
/3/In telegram 5124 from Saigon, May 30, Lodge indicated that Ky was "embarked on a campaign to
isolate the extreme Buddhists and their supporters," whose "current cynical campaign of hunger strikes,
letters in blood and suicide" Lodge viewed as a "desperate effort to bring maximum pressure on the U.S.

to force the Government of Vietnam into conceding to Tri Quang." (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5)
2. Enlargement of the Directorate to include 10 civilians for total of 20 has served to save face for the
Buddhists. When Ky saw a Catholic leader this morning he was greeted with hostility since the Catholic
was of the opinion that the government had again given in to Buddhist pressure. After Ky explained the
situation, the Catholic leader's attitude changed. The 10 civilians to join the Directorate will be as
follows: one from the South, one from Central Vietnam, and one from the Northern refugee group, one
from each of the four religious groups (Buddhist, Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai), and three from the
intellectual/professional group. The Buddhists have accepted this arrangement./4/
/4/In its Viet-Nam Situation Report, 0630, June 6, 1966, the Department of State reported that the
enlarged Directorate had its first meeting on June 6. (Department of State, EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167,
Viet-Nam Situation Reports)
3. General Tri, who now commands III Corps, is to replace General Chieu as Secretary General of the
Directorate. It is planned for Tri also to take over as Minister of Information and Director of Political
Warfare for the Armed Forces. Chieu will devote his full attention to political matters as leader of the
Veterans Party. We discussed Tri's replacement inconclusively.
4. The surprise movement of troops into Hue this morning did not go according to plan because it was
compromised by Nhuan. Nhuan drove last night by jeep from Quang Tri to Hue and informed Tri Quang
of the operation. Nhuan is afraid of Tri Quang. Colonel Toan who was all set to command the operation,
on the assumption that Nhuan would stay in Quang Tri, had the rug pulled out from under him. When I
inquired about Dinh, Ky classified Dinh as crazy and said that he was not worried about him.
5. Ky made the point that the big problem with senior officers was corruption and that temptations were
great. He himself had been offered sizeable sums by many parties in return for requested favors. He had
resisted these overtures realizing that once he had compromised himself there would be no turning back.
He has recently talked to Thieu, Co, and Vien about selecting a number of promising young officers and
grooming them for higher responsibilities with emphasis on leadership development and resistance to
self aggrandizement.
6. As I left, Ky said he was going to the afternoon briefing at the 7th Air Force. I explained that we were
particularly interested in showing him the results of the big strike at Yen Bay.
7. General Wheeler please pass to State at Embassy request.
151. Editorial Note
During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell that began at
8:05 p.m. on June 2, 1966, the following exchange took place:
"President: We got a pretty disastrous poll coming up on Vietnam. About 35-36% want to get out. About
40% approve of what we're doing--the way I'm handling it. About 41% approve of the way I'm doing it
and about 36% disapprove.
"Russell: Well, you're going have to do something different out there. If you don't you're going
eventually get in trouble. McNamara gave you some good advice on that.

"President: What's that?

"Russell: About pushing it a little bit harder.
"President: Well, he's not advising that now. We got until we get a government; until we get'em propped
up, nobody really-"Russell: I think the government's straightened itself out pretty well out there.
"President: Well, not yet. Not yet. It's on its way to doing it, but it's not--.
"Russell: Well, I don't think it ever will be clamped down and be a real government any more than I
think we're gonna have one in Santo Domingo." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts,
Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Russell, Tape F66.16, PNO 1)
152. Editorial Note
In JCS telegram 3086-66, June 2, 1966, General Wheeler notified General Westmoreland that he
thought the time for decision on expanding the air campaign against North Vietnam was approaching.
"It is quite clear authority to attack the POL system was within our grasp when the political turmoil in
SVN rose to a height which caused many people here to take a second look." Wheeler suggested that if
the political situation remained stable Westmoreland submit a proposal the following week for attacks
on POL targets. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)
That same day a U.S. military officer, under arrangements made by Secretary McNamara, briefed Prime
Minister Wilson at 10 Downing Street on pending air strikes against POL storage installations near
Hanoi and Haiphong. Wilson responded in a message to President Johnson the next day that he would
have to dissociate himself from such a move, which he believed would make settlement of the conflict
more difficult, but he would continue his overall support for Johnson's policy in Vietnam. (Telegram
7266 to London, June 3; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
In telegram 19218 to Admiral Sharp, June 5, General Westmoreland proposed strikes on eight POL
targets. (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Rolling
Thunder 50-A Extended) Secretary McNamara told Under Secretary Ball in a telephone conversation
the next day, Monday, that he was having an operational order for POL strikes drafted, since the
President wanted McNamara prepared to move later in the week. (Telcon, June 6; Johnson Library, Ball
Papers) In telegram 107 to Brussels, June 7, Ball passed this information on to Rusk, who was attending
a NATO Ministerial Meeting. Ball pointed out several reasons for delay, among them Rusk's meeting
with Prime Minister Wilson, scheduled for June 10, and Canadian diplomat Chester Ronning's peace
mission to Hanoi starting June 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
In two memoranda dated June 8, Special Assistant Walt Rostow informed the President that Secretary
Rusk was "firmly for postponement until we know the results of Ronning's mission," while Secretary
McNamara preferred to go ahead immediately. McNamara, however, felt that Rusk's request for
postponement should be honored. Rostow estimated that a postponement would mean a 2-week delay,
which he regarded "as unfortunate, but not necessarily a disaster." (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5)
153. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 8, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:15 p.m. Rostow forwarded the
text of the telegram to the President at 11:45 a.m. on June 9 under cover of a memorandum stating that it
was "worth reading through to the end" and had "much more good news than bad." (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5)
5378. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram.
A. Military Prospects
1. I have been hoping that we could get decisive military results within a year. I had based this hope on
our considerable military accomplishments in overcoming the main force units of the Viet Cong and
large units of the Army of North Viet-Nam, and in destroying the redoubts in the jungles. But MACV
does not think that it can do anything decisive in a year. Their operational plans for the next year, if
carried out, would mean that good progress had been achieved, but nothing decisive. The best estimate
also is that 20,000 men of the Army of North Viet-Nam have come into South Viet-Nam since January
and, as far as I can learn, we can't find them.
2. If we are now going as hard and as fast as we can go in South Viet-Nam militarily and cannot get a
decisive military result in a year, the question arises as to whether we should not intensify the air attack
on North Viet-Nam--whether we cannot thus bring about strains which will neutralize their army in
South Viet-Nam, in spite of our inability to do it in South Viet-Nam on the ground within a year.
3. The reports I get are certainly consistent with the proposition that the Hanoi regime is feeling real
pain because of our bombing. If there is this change of feeling in Hanoi--as seems likely--I believe the
bombing has had a lot to do with it, although ground casualties, of course, play a part. This being true,
an intensification of the bombing would be the most effective step we could take to get Hanoi to the
negotiating table or--better still--to start "fading away."
B. Weekly Military Highlights
4. The highlights of last week's military activity were two heavy battles won by U.S. and Korean forces
and a sparkling performance by the Vietnamese Second Division which surprised a large Viet Cong
force with a midnight assault on its bivouac in Quang Tin Province. After making the initial assault, the
attacking force deliberately withdrew and then re-attacked at 3:00 in the morning, catching the Viet
Cong survivors in the process of evacuating their dead and wounded. As a result, the Viet Cong lost 100
killed and 56 weapons, while the Vietnamese troops lost only two missing.
5. For the week ended last Sunday, the "killed in action" were: Vietnamese 135; U.S. 69; Viet Cong 902.
These figures fluctuate from week to week as relative missions change, and we must expect weeks when
there will be more Americans. This is undoubtedly still less than would be the case if we did not make a
stand in Viet-Nam and were thus constrained to make it elsewhere. Our choice is not between casualties
in Viet-Nam on the one hand or no casualties at all on the other. In the present state of the world, the
choice probably is between casualties in Viet-Nam on the one hand and more casualties somewhere else
if we were to leave Viet-Nam.
C. Vietnamese Catholics and Elections

6. D'Orlandi, the Italian Ambassador, and dean of the diplomatic corps, has a wide knowledge of VietNam. He is an accurate reporter, and his opinions are stimulating, although I often disagree. He makes a
business of keeping in touch with the different factions among the Vietnamese Catholics, and I have
found him particularly well informed about them. He sums up the prevailing Vietnamese Catholic views
as follows:
7. While they do not enthuse about holding elections, they probably will not boycott elections if they
take place . A commonly expressed attitude early last week was that they should try to get Ky out of
office, and then the elections would not take place. But as the Institute Buddhists have more and more
turned against Ky, the Catholic desire to force Ky out has moderated. Also elections appear inevitable.
8. They do, however, fear that once the elections are held, the United States will pronounce them to have
been good, thereby committing ourselves to what the Assembly may subsequently decide. They also
think the Assembly will be the first and only national body ever to have been elected by the people , and
will, therefore, at once try to take over from the GVN. They also fear that this Assembly will be badly
intimidated by the Viet Cong, and, will in a very short space of time, ask the United States to leave. All
this would happen even before the Constitution was drafted.
9. These Vietnamese Catholics believe that there are some who would think that for the U.S. to be thus
invited to leave would be a very subtle and clever "out" for the United States. But actually, they believe,
with the conditions as they are, it would be a resounding defeat, and the invitation to leave would be a
device which would not, in their opinion, fool anybody.
10. They believe that it would immediately lead to the slaughter and enslavement of the Catholics and
others in South Viet-Nam; it would turn Indonesia back to the Communists; and have catastrophic
results in Southeast Asia.
11. My comment on this is as follows:
12. There are a great many elements here having doubts about the wisdom of having elections. To the
Catholics must now be added the Tri Quang Buddhists who were frantically insisting on elections a
while ago. A week ago, I would have said that it was totally impractical to think of not having elections.
Now, I am not so sure, although the odds are still strongly that the elections will take place as scheduled
in September.
13. My guess is that the Assembly to be elected at that time will undoubtedly consider itself more
legitimate than the GVN, and that there will be a real row about that. Most of the members of the present
electoral commission will probably be candidates and if their attitude is any guide--and I believe it is--I
would feel confident that, if not intimidated, they would not invite us to leave.
14. But we must assume that many of them will be intimidated because that is a traditional way of doing
things here. I realize this will be hard to explain in the United States where Congressmen and Senators
are not influenced to vote a certain way by having their life threatened, and who will naturally think of
the Vietnamese Assembly as a counterpart of the U.S. Congress.
D. Paraplegic Veterans
15. This war has caused many Vietnamese to lose arms and legs, and until recently, the facilities for
helping these victims were very limited. The National Institute for Rehabilitation had been painfully
turning out a very few limbs and braces every month, using primitive hand methods. Mr. Juan Monros,

of the World Rehabilitation Fund, who was brought here by Howard Rusk, has held a 4-month training
course which 43 student technicians completed on May 27 on the techniques of producing plastic limbs
and braces. He expects that the Institute will now be able to turn out some 500 limbs and braces a
month, which will be a great help in solving what has been a serious human problem. I recall your
personal interest in making this possible.
E. Economic
16. The sharp rise in retail prices over the previous two weeks halted last week, as did the Saigon free
market rates for U.S. currency and gold. The price of rice was stable and those of wheat, flour and sugar
were down, as were those of most imported commodities.
17. The economic situation in Danang has improved somewhat. The airlift of meat and wheat flour into
the city brought down their prices as much as 25 percent. The port of Danang is now operating
satisfactorily.
F. Success in Binh Thuan
18. Mission Coordinator Wilson spent last night in Binh Thuan Province, southernmost coastal province
of II Corps. Population is roughly a quarter of a million, with more than 75 percent of the people
estimated to be under GVN control as contrasted with about 20 percent of the physical territory being
controlled by the government.
19. According to the Province Chief and his U.S. advisors on the ground, the people of Binh Thuan
sense that the Nationalist side is going to win and thus are shifting their allegiance and support to
province and district officials. These officials feel that this in no sense signifies a political conversion,
ideological shift or endorsement of the present government. It is merely a pragmatic recognition that the
Viet Cong is taking a beating and that it is better to get with the winning side.
20. Province Chief also attributes much of this shift in attitude to the leadership of General Thang,
Minister of Revolutionary Development, who has spent some time visiting personally in hamlets and
villages of the province and to new sense of urgency Thang has succeeded in imparting to provincial
officials. Highly successful operation in the province several months ago by the 101st Airborne Brigade
which resulted in a large number of Viet Cong casualties is also reported to have had a dramatic effect
on peasant attitudes.
21. Wilson reports: A quick evaluation of such indicators as the number of VC defectors, number of
refugees, willingness of people to provide intelligence on the Viet Cong, and the general rate of progress
on the pacification front tends to substantiate the conclusion that a positive trend has indeed begun in
this one province.
22. Comment: This seems to show all elements of our program working together as we have always
hoped they would and that when they do work together the desired result is achieved.
G. Education
23. By the end of May of this year we had completed 43 percent of our program of distributing fourteen
million elementary school textbooks throughout Viet-Nam. This program, which we began in mid-1965,
will be concluded in second half 1967. The books are distributed to the schools and lent to the students
for the school year. We hope to get three years' use out of each book.

24. The significance of this program and its impact on the system of primary education is worth special
note: for the first time, Vietnamese children have textbooks which they can take home and read and
show to their parents. Content and illustrations have been carefully worked out with leading Vietnamese
educators and cover such subjects as Viet-Nam's history and geography, along with other standard
subjects as arithmetic and personal hygiene and sanitation. I am providing a sample packet of these
books separately, including brief descriptive comments, as an item of possible interest.
25. Next to safety of life and limb, there is probably nothing more highly prized in Viet-Nam than
education--perhaps greater even than land reform.
H. Chieu Hoi
26. The number of returnees during the period May 28 to June 3 increased slightly to 257, as compared
to 247 for the previous period, for a total of 1,237 for May. This compared with a total of 1,620 for April
and 2,294 for March.
27. This reduction is due in part to the political crisis, in part to the diminution of combat (combat tends
to drive people into the camps) and in part to the fact that there are as yet no reports from I Corps.
28. It is to be noted that since early March, the number of so-called "high quality" defectors has
increased to rate of one or two per week, contrasted to a rate of one or less per month before March.
"High quality" defector is defined as meaning squad or platoon leaders from Viet Cong main force units.
Lodge

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
154. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield/1/
Washington, June 10, 1966, 8:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between
Johnson and Mansfield, Tape F66.16, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
[Here follows discussion of several topics, including Vietnam and Senator Dirksen.]
LBJ: What do you think about Vietnam?
MM: Well, I'm not happy about it any more than you are.
LBJ: No. Nobody is.
MM: I was a little bit disturbed by Lodge's first paragraph in his weekly report/2/ to you about heavier
bombing which I assumed meant the Haiphong-Hanoi complex or was leading up to it. I think it would
be a serious mistake because those places have been evacuated to a degree except for industrial needs so
there won't be much damage hurt. But you've got Giap with his 320,000-330,000 man army waiting and
if you knocked him out of there he'd say, "What the hell. We've got nothing to lose. Let's go." And they
won't come down in divisional strength. They'll just disperse those divisions into guerrilla units, and it
will be awfully hard for us to maintain the ratio needed. As far as petroleum is concerned, I don't think it
plays a hell of a lot in the life of the Viet Cong, or the Vietnamese rather. As far as mining or blockading
Haiphong Harbor is concerned, you've got more stuff going out of Haiphong than going in. Very little is
coming in at Haiphong. The ships have been reduced considerably. What British ships are left are
usually under Hong Kong registry and are struck maybe under the ownership of the Communists. You
run up against other nations and here the situation is already difficult; you make it more difficult. It's just
a hell of a can of worms. If you really go at'em, this could turn into an open-ended war and other
countries would begin to criticize us more than they are at the present.
/2/Document 153.
LBJ: I think that nearly everybody--well, they're not gonna mine anything and they're not gonna bomb
any industrial complex. What they're gonna try to do is take out the POLs. They find the petroleum
supply is almost double what it was last year--their needs are; and their supplies are stored there. And
they're trying to get rid of that storage and disperse it. And they're scattering it around where we can't get

to it with the individual bombs. They're puttin' it underground and puttin' it in concrete and they won't
take it out before it's all gone. And they're just about to walk out on it. They think it's a tragic mistake
not to destroy that petroleum that's supplying ten thousand trucks that are coming down now. It's in the
edge. It's kinda like Mt. Vernon, Alexandria, Arlington, and Washington, DC I seem to be the only one
that's afraid that they'll hit the United States Capitol or hit a hospital or hit a school or something. They
don't think so. But I see so many of these airplanes that get off all the time--like this B-70 thing. They
just constantly make mistakes.
MM: Yes. And you don't know when these planes will fly over to China--two or three or four already.
LBJ: Oh, they do that. They do that. They do that. I don't think that'll be a problem here, but just as they
do get off over there they're liable to get off here. And if they get off one little inch here you could drop
a bomb on a school or on a hospital and that's quite different from the oil. Now, the experts say that the
oil is not going to infuriate or inflame them more than the bridges that we're taking out running to China
now. That is about as big a needle as we can put in them, what we're doing now. But the oil is so much
more important because they gotta have it for their trucks--and then now, we've got their light plant
knocked out and they knocked out one of ours yesterday, too--that we've got to take out the oil. Now we
just keep delaying these decisions for various reasons. It's somebody going on a mission. This time Rusk
is in Brussels--you can't do it. When you get back we've got another fellow going to Hanoi. And things
of that kind that it's pretty hard to do this while this is going on 'cause they'll say that you do it. But the
military and the fellows out there, Westmoreland, just feel like that you're just lettin' 'em shoot our men
unnecessarily. That you ought to stop this--you ought to make it as difficult--we can't stop it, but make it
as difficult for them to get supplies as possible or you ought'n to be in there. And that's another thing.
None of them think you can get out this year. They all think that while they just--the casualties are hell,
like hell. They killed several hundred yesterday in one raid. We just give 'em a mopping up every time
we meet 'em. They nevertheless think that we're gonna be there all year.
MM: Well, I think so. I wish it was only for just a year, Mr. President, but I'm afraid it may be longer
unless there's a break somewhere in between.
[Here follows a brief discussion of peace negotiations.]
155. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June
1966. Secret. Komer sent copies of the attachment to Rostow and Taylor under a June 17 covering
memorandum in which he stated that the President was "strongly in favor" of his proposals. (Ibid.)
Here's my think-piece on where to go from here on the civil side. It's long but every word counts, so I
hope you'll plow through it.
I've shown it only to Bob McNamara (since it's his ox I want to gore, I thought this only fair). He said to
tell you he "strongly supports" it, which made me feel I'm on the track.
The key point is that neither Porter in Saigon nor the civilian agencies are thinking boldly enough or
pushing hard enough to galvanize the civil side. Porter needs a pep talk (McNamara and I will give him
one too) and to be told that it's his job to take hold and run the civil side (not just understudy Lodge).

We've laid on the first meeting with Porter for 11 a.m. Thursday/2/ (followed by impromptu press
conference), then later perhaps the Congressional briefing you had in mind (by Monday I hope we could
crow about devaluation). Is the attached war plan generally in accord with your views?
/2/June 16.
Yes
No/3/
/3/The President checked neither of these options and instead wrote: "See me, L."
R. W. Komer
Attachment
Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson
Washington, June 14, 1966.
Before you talk with Porter,/4/ here are the ideas which I am slowly maturing as I grab hold on Vietnam.
/4/The President met with Porter and Komer from 11:10 to 11:45 a.m. on June 16. Leonhart and
Zorthian joined the meeting for 10 minutes at 11:35 a.m No record of the discussion has been found.
(Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
I. The civil side--our "other war"--is even more central than I had realized. Indeed it may be the critical
determinant of success or failure in Vietnam. Our military buildup has already reversed the trend toward
defeat. As it continues, we can seize the initiative even more and outmatch any increase in Hanoi's
infiltration. We can also selectively increase our direct pressure on Hanoi. But I doubt that we can
definitively contain the guerrilla threat primarily by military means. We can chase the VC and PAVN
around the countryside, maul them when we catch them, and weaken their resolve. Yet without a major
pacification effort to secure the countryside and give Vietnam's war-weary people a sense of hope as
well as security, this military process could be well nigh endless--and infinitely more costly.
We also have to cope with a likely prolongation of the political turmoil of the last few months. The
Buddhist extremists may have been balked for the moment, but we are committed to a democratic
process which--necessary as it is--will create perhaps as much instability in the short run as it offers
hope in the longer run.
This leaves the pacification-social reform side of the equation. I suspect that only through an effort in
this field, more fully complementary to our military effort can we achieve success.
II. The Problem of Scale. So far I haven't said anything new. You and your advisors signed on to the
above in Honolulu. What may be new, however, is my growing conviction that we are not thinking big
enough, or moving fast enough, on the civil side to complement our military effort adequately--or
achieve reasonably quick results.
Some crude comparisons of scale are instructive. We are spending perhaps $15-18 billion on the military
side and only $700-800 million on the civil side. We've deployed about 300,000 troops compared to
about 3,000 civilians. The ARVN contribution is about 700,000 (plus around 80,000 Vietnamese

working for defense construction, etc.) while the GVN civil servants, police, cadre, etc. number on the
order of 250,000. Of course, such gross comparisons are misleading--but they illustrate the basic point.
Moreover, Porter and I have so far concentrated (and I think rightly so) on essential measures to prevent
disaster, and to provide basic building blocks for a future civil effort:
A. Coping with inflation, created largely by our own buildup, was Problem No. 1, because left
unchecked it could undermine the country. With luck, we're on the verge of real success:--(1) if Ky goes
through with devaluation, it will be a major step; (2) if DOD actually limits the local impact of our
buildup to end-FY 1966 levels, we'll at least prevent a whole new inflationary thrust--though we'll still
have the existing one; (3) a variety of steps--including military takeover of Saigon port--should reduce
port and inland distribution bottlenecks so that we can keep supply more in phase with demand.
B. We are also reforming and streamlining the aid program to reduce corruption, increase efficiency, and
meet growing Hill and press criticism.
C. We have underway a doubling of RD cadre output--the most promising rural pacification device--and
are energizing the new Ministry of Revolutionary Development (clearly the best outfit in an otherwise
feeble GVN).
III. Need for an Expanded Effort. But the above is far from enough. We've prevented economic collapse,
and this in itself is good. But we aren't going anywhere fast. If we continue along present lines, and at
the present pace, it may be years before we generate a major positive impact So we've got to think
bigger on the civil side:
A. Even at the accelerated rate, the cadre and RD program will take years to blanket the countryside. It
lags far behind in ability to secure and hold what US and ARVN forces can initially clear. The police
program is also too small and unambitious for its internal security mission.
B. As Orville Freeman will attest, it's incredible that in 11 years in a rural country, even during wartime,
we've accomplished so little in agriculture.
C. Our overall economic aid program is not big enough--or good enough--to permit more than slow
progress. It will only suffice to feed the people, help contain inflation, keep such little industry as exists
going, prevent epidemics, slowly expand basic education. Nonetheless, AID is programming little more
for FY 1967 than for FY 1966. Nor could AID, as presently organized, spend much more efficiently. It
was never set up to run massive logistic, relief, and rural construction programs in a war-torn country
with little infrastructure left, and to do so through a feeble "government" which works fitfully at best.
AID has on board only 2,900 plus of the 3,900 US and local employees called for, and at the present rate
of recruiting won't reach strength for another year or two. Nor is 3,900 probably enough.
In sum, while we've accomplished a good deal since Honolulu, especially in containing inflation, the
rest of civil side is still barely off the ground, and not going anywhere fast.
IV. My Solution. I don't want to argue for grand schemes which can't realistically be achieved in the
short term. But a substantial gearing up of civil programs is (a) essential; (b) can be achieved fairly
quickly by such measures as temporary turnover to our more efficient military of functions AID just
can't do as well ; and (c) would pay greater return per dollar and man invested than almost any other US
investment in Vietnam:

A. Administrative Steps. There is still too much "business as usual" on the civil side, both in
Washington and the field. This will take time to correct; the lead time needed for most "civilian"
enterprises seems to be two or three times longer than it would take our military to do the job. So if we
want quick results, there is no substitute for borrowing from DOD. I'm fortified in this by a strong
suspicion that borrowing say two percent of its Vietnam assets (less than one percent of its manpower)
could give us a much higher percentage of improvement on the civil side. And this would be in the
military's own interest as well as the nation's.
1. So my first proposal is to turn over more civil logistics functions to the military. AID is simply not
geared up to the unfamiliar task of providing at least half the needs of a civil economy in wartime.
Unlike its operations in other countries (where it works through a halfway decent local government and
infrastructure) AID has to do just about everything in Vietnam--from managing the whole import
program, scheduling ships, improving port facilities, and clearing goods to distributing them in-country.
AID has sought to go about this by setting up a roughly parallel logistics organization to that of our
military. But the lead time needed is great and AID is understandably less efficient. Hence my solution
is for our military to provide temporarily as many logistic services as it can do more efficiently by
simple extension of its existing machinery, e.g. take over scheduling of AID shipping, Saigon port, the
bulk of in-country transport, medical supply, etc. Otherwise we just won't get the job done soon enough.
Then, when AID has shaken down it can plan in orderly fashion to take over again later.
2. Strengthen Porter's mandate. Though you put Porter in charge of Vietnam civil programs, he is still
kept far too busy running the Embassy to devote more than part-time to it (Lodge confines himself
mainly to high policy). Porter must be freed to do the civil job--more than enough for any one man--and
get others to run the Embassy. Porter also needs a good chief of staff and more staff of his own, as he's
now coming to realize. At present he has only a part-time Colonel from MACV; its contribution needs
to be upgraded.
3. We need better coordination of the civil and military efforts. We are still running two wars, even
though the military makes a major contribution to the civil side. I may be wrong, but I sense that Westy
may be devoted too much to search and destroy, and not enough to slower moving clear-and-hold
operations, to preventing the siphoning off of civil resources to the VC, and to helping the pacification
effort. Rice control is a good example. The Delta delivered 700,000 tons of rice to the cities in 1963.
This year we expect to get only 260,000 tons. We 're meeting this shocking deficit by importing PL 480
rice--and maybe this is right. But Porter and Westy ought to be working harder on control of this key
resource--for example by pressuring General Quang in IV Crops. At present the Vietnamese economy is
feeding the VC and Cambodia, while we feed the cities.
B. Gearing up the Civil Side. Once we relieve AID of matters it can't handle efficiently, we can get it
focussed better on the problems which only it can manage. Here are the actions I think needed--not
AID's alone--for the purpose:
1. Expansion of RD Ministry Operations. This most promising of the GVN ministries needs more US
support. There are complaints of shortages of men, cement, and concertina wire from the provinces.
Let's ship in more. Let's start planning now for CY 1967--civil agencies rarely plan ahead. And we must
help the GVN strengthen its village and hamlet administration.
2. Further Expansion of Cadre and Police. We have planning exercises underway at least, but they will
entail an argument over civil vs. military use of manpower. My proposal is to have the argument now, in
the shape of discussion of a manpower budget, which will provide a framework for more rational
US/GVN manpower use (and hopefully more manpower for the civil side).

3. Expand the US civil advisory role at district level. We don't really know enough about what's
happening at the cutting edge down in the village or even district. Instead we're dependent on what the
Vietnamese tell us (which is notoriously unreliable). MACV is the only US agency with advisors below
the province (roughly two captains and three sergeants at district headquarters). Of course, these MACV
advisors spend much of their time on pacification matters. But this is not their primary function. So if
we want to expand operations in the critical countryside, and monitor effectively what is done there, we
need people with primary civil side duties at district too. But we can't recruit civilians fast enough for
even the province level vacancies as yet. Once again my solution is quick and dirty--borrow temporarily
from MACV three bright young captains and sergeants to work primarily to pacification in each of the
200 odd districts where our people can now function. This adds up to only about 600, who could be kept
in uniform and supported logistically by MACV just like the other district advisors. Operationally,
however, they'd be under Porter's direction. I'd experiment first with say 10 districts right now--and then
the 26 districts in the National Priority Areas.
4. Porter should also be given clear and unequivocal authority over civilian agency operations in the
regions and provinces. At present he shares this fuzzily with USIA, AID, and CIA. We need a unified
chain of command on the civil side, reaching from Porter's office down to the districts. He should have-and assert--unequivocal control over all USG officials, from whatever agency, assigned to pacification
operations. I would also favor strengthening his organization by giving to each of his Provincial
Representatives a fund of up to $10,000 annually in piasters to be spent, subject to Porter's approval, on
small-scale projects of high political impact where speed and flexibility are crucial for effectiveness
(such a plan worked well in African countries where rural problems are similar).
5. Step up our agricultural effort. Freeman's program may contain too much now, but AID's has too little
for the peasant in this agricultural country. The program needs better direction, agricultural experts at
provincial and district levels, a systematic effort to develop a local seed industry, expanded fertilizer
distribution, and a stepped-up animal husbandry effort. Both Freeman and Gardener have also urged a
broad-scale approach to irrigation, drainage, flood control, and rural water supply systems. We should at
least make a beginning, though local security is a prerequisite.
6. Forestry. We are exporting lumber, which is in tight US supply, to Vietnam at exorbitant prices while
forest reserves there are untapped and saw mills are operating at 40% capacity. Help to this industry is in
Vietnam's interest and our own. Local security is the hooker, so let's get Westy in the act.
7. Defector Programs (Chieu Hoi) have had a tremendous pay-off for a peanut US contribution ($
700,000 this year). The program is now deteriorating instead of building up. It needs new direction, and
better backing than AID is now giving it. Here again I'd borrow some MACV bodies.
8. Reaching the very young VC. You urged at Honolulu that a psy-ops plan be developed to reach the
VC age group in the 9 to 15 year old bracket. Little has been done to counter the long VC lead with this
group. I'd like to get a small group of real experts onto this.
9. Resource Control and Economic Warfare. We're not doing enough of either, largely because it falls
between stools (CIA, MACV, AID). Surely we ought to be able to outbid Cambodia for rice. Keeping
rice and aid commodities from being diverted to the VC ought to have a substantial pay-off at relatively
modest cost. More Mission, MACV, and AID support and enthusiasm is the key.
D. Doing the Above will take More Money as well as More Bodies. Once again, the way to get an
immediate add-on is from a man who'll take decisions--Bob McNamara. AID is thinking only in terms
of $650-700 million for Vietnam in FY 1967 (including about $100 million in PL 480), at most $50

million more than the $640 million programmed for FY 1966. But we are already considering $63-116
million more in add-ons, plus considerable dollar purchase of piasters. While I can't quantify yet all the
further proposals I've made above, I'm thinking for forward planning purposes in terms of at least $200
million more in FY 1967 than FY 1966.
One way to get the money is a supplemental--if DOD goes for one in January, we could tack AID on. If
DOD doesn't, however, I'd be dubious of AID's chances. AID is already trying to cut some $80 million
of over-commitments in FY 1966 programs, and has no stomach for a new round of hearings before
Fulbright et al. Another solution is to cut AID programs elsewhere. But these are already pared and will
probably have to be pared some more to absorb Hill cuts. Nor do we want to rob Peter to pay Paul.
So the only quick answer (at least to carry us till a supplemental) is to bury a good chunk of the civil
programs in the DOD and CIA budgets (the latter for RD cadre costs). My principle would be to have
DOD itself pay for (instead of being reimbursed) all that it provides to the civil side. At a rough guess
this might be on the order of $100-150 million ($25 million for operating Saigon port, $18-23 million
for cadre and police ammo and ordnance, $20-40 million for medical supplies, $10-15 million for incountry airlift, $17 million for mothball ships, etc.) DOD is already providing major help to the civil
side on a non-reimbursable basis--but it might be easier all around to hide another $100 million or so in
a budget so big it could hardly be found.
E. Conclusion. The above civil program is still painfully imprecise. It also ignores the gut issue of how
to get a feeble GVN to play ball. But at least it starts us going somewhere, with a sense of urgency
comparable to our military effort, at a piddling fraction of its cost. I believe that up to $200 million more
so spent--even wastefully--would still pay more return per dollar than the same $200 million spent in
any other way. And it will suffice to galvanize the civil side--which otherwise will limp along as
primarily an anti-inflationary dole without making any contribution positive enough, quickly enough to
complement properly our military push.
My program is not dramatic--but it will help win the war.
R. W. Komer
156. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson/1/
Washington, June 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 6.
Top Secret; Personal; Exdis. The message was drafted by Rusk, reviewed by the President, and redrafted
by Rusk and Rostow in light of the President's instructions. Rostow informed Read in a June 14
memorandum that the message had been sent that day and that an information copy had gone to
McNamara. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Dean Rusk has told me of his private talk with you about the problem of POL in Haiphong and
Hanoi./2/ Specific orders have not yet been issued but I see no way of avoiding such action, given the
expansion of the illegal corridor through Laos, the continuing buildup of North Vietnamese forces in
South Viet Nam, the growing abuse of Cambodian neutrality, and the absence of any indication in Hanoi
of a serious interest in peace.
/2/Rusk met with Wilson in London on June 10.

We expect costly fighting during the Monsoon season, the first engagements of which have undoubtedly
come to your attention. I must do what I can to reduce our casualties at the hands of those who are
moving in from the north.
I deeply hope that you will find a way to maintain solidarity with us on Viet-Nam despite what you have
said in the House of Commons about Haiphong and Hanoi./3/ We are not talking about an air assault on
civilian centers but a specific attack on POL installations with a direct relevance to the fighting in the
south. I hope that you can give further thought to your own interests and commitments in Southeast Asia
under the SEATO Treaty. Dean tells me that, in his talk with you and your colleagues, several references
were made to the "revival of SEATO." South Viet Nam and five signatories of SEATO are not talking
about a revival but are committing troops to repel an armed attack from the north. Nor do I believe that
your role as co-chairman means that Britain should stand aside; the other co-chairman is furnishing large
quantities of sophisticated arms and other assistance to North Viet Nam and is, therefore, an active
partner in the effort to take over South Viet Nam by force.
/3/In telegram 5768 from London, June 2, Bruce reported that on February 8 Wilson stated in the House
of Commons: "We have made it clear in Washington that we could not support any extension of the
bombing against North Vietnam by stages to Hanoi and Haiphong." (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
I know that you have some problems about Viet Nam, as do I. But I believe that it is sound for us to base
our policy on the simple principles of the Geneva Accords and the SEATO Treaty, and on the
assumption that North Viet Nam will not be permitted to seize South Viet Nam. Since we are
determined about the latter point, much of the present criticism will come right at the end of the day.
I gather Dean spoke to you of the possible combination of points which would put a different cast upon
disassociation by you from a decision to strike the POL. Quite frankly, I earnestly hope that you will not
find it necessary to speak in terms of disassociation. But it would be important to us if you could include
the following elements:
1. You were informed of the possibility that such an action would, in our minds, become necessary.
2. You expressed your own views to us in accordance with statements which you have already made in
the House of Commons.
3. The particular step taken by U.S. forces was directed specifically to POL storage and not against
civilian centers or installations.
4. Since Britain does not have troops engaged in the fighting, it is not easy or appropriate for Britain to
determine the particular military action which may be necessary under different circumstances.
5. It is a great pity that Hanoi and Peiping have been so unresponsive to unprecedented efforts by the
U.S. and others to bring this problem from the battlefield to the conference table.
6. Britain is satisfied that U.S. forces have no designs against civilian populations and are taking every
possible precaution to avoid civilian casualties.
7. Britain as a member of SEATO fully understands and supports the determination of its fellow SEATO
members to insure the safety and the self-determination of South Viet Nam.

I would hope that you could in this context affirm your support for the effort in Viet Nam and your
understanding that it is Hanoi which is blocking the path to peace.
The timing of a visit to Washington is somewhat complicated. You and I agree that there should be a
good deal of blue sky between your visit and possible action in Viet Nam. That alone would suggest that
the month of June is out, as we now look at the calendar of events. When we get into July, I shall expect
to be away for almost a full week surrounding July 4th. You have Pompidou's visit on July 6-8 and your
possible visit to Moscow on July 9-10. I have just suggested to President Senghor that he come here July
11-13.
It appears, therefore, anything before mid-July is blocked by our respective calendars.
If you feel a talk at that time is essential, we can say now that we expect it to be held in mid- or late July,
leaving the precise dates open for further determination. In response to questions as to why you are
coming, perhaps we both should simply say that we have felt occasional talks to be worthwhile and that
a number of matters of mutual interest could be usefully discussed, and that mid-July appears to be a
mutually convenient time.
I was much interested in what Dean told me of your talks about Rhodesia and the maritime strike. You
have my best wishes in bringing both of these troublesome matters to an early conclusion.
157. Memorandum From William N. Morell, Jr., of the Central Intelligence Agency to the
President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, June 15, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 7.
Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The memorandum and attachment were forwarded to the
President on June 16.
SUBJECT
An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in North Vietnam
1. The attached report represents a comprehensive research effort by this Agency and DIA on the effects
of Rolling Thunder attack against North Vietnam in 1965, and will, I believe, be of interest to you.
2. Although the Rolling Thunder program flew many thousands of attack sorties against military and
economic targets, the resultant damage was relatively light, in good measure reflecting the restricted
nature of the air campaign. North Vietnam reacted vigorously to restore transport facilities essential to
maintaining the flow of supplies to the insurgency in South Vietnam. The toll in human casualties, based
on fragmentary sample data, is estimated to have been between 11,700 and 14,800, divided about
equally between dead and wounded, with a somewhat higher percentage of military as compared to
civilian casualties.
3. The major effect of the attack has been to force Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal economic
activity and to divert manpower in significant numbers to war supporting activities. North Vietnam may
now require 200,000 full-time workers (or about 10 percent of the non-agriculture labor force) for tasks
associated with dispersal and emergency repair and maintenance, and the part-time work of another
100,000.

Bill Morell
DirectorResearch and Reports
Attachment
Intelligence Report/2/
Washington, June 1, 1966.
/2/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 H (1), Appraisal of
Bombing of NVN-CIA/DIA. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Prepared by the CIA and DIA.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTS OF THE FIRST YEAR OF BOMBING IN NORTH
VIETNAM/3/
/3/Covering the period from 2 March through 31 December 1965. [Footnote in the source text.]
Summary
The Rolling Thunder program, a systematic but restrained air offensive against selected economic and
military targets in North Vietnam, was begun on 2 March 1965. The basic objectives of the air attacks
on North Vietnam have been made clear in public statements by the President and other high officials of
the US Government. These objectives are (a) to reduce the ability of North Vietnam to support the
Communist insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos; (b) to increase progressively the pressure on North
Vietnam to the point where the regime would decide it was too costly to continue directing and
supporting the insurgency in the South; and (c) to bolster the confidence and morale of the South
Vietnamese.
The US and South Vietnamese air campaign against North Vietnam has been a carefully controlled
means of gradual escalation to achieve strictly limited objectives. Consequently, the program has
operated under a set of firmly defined ground rules which have limited both the choice of targets and the
areas to be bombed. The existence of large restricted areas has effectively insulated almost 80 percent of
North Vietnam's limited modern industrial economy from air attack; these areas contain 75 percent of
the nation's population and the most lucrative military supply and LOC targets.
The estimated dollar cost for the restoration of economic and military targets attacked in the Rolling
Thunder campaign is less than 10 percent of the value of the economic aid given to North Vietnam in
recent years by Communist countries.
Restoration Costs of Facilities Attacked by the Rolling Thunder Program
Million US $
Attacks on fixed targets
Economic, 23.6
Military, 26.4
Total, 50

Armed reconnaissance missions

Economic, 12.8
Military, 0.7
Total, 13
Total
Economic, 36
Military, 27
Total, 63
About 57 percent of the total damage--$36 million--is attributable to the destruction of economic targets.
This cost has been broadly distributed throughout the economic sector, and no one sector has been
forced to bear unacceptably high levels of damage. In terms of national capacity the greatest damage
was inflicted on electric power and petroleum storage facilities. These target systems lost 27 and 17
percent, respectively, of their national capacity. In each case, however, the target system has adequate
cushion in the form of excess capacity to absorb these attacks, and economic activity could therefore be
maintained at almost normal levels.
The damage to military facilities is just over $ 27 million. Almost 60 percent of this damage was to
military barracks, but the effect has been negligible. The damage to military targets has shown a definite
downward trend since the peak month of July 1965.
The damage to military facilities not only has resulted in losses of equipment but also has prompted the
abandonment of installations such as airfields and the dispersal of equipment and supplies normally
stored in ammunition and supply depots.
The United States has placed restrictions on the air offensive against North Vietnam in order to
minimize civilian casualties. It has been to North Vietnam's interest to assert otherwise, however, and
propaganda media attempt to give the impression that the air offensive has been a vicious and
unrestrained assault on the civilian population, hospitals, schools, and other nonmilitary objectives.
Nevertheless, in only one instance have Hanoi officials presumed to provide a total for the number of
casualties. In September, Egyptian journalists were told that total casualties were 75,000, including
40,000 killed and 35,000 wounded. No procedures devised in this report for the purpose of estimating
casualties can support a figure of this magnitude.
Although the Rolling Thunder program has flown many thousands of attack sorties against targets in
North Vietnam, the toll in human casualties has been light. Based on sample data, through the end of
1965, North Vietnamese casualties--both civilian and military--are estimated to have ranged from
11,700 to 14,800, divided about equally between killed and wounded.
Estimated Casualties Resulting from Rolling Thunder
Attacks on fixed targets

Military, 3,900 to 4,700

Civilian, 1,700 to 2,400
Total, 6,500 to l7,900
Armed reconnaissance missions,
Military, 2,600 to 3,200
Civilian, 3,500 to 4,500
Total, 6,100 to 7,700
Total
Military, 6,500 to 7,900
Civilian, 5,200 to 6,900
Total, 11,700 to 14,800
About 55 percent of these casualties were military personnel. The civilians killed or injured by armed
reconnaissance attacks were for the most part truck drivers or transport and construction workers rather
directly engaged in maintaining the logistic pipeline to South Vietnam.
Approximately 3,000 civilian deaths (one-half of total civilian casualties) as a result of military action
against North Vietnam is a small number. The impact of 3,000 civilian casualties is slight in a country
where over 350,000 persons died in 1965 from other causes and where the accidental deaths alone
produced casualties some three to five times greater than those resulting from the Rolling Thunder
program.
The economic and military damage sustained has presented an increasing but still moderate bill to
Hanoi, which in large measure can be (and has been) passed along to Moscow and Peiping.
The major effect of the attack on North Vietnam has been to force Hanoi to cope with disruption to
normal economic activity, particularly in transportation and distribution. Reconstruction efforts have
been hampered by difficulties in allocating manpower. The regime has relocated large elements of its
urban population. Problems in the distribution of food have appeared, although these problems are not
yet pressing. Where the bombing has hurt most has been in its disruption of the road and rail nets and in
the very considerable repair effort which became necessary. On the other hand, the regime has been
singularly successful in overcoming US interdiction efforts.
An examination of destroyed and damaged facilities shows that only a small number were truly essential
to the war effort. The major essential restoration has consisted of measures to keep traffic moving, to
keep the railroad yards operating, to maintain communications, and to replace transport equipment and
equipment for radar and SAM sites. These measures have probably been effected at a cost of between $4
million and $5 million, or between 5 and 10 percent of the total economic and military damage sustained
in North Vietnam to date.

The ability to react and to offset the effects of the air attacks has not been without its costs. It is
estimated that the diversion of manpower to tasks associated with dispersal programs and emergency
repair and maintenance of lines of communication throughout North Vietnam may now require the fulltime services of 200,000 workers (equivalent to about 10 percent of the nonagricultural labor force) and
the part-time impressment of another 100,000. An additional 150,000 people are also obligated, on a
part-time basis, to serve in various aspects of civil defense which take them away from their normal
pursuits. Thus a significant share of the labor force is diverted in varying degrees to supporting the war
in the South. The diversion of labor has been supplemented, particularly in the northern provinces, by
Chinese logistic support troops.
In response to the intensified US and Vietnamese air offensive in 1965, all countries of the Communist
camp have extended economic assistance as proof of their support. Total assistance extended by China
and the USSR in 1965 is on the order of $250 million to $400 million, of which military aid accounted
for $150 million to $200 million. This aid is a relatively insignificant drain on the capabilities of both
countries.
The USSR is by far the major source of military equipment for North Vietnam, supplying 70 to 95
percent, or $142 million, of the total provided in 1965. The major components of Soviet military aid
were SAM sites (15 to 20), antiaircraft guns (1,000 to 1,200), planes (44), motor vehicles (2,600), radar,
and jet fuel. China's identified military aid, totaling only $11 million, consisted principally of planes (8)
and trucks (1,400). In addition, large amounts of infantry weapons and ammunition are provided by
Communist China. The inclusion of the cost of this equipment would probably raise the value of China's
total contribution by a few million dollars. Military aid from the Eastern European Communist
countries--consisting principally of small arms and ammunition, medicines and medical equipment, and
some trucks--is valued at only a few million dollars.
[Here follows the body of the 146-page report.]
158. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to the President's Special Assistant
(Rostow)/1/
Saigon, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LV. Secret. Lodge
forwarded the memorandum to Rostow under cover of a memorandum dated June 17. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
General Taylor's Memorandum for the President of April 27, 1966, entitled "Assessment and Use of
Negotiation Blue Chips,"/2/ concerning which you asked my opinion
/2/Document 127.
1. Your attention is first invited to:
a. Saigon's 1377 of October 21, 1965,/3/ notably to suggestion for an opening negotiating position and
for definition of a "Satisfactory Outcome";
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 470-473.
b. Letter to Leonard Unger of November 30, 1965,/4/ commenting on the State Department paper, "A

Settlement in Vietnam" dated November 3, 1965;/5/ which includes

/4/Not found.
/5/Not found, but see footnote 7, Document 115, regarding a later version of this paper.
c. a paper by me entitled, "Negotiating with the Communists" (based on experience at the UN and study
of negotiations elsewhere);/6/
/6/Attached but not printed. Lodge sent a copy of this undated memorandum to the President on January
17, 1966. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 212, Negotiation)
d. Saigon's 2343 of January 1, 1966;/7/
/7/Document 1.
e. Saigon's 2376 of January 4, 1966./8/
/8/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
2. General Taylor's paper is of great value and he is to be congratulated on it. There are some
observations of his which are particularly wise. They should be a guide to anyone who represents the
United States at a negotiation and are as follows:
a. The initiation of discussions does not mean the advent of peace. Probably more people were killed
after the Panmunjom talks started than would have been killed had we kept the military initiative.
b. There must be an incentive for the enemy to come to a prompt settlement. Without such an incentive
the talks could drag on indefinitely. Therefore, military pressure must be maintained while the talks are
taking place.
c. The bombing must not be stopped without a quid pro quo. To do so solely for the purpose of getting
talks going would seriously prejudice the success of any subsequent negotiations.
d. Moreover, we should never give up any one of our assets in advance as a precondition for discussions.
We should only concede one step at a time.
e. Orthodox troop withdrawals, such as the US can make, are very easy to verify. Infiltration on the
communist model is so elusive that an effective detection system of a "ceasefire" is not feasible.
f. There should be an analysis by competent experts in Washington as to how our assets should be
played.
3. In his last paragraph, at the bottom of page 3, General Taylor affirms that the United States must
never give up any of its assets without achieving an equivalent gain. I agree emphatically. He also says
that his specific "estimate of assets and values may be challenged," which I take as a gracious invitation
to comment--and possibly to suggest variants--on his assessment of the "blue chips." In this spirit I make
the following observations:
4. The Essence of the Taylor Proposal

a. General Taylor proposes for the first phase of diplomatic negotiations that, in exchange for the US
stopping its bombing and its offensive military operations in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong stop their
incidents and their military operations.
b. For the second stage, the US would stop its force increase and the Viet Cong would cease its
infiltration.
c. After this, would come withdrawal by the Viet Cong and by the US and dissolution of the Viet Cong
(which the Viet Cong would agree to). In exchange, the GVN would give amnesty and civic rights to the
Viet Cong.
d. General Taylor adds that if the Viet Cong performance is bad as regards cessation of military
operations, we can resume bombing.
e. He also says that under his plan the US and GVN would retain the right to use weapons to protect the
civil population outside of the Viet Cong territory.
5. My General Comment on the Taylor Proposal
a. General Taylor, in effect, proposes a general ceasefire as a substitute for unilateral ending of United
States bombing.
b. If this becomes our policy, we should never reveal the fact publicly because the pressure of so-called
world opinion would probably force us to stop the bombing first, after which we would be committed to
a general ceasefire. Then, when we came to working out the all-important specific provisions of a
ceasefire, we would be without some very valuable bargaining power.
c. I also question whether we could readily resume bombing if the Viet Cong performance is bad, given
the influence of organized propaganda against the bombings. Whether we like it or not, bombing the
North is in a special propaganda category. But we could, to be sure, resume operation on the ground.
6. My Comment on the Substance of the Taylor Proposal Regarding "Blue Chips"
a. The Taylor proposal does not reach terrorism in the Viet Cong areas, even though it does enable us
and the GVN to retain the right to use weapons to protect the civil population outside of the Viet Cong
territory.
b. But it is very difficult to define Viet Cong areas geographically and this makes it equally difficult, if
not impossible, to define prohibited US-GVN "offensive" military operations therein. This would lead to
continual charges that we are violating the ceasefire. For example, many large segments of the
countryside are "controlled" by whichever side happens to be physically present at any given time. With
a ceasefire, would we be able to use arms to protect the people in such areas from the VC? Other
extensive areas of the countryside are controlled by the GVN by day and the VC by night. Would
friendly forces be able to patrol such areas at night? Could GVN officials stay in rural areas at night with
impunity from the VC? These considerations call into question the practicability of arranging a ceasefire
in isolation from a more general political settlement.
c. Whatever steps we might take to protect ourselves after the "ceasefire" was in effect would put us in
clear violation of the ceasefire.

d. On the other hand, the Viet Cong method of operation, being unorthodox from a western military
viewpoint, makes it easy for them to keep below the threshold of the proposed "ceasefire" agreement.
The term "ceasefire" cannot reasonably apply to such things as sabotage, assassination, terrorism,
propaganda, impressment, kidnapping, torture, subversive action, VC tax collection, infiltration from the
north, and direction of strategy and tactics. None of these things necessarily involve the use of firearms.
e. In the areas now embracing about 25 per cent of the population and which are presently controlled by
the Viet Cong, the forces of law and order would thus be prevented from using weapons, but the Viet
Cong would be free to go on using the methods which they traditionally use.
f. A general ceasefire would legitimize Viet Cong areas, thereby leading to partition or to irresistible
demands for a coalition government.
g. To end the military pressures against presently hard-pressed Viet Cong units, as a ceasefire would do,
would also enable them to regroup and launch operations later under more favorable conditions, as
happened very often in the Chinese civil war.
h. If a ceasefire permits unimpeded access by the government to the entire country it will be
unacceptable to the Viet Cong, but we would be committed to a ceasefire without a political settlement.
i. If a ceasefire leads to the recognition of Viet Cong safe areas, a political outcome will have, in effect,
been imposed by the formalities of the ceasefire.
7. My Alternative Proposal
a. Instead of linking the cessation of bombing to a cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military
operations, I would rather link the bombing to stopping infiltration by North Vietnam into the South and
to an agreement to establish control posts along the Ho Chi Minh trail and along both sides of the
Vietnamese-Laotian and Vietnamese-Cambodian borders.
b. This has the advantage that it would not be necessary for Hanoi to admit that it has infiltrated. Hanoi
could maintain a public posture of non-intervention and control posts could be established without loss
of face.
c. Also, this scheme has the advantage of relating the end of bombing to the interdiction of supplies--a
logical thing to do since the purpose of bombing is precisely to interdict supplies. For Hanoi publicly to
fore- swear infiltration would be a heavy blow to the morale of the Viet Cong. It would enable us to
continue the bombing until a satisfactory inspection mechanism is worked out. The issue of a general
ceasefire could be left to the general political settlement, where it belongs.
d. I recognize that General Taylor doubts the feasibility of an effective detection system for infiltration.
Concerning this very important objection, I make two observations: A. It should be promptly studied by
the best experts we have; and B. We should, under my proposal, continue bombing while a detection
system was being worked out--assuming that such a system was not ready when negotiations began.
8. Probable Consequences
a. My trade looks somewhat less dramatic than General Taylor's, but I wonder whether it would not put
us in a stronger position.

b. If Hanoi refuses to cease infiltration--or to establish control posts to verify that it is not infiltrating--it
will be in a difficult position to mobilize world opinion against an end of the bombing.
c. Also, my proposal would not force us to stop military operations in the South during negotiations. We
would thus remain in a position to maintain maximum incentives for a flexible communist attitude.
d. Also, the trade which I propose would enable us to tie a "cease-fire" to a political settlement or at least
to the outlines of it. And "cease-fire," as regards the Viet Cong, is much more political than military.
9. "Satisfactory Outcome"
a. I renew my recommendation that we be clear in our minds as to what constitutes a "satisfactory
outcome." Without a dependable stand-ard of measurement we run the risk of yielding to the pressures
of the moment to such an extent that we actually find that, immediately upon the conclusion of the
negotiations, we have lost the war and thus all that we have fought and sacrificed for. See Saigon's 1377.
b. The negotiator must not be made to feel that if the negotiations break down, he has failed. I have
known negotiations at the UN where on three separate occasions the US representative said in effect that
he was being asked to make such impossible concessions that there was no point in continuing the
conversation--and left the room. Yet an excellent understanding finally resulted. The other side was
simply trying to see how far we could be pushed.
159. Summary Notes of the 559th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, June 17, 1966, 6:05-8 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted
by Bromley Smith.
Vietnam--POL
The President summarized the actions required and the judgments which will have to be made in the
next several weeks, emphasizing the decision to strike POL targets.
In general, we should seek, with minimum loss and minimum danger of escalating the war, to achieve
the maximum effect on the North Vietnamese. We know that the North Vietnamese are dispersing their
POL stocks in an effort to anticipate our bombing. The effect of not disrupting POL shipments to the
North Vietnamese forces in the field is to pay a higher price in U.S. casualties. The choice is one of
military lives vs. escalation.
A decision on bombing is not being made now and one is not imminent. The reasons for our delay
include: the Secretary was at the NATO meeting,/2/ Canadian representative Ronning was visiting
Hanoi,/3/ time was required to talk to Prime Minister Wilson and our allies, and some sounds have come
from Hanoi. Every bit of information is needed in reaching a decision.
/2/Rusk was in Europe May 31-June 10. He attended the NATO Ministerial Meeting June 3-8 and then
met with Prime Minister Wilson in London.
/3/Ronning met with DRV officials in Hanoi June 14-17.

There is no uncertainty about my willingness to use the authority which is the President's.
There must be no discussion of this meeting. Everyone present can be trusted but we must be careful
about talking to the press or even to staff members who might talk to the press. The highest security
must be maintained.
Secretary Rusk: We have an elementary obligation to support our combat troops when they are carrying
out an assignment. The American people have a feeling of impatience and, over time, they may demand
a quick end to the war as the price for their continued support. This restlessness is evident in the public
opinion polls. Opinion abroad hopes that no larger military measures will be necessary. It is difficult to
separate in the minds of people attacks on POL supplies from attacks on the civilian economy. There is a
major difference between a 2- to 3-day strike and strikes continuing over a long period. We are under
constant observation by everyone abroad. We must get across to the public that if we widen the bombing
program to include POL targets that this does not mean a change in our policy of making every effort to
avoid killing civilians.
Many people who have no responsibility for the conduct of the war oppose a wider bombing program.
As early as we can we must get a check on whether the Ronning mission to Hanoi produced any change
in the North Vietnamese position. Mr. Ronning is reporting only to Canadian Foreign Minister Martin.
He declined to tell our Charge in Vientiane whether the Hanoi leaders told him anything new./4/
/4/Regarding the results of Ronning's visit, see Document 161.
The President: We must get the news fastest about the Ronning mission.
Secretary Rusk: Prior to executing any new orders on bombing, we must give 24-hour advance notice to
several Heads of State, including Korea, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia, and the UK.
If the decision is negative, we have no problem. A go decision will produce sharp reactions throughout
the world. There probably will be attacks on our Embassies. The reaction will be less if a decision is
limited to a short, sharp action.
We must try to bring Hanoi to a decision. There is no evidence of their willingness to talk now. We
cannot guarantee what the Chinese Communist reaction will be. Our guess is that there will be no
military reaction from the Chinese Communists or the Soviets. There will be many problems in the UN.
Secretary McNamara: Strikes on POL targets have been opposed by me for months. The situation is now
changing and the earlier bombing decision must be reconsidered. POL targets are military targets. The
military utilization of these targets has been greatly increased. The North Vietnamese dispersion of their
POL is lessening our chance of ever destroying their POL supplies. Military infiltration from the north is
up sharply. Consequently, the pressure on their lines of communication has increased. Their POL
imports have doubled. The military importance of their POL system is way up and will increase further.
The reasons for attacking POL targets are:
1. Our guess is that such attacks will limit infiltration from North Vietnam.
2. Those North Vietnamese troops in the south will worry about their source of supplies.
3. Pressure will be exerted on the political leaders in Hanoi. This bombing program seems to be the least

costly way to tell them of our serious intentions.

The reason against the POL bombing program is that it moves us further away from a termination of the
war, thus costing more U.S. lives.
General Johnson: The number of Vietnamese trucks has jumped from 6,900 to 10,000. Approximately
2,600 are en route to South Vietnam. All need fuel to operate. North Vietnamese POL imports are up
from 900 to 23,000 tons.
The President: What is coming in the next few weeks or the next 60 days?
General Johnson: The North Vietnamese will reinforce the military power they now have and make a
drive into central Vietnam--possibly even further south. Hitting the POL targets will hurt them in
moving rice and weapons to replace those we have captured. They have to step up the rate of supplies
from the north to the south.
We will lose 3 to 4-1/2 percent of planes used on these missions. (Secretary McNamara interrupted to
say this amounted to 20-25 planes.) More U.S. troops will be lost on the ground in the same time period
than will be lost in the air strikes.
The off-loading capacity of the North Vietnamese in the port of Haiphong would be struck. However,
the Chiefs' view is that POL targets should be hit as a first priority. These attacks might play a
significant part in bringing the war to a halt. If the POL targets are hit, the North Vietnamese will have
to find alternative ways of delivering POL. Meanwhile, the dispersion of their petroleum supplies is
continuing.
Secretary McNamara: Already we have identified 70-80 POL dispersal points. POL tanks are being put
underground and more POL is being stored in small tanks. Existing large tank farms would be
destroyed.
The value to us of the destruction of their oil supplies has greatly increased.
Following are the risks:
a. Civilian casualties would be very small. The estimate is for 50 casualties in the three prime targets. If,
as is possible, our bombs miss their primary targets, we will undoubtedly hurt our cause. The casualty
figure could go as high as 12,000. Six thousand of these would be civilians and of the civilians, three
thousand would be killed. The casualties caused if the bombs land on-target would be less than those
which would occur on targets now authorized to be struck. Our operation orders to our commanders are
to minimize civilian casualties by being certain of their targets, i.e., positive identification, visual
bombing, etc. We have made clear our views to Admiral Sharp regarding civilian casualties.
b. As to the military reaction to the widened bombing, every expert says the risk of this is small.
c. If we do not widen our bombing, the morale of U.S. troops and of the American people will suffer.
People will say: If you consider a POL target a military target, why do you not strike it?
d. The risk of hitting a Russian or foreign ship in a North Vietnamese harbor is very small.
The President: Have we hit targets deeper into North Vietnam and nearer to civilian centers? There will

be a psychological reaction because our bombing will be nearer to the center of cities.
Secretary McNamara: The POL bombing program would hit areas further north and nearer civilian
centers.
Secretary Rusk: The cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, rightly or wrongly, are symbolic. Although we have
hit oil storage areas in the city of Vinh, the reaction would be different if targets in Hanoi and Haiphong
were struck.
Walt Rostow: The military and political payoff of a strike on the POL targets hinges on the success of
the effort. We will never be able to get them all.
Secretary McNamara: We probably cannot do the job in one strike and would have to go back at least
once. We do not know how quickly they would be able to restore the oil storage facilities, but we doubt
that frequent strikes would be necessary to prevent rebuilding.
Mr. Rostow: Striking the POL targets is an extension of our bombing program, not a change in our
policy. We have been attacking their LOCs. Because of our restraint, the North Vietnamese have
changed their military planning to take advantage of our existing target system.
Ambassador Goldberg: Have we previously struck at the civilian economy as we would be doing if we
destroyed their supply of oil?
General Johnson: We estimate that 60 percent of POL is used by the military.
Mr. Rostow: Our bombing program is forcing the North Vietnamese to divert laborers to the repair of
roads and bridges. Our policy should remain steady and our actions should be cool and professional. We
should not be on the defensive. Our military effort is based on the violation of the Geneva Accords by
the North Vietnamese.
Ambassador Goldberg: The risk of widening the bombing program to attack POL targets is too great.
The results will not be what we think. All of us want to save U.S. lives but will such air attacks achieve
this objective?/5/
/5/In a June 16 memorandum to the President, Rostow stated that, at the President's instruction, he had
met the day before with Goldberg on the issue of POL strikes and had "marched carefully through all the
considerations." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow,
vol. 6)
The Chinese and Soviet reactions to the headlines reporting the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong will be
a challenge to them to give all aid necessary to make up the loss. The Chinese Communists as well as
the Soviets will not sit by. At the very least they will replace the petroleum and the facilities destroyed.
The Communist bloc is not going to let this outfit go down the drain. They see the Vietnam war as a
confrontation. With minimum risk, they can make up for the damage we do to the North Vietnamese
petroleum supplies. In addition, the world reaction would be strongly adverse--even Canada would
oppose our action.
During the President's absence from the meeting, Secretary McNamara estimated the probability of
missing our targets as slight. This remark was in response to the Vice President calling attention to our

having missed Mu Ghia pass on an earlier air strike. Added that a high level of damage was assured if
we bombed the POL targets. He acknowledged that more than one strike would be necessary to do the
job.
When the President returned to the room, Ambassador Goldberg said that the maximum military risk is
that Chinese Communists will move in troops. The decision to bomb POL will mean that we will be
isolating ourselves internationally. If we lose Canada and Japan as a result of these strikes, we will lose
the Chinese representation issue in the UN.
The domestic reaction will be very adverse if we strike these POL targets and then this act does not end
the war. The reaction domestically will be to demand stronger military action by the President. The
country's mood will turn at election time if the war is still going on. The American people are supporting
the President because he is cool and reserved. My judgment is based not on an interpretation of the polls
but on my travelling about the country. We must delay at least until after the Ronning peace effort is
safely out of the way so that if we take additional action, Mr. Ronning will be unable to say that we got
a peace feeler in Hanoi and wrecked it.
The President: No one has been reckless. Had we been, we would have struck these targets already.
The Vice President: We have been up and down this hill many times. If we authorize these strikes, our
action will be considered and looked upon as a change in policy even though it isn't. The action will
complicate our problems in the UN and in Europe. We should wait until Ronning is out of the way. If
the air strike is done cleanly, there will be less reaction. The North Vietnamese will not come to a
conference table but will slowly withdraw. We should keep up the punishment we are inflicting on
North Vietnam while seeking peace.
It would be a catastrophe if a Soviet ship were hit and if Soviet personnel were killed.
I have come around reluctantly to accepting the wider bombing program. Not to attack the POL targets
would be to contribute to North Vietnamese strength. The strikes will complicate their logistic problem
and exert pressure on Hanoi. As to the political consequences, it will play hell. But we should go ahead
with the additional strikes, exercising precautions.
Secretary McNamara responded to the President's question by saying that every precaution to avoid
civilian casualties had been taken. He again summarized the limitations placed on the pilots carrying out
the air strikes.
Secretary Fowler: We should recall the Korean experience where we failed to strike military targets
because of geographic limitations and where we failed to use our predominant military power.
a. Operational judgment on the strikes should weigh heavily with us. It is a most persuasive case which
has been made. (Secretary McNamara added that the military advice was unanimous and very strong in
favor of the strikes.)
b. We need to accelerate progress toward ending the heavy fighting in South Vietnam. The only way
open to us now is to weaken Hanoi.
c. Time is important because the North Vietnamese are dispersing their storage of petroleum.
We should move ahead.

Assistant Secretary of State Bundy: Ambassador Reischauer rather surprisingly said that he believed we
could put up with the Japanese reaction which he thought would be steep but supportable. This view is
different than that stated by Ambassador Goldberg as to the effect on Japan.
The recent meeting of our Ambassadors in Asia recommended that we undertake the expanded bombing
program.
CIA Director Raborn: We estimate that the Japanese reaction will not basically affect our relations with
Japan. As to the Chinese Communist reaction, we think that by no means would they invade. It is very
difficult for them to move into Vietnam and to support troops there. As to Soviet reaction, it will be
vigorous and sharp and might involve their moving oil ashore by emergency means.
We should recognize that this is not a one-shot operation. These targets will be a cause of continuing
concern. If we took out the two major targets, there would be a terrific effect, but not overnight, on the
confidence of the North Vietnamese troops.
We learned in World War II that we should step up pressure when the enemy shows signs of weakness.
USIA Director Marks: We should not decide this question on the basis of world opinion but rather on a
military basis. We have created our own problem in part by developing what have become sacred cows.
We should make a statement concerning the importance of oil off-loading facilities to the North
Vietnamese military effort. We should ride out the reaction rather than take to the TV.
Director Raborn: No statement as to our plans should be made because to make public our intentions
would result in the loss of more U.S. planes.
Secretary Rusk: If we make any mention of our intention to strike POL targets, we will have given the
other side preventive warning time.
The President: In order not to be lobbied on the decision, not another soul should be informed of this
discussion.
Deputy CIA Director Helms: The petroleum supplies are feeding the meat grinder in South Vietnam and
this North Vietnamese military effort will continue unless we take out their petroleum supplies.
General Johnson: Must we tell all our allies in advance?
The President: This is very worrisome. The fewest number of allies should be told on the shortest
possible notice.
Bill Moyers: We should be clear about what we say to the public. We should not oversell what we
expect to accomplish. We should keep in mind what the increased bombing program will do as well as
what it will not do. As to what it will do, we should stress the increasing burden and the cost of the war
to Hanoi.
Secretary McNamara: The reality is that we are not going to get all of the petroleum supplies but the
effect on the North Vietnamese will be to hoard the reduced petroleum supplies which remain.
Bill Moyers: No statement should be made to the public saying that we acted to shorten the war. If the
air strike does not shorten the war, then later people will say we misled them.

Secretary Rusk: Will there be any public reaction to bombing SAM sites near Hanoi?
Ambassador Goldberg: There will not be a major reaction.
Mr. Rostow: The decision is a rational one. Taking out the petroleum supplies sets a ceiling on the
capacity of the North Vietnamese to infiltrate men into South Vietnam. A sustained POL offensive will
seriously affect the infiltration rate.
Each person in the room, during the course of the discussion, indicated approval of the recommendation
to strike the recommended POL targets.
Bromley Smith
160. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, June 22, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:36 a.m. and passed to the
White House.
5684. Herewith my weekly telegram:
1. Many congratulations on the statement which you made at your Saturday news conference./2/ It was
impressive in its solidity, its broad base, and its well balanced view of the situation.
/2/At his news conference on June 18, the President made a statement on Vietnam and answered
questions about the war. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 625-636.
A. Hue back under GVN
2. Hue, the country's most persistent political trouble spot, has been brought back under government
control during the past week after having been effectively in disloyal hands for the past three months.
3. Under the direction of National Police Director, and Ky intimate Colonel Loan, four battalions of
loyal government troops plus about [garble] riot police dispatched from Saigon removed from the streets
the thousands of Buddhist altars which have blocked traffic throughout the city. They also arrested many
agitators including several prominent student and Struggle force leaders; and they dispersed a spate of
small anti-government demonstrations./3/ First Division Commander General Nhuan, who has been
mouthing his loyalty to the government while giving aid and comfort to the dissidents, has been
relieved; and former I Corps Commander and dissident leader General Dinh has been taken out of Hue
and sent to Saigon. Commercial activity is gradually returning to normal.
/3/On June 10 Ky sent several hundred special riot police to the Hue area under Colonel Loan's
command. The riot police took control of the local police force. On June 15-17 two airborne and two
marine battalions joined the police and carried out a 4-day campaign against disorganized opposition.
By June 19 open resistance from Buddhists and military dissidents had collapsed. (Clarke, Advice and
Support: The Final Years, p. 143; The New York Times, June 11, 16, 17, 19, 1966)

4. These operations were accompanied by a heavy outpouring of pro-government propaganda designed

to bring the city back under control with a minimum of opposition. Partly because of this propaganda,
but mostly because the majority of people in Hue never have supported Tri Quang during this Struggle
movement. Opposition was not serious. During the operation of the last few days, the Buddhists had
been able to gather only small bands of civilian demonstrators and a few First Division troops, largely
from service rather than combat units, who had responded to Tri Quang's appeal. Tear gas sufficed to
bring the dissidents under control. There were only rare instances of gunfire, producing very few
casualties with no more than five persons believed to have been killed. Most people in the city were
happy to see bright prospects for ending the turmoil. Once again, Ky had shown his skill in the use of
force--a useful talent for anyone trying to run a government in this part of the world.
5. Tri Quang remains on his so-called "hunger strike" (15 days as of June 22, although he has been
taking many types of nourishment in liquid form and can probably live indefinitely at this rate). His
rabble-rousing activities, however, have been effectively stopped. He has almost certainly lost the
considerable popular support he once commanded. He has now been brought to Saigon, reportedly at his
request--some say to protect him from being assassinated by the Viet Cong.
6. I hope that the return of Hue to government control, and the failure of the Buddhist Institute to arouse
mass popular support in Saigon mean that we are now at the end of the political crisis in Viet-Nam,
which began with the relief of General Thi on March 10. Although Ky did not see the trouble this would
make for him, he must be given credit for his wise and restrained application of force once the crisis had
started. This allowed the opposition extremists to overplay their hand. Now the government has regained
its power and can resume the many tasks which need doing./4/
/4/Telegram 5712 from Saigon, June 23, provided a detailed summary of developments in the "GVNBuddhist confrontation" during the previous 4 days. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S)
B. Much governmental activity
7. Over the last weekend, there was more governmental activity than at any time since Ky became Prime
Minister a year ago. On June 18, Minister of Economy announced a broad range of tough anti-inflation
measures which we and the IMF have been urging. It looks as though Ky has shown real courage and
decisiveness.
8. Sunday, June 19, was the first anniversary of the Ky government, making it the government which
has held office the longest since the overthrow of Diem in 1963. Instead of making it an occasion for
self-congratulation, Ky and his colleagues made the wise decision to designate the anniversary as armed
forces day with an impressive two-hour parade, a torch light ceremony and display of fireworks, which,
for the first time since I have been here, could be described as creating festive atmos-phere.
9. It is good for Vietnamese to think about the armed forces who are still the one disciplined, antiCommunist and nation building element in the country. During the last few months, the armed forces
have been attacked by the Viet Cong; they have had their prestige injured by the antics of certain
political Generals; their unity has been a target for the Buddhists and their chaplains; and the "Struggle"
movement has put a strain on their unity and morale. It was wise not only to have this celebration on
June 19, but to have used it as the occasion for announcing promotions and a pay raise.
10. The so-called "Unified Buddhist Church" is in considerable disarray. Its "Young Turk" bonzes who
are associated with the Struggle in Saigon appear unwilling to accept the moderate leadership of Thich

Tam Chau. He, on the other hand, sent a letter informing them that he still regards himself as chairman
of the Buddhist Institute. It would be wonderful if out of all this wreckage, a sober, responsible Buddhist
church might emerge.
C. Elections
11. On June 19, the government issued the election decree law setting forth the regulations for
candidates and voters in next September's election for Deputies to a National Assembly which aims to
produce a constitution. A decree was also issued dealing with the organization of the Assembly. The
election law represents the work of the drafting committee as modified by the enlarged Directorate
(containing 10 military and 10 civilians). I believe it compares well with the election laws and
regulations in one of our states. To organize elections in a war torn country, which has only had a very
slight experience with elections, and which has never had elections in a national framework, is quite a
job.
12. For this reason, I advise officials in Washington who speak about the Vietnamese elections not to
over-praise what has been done. While it is as certain as anything can be that elections are going to be
held, it is not at all certain that they will be held without intimidation, and that the results will command
widespread respect. It would be imprudent for our spokesman in Washington to say what a great thing
these elections are going to be, and then to have disappointing news. It is much better for us to say very
little, and then if the elections turn out well (a possibility which is not excluded), public opinion at home
will be entitled to feel really encouraged.
D. Military
13. Our forces continued to enjoy significant successes in their operations against the Viet Cong and the
North Vietnamese army forces during the week. A total of 928 enemy troops were killed and some 232
were captured. These figures are down somewhat from the preceding week. Contrasted with these totals,
friendly forces lost 239 killed in action (including 44 U.S.). The wounded figure was 725 (including 306
U.S.), but we count all slight wounds and Vietnamese only count hospital cases.
14. Our Coast Guard units made a significant catch in the night of June 19-20. While on patrol duty in
the China Sea, they picked up a steel-hulled coastal transport about 125 feet long. The vessel refused to
respond to their challenge. They pursued it, ran it ashore and discovered that it contained 250 tons of
Chinese war material destined for the Viet Cong. The Vietnamese Government is lodging a protest with
the International Control Commission and an inspection team of Canadian and Indian officials has
already gone to the site.
15. Despite the important gains we have made on the purely military front over the last several weeks,
we still seem to be having great difficulty in dealing with the Viet Cong's systematic campaign of terror.
Two nights ago in the vicinity of Hue, the Viet Cong summarily executed a district chief. Last week in
Binh Long, a village chief was murdered. This terror tactic which has been a Viet Cong trademark is still
terribly effective in demoralizing the population and breaking down the government's administrative
machinery. Since the turn of the year, there has been some slight improvement in the number of local
officials killed or abducted, but it is still running at the rate of seventy per month.
16. The "village guerrilla" is the responsibility of regional and popular forces, which are under the
Vietnamese military and, for the U.S., pertains to MACV. And the "village guerrilla" is also the
responsibility of the police which, for the U.S., pertains to USAID and its police advisers. Finally we
hope that our revolutionary development cadres will make life unbearable for local terrorists.

17. I doubt that Hanoi will conclude that it cannot win in South Viet-Nam as long as they can do so well
with local terrorism.
E. Chieu Hoi
19. We still get no Chieu Hoi figure from I Corps. I, therefore, have analyzed Chieu Hoi figures since
January leaving out I Corps (which is 7 percent of the total) so that we can see how we're doing in the
rest of the country. It looks as though it is starting up again. These figures are as follows: January 1005;
February 1862; March 2141; April 1444; May 1458.
Lodge
161. Notes of President Johnson's Meeting With the National Security Council/1/
Washington, June 22, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. No classification marking.
Prepared by George Christian. In a memorandum to Bromley Smith dated October 30, 1968, Christian
stated: "I have reconstructed the NSC meeting of June 22 from sketchy notes I took which have been
locked up for all this time." (Ibid., White House Central Files, Ex FG 11-5) The meeting was held in the
Cabinet Room and lasted from 12:50 to 2:20 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Bill Bundy: It is very clear there was no response from Hanoi. We had a long read-out from Ronning./2/
There is no give in their position. They indicated they wouldn't even talk as they did in Rangoon. There
may be a slight lateral shift, but no forward move. Canada accepts that. Martin went before the House
today. Our area of worry is their general underlying lack of sympathy with us. Martin said he would be
disturbed if Canadians thought they had been used. They may charge we put them in a false position.
/2/During his Hanoi visit, June 14-17, Ronning met with ICC liaison officer Ha Van Lao, Vice Foreign
Minister Nguyen Go Thach, and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. On June 21 Ronning reported on
his visit in meetings with William Bundy and Canadian officials. Records of the meetings on June 21
include: 1) telegram 1740 from Ottawa, June 21 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S);
2) memorandum of conversation in Paul Martin's office, June 21 (ibid., POL 7 CAN); and 3) Bundy's
memorandum for the record, June 22, re Dinner Meeting with Paul Martin and Other Canadian Officials
on June 21 (ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron).
Secretary Rusk: We cannot accept the merit of Martin's argument.
Secretary McNamara: (Discussing proposed air attacks on POL) What are the benefits and costs? Why
now?
1. Why now? The situation has changed dramatically. This is now an important target. Tonnage to the
South is increasing; truck traffic is up 100%, personnel infiltration 120%.
2. Costs? Criticism from abroad; dissension in the United States. There will be some civilian casualties,
and the estimate is 50 to 300. (Secretary McNamara read the orders, directing that the strikes be made
only under ideal conditions.)
General Wheeler: A POL strike will not stop infiltration, but it will establish another ceiling on what
they can support. There are three divisions there with another ready to move.

The President: How much chance is there of hitting a Russian ship?

General Wheeler: Negligible. There is a tanker in port now. It draws too much water to get close. We
have never seen a tanker tied up at any other pier. They use a 250 foot floating pipeline. The strike area
is 1500 to 1600 yards from the main tank center. The tanker will be at least 1100 yards away.
The President: MIG's?
General Wheeler: Tactical surprise may prevent that. When there are later strikes, they may use MIGs to
defend.
The President: How many planes will we lose?
General Wheeler: In all 7 strikes, we will lose about 10.
The President: Suppose your dreams are fulfilled. What are the results?
General Wheeler: Over the next 60 to 90 days, this will start to affect the total infiltration effort. It will
cost them more. In a very real sense, this is a war of attrition.
The President: You have no qualification, no doubt that this is in the national interest?
General Wheeler: None whatsoever.
The President: People tell me what not to do, what I do wrong. I don't get any alternatives. What might I
be asked next? Destroy industry, disregard human life? Suppose I say no, what else would you
recommend?
General Wheeler: Mining Haiphong.
The President: Do you think this will involve the Chinese Communists and the Soviets?
General Wheeler: No, Sir.
The President: Are you more sure than MacArthur was?
General Wheeler: This is different. We had ground forces moving to the Yalu.
Secretary Rusk: How many days until we are ready?
General Wheeler: A week or ten days.
The President: Can that tanker shoot back?
General Wheeler: It is unarmed.
The President: Will there be retaliatory pressure from the USSR?
General Wheeler: They could stop duty trains in Germany. In 1962 they ran maneuvers in the air

corridors in West Berlin.

If the tanker is at the pier, we will not strike the pier.
The President: Are we adequately prepared?
General Wheeler: We have a family of contingency plans to counteract Soviet retaliation.
Secretary McNamara: No senior military leader recommends anything other than proceeding with this
program.
The President: Would General Taylor give me his views.
General Taylor: I am optimistic. I think we have to press hard on all four fronts--economic, political,
military and diplomatic. I see a movement upward all the way. We should be escalating. Personally I
would mine Haiphong at the same time and get the political flak over with.
The President: I think that public approval is deteriorating, and that it will continue to go down. Some in
Congress are disgusted about the Buddhist uprising and are talking about pulling out.
Secretary Rusk: The overplay on the Buddhist matter hurt more than anything else.
The President: What is the difference between POL and the power plant?
Secretary McNamara: The plant is more dangerous in that they may react more forcefully.
General Wheeler: POL is recognized as a legitimate military target, related to the movement of military
supplies. We have already hit 4 POL facilities.
Secretary Rusk: Llewellyn Thompson does not believe there is a danger from the USSR.
The President: Who should we talk to?
Secretary Rusk: The chiefs of governments with troops in Vietnam, Mr. Wilson/3/ and Mr. Pearson.
/3/The President's message for Wilson was transmitted in telegram 7699 to London, June 23. The
President stated that he had no choice but to proceed in light of the failure of Ronning's talks in Hanoi
and "the accumulating evidence both of the importance of POL installations and a program to disperse
them beyond our reach." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S/NINA)
Secretary Rusk: On this matter of retaliation, might the North Vietnamese try to hit our carrier?
Admiral McDonald: No problem.
The President (going around the table): How do you stand?
General Johnson: For, without qualification.
Admiral McDonald: I am too.

General McConnell: Agreed.

General Greene: I concur fully.
The President: Do we have enough men to prevent trouble?
General Johnson: Yes.
The President: If you were Ho, what would you do?
General Wheeler: Attack in Pleiku. Westmoreland expects that and has concentrated his forces. He has
his eye on eventualities of this kind.
Admiral McDonald: If I were Ho, I would send IL 28's against the air base at Danang.
General McConnell: I would too.
Admiral McDonald: We would have a hard time stopping them at Danang.
The President: That is a little alarming. Bob, will you comment?
Secretary McNamara: He would lose his Air Force. It would be a foolhardy military operation. Also, if
we can't beat 6 obsolete bombers, we ought to abolish the carriers.
The Vice President: I reaffirm my position in favor.
Cy Vance: Fully agree.
Walt Rostow: Fully agree.
Ambassador Goldberg: I am still opposed. I do not think it will bring them to the conference table. I am
the least expert of any in this room, but I can see these risks:
--More involvement of North Vietnam in the South;
--No real shortage of supplies (Red China has plenty for them);
--More involvement by the Chinese;
--More involvement by the Soviets; (It is inconceivable that they can allow this significant action to pass
without reaction of some kind.)
--Attrition of friends abroad and people at home.
This would be regarded in the world as a major step and there are bound to be reactions.
What are the alternatives? Don't withdraw. I think we are doing well. Beef up our forces, go after more
successes and pressure of that type. Don't convert this to an extension of the war even to Hanoi. It is
tougher and painful to absorb, but it will hopefully lead to an agreed solution to let the people in the

South alone.
Secretary Fowler: I support it as an operational movement, and think it will increase the prospects for
peace. The time is urgent.
Leonard Marks: I am for the target.
Mr. Raborn: I support. We need even more pressure, such as mining.
Dick Helms: The most effective thing we can do is mining. It would do extra damage of course. I agree
there would be reaction from them.
The President: Any warnings you want to give me before I go to commune with myself and my God?
Mr. Ball: All things equal, this is a good thing to do, but it does not outweigh disadvantages. The world
thinks Hanoi and Haiphong shibboleth that war not expanded. It will affect Europe. It won't affect North
Vietnamese manpower. It would be hard for the Russians to take. They will have to supply POL across
China. I am concerned about increasing the level of violence. I believe we have considerable trouble
ahead on the political front. But if we are going to do it, do it now.
Mr. Bundy: I favor the strikes./4/
/4/JCS telegram 5003 to CINCPAC, June 22, authorized air strikes on June 24 against seven key POL
storage installations in the vicinity of Haiphong and Hanoi. Lodge was notified of the decision in
telegram 4011 to Saigon, June 22. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Due to bad weather and news stories
anticipating the attacks, the initial strikes were delayed until June 29. See Document 164 regarding
Johnson's June 28 conversation with McNamara about the strikes.
George Christian
162. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, June 23, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Nina. The
source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:02 a.m. Rostow
forwarded the text of the telegram to the President at 11:50 a.m. on June 23 under cover of a
memorandum stating: "Thieu's reaction to your decision is worth reading." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 7)
5710. 1. I gave Thieu gist of your 4011/2/ (Ky not in Saigon today) and used appropriate material from
the explanatory notifications being given to troop contributing countries.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 161.
2. Thieu listened with a most intense concentration and said that the President had chosen a "most
favorable moment". It had been clear, he said, that if we could survive the last political crisis, it would
be much harder for the Communists to attempt any more troublesome maneuvers in the future. It is now
clear, he said, that "this year will be a decisive year for the Viet Cong." It is also clear that "they will
make their maximum deployment this year." We here in South Viet-Nam, he added, hope that this is

what will happen. For the President's decision to come after we have surmounted our political crisis and
as the Viet Cong face such a bleak prospect is most welcome.
3. The Viet Cong, he said, cannot do any more than they are now doing; it is their maximum effort. It
was clear to them in February that they could not reasonably hope for military success and that they
needed some political gains. Before going to any peace talks, said Thieu, they hoped at least to have a
government in Saigon which was weak and which, in the political field, would compensate for their own
weakness in the military field. Now, if they accept conversations, they must hold them under conditions
which are very unfavorable to them. If they cannot win militarily and if they cannot win politically, they
will have no choice but to either stop the fighting or return to guerrilla war for ten or twenty years, and
for them to do this will not be profitable for them. What can it accomplish? Nothing decisive.
4. If fact, he added, with our program of pacification, which contrasts so markedly with their terrorism,
they will lose further public support without accomplishing anything militarily or politically.
5. What kind of conversations, therefore, he asked, can they have? If they stop the war in the South, they
will surely have it in the North because there will be so much dissatisfaction with them which an
admission of defeat would crystallize and bring to a head. Those who are running the show up there will
surely lose their positions.
6. When I asked whether that meant Ho Chi Minh would go down, he said, "Maybe not. Maybe he could
maneuver at the top and let the ones immediately under him be sacrificed."
7. Under questioning by me, he said that there were really three courses open to them rather than two.
The first was to have conversations, which meant that they would in effect have to admit defeat and
which would bring down the responsible parties in Hanoi; the second was to continue the war by
switching all their efforts to guerrilla fighting. Then he said, in response to my questioning, that there
was a third possibility: they could look as though they were continuing the war but actually it would be
at very low gear, and on a very small scale.
8. He believed they were now in a state of mind where it would be expedient to challenge them to accept
the Geneva Accords of 1954. He did not believe they would do so.
9. Returning to the recent political crisis, he said it had been "a test for us", for Hanoi and for all the
accomplices of Hanoi. It was unquestionably the most serious political crisis which South Viet-Nam had
had in three years. Their opponents had tried everything. In particular, they had tried to stir American
emotions by the self-immolations, the demonstrations, putting the altars in the streets, etc. But this had
failed.
10. Maybe, he said, "some people thought the GVN had been a little bit soft. But, he said, "if the GVN
had operated against Danang early the consequences might have been dangerous." The GVN, he said,
wanted to allow time for the people to understand so that when they finally did move, they had public
support and people thought they were reasonable.
11. During the conversation, I was called to the telephone to be given news of the tidal wave
approaching the city of Danang. Komer, who came with me, then said to Thieu that if this year was the
year of decision, as Thieu had said, and as Komer agreed, then it behooved both of our forces,
Vietnamese and American, to make maximum effort. To this Thieu agreed.
12. When the time came to leave, Thieu, apparently recalling what Komer had said, commented on the

fact that Komer had four more days in Viet-Nam and said that would give him plenty of time to speak
with Vietnamese and see for himself how strong their determination was. He had said earlier that it was
true there was war weariness in Viet-Nam, but that did not mean that they were for peace at any price, or
that they were indifferent to the kind of a peace which would be made. He obviously thought that there
was a great deal of war weariness in North Viet-Nam too.
13. Comment: A. This is the first time any high ranking and responsible Vietnamese has talked to me
about a decision coming as quickly as this year and about specifics of the courses open to Hanoi. Thieu
showed a new and unprecedented confidence. B. He was very clear that he thought that the President
had picked an extremely favorable time to bomb POL facilities, having in mind all the factors in
Southeast Asia with which he, Thieu, could not have first hand knowledge. End comment.
14. I gave him the pictures of the Moon, with the President's covering letter, for which he was most
grateful.
Lodge
163. Letter From George B. Kistiakowsky to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, June 23, 1966.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075,
Vietnam, 1966. Confidential; Privileged.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The eight days of briefings certainly have not made us into Vietnam experts or enabled us to reach wellfounded conclusions. However, they helped us to reach, among ourselves, a large measure of consensus
on several tentative inferences and also to identify several problem areas, the intensive study of which
might lead to conclusions and recommendations useful to you./2/
/2/From June 13 to June 22 a group of more than 40 distinguished scientists met in Wellesley,
Massachusetts, for briefings on the Vietnam war by military and civilian officials and follow-up
discussions. The meetings were organized by the JASON Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses
under a contract funded by the Department of Defense. A list of attendees and an agenda for their
meetings are attached to the source text but are not printed. Following the Wellesley meetings, the
participants broke into four study groups and in late August submitted to Secretary McNamara four
reports, which concluded that the bombing of North Vietnam was ineffective and recommended
construction of a barrier as an alternative means to check infiltration. The reports' major conclusions are
excerpted in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 115-123 and in the appendix to
Document 269, and are discussed in Document 233.
We have been strongly impressed by the arguments of our military briefers that effective suppression
and liquidation of main enemy forces is a necessary condition to the successful prosecution of the war of
the villages and pacification of the countryside. However we heard no evidence that it is also a sufficient
condition for achieving this ultimate objective. In fact, the emphasis on the war of the big battalions and
the attendant buildup of U.S. forces is apparently having harmful effects on the war of the villages
because of its economic impact on South Vietnam, gradual disintegration of the fabric of Vietnamese
society, etc. There was presented to us no convincing evidence that the war of the villages is progressing
favorably on the whole. There is thus already, from this point of view--aside from many other reasons--a

strong incentive for rapidly winning the war against the hard core forces of VC and PAVN.
The military briefers left us with the impression that this war will "bottom out" early in 1967 so that the
going will be easier thereafter. However we were forcibly impressed by the extraordinary unreliability
and uncertainty of data on the infiltration of manpower and supplies from the North, on attrition of
enemy forces, etc., data which, we assume, are the basis of their cautiously optimistic predictions for the
course of war in the next twelve months.
If these predictions come true or if the will to fight of North Vietnam is broken in the meantime, what
we propose to do will be a wasted effort. However we feel that prudence requires us to act on a more
pessimistic view of the course of the war, which is that the war of the big battalions will continue
escalating far into 1967 without the turning point being reached. This process will, we suspect, make the
winning of the subsequent war of the villages much more difficult. One natural reaction under these
circumstances is likely to be a very major escalation of the air war north of the 17th parallel. Whether
this would be successful in forcing North Vietnam to give up the fight we are unable to judge, but we
are mindful of the historical facts that aerial bombing never did it in the past and that the government of
Ho Chi Minh is a very tough bunch. What the briefings did bring out is that the present level of bombing
has caused only limited damage to North Vietnam and could have had no significant effect on the
present level of the flow of manpower and supplies to the south, although undoubtedly making this flow
more difficult to maintain. We would, however, like to examine the relevance of these difficulties to the
capacity of DRV to prosecute the war. Since North Vietnam, with its comparatively easy terrain and
high density of population and roads, is most likely not the choke point in the logistic supply line from
China to South Vietnam, probably only its conversion into total shambles could interdict such flow. We
should like very much the opportunity through detailed study to understand better whether that is so.
Since an operation leading to destruction of North Vietnam could have some very undesirable
consequences for United States, we feel that the search for a different military policy option should
become the central theme of our project. This option we can define at present only very vaguely as the
creation of interdictory force fields (i.f.f.) at the proper choke points from the North and thus reduce the
flow of materiel and manpower to such levels that the war of the big battalions could be substantially deescalated. Where the choke points are--near the border between Laos and North Vietnam, in Laos or
within the borders of South Vietnam--is not yet clear to us. Also the nature of interdictory force fields-stationary fences, air-sown mines and delayed action bombs, ECM, in addition to a further tightened sea
barrier, etc.--or some combination of these--is still totally unclear to us, although the briefings left us
with the impression that the present bombing of the Laos roads alone is not sufficient. The option for
interdictory force fields, incidentally, may have some attractive side effects, aside from making the war
of the big battalions more difficult for the enemy. If these fields are reasonably successful, the complex
arguments for continued bombing of North Vietnam become clearly separated and some components
eliminated. Also the acceptance of a cease-fire and subsequent policing of it will clearly be more
feasible. On the other hand, we should be mindful that an i.f.f. could itself become a source of escalation
of the war.
One of the major factors for the determination of the nature of the optimum interdictory force field is
better understanding of intelligence data on infiltration rates and rates of attrition (men and materiel)
since, for instance, large dumps of supplies in the Laos-South Vietnam border area would make materiel
flow interdiction further North less attractive. If the infiltration of personnel is the controlling factor,
quite a different i.f.f. may be required, and so on. Hence we would like to study the base of intelligence
data.
A possible component of the interdictory force fields is an effective disruption of the enemy's command
and control structure by selective electronic jamming and more sophisticated measures. The very limited

information given to us does not prove that this would be either impossible or harmful to U.S. objectives
on an over-all basis. We would like to study this question, also.
Needless to say, these studies will include thorough exploration of means for better utilization of our
technology in the war, although, generally speaking, we do not propose to become involved in a broad
effort at inventing new gadgets.
After some consideration, we concluded that the chances of our making useful contributions to the
prosecution of the war of the villages and to the effectiveness of South Vietnam government are even
less than in the above areas and do not propose to engage in systematic studies of these problems.
George Kistiakowsky
for Jason-East
164. Editorial Note
At 7:59 a.m. on June 28, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara telephoned President Johnson and
asked for authority to strike the two major POL storage installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area that
evening Washington time. The strikes had been decided upon earlier (see footnote 4, Document 161) but
delayed several days due to bad weather and concern over press leaks. The President expressed
hesitation about proceeding immediately rather than waiting until July 1, citing events scheduled for
June 30 that might be impacted adversely, including his own trip to the midwest.
The President then queried McNamara about the possible repercussions of hitting a Soviet tanker in the
Haiphong harbor. After noting that he thought the chances of hitting one were small, McNamara replied:
"I think it's serious, Mr. President, but I think that we have told the Russians that this clearly is--and we
put it in writing--that we have done everything possible to avoid antagonizing them in this military
conflict; and I think while it would be serious and while we would have a very strong protest, I myself
doubt that it would lead to any military action. As a matter of fact, the appraisals are that if we mined the
harbor and stopped Soviet ships from coming in there it won't lead to military action, so if we hit the
tanker I doubt that it would lead to military action."
After further discussion of this issue and of Secretary of State Rusk's position on the strikes, the
following exchange took place:
"President: I think now what we've got to analyze very, very carefully and we have, but before we
execute, I think we've got to say, do we get enough out of this for the price we pay. The Hartkes are all-they're starting their campaign tomorrow on the Senate floor, they're speaking.
"McNamara: Well, Lippmann's got an article in this morning's paper, same thing, on exactly that point,
and I think the answer is, this is just a minor incident in the war, and it's almost an incident that you can't
avoid taking. I don't see how you can go on fighting out there, Mr. President, without doing this, to be
absolutely frank with you. I don't think you can keep the morale of your troops up; I don't think you can
keep the morale of the people in the country who support you up without doing this. About that point.
Now in addition to that I myself believe it has military value, although I don't for the minute put the
weight on it that the Chiefs do; but I don't put the cost on it that some in State do. I don't put the cost on
that George Ball does, for example. I don't believe any Soviet experts, including Tommy Thompson, put
the cost on it that George Ball does."
During further discussion, McNamara recommended sending out an execute order and then canceling it

later in the day if the President changed his mind. The President gave his assent. Subsequently the
following discussion took place:
"President: Things are going reasonably well in the South, aren't they?
"McNamara: Yes, I think so.
"President: What are these 6,000 men doing? They're trying to locate the enemy, I see, and they've run
'em into caves. Do you know anything about that?
"McNamara: Yeah. It's just so typical, Mr. President, it's a relatively small enemy force. We think we're
taking a heavy toll of them. But it just scares me to see what we're doing there. We're taking 6,000 U.S.
soldiers with God knows how many airplanes and helicopters and fire power and going after a bunch of
half-starved beggars of 2,000 at most, and probably less than that. And this is what's going on in the
South and the great danger, and it's not a certainty, but it's a danger we need to look at, is that they can
keep that up almost indefinitely.
"President: Well I'd say with their manpower resources they have, they can't.
"McNamara: Yeah. That's the point. The only thing that will prevent it, Mr. President, is their morale
breaking. And if we hurt them enough--it isn't so much that they don't have more men as it is that they
can't get the men to fight because the men know that once they get assigned to that task their chances of
living are small. I, myself, believe that's the only chance we have of winning this thing. And that's one
reason I'm in favor of this POL, because there's no question but what the troops in the South--the VC
and North Vietnamese troops in the South--ultimately become aware of what's going on in the North.
We see this through the interrogation and the prisoner reports. I've been trying to watch those carefully
to see what comes through those. And they know that we're bombing in the North. And they know we
haven't destroyed the place, so that in a sense our bombing isn't fully effective, but they also know that
nobody is protecting North Vietnam, and we just have a free rein. And when we bomb this POL,
ultimately that will become known to the North Vietnamese soldiers and the Viet Cong in the South.
And this is just one more foundation brick that's knocked away from their support. And when they see
they're getting killed in such high rates in the South and they see that the supplies are less likely to come
down from the North, I think it'll just hurt their morale a little bit more. And, to me, that's the only way
to win. Because we're not killing enough of them to make it impossible for the North to continue to
fight. But we are killing enough to destroy the morale of those people down there if they think this is
gonna have to go on forever.
"President: Go ahead, Bob." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone
Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.17, Side A, PNO 2)
Between 1:10 and 2:27 a.m. on June 29, the President had 11 telephone conversations with Walt Rostow
and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance during which he was provided with reports on the air
strikes. Recordings of 10 of the conversations are ibid., Tape 6606.06, PNO 1-PNO 10.

JUNE 29-SEPTEMBER 18: EXPLORING NEGOTIATIONS

WITH NORTH VIETNAM AND CONTACTS WITH THE
VIET CONG; REASSESSING PACIFICATION
165. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

Washington, June 29, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Sullivan was in Washington for
consultations.
SUBJECT
Proposal for an "Asian Peace Offensive"
1. In Asia it is generally felt that our peace offensives concerning Vietnam are not sincere. This feeling
derives from the fact that we have generally directed our efforts toward a Geneva-type conference which
would include the Chinese Communists. The Asians understand that the Chinese Communists will not
go to such a conference. They also assume that we understand it. Therefore, they feel that we are
proposing a political arrangement which we know is a non-starter. Consequently, they doubt our
sincerity in seeking a political understanding.
2. I believe there is a need for new political action which will make clear that our interest in a peaceful
settlement is genuine and which will provide some feasible means for permitting the North Vietnamese
to extricate themselves from the military and political situation in which they now find themselves. In
the military field, I feel they are hurting badly and would be interested in seeking some way out of their
current predicament. However, in the political sense, they cannot do this unless they are provided some
assurances with respect to their future.
3. These assurances revolve fundamentally around their need to have a guarantor of their political and
military continuance as a communist state and of their economic development to a tolerable level of
exist-ence. They are considerably dependent upon the Chinese Communists for both political and
economic support in the current circumstances. However, this support is contingent upon the North
Vietnamese continuing to carry out a line of disruptive action in Southeast Asia which is compatible
with Chinese interests and tactics. If the North Vietnamese were to change their line of action, this
support would doubtless shrivel and they would have to turn elsewhere for guarantors. Since they could
not ideologically depend upon any Western country or upon the UN, they would obviously have to turn
to the Soviet Union as their guarantor.
4. The Soviet Union, however, cannot be expected to be entranced by the prospect of assuming these
responsibilities with respect to North Vietnam. They would in effect be buying a sort of Asian Albania
or Asian Cuba and a rather expensive one at that. Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Soviet
Union, if it were to agree to take on the responsibility of supporting North Vietnam in a state of peaceful
coexistence in Southeast Asia, would charge some price for these services. In short, they would wish to
bargain with us and the Western world for the service of taking the North Vietnamese plague off our
backs.
5. The problem is how to become engaged in a discussion with the Soviet Union on this subject. It
seems clear that neither the Soviets nor the North Vietnamese wish to enter into blunt negotiations in
this context. Therefore, an indirect, more oriental approach seems indicated. I would like to suggest such
an approach in this memorandum and would submit that it has certain other values both in a domestic
and an international context.
6. The approach I would suggest involves the public proposal that both North and South Vietnam
become members of the UN and that the UN mechanism be engaged to help settle the problem of
Vietnam. There are several by-products of UN membership, of which I shall mention only a few. First, it
would enable the Soviets and others to recognize the accredited existence in Saigon of a government

which is chosen by means acceptable to the membership of the UN. This absolves them of their
responsibility to seek only a Viet Cong dominated government. Secondly, it could address itself to the
ultimate goal of unification and stipulate that goal as part of the purpose of membership. Thirdly, it
would provide us with a quid pro quo against which we could suspend bombing operations in the North.
Fourthly, it would represent a clear break with China and Chinese policies but in a manner not so violent
as to induce Chinese Communist retaliation. Fifthly, it would be a revival of an old Soviet proposal and
therefore presumably difficult for them to ignore.
7. I would further suggest that we take advantage of the proposal for North Vietnamese membership to
extend our "peace offensive" to all East Asia. That is to say, I would include also dual membership for
North and South Korea and dual reception in the General Assembly for Communist and Nationalist
China. In other words, I would propose wrapping all three of these into one large and rather impressive
initiative which would capture public imagination and at the same time give a positive thrust to our
inevitable change of policy on the question of Chinese representation.
8. This device would, in my opinion, bring us for the first time into serious negotiations with the Soviets
on the price which they will demand for some initiatives with respect to Vietnam. Because of the nature
of the proposal, I think it is clear that we can expect their price to be expressed in some similar terms:
namely membership applications for East and West Germany. This may not be the case, but it would
seem logical to anticipate and they have already given some indication of this by their recent proposal of
East Germany for UN membership. In any event, I think we must assume that the Soviet price would
somehow or other be associated with the European area and the questions of military confrontation in
Europe which are paramount in their relations with the U.S.
9. I do not believe that we need to accept the Soviet proposal for East German membership, and perhaps
we could even give West Germany an assurance that we would not accept it. However, since it would
probably be the opening Soviet bargaining counter, we would at least have to discuss it in the context of
moving toward an acceptable price for Soviet services. It is conceivable that the price could be in some
related field such as MLF, nuclear proliferation, etc. etc. Nevertheless, I do not feel that we should
preclude the possibilities of opening discussions in this vein merely because the subject which the
Russians will wish to discuss would be offensive to our German allies and unacceptable to our national
interests.
10. It would be my suggestion that this blanket proposal be discussed with a limited number of countries
to sound-out not only their points of view but also the possibilities of various tactics. For example, we
might conclude that it would be the better part of valor to have the Canadians take the initiative on this
whole proposal and have ourselves become involved only in bilateral discussions with the Russians to
determine how much the traffic will bear.
11. I end where I began with the conclusion that we have not yet offered a practicable political route of
escape for the North Vietnamese to use under our increasing military pressure. I would suggest,
therefore, that this proposal be examined in that light and that discussion of it at an appropriate level
within the U.S. Government begin immediately./2/
/2/In a memorandum of July 1 to Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel called Sullivan's proposal a "non-starter and one we cannot afford,
particularly at the risk of paying the price with no return whatsoever." Stoessel contended that the steps
proposed by Sullivan to get the negotiations started were unnecessary and would give the Soviet Union
a political victory over Communist China "worth ten times the price of Soviet assistance in the
rehabilitation of North Vietnam." Moreover, the proposal would impair relations with West Germany
and fuel suspicions in Europe that "we might be willing to sell European security interests for a solution

to our problems in the Far East." (Ibid.)

166. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 29, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Senator Mansfield. No classification
marking.
SUBJECT
Two Meetings on Viet Nam with Democratic Members of the Senate
On June 28, I met with two groups of Democratic Senators to consider the question of Viet Nam.
Participants in the first meeting were Committee Chairmen or their designees. Those attending the
second meeting were drawn from the bottom of the seniority list of Democrats in the Senate, in order
and as available.
The meetings were held on a confidential basis. Completely free discussion was encouraged. Members
were asked to speak out on whatever aspects of the Vietnamese question were on their minds.
There was no attempt to obtain a consensus. What was sought rather was a free flow of the concerns,
ideas and attitudes of the older and the younger Democrats in the Senate. Yet, in the general outpouring
of thought, there were several points so constantly reiterated and so unchallenged as to suggest areas of
very heavy agreement. They may be stated as follows:
1. There is general support for you among the Members in your overwhelming responsibilities as
President;
2. The prompt end of the war is seen as most essential and there is confusion and deep concern that we
have not yet found the way to end it, either by extension or contraction of the military effort;
3. There is no sentiment among the Members for an immediate withdrawal;
4. There is a strong conviction that candidates of the Democratic Party will be hurt by the war.
Enclosed are brief summaries of the various lines of thought and ideas which were expressed at the two
meetings on yesterday./2/
/2/Attached, but only the summary of the first meeting is printed.
There is also attached herewith a copy of a memorandum which was sent to you after a similar
discussion on Viet Nam among a group of Senators from both parties which took place a year ago./3/
/3/Attached. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 270-278.
Attachment
Washington, June 28, 1966, 12:30 p.m.
DISCUSSION OF VIET NAM BY COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN OR DESIGNEES

The following Senators attended:

Russell (Ga.)EllenderEastlandMcClellanMagnusonFulbrightRobertsonLong (La.)
AndersonYarboroughJacksonBibleJordanRandolphInouyePastoreWilliams (N.J.)
Summary of Principal Lines of Thought and Ideas Expressed
A. General Comment
1. We may have gone too far in trying to obtain negotiations last year, even though we want the matter
settled honorably at a conference table.
2. We ought not to withdraw unilaterally, but we are in a fix, and it is not clear how we are going to get
out of it.
3. To get out in present circumstances would be very destructive of our stature in the world.
B. The War and Policies
1. We already have 400,000 men in the area and the cost will soon reach $2 billion a month.
2. Unless stable government can be had, the war is not going to be won, and the pressure to pull out
altogether will increase.
3. Stability of government in Saigon cannot be expected soon, and we make a mistake by emphasizing
it. Any government there is going to be a "puppet" for the present. What is involved here is that "this is
Communism's last stand" and the problem is to hit the Communists harder while giving whatever puppet
government we have in Saigon the economic support it needs.
4. The only moral reason we have for being in Viet Nam is the contention that the South Vietnamese
people want us there but have we tried to find out whether this is really so or not--whether, in fact, the
people want us?
5. The Secretary of State's theory of the conflict has been that we are facing an aggression pure and
simple; it is a wrong theory. We face, in fact, a situation not too different than that faced by the French.
6. Recent broadcasts by Eric Sevareid and Bill Lawrence have been very revealing and suggest we have
not, heretofore, been getting a complete and accurate picture of what is happening in Viet Nam.
C. Other Nations, International Organizations and the War
1. Beyond Viet Nam, the problem is the containment of China. The Chinese, however, are not likely to
become active participants unless we put forces into North Viet Nam.
2. The only major country supporting us is Britain which is totally dependent on us.
3. Most friendly countries are concerned by our preoccupation with and entrapment in Viet Nam.
4. Although the Australians will stand with us, there are indications that they want us to get out.

5. The U.N. does not want in, in this situation. It may be that the Geneva group can be helpful in
negotiations.
6. Improvement in relations with Eastern Europe is stymied by the Vietnamese war.
D. Suggestions
1. If we cannot get a stable government, we should agree to elections and get out as best we can; and
sooner rather than later, because it is a very expensive war. It is not dishonorable to have a conference
and get out.
2. We must think of our prestige and honor even if the area is not vital in a geographic sense.
3. The Communists are seeking to protract the war in the hopes of U.S. impatience; we must contract the
protraction or get out.
4. The question is not to stay in or get out but how to get out.
5. Increased military pressure is necessary. If we back off in Viet Nam, the U.S. public will support no
President in any effort to save any part of Southeast Asia.
6. It may not be possible to settle the war by negotiations; both sides would save face if the war just
peters out.
7. The bigger the war is expanded, the more it is going to be lengthened; a quick ending by expansion is
a fallacy.
8. The way to get negotiations is by calling for a cease-fire and neutralism.
9. The President should get his advice from the Armed Services.
10. The President should call groups of Senators together and tell Rusk and McNamara to be quiet while
they talked.
11. Is there not some way in which the U.N. can be brought in?
E. Political Implications
1. The Democratic Party is badly hurt by the war even though individually some Democrats may not be
troubled.
2. If war drags on, the Party will suffer badly. People want a decision, by a step-up of the war; they are
not interested in casualties. Indeed, it might be a good idea to stop televising what is going on over
there.
3. The people are following the President but not with enthusiasm, in part, because they do not
understand the importance of the war. There is a lot of worry over why we are there.
4. It is not a major war, but its consequences are being felt by many families in the nation.

5. The war is hampering domestic programs of Administration.

6. Democrats are badly split in West Virginia; the matter is not an issue in Virginia; the political
difficulties among Democrats in New Jersey over the war, as recently reported in the New York Times,
were vastly over-stated.
7. Viet Nam is worse than Korea and remember what Eisenhower did with the latter.
167. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, June 29, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis.
The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:06 p.m.
Passed to the White House and to Canberra, where Rusk was attending the SEATO and ANZUS
Council meetings. In telegram 1961 to Saigon, July 6, the Department of State indicated that all
messages dealing with the "Italian-Polish approach on Viet Nam" were to be slugged with the code
name Marigold. (Ibid.) The telegram is printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam
War, pp. 237-239. Many subsequent telegrams concerning Marigold are printed, in whole or in part,
ibid., pp. 241-370, and are summarized in a 90-page "Chronology of Marigold," prepared by the
Department of State in 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 147,
Marigold Chronology)
5840. Literally eyes only for the President, the Secretary, and the Acting Secretary.
1. This afternoon D'Orlandi, Italian Ambassador, telephoned to say it was urgent that I come to his
office as soon as the Catholic service honoring the anniversary of the coronation of Pope Paul VI had
ended. I went to his office at about 6:45, and he began as follows:
2. Two days ago, the Polish representative on the ICC, Lewandowski, came to him with a "very specific
peace offer".
3. D'Orlandi said he had requested instructions from Fanfani, who told him 1) to submit the whole
proposal to me, and 2) said that he, Fanfani, would send the whole thing to Washington for their
consideration.
4. By way of background, D'Orlandi said he considered the Pole to be a friendly and outspoken man,
and that they had a number of general discussions with D'Orlandi saying how very obdurate and foolish
the North Vietnamese were not to accept President Johnson's offer at a time when there were only
30,000 American advisers. Now there are now 265,000 fighting men which may go to between 400,000
and 500,000.
5. A salient feature of these various conversations had been that the Pole had talked about the need for
absolute secrecy in diplomacy--that nothing could be done without it. D'Orlandi felt that he was "not as
stubborn as most Communists," and had received the impression that he had "rather high rank," and
enjoyed the special confidence of his government and was actually in Saigon on a "very special
mission."
6. Nevertheless, D'Orlandi said, he was surprised when he came to see D'Orlandi within a half hour after
his request for an appointment on last Monday./2/

/2/June 27.
7. When he arrived, D'Orlandi spoke of having recently seen Sihanouk who thought that Hanoi was not
willing to do anything.
8. The Pole said, "You'd be surprised how much my visit completely contradicts what Sihanouk says. I
have been in Hanoi and can state a number of points." After stating his points, he read them over to
D'Orlandi afterwards so there was no misunderstanding.
9. The Pole began by saying that Hanoi has been deeply disappointed by the proposals made by Ronning
which, they are sure, had emanated originally from the United States and not from the Canadians.
Ronning had proposed that the U.S. stop the bombing if North Viet-Nam stopped the infiltration, and
had talked about the exchange of prisoners' parcels and letters. This had bitterly disappointed North
Vietnam. The first point, they had said, would be unconditional surrender, and they could not accept it,
but they are open to a "political compromise" settling once and for all the entire Vietnam question.
10. When D'Orlandi said that he was skeptical, the Pole said that Hanoi was prepared to go "quite a long
way." "It is useless for me to add," said the Pole, "that should there not be any kind of a preliminary
agreement, Hanoi will deny flatly ever having made any offer." According to the Pole, the North
Vietnamese are "tightly controlled" by the Chinese Communists. The preliminary talks, therefore,
should be between Moscow and Washington. When and if proposals should emerge which could be
considered as a basis for negotiations, Hanoi would at that time and under those circumstances get into
it. The Pole said that Hanoi was afraid of the Chinese Communists who have an interest in dragging on
the war for many years. D'Orlandi added that the Pole was evidently "proud of himself" for having
brought these proposals about.
11. The proposals are as follows:
A. They insist that the so-called National Liberation Front "take part" in the negotiations. The key word
is "take part." According to D'Orlandi, there is "no question of their being the representative; they are
not to have any monopoly."
B. There must be suspension of the bombing.
12. These are the two proposals.
13. Then there are other points, which D'Orlandi called "negative ones," which are that A) Hanoi will
not ask for immediate reunification, either by elections or otherwise, of North and South Vietnam; B)
they will not ask for establishment of a "socialist" system in South Vietnam; C) they will not ask South
Vietnam to change the relationships which it has in the field of foreign affairs; and D) they will not ask
for neutralization; E) although they will ask for U.S. withdrawal, they are ready to discuss a "reasonable
calendar"; E) although "we would like someone other than Ky"--to quote the words of Hanoi--they do
not want to interfere with the South Vietnamese Government.
14. The Pole thinks that these proposals were not made through Sainteny, because, he says, Hanoi feels
that proposals through French channels would "not be sympathetically considered in Washington."
15. Once again, the Pole insisted on utmost secrecy. He said to D'Orlandi, "we as Poles and you as
Italians are missing a terrific opportunity for agreement between Moscow and Washington. The sooner
we settle it, the happier we will all be." If this attempt failed, he would ask to be assigned elsewhere. To

illustrate the amount of secrecy, he said that none of the Polish Embassies in the world, including the
Polish Embassy in Rome, had been informed.
16. He did not give the name of the individual with whom he had talked in Hanoi. He did say that he
believed that Washington knew of this proposal already.
17. D'Orlandi said to me that it was clear from the above that Hanoi is trying to "run out" on China, that
the top officials in Hanoi not only fear for their political lives, but that they are actually afraid of having
the country occupied by the Chinese Communists.
18. The Pole said that his government would be willing to arrange for D'Orlandi to meet with
appropriate Polish spokesmen anywhere--Hong Kong or Singapore. In response to a question by
D'Orlandi as to why they had come to him, the Pole said they wanted "an able debater to put the case to
President Johnson, and we feel that the Italian Government has the sympathy of the United States
Government." Moreover, the Italians have the same interest we have in agreement between Washington
and Moscow, and in shutting out Peking.
19. D'Orlandi's impression is that the Poles are desperately seeking a way out on Moscow's instructions.
This, he said, may need further exploration. He had the definite impression that now Hanoi "was
amenable to common sense" saying "they do not want anything that would not stop the whole war. They
want a political settlement, and are prepared to go a long way."
Lodge
168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, June 29, 1966, 8:17 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority;
Nodis. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and approved by Ball. Repeated to Canberra for Rusk.
4108. Literally eyes only for Ambassador. Embtel 5840./2/ Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea came in today
with Faroche, Italian Ambassador-designate to Canada, who had hand-carried message similar to that
contained reftel and who said he was under instructions to hand-carry our reply back to Rome. We did
not indicate that we had received Saigon's message. Main differences between two messages was that
"participate" was used in place of "take part" with respect to role of NLF in negotiations.
/2Document 167.
We told Fenoaltea that, except for use of term "participate" with respect to NLF, which could have
implication Hanoi was not insisting NLF be "sole representative" of SVN, and "suspension of bombing"
in place of "cessation of bombing", position Hanoi indicated to Pole was very similar to previous
indications their position. Thus in light of various translations these words have gone through, it is not
clear whether their use has any significance. Therefore, without indicating to Pole that message had been
passed to USG, suggested Italian Government on its own responsibility, query Polish Rep on these two
terms to determine whether formulations contained in Polish version of Hanoi's position were used
advisedly by Hanoi and indicate some shift in position or were accidents of translation. We told
Fenoaltea we would be in better position to give him reply after receiving answer, and Fenoaltea
promised immediately to query D'Orlandi./3/

/3/In telegram 61 from Geneva, July 6, Goldberg reported that he had learned of the Polish-Italian
approach through U Thant, whose source was Fanfani. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency
File, United Nations, vol. 4) In telegram 145 from Rome, July 9, Goldberg transmitted a written
summary of the Polish-Italian approach from June 27 to July 7, which had been provided by President
Giuseppe Saragat of Italy. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD) Both
telegrams are printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 242-243 and 245247.
Ball
169. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, June 30, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority;
Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:03 a.m.
Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 241-242.
5855. Literally eyes only for the President, the Secretary and the Acting Secretary.
1. To me the Polish "proposal" contains matters of substance which, so far as we know in Saigon, are
new. The fact that the so-called NLF will not be the sole representative, and will merely "take part" or
"participate" (in this context there is really no difference) seems to be a new departure.
2. The fact that the talk is of "suspension of bombing," rather than a demand for complete "cessation,"
also looks like new substance.
3. The proposals attributed to Hanoi, as a package, go far beyond anything we have heard mentioned
before. In fact, they appear so forthcoming as to arouse suspicion concerning the credibility of the Polish
intermediary. It seems to us that not only is the so-called NLF being abandoned as the sole bargaining
agent, but so also is the NLF program of a "socialist" state, of unifying the North and South, and of
"neutralization." Also the phrase "reasonable calendar" indicates a definite softening of position
regarding U.S. troops. The same is true of acceptance of the Government of South Viet-Nam and its
foreign relationships.
4. As I have said many times, it is indispensable that total secrecy be preserved. I am convinced that the
slightest mention of anything like this will cause its immediate abandonment.
5. This proposal clearly comes in response to the successes we are having militarily, politically, and
economically. They must see themselves blocked everywhere--except terrorism and we are making
progress on that.
6. The officials in Hanoi are afraid for their own official lives, and they also undoubtedly have a
generalized fear as to what China may be going to do to them and their country.
7. Unquestionably the Polish proposal would never have been made without specific Moscow approval.
Hanoi's best chance is to get Moscow to underwrite some kind of a way out. An understanding between
Washington and Moscow is, therefore, attractive to them and obviously has some very attractive aspects
for us.

8. D'Orlandi and the Pole conversed in English. Whenever I have talked with the Pole, he has pretended
not to know any French. I do not know in what language the conversations were held in Hanoi.
9. It may be pertinent for me to remind the Department of the warm friendship which I have with
D'Orlandi, which goes back to my first tour here in 1963, and which was very much emphasized by the
help which the U.S. gave him at the time of his desperate illness when, thanks to your support in
Washington, I was able to get him a plane with a bed.
10. I believe him to be a careful and accurate reporter, and there is no doubt of his complete mastery of
English. In fact, I gather he has really been bilingual in English since he was a child./2/
/2/Rusk responded in Secto 58 from Canberra to Katzenbach and Lodge, June 30, stating that there
might be something in the Polish approach. The telegram has not been found, but is printed in part in
Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 241.
Lodge
170. Editorial Note
In a telephone conversation with Federal Reserve Board Chairman William McChesney Martin that
began at 9 a.m. on June 30, 1966, President Johnson made the following comments about the peace
feeler that had been transmitted the previous day in Document 167:
"I'm not going to tell anybody else this, Bill, and I don't put much credence in it, but before the day was
over yesterday I had the most realistic, the most convincing, the most persuasive peace feeler I've had
since I've been President. That was at 3 o'clock yesterday. I hadn't finished this dinner here with the
Prime Minister [a luncheon for Prime Minister Holt of Australia] and they were calling me out on a very
urgent call--the Secretaries of State and Defense. Now, I don't think it amounts to anything. I'm not a
fellow like Adlai Stevenson that gets a drink in a bar and thinks that somebody buying for him means he
wants to surrender. I'm too hard headed for that."
After a brief discussion of the previous day's air strike near Haiphong, the President returned to the
peace feeler:
"Yesterday they had a man in Saigon and yesterday they had a man in Washington, one talking to the
Secretary of State and one talking to our Ambassador, both of 'em saying that Hanoi had said that here
were conditions they'd never offered before. Now we're analyzing those, and I don't think much of 'em,
although the diplomats do, but I don't think so. I don't think they've had enough yet." (Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Martin, Tape
66.18, Side A, PNO 3)
171. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 1, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret.
SUBJECT
Second Komer Trip to Vietnam, 23-29 June 1966

This trip was far more valuable than my first. By now I've established sound working relations with all
the key people, and have begun to find out the real problems.
I try to make these visits both educational (for me) and cathartic (for others). In the course of a week I
talked with 60-70 Americans from Lodge and Westy on down to sergeants, and at least 60 Vietnamese
from Ky down to villagers. Each got a tailored pep talk.
I. General Conclusions. I return both an optimist and a realist. Optimistic because Westy's spoiling
operations are going well; his prudent concern that a monsoon "offensive" is still in the offing is partly
offset by abundant evidence that the VC has lost a lot of steam despite the infusion of strength from the
north. Optimistic also because our own civil side effort has finally gotten off the ground, and because
the GVN itself has a new wind--born of its success in containing the Buddhist bid for power over the
last three months. It is taking pacification more seriously too. Third, we've got the economic situation
under better control. In short, the US/GVN effort is greater and more efficient than ever before--though
one keeps wondering why it takes so long.
But is all this enough? The more I learn the more I'm sobered by the realization of how much further we
may have to go. On the military side, our intelligence is improving but it is still only one in several
sweeps that really catches and clobbers a VC main force unit. Nonetheless, Westy sees the VC/NVA as
committed to a classical Phase III Maoist strategy rather than reverting to guerilla war. He thinks they
are trying to concentrate in divisional strength in at least 8-10 different areas. Their aim is to tie down
our forces by synchronized though widely separated attacks and hopefully to overwhelm us in at least
some cases. Westy's counterstrategy is to mount spoiling attacks, hitting the VC first wherever he can
pinpoint a concentration. He seems to be keeping them off balance.
But our military effort against the VC is not yet matched by our pacification and civil side operations.
Our greatest weakness is our inability as yet to capitalize on the initiative our own military operations
have given us by extending our control over the countryside. We have stopped the erosion of GVN
control, but I would judge that we have not really extended our control significantly outside the main
towns over the last year. Until we can get rolling on pacification in its widest sense--securing the
villages, flushing out the local VC (not just the main force) and giving the peasant both security and
hope for a better future--we cannot assure a victory.
The weak link in the chain is the GVN and the ARVN. We must get a greater return out of them--and it
would be cheap at the price. The 700,000 ARVN forces are not pulling their weight. Nor is the GVN
civil side. The US is bearing the brunt of the effort--which is neither necessary nor desirable.
My two main conclusions from this trip are that we must (a) step up our own support of
pacification/RD; and (b) galvanize the GVN and ARVN into a much greater--and better--effort in this
field. There are some encouraging signs that this is feasible. My ideas as to how to do it follow--they
differ in some significant respects from the views in my 14 June memo to you/2/ (which proves to me
that trips are quite useful).
/2/Document 155.
II. Stepping up the RD/Pacification Effort.This is essentially a matter of better management of US/GVN
resources, and of generating enough resources to meet the need.
On the US management side, there is encouraging progress. Porter has recognized that he can't run a
billion dollar enterprise without a staff. He is organizing one, headed by Ambassador Koren, a top notch

FSO. He'll report 10 July. With Westy's help, I've also urged Porter to get a good general officer as No.
3, because better civil/military coordination is essential. Most of our pacification people in the field are
military--some 2200 MACV advisers working at least part time on pacification vs. some 300 odd
civilians.
Also most encouraging is Ky's plan to give General Thang, the highly energetic RD Minister, superministerial supervision over the Agriculture, Public Works, and perhaps Information Ministries--as well
as the Regional and Popular Forces. This step should serve to integrate control over the key security,
cadre, and reconstruction assets in the countryside under probably the most capable man in the GVN.
Equally important, the province chief will now be given more direct control over the local RF/PF
security assets available. Divided authority between the province chief (usually a Lieutenant Colonel)
who is pacification-minded and the ARVN regimental, division and corps commanders--who often are
not--has been a serious problem. In my visits to five provinces I found this a concern of US advisors as
well as province and district chiefs.
Next steps. We may need to go further in this direction, however. The crazy quilt pattern of ARVN and
local forces has further proliferated over the past year as pacification concepts have evolved. Now Police
Field Force companies--which Westy has come around to favoring--and RD cadre teams have been
added. The security element of the 59-man RD cadre team roughly equates to a Popular Force platoon; a
Police Field Force company is not much different than a Regional Force Company. Confusion exists as
to the proper roles and missions of each component of the pacification forces. There are also a number
of hangovers from earlier programs, such as auto-defense forces and Combat Youth.
So Porter and I started a high priority study by a top notch inter-agency group in Saigon to redefine
these functions. Then, working with the GVN, the Mission hopes that the roles and missions of
pacification forces can be precisely defined by a GVN decree. Such a rationalization of roles and
missions might also lead to certain consolidations and overhead reductions--essential as well for meeting
the growing Vietnamese manpower shortage.
Some of the most knowledgeable and imaginative experts also believe that there is a critical lack of
enough bodies to extend GVN control further into the countryside and provide security for the RD
effort. They say that all the RF, PF, Cadres, and police put together are not enough to do more than hold
the present real estate the GVN controls. One solution advocated is to shift many of the ARVN regular
units--which are not pulling their weight in the battle against the VC main force anyway--into local
security work. Those who advocate this solution would break up the lower grade ARVN units into
battalions and put them under the province chiefs. They argue that when regular ARVN units are
committed to a pacification (clearing and security) role, the ARVN regimental/division/corps levels
frequently inhibit the proper tactical employment of company and battalion-sized units.
This highly important matter of the GVN military and para-military structure merits open-minded
investigation. It is plain that whatever change in operational roles or chain of command might be
contemplated, the present MACV-supported logistic and administrative structure must be maintained.
No one else could do the job. There might also be local political complications in disturbing the present
distribution of military power. Major changes would doubtless be stoutly opposed by many in MACV or
elsewhere. But as MACV necessarily devotes more and more attention to an ever larger US military
effort, it inevitably becomes less of an advisory group and more of an operational headquarters. So
experienced hands like General Krulak in Honolulu support a re-examination of this whole problem
area.
The MACV advisory effort. Whatever is done about the above, however, the MACV province and
district advisory effort is indispensable--and one of the bright spots in Vietnam. We have 153 subsector

(district) teams in 75% of the districts now, and MACV is considering 12 more. They are really the
backbone of our effort in the countryside. Their high quality must be maintained.
Indeed, I favor a "single manager" concept whereby the senior man in each province or district--military
or civilian--would be designated as team chief for pacification/RD advisory purposes, reporting through
region to Porter's office. Over a year ago, we experimented by appointing one of the US representatives
at provincial level as US Team Captain, with coordinating authority over the entire US effort. I was
impressed by how well this concept is still working in Binh Thuan province, even though the experiment
ended six months ago with the decision to operate on a cooperative basis--not under a team captain. It
stands to reason that if the province chief is a single manager on the VN side, we should have a single
manager on the US side. Therefore, I intend to re-open the question of a US team chief. He would
receive guidance directly from Porter operating in his expanded role. MACV would still be able to deal
with the sector advisors on purely military matters.
The RD Cadre Program is now fully launched. Over 26,000 cadre are in the field (not all well-trained).
We will be graduating 5700 more each four months from the Vung Tau center and the Montagnard
center at Pleiku. I visited three 59-man teams in their hamlets. Many of them were not on duty stations.
Neither Porter nor I are satisfied with the quality of the cadre or their supervision in the field. I have
urged that the MACV district advisory teams (the only Americans down at the district level) keep an eye
on them. CIA is simply spread too thin to do the entire job; nor is AID much better
Colonel Chau, a trusted member of General Thang's staff (assisted by Major Be, who did such an
outstanding job with the cadre in Binh Dinh) has taken charge of Vung Tau. The former chief instructor
(Captain Mai) and a group of close supporters attempting to build the cadre into a "third force" have
been removed. There has been a temporary setback in the orderly development of an effective training
establishment. Porter will recommend any slowdown in rate of cadre output needed to insure that quality
has priority over quantity. The cadre program is promising, but it is just one of many pacification
instruments and will take time to achieve significant impact.
Police Field Forces (company sized units of motivated, well trained policemen working night and day in
the areas between hamlets) are receiving a great deal of attention. The concept is good; execution on the
part of the first units in the field has apparently been good also. Because of the manpower implications
and the overlap with Popular and Regional Force roles and missions, MACV has opposed PFF
expansion. Based on my discussions with Westmoreland, he now favors police and agrees with a 15,000
PFF level by 1967. Again (I will explain how later) this powerful instrument must be fully integrated
with the overall RD effort.
The Police Special Branch, charged with the local intelligence effort against the VC infrastructure seems
to be progressing nicely. Black lists given to US units before operations have led to the capture of many
VC cadre. Likewise, pacification has been enhanced by the pin-pointing of cadre and guerillas in
hamlets. Here is an area where I think we'll see progress of the most meaningful sort.
Land Reform. No progress here. A study has recently been completed but the recommended program is
more theoretical than practical. The big problem is now to administer a new land reform law with the
very thin GVN administrative apparatus. My idea is to implement simple reforms in local areas as the
areas are secured. Liberalized tenure and credit for tenant accomplished improvements are two possibly
workable ideas. Cabot's people will work with the GVN.
Chieu Hoi. Much more can be done. The cost per defector is 1/100th the cost per enemy killed by
military action. We've recruited a new and imaginative chief US advisor, who will work directly under

Porter to step up our effort, since an inter-agency committee approach hasn't worked. The GVN has to
carry the ball, but we can prod and help to insure that the effort at least keeps pace with expanding
military operations.
Area Priorities. Clearly, present capabilities for expansion of area control are limited and may not
correspond with the four National Priority Areas to which the GVN and ourselves are committed. By
and large, I favor instead more attention to those areas where greatest progress is feasible. For example,
with very little additional effort it might be possible to pacify the entire province of Tuyen Duc. Binh
Thuan Province under a dynamic province chief and an excellent US provincial team appears ready to
expand the area of government control. Wherever US bases exist the spillover improvement in security
and economic conditions should allow extension of pacified areas. Much depends also on the
competence and morale of the local GVN organization at province, district, and village. As the RD
mechanism at province and below grows in capability and the national level RD organization takes
shape, this type of selective expansion probably should become the general operational approach. Porter
intends to foster this concept.
Better Civil/Military Coordination. In keeping with the move toward super-ministerial status for RD, the
US Mission needs to strengthen its own machinery for civil/military coordination. I had useful
discussions with our Mission principals, who all agree on expanding the capabilities of Porter's office,
perhaps by adding a general officer as a chief of field operations and top-flight assistants for economic
warfare, Chieu Hoi, manpower, revolutionary development (in the restricted sense), and possibly RF and
PF. Given this organization, Porter should be able to work closely with the Ministry of Revolutionary
Development and cover the key civil/military components of pacification.
III. The Economic and Logistic Front. Here we are doing much better. Ky's bold devaluation plus
McNamara's piaster budget should between them keep about 30 billion piasters out of circulation during
FY 1967, thus effectively braking inflation. Devaluation led to some short term price rises of 10-25%
except for rice (which we got the GVN to subsidize)--but prices should drop back after a few months
unless we undermine the devaluation by too many offsetting wage increases. This would also nullify the
special wage increase allowed the GVN and ARVN, the chief victims of inflation. So I pressed the
Mission not to yield too much to the RMK strikers--lest we trigger a further chain of wage demands.
MACV port takeover should take place shortly. Westy, Lodge and I found Ky quite willing. Everyone
(AID included) agrees that takeover is the right thing, even though Mann claimed that waiting time on
commercial ships was down to two days. I gave Westy the green light to proceed as fast as feasible (he
confessed that after I mentioned the likely need on my last trip, he laid on contingency planning long
before formal instruction was received). The GVN also insists that goods are moving out of the port
much faster under the new 10-day rule (and the spur of devaluation). Next, we are proceeding to bring
AID cargo under the military shipping scheduling and priority system, which will help ensure a
smoother flow of goods into the ports.
I stressed to Westy the McNamara/Komer "most efficient operator" and "single manager" concepts for
meeting civil sector needs. If the military are already doing similar things and can take care of the civil
side as well by a marginal increase in already well-established military logistic programs, let's do so. It
saves money and increases efficiency. We're setting this up right now on medical logistics. (Westy
would like to go further and integrate the whole civil/military medical effort under General Humphreys,
but the latter is opposed.) My problem here is not Westy, who agrees, but the reluctant civil side. Both
will cooperate in the BOB logistics study I've laid on with DOD. My next target for possible integration
is in-country lift.
Meanwhile, AID is seeking to strengthen its Vietnam team and to increase the efficiency of our

economic aid program. We've made real progress toward agreement on streamlining the Commercial
Import Program via consolidated procurement, bulk purchasing, and opening up the Saigon import
community to insure healthy competitiion. I personally prodded Minister Thanh on this front, and
believe I made some progress. AID is also sending a dozen more top people to Saigon. Wehrle's
agreement to extend six months is another boon. I hit the AID people hard on stepping up our
agricultural programs, and getting more help from Orville Freeman.
Lagging rice collection from the Delta remains a critical problem. Collections are up a bit from the nineyear low of the last four months, but we're still estimating less than 300,000 tons this year (compared to
700,000 tons in 1963). A lot of this rice seems to be going to Cambodia, and then partly to the VC. So I
taxed everyone from Ky and Thanh to Lodge and Westy on the importance of an integrated
civil/military rice strategy. "Rice is as important as bullets" was my theme. I even invested a lunch with
General Quang at IV Corps in pressing him on rice.
Porter will join me in pressing for more effective rice control meas-ures, before the next harvest begins
around the turn of the year. He's plugging the concept of a canal barrier along the Cambodia/Delta
border, but MACV claims it will take too long to build, require too many engineer resources, and tie
down too many troops. However, Westy's plan to put one or two US brigades in the IV Corps region
will help a good deal. We will also press more effective resource control measures (the 750 police
checkpoints are largely farcical). Next, I'm seeking ways to use over 400,000 tons of US aid rice as
leverage to force the GVN to subsidize rice purchases and then subsidize rice sales (we'll foot the bill
through piaster counterpart). Lastly, we must open up the Delta transport routes and get more barges.
We are still neglecting the Delta.
Economic Warfare. Aside from the rice problem, the broader field of economic warfare requires
increased attention. For years we have urged that a widespread resource control program be enforced.
Except for some police check points (mostly statically positioned on major roads and simply bypassed
by the VC), few effective resource control measures are being carried out. Yet thousands of military
outposts exist on roads and canals. Ergo, use these outposts as resource control points and employ the
many daily PF/RF patrols and ambushes as part of a system of mobile resource control check points.
Ample laws exist giving military forces emergency police powers. However, the GVN has an aversion
to using military forces for checking supplies and people moving throughout the country. It must be
changed.
The extensive bombing of VC base areas, military search and destroy operations against the bases, and
crop destruction are effective economic warfare measures. But unsupported by other necessary
measures, these military activities alone will not result in economic strangulation of the enemy. It should
also be possible to undertake both active and passive measures against the widespread and productive
VC efforts to tax merchants, truckers, barge operators and the peasants.
Manpower. The most critical commodity in South Vietnam is manpower, particularly skilled manpower.
Since some drastic control meas-ures are needed, I took Assistant Secretary of Labor Leo Werts and Dr.
Kidd from Dr. Hornig's office with me to look into the situation. They are doing a great job, and have
outlined the dimensions for its solution. A carefully worked out manpower budget will be necessary
before we can lift the temporary manpower ceilings that have been imposed. I should have a preliminary
report on the manpower team findings within a month.
IV. Briefing the Saigon Press Corps. Both Lodge and Porter have responded handsomely to your
injunction that they devote more attention to the US press people. I followed up hard on this. It will take
continued urging, so I will regard it as an ongoing chore. Lodge still complains about his Mission giving
daily press briefings (i.e., only the Ambassador should speak), but he can't cover 350 pressmen by

himself.
The above is a mixed bag of large and small thoughts and actions. But I increasingsly see the civil side
problem as less one of discovering any single new key to success than one of much better management
and stepped up activity on many fronts. At the least I can say that we are moving more rapidly in this
direction, and I am reasonably confident that we can move faster yet.
R.W. Komer
172. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, July 2, 1966, 0459Z./2/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority;
Nodis. Repeated to Manila, where Rusk was meeting with President Marcos, and passed to the White
House.
/2/Z refers to Greenwich Mean Time.
131. Literally eyes only for the President, the Secretary and the Acting Secretary.
1. I bumped into D'Orlandi unexpectedly Friday night,/3/ and he told me the following:
/3/July 1.
2. He had received queries from his government concerning the two points raised in Deptel 4108,/4/ that
is the words "take part" versus "participate," and the words "suspension" versus "cessation" of bombing.
/4/Document 168.
3. His understanding of the words was the same as mine, but in order to make sure, he called on
Lewandowski who confirmed his understanding that these words meant, respectively, that the so-called
National Liberation Front would not be the sole representative, and that what was desired was a
suspension, meaning stopping temporarily without any commitments concerning resumption.
4. D'Orlandi said he had great difficulty getting Lewandowski on the telephone, which is why he called
in person, and that he had arranged for Lewandowski to telephone him twice a day at 10 and at 4. He
also has an appointment to talk with him on Monday night.
5. D'Orlandi found Lewandowski more eager than ever. Lewandowski said he was sure that this was the
right time to score against the Chinese. When D'Orlandi brought up the bombing of the POL in Hanoi
and Haiphong, Lewandowski made it clear that this, contrary to what some Senators are saying at home,
did not affect the prospects for reaching a political settlement. He stressed that the heart of the matter
was a political settlement, and not the question of whether or not the so-called National Liberation Front
was the sole representative or whether or not they meant suspension or cessation. He evidently feels that
we must get rid of the "cease-fire mentality," and think in terms of a political settlement of the whole
Viet-Nam issue.
6. Lewandowski was particularly earnest in saying that any initiative from the U.N. or the ICC at this
time would be "most unfortunate." He was sure that such initiatives would result in Peking putting

pressure on Hanoi for immediate rejection, and this would jeopardize the maneuver which he,
Lewandowski is trying to carry out.
7. This ends the report of what D'Orlandi said to me Friday night.
8. This is another reason why U Thant's attempt to get into the act would be dangerous to the cause of
peace./5/ Knowing U Thant quite well, I can understand his determination to get involved, now that he
has realized that the wind is beginning to shift, which was reported from here in Saigon 5437, June
10./6/ I have been thinking of some way to bring about his participation without injury to the cause of
peace and one idea, which is perhaps worthy of study, would be to consult with him before the Geneva
conference, or alternatively we might ask him to present whatever agreement was reached to the United
Nations once it had been ratified at Geneva.
/5/CIA Intelligence Information Cable [document number not declassified], June 28, reported that U
Thant planned to send a representative to meet with Chinese Communist and NLF representatives "in an
effort to obtain agreement that U Thant serve as an intermediary in a Vietnamese peace
settlement." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 4) Lodge
commented on the report in telegram 81 from Saigon, July 1, calling it "improper and unneutral." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET)
/6/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
9. Herewith a comment on the statement in paragraph 4 of the Secretary's message from Canberra Secto
58, June 30, transmitted to me as Deptel 4113,/7/ in which the Secretary says "D'Orlandi is a
professional, although his opinions seem to go up and down in Saigon on basis that seems to depend
heavily on gossip."
/7/Not found; see footnote 2, Document 169.
10. D'Orlandi has a rather usual Italian love of making startling and paradoxical statements at dinner
parties. He does so partly for his own amusement and also hoping it will startle and provoke other
people into talking. He also often has opinions about what is going to happen here with which I
disagree. I doubt whether many opinions are very firmly held. For example, he has been saying a
number of unfavorable and pessimistic things about Ky, and when I knew D'Orlandi was going to
Cambodia, I asked him please not to give Sihanouk the impression that this whole place was falling
apart, and believe he obliged in a very convincing way.
11. There are several things about him which, I think, are of great value. The first, as the Secretary says,
"D'Orlandi is a professional." He is thus an extremely accurate reporter. He has a complete command of
English, and can discern shadings and distinctions as well as any of us can. Secondly, in the very core of
his being, he is pro-American, and believes that the United States is carrying out a wonderful and
indispensable role in this dangerous world for the benefit of all humanity. If, therefore, you were
decided to work through him, you could be guaranteed of devoted help actuated by the deepest feelings
of friendship for the U.S. as well as absolutely accurate reporting with considerable insight into the
implications of everything that is said.
Lodge
173. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Kyoto, Japan/1/

Washington, July 5, 1966, 8:31 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and Ball and approved by Ball. From July 4 to July 7 Rusk
attended meetings of the U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in Kyoto and Tokyo.
Rusk approved the course of action proposed in this telegram in telegram Secto 113 to Katzenbach, July
6. In telegram 2673 to Tokyo, July 7, Ball informed Rusk that the President had approved the script and
added that it was felt that, carefully nurtured, the approach might develop into something. Neither
telegram has been found; telegram 2673 is printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam
War, p. 243, and both telegrams are summarized in the Marigold Chronology prepared by the
Department of State in 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 147,
Marigold Chronology)
1773. Tosec 169. To Secretary from Acting Secretary. Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow are going to
the Ranch tomorrow/2/ and I am proposing to send through them the following memorandum to the
President.
/2/Rostow, Harriman, Unger, and Goodpaster flew to the LBJ Ranch on the morning of July 6 to meet
with the President, and departed about 1:30 p.m. for Los Angeles to brief the Governors Conference on
Vietnam. McNamara arrived later that afternoon and departed the next morning. No record of the
discussions at the Ranch has been found. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
"Bob McNamara, Walt Rostow, Tommy Thompson, Alex Johnson and I have discussed further the
Italian-Polish approach on Viet-Nam and concur in recommending for your approval the following line
of action:
1. Tell the Italian Ambassador here that:/3/
/3/A memorandum of Ball and U. Alexis Johnson's conversation with Fenoaltea on July 7 is in
Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD.
a. We are very appreciative of his government's role and are interested in the approach, but there are
obviously aspects that require clarification.
b. In view of the Polish representative's statement that he would be willing to meet any place to follow
up on the matter, we suggest that Ambassador D'Orlandi, in Saigon, seek discreetly to arrange a meeting
between himself, the Pole and Ambassador Lodge. At that meeting Ambassador Lodge would seek the
necessary clarifications directly from the Pole.
2. Instruct Ambassador Lodge at such a meeting to:/4/
/4/These instructions were transmitted to Lodge in telegram 2626 to Saigon, July 7. In telegram 604
from Saigon, July 9, Lodge reported that he had "stated the four points in your 2626" to Lewandowski at
a meeting on July 9 and that Lewandowski had responded that he would seek to get answers "as soon as
possible." Telegram 604 is ibid. and both telegrams are printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of
the Vietnam War, pp. 244-245.
a. State that the United States shares the desire for an over-all political settlement.
b. Inquire when, where, and with what parties Hanoi contemplates that negotiations would take place.

c. Inquire what if any action Hanoi on its part would propose to take or not to take during the period of
suspension of bombing. (This is of course an implied reference to infiltration.)
d. Inquire whether Hanoi believes it realistic to keep negotiations secret if the United States suspends
bombing with the inevitable speculation this would entail.
3. We would await outcome of foregoing action before making any XYZ approach. If these actions led
nowhere or disclosed that initiative of the Pole was not well founded, we would seek to confirm this fact
through XYZ. In other words, we would inform Hanoi, through XYZ, of the supposed approach and ask
for their confirmation or denial.
This course of action has the advantages of:
1. Keeping the Italians in the act for the time being and, if nothing comes of it, satisfying them that it
was through no fault of our own. At the same time we would avoid too great a dependence on
communications by the tortuous channel of the Italian Ambassador in Saigon to Rome to the Italian
Ambassador here.
2. Directly engaging Ambassador Lodge in a matter with which he is already fully familiar and for
which he has expressed some enthusiasm.
3. Keeping the XYZ channel in reserve either to confirm a negative result or to follow up on a positive
result from the Polish channel.
If anything positive comes from Lodge's talk with the Pole we will have to decide whether or not to cut
out the Italians. We will also have to face the hard decision as to what role we will give the NLF and
how we can make that palatable to the GVN, what performance and degree of verification on cessation
of infiltration we will require to suspend bombing, how we can best maintain our freedom to resume
bombing if negotiations are unsuccessful, et cetera.
We feel that, if Lodge does meet with the Pole, it will be desirable that he say something of a general
nature to Ky in order to anticipate the inevitable rumors in Saigon./5/ However, I think that this is
manageable with Ky, who will at this point probably see in it the signs of a change of heart by Hanoi."
/5/Lodge reported in telegram 642 from Saigon, July 10, that he made an oblique reference to Marigold
as he was leaving a meeting with Ky, to which Ky responded "that he was sure that North Vietnam
could not stand much more of what they were getting." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14
VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 247-248)
If you have any comments or suggestions I would like very much to have them before 10:00 a.m.
Washington time Wednesday./6/
/6/July 6.
Ball
174. Memorandum From George Carver of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence
Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, July 7, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, V-1, 1966 (MayDec.), Vietnam. Secret.
SUBJECT
Comments on Mr. Komer's Report to the President on his 23-29 June Trip to Vietnam/2/
/2/Document 171.
1. Mr. Komer returns from Vietnam a cautious optimist. He feels the military side of the war is going
fairly well but the civil/pacification side is not keeping pace with our military effort. In no small
measure this is due to the fact that neither the GVN nor the ARVN is pulling its weight. His principal
conclusions are that the U.S. must step up its own support of pacification and rural development and
must galvanize its Vietnamese allies into greater and better effort. Mr. Komer offers a number of
detailed recommendations for achieving this goal.
2. Though we should respect the request that circulation of this memorandum be restricted, its only
really sensitive elements are its adverse comments on the performance of our allies. We recommend that
copies be furnished on an Eyes Only basis to the DDP, Chief/FE, Chief/FE/VNC, the Acting DDI,
D/NE, D/CI, and SAVA.
3. Mr. Komer makes a number of perceptive and valid comments on a variety of subjects: the need for
better manpower allocation and a more rational definition of the roles and missions of various
counterinsurgency elements, the Chieu Hoi program, area priorities, the economic scene, economic
warfare, and the desirability of MACV's taking over the Saigon port. He also has some useful things to
say about land reform, though like most observers he misses the point that credit, not tenure, is the
principal problem.
4. Within the bosom of the family, however, this memorandum--or rather the analysis and perspective it
reflects--has some serious flaws and raises some basic problems. Surface features such as its "gee whiz"
style, fondness for the perpendicular pronoun, and breezy bandying of first names ("Westy") are
irritating but relatively unimportant. What is important is its tone of activist omniscience which masks
some fundamental misconceptions about the nature of the war in Vietnam. Perhaps unconsciously, Mr.
Komer is encouraging the President to anticipate early and quantifiably measurable results. Even with a
proper mix of programs and personnel, such results are not going to occur in a short time span. If we
expect such results, we may be misled into constantly re-jiggering valid approaches before they have
had enough time to accomplish anything worthwhile. Mr. Komer perceives this unpalatable truth dimly
(". . . the US/GVN effort is greater and more efficient than ever before--though one keeps wondering
why it takes so long."), but he does not understand it.
5. The most serious defect in the memorandum arises from its misconception of the nature of
pacification, which prompts action recommendations we feel would be counterproductive. Mr. Komer
notes:
"until we can get rolling on pacification in its widest sense--securing the villages, flushing out the local
VC (not just the main forces) and giving the peasant both security and hope for a better future--we
cannot secure victory."
Had he stopped right there he would have been on solid ground and his memorandum would have been
most useful. He does not stop there. He goes on to argue that improvement in the pacification effort is
"essentially a matter of better management of US/GVN resources, and of generating enough resources to

meet the need." Management and resources are both important, but the essential aspect of pacification is
one of doctrine. Without the proper doctrine, management and resources can accomplish little.
6. Mr. Komer makes a number of concrete recommendations for improving the management of the
pacification effort, particularly the Rural Development cadre program. Their net effect would be to give
this program a military cast which would ruin its chances of success. For example, he recommends that
Ambassador Porter have a considerably augmented staff and that a U.S. General Officer be assigned to it
as Number 3 man in charge of all field operations--i.e., the Rural Development teams. He also suggests
that because "CIA is simply spread too thin to do the entire job; nor is AID much better", MACV
District Advisory teams should be tasked to "keep an eye on" all RD cadre in the field. Should both of
these recommendations be accepted, the rural development program that this Agency created would
cease to exist and would be replaced by, essentially, a new form of Popular Forces.
7. The opinions outlined above are private ones offered for your eyes only. They have been discussed
with Mr. de Silva who is in substantial agreement and would like to pursue this matter with you
further./3/ We recommend that the Agency acknowledge receipt of Mr. Komer's memorandum with a
bland and courteous response and not use his report as the vehicle for taking issue with his approach./4/
Nevertheless, we should also prepare an additional paper, not so closely keyed to his trip report as to be
provocative, to set forth this Agency's considered views on these larger questions.
/3/In a July 8 memorandum to Helms, DeSilva called Komer's views on pacification "appalling." He
found "really depressing and discouraging" Komer's proposals for establishing a "single boss" at the
province level and for giving MACV "broad supervisory authority at the lower levels." He predicted this
would result in rural pacification losing its momentum and coming to a halt. "If we have learned any
lesson in the past two years," DeSilva continued, "it is certainly the lesson that the military
establishment is incapable of contesting the armed guerrilla subversion of the Viet Cong throughout the
countryside." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, V-1, 1966 (MayDec.), Vietnam)
/4/For Helms' response to Komer, see Document 181.
8. At some point soon, fundamental decisions will have to be made on the shape and future scope of RD
cadre program, how it is to be managed on the U.S. side, and how it is to be funded. The three questions
are so closely interrelated that they will have to be answered collectively rather than seriatim. The
Agency's written and verbal input to this decision-making process would be the most appropriate vehicle
for presenting our arguments on the fundamental questions raised in Mr. Komer's report.
George A. Carver, Jr./5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
175. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 14.3-66
Washington, July 7, 1966.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry, Job 79-R01012A. Top Secret; Controlled
Dissem/Sensitive; No Dissem Abroad. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence
organizations of NSA and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the
estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the
members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except for the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on
grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY POTENTIAL FOR FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Problem
To estimate: (a) the present strength of the North Vietnamese military establishment; (b) its capability to
expand; (c) its capability through 1967 to send troops to the South and support them there; and (d) the
probable buildup of forces in the South.
Assumption
For the purposes of this estimate,/2/ we assume that North Vietnam will generally continue to pursue its
current strategy in the war over the next 18 months.
/2/The figures in this estimate are current as of June 1966. [Footnote in the source text.]
Conclusions
A. We estimate the present strength of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces to be slightly over 400,000
with about 375,000 of these in the army. North Vietnam has sufficient manpower to provide a total
military force of over 500,000 men without serious strain.
B. The total Communist force in South Vietnam is estimated at between 260,000 and 280,000. The

major combat elements include some 38,000 North Vietnamese troops, approximately 63,000 VC
regular main and local forces, and about 100,000 to 120,000 guerrillas.
C. North Vietnam is estimated to have a current annual capability to train 75,000 to 100,000 individual
replacements for infiltration. By making a maximum effort, this total might be doubled. From these,
North Vietnam could organize some 24 to 36 infantry regiments per year.
D. There is considerable margin for error in estimating total Communist losses. Nevertheless, we believe
these losses are mounting rapidly. The loss rate has already begun to strain the replacement capability of
the VC in South Vietnam, but it appears that current total Communist losses could be replaced, if
necessary, from within South Vietnam.
E. We estimate that the VC could recruit and train 7,000 to 10,000 men per month. The replacement of
cadre, however, is probably a problem and is almost certain to become more difficult in the future. By
the end of 1967, the loss rate may exceed the estimated capability of the VC to recruit replacements
from within South Vietnam, especially if the rate of combat increases. In such case, the Communists
might be forced either to scale down their plans for expansion or to step up the rate of infiltration from
North Vietnam.
F. Present evidence suggests that the total infiltration for 1966 will probably be between 55,000 and
75,000 men. These would probably include one or two infantry regiments per month, additional units
and combat support battalions, and individual replacements.
G. We have no reliable evidence of Communist force goals. By the end of 1966, however, the
Communist regular force may include 35-40 regiments and other units and number about 125,000
(65,000 VC and 60,000 NVA)--a net gain of about 50,000 for the year. By the end of 1967, this force
may grow to over 150,000, provided attrition remains substantially at 1966 proportions.
H. We believe that current and estimated future capacities of the Laotian road network are sufficient to
meet the requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam. Even if this capacity could be
reduced, say by one-third, and combat activities were to double, we would still estimate that the
capacities would be sufficient on an annual basis to support the requirements for the Communist forces
at current and future levels. However, at these higher levels of forces and combat, the excess of road
capacities over requirements would be reduced during the rainy season.
I. Maintenance and operation of the North Vietnamese truck fleet in North Vietnam and Laos is a
serious problem, and the regime is dependent on the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe for
trucks, spare parts, and POL. However, despite truck losses from air attack, breakdown, and retirement,
we believe these losses could be offset by imports. The POL requirement for trucks involved in the
infiltration movement has not been large enough to present significant supply problems. But local
shortages have occurred from time to time and may become significant as a result of attacks on the POL
distribution system.
J. Other channels of supply complement the Laotian corridor, Cambodia has become an increasingly
important source of supplies, particularly food. Although sea infiltration has been curtailed, the
Communists will probably continue to attempt to resupply their forces by this means, particularly in the
delta area.
K. We believe that morale problems for the Communists will become aggravated in the future. Hanoi's
problems in implementing its military strategy have increased, and the record of combat must raise

questions, at least among some leaders in North Vietnam, as to the wisdom of their long term military
strategy.
[Here follows the body of the 18-page estimate.]
176. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
July 7, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 8.
Confidential. Drafted by Rostow en route by airplane from Los Angeles, where he had attended the
Governors Conference, to Washington, and transmitted from the White House to the President in Texas
at 6:21 p.m.
Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles
What struck me about the Governors was their honest eagerness to hear the facts and to hear what we
think and why.
It is clear that even these mature and able men have not gotten a clear picture of all the elements in our
policy and how they fit together.
It is also clear, talking with people out here, that your Omaha speech/2/ was a personal breakthrough,
against the background of your decision to go for POL.
/2/The President spoke at Omaha on June 30. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 679-685.
I recommend, therefore, that we organize a campaign to drive home each of the themes of the Omaha
speech:
--We are fighting aggression; we are confident (not optimistic: we don't want to promise too much, too
soon); we shall persist; we shall succeed.
--We are proud of our skillful, brave, compassionate men fighting in Viet Nam; and we shall back them
to the hilt.
--There is a vital Free Asia emerging behind our defense of Viet Nam. (Several governors came up
afterwards to tell me this was new, exciting, hopeful.)
--There is a vital, modern South Viet Nam emerging. (The Honolulu program is slowly gaining
credibility. We don't want to over-sell it; but I found by talking about how Korea emerged after 1961 I
could make them see why it was possible.)
--Peace. Why we believe that there is a fair prospect of a relatively tranquil era ahead if we see it
through in Viet Nam, but only trouble and more war if we bug out.
--Food and Development. This is the real war for all to fight. (At some stage you should consider a
statement like that I got into President Eisenhower's April 1953 speech after Stalin's death:/3/ you are
prepared to recommend to the Congress that we put a proportion of what we save in military

expenditures, when the war in Viet Nam ends, into increased development assistance. This would put
extra pressure from developing nations on Hanoi and Peiping.)
/3/"The Chance for Peace," delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16,
1953. For text, see ibid.: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 179-188.
These six Omaha themes must be repeated until every newspaper in the country knows them; every
knowledgeable citizen; every commentator.
Repetition is the heart of both politics and teaching.
You should consider a series of talks in which you refer briefly to them all and then elaborate one of
them at length.
Secretaries Rusk and McNamara should do the same.
And all our other foreign policy spokesmen should follow suit.
You may wish to send a memorandum to this effect to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara./4/
/4/In a July 8 memorandum to Rusk and McNamara, Rostow indicated that the President wanted the "six
themes, developed in his Omaha speech, elaborated and driven home systematically in speeches and
statements made by members of the Departments of State and Defense on Vietnam." (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
In short, I believe the POL bombing and Omaha have caught the nation's attention. Our people sense
new determination; new ideas; new hope.
Now, in a quite systematic way, we must drive the lesson home.
177. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 11, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor. Top
Secret. On July 11 Rostow forwarded Taylor's memorandum to the President and, at the President's
request, to Rusk and McNamara. In his covering memorandum to the President, Rostow indicated that
he and Taylor had been "going into the negotiating question quite deeply" but that there were "some
critical gaps." He proposed to formulate these gaps into "key unanswered questions" in consultation with
Taylor, submit them to the Departments of State and Defense, and later schedule a meeting for the
President to review the planning. (Ibid.) The President indicated his approval on Rostow's covering
memorandum, resulting in the preparation of Document 178.
SUBJECT
Preparations for a "Cessation of Hostilities" in Viet-Nam
In commenting on Mrs. Gandhi's statement of July 7,/2/ our government spokesman included the
following sentence: "A cessation of hostilities both in North and South Viet Nam could be the first order
of business of a reconvened Geneva Conference."/3/ This, of course, is not new prose but I would like to
raise the question whether, as a government, we are in agreement as to what it means or implies.

/2/Gandhi proposed an immediate reconvening of the Geneva Conference and an immediate end to the
bombing of North Vietnam followed by a cessation of hostilities, with the ICC safeguarding the
standstill military arrangement. (The New York Times, July 8, 1966)
/3/Telegram 4535 to New Delhi, July 8, reported the text of the spokesman's statement on July 8 and
provided "confidential observations" on the proposal to be put before Gandhi. Telegram 4653 to New
Delhi, July 9, detailed the proposal's "numerous deficiencies," which needed rectifying if the initiative
was to "serve any useful purpose." (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
As I understand it, it means that we will negotiate a cessation of hostilities (which the newspapers call a
"cease fire" but is more properly an "armistice") in advance or as a part of negotiations aimed at a final
settlement in South Viet Nam. Since it took over two years to negotiate an armistice in Korea, I think it
very timely for us to make sure that we are not about to get into an equally frustrating and unsatisfactory
exercise.
I am aware that considerable work has been done and is being done in the State Department at the
planning level in anticipation of a possible cessation of hostilities. I have recently seen quite a good draft
on this subject which undertakes to define terms and proposes a way to use our most valuable
negotiating blue chips./4/ I would hope that this paper or one like it would get to you shortly because I
am constantly fearful that a Communist proposal will catch us by surprise. Any day we may be
presented with an offer to "stop bombing and start talking".
/4/Reference is to a 14-page paper entitled "Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam: Planning
Considerations," prepared by the Working Group of the interagency Vietnam Planning Group and sent
by Unger to Rostow, McNaughton, Ball, William Bundy, and other officials on July 8 in light of
Gandhi's July 7 proposals. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 72, E/Documents Relating
to a Cease Fire in Vietnam) Taylor's July 11 memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, critiquing the paper, is
ibid.
An analysis of the possible course of events in the negotiation of a cessation of hostilities reminds us
that, before we are successful, we are likely to be faced with many difficult situations, particularly in
winning and retaining public support in the face of the sharp criticism of allies, neutrals and segments of
the U.S. public, evoked by the unpopular positions which we shall be obliged to maintain. Throughout
the negotiations, unless we are willing to sacrifice vital interests, we will have to establish and maintain
an unyielding position on points like the following:
a. The U.S. will not stop bombing or pay any other price for the privilege of participation in negotiations
with the Communists.
b. The U.S. will not tolerate another prolonged Panmunjom-type negotiation. The negotiations will have
to demonstrate sincerity and obtain tangible results within a reasonable time after their initiation.
c. If it is impossible to get a system of international supervision of the execution of agreements reached,
the U.S. will reserve the right to decide whether violations have occurred and to take appropriate action.
d. The Government of South Viet Nam will have the right of circulation throughout all of South Viet
Nam during a cessation of hostilities and will have the obligation to protect its citizens and to maintain
law and order.
Obviously, the maintenance of these positions will subject us to Communist attack and will cause acute

unhappiness in many international and domestic quarters. Thus far, I have the feeling that we have not
prepared the domestic and international public for our attitude on these points. Not only have we not laid
the ground work to justify our attitude on these matters, but in some cases in the past we have used
misleading language which invites misinterpretation. An example is statement No. 14 of the U.S.
Official Position which reads: "We have said publicly and privately that we would stop the bombing of
North Viet Nam as a step toward peace."/5/ We need to clear up what we really mean by such a
statement or run the risk of being charged with double-dealing or at least of misleading the hopes of the
many nations who feel involved in the situation in South Viet Nam.
/5/For text of the "Fourteen Points of the United States Official Position on Peace in Southeast Asia,"
January 3, 1966, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 740-742.
As time may be running short, I would recommend that you urge State to propose to you at once a plan
for negotiating a cessation of hostilities in advance or as a part of the negotiation for a final settlement
and that the plan suggest ways and means for winning domestic and international understanding for the
unpopular positions which we will inevitably be obliged to take and hold throughout the negotiations.
Maxwell D. Taylor
178. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk
and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, July 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret. Benjamin Read forwarded
the memorandum to Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and William Bundy on July 14 under cover of a
memorandum stating that Rusk "has asked me to get your succinct private views on this matter." (Ibid.)
For background information on Rostow's memorandum, see footnote 1, Document 177.
The President wishes at an early stage to review with you both our planning for negotiations in Viet
Nam. In this connection, it may be helpful if answers were developed with respect to the following
questions, among others:/2/
/2/The 13 questions were prepared by Taylor and submitted to Rostow in a July 12 memorandum.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor)
1. What are the US/GVN negotiating assets and how should they be played to gain what? In particular,
what should we obtain from the other side to warrant a cessation of bombing in North Viet Nam?
2. How can we verify the cessation of infiltration of supplies and personnel into South Viet Nam, (a)
with third party supervision and (b) without such supervision?
3. If no third party policing of a cessation of hostilities is possible, can we afford to enter into any such
agreement?
4. What is our response if the DRV takes the position that it exercises no control over the VC/NLF and
has no authority to represent them?
5. To get a negotiation started, what might we communicate in advance to the Communist side to make
them see that an accommodation with us is preferable to the existing situation? What attractive "golden

bridge" or bridges can we offer to them? What carrots?

6. How would we want the NVA/VC units to behave under the terms of a cessation of hostilities? How
do we visualize the dissolution and/or repatriation of VC/NVA units and individuals?
7. During a cessation of hostilities, how would we prevent the DRV/VC from regaining strength and
continuing "non-shooting" activities such as propaganda, recruiting, tax collection and accumulation of
supplies?
8. During a cessation of hostilities, how do we avoid legitimatizing VC occupation and control of areas
of the country which government forces can not enter without fighting?
9. If we are to maintain the right of the GVN to circulate throughout South Viet Nam during a cessation
of hostilities to maintain law and order and to protect its citizens, how can these activities be carried on
without violating a cease fire?
10. How do we avoid prolonged negotiations on the model of Panmunjom?
11. How do we prepare the domestic and international public for the hard nose positions we must
maintain, such as:
a. The U.S. will not stop bombing or pay any other price for the privilege of participation in negotiations
with the Communists.
b. The U.S. will not tolerate another prolonged Panmunjom-type negotiation. The negotiations will have
to demonstrate sincerity and obtain tangible results within a reasonable time after their initiation.
c. If it is impossible to get a system of international supervision of the execution of agreements reached,
the U.S. will reserve the right to decide whether violations have occurred and to take appropriate action.
d. The government of South Viet Nam will have the right of circulation throughout all of South Viet
Nam during a cessation of hostilities and will have the obligation to protect its citizens and to maintain
law and order.
12. How and when do we bring our allies into these pre-negotiation discussions?
13. During or after negotiations, is it feasible to relate the intensity of our bombing to the violence of VC
activities in South Viet Nam? If so, we would probably never have to stop bombing completely and
would have a flexible means of replying to VC incidents following a cessation of hostilities. Otherwise,
when the inevitable violations occur, we would have no alternative other than to denounce the cessation
of hostilities or to tolerate the violations./3/
/3/William Bundy responded to this memorandum in a note to Rusk, July 15, stating that "we do not
have, at this moment, well organized answers to the questions" and thus Rostow "has precipitated the
very need that I had foreseen before our trip." (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB
Chron)
W
179. Memorandum for the Record/1/

New York, July 17, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Sensitive.
Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson. In a July 20 letter to Bohlen, Johnson indicated that messages concerning
the contact described in the memorandum printed here would be slugged "Elm Tree." (Ibid.)
I met with General Khanh from 1:00 p.m. to 4:15 p.m. July 17 in a suite at the Waldorf Astoria. As was
previously the case in our meetings, we conversed in a mixture of French and English, with General
Khanh talking primarily in French and with my interrupting to clarify points I did not fully understand.
After exchanging pleasantries, I referred to his previous conversation with Col. Jasper Wilson,/2/ which
I said had been brought to the attention of the President, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. The
President had asked that I meet with General Khanh to follow up on that conversation and no one else
was privy to our conversation or to his previous conversation with Col. Wilson. General Khanh
expressed much satisfaction and at my request went over the ground he had covered with Col. Wilson
but in more detail.
/2/No record of this conversation has been found; prior contacts in July between Khanh and the CIA
regarding this subject are summarized in two memoranda, dated July 7 and 20, from [text not
declassified] of CIA to William Bundy, who are identified in the memoranda by pseudonyms. (Central
Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 78-000032R, Chipwood Memos-FE)
He traced the Viet Cong movement in the South back to the "Movement Republicain de
Cochine" (MRC) which he said was one of several political movements that originated in the South in
the 1946 period, others being the "Movement Populaire de Cochine", which was a French puppet that
disappeared, the Dai Viet and the Viet Minh. The MRC was heavily composed of Cochinchinese,
essentially non-Communist intellectuals such as Tho. It was subsequently suppressed by the French and
its leaders imprisoned. They were released in 1954 and initially worked with Diem. However, to these
Southerners the Tonkinese Diem was essentially a "foreigner" and they broke with Diem around 1957 to
form what became the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front.
While southern-born cadre trained in the North were infiltrated and some supplies, the movement was
thus essentially Southern as opposed to Annamite or Tonkinese. However, various units were under
varying degrees of Communist or Tonkinese control, depending on the type and number of cadre.
However, Khanh said (it was not clear how much he was expressing his own opinion and how much that
of "Mr. Out")/3/ that there were no organized North Vietnamese forces introduced into South Viet-Nam
until after the introduction of the Americans. Nevertheless, he agreed with my observation that, from
what we now knew, the North began to move elements of the 325th Division toward the South before
the introduction of the first American combat units into Danang in April 1965. We did not return to or
further resolve this point.
/3/"Mr. Out" was Le Van Truong. Le Van Truong identified himself at a meeting with Paul Sturm on
July 27. The substance of the meeting was reported in Document 195, and the information on Le Van
Truong's identify was reported in telegram 1523 from Paris, July 30. After serving in Vietnam as
secretary general of the Movement Populaire Cochinchinois, established in 1946, Le Van Truong had
lived mostly in France from 1947 to 1954 and then in Saigon from 1954 to 1963, when he left Vietnam.
His overt political activity had principally taken the form of journalism. (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27-14 VIET) In an August 11 memorandum for Sturm, U. Alexis Johnson noted that
biographical information from CIA files, although very skimpy, generally "checks out with" Le Van
Truong's story. (Ibid.)

However, as Khanh saw the problem, it was a "problem of the South for the South".
He then recounted the history of his relationship with "Mr. Out" along the same lines as to Col. Wilson.
He said that "Mr. Out" alleged that he was one of the three leaders of the NLF along with Nguyen Huu
Tho and "Mr. In". He said that on our list of NLF officers "Mr. In" was listed as Ho Thu, a Deputy
Secretary-General (but of course that was not his real name) and, contrary to Col. Wilson's
understanding, he was not now living in Saigon but rather in Viet Cong-controlled area in South VietNam.
In reply to my question as to how "Mr. Out" was able to maintain from Europe the communication
necessary to be a leader of the NLF, Khanh said he was not familiar with the details but he knew that he
exchanged communications in 48 hours, Khanh thought possibly through the NLF office in Prague and
thence through Cambodia.
Khanh said "Mr. Out" said that some three weeks ago the CIA had attempted to establish contact with
"Mr. Out's" "liaison officer" in Brussels but he had turned them down as he did not want to deal with the
CIA.
Khanh said that, as a result of his talks with "Mr. Out", Tho, "Mr. Out" and "Mr. In" now agreed on a
program under which they would ask for the presence of American forces on the assumption that North
Viet-Nam would not agree to accept any arrangement for an independ-ent South Viet-Nam and would
seek to continue its efforts to take it over. However, they would not want the presence of other foreign
forces such as the Koreans, the Australians and the Philippines, as they desired to deal solely with the
United States. They would also ask for continued American economic assistance.
Khanh said that he had not discussed how the Viet Cong forces would come over or how arrangements
could be made, but he thought it important that we not talk in terms of "ralliement" but rather in terms of
"conciliation."
In reply to my observation that at some stage discussions of arrangements such as this would have
inevitably to involve the GVN and how did Khanh foresee the possibility of working this out, Khanh
said that it would be entirely impossible with Ky and the other Tonkinese now in the GVN. It would
have to be a purely "Southern solution" by Southerners for Southerners. America should reach
agreement with the NLF and then see that the kind of a government was installed in Saigon necessary to
carry it out. In reply to my observation that, as Khanh knew, we did not have that kind of control over
the political picture in Saigon, he observed that we had been very successful in bringing about a
satisfactory solution in the Dominican Republic.
In reply to my question on how we could test the bona fides of "Mr. Out" he suggested that we might
ask him to arrange the release of a few selected prisoners within an agreed period of time or ask for a
stand-down in Viet Cong operations in a specified area for a specified period of time. In this connection,
he said that "Mr. Out" had pointed out to him that the NLF had at one time prolonged a stand-down in
operations for three days longer than Hanoi had announced they were going to be stood down in order to
demonstrate, particularly to Rumania, the independence of the NLF from Hanoi. Khanh said that he was
not clear whether this was at Tet or at Christmas, but he thought it might be interesting for us to look up
the record and see whether in fact such an event had taken place./4/
/4/In a July 20 memorandum, U. Alexis Johnson stated that no substantiation had been found for this
claim. (Ibid., POL 27-14 VIET/ELMTREE)

Khanh also said that Y Binh Aleo (a Vice Chairman of the NLF), whose real name he says is Y Bit, is
the leader of the Montagnard element in the NLF and could probably bring along the Montagnards in
any arrangement that was reached with the NLF. He said that, while, as I knew, the Montagnards did not
like Vietnamese in general, they liked Tonkinese least of all and would prefer a southern government.
Khanh said that as a political ploy he had in mind the pattern of Malaya, in which the British had, after
careful arrangements, brought about the defection of the southern part of the country and the Malays
from the rebels and left the Chinese element isolated in the North.
In reply to his question, I told Khanh that he could be assured that the President was, in principle,
interested in vigorously pursuing the matter. I said that, while the complications and difficulties were
obvious, I knew that the President was deeply interested in anything that could bring about an end to
hostilities in at least part of the country or would in any way shorten the hostilities. I told him that an
individual/5/ who enjoyed the President's confidence and who could speak with authority was prepared
immediately to go to Paris to make contact with "Mr. Out". I said that the individual was a retired
diplomat not now active in the government who spoke good French and who could visit Paris
inconspicuously. I said that he was prepared to go at any time and urged Khanh immediately to go to
Paris and arrange the contact between this individual and "Mr. Out". I pointed out the importance of
proceeding urgently with anything that could shorten hostilities by even a week or an hour. Khanh
entirely agreed but said that the French had been very "sticky" about his visa and had given him a visa
valid only for one exit and reentry. The French in Paris watched him very closely and, if he returned
unexpectedly and applied for another visa to return to his daughter here, he was sure it would at the
minimum attract much French attention and they might even refuse him a visa. He felt that attracting
French attention in this situation was very dangerous and unwise. However, at my urging he promised to
think it over and see whether he could not work out something that appeared practical and get in touch
with me.
/5/The reference is to Paul Sturm, who was "Y" in the XYZ negotiations (see Document 4) and is
referred to as George in documents concerning his meetings with Khanh and Mr. Out during July 1966.
We also discussed how contact could be made in Paris between himself and the individual we had in
mind. After dismissing several possibilities that did not seem practicable, we agreed that, subject to my
consultations in Washington, I would see him again in New York before he left and arrange for him to
meet the individual we had in mind so that they could directly work out their arrangements for meeting
in Paris without the interposition of anyone else. Unless Khanh can leave earlier, he will in any event
leave New York on July 28 with his daughter. He said that, as "Mr. Out" travels a great deal, it will
probably take him a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 7 days to make contact with him after he returns
to Paris.
NOTES
During the course of our conversation, Khanh throughout and in many ways laid heavy stress on the
fundamental differences and hostility between the Tonkinese, the Annamites and the Cochinchinese. He
gave me illustrations. He said that while he was fighting in the North with the French he thought nothing
of bombarding a village because he looked on the people of the North as being essentially "foreigners".
However, he had quite a different attitude when he was fighting in the South. He said the Tonkinese
officers in the South Vietnamese forces have a similar attitude towards southerners; that is, they really
look upon them as "foreigners" and have little care or concern as to what they do to the local population.
He said that the Tonkinese are essentially warlike and their life revolves around making war. This
applied to the Tonkinese officers in the South Vietnamese forces such as Ky and it would be a very
serious problem for which he did not have the answer working out any arrangements such as we had
discussed. As another example, he pointed out that, when General Cao was recently sent to the First

Corps to put down the trouble in Hue and Danang, as a Catholic whose family had suffered at the hands
of the Annamite Buddhists he had every reason to be very "rough". However, he did not do so because
he himself was an Annamite.
In discussing the dispositions of the regular North Vietnamese forces as opposed to the Viet Cong
forces, Khanh said that, while he did not have exact and recent information, it was his general
impression that the North Vietnamese forces were generally to be found roughly North of the line
crossing the southern part of the Pleiku and the northern part of Darlac down to the South of Nhatrang.
As far as military command was concerned, he had the impression that these forces, which were
generally in the V Military Region, were commanded directly from Hanoi whereas the command line to
the forces in the South ran through the NLF and COSVN. He did not think that there was much
distinction between the NLF and the COSVN.
He stoutly protested that he was not seeking anything for himself in this but, if "we ever thought he
could be of service" he would be willing to consider whatever we might propose. He accepted my
replies to his queries to the effect that, after he had made contact between our representative and "Mr.
Out", the discussion should be entirely bilateral without his participation.
In reply to my query, he said that Le Van Hoach had been in touch with Huynh Tan Phat, Vice
Chairman of the NLF, during the period that I was in Saigon. He said that Phat was not a Communist
but that Hoach was entirely out of the question as any channel or contact because he was known to
everyone as such a big gossip.
I pressed him hard on the identify of "Mr. Out" and at one time he seemed almost to the point of giving
it to me, but said that he had "solemnly sworn" to "Mr. Out" that he would not disclose his identity until
the meeting had been arranged. He said that we would of course then learn who he was but he doubted
very much that we had much information with regard to him.
He expressed great fear of the French and what they might try to do to prevent any such arrangement as
well as what they might try to do to him personally. He said the French were determined to make an
arrangement that would be acceptable to the Chinese and wanted to see all of Viet-Nam under the
control of the North.
I did not attempt to discuss with him where all of this would leave Annam or how it could be fitted into
the picture. The strong implication is of course that the southerners do not care too much if they can
make a deal that will take care of themselves.
Khanh agreed that he would say absolutely nothing to anyone concerning our meeting and I said it
would be discussed only with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara at present./6/
/6/In his July 20 memorandum (see footnote 4 above), a copy of which was sent to the President, U.
Alexis Johnson outlined a scenario for his next meeting with Khanh, scheduled for July 23, and for
Sturm's first two meetings (as yet unscheduled) with Mr. Out. He concluded that if the contact with Mr.
Out turned out to have some substance, a minimum objective was to obtain the release of some
American prisoners and the defection of some members of the NLF, but that "a broad political
arrangement with the NLF, which requires a radical shift in the personnel and orientation of the GVN,"
presented "probably insurmountable difficulties."
UAJ

180. Memorandum From William Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's
Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, July 18, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret. Copies
were sent to William Bundy and Moyers.
SUBJECT
The Viet Cong and Liberation Front
We have been looking at the Viet Cong Liberation Front as the enemy, to be ignored politically or
destroyed militarily. I think it is time to look at them as a target of opportunity.
We keep getting reports, based on POW interrogations and other sources, that many VC are getting fed
up./2/ If this is true of the fighting man in the field, it must also be true of some in the political structure
of the Front. Surely there are some nationalists who are fed up with tight Communist control. Surely
there are some Southerners disgusted with ever-increasing domination by the Northerners. There must
also be many in both military and political echelons who are not happy with the prospect of continuing
battles and bloodshed and who feel that their sacrifices are going to be in vain.
/2/Presumably a reference in part to Lodge's report in telegram 879 from Saigon, July 13, of his
conversation with Leon Goure of the Rand Corporation, who had just finished a study based on
interviews with prisoners of war and defectors during the first 6 months of 1966. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) For Rostow's view of the implications of Goure's findings, see
Document 198.
I believe we and the GVN should be working on this in a forceful and coordinated way. The effort
should be both overt and covert.
On the covert side, we should be trying by every possible means to promote high-level defections from
the VC and the Front. We have said that the failure of any genuine nationalist to defect to the Viet Cong
is clear proof that they have no major appeal to the South Vietnamese. The other side of that coin is that
there have been no major defections from the VC. We ought to try by every available means to generate
some--the more the better. I need not point out how the appearance in Saigon suddenly of Nguyen Huu
Tho or some of the other leading figures in the Front would influence U.S. and world opinion. The
group defection of a VC military unit, however small, would be equally impressive.
It would be worth millions--or worth a division--or both.
On the overt side, I think Prime Minister Ky ought to make a major appeal to the VC. This would follow
up that part of the Honolulu Pledge which stated the "Purposes of the Government of Viet-Nam."
I think Ky should make a major speech on this subject. He would point out that China is prepared to see
the Viet-Nam War continue to the last Vietnamese; that Hanoi was ready to see the war go on to the last
South Vietnamese. He would contrast his government's purposes--peace, independence, progress,
security--with those stated just two days ago by Ho Chi Minh./3/
/3/In his appeal to "compatriots and fighters throughout the country," reported in Hanoi newspapers on
July 17 and over Hanoi radio in English on July 18, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed that "our people and army,

united like one man, will resolutely fight until complete victory, whatever the sacrifices and hardships
might be." For text, see The New York Times, July 17, 1966.
Ky calls for peace; Ho calls for war.
Ky wants independence for Viet-Nam; Ho would put his people under the control of an alien ideology.
Ky wants to work with his neighbors and with friendly states to build a new Viet-Nam and a new
Southeast Asia; Ho wants to rule all of Viet-Nam and to put it at the mercy of the Communist world-which has neither the resources nor the desire to do anything useful for the Vietnamese. Etc., etc.
Ky would call on the VC to look at what is happening around them, to recognize that military victory
cannot be achieved. He would ask them to foreswear the use of terror and armed attack and to join with
their fellow Vietnamese in the works and the satisfactions of peace. He would promise safe conduct,
jobs and other assistance to those who come in with their weapons. He would cite the coming elections
and ask them to participate in this new and exciting effort at nation-building and in the creation of a
truly democratic state.
He would challenge both the VC and Hanoi to a contest. He would urge that the fighting end. And he
would say: "Let us see which system is better in peaceful competition! Let us see whether the
Communist system in the North--with help from its communist comrades--or the system of freedom and
independence in the South--with help from the free world--can produce more and achieve more!"
And he would ask those southerners who have been impressed or misled into the VC ranks to join with
him and their southern compatriots in building a new nation.
I think Ky could take a powerful initiative in this manner. If it produced results--in terms of VC
defections--all the better. But even without such defections on a large scale, it would be an impressive
document--good for him and for his cause.
With your approval, I will explore what has been done--and what further efforts can be undertaken--on
the covert side.
I will also draft a speech for Ky which we might get Ambassador Lodge to provide for him on a
confidential basis.
What do you think?/4/
/4/In telegram 23332 to Saigon, August 6, drafted by Jorden, the Department of State proposed a
"psywar campaign"--launched by a speech by Ky and using appeals similar to those sketched in Jorden's
memorandum--to encourage defections from VC and NVN forces. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
Bill
181. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Special
Assistant (Komer)/1/
Washington, July 18, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, V-1, 1966 (MayDec.), Vietnam. Secret.
SUBJECT
Report to the President on Your Recent Trip to Vietnam, 1 July 1986
You very kindly invited my reaction to your report to the President on your latest trip to Vietnam./2/ I
find myself in accord with your general conclusions as to the situation in the area and the long road
ahead. As you know, I also fully agree with your view as to the importance of increasing the emphasis
on our pacification and civilian operations, as without this even successful military operations will not
produce a lasting result.
/2/Document 171.
With respect to how to accomplish this greater emphasis, you lay a great deal of emphasis on better
organizational approaches to the job, both on the Vietnamese and American side. Because of the
weakness of the Vietnamese which you note as one of our problems, you quite properly emphasize the
need to step up the American effort to compensate. To provide additional manpower, you suggest a
greater engagement of MACV in the civilian aspects of pacification, at both central staff and district
levels. This appears on the surface a quite reasonable judgment and one can only support the idea of
increasing the contribution of our military resources to the overall pacification problem. I do suggest,
however, that these steps may have to be watched very carefully in order that they not inadvertently alter
the essentials of our pacification effort, which to date has given great weight to irregularity, local
characteristics and individuality of leadership.
While we refer to the "civilian" aspects of pacification, I believe that the greatest element of the program
is its political content. The various civilian institutions, police structures, administrative programs, etc.
are in truth merely supporting additives to the key political heart of a successful pacification program.
Engagement of the population in a pacification effort, to secure its collaboration in expunging the
Communist fish from the popular sea, must come as a result of a motivated population, not merely an
administered one. Too much emphasis on our side on the administrative aspects can result in the major
effort being put in this field with only lip service given to the importance of political motivation. This is
particularly possible, of course, when our pressure upon the population is aimed at eliminating the
enemy from its ranks rather than primarily to stimulate the community to better itself, and incidentally to
purge itself of elements hostile to this process. A particular fondness of Vietnamese officialdom for
eyewash pleasing to superiors has frequently led to such mistake in emphasis, i.e., counting barbed wire
stretched, piglets distributed, or mass public pledges of loyalty.
I am sure you have no basic disagreement with these thoughts, but I do believe that as we review the
organizational aspects of the pacification job, we should be very sure that all Americans engaged in the
program start from its basic principle of motivating the population as its guiding doctrine, rather than its
statistical successes in terms of VC KIA or otherwise. This would be particularly important for MACV
district teams asked to "keep an eye" on the RDC teams, as the standards they use and their command
levels impose will clearly dictate their measurement of their effectiveness. With this approach, the
various steps you propose seem unexceptionable; without it, I would have concern over some of the
suggestions you make. There is a great difference between arousing local partisans and organizing a
national soldiery.
Aside from these general remarks, I should like to offer comments on some of your specific points:

a. Study of Roles and Missions. This is a highly appropriate effort. Strengthening of the civilian or
political command structure vis-a-vis the military in the pacification program would be a highly
appropriate result of such a study. Of greatest importance is the strengthening of the local structure of
pacification, of course, and improvement up the line, rather than from the top down.
b. Province Team Chief. If these should be revived for more efficient coordination of the Americans in a
province, they are critical figures to whom the general thoughts I expressed above must be put across.
Our experience has been one of considerable success in working locally with other agencies on a
cooperative basis and some problems under a formal team chief. Some of these stemmed from the nature
of our intelligence or operational work; some stemmed from the degree of emphasis given by the chief
in question to the political heart of the pacification program.
c. RD Cadre Program. The problem of supervision of the RD Cadre teams is one on which I believe our
Station is making considerable progress at this time, although I cannot contest your statement that we
cannot match the MACV presence throughout the districts. Against the apparent desirability of this
greater engagement of local Americans with the teams however, I do suggest that some thought be given
to the impact of this attention on the mission and political content of the work of the teams. It may well
be that a search for perfection in management through close American review of the work of the teams
may create very substantial problems with the teams themselves, their political mission and their
reception as "revolutionary" Vietnamese.
d. Vung Tau. We have fully supported General Thang's assignment of Col. Chau to take charge of Vung
Tau. Since Major Mai was so clearly the originator and most effective exponent of the motivational
aspects of the training there, however, we are frankly concerned whether this change may have adverse
effects on this all important heart of the program. We are examining this carefully.
e. Area Priorities. I fully concur with your comments on areas for pacification work. Pacification is so
heavily dependent on the exploitation of popular attitudes that I fully agree that we should exploit areas
of movement and not batter remorselessly against targets fixed by selection from the map. This is
another area in which the importance of flexibility may be greater than the apparent virtues of firm
planning.
This memorandum has addressed itself to your trip report. You are aware separately of my concern over
CIA's responsibilities and role with respect to the Revolutionary Development Cadre program. I have
sent Mr. Colby to Saigon to secure a clear statement of the Mission's recommendations on these points
per the message he showed Ambassador Leonhart last week, a copy of which is attached./3/ The above
comments on your trip report should be read in the light of this message as well.
/3/Attached but not printed.
Richard Helms/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.
182. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 21, 1966, 1533Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon,
Vientiane, Hong Kong, and Moscow. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 1022 to the President on

July 22 under cover of a memorandum stating that he agreed that "our best chance for making
negotiating progress is through very secret talks with Hanoi." (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9)
In telegrams 18844 and 20306 to Paris, July 30 and August 2, the Department of State requested
clarification and further exploration of a number of points raised in this telegram. Bohlen responded in
telegrams 1535 and 1657, August 2 and 3, noting that further consultation with Sainteny would have to
await his return to Paris in early September. (All in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
1022. Ref: State 6653, June 15, 1966./2/ The following is a summary of a long conversation I had this
morning with Jean Sainteny./3/ He asks of course that the information and the source be treated
confidentially. I believe that Sainteny was very frank and spoke without inhibition, although of course it
is always possible that he did not give me every detail of what the North Vietnamese said to him.
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 27-7 VIET)
/3/Sainteny, a former French colonial official in Indochina who maintained close ties with Ho Chi Minh,
visited Hanoi during July 1966 as President de Gaulle's personal emissary.
1. Sainteny saw no Russians during his overnight stop in Moscow, nor any Chinese at all during his stay
in Peking. In regard to the latter capital Sainteny said that he had already sensed the Chinese were
hostile to his trip to Hanoi and therefore for reasons of race he did not ask to see any Chinese.
2. While in Hanoi he delivered the innocuous letter from De Gaulle to Ho Chi Minh/4/ and had several
tete-a-tete conversations with Ho Chi Minh and several others with Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong
and other North Vietnamese officials. Sainteny said that he had come to the following conclusions in
regard to the Vietnamese attitude:
/4/Not further identified.
A. That they were determined to fight to the bitter end in protection of North Vietnam. He said the
country is mobilized, its population has never known anything but war and considered it on the whole to
be not an abnormal state of affairs. In reply to my question, he made a distinction between defense of
North Vietnam and the pursuit of the war in the South and said he found the North Vietnamese attitude
somewhat different in regard to the war in the South.
B. That while they looked forward to the eventual reunification of the country, he said that all
Vietnamese had spoken to him of the necessity of the creation of a government in the South which they
maintain could be done by the inhabitants of the South itself following which, after an extended period
probably five years or more, there could be negotiations as envisaged by the Geneva Accords of 1954.
Sainteny said that he could not be absolutely sure but that he personally felt that the North Vietnamese
were genuine in their view that there could be no military conquest or decision in South Vietnam but
that the peaceful methods would be devised for the organization of a government. I pointed out to him
that in effect it was largely because of the success initially of the Diem government that the North
Vietnamese had organized in 1958 or 1959 the current Vietcong movement and assistance from the
North. He did not disagree with this historical analysis but said that the Vietnamese had been very
consistent in repeating this thesis to him. (I may add here that Sainteny is not naive in regard to the
duplicities of the Oriental mind.)
3. He said that Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong had indicated to him on a number of occasions that

they would not totally reject the idea of some form of negotiation. He doubted however if they would
ever come to a conference or that there would be any public negotiation. He felt that the only method
would be a secret channel by an individual, not too well known, possibly here in Paris or in some other
neutral capital. He said that Pham Van Dong had said to him in Ho Chi Minh's presence that the U.S.
should stop the bombardment of North Vietnam, and that finally after some discussion Sainteny stated
that if they were being realistic at all there would have to be some North Vietnamese quid pro quo.
Pham Van Dong finally admitted that there would be some such reply from the North, which night take
the form of a cessation of "infiltration."
4. In regard to the prisoners of war, Sainteny said that Pham Van Dong had told him that the American
prisoners were being well treated and would continue to be well treated. The night before American
prisoners were paraded through the streets of Hanoi. He said he thought it was conceivable that Pham
Van Dong had not known of the intention to parade them when he made this statement to him. He
anticipates that some of these pilots will be tried by typical Vietnamese popular courts, sentenced, but
the sentence would be commuted. He said he had argued at considerable length with North Vietnamese
on the subject that these men were not criminals of war under the Geneva Convention but that they had
merely repeated the statement that there was no declaration of war. (Sainteny seemed to be familiar with
Article 2 of the Convention.)/5/ I told him that I thought any such action by the North Vietnamese would
be very serious and the reaction in the U.S. extremely severe, and I could not say what reprisals we
might undertake if any. Sainteny referred in this connection to the dikes in the North and said if these
dikes were touched his estimate would be about a million people would be threatened with death.
/5/For text of Article 2 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August
12, 1949, see 6 UST (pt. 3) 3318.
Sainteny said that his strong conclusion from this trip was that the Chinese were the real benefactors
from this war. He said there were four factors which he felt led to this conclusion:
(1) There had been a certain loss of American prestige in the Orient because we appeared in popular
eyes to be successfully resisted by a very small nation.
(2) The longer the war continued the more Hanoi became a prisoner of Peking. He said that there were
Chinese commissions, political and other advisers in Hanoi, and that the Chinese were handling the aid
in a way to increase Hanoi's dependency on Peking. He said the Russians were virtually non-existent
politically in Hanoi.
(3) He felt that the war in its present dimensions, which he was convinced the Chinese would do
everything to maintain, was essential to the Chinese as part of the justification for the very savage and
severe purge which was being done to the bourgeoisie and intellectuals. He said the Chinese could point
to the assistance of capitalist aggressors almost on the border of China as a need to tighten the turn of
the vise.
(4) The Vietnamese war is a distinct obstacle in Soviet-American relations.
In reply to my question, Sainteny said that of course he was not in any position to give advice to the
U.S. Government but that his personal view was that we should seek through secret channels to get in
touch with Hanoi and to suggest cessation of bombing in the North in return for some commitment to
cease infiltration into the South. He seemed to think that such a case might be successful since he was
convinced that Hanoi wished to find some means of bringing the war to an end although determined to
resist attacks on North Vietnam indefinitely. He mentioned in this connection that Ho Chi Minh had

twice been to Peking (he assumed to discuss with the Chinese either a search for settlement or an
increase in Chinese aid). He believed that the Chinese had refused the first and had agreed to the second.
Finally, Sainteny said that he had seen De Gaulle yesterday and made a report to him and he did not
anticipate any French move in this affair since there would not seem to be any prospects at the moment.
In this connection, he said the rumor from Phnom Penh/6/ was quite without foundation.
/6/Not further identified.
Bohlen
183. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, July 22, 1966, 0910Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Rostow
forwarded the text of telegram 1631 to the President at 4:35 p.m. on July 22. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9) Also passed to CIA and Defense.
1631. 1. I called on Ky at 11:00 a.m. on Friday, July 22.
2. As soon as I came in, he began by saying that he had been in the extreme northern part of Viet-Nam
yesterday, and he felt that Vietnamese and Americans now fighting there had arrived "just in time." He
agreed with my guess that Hanoi had planned a double barreled retaliation for the bombings of June 29:
a military surprise in the extreme North and sabotage-terrorism in Saigon. The Vietnamese-American
reaction had, he thought, surprised Hanoi.
3. In a speculative discussion of what Hanoi was thinking, he made the same analysis which I have
made to Washington: that Hanoi sees itself defeated militarily; politically in Saigon; and economically
with the anti-inflation and port decongestion measures. But it still thinks it can triumph in the field of
criminal violence, i.e. terrorism and subversion via the village guerrilla. Hanoi, Ky believes, is waiting
to see if revolutionary development will succeed. They believe it will not, and that Americans,
regardless of military, political and economic success, will tire and leave, and then Hanoi, still
possessing its tool of criminal, subversive, terroristic warfare can start all over again. It is not, Ky said, a
stupid theory. When, therefore, General Thang's program really gets rolling, Hanoi will realize the jig is
up--and not before. This does not diminish the importance of winning the three other wars (of which
bombing North Viet-Nam is a crucial part).
4. Continuing to talk before I had even raised the purpose of my visit, Prime Minister Ky spoke about
the Province of Go Cong, where the local authorities had stopped the transportation of lobster and fish to
Saigon. He looked into it and found that they had been bribed by black marketeers, and, he was sure, by
the French.
5. Turning to the Buddhist self-immolation last night, Ky had the would-be self-immolator talk in
response to questions, with the conversation being taken down on a tape recorder. The man had said that
he had not given a thought to self-immolation and that suddenly he had felt strange (Ky indicated that he
had been drugged). Then the man said he had lit a cigarette and "was set on fire." Ky plans to give all
this to the press. The man evidently was neither a religious fanatic nor a mental defective, but had been
used.

6. I then brought up the purpose of my visit, which was to call his attention to the fact that two
candidates' lists in Saigon had been disqualified on the basis of technicalities. The first was led by Phan
Khac Suu, and had been disqualified because one of the candidates had not produced an "extrait de
casier judiciaire." (Which I translate as a legal document certifying that the subject has no criminal
record.) The other was headed by Dang Van Sung. I hazarded the guess that maybe the Prime Minister
did not realize these disqualifications had been made--undoubtedly in good conscience--but that the
political effect would be considerable given the prominence of the two men.
7. Ky knew all about both cases, and that the law was, strictly speaking, against both persons. He said,
however, he had "done a favor" for Phan Khac Suu and had arranged to have him put on the list. He
realized this could create a precedent which would plague him, but in view of Phan Khac Suu's
prominence, he thought he should do it.
8. As regards Dang Van Sung, he said that he had no co-signers--no team mates--and was alone on his
list. Sung was unable to find anybody to team up with him, even after he had been given two or three
days to do so. He has, therefore, agreed to withdraw his candidacy.
9. I stressed the importance of these elections in terms of U.S. opinion, of which Ky was well aware-also the effect on world opinion. I told him our leading television and press men would be here.
10. He said that the Generals had had a meeting concerning the elections, and had agreed that it had to
be organized honestly, that the world was going to watch, and that they were not going to emulate the
procedure of the late President Diem, who had moved troops into an area to supply more votes as
needed. General Thang had been put in charge of the elections to be sure that they would be free and
honest.
11. I then read him paraphrase of POLAD Francis' wire no. 029,/2/ which in paragraph 12 describes a
scene in Tam Ky on July 16 of what might be the first anti-election action taken by Communists. On
that date Viet Cong attached VNQDD headquarters, killing a number of party members. They were
clearly after the party leadership. As a result of the attack, the leading VNQDD candidate, Phan Thong,
lost both his legs, but has sent word from the hospital to the Province Chief that he would not be counted
out and intends to run.
/2/Not found.
12. Ky knew all about this, and said that General Lam had told him about it.
13. I asked Prime Minister Ky what was planned in connection with regional forces and popular forces. I
said they were badly needed to protect the pacification process and were frequently diverted by division
and corps commanders. We believe that they should be under the primary control of General Thang.
14. In reply, Ky said the Generals had agreed to reorganize the regional forces, putting them under the
direct control of the Province Chief, and, he said, General Thang now has control of the Province
Chiefs. He evidently regards this as a big forward step.
15. I then adverted to the importance of not being stampeded by pressure for wage increases, which I
said simply stimulate merchants to raise their prices, and in turn stimulates further demands for higher
wages. I assured him that we on the U.S. side were doing everything that we could, and hoped the GVN
would pay close attention to this, and try to keep wage pressures dampened.

16. Ky agreed and said that on certain items, prices have started to go down. He had heard an
unconfirmed report that the Banque de l'Indochine in Laos was selling gold. He was sure that both the
French and the Viet Cong needed piasters badly, having in mind the plans they have for sabotaging the
elections.
17. As I was about to leave, he talked to me in a very informal and personal way about his belief that the
time had come to establish a rallying point ("centre de ralliement") in North Viet-Nam for what he
believed were many fervent anti-government elements in North Viet-Nam. The knowledge that there
was a rallying point might, if all else was well organized, bring about an uprising. He made it absolutely
clear that he was definitely not advocating an amphibious landing. He was talking about a parachute
drop of "a battalion--about 400 men," all Vietnamese, no Americans, at a point which he knows of south
of the 19th parallel, in the western part of the area, in the mountains. North Viet-Nam is narrow at that
point. The men would be thus close to the sea. They could be supplied at night by planes. There are now
so many planes flying around at night that this would not attract attention. They could conduct sabotage
operations, terrorism, and help political uprisings. Life would not be anything like as dangerous for them
as the life of the Viet Cong is here now. He said that Viet-Nam has the finest soldiers in the world for
this kind of duty./3/
/3/In telegram 14858 to Saigon, July 25, the Department of State indicated that it would "not wholly rule
out" such a project but believed that Ky should not be given any encouragement for now. (Department
of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Lodge
184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada/1/
Washington, July 22, 1966, 9:19 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by
Miller, cleared by William Bundy and McNaughton, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Also sent to
New Delhi, Warsaw, and London, and repeated to Saigon, Moscow, Vientiane, Bangkok, Paris,
CINCPAC for POLAD, and COMUSMACV.
13905. 1. Intelligence gathered over recent months points to greatly increased use by DRV of
demilitarized zone (DMZ) as infiltration route for DRV regular units coming into SVN. MACV and
GVN have in fact confirmed publicly from prisoner interrogation and photo reconnaissance presence of
DRV 324th Division in SVN just south of 17th parallel and that Division infiltrated into SVN through
DMZ. GVN on July 21 energetically protested to ICC against DRV's infiltration of troops through DMZ
and informed ICC that it (GVN) would be obliged to take appropriate measures to protect SVN
population. GVN note/2/ said that infiltration was dangerous threat to peace in SVN and made "urgent
appeal" to ICC to take adequate measures to halt it.
/2/Not found.
2. To counter what is now large scale DRV use of DMZ as infiltration route in clear violation of Geneva
Accords, USG has authorized air action in DMZ on both sides of demarcation line and artillery fire (land
and naval) into that portion of DMZ south of demarcation line, only against clearly defined military
activity. Before taking decision on what additional limited-defensive action on ground south of
demarcation line circumstances may require, USG desires establish public and diplomatic case for such
defensive actions. By separate tel of lower classification, action addressees are instructed to make

demarche to ICC governments as major step in this effort./3/

/3/Telegram 13895, July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Joint State/Defense
telegram 18807 to Saigon and the JCS, July 30, transmitted newly-approved instructions authorizing
ground operations by US/FWMAF forces in the DMZ "south of the demarcation line while in contact
with VC/NVA forces or when such engagement is imminent." (Ibid.)
3. Embassy Ottawa should inform GOC in strict confidence of authority granted for use of air and
artillery action in DMZ as described above.
4. Embassy London should inform HMG at appropriately high level of authority granted for air and
artillery action in DMZ as described above and of USG demarches to ICC powers.
Rusk
185. Telegram From the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge and Porter) to
Director of Central Intelligence Helms and the President's Special Assistant (Komer)/1/
Saigon, July 23, 1966, 0456Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables. Secret; Eyes
Only. Received in Washington via CIA communications facilities and transmitted by CIA to the White
House at 0800Z on July 23.
We have carefully reviewed the over-all revolutionary development program with a view to determining
the most appropriate role for CAS. As you know, we consider this over-all program an absolutely vital
part of our total war effort here. Our military is involved in it both directly and through advisory
influence on ARVN, arranging properly coordinated military actions to extend areas of pacification.
USAID is heavily engaged in providing economic assistance and improving government programs and
administration under a coordinated plan of strengthening of revolutionary development areas. USIA,
through JUSPAO, is providing psychological support. CAS, of course, is providing intelligence support
and has been heavily engaged in the cadre program. We believe that CAS should, at least for the time
being, remain responsible for the cadre program. All of these activities, of course, are conducted as an
integrated program under the direct command of Ambassador Porter.
The present cadre program, of course, is a result of the work of CAS officers here who saw the need and
went ahead and developed this tool. The cadre probably would not have been developed were it not for
several of the unique attributes of your agency. Of great importance was the flexibility of your funding
and logistics, but even more critical was your Agency's ability to decentralize your operations to the
Province Chiefs and to inject into the cadre a high degree of patriotic consciousness and motivation.
While your Agency originally conducted these operations under an informal clearance from the GVN,
the success of the approach has resulted in the GVN establishing a formal structure in the Ministry of
Revolutionary Development to carry on this program as a fundamental element of its over-all
prosecution of the war.
The establishment of this formal GVN structure, and the scale the cadre program has assumed, caused us
to review whether it should properly be continued by CAS, or whether it should be turned over to more
normal mechanisms for our government's support of the GVN's efforts. We know that there are
reservations on this point in various elements of the executive and legislative branches in Washington,
who have doubts that a secret agency should be engaged in such a massive and overt program, with the

difficulties this can cause in the procurement of the necessary funds, the exposure of the CAS apparatus,
and adverse political publicity. We have also had rumbles of concern from some Vietnamese that CAS
sponsorship may reflect some more menacing U.S. intentions with respect to this cadre program. Giving
these factors full weight, we nonetheless conclude that, if this program is to fill its vital role in the war
effort here, CAS must retain over-all responsibility and authority for it until a better alternative is
discovered. We have directed that a review of the program and its future sponsorship be made by 21
October 1966, as outlined in Ambassador Porter's Memorandum of 24 March 1966, copy attached./2/
Further, we will carefully review the specific elements of the program to see whether portions of it could
appropriately be performed by other agencies, even prior to a turnover of overall direction, so that the
CAS role can be reduced to the minimum essential.
/2/Attached but not printed.
In specific terms, therefore, we recommend that your Agency continue to pay the cadre, which should be
increased in numbers as rapidly as feasible, commensurate with maintaining quality; provide the
logistics channels and advisory personnel to support the cadre program throughout the country; and
retain for the time being the over-all responsibility for support to the revolutionary development cadre
training program, including the construction of new facilities as they are shown to be necessary.
We have reviewed the over-all cadre program and recommend that it be supported in the sum of
VN$2,376,814,000 and US$28,510,000. A recommended budget is attached/3/ and has our full approval
and strong recommendation for adoption.
/3/Attached but not printed.
With respect to the proposal of a new training camp at Long Hai to supplement, but not to replace, the
facilities at Vung Tau, we are reviewing the need for such a project. If, as, and when built, this will be
accomplished in segments, reflecting the arrangements made to obtain additional manpower for the
cadre program, and at the same time insisting that quality supersede quantity in future cadres. If built at
Long Hai or elsewhere, we believe that the construction of new camp facilities should be the
responsibility of your Agency in order to maintain the integrity of your authority over U.S. support to
the revolutionary development cadre program. At the same time, we will direct that other agencies
provide specific in-country assistance to this job as possible and appropriate.
We recommend that the President charge CAS with this responsibility, and we are prepared to assist
CAS as may be necessary in its requests to the appropriate sub-committees of Congress for the financial
resources necessary to carry out this program.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
186. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
No. 1683/66
Washington, July 23, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret; No Foreign
Dissem. Issued by the Directorate of Intelligence.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM (THROUGH 14 JULY 1966)/2/
/2/This memorandum is the Central Intelligence Agency's issuance of a joint Central Intelligence
Agency-Defense Intelligence Agency Study prepared monthly. [Footnote in the source text.]
Summary
1. The most significant air strikes of June and early July were conducted against the major bulk POL
storage facilities. Analysis of data available through 9 July indicates that the air strikes resulted in the
loss of about one-half of the preraid targeted capacity which existed on 28 June.
2. A high level of road interdiction attained nearly four times as many road cuts and cratered segments
as the previous month with a rec-ord number of trucks, ferries, and rolling stock destroyed or damaged.
Through rail service probably is not possible on at least three and perhaps four of the five major railroad
lines in North Vietnam, although rail shuttle service continues on all lines. Miscellaneous military
targets, including SAM sites and naval craft, were also struck.
3. The cumulative effects of the bombing since March 1965 have placed some strains on North Vietnam,
particularly in the economic areas, but on the whole the North Vietnamese have been able to meet their
military needs and to support the insurgency in South Vietnam, although their capability for overt
military aggression has been limited.
4. The recent US air strikes against targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area do not appear to have weakened
the North Vietnamese leadership's resolve to continue to prosecute the war. At the same time, the Hanoi
leadership appears to be taking note of the effects the bombing raids are having on popular morale and is
initiating steps to prevent or curb, if possible, any decline in the fighting spirit of the people. Presently,
however, there continues to be no hard evidence of real alarm in Hanoi or that morale in North Vietnam
has slipped to the extent that it would force the regime to change its policy of continuing the war.

5. The attacks on the petroleum facilities will make the operation of the economy more difficult and
costly. Even before these attacks, the bombings were causing increasing disruption of economic activity.
Food shortages and rising food prices apparently are becoming more prevalent throughout North
Vietnam. The economy, nevertheless, is still able to provide the essential needs of the population.
Measurable cumulative direct and indirect losses caused by the air strikes now amount to about $100
million./3/ In addition, there are other losses and costs to the economy and the military establishment
which have developed as a consequence of the air strikes but to which values cannot be assigned.
/3/US dollars are used throughout this memorandum. [Footnote in the source text.]
[Here follows the body of the memorandum.]
187. Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Johnson)/1/
Washington, July 23, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Sensitive.
Copies were sent to the President and Sturm.
Alexis Johnson and George/2/ met with General Khanh at the Waldorf in New York from noon to 3:00
p.m. on Saturday, July 23. They discussed the detailed arrangements for their meeting in Paris. Khanh is
leaving the evening of July 23 for Paris with his daughter. He was told that George will arrive in Paris
the morning of July 28. Johnson told Khanh that he was authorized to tell "Mr. Out"/3/ that the President
was fully aware of the conversations between himself and General Khanh and that George was a trusted
emissary who would be able to maintain direct contact with Washington.
/2/George was a code name for Sturm.
/3/Le Van Truong. See footnote 3, Document 179.
They went over much of the ground that Johnson and Khanh had previously discussed/4/ but in more
detail, and throughout the conversation Khanh was much less reticent than he had been at the previous
meeting in implicitly and explicitly setting forth the role that he saw for himself in the developments that
he hoped to see in South Viet-Nam come out of these discussions.
/4/For a summary of the discussion, see Document 179.
In good Vietnamese fashion the detailed formulae that he spun out tended to end up, without his ever
saying so, with the logical necessity of his playing a key role. It was difficult to tell how much of the
formulae were his own creation and how much they were those of "Mr. Out" and his associates.
However, Khanh took a very proprietary interest in them. Only from direct contact with "Mr. Out" can
we hope to determine how much of this is Khanh's creation and how much of it is that of "Mr. Out" and
his associates.
In his usual orderly fashion, and reading from notes, during the course of the conversation he outlined a
five-phase program substantially as follows:
First Phase: Conversations between our emissary and "Mr. Out" leading to agreement in principle.

Second Phase: The "signature" of a secret agreement between ourselves and the NLF, presumably with
the direct participation of Mr. Tho and "Mr. In".
Third Phase: The establishment in Saigon of a "transition government" that would implement the "secret
agreement" between the USG and the NLF, followed by a call by it to the NLF for a "cease-fire".
Fourth Phase: The establishment of a "government of national union" which would incorporate the nonCommunist elements of the NLF.
Fifth Phase: The holding of an international conference to put its "seal of approval" on what had been
done, work out a "Federation" in which Cochinchina and North Viet-Nam would be joined (he was
vague as to where Annam would fit into this) and generally work out the "Federation's" relations with its
neighbors.
Under these arrangements all allied troops except those of the United States would evacuate Viet-Nam
and the U.S. troops would remain at the request of the new government on bases to be agreed upon. (He
was very insistent on the importance of the evacuation of other allied troops on the grounds that, looked
at through the eyes of "we Vietnamese", the presence of these other forces would "infringe on the
sovereignty" of Viet-Nam but the same would not be true of U.S. forces remaining at the request of a
new government because U.S. forces would be there "for the protection" of Viet-Nam.)
In reply to questions on how Khanh saw the "transition government" being established and what he saw
becoming of those areas of the country not under NLF control, he said that the U.S. now has "enough
troops" in Viet-Nam to take care of both problems.
In reply to questions on how much of the NLF "Mr. Out" and his associates controlled, Khanh said he
could not answer precisely but the Front contained a number of elements, including Buddhists,
Catholics, Saigon intellectuals, Cochinchinese intellectuals, Center intellectuals, and Communists, but
the majority of the Front is non-Communist. While "Mr. Out" and his associates probably could not
speak for all of the NLF, he thought they speak for the majority. He somewhat airily dismissed the
problem of Communists in the NLF, although he did say that great secrecy was required in order to
prevent the Communists from carrying out a purge.
In reply to questions as to why these non-Communist elements in the NLF had not made some approach
at the time that, first, Big Minh and then he, Khanh, who were both Southerners, were in the
Government, Khanh said that they did not at that time believe that he was really a Nationalist but
thought that he was an "American puppet".
Khanh said that he had no reply to the question on how "Mr. Out" and his associates felt that they would
be able to manage divorcing themselves politically and militarily from the Communists and the DRV.
Khanh said that he had already discussed with "Mr. Out" the release of some prisoners as a means of
verifying his position and authority, and indicated that "Mr. Out" said that it would take a "couple of
days" to get a message back and then it would probably take a week or ten days to effect a release.
When Johnson talked about "not less than four prisoners," Khanh talked about "two or three," but
neither followed up this point. However, Khanh talked about the importance of a "gesture" on our part
such as suspending the B-52 bombing in Viet Cong-controlled areas for "a few days" or carrying out the
bombing in Viet Cong-controlled areas only "every other day" a la Quemoy as a signal to "Mr. Out's"
associates in South Viet-Nam that he was really in contact with Washington. Johnson said that such
matters could be considered in the conversations between George and "Mr. Out".

In reply to questions as to in what areas of the country the NLF exercised military control over the Viet
Cong, Khanh said he had nothing to add to what he had said previously to Johnson.
In reply to Khanh's pressing as to whether we "accepted" the phase concept as outlined above, Johnson
replied that we could not accept anything that required us to carry out a "coup" in Saigon, and the
concept obviously involved great difficulties. It was Johnson's hope that, as the conversations
proceeded, a way could be found for the NLF to fit into the constitutional process that was now under
way. Johnson pointed out that, in the natural course of events, it would seem probable that the
Constituent Assembly to be elected on September 11 would have a heavily southern flavor, and noted
that it was perhaps for that reason that Tonkinese and Annamites such as Father Quynh and Tri Quang
were opposing the elections. The Constituent Assembly would draft a constitution and presumably
sometime thereafter national elections would be held under the new constitution. It seemed to Johnson
that the critical period was between the undertaking of drafting of the constitution and the holding of
elections under it. Johnson hoped that a formula could be worked out in which the non-Communist
elements in the NLF could participate during this phase so that the government that would eventually
emerge would be acceptable to all non-Communists in South Viet-Nam. Khanh expressed skepticism
about elections "in wartime" but did not flatly reject Johnson's remarks.
NOTES
In reply to questions about "Mr. Out", Khanh said that he was of the "older generation", three or four
years younger than Khanh's father, and Khanh had known him all his life as a family friend. Several
times during the conversation Khanh strongly pressed the point on the importance of protecting "Mr.
Out" and preserving his incognito. In reply to questions on how "Mr. Out" was able to operate
effectively from France under an incognito, Khanh asserted that he "saw many people," wrote many
letters, and travelled widely. Contrary to our Western concepts, his very significance to the movement
lay in the fact that he was operating "in secret". He asserted that "Mr. Out" "gives order to Tho".
In discussing meetings between George and "Mr. Out", Khanh said he felt George should not see him
more than once or twice in France, and then that another point, perhaps in Switzerland or Belgium,
should be found.
Khanh said that he believed "80 percent" of the information he received from "Mr. Out" but he could not
be sure of the other 20 percent.
In reply to questions about Mai Van Bo, Khanh said that he was a Southerner by origin from My Tho
but was now completely a Northerner. He said that Mai Van Bo had gone to Hanoi some months before
and had come back about six weeks ago, and that about three weeks ago the status of his mission in
Paris had been changed from that of trade mission to a "general delegation".
During the course of the luncheon conversation, Khanh told Johnson that he knew the CIA had paid
$10,000 to a colonel whose name Johnson did not recognize for a briefcase containing Khanh's private
papers which had been left in a car in the confusion attending Khanh's departure from Saigon. Khanh
said that he in fact was glad that we had the papers because he was sure that we would not have found in
them anything personally discreditable to him.
Johnson told Khanh that he could freely and frankly deal with George in exactly the same manner as he
dealt with Johnson and, in reply to Khanh's request for a contact in Paris in the absence of George,
Johnson suggested that he get in touch with Mr. McBride, DCM in the Embassy in Paris, identifying
himself as "Ray".

Khanh accepted from Johnson, in accordance with their previous conversation, the exact amount of
additional cost that he had incurred by converting his excursion ticket to a ticket that would permit him
to return at this time, first class, but stoutly refused to accept any advance on future expenses that might
be incurred. He said he would inform George of the exact amount of any "out-of-pocket expenses" but
would not accept a "cent more" from us.
U. Alexis Johnson/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, July 23, 1966, 2:26 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by
William Bundy and Miller, cleared in substance by Rusk, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to
CINCPAC for POLAD.
14059. For Ambassador from Secretary.
1. We had high-level review today of election progress as reported in your recent cables, including your
useful discussion with Ky reported in your 1631./2/ Your reporting has been most useful, and we look
forward to your more definitive analysis and assessment of candidates and, more generally, the real
significance of the September elections for SVN's future political evolution.
/2/Document 183.
2. In following paragraphs we list certain negative indications in Embassy's recent reporting which give
us cause for concern. We therefore fully support your frank remarks to Ky reported Embtel 1631. We
are fully aware of realities of Vietnamese political scene and do not expect political miracles out of
September elections. At same time, we believe that Ky, Thieu, and others must be made to understand
clearly that international focus of attention is on these elections and that there is already widespread
skepticism regarding GVN's intentions to carry out free, meaningful elections. GVN leaders must be
made thoroughly aware of importance internationally of these elections and that burden of proof
regarding elections is on GVN.
3. Indications that could be construed as governmental rigging. As you know, this will be most sensitive
possible subject from every standpoint. We recognize that Government has every right to put up and
support sympathetic candidates, but we are somewhat perturbed by reports that many candidates in
provinces are civil servants and that a significant number of military officers are filing to run. This
situation can very easily give impression that Government is seeking to rig elections, and at very least
will focus attention sharply on constituencies where candidates closely identified with Government are
involved. For example, we find FBS 13, 396/3/ particularly disturbing.
/3/Not found.
4. Screening of candidates. We wish to reinforce the views expressed State 8259/4/ that this will be key
process. GVN should bend over backward to see that ineligibility criteria are strictly applied and that
minimum number of candidates are eliminated and these on solid grounds. We note from your 1641/5/
that Government has now approved Saigon lists headed by Suu, Sung, and Nghe, and suspect your

conversation with Ky may have contributed to this result. Article 16 provision/6/ that whole list can be
thrown out if one ineligible candidate is included could prove troublesome, and we gather from Ky's
discussion with you that Government may find it possible to permit list to be corrected and re-submitted
in cases where one candidate is ineligible, or there is some other defect such as existed in Sung's list. We
hope Ky and others can be urged to make use of this discretionary authority wherever possible.
/4/Dated July 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 VIET S)
/5/Dated July 22. (Ibid.)
/6/Reference is to Article 16 of the election law governing the Constituent Assembly election scheduled
for September 1966. The election law is discussed in "Background on Vietnamese Election Law," an
enclosure to airgram CA-4 to all posts, July 1. (Ibid.)
5. Boycott movement. Another unfortunate development, in our view, is ability of Father Quynh's Front
of All Religions to attract personalities such as Mai Tho Truyen and to produce Tri Quang at a rally.
September elections will be dealt another serious blow if Central Viet-Nam Buddhists are not
represented in Constituent Assembly even indirectly and we would be concerned if Southerner of
Truyen's stature cast his lot in opposition to elections. While GVN of course not directly responsible for
those developments, Father Quynh's movement can only benefit by being able to point to evidence of
GVN manipulation of election process.
6. Believe you should continue to discuss these issues very frankly with Ky, as well as with Thieu and
others as appropriate, keeping pressure on them and making clear to them that we consider political
progress in SVN as indispensable as military progress. We assume, too, that Embassy continuing to do
everything within its power to encourage all elements to participate in and lend their support to
September elections. We realize that these are delicate missions and leave to your discretion and
judgment how they should be handled tactically.
7. General comment. We have following additional thoughts for prospective actions:
a. For your use and our own full information here, we are planning to send you every Tuesday and
Friday a round-up of significant comment here and internationally on election progress. US comment
would include both media lines and Congressional angles.
b. Handling of instances of VC harassment may become important. We gather that GVN is reluctant to
publicize such incidents lest it contribute to very atmosphere of fear VC will try to create. However, it
seems to us that background low-key briefing of US correspondents, for reporting here, would not be
open to this objection and could assist in putting situation in focus.
c. As we have already made clear to each other in our exchanges, our basic policy should be to maintain
regular flow of information to press and media, not seeking to conceal defects and difficulties while
trying to give proper emphasis to positive and favorable developments. We have been taking
background line here that a certain amount of local skulduggery is almost inevitable in the situation, and
that such actions have not been uncommon in advanced democracies recently or even now.
d. We have been giving further thought to additional methods of international observation, particularly
best use of Asian democratic countries. We will have further thoughts on this early next week. In this
connection, we have been discouraging idea of individual American Congressmen going out to observe
elections, believing that Asian observers would be much more effective and not open to charges of US

intervention. You may be interested that there has been one Congressional demand for public hearings
on election progress; at some point, this might conceivably be useful, and we are keeping it under
review. In general, we will be trying here to get facts before interested Congressmen in all possible
ways.
8. We gather that GVN campaign to get out the vote is proceeding with reasonable effectiveness,
although with some spotty performance as well. Publicity to this operation would of course be helpful.
In this connection, we note that there is considerable impression here that there are major restraints on
right to vote, including impression that Communists and others are excluded. We should be keeping up
steady effort to make facts clear in this respect.
9. One final point of potential concern here--as we know it is to you--is that Ky avoid public statements
on what will happen after the Constituent Assembly convenes. We anticipate that the question of
whether Constituent Assembly can assume legislative powers may become acutely controversial once
Constituent Assembly is picked. However, any statement by Ky trying to pre-judge this issue or
suggesting his determination to stay in power over a substantial period can only feed the fires of
criticism that he is trying to rig the whole process. It would be helpful, of course, if he could reiterate his
past statements about willingness to hand over power to a duly constituted civilian government just as
soon as it exists. We say this knowing full well the difficulties you face in influencing his utterances, but
trust you will do all you can through whatever channel is appropriate.
Rusk
189. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, July 24, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 9:25 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 248-249.
1785. 1. D'Orlandi, Lewandowski and I met at D'Orlandi's office at 4:30. The meeting lasted for twenty
minutes. Lewandowski talked as follows:
2. "I have the following instructions from Warsaw which I have been asked to transmit to Ambassador
Lodge:
A. "It is difficult to discuss any proposition during the current important escalation of war activities in
the South and of the bombing in the North.
B. "To hold such discussions could be looked upon as a maneuver to force the DRV to negotiate under
American conditions.
C. "We know very well that the DRV will not give up the fight while the United States pursues its
present policy of military pressure.
D. "We have reasons to state that no proposition without the cessation of the bombing of the DRV will
produce results.
E. "United States Government has no right to bomb the DRV and no right to propose conditions for its

cessation.
F. "If the United States desires a peaceful solution, it must recognize the Four Points proposed by the
DRV and prove it in practice.
G. "The United States must stop bombing and other military activity against North Viet-Nam. Only then
can a political solution be expected."
3. That was the end of his prepared statement.
4. I said that it was evident that not one of the three questions which we had asked on July 9 had been
answered, to which he nodded his head.
5. I called attention to the fact that in his first paragraph, he had mentioned the escalation of war
activities in the South as well as the bombing of the North. Did this, I asked, mean that they were not
only insisting that we stop bombing the North but that we also stop all our military activities in the
South while they offered to do nothing in return?
6. Lewandowski said, "my interpretation" is that there are five places in the text where the bombing of
North Viet-Nam is mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. This is the most sensitive and most
important part of the statement. Twice in the statement he said Warsaw says: "We know very well" and
"We have reasons to state" that no proposition can succeed without cessation of bombing. He implied
this was significant.
7. I said that I would, of course, report all this to Washington, but that it looked to me as though this was
a backward step, and that we were being asked to give up a great deal and that Hanoi was not prepared
to give up anything.
8. Lewandowski said it is a question of who will be the first to start giving.
9. I said: why can't each give something simultaneously?
10. Lewandowski read his statement in a very matter of fact tone and didn't seem at all surprised by my
statement.
11. He then said: "There is one thing more in the telegram. My government believes that the contact
here should not be made public for the very practical reason that if anything is known, we won't be able
to have this contact in the future"--the implication being that they would like to have the contact in the
future.
12. I said that this was one thing on which we could agree and that he could absolutely count on the
United States keeping this secret.
13. Lewandowski said that in the first week in August, he was going to Hanoi and that "I can't tell what
effect that may have on this," meaning our meetings.
14. This mentioning of future meetings led me to say that it was obvious that we could not in the future
continue to meet in D'Orlandi's office in the middle of Sunday afternoon. I was continually followed by
Vietnamese police, I understood that he was too. I said that I felt sure that I could get out at night
without being followed, and that I had access to any number of houses which were not being watched. I

said that I understood that he, however, could not get out unobserved.
15. To this he said, yes, he could and that in the case there would be no great difficulty of him and I
meeting in the future.
16. D'Orlandi then spoke as follows:
17. "This is definitely a step backward. I had thought that the first meeting was rather encouraging. Both
the opening and the American questions were encouraging. I felt something might come out and, as a
matter of fact, I still feel this as a hunch. Accordingly, I hope the stiffness of your reply today is due to
prevailing circumstances, and that this channel may be kept open and resumed as soon as possible. We
were expecting a reply. Now we have a statement. I understood what led to this statement. It is the
circumstances of the moment."
18. I asked to what circumstances he was referring. He said to all of the rumors in the newspapers of
peace talk./2/
/2/For example of speculation in the press about peace talks during June and July 1966, see United
States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, Part VI-A, pp. 22-25.
19. I had thought he might say the bombing of the North or the intensified military activity in the South,
and I was surprised when Lewandowski agreed that it was all the peace talk which created the current
circumstances.
20. I said that I presumed Warsaw's statement was formulated with the knowledge of Hanoi.
Lewandowski did not deny this, but said that Warsaw was, of course, not in a position to commit Hanoi.
21. When I got up to go, Lewandowski said with a smile, "I'm sorry we can't have a glass of wine this
time in celebration of a real result."
22. There is one postscript which I should add to make the record complete, as follows:
23. D'Orlandi told me last night (Saturday) at a diplomatic function that he had called on Lewandowski
that morning and had said that Fanfani wanted D'Orlandi to come to Rome for consultation. D'Orlandi
therefore asked Lewandowski how long it would be before Lewandow-ski had something since
D'Orlandi wanted to make plans.
24. Lewandowski answered by saying that, by a strange coincidence, the word from Warsaw had just
arrived and that he would be ready to talk on Sunday. Lewandowski then made the following additional
remark:
25. That realistically this whole conversation with the Americans could not take less than six months.
D'Orlandi gathered that what he meant was that it takes time for Hanoi and Warsaw to formulate its
proposals; it then takes time to submit them to me; it then takes time for the USG to consider the
proposals and formulate their own answer.
26. Comment: It seems obvious that if the conversations are to accomplish something and if
misunderstandings are to be avoided and precise results achieved, this is not unreasonable. I also think
that while there may be progress, one cannot expect decisive results until after our elections.

Lodge
190. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, July 24, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 9:45 a.m. During a telephone conversation at 11:10 a.m. on July 24, Rostow told Rusk that he had
"left the negative Marigold cables upstairs for the Pres. to read"; Rostow also said that "his reflection
this morning had been re press leak" and he wondered "if on next round it wouldn't be wiser for direct
approach." (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)
1788. 1. I allowed enough time for Lewandowski to leave and then talked with D'Orlandi again.
2. He said that after I had left, Lewandowski made it clear that he was "much distressed." He had walked
up and down the room, saying how distressed he was.
3. D'Orlandi said that Fanfani had called him to Rome and that there was now no reason to stay if this
was the kind of line that Lewandowski was going to expound. He was, therefore, going to leave
immediately for Rome.
4. Lewandowski asked him when he would be coming back, and D'Orlandi replied by August 15.
5. According to D'Orlandi, Lewandowski's great preoccupation was China. He was terribly worried
about China. D'Orlandi thought it was China's influence which was making Hanoi so intransigent, but he
also feared that China might take some sort of action which would "mess up the situation."
Lewandowski was certainly worried about Chinese pressure.
6. It is clear, said D'Orlandi, that three or four weeks will go by during which nothing will happen and,
D'Orlandi surmised, this may explain Lewandowski's remark on Saturday/2/ morning that the entire
conversation between Lewandowski and me would take about six months altogether.
/2/July 23.
7. Fanfani is going to Warsaw tomorrow and will be back in Rome on Thursday. D'Orlandi's telegram
describing today's meeting will reach Fanfani before he goes to Warsaw.
8. D'Orlandi intends to ask Fanfani how much the Italian Government is interested in this whole
procedure, and how long he, D'Orlandi, should stay in Saigon. He said that Fanfani had had the idea of
replacing D'Orlandi as Ambassador and of sending him to Saigon on specific trips. Both D'Orlandi and I
felt that this would pretty much destroy the present arrangement. It appears that the minute anyone goes
on a special trip connected with Viet-Nam the ensuing publicity causes failure. The advantage of the
present situation is that D'Orlandi, Lewandowski and I all have regular jobs in Saigon, which serve as
cover for our conversations.
9. Lewandowski told D'Orlandi that he would not spend more than a week in Hanoi which would get
him back here around the 10th or the 12th of August. D'Orlandi felt that Lewandowski's trip to Hanoi
might be "quite pointless" and that Lewandowski's instructions were coming from Warsaw, with
Warsaw undoubtedly telling Hanoi what it was doing. On the other hand, D'Orlandi felt that the original

demarche had come as a result of one of Lewandowski's visits to Hanoi.

10. One thing is sure and that is that Lewandowski and Warsaw--and probably Hanoi--wish to maintain
the current contact between Lewandowski and me.
Lodge
191. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
No. 1684/66
Washington, July 25, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret; No Foreign
Dissem; Background Use Only. Issued by the Directorate of Intelligence. Helms forwarded a copy of the
memorandum to Moyers on July 25 under cover of a memorandum stating that "After your call to me
last week indicating that we had 'a hard mandate' from Higher Authority to collect information on North
Vietnam, I thought it would be advisable to get together for you what up-to-date information we now
have on the subject." (Ibid.) In a July 20 memorandum to the Deputy Director for Plans, Helms
indicated that, according to Moyers, the President was particularly interested in the intentions of North
Vietnam's "leadership with respect to waging the war, the American prisoners, etc." (Central Intelligence
Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Chrono, Jul-Dec 1966)
NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR/2/
/2/Produced by the Directorate of Intelligence and coordinated with ONE and SAVA. [Footnote in the
source text.]
Introduction
1. The Communist military drive in South Vietnam has been stymied and the prospects for victory as
viewed from Hanoi are almost certainly dimmer than at any time in the past five years. Nevertheless,
Hanoi probably feels that the moment for a basic decision on whether or not to end the conflict is still
well over the horizon. As the Vietnamese Communists see it, the allied will to persist in the war has not
yet been adequately tested. Also still to be fully measured, in their view, is the ability of the US combat
force in Vietnam to sustain its effectiveness, particularly in rolling back the Communists from the
substantial ground position they still hold or in uprooting their political infrastructure.
2. It is clear that the Vietnamese Communists believe Washington will soon be forced by the demands
of the conflict to put the US on an extensive wartime footing. They hope that such measures, combined
with the effect of sustained and increasing US casualties, will fan additional domestic American
opposition to continuing the war. In their view, these developments may well inhibit substantially
greater US ground escalation of the conflict and may, in the long run, force major concessions in
Washington's policy which could offer a realization of some Communist objectives in the South. Hanoi
probably still believes that Washington's determination to pursue the war will crack before curtailed
Communist capabilities make it necessary for Hanoi to completely rethink its strategy. They realize that
the domestic position of the Republic of Vietnam is stronger now than at any time in the past three
years, but they also judge that Saigon's programs to win the populace over have a long way to go before
they reduce significantly the insurgent hold on the South.

3. In sum, the policy makers in Hanoi see little choice but to continue to support and prosecute the war
generally along the present lines, at least until their prospects worsen decidedly. It is probable that they
view the coming winter as at least the earliest point at which the long-term outlook for the conflict may
come into sharper focus. In their view, the Vietnamese Communists have the ability to continue the
fighting through this period, and probably well beyond. Despite the bombing of the North, sufficient
supplies of men and materiel are still moving south and the will and ability of the domestic population to
support the war remains adequate. The main force Communist units in the South still hold a powerful
hand, and the Communist grip on a substantial segment of the populace in the South is still strong
enough to ensure most of the indigenous logistic backing needed for the war effort.
[Here follows the body of the 9-page memorandum.]
192. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 25, 1966, 3:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret. The source
text is marked with an indication that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
This is the first explicit suggestion from Saigon that Ky might run for President of South Viet-Nam in
the 1967 election./2/
/2/Attached is an extract from the text of telegram 1848 from Saigon, July 25, in which Lodge reported
that, according to Do, "Mrs. Ky's trip to the U.S. was also the opening gun in Ky's campaign for the
President." Also attached is the text of telegram 1786 from Saigon, July 24, in which Lodge stated that
he thought it "imprudent to rule Ky out as early as this"; envisioning adoption of a Vietnamese
constitution with a "strong U.S. type President," Lodge saw no one else "as ready to fill this job" and
"ready to run."
This should be no surprise: Ky's Directorate has been studying the evolution of South Korea after 1961.
There Park took off his soldier suit and became a politician, barely winning a quite honest election in
1963. He has since grown remarkably in his job.
The Quayle polls showed Ky quite strong when they were taken late in 1965: 92% of the people were
familiar with Ky; 34% liked him "very much"; 43% liked him "only a little"; only 5% "disliked" him.
Only two other men in South Viet-Nam were close, in terms of being known and "liked"; the moderate
Buddhist leader Tam Chau and our old friend Tri Quang.
Since then he has gained stature by his showdown in Hue and Danang; but he will lose because of
devaluation and inflation, unless we really get that rice, pork, etc., in there.
I'm sure we shouldn't hook ourselves to Ky; but I believe we should keep our mind open to the
possibility that he may emerge as a logical candidate, if he handles himself well over the next 6-9
months.
The critical question, in my view, is whether or not in the months after the Constituent Assembly meets,
the South Vietnamese can form a big national political party. The party should have military support but
reach far out into every region, religious and racial group./3/ If Ky and the Directorate can form such a

party and Ky can lead it, his candidacy might make sense.
/3/Rostow elaborated on this point in an August 4 letter to Lodge, a copy of which he forwarded to the
President under a covering memorandum, August 6, in which he noted that his views about the urgent
need for a large national political party were shared by Kissinger, Unger, and Jorden. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI)
A party law in the Constitution, forcing the small fragmented parties to come together in bigger units,
would be helpful. Such an article was written into the Korean Constitution.
In the meanwhile, quarrels and jealousies inside the Directorate are our greatest concern: a sample is the
attached bitter comment on Ky by his Foreign Minister./4/
/4/According to Lodge's report in telegram 1848, Do said that "anybody could beat Ky," who was
"inescapably connected in peoples' minds with devaluation and with inflation" and "literally had nobody
with him." Only Bui Diem could "get any work out of him," and "if Bui Diem were removed, Do said,
Ky would be like a man with both his arms and legs cut off."
Walt
193. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, July 27, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:04 a.m., and Rostow forwarded
the text to the President at 6.45 p.m. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, July 27; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9)
2041. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:
I thought your argument on your trip through Indiana was extremely effective. Your remarks about the
Communists having bombed the Embassy were much appreciated here./2/
/2/For text of the President's remarks on Vietnam in Jeffersonville, Indiana, on July 23, see Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 782-783.
A. Elections
1. A preliminary analysis of the candidates running in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area and I Corps (that is 43
of the 108 seats being contested) shows that of 328 candidates, only 30 are active military. Another 34
are civil servants. The largest category is businessmen, with 69 candidates. 57 teachers, 23 provincial
and city councilors, and 13 farmers are running. While there may be some government sponsored
candidates who do not appear in the military and civil servant categories, there is no sign of the
government's entering a large number of its own hand-picked candidates.
2. Two traditional parties, VNQDD and Dai Viet, are strong in I Corps. But in Saigon, slates tend to be
built around prominent individuals, and party affiliation is distinctly secondary. Except for Dr. Phan
Quang Dan's alliance, the National Democratic Bloc, no party or group in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area is
supporting more than one list.

3. Local election control boards were scheduled to complete screening of candidates on July 22.
Preliminary reports indicate that few slates were eliminated. In I Corps, two or three were apparently
rejected because of connections with the "Struggle," which was a conspiracy to overthrow government
authority by violence--not a bona fide political movement. Communist or police records and incomplete
documentation have caused the control councils to eliminate some others. In the Saigon-Gia Dinh areas,
no prominent politicians were struck from the lists; the slates headed by Phan Khac Suu, Dang Van
Sung, and La Thanh Nghe were all approved. Suu and Sung had been stricken for technical reasons, and
I spoke to Ky about them.
4. There are reports that the Viet Cong intend to make a major effort to interfere with the election. Some
candidates in Saigon have told us of threats. Authorities in I Corps have told us that they expect the
Communists to try to repeat past tactics such as attacking polling places, intimidating voters, and
stealing voter registration cards. Perhaps the first instance of Communist terror directed against the
election was the July 16 attack on the VNQDD Party headquarters in Quang Tin Province.
5. Popular attention is not yet focused on the election. JUSPAO field representatives speak of ignorance
and apathy, with the cost of living and terrorism still the big worries. The government is trying to
publicize voter registration and is producing a "how-to-vote" film.
B. Elections are an opportunity
6. To try to hold elections in the middle of a war, in this underdeveloped country and with no real
experience of democracy on a national scale, is difficult, complicated, unprecedented and dangerous.
We must expect turbulence. Very few countries--developed or otherwise--hold elections in war time.
Neither the British nor the French did during World War II.
7. But in spite of these considerations, I believe that holding elections in Viet-Nam at about this time
had to be tried. The heart of this war, after all, is political, and the elections, while a danger, are also an
opportunity for our side to look clean, to make it clear that cheating in Viet-Nam is really on the way
out. It is no exaggeration to say that if our side looks clean, this can change the course of the war.
8. This is because the Communists, while brutal, imperialistic, ruthless, unscrupulous, crafty and cruel,
appear puritanical by insisting that corruption exists on our side only. One rarely hears of a corrupt
Communist--at least while he is with their organization, but their abandonment of their own movement
and its values when they defect or are captured cast strong doubt on their supposed internal morality.
Nonetheless they are widely believed to be incorruptible.
9. I have put Lansdale onto the job of helping to bring about this big psychological victory. This is what
he did in the Philippines, admittedly an easier problem than this because of their island status. Another
asset which should stand him in good stead is the excellent relationship which he has developed with
General Thang, whom Ky has had the good sense to put in charge of the administration of the election
laws. I hope that all this will work together.
10. I have suggested to Lansdale that he draft a brief statement of guidance for Thang to publish under
his own name, listing the essential points: free speech for all candidates; travel in their districts, as far as
the war permits; no intimidation of candidates or of voters during the campaign and on election day;
watchers at the polls; and count of the ballots in the presence of all the watchers. After Thang has issued
this statement, I would then put it out to all the Americans in Viet-Nam as guidelines for them to follow
in their relationship with the Vietnamese.

11. I have also asked Lansdale to interest himself in the growth of national parties. They expect there
will be about 700 candidates for about 100 seats. Will there be any organization that seeks to endorse
candidates in every one of the 100 odd districts?
C. Course of the war
12. Keyes Beech of the Chicago Daily News is the most senior and most experienced daily
newspaperman in Viet-Nam, and one who has many times expressed his disgust at the journalism which
is practiced here. He also has in the past criticized what he thought was the U.S. role in the '63 coup. He
recently came in for backgrounding and, after we finished talking, volunteered the statement that
obviously the situation in Viet-Nam is "much, much better." When I asked him what he meant by that,
he said it was "much better than it was a year ago." Then after short pause, he said it was "much better
than it was when you and I first started talking three years ago." Finally he said that it's the best it's ever
been.
13. He thinks roughly: that we are winning militarily, politically and economically; and that once Hanoi
is convinced we have learned how to overcome subversion, terrorism and criminal violence generally,
they will stop--provided we continue to maintain momentum militarily, politically and economically. He
does not anticipate ChiCom intervention or escalation into World War III, or a demand by the American
public to bring the boys home. He does not think any publicized trips, such as those of Ronning or
Sainteny or Wilson or Gandhi will accomplish anything, but that there will be a secret understanding
and a quiet fade-out.
14. Beech has a house in Tokyo and travels all through the East. He says a new tide is running which
makes the old fashioned anti-Americanism obsolete. People like Bhutto in Pakistan, who saw a career in
trying to be a junior Krishna Menon, are out of step with the times. In none of the countries bordering
China is there a move toward Communism. Although the U.S. has been clumsy and made mistakes,
there is no doubt that our policies are beginning to bear fruit.
15. Beech says that once a place has felt the touch of the American bulldozer it is never the same again.
The reason for the phenomenal growth in Korea is because during the American stay there, we trained
many young men in handling the modern machinery which spells development of the country--that is
bulldozers, trucks, airplanes, electrical equipment of all kinds. This is one of the things we leave behind
us, which starts to grow after we have gone. He thinks that the progress in South Korea today is so great
and dynamic and is having such a magnetic effect on North Korea that it may eventually unify the North
and the South.
16. Comment: In Viet-Nam, we are doing the same thing--training young men in handling modern
equipment. This is one reason why our decision to construct a big trade school in Saigon is valuable, and
why we insist our contractors do on-the-job training. It helps to train the Vietnamese to develop their
own resources; it will be giving them an educational institution and training which they really want (as
compared with university educational facilities about which there is a great deal of doubt in my mind),
and it is enormously popular.
D. Pacification
17. I hate to say this, but I cannot see that any really big and significant headway is being made on
pacification. I talked with a very dependable man last night who had just been in Long An, which is the
province immediately south of Saigon, and on which I used to concentrate in my first year here and he
said the situation there is just about what it was three years ago./3/

/3/In a July 27 letter to Porter, Komer stated that "the civil side is a mess. Compared to our military
operations, it's still farcical. There are many reasons, few of them your fault or mine. But we inherited
this mess, indeed we were both appointed because it was such a mess; and from here on we're tagged
with straightening it out. The President wants results." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer
Files, Porter/Komer Numbered Letters)
18. The reason is easy to find. It is that GVN will not give pacification the proper priority. I get reports
which I am investigating that ARVN is not fitted to handle it--or else does not want to, or both. I am told
that the present kind of war has become a way of life with ARVN and that the American logistic support
is making it even more so. Apparently they won't want to chance anything.
19. We are surely better organized on the American side than ever before and the Vietnamese have an
organization headed by General Thang which is potentially better than they have ever had before. But
General Thang is not being given the tools to do the job, particularly in the form of military means to
protect the process of pacification. Everything should be geared to that.
20. What distresses me about this is that I believe our successes in military and other fields make this a
particularly good time for a really effective body blow at the village guerrilla, and at terrorism, and
subversion and criminal violence generally. Such a body blow would, I believe, very seriously diminish
all recruiting into the Viet Cong, which depends overwhelmingly on terror. If you can stop recruits from
going into the Viet Cong, you are crippling it just as surely as if you defeat it in battle.
21. Also I believe that Hanoi will regard their proficiency at terrorism as their ace in the hole--their way
to start all over again, even though they are defeated militarily, politically and economically.
E. Casualties, military and civilian
22. American military casualties this week were 108 killed and 478 wounded. Seven were listed as
captured or missing. The Communists lost 1,272 killed and 120 captured as compared with the previous
week's total of 1,200 killed and 116 captured.
23. In a typical attack on civilians, the Viet Cong raided a refugee resettlement village near Quang Tin
Province headquarters. They killed three refugees, wounded eleven, and left 145 homeless when they
burned 11 buildings. The total number of civilians killed this week by the Viet Cong was 33, including
one hamlet chief; 66 others were wounded.
F. Economic
24. This week, for the first time since devaluation, the USAID retail price index was down two percent-probably due mostly to an increase in the official price of live hogs in Saigon. It is hoped that this will
increase pork supplies by encouraging growers to send more hogs to market. The price of pork in Saigon
fell ten percent or more following the announcement of the official increase. Imported commodity prices
also dropped in most instances, breaking rises which had been continuous since before devaluation. Our
rice sales seem to be helping hold the line in that respect. We are endeavoring to produce a rational rice
policy for GVN acceptance and I will have more to report on this.
25. Port improvement surveys for Da Nang, Ba Ngoi and Nha Trang have been completed and designs
are in the final stages. A contract between the Navy and designers of port construction (World Wide
Consultants) was signed last week.

26. USAID cargo continued to move out of the port at an ever-increasing rate and, I am assured by
General Breakfield of USAID, that this rate shows definite improvement over the past three weeks.
General Pham Dang Lan, new port director, has formed a series of sub-committees to study port
problems and recommend solutions by July 27. The 4th Transportation Corps (which is taking over
supervision and control of the port of Saigon) and GVN customs officials have been meeting to work
out ground rules of customs administration by the GVN within and under ARVN and U.S. military
control.
G. Psychological progress
27. From July 16 to July 22, 322 returnees entered Chieu Hoi centers. This is an increase over the 256
reported last week, but still below the 339 which came in during the week of July 2. The total number of
returnees this year now stands at 10,754. For the same period last year, January through July, the total
was 4,686. The total for all of 1965 was 11,124. If the present rate continues, the number of returnees
this year may equal in eight months the total for all of 1965. Daily average this year is 52.9 as compared
with 30.4 for 1965.
28. The successful youth project in Saigon's District VIII is now being extended to District VI. As in the
first project, selected youth leaders will take over the government of the district as well as the
organization of a comprehensive program of civil improvements. Other youth activities include 73 work
camps set up in July, with participation by 5,000 students.
H. U.S. Congressional candidates
29. Two candidates for Congress were here last week, one Republican and one Democrat--Robert Taft
of Cincinnati, Ohio, and Clive Du Val of McLean, Virginia. Very confidentially, both appeared well
impressed by our effort here and thought that they had learned much which they had not known before.
Mr. Taft left a note of thanks, saying:
30. "Your staff has been extraordinarily helpful in every way as has the establishment at JUSPAO. This
has enabled me to get maximum coverage in the shortest period of time. The experience has been an
exciting and interesting one. The extent and necessity of the effort here is not sufficiently understood
and my own views have been fortified so that they can be better expressed. If I can be of service in any
way that can help the picture here, please call on me."
Lodge
194. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, July 29, 1966, 1141Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
1218. 1. In my meeting with Foreign Minister Thanat this morning, he said he had been giving
considerable thought to what new initiatives might be made prior to the beginning of the UN General
Assembly. He referred to the proposal previously tentatively advanced by Secretary for a meeting of
Foreign Ministers of the nations contributing troops in South Vietnam. He also alluded to the
unsuccessful attempts to get any constructive action out of the Geneva Co-chairmen on U.S. willingness
to expand the ICC activities on the Cambodian borders, and further to the unsuccessful attempts of
PriMin Wilson and PriMin Gandhi to move the Soviets towards any constructive utilization of their

position as Co-chairman. He said he would like the Secretary's reaction to the thought of having the
Japanese invite the FonMins of SVN and the troop-contributing nations and the FonMins of the regimes
in Hanoi and Peiping and possibly also the Soviets to meet in Tokyo sometime in early September.
2. Thanat explained that if we continued to depend upon the Co-chairmen machinery as the only device
for negotiations, we were giving the Soviets not only a veto power, but making their position
increasingly difficult since they were vulnerable to Chinese criticism had they made any forthcoming
moves regarding the reconvening of either of the Geneva conferences. It might be time, Thanat thought,
for an Asian initiative honestly seeking to break this impasse. He did not think the Chinese would agree,
although he thought it might have quite a bit of attractiveness for Hanoi. He thought that even in the
event of the highly likely refusal of both regimes of such an invitation, it would allow us to go into the
General Assembly with still another demonstration of the intransigence of the Communist camp. On
other hand, in the unlikely event of the acceptance of such an invitation, he assumed that we would be
prepared to participate.
3. Thanat pointed out that his own appraisal of Shiina and Sato led him to believe that, after their initial
shock, they might be attracted by the thought. He recalled that in the 15 months patient preparations for
the Seoul conference he had brought a great deal of pressure on both the Koreans and Japanese to settle
their outstanding differences before he would agree to facilitate the preparations for the conference
which was finally held. In this process he said he had come to have an increasing respect for both Sato
and Shiina and thought that together they could handle any initial internal Japanese opposition.
4. I said I would immediately convey his thoughts to the Secretary./2/
/2/In telegram 1881 to Bangkok, June 30, the Department replied that Thanat's proposal had, in its view,
"no chance of success," but it would not deter Thanat from trying it out with Shiina. (Ibid.) Thanat
announced his proposal on August 3. Rostow indicated in a telephone conversation with Rusk on
August 4 that the President was "quite excited about it"; Rusk replied that "we had a session on this
yesterday and we are quite enthusiastic about going ahead with this; the problem is the kiss of death
problem." (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) On August 5 Rusk endorsed the proposal at a news
conference. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 848) In telegram 22271 to Tokyo,
August 5, Rusk instructed Reischauer to convey "our favorable view" to Japanese leaders. (Department
of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Circular telegram 36816, August 27, reported that "Japan's
vigorous support" had been the "most hopeful immediate outcome" of the proposal but that "reaction
from other 15 Asian states to which proposal was addressed has been reserved or distinctly
skeptical." (Ibid.)
Martin
195. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 30, 1966, 1100Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Priority;
Nodis; Elm Tree. Drafted and authenticated by Bohlen. According to a July 30 cover memorandum, U.
Alexis Johnson sent a copy of the telegram to the President on August 1. (Ibid.) George, Ray, and Out
are code names for Sturm, Khanh, and Le Van Truong, respectively.
1522. 1. George met noon 27th with Ray and Out for four-hour lunch at secluded restaurant and stroll in
park of St. Cloud. Ray present during most of talk but both men seized occasion as it arose for private

work with George. Ray helpful in keeping Out to issues at hand when latter tended to stray into jungle
of Vietnamese politics. Out's identity and history, the major themes of conversation, are subject of
separate message;/2/ he is extremely sensitive this matter and welcomed assurances his name would
become known only to handful of men in highest positions of U.S. Government. In these messages,
therefore, he will be referred to by cover name. Following is summary of highlights of conversation
which ranged widely over twenty years of Vietnamese history and politics.
/2/Telegram 1523 from Paris, July 30; see footnote 3, Document 179.
2. Out presented himself as a Cochinchinese nationalist, of intellectual stripe, accustomed to good
bourgeois comfort and with horror of physical combat and miseries of life in the Maquis, which his
friend Nguyen Huu Tho appears able to tolerate. He expressed abhorrence and fear of Communists and
apprehensiveness of DRV Mission in Paris. He is interested first in Cochinchina autonomy, second in a
Vietnamese federation, and ultimately in an Indochinese federation to include Laos and Cambodia,
although Sihanouk's instability seems to him an obstacle. Except for regional bias, Out's point of view as
far as he expressed it to George, held few surprises. He appeared eager to use any means to bring war to
an end before Cochinchina could be submerged by North (DRV) or Northerners (like present Premier).
His conversation reflected no hostility toward U.S. or Americans except as sustainers of governments
not chosen by people. He spoke with feeling of Diem government as bad U.S. creation.
3. Out's channel of communication to Vietnam is liaison officer stationed at Prague, who makes weekly
visits here to carry messages. Ordered to report 28th to be available following meeting with George, he
failed to appear. Moreover, Out was notified 28th by DST (French equivalent of FBI) not to leave
French territory. Out feared liaison officer may have been intercepted carrying documents which
compromised Out. Whereas he had hoped be able prove his bona fides and authority within two weeks,
he now believed a month would be required.
4. George asked how Out was able to maintain his authority at so great a distance. Out gave no clear
answer except to allude to subsequent performance of which he seemed sure, even though execution
might be delayed.
5. Asked how and where next steps might be carried out if U.S. received proper assurances, Out said
best locale might be Saigon. George expressed doubt and suggested it might be possible arrange for Tho
and others to proceed to safe neutral spot where talks could take place in suitable atmosphere. Out
replied that Tho was in effect a prisoner, not because he was detained but because he and his associates
feared he might be replaced by someone unacceptable to them. George commented that U.S. view of
coalitions including Communist elements was that these tended to become Communist tools. Out
admitted FLN contained Communist members but said it was no more under Communist direction than
the Movement Populaire Cochinchinois of 1946. (His statement regarding Tho suggested less
confidence.)
6. With reference to possible outcome of contacts between U.S. Government and FLN, Out had little
precise to offer but tenor of his remarks suggested belief that somehow might emerge a cessation of
military action in Cochinchina, popular election of government in South acceptable to FLN, and gradual
diminution of hostilities in 17th parallel region as upper hand is gained by U.S. forces, which would
remain as "protection."
7. George handed over prisoner list which Out pocketed without glancing at it. He accepted without
comment George's statement U.S. would consider acceptable evidence release any two civilians and any
two military, with preference for those needing medical care. Ray mentioned possibility of quid pro quo.

Out misunderstood this as reference to money and took offense. Reassured, he replied subject could be
discussed later. Alone with George thereafter, Out said he would not ask for corresponding gesture on
part of U.S.
8. Since delay in prisoner release seemed certain, George said he would report conversation to
Washington and propose temporary return to his home. Simple code message based on reference to car
would bring him back to Paris within hours to resume contact. Communication would be through Ray as
Out indicated that great concern for his safety and especially for his wife, who is cardiac, made him
reluctant have any possible compromising document about him. George said before he left Paris he
would let Ray know. Ray too expressed some anxiety regarding his own security. He would return to
Spain if need arose as his visa is still valid. In reply to question, both men explained fear of French on
grounds latter have "own plan" for Vietnam.
Comment: In this tangle of improbables, George feels some confidence in Out's sincerity. Certainly
there was no doubt of his cordiality, to which George responded in kind. Whether Out can in the end
produce remains to be seen./3/ On balance it seems at this time U.S. has nothing to lose in playing along
with Out and company as long as interests of both parties remain parallel. This may not be very far. We
might, however, along the way, win freedom for some prisoners and to some extent undermine NLF.
George did all possible to assure Out of importance U.S. attaches to contact and its maintenance. In the
early phases, such risks as there are threaten Out and his friends rather than U.S.
/3/In telegram 55594 to Paris, September 28, U. Alexis Johnson asked McBride to tell Khanh: "Have
heard nothing since George's meeting two months ago and nothing has happened." McBride replied in
telegram 4675, September 30, that an Embassy official had met earlier that day with Khanh, who stated
that Le Van Truong had delivered the message regarding the release of prisoners to Tho "about a month
ago." Telegram 5440 from Paris, October 13, reported that Khanh had again seen Le Van Truong, who
was under the impression that one U.S. prisoner on Sturm's list had been released but was very disturbed
about his failure to deliver on the agreed-on number, since it cast doubt on his influence within the NLF.
Le Van Truong further stated that if the authority of non-Communist elements was waning within the
NLF, it was due to Hanoi's recently increased efforts to strengthen its influence, which had led to tension
between Hanoi and the NLF. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ELMTREE)
In meeting, Ray played role of honest broker with more seeming disinterest than he displayed in New
York. In aside to George he said much of what Out had to say of himself and his history he had never
heard before despite intimacy of their families. His attitude was one of slight aloofness, which may have
reflected some apprehension or reluctance on part of one of his former eminence to serve as a "letter
box" (his word). Out's manner toward Ray, however, suggested latter was trusted collaborator.
It is clear that Out's point of view in many respects departs from reality as U.S. sees it, and his claims
and pretentions in the eyes of a detached observer are implausible on the face of them. Nevertheless,
Vietnamese politics is a sphere in which the implausible need not be synonymous with the impossible.
Note: George requests authorization proceed as stated numbered paragraph 8 above.
Bohlen
196. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 2, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Kissinger, 1966. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by

Stearns.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador-at-Large
Henry A. Kissinger, Professor of International Law, Harvard
Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant, FE
Monteagle Stearns, Special Assistant, S/AH
Professor Kissinger came in at the Governor's request to give his impressions of the situation in Vietnam
following his recent visit there./2/ He explained that this had been his second trip to Vietnam. His first
visit was in October of 1965.
/2/Kissinger visited Vietnam July 16-29.
Atmosphere
Professor Kissinger emphasized the conspiratorial atmosphere which he said prevailed throughout South
Vietnam. He had never visited a country which was so self-absorbed. During his two visits and
countless conversations with Vietnamese he did not recall being asked a single question about problems
outside Vietnam. He was also impressed by the amount of backbiting that went on among the
Vietnamese and the value they attached to qualities like cleverness and cunning as opposed to attributes
like probity and integrity which were esteemed in the Western World. He recalled a long conversation
he had had with a Provincial Official in the First Corps area. The official had described with
considerable pride the tricks and maneuvers he had employed at the time of the struggle movement crisis
to avoid committing himself either to the Government or the struggle forces. To many Vietnamese,
conspiracy had become a way of life making political stability that much harder to achieve.
Military Situation
Kissinger acknowledged that the influx of American troops into Vietnam had resulted in a short term
improvement in the military situation. In the Spring of 1965 Hanoi and the Viet Cong had entertained
real hopes of a military victory. Their prospects for achieving this in the foreseeable future had been
greatly diminished. Nevertheless, Kissinger thought that the basic situation had not changed since
October of '65.
In his travels outside Saigon Kissinger had seen no sign that the Viet Cong's political organization and
capacity for guerrilla warfare had been seriously affected by our military operations. The pacification
program had made little progress. The Viet Cong still moved with relative impunity outside the main
cities and towns. Their intelligence was excellent and more often than not, despite the mobility of our
forces, the Viet Cong could avoid contact when they wanted to. While our military often pointed to the
heavy enemy casualties as a sign that we were winning the war, Kissinger thought that Hanoi and the
VC could accept a 10-1 kill ratio almost indefinitely. Even without infiltration of an estimated 4500 men
a month from the North the Viet Cong could make good their losses by recruitment in the South.
Kissinger did not seem impressed by evidence that Viet Cong recruiters were finding it difficult to get
able-bodied men. He thought the Viet Cong were still far from the bottom of the barrel.
Kissinger praised the morale and dedication of our military forces but asserted that our strategy was

wrong. "The best way to exhaust ourselves", he said, "is to spend our time chasing main force units near
the Cambodian border." Only the Marines had learned that the war had to be won against the guerrillas
and not against the main force units. Governor Harriman said that General Krulak had told him that the
Marines in the First Corps area were now starting to concentrate on small unit operations, the task of
which was to break the link between the guerrillas and the villagers. Kissinger observed that this was a
slow, hard job which did not appeal to the generals in Saigon. He thought that General Westmoreland
still conceived of his job as the location and destruction of main force units.
Kissinger cited as evidence of the lack of progress being made in pacification the fact that 18 months
after our arrival in Danang it was still impossible to go four kilometers outside of the city at night
without running a real risk of being shot. The situation around Saigon was almost as bad. Kissinger
described his experience of flying over main highways in a helicopter and seeing as many as five or six
Viet Cong road blocks. He noted that Government officials in ostensibly pacified areas refused to sleep
in their villages at night.
While praising the Marines for having understood the real problem, Kissinger said that they were just
beginning to learn how to conduct anti-guerrilla operations. Our military were not well equipped by
training or experience to fight this kind of war. The problem of how to establish effective civil
administration in the Provinces was still unsolved. We tended to confuse charitable activities with
political action. The rebuilding of schools and the distribution of emergency food supplies were useful
and constructive actions which won friends for us among the villagers. Such activities, however, did
little to break the Viet Cong stranglehold on the villages when our forces had departed.
Kissinger said that he understood that the effectiveness of South Vietnam's military forces continued to
suffer from their lack of aggressiveness. In the First Corps area General Lam actually deployed his
troops within the Marine perimeter. He cited areas in which the ARVN set up its road blocks and
conducted its patrols in the same locations night after night. Consequently, the VC learned quickly how
to avoid them. Kissinger agreed with Governor Harriman that the best way to increase the effectiveness
of the ARVN was to encadre South Vietnamese units with the American forces. Governor Harriman
observed that General Krulak had told him that this was being done by the Marines in the First Corps
area. Kissinger said that encadrement was not yet extensive. (Governor's note--2 Vietnamese squads to 1
U.S. Marine)
GVN Attitudes Towards Negotiations with NLF-VC
Professor Kissinger said that none of the Vietnamese military officers with whom he had talked showed
any flexibility about negotiations with the NLF. He thought the civilians were less rigid and singled out
Tran Van Do and Bui Diem as GVN officials who could conceive of some value deriving from contacts
with the NLF. He thought this was a change from October 1965 when the NLF was "unmentionable"
even among civilian officials. Tran Van Do had told Kissinger and Phil Habib that he thought,
personally, that it might be easier to talk to the NLF than to Hanoi. Kissinger and Habib had not reported
this remark by telegram be-cause, according to Kissinger, the mere mention of negotiations with the
NLF would have greatly antagonized Ambassador Lodge. They feared that Lodge might tell Ky that Do
was being disloyal.
Kissinger thought that a factor strongly influencing some Vietnamese to think about the possibility of
negotiations with the NLF was the increasing cost of the war. The massive influx of Americans had
created a better military situation for the GVN but large numbers of Americans inevitably created
frictions with the local population. Some thoughtful Vietnamese were beginning to conclude that
whoever won the war in the South the Vietnamese would lose. Kissinger noted that it was generally
believed in Saigon that many Vietnamese, including GVN officials, maintained discreet contacts with

the NLF and VC. In some cases this was because they had relatives on the other side. In other cases they
were simply hedging their bets. Few Vietnamese admitted that they maintained covert contacts of this
kind because of the obvous danger of doing so. Similarly, few GVN officials were willing to advocate
talks with the NLF-VC because they assumed that the Directory and the U.S. were strongly opposed to
such negotiations.
The Road to Negotiations
Kissinger said that we should stop talking about "unconditional" negotiations if we wanted to convince
the world that we were serious about trying to find a peaceful settlement to the Vietnam problem. He did
not find that anyone in Saigon understood what the phrase meant and it was usually interpreted to mean
that we did not want to talk. In Kissinger's view we should keep pressing for negotiations and state
openly what our conditions were. This was particularly important if we wanted to persuade the GVN to
think in terms of talks with the NLF-VC. At present the GVN leadership was convinced that we were
completely inflexible on this question.
Kissinger argued that negotiations with the NLF-VC offered greater chance of success than negotiations
with Hanoi or multilateral negotiations under the umbrella of the Geneva Agreements. Of all the
methods of negotiations available to us he believed that a big Geneva-type conference was the least
likely to succeed. Such a conference would involve too many people who didn't know the situation and
who brought to the conference nothing more than their prejudices. Furthermore, the composition of a reconvened Geneva Conference would be stacked against us.
One advantage of direct negotiations between the GVN and NLF-VC was that it ducked the troublesome
problem that would be posed by VC representation at an international conference. Kissinger also
thought it possible that Hanoi would prefer to let the NLF-VC take the lead since their own prestige
would not be directly engaged in compromises reached by southerners in the South. If agreements could
be reached with the NLF they could be ratified by the Geneva powers in a large international
conference.
He agreed that the central problem was to conduct negotiations in the South which would not result in a
take-over by the NLF. The fragility of the GVN created real difficulties and meant that we were
continually in the position of being blackmailed by the political weakness of the GVN. Despite the
problems, Kissinger thought that we should direct all of our efforts, military, political and economic, to
creating a situation favorable to negotiations with the NLF-VC.
In practice this would mean (a) re-orienting our military strategy to put anti-guerrilla operations before
operations against main force units, (b) encouraging the development of a broader political base in
Saigon through elections and increased civilian participation in the Government and (c) putting more
effort into improvement of civil administration both in Saigon and the provinces.
Another step that Kissinger considered necessary was to levy a top priority requirement on CAS to
obtain more and better intelligence on the composition and leadership of NLF-VC. This was vitally
important if realistic negotiations were ever to be conducted with the NLF. Even if a deal could not be
made we might be able to induce the defection of non-communist members of the NLF. For this reason
we had to do a better job of identifying non-communists and hard-core leaders. Kissinger noted that the
NLF leader, Tho, had gone over to the communists in 1962 because of his opposition to Diem. He had
tried to return to Saigon in '62 or '63 but Diem had refused to let him. It was barely possible that Tho
and others like him could still be induced to return. Kissinger emphasized that we needed not only
information on the principal NLF leaders but on their provincial leadership as well.

Kissinger thought that an amnesty offer by the GVN would be useful and should precede any serious
effort by the GVN to engage in talks with the NLF-VC.
Impressions of the Embassy
Kissinger said that it would be extremely difficult to bring Ambassador Lodge to accept negotiations
with the NLF-VC. He thought it might be done on a step by step basis. If Lodge could be convinced, the
job of convincing Ky and the GVN would be much easier. The Vietnamese were somewhat in awe of
Lodge's personality and his views would carry real weight with them. Lodge was completely sold on Ky
and did not like twisting his arm. The Ambassador was sensitive to charges that he had pulled the rug
out from under Diem and did not want the same thing to happen again.
Bill Porter was doing an excellent job under difficult circumstances. He had to spend far too much time
answering questions from Washington. This was particularly unfortunate because the mission needed
pulling together and Washington often asked the wrong questions.
Phil Habib was a first class professional. Kissinger regretted that he would be leaving in about 6 months.
The 18 month tour of duty was a mistake since it took about a year and a half to learn the situation well
enough to be able to influence it. The Department should reverse its decision not to let wives remain
with their husbands and extend tours of duty to 2 to 3 years.
Kissinger had mixed impressions of Lansdale who he thought was too much of a Boy Scout. He
commented that Lansdale had the great virtue of patience and was willing to spend long hours talking to
Vietnamese. He was an excellent man for contacts but ineffective when it came to details. According to
Kissinger, Lodge should have put Phil Habib in charge of monitoring the elections instead of Lansdale.
Kissinger did not believe that the PATs were accomplishing much. They had been recruited and trained
too quickly. He said that it was admitted that they had a desertion rate of at least 15% and the rate might
be significantly higher. His own observation of the PATs in operation indicated that they tended to stick
close to their base of operations and were no match for the highly motivated VC.
197. Memorandum of Meeting/1/
Washington, August 2, 1966, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 72 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations,
8/8/66. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Harriman's office. Assigned by the President in July
to devote full attention to the search for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, Harriman established a
"Negotiations Committee," which met once a week beginning with this meeting. In an October 4
memorandum to Katzenbach, Harriman stated that his committee met each Thursday "to develop, assess
and follow up all leads to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict." Principal participants were U.
Alexis Johnson, Llewellyn Thompson, William Bundy, Joseph Sisco, Leonard Unger, Thomas Hughes,
and Benjamin Read. (Ibid., S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Department of State--Rusk)/1
PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman
U. Alexis Johnson
Llewellyn ThompsonLeonard Unger
SUBJECTVietnam: Negotiations

Amb. Unger's check list/2/ was reviewed. It was agreed that a message to Saigon should be prepared
exploring the possibilities and problems of secret GVN talks with the NLF-VC.
/2/Not found.
The group agreed that we need to know much more about the leadership and composition of the NLF
and the VC. Amb. Johnson commented that Mr. Helms had told him in a recent conversation that CAS
was beginning to develop the capability to obtain better intelligence on this subject through penetration
of the NLF-VC. He concurred, however, that more had to be done and that Saigon should be informed
that we consider this a top priority requirement.
It was agreed that the question of an amnesty offer by the GVN to the NLF-VC was closely tied to the
question of secret talks. A meaningful amnesty offer should open up the possibility of NLF leadership
(not merely rank and file) returning to "normal" political life in the south. Any GVN initiative to engage
in direct talks with the NLF-VC should be taken against the background of the amnesty offer.
It was recognized that there would be considerable resistance in Saigon, both on the part of the GVN
military leaders and the Embassy, to the idea of negotiations with the NLF-VC. Amb. Thompson
suggested that the idea might be sold on the basis that it offered the possibility of sowing dissension in
the ranks of the enemy and peeling off non-communist elements from the NLF. Amb. Johnson
commented that this point had to be handled very carefully because dissension could be sowed in both
directions. He thought that in its present mood of confidence the GVN would be hard to persuade that an
initiative for talks with the NLF-VC was desirable. He thought that it would take six weeks at a
minimum to prepare the ground in Saigon.
It was agreed that Amb. Unger would prepare a draft of a message to Saigon.
The subject of a Congressional resolution setting forth US aims in Vietnam was discussed. Amb. Unger
said that he visualized such a resolution as a means of emphasizing the limited nature of our objectives
and our readiness to engage in unconditional talks. If the right language could be worked out, such a
resolution might be a way of getting Fulbright back on the track. Governor Harriman commented that it
was hard to conceive of any resolution which would be acceptable to both Congressional hawks and
doves--to Fulbright and Symington for example. The group agreed that there could be no more effective
way of convincing Hanoi and the rest of the world of our unity and determination than to bring Fulbright
around.
Amb. Unger will prepare a draft Congressional resolution so that the group can see how it might look.
198. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 2, 1966, 5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Confidential. The
source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. A copy was sent to
Moyers.
Mr. President:
The attached latest report on Viet Cong motivation and morale, January-June 1966,/2/ is important both
as an intelligence document and as a basis for action. Not included in the report is the following estimate

which I am having refined in Saigon and will present to you in about a week:
/2/Attached but not printed, is "Some Findings of the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study, JanuaryJune 1966: A Briefing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," August 1, prepared by Leon Goure for the Rand
Corporation. Goure spent an hour with Rostow on August 2 and briefed McNamara on August 3.
--When Rand first began to interview the VC, 65% of those who defected or whom we captured
believed that the VC would win; 25% felt the GVN would win; 10% were uncertain.
--The present figures are: 20% now believe the VC will win: 60% believe the GVN will win: 20% are
uncertain.
The rise in those "uncertain" reflects, in itself, an important fact. The number of hard core Communist
defectors has increased. These men find it difficult to go beyond a statement other than "uncertainty"
about victory.
What this report shows is a progressive decline in the morale and the fighting capacity of the VC. As
you said at lunch yesterday to the newspaper men, no one can tell you when this progressive decline will
lead to the breaking up of units or to the ending of the war. But the process under way among the VC is
clear.
The operational implication, in my view, is that we must now persuade the government in Saigon to
mount a campaign which effectively appeals to the VC and the North Vietnamese troops along the
following lines:
1. All Vietnamese should now rally to stop the killing and end the war.
2. The Americans will go home as soon as peace is assured.
3. It is time for all Vietnamese to turn to economic and social development of their country.
I have put Bill Jorden to work this morning with State to produce an operational scenario which would
hammer away at these three simple themes.
Two final observations. We must get a team in Saigon to work now on a post-war Vietnamese
development plan. One aspect of that plan should be the constructive post-war use of Camranh Base.
Apparently nothing makes Vietnamese more skeptical that we will ever leave than our willingness to
construct that marvelous installation. We ought now to encourage thought and planning as to how it
might be used in the future development of the country. Second, all the interrogators (Vietnamese and
U.S.) are convinced that if the VC fail this time in the South they--and the whole country--will be swept
by a mood of wanting no further violence and killing. They are close to having had enough. As Goure
put it, they will be like the Spanish after the civil war--prepared to take even a bad government rather
than to risk civil war again. We have seen that mood also in the Dominican Republic and earlier in the
1920's in Mexico after their bloody revolution. I cite this to illustrate the need of getting the government
in Saigon to shift from talk about invading the North to a policy of appealing for peace, order, and
progress in the South.
It may be that you would like to hear directly from Goure his reflections on the evidence which now, as
you can see, includes not only interrogations but a mass of captured documents which bear on morale.
He will be here a few more days.

It is, of course, extremely important that we not overestimate these trends and develop excessive
optimism; but it is equally important that we look at them soberly and, especially, mount the kind of
political as well as military operations which will accelerate them.
Walt
Bring Goure in (I spent an hour with him today)
Not necessary/3/
/3/The President did not mark either option. The President's Daily Diary indicates that he did not meet
with Goure during August 1966. (Johnson Library)
199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva/1/
Washington, August 2, 1966, 6:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Top Secret; Priority;
Exdis. Drafted by Sisco and Buffum, cleared in draft by William Bundy and Harriman, and approved by
Rusk.
20124. For Goldberg. Dept. has given most serious study to ICRC proposal (Urtel 466)./2/ We
commend you for handling discussion with great delicacy. We endorse fully your view that proposal
must be handled with great care and that ICRC channel may offer possible fresh avenue to probe Hanoi's
present intentions.
/2/Responding to a question about possible war crimes trials in Hanoi for U.S. prisoners, President
Johnson had indicated in his press conference on July 20 that the United States was ready to participate
in an ICRC-sponsored conference on the application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the Vietnam
conflict. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, p.
744) In telegram 466 from Geneva, July 26, Goldberg transmitted a proposal from the ICRC to convene
a conference that would seek a more general settlement of the conflict. (Department of State, Bundy
Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III) Rostow's notes of the Tuesday lunch meeting on August 2 state:
"ICRC language was changed. President uneasy about drafting of that." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President)
Onus for any rejection of proposal should rest on Hanoi and not on US. Our willingness to continue to
probe possibilities of peace talks through this channel should help our position both internationally and
domestically. Note verbale which we providing you is drafted on assumption that at some point, if
proposal is not accepted by Hanoi, it might be advantageous to have it surfaced publicly. We fully agree,
however, that for the time being this should be treated as a matter of utmost sensitivity.
General posture we wish to strike is appearance of being forthcoming without giving up any points of
principle. In particular, we wish assure our response fully accords with frequently stated US readiness
engage in unconditional discussions which might help terminate conflict in Viet Nam. We assume ICRC
suggestion for broad conference on all humanitarian problems, based on resolution X,/3/ would logically
involve discussion of ways to end conflict.
/3/Resolution X, adopted at the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, encouraged the ICRC
to undertake efforts to prevent or settle armed conflicts.

Recent reports of Hanoi mood and intentions are contradictory but merit further study. On one hand,
Hanoi has recently moved one additional division to SVN. On other hand, there appears to be some
difference between Hanoi and Peking on continuing validity of Geneva Agreements. Also noteworthy is
timing of Hanoi's statement that foreign volunteers not now needed,/4/ coming as it does on heels of
Bucharest Declaration./5/ In short, these recent moves might presage some willingness on Hanoi's part
to decelerate present trend of escalation, and we of course would be interested in probing meanings of
these moves in very private and quiet manner.
/4/Not further identified.
/5/In the Bucharest Declaration, issued July 6, Warsaw Pact members meeting in Bucharest proclaimed
their readiness to allow volunteers to go to Vietnam if the DRV requested it. For text, see American
Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 832-834.
Following is text note verbale you may give Gonard:
The US Government has studied carefully the note verbale given to Ambassador Goldberg by Samuel
Gonard, President of the ICRC, suggesting that a conference be held under the auspices of the ICRC
which would not be limited solely to the study of humanitarian problems arising out of the application of
the Geneva Conventions as such, "but that its scope should be extended to include also the study of
those problems arising out of the methods employed in the conduct of military operations." Consistent
with its position that it is prepared to engage in unconditional discussions, the US would be ready also to
discuss all humanitarian problems "over and beyond the strict application of the Geneva Conventions"
as suggested by the ICRC.
The ICRC has asked whether the US would be willing to take now certain measures susceptible of
facilitating the convening of such a conference. The US looks sympathetically on this request. The
ICRC can state unequivocally to the government at Hanoi, that it is satisfied the US is ready to engage
in discussions on an abatement of the Viet Nam conflict and would be willing to accept a reduction of
hostilities on a reciprocal basis, either prior to or during a conference.
In addition to delivering the above note, you should make the following points orally to Gonard:
1. You should stress that when the US speaks of reduced military activities on a reciprocal basis, we are
obviously including bombing of the North as one of the elements. While US cannot agree to a formal
bombing pause except as part of a reciprocal reduction of hostilities accepted by Hanoi, you may
reaffirm to Gonard that if he decides to pursue matter personally in Hanoi he need have no fear for his
safety as far as US bombing concerned. You may add that if his efforts succeed in bringing about a
meeting of the type he envisages, we would be prepared to consider sympathetically steps to facilitate
such discussions.
Moreover, we would be prepared to consider indications of an informal nature by Hanoi as to what it
would do on its side by way of a reduction of hostilities; and would consider carefully indications that
Hanoi was in fact reducing its infiltration or other operations, recognizing always that we would have to
observe carefully whether such a reduction was in fact taking place and being continued. FYI: We had
recent indication from Sainteny report/6/ that some Hanoi leaders recognized that they would have to do
something on their side if we were ever to consider suspending or ceasing bombing. However, we have
always recognized the difficulty they might face in saying something for the record as to what they
would do or were doing. End FYI.

/6/See Document 182 for a report on Sainteny's trip to Hanoi.

2. We remain concerned that ICRC initiative not result in effort to trade off safety of POWs for
cessation of bombings of North Viet Nam. Should we continue discussions on wider issues as outlined
by Gonard, we would feel free to discuss all aspects of military activities, including Viet Cong terrorism
in South--not just bombing of North.
3. We continue to believe that first step would be for Gonard to go to Hanoi. As you have told him,
depending on reaction he receives there, further consideration could be given to question of whether
Viet Cong participation in conference is an important element.
Rusk
200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, August 3, 1966, 1:21 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in the
White House, cleared in substance by Rusk and McNamara, and approved by Rusk.
20533. For Ambassador Lodge.
1. Your recent comments that pacification seems to be moving too slowly,/2/ plus other reports to this
effect,/3/ have been subject highest level discussion here./4/ We generally share your views, including
your belief that GVN is not fully employing its military assets (ARVN, RF and PF) either offensively or
in support of pacification. Clear to us they ought to put more effort into pacification. No one here
believes that GVN military forces are contributing to offensive operations of pacification programs in a
measure anywhere near what should be expected from a 600,000 man force. We also note that Ky
himself is becoming much more concerned about pacification, for example in his 22 July talk with you.
/2/See Document 193.
/3/In an August 2 memorandum to the President, in anticipation of Johnson's lunch-eon meeting that
day, Komer stated that pacification of the countryside, one of the "four chief components of our
Vietnam strategy," was the "area where we've made least progress." He saw "Problem No 1 in Vietnam
as increasingly that of redirecting the ARVN to the pacification task, with US logistic
support." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Ko-mer Files, Memos to the President)
/4/After the President's lunch meeting on August 2, Rostow telephoned the following instruction to
Read: "Go to Westmoreland and Lodge on weaknesses of pacification and ask Westmoreland and Lodge
to do a cable asking for a plan to improve the whole pacification effort and to see in general how in that
context can use ARVN more effectively." (Notes re Lunch Meeting by Rostow, August 2; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President) Rusk, McNamara, Rostow,
and Moyers attended the President's lunch meeting on August 2, which lasted from 1:24 to 3:10 p.m.
(Ibid., President's Daily Diary). No record of the discussion has been found.
2. Highest authority requests that you personally address the question of best means of accelerating and
giving direction to the pacification effort--by pinpointing responsibility of both GVN and US officials at
Saigon level as well as in provinces and districts, by clear-cut directives to both GVN and US officials,
by appropriate assignment of GVN resources, by full and fast reporting, by vigorous follow-up, and so

on--as a preliminary to discussing these matters with the GVN. Top levels here are most interested in
your suggestions as to action needed to galvanize the lagging effort in this essential field./5/
/5/Lodge replied in telegram 2675, August 4, noting that Westmoreland had a team studying Vietnamese
military, paramilitary, and police forces and that once Westmoreland submitted his proposals, Lodge
hoped to develop a unified U.S. position to take up with the GVN. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk
201. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
SNIE 13-66
Washington, August 4, 1966.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry, Job 79-R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem.
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of NSA and the Departments of State
and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director
of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board except for the
Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
Rostow forwarded the estimate to President Johnson on August 5, noting in his covering memorandum
that it had been produced "at our request." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the
President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 10)
CURRENT CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION
Conclusion
The Chinese Communists have responded to recent US air action against North Vietnamese POL
facilities and to Ho Chi Minh's July 17 appeal for more aid/2/ with massive propaganda demonstrations
all over China. These occasions were used to renew pledges of complete support for Hanoi and to
reiterate the Chinese view that the war must be continued to final victory. At the same time, the Chinese
seem likely to provide more manpower for logistical and engineering functions in North Vietnam, and,
for the first time, they may move some infantry troops into North Vietnam as a precautionary step
against the contingency of invasion.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 180.
We do not conclude, however, that the Chinese have changed their basic policy because of the recent air
strikes. We have estimated that Peking would almost certainly intervene if North Vietnam were invaded
or if the collapse of the Communist regime seemed likely. But we continue to believe that, at present
levels of US action against NVN, China will not commit its ground forces to the war, nor its air force to
deliberate and sustained action against US forces.
[Here follows the body of the 7-page estimate.]
202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, August 4, 1966, 6:59 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by
Miller and Unger; cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, Harriman, Thompson, and Bromley Smith; and
approved by Rusk.
21944. For Ambassador Lodge from the Secretary. Saigon 1781 and 1927./2/ Several of recent reports
from Saigon have raised intense interest here at high levels in possibility of generating GVN initiatives
to foment divisions among VC/NLF, stimulate increasing scale of defection and ultimately pave way to
GVN-VC/NLF talks to work out negotiated solution to Viet-Nam conflict on favorable terms. We have
in mind both a covert course of action for the GVN, which is discussed in this message,/3/ and a longer
range overt GVN program which will be discussed in Septel./4/
/2/In telegram 1781 from Saigon, July 24, the Embassy reported that, in a conversation with Kissinger
on July 23, Bui Diem seemed prepared to accept the NLF "into the body politic of the South if (1) they
would turn in their arms, and (2) agreed to participate on same basis as other Vietnamese political
elements." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 1927 from Saigon, July 26,
the Embassy reported that Tran Van Tuyen, an influential VNQDD politician, had taken the same
position in a conversation with Kissinger, indicating that it would be appropriate and easy for the
Vietnamese to establish contact with both the NLF and Hanoi, whose leaders were known personally to
him and many of his countrymen. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III)
/3/After the President's lunch meeting on August 2, Rostow telephoned the following instruction to
Read: "Cable to Lodge which asks him to encourage SVN to begin to see what contacts can make
covertly with VC. Maximize covert operations. Suggest Ky, instead of sounding out about going to
North, ought to launch peace campaign based on Honolulu where he said: come on over." (Notes re
Lunch Meeting by Rostow, August 2; Johnson Library, National Security Files, Rostow Files, Meetings
with the President)
/4/Document 203.
2. We have made specific note of Kissinger conversation with Tran Van Tuyen, and have related it to
the reports of poor morale and dissention in VC ranks (e.g. recent Rand/Goure Report)/5/ as well as
hints at more significant divisions among VC/NLF leaders and eventual possibility splitting off certain
dissatisfied, anti-NVN elements not wholly under communist discipline. Our conclusion is that time
may now be favorable for aggressive GVN action on covert side to exploit its contacts with VC/NLF
elements and encourage expanded contacts in order to smoke out all evidences of divisions in VC ranks
and prospects for important VC defections. As opposed to earlier periods, we judge that GVN today
could take such actions from position of relative strength and therefore avoid spreading suspicion and
consternation among its own people about possible intentions of making a deal with VC.
/5/See Document 198.
3. You will know better than we how GVN might proceed but we have in mind generally accepted
reports that through family and village connections, ties of northerners who have gone south, etc. there
are many quiet and informal avenues to VC/NLF and we also understand many GVN officials and
military commanders know in greater or lesser degree their VC "opposite numbers". It may therefore
come down to a matter of confidential GVN instructions to appropriate officials and military to lift
present inhibitions on contacts and provide them with effective line to be taken in any contacts which
ensue.

4. We would like you to consider how we might best get GVN into motion on this matter and if general
line set out above makes sense you are authorized to proceed without further exchanges with us. If you
see problems in what we are suggesting, please let us know and give us your suggestion as to how to
move this matter forward./6/
/6/Lodge replied in telegram 2814, August 5, and in telegram 2818, Document 204. In telegram 2814, he
indicated that he had spoken to Ky about covert exploitation of contacts with the NLF leadership and
that Ky had liked the idea. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
5. You may also want to consider in this connection whether there is any way our own intelligence
efforts might be expanded to develop greater body of information on VC/NLF especially their leaders,
and potential weaknesses within its ranks (see Deptel 1130, Oct. 26, 1965 and Embtel 1467, Oct. 28,
1965/7/ for our previous exchange on this subject).
/7/Neither printed. (Ibid. and ibid., POL 15 VIET S, respectively)
Rusk

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, August 5, 1966, 8:08 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by
Unger; cleared by Harriman, U. Alexis Johnson, McNaughton, Thompson, Rostow, and Jorden; and
approved by Rusk.1
23182. For Ambassador Lodge from the Secretary. State 21944./2/
/2/Document 202.
1. In this message I would like to put before you longer range GVN program mentioned ref State tel. I
would appreciate your giving this overt program intensive study at your earliest convenience and telling
me how you feel it might most effectively be promoted with GVN (with such modifications as you
consider desirable) for execution at appropriate moment.
2. We have touched on certain elements of this plan in past, notably through Deptels 2534 of last
February/3/ and 5454 of July 11,/4/ in conversations when you were last in Washington and in paper
(Item 17) prepared for that visit/5/ and, we understand, it was discussed by you with Henry Kissinger
during his recent visit to Saigon.
/3/Telegram 2534, February 25, stated that "we should do all possible to try to break off some of the
elements of the NLF/VC" and urged Lodge to "encourage Ky and Thieu to exercise their imagination
and ingenuity in this field." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/4/In telegram 5454, the Department recommended that Lodge discuss the issue with Kissinger during
his visit in July. (Ibid.)
/5/"Contacts with the VC," prepared for Lodge's visit to Washington in early May 1966. (Ibid., S/S-NSC
Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting, 5/10/66)
3. The essence of the program would be an approach to VC/NLF personnel, individually and
collectively, to promote their reconciliation with GVN and reincorporation in body politic. As we see it
now, and subject to your views, the approach would be in the form of a proclamation by the GVN
PriMin or Chief of State offering the VC/NLF in return for the surrender of its arms and the
abandonment of its insurgency, amnesty for its members and their right to participate in the political

process as well as possible material rewards. Specifically the proclamation might follow these lines:
Sketch out the origins of the present struggle; mention the improved military situation in the South and
the strikes at the root of the aggression in the North; call on VC/NLF to recognize that it cannot impose
its will on the people of SVN by force; urge it to join in effort to achieve national reconciliation and to
carry out the peaceful reconstruction of the country.
4. More particularly, the proclamation would offer VC amnesty in return for turn in of arms, or freedom
to return North; would renew GVN pledge to carry out program of transition to civilian, representative
government, with VC participation in political life whenever they forswear violent means, would leave
local administration undisturbed pending local elections, at same time affirming GVN authority
throughout country in principle; would announce phased withdrawal of foreign troops as security
reestablished; and would announce intensified economic and social programs. Finally, proclamation
would envisage talks with Hanoi at appropriate future date on trade resumption, etc. and reunification.
(Fuller exposition of program together with one or more versions possible text being pouched.)
5. Briefly, we see following advantages to such a program:
(a) Would go long way to take heat, domestically and internationally, out of demands for VC/NLF
representation in international negotiations or Conference, since GVN would have made offer (whether
accepted or not) to work out internal political problems on reasonable basis.
(b) If offer rejected would put onus on VC/NLF side and would probably intensify their internal
differences over continued prosecution of insurgency, encouraging individual and group defections.
(c) If offer accepted GVN dealing from strength in subsequent negotiations.
(d) Would provide phased settlement of conflict without calling on DRV to admit defeat or direct
participation in conflict.
(e) Any later international conference could devote itself primarily to provision of guarantees and
enforcement machinery since resolution of basic internal SVN political questions would hopefully have
been largely achieved by GVN-VC/NLF negotiation.
6. Successful launching of such a program requires that GVN speak from strength so that its action is
not interpreted as a preparation for a compromise deal with VC/NLF and therefore a signal for
politically sensitive individuals to seek their own accommodation. Politically and militarily present time
appears relatively favorable but we see following difficulties in moving ahead too soon:
(a) Will require careful preparation with GVN, particularly to overcome anticipated reservations of
military, and successful launching requires full understanding and acceptance of program by entire GVN
leadership. May take time achieve this if violent reactions (coups?) are to be avoided.
(b) Offers to VC/NLF personnel envisaged in proclamation concerning restoration civil rights if made
prior to Sept. 11 elections could create embarrassment with provisions of present electoral law.
(c) GVN forthcoming posture more credible following successful elections.
We have concluded therefore the program could best be launched in late September or early October,
but our views on this are not fixed./6/

/6/Lodge replied in telegram 3130, August 10. Given how "uninformed" GVN leaders were regarding
"diplomatic techniques for bringing a war to an end," Lodge proposed that such a program not be
broached directly to the GVN but that a "broad dialogue on settlement possibilities" be opened with the
GVN. "We would seek quickly in this educational process to reach agreement on your specific
proposal." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The Department concurred in telegram 27973, August
15. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III)
7. In your comments I should appreciate your also covering the possible desirability of launching such a
program in one area only at first, as for example in Region IV, before attempting it on a nation-wide
basis.
8. Septel/7/ discusses some more immediate measures, including psywar campaign, aimed at
encouraging individual and group defections now.
/7/Telegram 23332 to Saigon, August 6; see footnote 4, Document 180.
Rusk
204. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, August 6, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:14 a.m. Rostow forwarded the
text of telegram 2818 to the President on August 9, together with the text of telegram 3038, August 9, in
which Lodge provided a progress report on contact with Tho. In his covering memorandum Rostow
stated: "Here is the first attempted major operation to go to work on the political orientation of the NLF.
The case itself is attractive, if it works out; but it is equally important that Lodge is now aboard and
interested." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 10)
2818. Absolutely no distribution except at direction of Secretary.
1. This is in further reply to State 21944./2/
/2/Document 202.
2. We have been impressed by growing number of indicators, buttressed by Rand/Goure report, that
NLF-VC morale sinking. These have naturally led us to give intensive consideration to what might be
done to stimulate decay in their organization. At present, we are endeavoring to set up test in a particular
province (that of official now in charge of Chieu Hoi activity) with view to determining whether certain
incentives can be provided, in the form of material and status rewards, which would induce high-level
NLF-VC defections. By material and status awards, we mean (a) substantial cash awards to families to
enable such high-level defectors to "reconstitute their lives" and (b) assurances that their status as
officials will be recognized if they come over, that they will not be herded into ordinary Chieu Hoi
centers or prisons, that they and their families will not be maltreated, and that they will be permitted to
resume their professions if they have them, provided they maintain correct attitudes toward GVN.
3. It will probably not be easy to induce GVN to accept such approach, though their attitude toward
returnees has improved considerably. Their objection stems from reluctance to "reward" NLF-VC, while
patriotic elements are unrewarded. Their tendency has been to rely on rewards for NLF-VC taken "dead

or alive." To counter this, it is currently our idea that proposal be described as GVN rewarding families
for performance of patriotic duty in persuading their relatives to return to GVN side. We are now
developing format to propose to GVN on this. If we are blocked by bureaucracy from running test along
general lines mentioned above, I will take matter to Ky with view convincing him that this is worthwhile
effort, that it is better to induce NLF-VC by such means to walk in rather than have to go shoot them
and get shot ourselves in the process. My talk with him yesterday will, I hope, have paved the way. We
do not intend to confine awards to families of returnees, but will consider other devices calculated to
minimize political resentment, such as donations to Vietnamese war veterans, etc. I will keep you
informed as this matter develops.
4. A second effort we are making is at present closely held among very few of us here. On July 23, one
of our most experienced American officials, a man with excellent reputation among Vietnamese, was
approached and requested to meet with an uncle of Nguyen Huu Tho,/3/ chairman of the National
Liberation Front. The uncle is head of the Tho family as now constituted, and has assumed
responsibility for the welfare of Tho's wife and nine children, the tenth child, a boy, being with Tho in
the Maquis. We approved meeting between the American and the uncle in presence of the intermediary.
The uncle said he wished to induce Tho to come back, not only for patriotic but for family reasons. As
Tho would turn himself over only to the Americans, they wished to know whether we would help, if he
did so, and particularly whether we would put Tho beyond reach of VC.
/3/In a September 27 memorandum to Helms, Carver identified the uncle as Nguyen Huu An, Permanent
Secretary of the (South) Vietnam Red Cross. (Central Intelligence Agency, GAC Chron, Job 80R01720R) Although Nguyen Huu An is referred to as "uncle" in most White House, State Department,
and CIA documents dealing with him, Carver notified Helms in an October 17 memorandum that it had
been revealed that An was not actually Nguyen Huu Tho's uncle but a cousin of Tho's father. (Ibid.)
5. Bill Porter, who is handling matter at my request, instructed American to give assurances that we
would assist Tho and family in every possible way, including protection from VC. This assurance was
given on July 26 and in return, Tho's uncle stated that plan would be implemented immediately by
sending his (uncle's) wife to Cambodia (they declared no problem doing this) where she would meet
with Tho's mother-in-law. The two women would then go either singly or together to meet with Tho or
call Tho to see them, their purpose being to obtain from Tho statement of conditions under which he
would come back. Uncle's wife would then return to Saigon with these conditions, which would then
pass from her to uncle to intermediary to American contact. Uncle believes Tho will insist on talking to
authorized American before actually turning himself in. He insists Tho not real Communist.
6. Intermediary who arranged meeting with Tho's uncle expressed view that if Tho comes over, several
other prominent NLF-VC officials would also come. He cited by name Nguyen Van Tri, alias Muoi Tri,
VC political and military advisor, Zone D; Hbay Mon, VC chief of west; La Van Liem, special
commissioner, for VC special missions in Saigon, Cholon and Gia Dinh (terror, sabotage). Tho's uncle
said during meeting with American that if Tho comes over, he may arrange to free some American
prisoners when he does. Uncle said there no further need for direct contact between him and American,
that further messages on subject would come through intermediary.
7. We have learned that uncle's wife left immediately as scheduled. No further word.
8. If and when matter progresses to point where arrangements are required, CAS will be brought in to
effect them.
9. Cannot forecast what will come of this, but it is interesting family initiative. We will look for

others./4/ I assume I have authority to make any arrangements required to get Tho or any other topranking NLF-VC to come over and that if they wish to do so to us instead of to GVN, we should accept
and leave problems to be cleared up with GVN later./5/
/4/In telegram 27768 to Saigon, August 13, the Department of State notified the Embassy that messages
referring to the possible defection of Tho and other key NLF leaders should be slugged Thrush.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH)
/5/In telegram 23352, August 7, the Department indicated that Lodge assumed correctly that he had such
authority. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
Lodge
205. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to
the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Saigon, August 7, 1966, 0005Z.
/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top
Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to General Wheeler.
MAC 6814. Subject: 66-67 force requirements (U). Ref: Emrick's message, DTG 032207Z Aug 66./2/
/2/In his August 3 telegram, Emrick indicated that CINCPAC's 1966-1967 force requirement package
was in trouble in Washington and that the JCS were loathe to recommend approval without additional
rationale, which would probably mean presenting a special briefing. (Ibid.) In a memorandum to
McNamara, JCSM-506-66, August 5, the JCS indicated that they had some reservations particularly
with respect to CINCPAC's added requirements for "air defense, security units, attack sorties, and the
force requirements derived therefrom." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA
Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 320.2 Vietnam)
1. Continuous study of the situation indicates that past and current developments reinforce my appraisal
of the war on which the CY 66-67 force requirements were based. There are no indications that the
enemy has reduced his resolve. He has increased his rate of infiltration, formed division size units,
introduced new weapons into his ranks, maintained lines of communications leading into South
Vietnam, increased his use of Cambodia as a safe haven, and recently moved a combat division through
the DMZ. These and other facts support earlier predictions and suggest that the enemy intends to
continue a protracted war of attrition. We must not underestimate the enemy nor his determination.
2. The war can continue to escalate. Infiltration of enemy troops and supplies from NVN can increase
and there is no assurance that this will not occur.
3. If, contrary to current indications, Hanoi decides not to escalate further, some modification of the
forces which I have requested probably could be made. Under such circumstances, I conceive of a
carefully balanced force that is designed to fight a long war of attrition and sustainable without national
mobilization.
4. I recognize the possibility that the enemy may not continue to follow the pattern of infiltration as
projected. Accordingly, my staff is currently conducting a number of studies with the objective of
placing this command and the RVN in a posture that will permit us to retain the initiative regardless of

the course the enemy chooses to pursue. These include:

A. A study which considers possible courses of action by the enemy on our force posture and
counteractions to maintain our superiority.
B. An analysis of our requirement to determine a balanced US force that can be employed and sustained
fully and effectively in combat on an indefinite basis without national mobilization.
C. A study to determine the evolutionary steps to be taken in designing an ultimate GVN security
structure.
D. A study to determine the optimum RVNAF force structure which can be attained and supported in
consideration of recent experience and our estimate of the manpower pool.
5. If a briefing officer or team is required as suggested by reference message, the briefing would only
convey the philosophy reflected above and reiterate the forces requested and justified in CINCPAC CY
66 adjusted requirements and CY 67 force requirements, SER: 000255, 18 June 1966./3/ Moreover, it
would emphasize the requirement for a well balanced, sustainable force in SVN for an indefinite period
even if Hanoi elected to stop the escalation.
/3/Not found.
6. At this point in time I cannot justify a reduction in requirements submitted.
206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, August 7, 1966, 1:57 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and
approved by Rusk.
23355. Literally eyes only for Lodge from Rusk. I was most interested in your 2818,/2/ especially
beginning with paragraph four. You should know that we have had some intimation about Tho's attitude
from an interested Viet Cong source in Europe. Some recent public discussion in Hanoi reflects concern
about the solidarity of some of their comrades in the South.
/2/Document 204.
A defection by some of the key Liberation Front leaders could be worth many battalions to us and could
greatly stimulate Chieu Hoi among rank and file. I'm sure you know that funds in any amount will be
provided if silver bullets will help.
Rusk
207. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 9, 1966, 1936Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to
the White House.

714. For Secretary of State, Goldberg, Harriman, Bundy and Sisco.

1. Met with ICRC President Gonard and Executive Director Gallopin today and received oral report on
meeting of ICRC delegates August 8 at which USG's note verbale/2/ reportedly received careful study
and consideration.
/2/See Document 199.
2. Referring to moderation displayed by Hanoi in postponing trials of American POWs, Gonard said
ICRC had hoped that USG, the major power in the conflict, would have offered a more positive gesture
to enhance ICRC efforts to bring Hanoi to conference table. Gonard then recalled ICRC note verbale in
which they inquired as to willingness of USG to suspend or restrict military operations.
3. The ICRC feels, Gonard said, that USG offer to engage in discussions on an abatement of the Viet
Nam conflict and willingness to accept reduction of hostilities on reciprocal basis, ties ICRC hands visa-vis Hanoi. As consequence, Gonard believes any approach by ICRC to Hanoi "would not appear to
offer much hope for success."
4. Gonard observed that humanitarian law, on which ICRC proposed efforts were to be based, "does not
know the notion of reciprocity." The purpose of this law, he said, is to alleviate the suffering of all
victims of conflict regardless of relative positions of contending parties.
5. Referring to Ambassador Goldberg's comments and observations, Gonard said that ICRC appreciated
that USG experiences during the Korean conflict and in Viet Nam during 1965 bombing pause account
for the USG attitude now; however, he reiterated that our request for reciprocity would jeopardize ICRC
chances for success in Hanoi. At this juncture I recalled to Gonard our complete lack of success in
getting any favorable response from Hanoi during last suspension of bombing and informed him that
during first four weeks of last suspension the Viet Cong committed more than 2500 terrorist acts against
the South Viet Namese people, i.e., school teachers, doctors, nurses, farmers, health workers, religious
leaders and all categories of local civic officials. I said that I personally thought the reaction in the U.S.,
and in South Viet Nam, would be bitter if there were yet another pause during which Hanoi continued to
carry on aggression and committed atrocities. Gonard said as soldier he appreciated problem for our
forces if they were hit by enemy during a pause.
6. Referring to the Sainteny report/3/ and other reports which suggest that Hanoi may be adopting a
more conciliatory attitude, Gonard said ICRC does not agree with these views. Gonard observed that
Hanoi is decentralizing its industry and that there is large-scale evacuation of civil populations from
urban areas. Gonard stated further that he believes decentralization of industry reflects a far-reaching
decision which suggests that Hanoi may be preparing for a long struggle.
/3/See Document 182.
7. Gonard said it was neither his wish nor intention to dictate to the USG but rather he wanted to make
USG realize difficult position of ICRC in this matter. Gonard said that because USG so strong he
thought it could afford make a more positive gesture. In this vein be observed that the greater power can
make gesture at lesser risk. The USG must evaluate, Gonard said, whether risk of another pause would
be worth taking on chance that it would lead to negotiations. He suggested pause of 10 to 15 days may
be sufficient to test Hanoi.
8. While again reiterating ICRC willingness take soundings Hanoi, Gonard said USG's request for

reciprocity makes it difficult for ICRC to operate on basis its proposal. He then expressed hope that
USG would reexamine its position with respect reciprocity condition. He also alluded to possibility of
abandoning broader approach and reverting to President Johnson's proposal expressed at July 20 press
conference/4/ indicating that USG would be ready whenever the Hanoi government is ready to sit down
at a conference table under the sponsorship of the ICRC to discuss ways in which the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 can be given fuller and more complete application in Viet Nam.
/4/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II,
p. 744.
9. I assured Gonard that ICRC views would be communicated to Washington immediately and that I
would be in contact with him again when reply available. Gonard will be in Geneva balance current
week but will be absent most of next week.
10. Comment: Despite strong representations by Ambassador Goldberg and myself re U.S. willingness
to deescalate on reciprocal basis, clear that ICRC feels U.S. should make first gesture, even at risk that
another bombing pause would not lead to negotiations./5/ As have previously reported Gonard on recent
trip to several Eastern European countries got impression that new pause might lead Hanoi to table.
However today he spoke of signs indicating Hanoi preparing for long struggle. ICRC caution
understandably may be due to fear failure of mission to Hanoi "unless given a strong hand," and I
suspect even with it, they would recognize chances for success limited.
/5/Rusk replied in telegram 26108 to Geneva, August 11, that the United States stood by its position on
reciprocity and could not accept a bombing pause, "which would, once more, permit the other side to
move substantial additional forces into South Viet-Nam with impunity." (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Tubby
208. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, August 10, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:34 a.m. and passed to the White
House. In telegram 27780, August 13, Komer told Lodge that the President was "greatly heartened" by
his latest weekly report, particularly by the plans to "shift much of ARVN into a stepped up pacification
campaign." In addition, the President hoped that the "civil side effort in the countryside" could be
stepped up "in similar fashion" and also that, given the importance of a good election turnout, Lodge
would "quietly keep pushing the GVN to get out the vote." (Ibid.)
2375. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:
A. Smell of victory
1. In the struggle for the independence of Viet-Nam, the following can be said:
2. We are not losing; we cannot lose in the normal sense of the word; never have things been going
better; indeed, never have things been going so well. We are "on the track" with regard to almost every
aspect of the war and we are winning in several.

3. All of this is a great tribute to the excellence of your policies and to the courage with which you have
made your decisions. It is also a tribute to those who execute the policies, notably our magnificent
military men.
4. But all of this is still not called "victory." Indeed, however much they disagree about many things,
everyone--in Washington and Hanoi and in Saigon--seems to agree that what we have now is not
"victory."
5. In truth we do not need to define "victory" and then go ahead and achieve it 100 percent. If it becomes
generally believed that we are sure to win (just as it is now generally believed that we cannot lose) all
else will be a mopping up. If there is the "smell of victory," we will be coasting.
6. There are a number of things which would psychologically mean "victory" to US, to Hanoi, to Saigon
and to the world, as follows:
A) First on the list would be some really smashing results as regards the "criminal" war: terrorism,
subversion, village guerrilla. Figures indicate a diminution in assassinations of local officials, but we
have as yet no good figures on the trend as regards civilian casualties in general.
B) Important defections as described in State's 21944/2/ could mean a great deal.
/2/Document 202.
C) A successful advance towards constitutional democracy could bring a feeling of success.
D) Really spectacular numbers of people coming into the Chieu Hoi camps would look like the end of
the war.
E) Of great significance psychologically would be a situation in which one could start at Camau and
drive securely all the way to Quang Tri, since this would mean that the 50 percent of the population
which is in Saigon and the Delta and the 35 percent of the population in the coastal strip from Hue to
Qui Nhon had been effectively pacified. To be able to ride the whole length of the railroad would also
mean much. (Several months ago I sent you a population map/3/ which illustrates this.)
/3/Not further identified.
F) Other things which would have great meaning would be to be able to drive securely to Dalat or to
Vung Tau.
7. Clearly the type of "battle victories" which we have been winning, and the impressive 10 to 1
casualties we are inflicting, do not look like victory to many Vietnamese as much as does the
phenomenon of open roads. Driving the Viet Cong out of a certain place on the map seems to mean little
in and of itself. In that sense this looks more like naval war in which one particular point in the ocean is
much like another. The solid thing is the people and 85 percent of the people live in the area through
which a traveller driving from Camau to Quang Tri would pass.
8. But none of these things are just around the corner.
9. Let us, therefore, by all means rejoice in the good news: that a wildcat, soul-destroying inflation
seems unlikely; that a successful Communist takeover of the government of Viet-Nam seems now

improbable; and that we have the beginnings of a policy on the main "unfinished business"--counterterrorism, being mindful that unless definitively crushed, terrorism will always remain as Communist
ace-in-the-hole and the ground for hope by Hanoi that it can at any time "go to Phase 1" and start the
whole struggle up again. Finally, let us be thankful that our troops are so magnificent.
10. But our troops will be the first to speak of their respect for the hard-fighting Viet Cong--and General
Westmoreland says North Viet-Nam army strength in South Viet-Nam has increased from 15,580 on
January 1 to 47,100 as of July 31--the equivalent in battalion terms of from 31 to 81. Also 4 divisional
and 10 regimental headquarters have been introduced since January 1. Average infiltration rate is 4,400
men per month. No evidence of serious food or ammunition shortage among major units is observable
despite acknowledged effect of our air strikes. 60 percent of enemy forces, it is estimated, have yet to be
committed to combat.
11. If the above is true statement of the situation, it is obvious that we have quite a stretch of time ahead
of us.
12. The question, therefore, arises: How much time? And the corollary questions are: Can we shorten
the time? Should we shorten the time: and, if so, how?
13. In trying to answer these questions, the first point is that time is not necessarily on the side of the
U.S. or the Vietnamese.
14. Is not a relatively big, fast war easier for the U.S. to sustain than a relatively moderate slow war?
15. As far as the Vietnamese are concerned, they have demonstrated the patience for which Asians are
famous and maybe they can keep on going as they have been. But their leadership is thin, both militarily
and politically. This is partly due to the numbing effect of colonialism, with all its deliberate and rather
diabolical discouragement of a national spirit, and with all of its educational effort aimed to make people
Frenchmen rather than Vietnamese. The war has also played its part. Hope for the future of country is to
be found among young people in Viet-Nam. But they will not be ready for some time.
16. Maybe the Vietnamese can last indefinitely--although it would be dangerous to assume it. But
certainly they would be helped by a quick end to the war, assuming always that a satisfactory outcome
was achieved. At present U.S. military forces must help the Vietnamese actively in order to get the
Vietnamese pacification effort moving--let alone the war against the big units. We have high hopes that
eventually they can undertake it all themselves and our soldiers have already expressed appreciation for
the newly created Vietnamese political action teams and have recognized that they render the kind of
service no American can render. Nonetheless our help is at present indispensable in the field of
criminal/terrorist war as it is on the purely military side.
17. Therefore, it seems that, for both Vietnamese and American reasons, time is not necessarily on our
side and that a quick victory would be of immense value to both.
18. These thoughts, which are not, of course, original with me, merge from many talks and much
reflection. They reminded me of a statement which General Eisenhower once made to me, as follows:
19. If you desire to conquer one ably led and well organized battalion solidly entrenched and favorably
located, and you try to do it with two battalions, you may succeed, but it will take you a long time and
you will have many casualties. If, on the other hand, you use a division, you will do it quickly and the
losses will be very slight.

20. In a war like this, in spite of everything, there is something tremendously effective about sheer mass.
On the fifth floor of this building, I can see the port of Saigon, thick with shipping and in the green flat
fields through which the Saigon River winds, I see more ships constantly making the sixty mile trip to
and from the open sea. When I flew over Vung Tau last week, I counted eighteen ships anchored there.
There are undoubtedly more in the Philippines and elsewhere. This is American mass, which none can
produce as we can.
21. While I do not believe we can bring anything more into the city of Saigon (in fact, I think the
American presence in this city must be reduced), I submit that if ports, piers and warehouses throughout
Viet-Nam are ready and the military leaders can manage, and it can be done without political damage-three big "ifs"--there is a strong case for "more" coming in "quicker."
22. Such are the agonizing questions of history, since we never know what would have happened had
the course which was not followed been followed. But common sense suggests that the more we bring in
and the quicker we do it, the sooner there will be the "smell of victory," the sooner will the war be over
and the fewer will be the casualties. Is this worth what it will cost in further dislocating the lives of
Americans? Could they be made to understand that something is being asked of them now so as to avoid
much great sufferings later?
B. Pacification
23. At Mission Council meeting on last Monday,/4/ MACV presented their proposal for a revised role
for the Army of Viet-Nam (ARVN) as regards pacification, as follows:
/4/August 8.
A. The war in South Viet-Nam is a political struggle with violent military and terroristic (criminal)
overtones. We must thus succeed in both the conventional military and unconventional terroristic areas.
If we are not equally successful in both, Hanoi will find some way to slide back to so-called "Phase 1"
activities, consisting primarily of clandestine, guerrilla-type actions. (And Westmoreland recognizes that
one effective guerrilla is worth two main force Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army soldiers.)
B. In the past, says MACV, ARVN has been so hard-pressed by Viet Cong main force and North
Vietnamese Army units that it has had no choice but to concentrate on major offensive and defensive
operations against these forces, leaving regional and popular forces with primary responsibility for
providing local security in hamlets and villages. The latter have not been adequate to this mission. Now
the buildup in U.S. and free world military forces makes it feasible to release a major part of ARVN
from its former primary task of search and destroy operations and direct its main attention to
pacification.
C. Thus, behind the security screen provided by U.S. tactical units (plus some elite Vietnamese Army
units), who will take care of the enemy's regular, hard-core forces, the main task of the Vietnamese
Army, along with regional and popular forces, political action teams, police and police field forces will
be to support district and village chiefs in establishing and maintaining law and order in villages and
hamlets.
D. Greater stress will be placed on ARVN small units operating at night, on continuity of operations and
on more prompt and thorough exploitation of local intelligence.
E. For ARVN to be successful in these activities, there must be a new attitude among ARVN personnel

towards the farmers, and ARVN commanders engaged in pacification will be evaluated to a large extent
on their success in effecting this change. (Comment: Lansdale points out that the turning point in the
Philippines' campaign against the Huks came when the Filipino soldier began treating the peasant as his
brother. End comment.)
F. No major changes in ARVN's organization in order to handle pacification is now envisaged. At least
50 percent of ARVN's strength in the I, II and III Corps areas will be diverted to this mission; in IV
Corps, where U.S. forces will be much more limited in number, about 25 percent of the ARVN tactical
units will be focused on pacification. In many instances, depending on the local situation, ARVN
pacification forces will be placed under the direct control of the province chief.
24. General Westmoreland and his staff are working closely with the ARVN high command to develop a
campaign plan for 1967 which will reflect and carry out this scheme.
25. This new concept of ARVN support of pacification operations will mean that U.S. tactical forces
will be carrying the main burden of search and destroy operations against Viet Cong main force and
North Vietnamese Army units, while ARVN will be concentrating on pacification. This will probably
mean that U.S. military casualties will constitute a higher proportion of total friendly military casualties,
although some elite ARVN units will participate with U.S. units in operations against main force units
so that there will always be a Vietnamese presence.
26. But it will be important when announcing casualties in the future that the Vietnamese civilian
casualties inflicted by the Viet Cong be announced concurrently with the Vietnamese and American
military casualties. The Communists make no distinction between military and civilians and it seems
ritualistic for us to adopt the World War II style of always announcing military casualties separately. It
is disadvantageous to our best interests and, at the same time, it is not an honest reflection of the true
situation. As I have said, we are working to set up a reporting system throughout the country on
Vietnamese civilian casualties.
27. If, in the future, there should be criticism because U.S. military casualties are a higher proportion of
total friendly military casualties than they have been, the answer is that the purpose of our military
sacrifices and military successes is to create the opportunity to do the pacification job without which the
war cannot be successfully completed. If we do not definitively end terrorism, this whole tragic business
can start all over again. In pacification the overwhelming bulk of the casualties are borne by
Vietnamese.
C. Casualties, military and civilian
28. For the first time in thirteen weeks the total of Viet Cong-North Vietnamese Army dead dropped
below one thousand--to 649 for the week. Overall friendly military losses for the week as follows:
189 killed in action (including 59 U.S.)
605 wounded in action (including 229 U.S.)
60 missing in action (including 6 U.S.)
29. The July figures for local officials killed or kidnapped by the Viet Cong are still incomplete. So far
all of the four corps have reported in except for II Corps. The total to date is 33. Depending upon what II
Corps reports, this could represent the lowest figure in the last eighteen months.
30. Totals for GVN officials killed or kidnapped for the first seven months of 1966, as compared with

the same month for 1965, are as follows:

January 1965, 258
January 1966, 76
February 1965, 68
February 1966, 91
March 1965, 119
March 1966, 59
April 1965, 120
April 1966, 52
May 1965, 112
May 1966, 78
June 1965, 214
June 1966, 64
July 1965, 73
July 1966, 33 Plus
31. As you see, generally speaking, the figures are lower in 1966 than they were in 1965. This may be
because Viet Cong guerrillas were busy with military operations or that friendly defense against
terrorism has been improving or a combination of both. It is hard to tell. Also, there is no reason to
believe that the 1966 figures cannot be increased whenever the Viet Cong decide they want to do it. One
thing is clear: this is a time tested traditional Viet Cong weapon. It is this--and not popularity--which
brought them into existence at a time when there were no constabulary forces to cope with terrorism and
it is their way to get started again if everything else they attempt has failed--as it looks as though it
might.
32. I apologize because my civilian casualty figures are by the month and do not match up with the
military casualty figures, which are by the week. I also apologize because we still have not got overall
civilian casualty figures which are an integral part of the casualty picture. As soon as we have adequate
figures for civilian casualties on a monthly basis, I will examine the possibility of providing them week
by week, as I do the military figures.
D. Elections
33. The Central Election Review Council has recently met in Saigon to examine the cases of candidates
who had either been disqualified on the basis of provincial screening or had been challenged by their
opponents. Of the forty-two cases reviewed, twenty-three were reinstated. This review process was

carried on beneath the gaze of the local press and the interested parties and even those who were
adversely affected by the council's decision have admitted that the hearing was fair and free of pressure
from the central government.
34. Election lists have now been posted in all cities, provincial capitals, district towns, and villages
giving the names of qualified voters in each area. Purpose of the posting was to permit citizens to see if
their names were inscribed. Anyone finding his name omitted could petition for its inclusion. I have no
country-wide results as yet concerning how many people checked the lists, found their names omitted
and complained. However, as a spot check, over 5,000 people had already registered in Saigon last week
after finding their names not included in the lists. Many of these were undoubtedly refugees who had
moved to the city within the last year. This statistic provides some measure of popular interest in these
elections.
35. The campaign itself will not begin until August 26. Until then candidates are proscribed from
engaging in campaign activities so that everyone will have an equal chance during the fortnight the
campaign officially runs. Nevertheless, some of the more sophisticated candidates are already engaged
in the campaign here in Saigon through their friends, the columns of the daily newspapers, and in other
ways.
36. I am cautioning Americans here and Vietnamese against making any very optimistic claims about
the September 11 elections. I have told them to say in response to questions that, to hold elections in war
time is very ambitious, particularly for a country with no experience with democracy; that even the
British never had elections in World War II; that the Viet Cong are going all out to intimidate;/5/ and
that the GVN will do very well if between 35 percent and 40 percent of the qualified voters vote.
/5/In its Field Information Report, [document number not declassified], August 8, the CIA Station in
Saigon reported that "from all evidence the Viet Cong/VC/ intend to make an all-out effort to disrupt the
government of Vietnam/GVN/ elections." (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 85-00392R,
137-9-23, Government Activities in SVN, 1 Aug 66 thru 31 Dec 66)
37. As you know, I confidentially think it is going to be quite good. But if we make extravagant claims
now, we will get no credit, whereas, if the public expects 35 percent and gets 70 percent, it will look like
a miracle. I think this could be most important.
38. I am looking around for things to do which will put the people in a good humor as far as the
government is concerned during the first ten days of September. The general supply office is helping:
through the sale of rice from the backs of trucks in low income areas, the transportation and sale of pork,
and the importation of motorbikes. Frozen pork carcasses will be arriving from Europe by September 1
and will be released on the market in Saigon at the rate of 50 tons a day, which is about 30 percent of the
daily Saigon requirement.
E. Psychological
39. For the first time awareness of the elections--in urban areas--has become more general than
complaints about prices, according to the JUSPAO weekly "evaluation of attitudes." They get reports
throughout most of the country that "rising costs seem to have leveled and have stopped rising, and there
is relief that inflation has apparently halted."
40. JUSPAO also reports that the government's publicity efforts are resulting in more people knowing
about the elections, and that elections are being talked about, although sometimes cynically. The Viet

Cong are increasing their effort to disrupt the elections, particularly in IV Corps, and elements of
Buddhism are opposing or boycotting.
41. There is more ground fire against planes dropping leaflets indicating increasing concern by Viet
Cong commanders over the psychological effects.
42. Other notes are: the Mayor of Danang is making an excellent impression on the public and is
meeting with many groups to explain the government's program, and to invite them to make known their
complaints. In IV Corps the flow of farmers from outlying villages into more secure hamlets is
increasing due to heavier Viet Cong taxation and artillery barrages. A Viet Cong propaganda officer
reported stubborn resistance by peasants to the Viet Cong draft, saying that the peasants cried out: "If
you want a revolution, fine, but don't make us and our sons fight it for you." Also morale went up in
Kien Toung where a military operation uncovered another sizable cache of foodstuff and equipment.
43. Evidence was uncovered in Chuong Thien that a large Viet Cong campaign was in the making to
obstruct the voters from reaching the polls and to confiscate their identification cards which are the
equivalent of registration in the U.S.
F. Economic
44. The economic picture has brightened--a tribute to you and your associates for your long, hard efforts
and to the GVN for following our advice. It is all set forth in Saigon 3055/6/ which also includes news
on Chieu Hoi and the port and which I will not repeat.
/6/Dated August 9, not found.
45. Some months ago, Prime Minister Ky asked me for help in setting up a GVN PX/commissary
system for Vietnamese military and civil servants--people with fixed incomes whose purchasing power
has diminished as prices rose. As a result of our reaction to this request USAID and MACV have been
working actively with the GVN general supply office under the Ministry of National Economy to
develop a series of PX/commissary outlets for civil service and military use. The layout of the first
proposed outlet in Saigon for the sale of vegetables, meats and staple items has been forwarded to the
U.S. military subsistence center in Chicago for technical review and the site for this first service center
in downtown Saigon has been selected. Certain refrigeration items have been identified in U.S. excess
property lists and are being held in place for use in this center. In addition, a U.S. military specialist in
commissary and PX systems is being assigned to assist the GVN run their system.
G. Visitors
46. Chester Bowles is here and is favorably impressed with our entire operation. He attended a Mission
Council meeting and remarked on General Westmoreland's remarkable sensitivity to political factors
and his breadth of view. Bowles believes this struggle is of both historical and world-wide importance
and is the kind of thing that happens once in 200 years. If, he says, we succeed (and he is confident that
we will) it will be the beginning of the end for world Communism and will be a date in Communist
history comparable to 1917 when Communist government was born in Russia. He was much impressed
by the way American soldiers understand and carry out in practice the truth that, in this war, unlike
World War II, we must win the war and build the peace at the same time. He has seen them doing it. He
believes also that victory here will change America, in that so many young Americans have seen at first
hand the importance of economic and social development going hand in hand with security against
violence.

47. Another visitor was Gough Whitlam, deputy leader of the opposition in the Australian Parliament. I
had a fine visit with him. I sense that he does not think his party will elect the Prime Minister at their
forthcoming elections. I also sense that he is favorably impressed with the effort here, and I would be
surprised indeed to hear him attack what Americans and Australians are doing in Viet-Nam.
Lodge
209. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger)/1/
Washington, August 11, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret. Copies
were sent to Harriman, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, McNaughton, and Taylor.
SUBJECT
Possible Sequence of Actions Toward a Settlement in South Viet-Nam
I find the paper of August tenth on the possible sequence of actions toward a settlement in South VietNam/2/ excellent and most useful. I would like to suggest that I doubt that Hanoi will ever agree to
negotiations until the Viet Cong are in favor of a settlement. If the VC should decide they have had
enough, it seems to me that there might be great advantage in negotiating with them through the GVN
rather than with Hanoi if this can be arranged.
/2/Drafted by William Bundy, the 28-page paper was sent by Unger for comment to Harriman,
Thompson, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, McNaughton, and Taylor on August 10. (Ibid.) In an August 13
memorandum to Unger, Taylor took issue with a number of points, calling the exchange of a cessation
of bombing for a cessation of infiltration "bad business." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers,
Box 72, B/Negotiations and Related Matters) Bundy sent Lodge a copy of his paper, together with
Thompson's and Taylor's comments, under cover of a letter, August 19, in which he noted that his paper
concluded "that we should explore exactly the same kind of 'three track' approach" that had been under
discussion for a while but that its "discussion of other issues is somewhat more full and blunt than in any
other paper we have ever produced on this subject." (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240,
WPB Chron)
I do not believe that we can get away with trading a cessation of bombing against a cessation of
infiltration, and believe it would be unwise to put such a position forward even as an initial bargaining
position because of the damage we would suffer in a retreat from such a position. I believe that we
would have to agree to trade a cessation of reinforcements for a cessation of infiltration and agree that so
long as the provisions of such an agreement were observed we would not bomb North Viet-Nam. I do
not believe that this is as unfavorable a bargain as it might seem at first glance. In the first place, we
could prepare for such an agreement by stepping up the numbers of our troops in South Viet-Nam and
there is, in any event, a question as to what the optimum number should be. Casualty ratios are running
so much in our favor that even allowing for the fact that a high proportion are Viet Cong and not North
Viet-Namese, a continuation of hostilities in the South might well be in our favor without significant
reinforcements from either side.
More important, such an agreement would presumably only come about if we were on the verge of
serious negotiation, if not a real settlement. In these circumstances, I should think we would, for a
considerable period of time, not want to send reinforcements even to replace casualties. If negotiations

broke down, or if the agreement should be significantly violated by the other side, we could always call
the whole deal off. I should think that in the event of such an agreement, large numbers of VC would
rally to GVN in the light of the amnesty that presumably would be declared. This alone should mean
that we would have no need for reinforcements. I quite agree that we would have to be free to bring in
materiel and supplies.
I must say I doubt very much that the North Viet-Namese will ever admit that they have sent in regular
units and this is why I believe that our negotiations should be with the NLF or VC. The NLF would be
representing Hanoi rather than the other way around, and if agreement were reached, I should think the
withdrawal of the North Viet-Namese regular units would follow automatically.
There are several positions in the paper which I do not believe could be sustained unless we have a
greater victory than now seems likely. Among these are those on page 12. The first suggestion is that
North Viet-Namese elements would have to be withdrawn before our withdrawal in stages. The second
is that those southerners who went north for training and were reintroduced would also have to be
withdrawn to the north.
210. Editorial Note
On August 13, 1966, General Westmoreland flew to the LBJ Ranch in Texas to meet with President
Johnson, arriving at 6:24 p.m. He stayed overnight and departed for Honolulu at midday on August 14.
(Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) W. Thomas Johnson of the White House staff took informal
notes of Westmoreland's meeting with the President on August 13, which are ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes
of Meetings. On August 14, the President made a statement to news correspondents about his meeting
with Westmoreland, and Westmoreland also held a news conference. Transcripts of both are printed in
Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1966, pages 335-338.
In a telegram to General Wheeler reporting on the visit, HWA 2419, August 16, General Westmoreland
stated that the "only significant exchange" with the President "involved the possibility of another stand
down of the air campaign in North Vietnam." Westmoreland urged that President Johnson "not consider
any cessation of the full bombing program to the north," emphasizing that "as a minimum" the air
interdiction campaign of lines of communications in the southern part of the panhandle of North
Vietnam south of Vinh was "militarily essential to the battle in the south." (Center of Military History,
Westmoreland Papers, #8 History File)
In JCS telegram 5039-66 to General Westmoreland, August 24, General Wheeler reported that the
President had talked with Secretary McNamara that morning about Westmoreland's visit to the Ranch,
stating that he appreciated better the problems confronting Westmoreland and his efforts to solve them,
but there was one area in which he wanted "new and further action": the "scale-down" of American
personnel and facilities in Saigon. (Ibid., COMUSMACV Message Files)
211. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 17, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Secret. Drafted by
Unger.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Vu Van Thai, Vietnamese Ambassador
Ambassador W. Averell Harriman--S/AH
Mr. Leonard Unger--FE
1. Ambassador Vu Van Thai called on Ambassador Harriman following Ambassador Harriman's having
undertaken at the President's request a "peace mission" on Viet-Nam. Their conversation, which lasted
almost two hours, was quite full and frank and ranged over many aspects of US-Vietnamese relations as
well as the situation inside South Viet-Nam. There are recorded below the more significant points which
emerged from the conversation and which have not been recorded elsewhere.
2. Ambassador Thai agreed with Ambassador Harriman on the importance of a good turnout at the
September 11 elections for a constituent assembly. He expected the Viet Cong to be trying in a few
instances to infiltrate candidates sympathetic to their cause and, behind the scenes, to drum up votes for
them. Of more significance he felt would be the Viet Cong efforts to discredit and interfere with the
elections by various means including terror. He pointed out, however, that an election situation was
different from a VC terror campaign aimed at one or several objectives and that the Viet Cong resources
were probably insufficient to permit them to be effective all over the country at once.
3. The Governor turned to the question of Chieu Hoi and encouraging defections from the Viet Cong
and splits in VC/NLF ranks. He emphasized the importance of the treatment of Chieu Hoi, as well as the
treatment of prisoners in general and asked Ambassador Thai for his thoughts about what might be done
to encourage defections, particularly of important figures like Nguyen Huu Tho. Thai reviewed his own
acquaintance with Tho dating back to about 1954 when the latter was active although not an important
figure in a peace movement. He mentioned Tho's imprisonment along with the present Finance Minister,
Thanh, and of the efforts he, Thai, had made with Prime Minister Diem to secure their release or at least
good treatment of them. Thai said that Tho was not a strong figure and was used by the VC/NLF
primarily as a figurehead, someone who is pliable. He believes that the Viet Cong and the fighters and
doers are separated from the NLF who play the role of spokesmen and he considers the latter not a
fundamentally significant group. He expressed doubt as to how much would be achieved even if some of
these front individuals should defect from the VC/NLF. While Thai recognized that important defections
would have great significance internationally, he did not feel persuaded it would have real impact on
either the Viet Cong or on the population of South Viet-Nam. The only effective action would be if
some of the core Communist group could be influenced--here the personalities are not too well known to
us. In answer to the Governor's question he agreed that Phat is perhaps a more important person and
seemed dubious about the chances of his defecting.
4. With regard to North Viet-Nam Thai referred to the basic division between the Le Duan and Giap
groups and he reminded the Governor of Le Duan's adamant opposition to compromise even as far back
as when he opposed Ho Chi Minh's accepting the Geneva Accords of 1954. After some discussion of the
relation of the Chinese-Russian split to North Vietnamese positions, Ambassador Thai stated that a
fundamental difficulty for North Viet-Nam was that today it could not come to the conference table or in
some other fashion bring the war to an end without ending up by being unacceptably dependent on the
U.S. and its close friends in the Southeast Asian region. To bring the fighting to an end means a cooling
off of relations with Communist China; since Chinese Communist prestige is so much at stake in the
Viet-Nam war it is unlikely to acquiesce in North Viet-Nam's bringing the war to an end. If it cuts its
ties in that direction, North Viet-Nam has no alternative but to face a knuckling under to the United
States since the Russians are not at present a force of any significance in the region. Thai thought that
perhaps an environment could be created in Southeast Asia which would appear to the North
Vietnamese to be some alternative to an exclusively U.S.-run show. He was thinking of some
association of aligned and non-aligned countries, particularly in the economic field, in which the

Japanese and French and others might also play some role. An important incentive to North Viet-Nam
would also be concessions by South Viet-Nam on the matter of food supply, a field in which China can
offer no effective competition. To illustrate the importance of this point, Thai referred to the situation in
1959 when the North Vietnamese dropped their five-year plan. He said this resulted from their having
discovered, from a recent census, that their population was growing at 3% per annum as opposed to the
previously understood 2 or 2-1/2% and this made them realize that without the possibility of securing
food from abroad they could not proceed with the plan. At this time Vu Van Thai said he pled with
President Diem to open trade but to no avail.
5. This led Thai into a discussion of his belief in the importance of stimulating economic development in
South Viet-Nam and in the Southeast Asian region as a means of persuading Viet Cong sympathizers in
the south of the wisdom of coming back to the Government's side and to demonstrate to North Viet-Nam
the value of turning to cooperation within the region. Thai felt that within five years economic activity
and output could be 200% of its present level and this might even be achieved sooner if cooperation
within the area grows. He talked about the Mekong project and his favorite theme of a regional
university and of selected industries in each of the four Mekong countries. He noted that both from the
point of view of power requirements and food requirements North Viet-Nam was even more interested
than South Viet-Nam in the Mekong. Governor Harriman pointed out that the five years which the
Ambassador had mentioned might be an impractical period to wait in view of the dangers among other
things of escalation.
6. The discussion then turned to the internal situation in South Viet-Nam and Ambassador Thai's
conviction that effective and clean administration, particularly on the part of the district and province
chiefs, could do more than anything else to weaken the VC and increase the attractiveness of the
Government side. He felt the quality of district officers was continuing to decline at present and
attributed this, in answer to Governor Harriman's question, to the fact that the military have taken over
so many of these posts. He recognized that some of the military were quite competent but expressed
concern particularly about growing corruption. This grows inevitably, according to Thai, as the scale
and scope of the war grows and the opportunities for getting hold of large sums of money are expanded.
He said the military are not trained, as were the civil servants formerly in charge, in a respect for laws
and regulations and they are prone to taking arbitrary action. He referred back to the technically efficient
administration under President Diem which, however, had its drawbacks also because of its arrogant
style and preoccupation with building the record for Diem. Thai said that the civilians formerly in the
Civil Service are many of them now working for American contractors or for the U.S. Government and
others who are still civil servants have lost much of their earlier zeal.
7. In answer to Governor Harriman's question the Ambassador said that the ten new civilian members of
the Directorate were weak personalities and not likely to have much influence on decisions. He felt that
the Constituent Assembly will have stronger figures elected and that even though the Assembly does not
have legislative powers it nevertheless will serve as something of a deterrent to arbitrary action by the
GVN. Returning to the matter of a government with more appeal for the people, Thai regretted the split
that developed between Generals Ky and Thi. He identified them both as honest men who have some
grasp of the aspirations of the people. He was hesitant to answer the Governor's question about General
Thieu and only said that the latter played a "moderating" role.
8. The conversation turned once more to the question of how to end the war and whether the South
Vietnamese could not find a way to work this out between themselves. Could not the Government, once
the VC have accepted the fact that they are bound to lose, either bring them over to its side or divide
them so that they no longer have any effective power? Ambassador Thai kept returning to his conviction
that the key is in Hanoi and that Russian-Chinese relations are crucial in Hanoi's decision. He also
referred to the bombing of North Viet-Nam and urged a pattern which would make the North more

dependent on the Soviet Union. The Ambassador emphasized that the mining of Haiphong could
increase the Chinese role. With regard to bombing, he advocated an irregular program with various
starts and stops. This would serve to confuse but also bring North Vietnamese energies to bear on
reconstruction with the threat of repeated destruction if they do not finally come to terms.
212. Memorandum of Meeting of the Negotiations Committee/1/
Washington, August 18, 1966, 4:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations,
1968. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns. The meeting was held in Harriman's office.
PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman
U. Alexis Johnson
Wiliam Bundy
Leonard Unger
Benjamin Read
SUBJECT
Vietnam
1. Memorandum to President and Secretary
The Governor's memorandum for the President and the Secretary/2/ was read and approved by the
Group.
/2/Document 213.
2. Ambassador Thai's Conversation
The Governor noted that he and Ambassador Unger had talked at length with Vietnamese Ambassador
Thai on August 17 and that Thai had made a number of interesting observations about the situation in
Vietnam./3/ Ambassador Unger observed that the Governor had tried to draw Thai out on the subject of
contacts with the NLF-VC. Thai, however, had not committed himself on the desirability of such
contacts. Instead he had turned the conversation toward the subject of talks with Hanoi. Mr. Bundy
commented that Thai might be reluctant to reveal his true feelings in a formal conversation with
Departmental officials. Ambassador Unger agreed that this might be so, but said that Thai had been
extremely candid about other subjects including GVN personalities.
/3/See Document 211.
3. Corruption
Mr. Bundy mentioned Ambassador Lodge's talk with Ky about corruption. In this conversation Ky
indicated that he was aware that Generals Co and Quang were deeply implicated. Lodge had asked for
guidance from the Department on what to tell Ky. Mr. Bundy said that his inclination was to tell Lodge
that if Ky was confident that he could get rid of these officers smoothly and efficiently without bringing
down the government, he should do so. Ambassador Johnson observed that the IV Corps situation was a
mess and that action to clean it up was overdue. He pointed out that if Co and Quang were to be

removed, the timing had to be just right. Ambassador Unger thought we should ascertain whether Co
and Quang had significant support in the army. The Group generally agreed that both officers should be
purged if the operation could be accomplished efficiently after the September 11 elections. Mr. Bundy
commented that it was encouraging to see that Ky was doing some soul-searching on the problem of
corruption.
4. U Thant in Moscow
Governor Harriman raised the subject of U Thant's special talks in Moscow. He said that Arthur
Goldberg wants the Department to develop questions that the SYG could put to Ho. These might include
an effort to interpret Hanoi's 4 Points in a way that would be acceptable to us. Governor Harriman noted
that Chester Cooper was preparing an analysis of the 4 Points along these lines. It was agreed that U
Thant did not expect anything from us immediately to convey to Ho.
5. NLF Rep in Algiers
Governor Harriman referred to the information which the SYG had given Arthur Goldberg about the
new NLF representative in Algiers. The SYG understood that the new rep was a senior Lao Dong
official and had suggested that we try to contact him through a non-American intermediary. The
Governor said that he had approved a telegram/4/ asking our Embassy to provide us with the best
information it could obtain on the NLF rep and to suggest the names of non-American newsmen
presently in Algiers who might be good intermediaries.
/4/Not further identified.
Ambassador Unger said that information available in Washington did not indicate that the NLF rep was
a significant Lao Dong official. The Governor thought it would be useful to supplement this information
through CIA sources abroad. Ambassador Unger said that he would have CIA check their sources in
Saigon [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and elsewhere to see if other significant
information was available.
6. POWs
Governor Harriman noted that the objectives which we hoped to achieve by encouraging direct contacts
with the NLF-VC included increased defections and divisions in the ranks of the NLF-VC. His
memorandum to the President and the Secretary spoke of the possibility of a proposal by the GVN for a
general amnesty by early October. The Governor said that our ability to achieve these objectives would
be impaired if we did not take immediate and effective steps to improve treatment of POWs in the South
and to put more steam into the Chieu Hoi program. He recalled that General Johnson had made some
encouraging remarks about improvements being made in the Chieu Hoi program. The POW question
was difficult and complicated. The Governor wondered whether our military in Vietnam were
sufficiently well indoctrinated on treatment of POWs. Ambassador Johnson said that the handling of
POWs was always a problem but that he thought that General Westmoreland was keenly aware of the
importance of handling it correctly. He observed that in Korea we had to offer a bounty to our forces to
guarantee a flow of captives for intelligence purposes.
Governor Harriman said that he understood that the critical period for prisoners in Vietnam was between
the time they were captured at the front and the time they were delivered to a place of detention.
Ambassador Unger said that Frank Sieverts was working on a series of recommendations which would
help assure the security of POWs while being transported to detention areas.

7. Kissinger's Impressions
Mr. Bundy said that Henry Kissinger had formed a number of interesting opinions about GVN contacts
with the NLF-VC, some of which had not been reported when he was in Saigon. Kissinger had found
Thieu and Vien negative about the value of such contacts. Tran Van Do had been less rigid and had told
Kissinger that contacts between GVN officials in Paris and resident Vietnamese "neutralists" had been
undertaken at Do's initiative. Mr. Bundy said that Dan Davidson was putting together a memorandum on
Kissinger's views.
8. DeGaulle's Trip
The group briefly discussed the pros and cons of communicating our views on Vietnam and Cambodia
to the French prior to DeGaulle's trip. It was agreed that a message from Secretary Rusk to Couve would
be preferable to a message from the President to DeGaulle. Mr. Bundy said that he would prepare a draft
for the Group's consideration.
9. 3-Track Paper on Negotiations
Mr. Bundy said that he had discussed the 3-track paper/5/ with Kissinger. He thought it would be useful
to supply a copy to Lodge and to Arthur Goldberg before his proposed trip to Eastern Europe. Mr.
Bundy thought that the paper was useful in setting down the fundamental elements of our thinking about
the problems and possibilities of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Governor Harriman said that he
wanted to re-read the paper and would let Mr. Bundy know his views about it.
/5/For information on the paper, see footnote 2, Document 209.
Note: Ambassador Goldberg is on leave in Virginia for a week. No definite date has been set for his trip
to Eastern Europe.
10. Sainteny
Mr. Bundy referred to the proposal that Henry Kissinger see Sainteny in Paris on or about September 9.
He though Kissinger was the right man to talk to Sainteny and that there were two subjects in particular
that we would like to see explored: (a) could Sainteny obtain clarification of Pham Van Dong's reported
indication in an earlier conversation with Sainteny that Hanoi might be willing to stop infiltration into
the South if we stopped bombing the North? (b) could Sainteny find out what Hanoi has in mind for a
political settlement in the South? Governor Harriman agreed that Kissinger was the right man to talk to
Sainteny and said it would be useful for him to determine what Sainteny thought we should be saying to
Hanoi.
11. Tokyo Contact
Mr. Bundy said that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had received information from a
Japanese businessman to the effect that the President of a Japanese news agency who is an excommunist had offered to set up a contact with DRV representatives and had claimed that Hanoi would
be willing to have discussions with us which were not confined to or conditioned on Hanoi's 4 Points.
Mr. Bundy said that he was telling Bill Colby to go ahead and see what the self-proclaimed intermediary
could accomplish. If he could arrange for unconditional talks we would be there.
12. Thanat Proposals

Governor Harriman asked whether there was anything further that we could do at this time on the
Thanat proposals. He observed that even if the Thanat initiative did not produce a conference it was an
extremely valuable example of Asian initiative. Mr. Read commented that Chuck Percy is claiming
credit for Thanat's proposal and Senator Douglas would appreciate anything that could be done to show
that Thanat was not a registered Republican.
213. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, August 18, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations,
8/8/66. Secret.
As a result of previous consideration, and particularly Henry Kissinger's talks in Vietnam, we have
begun to take several steps looking toward possible eventual reconciliation between substantial elements
of the Viet Cong and the GVN. There are three areas of activity:/2/
/2/In a 6-page memorandum to Harriman entitled "The NLF and Where We Go From Here," August 31,
Cooper discussed a number of ideas for advancing activity in all three areas. (Ibid., Viet-Nam
Negotiations, 1968)
1) Efforts to increase defection, including the higher echelons;
2) Consideration of ways and means to create divisions within the NLF or VC;
3) Development of conditions which might eventually lead to negotiations between the GVN and NLF.
Ambassador Lodge is on board but he points out, and we agree, that it will take some time to get full
understanding and cooperation from General Ky and his colleagues.
In the meantime the Chieu Hoi program will be emphasized and steps undertaken to bring about the
defection of important individuals.
It is our hope that after the elections, perhaps by early October, conditions will be ripe for a proposal by
the GVN for a general amnesty with full social, economic and political status for those who come over.
Our targets are the noncommunist VC. There is not much hope of influencing the hard core communists
who are part of Ho Chi Minh's party apparatus.
One interesting feature is that the Rand interrogation reports indicate little communist indoctrination
among the VC rank and file. The propaganda emphasizes three themes--land, peace and a better life.
These and other reports indicate that efforts along the lines undertaken will be useful even though it may
take some time before their full impact is felt.
There are a number of leads to Hanoi which we are investigating in detail, but none so far can be
considered as a hot trail.
W. Averell Harriman/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, August 19, 1966, 6:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH. Secret; Nodis; Thrush.
Drafted and approved by Rusk.
31851. Personal for Lodge from Secretary. I am encouraged by information developed through
Thrush/2/ traffic. I am sure that it will occur to you that if we get through a good South Vietnamese
election and operation Thrush comes to a successful conclusion before too long, the combined impact of
both in the forthcoming General Assembly could be very constructive indeed. Even more importantly,
such an event just might jar some of those on the other side to begin to think about a peaceful settlement.
We will all keep our fingers crossed.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 204.
Rusk
215. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to
President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 22, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret; Sensitive.
The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
Ky and Lodge Discuss Corruption in Vietnam
Prime Minister Ky in a long discussion with Ambassador Lodge/2/ laid on the table the great problem he
was having with two senior officers, Generals Co and Quang. Both senior and young officers were
asking that the two generals be removed from office because of the corrupt conditions which existed in
the areas that they control. Ky said that General Quang opposed the sending of U.S. troops to the IV
Corps area because they would interfere with his corrupt practices.
/2/Lodge reported on the discussion in telegram 3842, August 18. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S)
Ambassador Lodge replied that his raising the matter of corruption was indeed a coincidence. Earlier in
the day he had decided not to raise this subject with General Ky because he did not want to urge on Ky a
step which might precipitate a coup.
Ky said that the people of Vietnam want to get rid of corruption and so did he, but that the generals he
would have to act against would seek support from others to prevent him from removing them. He had
decided not to do anything before the September 11 elections but to think very hard about it immediately
thereafter.
Ambassador Lodge replied that men in positions of high responsibility led pretty bleak lives in all

countries, but that in this country he had the added problem of leading it out of the middle ages into
constitutional democracy, and there were still some people like Co and Quang desperately fighting a rear
guard action and it was bound to be very unpleasant.
Ambassador Lodge believes that the decision to do nothing about corruption until after the election is
wise. There is no doubt in his mind that there is widespread disgust with corruption and that it shakes
confidence in the government and in the integrity of the elections. He believes that reports of corruption
will get into the U.S. press, particularly in connection with the sale of U.S. supplies to the Viet Cong. He
is convinced that the problem will have to be dealt with at some time or other but that it ought to be
done quickly and surgically.
Secretary Rusk replied/3/ to Ambassador Lodge's request for advice by saying that the Ambassador was
quite right in warning about the dangers of precipitating a coup and thus risking the undoing of forward
steps in the political and economic field so laboriously brought about over the past year. He added that
the unity of the military is an indispensable factor in maintaining sufficient stability and continuity in the
government of Vietnam to permit it to carry on its military fight as well as essential political and
economic actions. He recognized that the problem of corruption is a fundamental stumbling block in the
way of constructing a government in South Vietnam which could defeat the Viet Cong in the political
realm.
/3/Rusk replied in telegram 32309, August 20. (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk agreed that Generals Co and Quang should go when this can be managed without
endangering government continuity. He believes that the sooner this can be accomplished the better but
doubts that it can be carried off before elections. He asked the Ambassador to assess the line up of
military leadership in the Co-Quang issue.
Ambassador Lodge replied/4/ that the first thing that must be done is to gather all the facts on Co and
Quang. They would be confronted and asked to go abroad quietly and if they refused they would be
forced to leave. The military directorate would have to be lined up by Ky prior to any such action.
/4/Lodge replied in telegram 4107, August 22. (Ibid.)
The embassy is assembling in detail how it thinks the military leadership would react to a confrontation
with Co and Quang.
Bromley Smith

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
216. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-538-66
Washington, August 24, 1966.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, 381
Vietnam. Secret.
SUBJECT
A program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (U)
1. (U) In March 1966, the Army staff promulgated a study entitled, "A Program for the Pacification and
Long-Term Development of South Vietnam" (short title: PROVN). You will recall that, on 13 June
1966, members of the Army staff briefed you on PROVN. A copy of the study is attached./2/
/2/Attached, but only the "PROVN Summary Statement" is printed below. The 900-page report was
produced by an Army study group formed in August 1965 at the direction of the Army Chief of Staff.
2. (C) At the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army referred PROVN to them for their
consideration as to its utility in the conduct of our effort in Vietnam and as to what disposition should be
made of the study.
3. (S) As might be expected, a study of this depth and scope has its controversial aspects. PROVN was
forwarded to the Services, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV for comment and each of them took
exception to certain of the proposals therein. The Joint Chiefs do not endorse PROVN in its entirety,
particularly in regard to those proposals which would in effect: downgrade the role of the Government
of Vietnam in the conduct of the war effort; involve the United States too directly in influencing the
South Vietnamese governmental structures at all levels, including the local level; and result in a major
revision of current channels of command from Washington to Saigon. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs
consider that PROVN, when viewed as a whole:
a. Presents a conceptual approach to matters of major concern in the US effort in Vietnam.
b. Provides a comprehensive digest of critical factors influencing the internal situation in South
Vietnam.

c. Provides background material for use in developing future concepts, policies, and actions to improve
the US effort in Vietnam.
4. (C) While neither unanimity nor consensus has been reached on PROVN, it is believed that no good
purpose would be served by presenting an expurgated version. Moreover, any effort to accommodate all
interests by deleting passages would emasculate PROVN and detract from its effectiveness.
5. (S) In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Have requested that the Chief of Staff, US Army, distribute PROVN on a need-to-know basis to
interested Department of Defense agencies.
b. Recommend that you authorize the Chief of Staff, US Army, to distribute PROVN on a need-to-know
basis to appropriate US agencies/activities outside the Department of Defense to include those listed
below. Such distribution would be accomplished with a proviso to the effect that PROVN does not
necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(1) National Security Council.
(2) Senior Interdepartmental Group.
(3) Vietnam Interagency Committee.
(4) Interdepartmental Regional Group, Far East.
(5) Special Assistant to the President for Nonmilitary Programs Relating to Vietnam./3/
/3/In a September 1 letter to McNamara, Komer stated: "While I'm still only a 5-month expert, I've spent
this time 100% on Vietnam. . . . Most of my ideas have been borrowed liberally from the people and
studies which impressed me--especially the PROVN Study, the draft Jacobson Task Force report, and
Brute Krulak (not Wally Greene)." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files,
McNamara/Vance/McNaughton)
(6) Appropriate offices both in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development.
(7) Central Intelligence Agency.
(8) US Information Agency.
(9) US Embassy, Saigon.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Attachment
Washington, March 1996.

PROVN SUMMARY STATEMENT

The situation in South Vietnam (SVN) has seriously deteriorated. 1966 may well be the last chance to
ensure eventual success. "Victory" can only be achieved through bringing the individual Vietnamese,
typically a rural peasant, to support willingly the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). The critical
actions are those that occur at the village, district and provincial levels. This is where the war must be
fought; this is where that war and the object which lies beyond it must be won. The following are the
most important specific actions required now:
Concentrate US operations on the provincial level to include the delegation of command authority over
US operations to the senior US Representative at the provincial level.
Reaffirm Rural Construction as the foremost US-GVN combined effort to solidify and extend GVN
influence.
Authorize more direct US involvement in GVN affairs at those administrative levels adequate to ensure
the accomplishment of critical programs.
Delegate to the US Ambassador unequivocal authority as the sole manager of all US activities, resources
and personnel in-country.
Direct the Ambassador to develop a single, integrated plan for achieved US objectives in SVN.
Reaffirm to the world at large the precise terms of the ultimate US objective as stated in NSAM 288:/4/
A free and independent, non-communist South Vietnam.
/4/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 172-173.
The task of the enemy is much easier. He is opposing a "government" that cannot validly claim the
active loyalty of a majority--even a significant minority--of the people. The US and the GVN, on the
other hand, are dealing essentially from a point of weakness. Building upon the foundations of an
ineffectual government, we must develop and "deliver" a positive program that assists the GVN to create
an attractive environment so that a firm commitment of the individual to his nation will take root and
grow. The VC do not have to deliver until they win. We have to deliver in order to win. The strategic
implications of failure necessitate total resolve and effort.
The Strategic Importance of South Vietnam
The future role and accompanying strategy of the US in Asia, especially regarding the security of
Southeast Asia, critically depends on the outcome of the current conflict in SVN. US foreign policy,
through the short range, will have as its central focus the containment of world communism. Communist
China today poses the most immediate danger. Targeting on the less-developed nations, the Communist
Chinese have adopted the aggressive doctrine of "wars of national liberation" as a vehicle for communist
encirclement of the US and Western Europe. Reiterated by Marshal Lin Piao on 2 September 1965, this
doctrine is currently being tested in SVN.
US strategy in mainland Southeast Asia includes supporting the provisions of the 1962 Geneva
agreements in Laos, continuing to strengthen Thailand economically and militarily and restoring peace
and security in SVN. In general, US policy calls for the continued development of the individual
countries of all Southeast Asia and their increasing regional integration--economically, socially and

politically-- through the agency of such programs as the Mekong River Development Scheme and the
recently established Asian Development Bank.
The outcome of US involvement in SVN will determine the future strategy which we as a nation can or
will be willing to adopt in Asia.
Major Problem Areas
Five major obstacles stand out above all others as hindering the achievement of the ultimate US
objective in SVN:
A Well Led and Adequately Supported Communist Political Military Machine: Long experience, the
defeat of the French under the nationalist mantle, a formula attuned to peasant aspirations and
sanctuaries continuous to the entire western flank of SVN have provided the Communists a significant
advantage.
An Inefficient and Largely Ineffective Government, Neither Representative of Nor Responsive to the
People: Instability, ineffectual leadership, corruption, over centralization and disdain for the peasantry
have compounded the limitations of skills, experience and equipment.
The Marginally Effective US Method of Operation: Rapid expansion, lack of understanding of the
nature of the conflict, inappropriate response and interagency competition have undermined US efforts
to overcome the other four problem areas which fundamentally determine the nature of the conflict in
SVN.
The Escalating Requirement for Material Resources to Prosecute the War and Meet Consumer
Demands: Having an underdeveloped agricultural economy, SVN does not possess the indigenous
resources, the communications infrastructure or the skills necessary to sustain the rapidly escalating
conflict.
The Vietnamese Peasant Outlook: Fatalism and war-weariness have sapped peasant motivation;
governmental corruption and inefficiency have caused disillusionment; and deeply ingrained traditional
values have retarded social change.
US Short-Range Objectives
US short-range objectives must be designed and established to provide a base for gaining the initiative
in the current struggle and to ensure significant progress toward overcoming the crucial obstacles. The
five major short-range objectives should be:
The defect of PAVN and Main Force VC units and the reduction of VC guerrillas and political
infrastructure among the population.
The development of GVN leadership and institutional practices capable of furthering nation building.
The establishment of an integrated US civil-military organization and method of operation capable of
ensuring execution of US-GVN plans and programs in SVN.
The provision of a war-supporting economic infrastructure and initial foundations for economic growth.

The development of an allegiance to the GVN among the South Vietnamese people.
The Concept of National Operations
The situation in SVN is both challenging and unorthodox; it calls for the application of new and
imaginative emphases and techniques. The US must devise an effective counter to "wars of national
liberation." The proposed US concept of operations is a broad-front offensive which directs major
efforts along three mutually supporting axes--eliminating armed Communists; ensuring the effective
performance of the GVN; and conducting an effective combined US-GVN Rural Construction Program.
To launch and sustain the momentum of this offensive, four initiatives must be taken now:
(1) The deployment of US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) to destroy PAVN and
Main Force VC units and base areas and to reduce external support below the sustaining level. Rural
Construction can progress significantly only in conjunction with the effective neutralization of major
enemy forces. The bulk of US-FWMAF and designated ARVN units must be directed against base areas
and against lines of communication in SVN, Laos and Cambodia as required; the remainder of these
forces must ensure adequate momentum to priority Rural Construction areas.
(2) The establishment of Rural Construction as the essential vehicle for extending security to,
developing the requisite leadership of and providing the necessary social reform for the Vietnamese
people. The war has to be won from the ground up; the people of the countryside are the target. RVNAF
must be the main Allied military element supporting Rural Construction, with the US providing material
and technical assistance and stimulating social reform as required. Requisite authority and resources
must be provided to the province chief.
(3) The exercise of more direct US involvement to ensure the attainment of US-GVN objectives.
Discriminate US involvement in GVN affairs--ranging from skillful diplomatic pressures, through the
application of politico-economic leverage, to US unilateral execution of critical programs--is essential.
The GVN has been either unwilling or unable to accomplish successfully many requisite tasks. The
eventual creation of a cohesive society in SVN requires, however, that GVN achieve effectiveness and
be directly credited with success. The US must exercise its influence to evoke GVN performance.
(4) The delegation of command authority from Washington to the district level in SVN and the
concentration of delegated authority at each intermediate US organizational level in SVN. The requisite
flexibility and responsiveness of day-to-day operations can only be achieved if those closest to the
situation are delegated adequate authority and means to influence counterpart action. An Executive
Agent in Washington should coordinate support activities in the US; the US Ambassador in SVN, raised
to the new post of Single Manager, should exercise unequivocal authority over all in-country US
activities, personnel and resources; and a single, senior US representative (SUSREP) should be
appointed at each lower echelon to function as the counterpart of his parallel GVN senior official.
Maximum authority must be delegated to province. The Single Manager must be authorized an adequate
super-agency planning staff and a deputy for Rural Construction and Development (RC&D) who
exercises operational control over USOM, JUSPAO, CAS and the Joint US Military Assist-ance
Advisory Group (JUSMAAG) as well as MAP functions (a reduced MACV). US military units in SVN
must be under the command of a newly established CINC US Forces Vietnam, coequal with the Director
of RC&D.
Priorities. US-GVN priorities for action must be established on the interrelated bases of population and
natural resource concentrations, the location and nature of the enemy, available Allied resources, current
successes and military logistical requirements. The complex interrelation of considerations for

establishing priorities and the varying mixtures of limited military, economic and political resources that
may be marshaled to achieve any one objective make the determination of priorities extremely difficult.
For these same reasons, establishing clear priorities is all the more important. After securing requisite
logistical bases, the first priority must be the Delta (current emphasis on An Giang, Vinh Long, Dinh
Tuong, Go Cong, and the Hop Tac area surrounding Saigon). The second priority area comprises the
Coastal Lowlands; the third is the Central Highlands.
Mid-Range Objectives and Subobjectives
Successful achievement of the short-range objectives should allow gradual transition toward mid-range
development objectives. These objectives, together with representative subobjectives, are as follows:
The established capacity to defeat subversion and maintain stability. Subobjectives would include:
elimination of VC infrastructure, use of Allied forces to support completion of the Rural Construction
Program and transfer of Regional Force-Popular Force responsibilities to the National Police as the RCP
progresses.
A government representative of, and responsive to, its people. Subobjectives would include: an efficient
governmental and administrative system, increased authority and prestige of province chiefs and the
development of responsible and forward-looking political parties.
A US organizational presence adequate for assured national security and development. Subobjectives
would include: termination of the Executive Agent, return to the country team organizational concept (as
the RCP nears completion) and the reduction of the US presence commensurate with increased GVN
capability.
The amelioration of divisive social factors. Subobjectives would include: maximization of minority
group integration into the social fabric, expansion of social reforms and the reintegration of the former
VC into the society.
A viable economic infrastructure oriented toward expansion. Subobjectives would include: initiation of
major land reform, acceleration of Mekong regional development and the development of light industry.
Long-Range Objectives: The Ultimate South Vietnam
Achievement of US-GVN mid-range objectives will lay the foundation for the long-term development
of SVN as a free, independent, non-communist nation. Development should proceed toward a society
that enjoys inner social cohesion; a viable government; a diversified, maturing economy; and an
adequate security posture. In less than 50 years, SVN should have effectively integrated its significant
minority groups into the fabric of its society. The government should be basically democratic with
firmly established political institutions capable of withstanding crises and allowing for the legal and
peaceful transfer of political power. Economically, SVN should have passed the take-off point to selfsustaining growth. A somewhat smaller, well-equipped and well-trained military establishment, backed
by regional and international security guarantees, should be able to ensure national security. Throughout
the long-range period, the US presence should be minimal.
[Here follows a section on "Measuring Progress."]
217. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, August 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Personal; Confidential. Drafted by
Harriman. The meeting was held in Fulbright's office.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
PARTICIPANTS
Senator J. William Fulbright
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
I lunched today with Senator Fulbright. I opened by explaining my assignment and asking for his
opinion on the way to get negotiations going. He rather evaded the question but did say there were two
matters which he thought were preventing discussions. First was our unwillingness to accept the NLF or
VC as full-fledged participants; second, and even more important, Hanoi did not believe that the United
States Government had any intention of withdrawing its forces from Vietnam or, in fact, Southeast Asia.
He said he himself did not believe that we would in fact withdraw and pointed to the size of our
installations in Thailand as well as Vietnam.
He spoke disparagingly of the September 11 elections because the VC were not permitted to put up
candidates. He maintained that all the 550-odd candidates were of the same line of thought--opposed to
the VC. He admitted, however, that not very many people would have voted for Viet Cong candidates.
I told him I was convinced that the President had every intention of removing our troops from South
Vietnam if the North Vietnamese did likewise. I agreed that North Vietnam doubted our sincerity at the
present time but that both Hanoi and Moscow were convinced that the President would be forced by
public opinion to change his policies and that we would withdraw as the French did.
He repeated that he had said publicly that Congress was more war-like than the President and would
force the President to take action which would involve us with China and the Soviet Union. I disputed
these statements but did not appear to have any effect.
Towards the end of lunch he announced he had to go to a conference committee meeting on foreign aid,
and the rest of the time was spent on my arguing with him to support the House version.
I left the door open to come back and asked him to call me if he had some constructive ideas.
He stoutly maintains we are overextended in Asia. He was skeptical when I described the new Asian
initiatives--Asian Development Bank, ASPAC and ASA peace conference initiative.
Intermingled with the above was a discussion of Arkansas politics and the state of our domestic
economy. Needless to say, we did not agree on the latter.
218. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, August 25, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder
Memos, 1966. Top Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and Unger.
SUBJECT
Proposed RT Program, and Escalation Generally
I understand Defense has sent over a proposed RT program that would include strikes against the
Haiphong docks, a steel plant, and other sensitive targets./2/ Since I will be away just overnight I am
setting down my grave reservations about this proposal and about anything on our part which smacks of
escalation at the present time.
/2/Presumably a reference to Rolling Thunder 52, which was approved by the JCS on August 19 and
presented to McNamara by Wheeler on August 22. An August 18 memorandum for Wheeler outlining
the proposal for RT 52 is in Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb
65), Section 13, Rolling Thunder 52. The proposal included strikes against the Phuc Yen and Kep POL
storage facilities, a steel plant, a cement plant, two thermal power plants, four locks, the Haiphong, Cam
Pha, and Hon Gai ports, and other targets. CINCPAC's recommendation of August 8 for strikes against
some of these targets was analyzed in an August 17 memorandum to Ball from Hughes. (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
There are three reasons for my concern:
a. I am very worried about the apparent escalation in which we have been engaged over the past six
weeks As you may know, the number of our sorties over North Viet-Nam has substantially increased in
this period./3/ Moreover, while I think the other side understood what we were doing on the DMZ
business, they--and certainly third countries--may have interpreted this as escalatory. Thirdly, although I
think your refusal to exclude the possibility of land action against the north totally or for all time at your
press conference/4/ was a right basic position, you probably have noted the Periscope item in this week's
Newsweek--just the sort of thing other governments, including the other side, pick up--that we are
seriously making plans for such action./5/ (I was asked at my Congressional briefing about this and said
flatly we had no such plans.) These specific problems exist in a background of general comment to the
effect that sentiment in the country is becoming more hawk-like. Thus, I think we have to be terribly
concerned with both the fact and the appearance of our actions in the present.
/3/Under cover of a memorandum dated August 16, Read sent Bundy a report on U.S. "Escalatory
Signals in July," which indicated that "10,198 attack sorties were flown against NVN [in July] compared
with a previous high 7,398 in June." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam,
vol. LVII)
/4/For text of Rusk's statement, see Department of State Bulletin, August 22, 1966, pp. 259-260.
/5/"Many top-level civilian analysts predict that sometime this fall the U.S. will invade North
Vietnam." ("The Periscope," Newsweek, August 29, 1966, p. 9)
b. The real convulsion in Communist China still defies assessment, but at the very least it means that
any escalatory action on our part might be construed in Peking and Hanoi as a sign that we thought we
could get away with something because of the political confusion in Communist China. This could
trigger irrational action by one or both of these capitals. In other words, while I think an unsettled
Chinese leadership will not take any initiatives, this is the time to be very careful in not appearing to
take advantage of their troubles.

c. On any reading we can make, Hanoi remains firm in its basic position, and our guess is that they are
watching the September and November elections. There may come a time for extra pressure to bring
about the right decision on their part, but there is no indication that that time is now.
I would suggest that not only the RT program but our whole pace of action against the north be
discussed with these factors in mind, and my own feeling is that we should reach high level agreement
that we will maintain the present pace, perhaps even cutting back on the possibly excessive sortie rate in
the north, which I doubt to be effective in the margin in any event, and avoid anything for the present
that could be construed as a significant escalation.
219. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
SC No. 09624/66
Washington, August 26, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Special
Intelligence Material, vol. X. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The source text, pages 19-21 of
the memorandum, is attached to an August 29 memorandum from R.J. Smith, CIA's Deputy Director for
Intelligence, to Rostow, under cover of which Smith sent Rostow a copy of the full study; the full study
has not been found in Johnson Library files.
Helms sent the President pages 1-21 of the study, consisting of the "Summary Discussion" and
"Principal Findings," under cover of an August 29 memorandum, in which he noted that McNamara had
asked CIA to undertake the study several weeks earlier. Helms noted that he had sent copies of the full
study, which included several hundred pages of basic material backing up the "Principal Findings," to
McNamara, Rusk, and Wheeler. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A,
Chrono, Jul-Dec 1966) Helms also briefed Senators Mansfield, Russell, and Fulbright on the study on
September 19 and summarized the discussion that followed in a memorandum to Rostow, September 20.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA) Rostow provided the President with his
summary of this study in Document 239.
THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS' WILL TO PERSIST
Principal Findings
1. So long as the U.S. air offensive remains at present levels, it is unlikely to diminish North Vietnam's
continued ability to provide materiel support to the war in the South. North Vietnam is taking
punishment on its own territory, but at a price it can afford and one it probably considers acceptable in
light of the political objectives it hopes to achieve.
2. The Viet Cong have borne the brunt of Communist personnel losses in South Vietnam and have also
had to compensate for losses of North Vietnamese personnel. We believe that the Viet Cong capability
to recruit and train manpower is adequate to cover losses estimated for 1966 but will probably be
inadequate to compensate for casualties and losses in 1967. During 1967 the North Vietnamese will
have to assume most of the burden of expanding force levels, and an increasing role in replacing losses.
These manpower requirements can almost certainly be met from North Vietnamese resources, but they
will impose additional strains on North Vietnam's limited supply of skilled personnel and leadership
cadre.

3. The Communists' present strategy is costly in both human and economic terms and is taxing
Communist resources in some areas, particularly within South Vietnam itself. Allied actions are
complicating Communist efforts and raising the costs of their execution. However, neither internal
resource shortages nor allied actions within present political parameters are likely to render the
Vietnamese Communists physically incapable of persisting in their present strategy.
4. In absolute numerical terms the Communists cannot hope to match present and projected Allied force
commitments. However, if present estimates of Allied and Communist force projections are accurate, by
mid-1967 the Communists will have a slight advantage in maneuver battalions--i.e., tactical combat
troops available for commitment to offensive ground operations.
5. Nevertheless, if they are objective, the Communists must acknowledge that during the past year their
insurgent campaign has lost momentum in both the military and political fields. Although they may not
be losing the war at the present time, they are certainly not winning it. The Communists are far from
being defeated; but they are faced with problems greater than any they have had to contend with before
in this struggle. Furthermore, Communist forces have at least temporarily lost the aura of invincibility
which was one of their most potent political assets.
6. Morale within Communist military forces and the political apparatus in South Vietnam has declined
since mid-1965 but not to a point presently sufficient to force any major revision in basic Communist
strategy.
7. The Communists must be disappointed in comparing the present situation with that which existed in
the spring of 1965. At least indirectly, they have acknowledged that the infusion of U.S. and Allied
combat forces has created new problems which must be overcome before victory can be won. Yet
Communist realism is presently tinged more with defiance than pessimism; the Communists may be
disappointed, but they do not yet seem to be discouraged.
8. Consideration of world popular opposition to U.S. policy would certainly enter into any eventual
Vietnamese Communist decision on whether to revise present strategy but would most certainly not be a
decisive factor.
9. The Vietnamese Communists pay close attention to evidence of opposition to current U.S. policy
arising within the United States itself. The outcome of their previous struggle with the French almost
certainly predisposes them to draw invalid parallels to French domestic opposition in the Indochina war
and to look for signs of American domestic political pressures capable of forcing policy changes on
Washington.
10. The timing of any Vietnamese Communist decision on altering basic strategy--and the nature of such
a decision--will be greatly affected by a variety of considerations, including those outlined in this paper.
We estimate that none of the pressures upon the Communists which we can now identify is severe
enough to force a major change in Communist strategy over the next eight to nine months. The
Communists would be even less inclined to alter their strategy if they should find political and military
developments during this period running in their favor--for example, serious political deterioration in
South Vietnam, a series of major Viet Cong military successes, or what they construe as a significant
rise of anti-war sentiment in the United States. If on the other hand pressures on them are maintained
and the course of events gives them no grounds for encouragement, by late spring of 1967 they will
probably feel compelled to take stock and consider a change in their basic strategy.
220. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 29, 1966, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. No classification
marking. The President wrote on the source text: "Let's get Komer to pick up & spark this inspiration."
Mr. President:
This cable from Gen. Westmoreland spells out his concept of where he's come from since 1 May 1965
and where he proposes to go from 1 November 1966 forward--towards pacification, without reducing
the heat on the VC and NVN main force units.
It underlines the need to mount a maximum political campaign, overt and covert, designed to defect VC
and start Saigon VC negotiations as soon after the Sept. 11 election as possible.
That is the political track required to match Westmoreland's military plan which is, clearly, in the right
direction; although he and Lodge must engage Ky and the ARVN fully if it is to work.
Walt
Attachment/2/
August 26, 1966.
/2/Top Secret.
FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND (29797)
SUBJECT
Concept of Military Operations in South Vietnam
In order to promote a better understanding of the role which military operations play in the overall effort
in South Vietnam, I discern a need at this time to review the military situation in South Vietnam as it
relates to our concepts; past, present and future. This is an appropriate time in light of the fact that we
are on the threshold of a new phase in the conflict resulting from our recent battlefield successes and
from the continuing US/Free World military buildup.
The enemy has launched a determined campaign to gain control of South Vietnam--its land, its people,
and its government. There are no indications that the enemy has reduced his resolve. He has increased
his rate of infiltration, formed divisions in South Vietnam, introduced new weapons, and maintained his
lines of communications into South Vietnam in spite of our increased air efforts. He continues to use
Laos and the border regions of Cambodia as sanctuaries and recently moved a division through the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into the First Corps Tactical Zone. His campaign of terror, assassination,
intimidation, sabotage, propaganda and guerilla warfare continues unabated. The enemy still holds sway
over large segments of the land and population. Although thwarted in his overt large scale campaign, he
is still determined.
As a companion of the foregoing appreciation of the present enemy situation, a review of our strategic
concept for the past year would appear to be useful.
A. During the period 1 May 1965 to 1 November 1965, our task was to build up our combat and

logistical forces; learn to employ them effectively; gain confidence in ourselves in fighting in the
counterinsurgency and Southeast Asian environment; gain the trust of the Vietnamese in our military
skills, courage and ability; and protect our installations and forces from distraction by the enemy.
B. During the period 1 November 1965 to 1 May 1966, our objectives were to extend our deployments
toward the frontiers; exercise our logistics in furnishing support to troops in sustained combat;
indoctrinate commanders on the techniques of sustained ground combat; interdict intensively by air the
lines of communications leading from North Vietnam to South Vietnam; disrupt enemy bases by B-52
strikes; deny the enemy rice by protecting harvests and capturing caches in storage areas; increase our
surveillance along the coast; and initiate a program of patrolling certain vital inland waterways. In
summary, our purpose was to disrupt the enemy's effort to prepare his battlefield, to throw his plans off
balance by offensive operations, and to continue to gain experience and self-confidence in this
environment.
C. During the period 1 May to 1 November 1966--the Southwest monsoon season--our strategy has been
and is to contain the enemy through offensive tactical operations (referred to as "spoiling attacks"
because they catch the enemy in the preparation phases of his offensives), force him to fight under
conditions of our choosing, and deny him attainment of his own tactical objectives. At the same time we
have utilized all forces that could be made available for area and population security in support of
revolutionary development, rice harvests heretofore available to the enemy have been protected, lines of
communication required by us have been opened, and some of the inland waterways used by the enemy
have been interdicted to disrupt his communication and supply systems. The threat of the enemy main
forces (Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army) has been of such magnitude that fewer friendly troops
could be devoted to general area security and support of revolutionary development than visualized at
the time our plans were prepared for the period.
During the period 1 November 1966 to 1 May 1967--the Northeast monsoon season--we will maintain
and increase the momentum of our operations. Our strategy will be one of a general offensive with
maximum practical support to area and population security in further support of revolutionary
development.
A. The essential tasks of revolutionary development and nation building cannot be accomplished if
enemy main forces can gain access to the population centers and destroy our efforts. US/Free World
forces, with their mobility and in coordination with Vietnamese Armed Forces, must take the fight to the
enemy by attacking his main forces and invading his base areas. Our ability to do this is improving
steadily. Maximum emphasis will be given to the use of long range patrols and other means to find the
enemy and locate his bases. Forces and bases thus discovered will be subjected to either ground attack or
quick reaction B-52 and tactical air strikes. When feasible, B-52 strikes will be followed by ground
forces to search the area. Sustained ground combat operations will maintain pressure on the enemy.
The growing strength of US/Free World forces will provide the shield that will permit ARVN to shift its
weight of effort to an extent not heretofore feasible to direct support of revolutionary development.
Also, I visualize that a significant number of the US/Free World Maneuver Battalions will be committed
to Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TOAR) missions. These missions encompass base security and at
the same time support revolutionary development by spreading security radially from the bases to
protect more of the population. Saturation patrolling, civic action, and close association with ARVN,
regional and popular forces to bolster their combat effectiveness are among the tasks of the ground force
elements. At the same time ARVN troops will be available if required to reinforce offensive operations
and to serve as reaction forces for outlying security posts and government centers under attack. Our
strategy will include opening, constructing and using roads, as well as a start toward opening and
reconstructing the National Railroad. The priority effort of ARVN forces will be in direct support of the

revolutionary development program; in many instances, the province chief will exercise operational
control over these units. This fact not-withstanding, the ARVN division structure must be maintained
and it is essential that the division commander enthusiastically support revolutionary development. Our
highly capable US division commanders, who are closely associated with corresponding ARVN
commanders, are in a position to influence them to do what is required.
C. We intend to employ all forces to get the best results, measured, among other things, in terms of
population secured; territory cleared of enemy influence; Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army bases
eliminated; and enemy guerrillas, local forces, and main forces destroyed.
D. Barring unforeseen change in enemy strategy, I visualize that our strategy for South Vietnam will
remain essentially the same throughout 1967.
In summation, the MACV mission, which is to assist the Government of Vietnam to defeat the Viet
Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces and extend Government control throughout South Vietnam,
prescribes our two principal tasks.
We must defeat the enemy through offensive operations against his main forces and bases.
We must assist the Government to gain control of the people by providing direct military support of
revolutionary development in coordination with the other agencies of the U.S. Mission.
The simultaneous accomplishment of these tasks is required to allow the people of South Vietnam to get
on with the job of nation building.
Ambassador Lodge concurs, with the following comment:
"I wish to stress my agreement with the attention paid in this message to the importance of military
support for revolutionary development. After all, the main purpose of defeating the enemy through
offensive operations against his main forces and bases must be to provide the opportunity through
revolutionary development to get at the heart of the matter, which is the population of South Vietnam. If
this goal is achieved, we will be denying manpower and other support to the Viet Cong."
221. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 30, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor. Top
Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson on August 30 under cover of a
memorandum stating that the danger foreseen by Taylor must be met by 1) engaging elite ARVN units
fully in fighting VC and North Vietnam main force units; and 2) "getting the ARVN engaged effectively
in pacification." The President indicated on Rostow's memorandum that, prior to getting Defense, State,
and Komer to prepare analyses and recommendations, Rostow should first "talk over" pacification with
McNamara. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
"Concept of Military Operations in South Viet-Nam"
I have just seen General Westmoreland's message on the above subject/2/ and have found it thoughtprovoking reading. He has set forth very clearly what kind of war he thinks we should fight and the role

of U.S. forces both in offensive operations and in support of "revolutionary development." While there
is little completely new in his paper, there are indications of emphasis which could carry very important
implications for the future with respect to the size and the manner of employment of our ground forces
in South Viet-Nam.
/2/Attachment to Document 220.
The most significant change of emphasis is the reorientation of the military effort both of ARVN and of
U.S. forces to support "revolutionary development." General Ky made the proposal to me over a year
ago that the U.S. forces should operate generally as a shield for population centers in front of ARVN
forces which would assume as a primary mission the direct support of the development effort. Westy is
now proposing the same kind of shield mission but goes two steps farther in putting U.S./Free World
forces into the business of pacification. He endorses the expansion by U.S./Free World forces of control
over terrain and population around base areas in application of the "oil spot" concept as the Marines
have been doing in the I Corps area (and other U.S. forces elsewhere to a lesser degree). Beyond the
creation of an indeterminate number of such American "oil spots", Westy also contemplates mixed
pacification operations in which U.S. forces would act in close cooperation with Vietnamese military
and paramilitary forces in order to bolster their effectiveness in protecting pacification activities.
An additional mission to be stressed in the coming months is the reopening of rail and highway
communications, an activity which, while of the utmost importance, will require large numbers of troops
if these communications are to be kept open.
Several thoughts occur to me in reflecting on the consequences of the application of this new concept of
military operations. The first is that, if successfully carried out, it offers the hope of speeding up the
termination of hostilities in South Viet-Nam and of advancing the important non-military programs
directed at controlling the population and rebuilding the shattered society and economy. On the other
hand, there will be a cost to pay for this progress in a rise in the U.S. casualty rate and in the ratio of
U.S. casualties to those of the GVN. Such a rise will reinforce the charges at home that the U.S. has
taken over the war and is accepting a disproportionate share of the losses.
Most importantly, the acceptance of this concept would seem to create an open-ended requirement for
U.S. forces. If our goal is to reestablish GVN authority over the entire territory, open and keep open the
road and rail communications, and make good the manpower deficiencies in the revolutionary
development program, General Westmoreland will be justified in asking for almost any figure in terms
of future reinforcements. If we undertake to meet such requirements, there will be ground for renewed
concern for the increased strains on the GVN economy and for the effect on U.S./GVN relations if we
become deeply involved in revolutionary development activities.
In this connection, when General Ky raised the proposition I mentioned above, he was very explicit in
saying that he felt the U.S. troops should be kept away from the Vietnamese population insofar as
possible. At the time, I thought he had in mind the consequences of the U.S.-Montagnard relationship
developed a few years ago in the Highland region. There, we became so popular with the Montagnards
that GVN officials became convinced that we were trying to subvert the loyalty of the Montagnards to
the government and to attach them to us. The recriminations arising from that episode are still heard
from time to time. I have been expecting to hear some reaction of this sort from the very effective civic
action efforts of the Marines in their "oil spot" activities. It is very easy for our representatives in VietNam to forget that we are seeking to develop popularity for the Saigon government and not for
ourselves. I have always been doubtful of the long-term benefits of U.S. actions, no matter how
beneficent, in replacement of those of the responsible Vietnamese ministries.

These thoughts boil down to the following. General Westmoreland has sent us a very thoughtful and
important cable, outlining his proposed future military policy in South Viet-Nam. It is full of important
implications and deserves close study and a considered reply. It should not be accepted without a reply
as this would convey tacit approval and would justify Westmoreland to feel that his concept had official
approval. Perhaps it should be approved but only after a careful analysis and in full knowledge of its
implications.
I recommend that you ask DOD for such an analysis.
Maxwell D. Taylor
222. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 30, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret. Komer
forwarded copies of this memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, Gaud, Taylor, Rostow, and Moyers under
cover of a memorandum dated August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Leonhart)
On September 13 Komer submitted to the President a 44-page report entitled "The Other War in
Vietnam--A Progress Report." In his letter of transmittal, Komer called the report "mainly a review of
accomplishments." Written for public release, the report and Komer's transmittal letter are printed in
Department of State Bulletin, October 10, 1966, pp. 549-567, and October 17, 1966, pp. 591-601.
SUBJECT
Visit to Vietnam--August 1966
I. Pacification.
1. The main purpose of my second visit to Vietnam was to find out more about Ambassador Lodge's
views on where we go from here on pacification, how to speed it up, and how MACV planned to
redirect more GVN military resources to tough local security problems. I tried out a number of ideas
along these lines that Bob Komer asked me to discuss with Lodge and Porter.
a. Lodge was more than receptive. Your recent messages/2/ have firmly focused his attention on
pacification which he now calls "the heart of the matter." Westmoreland and Porter are similarly
engaged. An extensive planning effort is now underway--but its real bite will not come until 1967.
/2/See, for example, telegram 20533, Document 200. In an August 9 memorandum to the President,
Komer asked for and received permission for Leonhart to deliver a private verbal message to Lodge and
Porter from the President that he was "dissatisfied with the slow rate of pacification progress," that the
GVN was "clearly not sufficiently pacification-minded," and that a "more coherent US-GVN strategy
for pacification" and "a strengthened management structure" were probably needed. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President)
b. On the Embassy side, a Roles and Mission Working Group is targeted on streamlining the
hodgepodge of GVN military and civilian security forces. MACV is doing staff exercises on an
optimum ARVN force structure; a design for a post-hostilities GVN security establishment; and a
balanced U.S. force structure which can be sustained, indefinitely if needed, without a reserve call-up.
You should have their conclusions by early October.

c. Similarly, a new US/GVN effort at coordinated pacification planning is underway, really for the first
time. Porter has pulled together all the civilian agencies plus MACV in a Joint Planning Group on RD
goals, resources, and guidelines. Regular meetings, including joint field trips, with GVN, RD and JGS
officers are coordinating selection of 1967 national priority areas and setting combined resource and
manpower requirements. Completion expected by December.
d. All of these are useful initial steps, but they must be followed through effectively and on a scale that
matches our commitments. Much more remains to be done before there is an effective and responsible
pacification system in operation on the ground. Moreover, even at this planning stage, there are still a
number of unresolved questions--the extent of participation by U.S. forces; the role of ARVN corps and
division levels in pacification operations; possible transfer of RF/PF to the RD Ministry; or the
conversion of the RF/PF to a Police Constabulary for post-hostilities civilian security.
e. But there now seems general Mission agreement that, while U.S. forces must help, ARVN should
carry the main weight of the pacification job and that in 1967 the GVN will devote at least 50 percent of
its military resources to RD in I, II and III Corps, and 25 percent in IV Corps, where there are as yet no
significant U.S. forces. As rough aggregates, these represent progress; their application to provinces and
districts has yet to be worked out.
2. ARVN Force Improvement. Closely related to the use of ARVN for accelerated pacification is a
systematic new MACV effort to improve the quality and effectiveness of GVN forces. This parallel
effort may be the most significant event now taking place in Vietnam.
a. At its core is expansion of combined operations and the military "buddy system." It builds both on the
small unit models of the Marines' Combined Action Companies and the newer association of the US 1st
Division with the 5th ARVN and of the 25th US with the 25th ARVN. It will cover the use of forces in
both pacification and major combat actions.
b. The ARVN improvement program will also include reduction of the ratio of tail to teeth in combat
units, improved leadership training, battlefield commissions, reform of the draft law, new desertion
penalties, and joint US/GVN military inspection teams to appraise the effectiveness of ARVN units and
commanders in RD. (A similar program for ROK Forces turned the tide of battle in Korea.)
3. Enemy Situation. All intelligence available to us confirmed weakening VC morale: food and medical
supplies are down; sickness up--enlistments more difficult; defections more frequent. The end of the
beginning may be in sight.
a. There are a number of projects now being explored which we hope will accelerate the process: Ky's
proposal for GVN warehouses and ARVN rice collections (paying market prices) in the delta; the
question of a U.S. delta offensive now under examination by the Embassy and MACV staffs; improved
surrender, interrogation, and prisoner exploitation procedures; stepped-up economic warfare and
resources control. Bob Komer and I have been plugging away at all of these in Washington and Saigon,
and will continue to do so.
b. Under pressure from here the defector program (Chieu Hoi) is now in higher gear. As you know, the
rate is running twice last year's; should total 22,500 in 1966; now has a target--based on better backing
and more skillful use of the defectors against other VC waverers--of 45,000 in 1967.
II. Economic Items.

1. Bob Nathan has reported to you separately on economic stabilization, field economic management
deficiencies, and the need for top quality U.S. personnel in the field./3/ We are doing some of the
economic forward planning here in Washington; and Bob Komer has laid on a new stabilization study to
preserve the benefits of devaluation. But there is an urgent requirement for three or four qualified
economic experts in the Mission to formulate--and negotiate with the GVN--an adequate stabilization
strategy.
/3/Nathan's August 31 memorandum for the President emphasized the need both for a tough stabilization
program to keep inflation in check during 1967 and for top economic talent in Saigon. (Ibid.)
2. GVN Foreign Exchange Reserves pose a special problem. At present GVN reserves total about $250
million and are rising $10 million a month. If present practice continues, they will be in the $450-$500
million range by the end of 1967. We took a tough line with Minister of National Economy Thanh and
National Bank Governor Hanh that such accumulations would pose major political problems for us--and
could risk Congressional and public support for the AID program. We had in mind particularly the
vulnerability of a possible AID Supplemental to this kind of exchange reserve build-up. We suggested
these GVN reserves might better be used in 1967 to finance a larger share of imports, prepay DLF loans,
or increase GVN contributions to international monetary institutions. Both Thanh and Hanh will attend
the IMF/IBRD meeting in Washington at the end of September and we will hit them hard again on this.
3. Port Situation. The takeover has gone well. Relations between the MACV advisers and their GVN
counterparts are close and effective. But we are not yet out of the woods. Some deficit in capacity will
remain throughout 1966 and into early 1967. Our military, as you know, only assumed responsibility for
military and government-to-government CPA shipments--not the much tougher task of handling
commercial imports.
What we need to do: (1) Give top priority to the completion of Newport, which continues to slip-restoration of a $30 million funding cut is now being sought; (2) Refurbish Saigon port by paving worn
out dirt approaches, completing hard stands, and improving lighting and handling gear--MACV and
USAID are now compiling estimates; (3) Control strictly U.S. civil/military inventory levels and
shipments of non-essential supplies; (4) Review present arrangements for handling commercial cargoes
at the end of the next 60 days, and, unless promised improvements have been made, press again for
military management of commercial shipments.
4. Postwar Development Planning. At Komer's request, Nathan made a first-rate presentation to Ky of
the political and economic benefits of launching a study now. He explained how it should be organized
on sectoral and regional bases to best contribute to binding South Vietnam together as a nation. Ky
seemed enthusiastic and eager to get started. The way now seems clear.
III. Post-Election Prospects.
Every indication points to a successful Constitutional Assembly election and an impressive voter
turnout. The need to broaden the political base, to re-start the democratic process, to fold civilians into
the directing military establishment, and to do so on terms the military will find tolerable are all evident.
a. But the Assembly will mark a new and more complicated political phase in our relations with
Vietnam. There will be new opinion currents with which to deal and new influences at work to which
we may have to adapt the timing or substance of our decisions. The political process in short is likely to
become a good deal more tricky in the period immediately ahead.

b. These prospects strengthen the need to institutionalize the new network of joint US/GVN bodies that
are now beginning to appear. While we were in Saigon, two new joint boards were set up: a Joint
Economic Committee, to be co-chaired by the Minister of National Economy and the Deputy
Ambassador which will meet regularly every ten days; and a Joint Rice Board for US/GVN cooperation
on production, import, storage, sale and pricing. We still need a better handle on rice, and are trying to
get one.
c. Additionally, we now have a Joint Planning Group for RD, a Combined Postwar Planning Group in
prospect, and the standing liaison between MACV and the JGS. Properly used, these joint agencies can
provide moorings and stability for our policies against the waywardness or inexperience of the
Constituent Assembly or the future Parliament. They can develop into essential instruments of U.S.
influence. But they must be staffed by first-rate people.
William Leonhart
Postscript
"Other War" Visits.
We were received throughout, and particularly by Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland, with
the warmest hospitality and the most unstinting cooperation. At staff levels, I think our visit alleviated
some sense of strain in the Washington-field relationship. We have been pushing pretty hard, and the
relationship between two unique jobs--Porter's as "theater commander" on the civil side and Komer's as
the Washington guiding hand--is still in process of evolution. Such stresses can probably never be
absent from a war-time situation which pits immediacy of field experience against the perspective of
wider policy. But more, rather than fewer, visits from your "other war" headquarters may be the answer-so long as the overriding consideration is to speed up constructive movement on the civil side.
WmL
223. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 31, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 11.
No classification marking. Copies were sent to Moyers and Komer.
Mr. President:
With reference to your note about General Taylor's comment/2/ on General Westmoreland's message,/3/
I had a long and good conversation with Bob McNamara.
/2/See Document 221 and footnote 1 thereto.
/3/Attachment to Document 220.
His view is that what is needed now is not a Washington exercise to review Westmoreland's message,
but a reorganization of the military and civil resources in South Vietnam to produce concrete working
plans, region by region, for pacification.

In turn, this requires clear-cut chains of command and assignments of responsibility on our side and the
Vietnamese side.
The working out of this managerial task, he believes, can only be done on the spot. He envisages this as
his primary mission when he next goes to Vietnam. This will be, he hopes, after the Erhard visit early in
October. He would like Bob Komer to go and suggested that I also go (I am not sure the latter is wise,
but would of course be quite willing).
It will be interesting for you to read Lodge's weekly telegram/4/ in the light of Bob's comments. The
first part wholly concerns pacification. They are drifting towards a recognition that the critical problem
is how better to organize our military and other assets to do the job. On the basis of performance in the
past, I suspect Bob McNamara is right in his assessment; namely, that much more radical changes in
organization will be required if we are to move forward effectively.
/4/Attached but not printed is telegram 4923 from Saigon, August 31.
I recommend we discuss this matter at the next Tuesday lunch.
W.W. Rostow/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Put on Tuesday agenda and have Taylor present/6/
See me
/6/The President indicated his assent and added by hand the request for Taylor's presence, but no record
of the discussion at the next Tuesday luncheon, on September 6, has been found. According to a
handwritten note at the bottom of the source text, the President also responded: "Let's get something to
Westy so that he will not assume that we have approved."
224. Intelligence Report/1/
S-3690/AP-2F
Washington, August 1966.
//1Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret; Controlled
Dissemination; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared jointly in the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency. The source text does not indicate a specific day of issue in August 1966.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH 11 AUGUST 1966
Summary
1. (S/NFD) Air strikes against North Vietnam in July and early August have increased over recent
months with particular emphasis on POL facilities, dispersed POL storage sites, lines of
communications (LOCs) and transportation equipment. After the initial spectacular air strikes against
the major bulk POL facilities, which began in late June, the campaign against NVN POL has steadied
down to a slow and grinding effort to reduce the remaining bulk capacity and that of dispersed storage.
This effort is slowing down and making difficult and costly the import and distribution of POL for the

North Vietnamese.
2. (S/NFD) All five major rail lines were struck during the period. The Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-Vinh
lines are interdicted for through service, the Hanoi-Dong Dang and Hanoi-Thai Nguyen lines are
probably operational for through service, and the status of the Hanoi-Haiphong line is uncertain. With
the exception of small water craft, the destruction of transport equipment in July was at the highest level
to date. However, there are no indications that shortages in transportation have been serious.
3. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese are placing emphasis on the development of alternate highway
routing within the NVN Panhandle network. Highways in this area have been subject to extensive
interdiction which has required heavy maintenance and the development of longer and lower capacity
bypasses. Continued restoration and construction work on the LOCs throughout the country combined
with the use of expedients have permitted the North Vietnamese to satisfy their logistic requirements
and to continue their support of Communist activities in South Vietnam and Laos.
4. (S/NFD) Although there has been no noted change in VC/NVA military capabilities in South Vietnam
which could be attributed to the air strikes in NVN, the recent B-52 strikes in the DMZ area disrupted
support of the NVA 324B Division and have probably discouraged operations of this type in the
immediate future.
5. (S/NFD) There is evidence that the regime is experiencing difficulty in implementing its urban
evacuation program and that it has caused some popular dissatisfaction, but there is no concrete
evidence that the air strikes have significantly weakened popular morale.
6. (S/NFD) Damage to the economy increased by almost $10 million,/2/ the highest amount of economic
loss measured during any reporting period in this series of reports. Total measurable direct and indirect
losses to the economy and the military establishment are now estimated at $106 million. The loss of
storage capacity in bulk petroleum facilities has presented Hanoi and its Allies with the necessity of
improvising a makeshift storage and distribution system and conversion to this system has placed an
additional heavy drain on economic resources. The cumulative debilitating effects on the economy are
becoming increasingly apparent with the disruption of agricultural and industrial production. It is certain
now that economic growth has stagnated. Shortages of economic goods and hardships are apparent
among some parts of the civilian population but there have been no sustained and critical hardships
among the bulk of the people.
/2/US dollars are used throughout this report. [Footnote in the source text.]
[Here follows the body of the 23-page report.]
225. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, September 1, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH. Secret; Immediate; Nodis;
Thrush. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:16 a.m.
Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to the President at 11 a.m. on September 1, under cover of a
memorandum stating that "we should keep our fingers crossed; but this could be good news." (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 143, Thrush)
4969. 1. Uncle/2/ saw nephew at Go Dau Ha in Tay Ninh Province yesterday. Arrangements were made

for uncle to take our man to Can Tho on "Monday or Tuesday"/3/ at a point near the airport. The exact
place will be given to uncle when he goes to Go Dau Ha on Saturday. On that day, uncle will meet
nephew's son who will give him exact time and place and will then come back to Saigon with him.
/2/Nguyen Huu Tho's "uncle," Nguyen Huu An. For more information on this operation, see paragraphs
4-9 of Document 204 and footnote 3 thereto.
/3/September 5 or 6.
2. On arriving in Saigon, son will give letter to our man at our man's house on Sunday morning. The
letter will be signed by the nephew in his official capacity as president of the organization. Our man
does not know what will be in the letter.
3. But he is sure that it will not impede further action since it is understood that our man will go to Can
Tho on Monday or Tuesday to "pick up" nephew.
4. Comment: It becomes urgent to decide where nephew should be taken. He is understandably
concerned about his security as regards the GVN. Unless you can think of something better, I plan to
have nephew met at Can Tho by a CAS plane of sufficient size and arrange to take him and his party to
Chu Lai, which is an all American base, and from where I suggest he be flown to Okinawa [less than 1
line of source text not declassified].
5. Upon reflection, I think this is better than flying him to Guam or taking him out to a carrier.
Obviously we are honor bound to get him out of the country immediately.
6. Other questions which arise are:
When do you divulge this?
When do we tell GVN?
And what do we tell them? End comment.
7. It is expected that the son will be staying at our man's house in Saigon as a "gesture of good faith."
8. Our man has suggested that we would be generous with money and personal security. Nephew has
said that he would eventually like to return to South Viet-Nam and take part in politics.
9. Please advise receipt this wire and give me any advice or instructions./4/
/4/The Department of State replied in telegram 39769, September 1, approving the plan set forth in
paragraph 4 and providing guidance for informing Ky and revealing the defection publicly. (Department
of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH) On September 5 Rostow forwarded three additional
Thrush telegrams to the President (5245 and 5246 from Saigon and 41139 to Saigon, September 5),
noting in his covering memorandum that "the bird is not yet in hand; but he hasn't retreated to the bush
either." In a memorandum of September 9, Rostow informed the President that "Uncle, who has been
trying to arrange Liberation Front leader's defection, was picked up by South Vietnamese security men
on the morning of the 7th" for apparently unrelated reasons and was still being detained. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 143, Thrush)

Lodge
226. Editorial Note
In a letter of September 6, 1966, to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Unger, the Department of
Defense requested the Department of State's concurrence in authorizing air strikes under Rolling
Thunder 52. The seven targets comprised three SAM support facilities, two POL storage areas, the Xuan
Mai highway bridge, and the Yen Vien railroad yard. (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working
Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966) In commenting on the proposal in an
undated note to Secretary Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson observed that this was a
"substantial reduction in the package McNamara gave you some time ago." (Ibid.) Regarding the earlier
package, see Document 218 and footnote 2 thereto.
Assistant Secretary of State Bundy reviewed the Department of Defense proposal in a September 10
memorandum to Rusk. His reservations about attacking the Yen Vien railroad yard and the Hanoi SAM
storage area were concurred in by U. Alexis Johnson in an undated cover note to Rusk and by
Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson in a September 12 cover note to Rusk. Thompson also
expressed concern about striking one of the POL storage areas. (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam
Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966)
In a suggested agenda for the Tuesday luncheon scheduled for September 13, forwarded to President
Johnson on September 12, Rostow included an item on the bombing of North Vietnam. He indicated
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended additional targets, the Department of State was "resisting
on the grounds of escalatory signals and the Rusk-Gromyko talks," and Secretary of Defense McNamara
wanted a freeze "at approximately the present level, with perhaps a few additional targets." (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President) No record has been found of
the discussion at the lunch meeting on September 13. According to Unger's recollection, summarized in
an October 31 memorandum to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach, it was decided in a conversation
between Rusk and McNamara not to proceed with Rolling Thunder 52 either as proposed by the
Department of Defense or in modified form. (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group:
Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966)
227. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, September 8, 1966.
/1/Source: Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. The source
text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:29 a.m. Printed in part in
Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 250-251.
5517. 1. D'Orlandi told me that in his recent talk with Lewandowski, the problem referred to in my last
telegram/2/ regarding Lewandowski and D'Orlandi working up a proposal to submit to Washington and
Moscow was discussed. Lewandowski made three points:
/2/Telegram 5229, September 4, which reported that, according to D'Orlandi, "Lewandowski had
returned from 16 days in Hanoi profoundly discouraged. His two closest contacts Pham Van Dong and
General Giap were both away. His talk with Ho Chi Minh produced nothing of interest. There was
absolutely no sign of a desire to stop the war." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14
VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 249-250)

A. He did not want the only outcome of the procedure between D'Orlandi and himself to be to inform
the United States as to "just how far the North Vietnamese would give in."
B. Although Lewandowski recognizes that I had already given him ample assurances, he feels that
emphasis must be given to the need of the U.S. approaching the problem so as to concern South VietNam alone and not South Viet-Nam as a "piece of a general Chinese puzzle." Lew-andowski feels that
the problem could be "simple enough" if limited to South Viet-Nam--but not if the United States is
thinking of using conversations with Lewandowski (and Lewandowski's talks in Hanoi) as a way of
getting at China or Chinese questions. I quickly assured D'Orlandi that, of course, we were solely
interested in suppressing the aggression in South Viet-Nam and in nothing else. D'Orlandi said that not
only did he realize this, but that Lewandowski did too. (Comment: Perhaps Lewandowski has had this
point impressed upon him in Hanoi or elsewhere. It is a curious angle, as I, of course, have never said or
even implied anything to justify his admonition. End comment.)
C. Lewandowski said that it was only fair to state that the "aim of the exercise" between him and
D'Orlandi should not be to reinforce the status quo, but to get a "global" settlement. When he says
"global," he obviously does not mean worldwide; he means "over all" as regards South Viet-Nam. This,
said D'Orlandi, quoting Lewandowski, means "guarantees, etc."; therefore "not just deescalation."
2. When I asked D'Orlandi what this meant, D'Orlandi, for illustration, said that it could mean
"elections;" "a new government;" "settlement with the Viet Cong."
3. Lewandowski went on to say that the purpose of his discussions with D'Orlandi would not be to
inaugurate a "socialist" regime in South Viet-Nam; it would not be to get a "cease-fire" and still less a
"standstill." (Comment: In the light of para 3, the "settlement with the Viet Cong" mentioned in para 2
must refer to some governmental arrangement and not to military operations. End comment.)
4. D'Orlandi told Lewandowski: "I have very clear cut instructions as I have already told you, and they
are: be useful, or go home. Fanfani has instructions for me and Rapacki knows what they are. We may,
of course, rule out an agreement confirming the status quo since this would be nothing more than the
former approach. The fact is that either you and I are going to have these conversations or else nothing is
going to happen at all anywhere concerning Viet-Nam. I was flatly told in Rome that you were to do
something with me, and that it was you who wanted the conversation to go on with Ambassador Lodge."
5. Lewandowski said he was sure that something could be done. Hanoi, he said, looks at the situation
through the distorted spectacles of the Viet Cong through whom they get all their information about the
situation. "My job," said Lewandowski, "is to explain to Hanoi that they have a wrong view." The last
time he had been in Hanoi neither Pham Van Dong nor General Giap were there, and "they are the only
two in the whole place who talk sense and understand the real situation in the south."
6. This was the end of the conversation. D'Orlandi says he was going to puzzle over a possible
agreement formula and when he has figured something out, he will get in touch with Lewandowski. No
date has been set for their next meeting.
7. D'Orlandi is sure of one thing: Lewandowski absolutely does not want the conversations stopped.
D'Orlandi surmises that the Communist intention is to state that there is no hope; for the record to break
off all conversations; adopt an attitude of nothing doing; and then to have the kind of "non-talks," to
paraphrase the late E.E. Cummings, with D'Orlandi of which this telegram treats. They would not only
want to be able to deny publicly that they are having talks, they want to deny it to everybody privately.
It is real "double talk"; if not "double think."

Lodge
228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, September 12, 1966, 1:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis;
Marigold. Drafted by Unger; cleared by William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, and Harriman; and
approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 251-252.
44917. Ref: Saigon 5517./2/
/2/Document 227.
1. We find Lewandowsky's thinking as conveyed by D'Orlandi very interesting but not always lucid.
Would like you to discuss some of these ambiguities with D'Orlandi and suggest that he explore them
further with Lewandowsky, hopefully not waiting until D'Orlandi has his "possible agreement formula"
worked out. In ensuing paragraphs puzzling items are identified, together with points we would like to
have you make to D'Orlandi.
2. Lewandowsky's remark that the aim of the exercise should not be to "reinforce the status quo" is all
right if he is talking about the present status quo in South Viet-Nam. But we cannot buy a discarding of
the status quo ante, i.e. the 1954 and 1962 Agreements. We have had so many experiences in the past 20
years with the Communists saying "What is mine is mine and is not discussable; we must talk about
dividing what is yours". You may add for D'Orlandi's own information that we do not rule out
consideration of revisions of the provisions of the Geneva Agreements but we could accept no changes
until we had a clear picture of what was the total context of an understanding with the Communists.
3. As you have already indicated D'Orlandi can reassure Lewandowsky that we are not thinking of South
Viet-Nam as a piece of a general Chinese puzzle; nothing is further from our minds than the idea that we
should try to settle the China question somehow in Viet-Nam. However, D'Orlandi should be aware of
our concern about Lewandowsky's statement that "the problem could be simple enough if limited to
South Viet-Nam". North Viet-Nam is inevitably involved if there is to be any lasting settlement in South
Viet-Nam. At the same time we must be very careful not to accept the idea that North Viet-Nam has a
full right to sit in on the disposition of the internal political arrangements within South Viet-Nam (for
example the points mentioned Para 2 reftel) just because it has sent 19 regiments where they have no
right to be.
4. FYI. As you know our hope is that the GVN will be able to improve successively its position as the
sole governmental authority in South Viet-Nam and will be able to dispose of as many as possible of the
problems mentioned in Para 2 as a government dealing with a dissident group within its borders. This is
process which we are hoping to get underway at the earliest possible moment pursuant to Deptel 23182
of August 5./3/
/3/Document 203.
5. Re Para 7 we remain skeptical as to whether Hanoi and even Warsaw likely to choose the
Lewandowsky-D'Orlandi channel for substantive negotiation. We do nevertheless want to do nothing to
discourage this channel but somewhere along the way we suspect we will reach point where we will not
be able to be more concrete about our positions unless we have better evidence that Lewandowsky

empowered to speak for Hanoi and that they are ready to go beyond standard positions. Nevertheless we
will consider here whether there is something that could be given to D'Orlandi for his "possible
agreement formula" which could demonstrate our earnest desire move forward and smoke out Hanoi's
intentions. This might lie, for example, in realm of mutually-timed withdrawal formula, or quid pro quo
on cessation of bombing and halt in expansion US forces against end to infiltration by Hanoi.
6. Please continue keep us closely informed of any indications of what Lewandowsky really in position
do. For moment we would prefer you not even mention to D'Orlandi possibility sweetener for his
"formula" mentioned in preceding paragraph./4/
/4/Lodge replied in telegram 5965, September 14, summarizing a long session with D'Orlandi during
which Lodge clarified the points raised in this telegram. According to D'Orlandi, Lewandowski was "not
interested in de-escalation or any kind of negotiation which would lead to a settlement and which would
at the same time perpetuate the personnel of the present government." (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War,
pp. 252-253)
Rusk
229. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, September 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. The source text does not indicate the
time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:20 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram
5970 to the President on September 14 under cover of a memorandum stating, "Herewith Lodge's
evaluation of the election--much like ours, but very interesting reading." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 12)
5970. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:
A. Elections
1. Looking back at the election on last Sunday,/2/ the following can be said:
/2/September 11.
2. The Viet Cong went all out, both by violent deed and violent word.
3. By deed. There were 166 Viet Cong deeds--acts of terrorism just before and including the election
day. This was about nine times the level of activity four days before election and fifteen times the level
of activity on an average day in August. GVN casualties from 6:00 p.m. September 10 to 6:00 p.m.
September 11 are estimated at nineteen killed and one hundred twenty wounded. The Viet Cong
casualties are estimated at eighteen killed, three wounded, and fifteen captured.
4. The government losses were small considering the all-out campaign of the Viet Cong because the
GVN on its side went all-out too. It was high tide both ways. The Ky government once again showed its
talent in using force and handling troops and police effectively.
5. By word. Then the Viet Cong by word made the issue, pumped it up, and unrestrainedly boasted

about their certain success.

6. In quite a miraculous way, the GVN suddenly seemed to grasp the technique of effective publicity,
certainly the posters, billboards, radio, television, and dragon dances were skillfully designed to work up
interest and to do so in an honest and attractive way.
7. All of this was observed by more than five hundred journalists, diplomatic observers, and Japanese
and Korean Parliamentary groups. In particular the Vietnamese people were watching intently. The
election was therefore as clean as such a thing can be.
8. Big political defeat. It, therefore, must be set down that the vote on September 11 was an immense
vote of "no confidence" in the Viet Cong. They asked for it, and they got it. It is very big--on a par in
importance with the departure of nearly 1,000,000 Vietnamese refugees from the north in 1954 rather
than live under a Communist regime.
9. The vote also indicates that the government is capable of influencing and providing security for more
people than we had thought. We have consistently used the figure of 54 percent, which is up three
percent from what it was a year ago, as indicating the percentage of people living under secure
conditions--with something over 20 percent under complete Viet Cong domination. Four-fifths of the
5,288,512 registered voters went to the polls on Sunday. The vote must reflect a base of at least ten
million people if you add in the children and members of the population who didn't vote. This makes the
number of people who were living under secure conditions on that day nearer 65 percent than 54
percent.
10. An interesting feature was the marked willingness of people to talk. Never in my service here have I
had so many reports come to my desk describing Viet Cong intentions and plans as were told to our
people throughout the country by Vietnamese.
11. I also believe that relatively stable prices helped the government in its very successful efforts to
arouse public interest in the elections.
12. U.S. troops acted as a shield and prevented large units of the Viet Cong and the Army of North VietNam from interfering in the elections. Had we not been here, there could have been no elections. But,
then, had we not come in when we did last year, there probably would be no VietNam either.
13. For us on our side to destroy the redoubts, divide the main force units, and keep them off balance
while the Vietnamese on their side do the face to face, elbow to elbow, work of population security is
the ideal division of labor. What we have so often talked about actually happened last Sunday--and it
worked.
14. In Saigon there were no Americans on the streets, and the Vietnamese had their own city to
themselves. This was good all around--especially for us who thus could not be accused of interference in
elections. We kept our hand from showing all over the country. My orders to keep it a Vietnamese show
and keep away from overt support were followed with great efficiency by all elements of this Mission.
15. We have heard no evidence of fraud in any of the fifty-two election districts. Several candidates
known to be favored by the local authorities were defeated. Only twenty military men were elected, a
fact that has stopped the rumor that the government planned to pack the convention with military
delegates.

16. The Vietnamese people showed amazing courage in the face of record breaking attempts at terror.
Embassy officers observed heavy voting at four Saigon polling stations which were grenaded on
election eve. An eyewitness reported that in Tra Vinh the population trooped to the polls even while the
area was under Viet Cong mortar fire. Only one polling area in the entire country suspended operations
for security reasons.
17. The elections also showed the weakness of the militant Institute Buddhists, confirming a long
standing suspicion of mine and, I hope, destroying a myth which some journalists have promoted. In
addition to the September 6 press conference which I reported last week,/3/ the Institute militants tried
several times to launch anti-election demonstrations and strikes. There was no popular response, and the
handful of monks involved were quickly dispersed in every case.
/3/In telegram 5433, September 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
18. Catholic opposition did not materialize. Nothing was heard from Father Hoang Quynh's front of all
religions for three weeks before the elections. The Catholic citizens bloc never made good on its threat
to call for a boycott of the election. On the contrary, Catholic citizens and candidates were very active in
the campaign. And thirty Catholic candidates were elected. (This compares with thirty-four candidates
who are listed under the broad label of "Buddhists.")
19. Cynics claim that most people went to the polls simply to avoid future difficulties with the
authorities and that the Vietnamese people fear they will be required to show canceled voting cards
whenever they come into contact with officialdom. No doubt this is part of the explanation. But if 80.8
percent of the registered voters went to the polls simply because the GVN pushed them into it, it at least
shows that the GVN has some authority and standing with the great majority of the population. And
adherence by the population to the government is what this political-military war is about. I believe it is
nearer the truth to say that the average Vietnamese voter realized that the election was a major contest
between the Viet Cong and free Vietnamese. Both sides impressed this fact on him. He made his choice.
20. The GVN not only conducted a most aggressive information campaign and handled military, police,
and civil authorities to insure security with great skill; Ky showed political cleverness in his move to
spike the Buddhist Institute's guns by sending them a conciliatory letter on election eve and encouraging
the Peoples Army Council to try to mediate Institute-GVN differences. He and other government leaders
made a series of well timed statements and public appearances designed to arouse general enthusiasm
for the elections. We, of course, had been quietly counseling these things on Ky and some of his
principal advisors.
21. The convention is truly representative. Regional differences are very important to the Vietnamese,
and the Southerners often complain that they are not sufficiently represented in the government. There
are forty-four Southerners in the convention. Twenty-seven successful candidates come from North
Vietnam, five from North-Central Vietnam, and twenty-three from Central Vietnam. There are four
ethnic Cambodian representatives, eight Montagnard tribesmen, and four Chinese. The convention also
includes all major Vietnamese religions. We know of thirty-four Buddhist, ten Hoa Hao, thirty Catholic,
five Cao Dai, and seven Confucianists among the successful candidates. The others are not clearly
identified by religion but probably include people who practice ancestor worship, or are nominal
Buddhists or are animists. The convention will include twenty-three teachers, twenty-two businessmen,
twenty military, eighteen civil servants, eight lawyers, five doctors, and seven farmers. Twenty-three
members have had valuable experience in provincial or municipal councils. The convention will also
benefit by the experience of such leading political figures as former chief of state Phan Khac Suu,
Saigon City Council President La Thanh Nghe, newspaper publisher Dr. Dang Van Sung, and prominent
politician Dr. Phan Quang Dan.

22. The Vietnamese have taken the first step toward stable, democratic government. They still have a
long, long way to go. But what we saw on September 11 is reason for confidence.
B. Pacification
23. On September 20, elements of the U.S. 25th Division will start pacification of Long An Province.
This has been a longstanding dream of mine going back to 1963. At that time Long An was the only
province in Viet-Nam which stretched from Cambodia across to the South China Sea. It has since been
divided, but is still important. It is only eight miles south of the Saigon city limits and heavily populated.
It will be the biggest test which U.S. troops will have had in fighting against guerrillas under urban
conditions--a different thing from the war of movement in the unpopulated, high plateau.
24. I have always suspected that the Viet Cong have some of their toughest and ablest officers in Long
An because it is so close to Saigon and has always been such a depressing place for us and, I imagine, an
inspiring place for them. In pacifying Long An, we will have to depend on very effective police type
measures, a precinct by precinct comb out, and, because it is so thickly settled, we will not be able to use
our huge artillery capacity and our air power as we would normally do in open country. A long time ago,
General Westmoreland and I agreed that this would be a great thing to do but we have never been strong
enough to take it on. Now General Weyand has done so well in Hau Nghia to the west of Saigon that we
are all encouraged that he can slip to the south of Saigon where the challenge is much greater. If he does,
it should impress Ho Chi Minh. We are going to watch this operation very close to see what lessons we
learn for further operations in heavily populated areas.
C. Economic
25. Prices edged up on imported items this week, but the Saigon retail index was down two percent over
last week and six percent over a month ago. Main reason for the decline in the retail index was an
increase in rice and pork deliveries in Saigon. Dollars dropped very slightly, from 167 last week to 166
this week.
D. Military
26. Although they attempted to avoid contact with allied forces and concentrated on terror and small unit
actions against the elections, the Viet Cong lost over 1,000 killed in action during the reporting period.
The 1,166 Viet Cong killed in action this week compares with 885 for last week. All other military
indices were favorable.
27. Major operations during the week included: (1) Prairie, a USMC three-battalion operation
immediately south of the DMZ intended to thwart a Viet Cong build-up there; (2) Paul Revere III and
Su Bok (ROK), search and destroy missions in the Highlands area southwest of Pleiku; (3) Baton
Rouge, a combined search and destroy operation in Rung Sai special zone designed to reduce the threat
to the Saigon ship channel, and (4) Dan Chi 261B, a continuation of operations Dan Chi 261 in Ba
Xuyen/Bac Lieu Provinces conducted by the 21st ARVN Division. The last named operation was a
major ARVN victory with cumulative results Dan Chi 261 and 261B--313 Viet Cong killed, 179 Viet
Cong small arms, 11 crew served weapons, and nine tons of ammunition captured.
E. Reaction to de Gaulle's Phnom Penh speech/4/
/4/On September 1, de Gaulle gave a speech in Phnom Penh, which, among other things, called on the
United States to make a unilateral commitment to withdraw its forces from Vietnam by a fixed date. For

text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 646-648. Lodge commented initially
in telegram 5090, September 2, which Rostow forwarded to the President under cover of a September 2
memorandum giving Rusk's and his own views on how the United States should react. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 12)
28. Prime Minister Ky publicly castigated de Gaulle, and the Vietnamese press generally attacked the
French President for his September Phnom Penh remarks. The de Gaulle speech was widely interpreted
as a cynical attempt to re-establish French influence in Asia at the expense of Vietnamese freedom.
29. On September 8 two prominent French businessmen in Saigon were arrested on charges of
financially aiding organizations which were trying to sabotage the elections. Ky said publicly that the
money involved amounted to 50 million piasters and that if investigation showed the two men to be
guilty they will be expelled and their businesses nationalized. Many in the French community regard the
arrests as a response to the de Gaulle September 1 speech.
F. Americans and Vietnamese killed
30. Final totals of Vietnamese civilians killed and wounded as a result of Viet Cong action during the
period September 4 through 10 are not yet available. However, incomplete figures available to us now
indicate that at least thirty-four civilians were killed and thirty-three wounded. If we add the 174
Vietnamese military killed during that period to the 34 Vietnamese civilians, the total Vietnamese killed
by the Viet Cong is 208. This compares with the 50 Americans killed in the same period.
31. I have just obtained figures of Viet Cong killed in action and captured in the months February to
August inclusive. During that period the ARVN killed 17,692 Viet Cong, and the U.S. killed 15,187.
The ARVN captured 2,399 Viet Cong, and the U.S. captured 1,521. Free world forces killed 2,135, and
captured 236.
Lodge
230. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, September 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 78-05505A, Area Activity-Far East-Memos
Re Agency Planning. Secret. The memorandum was produced by the Vietnamese Affairs Staff of the
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence and was drafted by George W. Allen.
SUBJECT
Comments on Vietnamese Election Results
1. The unexpectedly high vote in the 11 September elections represents a resounding success for the
GVN's efforts to turn out the vote in the face of Viet Cong intimidation and a threatened boycott by
Buddhist extremists. It cannot be construed, however, as a ringing endorsement of the GVN as presently
constituted, nor as a political repudiation of the Viet Cong though the Communists have lost
considerable face and the lie has been given to their exaggerated claims of "control". While the election
does mark a significant step forward in the establishment of representative governmental institutions, it
is only the first of many steps required in the evolution toward the viable political base which is
essential to the success of the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam.

2. The official returns reported by the GVN probably are generally reliable, although they may have
been padded in some cases by local officials. In retrospect, several factors operated to bring about a
higher turnout than that recorded, for example, in the 1965 elections. The most important of these was
the unprecedented GVN program aimed at registering the electorate and publicizing the election.
Bolstering this was the "command interest" in the elections throughout the Vietnamese civil and military
structure which was demonstrated in terms of briefings and inspections of local preparations, and
emphasis at all echelons on the need to turn out the vote. As a result, the electorate was probably more
aware of its "responsibility" than in most previous Vietnamese elections.
3. The turnout does not necessarily reflect support for the GVN nor opposition to the Viet Cong, because
these were not issues confronting the voter. In effect, his participation was not merely solicited, but
actively arranged by the full energies of the GVN administrative and security apparatus in a
demonstration of what that apparatus can do when directed toward accomplishing a single,
uncomplicated task. This, in itself, is encouraging when measured against the normal inadequacies and
relatively ineffectual performance of that apparatus.
4. The failure of Viet Cong efforts to sabotage the elections can be described as a case of their once
again biting off more than they could chew in the political-psychological field. Given the GVN's
massive effort to turn out the vote in essentially government-controlled areas, the improved
effectiveness of GVN intelligence, and the elaborate and extensive security arrangements to protect the
balloting, the Communist efforts were bound to be largely ineffectual. Viet Cong plans, intentions and
techniques for disrupting the elections were known in advance by GVN authorities in some detail, and
appropriate countermeasures were taken. Although most voters probably were aware of Viet Cong
threats, their sense of "responsibility" and awareness of government security measures probably led
them to minimize their individual vulnerability at the polls. In any event, although the Viet Cong capped
the week-end buildup of anti-election terrorism with a widespread display of harassments and terror
incidents, including mortar fire on at least four provincial capitals and eight district towns on election
day, the voters were not dissuaded from going to the polls. The Communists lost considerable face
because of their inability to enforce much-proclaimed opposition.
5. The virtual collapse of the Buddhist boycott was telegraphed well before election day by the evident
confusion and dissension within their hierarchy in Saigon and in the provinces. These factors are a
carry-over from the ill-fated struggle movement earlier this year, which clearly demonstrated the
political bankruptcy and increasing isolation of the Buddhist extremist elements, who seem to have lost
their ability to either guide or reflect the desires of the masses. To many Vietnamese, the opposition of
the radical Buddhist leaders was irrational, since the elections had been the direct result of Buddhist
demands. Although the Buddhists still have some potential for mass political action if they can heal the
differences within their hierarchy, they are not now the dominant force in Vietnamese politics they once
were.
6. The elections have produced a body which is charged with drafting a constitution which will establish
the institutional framework of a future Vietnamese Government. But many potential obstacles remain
before any new governmental institutions take shape and a viable political base is attained. There are
many ways in which this new body may make mischief for the GVN, and vice versa, as the Vietnamese
grope for an acceptable political formula. Even when new legal institutions are established, ways must
be found to ensure their stability and continuity under conditions of civil war, increasing U.S.
involvement in that war, and the latent war-weariness and cynicism of the populace. In short, the
elections represent only the initial--and perhaps the easiest--step in the long and difficult but essential
process of creating a political base sufficiently strong, dynamic, and appealing to undergird the
pacification effort and contest the Viet Cong apparatus for political control in the countryside.

231. Intelligence Note From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of
State Rusk/1/
No. 569
Washington, September 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam, September 1966. Secret.
SUBJECT
Assessment of Current Situation in North Vietnam
Our assessment of the impact of the war on Hanoi leads us to believe that the strains are severe but not
unbearable. The North Vietnamese people appear somewhat weary but not disaffected, and the regime
has no evident difficulty in exercising effective control. The leadership has debated alternate strategies
for conducting the war in the South but has not deviated from basic policy goals. Bombing has seriously
disrupted North Vietnam's small modern industrial sector as well as seaborne foreign trade, but has not
materially interfered with the maintenance of adequate lines of communications. While some shortages
of consumer goods exist, the supply of basic commodities, including foodstuffs, appears adequate for
minimal needs. Some evacuation of urban areas, particularly Hanoi, has taken place recently.
Morale and Central Government Control. Our intelligence on popular attitudes in North Vietnam is
understandably spotty. However, what can be gleaned from various sources indicates that there is some
dissatisfaction with hardships, as there always has been, but there is no serious dissidence. Although
some war-weariness undoubtedly exists, the populace has an attitude toward the war that varies between
enthusiastic support and resignation. Interrogations of prisoners in the South indicate that recruits for
operations in South Vietnam start out in a state of high morale. The North Vietnamese regime has also
been able to exploit nationalist sentiments and the instinct for self-preservation in order to impose an
unprecedented degree of mobilization on the people, so as to insure the continuation of vital transport
and essential production.
There is no evidence that any significant portion of the population blames the Hanoi regime for the
bombing. Instead "US imperialism" is the focus of hatred. Although some of the people realize that
American bombers are concentrating on military targets, most appear to believe that the strikes are
aimed at civilian targets as well. A number of reports show that considerable evacuation of city dwellers
to rural districts has taken place without substantial discontent. Nor is there any evidence to suggest the
central government is experiencing difficulties maintaining control over areas outside of Hanoi.
The Leadership. Evidence of major disagreements within the leadership, notably Defense Minister
Giap's alleged loss of influence, is tenuous and difficult to assess. However, in a number of recent
polemical articles there have been clear hints of past and continuing disagreements over proper strategy
in thwarting the strengthened US/GVN forces in the South. One side apparently argued unsuccessfully
for a more cautious military policy against those who advocated maintaining an aggressive posture.
There is no evidence, however, that the dispute involved a more fundamental change in political
strategy, such as an effort to get negotiations underway.
The Economy. It seems evident that North Vietnam's small heavy industrial sector has been seriously
affected by the bombing. Since mid-1965 Hanoi has been concentrating its productive efforts in
dispersed light industry and agriculture while relying on outside assistance for the essential products of
heavy industry. According to the North Vietnamese press, light industry is producing at about the same

level as in early 1965. Poor weather, the disruption caused by bombing, and other priority calls for
transport combined to reduce substantially procurement from the spring crop. It seems likely that the
same factors will adversely affect the harvest now underway. Despite Hanoi's denials, the Chinese have
provided small quantities of rice. Visitors to Hanoi and intercepted letters from North Vietnamese in the
countryside indicate that sufficient food is available. The rice ration has not been reduced, but meat is
quite scarce. Western medicines are in particularly short supply. There are conflicting reports about the
availability of consumer goods and textiles, but these appear adequate for minimal needs. Prices are kept
low to guard against inflation, although the average worker's buying power is insufficient to allow a run
on goods.
Although the bombing of Haiphong has made off-loading more difficult, communist shipping continues
to bring in supplies at a high rate. In July 1966 seaborne imports of goods other than petroleum reached
the record volume of 80,500 tons, 76 percent of which arrived on Soviet ships. (Non-communist
shipping is now almost nonexistent.) Strikes on transportation routes have all but halted North Vietnam's
two principal exports, anthracite coal and apatite. Petroleum products are being imported by rail and sea
at a level somewhat reduced from the high of last spring, but the supply is ample for North Vietnam's
needs. Although distribution patterns have changed, there is no evidence of any shortage of POL as a
result of the concerted bombing effort. DIA estimates that the entire country has POL stocks (most in
small, dispersed storage areas) to meet normal civilian/military needs for two months and that two
medium-sized tankers a month will be able to supply North Vietnam's needs.
According to a recent CIA study,/2/ the internal transportation system is now running more efficiently,
though at obviously greater cost in manpower, than before the US bombing program began. Ingenious
methods of repair and alternate means of communication, based in part on the Korean experience, have
ensured the maintenance of adequate communication and rendered the transportation system
increasingly less vulnerable to interdiction.
/2/Not further identified.
Civil Defense and Evacuation. The North Vietnamese are keenly aware of the need for continually
improving their civil defense. An August 7 Nhan Dan editorial stresses the importance of digging
shelters and communications trenches, evacuating urban areas, dispersing offices and living quarters of
those remaining in the cities, and preventing resettlement areas from becoming densely populated zones.
Evacuation of some citizens, industries, and government ministries from Hanoi has taken place
throughout the summer. Possibly about 40% of the populace had been evacuated by late August,
although this figure must be weighed in light of other reports that many people apparently move out of
the city during the day, but return at night, in part owing to the lack of accommodations in the
countryside. Canadian ICC reports/3/ describe a large-scale section-by-section evacuation of old people
and children, with priority given those living near bridges and dams. Some government ministries have
been relocated (probably to a limestone region near Phu Ly, whose caves and grottos were used by the
Viet Minh in the war against the French) and retail store hours have been ordered cut to reduce daytime
activity in Hanoi.
/3/Not further identified.
232. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, September 15, 1966, 9:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam--W.W. Rostow. Top Secret.
The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.
Mr. President:
A reflection on bombing the North.
1. Clearly, bombing the North has not stopped infiltration to the South; although it may have set a limit
on the scale of military operations in the South. For example, the Laos road net has been expanded, with
great effort, to a capacity of 400 tons a day. A recent report/2/ indicates it is only being used at a rate of
80-100 tons a day.
/2/Not further identified.
2. Clearly, bombing the North as we have done it has not, by itself, brought Hanoi to the conference
table; nor has anything else we have done by way of military, civil, or diplomatic action.
3. What has it done?
It has imposed a severe but not decisive general burden on the North Vietnamese. Bombing in the North
is our equivalent of Viet Cong guerrilla operations in the South:
--It engages a large amount of civil manpower (2-300,000), and substantial military resources and
foreign aid in countering damage and air defense.
--It imposes economic stagnation or decline.
--It imposes a political and psychological burden and morale problems which have, on firm evidence,
increased with the passage of time.
--It limits normal shipping to North Vietnam.
--It assures that the bulk of external assistance is to shore up North Vietnam rather than increase its
thrust against the South.
4. Again--bombing as we have conducted it--is not a decisive instrument any more than the guerrilla
operations in the South are a decisive instrument. But if it weren't hurting we would not have either the
vast effort at air defense in the North or the extraordinary diplomatic and psychological effort to force us
to stop bombing without conditions.
5. Put another way, without the bombing, Hanoi could keep the war going without any significant
incentive to knock it off. I keep close by me all the time the November 1962 interview in the Saturday
Evening Post/3/ with the Hanoi leaders, the punch line of which was this:
/3/Bernard B. Fall, "Master of the Red Jab," Saturday Evening Post, 235 (November 24, 1962), pp. 1821.
"Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus
we are sure to win."

A cessation of bombing in the North would make it much easier for them to make that judgment stick.
6. Therefore:
--I am against taking the heat off the North: we should stay with oil and steady pressure on transport;
--I believe we should be studying ways to increase the pressure on the North at the right time in the
future;
--We should not diminish our pressure on the North without a fully adequate quid pro quo in the South.
7. I add an amateur political judgment: a "pause" during the campaign, without solid evidence that a
move towards peace will promptly follow, could be quite dangerous during the campaign, as well as
providing evidence of over-anxiety and lack of perseverance to Hanoi./4/
/4/McNamara handwrote the following note in the margin of the source text, next to this paragraph: "I
am inclined to agree that a 'pause' prior to November would be unwise."
Walt
233. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Director of the Defense
Communications Agency (Starbird)/1/
Washington, September 15, 1966.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, VIET 385
BARRIER. Secret.
SUBJECT
Infiltration Interdiction System for Vietnam
An infiltration interdiction system, to stop (or at a minimum to substantially reduce) the flow of men and
supplies from North to South Vietnam, is to be designed, produced, and put in place in South Vietnam
and Laos as a matter of highest priority. You are hereby named Director of Joint Task Force 728 to
achieve the objective of having the system installed and in operation by September 15, 1967. The
present concept, which may have to be modified as your work progresses, is summarized on the attached
sheet./2/
/2/The concept summarized in the attachment was drawn from the study, "Air-Supported AntiInfiltration Barrier," August 1966, prepared by the Jason Division of the Institute of Defense Analyses.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2D, Barrier) For background
information on the study, see Document 163 and The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp.
115-123.
To make this system work: There will be required experimentation and further development for such
features as foliage penetration, moisture resistance, and proper dispersion of gravel; development of a
better acoustic sensor than currently exists; aircraft modifications; possible modifications in BLU-26B
fusing; refinement of strike-navigation tactics; and total system tests. Production of components will
have to be increased, personnel will have to be trained, a unit and command structure to operate and
supply the system will have to be created, and a doctrine for its operation will have to be developed.

Communist infiltration practices and the location of civilian populations will have to be studied.
Political groundwork will have to be laid. Public relations questions will have to be addressed./3/
Furthermore, to keep ahead of countermeasures, new components of the system and new tactics will
have to be under development even before the first generation system is installed.
/3/Foster's memorandum for the record of a meeting on the barrier, September 6, attended by
McNamara, McNaughton, Kistiakowsky, and other members of the Jason study team, indicates that
"note was taken of a number of serious non-technical problems, including possible added dangers to
Laos and Thailand; the CINCPAC, MAC-V and Ambassador Sullivan's attitudes; and the possibility of
premature leakage to the press." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC
70 A 4662, VIET 385 BARRIER)
In carrying out your duties as Director of the Joint Task Force, you will report directly to me and are
authorized direct contact with the JCS, the Military Services, and subordinate organizations. Dr. Foster
(DDR&E) will represent me as necessary to assist you in the achievement of your assignment.
Implementation will involve political affairs and matters of concern to ISA, the State Department and
foreign governments; you should therefore keep Mr. McNaughton (ASD/ISA) fully informed and call
on him for assistance as necessary in those areas. I expect you to make use of an advisory group of nongovernmental experts, including Dr. George Kistiakowsky. You will keep the Chairman, JCS fully
informed as to the status and progress of your work.
You should immediately establish a project office and submit to me by September 29 an outline of a
program for carrying out your task. This program should include the approximate time schedule you
plan to meet over the next twelve months; preliminary estimates of your needs in personnel, equipment
and facilities; and an initial plan of your proposed organization.
The existence and operations of the Joint Task Force should be kept confidential.
You are to feel free to call on me as necessary for resources, guidance, decisions, and any other
assistance.
Robert S. McNamara
Attachment
CONCEPT FOR INFILTRATION INTERDICTION SYSTEM FOR VIETNAM
The system would have two different parts--one part designed against foot traffic and the other against
vehicles. The location for the anti-foot-traffic part would be in South Vietnam along the southern edge
(outside) of the DMZ to the Laotian border and then on westward, north of Tchepone, to the vicinity of
Muong Sen. Except for the portion nearest the sea, the area involved is virtually unpopulated and the
terrain is quite rugged. The location for the anti-vehicle part of the system would be the area, about 100
kilometers north-south and 40 kilometers east-west, covering the road networks in eastern Laos from
north of Mu Gia Pass to south of Route 9. The eastern end of the anti-foot-traffic part would be a wide
ground barrier of mine fields, concertina, fences, sensing devices, patrols and air-mobile troops. The
remainder of the anti-foot-traffic system and all of the anti-vehicle system would be effectuated entirely
by air actions.
The first generation of the anti-foot-traffic part of the interdiction system would involve a combination
of non-sterilizing gravel mines for area denial off the trails where sweeping would be difficult, gravel

mines plus "button bomblets" on the trails to harass and to signal acoustic sensors, acoustic detectors to
pinpoint explosions caused by infiltrators, and Sadeye/BLU-26B clusters for saturation attacks on areas
where infiltrators were detected. The mined area--which would constantly be reseeded--would
encompass a strip about 100 by 5 kilometers. The sensor patterns, laid through and around this field
would be monitored 24 hours a day by patrol aircraft, which could call in strike aircraft on a few
moment's notice.
The first generation of the anti-vehicle system would consist of acoustic detectors, supplemented by
gravel mines, distributed along all truckable roads in the zone; 24-hours-a-day monitoring by patrol
aircraft; and strike aircraft using SADEYE prepared to respond to signals that trucks had been located.
The cost of both parts of such an initial system has been estimated to be about $800 million per year,
and the key requirements to be approximately 20 million gravel mines per month, 25 million button
bomblets per month, 10,000 SADEYE/BLU-26B clusters per month, 1600 acoustic sensors per month,
70 appropriately equipped PO2V patrol aircraft, 20 mine-dispensing C-123s, 500 strike sorties per
month, and sufficient photo reconnaissance to cover 2500 square miles a week.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
234. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large's Special Assistant (Cooper) to the
Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/
Washington, September 16, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Secret. A copy was sent
to Unger.
I met today with Bill Colby and Mr. Stone from the Agency. Stone is in charge of the "Intelligence
Division" of CIA's station in Saigon. He has been here for several days and was returning to Saigon this
evening.
All the activities in connection with the Viet Cong are handled by Stone. (The other major division of
the Agency in Saigon deals with the pacification cadres.)/2/ Stone discussed in some detail their plans
and their progress in the area of Viet Cong defections. He indicated that the Agency has made some
inroads into the Front and Viet Cong apparat. Eight Province Committees have thus far been penetrated.
Other things being equal, the Agency prefers to keep a defector "in place", i.e. to have him ostensibly
remain in the Viet Cong and meanwhile report valuable intelligence. They anticipate, however, as their
program moves forward they will get an increasing number of Front officials who will prefer for many
reasons, including their own safety, to "come over". Stone was quite confident that they would have at
least a few of these chaps in hand before very long.
/2/In an undated report on CIA operations in East Asia through 1966, the Department of State's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research stated the following regarding programs in Vietnam: "CIA has remained
responsible for several political and social projects which originally had some intelligence potential. The
Revolutionary Development program (which is to be funded in part by AID), the Chieu Hoi program,
and Census/Grievance teams are run by CIA. In addition the Agency supports and trains various police
and intelligence organizations. Veterans, labor, youth, and student organizations in Vietnam are being
given guidance and support." The report noted that "the cost of the Vietnam program is approximately
$30,000,000 per year, not including any funds which will be supplied by AID." (Ibid., INR/IL Historical
Files, EAP General, EA Reviews, 1964-66)
I told Colby and Stone of our hopes and plans for a large-scale amnesty program and our desire to have
this go hand in hand with a stepped-up effort at defections. They welcomed this and indicated that it
might be possible to line up some significant defections that would be timed to take place at the most
dramatic moment following Ky's appeal.

I cautioned Stone to do some quiet thinking and planning but to keep our conversation to himself until
Lodge was informed directly from Washington of what we had in mind.
I gave a copy of our amnesty memorandum/3/ to Colby who later in the day called me back and said that
he was in perfect agreement with it.
/3/Reference is to Cooper's draft paper, "A Program of National Reconciliation and Reconstruction,"
which was discussed at length at a meeting of Harriman's Negotiations Committee on September 15.
Harriman's record of the discussion is ibid., S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Vietnam
Negotiations, 1968. A September 29 draft of Cooper's paper is ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240,
TS/Nodis, vol. III.
Chester L. Cooper/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
235. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-594-66
Washington, September 17, 1966.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4662, VIET 385
BARRIER. Top Secret. In an earlier memorandum to McNamara, CM-135-66, April 18, Wheeler
recommended against construction of a barrier and forwarded "A Study of Feasibility and Requirements
for a Counter Infiltration Barrier" in support of his view. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Proposal for Barrier Systems (U)
1 (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the concept for an infiltration barrier system which was
forwarded to them by your memorandum, dated 3 September 1966,/2/ subject as above, and they have
noted your directive to Lieutenant General Starbird, Director, Defense Communications Agency, dated
15 September 1966./3/
/2/In this memorandum McNamara stated that he was "inclined to believe that the proposal has
sufficient merit to warrant a decision that we will accept the plan or some modification thereof in
principle." (Ibid.) Attached to McNamara's memorandum was a 6-page excerpt from the study noted in
footnote 2, Document 233.
/3/Document 233.
2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the historic use of barriers and the potential inherent in this
concept. The imaginative use of technology and surprise can contribute considerably toward solving the
infiltration problem. While the capability of the system to meet the objective established for the system
is subject to determination, the development of its component parts and operational techniques will be
useful regardless of the success of the entire project. Your directive to General Starbird provides
adequate direction, flexibility, authority, and control. It is requested that the project definition as
developed by General Starbird be submitted to you through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. (TS) The views of CINCPAC, incorporating those of his component commanders and
COMUSMACV, have been received (CINCPAC 130705Z September 1966, JCS IN 99920)./4/
CINCPAC affirms that any measure that will effectively impede and disrupt the flow of men and
material into South Vietnam merits careful consideration, and he recommends the development of the
components of the system regardless of the decision to proceed. CINCPAC questions the practicality of
the concept as presented. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate and share the concern behind his
reservations but recognize that these issues could be resolved by rigorous determination of feasibility
that must precede execution or commitment of resources.
/4/In telegram 130705Z, September 13, Sharp devoted eight paragraphs to questioning the barrier's
practicality, doubting that it "would impede infiltration, even initially" or "appreciably improve the U.S.
position in SVN." He emphasized, among other things, that its establishment and maintenance would
likely involve tremendous amounts of time, effort, manpower, and material and require either the
"introduction of large numbers of additional forces" or the diversion of land and air forces needed for
revolutionary development and ongoing air operations. In addition, the considerable force required to
man the static barrier would be vulnerable to attack by a mobile enemy from both north and south.
(Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October
1966)
4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the barrier concept, as set forth in your memorandum, dated 3
September 1966, is not offered as a substitute to any major US or Free World military effort in North or
South Vietnam. They concur. It is important that logistical support for the barrier be of a scale that
precludes diverting critical munitions and strike forces from other combat operations.
5. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the system deployment date given to General Starbird is
optimistic. However, they recognize that the concept may have the potential of shortening the war and
that proceeding in the manner directed will provide a quick determination of concept validity and
accelerated development of associated hardware.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, September 17, 1966, 6:17 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Lake,
Miller, and Unger; cleared in substance by Cooper and Jorden; and approved by Rusk and Unger.
49407. From Secretary. Refs: A. State 27973; B. Saigon 3130; C. State 23182;/2/ D. Saigon 1350./3/
/2/See Document 203 and footnote 6 thereto.
/3/Dated July 19. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI)
1. We here are intensely interested in moving ahead rapidly on long-er range program directed toward
VC discussed reftels. In favorable atmosphere surrounding highly successful Constituent Assembly
elections, believe moment propitious, if you have not already had opportunity broach subject in

pursuance State's 27973, to open dialogue with GVN on this whole subject.
2. With respect to timing, we are thinking in terms of Ky launching a call for "national reconciliation"
on November 1, which would appear to be logical date since it is SVN National Day. On other hand, if
earlier date would be feasible and appropriate, this would be even better. Appeal in effect would have
various purposes, within SVN and internationally, which were outlined Reftel C, para 5. We accept that
in present time frame chances of accomplishment better in field of encouraging defections and
fomenting divisions among VC than in leading to discussions with VC/NLF as organization concerning
wind-up of insurgency. We recognize of course that this appeal must be carefully worded in order to
maximize psychological impact on VC without damaging current SVN fledgling political development
process now so well begun. Appreciate your comment on foregoing./4/
/4/Lodge replied in telegram 6423, September 20, that he would initiate the dialog with the GVN.
Regarding the call for national reconciliation, he concurred on the timing and noted that he now
envisaged its principal purpose to be to "encourage defections and foment division among VC," since he
saw no chance now that it could be used to open contacts between the GVN and the VC. (Department of
State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III)
3. With respect amnesty and defection questions we are developing some specific proposals for action
which will be forwarded to you shortly. These include points which would, as appropriate, be covered in
Prime Minister's call for "national reconciliation." Subject to your views, we would have in mind
sending out two or three people very soon to elaborate on Washington thinking on these proposals and
to stay longer to assist as you deemed useful.
4. Re idea of leaving local VC administration temporarily undisturbed (para 4, Ref A), see UngerFurlonger August 11 memcon,/5/ pouched Saigon; this provides some elaboration our ideas on this
subject.
/5/Not further identified.
Rusk
237. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, September 18, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis;
Marigold. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:57 a.m.
Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 253-254.
6280. 1. D'Orlandi had a meeting with Lewandowski Friday night./2/ It started as a social affair on
D'Orlandi's invitation and on Lewandow-ski's initiative became a discussion of the war. According to
Orlandi, Lewandowski said the following:
/2/September 16.
2. The United States Government is not really interested in talks. He said he had reason to believe that
the State Department is trying to promote talks elsewhere along lines having to do with the revision of
the Geneva Convention. Therefore, he says, the United States doesn't care about talks in Saigon. He
heard there might be another attempt by Ronning. This would be hopeless. What we do not need are

messengers carrying bits of paper but men who are inventive and imaginative and out of whose
conversations something creative could come. With this as a preface Lewandowski went on to say:
3. Obviously he cannot give any kind of guarantee and no one else can--"not even Kosygin"--but should
any kind of a reasonable proposal emerge he would take the first plane to Hanoi and put it in the best
possible way.
4. Averting to what the nature of such a proposal should be, Lew-andowski said that it was very simple
and very easy to agree on "immortal principles" and grandiose platitudes such as "we love peace in Viet
Nam," etc. It is the practical application which presents insurmountable difficulties.
5. If the Americans ever really cared, they should especially concentrate on Pham Van Dong's fourth
point concerning "who is to speak for South Viet Nam." This does not mean that Hanoi would be trying
to ram the Viet Cong down our throats. We could consider the setting up of a coalition government, the
bulk of which would be made up of "sensible South Vietnamese politicians." To preserve appearances
you could have "on the fringes" men from the "right" in one or two "unimportant Ministries" and from
on the "left" fill one or two "unimportant Ministries with the so-called NLF."
6. D'Orlandi--this is unthinkable. If this is what you want to talk about, it is better for us to stop the talks.
7. Lewandowski asked whether D'Orlandi realized that what he meant to say was that this would be the
last step not the first.
8. D'Orlandi said: What would be the ultimate goal? If it is to have the Viet Cong in the Government of
Viet Nam, I won't even submit such a proposal to Ambassador Lodge.
9. Lewandowski said that is not at all what he meant to put to D'Orlandi. Plainly, the ultimate aim would
be: "To make of South Viet Nam a second Cambodia."
10. D'Orlandi said that makes more sense, it is at least worth talking about.
11. Lewandowski said: "But I don't believe the Americans really wish to talk. They are trying to do two
things at once: military escalation grouped with political proposals. You can't do both. So long that they
won't make up their minds, we can't do anything. We must wait until November.
12. Comment: It is clear that the criticism of the United States for engaging in military escalation and
political proposals at the same time is thoroughly disingenuous. Orlandi senses that Lewandowski
realizes that the only possible chance for significant talks is that our military success should grow. End
of comment.
13. D'Orlandi fixed on Lewandowski's statement about waiting until November to say that the more you
postpone the worse things will get for you. If you had started having discussions a year ago when the
Americans were much less numerous you would be in much better shape today.
14. Lewandowski said what I have said is my considered opinion. The Americans should produce some
evidence that they are using their imagination. Why should we do it all?
15. D'Orlandi said--Doesn't this mean that you don't care any long-er to be in touch with me?
16. Lewandowski said: No, I want to be in touch with you, but when it comes to our tripartite talks,

that's how I see it. That is why I say we may all be in a better position in November.
17. Comment: As the Department is aware I have been thinking that there would be no real talks until
after our November elections although I have also considered and still do think that the time between
now and then can be useful for the formulation and consideration of ideas. Lew-andowski's technique
seems to be to say how hopeless it all is and how there is no use in going on and then sliding something
in sort of at an angle, in this case a status for Vietnam similar to that of Cambodia. As I understand it,
the problem has never been any difficulty with the idea of South Viet Nam being eventually neutral. The
trouble has been that she wasn't strong enough to be neutral. The very weak cannot be neutral. The
second difficulty has been that North Vietnam did not want her to be neutral but wanted to conquer her.
End of comment.
Lodge
238. Research Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
RSB-89
Washington, September 18, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions
and Initiatives--Soviet. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.
SUBJECT
Soviet World-Wide Demarches on Vietnam Seek to Isolate the US and Deter Escalation
Soviet diplomats have been active in recent weeks in pressing Moscow's views on Vietnam. In this
paper we sort out the diverse and occasionally inconsistent elements of the Soviet demarches to
governments other than the US.
Abstract
The USSR has approached a large number of governments in the past six weeks on the Vietnam issue.
This campaign has not indicated any shift in Moscow's position on the settlement of the war and may be
the prelude to a Soviet effort at the forthcoming UN General Assembly to generate opposition to US
policies in Vietnam. The Soviet demarches appear intended to isolate the US on the Vietnam issue, to
discourage the US from further escalation of the war, and to underline Soviet support for Hanoi and the
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV).
In a number of cases, these demarches appear intended primarily to intensify pressures on the US to
desist from further intensification of the war by citing the potential dangers of Chinese or even Soviet
intervention. These demarches and recent Soviet propaganda have shown a concern at the possibility
that the war might spread into Laos and Cambodia. The Indian delegation left the USSR after
Mrs.Gandhi's visit in July convinced that Moscow's major fear was that the extension of the war into
these countries would lead to Chinese intervention. Kosygin, moreover, warned Mrs.Gandhi that World
War III would result if the US crossed the 17th parallel, stating that the USSR would have to stand by its
ally. On a number of occasions, Soviet officials have mentioned the possibility of "volunteers."
Soviet statements about the precise type of American escalation which it might hope to deter has been

deliberately vague, since Moscow has not wished to imply approval for some further American step to
intensify the war. Soviet emphasis has varied over time, primarily as it has responded to events. Thus, at
the time of Mrs. Gandhi's visit, Kosygin stressed the dangers inherent in an invasion of North Vietnam
at a moment when North Vietnamese infiltration through the DMZ was getting underway. At other
times, when Western press reports have mentioned mining Haiphong, the Soviets have given public
indications of their concern on that score. A general step up in Soviet emphasis upon Moscow's aid to
the North Vietnamese air-defense effort has reflected Soviet concern over the relatively poor showing of
the SA-2s as well as over the possibility of American extension of bombing beyond the POL facilities to
include populated centers. Finally, press reports in the West about operations in Laos and Thailand have
evoked expressions of Soviet concern over the prospect of the war's spreading to the rest of Southeast
Asia.
In other cases, the Soviets have used these demarches to indicate opposition to negotiations as long as
Hanoi refuses them. The Soviet leaders continue to resist efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference or
to bring about negotiations under any other aegis until Hanoi is ready for them. Gromyko told the
Japanese in late July that the USSR had not and would not act as an intermediary. Gromyko asserted that
the solution of the war must be found among the participants. This position was probably not meant to
be taken literally as the Soviets have given some evidence of a concern about a peace settlement which
would exclude them from Indochinese affairs. Rather, Gromyko merely sought to emphasize Moscow's
position that it will take no initiative on a peaceful settlement until Hanoi indicates that it desires
negotiations.
The theme of full support for Hanoi is reflected also in Soviet public statements which seek to refute
Chinese charges of Soviet indifference to the North Vietnamese cause. Recent publicity of pilot training
given North Vietnamese in the USSR and of the alleged effectiveness of Soviet surface-to-air missiles
are examples of Soviet efforts to demonstrate the extent and effectiveness of the support given Hanoi.
Both private and public Soviet statements, then, are intended to convey the same message that Moscow
is wholly loyal to Hanoi and will not take any step not already acceptable to the North Vietnamese. This
message, while limited in scope, reflects continued Soviet desire to exert a voice in any future
Vietnamese settlement. This concern reflects Soviet determination, since the fall of Khrushchev in
October 1964, to play a significant role in Far Eastern affairs. This determination has led Moscow to
render Hanoi extensive economic and military aid as well as full diplomatic support. Having chosen this
course, the Soviets find few diplomatic options open to them as long as Hanoi refuses to consider
negotiations on any terms other than its own.
[Here follows the body of the memorandum, including a list of 29 Soviet demarches on Vietnam during
July and August 1966.]

SEPTEMBER 19-NOVEMBER 27: MANILA CONFERENCE;

DEBATES OVER PACIFICATION AND STABILIZATION OF
THE WAR
239. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, September 19, 1966, 1:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIX. Top Secret;
Sensitive.

SUBJECT
Status of Civilian Morale in North Vietnam
This wrap-up is based on the full text of the comprehensive CIA report from all sources, which Sect.
McNamara initiated./2/
/2/Reference is to "The Vietnamese Communists' Will To Persist," August 26. See Document 219 for
the principal findings of the report.
When bombing of the North first began, it generated a high degree of patriotic response. It was not
unlike the initial reaction of the British when the Germans hit their homeland in 1940. But it seems clear
that the initial level of patriotic fervor has not been maintained.
As a result of the bombing, every segment of the population has been forced to make sacrifices in living
standards. Hardest hit are those living in southern North Vietnam--about 15% of the population. Letters
to relatives and friends (e.g., in Thailand) mention personal hardships and anxieties more than do letters
from other parts of the country.
The NVN Ministry of Labor released data early this year on absenteeism among construction workers. It
was worst among the people in the southern provinces--averaging more than 16 days per worker--or 5%
of total working days scheduled. Shortages of food are reported.
Main sources of complaint elsewhere are: hardships caused by evacuation from urban centers; splitting
of families; lower quality of consumer goods; longer work hours without added pay; loss of income
resulting from transfers from normal jobs to defense-related tasks.
The regime has talked publicly of the need for tighter discipline among both Party members and the
general population. A high government official called a few months ago for revision of the legal code
dealing with counter-revolutionary activities, protection of state property, and the rights and duties of
citizens "in order to satisfy the demands of wartime."
As the bombing has continued, economic and political problems have intensified. Patriotic fervor
appears to have diminished.
Official publications have complained of difficulties in using people already mobilized. There have been
complaints about lack of experience and discipline among Party cadres. Prejudice and discrimination
against the young and against women are reported.
Managerial inefficiency is reported; for example, a recent message reported 1,600 workers being sent to
a highway repair site, with no supervisory personnel present or available.
Captured North Vietnamese soldiers in the South have told us that people in the North are aware of the
hardships, sickness and injuries suffered by infiltrated troops. As morale of NVN troops in the South
drops, there is every reason to believe it will have an effect on the folks at home.
Outlook
Civilian morale is likely to continue to drop in the North over the next year. Trouble on the farms-resulting largely from labor mobilization--has already affected the current harvest. Food prices have
started to rise on the free market. Beyond food shortages, other strains are likely to increase.

There is no agreement in the intelligence community as to when morale may reach the breaking point.
The intelligence community doubts that weakening morale will deprive the Hanoi leadership in the
coming year of the freedom to pursue the conflict in any manner it chooses. My feeling is that the
pressures on the regime may be greater than most of us realize.
I make this point not because I believe they are hurting enough to force them to negotiate now--or at any
particular early date; but because debate about bombing in this town between crusaders and detractors
has sometimes failed to make clear the important middle ground: that we are imposing a day-to-day cost
on Hanoi; this cost is considerable, if not decisive; it is rising; and we shouldn't let them off the hook
until the very day they make parallel de-escalatory moves.
Walt
240. Editorial Note
During a telephone conversation on Vietnam with President Johnson that began at 5:30 p.m. on
September 19, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara made the following comments:
"What I'm much more concerned about, Mr. President, is what we should be doing on the bombing, and
the force levels, and our whole position out there. Once you have time I want to talk to you further about
it. I myself am more and more convinced that we ought definitely to plan on termination of the bombing
in the north but not until after the election, and I hate to even talk about it before then for fear of a leak."
Following an unintelligible interjection by the President, McNamara continued:
"So I haven't said anything in this building yet, but I just wanted to exchange some views with you when
you had time on it. And I think also that we ought to be planning as I mentioned before on a ceiling on
our force levels. I don't think we ought to just look ahead to the future and say we're going to go higher
and higher and higher and higher--600,000, 700,000, whatever it takes. It will break the economy of that
country and will substitute U.S. soldiers for South Vietnamese and will distort the whole pattern of
conduct in South Vietnam if we do. We ought now to be planning on the ceiling of our forces. I would
think they ought to be somewhere around--somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 ought to be the
ceiling; and after the election we ought to tell that to our military commanders to get their planning on
it."
The President did not respond to McNamara's comments prior to concluding the conversation. (Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape
F66.25, Side A, PNO 1)
241. Draft Paper by the President's Special Assistants (Rostow and Komer)/1/
Washington, September 20, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 13.
Secret. Forwarded to the President by Rostow on September 28 under cover of a memorandum stating:
"Here is the strategy paper which Bob Komer and I put together and talked over with Bill Bundy. We
are all in basic agreement." (Ibid.) Also sent to Komer and William Bundy.
A STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT PHASE IN VIETNAM

Barring either a diplomatic breakthrough in the conversations between Gromyko and Secretary Rusk, or
a major increase in North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, our position in South Vietnam can be
described as follows:
We have frustrated the VC and North Vietnamese main force units; we are imposing a painful but not
decisive cost for continuing the war on North Vietnam through our bombing; we have moved politically
and economically in the South to make increasingly unlikely a political disintegration which the VC
might exploit.
Meanwhile, at home, whatever the debates, Hanoi cannot count on a political cave-in of US public
opinion which would destroy the foundations of the President's policy towards Vietnam. Thus, all
western logic would indicate that the NLF/Hanoi should start negotiating now, before they lose even
more bargaining counters. Perhaps they will do so at some point after the US elections, at least putting
out feelers.
On the other hand, the VC have not yet come to a point of either military or political disintegration; the
burden of bombing in the North, however awkward and painful, has not yet been decisive. Present
evidence is that we have come to a point where Hanoi cannot win, but obviously we have not yet forced
it to accept negotiations on our terms.
Our problem is to present them with a situation where, whatever their will to hold on and sweat us out,
they have no realistic option but to accept our terms.
There are, in conception, two major routes to this objective short of occupying North Vietnam:
First, to increase the weight of our bombing in the North so radically that the whole economic, social,
and political infrastructure of North Vietnam is endangered. I believe this course of "bombing them back
to the Stone Age" should be rejected. The pressures at home and abroad we would have to bear would
likely be excessive. The possibilities of much deeper Chinese Communist involvement in the war would
be increased if they thought our objective were to destroy the Communist regime in North Vietnam.
A more temperate buildup in the pressure on the North, however, could play a significant role in the
alternative strategy outlined below.
The second way to force acceptance of negotiations is to produce a palpable process of political and
military disintegration of the Viet Cong. This is the recommended strategy.
The elements of such a strategy must be more than military. It is increasingly apparent that political,
psychological, and economic factors--as well as the civil/military problem of pacification--have an ever
more important role to play. A strategic plan should be developed on an across-the-board basis.
Moreover, many of its components might conflict with each other unless adequately coordinated.
On the military side, the ARVN/US ground campaign and bombing offensive will be stepped up. Barrier
possibilities will be explored intensively. But perhaps the major new development should be a steppedup attempt to deal with the "weak sisters" of the NLF/Hanoi combination, the VC. Their morale is
already declining more rapidly than that of the NVN infiltrators. Their strength has stopped increasing.
Most of the rising number of defectors are VC. They are probably hardest hit by food and medicine
shortages, and by the increasing success of the GVN in establishing itself. By focussing on their
vulnerabilities, we can accelerate their decline and possibly split them off from Hanoi, which could be a
decisive step toward winning the war. At the same time by continuing the cost to Hanoi, Hanoi might be

more willing to accept such a splitting off.

Disintegrating the Viet Cong
The headings for a policy to produce an accelerated disintegration of the Viet Cong should include the
following:
A. A dramatic and sustained political and psychological appeal to the VC to join in the making of a new
South Vietnamese nation
(i) an amnesty offer.
(ii) enlarged and sustained efforts to defect VC leaders.
(iii) an expanded psywar effort to split the VC from Hanoi.
(iv) a radical expansion in Chieu Hoi efforts.
(v) agreement on a Constitution followed by elections in accordance with the Constitution in which the
VC who had accepted amnesty would be allowed to vote.
B. Accelerated Pacification
(i) new organizational arrangements providing more unified US/GVN civil/military management.
(ii) size of forces to be allocated.
(iii) converting appropriate ARVN forces to pacification functions.
(iv) 1967 targets to be set, including rapid pacification of certain key areas (as recommended by Sir
Robert Thompson).
(v) contributing programs to be expanded, e.g., RD cadres, agriculture, land reform, police.
C. An accelerated, workable land reform scheme
D. Pressing forward rapidly and dramatically with formulation of post-war development program
E. Assuring good military-civil political relations in post-election period, including creation of a national
political party embracing both elements
F. Avoiding another round of severe inflation
G. US/GVN military offenses against VC/NVA Main Force maintaining the capacity to deal with
present or enlarged North Vietnamese military formations introduced into the South, plus whatever we
can do about infiltration.
H. Bombing offensive in the North continuing to impose a cost on the North for continuing the war.

242. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, September 22, 1966, 9:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, POTUS
Trip, vol. 1. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the
memorandum.
Mr. President:
Here is Bill Bundy's proposed scenario.
I would only add this: October will be a month of prayer among Catholics for peace in Viet Nam. That
fact will be politically important in the U.S. and throughout the world.
Therefore, if we go forward with this meeting, we ought to give a lot of thought to making the most of a
common plea for peace at the meeting and give maximum emphasis to the civilian aspects of
Vietnamese development:
--An appeal to the VC and an amnesty offer;
--The surfacing of work on a Vietnamese long-term development program;
--Forward movement on the Honolulu program; etc.
As for Bill's raising the question of the political impact of the conference--at home and abroad--I have
these observations: the domestic effect is a matter on which only you can render a judgment; the impact
abroad will depend, in the end, on whether the conference produced ser-ious results and an authentic
sense of forward movement. In turn, that will depend on having the conference as well prepared as we
can by a small first-class, imaginative group.
If we go ahead, I would suggest that we put Bill Moyers, Bill Jorden, Bob Komer, Bill Leonhart, and
Len Unger to work virtually full time from the moment you make a positive decision.
I just talked to George Ball to ascertain what Sec. Rusk's view was of the enterprise. He is reported as
"very enthusiastic."
Bill Jorden and I think Ky should initiate the meeting--the others should respond. It's their war.
Walt
P.S. Now a wild idea. Send a message, in greatest secrecy, to Ho Chi Minh that you want to talk to him
personally in, say, Rangoon. You win if he refuses or if he accepts.
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/2/
Washington, September 21, 1966.

/2/Secret.
SUBJECT
Scenario and Issues on a Meeting of Chiefs of Government to Discuss Viet-Nam
The Proposal
The proposal is that a meeting be held in late October in Manila, to be attended by the Chiefs of
Government of South Viet-Nam, the US, and the nations contributing military forces in South VietNam--The Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, and Thailand. Such a meeting would have the
over-all purpose of presenting to the world a dramatic picture of the collective support being given to
South Viet-Nam; it would provide an effective occasion for reviewing the military situation at least in
general terms, but stress would be placed on the non-military programs and on the posture of South
Viet-Nam, the US, and the other participants toward a peaceful settlement.
This memorandum discusses the possible sequence of actions in bringing about such a meeting, and the
major issues that should be considered in making plans.
Possible Sequence of Actions
1. Both Holt and Holyoake have elections, and would feel very hurt if they were not privately consulted
before the Asian participants are approached. We believe that both will see no political problem in the
proposed meeting--and may well see some advantage. Nonetheless, we should have a quick turn-around
with them before we approach the Asians. (Messages for this purpose will be drafted immediately.)
2. Our next approach should be to South Viet-Nam. Prime Minister Ky and Thieu should both be
"consulted" but in a fashion that makes clear that we expect them to agree, and that also makes clear to
Ky that this conference would essentially be in lieu of his visiting the US separately. (A message for this
purpose will be drafted immediately.)
3. Marcos, Park, and Thanom should then be approached concurrently; at the same time confirming
invitations should go to Holt and Holyoake. Part of our approach to Ky should be to get him to agree to
be the inviting party jointly with us, but he should agree also that we will be the ones to handle the
diplomatic exchanges in establishing the meeting. (Messages to this effect will be drafted immediately.)
4. Announcement of the conference could then follow. As one possibility, it should be done
concurrently in Saigon and Washington, with confirming announcements in the other four capitals.
Alternatively--and perhaps better--Marcos could make the announcement. In view of the minimum
period of 2-3 days required to get concurrence from Australia and New Zealand and then from VietNam, it might be possible for Marcos to make the announcement before he leaves US territory on the
27th. However, to seek an immediate announcement without those clearances might well involve serious
adverse reactions in Viet-Nam and to a lesser extent in Australia and New Zealand.
In all of the above sequence, it would be desirable, although not essential, to have as clear a picture as
possible on the scope of the conference, its duration, and other features. The question of dates should of
course be firm in any event.
Issues Requiring Early Decision
1. Dates. While a successful late October conference would have many great and perhaps decisive

advantages, we must reckon that many quarters in the US and significant elements of third-country
opinion would relate the timing of the conference to the US elections. However successful the
conference in fact turned out to be, its "image" would be up against considerable cynical advance
comment and resistance. If Ky later had political trouble--and particularly if that trouble was attributed,
however wrongly, to the conference--the possible eventual net loss might be serious. In other words, a
conference in late October has possibly greater potential gains but also greater potential losses, than a
conference after the US elections.
The alternative date would appear to be in mid or late November, which would not have a favorable
impact on our elections but would have somewhat less risks.
In the choice of dates, we do not see the Viet-Nam political situation as a predictable factor arguing
either way. The Constituent Assembly will be in operation by late October, and will probably be
continuing into November. It is just possible that it will have completed its work by early November, so
that Ky would appear in a strong and favorable light in mid-November. On the other hand, the
Constitution would represent a milestone on the election of some successor, so that Ky's authority and
tenure might look more solid in late October./3/
/3/In a telephone conversation at 12:40 p.m. on September 22, Ball told Rusk that the President wanted
to move very fast on the Manila trip and was thinking in terms of October 18, adding that "this may be a
little soon but this would be a way of heading off Ky." (Telcon; Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam
II)
2. Level and Location. We agree completely that a meeting of Heads of Government is the proper level,
and that the Philippines is an ideal location. In many ways, however, Manila itself might be less
desirable than Baguio. However, this need not be decided before the conference is set up, and Marcos
might even suggest a third site.
3. Scope. The following are considerations and possible useful points.
a. Since the meeting is based on military contributions, it would be incongruous to omit a review of the
military situation. Moreover, the Koreans in particular would undoubtedly welcome and want this.
However, we should probably try to confine this element to a simple review and forecast, with no
implication that great new decisions on military strategy are being taken. This of course follows the
Honolulu pattern.
b. On the non-military side, the South Vietnamese should play a leading role in presenting a progress
report on the actions that have been taken in pacification, economic benefits, and the rest. The
communique should stress these elements, and also the South Vietnamese presentation of their political
timetable and progress. An additional element which might be stressed in this area is that of plans for
post-war reconstruction and development, including the conversion of military facilities to civilian use.
At the same time, this theme should not be so stressed as to convey the implication that the participants
are confident of early victory.
c. The communique must contain a firm and clear statement of position on negotiations and the elements
of a peaceful settlement. Here we must note that we have not had the fullest possible discussions with
the South Vietnamese--although we plan to do so in the immediate future--and that we have never gone
deeply into many of the issues with Korea, the Philippines, or Thailand. This suggests the practical need
that each participant send its Foreign Secretary, and that the Foreign Secretaries meet separately in the
early stages of the conference to hammer out the necessary communique language and to explore as

much of the subject as can be profitably discussed. We would have to do careful advance work so that
South Viet-Nam, through its able Foreign Minister--Tran Van Do--took as much of a lead as possible.
4. Duration. Because of time pressures on the Chiefs of Government, two days might have to be the
duration of the actual conference, although a third day would have many advantages in cementing the
picture of serious and deep discussions. With the time-change adjustment from a long Pacific trip there
would be advantage if the President would plan to arrive at least a day before the opening of the
conference.
5. The Philippine Angle. If the conference were held in Manila itself, a call by the President on President
Marcos would not add significant time to the schedule. However, we must reckon that there would be
significant Philippine pressures for the President to pay his respects to our bilateral relations with the
Philippines through some separate speech, a separate reception, or otherwise. If the conference were
held outside Manila, such actions might be even more pressed by Marcos.
6. Possible Additional Visits. It is understood that the President might consider going on to Australia. If
so, this reinforces the importance of the first contact being made with Holt. As of now, we would
suppose that Holt is fairly certain of reelection and that a Presidential visit would if anything enhance his
chances. However, we must reckon that such a visit would involve the US deeply in Australian politics,
and would be open to sharp criticism from Holt's opponents.
Working Preparations
To get a solid and effective discussion of the issues and particularly to get good presentations by the
South Vietnamese, a small and not too conspicuous US team might be sent to Saigon a few days in
advance to assist the Mission. Extensive work will obviously be required on all the non-military
programs, and General Westmoreland should presumably work with the South Vietnamese military
leaders so that they take as much of a role as possible in presenting the military picture. On the
diplomatic side, we should try to have careful advance discussions in the various capitals to cover the
issues and to prepare the way for the meetings of the Foreign Secretaries.
243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, September 22, 1966, 9:58 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH. Secret; Priority; Nodis;
Thrush. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Thompson, U. Alexis Johnson, and Rostow in substance; and
approved by Ball.
51896. For Amb. Lodge from Acting Secretary. There is an intense interest at highest levels in carrying
through defection of principal and getting him out./2/ Assuming effort described Saigon's 6522, Para
2,/3/ does not work out, would like you to consider again whether there is not some way in which matter
might be again set in motion through your taking it up with PriMin Ky. He surely would grasp
immediately how important it is for this project to succeed and might be able to develop some method of
obtaining release of uncle without exposing operation to Loan or others. You should understand that in
urging you to reconsider this point I do not mean in any sense to press you into any action which
seriously risks spoiling the project./4/
/2/In telegram 49432 to Saigon, September 18, Rusk stated (in anticipation of his meeting with
Gromyko in a few days): "I suppose it is impossible to bring off the Thrush operation before then but it

would be an enormous help could it be done." Lodge replied in telegram 4773, September 19, that Tho's
uncle, Nguyen Huu An, was still being detained by GVN authorities, for reasons apparently unrelated to
Thrush, and that "in the interest of preserving the operation we should sit tight." (Ibid.)
/3/Paragraph 2 of telegram 6522, September 21, dealt with the issue of obtaining the release of Nguyen
Huu An. (Ibid.)
/4/In telegram 6811 from Saigon, September 24, Lodge recommended that the issue not be brought up
with Ky; the Department of State concurred in telegram 54428 to Saigon, September 26. (Ibid.) In
telegram 8570 from Saigon, October 15, Lodge reported that Nguyen Huu An was finally out of jail and
commented that "perhaps now we will learn whether we have gold, brass or too much imagination."
Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President under cover of an October 15 memorandum stating:
"Now we shall see. Timing is first class if it can be pulled off in the next few weeks." (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 143, Thrush)
Ball
244. Editorial Note
On September 22, 1966, at the opening meeting of the 21st U.N. General Assembly, U.S. Representative
Arthur Goldberg made a major speech on the Vietnam war in which he stated that the United States was
"prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are assured, privately
or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation
on the other side." For text of the speech, see Department of State Bulletin, October 10, 1966, pages
518-525.
In forwarding a draft of Goldberg's speech to the President on September 21 for his clearance, Rostow
noted in his covering memorandum that the key passages on Vietnam did "not go beyond existing
policy." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 13)
William Bundy told Canadian Ambassador A. Edgar Ritchie that Goldberg's speech contained "nothing
of substance" that "had not already been said privately," but "as codified it represented a new
formulation in certain respects. Moreover, the speech took more explicitly into account the need for
realistic phasing in any supervised mutual de-escalation." (Memorandum of conversation, September 29;
Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research, summarized the reaction of Hanoi, Peking,
and the NLF to Goldberg's speech in an intelligence note to Secretary Rusk, September 28. Peking and
the Viet Cong were "predictably negative," observed Hughes, while Hanoi avoided direct rejection of
Goldberg's proposals but insisted that he had offered nothing new. (Ibid., EA/ACA-Vietnam
Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, National Liberation Front)
245. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/
Washington, September 22, 1966.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip,
October 1966. Secret. McNaughton sent copies of this draft memorandum to Ball, Gaud, Helms, Marks,
Wheeler, and Komer under cover of a September 22 memorandum, in which he stated that McNamara
had been asked to prepare a draft reorganization of pacification responsibilities and wanted to discuss
his draft memorandum the following week with a view to having it ready for the President during the

first week of October. (Ibid.)

Now that a Viet Cong victory in South Vietnam seems to have been thwarted by our emergency actions
taken over the past 18 months, renewed attention should be paid to the longer-run aspects of achieving
an end to the war and building a viable nation in South Vietnam.
Central to success, both in ending the war and in winning the peace, is the pacification program. Past
progress in pacification has been negligible. Many factors have contributed, but one major reason for
this lack of progress has been the existence of split responsibility for pacification on the U.S. side. For
the sake of efficiency--in clarifying our concept, focusing our energies, and increasing the output we can
generate on the part of the Vietnamese--this split responsibility on the U.S. side must be eliminated.
We have considered various alternative methods of consolidating the U.S. pacification effort. The best
solution is to place those activities which are primarily part of the pacification program, and all persons
engaged in such activities, under COMUSMACV. Attached (at Tab A)/2/ is a chart showing the present
organization in Vietnam, with the "pacification" activities indicated by the bolder bordered rectangles.
Also attached (at Tab B) is an illustrative chart showing the proposed reorganization which integrates all
pacification activities. In essence, the reorganization would result in the establishment of a Deputy
COMUSMACV for Pacification who would be in command of all pacification staffs in Saigon and of all
pacification activities in the field.
/2/Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.
It is recognized that there are many important aspects of the pacification problem which are not covered
in this recommendation, which should be reviewed subsequent to the appointment of the Deputy
COMUSMACV for Pacification to determine whether they should be part of his task--for example, the
psychological warfare campaign, and the Chieu Hoi (defector) and refugee programs. Equally important
is the question of how to encourage a similar management realignment on the South Vietnamese side,
since pacification is regarded as primarily a Vietnamese task. Also not covered by this recommendation
are important related national programs, all of which have an obvious impact on the pacification effort-such as the anti-main force military activities and the efforts to control inflation. Finally, there is the
question of whether any organizational modification in Washington is required by the recommended
change in Vietnam.
I recommend that you approve the reorganization described in this memorandum as a first essential step
toward giving a new thrust to pacification. Under Secretary Ball, Administrator Gaud, The Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Director Helms, Director Marks and Mr. Komer concur in this recommendation./3/
/3/For Komer's response to McNamara's recommendation, see Document 249. For Gaud's response, see
footnote 6, Document 263. For Helms' response, see footnote 3, Document 248. Wheeler responded in
JCSM-626-66, September 29, concurring in the draft memorandum's concept of organization,
particularly in the establishment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification who would direct all
pacification activities. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A
4443, VIET 380 PACIFICATION) In a memorandum to McNamara, September 27, Taylor raised six
questions about the proposed organization which he felt needed answering at an early stage of
discussion. (Ibid., McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966)
Robert S. McNamara/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

246. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, September 22, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb Harriman-Negotiations Comm. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the
memorandum.
SUBJECT
"Negotiations Committee"
We have been reviewing for some weeks the advisability of a broad offer of amnesty and reconciliation
to the NLF/VC by Prime Minister Ky. Because of the outstanding success of the election and
moderately encouraging reports of decline in morale of the VC, we believe that the time has come for
such an offer. Lodge is in agreement and has undertaken to talk to Ky and his principal colleagues at an
early propitious moment.
A draft speech of reconciliation and amnesty to be delivered by Ky has been sent to Lodge for his
comment./2/ It covers three areas. The first deals with the economic, political and military progress
during the past year. The second offers amnesty and reconciliation to all VC who are ready to put aside
their arms. It also expresses Ky's willingness to talk to leaders of the NLF/VC as a group to achieve
national reconciliation. The third states the GVN's war and peace aims.
/2/The draft speech was transmitted in telegram 52727, September 22. (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S) The speech was discussed at a meeting of the Negotiations Committee on
September 23. A memorandum of the meeting is ibid., S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207,
Negotiation.
November 1 has been suggested as the most advantageous date as it is the anniversary of the 1963
revolution, and Ky made a significant speech on that occasion last year. I had favored an earlier date and
Lodge is considering whether that is possible, though there are a number of preliminary actions to be
taken. Lodge has accepted our offer to send a two or three man team from Washington to help work out
the plans.
Averell
247. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
New York, September 24, 1966, 6:30-11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations,
1968. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on September 26 by William D. Krimer of the Language Services Division,
Department of State. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York. A
memorandum prepared on September 30 in the Bureau of European Affairs analyzed "new elements" in
Gromyko's conversation with Rusk. (Ibid.)/1/
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September-October 1966

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg
Ambassador Foy D. Kohler
Ambassador William C. Foster
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson
Mr. William D. Krimer (Interpreter)
USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Nikolai T. Fedorenko
Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Mr. Lev I. Mendelevitch
Mr. Alexei A. Roschin
Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter)
The Secretary said he would appreciate a chance to make some observations concerning the problem of
Viet-Nam. It was our clear understanding that the Foreign Minister felt he was not in a position to
negotiate concerning Viet-Nam, since he had not been authorized by certain parties to do so and we
respected this position. The Secretary did, however, want to explain to Mr. Gromyko the problems we
were facing in bringing the problem of Viet-Nam to a conclusion. He wanted to express the frustration
we were experiencing in this respect. In the Warsaw Pact Communique of Bucharest,/2/ the Warsaw
Pact countries had called upon us to comply with the 1954 and 1962 agreements concerning Southeast
Asia. We agree with this proposal. We assumed that the Communique had meant that other parties, too,
would comply with these agreements; how do we get started? We had said on many occasions that we
agreed to sit down at a conference to talk about the problem of Southeast Asia; yet, such a meeting or
conference had proved to be impossible to convene. We had said yes to Prince Sihanouk's requests to
the International Control Commission to protect and insure respect for the neutrality and integrity of
Cambodia; the other side had not reacted, even though we have no desire to involve Cambodia in the
present conflict. We had urged the ICC to take the necessary steps to assure the maintenance of the
demilitarized zone between North and South Viet-Nam. Yesterday Hanoi informed the ICC that they
would have no part of any such idea. We had made it clear that we were prepared to carry on bilateral
negotiations with Hanoi; we had made it clear that we would welcome third parties as intermediaries; we
have also made it clear that we would welcome discreet and tactful unofficial contacts with Hanoi; still,
nothing happens. We tried to talk to the other side about deescalation; nothing happens. We tried to
arrange for an exchange of prisoners and have even returned some prisoners unilaterally; the other side
expressed no interest. We had said that we would stop the bombing if anyone could tell us what else
would happen if we did so; to date no one has been able to tell us anything in this respect. In the
meanwhile North Viet-Nam continues to send its regular armed forces into South Viet-Nam. During the
last few days again the traffic has increased and a new regular North Vietnamese army division has
entered South Viet-Nam through the demilitarized zone. Hanoi and Peking have called Ambassador
Goldberg's new proposals a "peace swindle". They have called the Pope a mouth-piece of the
reactionary forces. It seems to us that the Soviet Union and the United States have no conflicting

interests in this situation. We are not interested in punishing or bombing or attempting to destroy North
Viet-Nam. The bombing can stop, literally within hours, if something can be done to stop the attacks of
NorthViet-Nam upon South Viet-Nam. We are puzzled over the fact that all the processes capable of
bringing about a peaceful settlement appear to have been blocked. Hanoi had asked us to accept its four
points./3/ We had replied that we were prepared to discuss their four points if others at the table were
free to state the points they had in mind. Actually, we had no great problem with points one, two and
four; we had suggested some changes in point three; we have received no reply. Over the last five years
we had made literally hundreds of efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement; so far, the only reply has
been a continuation of the traffic from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. We have had absolutely no
indication that Hanoi is interested in a peaceful settlement. We think that is unfortunate. Concerning the
Warsaw Pact Bucharest Communique: the Soviet Union has prompted us to comply with the Geneva
Agreements of 1954 and 1962; we agree, but how do we get started?
/2/Excerpts from the communique, July 6, are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1966, pp. 832-834.
/3/For text of the four points, April 8, 1965, see ibid., 1965, pp. 852-853.
Foreign Minister Gromyko said in reply that the Soviet Union's position on Viet-Nam had been stated
many times and he saw no need to repeat it. He had to say in the name of the Soviet Government,
however, that the many statements of the US Government on Viet-Nam and the actions of the United
States in Viet-Nam had very little in common, to say the very least. Concerning these statements about
the desirability of a peaceful solution of the question: if one were to read these statements only, one
could indeed come to the conclusion that the United States was seeking a peaceful solution to the
problem. Yet, the concrete facts of escalation of US military actions in Viet-Nam lead us objectively to
the opposite conclusion. If we were to characterize such statements, particularly some of the statements
made by the US Secretary of Defense, we would have to use very harsh words indeed. Mr. Gromyko
had no desire to do so, he only wanted to speak on the substantive aspects of this problem. Therefore, he
repeated, words were one thing, actions--something else again. Thus, the latest US statement before the
UN General Assembly/4/ also failed to produce any new confidence, for it had been preceded by very
recent evidence of plans and by statements indicating further escalation of US military actions in VietNam. Secondly, the proposals the US had made before the UN General Assembly were accompanied by
conditions which the other side could not possibly accept. In fact, each statement made by the US had
been accompanied by such conditions, conditions which cannot be fulfilled. The Soviet Union was
therefore not surprised that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam did not react to these American
statements in any other way except to reject them out of hand. He therefore concluded that while he
could not negotiate, and while he did not want the US to underestimate this influence,/5/ he had seen
nothing new in the American position during the latest period of time. As to what the Secretary had said
about US efforts to establish contact not having produced any results, he was not surprised. The trouble
was that the US had made no effort to make its proposals acceptable to the other side. He was therefore
concluding that the United States was determined to continue the war in Viet-Nam with all the
consequences that ensued. Thirdly, the Soviet Government had, of course, not failed to consider the
reasoning and the position of the United States, not just once, but repeatedly. His Government had
concluded that for reasons of its own the United States had decided to unleash and escalate the war in
Viet-Nam. It was his Government's view that this was a grave mistake, if the statements of the United
States Government about its desire to reduce international tensions were to be taken at face value. For, if
the US really wanted peace in the area of Indochina and wanted to put an end to the war, it would have
to furnish proof of this desire to the other side. Not only verbal declarations, however. What kind of
proof? What, specifically, could improve the situation? Cessation of military actions in South Viet-Nam.
The United States was a great and strong country. As Mr. Gromyko saw it, the prestige of the United
States would not be damaged if the bombing of North Viet-Nam were stopped, as "a minimum of

minimums". On the contrary, such a step would be evaluated positively throughout the world. Yet, the
US did not even stop the bombing. The US ought to realize just what it was doing; it was unthinkable to
try and bring the DRV and South Viet-Nam to their knees. The Soviet Union knew and thought the US
also realized the fact that the people of Viet-Nam were full of resolution to expend whatever time and
effort were required, whatever sacrifices were required, in order to defend their land. What would
unconditional cessation of military actions accomplish? Itwould improve the general situation in Viet/4/See Document 244.
/5/The Soviet interpreter omitted this particular reference to influence. [Footnote in the source text.]
The Secretary said that he was most interested in Mr. Gromyko's remarks, despite the fact that as Mr.
Gromyko had indicated he was not in a position to negotiate. It was important that this problem be
discussed between them, precisely because they both agreed that the problems of peace in the world
depended heavily upon the US and the Soviet Union. These two nations had the power and the
responsibility before mankind and before history. He hoped that there would be another occasion for
them to discuss this problem further. However, he did want to comment on Mr. Gromyko's remarks
about the difference between the statements and the actions of the United States. He recalled that in June
of 1961 his Government and ours had discussed the situation in Southeast Asia. This had eventually led
to an agreement on Laos and after some period of time this agreement had been signed by the USSR, the
US and Peking. We were bitterly disappointed over the way that this agreement had worked out; in fact,
President Kennedy had been bitterly disappointed by it. We had accepted the Soviet Union's candidate
for Prime Minister of Laos, we had also accepted a coalition government which included all three
factions. This had not, however, deterred Hanoi from continuing infiltration into the areas which were
controlled by the Pathet Lao. Neither the International Control Commission nor representatives of the
coalition government were able to penetrate into these areas. Still, we continued to discuss peace in
Southeast Asia. For a period of five years, while there was no bombing of North Viet-Nam, its
Government continued to infiltrate its forces into SouthViet-Nam. These five years were filled with
efforts toward finding a peaceful solution. We continued to believe that the USSR had signed the
agreements on Southeast Asia in good faith; for some reason Hanoi had not. Undoubtedly Mr. Gromyko
knew better than we did, why. We cannot accept the view that the problem in Viet-Nam is purely a
problem between the people of the two Viet-Nams; we could not accept such a view with respect to the
people of the two Germanys either. The situation is becoming increasingly difficult for us. Over the past
few years many governments, groups of governments and individuals such as U Thant and the Pope
have continued to make proposals for peace. To all of these we have said yes; Hanoi--no. Yet, we are
still expected to say something new in spite of the fact that there has been no response from Hanoi to
any proposals for the past two years; we are expected to surrender South Viet-Nam to North Viet-Nam.
It is not easy for us to separate the military actions of our side from those of the other side. No one can
tell us what might happen to the 19 regiments of the regular forces of North Viet-Nam which are now in
South Viet-Nam. When we stopped the bombing early this year the only response was more infiltration.
It was carried on on a 24-hour basis instead of just at night. Hanoi made no proposals or counterproposals at that time; it only said for us to get out and to turn South Viet-Nam over to North Viet-Nam.
Nevertheless we continued to probe for a peaceful settlement. What the people of South Viet-Nam want
we were prepared to leave to them, to ascertain their wishes by a vote. We did not believe that they
wanted to have North Viet-Nam impose its will upon them by force. We intended to continue our efforts
to find a peaceful solution, but we were made to wonder whether the very efforts we had been
undertaking in that direction had not led Hanoi into a grave miscalculation. There had not been any other
example in history when one side had made so many efforts to end the war, as had been the case with
the United States with respect to Viet-Nam. Perhaps this then convinced Hanoi that we would weaken
and eventually surrender South Viet-Nam to its forces. During the 1964 electoral campaign President
Johnson had said repeatedly that we wanted no larger war. We wondered if this d

Mr. Gromyko said that he had expressed the position of the Soviet Government, which was guided by
the recognition of the great responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union for world peace. He
hoped the United States would not be carried away by setting conditions for the other side. If the US
was really interested in peace much depended upon its actions and its not raising complicated and
humiliating conditions for the other side. He repeated that the views of his Government were dictated by
recognition of the great responsibilities of the two powers.
248. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence
Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, September 28, 1966.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, McNamara Project.
Secret/Sensitive.
SUBJECT
The Agency's Position on the OSD's 22 September Draft Pacification Reorganization Proposal/2/
/2/Document 245.
1. The 22 September OSD draft proposal raises and conflates two important but quite distinct questions:
(1) Whether the U.S. pacification effort in Vietnam should be radically reorganized and placed under a
single command authority--i.e., pacification czar.
(2) Whether this pacification czar should be a civilian U.S. official directly subordinate to the
Ambassador (or Deputy Ambassador) or a U.S. military officer subordinate to COMUSMACV.
Our position on (1) should be affirmative. If such a czar is created, we should be willing to turn over to
his control, under a suitable administrative agreement, the Cadre Operations Division of the Saigon
Station. Our position on (2) should be diplomatically but firmly negative, since we feel strongly that it is
neither in the Agency's parochial interests nor in the larger interests of the pacification program and the
U.S. Government's objectives that program is intended to further, for pacification ("the other war") to be
under direct military control.
2. Leaving the military versus civilian question momentarily aside, we have serious problems with the
particular pacification organization structure proposed in the 22 September OSD memorandum. The
"pacification staff" it advocates incorporates not only the Station's Cadre Operations Division, which we
are prepared to surrender, but also key elements of the Intelligence Division which we feel should not be
removed from our Chief of Station's command jurisdiction. Specifically, the DOD proposal would
incorporate our liaison with the Police Special Branch at regional, province and district levels into the
command authority of the pacification czar. This would complicate our continuing responsibility for
liaison with the South Vietnamese police apparatus at the national level through the Director General of
the National Police and with the Central Intelligence Organization at national, regional and local levels.
It would splinter the internal intelligence collection capabilities of the CIA Station in a way that would
make it difficult if not impossible to discharge our continuing overall responsibilities in this field. The
takeover of our Station's Intelligence Division assets implicit in the DOD proposal, therefore, is
something we cannot accept and should resist.
3. Actually, if the pacification czar were a civilian, we probably could work out a satisfactory

arrangement with regard to provincial and district Special Branch liaison. If he is a military subordinate
of COMUS-MACV, however, we should stonewall on this point. DOD will not be able to budge us here
since the same arguments for bringing our intelligence activities at province and district levels under the
pacification command also apply to military intelligence activities at those levels.
4. Any assignment of Station functions, programs or personnel to a non-CIA command structure will
generate serious support and, in some instances, legal problems. It will fracture the unified integrity of
the present Station support structure and break up an intricate, interlocked cycle through which we
presently supply funds, people and management to all CIA Vietnam programs. The administrative
mechanisms of such a detailing of assets would have to be very carefully structured to avoid impinging
unacceptably on the Director's responsibilities to Congress for funds expended by this Agency on his
personal accountability. The funding and support of the activities of the Cadre Operations Division are
currently being organized so that these activities can be turned over to someone else to operate at some
future time without major administrative or legal problems. The support of Intelligence Division
activities, however, is not so structured. It is an integral piece of the total support for the Saigon Station.
Though it could be factored out as a separate entity, doing so would be very difficult.
5. On the major issue, we agree that the pacification effort needs to be better managed on the U.S. side
(and, for that matter, on the Vietnamese side as well). We cannot agree, however, that the road to
progress lies through subordinating pacification to the U.S. military. Bureaucratically there are several
major objections to the philosophy behind the DOD proposal. For one thing, what it does is implement
much of the Command Relationships Agreement even though Vietnam has not been (and under
President Johnson is never likely to be) formally and legally declared an "active theater of war". The
DOD proposal guts the present pacification arrangement, including Deputy Ambassador Porter's role
and functions. General Westmoreland becomes, in effect if not in title, the U.S.proconsul or High
Commissioner, with the other senior members of the country team being relegated to largely ceremonial
functions and their assets and functions placed under the command of one of their peers.
6. As we know from private soundings, the Department of State is going to argue strongly against the
DOD proposal. A central element of State's argument will be that the optics are all wrong. The U.S.
Government is strongly encouraging, indeed pressuring, the Vietnamese to civilianize their pacification
effort. Making our support of pacification a military endeavor would go directly against the grain of this
policy. State's point is valid and we endorse it, but we feel it is a consideration we should let them argue.
7. Our objections to placing pacification under U.S. military control are not emotional or even
predominantly philosophical. We have in Switchback an historical indication of what is likely to happen
to the RD program if the U.S. military takes it over as they did not CIDG./3/ Undoubtedly the
organization charts would be tidier. Without question RD cadre would be turned into good soldiers. But
that is what they would become, soldiers. The spirit of revolutionary development and sense of
movement towards an endogenously rooted political structure would be lost. Political aims would be
subordinated to military objectives. Because of this, the pacification effort--however well managed-would almost certainly fail. The argument (Komer's argument, which we believe is in large measure
responsible for the DOD proposal) that since the U.S. military organization in Vietnam is far larger than
the civilian organization, it should be given control over all U.S. activities simply does not wash. This
war can be lost by bad management but it cannot be won by good organization unless that organization
serves as a vehicle for implementing non-charitable ingredients of spirit and attitude. It will not be won
until a Saigon-directed civil structure takes hold of and roots in the countryside. Progress towards this
essential goal will be impeded rather than facilitated by placing pacification under military direction.
/3/Switchback was a program for transferring responsibility for advising and assisting ethnic tribal
groups in South Vietnam from CIA to the U.S. Army.

8. As for the play of the Agency's Washington hand in the immediate future, we believe your initial
written reply to Secretary McNamara should address itself to the Agency's difficulties with the details of
the proposal submitted and should not address the larger considerations./4/ We should let State be the
first to table these. However, we recommend that you be prepared to support State's view in oral
discussion. We also recommend that you support State in arguing that basic decisions on how the U.S.
pacification effort is to be organized should not be made in undue haste. This is a very complicated
problem to which an optimum solution is not going to be worked out in a few days. Furthermore, it is a
decision which should not be made until the field components of the U.S. agencies involved or affected
have had the chance to express their views on the proposals Washington is seriously weighing.
/4/A draft reply to Mr. McNamara is appended as an attachment to this memorandum. [Footnote in the
source text. The draft is attached but not printed. In the reply sent on September 30, Helms indicated that
the proposal "would cause us some problems in its present form," particularly by providing "for
assumption of operational control by the pacification czar of some of our Station's intelligence collection
and intelligence liaison responsibilities and assets." Helms also called for careful examination of the
political ramifications of assigning primary operational responsibility to a "subordinate military officer
within the COMUSMACV command structure." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry,
Job 80-B01580R, McNamara Project)]
9. As indicated above, we agree that the U.S. pacification effort needs managerial improvement but we
feel you should oppose carving up the Saigon Station and should oppose placing pacification under
military command. However, your posture should not be purely negative. As a constructive contribution
to the discussion, you should support the following alternative proposal which State will make in some
form and you can endorse: The outlines of a sensible pacification structure already exist. Ambassador
Porter's present position was established as a result of the Warrenton Conference in order to accomplish
the very ends that the DOD proposal is designed to achieve. The problem is that Porter has operated as a
committee chairman rather than as a director or commander. The easiest solution, the one most in
keeping with overall U.S. policy objectives as well as the one most administratively feasible to institute,
is to make some senior civilian (Porter himself, or possibly Ambassador Sullivan) what Porter was
originally intended to be--i.e., the pacification czar. In order to play this role he should have a planning
and coordinating staff equivalent in function (though not necessarily in size) to the staff which supports
General Westmoreland as COMUSMACV. He will have to exercise operational control over those
elements of the various components of the U.S. Mission which deal primarily with pacification
problems. This could certainly include the Cadre Operations Division of the Saigon Station, provided
suitable support and funding mechanisms were arranged, particularly if through such a device the cost of
the RD program could be taken off the Agency's account. Other Station elements would, of course, be
responsive to the requirements of the pacification director.
10. Your initial discussion with Secretaries McNamara, Rusk, et al., should focus on the major issues
(e.g., pacification czar under the Ambassador or under COMUSMACV; civilian or military) rather than
the details, which can be most effectively ironed out once agreement is reached on the basic points. We
have appended, however, a sketch organization chart which shows bureaucratically how our preferred
alternative would look./5/ In essence, it is an attempt to give the pacification czar the control and staff
means for discharging his responsibilities without doing unnecessary violence to the organizational
integrity of the components of the various U.S. Government agencies which, collectively, compose the
present country team. It provides the pacification czar with an adequate staff, which Porter does not now
have. This staff would be joint, its members drawn from the various components of the Mission Council,
including our Station as well as the military. Our proposal would also include a military deputy which
would insure ample representation of military views and facilitate integrated political-military planning.
/5/Attached but not printed.

George A. Carver, Jr./6/

/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Carver signed the original.
249. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to Secretary of Defense
McNamara/1/
Washington, September 29, 1966.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip,
October 1966. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk, Gaud, Marks, and Helms.
After weighing the pros and cons, I concur in your 22 September 1966 memo proposing a unified US
pacification management under COMUSMACV./2/ In fact, despite the many secondary disadvantages
which might be entailed, such a step seems to me essential if pacification is to be given the large scale
push forward which I strongly believe is central to a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam.
/2/Document 245.
As my small staff and I have progressively steeped ourselves in the Vietnam civil side, we have as you
know also been insisting that stepped-up pacification is "central to success, both in ending the war and
winning the peace . . ." We further agree that progress to date in this neglected aspect of the war has
been negligible, largely in my view because of the lack of military resources which could be devoted to
doing the local security part of the job. In any event, with most other aspects of the Vietnam war going
better, pacification has become--as Cabot Lodge says--our chief unfinished business.
Stepping up pacification seems doubly important because it targets directly on what I believe to be the
most vulnerable element in the enemy lineup--the southern VC. If we can step up both pressures and
inducements targeted on the VC, we can increasingly isolate Hanoi. Moreover, until we can crack the
VC infrastructure, the enemy always has the option of reverting to protracted guerrilla warfare.
I. So I favor every sensible measure to accelerate the momentum of pacification. The most important
step is to get the GVN and ARVNAF really targeted on it, and adequately organized and motivated to do
the job. At present the ARVNAF are not pulling their weight; unless we can get them fully involved in
pacification, US forces will have to assume the main burden here too.
On the principle of first things first, straightening out the lines of responsibility on the US side is an
essential prerequisite to tackling the GVN and ARVNAF. Split civil/military responsibility has not
worked well enough in the past, nor is it likely to do so in the future. Unified management on the US
side seems to me essential to giving a real push to pacification.
If such a "single manager" is thus essential, I further agree that he should be military. Indeed, I don't see
any other realistic option given the simple fact that the bulk of the resources and management assets
needed for pacification are military, on both the US and GVN sides:
A. The first prerequisite for successful pacification is adequate local security. This is primarily a military
job. Even if the civil side has the whole responsibility, it doesn't control the key assets. An estimated
year end strength comparison drives home this point.
GVN Pacification Assets

ARVN (the 50% that Gen. Westmoreland proposed to be devoted to pacification)

Military, 140,000
Civil, 35,000
RD Cadre (mostly not-Vung Tau-trained)
RF
Military, 145,000
Civil, 20,000
Police (in provinces)
PF
Military, 155,000
Total
Military, 390,000
Civil, 55,000
B. Similarly, on the US side there are far more Americans in uniform advising on pacification than there
are civilians. This is entirely separate from the question of how many US forces are or will be engaged
in supporting pacification. Again, the arithmetic is instructive, particularly down at the critical district
(sub-sector) levels.
US Advisor Assets for Pacification
Corps
Military, 480
Civil, 143
Region
Sector
Military, 860
Civil, 327
Province

Sub-Sector
Military, 1200
Civil, 0
District
Total
Military, 2540
Civil, 470
C. The military are much better set up to manage a huge pacification effort. Quite frankly, I believe that
we have made real progress toward strengthening the civilian management side of pacification since
Ambassador Porter took this over last February. Progress has also been made toward better coordination
between the military and civil sides of pacification. But coordination in my view is not enough to
produce the needed results. The alternative of unified management under civilian control falls down
because most of the assets involved are military, and because only the US military staff and advisory
resources in Vietnam are big enough to manage pacification on the scale we seek. It would take at least
eighteen months in my judgment to get a civilian management structure which might handle pacification
as effectively as MACV could today.
In sum, if 60-70% of the real job of pacification is providing local security, this job can be done by the
military, and without it the civil side of pacification cannot really get off the ground, the advantages of
providing military management seem over-riding.
II. Clarification of your Charts would help. Your proposals raise several questions, particularly on US
civil-military relationships. I believe that if they were handled in the manner described below, your
proposal would be workable.
A. Would the primacy of overall supervision of the pacification process by the Ambassador and Deputy
Ambassador be clearly restated? I believe that the Ambassador and his alter ego must retain clear
personal authority over pacification as over all other aspects of our operations in Vietnam.
B. What would be included in pacification and put under the new MACV Deputy? We should avoid
overburdening him with any more ancillary activities than he can effectively handle. The purpose of the
exercise is to get pacification rolling in the countryside, not to get single management of a lot of
functions that the manager won't know how to manage. I assume you would put under him only those
field activities (and the Saigon field operations staffs) which primarily and directly contribute to
winning the village war. This should include Chieu Hoi, refugees, and resource control. It should not
include (1) overall economic policy, the CIP, or anti-inflationary programs--these are best left to AID;
(2) CIA programs other than Police Special Branch and Cadre; (3) national information and postwar
programs other than those directed at the VC guerrilla structure and the rural population; (4) certain
national AID project programs which are still best handled separately, e.g., medical, national agricultural
activities, or education at other than the village level, etc.
C. Would the civilian components merely come under the new Deputy's command control or would
MACV take them over in toto? The new Deputy and his corps and province Pacification Directors

should assume operational control over the existing civilian components, but these should remain in
civilian clothes, and be paid, administered, and logistically supported as at present. This would lead to
certain "dual responsibility" problems, but be less disruptive than blanketing all the civil echelons
functioning in the field into MACV.
D. What should a new Deputy's responsibility be for developing plans, programs and requirements for
pacification? Clearly he must have such management tools at his disposal. Yet he shouldn't be burdened
with the laborious tasks of preparing the CAP, programming personnel replacements, etc. Basically, he
should be responsible only for those plans and programs that directly bear on field operations, and draw
on the existing agencies for such support.
E. Should the pacification organization have logistic responsibilities? These should remain with AID,
CIA, JUSPAO, and other elements of MACV, which would together service the new organization. To
do otherwise would be disruptive and cause major delays, when the purpose of the exercise is to get up
more momentum now.
III. Likely Disadvantages. There's no doubt that we'd have to pay a price for unified US military
management of pacification, but some of these seem to me to be more apparent than real.
A. The image problem. At a time when we're trying to emphasize the non-military aspects of the war,
and when the GVN itself is civilianizing, there will be criticism of any apparently opposite trend. But
this must be offset against another, even more important image which we seek--that pacification is
finally moving forward, that the NVA forces are being increasingly isolated as the southern VC fall
away, and that the population is at long last coming our way in ever larger members.
B. Is an essentially military US management the best means by which to influence the GVN? Since our
policy is to utilize mainly Vietnamese for pacification rather than US forces, the interface between the
US and GVN pacification structures is important. But the fact remains that the bulk of GVN pacification
assets are under military control. Even the RD Ministry is largely military. So are the province chiefs.
Military officers are in most of the key slots at region, province and district levels. The ARVN, RF, PF,
and really the police are under military management, and likely to remain so. In practical terms, I
suspect that a US military management could most effectively motivate and advise them.
C. An essentially military pacification structure might put us in an awkward position in case of
negotiations. This would be the case if any truce arrangement called for a stand-down of organized
military forces on both sides, which could leave the GVN/US without adequate instruments to deal with
the VC infrastructure. For this reason, some have argued that we should civilianize the GVN
paramilitary forces and put them under a civilian ministry. But I doubt as a practical matter that the
Directory would countenance this, even after another election.
D. The proposed structure is too corps-heavy, when many argue that corps is an impediment to
pacification and should be more decentralized. I agree, but doubt that it will be politically feasible to
push the ARVN corps commanders out of the picture for a while. If so, let's use them, not deplore them.
E. Problems will arise from putting US civilians under the US military. Will many of them refuse to
serve in this manner, including some quite senior people? Many bureaucratic sensitivities will be
affected. Would this result in a major loss in efficiency on the increasingly important US civilian side of
pacification? I believe that keeping civilian personnel in their own agencies, even though under a new
Deputy's command control, would mitigate many of these problems, especially after a shakedown
period. The mixed civilian-military staff you contemplate at all levels would help further.

F. Some dual responsibility and administrative confusion would result. I believe that this could be
minimized under the leadership of Ambassadors Lodge and Porter, who would remain in policy control
of all US activities in Vietnam. What is proposed is essentially to unify management responsibility for
pacification in the field. I cannot see that such a reorganization would create more dual responsibility
and administrative confusion than exists today. Simply having a US team chief in each province would
be a major step forward; collaboration is no substitute for management control.
IV. Conclusion. Despite the disadvantages cited above, and perhaps others, they seem to me to be
outweighed by the positive thrust which would be generated by unified US management. To be perfectly
candid, I regard your proposal as basically a means of bringing the military fully into the pacification
process rather than of putting civilians under the military. Without minimizing the growing civil side
contribution to pacification, the US and GVN military have the bulk of the assets needed to provide the
essential local security input and the management structure needed to make pacification work. So
assigning responsibility to the Deputy COMUSMACV is the best way to get pacification moving in
Vietnam. I don't think that we can achieve this--soon enough or well enough--without such a step./3/
/3/Carver forwarded a copy of this memorandum to Colby under cover of a memorandum, October 3,
stating that "this office finds little it can agree with in Mr. Komer's memorandum." (Central Intelligence
Agency, DCI-Executive Registry, Job 80-B0158R, McNamara Project)
R.W. Komer
250. Memorandum From the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, September 30, 1966, 6:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Bill Moyers, BDM Memos, Sept. 1966-Feb. 1967. No
classification marking.
I have been concerned for some time because while we are at war in Vietnam, the Government is not
really organized for war. We have no one high official of the Government who spends full time on the
war; not even the Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East devotes more than 50% of his time to the
effort. We are just not orchestrating the handling of the most critical problem we face.
One small step forward would be to take advantage of the new wind at State, and make Nick
Katzenbach/2/ chairman of a little kitchen cabinet--to meet at least biweekly and report directly to the
President in writing. Nick would be a good impartial chairman and has no hawk/dove image problem.
Cy Vance and Komer and Rostow could be members./3/
/2Katzenbach was appointed Under Secretary of State on September 30 and entered on duty October 3,
replacing Ball.
/3/The wording of this paragraph was taken from a memorandum forwarded to Moyers by Komer on
September 30. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, WH Chron)
You are not getting the kind of service on Vietnam out of the Government that I think you need. We're
fighting a war on a part-time basis./4/
/4/Rostow's list of action items prepared following the President's Tuesday lunch meeting on November
15 includes the following item: "President wants Mr. Rostow to set up a group--Katzenbach to chair--

Komer, Rostow, Vance, good military man--to meet three times a week on Viet Nam and all its
dimensions." (Ibid., Rostow Files, Meetings with President) In a November 18 memorandum to Vance
and Katzenbach, Komer proposed an agenda for the first "non-session" of "our non-club." (Ibid., Komer
Files, Katzenbach) For more information on the group, see Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the
Vietnam War, Part IV, pp. 479-482.
251. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, September 30, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb. HarrimanNegotiations Comm. Top Secret; Nodis.
SUBJECT
"Negotiations Committee"
While the Secretary's discussion of Vietnam with Gromyko/2/ did not reach any affirmative
understanding, Gromyko's relatively relaxed attitude, his willingness to continue discussions and his
emphasis on Soviet influence in Hanoi were encouraging indications of possible future Soviet initiative.
We hope that further talks with Gromyko can be held prior to your meeting with him.
/2/See Document 247.
The group found no significant concessions in recent statements by NLF Chairman Tho/3/ and Pham
Van Dong,/4/ but we believe that our public reaction to these and other restatements of position by the
other side should avoid being too negative. The Secretary's statement/5/ that we were studying the new
formulations strikes the right note, as well as Ambassador Goldberg's attitude on proposals made in his
UN address. Meanwhile we are asking Ambassador Goldberg in his conversations in New York to
encourage the Eastern Europeans and others to try to obtain clarification of what the recent statements
mean.
/3/Nguyen Huu Tho outlined his peace terms in an interview on August 25 with Australian
correspondent Wilfred Burchett, which was broadcast by NLF clandestine radio on September 13 and by
Hanoi radio on September 28. For text, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, Part
VI B, pp. 218-219.
/4/Presumably a reference to Pham Van Dong's speech in Hanoi on September 24 to a Czechoslovak
delegation, broadcast over Hanoi radio the same day. For text, see Foreign Broadcast Information
Service Report, North Vietnam, September 26, 1966, pp. jjj 13-19.
/5/Not further identified.
The October meeting in the Philippines provides an excellent opportunity to convince "hard line" Asians
such as the Koreans and the Thais of the necessity of continuing efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement.
Our group believes we must establish promptly and emphatically that the October meeting is not a
"council of war," as not only the communist but other press and radio are already announcing, but is a
"council of peace and postwar reconstruction."
The group feels strongly that between now and the meeting any escalation of our bombing of the North

should be avoided. Military escalations could drown out talk of peaceful negotiation.
In advance of the meeting the group thought it might be worthwhile to have me or another senior
American emissary discuss with the leaders of other Asian countries not participating, the aims of the
conclave and ask for their suggestions. The countries he might visit would be Japan, Malaysia,
Singapore, India and possibly Indonesia. The thirty-odd countries who are making some contribution to
the effort in Vietnam should also be briefed in advance as well as after the meeting through their
Ambassadors here or by some other channel.
Averell
252. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 1, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Miscellaneous Vietnam Reports: Lot 70 D 48, Briefing Materials on
Vietnam. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Unger.
SUBJECT
Secretary McNamara's Proposal for Placing Pacification Program in South Viet-Nam Under
COMUSMACV/2/
/2/Document 245.
1. Secretary McNamara is seeking your concurrence in a Memorandum for the President proposing that
all activities which are primarily a part of the pacification program and all persons engaged in such
activities be placed under the command of COMUSMACV. This action is intended to increase the
efficiency of the operation and remedy the split responsibility for the program on the US side. The
proposal also rests in part on the fact that an important segment of the US personnel engaged in
pacification are military, although some of them are presently working under civilian direction.
2. Secretary McNamara's concern about the limited progress shown by the pacification program thus far
is justified, and I agree with his emphasis on the program as central to the ultimate achievement of our
objectives in South Viet-Nam. Here I would observe only that a much more serious liability of the
program is the failure of the GVN to devote adequate ARVN forces to the task and take such forces out
from under the corps commander whose interests lie elsewhere.
3. Secretary McNamara's proposal does offer one possible means of remedying the problem of split
responsibility, but before adopting this remedy I believe we should look very closely at some of its
effects:
a. We have made extended efforts to emphasize the "other war" and to project an increasing role for the
civilian side in South Viet-Nam. This would be seriously undermined both in appearance and in fact by
put-ting pacification under military command. It would be difficult to remove the impression that
pacification had not become a civil affairs/military government matter, with all the overtones of the US
taking over in an occupied country.
b. As a military organization MACV quite naturally works through the corps and division, and orders to
the sector level, where pacification must really be carried out, come through these filters. Placing

pacification under MACV command would thus tend to emphasize the military channel through higher
commands whose interests and competence lie much more in the military field than in pacification. This
would also work against the civilianization of pacification which we are seeking in our efforts, among
other things, to bring sector-level activities (including regional and popular forces) more directly under
the authority of Revolutionary Development Minister Thang. In a more general sense both Thang and
the civilian leaders now beginning to emerge on the political scene in the constituent assembly could
also be expected to see the placing of pacification entirely under MACV as a set-back and reflecting a
return to military rule.
c. It is a fact of life whether justified or not that the morale of the many US civilians now working on
pacification and indispensable to the program would be affected most adversely if they were put under
military direction.
4. Without any intention of "fighting the problem", I question whether the problem of split responsibility
on the American side is such a serious one and so urgently in need of remedy that we should take on the
liabilities mentioned above. Moreover, the present framework on the US side has been in operation
barely six months and the RD program itself is hardly any older, and while I am certainly not satisfied
with the progress of pacification, I am not sure that we yet have a reliable enough reading on how it is
proceeding and where the problems lie to justify our again upsetting the organization and starting over.
Furthermore, there are alternative means of reducing the problem of split responsibility which should be
examined. A possible alternative would be the appointment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for
Pacification who would also be adviser to the pacification czar, Ambassador Porter; Porter would have
as deputies the chiefs of the civilian agencies (AID, JUSPAO and CIA) also involved in pacification,
and those deputies and DepCOMUSMACV might form a Pacification Council under Porter's direction.
While DepCOMUSMACV would himself command, under General Westmoreland's authority, the
MACV elements advising the GVN military and para-military elements engaged in pacification, he
would be made as integral as possible a member of Ambassador Porter's staff in order to achieve the
fullest possible coordination.
5. The questions discussed above have received extended consideration in the Mission in Saigon and
this is as it should be since there are involved many complex questions of US-GVN relationships and the
need for an intimate knowledge of the workings of the machinery from top to bottom. Although we have
not yet received any comprehensive comments from the Mission, Ambassador Porter will arrive in the
United States this weekend and could tell us where this question stands in the Mission and could give us
his own views.
Recommendation/3/
/3/There is no indication on the source text whether Rusk approved the recommendation. In a telephone
conversation with McNamara on October 3, Rusk stated that his "principal problem" with turning over
pacification to the military "was that we seem to be moving toward military govt when South Viet Nam
was moving the other way." McNamara responded that he "realized this but his chief concern was that
the administration of it be effective." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)
6. Before Secretary McNamara's proposal is given final consideration, we should have the considered
views of our Mission in Saigon on the overall question of organization for pacification on the US side.
Meanwhile, you may wish to point out to Secretary McNamara our reservations about placing
responsibility under COMUSMACV and our hope that a means should be found to put Ambassador
Porter in a position to carry out his responsibilities, as originally envisaged, fully and effectively.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
253. Memorandum From Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the
President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, October 1, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. Rostow
forwarded the memorandum to the President on October 1 under cover of a memorandum suggesting
that he read it and calling Ginsburgh a "superb JCS liaison officer" who "has made important
contributions to our work on negotiating positions" and other Vietnam issues. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Vietnam--The Next Phase
Some time within the next two to three weeks I think it would be worth the President's time to reflect on
and plan for his immediate post-election strategy in Vietnam.
I assume that the November elections will indicate basic public support for the President's Vietnam
policy.
I am equally convinced that if Hanoi does not immediately sue for peace they will closely watch our
actions immediately after the election for a clue to what they should expect from the US in the next two
years. In the process of re-evaluating their position, they must attempt to gauge their capability for
holding out until after the Nov '68 elections.
The closer we get to the Nov '68 elections, the greater will be the incentive for the VC/DRV to hold on
at all costs in hopes of a political reversal of the US position in Vietnam. In fact in terms of the effect of
the war in Vietnam on US domestic politics, it seems to me that the national political conventions are
equally as significant as the fall '68 elections.
I do not believe that any US administration--Republican or Democratic would either abandon our
commitment to Vietnam or recklessly escalate--regardless of campaign oratory. Because of the
campaign oratory, however, I believe that it is in the US national interest to win this war in Vietnam
before the beginning of the political conventions in the summer of 1968. This does not mean that we
would need to have all of our troops out of Vietnam by that time or that all anti-guerrilla action needs to
have ceased. But we must do our best to be clearly over the hump by then, and it would be extremely
helpful to have started a phased troop withdrawal.

Action Program: In view of the above, I recommend the following:

1. Establish at top levels within the government the objective of winning--or at least passing the crest-by 1 June 1968. Keep this goal out of the press.
2. Allow the Communists one week to evaluate the political impact of the November election.
3. After one week, get the word privately to the VC/DRV that the US is prepared to resume its program
of increasing pressure--at a faster rate than before. Issue no public ultimatums.
4. If no satisfactory de-escalatory signals are received within 10 days to two weeks resume our program
of increasing pressures:
a. Resume the POL campaign.
b. Over a 2-3 week period take out the remaining hydro-electric plants.
c. Destroy the steel plant.
d. Mine the ports.
e. Eliminate the NVN air forces.
f. Attack the air defense system.
g. As d and e are eliminated shift weight of effort back to interdiction campaign.
5. As soon as details are worked out announce reorganization of pacification activities and beginning of
new phase of operations.
6. By 1 January announce intention and commence withdrawal of up to two divisions and appropriate air
units from Europe for transfer to Vietnam, with redeployment determined on basis of logistic capability.
Justify as temporary move without committing US to necessarily redeploy to Europe after Vietnam war
is over.
Finally, I urge that decisions on the above recommendations be made as soon as possible so that
implementation can begin immediately after the November elections.
G
254. Telegram From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 2, 1966.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip,
October 1966. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC. McNamara visited Vietnam October 10-13, accompanied
by, among others, Katzenbach, Wheeler, McNaughton, and Komer.
4244. A. Following is suggested agenda for our discussions in Saigon beginning Monday, October 10:

1. Intelligence estimates. An evaluation of infiltration and of enemy regular and VC force levels,
including a projection through CY 1967; of enemy morale (in both the North and South); and of any
signs that population under VC control is wavering. Include also estimates of the enemy capabilities to
hinder RD programs; of the situation in the DMZ and capabilities of the enemy for attack across the
DMZ and from Cambodia or Laos; and of how good our intelligence is, especially with respect to
estimates of enemy's strength.
2. Operational analysis and statement of requirements. This would be briefing, of type given previously
by DePuy, showing military requirements through CY 67. It should include a statement of US military
objectives; of our strategy for and likelihood of achieving them; of roles to be played by US, FWMAF,
RVNAF, paramilitary and police; of actions to be taken against NVN, in Laos and at sea; of proposed
force deployments; and of proposed aircraft and sortie levels.
3. Air interdiction operations. An evaluation of Rolling Thunder; Steel Tiger; Barrel Roll; Arc Light
(also of Shining Brass). Are major changes required in any of these?
4. Logistical estimate. Herein the construction program, port and shipping management,
communications needs, maintenance capabilities, common supply system, and adequacy of supplies.
5. Barriers. The interdiction infiltration system being developed by General Starbird's TF 728. I suggest
this be the first item on the agenda to permit Dr. Foster and General Starbird to depart promptly. Other
concepts, including an involving compartmentalization of VC logistical movements within South
Vietnam, could be discussed at this time.
6. Pacification (RD). Include an evaluation of the situation country-wide and in the priority areas,
present against past, with plans for the future. Under this item we can discuss the development of a
pacification concept, the possibility of consolidating responsibility for pacification (RD) on the US side,
the plans to devote a portion of ARVN (and possibly US) forces to the pacification mission,
improvements in GVN RD organization, and an evaluation of the RD cadre program.
7. The Delta. Pros and cons of, and the plan for, deploying US forces into the Delta, with the
accompanying pacification program. Herein an assessment of any accommodation that may exist in the
Delta and the relation between such an accommodation and our efforts to bring the war to a satisfactory
conclusion.
8. Chieu Hoi. Discussion of the program and how it might be improved.
9. US-RVNAF-FWMAF relations. Report on how the military commands are getting along, and
comment on suggestions for changes in command relationships, e.g., the suggestion of a US Director of
Military Operations (i.e., a Combined US-GVN-FWMAF Command under General Westmoreland).
10. US, RVNAF, and Pacification (RD) personnel morale. Morale of US military personnel and of US
civilians, including proposals regarding any change in duty-tour or dependents policy; and, on
Vietnamese side, the problem of desertions and the implications of the new anti-desertion program, and
the question of Vietnamese will to implement the RD program.
11. Piaster budget for US military operations in CY 1967. A comparison by category with CY 1966; an
appraisal of how it pinches our efforts; its relationship to the total anti-inflation program; and the
outlook for success of such a program.

In addition to the above items, I will of course want to hear your views and to discuss (12) the extent
and impact of corruption in the GVN at ministry, JGS, corps, division, sector andsubsector levels, and
the price if any paid for "fencing around" big violators like Co and Quang; (13) the outlook for
continued political development and the prospect that the Ky-constituent assembly confrontation can be
handled; (14) the lines that might be followed to split the VC off from Hanoi, to make both the VC and
Hanoi more amenable to a satisfactory settlement, and to bring the GVN along with us in these efforts;
(15) the degree of anti-Americanism that prevails among peasants, army, intellectuals, etc., and actions
we should take in this connection; and (16) any matters that need to be ironed out in preparation for the
Baguio meeting of Heads of State.
B. I will want to get into the field while there; General Wheeler will discuss details of trips with General
Westmoreland.
C. I hope to avoid formality and diplomatic affairs. This of course does not rule out working lunches and
dinners which you might consider desirable. I will want to talk with key Vietnamese and third-country
representatives if such talks appear useful.
D. I will be accompanied by General Wheeler, Bob Komer, Art Sylvester, and John McNaughton. I
believe John Foster and General Starbird will be in Saigon when we arrive. The party will also include
approximately five support personnel. As you know, I have offered a ride to Bill Porter and Henry
Kissinger.
E. Please give me your views as to any additions to or changes in the above-suggested agenda.
255. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 3, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 14.
Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President at 9:30 a.m. on October 4 under cover
of a memorandum stating that he concurred with McNamara's recommendation. (Ibid.) During a
telephone conversation with McNamara that began at 7:48 a.m. on October 5, the President indicated
that he had read McNamara's memorandum and thought his decision was justified but also thought
McNamara should get the Joint Chiefs and their adherents to point out how disastrous it would be for
the United States to inaugurate a new policy of this type during the closing days of Congress and on the
eve of the Manila Conference, and "how the propaganda people would just wreck us." (Ibid., Recordings
and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.27, Side B, PNO
2)
SUBJECT
Naval Gunfire Against North Vietnam
On a number of occasions since May of this year, General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp have
recommended the use of naval gunfire against North Vietnam. These recommendations have had the
support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but have never received final approval, largely because of the
international problems such action might entail. At present, naval fire on North Vietnam is authorized
only in self defense against attack from the shore.
As you know, General Westmoreland is now quite concerned about the threat developing to the
northernmost provinces of South Vietnam--in the form of enemy attacks supported, and potentially

launched from, the DMZ and southern portions of North Vietnam. He is urgently requesting authority to
employ naval gunfire against North Vietnam south of 175 30'--i.e. from Dong Hoi south to the DMZ.
Again, he has the support of CINCPAC and the Chiefs. The advantages and disadvantages of approving
this request are briefly set forth below.
1. Advantages. General Westmoreland and the Chiefs point out that the enemy buildup in and north of
the DMZ involves numerous fixed military targets and a vital supply axis along coastal Route 1,
supplemented by waterborne traffic, all of which cannot be consistently and successfully engaged by air
attack. Naval gunfire is less inhibited by darkness and weather than is tactical air. It can deliver
reasonably accurate area and harassing fire under any weather conditions. It can engage targets,
including moving targets, with observed fire in weather which would preclude effective air attack. In
good weather, its accuracy at reasonable ranges is equal to that of air attack.
Operating within 12 miles of the coast, the various ships and weapons involved can effectively engage
targets up to 12 or more miles inland--a distance which encompasses the principal lines of
communication in that part of North Vietnam and the eastern portions of the DMZ. At least in theory,
the application of naval gunfire to targets in this area would free tactical air resources to engage targets
along the more primitive LOC's to the west, in the western DMZ, and in the immediate battle area of any
actual attack. Also, ships could be used to engage targets which the enemy has protected with heavy
local defenses and thus avoid aircraft losses. (It is always possible, of course, to lose a ship to coastal
guns or air attack.)
This fire could be provided with resources already deployed, at the expense of support to forces in South
Vietnam. Ammunition supplies are adequate. The most probable average commitment would be 4 ships
(one 6" or 8"-gun cruiser, two 5"-gun destroyers, and one 5"-rocket ship) of the 7 to 11 such ships which
have been engaged in naval gunfire support to operations within South Vietnam. On a number of
occasions, this in-country support has been quite effective.
In sum, the arguments in favor of employing naval gunfire against North Vietnam are: a serious threat
exists involving targets appropriate for naval gunfire; the resources are readily available; and this fire
can be delivered under certain conditions which preclude air attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
recommended that we approve the use of naval gunfire south of Dong Hoi against radar and antiaircraft
sites, other fixed military targets, convoys and elements of LOC's and North Vietnamese craft which are
definitely identified as naval vessels or vessels bearing military cargo. Attack would be prohibited
against civilian craft and other targets which involve large collateral damage or civilian casualties.
2. Disadvantages. The disadvantages of this course of action still lie primarily in the reactions we may
expect from the North Vietnamese, the Chinese, other nations, and certain elements here at home. There
is also some doubt as to the measure of military advantage we would gain to offset these reactions.
While from one point of view the additional destructive force applied against North Vietnam by naval
fire would be proportionately small, from another viewpoint this would be escalation, and a step toward
extension of naval bombardment still farther north. The enemy probably would claim that we were
engaging in a new kind of attack. Perhaps more important, since this is the kind of activity which would
normally precede such action, the North Vietnamese and Chinese might conclude that we were in fact
preparing to invade the North, and undertake some escalatory action in response. (At the very least, this
action would lend credence to past South Vietnamese threats and American newspaper speculation
concerning invasion.) Other nations, including some allies, would probably regret that we found this
new departure necessary, and might dissociate themselves from it. International legal questions could be
raised. It is certain that at least some of our detractors here at home would point to the action as a new
and serious form of escalation. On the other side of this question, it must be conceded that our ships

have already fired on North Vietnamese territory--in defense against shore fire--on three occasions
(February, March and April of this year while engaged in search and rescue operations). There was no
serious adverse reaction in these cases, but the self-defense nature of the fire was immediately
demonstrable.
We have no guarantee that the incremental military benefits of naval gunfire would be of sufficient
magnitude to compensate for these adverse reactions. Assuming that sufficient targets can be identified,
ships engaged in this mission would probably fire on the order of 200 rounds per ship per day, or a total
of 800 rounds.
--As one measure of the concentration involved, this would amount to 16 rounds per mile over the 50odd miles of Route 1 from Dong Hoi to the DMZ.
--As another measure of weight of effort, the explosive charge in the average round involved is on the
order of 14 pounds. This would mean about 6 tons delivered per day--quite a small amount (roughly the
equivalent of 10 attack sorties) compared with tonnages we have delivered in the same area with tactical
air.
--The average shell has an effects radius of 40-90 yards against personnel, and a somewhat smaller
radius against vehicles. Some types can achieve good penetration of concrete and other fortifications,
particularly if the target presents a vertical face, but this requires precision, observed fire.
Granted, this weight of effort could be concentrated (especially that of the rocket ship), or substantially
increased (by committing more ships or by including a higher proportion of heavier guns). Even so,
when we consider the large amounts of tactical air available--particularly in an emergency--and the
rather limited sets of circumstances under which naval gunfire enjoys an undisputed superiority, the
military advantages appear less imposing.
--Few fixed targets would be so time-sensitive as to demand attack during weather conditions when
naval ships could engage them and tactical air could not.
--At least half the problem with fleeting targets, such as convoys, is to locate and identify the target; this
part of the problem would be the same for naval fire as for tactical air. This detracts from the admitted
ability of naval ships to engage a target, once located, under certain conditions when tactical air would
not be effective.
--While the enemy may undertake to increase antiaircraft defenses in southern North Vietnam to support
a major effort, at present his defenses in that area have been neutralized to the point where we lose
relatively few aircraft.
3. Recommendations. On balance, I conclude that the military advantages of approving naval gunfire
against North Vietnam at this time are outweighed by the probable adverse reactions and possible
military risks. The Secretary of State and I recommend against approval.
Robert S. McNamara/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
256. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 3, 1966, 2:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, POTUS
Trip, vol. 1. No classification marking.
Mr. President:
We want these results from the Philippines conference:
1. A reaffirmation of the commitment among the fighting allies to see it through to an honorable peace.
2. An agreed position among the fighting allies and Saigon on the terms on which peace will be sought.
3. An approach by the Saigon government, backed by the fighting allies, to those now fighting with the
VC, including perhaps an amnesty offer, which would be beyond the appeal made in the Honolulu
declaration by the Vietnamese government.
4. Increased emphasis by Saigon, backed by the fighting allies, on pacification, land reform, planning for
long-term economic development (including future use of our bases), education, health, agriculture, etc.
5. If possible, an agreed statement of support for Cambodian territorial integrity and independence.
6. Support from all the governments for Asian regional economic development without creating or
appearing to create a new Asian grouping made up of the fighting allies.
In general, we want the government in Saigon to recommit itself to its allies and to the world to getting
on with the Honolulu program, where much progress has been made, including the commitment to go
forward in next steps towards constitutional government.
W.W. Rostow/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
257. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 3, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX.Top Secret. Rostow
forwarded the memorandum to the President at 1 p.m. on October 4. In his covering memorandum he
expressed his doubts that the Russians had the "power to make Hanoi end the war" and his opposition
either to abandoning the hardware option or to letting the Germans "off the hook on balance of payments
offsets." (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
"Negotiations"
I believe the only real chance now in sight to induce Hanoi to negotiate a settlement depends on the
influence Moscow is willing and able to exert. Events in China have probably made Hanoi look more
towards Moscow than Peking, but have not eliminated Hanoi's dependence on Peking.

If Moscow is to take on the task of persuading Hanoi to move towards a settlement, theUSSR will
probably have to assume certain risks and obligations. Thus I believe we must offer some compensating
inducements.
In my judgment, the overpowering desire of Moscow today is for greater stability in Europe. Regardless
of how we assess developments in Germany in the years ahead, I am convinced that the Soviet leaders
are deeply concerned over a possible reemergence of a German threat to Russian security. The Kremlin
desires a nuclear non-proliferation pact with Germany particularly in mind. I seriously doubt that the
Soviet Union will be satisfied with a formula which would permit "hardware participation" by the
Germans. A possible quid pro quo for Moscow's action in Southeast Asia would be our abandoning the
hardware option in our proposals for the pact. Although few Germans really believe a NATO hardware
deal is probable, its abandonment would mean to the Germans the giving up of a hope which has some
political appeal.
To induce a German Government to abandon this hope would probably require concessions in "offset"
agreements. Yet, the end of hostilities in Vietnam would more than compensate for the dollar drain
resulting from such a concession.
In addition, a mutual reduction in forces in Germany would probably appeal to Moscow.
In sum, I believe that we will have to agree on some arrangement affecting Germany if we are to induce
Moscow to act in Vietnam. I recognize the political difficulties in Germany at the present time, but our
interests are so overwhelming to get the war over in Vietnam, that I cannot help but feel we should move
as rapidly as feasible.
I hope that there will be an opportunity for you to raise this subject, or at least touch on it, in your talk
with Gromyko. It may require discussions with Soviet leaders in Moscow before an understanding can
be worked out. But the stakes are so great in ending the fighting in Vietnam, that action along the lines
outlined above is highly desirable./2/
/2/Responding to a request from the President for comments, Katzenbach and Eugene Rostow each
expressed disagreement with Harriman's proposal in memoranda of October 8 and 12, respectively.
Katzenbach questioned both the necessity of the proposed concession to Moscow and "the wisdom of
mixing Europe and Asia at our suggestion." (Ibid., box 212, Amb. Harriman--Negotiations Comm.)
Averell
258. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 4, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text
does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:08 a.m.
7630. Ref: A. Saigon 7243;/2/ B. State 23182;/3/ C. State 52726;/4/ D. State 52727./5/
/2/In telegram 7243, September 29, Lodge transmitted a proposed outline for the discussion summarized
in this telegram. (Ibid.)
/3/Document 203.

/4/Telegram 52726, September 22, discussed national reconciliation, contacts between the GVN and the
Viet Cong, and the encouragement of Viet Cong defections. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
/5/Telegram 52727, September 22, transmitted a draft speech on national reconciliation for Ky. (Ibid.)
1. I met Thieu, Ky and Tran Van Do Oct 3 in long and frank session which revealed much of South
Vietnamese thinking on peaceful settlement and national reconciliation issues.
2. After agreement on the agenda to be followed, and using an outline similar to that in Saigon 7243, we
went down the list point by point on the objectives, guarantees, and components of satisfactory outcome
to the war, the methods of reaching a settlement, and finally the approach to a national reconciliation
program. I pointed out that these were ideas for discussion and for illustrative purposes and were not to
be considered official positions.
Objectives
3. In response to my question on their views regarding the three basic objectives (sovereignty of GVN to
be intact, territorial limits of SVN to be intact, and system of guarantees), Tran Van Do and Ky
emphasized that they were concerned with guarantees, specifically whether the US intended to keep its
troops in SVN as one of the principal guarantees. They wished to know what kind of guarantees are
envisaged and how control can be exercised in practice during critical period of withdrawal of NVA and
VC as well as by US troops. Thieu asked what kind of procedures would be followed and how would
timing be determined with respect to a so-called "cease-fire." He asked would we accept a "cease-fire"
when we all start to talk with the VC? Their concern was with defining the system of control, the
machinery to be used prior to any agreement to withdraw.
4. I replied that I was authorized to state that the US will not withdraw our troops before security is
assured or GVN is able to cope with terrorism or while the VC infrastructure remains intact; SVN would
not be left without protection. In addition, there are other forms of possible guarantees such as
multilateral commitments, expanded ICC, and bilateral pledges. The question of a "cease-fire" depends
on definition; a "cease-fire" means something different to Hanoi than to US and we can say at present
only that it would be part of a general package or settlement--a point for negotiation, not an end in itself
to be agreed to separately at the outset. We were aware that terrorists often did not use firearms and that
a conventional "cease-fire" might have very little relevance for the main source of aggression, i.e.,
terrorism.
5. Tran Van Do inquired if it would be useful and possible to obtain a multilateral commitment from the
impending seven nation conference. Although all the participants have given evidence of support, what
does the US think of a general pact to provide a specific international guarantee? The basis of the US
commitment is also not entirely clear. Do said a formal guarantee of mutual security would broaden
support so that in the future the US would not have to initiate aid alone and then persuade others to join
in. Thieu said they wished a broader international commitment than that provided by SEATO, which,
Do noted, is an obligation for separate bilateral commitments. They wish an international obligation
which commits an entire group of nations to the security of each member. This would not, Do said, be
aimed just at SVN, but would be for the benefit of all SEA nations, any one of which may be threatened
at some future date. It would do what it had been intended for SEATO to do. Could this be raised at the
seven nation conference? Do asked.
6. I replied that I would report their views to Washington; the question of a multilateral committee

[commitment?] is significant. I noted that there had been discussion [garble].

On the US commitment, I pointed out that in addition to the SEATO protocol authority, the US
Congress had, after the Tonkin Bay incident, authorized the President to undertake broad military
assistance to SVN; this was a legal commitment as far as the US alone was concerned. As for discussion
of a mutual security arrangement at the seven nation meeting, it is obviously something which could be
discussed.
Components of a Satisfactory Outcome
7. When we reached this item, I simply read the title and then paused, saying that I would very much
like to hear their views on what they considered the specifics of a satisfactory outcome--or to put it in
French terms, an acceptable result. They looked at each other and then said that they would like to hear
what I thought the elements were. I then, making it clear that I was not making an official proposal on
behalf of the US Government, but was merely proposing personal ideas for illustrative purposes, went
through the following points:
A. Cessation of aggression--by ending "military" hostilities. GVN comment: This met with no objection.
B. Cessation of aggression--by "criminal" (terroristic) hostilities. This meant an end to the terrorist
organization, to what is sometimes called the infrastructure. GVN comment: At this point Ky said the
terrorist organization would have to be "dissolved." It would be understood, I said, that after the
satisfactory outcome had been reached, any new case of assassination, torture, or kidnapping, or of
recruiting or impressment, or of sabotage for subversive reasons would be justification for immediate
retaliation.
C. Departure of hardcore Viet Cong officer personnel. GVN comment: Ky said, yes, but they would
have to leave within a certain time limit.
D. Reintegration of rank and file Viet Cong.
(1) GVN comment: Ky pointed out that this depended on the Chieu Hoi program.
(2) Thieu stated that departure of the North Vietnamese Army by a time limit is not difficult, but for the
village Viet Cong infrastructure, it is another problem. If local members of the Viet Cong organization
do not choose to go North or join the GVN after a specific time, the GVN would consider them rebels
and take action to eliminate them.
(3) I agreed that an intensified Chieu Hoi effort was most desirable and that a time limit would have to
be imposed. The destruction of the Viet Cong infrastructure was clearly a matter for police-type action.
No government can be denied police powers, and I was glad to see that in that connection steps are
being taken to train some ARVN troops in constabulary work. Thieu agreed.
(4) Tran Van Do asked how in practice infiltration could be really halted. Supposing Hanoi should agree
to withdraw and take out many troops, they can still leave many thousands behind and resume
infiltration at a later date. The Americans, however, would have stopped their strikes and ground
operations. How then could we be able to control the ground and prevent infiltration across the border?
(5) Thieu said they had been thinking of constructing a surveillance system all along the border. Ky said
that he wished to discuss this problem further with us. He was examining it carefully and was having a

study made on a system of border outposts, of the question of troop roles and missions for all forces in
South Viet-Nam on border control, counter-terror efforts, security, etc. I said that I had not realized that
control of infiltration across these frightful jungles was a possible thing to do, physically. They assured
me that it was and that it was entirely a question of whether one wanted to do it. They indicated a desire
to bring this up with Secretary McNamara during his forthcoming visit.
E. Departure of North Vietnamese Army. (Comment on this just covered above.)
F. Stopping infiltration of men and supplies. (Covered above.)
G. All roads to be open to the ARVN; new roadblocks or blown bridges or re-establishment of
underground redoubts would justify retaliation. (They all agreed.)
H. Viet Cong to disarm, give up explosives and weapons. (They agreed.)
I. North Viet-Nam to stop direction of Viet Cong. (Agreed.)
J. Staged withdrawal of free world forces. (Covered above.)
K. Supervision and guarantee of the actions listed. (Covered above.)
L. Peace talks not to be dragged on for a long period unless tangible results have been and are being
achieved. (They agreed.) The methods to achieve objectives.
8. I went over each of the eight alternative methods, from tacit cessation of hostilities through a full
multilateral conference, any of which might singly or in combination lead to a settlement, pointing out
that we favored no particular one but that they should all be reviewed for planning purposes.
9. Thieu asked for our frank views on whether or not the US would agree to a new Geneva conference
with the original participants. Tran Van Do asserted that "we do not know precisely what we want, but
we know we do not want another Geneva conference." Ky said that for their part the best place for a new
conference would be Tokyo. "We will have nothing to do with Geneva. Nor will we ever sit down with
France." A cease-fire agreement now is 180 degrees different than it was in 1954, he stated, and the
participants are now different, so why go back to Geneva or accept the same participants? Ky referred to
Vice President Humphrey's statements that this war is an Asian problem and should be solved by Asian
nations. Those involved number just about every nation in the area except Japan, and Japan, he pointed
out, will not be attending the seven nation conference. The main point, Thieu said, is that SVN must not
be committed beforehand to going back to Geneva. Thieu asked what nations might attend a Geneva
conference?
10. We explained that the US has publicly stated it is prepared to go back to Geneva, that although we
might prefer an Asian setting, we are always prepared to negotiate at any place, and that SVN has also
agreed to this. Participation can be discussed and changed to comprise those countries with a legitimate
interest in the war. We have not said that readiness to use a Geneva conference meant that we must
reach agreement "in accordance with" the 1954 agreements, but rather "on the basis of." The important
point is that we must both be always prepared to negotiate. As for an Asian conference, our acceptance
of the Thanat proposal was evidence of our approval of the idea. Although we are in favor of such a
conference, we cannot also refuse a Geneva conference. I told them I took note, however, of their strong
opposition to any full scale multilateral negotiations using the Geneva conference format and their
opposition to the inclusion of France.

11. Ky agreed that many combinations of nations, excluding of course, France, could be acceptable. He
said in this regard that the GVN thought too much attention was focused on Hanoi and Washington and
that Peking, Moscow and Saigon were often not mentioned. Reports should equate Saigon to Hanoi, and
Washington to Peking and Moscow so that the roles of the latter are not forgotten. Ky then took up the
point of including the VC in negotiations. "We cannot accept any conference with the VC, we cannot sit
down with the VC," he said. He reiterated several times that the GVN must not go to a table where the
presence of the VC is required; that any equating of Saigon with the VC is unacceptable.
12. It was explained that the issue is not one of sitting down at a conference, but of communicating with
the VC to arrange a cease-fire. The VC would in no case be granted status as a sovereign equal, but as
an internal Vietnamese problem. In the matter of reaching a settlement the enemy should be dealt with in
alternative ways: externally, with Hanoi, as one channel, and internally with the VC as the other. It
might be possible to handle the VC in one way and Hanoi in another.
13. Ky then switched to the possibility of a drawn-out tacit cessation of GVN-VC hostilities with a
staged reduction of GVN-US military operations. He said he did not see how we Americans would have
time to accept a "fade-away" solution, although he personally favored such a solution and he thought
Hanoi would, too. It would mean fewer casualties, but he believed we were in too much of a hurry to
make this acceptable to us. He feared that prolonged war of this nature would find US public opinion
unprepared for the continued employment of US troops in what would be a purely guerrilla-type,
terroristic war even though casualties would be light. He thought it possible that the VC might accept
this option, but the US might have considerable difficulties. The fade-away of the Communists in
Malaya, in this regard, is not comparable, Ky pointed out. Malaya did not have an active sanctuary
behind the rebels. The point, according to Ky, is that SVN could accept a "fade-away" cessation only if
it has a system of border guarantees. Even if NVN withdraws its troops from SVN, Ky strongly
emphasized, a system of concrete guarantees will still be imperative.
14. We noted that the VC may very well opt for a tacit cessation, and this might be better for the US and
GVN, but a system of guarantees was, of course, still required.
15. Ky said he preferred two systems of guarantees: first, an international commitment as discussed
earlier for external threats, and second, a strong system of border protection against support of
subversion. If it is decided after thorough study that we can establish a line of border outposts which will
provide protection, then, Ky said, he believed the best option would be for all concerned to reach a
secret agreement with the VC. We could afford it then, he said, but must exclude NVN. Tran Van Do
supported the same doubts [re?] guarantee approach: an internal sealing off of the border by police
efforts plus a broad international military commitment. Ky said that the actual number of geographical
routes for infiltration in the air and on the ground into SVN are not numerous. It is possible to seal them
off physically.
16. Concerning US-NVN negotiations, Ky said he did not believe that Hanoi would ever sit down with
the US. To do so would contradict all its propaganda and destroy the people's belief in what the
government has said. This is a Vietnamese reaction, and Hanoi cannot afford to accept it, which poses a
real problem if it does want to consider negotiations. NVN has also never admitted its military presence
in the South; to deal with the US would be an acknowledgement of this. Ky said he frankly believes that
when Hanoi finally reaches the conclusion that it cannot win the war, they will simply withdraw their
troops and cease active military operations for a period of years, leaving the GVN to cope with a revived
VC at some later date. The VC, Ky said, if they decide to negotiate with the US, must, therefore, do it
secretly. What they are really interested in, Thieu said, will be "la monnaie de change"--the chips to use
in the poker game. In this case our best chips in NVN are our bombing, and our best chips in SVN will
have to be our threat to the guerrilla infrastructure--when we have it.

National Reconciliation
17. I read through an outline drawn from State telegrams 23182, 52726, and 52727, noting the
possibility of an amnesty proclamation on Nov 1.
18. Ky replied that the timing appeared to him to be premature. This is important since poor timing of an
appeal could adversely affect the morale of the South Vietnamese troops who would see their enemies
being accepted back before they were defeated. This could pretty well eliminate their fighting capacity.
19. Thieu, however, said he was planning a speech for November 1 which would be the kind of plea
which we desire. I left with them a memorandum covering the proposal and they agreed to consider its
applicability for the November 1 speech.
20. Ky said the govt can help itself by effectively helping the victims of the present floods in the Delta.
A program is being launched by Social Welfare Commissioner Tran Ngoc Lieng to provide materials
and assist-ance to build new houses upon stilts in flood areas. These would be permanent alterations
since the floods recur annually, and houses on stilts would eliminate need for evacuations. The people
are enthusiastic about the program, but it will take more time.
21. A further consideration to hold off on a proclamation is to allow successful dry-season operations to
have full effect. We are agreed in principle, Tran Van Do said, on the idea of appeal, but it should be
delayed until after the flood problem is resolved and the government has been able to demonstrate its
authority and responsiveness to the people.
22. The flood alleviation concept is sound, I agreed, and said I would get USAID to provide what it
could to help the program in addition to the food distribution program now underway. This is an area
where the VC cannot be of any help to the people, thereby offering the government a useful opportunity.
I asked their views on the Chieu Hoi program, saying I had been disappointed that the highly successful
elections had had no effect on it.
23. Thieu replied that over the years Chieu Hoi has not had a powerful appeal. The enemy tends to wait
things out, to sit back and see how actual conditions develop rather than respond to governmental
appeals. What is needed is a dramatic gesture to get momentum started, backed by better organization.
All agreed on the importance of improving the Chieu Hoi effort.
24. The meeting ended with mutual agreement that it had been extremely useful and that we would meet
again in about six days.
25. Comments: One aspect of the positions taken by Thieu, Ky and Do deserves special mention. Those
positions reflect a continuing fragility in the political structure in Viet-Nam, despite the substantial
success of recent months. This lies behind some of the caution with which they approach the problem of
negotiations, as well as the caution with which they approach other problems. We are still greatly
concerned, as we have been for some time, with the importance of maintaining governmental stability in
Saigon. The unity of military leadership is always precarious, given the rivalries that exist. Even selfassured people like Thieu and Ky recognize limits on how far and how fast they can move on any
question--whether negotiations or the fight against corruption. I believe they responded well to our
presentation, particularly to the dealing with amnesty and a reconciliation proclamation of November 1.
On other items they were more cautious. They recognize something which I have mentioned before-namely, that there is a pace at which things can be made to move here. If we or they exceed that pace too
greatly, then there is a danger of reaction and instability despite the best of intentions. This needs to be

taken in particular account when dealing with a subject so replete with potential pitfalls as negotiations
and contacts with the Viet Cong.
26. Please let us have your views on Tran Van Do's proposal that the seven nation conference make
some sort of a multilateral mutual security commitment.
Lodge
259. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 4, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Secret.
Dear Dean:
By message of 16 August 1966 (Saigon's 3601),/2/ Ambassador Lodge raised the question of the
possible extension of defoliation operations into the DMZ and requested the views of the Departments
of State and Defense on the desirability of doing so.
/2/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-10 VIET S)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that, from a military standpoint, defoliation of areas in SVN
within and near the DMZ is highly desirable and should be undertaken. I agree with this position.
As you are aware, Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces have been exploiting the
combination of remoteness and heavy vegetation found in the DMZ to their own purposes and
advantage. This is particularly true in the western sector. The seriousness of NVA/VC use of the zone is
illustrated by the recent introduction of the 324B Division of the NVA directly across the zone into SVN
where the force now confronts GVN, US and other friendly forces in combat. Intelligence indicates that
the communists are resupplying the units recently infiltrated into South Vietnam's Quang Tri Province
through the DMZ and are building a supply base in the zone for future operations.
Defoliation in the southern portion of the DMZ may have political as well as definite military
advantages. Such operations are defensive in nature and would assist the efforts of the ICC and all who
seek actual demilitarization of the zone.
Defoliation has been conducted in SVN since 1961 and in Laos since 1965. Such operations continue
routinely today. In my opinion, the political risks of defoliation in and near the DMZ should be less than
the predictable military risks of failure on our part to take all reasonable measures to deny the
communists continued use of the DMZ. Since it takes up to three months for the jungle cover to fall
after spraying, this matter is one which requires early attention.
Current authority for defoliation within SVN was delegated to the American Ambassador Saigon and
COMUSMACV after review by the highest authority in May 1963. Extension of this authority to
include the southern portion of the DMZ would seem to be appropriate under current circumstances. If
you agree, I would appreciate your releasing the required instruction essentially as contained in the
attached draft joint State/Defense message./3/
/3/Attached but not printed. Rusk concurred in a letter of November 18 to McNamara, stating: "While I

can foresee some unfavorable political reaction to these operations, I believe the reaction would be
manageable as long as we avoid defoliating any area of North Vietnam." Defoliation operations in the
southern sector of the DMZ were authorized in telegram 91707 to Saigon, November 26. Rusk's letter is
quoted and telegram 91707 is cited in JCS telegram 1752, December 19. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII)
Sincerely,
Bob
260. Editorial Note
In his weekly telegram, October 5, 1966, Lodge notified President Johnson that a Cabinet crisis was
brewing in South Vietnam:
"A crisis, so far not of serious dimensions, is taking place in the Ky government. The chief of the office
staff of the Minister of Health, Nguyen Tan Loc, who, under Vietnamese and French custom, has the
impressive title of 'Director of Cabinet,' was arrested September 29 and held overnight on vague charges
of Southern separatist activity. The charge is believed untrue. Southern members of the Cabinet,
particularly Youth Minister Vo Long Trieu, interpreted the arrest as a move to intimidate Southern
officials. Trieu and other Southern Ministers apparently seriously considered submitting their
resignations as a result.
"At an October 3 Cabinet meeting Minister of Education Truong (Southerner) raised the issue and
suggested that Minister of Health Kha (a Northerner) was trying to force Loc out of the Ministry, a
charge which may well be true since Loc and Kha are known to have been at odds over proposals to
reorganize the Ministry. Deputy Prime Minister Vien (Southerner) then charged that Kha has managed
the Ministry of Health very poorly. Kha thereupon tendered his resignation.
"It is not yet clear whether Prime Minister Ky will accept Kha's resignation. To fail to do so could
trigger resignations by Trieu, Truong, and Vien. In any event regional differences have unfortunately
been intensified within the government." (Telegram 7732; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
261. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/41
New York, October 5, 1966, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Approved in S on October
12. The meeting was held at USUN.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1966
SUBJECT
Vietnam Conflict

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
William M. Owen
Republic of Vietnam
Bui Diem, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Deputy Foreign Minister Diem said that Prime Minister Ky had instructed him to come to New York
and to present his government's views to as many delegations as possible. The Secretary noted that it
was important that this be done since Diem spoke as an Asian and his views would carry weight
amongst the Afro-Asians. The communique issued at the ASPAC Meeting in Seoul/2/ had also been
very helpful in this respect.
/2/The communique was issued following the first Ministerial meeting of the Asian and Pacific Council,
June 14-16. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 618-619.
Diem said he had also been instructed by Prime Minister Ky to inquire as to the outcome of any
discussions the United States had had with Russian and French representatives. The Secretary said that
the talks with the French had been of no use whatsoever, since it was quite clear that France accepted no
responsibility in Southeast Asia. De Gaulle's attitude was that he desired peace regardless of the
consequences, which was not the U.S. view. The press had reported that Couve de Murville had tried to
draw us out on an eventual peace settlement. The Secretary had told Couve that he would not negotiate
this matter with him because Couve could not stop the fighting./3/ We have had no indication from
Hanoi directly or indirectly that they are interested in a serious approach to peace, so it looks as if the
fighting will have to continue for a period of time.
/3/Accounts of Rusk's conversations with Couve de Murville concerning Vietnam on October 3 and 4
were transmitted in telegrams 60476 and 62579 to Paris, October 5 and 8. (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S)
As to the Russian attitude, the Secretary said that their basic view is that if they were acting alone they
would be prepared to see the matter settled on the basis of the status quo ante at the 17th Parallel. The
problem was that they were attacked by Peking, which accused them of conspiring with the U.S. The
Soviet Union is impotent in the face of this bitter attitude from Peking. Russia does not like the fact that
we are bombing a fellow socialist country in North Vietnam, but, when we ask the Russians what will
happen when we stop bombing them, they have nothing to say on that point. They say they cannot
negotiate on this matter because Hanoi has not asked them to do so. They are embarrassed. On the other
hand, it would be of some interest to Diem to know that Gromyko did not interpose Vietnam as a barrier
to discussion of other subjects with us. This was of some significance because it showed that Vietnam
was not an overriding problem with them. Russia was very much concerned about Communist China,
where none of us really knew very much about what was happening.
Diem said that he had met with Secretary General U Thant earlier in the day and pointed out to him that
the South Vietnamese were more interested than anyone in peace. At the same time, Diem drew U
Thant's attention to the fact that the Communists have not shown the same desire for peace, whether
through the UN or any other channel, and said that fact should be taken into account.
After the discussion of another subject, the Secretary observed that he thought we were coming to a very
interesting and critical period because Hanoi must now be coming to realize that they could not succeed

by military force. They must therefore decide what consequences would derive from such a situation.
Diem recalled the Secretary's visit to Saigon last year and the speculation which it created in Hanoi.
The Secretary expressed the belief that the recent elections in South Vietnam have had a very important
international result. If the Constituent Assembly succeeded in working out a constitution and could
cooperate with the government on progressive measures, there would be a new chapter in the
development of Vietnam because it would be made quite clear to Hanoi that they could not succeed
politically in the south, which has been one of their hopes. The military side was also going quite well
despite the problems of guerilla warfare. One of the difficult tasks was, of course, to bring as many as
possible of the misguided people in the National Liberation Front back into the orbit of the Government
of the Republic of Vietnam. Diem agreed, but noted that progress had been made only at a low level.
The NLF has a very tight control. Whenever a member of the NLF moves from one area to another, he is
very closely scrutinized. Many people have raised the idea of having a`UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
As to the Russis frankly refused because it is afraid of such a government.
Diem said he had told the African delegations here that it was crystal clear that the conflict was an
international problem since North Vietnam was infiltrating personnel into the south and that they should
go back north. When they did so, there would be no problem. It was clear from his talks that the various
delegations had a common concern for peace. He also felt that there was now a better understanding of
the Vietnamese position, although they were not going to say publicly that they understood it.
The Secretary estimated that there were 65-70 governments who very much hoped that the South
Vietnamese, the U.S., and their allies would succeed although they did not emphasize the point publicly.
About 25 governments, composed of the communist bloc, France, and some others hoped that we would
not succeed, while another 15-25 did not want to hear or think about Vietnam. The Secretary did not
believe that the situation with respect to these various governments would change very much, but we
should not be timid about making them realize that the security of South Vietnam is of great significance
to other small countries.
In reply to Diem's query as to what we had heard of a draft resolution on Vietnam at the General
Assembly, the Secretary said that there have been reports that a number of countries have been working
not on a joint resolution but on a joint statement, but that it appears that only a limited number of
countries are interested, including Cambodia, Algeria, Guinea, and two or three others. Apparently it
would not be a bilateral but a unilateral initiative. They were not getting much response, but we would
watch the matter closely. The Secretary suggested that Diem need not be concerned about the statement.
The Secretary stated that it sounded rather harsh to say so, but the fact was that international opinion
was not going to make these decisions as far as the U.S. was concerned, because most of these countries
bore no responsibility. He found it rather distressing that those who have treaty commitments are not as
solid as they should be: these include France, the UK--which should be doing more than it was--and
Pakistan. Otherwise, all SEATO members were taking an active part and bearing responsibilities. Diem
stated he did not think the French position was going to change unless De Gaulle left the scene. The
Secretary agreed.
The Secretary added a point of clarification which he thought was of some interest. He had pressed
Couve very hard to tell him whether his reference to the use of foreign troops in Vietnam included the
use of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Couve responded ambiguously that he did not make
that point publicly. If he did clarify that point, the Secretary observed, it would help somewhat.

Diem said that while his discussions with other delegations were helpful, he did not have the impression
that the Secretary General was really willing to understand the problem. U Thant explains that he is
trying to see the problem from a very humanitarian aspect. Diem was very frank with him and told him
it was impossible to solve the problem from that viewpoint alone. The Secretary agreed and added that it
would not be solved by being humanitarian and getting out of the way, thereby letting North Vietnam
overrun South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese would then be able to liquidate the leadership of the
non-communist elements in South Vietnam, which was the bulk of the leadership.
Diem said that many delegations had asked if South Vietnam had any concessions to make to the other
side. He had told them that they had one shirt and nothing more. They had no territorial ambitions north
of the 17th Parallel; they did not wish to destroy any regime; they simply wanted to be left alone. When
queried about one of Ky's most publicized statements, he was able to explain that the Prime Minister had
been speaking in purely defensive terms but that they had no choice but to fight if they were pushed
against the wall. The Secretary said that we have no doubt in our own mind that all of the Asian
countries outside Peking, Hanoi, and possibly North Korea hope that we succeed in our efforts, although
some of them will not say so publicly; for example, India and Pakistan. Even Prince Sihanouk hopes for
our success now that he has been made apprehensive by China.
Diem referred to the television statement by Deputy Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia/4/ in which he
was quoted as saying that Malaysia would be sending troops to South Vietnam. The Secretary said that
he had heard the program and thought that an ambiguous question and answer had been misrepresented
by the press. The question seemed to ask for Malaysian views about sending troops to South Vietnam,
which Razak apparently interpreted as referring to the troops which had already been sent there by other
countries. He was thinking in general terms and was not thinking of sending Malaysian troops. The
Secretary was quite sure that Razak had been misunderstood. Diem said that it was quite amazing
because he had understood that the Malaysian position on the subject was still very vague. The Secretary
noted, however, that Malaysia was prepared to give political support, as they did at the ASPAC Meeting
in Seoul when they joined in the communique. Diem stated that he had been present, and understood
that the Malaysians had had a problem with Indonesia and wished to stay on good terms with them until
the non-confrontation agreement and withdrawal of troops had been fully implemented.
/4/Not further identified.
The Secretary said he thought it very important from the viewpoint of public opinion in the U.S. to let
Asians speak for themselves on these matters. Diem said that he had tried to do so during his New York
stay by giving the views of his government. Prime Minister Ky had directed that more initiative be taken
in this respect, perhaps including the sending of more envoys abroad. If such measures were not taken,
there would be an impression that they were only a tool of the big powers.
The Secretary expressed the hope that the Constituent Assembly would move along constructively and
smoothly and would build political solidarity which would demonstrate especially to Hanoi that the
country was on firm foundations. Diem agreed, saying it was very important that Hanoi realize they
would have to negotiate or at least to cease their aggressive actions.
The Secretary inquired whether there was any doubt now amongst the South Vietnamese that the United
States meant business, that we were determined to see the matter through. Diem replied that in the
government there was no doubt as to U.S. intentions. There was also an understanding of the difficulties
faced by the U.S. in the exercise of its world-wide responsibilities and commitments. Nevertheless,
sometimes the man in the street in Vietnam was rather vague about the U.S. position, as were people in
the provinces. An example could be found in Ambassador Goldberg's recent speech. "All of us" agreed
with 99 percent of his statement but on one point in which he referred to the "obstacle as not being

unsurmountable,"/5/ there was some misunderstanding even though the government understood it very
well. The Secretary noted that the same statement had been made by President Johnson in July 1965./6/
Diem said they understood, but some people thought it was really a change in United States policy. They
had been told that it was not. Diem asserted that it was a problem of tactical approach.
/5/Reference is to Goldberg's statement regarding the role of the National Liberation Front in peace
negotiations in his September 22 speech to the U.N. General Assembly; see Document 244.
/6/For text of the President's statement on July 28, 1965, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, p. 803.
The Secretary stated that there were two points which Diem might keep in mind if anyone raised this
question with him: (1) the 300,000 Americans who were in South Vietnam were not there as tourists, but
were fighting; (2) the democratic society of the U.S. was made up of people who wished to do what was
necessary provided they understood that there was no honorable alternative. It was, therefore, necessary
to tell them that there would be peace now if the other side would make peace. By tradition, if one
scratched the skin of an American, one found an isolationist. The change of tradition which had
developed in the past 20 years had called for an act of will on the part of the American people. They had
suffered 180,000 casualties since World War II in resisting communist aggression around the world,
most of the casualties being in Asia. If people looked at what we are doing, they should be persuaded.
We have not abandoned anyone, but have kept our treaty commitments. We are not giving South
Vietnam away. We have lost 5,000 killed to prevent his country from falling under Hanoi's control. The
Secretary believed we should all concentrate on getting the job done. He did not know when and how
the denouement would come. Diem said he hoped it would not be too far away. We had the initiative
now. He hoped we could show the communists convincingly that they could not win. They would then
accept the situation. It was a matter of pushing forward very hard, but it would take a certain period of
time to do it. In South Vietnam they had suffered from various coups and changes of government which
had stimulated the hopes of Hanoi. The Secretary said that if he might be very frank these problems
have been our biggest concern in terms of U.S. public opinion. Americans keep asking, "whom have we
to support?" Accordingly, if there was real solidarity in South Vietnam, there would be general
encouragement and the American people would feel that progress was being made.
The Secretary said he looked forward to seeing Diem again in Manila and asked him to convey his good
wishes to Prime Minister Ky and other South Vietnamese leaders.
262. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 5, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, July-Dec.
1966. Secret. Komer sent a copy of the memorandum to Katzenbach on November 29 under a covering
memorandum stating that he believed it had "had considerable impact." (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Manila--and Vietnam in General. Now that I've been on Vietnam six months (the only full time senior
official in Washington), I feel that I've learned something about Vietnam.
I. The REAL OBJECTIVE. To me, it is achieving a satisfactory outcome by the end of 1967, or at the
minimum achieving such momentum that it will be clear to all--including the US public--that it is only a
matter of time. To me, this is quite feasible if we take the right steps beginning now.

We can't predict such imponderables as ChiCom intervention; but we can devise a policy which reduces
their likelihood. For example, I believe we can develop a "win" strategy without further major escalation
against the North, or sizable US deployments beyond what you've already approved.
We're doing better than we think. We've actually gotten up more momentum in Vietnam than we're
willing to admit as yet. Most of the indicators are running favorably--indeed all except pacification and
continued infiltration from the North.
On the latter score, Westy has hit on a winning strategy against the NVA/VC main force. So far this year
the NVA/VC have mounted on the average only 1.3 battalion or multi-battalion-sized attacks a week. So
most of the 170-odd enemy battalions our order of battle carries must be busy defending themselves or
hiding from our air, artillery, and search and destroy operations, or foraging to support themselves.
Westy keeps prudently estimating that they will yet catch us off-guard somewhere, but they haven't won
a major battle in over a year so far. Meanwhile, Westy's strength continues to grow; he can go anywhere
in the country and does. Our air power is up to more than 30,000 sorties a month. We're inflicting
heavier casualties than ever before.
In fact, where is all that enemy strength? I'd agree with Joe Alsop that enemy effectives, especially VC,
may be lower than our conservative O/B indicates. Certainly the enemy is hurting more if PW and
defector reports, the generally declining incident rate, the total NVA/VC inability to win victories mean
anything at all. Nor were the enemy able to exploit effectively the major dissidence in I Corps last spring
or the 11 September elections, though we know they tried. Add our success in controlling inflation and
in promoting the start of a healthy political evolution, and we have at the end of September 1966
achieved some real momentum in Vietnam.
II. HOW DO WE ACHIEVE EVEN GREATER MOMENTUM IN 1967? To me, there is no one
decisive element! Rather it is a matter of properly orchestrating and pushing on at least seven different
major fronts in 1967. If we do so, I think we can achieve sufficient cumulative impact either to force the
enemy to negotiate or cripple his ability to sustain the war.
A. Step up Westy's campaign against the NVA/VC main force. This is essential to contain the NVA
infiltrators and keep the organized enemy large units off our backs while we step up pacification. When
I see what 80 or so US/FW maneuver battalions plus our air and artillery have already accomplished, I'm
confident that with 10-15 more battalions by end 1966, we'll do even better. Westy prudently predicts
new NVA/VC offensives, but if they couldn't mount one up to now the odds are he can keep them even
more off balance from here on. The prognosis here is for even greater success, perhaps without much
increase in US forces beyond our presently scheduled buildup.
But neither Westy's spoiling campaigns nor our graduated air offensive against the North seem likely by
themselves to force the enemy to cry uncle. Our best estimate is that he could sustain this punishment
and keep infiltrating for quite a time. I also doubt that Hanoi will accept that it's lost this war until we
start steadily pacifying the countryside. This would also deny it the option of reverting to guerrilla war.
So we need yet other strings to our bow to increase the pressure on Hanoi, deny it the guerrilla option,
and erode its base in the south.
B. The trick is to focus increasingly on the most vulnerable enemy element--the VC. Even present
intelligence suggests that their strength has already peaked, their morale is declining, and they face
increasingly difficulty in finding food, medicine, and recruits. The more we can erode their strength and
peel off the VC from the NVA, the more we can isolate the latter, sharply decrease their effectiveness,
and demonstrate to everyone that the only real problem is invasion from the North. We can achieve this

via the following programs, if we really back them up.

C. Step up Pacification in the Countryside. As I've repeatedly warned privately, we're not yet going
anywhere fast. Nor will we, in my judgment, so long as we fail to recognize that pacification is first and
foremost a military task--providing continuous local security. There's no point in blaming the civilians
when the critical first phase of pacification is primarily a military job--and one which only the US and
RVNAF military have the resources to do. This is why I back McNamara's proposal as an important first
step.
D. Reviving the GVN Armed Forces. But unless we want to send a lot more US forces, and keep them
there a lot longer than our political posture calls for, we must get the Vietnamese to do most of the
pacification job. This makes sense, because they certainly aren't pulling their weight now. We've got to
get them back into the war more effectively, so it won't be so much a US war. I think this is the biggest
single thing we could do toward getting quick results in Vietnam--and it won't cost the US much at all
because we're already paying and supporting all 700,000 GVN armed forces. To markedly increase their
efficiency would be a major breakthrough at little cost. But it means guiding them more effectively-mostly into pacification, ensuring better leadership, improving their attitudes toward the peasant, and
perhaps getting them under Westy's actual command (see below).
E. Mounting a massive national reconciliation campaign. Harriman is already effectively pushing this,
and deserves top backing. We need to step up sharply all defector programs--high level and low. As we
increase the pressure on the southern VC, it will increase the effectiveness of appeals to them to rally to
the new South Vietnam. As the GVN acquires more confidence, plus a broader popular base, I believe
that it will be less fearful of extending a hand to the VC.
F. We must avoid a retrogression to military government in Saigon. The success of the above strategy,
and the credibility of our political purpose, depends on forestalling new military coups. I'm all for the
military continuing to play a major political role in VN (we can't prevent it, and need their help). But
we've passed the point of no return with the 11 September election. There are already worrisome signs
of military wire-pulling in Saigon, and we can't afford to let it happen.
G. We must have a tough stabilization program to keep inflation under control. I won't rehearse the
arguments, because I think we're all agreed. I'm also confident that McNamara can keep the really big
spenders--the US and ARVN military--in line. I've even got Lodge on board in favor of a tough
spending limit. We'll have to keep constantly after this matter, but note that my program does not require
big US outlays. In fact, if it works we could cut back in certain respects.
H. Step up the "other war"--not just pacification but other positive meas-ures. We have plans for this,
and should gain enough momentum in agriculture, health, education, port clearance, etc. during 1967 to
help considerably.
I. If the above seven programs go at all well, we'll have another factor working for us--increasing
confidence that our side has it made. This intangible psychological factor may be the most important of
all. Lodge, who has a shrewd ear for such things, already senses a new mood of confidence in Saigon.
We must build on this to get a real bandwagon psychology rolling--which will greatly reinforce all other
elements of our strategy in 1967. By our own postwar programs we can add to this bandwagon effect.
III. We badly need a carefully orchestrated strategic plan and program in order to accomplish all the
above in 1967. It won't just happen. To get optimum results will require pulling all the strands together
in a comprehensive program for 1967, getting all US elements on board, selling it to the GVN, and last

but not least establishing the machinery to make sure it's carried out. In all honesty, I must report that I
don't think we're properly organized in Saigon or Washington to serve you most effectively on Vietnam.
We need:
A. A comprehensive strategic plan for 1967. You've seen the Komer/Rostow paper/2/ which was a first
crack at one. So far State is too busy with Manila preparations to be able to flesh it out.
/2/Document 241.
B. An effective sub-cabinet level mechanism in Washington to monitor performance. We badly need to
organize more systematically to (1) keep you properly informed on key programs; (2) do the staff work
necessary to present you with coordinated recommendations; and (3) follow through on your decisions.
You've seen my proposal for a small "war cabinet" chaired by Nick Katzenbach./3/
/3/See footnote 4, Document 250.
C. A Joint Command which gives Westy more control over ARVN--an essential in my view if we are to
get proper use out of this asset. With 400,000 US troops soon to be in Vietnam, and with six of seven
countries at Manila already accepting US command, why couldn't you sign Ky on too? The Koreans
have proposed this for the agenda, which gives a great opening.
D. Give Pacification Management to Westy. You've heard my voice on this. I'll just say again that we
won't get up real momentum in pacifying hamlets until you give it to the only people who can do most
of the job. Lack of progress so far is not the fault of the civilians--it is basically because the US and
ARVN military haven't provided the one essential ingredient--local security./4/
/4/In a telephone conversation with McNamara that began at 7:48 a.m. on October 5, the President said
regarding pacification: "I feel very strongly that it ought to go to the military." (Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara,
Tape 66.27, Side B, PNO 2)
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: If what I say makes sense we can take a big step toward it during the
upcoming trips to Saigon and Manila. In fact, what you can get moving privately there could be just as
important as the public posture we create.
A. A real coup at Manila would be for you to sign Ky on to (1) continued political evolution--and no
more coups; (2) a big push on pacification; (3) a tough anti-inflationary agreement; (4) a national
reconciliation program.
B. But this will take a lot of prior spadework in Saigon. Lodge alone can't do it, but McNamara,
Katzenbach, and I could help a lot if charged to do so.
C. So I urge that the above be the agenda for a meeting Saturday morning/5/ at which you tell us:
/5/On Friday, October 7, the President flew to the LBJ Ranch for the weekend, returning to Washington
on October 10. He did not meet with Komer in Texas. However, from 7:35 to 8 p.m. on October 7, prior
to his departure for Texas, he met privately with Komer, McNamara, and Katzenbach on board Air
Force One at Andrews Air Force Base. No record of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., President's
Daily Diary)

(1) You want us to press Ky/Thieu to stand up and say the right things at Manila.
(2) You want an across-the-board strategic plan and program for 1967 before Manila--one which will
produce irresistible momentum before the end of 1967.
(3) You want an overhaul of our machinery both in Washington and Saigon so that this program can
really be made to work (no need to saw off specifically on pacification management yet).
Postscripts. I may be way off base, but I think that a program like the one I describe offers the best
chance of a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam:
First, it doesn't call for a lot more troops or escalated strikes against the North (I've omitted barriers,
where I'm with McNamara). Instead, it calls for better management, better orchestration, and better use
of the assets we already have.
Second, I don't think it will cost a lot more money beyond what we already plan to spend. It seeks to
avoid greater inflationary pressures by making better use of what's already going for us.
Third, it is just as well designed to bring Hanoi to the conference table as it is to "win" the war. Few
things would maximize the pressure on Hanoi more than our cutting down or defecting the southern VC-which leaves the NVA increasingly isolated.
Finally, if it works, and we do get up visibly growing momentum in the South, it opens the option of
cutting back (I don't say stopping) at least the marginal increment of our bombing in the North--which
seems to me awfully expensive in proportion to return.
R. W. Komer/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
263. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence
Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, October 6, 1966.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI-Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, McNamara Project.
Secret.
SUBJECT
McNamara Pacification Reorganization Proposal Activity
Summary
(1) The President has apparently bought the rationale behind the McNamara pacification reorganization
proposal and presently feels that the burden of proof is on its opponents to come up with something
better. No firm decisions, however, have yet been taken.
(2) AID (Mr. Poats), State (Ambassador Unger) and Ambassador Porter are all strongly opposed to the
proposal but not sure how to proceed in fighting it or what to offer in the way of an alternative.

(3) AID's counter proposal (copy attached)/2/ is not likely to carry the day. As of now (6 October) it
looks as if the final decision will not be made until the McNamara party (including Messrs. Komer,
Katzenbach and Porter) has returned to Washington after reviewing the bidding with Ambassador Lodge
and his colleagues.
/2/Not attached; see footnote 6 below.
(4) In discussing this whole affair, Ambassador Porter had high praise for [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] and the Saigon Station.
1. On Wednesday, 5 October, I spent several hours with Ambassador Unger, Ambassador Porter and,
intermittently, AID Assistant Administrator Poats, going over the McNamara proposal in all its aspects
and ramifications. For essentially similar reasons AID (Poats) and State (Unger) and Ambassador Porter
are all opposed to the proposal but uncertain about how to proceed in fighting it or what to offer in the
way of an alternative.
2. Ambassador Unger felt that someone (Mr. Komer, Secretary McNamara, or both) had already gotten
to the President and sold him on the thesis that pacification was not working, drastic U.S. organizational
rationalization and surgery was required, the U.S. military alone "had the horses" to do what was
needed, hence the U.S. military should be given command authority and told to do the job./3/ According
to Ambassador Unger, the President was strongly inclined to endorse the McNamara proposal. He had
listened to counter arguments (from Secretary Rusk) but was not persuaded and felt the burden of proof
was on the dissenters, who should fall in line unless they could soon come up with a better alternative.
In any event, the President wanted a decision made in principle before the McNamara party left for
Saigon on 8 October. A White House meeting was tentatively scheduled for the morning of 8 October to
review the bidding and come up with a decision. Ambassador Lodge would be consulted but, in effect,
after the basic decision had already been made.
/3/In an October 2 memorandum to Rusk, Unger summarized Porter's views on McNamara's proposal
following a telephone conversation with Porter. Under cover of an October 4 memorandum, Rostow
forwarded Unger's memorandum to the President "as background to our discussion at lunch
today." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX) No record of the
luncheon discussion has been found; Rostow's agenda noted, under "Viet Nam: Organization of
Pacification," that "Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have been informed by Porter that there will be
great difficulty with Lodge about turning the organization of pacification over to the military." (Ibid.,
Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 14)
3. Ambassador Porter objected strongly to the McNamara proposal itself and to the mode of procedure
outlined above./4/ He felt:
/4/In a September 30 memorandum to the President, Komer made the following comments regarding
McNamara's proposal to put pacification under the military: "I will say flatly that unless we do so,
despite all the confusion it will entail, we will NOT get the early results in pacification necessary to 'win'
the war with dispatch. . . . It's the only way to get real results before 1968." (Ibid., Komer Files, Memos
to the President)
a. It was inaccurate to say that pacification was not going well and unrealistic to have expected
spectacular, measurable results in the eight months since Honolulu. Pacification involves rebuilding the
whole structure of South Vietnamese society, a task that could not possibly be accomplished in a short
span of time.

b. No organizational structure is perfect. The current U.S. pacification organization could be improved;
but scrapping it to set up a new one would inevitably check the momentum now building up. It would
take us another eight months of shakedown to get back to where we are today.
c. Putting a military cast on the U.S. pacification effort would work against the major U.S. political
objective of trying to civilianize the GVN and would seriously complicate our political problems within
South Vietnam.
d. Past experience (CIDG/Switchback, the Saigon Port) does not indicate that civil programs are likely
to improve if the U.S. military takes them over. For years the U.S. military has had all the command
authority it needs to address itself to the crucial problem of rural security, which is far from being
solved. This is hardly an argument for giving it more authority and assigning it additional tasks. Rural
development, especially its associated cadre program, is not a military activity and its essential spirit
would be lost if it became a military activity.
e. Above all, major reorganization of the U.S. Mission should not be decided on until Ambassador
Lodge and his immediate colleagues have had a chance to examine the proposal and express their views
on it. If the McNamara proposal were presented as a virtual fait accompli, Ambassador Porter felt
Lodge's reaction was likely to be pyrotechnic and he would probably resign.
4. Mr. Komer called during our discussion and told Ambassador Porter the final decision would not be
made until Ambassador Lodge had been properly consulted, though Porter had serious reservations
about the value of these assurances. Komer also said the tentatively scheduled Saturday morning (8
October) White House meeting would not focus on reorganization of pacification but would be a general
review of the bidding in Vietnam. Even after this call, Porter was not sure whether he was to attend the
Saturday morning meeting, but understood that he was to accompany McNamara to Saigon.
5. Ambassador Porter mentioned that the essence of the McNamara proposal had been surfaced by Mr.
Komer in an informal letter sent to Saigon last summer./5/ Mr. Komer's letter had stressed, however,
that it was not an official proposal for the U.S. Mission to study but only an informal note designed to
give Lodge and Porter the flavor of "some ideas circulating around town" (i.e., Washington). Unger felt
that Komer might cite the letter as evidence that Lodge had in fact been consulted already on the
reorganization proposal. (Unger later told me privately that it seemed to him that Lodge and Porter had
apparently ignored Komer's letter, hoping the ideas expressed therein would die quietly. It was obvious
that they had not done so.) Porter also said that Lodge plans to return to the U.S. in November on leave
and to remain at least through December. If the U.S. pacification effort should be reorganized, Porter
would be in charge during the transition period.
/5/Presumably a reference to Komer's August 10 letter to Lodge. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Memos to the President, Komer Files, Lodge)
6. The only piece of paper that emerged from our 6 October conversations was the attached AID
memorandum to McNamara, drafted by Poats and signed by Mr. Gaud./6/ Ambassadors Porter and
Unger felt it was a weak lance with which to do battle and that AID's proposed "alternative" was not a
satisfactory answer to the problem. (I agree.) They also felt that the best alternative lay in using the
present structure (i.e., a civilian pacification director reporting directly to the Ambassador) but giving
the pacification director a stronger personal staff and more direct command authority over pacification
programs at regional and provincial levels. (In essence, this is the approach suggested in our 28
September memorandum to you.)/7/ I took the line that the Agency would be willing to turn the RD
program over to such a structure (i.e., the assets and responsibilities of the Station's Cadre Operations

Division) provided suitable arrangements could be made to relieve the Agency of the responsibility for
funding this program and supporting it logistically. I also indicated that we would not be willing to turn
over control of our intelligence collection activities at regional and provincial level (Police Special
Branch liaison), but would be willing to detail an officer to the regional and provincial pacification
directors to serve as their intelligence advisor and ensure that their requirements were serviced
efficiently and promptly.
/6/Gaud's October 5 memorandum proposed six standards for organizing pacification/revolutionary
development, including direct responsiveness to the U.S. Ambassador, unified command, and an
"emphasis on civil leadership and constructive purposes, while fully utilizing military capabilities at all
levels." Gaud stated that McNamara's proposal would "look like a move toward military government,
play into the hands of critics," and run counter to the evolution of civilian government. (Washington
National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966)
/7/Document 248.
7. The real problem remains that of integrating U.S. military assets into the pacification director's
command channel, in particular giving him some effective control over the activities of U.S. military
advisors to Popular Forces, Regional Forces and ARVN units assigned to pacification duties. Neither
Porter nor Unger had an answer for this one that they felt the military would buy. Both were inclined to
the notion of giving the pacification director a military deputy (two or three star) who could service his
military requirements but could still, somehow, remain subordinate to COMUSMACV's overall
authority. (One solution might be to double-hat such an officer as COMUMACV's deputy for
pacification operations and as the pacification director's military deputy. This was the suggestion Unger
planned to make to Mr. Katzenbach, who was to be briefed on the whole affair later in the afternoon of 5
October.)
8. As of now, all that can be said with assurance about the pacification reorganization proposal is that no
firm decision has been made and there will almost certainly be more thrashing about before one is taken.
It now appears that the final decision will not be made until after the McNamara party (which will
include Messrs. Komer, Katzenbach and Porter) has visited Saigon and reviewed the bidding with
Ambassador Lodge.
9. During the discussion outlined above, Ambassador Porter spoke several times in glowing terms about
the Saigon Station and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He had high praise for the
Station's performance and warm appreciation for the support and wholehearted cooperation he received
from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
George A. Carver, Jr.
264. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 10, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Nodis. Approved in the White
House on October 13. The meeting, held in the Oval Office, lasted from 5 to 6:41 p.m. (Johnson
Library, President's Daily Diary) The President discussed his meeting with Gromyko in a telephone
conversation with Senator Fulbright that began at 5:20 p.m. on October 11. Both a recording and a
transcript of the conversation are ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F66.28, PNO 2; the transcript
is in Chron Series.

SUBJECT
Miscellaneous Matters
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson
Mr. Rostow
U.S.S.R.
Mr. Gromyko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev
The President opened the conversation by saying that he had been informed of the Minister's talks with
Secretary Rusk and the Minister's other activities and thought he must have been a very busy man.
Gromyko said it was true that he had much to do here. He had an exchange of views with Secretary
Rusk and had also had a meeting with Ambassador Goldberg to discuss questions which he had raised.
He assumed the President was informed of the content of these meetings and this would facilitate his
task.
The President said he had been informed of these discussions and that Secretary Rusk would have a
further discussion with him this evening. While waiting for the photographers to come in, the President
said that the Soviets had allowed their Ambassador to come back to Washington and in return the
President had selected the best man we had to go to Moscow.
Mr. Gromyko said Mr. Thompson would be very welcome in Moscow. After the photographers had left,
Mr. Gromyko remarked that the temperature of the room had risen as a result of their activities. The
President replied that he hoped not as his job was to cool things down.
Gromyko said that the leadership and the Government of the Soviet Union often discussed the question
of where the policy of the United States is leading. He presumed that there was an awareness of the
responsibility of the United States and of the Soviet Union in world affairs. However, certain facts
related to United States policy baffled the Soviets. He could declare on behalf of the Soviet Union that it
was in our mutual interest to work for better relations. If the United States Government and Mr.
Johnson, as President, were willing to take steps to promote international detente to improve relations,
they would not find the Soviet Union lacking in response as this was in accord with the wishes of both
the Soviet Government and its people.
The President said he agreed with the points Mr. Gromyko had made. We were just as baffled about the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It was evident that we had not communicated with each other very
well. He also agreed that agreement between our two great powers was of the highest importance and
that we had a great responsibility to the world. He had on many occasions tried to take steps to ease
tension. He had been greatly encouraged in the correspondence that had taken place during his early
months in office. He had been deeply disappointed that the keeping of our commitment to South VietNam seemed to frustrate these early beginnings. He had been distressed to read in the Soviet press
remarks about himself personally and about the motivation of his Administration. He knew that the

Soviet and American people wanted friendship and he was always ready to go more than half way to
reach agreement. The greatest reward to him as President, and the greatest blessing for all people, would
be if we could succeed in this endeavor.
Gromyko said that the President had referred to Viet-Nam and remarked that he had discussed this with
Secretary Rusk and had explained the Soviet point of view./2/ He had also touched on this in the
meeting with Ambassador Goldberg. He would like to hear the President's personal view and know what
way out of the situation he saw. The Soviet Government has expressed its position on Viet-Nam and he
had explained it to Secretary Rusk, but he would like to touch on certain points after hearing the
President's point of view.
/2/See Document 247.
The President said he had mentioned Viet-Nam because he had heard that it was this question that
explained the Soviet attitude toward the United States and its leaders. He had tried to explore every
possible avenue to peace. There had been many consultations with various representatives of various
countries interested in bringing about negotiations. He had always thought that as co-Chairman, the
Soviet Union could exert its leadership in trying to bring about a negotiation. Early in his Administration
and in his Baltimore speech,/3/ he had expressed our willingness for unconditional negotiations, he had
made clear that we were willing to withdraw from that area and give up a very important negotiating
position provided there was self-determination for South Viet-Nam and that it was not overrun. The
President pointed out that United States forces had been moved into South Viet-Nam only after North
Viet-Nam had moved into the South and we saw that we were faced either with tearing up our
agreements as scraps of paper or of resisting. The United States was going to discharge its obligations
and he hoped the Soviet Union would do the same. He believed the Soviet Union could exercise an
important influence if it chose to do so. We were prepared to pull out our troops and convert our bases to
civilian uses. We were prepared to try to improve the lot of the poor people in that area but we could not
do this by running away or by capitulating. The United States could do more than it was doing in the
war and the President said he had difficulty resisting pressures upon him to do more, but he had no
desire to destroy Viet-Nam or to change its Government. He did, however, have an obligation to South
Viet-Nam.
/3/April 7, 1965. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1965, Book I, pp. 394-399.
The President said that if South Viet-Nam tried to change the Government in North Viet-Nam, he would
have a few words to say about this. His position was that he desired to see this difficult problem settled
as there was so much that our two countries could do for the good of the world. We were willing to go
from the battlefield to the negotiating table. If South Viet-Nam wanted to vote to go with North VietNam, that was their business. He hoped that the Soviet Union and Great Britain or the United Nations or
non-aligned countries or neutral nations could make proposals that could be acceptable to both sides. He
had arranged a pause in bombing for thirty-seven days despite the opinion of the military that this would
not help our situation, in the hope that we would get some message, but when we called, the other side
hung up the telephone. He knew that Mr. Gromyko did not interpret these efforts on his part as a sign of
weakness, but rather as an indication of his determination to achieve a peaceful settlement of the VietNamese affair. If the United States wanted victory over North Viet-Nam, we could achieve it, but our
aim is not that but to settle the problem. The best way to test our sincerity in this would be to name the
time and place for negotiations. He had said that Secretary Rusk would be ready to be there in twentyfour hours.
Mr. Gromyko said he wished to make a couple of preliminary remarks. The President was familiar with

the Soviet statement that they were not the country to conduct negotiations on this question and he was
familiar with Soviet views about the conduct of the war and the Soviet assessment of the chain of events
leading to it. Mr. Gromyko said the Soviet Government pays attention to statements made by the
President concerning his desire to see an end to the war. He had likewise given attention to the most
recent statements on that score. He said he would make a detailed report to the Soviet Government on
the statement which the President had just made. He said he must, at the same time, frankly state that the
Soviet Government could not help but note that the United States Government has not taken any real
step to end the war. Statements made by the United States, both by the President personally and on
behalf of the United States Government at the United Nations had been accompanied by conditions
known to be unacceptable to the other side as the other side would have to capitulate. Mr. Gromyko
thought the United States should take a more realistic position and should not give ultimata or pose
conditions as that was not the road to settlement of the war. This is what he had tried to emphasize to
Secretary Rusk. The United States statements on the desire to end the war were not compatible with the
steps which the United States had taken which had actually widened the war.
(The President interrupted the interpretation at this point to ask Mr. Gromyko if he was aware that the
North was invading the South. We had not asked anyone to surrender. We were asking that they stop
shooting, in which case we would stop shooting. Didn't Mr. Gromyko know that North Viet-Nam troops
were in South Viet-Nam before ours? At first we had had only advisers getting shot but they sent whole
divisions in and we had to act. If they would go back now, we would quit shooting. Every move on our
part had been in answer to a move on the part of North Viet-Nam. The Minister talked as though the
other side did nothing to escalate. Now they were coming across with four or five divisions.)
The interpretation of Gromyko's remarks was continued at this point.
Gromyko said that when Mr. Goldberg spoke to the United Nations and had put forward what we called
a program for ending the war, the United States Minister of Defense had made quite another statement,
implying a widening of the war.
(The President interjected that when Ambassador Goldberg made that statement, the Minister of Defense
had asked Congress to place orders for planes for delivery two or three years from now. He assumed the
Soviet Union may have placed some orders about the same time, but this had nothing to do with the
Goldberg speech. He said we might also have laid the keels for some ships to be delivered six years
from now.)
(The President again interrupted the interpreter to ask if Mr. Gromyko wanted to stop half the war or all
of it. Mr. Gromyko replied that stopping the bombing was the first of first steps. This would bring a
better atmosphere for a general settlement.)
The interpreter continued.
Mr. Gromyko asked what would happen if the United States widened the war and other countries,
including the Soviet Union would give further aid to Viet-Nam. In that case, the Soviet Union and the
United States would find themselves drawn into these events. The Soviet Union earnestly believed that
the key to a solution was in the hands of the United States. The President had said he wanted the Soviet
Union to use its influence to end the war. Although the Soviet Union did not engage in negotiations, he
did not deny that they had some influence among their own friends but the position of the United States
made it more difficult for the Soviet Union to use this influence. The Soviet Union was in favor of
ending the war in Viet-Nam and believed this was in the interests of the great powers, including the
United States. The first of first steps was to stop the bombing. Mr. Gromyko said he could not say what

North Viet-Nam or the NLF would do, but the reaction would be a different one. He repeated he was
prepared to say that the behavior of the other side would be different if the United States ended the
bombing of North Viet-Nam.
The President said he had received some suggestions for a bombing pause twice before. The first time
the other side sent our note back to us. As for the second pause, Ambassador Dobrynin would recall that
he had been instrumental in convincing McGeorge Bundy and others that we should try another pause.
The President asked whether if we stopped bombing, the other side would continue to bomb our soldiers
in South Viet-Nam. We were prepared to stop the bombing if they would say what they would do if we
did stop. The President asked Mr. Gromyko how long he thought we should stop before we should get
some reaction. He also asked Mr. Gromyko what the reaction would be in his country if they found
themselves in similar circumstances.
Mr. Gromkyo replied that the Soviet Union had no soldiers in the same situation as ours. He observed
that the President had said we had stopped bombing and we had told the Soviet Government that we
were going to pause and see what happened. This was not said in public statements but tens of
governments knew that this was our position.
(At this point the President interrupted to say that he understood the Soviet Government had
recommended this. Gromyko said this was true, but without conditions.)
Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviets were very sincere in their point of view. It was their earnest
opinion that the United States had no interest in establishing a base in Viet-Nam.
(The President interrupted to say that he agreed.)
Mr. Gromyko continued that when the question arose about the withdrawal of troops, the United States
had avoided being specific and had given only a very general statement. He said that perhaps if we were
more specific and would give a more concrete statement, this might be of use. He said that the Soviet
Union was not holding anything back and was acting in good faith. They would like to see the end of the
war.
The President said that he agreed. He had never questioned the Soviet good faith and he fully agreed
with the importance of peace to both of us. He wondered if the Minister had any idea of what the other
side would do. He saw some merit in stopping the bombing if the other side would stop. He pointed out
that they had killed more of our soldiers with mortars and bombs than we had killed in the North by
aerial bombardment. Was he expected to, in effect, tie our soldiers' hands behind their backs? He said,
however, he would give attention to Mr. Gromyko's suggestion for clarification of our position and in
his next public statement he would be careful to try to make our position clear. As he had said in
Baltimore, we were ready to talk without conditions at any time and any place. We were ready to
withdraw our troops when the other side was willing to stop bombing us and to withdraw their troops.
The President said we would like to take the resources we are spending on killing people and use them
to enable these people to live longer, both in North and in South Viet-Nam.
Mr. Gromyko said he could only repeat that the Soviet Union could not give a detailed schedule as to
what the other side would do, but he could say that the reaction of the other side could be very different.
The discussion continued on the subject of non-proliferation.
265. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to

Secretary of State Rusk/1/

RFE-41
Washington, October 11, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions
and Initiatives, DRV North Vietnam. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; Limited
Distribution.
SUBJECT
The Vietnam War: Situation and Prospects
Underlying the rigid Communist response to peace proposals from all quarters is an apparent confidence
in ultimate victory. This memorandum, prepared at the request of the Under Secretary, examines some
of the factors in both South and North Vietnam on which they may base the view that, their heavy losses
notwithstanding, they still hold the advantage, and assesses the threat in Chinese intervention against the
background of the Mainland's internal upheaval.
Abstract
The massive introduction of US forces into Vietnam beginning in 1965 retrieved a situation that was all
but desperate. In the period immediately preceding our intervention on the ground, the GVN military
response to the Communist drive had become virtually ineffective. The Communists were able to
maintain at increasingly high levels the harassment of small forces, military outposts, administrative
centers, and lines of communication that denied the government control of much of the countryside.
Further in their increasing resort to large-scale operations, they were able to take full advantage of GVN
military weaknesses in organization, force strength, mobility, and morale. With the GVN military fabric
increasingly stretched and torn, the prospects that the country could be held together politically to
support continued resistance over any long period were growing dim.
US intervention faced the Communists with a force of great mobility, vast fire power, and increasing
strength. In so doing, it blunted their military offensive, heavily increased their costs in both North and
South, seriously reduced their opportunities to move unexpectedly in strength, and opened them to
attack in formerly almost impregnable base areas. At the same time, the new US role reassured the
South that the US commitment was a firm and lasting one, and insulated the government against the full
consequences of its many and continued weaknesses in cohesiveness, performance, and support.
This said, however, it must also be noted that the Communists retain the capability and, by all evidence,
the will to prolong the war over a considerable period. They have shown that they are still able to
increase the number of the small unit and harassing actions that have been the real key to their success to
date, maintain their political infrastructure, interdict lines of communication, and reinforce and supply
themselves from both North and South. For its part, the GVN has not yet been able to increase its
control of the countryside to any appreciable extent despite its own and our efforts to move more rapidly
into effective pacification programs.
The Communists can still utilize or at least deny to the government much of the terrain and resources of
the countryside. They are also fielding a combat force almost equal in number to allied forces actually
committed to combat, and thus still have some basis for believing that in due course they will be able
completely to undermine the resistance of the South. In their apparent confidence that domestic and

international pressures will make it impossible for the US to stay the course, they are open to misreading
a situation with which they have little or no first-hand familiarity. They may well be closer to the mark
however, in their belief that they can maintain much of their position in the countryside and that--as the
war presses increasingly heavily on an urban population thus far relatively immune to their political
influence--they can make political inroads in the cities to the point where the impact of the US presence
as well as the level of conflict will become intolerable to the people of South Vietnam.
In the North, the war appears to be having a severe but not unbearable impact. The North Vietnamese
people seem somewhat weary but not disaffected, and the regime has no evident difficulty in exercising
effective control. The leadership had debated alternate strategies for conducting the war in the South, but
has not deviated from basic policy goals nor altered its carefully balanced attitude towards Moscow and
Peking. Bombing has seriously disrupted North Vietnam's small modern industrial sector as well as
seaborne foreign trade, but has not materially interfered with the maintenance of transportation and lines
of communications adequate to sustain its war effort. While some shortages of consumer goods exist,
the supply of basic commodities, including foodstuffs, appears adequate for minimal needs. Some
evacuation of urban areas, particularly Hanoi, has taken place recently.
Although it is too early to make any final judgment on the effects of the Peking purge, it has yet to result
in any increased militancy on the part of the regime. The Chinese continue to view the conflict as
essentially a Vietnamese affair. Like Hanoi, they may feel that Communist prospects in the war are far
from bad and that current levels of Chinese aid, together with North Vietnamese resources and
assistance from other Communist countries, may be enough to maintain Hanoi's will to fight and to lead
eventually to the wearing out of American patience and determination. In addition, fear of US retaliation
in all probability weighs importantly in China's calculus. Thus it appears that at the war's current level of
intensity, which involves neither a threat of invasion of North Vietnamese or Chinese territory nor the
destruction of the Hanoi regime, the Chinese will not actively and openly intervene in the fighting./2/
/2/This conclusion parallels that made in the latest coordinated estimate by the intelligence community
on "Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation" (SNIE 13-66, August 4, 1966,
SECRET). [Footnote in the source text. For SNIE 13-66, see Document 201.]
[Here follows the 13-page body of the research memorandum.]
266. Letter From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 13, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15.
No classification marking.
Dear Mr. President:
In spite of your repeated efforts and those of Arthur Goldberg and others, a way to open the door to
negotiations on Viet Nam has yet to be found. With the passing of time, I am afraid that the options are
growing fewer and that we are beginning to run out of alternatives.
It would be my hope, as I know it is yours, that we lose neither the desire nor the will to continue to try
to bring about an honorable conference. In my judgment, the negotiation of a just and mutually
acceptable settlement in the near future is the one possible way to end this war in accord with the
interests of the United States. The alternative of looking for a way out by continuing to raise the military

ante gets us in deeper all the time, with no terminus in sight. In the end, we are likely to wind up either
in war with China, or all of Viet Nam (if not all of Southeast Asia) will be so devastated and
depopulated by protracted conflict that the great delta areas of that vast region may become once again,
as in the remote past, "natural" areas for colonization by the surplus rice farmers of China.
So I would say, with all due respect, that we should go to very great lengths to try at once to reduce the
intensity of the struggle, both from the point of view of checking the rising cost in lives and resources,
and as a possible prelude to negotiations. We should do so, not out of fear of the Viet Cong--the war is
far more miserable for them than it is for us--and they know it. We should do so, not because we lack
the means or will to stay with this conflict--we have both for as long as it is necessary and useful, and
the world knows it. We should do so, rather, because a prompt settlement is the best, if not the only way,
to serve our interests and those of the people of Viet Nam whom we set out to help in the first place.
On the basis of this view, I would respectfully suggest that the following points be considered for
incorporation into existing efforts to bring about negotiations:
1. We should be prepared to terminate the bombing of North Viet Nam abruptly, without indicating
whether it is permanent or temporary, but in the expectation that it will help to open negotiations in any
reasonable forum, whether it is Geneva, the U.N., and Asian conference, or some other.
2. We should be prepared for an immediate and reciprocal "hold-fire" ("fire only if fired upon") in South
Viet Nam, to be succeeded by a firm "cease-fire" and "stand-fast," as soon as the conditions thereof can
be agreed upon in negotiations.
3. We should be prepared for a token and unilateral withdrawal of 30,000 U.S. forces, to be completed
during the first week or ten days of negotiations, and we should be prepared to work out a time-table for
joint and total withdrawals of all forces alien to South Viet Nam as part of a settlement by negotiations.
4. We should be prepared for the full participation of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front in
all negotiations, with the understanding that they can be represented separately or together with Hanoi,
as they choose, along with the Saigon military government.
If these points seems useful in your judgment, I would suggest, further that U Thant be enlisted, in his
diplomatic capacity, to convey their content, as he sees fit, to the Hanoi government. If, for some reason,
his services cannot be effectively used at this time, other routes such as Rangoon, Paris, or the Vatican
or even a direct U.S. approach to Hanoi might be considered. However, these would be of considerably
less utility, in my opinion, than the mediation of U Thant, with whom I am sure, on the basis of your
New York meeting, you have a closer rapport.
In writing you, I have advanced what I hope are helpful suggestions for you to use or discard as you see
fit. Some of them you may have already considered, because all of them, in my opinion, fit in with
public statements of our position which you have made in the past.
While a military victory against us is impossible, our national interests seem to me to require of us that
we seek a restoration of peace at the earliest possible time. The approach suggested above is not "tuck
tail and run." Rather, it is proposed in the hope that it will be useful in producing bona fide negotiations
which will accord with our interests, the needs of the Vietnamese people, and the hope and expectations
of the world.
Respectfully,

Mike Mansfield
267. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb. Harriman-Negotiations Comm. Top Secret; Nodis.
SUBJECT
"Negotiations Committee"
The Committee believes/2/ that an encouraging aspect of Gromyko's visit was the evident Soviet desire
to have the war end in Vietnam. Another gain is that the Soviets have been put on the spot publicly as
having a responsibility to get negotiations going. Sometime after our elections, which will undoubtedly
confirm US support for your policy in Vietnam, consideration should be given to the next step in our
dialogue with the Russians. I believe your statement to the press yesterday regarding your talks with
Gromyko/3/ will be given searching consideration in Moscow and perhaps provide a basis for progress
in later discussions.
/2/A memorandum of the Committee's meeting at 4.30 p.m. on October 14 is in Department of State,
Central Files, POL 7 PHIL.
/3/For text of the President's statement, made during his news conference in Washington on October 13,
see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 11661167.
In Manila, we hope that you will have an opportunity to impress on Ky (as well as Lodge): (1) The
importance we place on the constitutional process with the emergence of a government that has
legitimate roots. This will vastly strengthen not only the position of Saigon but our own position in
international discussions and world opinion. (2) We hope that in the speech which Chairman Thieu or
Prime Minister Ky will deliver on November 1, the anniversary of the revolution, there will be included
a declaration on amnesty and national reconciliation. You have placed great emphasis in your public
statements on the fact that the people of South Vietnam should be permitted to settle their own affairs.
This means that if the NLF-VC abandon violence, these people would have the opportunity to play a
legitimate role in the political life of the country./4/
/4/In a 9-page memorandum to Harriman on "The Pursuit of Peace in Manila and Elsewhere," October
14, Cooper sought to "diagnose the reasons for Hanoi's sluggish responses to our overtures and to
prescribe some new medicine that might produce a bit more animation." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XL)
I talked to Gene Black yesterday in New York and suggested that in his trip to the Far East, he might be
able to develop more specific ideas about economic cooperation with North Vietnam on a regional basis
after the end of the war. This would be a follow-up of your Johns Hopkins speech. Saigon for its part
could offer the possibility of trade relations, especially in rice, which would be mutually beneficial and
relieve Hanoi's dependence on Peking. Out of Gene's talks and the discussions at Manila could come
Asian proposals that might give some inducement to Hanoi to end the war.

Averell
268. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Top Secret.
Also printed in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 348-355. McNamara submitted the
report to the President after visiting Vietnam October 10-13.
SUBJECT
Actions recommended for Vietnam
1. Evaluation of the situation. In the report of my last trip to Vietnam almost a year ago,/2/ I stated that
the odds were about even that, even with the then-recommended deployments, we would be faced in
early 1967 with a military stand-off at a much higher level of conflict and with "pacification" still
stalled. I am a little less pessimistic now in one respect. We have done somewhat better militarily than I
anticipated. We have by and large blunted the communist military initiative--any military victory in
South Vietnam the Viet Cong may have had in mind 18 months ago has been thwarted by our
emergency deployments and actions. And our program of bombing the North has exacted a price.
/2/November 30, 1965; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 591-594.
My concern continues, however, in other respects. This is because I see no reasonable way to bring the
war to an end soon. Enemy morale has not broken--he apparently has adjusted to our stopping his drive
for military victory and has adopted a strategy of keeping us busy and waiting us out (a strategy of
attriting our national will). He knows that we have not been, and he believes we probably will not be,
able to translate our military successes into the "end products"--broken enemy morale and political
achievements by the GVN.
The one thing demonstrably going for us in Vietnam over the past year has been the large number of
enemy killed-in-action resulting from the big military operations. Allowing for possible exaggeration in
reports, the enemy must be taking losses--deaths in and after battle--at the rate of more than 60,000 a
year. The infiltration routes would seem to be one-way trails to death for the North Vietnamese. Yet
there is no sign of an impending break in enemy morale and it appears that he can more than replace his
losses by infiltration from North Vietnam and recruitment in South Vietnam.
Pacification is a bad disappointment. We have good grounds to be pleased by the recent elections, by
Ky's 16 months in power, and by the faint signs of development of national political institutions and of a
legitimate civil government. But none of this has translated itself into political achievements at Province
level or below. Pacification has if anything gone backward. As compared with two, or four, years ago,
enemy full-time regional forces and part-time guerrilla forces are larger; attacks, terrorism and sabotage
have increased in scope and intensity; more railroads are closed and highways cut; the rice crop
expected to come to market is smaller; we control little, if any, more of the population; the VC political
infrastructure thrives in most of the country, continuing to give the enemy his enormous intelligence
advantage; full security exists nowhere (not even behind the US Marines' lines and in Saigon); in the
countryside, the enemy almost completely controls the night.
Nor has the Rolling Thunder program of bombing the North either significantly affected infiltration or
cracked the morale of Hanoi. There is agreement in the intelligence community on these facts (see the

attached Appendix)./3/
/3/Printed below.
In essence, we find ourselves--from the point of view of the important war (for the complicity of the
people)--no better, and if anything worse off. This important war must be fought and won by the
Vietnamese themselves. We have known this from the beginning. But the discouraging truth is that, as
was the case in 1961 and 1963 and 1965, we have not found the formula, the catalyst, for training and
inspiring them into effective action.
2. Recommended actions. In such an unpromising state of affairs, what should we do? We must continue
to press the enemy militarily; we must make demonstrable progress in pacification; at the same time, we
must add a new ingredient forced on us by the facts. Specifically, we must improve our position by
getting ourselves into a military posture that we credibly would maintain indefinitely--a posture that
makes trying to "wait us out" less attractive. I recommend a five-pronged course of action to achieve
those ends.
a. Stabilize US force levels in Vietnam. It is my judgment that, barring a dramatic change in the war, we
should limit the increase in US forces in SVN in 1967 to 70,000 men and we should level off at the total
of 470,000 which such an increase would provide./4/ It is in my view that this is enough to punish the
enemy at the large-unit operations level and to keep the enemy's main forces from interrupting
pacification. I believe also that even many more than 470,000 would not kill the enemy off in such
numbers as to break their morale so long as they think they can wait us out. It is possible that such a 40
percent increase over our present level of 325,000 will break the enemy's morale in the short term; but if
it does not, we must, I believe, be prepared for and have underway a long-term program premised on
more than breaking the morale of main force units. A stabilized US force level would be part of such a
long-term program. It would put us in a position where negotiations would be more likely to be
productive, but if they were not we could pursue the all-important pacification task with proper attention
and resources and without the spectre of apparently endless escalation of US deployments.
/4/Admiral Sharp has recommended a 12/31/67 strength of 570,000. However, I believe both he and
General Westmoreland recognize that the danger of inflation will probably force an end 1967
deployment limit of about 470,000. [Footnote in the source text.]
b. Install a barrier. A portion of the 470,000 troops--perhaps 10,000 to 20,000--should be devoted to the
construction and maintenance of an infiltration barrier. Such a barrier would lie near the 17th parallel-would run from the sea, across the neck of South Vietnam (choking off the new infiltration routes
through the DMZ) and across the trails in Laos. This interdiction system (at an approximate cost of $1
billion) would comprise to the east a ground barrier of fences, wire, sensors, artillery, aircraft and mobile
troops; and to the west--mainly in Laos--an interdiction zone covered by air-laid mines and bombing
attacks pin-pointed by air-laid acoustic sensors.
The barrier may not be fully effective at first, but I believe that it can be made effective in time and that
even the threat of its becoming effective can substantially change to our advantage the character of the
war. It would hinder enemy efforts, would permit more efficient use of the limited number of friendly
troops, and would be persuasive evidence both that our sole aim is to protect the South from the North
and that we intend to see the job through.
c. Stabilize the Rolling Thunder program against the North. Attack sorties in North Vietnam have risen
from about 4,000 per month at the end of last year to 6,000 per month in the first quarter of this year and

12,000 per month at present. Most of our 50 percent increase of deployed attack-capable aircraft has
been absorbed in the attacks on North Vietnam. In North Vietnam, almost 84,000 attack sorties have
been flown (about 25 percent against fixed targets), 45 percent during the past seven months.
Despite these efforts, it now appears that the North Vietnamese-Laotian road network will remain
adequate to meet the requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam--this is so even if its
capacity could be reduced by one-third and if combat activities were to be doubled. North Vietnam's
serious need for trucks, spare parts and petroleum probably can, despite air attacks, be met by imports.
The petroleum requirement for trucks involved in the infiltration movement, for example, has not been
enough to present significant supply problems, and the effects of the attacks on the petroleum
distribution system, while they have not yet been fully assessed, are not expected to cripple the flow of
essential supplies. Furthermore, it is clear that, to bomb the North sufficiently to make a radical impact
upon Hanoi's political, economic and social structure, would require an effort which we could make but
which would not be stomached either by our own people or by world opinion; and it would involve a
serious risk of drawing us into open war with China.
The North Vietnamese are paying a price. They have been forced to assign some 300,000 personnel to
the lines of communication in order to maintain the critical flow of personnel and materiel to the South.
Now that the lines of communication have been manned, however, it is doubtful that either a large
increase or decrease in our interdiction sorties would substantially change the cost to the enemy of
maintaining the roads, railroads, and waterways or affect whether they are operational. It follows that the
marginal sorties--probably the marginal 1,000 or even 5,000 sorties--per month against the lines of
communication no longer have a significant impact on the war. (See the attached excerpts from
intelligence estimates.)
When this marginal inutility of added sorties against North Vietnam and Laos is compared with the crew
and aircraft losses implicit in the activity (four men and aircraft and $20 million per 1,000 sorties), I
recommend, as a minimum, against increasing the level of bombing of North Vietnam and against
increasing the intensity of operations by changing the areas or kinds of targets struck./5/
/5/See footnote on page 7. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to footnote 8 below.]
Under these conditions, the bombing program would continue the pressure and would remain available
as a bargaining counter to get talks started (or to trade off in talks). But, as in the case of a stabilized
level of US ground forces, the stabilization of Rolling Thunder would remove the prospect of everescalating bombing as a factor complicating our political posture and distracting from the main job of
pacification in South Vietnam.
At the proper time, as discussed on pages 6-7 below,/6/ I believe we should consider terminating
bombing in all of North Vietnam, or at least in the Northeast zones, for an indefinite period in
connection with covert moves toward peace.
/6/Section 2e, below, entitled "Press for negotiations."
d. Pursue a vigorous pacification program. As mentioned above, the pacification (Revolutionary
Development) program has been and is thoroughly stalled. The large-unit operations war, which we
know best how to fight and where we have had our successes, is largely irrelevant to pacification as long
as we do not lose it. By and large, the people in rural areas believe that the GVN when it comes will not
stay but that the VC will; that cooperation with the GVN will be punished by the VC; that the GVN is
really indifferent to the people's welfare; that the low-level GVN are tools of the local rich; and that the

GVN is ridden with corruption.

Success in pacification depends on the interrelated functions of providing physical security, destroying
the VC apparatus, motivating the people to cooperate, and establishing responsive local government. An
obviously necessary but not sufficient requirement for success of the Revolutionary Development cadre
and police is vigorously conducted and adequately prolonged clearing operations by military troops,
who will "stay" in the area, who behave themselves decently and who show some respect for the people.
This elemental requirement of pacification has been missing.
In almost no contested area designated for pacification in recent years have ARVN forces actually
"cleared and stayed" to a point where cadre teams, if available, could have stayed overnight in hamlets
and survived, let alone accomplish their mission. VC units of company and even battalion size remain in
operation, and they are more than large enough to overrun anything the local security forces can put up.
Now that the threat of Communist main-force military victory has been thwarted by our emergency
efforts, we must allocate far more attention and a portion of the regular military forces (at least half of
the ARVN and perhaps a portion of the US forces) to the task of providing an active and permanent
security screen behind which the Revolutionary Development teams and police can operate and behind
which the political struggle with the VC infrastructure can take place.
The US cannot do this pacification security job for the Vietnamese. All we can do is "massage the
heart." For one reason, it is known that we do not intend to stay; if our efforts worked at all, it would
merely postpone the eventual confrontation of the VC and GVN infrastructures. The GVN must do the
job; and I am convinced that drastic reform is needed if the GVN is going to be able to do it.
The first essential reform is in the attitude of GVN officials. They are generally apathetic, and there is
corruption high and low. Often appointments, promotions, and draft deferments must be bought; and
kickbacks on salaries are common. Cadre at the bottom can be no better than the system above them.
The second needed reform is in the attitude and conduct of the ARVN. The image of the government
cannot improve unless and until the ARVN improves markedly. They do not understand the importance
(or respectability) of pacification nor the importance to pacification of proper, disciplined conduct.
Promotions, assignments and awards are often not made on merit, but rather on the basis of having a
diploma, friends or relatives, or because of bribery. The ARVN is weak in dedication, direction and
discipline.
Not enough ARVN are devoted to area and population security, and when the ARVN does attempt to
support pacification, their actions do not last long enough; their tactics are bad despite US prodding (no
aggressive small-unit saturation patrolling, hamlet searches, quick-reaction contact, or offensive night
ambushes); they do not make good use of intelligence; and their leadership and discipline are bad.
Furthermore, it is my conviction that a part of the problem undoubtedly lies in bad management on the
American as well as the GVN side. Here split responsibility--or "no responsibility"--has resulted in too
little hard pressure on the GVN to do its job and no really solid or realistic planning with respect to the
whole effort. We must deal with this management problem now and deal with it effectively.
One solution would be to consolidate all US activities which are primarily part of the civilian
pacification program and all persons engaged in such activities, providing a clear assignment of
responsibility and a unified command under a civilian relieved of all other duties./7/ Under this

approach, there would be a carefully delineated division of responsibility between the civilian-in-charge
and an element of COMUSMACV under a senior officer, who would give the subject of planning for
and providing hamlet security the highest priority in attention and resources. Success will depend on the
men selected for the jobs on both sides (they must be among the highest rank and most competent
administrators in the US Government), on complete cooperation among the US elements, and on the
extent to which the South Vietnamese can be shocked out of their present pattern of behavior. The first
work of this reorganized US pacification organization should be to produce within 60 days a realistic
and detailed plan for the coming year.
/7/If this task is assigned to Ambassador Porter, another individual must be sent immediately to Saigon
to serve as Ambassador Lodge's deputy. [Footnote in the source text.]
From the political and public-relations viewpoint, this solution is preferable--if it works. But we cannot
tolerate continued failure. If it fails after a fair trial, the only alternative in my view is to place the entire
pacification program--civilian and military--under General Westmoreland. This alternative would result
in the establishment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification who would be in command of all
pacification staffs in Saigon and of all pacification staffs and activities in the field; one person in each
corps, province and district would be responsible for the US effort.
(It should be noted that progress in pacification, more than anything else, will persuade the enemy to
negotiate or withdraw.)
e. Press for negotiations. I am not optimistic that Hanoi or the VC will respond to peace overtures now
(explaining my recommendations above that we get into a level-off posture for the long pull). The ends
sought by the two sides appear to be irreconcilable and the relative power balance is not in their view
unfavorable to them. But three things can be done, I believe, to increase the prospects:
(1) Take steps to increase the credibility of our peace gestures in the minds of the enemy. There is
considerable evidence both in private statements by the Communists and in the reports of competent
Western officials who have talked with them that charges of US bad faith are not solely propagandistic,
but reflect deeply held beliefs. Analyses of Communists' statements and actions indicate that they firmly
believe that American leadership really does not want the fighting to stop, and that we are intent on
winning a military victory in Vietnam and on maintaining our presence there through a puppet regime
supported by US military bases.
As a way of projecting US bona fides, I believe that we should consider two possibilities with respect to
our bombing program against the North, to be undertaken, if at all, at a time very carefully selected with
a view to maximizing the chances of influencing the enemy and world opinion and to minimizing the
chances that failure would strengthen the hand of the "hawks" at home: First, without fanfare,
conditions, or avowal, whether the stand-down was permanent or temporary, stop bombing all of North
Vietnam. It is generally thought that Hanoi will not agree to negotiations until they can claim that the
bombing has stopped unconditionally. We should see what develops, retaining freedom to resume the
bombing if nothing useful was forthcoming.
Alternatively, we could shift the weight-of-effort away from "Zones 6A and 6B"--zones including Hanoi
and Haiphong and areas north of those two cities to the Chinese border. This alternative has some
attraction in that it provides the North Vietnamese a "face saver" if only problems of "face" are holding
up Hanoi peace gestures; it would narrow the bombing down directly to the objectionable infiltration
(supporting the logic of a stop-infiltration/full-pause deal); and it would reduce the international heat on
the US. Here, too, bombing of the Northeast could be resumed at any time, or "spot" attacks could be

made there from time to time to keep North Vietnam off balance and to require her to pay almost the full
cost by maintaining her repair crews in place. The sorties diverted from Zones 6A and 6B could be
concentrated on the infiltration routes in Zones 1 and 2 (the southern end of North Vietnam, including
the Mu Gia Pass), in Laos and in South Vietnam./8/
/8/Any limitation on the bombing of North Vietnam will cause serious psychological problems among
the men who are risking their lives to help achieve our political objectives; among their commanders up
to and including the JCS; and among those of our people who cannot understand why we should
withhold punishment from the enemy. General Westmoreland, as do the JCS, strongly believes in the
military value of the bombing program. Further, Westmoreland reports that the morale of his Air Force
personnel may already be showing signs of erosion--an erosion resulting from current operational
restrictions. [Footnote in the source text.]
To the same end of improving our credibility, we should seek ways--through words and deeds--to make
believable our intention to withdraw our forces once the North Vietnamese aggression against the South
stops. In particular, we should avoid any implication that we will stay in South Vietnam with bases or to
guarantee any particular outcome to a solely South Vietnamese struggle.
(2) Try to split the VC off from Hanoi. The intelligence estimate is that evidence is overwhelming that
the North Vietnamese dominate and control the National Front and the Viet Cong. Nevertheless, I think
we should continue and enlarge efforts to contact the VC/NLF and to probe ways to split members or
sections off the VC/NLF organization.
(3) Press contacts with North Vietnam, the Soviet Union and other parties who might contribute toward
a settlement.
(4) Develop a realistic plan providing a role for the VC in negotiations, post-war life, and government of
the nation. An amnesty offer and proposals for national reconciliation would be steps in the right
direction and should be parts of the plan. It is important that this plan be one which will appear
reasonable, if not at first to Hanoi and the VC, at least to world opinion.
3. The prognosis. The prognosis is bad that the war can be brought to a satisfactory conclusion within
the next two years. The large-unit operations probably will not do it; negotiations probably will not do it.
While we should continue to pursue both of these routes in trying for a solution in the short run, we
should recognize that success from them is a mere possibility, not a probability.
The solution lies in girding, openly, for a longer war and in taking actions immediately which will in 12
to 18 months give clear evidence that the continuing costs and risks to the American people are
acceptably limited, that the formula for success has been found, and that the end of the war is merely a
matter of time. All of my recommendations will contribute to this strategy, but the one most difficult to
implement is perhaps the most important one--enlivening the pacification program. The odds are less
than even for this task, if only because we have failed consistently since 1961 to make a dent in the
problem. But, because the 1967 trend of pacification will, I believe, be the main talisman of ultimate US
success or failure in Vietnam, extraordinary imagination and effort should go into changing the stripes
of that problem.
President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky are thinking along similar lines. They told me that they do not
expect the enemy to negotiate or to modify his program in less than two years. Rather, they expect the
enemy to continue to expand and to increase his activity. They expressed agreement with us that the key
to success is pacification and that so far pacification has failed. They agree that we need clarification of

GVN and US roles and that the bulk of the ARVN should be shifted to pacification. Ky will, between
January and July 1967, shift all ARVN infantry divisions to that role. And he is giving Thang, a good
Revolutionary Development director, added powers. Thieu and Ky see this as part of a two-year (196768) schedule, in which offensive operations against enemy main force units are continued, carried on
primarily by the US and other Free World forces. At the end of the two-year period, they believe the
enemy may be willing to negotiate or to retreat from his current course of action./9/
/9/Lodge's report of McNamara's meeting with Thieu and Ky is in telegram 8161 from Saigon, October
11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US-VIET S) Westmoreland's memorandum for the record
of McNamara's meeting with Ky, October 11, is in the Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, #9
History File.
Note: Neither the Secretary of State nor the JCS have yet had an opportunity to express their views on
this report. Mr. Katzenbach and I have discussed many of its main conclusions and recommendations--in
general, but not in all particulars, it expresses his views as well as my own.
Appendix
Extracts from CIA/DIA Report "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam through 12 September
1966"/10/
/10/Not found.
1. There is no evidence yet of any shortage of POL in North Vietnam and stocks on hand, with recent
imports, have been adequate to sustain necessary operations.
2. Air strikes against all modes of transportation in North Vietnam increased during the past month, but
there is no evidence of serious transport problems in the movement of supplies to or within North
Vietnam.
3. There is no evidence yet that the air strikes have significantly weakened popular morale.
4. Air strikes continue to depress economic growth and have been responsible for the abandonment of
some plans for economic development, but essential economic activities continue.
Extracts from a March 16, 1966 CIA Report "An Analysis of the Rolling Thunder Air Offensive against
North Vietnam"/11/
/11/Not found.
1. Although the movement of men and supplies in North Vietnam has been hampered and made
somewhat more costly [by our bombing],/12/ the Communists have been able to increase the flow of
supplies and manpower to South Vietnam.
/12/All brackets are in the source text.
2. Hanoi's determination [despite our bombing] to continue its policy of supporting the insurgency in the
South appears as firm as ever.
3. Air attacks almost certainly cannot bring about a meaningful reduction in the current level at which

essential supplies and men flow into South Vietnam.

Bomb Damage Assessment in the North by the Institute forDefense Analysis' "Summer Study
Group"/13/
/13/A full copy of the report, "The Effects of U.S. Bombing on North Vietnam's Ability To Support
Military Operations in South Vietnam and Laos: Retrospects and Prospect," August 29, is in the Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 192, The Effects of U. S. Bombing.
Attached is a memorandum from Ginsburgh to Rostow, September 13, critiquing the five points
excerpted in the Appendix printed here.
What surprised us [in our assessment of the effect of bombing North Vietnam] was the extent of
agreement among various intelligence agencies on the effects of past operations and probable effects of
continued and expanded Rolling Thunder. The conclusions of our group, to which we all subscribe, are
therefore merely sharpened conclusions of numerous Intelligence summaries. They are that Rolling
Thunder does not limit the present logistic flow into SVN because NVN is neither the source of supplies
nor the choke-point on the supply routes from China and USSR. Although an expansion of Rolling
Thunder by closing Haiphong harbor, eliminating electric power plants and totally destroying railroads,
will at least indirectly impose further privations on the populace of NVN and make the logistic support
of VC costlier to maintain, such expansion will not really change the basic assessment. This follows
because NVN has demonstrated excellent ability to improvise transportation, and because the primitive
nature of their economy is such that Rolling Thunder can affect directly only a small fraction of the
population. There is very little hope that the Ho Chi Minh Government will lose control of population
because of Rolling Thunder. The lessons of the Korean War are very relevant in these respects.
Moreover, foreign economic aid to NVN is large compared to the damage we inflict, and growing.
Probably the government of NVN has assurances that the USSR and/or China will assist the rebuilding
of its economy after the war, and hence its concern about the damage being inflicted may be moderated
by long-range favorable expectations. Specifically:
1. As of July 1966 the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam had had no measurable direct effect on Hanoi's
ability to mount and support military operations in the South at the current level.
2. Since the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program the damage to facilities and equipment in North
Vietnam has been more than offset by the increased flow of military and economic aid, largely from the
USSR and Communist China.
3. The aspects of the basic situation that have enabled Hanoi to continue its support of military
operations in the South and to neutralize the impact of U.S. bombing by passing the economic costs to
other Communist countries are not likely to be altered by reducing the present geographic constraints,
mining Haiphong and the principal harbors in North Vietnam, increasing the number of armed
reconnaissance sorties and otherwise expanding the U.S. air offensive along the lines now contemplated
in military recommendations and planning studies.
4. While conceptually it is reasonable to assume that some limit may be imposed on the scale of military
activity that Hanoi can maintain in the South by continuing the Rolling Thunder program at the present,
or some higher level effort, there appears to be no basis for defining that limit in concrete terms, or for
concluding that the present scale of VC/NVN activities in the field have approached that limit.
5. The indirect effects of the bombing on the will of the North Vietnamese to continue fighting and on
their leaders' appraisal of the prospective gains and costs of maintaining the present policy have not

shown themselves in any tangible way. Furthermore, we have not discovered any basis for concluding
that the indirect punitive effects of bombing will prove decisive in these respects.
Robert S. McNamara
269. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-672-66
Washington, October 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Top Secret.
McNamara noted on his copy of the memorandum that it was received at 8:50 a.m. on October 15 and
that a copy was sent to the President. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files:
FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966)
SUBJECT
Actions Recommended for Vietnam (U)
1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed your memorandum to the President, subject as above./2/
Their views as to the situation in Vietnam and the proper courses of US actions coincide substantially
with yours in many areas; however, in some important areas the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree with
you. For convenience of reference their comments are set forth in subsequent paragraphs in the same
sequence and with the same headings as in your memorandum.
/2/Document 268.
2. (TS) Evaluation of the Situation.
a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the military situation obtaining in Vietnam has improved
substantially over the past year. Since the President authorized the deployment of US ground forces to
South Vietnam (SVN), Free World military forces have enjoyed an almost unbroken series of successes
in combat. The few enemy victories have been gained at the expense of South Vietnamese Regional and
Popular Force units. Our present posture achieves our often-expressed objective of ensuring that the
enemy cannot win militarily in SVN at his current level of effort; our future programs should be geared,
as a minimum, to retaining this favorable situation. Our restricted air campaign against North Vietnam
(NVN) has destroyed substantial quantities of military supplies and war-supporting facilities, inflicted
major damage on lines of communication, and forced the diversion of at least 300,000 men from
agriculture and industry to repair and maintenance activities. The demands of communist leaders and
leftist sympathizers for cessation of bombing give strong indication of the impact the bombing is having
on the North Vietnamese. Widespread and uninhibited Viet Cong (VC) sabotage in SVN over a period
of five years has been far less detrimental to a sustained war effort.
b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree there is no reason to expect that the war can be brought soon to a
successful conclusion.
c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also agree that the enemy strategy appears to be to wait it out; in other
words, communist leaders in both North and South Vietnam expect to win this war in Washington, just
as they won the war with France in Paris. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there is
reason for such expectations on the part of the communist leadership.

d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that, manpower-wise, the enemy should be able to replace his heavy
combat losses. This assessment, however, does not--indeed, cannot--take into account the adverse
impact over time of continued bloody defeats on the morale of VC/NVA forces and the determination of
their political and military leaders. Pertinent to the foregoing, there is evidence that the VC increasingly
must resort to forced conscription to fill their ranks, and that men furnished from NVN to replace
casualties suffered by the 324B Division are a mixture of hard-nosed regular soldiers (about 25%),
fanatical communist volunteers (about 25%), and unmotivated conscripts (about 50%).
e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that pacification (revolutionary development) programs have not been,
and are not now, adequate to the situation.
f. Additional Comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that your memorandum addresses only SVN; it
does not consider the prospect of the expanding threat in northeast Thailand or Laos, or the requirement
for the Free World forces to cope with these threats.
3. (TS) Recommended Actions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in your general recommendations that
we should continue to press the enemy militarily, improve pacification programs, and attain a military
posture we can maintain indefinitely. Their comments on your specific recommendations are:
a. Stabilize US Force Levels--The danger to Government of Vietnam (GVN) viability imposed by
inflation is recognized. However, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that a stable, sustainable force
level in SVN is desirable, the suggested level of 470,000 is substantially less than earlier
recommendations of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. Hence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reserve judgment
upon the force level required until they have reviewed the revised programs now being prepared under
the supervision of Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland at Headquarters, Pacific Command. In this
connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff point out the necessity of having in CONUS, Hawaii, and Okinawa,
forces capable of immediate deployment to SVN to cope with contingencies.
b. Install Barriers--The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that barriers properly installed and defended by
ground and air effort can impede infiltration into SVN from NVN. As you know, they have reservations
concerning the effectiveness of the currently-proposed air-laid munitions barrier; moreover, they
consider that this effort must not be permitted to impair current military programs.
c. Stabilize Rolling Thunder--The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur in your recommendation that there
should be no increase in level of bombing effort and no modification in areas and targets subject to air
attack. They believe our air campaign against NVN to be an integral and indispensable part of our overall war effort. To be effective, the air campaign should be conducted with only those minimum
constraints necessary to avoid indiscriminate killing of population.
d. Improve Pacification Program--The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed you earlier that, to achieve early
optimum effectiveness, the pacification program should be transferred to COMUSMACV. They adhere
to that conclusion. However, if for political reasons a civilian-type organization should be considered
mandatory by the President, they would interpose no objection. Nevertheless, they are not sanguine that
an effective civilian-type organization can be erected, if at all, except at the expense of costly delays. As
to the use of a substantial fraction of the ARVN for pacification purposes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concur. However, they desire to flag that adoption of this concept will undoubtedly elicit charges of a
US takeover of combat operations at increased cost in American casualties.
e. Press for Negotiations--The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with your proposal that, as a carrot to
induce negotiations, we should suspend or reduce our bombing campaign against NVN. Our experiences

with pauses in bombing and resumption have not been happy ones. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff believe that the likelihood of the war being settled by negotiation is small; and that, far from
inducing negotiations, another bombing pause will be regarded by North Vietnamese leaders, and our
Allies, as renewed evidence of lack of US determination to press the war to a successful conclusion. The
bombing campaign is one of the two trump cards in the hands of the President (the other being the
presence of US troops in SVN). It should not be given up without an end to the NVN aggression in
SVN. As to maintaining contacts with NVN and the USSR in order to find ways to end the war, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff agree; however, they advocate that US personnel involved should reflect a quiet
determination to prosecute the war until communist aggression against SVN ceases.
4. (TS) Prognosis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree we cannot predict with confidence that the war can be
brought to an end in two years. Accordingly, for political, military, and psychological reasons, we
should prepare openly for a long-term, sustained military effort.
5. (TS) Additional Comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the war has reached a stage at which
decisions taken over the next sixty days can determine the outcome of the war and, consequently, can
affect the over-all security interests of the United States for years to come. Therefore, they wish to
provide to you and to the President their unequivocal views on two salient aspects of the war situation:
the search for peace; and military pressures on NVN.
a. The frequent, broadly-based public offers made by the President to settle the war by peaceful means
on a generous basis, which would take from NVN nothing it now has, have been admirable. Certainly,
no one--American or foreigner--except those who are determined not to be convinced, can doubt the
sincerity, the generosity, the altruism of US actions and objectives. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff the time has come when further overt actions and offers on our part are not only nonproductive,
they are counterproductive. A logical case can be made that the American people, our Allies, and our
enemies alike are increasingly uncertain as to our resolution to pursue the war to a successful
conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocate the following:
(1) A statement by the President during the Manila Conference of his unswerving determination to carry
on the war until NVN aggression against SVN shall cease;
(2) Continued covert exploration of all avenues leading to a peaceful settlement of war; and
(3) Continued alertness to detect and react appropriately to withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from
SVN and cessation of support to the VC.
b. In JCSM-955-64, dated 14 November 1964, and in JCSM-982-64, dated 23 November 1964,/3/ the
Joint Chiefs of Staff provided their views as to the military pressures which should be brought to bear on
NVN. In summary, they recommended a "sharp knock" on NVN military assets and war-supporting
facilities rather than the campaign of slowly increasing pressure which was adopted. Whatever the
political merits of the latter course, we deprived ourselves of the military effects of early weight of effort
and shock, and gave to the enemy time to adjust to our slow quantitative and qualitative increase of
pressure. This is not to say that it is now too late to derive military benefits from more effective and
extensive use of our air and naval superiority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:
/3/For text of both memoranda, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 902-906 and 932-935.
(1) Approval of their Rolling Thunder 52 program, which is a step toward meeting the requirement for
improved target systems. This program would decrease the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuary areas,

authorize attacks against the steel plant,/4/ the Hanoi rail yards, the thermal power plants, selected areas
within Haiphong port and other ports, selected locks and dams controlling water LOCs, SAM support
facilities within the residual Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuaries, and POL at Haiphong, Ha Gia (Phuc Yen)
and Can Thon (Kep).
/4/Inserted in handwriting at this point, apparently by McNamara, is "the cement plant."
(2) Use of naval surface forces to interdict North Vietnamese coastal waterborne traffic and appropriate
land LOCs and to attack other coastal military targets such as radar and AAA sites.
6. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that their views as set forth above be provided to the President.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle J. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
270. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence
Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, October 15, 1966.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job. 80-B01285A. Top Secret. Helms
forwarded a copy of the memorandum to McNamara under cover of an October 16 memorandum,
stating that it resulted "from a detailed analysis undertaken by the seven top officers in the Agency on
Vietnam" and "had been reviewed by the Deputy Directors involved as well as the undersigned." On his
copy of the memorandum, McNamara wrote: "Prepared by Dick [Helms] at my request." (Johnson
Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII)
SUBJECT
Comments on Secretary McNamara's Trip Report/2/
/2/Document 268.
SUMMARY
We endorse Secretary McNamara's evaluation of the situation and his prescriptive analysis of what
needs to be done. We have problems with his proposed package of "recommended actions" and serious
difficulties with the details of some of the actions recommended, particularly the "press for negotiation"
recommendations which we feel would be counterproductive. We consider his prognosis too gloomy. If
the odds for enlivening the pacification program are indeed "less than even", present U.S. objectives in
Vietnam are not likely to be achieved.
1. Evaluation of the Situation: Secretary McNamara's evaluation of the situation is sound, perceptive and
very much in line with our own appreciation. We agree that the struggle "for the complicity of the
people" is "the important war", though we feel that the important struggle is not just for the "complicity"
of the people but, rather, for their engagement, for a degree of active participation whereby they come to
identify their fortunes with the political institutions and instruments of a non-Communist Saigon
government. The only part of Secretary McNamara's evaluation with which we would take issue is its
concluding sentence. We believe that despite the errors and administrative weaknesses of present

programs, in the concept of revolutionary development (which involves much more than surface
"pacification") we have found the right formula, a catalyst that is potentially capable of inspiring the
Vietnamese into effective action. Revolutionary development, however, involves fundamental structural
and attitudinal changes in Vietnamese society which even perfectly conceived and managed programs
could not effect overnight. Thus, in spite of organizational weaknesses and performance shortfalls in our
present programs, it is far too early to write them off as discouraging failures. Serious and systematic
effort in this field is really a post-Honolulu Conference development and it would be unrealistic to
expect dramatic, readily quantifiable progress in the short span of eight months.
2. Recommended Actions: We agree that "we must continue to press the enemy militarily", that "we
must make demonstrable progress in pacification", and that "progress in pacification, more than
anything else, will persuade the enemy to negotiate or withdraw". (The last point is in our view the most
important one made in the whole report. It should be highlighted, not buried in a parenthetical aside at
the end of paragraph 2.d.). We also agree that the U.S. should adopt a military posture that unmistakably
signals its readiness to stick out a long war. Yet, though we agree with Secretary McNamara's
prescriptive analysis of what needs to be accomplished, we do not believe the specific action mix he
recommends would accomplish these objectives and feel that some elements of this recommended mix
(particularly the "press for negotiations") would actually be counterproductive.
3. The key problem here lies in the fact that the U.S. simply cannot try to work both sides of the street
and hope for any kind of success. On the one hand, we can keep the Communists under pressure and
militarily at bay while we endeavor to help the South Vietnamese build a viable political structure and
while at the same time we adopt a posture on negotiations which will put the onus on Hanoi, minimize
domestic and international pressures on the U.S., and avoid detrimental effect on our political efforts
within South Vietnam. Or, we can adopt a course of action which has some genuine chance of getting
Hanoi to the table within the reasonably near term future. We cannot realistically hope to do both
simultaneously.
4. Specific Action Recommendations: We have the following comments on the specific actions
recommended in Secretary McNamara's report.
a. U.S. force levels: A U.S. force level of 470,000 will be sufficient to punish the enemy at the large-unit
operations level and keep the enemy's main forces from interrupting pacification only if the increase
over present levels is primarily in maneuver battalions (not support elements) and if measures to check
the enemy's buildup through infiltration are effective.
b. The barrier: In order to achieve the objectives set for the barrier in our view it must be extended well
westward into Laos. Air interdiction of the routes in Laos unsupplemented by ground action will not
effectively check infiltration.
c. Rolling Thunder: We concur in Secretary McNamara's analysis of the effects of the Rolling Thunder
program, its potential for reducing the flow of essential supplies, and his judgment on the marginal
inutility of added sorties against lines of communication. We endorse his argument on stabilizing the
level of sorties. We do not agree, however, with the implied judgment that changes in the bombing
program could not be effective. We continue to judge that a bombing program directed both against
closing the port of Haiphong and continuously cutting the rail lines to China could have a significant
impact.
d. Pacification: We agree that revolutionary development (pacification) must be pursued vigorously, and
that success in pacification depends on the interrelated factors Secretary McNamara catalogues.

Although "the U.S. cannot do this . . . job for the Vietnamese", neither can the Vietnamese do it alone-we must integrate our efforts. We agree that corruption is a serious problem and the attitude of GVN
officials must be improved, but we do not believe that these problems have to be solved at the top before
attempting to make pacification cadre effective. We must work at both ends of the Vietnamese
command chain simultaneously; working unilaterally if necessary at the lower end. We concur in the
comments on ARVN.
e. The management of the U.S. pacification effort needs improvement. We are not sure just what
Secretary McNamara's first recommended solution really involves. If it involves only minor cosmetic
surgery on the present arrangement, it is unlikely to succeed. If Secretary McNamara is proposing real
organizational change under which the civilian director would have a joint staff of sufficient scope to
enable him to plan, control and direct the U.S. effort and have operational control over all--not just
civilian--elements engaged in revolutionary development activities, then we support his
recommendation wholeheartedly. "A carefully delineated division of responsibility between the civilianin-charge and an element of COMUSMACV under a senior officer", however, does not look to us like
the unified control and management arrangement necessary or an arrangement which would give the
civilian director sufficient authority over U.S. military pacification activities.
f. A civilian pacification structure cannot be given a "fair trial" unless the civilian director has the
necessary authority. Also, the trial will not be "fair" if major quantifiable results are anticipated in a
matter of months. Further, even if a particular civilian-headed administrative structure does not work,
the fact remains that revolutionary development (which is what we ought to be talking about, not
pacification) can only succeed if it is something in which the civil populace engages itself. If an attempt
is made to impose pacification on an unengaged populace by GVN or U.S. military forces, that attempt
will fail.
g. Negotiations: While we agree that the U.S. must maintain an open posture toward negotiations for
domestic and international political reasons, we do not believe we should actively press for negotiations
until definite progress has been made in the revolutionary development/pacification program. Otherwise,
we will be negotiating from a position of weakness and running a great risk of undercutting what we are
trying to develop politically within South Vietnam.
h. Shifting the air effort from the northwest quadrant to the infiltration areas in Laos and southern North
Vietnam would be quite unproductive. Such a course of action would not induce Hanoi to negotiate
(since it would still involve bombing of the north) and would probably have little effect in changing
present international attitudes. Furthermore, a concentration of sorties against the low-yield and elusive
targets along the infiltration routes in the southern end of North Vietnam and in Laos would not
appreciably diminish North Vietnam's ability to maintain the supply of its forces in South Vietnam.
i. For a variety of diplomatic, image and psychological warfare considerations, much needs to be done
on imaginative amnesty programs. However, any U.S. effort at the present time to sponsor proposals
which would give the VC a role in the government of South Vietnam would have very adverse effects
on the morale and determination of our South Vietnamese allies.
4. Prognosis: We agree with Secretary McNamara's prognosis that there is little hope for a satisfactory
conclusion of the war within the next two years. We do not agree that "the odds are less than even" for
enlivening the pacification program. If this were true, the U.S. would be foolish to continue the struggle
in Vietnam and should seek to disengage as fast as possible. We think if we establish adequate
management and control on the U.S. side and ensure that the Vietnamese follow through on redirecting
their military resources as promised, there are at least fair prospects for substantial progress in
pacification over the next two years.

George A. Carver, Jr.

271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 15, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, vol. IX. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Administration of Revolutionary Development
I. Introduction
You requested a position paper on the administration of the "other war" in Viet-Nam. Let me begin by
offering two powerful first impressions which I believe bear decisively on that question.
1. My overriding impression after five days in Viet-Nam is of a topic so common it is all-too rarely
reported and so obvious it is all-too rarely considered: the unceasing, backbreaking toil of the peasant
population.
To see rows of coolies bending down, hour after hour, tending rice plants in the exhausting sun, is to
recognize that it is not so much water that their rice grows in; it is sweat. They seed, nurture, replant,
irrigate, dig manure, harvest, dry, and carry day upon day, year upon year to squeeze only the barest of
essentials from the land.
And to see all this is to recognize a political fact: how easy it is for these people not to give a whit
whether they are governed by the GVN or by the VC or by anyone else. Given the dawn-to-dusk
imperative of their work, what they may wish more devoutly than anything is simply to be left alone.
They wish no longer to be bombed and shelled or knifed and shot, drafted or kidnapped, propagandized
or harangued, gouged by landlords or "taxed" by guerrillas.
2. Second, I could not help but be struck by the extent to which Viet-Nam is commonly discussed in a
strange language of abbreviation and acronym. For example, "If we can get MACV, USAID and
JUSPAO to prod the GVN, then maybe ARVN--working with the PF, RF, PFF, CIDG and the PAT
cadres--can get RD off the ground."
It is easy to understand why such sentences would be common in Saigon, where people talk of little
other than the war and where shorthand thus becomes a necessity. The same is true, however, at a less
superficial level, when shorthand is applied to concepts as well as to agencies--when real words become
shorthand symbols--but destructive symbols because they mean such different things to different
speakers.
An example--and one closely relevant here--is the word "security," which has come to blanket a variety
of different meanings. I believe decisive, effective revolutionary development depends on a clear and
precise common understanding of the security we all recognize to be the foundation of success in "the
other war."
To illustrate the divergence of meanings, let me report briefly on a conversation I had with a small group
of reporters in Saigon. It quickly degenerated into a debate, not between the reporters and me, but
between Ward Just of the Washington Post and Charles Mohr of the New York Times.

Just argued heatedly that RD could not even begin to be effective unless security were first guaranteed
both to the peasants and RD workers. "An AID man cannot do his work," he said, "while he is being
shot at by the VC."
Mohr responded, just as heatedly, that security could not come first--because security from guerrillas is
meaningless and impossible until the peasant populace is motivated to support the GVN and deprive the
guerrillas of havens, secrecy, and resources.
Obviously, the easy answer to this circular chicken-egg debate is to say that both are necessary--military
protection and public motivation against the VC. And yet even that answer is incomplete for it defines
security only in the American frame of reference (more police in Central Park; or National Guard
against riots).
What we must also ask is, what does security mean to the Vietnamese peasant, stooped over in the rice
paddies?
Does security mean a guarantee of the absence of physical danger? Or is the peasant willing to take
some risks in exchange for other factors?
If so, what are those factors:
Communist ideology?
Land reform?
Lowering of crushing taxes--whether imposed by the GVN or VC?
No further conscription--again by either side?
Social justice--such as the elimination of corruption which requires under-the-table payments even for
an act so elemental as registering a birth?
A voice in local government?
The VC have found effective answers to such questions, tailored to specific local needs. We must do at
least as well. And indeed each of these factors is important to the peasantry in some, many, or all areas.
They must be seized on as a critical element in defining and providing true security.
If the peasant were not willing to accept any risks, then the outlook for revolutionary development
would be grave, indeed. No matter how effectively they are administered, even military security and
capable RD efforts cannot bring instant success. At best, they can give us a mutually reinforcing
stairstep route to success.
A high level of physical security (against guerrilla, rather than main-force opposition) cannot be
achieved without motivating the populace. Such motivation cannot be achieved without considerable
progress toward physical security. Both must be sought at once, in a way designed to lower the peasant's
current risks while at the same time inducing him to accept the risks of involvement that remain.
Given limited time, we must carefully identify and concentrate on those risks which are least acceptable
to him and on those gains which are most essential to him.

II. The Ideal, Theoretical Program

I know of no one who believes we have begun effectively to achieve this goal, despite a series of
pacification programs and despite even the budding early efforts of Ambassador Porter's new program.
The Military Aspect. Secretary McNamara, Mr. Komer, Ambassadors Johnson, Lodge, and Porter, Mr.
Gaud, I, and all others who have approached the problem are perfectly agreed that the military aspect of
Revolutionary Development has been spindly and weak.
This probably is the result of the entirely understandable preoccupation by MACV in recent months with
the main-force military emergency. However justifiable this has been, a major effect has nonetheless
been our failure effectively to press RVNAF to even start meeting their crucial RD responsibilities.
(I know of no one who believes that these should be met principally by American forces--unless we
should wish the whole RD effort to collapse once we leave.)
The Civil Aspect. Similarly, the work of civilian agencies has fallen short--largely, but not only because
of the failure of RVNAF to provide a military screen behind which to work.
For example, we have been successful in persuading farmers to turn to modern insecticides and
fertilizers, overcoming the skepticism and hostility borne of old ways used for centuries. But having sold
the peasants on the concept, there is not enough insecticide in the whole country now to meet the
demand in Long An province alone.
We have built--as Mr. Komer outlined in such careful detail in his report to you of September 13/2/-large numbers of school rooms. But, again to cite Long An, the province which I visited, we built 65
school rooms in 1965--but 55 American-funded schoolrooms were so located that they were blown up
by the VC.
/2/"The Other War in Vietnam--A Progress Report," printed in Department of State Bulletin, October
10, 1966, pp. 549-567, and October 17, 1966, pp. 591-601.
We have sent 2.2 million textbooks to Viet-Nam, but how many are still tied up in warehouses?
Recent discussions of such shortcomings have been conducted in terms of who should control the
program--civilian agencies or the military. I believe this is too narrow a frame of reference. It is too late
to worry about organizational symmetry or inter-agency niceties.
Rather than engage in a civil-military debate, I think we should devote our efforts toward trying to
devise an administrative structure that capitalizes on the assets each agency can offer to RD.
What should be the elements of an ideal organization?
1. It should have maximum leverage on RVNAF to engage in clear and hold operations in direct support
of RDM efforts.
2. It should have a single American "negative", anti-VC channel--that is a single commander for all
action against Communist guerrilla forces. This commander would calibrate and choose among the
various force alternatives--depending on whether he believed the need to be military, para-military, or
police.

This command would include complete responsibility for all anti-VC intelligence--that is, concerning all
VC suspects either in the infrastructure or in guerrilla units.
3. It should have a single, unified channel for all "positive", pro-people aspects of RD, irrespective of
the present lines of command within civilian agencies, allowing a single commander to calibrate and
assign priorities to relevant positive programs on behalf of the peasantry.
This, too, would include the immediate expansion of and control over all "pro-people" intelligence--that
is, detailed district-by-district and province-by-province reporting on the particular gains most wanted
by the populace (land reform, for example, in one province; or schools in another; or agricultural
assistance in another).
4. Sensitivity to political inputs and wise political guidance of the whole process are needed to ensure
that military programs support rather than negate efforts to win public support and participation. Failure
to assure this--which characterized French efforts in Indochina and Algeria, in contrast to civil-led,
successful, British efforts in Malaya and the Filipino campaign against the Huks--means that the very
process of gaining security would be weakened and prolonged, at increased cost in Vietnamese and
American lives.
Thus, overall civilian command of the RD program is needed for fundamental practical reasons, by no
means for considerations of international image alone (though on the latter point, it must be observed
that as soon as we put "the other war" under obvious military control, it stops being the other war). In
particular, it is important not to block or reverse--by the way we organize our efforts--the current
genuinely hopeful Vietnamese trend toward increased civilian influence and participation in
government.
In short, it is not the precise form of organization or the precise choice of flow chart that is important.
What is important is:
1. An immediate and effective military screen for RD efforts; and
2. Authoritative and compelling administration of the efforts of civilian agencies.
III. Achievement of the Ideal
I believe we can institute effective administration of the RD program--which Ambassador Lodge has
aptly described as the heart of the matter--achieving all of these ideals:
1. Maintain the effect and the appearance of civilian control by immediately assigning overall
supervision of all RD activities to Ambassador Porter (and assigning a second deputy to Ambassador
Lodge to absorb the substantial other responsibilities now met by Ambassador Porter).
2. That the several civilian lines of command within agencies be consolidated into one. Thus, USAID,
JUSPAO, OSA, and the Embassy personnel assigned to RD all would continue under the nominal
administrative control of their respective agencies but full, unified operational control would rest solely
with Ambassador Porter.
3. That Ambassador Porter's authority be made clear and full to each constituent agency of the RD team,
including:

--relocation of personnel;
--the establishment of priorities irrespective of agency priorities;
--and the apportionment of the funds allocated by each agency to Viet-Nam, bounded only by statutory
limitations.
4. That MACV immediately give highest-level command focus and consolidation to its RD concerns
and staff, now that it is no longer so completely distracted from RD by the compelling requirements of
main-force combat. This would be organized around the thesis that the central need is the most effective
persuasive power or leverage on RVNAF. This thesis is strengthened substantially by:
--The firm intent, expressed to us in Saigon last week, of President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky to shift
ARVN infantry to revolutionary development work starting in January;
--The enhanced powers they intend to give to General Thang, already an able chief of RD for GVN.
5. That the MACV effort embrace at least advisory control over all levels of force--starting with ARVN
but also including RF, PF, CIDG, and the para-military operations of the RD cadre, PFF, and PRV.
These steps would greatly strengthen both the military and civil lines of command. They would
contribute significantly to the success of RD. But not even these changes would be decisive without a
strong link between them.
The civil side requires the capacity to influence military movement which no organizational chart can
provide.The MACV side requires the political and substantive expertise which a military organization
does not--and is not expected to--possess.
Thus the fundamental recommendation I would make is:
6. To appoint, as principal deputy and executive officer to Ambassador Porter, a general of the highest
possible ability and stature--of two, three or even four-star rank. To do so would win the following
advantages:
a. Compelling indication of the seriousness with which the Administration regards RD;
b. The rank and stature to insure optimum RD performance from MACV.
c. The rank and stature to afford maximum impact on GVN military leaders and capacity to persuade
them properly to prod RVNAF when necessary.
d. Demonstrated command administrative capacities with which to assist Ambassador Porter, while
bridging the inevitable institutional difficulties that might well otherwise develop from one arm of
MACV's taking orders from a civilian.
e. A solution to the military control image problem, by which the advantages of close military support
would be veiled by civilian control.
f. The capacity and position to formulate an effective, qualitative plan encompassing both military and
civil realities. Previous plans have focussed on numbers of provinces, volume of RD cadre trained, and

so on. They have put an unrealistic premium on quantitative, "statistical" success. Meaningful criteria,
however, must be qualitative. I would envision such a qualitative plan intended to cover at least the next
12 months.
There would be an additional prospective advantage as well. If it should later be found that dual lines of
authority--even given this strong link--are not successful, then we could more readily fall back to a
unitary, military command structure--with the new RD general taking charge.
He would have the benefit, in that situation, of having been under civilian control and his relationship to
RD would already be evident, making the change to military control less abrupt and less susceptible to
criticism.
Beyond the form of organization, I also would, later, like to advance a series of specific thoughts on
matters of substance for the RD program.
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
272. Summary Notes of the 565th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, October 15, 1966, 2:40-3:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Secret;
Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith.
Vietnam--Manila Conference
The Council Meeting had originally been planned to give Secretary McNamara a chance to report on his
visit to Vietnam. However, it was later decided to spend the meeting time discussing the President's
Asian trip.
Following the change in the subject matter of the meeting, it was arranged that Secretary McNamara and
General Wheeler see the President alone prior to the NSC Meeting. The purpose of this private session
was to have been a discussion of the differences between General Wheeler and the Chiefs and Secretary
McNamara with respect to future military actions in Vietnam.
The meeting in the President's office included, in addition to Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler,
the Vice President and possibly the Secretary of Treasury. There is no record of this discussion/2/ but it
apparently centered on the differences recorded in memoranda from Secretary McNamara and General
Wheeler, single copies of which are attached./3/
/2/For Wheeler's record of the discussion, see Document 274 and footnote 3 thereto. The meeting with
the President in his office began at 2:10 p. m. and was attended by McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, and
Humphrey. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
/3/Documents 268 and 269.
The formal NSC Meeting was opened by the President, who requested Secretary McNamara, General
Wheeler and Under Secretary Katzenbach to report briefly on their recent visit to Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara: The military situation in Vietnam is better than he expected it to be. Military
preparations are progressing in an entirely satisfactory way. Progress in pacification is less than he had
hoped. More emphasis needs to be placed on pacification programs. The pacification situation was
worse than it had been when he was last in Vietnam.

We will be in Vietnam longer than we have thought. We should prepare now contingency plans looking
toward the future so that if it turns out that we have to stay a long time, we would be prepared to do so.
General Wheeler: There has been substantial improvement in the military situation. The morale of our
troops is the best ever.
General Wheeler then gave a short summary of fighting in and along the Demilitarized Zone, citing the
activity of the North Vietnamese 324B Regiment. He described Operation Irving/4/ and said that there
was still a belief in the field that the North Vietnamese were trying to separate the two most northern
provinces from the rest of South Vietnam.
/4/U.S. troops, assisted by South Vietnamese and South Korean soldiers, launched Operation Irving on
October 2 against a combined Viet Cong-North Vietnamese force in the central coastal area about 305
miles northwest of Saigon.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: Efforts in the field of pacification are not as good as they should be. Lack
of security in many areas prevented progress toward re-establishment of the authority of the South
Vietnamese Government. For example, we constructed 65 school rooms in one area, only to have 55 of
them destroyed within the year.
The Council then turned to a discussion of the President's Asian trip, including the Manila
Conference./5/
/5/Filed together with the source text is telegram 66747 to Saigon, October 14, 16 pages, transmitting a
paper drafted by William Bundy that discusses the scope and issues of the conference.
Secretary Rusk: The purpose of the conference is to give the President an opportunity to meet with the
Heads of State of those countries contributing to the war effort in Vietnam. Although there is basic unity
among the seven countries involved, there is rivalry among Korea, Thailand and the Philippines for
Asian leadership. The conference will come out satisfactorily for us.
Bill Moyers: The purpose of the Asian trip is to show our friendship for Asian countries rather than
accomplish substantive policy gains. There are specific problems which will be encountered in each
country, e.g., Malaysia--the rubber problem; Thailand--the internal security problem. In addition, there
is the problem of rivalry between Korean President Pak and the Philippines President Marcos.
There followed a discussion of public information problems which was initiated by the President who
referred to a leak to Drew Pearson of the substance of the President's conversation with Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko.
The President: There should be no backgrounding on the Manila Conference unless it is cleared with
Bill Moyers. Our public information must be coordinated. Our Ambassadors in these countries should
talk to the heads of government about the dangers of public airing of differences among us as well as the
critical need for unity.
Mr. Moyers: We should play down any expectation that a hard peace proposal will come out of the
conference. Our emphasis should be on reconstruction in Vietnam after the fighting stops.
Secretary Rusk: Summarized the draft communique (copy attached)./6/

/6/Not attached.
The President: The conference will probably accomplish little so we must consider now how to keep the
initiative in the period ahead.
Bromley Smith
273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 16, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority;
Nodis/Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at
5:59 a.m.
8583. 1. This is in reply to your 66655./2/
/2/In telegram 66655, October 14, the Department of State posed four questions that Lodge should put to
D'Orlandi and that are answered in this telegram. (Ibid.)
2. On Saturday I asked D'Orlandi this question:
"Does Lewandowski's strong position against what he calls any form of 'barter' i. e., 'We stop doing this
and you stop doing that' reflect his own appraisal of Hanoi's position or is it based explicitly on what he
has been told by North Vietnamese?"
3. D'Orlandi's reply: This question is not phrased so as to reflect the realities. Lewandowski's views
reflect Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap who are the only two North Vietnamese with whom
Lewandowski has been in contact. Are or are these not the real power in Hanoi? Lewandowski does not
know. D'Orlandi believes you know more than we do about that.
4. Question: Could Lewandowski envisage any variation on Goldberg's September 22nd bombinginfiltration formula which would be compatible both with the principle of reasonable reciprocity and
with Hanoi's apparent determination to avoid actions which would be interpreted as bowing to U.S.
pressure?
5. Answer: D'Orlandi says: I don't think he would answer that question. It would be going back on what
he has said he refused to do. He wants an overall agreement--not a truce which would allow
conversations. He wants a "package deal" which covers everything and which thereby avoids any
chance of publicity. Hanoi will buy something that is "final."
6. When I asked D'Orlandi what would be the elements of a package deal he said for illustration: After
one or two years, elections internationally controlled; a Vietnamese government which would abide by a
policy of neutrality; the United States to leave "eventually" (this word was stressed); a coalition
government (which he said was not a "must") which would contain representatives of so-called
"extremists" having nominal ministries. By "extremists" he meant the Ky regime on the one hand and
the Viet Cong on the other. D'Orlandi was sure there would never be an answer to the question "What
will you do if the bombing stops?" But a "real package deal" would get "very serious" consideration and
it would get it "immediately".

7. This is also an answer to the last question in your paragraph 1./3/

/3/The last question in paragraph 1 was: "Are there in Lewandowski's view other elements which might
be included in formula which would cause Hanoi to give it serious consideration?"
8. As far as the question in your paragraph 2/4/ is concerned I think it is answered effectively by
Lewandowski's intention to go to Hanoi immediately after the U.S. elections. Lewandowski says he
"attaches special importance" to these elections. Even though he says he does not understand our
national politics, he knows that the fact that the elections have been held will "clear the air, whatever the
results may be." It will mean that the electoral question will have been removed and he will know that
the United States "can deal if it wants to."
/4/The question in paragraph 2 was: "Did Lewandowski have a particular reason to attach importance to
the November 15 date, after which, according to him, there would be 'much to do.'"
9. Comment: I find this interesting since it confirms the belief which you and I have had for a long time
that they must at all costs avoid publicity and consequent loss of face. I think long drawn out peace talks
are very dangerous for us. It appears now that they are convinced that long drawn out peace talks are
utterly unacceptable for them. End comment.
10. D'Orlandi's illness has been diagnosed as a type of slow moving leukemia. He is very pleased with
the care he is getting here from Dr. Richard Cohen, Captain, Medical Corps, U.S. Army, who has had
tests made, the results of which D'Orlandi can take with him to Rome. Would you tell Dr. Shirley Fisk,
the special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for medical matters, about D'Orlandi so that he will
have it in mind should there ever be an opportunity for a doctor who is a specialist in such diseases to
come to Saigon and then take a look at him?
Lodge
274. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
Washington, October 17, 1966, 2139Z.
/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top
Secret. Also sent to Admiral Sharp.
JCS 6339-66. 1. Reflecting on our telecon on Saturday afternoon,/2/ I have come to the conclusion that I
can and should give you a better grasp of the situation here as regards pacification. The discussion of the
inadequacy of the pacification program took place in the smaller meeting which preceded the National
Security Council meeting to which I referred in my message Saturday afternoon./3/ Those present were
the President, the Vice President, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Vance and me. It came out clearly
that the President views pacification as critical to the success of our effort in South Vietnam; that he is
dissatisfied with the present direction and execution of the program; but that he is unwilling to override
the strong objections of Secretary Rusk (in consonance with those of Ambassador Lodge) to transferring
the control of the program from civilian to military hands. However, he stated flatly that he wanted
action soonest. "Soonest" was established as a period of ninety days within which to produce, the
implication being that he would entertain a transfer of responsibility at the expiration of that time if the
pacification situation remains unsatisfactory. As I mentioned to you on the telephone, he directed Cy
Vance to draft for him a memorandum which would establish this deadline.

/2/October 16. No record of the telecon has been found.

/3/In JCS telegram 6313-66, October 16, Wheeler reported that at the "smaller" meeting "the President
was quite receptive to certain proposals I presented regarding Rolling Thunder 52. Specifically, he
indicated his readiness to take out the steel plant, the cement plant and certain thermal power plants.
Without indicating which portions he disliked, he said that certain of the items gave him great
difficulties. I consider that we will get favorable action from him on his return from the Manila
Conference." (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)
2. During the NSC meeting pacification was referred to in more muted and general terms. However, the
need for speedy strengthening of the civilian side of the program was made amply clear to all concerned.
3. Now as to the matter of personalities, my thinking along these lines is influenced by several factors:
A. The heightened Presidential interest in and dissatisfaction with our pacification efforts is going to
increase the boiler pressure substantially with every passing day.
B. You and Heintges are both extremely busy and, in my judgment, can devote only a fraction of your
time to pacification activities. Someone on your staff should devote full time his attention to pacification
in its many ramifications.
C. Fred Weyand would no doubt make an admirable choice for this job.
D. Bruce Palmer would be equally good, I think, once he got his feet wet.
E. No one here is optimistic that a civilian-type operation can be gummed together to perform the
pacification function effectively except at the cost of considerable delay. Many of us, and I am one,
doubt that an effective civilian-type organization can be put together at all. Therefore, your effort should
be designed, first, to plug in a pacification channel between the Embassy and your headquarters; and,
second, to permit a transfer of authority and direction of the whole operation to you at some future time.
If the above factors are valid, I come down on the side of establishing in your headquarters now a deputy
charged with pacification; of course, his title is immaterial, it is the functions performed that are
important. Apropos of this, I have learned that Porter may be furnished an officer, in civilian clothes, to
assist him. Rest assured there is no intent to take any of your forces from you.
4. New subject. As I mentioned in my message of Saturday, the President is receptive to striking a few
targets of greater worth in North Vietnam despite advice he has had from some quarters to forego
expanding the target system or increasing the weight of effort in the North. Specifically, he told me on
Saturday that he was opposed to reducing the sanctuary areas around Hanoi and Haipong. As we know,
there are many targets in these two areas which should be struck; a fine example is the motor repair
facility, a picture of which your J-2 showed us during our meetings in your headquarters. I surmise that
this subject may be discussed with you during the Manila Conference. I suggest that you be prepared to
discuss the air campaign against North Vietnam in a broad way. I think you agree that the air campaign
against North Vietnam is an integral and indispensable part of our overall military effort in Southeast
Asia. Since we are committed to a program of increasing pressures, we should continue to increase
pressures rather than staying on a level of decreasing effort.In this regard, I think it would be good for
you to mention also the need to apply Naval pressures against ground LOC's and other high-value
coastal targets in North Vietnam such as radar and air defense sites.

5. Mr. McNamara informed me one hour ago he finally got the President to agree that he will not attend
Manila Conference. Neither will I. Best regards to you both.
275. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 17, 1966, 6:30-7:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William
Bundy and approved in S on October 19. The meeting was held in Rusk's office. In a letter to Bruce,
October 18, Bundy explained that the meeting flowed from a "rather painful dinner party" on October 15
at which George Brown pressed Bundy and McNamara relentlessly for the "minimum terms" on which
the United States would stop the bombing and claimed that what they told him "did not square with what
he had been told by the President." (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)
SUBJECT
Possible Conditions of a Cessation of Bombing
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Bundy
Ambassador Dean of the United Kingdom
Sir Michael Stewart, Minister, UK Embassy
Dean said that he had come to talk about the conditions under which we might be prepared to cease
bombing, for the guidance of George Brown in future contacts with Gromyko, specifically if and when
Brown went to Moscow in response to Gromyko's recent invitation to him.
The Secretary said that the first question was where we wanted to come out. In general, we looked to a
solution under which all North Vietnamese elements were withdrawn, there was a return to full
observance of the general principles of the 1954 Geneva Accords and of the 1962 Geneva Accords in
toto, and South Vietnam was thus left free to determine its own future.
The Secretary said that this was the eventual objective. However, the question of bombing could be
separated from it. It seemed to him unlikely that all the elements of an eventual solution could be
embraced in a written and negotiated agreement; some of the elements would come into place on a de
facto basis and through a withering away of activity. In any event, the question of de-escalation was
important and interesting, in itself.
The Secretary therefore said that, in connection with the bombing, he was not inclined to spell out the
details of a final settlement. The point was to get a significant process of de-escalation started. It would
be difficult to get around a conference table while military operations were going full blast. But the way
might be prepared by "sufficient identifiable concrete military action to indicate that a process of deescalation was under way,"
The Secretary then said that if we did stop bombing in response to such action, it must always be
recalled that we could not "write in blood" that we would not resume. There was a possible snag here in
that the Communists wanted a cessation accompanied by a guarantee that the bombing would not be
resumed. Hence, serious difficulty could arise if the other side carried on everything else, so that we felt
we had to resume.

Therefore, the Secretary said, we must know what would happen if we stopped bombing. Gromyko had
said that things would be different. We needed to know in what way and how. At the same time, we
recognized that the action on the other side might be hard to smell out and that we might have to probe
for a time to see what the true basis was and would be. In sum, the Secretary said that we must have
"some indication" that something concrete would happen on the military side. At the same time, if this
something did not extend into significant de-escalation, we would have to resume. Thus, Mr. Brown
should explore with the Russians to see what more the Soviets could say about what would be different.
The Secretary noted that the bombing constituted in our judgment a major incentive to Hanoi to stop the
war. It was a military plus, but it also played a key political role, for without it Hanoi could simply
watch events in the South and play them as it chose without any elements of pain to itself.
The Secretary said that Gromyko had indeed gone a little further than any past Soviet statement, by
saying that things "would be different." He then remarked that Foreign Minister Peter of Hungary had
told him that it was his impression that Hanoi would accept a solution based on the 17th parallel. When
the Secretary had pressed him whether he in fact had this from Hanoi, Peter had responded that he had
good information and that he was making the statement soberly on the basis of official responsibility. If
Peter had any grounds for such a belief, Gromyko must be aware of them, and therefore may go further
and give us something more on which to build.
Dean then said that various forms of concrete actions had been mentioned in discussions with other
Americans, specifically reduced military activity in the South, or a cessation of infiltration. It had
apparently been made clear in connection with these conversations that the US could not accept a mere
cessation of infiltration through the DMZ, but a combined cessation of DMZ infiltration and acceptance
of ICC policing of the DMZ had been mentioned as an acceptable concrete action.
The Secretary responded that the last could not be a final answer, but must be part of a process of
significant de-escalation.
The Secretary then returned to the suggestion that Brown could ask the Russians: "What more can you
say?" and start the process of probing moving.
The Secretary said that he wanted to make clear that he was not concealing from the British any piece of
paper on the precise conditions we could accept for stopping the bombing. The subject had been
discussed at great length between the President, Secretary McNamara, and himself. The fact was that
there were too many variables and a wide range of possibilities that defied precise delineation. Among
the variables he specifically mentioned the political confusion in Communist China and its possible
effect on what would be acceptable.
Dean chimed in that Hanoi's view of the American elections and the Manila Conference might also
affect the timing question. He said that Gromyko had spoken to Brown in terms of a possible January
visit by Brown. He asked, in effect, whether we thought this timing made sense.
The Secretary did not respond directly on this question, and it was left open.
The Secretary then returned to what Gromyko had said, and attached particular significance to
Gromyko's response to the question of which Eastern European country had the most effective influence
and role with Hanoi. Gromyko had responded flatly: "Moscow." The Secretary then summarized what
he had been saying along the following lines:

a. The issues of a final settlement and de-escalation could be separated.

b. The Communist side said it regarded the suspension as an ultimatum, and was therefore talking about
a cessation. In that event, you must elevate the price, and this could be summed up as actions amounting
to "the serious beginning of a process of de-escalation."
Sir Michael Stewart asked what we would think of any proposal to suspend the bombing and see what
would happen. The Secretary responded that the Communist side appeared clearly to regard a
suspension as an ultimatum. If the suspension went along without reciprocal action, a very dangerous
situation would be created. Therefore, there must be "some substantial information" because what we
had to consider in effect amounted to a cessation even if we stopped the bombing without saying we
were doing so finally, as a cessation, at the outset.
The Secretary then went back to the main threat, saying that his remarks should give George Brown
enough to start discussions with Gromyko. If Gromyko produced any response, then we could consult
urgently about how to move toward a deal.
Dean returned to the question of concrete actions that we might regard as adequate. He asked in what
areas to look. The Secretary responded that the actions we could consider should be "something highly
relevant to continued infiltration." Dean said this was most helpful. In explaining his definition, the
Secretary said that any action meeting this criterion would surely have a significant effect on the other
side's morale, which would make it thus a serious matter for them to undertake.
Finally, the Secretary noted that Ambassador Thompson had that day seen Dobrynin to ask him
specifically about Gromyko's remark that "things would be different." Thompson had asked whether
Dobrynin had anything to add, and the response had been negative. Thompson had also alluded to the
remarks by the President and Brezhnev, in order to counter any negative implications the Soviet side
might have drawn from the President's press conference remarks.
Comment: It seemed to Mr. Bundy likely that the conclusions Dean would have drawn from their
conversation, and reported to Brown, would be roughly as follows:
a. As to the degree of likelihood of responsive action by Hanoi, that we must have "some substantial
information" that such action would take place.
b. As to the nature of responsive action by Hanoi we would regard as satisfactory, that we would be
looking for actions that would be concrete and in the military sphere, and that we would require actions
indicating that a significant process of de-escalation was being started. The best area to look was in the
sphere of actions "highly relevant to continued infiltration."
c. That in the nature of the problem the US could not be more precise than this as to what it would
accept in return for a cessation of bombing, and that it would be highly useful in any event if Brown
were able to obtain from the Russians any indications that went beyond the general statement that
"things would be different." Such an indication could open the way to further discussions that would
bring about an understanding on which a cessation of bombing could be based.
d. That the Secretary was not suggesting at this point any acceleration of the contemplated January date
for Brown's discussions in Moscow.
276. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, October 19, 1966, 1230Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra and
Wellington and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
8835. Ref: Saigon 7630./2/ Subject: GVN national reconciliation program.
/2/Document 258.
1. Thieu and Ky informed me today that they are prepared to go ahead with national reconciliation
program as discussed at our October 3 meeting./3/ They will make a general reference to the program at
Manila and will follow up with a proclamation on November 1.
/3/See Document 258.
2. They are in agreement with us on need to expand Chieu Hoi program and to make a concerted effort
to win over VC cadre at all levels. General Tri, Minister of Information and Chieu Hoi, is now actively
engaged in working out program and will be coordinating closely with US agencies./4/
/4/Lodge outlined his view of the components of such a program in telegram 8958, October 20.
Kissinger outlined a program of national reconciliation in a 9-page paper prepared with Daniel Davidson
of FE and forwarded to Lodge on October 19. Frank Sieverts of S/S forwarded a copy to Katzenbach on
November 1 under cover of a memorandum stating that it was the "key memorandum" for a proposal for
national reconciliation on which William Bundy and Harriman were working. (Both in Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. Thieu reiterated GVN view that they cannot deal with VC as a political entity, but only as an internal
security problem involving individuals or groups who will be given opportunity to return to the fold. In
regard to the amnesty, he said, the VC will comprise two groups: those who may wish to return to NVN,
and those who may wish to stay. The latter will be handled through national reconciliation program.
Lodge
277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 19, 1966, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by
Rusk; cleared by McNamara, Katzenbach, and William Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to
Canberra and Wellington, eyes only for the President through Rostow.
The President left Washington October 17 for an extended trip through Asia. He visited New Zealand
October 19-20; Australia October 20-23; the Philippines October 24-26, where he attended the Manila
Conference (see Document 281); Cam Ranh Bay October 26 where he visited U.S. military personnel;
Thailand October 27-30; Malaysia October 30-31; and Korea October 31-November 2. He returned to
Washington November 2.
69371. Eyes only for Lodge and Westmoreland from Rusk and McNamara. We are gravely concerned
about continuing uncertainty over Cabinet situation and impressions of political disarray in Saigon on
eve Manila Conference./2/ It is obvious that if general impression is created that there is nothing in

Saigon to support, main purposes of Manila Conference will be frustrated and allied efforts will look
ridiculous. We appreciate your own personal efforts but it does not seem to us that it is enough that
certain patchwork be accomplished to paper over a major political crisis for duration Manila Conference
since everyone knows that the crisis exists and that no answer has been found. From point of view of
American and international opinion, situation is very close to that of worst days of Tri Quang's efforts
and we can expect strong revulsion against South Vietnamese who play games while Americans are
getting killed to carry the brunt of the battle.
/2/In his discussion of the Cabinet crisis in telegram 8838 from Saigon, received at 10:35 a.m. on
October 19, Lodge indicated that even dissident Ministers were insisting on resigning. (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
We believe that we should weigh in strongly with all parties concerned, but especially with Ky, Thieu
and the seven dissident Cabinet members. The seven Cabinet members should be shamed or shocked
into full realization that American people will find intolerable moves which destroy sense of South
Vietnamese unity at a time when Constituent Assembly is meeting to bring about the very kind of
political order they seem to want. If they have legitimate grievances about personal har-assment or
intimidation, you can assure them that we are much interested in that kind of point and will do what we
can to bring about corrections. Believe you should discuss with Ky and Finance Minister Thanh whether
they really want to engage in gross discourtesy to the President of the United States by Thanh's failure to
appear at Manila Conference just after the President has himself received Thanh and when the President
is traveling half way around the world to support the freedom and safety of South Viet-Nam. The object
would be, in consultation with Ky, to bring about the withdrawal of the resignations of the civilian
Ministers immediately. This may have to be accompanied by a hair shirt talk with Loan about some of
his Gestapo tactics.
This is a matter of such importance that a maximum effort should be made even if it means some delay
in your own arrival at Manila. The object is to produce an international impression of solidarity in
Saigon but this cannot be done unless there is in fact some resolution of the problem behind the scenes.
Believe you should see Ky before his press conference to alert him fully to the grave dangers we see in
this situation to insure that he not make matters worse by any ill-considered statements and that he
knuckle down to a solution of the problem. At press conference he perhaps ought to say a police state
will not be tolerated in South Viet-Nam.
The American people are prepared to do what has to be done against the application of force by North
Viet-Nam and their Communist allies but the South Vietnamese have the job of convincing the
American people that the South Vietnamese themselves are interested in the result and are prepared to
work together to achieve it./3/
/3/In telegram 8966 from Saigon, October 20, Lodge reported on his "lengthy conversation" with Ky
pursuant to this telegram. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)
Rusk
278. Memorandum From the Chairman, Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of
Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, October 20, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 350.09
Vietnam. Secret. In his October 20 covering memorandum to Helms, Kent stated that "on the whole, we
think the chances are better than even that the crisis will be compromised in some fashion which will
limit the damage and leave Ky about where he is."
SUBJECT
Implications of the Current Cabinet Crisis in South Vietnam
1. Situation. The current cabinet crisis derives from an unfortunate meshing of two of the major divisive
factors which have long complicated political life in South Vietnam--regional rivalries and the issue of
civilian versus military control./2/ It does not represent a new development, but merely the first
significant manifestation of these fundamental maladies since the September elections. It will not be the
last.
/2/A third major divisive influence is religion which is not yet openly involved in the crisis; but should
the crisis drag on, religious animosities and political jockeying among the various religious groups could
readily come into play. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. The seven cabinet ministers (out of 29) who have proffered their resignations are all of Southern
(Cochinchinese) origin and are civilians./3/ They share the general Southern antipathy toward the
Northern "carpet-baggers" who dominate the Ky government and the military establishment. They also
suspect that the military leadership will not fulfill its pledge for a transition to a civilian government.
The visits of various GVN leaders (in particular those of Police Director, General Nguyen Ngoc Loan)
to military-dominated South Korea adds fuel to Southern suspicions. With this backdrop of traditional
mistrust, the heavy-handed action by Loan, a Northerner, in arresting an acting cabinet minister
provided a rallying-point for the Southern ministers. They began to pressure Ky and to charge that Loan
was attempting to create a "police state." Moreover, the imminence of the Manila Conference gave them
an advantageous moment to bring pressure on Ky. The ministers assumed that Ky would be eager to
avoid any political crisis before the Conference, in particular one involving the issue of civilian-military
relations which the US considers crucial to the "other war" in Vietnam.
/3/The exact status of these ministers is unclear. Ky has said that they have agreed to remain at their
posts until after the Manila Conference (24-26 October). Nonetheless, the resignation statements have
appeared in the press after the ministers supposedly agreed to stay on, and the statements at least appear
unequivocal. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. It is also likely that General Dang Van Quang (IV Corps Commander) and perhaps General Nguyen
Huu Co (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of War) are involved behind the scenes in the challenge to
Ky's regime. Both men are Southerners. More important, they have strong personal reasons to oppose
Ky: both men are prime candidates to be removed from their posts for corruption.
4. In any event, Ky, a Northerner (Tonkinese) and a military man, is almost certainly the ultimate target
of the Southerners although the ministers have scrupulously avoided attacking Ky personally. Instead
they have aimed their attack at those close to Ky, particularly Loan, head of the two principal security
organizations; but also at General Le Nguyen Khang, III Corps and Marine Commander; Bui Diem,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and Dinh Trinh Chinh, Secretary of State to the Prime Minister.
These men are all Northerners. Because they command the security forces in the Saigon area, Loan and
Khang provide much of the physical protection for the Ky regime. Should Ky be obliged to remove
these men, his power base and prestige would be seriously weakened.

5. The crisis has already done some damage to Ky's image. Regardless of the immediate outcome of the
crisis, Ky will go to Manila with his domestic house in a state of some public disarray. There has already
been adverse foreign publicity on this score, and the heavy press coverage of the proceedings in Manila
will engender more. In South Vietnam, the crisis has helped dim the glow left by the successful
September election. It also has publicly raised the issue of civilian-military conflict. This will have
reverberations in the Constituent Assembly where there is a sizeable and vocal bloc of Southern
delegates, the most notable and most vocal being Tran Van Van, who may be working covertly with the
dissidents.
6. Implications. The crisis can almost certainly not be resolved before the Manila Conference, and the
best that can be looked for is its deferral until after the Manila Conference. Such a deferral would put the
best face on an embarrassing problem at Manila and might allow things to simmer down in Saigon. On
previous occasions, Ky has been adroit at fashioning compromises which have at least temporarily
tended to placate the contending elements. If no compromise can be reached this time, or if Ky is
compelled to meet the problem head on, he has two alternatives: 1) to accept the cabinet resignations, or
2) to sack or substantially curb Loan.
7. If Ky does accept the resignations, it would be a blow to civilian-military relations and would further
exacerbate regional rivalries. There would be a chorus of unfavorable publicity in the foreign press. To
lessen the impact of such a move, Ky would probably try to replace the ministers with other
Southerners. He could probably do so, and this would help. Nevertheless, there would be a new round of
anti-GVN statements, charges of "military dictatorship", and the like. Some of the firebrand Southerners
in the Assembly might resign in protest. In these circumstances, there might be some street
demonstrations and the militant Buddhists might strike up a temporary alliance with some Catholic
Southern elements.
8. A move by Ky to drop Loan could cause more immediate and serious problems. Ky realizes this and
has said that he will not fire Loan, though like all decisions in South Vietnam, this is probably not
irreversible. As director of the two major security organizations, Loan is a power in his own right.
Moreover, he is the foremost figure in the loose grouping of young, hard-line officers collectively called
the "Baby Turks." Loan's removal would raise the spectre of renewed military factionalism which has
not seriously plagued the GVN since the removal of General Thi last spring. Moreover, Ky has
confidence in Loan, who played a major role in upholding the GVN in its recent victory over the
militant Buddhists. In considering a move against Loan, Ky would be aware that this would only
temporarily appease the opposition elements and only whet the Southerners' appetite for more
concessions. Loan's removal under pressure would weaken Ky in the eyes of all concerned.
9. On the whole, the best thing that could happen would be that the crisis not come to a final head before
Manila and that after Manila it can be settled by a compromise or at least by a not overly disruptive
showdown. The worst that could happen would be a shattering of the unity among the military. At
present and for a long time to come, military support, and probably predominance as well, is essential
for any regime in South Vietnam.
For the Board of National Estimates:
Sherman Kent
279. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 22, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Miller and
approved in U on November 7.
SUBJECT
Rumanian Approach on Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
H.E. Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Ambassador
The Acting Secretary/2/
Robert H. Miller, Director, Viet-Nam Working Group
/2/Katzenbach.
The Acting Secretary received the Italian Ambassador at the latter's request on October 22. Ambassador
Fenoaltea said that he had just received word from his Foreign Office that the Rumanian Ambassador in
Rome had seen a senior Italian Foreign Office official on October 20. The Rumanian Ambassador stated
that his government had carefully analyzed the situation in Viet-Nam and that on the basis of this
analysis and various contacts which the Rumanian government had had, the Rumanian government had
concluded that if the U.S. were to cease its bombing of North Viet-Nam permanently, a concrete
response from North Viet-Nam would not be lacking. Ambassador Fenoaltea said that the Italians had
queried the Rumanian Ambassador for clarification of the phrase "permanent cessation" on the grounds
that it was difficult to imagine the U.S. taking such a step without a clear indication of what
counteraction would come from the other side. According to Fenoaltea, the Rumanian had replied that
the U.S. should not declare publicly a cessation of bombing for a limited time or with any conditions.
The Rumanian had said that the 37-day pause last December and January had had the appearance of an
ultimatum to Hanoi, and that the U.S. should now be asked to cease its bombing without any time limits
or conditions. The Rumanian Ambassador repeated that his government's information had brought it to
believe that if such a move were to take place, an appropriate and a positive reaction from the other side
would not be lacking. The Rumanian Ambassador noted that a sentence in Rumanian Foreign Minister
Manescu's recent speech in the UNGA/3/ had apparently escaped the attention of the Western world,
and that this sentence had particular significance.
/3/Not found.
Ambassador Fenoaltea said that he had asked to see the Acting Secretary on Saturday/4/ because he had
been instructed to seek the U.S. Government's reaction to this Rumanian approach before Tuesday night,
when the Rumanian Ambassador would be seeing the Italian Foreign Minister.
/4/October 22.
The Acting Secretary noted that the U.S. position with respect to a cessation of bombing of North VietNam was most recently stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the UNGA./5/ He said that it was difficult to
know who was speaking for Hanoi, if they were actually able to speak for Hanoi, and furthermore what
the specific response to a cessation of bombing would be. In other words, the Acting Secretary said, we
had to have a firmer and more specific idea of Hanoi's intentions.
/5/See Document 244.
In response to Ambassador Fenoaltea's query as to whether this Rumanian approach to the Italians might

possibly be the beginning of "the right channel," the Acting Secretary expressed some skepticism. He
observed that, although there is a feeling in some quarters that if the U.S. would stop bombing North
Viet-Nam something would happen, this had not happened in response to the two previous bombing
pauses. The Acting Secretary stressed that it was extremely important to be clear as to the specifics of
any bona fide approach from the other side. He suggested that the Italian Foreign Minister press the
Rumanian Ambassador hard on the details of the Rumanian approach to the Italians and to quite frankly
emphasize to him that this was not a game. The Acting Secretary emphasized that the U.S. Government
could not just turn the bombing of North Viet-Nam on and off lightly and that we really had to know
whether the Rumanian approach was serious. We had to know, in specific terms, publicly or privately,
what response would be forthcoming to a cessation of bombing. The Acting Secretary said that, on the
basis of what we knew of the Rumanian Ambassador's approach in Rome, he was not disposed to take it
too seriously, but that of course we would be interested in any indication of serious intent.
Ambassador Fenoaltea referred to press reports that Philippine President Marcos was proposing a
bombing pause in connection with the Manila Conference. The Acting Secretary noted that, in our view,
there was no relation between the question of a pause and the Manila Conference, and that our position
was as stated by Ambassador Goldberg.
Ambassador Fenoaltea asked whether he could report that the U.S. Government was not interested in a
suspension of bombing as a good will gesture. The Acting Secretary replied affirmatively and added that
the U.S. Government needed to have, publicly or privately, a concrete indication of what response a
cessation of bombing would bring.
The Acting Secretary expressed appreciation for the information conveyed by Ambassador Fenoaltea
and emphasized that the U.S. Government would be most interested in any indication of Hanoi's serious
intent to resolve the Viet-Nam conflict.
280. Notes of Meeting/1/
Manila, October 23, 1966, 9:15-10:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Asian Trip Memcons. Secret. Drafted
by Rostow (identified as WWR in the notes). The meeting was held in the Manila Hotel. Rusk, Lodge,
Komer, and Westmoreland attended along with the President. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) President
Johnson arrived in Manila about 3 p.m. on October 23. He flew from Washington to Honolulu on
October 17 and stopped at American Samoa on his way to New Zealand October 18. (Ibid.) For his
itinerary during his Asian trip, see footnote 1, Document 277.
Meeting of the President with Thieu and Ky (Republic of Vietnam)
MEMBERS OF PARTY
Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu; Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky; Dep. Prime Minister Co; Foreign
Minister Tran Van Do; Secy of State for Foreign Affairs, Bui Diem; Amb. Lam--GVN Amb. to the
Philippines
The meeting opened with Thieu asking if the President were tired. The President replied that he missed
his naps, but was feeling fine. He added, "I don't have as many or as burdensome problems as some of
my colleagues." He then went on to congratulate Ky and Thieu on the success of the election. He said
that when Ky had come out in public with a prediction of 60-70% of the registered voters voting--and he
thought of our 40%--his thought was, "What the hell are we both going to do when we only fetch up

with 25%?"
Ky replied that Ho thought the same, and that's why he is still fighting. (This thought still remains
somewhat obscure to me. WWR)
The President reported that an Australian politician dealing with Labor Party attacks on Holt's phrase,
"All the way with LBJ" came up with the slogan, "Better all the way with LBJ than half a win with Ho
Chi Minh."
The President then asked General Westmoreland how the Australians were doing in combat. He reported
they were fine: two strong battalions, two batteries, one manned by the New Zealanders. They were
excellent troops. The President then resumed by saying that Honolulu was a much better conference than
we were given credit for. It was a big blow to Hanoi. The press systematically misinterpreted it. "Both of
us," the President said to Ky, "must be careful not to let the press bait us."
The President said our task at this conference was to make it clear that it was not just the "imperialist"
Johnson and Generals Thieu and Ky who were running this war, but seven nations were engaged
because it was in their interest. We must indicate that we are ready to negotiate on the basis of reason,
but we must give no grounds in Hanoi for illusion that we're going to give up, or that they can win the
job in Washington as they once won it in Paris. The people of the world should get a picture of
reasonable people ready to take steps towards peace when the other side is reasonable.
The President then told Ky that he had an enormous opportunity in his speech the next day./2/ "The
whole world will listen to your words. It will be much more effective than if you gave the speech in
Saigon where it might get lost, the way some of my speeches in Australia were lost." The President's
advice was this: lean as far away as you can from the "imperialist" Johnson, from the hard-liner Rusk,
and that fellow with stars on his shoulders, Westmoreland. You just hold the Bible in your hand
tomorrow. You be a man of good will; love your neighbor; but indicate, of course, that you will not take
steps which tie your hands behind your back when they are still shooting.
/2/The text of Ky's speech is in Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586,
President's Asian Trip, Oct.-Nov. 1966.
The President then went on to say that many in the West were prejudiced towards Asia because of
ancestry, distance, and color. He told the story of his own position vis-a-vis Hawaii, and how he brought
about the entrance of Hawaii as a state, pushing the U.S. 2500 miles out into the Pacific. This was one of
the major sources of pride as he looked back over his career--to have overcome within the Congress and
among the people of his region the color prejudice which had kept Hawaii out of the Union. Now he
wanted to push the interest of the U.S. firmly out into Asia, not 2500 but 10,000 miles.
One doesn't enter public service to make money. If one is interested in money one goes into a big
corporation. In public service the only satisfaction is what you can do for human beings. It is in Asia that
the bodies are--2/3 of humanity. It is there that people die under 40; where illiteracy is high and income
is low.
One of the purposes of his trip is to turn the spotlight of the world on this area. It is here where the
problems of tomorrow must be faced. The President is prepared to do this, he said, because he sees the
emergence of new leaders, new voices, new institutions, like the Asian Development Bank.
With respect to the conference, the President doesn't think we should produce new battle plans. They

should come from the soldiers. And he quoted Sam Rayburn's remark when the President once criticized
Eisenhower: "If he doesn't know more about military matters than you and me, we've wasted a hell of a
lot of money on West Point."
Nor can we expect peace as a result of the conference. The critically important negotiations are not here.
What we can expect is a demonstration that we are united (and we must not let the newspapers pull us
apart). We are there to stay as long as it is necessary. We are there in a group. We are willing to reason;
we are willing to forgive and to forget; we are willing to live and let live; but we are not going to tie our
hands behind our back and let them shoot at us. The President then told Ky and Thieu of his reaction to
the demonstrators in New Zealand and Australia; they should talk to Ho, not to Johnson. They've
already sold Johnson on peace. Again the President underlined the importance to Ky and Vietnam of his
speech so he could do himself, his cause, and all of us a great deal of good the next day. He advised Ky
to go into the causes of war--Asian poverty--and to look forward beyond today to the long future of
Vietnam and Asia. The President said that every day he listens for a few hours to television. What makes
news is what goes wrong--for example, if some of Westy's forces hit our men or friendly Vietnamese by
accident.
Here all they can report is what you say. Ky should try to reflect the new emerging Asia, young and
fresh with great opportunities as well as great problems, beginning to build institutions like the Asian
Development Bank, the Mekong Committee, etc. The President then turned to inflation. Ky replied that
they had taken quite effective measures, but the problem was still there. This time they hoped to institute
measures in anticipation of the inflationary pressures that might arise as the number of troops from
abroad expanded. He said that they would deal with port congestion. Ky, going back to an earlier
suggestion of the President's, said he would love to talk in a speech about the future of Asia. The
President advised him to put out the cold hard facts on life in Asia: the facts about health, and life
expectancy, and the state of the children.
The President then asked about the effectiveness of Viet Cong prop-aganda. Ky said that the people of
Vietnam under the colonial and post-colonial governments had no reason for confidence. That is why
they listened to the Viet Cong. The worst problem in Vietnam is the problem of corruption.
The President then picked up this theme and asked if there were any steps we can take to find and deal
with corruption before his critics got there. There were several Congressional investigations about to go
forward in this matter.
Ky said that this was his hardest problem. He said, for example, the port is run by his navy. The police
and importers and some politicians make money. He gave orders to the police chief to clean it up. They
found one case where a general was supposed to have gotten 40 tons of supplies. He informed the police
that they must give him the hard evidence on this. They have not gotten back. Ky said he would struggle
against these deeply ingrained forces and habits.
The President then asked Ky what is in the mind of the Viet Cong--do they expect to win? (there was a
thoughtful pause) Ky replied: "No. I don't think so. I believe they will very soon collapse--if we can get
to them the facts." He said that Westmoreland had reported to him the other day that half the prisoners
captured in Operation Irving/3/ still thought Diem was running the government in Saigon. We must
improve our information, get to the people, give them the facts, enlarge the open arms program. Then
they will come back to us. As for the port, aside from corruption, progress is being made. The problem
is that commercial importers don't pull their cargoes out of the warehouses. They hold them awaiting
higher prices. The warehouses are clogged. This slows down the unloading of ships. The shortage is
warehouse space. The entrepreneurs exploit the fact that the warehouse storage rates are very low.
Therefore they are issuing a decree which will specify that if importers don't remove their goods in a

certain time, the government will pick them up. They will be moved to military warehouses and
confiscated. In the interval, the storage rates will rise with the length of time that the goods are in
storage. The President asked Bob Komer what he thought. He said he hoped it would be all right. But
there have been lots of decrees. Westmoreland added that if it were enforced, the decree would clear the
port. He believed it would be enforced.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 272.
The President then asked Westmoreland for his assessment of the military situation. He said that by
every index, things were improving. He cited Operation Irving as the biggest success of the war. He also
cited the favorable trend of relative casualty figures, defections, weapons losses. Above all, an optimistic
spirit was now unmistakable in Vietnam. The ARVN are fighting better and are more aggressive. There
was improved outlook for pacification which would become the first task of the ARVN as they were
retrained. Improved intelligence from the villages permitted more effective police measures. The
President asked if the VC would still seek a major victory in October. Westmoreland thought they would
try, but they would not succeed. Substantial forces were gathering in Cambodia, apparently aimed at the
Kontum area. General Westmoreland then described operations over the past six months in the DMZ.
The President asked General Westmoreland whether he had enough troops. He said he would certainly
need more forces. He would like all the allies fighting in Vietnam to increase their forces at least by
35%. The President turned to Secretary Rusk and remarked that he had his work cut out for him. The
President asked if there were any more troops to be generated from South Vietnam. General
Westmoreland replied that he envisaged an increase of about 22,000--up 20,000--by the end of 1967, but
basically South Vietnam was a country whose manpower for military purposes was being stretched to
the maximum. There followed some discussion of the possibilities of individual nations generating more
forces--the Philippines and Korea were referred to. General Westmoreland would like to see another
Korean division, and expressed the hope that as the Philippines went into action, they would generate a
national pride of the kind which took hold in Korea, with the passage of time./4/
/4/See Document 286 for Westmoreland's report of this discussion.
General Westmoreland said that while there was light at the end of the tunnel, we had to be geared for
the long pull. The enemy is relying on his greater staying power. It is only his will and resolve that are
sustaining him now, and his faith that his will is stronger than ours.
With respect to bombing, General Westmoreland regarded it as very important. We should in no case
unilaterally quit bombing. Infiltration continues. The price of infiltration has definitely been raised. The
President suggested that General Westmoreland talk with Secretary Rusk, and instructed Rostow to get a
fuller version of General Westmoreland's suggestions about the future of the bombing program./5/
/5/See the attachment to Document 282.
Returning to the conference and summing up, the President told Thieu and Ky that they should bear in
mind the importance of projecting unity. Dissent is fine, and we all are for it; but there is a danger if
Hanoi interprets dissent as weakness. It will prolong the war.
The conference will be neither a war nor a peace conference. The central lesson will be that we are all
together; that we won't give up until it is over.
The President asked Ky if he had anything to add. Ky said no, except the problem of infiltration.

Bombing is good, but the establishment of a base camp and patrols above the 17th parallel could do
more. This concept was explored at some length.
The President asked how serious was the Cabinet crisis. Ky replied that it was not serious at all. These
men were invited to work in the Cabinet as individuals and technicians. They are not representatives of
substantial groups in the country. He can easily find replacements for them. He has spoken to each of
them and explained his position. They were all present at the airport at the time of his departure. The
Acting Premier is one of the dissidents.
The President was grateful for this information, but noted that it was a considerable problem in the U.S.,
where people thought of Ky's government as a European Cabinet. He asked Ambassador Lodge to talk
to the press and explain the distinction.
The President then asked Tran Van Do if he had anything to add. He said that what Ky said was O.K.
with him. He said he had already had a discussion with Secretary Rusk.
The President's last word was: Don't let the newspapermen divide us.
WWR/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
281. Editorial Note
The Manila Summit Conference opened at 9:07 a.m. October 24, 1966. In attendance were President
Lyndon Johnson; President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines; Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu and
Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of Vietnam; President Chung Hee Park of Korea; and Prime Ministers
Harold Holt of Australia, Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, and Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand. Three
days earlier, on October 21, delegations from the participating nations, including Secretary of State
Rusk, had met in Manila for preparatory discussions.
An opening public session on October 24 was followed by a 3-hour closed session at which Vietnam's
leaders reviewed the situation in their country and General Westmoreland made a statement. At a 2-hour
closed session on the afternoon of October 24, following a working lunch, the chiefs of other
governments, including President Johnson, made statements. The conference resumed at 11 a.m. on
October 25 with a long executive session during which the communique was discussed and approved. A
closing public session featured announcement of the three conference documents: the Declaration of
Goals of Freedom, the Joint Communique, and the Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the
Pacific. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966,
Book II, pages 1259-1265.
Summary and verbatim records of the public and closed sessions, except for the executive session on
October 25, are in Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586, President's Asian
Trip, Oct.-Nov. 1966. No official record was kept of the executive session. Audiotape recordings of the
public and closed sessions on October 24 are at the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts.
Comprehensive documentation of the conference, including planning documents and follow-up reports
on international reaction, are ibid., National Security File, NSC History of the Manila Conference; ibid.,
International Meetings and Travel File, boxes 2-12; Department of State, S/S-International Conferences:
Lot 67 D 586, President's Asian Trip, Oct.-Nov. 1966; and ibid., Central Files, POL 7/PHILIPPINES.

Chester Cooper, a member of the U.S. delegation, described behind-the-scenes deliberations prior to and
during the conference in The Lost Crusade, pages 310-320, including the controversy over insertion in
the joint communique of wording calling for the withdrawal of U.S. and Allied troops within 6 months
of North Vietnam's disengagement from the war. For commentary on the conference by two other
members of the U.S. delegation, Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton and General
Westmoreland, see Documents 284 and 286.
Following the Manila Conference, President Johnson visited South Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and
South Korea, returning to Washington on November 2. At the President's request, Ambassador at Large
Harriman and Assistant Secretary of State Bundy reported to foreign leaders on the results of the
conference. Harriman met with Heads of State and Ministers of Indonesia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Iran,
Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Morocco, in addition to Pope Paul VI. Memoranda of
his conversations are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. He discussed his trip at a
meeting of the Negotiations Committee on November 10 (see Document 300) and submitted a report to
the President on November 22 (Document 315). Chester Cooper, who accompanied Ambassador
Harriman, described the trip in The Lost Crusade, pages 320-324. Bundy visited Taiwan and Japan and
summarized the results in a memorandum to the President, November 15. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15)
282. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Manila, October 24, 1966, 11:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret.
Mr. President:
You asked me to go into more detail on General Westmoreland's views on bombing strategy. I thought
the simplest way to proceed was to get him to put on paper his assessment of the value of bombing the
North and what targets we ought to consider in the weeks and months ahead.
In para. 6 he lists seven further target systems. I believe you will wish to read this line by line. It is the
sober assessment of the responsible commander on the spot. I would not agree with all of his seven
suggestions; but I am convinced:
--bombing the North is a greater asset than our intelligence people recognize;
--we should consider, if they persist in the war, having some further target systems, but our first duty is
to mop up more oil because there is now evidence that they are hurting; and
--I agree with his observation in para. 7 that we should, in any circumstances, "avoid any restriction on
strikes in the extended battle area."
W.W.R./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
Attachment
Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to

the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)

Manila, October 24, 1966.
SUBJECT
COMUSMACV's Comments on Rolling Thunder/3/
/3/In a telegram to Rostow in Manila, CAP 66803, October 25, Bromley Smith transmitted a message
from Wheeler stating that he had read Westmoreland's comments, concurred heartily, and urged from a
military point of view the earliest approval of his recommendations. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX)
1. The Rolling Thunder program (the bombing of North Vietnam) was designed to disrupt the
movement of men and materiel from North Vietnam to South Vietnam and to influence the will of the
leadership in Hanoi against further prosecution of the war.
2. Although the program has not stopped the flow of men and materiel to South Vietnam, it has had
significant impact on the war effort by the communists. The enemy has been required to divert to his air
defenses substantial quantities of his manpower and skills that are in short supply. Also, quantities of
labor and materials have been diverted through necessity to the maintenance of his lines of
communication. Prisoners testify to the debilitating effect of the long march south caused by circuitous
routes and inability to move personnel by vehicle. In addition, the amount of materiel and munitions that
has been destroyed, as evidenced by pilot reports, has been significant. In my opinion, one of the main
reasons for the lack of success thus far of the enemy's massive effort across the Demilitarized Zone was
the disruption by the intensified air interdiction program north of the DMZ and along his major arteries
of communication.
3. To stop the bombing campaign to the North would adversely affect the war in the South in serious
degree. The enemy would be able with impunity to move his men, materiel and supplies to the South.
He would no doubt move numbers of anti-aircraft weapons and surface-to-air missiles south toward the
Demilitarized Zone and along his routes of communication leading into Laos. Furthermore, he would
probably prepare jet airfields further south to give himself an offensive air capability. The adverse
psychological effect that the cessation of bombing would have on the Vietnamese and allied forces
fighting in Vietnam would be of significance. Our troops would be placed at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the
enemy, since the enemy would no doubt continue his shelling of airfields, his sabotage of lines of
communication, his ambushes, and his terrorism.
4. Thus far our air campaign to the North has been characterized by creeping escalation. This strategy
has not influenced the will of Hanoi. The strategy has used air power inefficiently and expensively, and
has achieved results far short of potential. In addition, a considerable and growing risk factor has been
injected into the situation. The enemy now has a comprehensive air defense system under centralized
control with a three-fold effectiveness. First, it involves a great number of automatic weapons and antiaircraft units for use against low flying aircraft. Second, there are surface-to-air missiles for use at
medium altitudes. While their kill ratio has been less than the enemy would have hoped, the threat of
these missiles drives our aircraft to the lower altitudes where they encounter heavy automatic weapons
fire. Third, there is a growing MIG capability at the higher altitudes. Besides the actual effect of these
weapons, they have caused a degradation of accuracy in our bombing. In some cases, the threat of MIG
attack has forced our planes to jettison their loads prior to reaching their targets in order to maneuver.
This very hostile environment will result in mounting casualties as the war goes on--perhaps more than
we will be willing or even able to sustain, given the present limitation on targets.

5. The time for a change in strategy is at hand. Two courses of action appear open to us. The first
involves giving consideration to moving to shock action by striking over a short period lucrative targets
that will hurt the enemy and convince him that our power does not have to be restrained. The second
course of action would involve elimination of these same targets on a well programmed but graduated
campaign, as opposed to shock action, and would be followed by a level of operations we can sustain. In
any case, even with the elimination of any initial group of lucrative targets, it is doubtful whether the
required effort can be supported without greater flexibility in target selection. Following either of these
two courses, we should maintain a given level of air effort against North Vietnam on a sustained basis,
but with sufficient target flexibility that will serve to bring maximum pressure to bear on the war
economy of North Vietnam with minimum risk to our planes.
6. Specifically, the following targets are recommended in the general priority listed:
a. Large motor maintenance facilities which support his transportation system regardless of their
location. There is a particularly lucrative installation inside the Hanoi ring.
b. The SA-2 missile assembly area, also inside the Hanoi ring.
c. The Haiphong port with emphasis on the dock area. It is believed that this target could be destroyed
without jeopardizing foreign bottoms in major degree.
d. The complex of thermal power plants which numbers approximately twelve installations. These are
known, are vulnerable, and could be struck without unacceptable risk.
e. The steel plant which reportedly manufactures POL drums and has a direct role in supporting the war.
f. The MIG air bases, to include supporting facilities and fighter aircraft. This could be done in
retaliation for attacks on our airfields in South Vietnam which has been and will continue to be a
recurring action by the enemy.
7. If the situation dictates that there be some cessation of the bombing campaign, the above targets
should be hit before any consideration is given to such action. Furthermore, any change in the bombing
program should avoid any restriction on strikes in the extended battle area, that area of North Vietnam
from Quang Tri Province north to Vinh. In consideration of his responsibility in fighting the ground war,
the field commander on the ground should be permitted to bring military power to bear on the enemy
along those lines of communication leading directly to the battlefield.
W. C. Westmoreland/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
283. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/
Honolulu, October 26, 1966, 1920Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret.
Repeated to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, and CGFMFPAC. The source text is
marked with an indication that McNamara saw the telegram.
91125. Air campaign against North Vietnam (U).

1. The air campaign directed against North Vietnam is an essential element of our strategy for achieving
U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. The purpose of this message is to establish clearly the critical
importance of these operations to our military efforts in South Vietnam and to identify the grave risks
involved should these operations either be suspended or their scope significantly reduced before NVN
actually ceases infiltration of men and material into SVN and the DMZ.
2. Self-imposed controls on the use of air power against NVN have had an adverse impact upon the
effectiveness of air power in reducing the capability of NVN to direct and support the insurgency in
SVN. These operations, nevertheless, have had a significant impact upon the military capabilities of the
North Vietnamese Army and the VC. Indeed, the amount of disruption and enemy material destroyed
has been of such magnitude as to represent the probable balance of power which to date has denied the
enemy a capability for seizing significant portions of I and II Corps. The enemy has been unable to
move concentrations of requisite military force to SVN to accomplish such a task without incurring
unacceptable losses from air attack. The tactics of the enemy, the nature of the terrain in SVN and the
concealment which it affords all dictate that we must not withhold our airpower until he closes with us
in close ground combat. We must begin disruption, harassment and attrition of enemy forces as far back
as we can find and attack them, thus degrading his capability qualitatively and quantitatively before he
reaches the battlefield. Otherwise, his full capability must be met on the battlefield in a mode of combat
which is certain to increase our casualties by appreciable and unnecessary numbers.
3. The risks described above are of immediate and pressing concern in connection with NVA
concentrations now known to be in and near the DMZ. This is an area where the enemy is adept at
moving and concealing large forces, and from which he can attack with little warning. The military
security of our numerically smaller forces in this area depends in great measure on the ability of our air
power to deny the enemy freedom to move and concentrate in positions from which he can attack with
great advantage. A stand-down of air operations against enemy forces in or within supporting distance of
the DMZ for even the shortest period of time would create the gravest of risks to the security of friendly
forces in the area. The enemy would be accorded a greater freedom of movement for his men and
supplies. We cannot afford to risk creation of a sanctuary of this nature close to our own forces.
4. Our air campaign in the North is a major military activity wherein we have the initiative and control
over the intensity of combat. In SVN, the enemy can engage or disengage on the ground almost at will,
thus in a sense pacing the ground war to his advantage. Such is not the case in the air over his homeland,
where he must make a concession if he is to gain any relief from the pressures being applied against
him. It must be quite apparent to him that decisions which can increase his losses at home will not be of
his own making. We cannot afford to relinquish these initiatives except under conditions clearly
indicative of success in our over-all objectives.
5. There are very serious military risks attached to any form of a partial stand-down, either in terms of
reducing the targeting base or in restricting air operations to small geographic areas. As soon as such
reductions become apparent in the past, the enemy has reacted quickly by readjusting his air defenses
and our attrition has increased proportionately. It is essential that we avoid any voluntary
simplification/reduction of his air defense problems. In fact it is becoming critically apparent from
current attrition trends that a broader target base in NVN is urgently needed.
6. Our primary objective in the air campaign against North Vietnam is to make it as difficult and costly
as possible for the NVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause Hanoi to cease controlling
and directing the insurgency in SVN. To achieve this objective, a steady increase in the pressure applied
to the enemy is necessary to cause him to reconsider his support of the aggression. The most recent
increase of pressure was applied through the systematic destruction of the NVN POL system.
Inaugurated in early July, the program has resulted in the destruction, greatly reduced capacity or

abandonment of all major POL targets authorized for attack. In recent weeks our pressure on the enemy
has not continued to increase. In fact, it has decreased. Our air power is not being used to its maximum
effectiveness. Many lucrative targets and target systems should be attacked to increase the pressure
applied to the enemy.
7. This is not the time for relaxation of pressure. A broadened target base designed to lead Hanoi to
expect attacks anywhere, at any time, against any type of military target or activity that supports their
aims is essential. The targets and freedom of actions proposed by the JCS for Rolling Thunder 52 are a
first step towards this broadened target base. Implementation of RT 52 would again increase the pressure
on NVN, although not using our air power to its maximum effectiveness. It is time now to tell Hanoi
that no military target, no activity that helps sustain the NVN effort to prosecute the war, is free from
attack.
8. In summary, air operations in NVN have not yet reduced NVN support of the insurgency in SVN to
the level desired. Hanoi has not been brought to the negotiating table. However, air operations in NVN
have prevented the enemy from supporting his forces sufficiently to mount any major offensives or to
seize and hold any vital areas in SVN. The NVN air campaign is the one action that brings the war home
to North Vietnam. It disrupts the daily life in North Vietnam. It causes multiple and increasing
management and logistic problems. It prevents the enemy from conducting an aggression from the
comfort of a sanctuary.
Any continued relaxation of pressure in our air campaign against North Vietnam will provide the enemy
with the incentive to sustain and increase his support of the aggression in SVN. Our allies in SVN will
consider the US irresolute in its determination to force the Hanoi government to stop supporting the
insurgency. The communists will be encouraged to increase their disruptive efforts throughout SEAsia.
Our alternative is to convince Hanoi that its best hope is the negotiating table. A broadened target base is
essential to achieve this end. The JCS proposed RT 52 is the first step towards a broadened target base.
It is recommended that RT 52 be implemented now, with additional broadening of the target base
authorized at the earliest to clearly signal our intent to Hanoi.
284. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, October 26, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, VNS 2, Vietnam 66-68. Secret; Eyes
Only. Copies were sent to Vance, Hoopes, and Steadman.
SUBJECT
McNaughton in Manila, October 23-25, 1966
Herein: Key items on (1) Manila Conference, (2) Westmoreland's thoughts, (3) Thai-related problems,
and (4) more ROK troops:
1. Manila Conference. The Conference went well. I think we got what we wanted: Display of not-USaloneness, of resolve, of beginnings of an awakening responsible Asia, and of concern for the miseries
of the Asian billions. Not least, the Heads really got to know each other, we clarified some stands (for
the world and for the enemy), and we tacked Saigon down to some useful propositions. (The President's
extemporaneous statement/2/ was particularly moving. He was tough and determined, saying, e.g., that
he did not expect success on the economic or diplomatic front until we won the military front. But he

also had a lot of "peace" and "Great Society" in it.) Most important Conference specifics-/2/For Moyers' notes of the President's extemporaneous statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1256-1259.
--Withdrawal within six months. This sentence (in para 28 [29] of the Communique, DOC/3 attached)/3/
had to be negotiated by the President himself. I'll tell you the tale later.
/3/Attached but not printed. Paragraph 28 in the attachment was divided into two paragraphs, 28 and 29,
in the final text printed ibid., pp. 1259-1265. The sentence in question appears in paragraph 29 in the
printed text.
--US commitments not expanded. It was a continual battle to keep language out of our own drafts either
hooking us to enlarge our treaty commitments or adding preconditions to our withdrawal of forces from
Vietnam. The issue arose in the first form in Part I of the Declaration (DOC/4 attached);/4/ and in the
second form in the Communique, paras 3, 4, 27(1), 27(5) and 28 [29]. I would not allow "end of all
terror" or "peace assured" language; in all cases but one, our position is protected by words such as
"externally supported" or "aggression" (which implies "from without"). My failure was partial in para 28
[29] of the Communique. It resulted from the President's having to negotiate the language himself. The
offending language involved is "and the level of violence/5/ subsides." We also succeeded in avoiding
giving South Vietnam any bilateral post-war guarantees (para 27(6)) or promising to do more than to
consult with our allies regarding settlement of the war (see paras 28 and 29 [and 30] of the
Communique).
/4/Not attached; printed ibid., p. 1259.
/5/McNaughton added here in hand the word "thus," which appears in the final text.
--Message to the enemy. Among the messages to the enemy are (1) a display of resolve (statements of
resolve, the fact and aura of the meeting, the attention paid to long-term concerns); (2) a reference to
conversion of military installations (para 18 of Communique); (3) tabling of the six-point South
Vietnamese "essential elements of peace" (para 27 of Communique); and, probably most important, (4)
the public undertaking to have our forces out within six months of the time North Vietnam "turns herself
off" (para 28 [29] of Communique).
--Specific Vietnamese commitments. In the Communique you will find specific references to treatment
of POWs (para 9); to allocation of forces to RD (para 11); to fighting corruption (para 14); to holding
down inflation (para 16); to forward political steps (paras 21 and 22); to national reconciliation (paras 23
and 27(4)); to staying south of the 17th Parallel (paras 27(2) [29] and (3); and to withdrawal of US
forces (paras 18, 27(5) and 28 [29]).
2. Westmoreland's thinking. Westy sought me out twice to give me his thinking on force levels, Rolling
Thunder, the barrier and RD. His thoughts---Force levels. He is thinking of an end-CY 67 strength of 480,000 filled out by end-CY 68 of 500,000.
Barring surprises, he would plan to hold it there. He believes that this will be what the US can sustain
over time without mobilization and without calling up reserves and what the Vietnamese economy can
bear. (In this latter connection, he said he could not live within P42 billion; but in further conversation
he said he meant that he could not "plan" on that basis--that "reasonable" (conservative?) assumptions
led him to P46 billion, but that as he moved along he might end up using no more than P42 billion.) He

said the 480-500,000 men would be enough even if infiltration goes on at a high level--at one point he
said that "we have great mobility and fire power" and that "there is only so much geography" (but at
another he said, "I can't say now whether I will have enough troops to take on the Delta"). He said with
respect to air power that he wants more B-52 strikes, but that, when he gets the presently programmed
TAC air capability, he will need no more TAC air. He wondered if he got across to you his need also for
a "Corps contingency force" to back him up in case of emergency. "It could be located in Hawaii,
Okinawa or CONUS, and could be part of the rotational base." His strategy is to create and maintain "a
balanced, powerful force that we can sustain indefinitely." He believes (perhaps as a result of my, or
your, suggestion) that such a posture will be of critical importance in convincing the North of our
resolve.
--Rolling Thunder. He says he "shudders" at the thought of our stopping bombing the North. He called
RT our "only trump card--our only pressure on the North." He said that it has slowed down the
movement of supplies, has been costly to the North, and has diverted enemy manpower. He favors
reducing the restrictions on the program ("more flexibility"), noting that "you are asking for a very bad
political reaction." He was referring to the large aircraft losses when our aircraft are after "low-value
targets." (He mentioned the "most hostile environment we've ever operated in--AAA at low level, SAM
at medium level, and MIG at high level.") His recommended targets: The missile assembly area, the
motor (truck) maintenance facility, the MIG bases, the Haiphong docks, the 12 thermal power plants
("which would cripple their war-making potential"), and the steel plant ("where we think they are
making POL drums"). I did not, for obvious reasons, press Westy hard on this. But I did say that
whenever I write a paper in support of RT strikes I have trouble developing the reasoning clear through,
connecting recommendations with payoff. I noted that CIA says that, even with enlarged strikes, the
enemy could supply several times the amount of materiel required to support a much-increased level of
combat in the South. I asked how, for example, hitting the power plants would end up in fact helping
him in the South. He said, "I'm not responsible for the bombing program. Admiral Sharp is. So I haven't
spent much time on it. But I asked a couple of my best officers to look into it, and they came up with the
recommendations I gave you." At another point he reported that the President had asked him his views
in front of Ky and Thieu, and that he had given them; that Walt Rostow had asked him to put them down
in a memo for the President and that he was doing that./6/ It turns out that he favors some targets
because they are directly related to air defense, some because he relates them to infiltration, and all of
them because of their "shock" and "bargaining" effect. He said that, in any event, we should not shut off
bombing in the "extended battle area" up to Vinh. He said the North will merely use a pause to improve
their air defenses and air fields ("I would").
/6/Attachment to Document 282.
--The barrier. Westy seems to be fighting the barrier less (although he obviously fears that it is designed
mainly to justify stopping RT, at which he "shudders," as reported above). He seemed reconciled to an
air-delivered area-denial system at the west end. He did comment that you may have too much time
pressure on the Starbird program--"it may cause us to make some bad mistakes." His only specifics,
though, related to the need in Vietnam to evacuate people, to condemn real estate, etc., "all of which
takes time." He mentioned, in connection with the barrier, the possibility of using a Nike battalion in a
surface-to-surface all-weather function. He said the conventional warhead, if authorized, could be ready
in six months, but he had not done a cost-effectiveness study of the idea.
--Revolutionary development. He plans for 75% of ARVN and perhaps 25% of US to be devoted to RD.
What the mix will be as between ARVN and US, he cannot now say--in some cases, US might comprise
90% of the forces, in another case it might be the other way around. He thinks the new arrangement
should be in operation by July 1, 1967.

[Here follows a paragraph on Thailand.]

--Korean troops. Ambassador Brown advised against bumping Park now for more troops for Vietnam.
So far as I know, the President did not do so. But (1) the President's off-the-cuff remarks on Monday hit
hard at the "we're all going to have to get in there and do more" theme. The theme was so strong that
word had to go out to all hands afterward to deny that the President had put the bite on the other six for
more troops. And (2) Park was the one who asked Westy in the Monday session whether more troops
would be needed. Westy said yes.
John T. McNaughton/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that indicates McNaughton signed the original.
285. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 26, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, DOD. Secret.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia Costs
As you requested, we have estimated the incremental cost to the Defense Department of the Southeast
Asia conflict; that is, the cost over and above the normal costs of the Defense establishment. These
estimates are:
$ Billion
Annual Rate as of 30 June 1967
For FY 1966, 9.4
For FY 1967, 19.7
Total, 22.4
Robert S. McNamara
286. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, October 27, 1966, 1201Z.
/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top
Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to Admiral Sharp.
MAC 9451. Subject: Manila Conference.
1. Now that the Manila Conference is over and the President has completed his short visit to Vietnam,
on which I reported separately,/2/ some comment on the events of the past few days are in order.

/2/In telegram 270440Z from COMUSMACV, October 27. (Ibid.) On October 26 the President flew
from Manila to Cam Ranh Bay, arriving at 4:34 p.m. He reviewed the troops, awarded service
decorations, spoke to the assemblage, visited the NCO Mess Hall, met with top commanders from all
over Vietnam, and departed at 6:57 p.m. for Manila. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Dairy)
2. On Sunday evening,/3/ the President asked Ambassador Lodge, Secretary Rusk, Walt Rostow and me
to a meeting which started at 2000 hours. The President spoke briefly on his view of the Conference and
his hope for unity of purpose at the meeting. In anticipation that I might be asked to comment on the
general situation in Vietnam, I had drafted some remarks which I left with Walt Rostow./4/ These were
in extension and support of remarks to be made by Vien and Thang. The next morning the President told
me that he had read my prepared remarks and fully approved them.
/3/October 23.
/4/Not found.
3. At the same Sunday evening meeting, the President also asked my ideas on the bombing of North
Vietnam. He requested that I write up my views and give them immediately to Walt Rostow./5/ I did so
on Monday following which I sent both of you copies TWX./6/
/5/Attached to Document 282.
/6/In telegram 250532Z from COMUSMACV, October 25. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland
Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)
4. At 2115 hours on Sunday, Thieu and Ky came in and joined the meeting./7/ The President discussed
with them his concept of the Conference. There was some discussion as to the need for additional forces.
When asked, I replied that such an increase was definitely needed and estimated about 35 percent above
end year levels. I suggested that we urge the other nations to contribute their proportional share. The
President tied the proportional share to percentage of population, a line which he subsequently followed
in the closed sessions of the meeting.
/7/See Document 280.
5. The first closed session started Monday morning, 24 October. Statements were made by Ky, Vien and
Thang, following which I made my statement,/8/ a copy of which has been mailed to you.
(Subsequently, the President asked that I make a videotape of my remarks which was done that
afternoon.) I received a question from the Prime Minister of Australia asking about the impact of large
numbers of foreign troops on Vietnam. In my reply, I admitted the political, psychological and
economic risks, but explained how friction was minimized by careful orientation of the troops of all
nations. Violations of standards are infrequent although one occurs from time to time. The Prime
Minister of New Zealand asked about enemy activity in the DMZ. I replied with a detailed explanation.
The Korean President asked if more troops would be needed, to which I gave an affirmative answer.
/8/Text is in Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586, President's Asian Trip,
Oct.-Nov. 1966--Documents, vol. IX.
6. Late Monday afternoon, at the request of the President, I held a back-grounder for about 30 members
of the press at the Manila Hotel. Questions revolved around revolutionary development, the state of
training and morale of the RVNAF and the concept of troop deployments. I made the point that the

available leadership of the RVNAF was stretched to the elastic limit. For leadership, manpower and
economic reasons, the strength of RVNAF would expand only marginally over what it now was. I
stressed that quality must now be emphasized, mentioning the detailed and practical leadership training
programs we had launched, in which the Vietnamese Government was taking renewed interest. I
explained the need for education of officers and retraining of troops to shift emphasis from the needs of
combat to the support of revolutionary development. To questions on the U.S. Mission organization to
deal with RD, I replied with a historical account and some general phil-osophy rather than in practical
terms to avoid speculation of friction within the U.S. Mission.
7. The session on Tuesday, 25 October, was taken up primarily in waiting for the Foreign Ministers and
Chiefs of State or Heads of Government to come up with a final report and communique. This gave me a
chance to conduct further conversations with various delegations. I had ample time to talk with the
Australian and New Zealand delegations and I believe we may get additional troop contributions after
their elections next month. (I had had time for extensive talks with the Koreans while their President was
here, and believe them receptive to a further contribution.) The attitude of the Philippine leadership is
unclear, although I went out of my way to praise the quality of their contribution, both to individuals and
to the press. The Australian and New Zealand delegates were interested in the question of the
Cambodian sanctuary. At lunch, I had a long discussion with Ambassador Harriman on the same subject
and believe I was able to cast some new light on the problem as seen from Washington.
8. With respect to the six months withdrawal provision in the final communique, I was as surprised as
most when this emerged in final version.
9. As I have reported, when the final session ended on Tuesday, the President held me over to talk about
his trip to Vietnam. I returned here early yesterday morning to make the necessary arrangements.
10. Best regards.
287. Report Prepared by the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/
Washington, October 1966.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3 (29 Oct 66). Top Secret.
Prepared by J-3, Directorate for Operations. Forwarded to Wheeler by Goodpaster under cover of an
October 31 memorandum, noting that the report was prepared in response to Wheeler's request. A copy
of the report is also at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 193,
Evaluation of the Effects of the Air Campaign.
In a November 7 memorandum to Goodpaster, signed by General Robert Taylor for the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA commented on the report, noting that its judgments and statements
"could be challenged by someone unwilling to depart from the relatively confined area of solid
intelligence evidence," but that, on the whole, DIA was "inclined to accept the J-3 report as a reasonable
analysis of the situation." (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3/3200
(CY 1966))
AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
AND LAOS
[Here follows a 2-page Summary.]

Discussion
1. The war in Southeast Asia is a single conflict against an enemy whose operations are integrated
militarily, geographically and politically, and therefore cannot properly be compartmentalized in
strategy or in evaluation of results. Combat operations of all types, and in all areas, contribute to the
eventual achievement of US objectives in Southeast Asia. Thus, the results of the air campaign against
North Vietnam and the infiltration routes through Laos, are directly and decisively related to the success
or failure of US/FW/GVN operations in South Vietnam. Conversely, increasingly effective combat
operations in South Vietnam have a major influence upon North Vietnam's capability and determination
to support the insurgency. (See Appendix A)./2/
/2/Appendices A-G are attached but not printed.
2. In early 1965, when the fortunes of the GVN were at their lowest ebb, two important actions were
taken by the United States which have changed the course of the war in Southeast Asia: the deployment
of US combat troops; and the initiation of the air campaign against North Vietnam. These two actions
were integral elements of a single strategy designed to blunt the increasingly successful communist
advance in South Vietnam, and to seize the initiative from the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army
forces; eventually to cause the communists to cease their aggression in South Vietnam; and finally, to
assist that country in its development as a viable, independent, non-communist nation. It was understood
at the time these critical actions were taken, that US objectives would not be achieved in a short time,
even under optimum military conditions, and that the force build-up, as well as the accumulation of the
over-all impact of this military effort upon the enemy, would take time. It became obvious also, as
indications of rapidly increasing support and participation by NVN were obtained, that the successful
implementation of US objectives in SEAsia could not be achieved without continued direct pressures
against NVN, unless the United States was prepared to provide a major increase in the number of US
ground troops already deployed or programmed for deployment. (See Appendix B).
3. There is increasing evidence that US/FW/GVN combat units have now successfully seized the
initiative in SVN. Recent past and current combat results support this loss of initiative. This has been the
combined results of operations in NVN, SVN, and the Laos panhandle. Increasingly effective combat
operations in SVN have aggressively searched out and attacked VC/NVA main units, destroyed their
bases, constantly disrupted planned schedules, and maintained continuously increasing military
pressures against them. (See Appendix C). At the same time, the air campaign in NVN and the Laos
panhandle has destroyed significant amounts of materials and munitions, killed numbers of troops
moving south to the combat area, and disrupted NVN's transportation and lines of communication
supporting this logistic flow. It has required the enemy to divert substantial quantities of his manpower
and skills that are in short supply, and quantities of labor and materials have been diverted because of
the necessity to maintain and expand his lines of communication. The lack of success thus far in enemy
attempts to mount large scale offensives has been due in large part to the disruption of his main arteries
of communication. (See Appendices D and E).
4. The substantial activities in US ground, air, and naval forces in SEAsia is beginning to evidence signs
of positive results. Despite major military handicaps, indications of some of the cumulative effects of
US/FW/GVN combat operations are now emerging. The VC/NVA force build-up has essentially leveled
off, despite major attempts to infiltrate and recruit larger numbers of military personnel; VC/NVA
organized large scale military initiatives have dropped to a low level; shortages of critical military
supplies and morale problems among VC/NVA units in SVN are beginning to surface; VC control of
population and area in SVN is decreasing; NVN support of combat operations in SVN in terms of men
and resources has been degraded; NVN has been denied a total sanctuary from which to export
insurgency; the life and economy of NVN has been disrupted; morale in NVN has suffered; national

aspirations are being frustrated; large portions of NVN's population have been displaced; NVN's
demands upon communist nations for war-supporting equipment and materials has increased
substantially, and at the same time, its ability to provide reimbursement has decreased; doubts are now
emerging among NVN leaders as to their ability to succeed in SVN; major drains on manpower
resources have occurred; and a massive, well-coordinated worldwide communist diplomatic and
propaganda effort to pressure the United States to cease bombings, whose scope and intensity testify to
the growing impact of the US combat operations, is in full operation. (See Appendix F).
5. To decrease the current level of coordinated military pressures against the enemy at the very time
evidence of progress is beginning to appear, would at a minimum, prolong the war significantly, require
substantial increases in US ground troops, and result in greatly increased loss of US lives. It would also
provide the communists with new hope and new opportunities, postponing or completely removing the
necessity for any major strategy changes on their part. It would forfeit the hard fought gains which have
already been achieved at significant cost in US lives and equipment, and in the long run, could result in
failure by the United States to achieve its objectives in all of SEAsia. (See Appendix G).
6. It has been recent practice to attempt to evaluate the progress of operations in SEAsia by analyzing
known statistical results. The problems which are associated with this approach are numerous and
serious. It tends to separate the war into separate compartments, ignoring the interrelationship of all
operations in support of a single strategy. Statistics on combat results are unreliable at best, and in
general, focus on small segments of the over-all operations while overlooking the major trends on which
little or no data are available. In SEAsia good intelligence information on the results of combat
operations, particularly relative to their overall impact upon the enemy is minimal; and yet, this is the
only kind of information which really measures the true pulse of the enemy. Recognizable indications of
this kind of effect may not appear for months, or perhaps years, after a military campaign has been
initiated. The history of past wars has repeatedly borne this out. Thus, the current statistical analyses by
which progress is judged have not touched upon such matters as the depth of erosion of communist
stockpiles in NVN and SVN, or the extent and nature of major deficiencies in NVN's war-supporting
capability. They do not indicate the extent of disruption and upheaval within NVN, nor the real state of
the morale of the North Vietnamese people. These analyses have therefore not indicated the true value
of the investment in aircraft, munitions, and US lives that has been made to date.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
288. Memorandum From Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the
President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, November 2, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. In his
covering memorandum to Rostow, November 2, Ginsburgh stated: "Attached is my reaction to Secretary
McNamara's memo on Vietnam [Document 268]--which seemed to me exceedingly and excessively
pessimistic." (Ibid.) In a separate memorandum to Rostow, November 2, Ginsburgh listed the pros and
cons of both a cessation and an intensification of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam and also
listed the major criticisms of the bombing together with opposing arguments. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam)
SUBJECT
Winning the War in Vietnam (U)
I believe that it is possible to win the war in Vietnam within the next 12 to 24 months.
By winning the war I mean the elimination of infiltration of arms and men and the reduction in incountry insurgency to proportions generally manageable by the Vietnamese but without precluding U.S.
troop and material assistance.
I believe this outcome is possible without greatly increasing the risks of expanded CHICOM or Soviet
participation in the war.
Obviously, it is in the U.S. interest to win this war as soon as possible if it does not involve great risk,
because any prolongation of the war causes U.S. casualties and diverts our energies and resources from
pursuing the Great Society at home and abroad. Perhaps less obvious is the fact that prolongation of this
war will probably encourage the communists to resort to other low-cost (to them) wars of adventure.
I believe that it is especially important for us to win the war before our political conventions in the
summer of 1968. If the war is still being fought in the summer of 1968, I think that the communists
would have every incentive to hang on at all costs until after the fall elections in hopes of a change in
U.S. policy.
I do not believe that our present strategy is likely to end the war within the next 18 to 24 months--but it
might.

a. The final conclusion of the CIA study The Will to Persist,/2/ stated:
/2/For the principal findings of the study, see Document 219.
"If on the other hand, pressures on them (the communists) are maintained and the course of events gives
them no grounds for encouragement, by late spring of 1967 they will probably feel compelled to take
stock and consider a change in their strategy."
b. The continuing efforts to get the U.S. to stop bombing the north give a possible indication that the
other side is genuinely interested in stopping the war. Until Hanoi's responses are more forthcoming,
however, it is prudent to consider that the anti-bombing campaign may be simply part of their
psychological warfare efforts to gain a respite to improve their chances of holding out until after the
1968 elections.
The prolongation of the war by the other side involves a complicated interaction of will and capability.
At the present rate of attrition, the communists would have the theoretical capability to fight on for at
least 15 years. But the history of warfare shows that the will to resist collapses long before the absolute
capability is destroyed. Thus, my analysis--which as you know is not shared by the intelligence
community--indicates that the communist calculation of profit and loss applied to their manpower drain
would bring about the end of the war within three to six years.
It seems to me that this three- to six-year period will most probably be shortened by the U.S. elections in
1968. Regardless of the outcome of our elections (barring Senator Fulbright's becoming President), I
believe the war would most likely end between January and June 1969.
If the above analysis is correct--and it is a big if--the policy question facing the President now is: What
might reasonably be done now to shorten the war by 6 to 12 months? This is a question which should be
faced now because of the time involved for decision, for implementation, and for the actions to take
effect.
Although it could be argued that we should wait until the spring of 1967 to see whether the communists
will in fact change their strategy, this possibility does not seem sufficiently likely to base major
decisions upon it. Furthermore, action taken now will have more impact than the same actions taken six
months from now because of:
a. The cumulative impact of an additional six months of pressure.
b. The longer time that the communists would have to hang on before the 1968 elections.
c. The apparent expectation by the communists of increased pressure after the Manila Conference which
if not forthcoming will give them a psychological boost.
There are five interrelated major elements of our strategy that need to be addressed:
1. National development. After many months of your urging, I believe that there is a general recognition
of the need for developing national political and economic institutions. Some progress in both areas is
being made.
We need to get on with the job of developing (a) national political parties and (b) a long range economic
development plan.

2. Pacification. In many respects, this element of our strategy has shown the least satisfactory progress
but it is the single most important element. It is not only essential to our success within SVN but
progress within SVN must greatly affect NVN calculations of gains and costs. With due regard to South
Vietnamese sensitivities and interests, it is important to unify all pacification efforts as quickly and
effectively as possible.
Eventually, we should look toward the appointment of a U.S. "proconsul." In the meantime, the U.S.
effort in SVN should be unified--whether under civil or military leadership--and supported by a unified
effort in Washington. This effort should be given equal priority with the military effort.
3. The war in the south. Perhaps the most satisfactory element of our strategy has been our search and
destroy operations in SVN.
While continuing an appropriate level of search and destroy operations, we must divert as much of the
U.S. and Vietnamese effort as seems militarily sound to the clear- and hold-type operation essential to
progress in pacification.
4. The war in the north. I believe that the war in the south has reached the point where the continued
bombing of the north is no longer essential to victory in the south--unless the cessation of bombing were
to bring about a major increase in infiltration.
In any event, as long as North Vietnam pursues the war, we would pay a price for ceasing to bomb the
north. If we relaxed our pressure on his lines of communication, we would need more troops in the
south. No one can say precisely how many more troops would be needed but the bombing campaign
must represent the equivalent of one to three divisions of troops.
Even with additional troops, a cessation of bombing would most likely prolong the war because we
would no longer be exacting a price on the North Vietnamese homeland for their continuing
adventurism.
Conversely, while it cannot be proven, it seems logical that at some point an increase in the intensity of
the bombing ought to contribute to shortening the war.
I believe that in conjunction with the other recommendations that a renewal of the program of increasing
pressures would materially improve our chances of ending the war by summer of 1968.
It must be recognized, of course, that increasing the intensity and scope of the bombing could cause a
wider war. However, there are only two categories of targets--population and mining of the ports--which
have not already been taken under attack. Although we have attacked a number of airfields, so far we
have avoided those airfields in the vicinity of Hanoi. As long as these categories are avoided, we would
not seem to risk widening the war by attacking additional targets similar to those we have already hit.
Attacks on population we can reject out of hand, both on political and military grounds.
Attacks on the remaining airfields have so far not seemed militarily essential. We can continue to take
the calculated risk of avoiding attacks on these airfields without undue danger until the NVN air forces
become a major interference to our bombing campaign. In the meantime, attacks on other elements of
their defense network could decrease the potential effectiveness of their aircraft. In any event, a major
air campaign should be undertaken against his radars, communications, and SAM facilities as soon as
the appropriate weapons become available.

There remains, however, the major gap in our pressure on the north--the ports through which they
import without interference the materiels necessary to sustain their war effort. We should be able to
reduce substantially their imports either by attacking their port handling facilities or mining their ports.
Air attacks on the ports would have the disadvantage of causing noncombatant casualties. Even so,
casualties could be minimized by careful targeting and precise attacks.
Mining of the ports creates the risk of a potential confrontation with the Soviets and Chinese.
I believe this danger is overestimated.
If our mining is limited to North Vietnamese territorial waters and if everyone is forewarned that the
waters are mined, the sinking of the ship would be the direct result of a positive action by the ship
captain. This, it seems to me, is far different than sinking a Soviet or CHICOM ship by air or surface
attack--both of which should be avoided unless we are prepared to take much greater risks.
We should, therefore, immediately renew our air campaign of gradually but constantly increasingly
pressures on the North. The proposals of Rolling Thunder 52/3/ would be an appropriate start followed
up in timely fashion by additional attacks on similar targets. In the process, we should carry the POL
and electric power campaigns through to completion. As soon as appropriate weapons become available,
we should mount a concentrated campaign on his air defenses--avoiding airfield attacks unless his
aircraft cause major interference to our operations. Ports should be mined at times when there are no
third country ships in harbor, and port facilities should be struck in such fashion as to avoid third
country ships. Such a campaign should be played in low key. It should not be described as escalation. In
answer to any queries, it should be described merely as implementation of U.S. determination to do
whatever is reasonably necessary to cause the North Vietnamese to cease and desist.
/3/See Documents 226 and 295.
5. Diplomatic posture. By any objective measure, I believe that the United States has been most
forthcoming in a search for peace. I think we are now at the stage where any new diplomatic overtures
will be counterproductive barring some kind of response from Hanoi. Further initiatives on our part can
only serve to erode our negotiating position and give hope to the communists that we are looking for a
way out. Our diplomatic posture should be one of simply quietly restating our position and remaining
alert to any possibility of favorable response from the other side.
G
289. Editorial Note
In telegram 10098 from Saigon, November 4, 1966, Ambassador Lodge advised the Department of State
that the scheme to secure the defection of National Liberation Front Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho by
working through his purported uncle, Nguyen Huu An, was "largely based on wishful thinking." In
forwarding the telegram to the President's Special Assistant, Walt Rostow, Arthur McCafferty of the
White House Situation Room noted in his covering memorandum that "in short, the Uncle is one of the
best 'fiction' writers of our time." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box
143, Thrush)
Two months earlier, Lodge had notified the Department that a promising operation had been launched to
secure Nguyen Huu Tho's defection and that other high-level defections from the NLF might follow; see
Document 204. Secretary of State Rusk and Rostow followed the case closely, and President Johnson

was kept abreast of developments; see Documents 206, 214, 225, and 243 and the footnotes thereto.
Additional information on White House and Department of State interest in the operation is in the
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 143, Thrush, and in Department of
State, central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH. Director of Central Intelligence Helms was informed
regularly about the operation by his Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, George Carver, who wrote
him at least 14 memoranda about Thrush from late September through late October 1966. In an October
11 memorandum to Helms, Carver noted that Secretary of Defense McNamara, who arrived in Saigon
on October 10, had been briefed on Thrush and "seemed pleased at the way things are being handled."
Carvers memoranda are in the Central Intelligence Agency, GAC Chron, Job 80-R01720R.
In telegram 8635, October 17, Lodge informed the Department of State of "unresolved discrepancies,
inconsistencies and apparent falsifications," especially involving Nguyen Huu An, which affected the
substance of the defection effort and called into question the honesty of the participants. A
"confrontation meeting" on November 3 between a CIA representative and An, reported by Lodge in
telegram 7657, confirmed that An had "lied about all of his activities during July and August." An was
still regarded as a potential asset, Lodge indicated, but given theoperations "metamorphosis into a
longer term intelligence/defection effort," full control would be turned over to CIA personnel.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL VIET S/THRUSH)
290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 4, 1966, 1:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted in the
White House, cleared by Katzenback, and approved by Rusk. The President met with Rusk, McNamara,
and Rusk from 10:35 to 11:20 a.m. on November 4. (Johnson Library, Presidents Daily Diary) No
record of the discussion has been found. However, under a November 4 covering note in which he stated
that reorganization of the revolutionary development program was on the agenda, Rostow forwarded to
the President back-up papers for the meeting that included a draft of this telegram, which had originally
been transmitted to the President for his concurrence in telegram 68390 to Wellington, October 18.
(Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15)
78865. Literally eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary, SecDef and Komer. You have described the
RD program as the heart of the matter in SVN. We agree. Also, you have reported and we agree that
progress in the RD program so far has been slight and unsatisfactory. We all agree that progress must be
made in this crucial area if the war is to be won in the South and if the North is to be persuaded to
negotiate. It is clear to us that some organizational changes are required on the American side to get RD
moving--to bring harder pressure on the GVN to do its job and to get solid and realistic planning with
respect to the whole effort.
We had considered putting the entire program under COMUSMACV to achieve these ends; and this
may ultimately prove to be the best solution. But recognizing certain objections to this approach, we are
prepared to try a solution which leaves the civilian functions under civilian management. As we see it,
the trial organization would involve the following changes:
1. The several civilian lines of command within U.S. agencies would be consolidated into one. Thus,
line responsibility for all personnel assigned to RD civilian functions would rest solely with one highranking civilian. (We presume this man would be Ambassador Porter. If so, he would have to be
relieved of all other duties, and you would have to have another deputy assigned to absorb the
substantial other responsibilities now met by Ambassador Porter.) The authority of this civilian would

be made clear and full to each constituent agency of the civilian RD team, including relocation of
personnel, the establishment of priorities irrespective of agency priorities, and the apportionment of the
funds allocated for RD by each agency to Viet-Nam (bounded only by statutory limitations).
2. To strengthen Porter administratively, it might be well to assign him a competent Principal Deputy
and Executive Officer--a military officer of two- or three-star rank. If this officer is desired, General
West- moreland can supply him or, if he requests, the officer can be provided from here. This officer
would not be to command U.S. military forces or operations or to perform MACV's functions of
advising and prodding the ARVN, but would be to provide administrative strength on the civilian side
and to serve as a bridge to MACV, ensuring efficient interface between the civilian and military
structures.
3. We understand General Westmoreland is already considering a MACV Special Assistant for
Pacification or a Deputy for Pacification. We presume that the appointment of such a Special Assistant
or Deputy could be timed to coincide with the changes on the civilian side, making possible the highestlevel command focus and consolidation to MACV's RD concerns and staff.
4. Careful definition and delineation of responsibilities of the U.S. civilian and U.S. military sides would
be necessary in the whole RD establishment in South Viet-Nam to ensure that nothing falls between the
stools and that the two efforts fully mesh.
We are most anxious, as we know you are, to make progress in RD. So this new organizational
arrangement would be on trial for 90-120 days, at the end of which we would take stock of progress and
reconsider whether to assign all responsibility for RD to COMUSMACV./2/
/2/Lodge responded in telegram 10204 from Saigon, November 6. He stated that the crux of the problem
was security, not defective organization, and that the first priority was more U.S. troops allotted to
pacification. He agreed that civilian functions should be consolidated under Porter but argued against
creating another deputy ambassador to absorb Porter's other responsibilities. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk
291. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Roche) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 4, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. The source
text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.
At your instruction I went to Saigon from Manila and spent three days trying to convince the mission
that a period of profound calm in Vietnamese politics was a top United States priority.
I discovered on arriving that--with the elections here a mere ten days off--Ambassador Lodge was off on
vacation in Thailand.
Deputy Ambassador Porter has been virtually forbidden by the Chief of Mission to deal with Thieu and
Ky.
--The Ky's talk only to Lodges. And Lodge doesn't talk to anybody--in Saigon at least.

This has as its practical consequence that effective American pressure on the GVN can come only from
Ambassador Lodge. And he is seldom really there--he puts in a five or six-hour day.
I went to make it clear that I consider Ambassador Lodge a fine American who has loyally undertaken
what may be an impossible task.
But we need in Saigon a man with immense vitality, who can and will work an 18-hour day.
--one who can assert real administrative authority over that sprawling, feudal American mission.
--one who can keep two jumps ahead of the Vietnamese, anticipate and head off trouble, and put the arm
on them when they play French games.
--For example, they have--in the best French tradition--agreed "in principle" to the reform of the Port of
Saigon.
--Which means they really haven't agreed to anything that will specifically remedy the problems; they
are stonewalling at the administrative level.
Plenty of trouble is coming. Some time this winter or spring there will be a moment of truth between the
Directorate, the People's Army Council and the Constituent Assembly./2/
/2/On October 4 Roche sent a memorandum to the President warning of a "head-on collision between
the Directorate and the Constituent Assembly" and expressing criticism of the U.S. Mission's role in the
matter. (Ibid., Office of the President File, John Roche)
--The recent resignations were a precursor and the lines of stress run through all three bodies.
--There are generals in every camp and a, to me, ominous fact is that Chief of State Thieu (who has
played second fiddle to Ky so far) is a very old buddy of two generals Ky is out to purge: Co and Quang.
--None of them is Northern. (Thieu is from the center, Co and Quang from the south.)
--They were together at Hue Military Academy (1948-49), at Infantry School in France (1949-50),
Tactical Command School, Hanoi (1951-52) and at Fort Leavenworth (1956-57).
Our task is to prevent any confrontations and disruptions--or we are likely to be back where we were
after Diem fell--which would be disastrous in terms of American public opinion and the long-range
conduct of the war.
And somebody out there in top authority should be worrying about this sort of thing seven days a week,
18 hours a day (possibly even 24).
In my considered judgment this is our top priority in Vietnam. We can't lose the war, but we can find
ourselves fighting it endlessly in a political vacuum.
John P. Roche
292. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

[document number not declassified]

Washington, November 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 H (1), Appraisal of
Bombing of NVN. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The CIA forwarded the memorandum to the
President on November 5.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM IN NORTH VIETNAM/2/

1 January-30 September 1966

/2/This memorandum was produced by CIA. Aside from the normal substantive exchange with other
agencies at the working level, this memorandum has not been coordinated outside CIA. It was prepared
by the Office of Research and Reports and was coordinated with the Office of National Estimates, the
Office of Current Intelligence, and the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs; the estimates and
conclusions represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 3 November 1966.
[Footnote in the source text.]
The Rolling Thunder air offensive against North Vietnam has been accelerated sharply in 1966,
compared with operations in 1965. The 59,000 attack sorties flown in the first nine months of 1966
against targets in North Vietnam were about 2.3 times the 1965 effort; the 90,000 tons of ordnance
dropped was 2.6 times the ordnance delivered on targets in 1965. The 1966 air operations have also been
carried out more efficiently than the 1965 campaign. The average bomb load per attack sortie has
increased, and the rate of aircraft losses has been some 58 percent of the 1965 rate.
In spite of these improvements, it is estimated that the cost effectiveness of the air campaign diminished
in 1966. The direct operating cost of inflicting a dollar's worth of damage in North Vietnam has
increased by about 28 percent--from an estimated $6.80 in 1965 to about $8.70 in 1966. The major
determinants of this decrease in cost effectiveness have been the far greater proportion of attack sorties
accounted for by armed reconnaissance strikes (as opposed to initial strikes on fixed targets) and the
geographic concentration of the air effort against logistic targets in the southern areas of North Vietnam,
principally Military Region IV.
By the end of 1965, a growing scarcity of fruitful fixed targets outside of sanctuary areas, as well as
other operational restrictions virtually forced a continually increasing emphasis on armed
reconnaissance. This trend was temporarily interrupted by the strikes against major petroleum storage
installations, which began late in June 1966. Strike sorties against JCS fixed-target systems dropped
from more than 30 percent of the total sorties flown in 1965 to less than 3 percent in 1966. Armed
reconnaissance sorties increased by over 230 percent, from about 17,300 sorties in 1965 to 57,300 in
1966. Almost two-thirds of these--37,000 sorties--were directed at the southernmost areas of North
Vietnam, the Panhandle section south of Vinh.
The air campaign over Laos shows similar emphasis on the attempted interdiction of the infiltration
network into South Vietnam. Attack sorties flown under the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger programs
increased from 11,000 sorties in 1965 to about 38,000 during the first nine months of 1966. Ninety-five
percent of the attack sorties flown in Laos in 1966 were on armed reconnaissance missions.

The major measurable effects on North Vietnam of Rolling Thunder attacks are:
(1) About 20 percent, or 70,000, of the total military forces are engaged directly in defensive programs
and countermeasures against the Rolling Thunder program. About 220,000 full-time and 100,000 parttime workers have been diverted to repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs in North Vietnam and
Laos. In 1965 and 1966, from 25,000 to 35,000 persons are tentatively estimated to have been casualties
of air attacks in the North.
(2) Physical damage to economic and military targets has also increased. This damage amounted to $65
million in 1965 and an additional $95 million in the first nine months of 1966. Of the latter total, over 70
percent represented damage to economic targets.
Despite the increased weight of air attack, North Vietnam continues to increase its support to the
insurgency in South Vietnam. The Rolling Thunder program has not been able to prevent about a
threefold increase in the level of personnel infiltration in 1966. The external logistic support needed to
maintain the expanded VC/NVA force in South Vietnam has been adequate. In particular, despite the
neutralization of the major petroleum storage facilities in the North, petroleum supplies have continued
to be imported in needed amounts.
Taking a broader view, during the course of the Rolling Thunder program the North Vietnamese
capability to support the war effort has improved.
(1) The capacity of the transportation system, at least as it affects the ability to handle the flow of men
and military supplies to South Vietnam, has been increased.
(2) The sizable manpower drain has peaked, unless there is a sharp increase in estimated VC/NVA
manpower losses in South Vietnam or a radical change in the nature of the air campaign against North
Vietnam. In 1965 and 1966, North Vietnam had to mobilize 80 percent of its physically fit males as they
reached draft age. Subject to the assumptions just delineated, this levy could be as low as 50 percent of
the 1967 class.
(3) Aid from the USSR and Communist China received in 1965 and 1966 has amounted, in estimated
value, to about five times the total caused by Rolling Thunder attacks.
The fact that a large share of the imports now flowing into North Vietnam is not military aid but
machinery and equipment seems particularly significant. On the one hand, it reflects a willingness of the
major Communist powers to provide additional equipment for war-related industrial facilities, probably
encouraged by the fact that the modern industrial sector of the North Vietnamese economy has been
largely off-limits to air attack. On the other hand, it suggests that adequate reserves of skilled manpower,
electric generating capacity, and other essential inputs are available on a significant scale for conversion
to a war-supporting role. While this new emphasis accelerates the ability to support military operations
in the short run, it does postpone Hanoi's long-run plans for the development of heavy industry.
Nor has Rolling Thunder served visibly to reduce the determination of Hanoi to continue the war. We
see no signs that the air attack has shaken the confidence of the regime, and with increased Soviet and
Chinese aid to bolster its capabilities, North Vietnam in the short term at least, will apparently take no
positive step toward a negotiated settlement. In any event, it is estimated that Hanoi will continue to be
insistent on a cessation of the bombings as a prerequisite for negotiations. Analysis of popular attitudes
in North Vietnam indicates a continued firmness in support of the regime's policies. Although the longterm effects of the war may have some wearying effect on the population, there is no evidence that it has

yet reached a point sufficient to deter Hanoi's leaders from their present policies.
Finally, the course of the air campaign in 1966 has had no significant effect on the attitudes of third
countries. From the resumption of the bombings in January 1966 to the escalation represented by the
bombing of the petroleum storage facilities, third-country attitudes have been, predictably, relatively
constant. The unyielding attitude of the North Vietnamese, particularly during the January bombing
pause, has had a somewhat sobering impact on some third countries. Indeed, the escalation against POL
storage facilities produced a reaction more restrained and less critical than had been anticipated. Among
Communist third countries, the USSR and the Eastern European countries would prefer a neogtiated
settlement because they regard a continuation of the war as potentially dangerous to themselves and in
any case as posing an awkward dilemma for them within the Communist world. The Chinese
Communists, however, remain adamant in their attitudes toward the war and any steps leading toward a
negotiated settlement.
Over and above the measurable effects discussed in the foregoing, the Rolling Thunder program has
certain intangible aspects such as enemy morale and determination which are much more difficult to
assess. The Rolling Thunder program has been the object of much neutralist criticism and the target of a
concerted Communist diplomatic and prop-aganda campaign. In one sense, this must serve to stiffen
Hanoi's back; at the same time, the program has become one way Hanoi probably meas-ures US
determination--though the extent of US commitment on the ground conveys this determination far more
persuasively. Moreover, the Rolling Thunder operation carries some threat of further escalation, and in
this way may exert a certain worrisome pressure on Hanoi. On the other hand, if Rolling Thunder were
to be terminated at this point without concessions, the United States would be deprived of one form of
leverage against Hanoi which it now has.
293. Editorial Note
On November 5, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara flew to the LBJ Ranch in Texas, arriving about
10 a.m. At 11:30 a.m., following a meeting with the President, he held a news conference on the front
lawn of the Ranch. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) He indicated that in a meeting the
previous day (see footnote 1, Document 290) and continuing at the Ranch that day he and President
Johnson had reviewed the Department of Defense budget for fiscal year 1968. As a basis for making
decisions on the budget, they discussed the situation in Vietnam currently and as it looked "for the
months ahead" in comparison to what it had been about a year earlier. "Whereas the North Vietnamese
and the Vietcong forces were approaching possible victory some 15 months ago," Secretary McNamara
stated, "I think it is clear to all that today a military victory is beyond their grasp."
Secretary McNamara then stated that, looking ahead to 1967, the following points seemed clear, barring
unforeseen circumstances: 1) draft calls for 1967 would be lower than for 1966; 2) increases in U.S.
forces in South Vietnam in 1967 would be substantially less than during 1966; 3) a second cut in the
planned annual rate of production of air ordnance, on top of the $1 billion cut already ordered, was a
probability; and 4) he expected "that this same trend towards stabilization will govern our air operations,
and the deployments of air units to South Vietnam, and the level of our air activities." Secretary
McNamara also indicated that the military situation had improved to the point that additional emphasis
could be placed on the rural reconstruction program through shifting more South Vietnamese forces to
the effort. For text of the press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pages 1325-1331.
294. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson/1/

Saigon, November 7, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret.
Dear Mr. President:
At the meetings which I had with you in Manila, the urgency of bringing about a quick decision in the
Viet-Nam war was touched on, but there was no opportunity to pursue the subject thoroughly.
I, therefore, submit for prompt and searching analysis a program (the result of much study) to hasten the
end of the war to the greatest degree possible, as follows:
The heart of the matter in the war in Viet-Nam is to destroy the terrorist organization and network--what
Ho Chi Minh calls the "guerrilla infrastructure"--so that terrorists can no longer assassinate, kidnap,
torture, sabotage, cut roads, blow bridges, engage in sudden and surreptitious mortaring and shell fire (as
they did last Tuesday/2/ in Saigon), and, above all, so that they can no longer impress young males into
the service of the Viet Cong, as they are still capable of doing, at a rate of four battalions a month.
/2/November 2.
All concerned agree that this is indeed the crux, and MACV specifically states that what it calls
"offensive operations" are conducted so as to create the opportunity to destroy terrorism, that is
"pacification".
But the phrase "offensive operations" is defined as meaning to "seek out and destroy". This is how the
Germans were beaten in World War II.
I believe that the Vietnamese war will certainly never be won in this way; that the phrase "offensive
operations" should be defined as "split up the Viet Cong and keep him off balance"; and that U.S.
participation in pacification operations should be stepped up./3/
/3/Lodge made the same argument he makes in this letter--that offensive operations should be defined as
"split up and keep off balance" rather than "seek out and destroy"--in at least three other
communications: 1) a memorandum he read to McNamara during their private conversation in Saigon
on October 10 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Vietnam Papers; printed in Gibbons,
The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, pp. 451-452); 2) a memorandum to Rostow,
October 24, which Rostow forwarded to the President the same day, noting in his covering
memorandum that it raised a "first-class issue" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, vol. LX); 3) and telegram 10204 from Saigon, November 6 (see footnote 2, Document 290).
This new definition of the phrase "offensive operations" will require fewer U.S. soldiers and will
(according to reports made to me) mean fewer U.S. casualties.
It will also mean that more U.S. troops will be available to help out in pacification (an even more
fundamentally "offensive" operation)--to be catalysts; to lead by example; and to work with the
Vietnamese on the "buddy" system. They would be the 10% of the total force of men under arms (90%
of whom would be Vietnamese) which would get the whole thing moving.
From experiments already made in doing precisely this, it is clear that U.S. casualties would be few. Yet
the result would be durable--an unusual thing in Viet-Nam where much of the land is to the Army what

the ocean is to the Navy--something you move around on, but most of which you don't want to hold.
What counts in this war is people.
The gains under such a program, while not flashy, would be solid. While it would take time, it would be
absolutely clear at home that time was working for us, and the light at the end of the tunnel would get
steadily brighter.
What I propose has been done on a small scale by elements of the U.S. Marines, the 1st and 25th U.S.
Infantry Divisions, and the Koreans. We know that it works.
It means that the Vietnamese will ferret out and execute (or send into dependable exile) the hard-core
terrorists--the human monsters who cut out men's livers and inflict other nameless tortures. They are the
keystone of the Viet Cong terrorist organization. Their elimination would mean that the night no longer
belongs to the Viet Cong and that the impressment of young men would stop. These key terrorists would
be the real, the ultimate coonskin.
While the Vietnamese must do the ferreting out and the executing, we can help through our police
advisers and our CIA counter-terrorist intelligence. This would be in addition to our military help. I am
calling a meeting of these men to stimulate action.
This program will also hasten the revamping of the ARVN, which is now due to have been completed
by normal Vietnamese bureaucratic methods by July 1967. (I believe this is an optimistic date.) My
proposal would, in effect, revamp the ARVN by "on-the-job-training". It is the only way I can think of
to accelerate the present pace. This would at last correct an error made ten years ago when the U.S.
decided that Viet-Nam should have a World War II type Army rather than a constabulary.
To do this is constructive; it means building a nation; our men like it. In fact, a number have signed on
for another tour so as to do it.
None of the above, of course, applies to overt aggression--that is conventional invasions such as that in
the DMZ and which must always be defeated.
As regards public opinion at home, I think it most unlikely that a clean-cut news event can be brought
about within an acceptable period of time which will cause the press to say that the "war is over" or that
an "armistice has been signed"--or any sharp focus news stories such as we had in World War I, World
War II, and Korea, and to which public opinion in the West is conditioned.
The Communists will not make such an agreement, and if they did, their word is no good. Any peace
proposal they make will probably be to make us stop winning while they keep on fighting.
But I believe a condition can be brought about in which in effect our troops simply keep the enemy off
the backs of the South Vietnamese so that they can go ahead on the job of permanently wiping out
terrorists.
An illustration of such an allocation of tasks is provided by the experience on Election Day, September
11, when
a) We, in effect, kept the main force and NVN units off the backs of the South Vietnamese;
b) with the result that South Vietnamese under arms--military and police--were enabled to provide order

for the voter;

c) with the result that more than 80% of the qualified voters voted; and that
d) for that day anyway, 65%, rather than the commonly accepted 54%, of the population were secure.
Had this condition continued, much ferreting out of terrorists could have ensued--durable progress.
While the above does not produce a "war is over" type of headline, it would mean that the war had
entered a new phase--a phase of which American public opinion would be clearly aware, in which our
battle casualties would be very low, and in which time was plainly and obviously on our side. When
Hanoi faded out, there would be no clean-cut headline, but everyone would know it.
The above raises very large questions on the whole conduct of the war--questions which are far more
than purely military. I propose that this should be thoroughly analyzed and decided on the broadest
possible basis.
With respectful regard,
Faithfully yours,
Cabot L.
P.S. All my best wishes for your good health./4/
/4/Lodge added the postscript by hand.
HCL
295. Memorandum From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense
McNamara/1/
CM-1906-66
Washington, November 8, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2EE Primarily McNamara
Recommendations. Top Secret. On November 8 McNamara forwarded copies to the President (ibid.)
and to Rusk (Department of State, EA/VN-Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos,
1966).
SUBJECT
Military Actions against North Vietnam
1. As you know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that we should increase military pressures on
North Vietnam. They believe that military actions designed to reduce still further the capabilities of the
North Vietnamese to receive help from out-of-country, to move men and material in-country and from
North Vietnam to South Vietnam, and to reduce in-country war-supporting facilities and supplies are
necessary and feasible--militarily, politically and psychologically. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Rolling
Thunder 52 (RT-52) program, provided earlier,/2/ is a desirable first step in undertaking such military
measures against North Vietnam.

/2/See Document 218, footnote 2 thereto, and Document 226.

2. Another useful concurrent action would be the employment of our surface naval vessels against
waterborne coastal traffic between 17 degrees 30' N and 20 degrees N.
3. The salient features of the recommended program are set forth in the following subparagraphs:
a. Reduction of Restricted Areas. Reduce the restricted areas around Hanoi and Haiphong to a tennautical-mile radius racetrack pattern around Hanoi/Phuc Yen airfield; reduce the restricted area around
Haiphong to four-nautical-mile radius.
Comment. Within the Hanoi restricted area are located at least thirty-six (36) major targets of military
worth. The location of population argues against striking some of these targets; however, many are
located in population-free areas. While the number of targets in the Haiphong restricted area is much
smaller, there are worthwhile targets not now subject to attack. Additionally, reduction of both the Hanoi
and Haiphong restricted areas will permit armed reconnaissance operations against an additional 284
nautical miles of the primary lines of communications around these two cities and the searching out and
destruction of the increasing number of dispersed supply installations in these two restricted areas. Area
reductions will also provide desirable flexibility, now lacking, in targeting and tactics, thereby degrading
air defenses.
b. SAM Support Facilities. Three (3) SAM support areas are recommended for attack.
Comment. Since 1 July 1965 the North Vietnamese have launched at least 949 SA-2 missiles against our
strike forces and have destroyed thirty-two (32) manned aircraft. At least twenty-eight (28) SA-2
missiles were launched in the Hanoi/Haiphong area on 4 November. Obviously, we should destroy
concentrations of SAM equipment and SAM support facilities wherever discovered in order to reduce
their limiting effect on our strike forces, which is greater than revealed by the number of U.S. aircraft
destroyed by missiles.
c. POL Storage Systems. As of 4 November our intelligence indicates that some 24,800 metric tons of
fixed POL storage capacity remains of a pre-strike fixed capacity of 132,000 metric tons. Dispersed
storage capacity has grown to 42,500 metric tons. The program recommends strikes on fixed POL
facilities at Ha Gia and Can Thon, formerly erroneously identified as being associated with Phuc Yen
and Kep airfields respectively.
Comment. It is apparent that identified dispersed storage now represents the major portion of the POL
storage system in North Vietnam. Nevertheless, it would be militarily desirable to destroy all fixed
storage in order further to reduce flexibility in receiving, storing, and distributing POL throughout the
country. In this connection, while the residual Haiphong POL storage area is not included in RT-52,
railroad tank cars have been identified in the Haiphong POL storage area, leading to the belief that the
remaining pumping station is still in use and should be destroyed.
d. War-Supporting Facilities. The program recommends attacks on selected elements of the Thai
Nguyen steel plant and the Haiphong cement plant. These two facilities are producing materials to repair
damaged lines of communications and, in the case of the steel plant, to build barges and tanks to move
POL products.
Comment. There are other industrial areas which should be brought under attack because they produce
or contribute to production of small arms, grenades, ammunition and the like.

e. Electric Power Systems. Two electric power plants, Haiphong TPP West and Haiphong TPP East, are
recommended for attack in RT-52. These two plants represent fifteen per cent of remaining generator
capacity in North Vietnam and destruction will reduce operating efficiency in the entire Haiphong area;
specifically, six (6) shipyards and the naval base, the ship and railway shops and, to an undetermined
degree, the off-loading of cargo in the Haiphong port will be affected.
Comment. There are eight (8) major electric-power generating plants remaining in North Vietnam. All
should be struck, as should the Hanoi transformer station, in order to affect to a major degree both
military and civilian support to the war effort. In this connection, the North Vietnamese have contracted
from Czechoslovakia, and are in the process of installing, a number of small packaged generating plants
which, apparently, they will employ to supplement or to replace electric power sources in North
Vietnam.
f. Waterway Locks. Four (4) waterway locks are recommended for attack. These locks control water
levels on water lines of communications. We have noted an increasing use of inland waterways by the
North Vietnamese to supplement or to replace interdicted rail and road lines of communications.
Comment. These locks are not associated, except indirectly, with agriculture. Flooding resulting from
their destruction will be minor and very few people will be at risk. Moreover, the North Vietnamese
have expressed on many occasions their apprehension that we will destroy the Red River dikes as a part
of our air campaign. The destruction of these four (4) locks should exert desirable psychological
pressures on both leaders and population.
g. Ports. Selected areas of Cam Pha port and Haiphong port are recommended for attack. The particular
areas, remote from berths and wharves to preclude damage or destruction of foreign shipping, were
chosen not only to destroy important facilities but to exert psychological pressure on the North
Vietnamese, shipowners and crews by showing that ports are not sacrosanct. It is anticipated that attack
of these port facilities could cause shipping (as in the case of the Soviet tankers) to move out of the port
areas into roadsteads and unload by time-consuming use of lighters and barges.
Comment. If the result hoped for is achieved, not only would the unloading process be impeded but
barges and lighters would be open to attack once they had left the cargo vessel, thereby giving us the
opportunity to destroy imported materials in bulk.
4. Mentioned earlier was the military desirability of using our naval surface craft to interdict coastal
shipping in the area between 17 degrees 30' N to 20 degrees N. Pertinent to this comment is the fact that,
from 25 October through 2 November, 325 coastal craft were sighted in coastal waters between the
DMZ and 17 degrees 30' N with 132 craft destroyed and 140 damaged. Since 2 November very little
movement of coastal water craft in this area has been noted.
Comment. It is pertinent that, during the month of October, in the coastal waters lying between 17
degrees 30' N and 20 degrees N our aircraft observed over 800 coastal craft. Obviously, surface naval
activities in this area would restrict further the flexibility and capacity of North Vietnamese lines of
communications.
5. I informed you the other day that I have had prepared folios of blown-up photographs of the target
system in North Vietnam which reveal very clearly the military worth, the location of population and
other factors pertinent to air strikes.
6. I recommend the following: (a) that President Johnson be briefed in the immediate future on RT-52 so

that his early approval of the program can be obtained; and (b) that I be present in order to explain the
photographs and RT-52 and to respond to any questions the President may have./3/
/3/See footnote 4, Document 299, regarding Wheeler's meeting with the President.
Earle G. Wheeler
296. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/
Washington, November 9, 1966, 1416Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Bombing. Top Secret.
CAP 66932. You will receive this morning by courier the JCS views on expanded military pressure
against North Viet Nam./2/ Sec. McNamara and Sec. Rusk will forward their views/3/ as soon as they
have had a chance to study Gen. Wheeler's recommendations.
/2/Document 295.
/3/See Document 299.
My own views are as follows:
1. We must begin now to lean more heavily on the North. I have reviewed all the evidence and all the
reports we have on the effect of bombing the North. It is clear that the attritional cost we are imposing is
significant for the North Vietnamese in military and economic terms and increasingly significant for
Moscow and the Eastern European countries which are being forced to expand military and economic
aid to compensate for our bombing; and they don't like it. That increased burden may add to their
interest in a negotiated settlement.
2. The expansion in military pressure should be as steady and undramatic as we can make it.
3. We have to take into account George Brown's visit to Moscow later in the month. There is no reason
to be excessively hopeful about that visit; but we must give him a fair chance to probe. It might help his
mission if we signalled, between now and then, our intent to up the ante in the North; but it could
destroy his mission if we did anything dramatic or noisy.
4. The Rolling Thunder program proposed by the JCS probably goes too far at this time in the light of
the Brown visit.
5. Therefore, I suggest you approve certain limited targets from the JCS recommendations, which would
make clear to Hanoi and Moscow the seriousness of our future intent, without putting them under public
challenge or ultimatum. For example, we might hit the SAM support sites, one or two thermo-power
plants, one of the two unstruck POL storage facilities, and extend the surface sea interdiction zone a bit
to the North. In the last few weeks the sea interdiction between the 17th parallel and 17 degrees 13' has
been an effective operation. An additional northward shift of 30 minutes would represent the kind of
steady incremental increased pressure we wish to signal.
6. A limited quietly expanded program of this type, involving no new target systems, is, I believe, what
we need between now and Brown's visit. Properly done it could both increase Moscow's leverage on

Hanoi and Brown's leverage in Moscow. While he is actually in Moscow, we might cut back to armed
reconnaissance.
297. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, November 9, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder
Memos, 1966. Top Secret. Sent through Under Secretary Katzenbach. On November 1 the Department
of State changed the title of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs.
SUBJECT
JCS Proposal for RT 52
1. This proposal which has been forwarded to the President and to you by Secretary McNamara (see Tab
A)/2/ is very similar to his earlier informal proposal presented early in September/3/ which was
subsequently withdrawn and considerably reduced in scope and re-presented somewhat later.
Memoranda to you and the Acting Secretary of September 10, re-submitted on October 31, discussed
this reduced proposal for RT-52; they are attached at Tab B./4/
/2/Document 295.
/3/See Document 226.
/4/Attached but not printed.
2. The renewed proposal for an expanded RT-52 includes strikes on SAM support facilities, POL
storage areas, electric power, steel and cement plants, waterway locks and port areas. It also proposes
moving naval gun fire farther north and permitting armed recce up to within 10 nautical miles of Hanoi
and Phuc Yen and 4 nautical miles of Haiphong. There is attached at Tab C a tabular review of each of
these target proposals, together with recommendations for approval or disapproval./5/
/5/Attached but not printed.
Discussion
3. In general the RT-52 proposal would, if carried out in full, be interpreted as an escalation because of
the inclusion in an RT program for the first time of steel and cement plants and waterway locks as
targets. Whether or not RT-52 envisages a greater intensity of activity is not clear because there is no
period mentioned within which the targets proposed would be struck. However, permission for armed
recce to enter the present 30 and 10 nautical mile circles around Hanoi and Haiphong would
undoubtedly appear to be an intensification in sensitive areas. The recommendations which are made in
Tab C assume that we wish to continue the bombing pressure on North Viet-Nam as it has been applied
over recent months but do not wish to make any sharp departures in the way of more intensive activity
or new kinds of targets which begin to enter the civilian realm or which take less account of the danger
of civilian casualties.
4. With regard to four SAM support facility targets which have not previously been proposed we are

unable to comment intelligently since we have neither information on civilian casualties nor any
photographs. With regard to the waterway locks, we have not had time to assess their full impact on the
civilian population in terms of flooding and particularly crop destruction; the two targets where these
dangers appear to be great have been negatively recommended.
5. Under Rolling Thunder 52, armed recce would be authorized up to 10 NM from the center of Hanoi
and Phuc Yen airfield and up to 4 NM from the center of Haiphong vis-a-vis the present 30 NM for
Hanoi and 10 NM for Haiphong. There would be a route and railroad segment which would approach
within 10 NM of Phuc Yen airfield; however, this was authorized in Rolling Thunder 51. We believe the
proposed new limits for armed recce to be too close for "free wheeling" without special justification and
the designation of special route segments--(Rolling Thunder 51 included 4 railroad and 1 highway
segments that were within the 30 NM limit of Hanoi). The attack of dispersed POL within the armed
recce limits surrounding Hanoi and Haiphong would continue to be authorized provided positive
identification is obtained, the targets are not in populated areas, and after notification to Washington of
the plan to strike. (Attack against dispersed POL co-located with JCS numbered targets within the above
limits that have not been authorized for attack is prohibited.) SAM sites would also be authorized for
attack except in the Chinese buffer zone and in populated areas.
6. Naval gun fire operations against military and logistic water-borne traffic in coastal waters of NVN
would be authorized south of 20 degrees north latitude vis-a-vis the present limitation of south of 17
degrees 30' north latitude. The present authority has only been in effect since October 15 and we believe
that it should remain in effect until greater experience factors have been developed. We are concerned
with the possibility of engaging purely civilian or commercial traffic north of 17 degrees 30'.
7. In light of the experience of the past eighteen months, we judge that the full program will have only
marginal impact on Hanoi's general war effort and, in particular, its ability to sustain the conflict--at the
present level or above--in South Viet-Nam. INR adds the following observations: The program proposed
by JCS would have significant diplomatic repercussions in offsetting the positive impact of the Manila
Conference and in reducing prospects for exploring modalities for negotiation. It is highly unlikely to
have an adverse effect on the determination of the leadership in Hanoi to pursue the war, or significantly
undermine the regime's ability to maintain public control and a disciplined war effort.
Recommendations
8. That you approve the targets as recommended in the Tabular Review at Tab C with provisions
outlined and with the understanding that the strikes will be spread out over a reasonable period of time
to avoid the appearance of undue intensification and escalation./6/
/6/Bundy recommended approval of the following targets: 2 of 8 SAM support facilities (he
recommended disapproval of 2 and deferred a recommendation on 4 while awaiting civilian casualty
estimates); 2 of 2 POL storage areas; neither of the 2 industrial targets (the steel and cement plants); 1 of
2 electric power plants; 2 of 4 waterway locks; and 1 of 2 ports (Cam Pha but not Haiphong).
9. That armed recce be maintained with the present limits and subject to the present ground rules.
10. That naval gun fire operations against coastal military and logistic water-borne traffic be limited to
the south of 17 degrees 30' north as presently in effect.
298. Editorial Note

At 2:51 p.m. on November 9, 1966, Secretary McNamara telephoned President Johnson at the LBJ
Ranch regarding the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to expand the air war (Document 295). The
President indicated that he had not yet seen it but had received Rostow's cable (Document 296).
McNamara stated he had just discussed the proposal with Secretary Rusk and would send to the Ranch a
memorandum containing their recommendations (Document 299).
At the President's request, McNamara outlined the differences between the JCS proposal on the one
hand and his and Rusk's recommendations on the other, stating that the differences were "very
substantial, I think. We recommend that we do more than we are presently doing but not nearly as much
as they recommend." The following exchange then took place:
"RSM: I'd say we did about a third of what they recommended.
"LBJ: Well, we'll have to look at 'em. How long can this wait?
"RSM: It shouldn't wait until after you come out [of the hospital after surgery scheduled for the
following week]. Some parts of it, at least, they and Dean and I are all in agreement on, and I don't see
any reason, if you agree, why we shouldn't start that immediately. The remaining portions that we're in
disagreement on can certainly wait. The weather is not too good at this time of year and we couldn't get
all this in immediately anyhow. If you wished, I know that Buzz Wheeler and I'd be very happy to come
down. He would appreciate an opportunity at some point to talk to you about it anyhow."
The President decided that they should come down the next morning, bringing McNamara's
memorandum (Document 299) with them. The following exchange then took place:
"LBJ: My feeling on this is roughly this: I think we should and must use every hour, every day, every
week, and every two months between now and January that we can. Number one, effectively, all around
the clock. Two, I think that this pressure must be as steady but--this looks like a contradiction but I don't
want it to be--steady but undramatic as we can make it. I think we've got to bear in mind that we've got
the Browns [George Brown] going to Moscow and that we don't want him to feel we don't give him
decent opportunity for that and if we caused this mission to fail, that could be dangerous. And I would
feel that we ought to make clear to these folks the seriousness of our future intent without rubbing their
nose in it in front of a television camera. And I would think of some of the unstruck ones that we've
played around with sometime before and our POLs and some of these other things, but I wouldn't get
into something that is so dramatic that you have a headline every day that you're really changing your
policy. I would-"RSM: That's exactly the character-"LBJ: I'd have it trotting but I wouldn't have it running right now from a walk.
"RSM: That's exactly the character of the recommendations that Dean and I will make to you. We'll be
there about 9 to 9:30 in the morning.
"LBJ: In other words, I want a limited, very quiet, expanded program, but I think it could serve to give
Moscow a little leverage on 'em if it weren't so damn violent that it forced 'em to react otherwise. Do
you follow me?
"RSM: Yes I do. I'm not sure I agree with the conclusion that it would give Moscow more leverage. I
don't believe it would. But, in any case, I believe we arrive at the same conclusion.

"LBJ: Well, what I think is this: I think if we're causing 'em damage and they're hurtin' but we haven't
got their children's hospitals afire and so forth, I think Moscow can say to Hanoi, 'Goddammit, this thing
is gettin' awfully costly on you and on us and on everybody else. Let's try to find an answer here.' If it's
not being costly, I don't think maybe they got any real desire to stop the bombing if it's not hurtin'. But,
we can debate that tomorrow.
"RSM: Sure. We'll be there, Mr. President. Thank you very much." (Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.30, Side
B, PNO 3)
299. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 9, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/VN-VietnamWorking Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder
Memos, 1966. Top Secret. See Document 298 regarding the transmission of this memorandum to the
President.
SUBJECT
JCS Recommendations for Military Actions Against North Vietnam
Attached is a summary of the changes in the Rolling Thunder and associated programs which the Joint
Chiefs of Staff proposed to me in a memorandum dated November 8,/2/ a copy of which I sent to you
yesterday.
/2/Document 295.
I recommend approval of the items checked in blue and disapproval of the items checked in red./3/ My
recommendations are based on my belief that we should limit our attacks to military targets, and within
the category of military targets, attack only those which can be successfully destroyed without
substantial civilian casualties and the destruction of which will more than offset our probable strike
losses.
/3/Items 2, 3, 11, and 12 were checked in blue. Items 1a, 1b, 1c, and 4-10 were checked in red. The last
part of item 14, "17 degrees 30' N to 20 degrees N," was checked in red, but an emendation handwritten
just below the typed item, "extend from 17 degrees 30' N to 18 degrees N," was checked in blue.
Because the military value of the targets and the possible strike losses may be expected to change with
time, I may wish to recommend later that you authorize attack on certain of the targets presently checked
in red.
The Secretary of State concurs in my recommendations./4/
/4/McNamara, Wheeler, and Rostow met with the President at the LBJ Ranch in Texas on November 10.
(Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of their discussion has been found but see
Document 298. Also, a note of November 9 to the President from his secretary, Mary Slater, indicates
that Wheeler's memorandum and Rostow's cable, Documents 295 and 296, were among the papers that
the President wanted to discuss with McNamara on November 10. (Johnson Library, President's
Appointment File) Presumably a decision was made regarding Rolling Thunder 52. Strikes were
authorized in JCS telegrams 7735 and 7783 to CINCPAC, November 10 and 11, against the targets

indicated in items 2, 3, 11, 12, and 13 on the attached "List of Changes." Item 14, as amended by
McNamara, was also authorized. Strikes on the targets indicated in items 4, 5, and 6 were authorized but
deferred. (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Section 13,
Rolling Thunder 52) McNamara recommended the deferment (tentatively until November 25), and the
President approved, during a telephone conversation that began at 9:44 a.m. on November 11. (Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and
McNamara, Tape F66.31, PNO 2) Rolling Thunder 52 was initiated on November 22.
Robert S. McNamara/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment
LIST OF CHANGES IN ROLLING THUNDER AND ASSOCIATED PROGRAMS PROPOSED BY
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
1. Reduce the restricted area around Hanoi from a 30-mile circle to a 10-mile "race track" pattern and
reduce the restricted area round Haiphong from a 10-mile to a 4-mile circle in order to:
a. Permit strikes on approximately 36 identified military targets around Hanoi and approximately 8 such
targets around Haiphong--these targets include bridges, supply depots, and similar facilities.
b. Carry out unlimited strikes against vehicles and other forms of military traffic on the approximately
284 miles of roads and waterways between the present and proposed circles around Hanoi and
Haiphong.
c. Permit search for and destruction of dispersed military supply installations lying between the present
and proposed circles.
2. Attack 3 surface-to-air missile support facilities: Kinh No SAM Storage (16 strike sorties); Hanoi
SAM Storage (16 strike sorties); Haiphong SAM Assembly (40 strike sorties).
3. Strike fixed POL storage facilities at Ha Gia (40 strike sorties) and Cam Thon (54 strike sorties).
4. Strike Thai Nguyen steel plant (28 strike sorties).
5. Strike Haiphong cement plant (18 strike sorties).
6. Strike Haiphong thermal power plant west (4 strike sorties).
7. Strike Haiphong thermal power plant east (4 strike sorties).
8. Strike 4 waterway locks: Thanh Hoa (24 strike sorties), Ben Thuy (24 strike sorties), Xom Trung Hoa
(24 strike sorties), Trung Luong (24 strike sorties).
9. Strike Cam Hoa Port (selected areas only--22 strike sorties).
10. Strike Haiphong Port (selected areas only--24 strike sorties).

11. Strike Xuan Mai highway bridge (34 strike sorties).

12. Strike Yen Bien railroad yard (4 strike sorties).
13. Strike Van Dien vehicle depot (56 strike sorties).
14. Extend the area in which naval gunfire is authorized against coastal shipping from 17 degrees 30' N
to 20 degrees N.
300. Memorandum of Meeting/1/
Washington, November 10, 1966, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns.
PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman
Eugene Rostow
William P. Bundy
Joseph J. Sisco
John Roche
Thomas Hughes
Leonard Unger
Benjamin H. Read
Richard Steadman
Chester L. Cooper
Monteagle Stearns
Frank Sieverts
Daniel Davidson
1. Manila Conference
Governor Harriman opened the meeting by summing up reactions to the Manila Conference in the
countries he had visited./2/ He believed that the reaction to the Manila Communique had been favorable.
The emphasis placed at Manila on our limited objectives, agreement to withdraw troops promptly after
aggression had ceased and on finding a peaceful settlement had provided convincing evidence of our
desire to negotiate. The sections of the Communique dealing with elections and with national
reconciliation were also important. We had to recognize that Ky was regarded as an American stooge in
most of the non-aligned Asian countries and in Europe. The Governor believed that we must persevere
in our efforts to encourage the development of a government in Saigon with legitimate roots. We should
follow constitutional developments closely and not permit the GVN to draft a constitution which would
bely the promises of national reconciliation contained in the Communique.
/2/See Document 281 for information on Harriman's trip.
The Governor observed that the government leaders with whom he had talked on his trip had been
virtually unanimous in wanting us to stop the bombing of North Vietnam. The Governor had made plain
that this could not be done without reciprocal action by Hanoi. Many non-aligned Asians and Europeans
believed, however, that the United States could afford to take the first step toward de-escalation. They
wanted to see talks get underway, believed that this would not happen as long as the bombing continued

but gave no evidence for this conclusion.

Mr. Rostow asked the Governor about his talk with Couve. The Governor said that he had told Couve
that DeGaulle's speech in Phnom Penh/3/ had simply made Hanoi more intransigent. Couve had not
denied this and the Governor said that he seemed to gloat over the fact that DeGaulle was making life
uncomfortable for us. The Governor said that he would review the memorandum of conversation with
Couve/4/ to see whether any elaboration was desirable.
/3/For text of de Gaulle's speech in Phnom Penh, September 1, see American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1966, pp. 646-648.
/4/Not found.
2. George Brown and D'Orlandi
The Governor said that the group should consider what guidance could be provided to George Brown
before his trip to Moscow. We should also see what could be given to Italian Ambassador D'Orlandi
when he returned to Saigon. It might be useful, for example, to spell out with greater clarity what we
mean by reciprocal action by Hanoi.
Mr. Cooper said that he and the Governor had met Ambassador D'Orlandi at the Fanfani luncheon in
Rome./5/ He was returning to Saigon almost immediately and would be seeing his contact soon after he
arrived. D'Orlandi had told Mr. Cooper that his contact expected to leave soon for Hanoi. Mr. Cooper
suggested that D'Orlandi persuade him to postpone his trip a few days. This would give us time to pass
to D'Orlandi through Ambassador Lodge any information that we wished him to convey to his contact.
Governor Harriman noted that he had been impressed by D'Orlandi's evident sincerity. His health was
bad and he had explained to the Governor that he would not be returning to Saigon if he did not believe
that he could contribute to the task of getting negotiations started. While D'Orlandi might not be the
most direct or authoritative channel to Hanoi available to us the Governor throught that we should not
shut it off.
/5/According to the memorandum of their conversation on November 2, D'Orlandi told Harriman and
Cooper that "it was time now to be more specific. In particular, he said that Washington should come to
grips with the problem and find out from Hanoi just what kind of regime they would settle for, what
kind of guarantees they expected, and what kind of guarantees they would comply with. In short,
d'Orlandi felt that we should face up to the kind of ultimate solution we wanted and then worry about
moving toward it." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Mr. Bundy observed that George Brown was somewhat nearer the heart of things than D'Orlandi and his
contact. Consequently, he thought that we should concentrate on what we could give to Brown. Mr.
Unger recalled that we had made a specific proposal for de-escalation in the DMZ to D'Orlandi's contact
not long ago. Nothing had come of this. In fact, we had no firm evidence that D'Orlandi's contact was
operating under instructions from his government. Mr. Cooper said that he had asked D'Orlandi about
this and the Ambassador had stated that he was convinced that his contact had specific instructions not
only from his own government but from Moscow. Mr. Cooper agreed with Mr. Bundy, however, that
George Brown's talks in Moscow offered better immediate possibilities than the D'Orlandi channel.
Governor Harriman said that he had promised to give Brown an analysis of last Tuesday's election
results in relation to the Vietnamese problem. Brown would then be in a position to disabuse the Soviets
of any ideas they might have that the elections had been a repudiation of the President's Vietnam policy.

He asked what we could tell Brown to clarify what we meant by a "signal" from Hanoi that could lead to
a new bombing pause.
Mr. Bundy said that he intended to review the Secretary's talk with Sir Patrick Dean. The criteria were
well stated in that memorandum./6/ He doubted that we could go much further with George Brown. He
had asked Mr. Davidson to work with Mr. Cooper to prepare a draft telegram covering the points that
Brown wanted to raise with the Soviet leaders. This paper ought to be ready by Monday./7/
/6/Document 275.
/7/November 14. The resulting 12-page telegram for Brown, 86196 to London, November 16, spelled
out U.S. views on a number of key issues, including the role of the NLF in negotiations, the withdrawal
provisions in the Manila Communique, and especially the "conditions for a possible cessation of the
bombing"; the latter discussion included the same language for the Phase A-Phase B formula in
paragraph 3d of telegram 83786, Document 305. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET)
7
Mr. Bundy thought that the question was not only to define what we meant by reciprocal action but also
to decide what next steps would have to be taken if Hanoi agreed to some form of de-escalation in
exchange for a bombing pause. Mr. Bundy could foresee that if Hanoi took significant reciprocal action
and we then suspended the bombing, pressures would quickly build up for us to stop troop reinforcements as well. Mr. Cooper commented that we should keep in mind that George Brown in his
Brighton Speech/8/ had publicly advocated a formula calling for a bombing pause plus no reinforcements in exchange for an end to infiltration. Mr. Bundy agreed that ending U.S. troop reinforcements seemed to figure prominently in Brown's thinking and came high on his timetable. Mr.
Bundy observed that we had to be careful about how far we went with Brown. We would not want to
make substantial concessions before Hanoi was even at the negotiating table. Nevertheless he
recognized that we had to give Brown something to contribute to the value of his talks. Though he was
not a discreet man he was well intentioned and capable and was a good friend of the U.S.
/8/Not further identified.
Governor Harriman thought that further discussion on this point could be deferred until the group could
read the paper being drafted by Mr. Davidson and Mr. Cooper. The main thing to keep in mind was that
the Soviets continued to be our best hope for getting negotiations underway. They were seriously
embarrassed by our bombing of North Vietnam and he thought that they would go to considerable
lengths to get the bombing stopped. Furthermore, they were deeply concerned by Chinese Communists'
policies and would probably like to see a non-aligned buffer state or states develop in Southeast Asia
against Peking. The Soviets wanted to get off the hook in Vietnam and for this reason had a stake in
seeing the war ended and negotiations begun.
Mr. Bundy said that he doubted that the Soviets had anything new to say to George Brown about
Vietnam. If there were new elements in the Soviet position he thought they would prefer to talk to us
about them directly. Mr. Read observed that the Soviets might also be skeptical about Brown as an
intermediary in the light of public statements he had made after talking to Gromyko in New York.
Governor Harriman said that despite these cautionary factors we should try to make the most of Brown's
trip to Moscow. The Soviets might be interested in trying out some ideas in their talks with Brown. We
should not conclude in advance that nothing constructive would emerge. Furthermore, our relations with
the British would suffer a damaging blow if the British government were to conclude that we were not
serious about reaching a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. The Governor agreed with Mr. Bundy that

we should give Brown enough to work with to satisfy him but obviously should not give away our
whole position. We might be able to refer to the concepts that the Secretary had mentioned to Pat Dean
and then give Brown some examples of de-escalatory actions that Hanoi could take.
The Governor thought that it would also be useful for Brown to point out to the Soviet leaders that the
Manila Communique's reference to withdrawal of allied forces from South Vietnam within 6 months of
the time that North Vietnam had withdrawn its forces was directly responsive to Gromyko's request for
public clarification of our intention not to remain permanently in Vietnam. Mr. Bundy observed that this
point had already been made by Ambassador Thompson to Ambassador Dobryn-in but he agreed that it
would also be useful for Brown to cover this ground.
Mr. Davidson noted that Brown had requested any information that we could provide on the role we
envisaged for the NLF/VC in negotiations. Mr. Bundy thought that the Soviets were less interested in
this point than in stopping the bombing. In his conversation with Soviet Counselor Zinchuk before the
Manila Conference this was one aspect of the Vietnamese problem that Zinchuk did not explore. Mr.
Bundy doubted that it was either practical or necessary to give Brown much in the way of clarification
of this point.
Mr. Rostow noted that the Secretary had mentioned to him a recent telegram/9/ in which the Soviets
were reported to be telling Hanoi that the principal points at issue in Vietnam were the bombing of
North Vietnam on the one hand and the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South on the other.
If this was an accurate report it implied that the Soviets were trying to narrow the areas of disagreement.
Governor Harriman said that other reports indicated that the Soviets wanted assurances about what the
future of the NLF/VC would be if the conflict ended in Vietnam. He believed personally, however, that
the principal Soviet objective was to stop the bombing.
/9/Not further identified.
Mr. Unger said that it was possible that the Soviets would raise with Brown the question of the Geneva
Accords and the fact that the Manila Communique did not specifically re-affirm their validity as a basis
for settlement. He thought it might be useful to touch on this point when we communicated with Brown.
Mr. Rostow wondered whether it would be worthwhile for Brown to discuss with the Soviet leaders the
idea of stationing neutral troops in the DMZ. Mr. Cooper doubted that the time was right for this
proposal. Mr. Unger commented that this was an idea that we had proposed originally but had never
pressed because it presented a number of practical problems of implementation. In the first place it was
hard to imagine the ICC as now constituted giving its approval to the proposal. It was also difficult to
think of any neutral powers which would be willing to contribute troops. Finally, the proposal raised
some tough military problems. Despite these considerations Mr. Unger could see no harm in Brown
discussing the proposal with the Soviets. In fact, the subject could logically follow from whatever
discussion Brown planned to have on the general subject of the ICC. It was decided that Mr. Cooper and
Mr. Davidson would consider whether it was feasible to include some mention of the proposal in the
package being prepared for Brown.
In closing the discussion of George Brown's trip the Governor said that after we had prepared the
material for Brown we should see what morsels could be given to D'Orlandi. He repeated that he had
been personally impressed by D'Orlandi and believed that we should give him some encouragement.
3. National Reconciliation and Constitution

Governor Harriman said that he was disturbed by indications that the new Vietnamese constitution
would have a clause excluding "communists and neutralists". We must assure that the constitution was
not inconsistent with the principle of national reconciliation. Mr. Bundy thought that our first objective
should be to obtain from Ky and Thieu a strong statement on national reconciliation. The reporting from
Saigon/10/ indicated that the GVN was now pointing to December to kick off their amnesty and
reconciliation program. The wording of the constitution might present problems, as the wording of the
electoral law had presented problems. But in Mr. Bundy's mind the first order of business should be to
get the GVN firmly and publicly committed to the principle of national reconciliation.
/10/Telegrams 9690, October 29, and 10005, November 3, both from Saigon. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S and POL 15 VIET S, respectively)
Mr. Roche recalled that we had been caught short on the electoral law. He thought it might be risky to
delay putting pressure on the GVN for the kind of constitution we could support. Mr. Unger agreed that
it would be useful to flag the issue now so that the Embassy would have no doubts about our attitude.
Governor Harriman said that he tended to agree with Mr. Bundy that we should concentrate on the
national reconciliation program as a first priority. He recalled that he had told the Indians and others that
the GVN would announce a program of national reconciliation on November 1. This had been done. We
had to hold the GVN to its new schedule so that an effective program would be announced and would
get under way in December. Mr. Roche commented that it was easy to get the Vietnamese to agree to
anything in principle. The real problem would be in getting them to follow through with an effective
program. The Governor asked Mr. Davidson who would follow up with the GVN in Saigon. Mr.
Davidson said that Henry Kissinger's recommendations to improve the Embassy organization as it
related to national reconciliation, pacification etc. were not being followed. It was not clear to him who
would be responsible for making sure that the GVN carried through a program of national reconciliation.
Mr. Roche observed that Ambassador Lodge was the only American in Saigon with the access to and
influence on Ky to do the job. He noted that Lodge expected to go on leave some time in December. Mr.
Rostow said that this meant we should get to Lodge right away. Mr. Cooper remarked that Lodge would
be able to provide the initial push but that we needed to keep after the GVN to see that a strong speech
on national reconciliation was actually delivered. He assumed that by next week someone in the GVN
would start drafting. The Embassy should be in a position to get our ideas across at an early stage. Mr.
Unger said that he would undertake to see that a message to Saigon was drafted promptly to this effect.
Before the meeting closed Mr. Davidson pointed out that even if we managed to get the GVN leaders to
commit themselves publicly to a program of national reconciliation, we could still have trouble
dissuading them from introducing a clause into the new constitution excluding "communists and
neutralists". We should realize that when Ky and Thieu spoke of national reconciliation they were
thinking in terms of defections from the NLF/VC not of the NLF/VC itself playing a political role in
South Vietnam. In short, a constitutional clause excluding members of the NLF/VC from Vietnamese
political life would not necessarily seem to Ky and Thieu inconsistent with the principle of national
reconciliation as they interpreted it.
301. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Wheeler)/1/
Washington, November 11, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII. Top Secret. Printed in
The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 364-365.

SUBJECT
Deployments to Southeast Asia (U)
I have reviewed your recommendations in JCSM 702-66, November 4, 1966,/2/ and the related military
and economic effects of your recommended deployments. The attached table/3/ summarizes your plan
and the forces which I am approving for planning purposes.
/2/This memorandum concerned "Deployment of Forces to Meet CY 1967 Requirements." (Department
of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3 (18 Jun 66), Section 8A)
/3/Attached but not printed. The table lists the following projected figures, in thousands, for total
personnel in South Vietnam under the Southeast Asia Deployment Program:
JCS Plan:
June 1967, 455.9
December 1967, 504.0
June 1968, 522.2
OSD Plan:
June 1967, 439.5
December 1967, 463.3
June 1968, 469.33
As you know, a reasonably stable economy in South Vietnam is essential to unite the population behind
the Government of Vietnam--indeed to avoid disintegration of the SVN society. Runaway inflation can
undo what our military operations accomplish. For this reason, we have already taken actions to reduce
military and contractor piaster spending towards the minimum level which can be accomplished without
serious impact on military operations. Nevertheless, the price stability achieved last summer may be
giving way to a new round of severe inflation. More must be done.
Ambassador Lodge has asked that U.S. military spending be held to P42 billion in CY 1967. The
Ambassador's proposed program of tightly constrained U.S. and GVN civilian and military spending
will not bring complete stability to SVN; there would still be, at best, a 10 billion piaster inflationary
gap. It would, however, probably hold price rises in CY 1967 to 10%-25% as opposed to 75%-90% in
FY 1966. The burden of inflation falls most heavily on just those Vietnamese--the ARVN and GVN
civil servants--upon whose efficient performance our success most heavily depends. Unless we rigidly
control inflation, the Vietnamese Army desertion rate will increase further and effectiveness will
decline, thus at least partially cancelling the effects of increased U.S. deployments. Further, government
employees will leave their jobs and civil strife will occur, seriously hindering both the military and the
pacification efforts and possibly even collapsing the GVN.
For these reasons we must fit our deployments to the capacity of the Vietnamese economy to bear them
without undue inflation. As your memorandum indicates, the program you recommend would cost over
P46 billion in CY 1967 at current prices. I believe implementation of a program of this size would be

self-defeating. The plan I am approving at this time for budgetary planning appears to me to be the
maximum consist-ent with any reasonable hope of economic stability. If contingencies arise during the
year, we can re-examine the plan accordingly. I plan to provide sufficient combat-ready forces in the
U.S. to meet reasonable contingencies.
A troop list containing each unit in Program # 4 is attached./4/ You may wish to suggest changes in the
unit mix, if there are units that have been deleted that have a higher priority than those I have approved.
I would like to have these recommendations by December 1, 1966. I also would like your proposals as
to ways in which approved units can be accelerated so as to provide maximum combat capability as
early as possible in CY 1967./5/
/4/Attached but not printed.
/5/The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded in JCSM-739-66, December 2, proposing modifications in the
plan for deployments to Southeast Asia. (Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN
VII)
RMcN
302. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, November 11, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 138, Nodis/Louisiana.
Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to McNamara.
Yesterday the President elaborated to Bob McNamara and to me his desire to have a systematic
assessment of what each of the following countries might do to help us in Viet Nam: Korea, Australia,
New Zealand, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, and others, including the Europeans. He has in mind three
things:
a. Troops or additional troops where possible.
b. Other forms of assistance; e.g., increased training by Malaysians; increased economic aid for Viet
Nam; increased political and diplomatic support; etc.
c. Even if increased help is not forthcoming, he wants our request to be part of our bilateral accounts so
that if they do not act, they understand they have failed to act and should bear this in mind when asking
us for assistance.
In this connection, he asked whether Ellsworth Bunker might not spend a part of his time touring some
of these countries, where it is impossible for you to go before the NATO meeting.
He raised the question, on a different basis, as to whether it would not be wise for Bunker to go quietly
to Indonesia to make an assessment of the situation on the spot, perhaps accompanied by a couple of
good young military officers--"young Goodpasters."
In any case, the President wants to have available by the opening of Congress a systematic record of all
our efforts to increase and widen international support for our effort in Viet Nam, in the form of a record
that might be shown to General Eisenhower, Senator Dirksen, Gerry Ford, etc./2/

/2/In circular telegram 8350, November 11, the Department stated that the "time is ripe for major effort
to obtain additional manpower contributions by other countries in Vietnam" both for "practical
importance" and to demonstrate "wide support for basic objectives in Vietnam"; cable traffic on this
subject was to be slugged Louisiana. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-3 VIET
S/LOUISIANA)
Walt

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
303. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 11, 1966, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 141, Aspen. Top Secret;
Nodis; Aspen. Drafted by Heyward Isham of EA and Unger. Printed in part in Herring, Secret
Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 655-661. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Dining Room.
Documentation on Aspen, the codeword for the negotiating channel with North Vietnam through
Sweden, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14/ASPEN, and in the Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 141, Aspen. A substantial selection has been printed
in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 655-715.
SUBJECT
Swedish Diplomatic contacts with North Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
United States
Secretary Rusk
Deputy Asst. Secretary Leonard Unger
EUR/SCAN--David McKillop
EA/VN--Heywood Isham
Sweden
Minister of Foreign Affairs Torsten Nilsson
Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry R. Hichens-Bergstrom
Ambassador to United States--Hubert de Besche
First Secretary, Pol.Div., Ministry For.Affairs--J.C.S. Oberg
After preliminary exchange of greetings, Foreign Minister Nilsson read a report of two recent
conversations between Swedish diplomats and representatives of North Viet-Nam which took place in
Warsaw and Hanoi (The text of this paper is attached)./2/ Having read the paper, the Foreign Minister
summarized the salient points of what DRV Foreign Minister Trinh had told Ambassador Petri in Hanoi:
North Viet-Nam preferred a political to a military solution and was interested in a climate favoring a
political settlement provided certain conditions were fulfilled; withdrawal was not specifically
mentioned; the National Liberation Front was described as one of the spokesmen for the South VietNam people although the most valid one. Regarding the possibility of reaching a final settlement, the

NLF and Hanoi supported the formation of a National Coalition Government in South Viet-Nam
founded on a broad basis including all political and religious groupings as well as all social classes
generally desiring to achieve national independence. Moreover, conditions should be created permitting
moving in the direction of future re-unification.
/2/Attached but not printed.
The Foreign Minister commented that it was difficult to judge the significance of the talks although it
was interesting that a moderate tone characterized both of them. It was impossible for the Swedish
government to assess the value of the information given to Ambassador Petri. An analysis of these
exchanges in both Warsaw and Hanoi, however, might show them to contain elements justifying
carrying on a discreet dialogue with the North Vietnamese government. The DRV Foreign Minister had
concluded his conversation with emphasizing that he expected the conversation to be handled with
absolute discretion. Foreign Minister Nilsson observed that although they had contacts with the Front
and Hanoi since 1965, until now they had received nothing of interest but that a study of the recent
exchanges had led them to feel that the atmosphere had begun to change and they felt it their duty to
inform us.
The Secretary prefaced his reply by underscoring the need for extreme accuracy in reporting such
conversations and knowing the exact language that was used on the other side. Great issues were at
stake. We receive many reports about Hanoi's attitudes and positions which when tested proved to have
no substance. The Secretary went on to note that there were one or two positive and one or two negative
elements in what had been told to the Swedish representatives. On the positive side, Hanoi's interest in a
political rather than a military solution represented a small step forward.
Foreign Minister Nilsson, describing the background of Ambassador Petri's mission, said he had been
received by the head of the political department of the DRV Foreign Ministry and had several two-hour
conversations and three dinners all within the space of three days. These had revealed nothing new in
Hanoi's position. After all this, Trinh had sent him an invitation to come see him; Petri had not asked to
be received by Trinh. While there was no discussion of conveying Trinh's remarks to the United States,
neither did Trinh say Petri could not do so and he emphasized the importance of maintaining secrecy.
The Swedes interpreted Trinh's attitude as a tacit indication that his remarks could be conveyed to the
United States.
The Secretary, continuing his commentary on Trinh's remarks said the missing element was what Hanoi
would in fact do on the military side. At least 19 regular North Vietnamese regiments were in the South
and three North Vietnamese divisions were in the DMZ and north of it. They could attack our Marines at
any moment. If we committed ourselves to stop bombing permanently, we must know what would
happen on the ground militarily. We could not possibly make a commitment on the ground unless we
knew what Hanoi would do with those 19 regiments. Trinh had used the phrase, "We know what we will
have to do" in the event their conditions were accepted. The Secretary said we would want to know what
that phrase means.
Mr. Bergstrom, noting that Petri's report had been in the form of one written and one telegraphic
message, said they had queried him for clarification on the formulation regarding the National
Liberation Front and the paper read by Foreign Minister Nilsson represented as accurate and precise a
summary of Ambassador Petri's reports as they knew how to prepare. Ambassador Petri had observed to
Trinh that if the two conditions were fulfilled, the North should follow suit. Bergstrom did not indicate
whether there had been any comment to his remark.

The Secretary said that Hanoi had denied, even to the Soviets, that they had troops in the South.
However, we must have corresponding action on the ground; we could not be children in this matter. As
to the role of the Front, we knew who their leaders were including North Vietnamese Generals in the
South using a variety of names. The Liberation Front is Hanoi. Some southern individuals with other
associations were included in the Front, but they had no influence. When Trinh said the Front was the
most valid spokesman for the South Vietnamese people and that the situation must be consistent with
moving toward reunification, he was expressing Hanoi's political objective of permanently unifying the
country on a Communist basis. We were prepared to have South Viet-Nam decide on a solution through
elections but so far Hanoi was not prepared to do so. The Secretary said we could not impose a coalition
government on the South; we could not turn our men around and start them shooting in the other
direction to impose a coalition government. If the South Vietnamese people were to decide on this it was
up to them and we would abide by the result, but a coalition would not be imposed by our arms and our
power.
The Secretary asked what resources the Swedes had to continue this conversation; would the
Ambassador be returning to Hanoi? It would be useful to get greater precision on the meaning of Trinh's
phrase "they knew what they must do." The Secretary told the Foreign Minister for his personal
information that last fall the Soviets suggested that we suspend the bombing for 15-20 days in order to
permit further explorations of Hanoi's positions. We had suspended the bombing twice as long as the
Soviets had requested. During this time, Hanoi multiplied the number of trucks it was sending South and
poured men and arms into the South on a 24 hour a day basis.
On the 34th day of the pause, Hanoi had asked us to accept the four points, recognize the Liberation
Front as the sole spokesman of the South Vietnamese people and get out of South Viet-Nam. Hanoi had
not even used dilatory tactics as they might well have to embarrass us; they had simply asked us to
surrender. This had been stupid of them. They could have made considerable problems for us if they had
been more sophisticated or clever. Every week since January, we had tried to get an answer to the simple
question: if we stopped the bombing as step 1, what would be step 2? Of course things would be better
in the North, but what would happen in the South? We were vitally interested in this. Any further
clarification as to the meaning of Trinh's phrase would be of some interest. The Secretary added that the
other side had made clear we must end the bombing permanently, since they insisted that a suspension
would imply an ultimatum. This represented an increased demand on their part and we must have
something in exchange for a permanent cessation.
The Swedish Foreign Minister noted that they had contacts with the Front or Hanoi in Algiers, Warsaw,
Moscow and Hanoi as well as Peking. The Secretary noted that the only serious interlocutor was Hanoi-not the Front. The Secretary said that we did not discount the importance of any third party channels. In
past crises, we never knew which channel would be important. In this case, we did not know whether
Hanoi would say something important through the Swedes rather than through someone else. We did not
wish to close any channel of communication but we did wish to know what Hanoi meant by the
particular formulation Trinh had used. The Foreign Minister said that they also did not know about
Hanoi's intentions in this respect, but were certainly prepared to ask for greater precision. The Secretary
commented that since Hanoi was terrified of being caught by Peking talking with us it would be
important for the Swedes to stress they were seeking these clarifications solely on their own.
The Secretary went on to say that the Eastern European countries would probably be interested in
settling for the status quo ante at the 17th Parallel but on account of Peking, were unable to move
forward. We are prepared, he said, to accept the Communist world's interest in North Viet-Nam if they
are prepared to accept our interest in the South. Until Hanoi abandoned its objective of seizing South
Viet-Nam, there could be no peace. It was as simple as that. We were prepared to cooperate in finding
ways for Hanoi to abandon its effort to take over the South but not in finding ways to abandon our own

effort in the South. The Swedish Ambassador commented that Petri's impression was that the North
Vietnamese were deeply concerned over developments in China, were essentially North Vietnamese
patriots and that because of these Chinese developments there were better prospects of negotiating than
before. The Secretary said that Hanoi undoubtedly did not desire to be taken over by China nor did the
Soviets wish this to happen. But they could not expect us to do anything about this if it meant giving
South Viet-Nam up to them. If the Chinese wanted war over this, they could have it. We would not
abandon South Viet-Nam under any circumstances. The Secretary continued that two things were vital:
(1) Hanoi must abandon its attempt to seize South Viet-Nam by force, and (2) the people of South VietNam must have a chance to decide what government they want and to express their views on
reunification without being subjected to force by the North. This principle was true for Korea, for
Germany and for Viet-Nam. The Swedish Ambassador pointed to Trinh's implication that reunification
could be a long term proposition and the Secretary countered that the thrust of that passage meant a
Communist regime for the South. This was one of the negative aspects of Trinh's remarks. The Secretary
pointed out the lack of reciprocity in the position of the other side. If we were to say we would not
negotiate until the North stopped bombing in South Viet-Nam, people around the world would protest
that we were being belligerent. We had suspended bombing in the DMZ to see if there would be any
response, but there was none and the ICC had been denied access to the area under the North.
Nevertheless the Trinh statement could be important if we had more precision.
Ambassador Unger called attention to the reference by the North Vietnamese in Warsaw to "no military
action being undertaken in the demilitarized zone." He suggested, and the Secretary agreed, that this was
also a point on which the Swedes might make further soundings in Hanoi. We were certainly ready to
see the zone truly demilitarized and would welcome an end to violations of it by North Viet-Nam.
The Foreign Minister mentioned possible differences of opinion between the Front and Hanoi and
pointed out that all elements of the Front were not Communists. The Secretary responded there was no
problem about contact with the Front; the South Vietnamese were able to communicate with its
representatives. South Viet-Nam could take care of the indigenous problem through reconciliation and
bringing the dissidents back into the body politic. United States troops had only entered when North
Viet-Nam regulars had come down. If the Swedes were in the same position, they would not accept a
coalition government thus imposed on them.
In answer to the Foreign Minister's question as to how long the conflict might go on, the Secretary said
that peace could be had by 6:00 this afternoon if the North told us they would stop trying to take South
Viet-Nam by force. But we were not looking for a face-saving formula to permit us to abandon South
Viet-Nam and some of the Communist states appeared at last to recognize this. The Secretary noted
three channels to Hanoi: the direct one through which little was said because of Hanoi's fear of Peking;
the channel through Moscow to which we attach importance because of Moscow's attitudes and
influence--but here again Hanoi was probably afraid of Peking; and finally a channel through a third
party, which could be Sweden. But, he continued, this represented perhaps 50% of the question; the
other 50% was the possibility of resolving the problem by de facto action on the ground in the pattern of
the Greek insurrection and the Quemoy-Matsu crisis. Ho Chi Minh might prefer to pull back troops
rather than enter negotiations, calculating that Americans might go home and could not come back,
although, the Secretary said, we can get back faster than they can. We would be prepared to try this
route. There need be no confessions that they have 19 regiments in the South.
In response to an analysis by the Foreign Minister of Hanoi's problem, the Secretary noted that we had
reports from Eastern European sources that confirmed this precisely: Hanoi feared the effect of
negotiations on the morale of the Viet Cong and Hanoi's present leaders feared that they could not
survive a failure to achieve their objectives. However, the Secretary said on this we cannot help them;
they are in places they have no right to be.

Further, on the point of gradual de-escalation, the Secretary said that since January we had made clear
our interest in responding to actions on the ground--what we call a process of "mutual example"-without evoking thus far any interest on Hanoi's part. If Trinh's phrase pointed in the direction of
positive Hanoi response, this could be important.
As to Trinh's own alignment in the regime as between hawks and doves, Mr. Bergstrom commented that
the French considered him pro-Chinese but that Ambassador Petri did not have that impression.
The Foreign Minister asked whether it would be necessary to specify how long we would halt the
bombing. The Secretary said that under our system the press and Congress would force us to answer this
question. A permanent bombing halt would require a very important reciprocal action. Ambassador
Unger commented that Trinh's remarks implied some readiness to discuss now not only conditions for
negotiation but also the terms of an eventual settlement. The Secretary agreed that Hanoi was hesitant
about discussing the first step until they saw how the negotiations would end. He indicated that another
reason for keeping further inquiries on the basis of a Swedish-DRV dialogue was to avoid having to
bring Saigon into the picture, which we were disinclined to do at this stage.
The Secretary suggested as a technical point it might not be wise to pursue the dialogue with Hanoi
through other capitals. In order to protect Trinh's position if there are divisions within the leadership it
was important not to have communications from abroad available to too wide a group in Hanoi. Foreign
Minister Nilsson agreed with this suggestion. The Secretary emphasized the importance of examining
very carefully all indications bearing on Hanoi's position but as he had told the press on another
occasion, we could only negotiate with those who could stop the fighting. If we entered into too great
detail on our conditions for settlement, the other side would just put that in their pockets and then
propose to split the difference. We were not worried about real southern insurgents--16,000 of them had
defected this year--but the Northern Generals must go home. We would even be prepared to give them a
villa on the Riviera!
Responding to a question by the Foreign Minister, the Secretary said that Premier Ky was not
particularly popular as an individual but that the majority of the population had strongly rejected the
Viet Cong and supported the move towards a constitutional government. Even Tri Quang, opposed as he
was to Ky, wanted us to bomb China. The trouble with the Vietnamese was the influence of the French
"fourth republic mentality" where every man had his own party.
Reverting to the paper given us by the Foreign Minister, the Secretary said we would wish to put it
under a microscope and give a more systematic answer. Ambassador Unger would go to New York
before Nilsson's departure next week and give him our further comments. In any event, these statements
from Hanoi did have a certain resonance. Responding to a final question from the Foreign Minister
about Hanoi's difficulty of believing that the United States could abandon such expensive United States
bases, the Secretary pointed out that the United States' capacity in this regard should not be
underestimated. We had built roads in India, over the hump, and Alaska during the war which we had
never used, and we had demobilized 100 divisions after World War II. In the last five years we had
closed 600 bases. As the President had said, we had no intention of leaving our soldiers in South VietNam as tourists.
Following the general conversation, Ambassador Unger privately mentioned to Minister Nilsson and
Mr. Bergstrom our concern over reports that Ambassador Petri had spoken rather openly about his
contacts in Hanoi. They agreed and said that recently they had twice communicated with Petri and
instructed him to treat this subject with maximum discretion.

304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, November 12, 1966, 2:02 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by
Unger; cleared by McNamara, Helms, Gaud, Marks, and Komer; and approved by Rusk and
Katzenbach. In telegram 85196 to Saigon, November 15, Rusk told Lodge and Porter that telegram
83699 "was discussed today at highest levels, who wished to emphasize that this represents final and
considered decision." (Ibid.)
83699. For Ambassador from Secretary, SecDef and Komer. Ref: (a) Saigon's 10204; (b) State's
78865./2/
/2/See Document 290 and footnote 2 thereto.
1. We appreciate your views in reftel (a). Your review of organizational problems has been helpful to us.
2. We would like now to proceed immediately with measures on US and GVN side to get RD program
moving forward effectively.
3. Re para 20 reftel (a),/3/ realize you were not in position discuss our proposal in sufficiently wide
circle. You are authorized now to discuss this and reftel (b) with Ambassador Porter and General
Westmoreland and, once plans mature, inform members Mission Council.
/3/In paragraph 20, Lodge requested authority to discuss the proposal in telegram 78865 with the "heads
of the different mission agencies involved here."
4. Following steps need to be taken promptly if we are, in the time available, to give adequate test to
organization which is intended to keep RD civilian functions under civilian management, an objective to
which we know you attach considerable importance. These steps have already been discussed reftel (b)
which should continue to serve as general guide. We would like you to prepare articulated plan to put
these meas-ures into effect as soon as possible, carefully delineating and defining US civilian and
military responsibilities, with particular attention to most effective relationship among Ambassador
Porter, his new military deputy and Gen. Westmoreland and his new RD/P deputy or special assistant.
A. Mission directive should be issued providing that Ambassador Porter, working under your general
supervision, should, pursuant para 1 reftel (b) take explicit operational charge of all personnel and
programs carrying out RD/P civilian functions, including public safety, province reps and any other
pertinent USAID elements; JUSPAO; CIA cadre and other RD/P programs; and military to the extent
that civilian functions have been assigned to them.
B. Mission directive should include new organizational pattern at regional, provincial and district level,
putting premium on effective coordination with each province of all activities related to RD/P.
C. Mission directive should also reiterate that Ambassador Porter is freed of any Mission duties other
than RD direction and that provision is made for the direction of all other Mission business during your
absence (for example, during your coming leave) by a designated officer, whether or not it is considered
essential that Ambassador Porter be nominally in charge. Same directive should create staff for
Ambassador Porter adequate to support him in discharge of these responsibilities.

D. You and Ambassador Porter will wish to work out with General Westmoreland most expeditious
means of accomplishing following, calling on Washington for additional authority or funds as
necessary:
(1) Assignment of principal deputy and executive officer to Ambassador Porter, being general officer of
two or three-star rank. This would require immediate consultation with General Westmoreland to secure
most appropriate officer.
(2) Designation by General Westmoreland of separate Deputy or Special Assistant for Pacification to
MACV.
(3) Preparation of realistic and detailed plan by MACV with assist-ance Ambassador Porter for bringing
about change in mission for bulk of ARVN to responsibility for local security and coordination of such
activities with RD Ministry priorities and plans. This should utilize MACV relations with leading GVN
military officials, including use of all leverage provided through MAP and Adviser Program, and should
draw on maximum support as necessary from yourself and high-level officials Washington. We are
aware of resistance among top-ranking GVN military, including Corps Commanders, but believe time
has come to take on this problem and find successful way to press ARVN to devote sufficient military
muscle to accomplish this task, which, as you say, is the foundation of the RD/P program. This is task
for entire Mission. Load inevitably falls most heavily on MACV and on you who must keep heat on Ky
and Thieu. Your election analogy (para 8 reftel (a))/4/ suggests that when Vietnamese wish to take on
task analogous to what we are advocating, they can do so.
/4/In paragraph 8, Lodge noted how U.S. troops, working in conjunction with South Vietnamese forces,
provided protection for voters on election day, September 11.
(4) Should either you or General Westmoreland have reservations concerning these actions, please raise
specific alternatives with us immediately.
(5) Re para 3 reftel (a), we understand General Westmoreland plans use of limited number US forces in
buddy system principle to guide and motivate ARVN in RD/P. However, we have serious doubts about
any further involvement US troops beyond this in straight pacification operations. We fear this would
tempt Vietnamese to leave this work more and more to us and we believe pacification, with its intimate
contact with population, more appropriate for Vietnamese forces, who must after all, as arm of GVN,
establish constructive relations with population. Hence we believe there should be no thought of US
taking on substantial share of pacification. The urgent need is to begin effectively pressing ARVN.
Rusk
305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 13, 1966, 3:37 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy
of the Vietnam War, pp. 263-264.
83786. Ref: Saigon's 10714./2/
/2/In telegram 10741 from Saigon, November 13, Lodge indicated that he had agreed to meet with

D'Orlandi and Lewandowski on November 14 and would appreciate any further guidance the
Department might have. (Ibid.)
1. Agree you should meet with d'Orlandi and Lewandowski. We hope this way lead to the latter's being
able carry out useful mission in Hanoi by securing better understanding there of our position and
bringing back to us some clarification North Vietnamese position, although past exchanges with
Lewandowski, received thorough d'Orlandi filter, have not yet persuaded us Pole is in a position to
provide effective line of communication.
2. We believe your meeting Monday/3/ should be devoted primarily to asking questions so that we can
get a better picture directly from Lewandowski of what he thinks can be accomplished through him.
After we have had a chance to digest his replies, if they justify a further exchange, we will send you our
more substantive suggestions immediately for an additional exchange with him prior to his departure for
Hanoi.
/3/November 14.
3. These are queries to be put to Lewandowski:
a) What role does he envisage for himself? Is he, on the one hand, seeking merely to facilitate a better
understanding on each side of the other's position in order to pave way toward some kind of direct
contact, and, if so, does he have reason to believe Hanoi will agree to such contact? Or, on the other
hand, does he contemplate serving as an intermediary, conveying a series of proposals and
counterproposals between two sides to try to achieve agreement on specific issues?
b) What does Hanoi consider to be his role? Has Hanoi entrusted specific messages to him and, if so, to
whom were they to be conveyed?
c) As we understand it, Lewandowski wants an overall agreement and says Hanoi will buy something
that is "final," he doesn't want a truce just to "allow conversations." How does he propose to get from
here to there? How would he envisage overcoming our considerable reluctance to modify our position
on one point or another without having any indication of what if any helpful response this would evoke
from Hanoi?
d) We understand that considerations of face inevitably play a role in Hanoi's thinking. Does this
perhaps explain, in Lewandowski's view, why we are unable to get any meaningful response to the
question "what would happen if the bombing on NVN stopped?" Does Lewandowski see any way
around this? Could some package deal be worked out which in its totality represented what both we and
Hanoi would agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual de-escalation, but which would have two
separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension, while Phase B, which would
follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions.
Hanoi's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to our actions in Phase B rather than to
the bombing suspension.
4. Lewandowski should understand that none of the foregoing represents a position which he is
authorized to put to Hanoi on our behalf. We will review his replies to our questions and will then wish
to determine what we wish to propose concerning his forthcoming visit to Hanoi.
Rusk

306. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, November 14, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Flash; Nodis;
Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:06
a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 266-268.
10856. 1. I met Lewandowski at D'Orlandi's apartment at 3:00 p.m. Saigon time.
2. Lewandowski began by saying that he was "grateful" to me for being "so responsive to my request"
that he see me today on the eve of his visit to Hanoi. What he was about to say was not "official" in the
sense that he was not instructed by Hanoi to do it. But before his departure, he wished that "some things
could be clear." He added, "you may not be prepared to answer right away and, if so, I will understand."
He had four questions, as follows:
A. "Regarding the offer at Manila concerning the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet-Nam on the
condition that the troops of North Viet-Nam would withdraw (and, he said, "North Viet-Nam, of course,
doesn't admit that they are there at all), does this condition mean the United States withdrawal depends
on control by the present South Vietnamese Government of territories not now under the control of
Saigon?"
B. "In case of a cease-fire, would the United States be prepared to withdraw from the combat areas and
not to interfere in the creation of a new Government of Viet-Nam? The question of how the new
Government of Viet-Nam will be formed will certainly arise."
C. "In case of a cease-fire, would the United States undertake not to interfere in peaceful progress
toward unification of Viet-Nam if the people so wish, whether by referendum or by election?"
D. "In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations, would the United States be ready to use the Geneva
Agreement and the machinery of the International Commission in bringing peace to Viet-Nam, and if so,
would the United States publicly declare its intention to this effect?"
3. I said that these were questions which I would have to refer to the U.S. Government, and that I would
do so and provide answers as soon as I could.
4. I then said I had some questions to ask, and I asked him the four sets of questions listed in your State
83786./2/ When I had finished reading him these questions, which I did slowly so that he could take it
all down, I added that none of what I had just said represented a position which he was authorized to put
to Hanoi in our behalf. We would, however, review his answers and then decide what we wished to
propose.
/2/Document 305.
5. I then became silent, thinking that perhaps this would be the end of the meeting.
6. Without any prodding at all from me or D'Orlandi, he said, "Well, some of your questions cannot be
answered now. As to your question no. 1, my present role is in accord with the instructions of my
government who would be prepared for me to take any role which would bring peace nearer. The two
roles set forth in your question, that is, on the one hand, to work to facilitate a better understanding and

pave the way to contact or, on the other, to be an intermediary, do not exclude each other. In fact, they
could be done together. If the ideas which can be developed are not too far apart, then there can be talks,
and if the ideas then start separating, both sides can withdraw. On the other hand, if I am successful in
bringing the two sides together and they agree on something together, I can withdraw feeling that I have
achieved something useful."
7. As to the second question, Lewandowski said "You have worked in Southeast Asia and you realize
that diplomacy in Viet-Nam is different than what it is in Europe or the United States. Clear-cut answers
are very difficult to get. One has to be very patient and look for indirect symptoms." He was not, he said,
an agent of the Hanoi government, but "if and when they decide they want you to know something," he
said, "they would tell me. Of this I am confident. Each time I go, the Prime Minister asks me about
Americans and what the Americans think."
8. "On your third question, it is a frame without a picture. It is very theoretical."
9. "As to the fourth question, it recognizes that you can't trade bombing suspension for something else.
The question of bombing suspension in the first instance could be discussed informally. But if well
founded hopes developed for reaching some agreement, then the bombing suspension could be brought
in in the second phase."
10. D'Orlandi remarked that in the beginning of our talks, Lewandowski had agreed that the bombing
suspension would not be a precondition.
11. Lewandowski said, "Yes, there must be positive steps--not speeches or declarations. A package deal
is not only the most practical way of going at it; it is the only one. The A and B in your fourth question
are the beginnings of the alphabet. It might be quite useful. We must go right through to Z, including
everything that needs to be in the package deal."
12. I remarked that we would certainly be willing to accept the formula of a package deal as a way of
doing business without, of course, committing myself to the substantive elements which might be in it.
13. D'Orlandi thought that the package deal idea was a "positive step forward." He regarded it as a "very
substantial concession." He saw the two distinct parts with no direct link between. The first, he said,
gives full satisfaction. Phase B, he said, is very reasonable indeed.
14. The atmosphere was much the best that it has ever been since we have met. He had plainly asked for
the meeting and said so. As I was about to leave, he said very much as an afterthought and in an
extraordinarily mild tone of voice that he had forgotten to say something that he had meant to say which
was that there should be no further escalation because to do so would "freeze the atmosphere." I noted
the casual tone and said equally casually that one could assure that that applied both ways.
15. Comment: Lewandowski is due to take off at 11 a.m. Tuesday, Saigon time. If you can get me a
reply into my office by 9 a.m. Saigon time, I will try to get it to him if you desire. On the other hand, we
have the perfectly good basis for saying there wasn't much time to give him an answer. End comment.
Lodge
307. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. Copies
were sent to Rusk and Wheeler.
SUBJECT
Anti-infiltration barrier between North and South Vietnam
I recommended in my October 14 trip report/2/ to you that we install south of the 17th Parallel a barrier
against infiltration from North into South Vietnam.
/2/Document 268.
We are now preparing to proceed to install the ground portions of this barrier. The easternmost portion
will be a continuous ground barrier of fences, wire, mines and sensors, supported by artillery, aircraft
and mobile troops, and will extend from the South China Sea westward approximately 30 kilometers, as
far as the land remains relatively flat. To the west of this continuous ground barrier will be intermittent
ground barriers placed in the ravines or defiles through which men and supplies are forced by the terrain
to move. These barriers are supported by General Westmoreland and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
West of the ground barriers there is a clear need for an air barrier. The exact character of the air barrier
has not been decided. It may be an intensification of the present program of air strikes on infiltration
routes, a form of the Air Force "Beaver" proposal involving continuous bombing of three or four lines of
choke points, or some other air method of denying transit to enemy trucks, men and supplies. We are
now taking steps to acquire the munitions, sensors and other equipment and facilities necessary to
implement the air portion of an anti-infiltration barrier./3/
/3/In two memoranda to Katzenbach, November 16 and November 26, Rosenthal summarized and
discussed two briefings on the barrier provided to Department of State officials by General Starbird and
Richard Steadman. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Robert S. McNamara
308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 14, 1966, 6:03 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold [1]. Top
Secret; Flash; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Cooper and Heywood Isham of EA/VN; cleared by
Harriman, Unger, and William Bundy; and approved by William Bundy. Printed in part in Herring,
Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 268-269.
84238. Ref: a) Saigon's 10856; b) State 83786./2/
/2/Documents 306 and 305.
1. You should convey following to Lewandowski before he departs for Hanoi:
2. We will be awaiting with great interest Lewandowski's account of his forthcoming visit. What he
learns there may have an important bearing on how effectively he will be able to pursue his efforts to
facilitate a better understanding and pave the way for further exchanges.

3. In connection with Lewandowski's observation about the need "to be patient and look for indirect
symptoms", we believe we have exercised what in all objectivity can be called a high degree of patience.
We would be prepared to be even more patient if we knew that something of importance was at the end
of the road. We have listened to literally scores of well-intentioned persons who in varying degree have
claimed to be reflecting Hanoi's views, but we have not yet had authoritative word from Hanoi itself as
to its real conditions or how it would envisage reaching a peaceful settlement by any means other than
our complete accept-ance of its terms.
4. If during Lewandowski's forthcoming visit to Hanoi, the Prime Minister should again ask him "what
the Americans think", Lewandowski should convey the idea, as his impression of our views, that while
we remain intent on finding a path to a reasonable and honorable settlement, we are not prepared to
withdraw and find that armed subversive elements from the North have moved in again. We are serious
in expressing our willingness to remove our troops, to dismantle our bases, and accept a non-aligned
South Viet-Nam so long as it is genuinely non-aligned. We do not regard the genuine neutrality of South
Viet-Nam as opposed to our interests. With respect to our efforts to find an approach toward reciprocal
actions of de-escalation, we are aware that Hanoi must assign weight to considerations of face, and we
have said that so long as we were certain that the elements from the North were removed, we would not
insist on any acknowledgment that these forces had ever been in the South.
5. In addition to the foregoing, we have the following specific comments on Lewandowski's four
questions:
A. The Manila formulation on withdrawal was considered and worded with the greatest care. It was
included in the communique in the light of specific indications from Eastern European sources that such
a mention of a definite withdrawal period would help in establishing an acceptable basis for
negotiations. The mechanics of a phased withdrawal would probably have to be a matter for negotiation
although the initial de-escalatory steps might be taken by mutual example.
B. We have often said that we supported free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese
people a government of their own choice. We are prepared to abide by the genuine manifestation of that
free choice. We support the emerging constitutional process in South Viet-Nam. The orderly formation
of a responsive and representative government based on free elections will receive our support.
C. We are on record that the question of the reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the
Vietnamese of both North and South through their own free decision, without any interference from
outside. How soon that can take place depends on a number of factors, above all the restoration of peace
and order in South Viet-Nam so that South Viet-Nam will be in a position to treat freely with NVN on
this matter.
D. We have already declared our view that the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements are an adequate basis
for peace in Southeast Asia. Since 1954 there have been many developments which have revealed
sharply the need for an effective and truly neutral mechanism of supervision and control. We would be
prepared to discuss all matters bearing upon this complicated problem.
6. We would also observe that what Lewandowski terms our "theoretical" third question of how we get
from here to there bears most directly upon his proposal for a "package deal" including, as he put it, not
only A and B but all the other letters of the alphabet. These range all the way from the reciprocal
measures of de-escalation to the components of a final settlement. The immediate issue is to find out
precisely and concretely even if quite privately what steps Hanoi would take if we stopped bombing.
Lewandowski would be rendering great service if during his conversations in Hanoi he is able to bring

fresh light on the answer to this question. (You should refer again at this point to item 3d) of reftel b.)
7. Finally you might tell Lewandowski that the remaining aspects of the questions raised by you
yesterday, i.e. those not discussed above, are also still of real concern to us and any light he can shed on
them by virtue of his forthcoming visit will be helpful. We are proceeding on the understanding, of
course, that Lewandowski in Hanoi will be speaking throughout for himself, on the basis of what he
understands to be our position./3/
/3/In telegram 10955 from Saigon, November 15, Lodge reported that in a meeting with Lewandowski
and D'Orlandi he had twice read the full text of this telegram, both men had taken copious notes,
D'Orlandi had indicated that he was "rather encouraged" by the U.S. response, and Lewandowski had
stated that he shared that view. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
Katzenbach
309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
(Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, November 15, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-3 VIET S/LOUISIANA. Secret. Drafted by
Bundy.
SUBJECT
Additional Contributions in Vietnam and Your Trip
We have now received replies and reports from all our Embassies,/2/ leading to the following
judgments:
/2/See Document 302 and footnote 2 thereto.
1. Australia and New Zealand. If the elections come out right, both will do more. But they need no
urging and your arrival right after the elections would be badly misconstrued.
2. Korea. Park has now announced the formation of a service force, and is being vigorously attacked by
his opposition for this. The Embassy believes it crystal clear that this is the maximum to be expected
before the elections next March. With the decision made and the issue controversial, a stop by you in
Korea would be a great mistake in my judgment.
3. Japan. Alex thinks the Japanese may be willing to undertake civilian assistance on a few projects but
not on a broad basis. While a Japanese stop by you could be pegged to broad discussions, it could not be
expected to produce more than very modest results in terms of any additional Japanese contribution.
4. GRC. The Embassy feels there is a distinct possibility of more civilian help in fields of engineering,
agriculture, and health, subject to agreement on financing. However, it is my judgment that these
contributions can be obtained without a visit by you, and that any such visit would in any event have to
be directed to some other clear objective--lest we appear to stir up the question of GRC military forces.
5. Philippines. The Embassy feels it is definitely premature to seek additional military contributions, and
that any further non-military assistance should arise from clear GVN initiative. There are various

possibilities, but the slim pickings and the strong chance of negative reactions to a visit by you--which
could hardly have any other purpose at this moment--lead me to recommend strongly in the negative on
your stopping there.
6. Malaysia. The Embassy believes GOM would not now consider a military contribution. There is a fair
chance they might be willing to send police and development advisors to a relatively secure Vietnamese
province, but Bell doubts they have enough manpower to fully "adopt" a province. A stop by you might
be some help, but the pickings would again appear slim.
7. Thailand. Martin is just in with the judgment that the President's pitch will take some weeks to sink
in. He reports a strongly negative reaction by Dawee. While Martin gives no judgment on your stopping,
my own would be negative in the next 2-3 weeks, while the matter is obviously under intense private
discussion.
8. Singapore. The Embassy thinks there is no chance of any kind of assistance for the present.
9. Burma. Byroade believes the Burmese would not be prepared to do anything.
10. India. The Embassy believes that GOI might be persuaded to consider some form of humanitarian
help but might well feel compelled to offer similar contributions to North Vietnam. Bowles recommends
against pressing the issue.
11. Pakistan. The Embassy believes GOP would consider civilian as well as military contributions to
SVN to be beyond the realm of their political-military capabilities at this time.
12. Iran. The Embassy rates chances of getting any military element as infinitesimal. Tehran believes
there would be an even chance of persuading the Shah to enlarge the Iranian civilian medical effort, but
Saigon recommends against this on usefulness grounds for the moment. Meyer does recommend you
stop in Tehran if you go to any neighbors.
13. Turkey. The Ambassador is not optimistic regarding a new approach to Turks for manpower
contribution to Vietnam. If we are to approach Turks at a high level, the Ambassador suggests the best
opportunity would be when President Sunay visits Washington in early December.
14. Greece. The Embassy doubts that GOG is now willing to become involved even marginally in the
Vietnam issue.
In terms of these responses and judgments, I find great difficulty in suggesting a meaningful itinerary for
a trip by you./3/ For the various reasons given above, I would be clearly negative on Seoul, Taipei,
Manila, Singapore, Bangkok, New Delhi, Rawalpindi, Ankara, and Athens. Burma, Malaysia, and Iran
are at best make-weights and would create a very confusing picture of the purposes of the trip. Even a
"search for peace" motif would have little bearing in these places, as likewise in India and Pakistan in
view of their attitudes and the recent Harriman visits.
/3/In circular telegram 83500, November 11, the Department noted that Rusk's upcoming trip in
connection with the NATO meeting on December 15 might be directed in part to obtaining additional
manpower contributions for Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-3 VIET
S/LOUISIANA)
In short, my own conclusion is that the only stops that make real sense would be Japan--always justified

on broad grounds--and Saigon itself. If you did this routing to Paris, you could refuel in Tehran and stop
briefly if you wish. This is not of course a trip that will raise new forces, but it does make other kinds of
sense.
As an alternative, I suggest the possibility of your doing a Tehran-Saigon-Tokyo itinerary after the
NATO conference. This would be short enough to be compressed into the period between the NATO
conference and Christmas, and might fit better with your other commitments and the possible
importance of preparing carefully for the NATO conference itself.
I hate to seem negative, but a highly selective contribution-seeking tour seems almost worse than none. I
cannot imagine what the press and other capitals would make of it. Hence, the middle ground seems to
me the only feasible kind of trip that would have any merit.
310. Letter From President Johnson to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge)/1/
Washington, November 16, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. Drafted by
Komer and cleared by McNamara and Rusk. In a back channel telegram, November 18, Komer gave
Lodge "advance flavor" of the President's reaction to Lodge's November 7 letter, Document 294: "He
said I agree with Cabot that pacification is the heart of the matter, I've given him every support I know
how and will give him more if he needs it. But I wish he'd make his people stop arguing about the
organizational instructions we send, accept them cheerfully, and get on with the job." (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables)
Dear Cabot:
I have carefully digested your letter of 7 November on pacification,/2/ as I did your memorandum at
Manila./3/ In fact, I have consistently sought to encourage an accelerated pacification program ever
since you were among the first to call it the heart of the matter some months ago.
/2/Document 294.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 294.
There does not seem to me to be any major difference between your ideas of what is needed to make
pacification work, and those of my chief advisers and myself. Bob McNamara and the Joint Chiefs
realize, as does General Westmoreland on the basis of the dispositions he is increasingly making, that a
limited number of U.S. combat forces must be detailed to be the catalysts for the Vietnamese.
What worries them is rather that if the U.S. takes over too much of the job, the ARVN will tend to sit
back and let us fight that "war" too. I'm sure that you are no more eager than we are to let this happen.
As a matter of fact, getting the U.S. military more heavily engaged in refocussing ARVN on the heart of
the matter is one reason why we here have seriously considered charging MACV with pacification. I
hope you will ponder whether this is not in the end the best way to achieve the aim you seek.
I genuinely believe it is--however, I am willing to try out for a time a compromise solution, and warmly
endorsed the recent instructions sent to you./4/ For this scheme to work, it is essential that there be a
clearcut assignment of pacification responsibilities to Porter and MACV now, including a clear
delineation between their respective responsibilities, and then that Porter and MACV each organize as

effectively as possible to carry out the tasks assigned. If showing ARVN the way on pacification can
take up to ten percent of our troops, it also deserves the full-time attention of some of our best generals.
So I have asked Bob McNamara to send you the best men he has here for assignment to the civilian as
well as military sides, in the event that Westmoreland cannot spare enough top talent for the key spots
proposed.
/4/See Document 304.
You have our full support and backing. In turn, we here depend on you not to let your people spend too
much time in arguing details but to make them get on with the job.
Warmly,
Lyndon B. Johnson/5/
/5/Below his signature the President wrote, "Written from Hospital--but I applaud your comments in
your personal note and when this reaches you it will be about a month since Manila and perhaps 500 of
our boys are gone. Make them all follow your orders & let's get going. With admiration & thanks."
311. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 17, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President. Secret. The
source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.
Pacification Organization Moving at Last. Your Tuesday blast led Rusk to send a tough cable/2/ which
finally unfroze Lodge and Porter (I did a few back channel words to the wise myself)./3/
/2/Telegram 85196 to Saigon, November 15; see footnote 1, Document 304. The President presumably
delivered his "Tuesday blast" during his luncheon meeting on Tuesday, November 15, with Rusk,
McNamara, Rostow, Komer, and Moyers. The meeting lasted from about 2:05 to 3:40 p.m. (Johnson
Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found.
/3/See footnote 1, Document 310.
Lodge is now in with three long replies (attached)/4/ which essentially buy our proposals. Suggest you
read only sidelined portions. The only significant resistance is that Westy refuses to assign a top Deputy
for pacification but is otherwise strengthening his staff. I don't worry about this because Westy is really
turning around and will in time see the logic of a Deputy. He told me privately he intends to put Major
General Weyand (who's tops) in as J-5 on pacification--a big step in the right direction.
/4/Attached but not printed are telegrams 11124 and 11125, November 17. The third telegram from
Lodge has not been identified.
I hope you'll forgive me if I feel pretty good about all this. It took four months of backstairs wheeling
and dealing to get us even this far (plus some bruised feelings), but the fact that you showed everyone
you backed me turned the trick.
I think (as you do, judging from your latest letter to Lodge)/5/ that even the new civilian organization
won't really be able to do the job, and that if we want solid results by end-1967 we'll have to give it to

Westy./6/ But at least we've already gone 25% of the way in the right direction. Your letter will set
Lodge himself to thinking about whether to go the rest of the way.
/5/Document 310.
/6/In telegram WDC 13803 to Westmoreland, November 23, General Johnson stated: "The more I
ruminate about the rate of progress in Vietnam and the inevitable relationship to our own elections in
1968, the more convinced I am that you will be given full responsibility for the program [revolutionary
development] sometime after the first of the year." (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers,
COMUSMACV Message Files)
If he doesn't, the time to take the next bite may be when Lodge leaves. I'm sure he'd like to switch no
later than next spring (he'd dearly love Rome and the Vatican as a reward), though I believe him when
he says he'll stay as long as his Commander-in-Chief wants him. However, I strongly believe that
decisive results in 1967 demand an Ambassador who can take hold and manage that sprawling empire.
I'm sure McNamara would agree.
If you switched Lodge next February (after the 90-120 days are up), this change in ambassadors could
cover up the shift of pacification responsibilities. I wish I could offer you a top notch name (a
McNamara, Mac Bundy, or Katzenbach type). I'll keep thinking, as I doubt that you'll have any more
important appointment to make before November 1968. If I'm getting over my head, just tell me so.
R. W. Komer
312. Editorial Note
In a 34-page draft memorandum for the President, November 17, 1966, Secretary McNamara
recommended that a supplemental appropriation request totaling $12.4 billion be submitted to Congress
in January 1967. He also recommended that "forces totaling 469,000 be approved, for planning and
budgeting purposes, for deployment to SVN by June 30, 1968." A copy of Secretary McNamara's
memorandum is in the Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII. A substantial
portion of the first 22 pages is printed in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, volume IV, pages 133135, 365-385. In explaining the operational concept that underlay his recommendations, Secretary
McNamara first discussed "Military Strategy in Vietnam" (pages 7-17) and then "Consolidation and
Extension of GVN Control" (pages 17-22), incorporating and developing many of the points made in his
October 14 memorandum to the President (Document 268). In a final section (pages 23-24), he provided
his reasons for specific program recommendations and the costs by major area of activity.
The opening paragraphs of Secretary McNamara's discussion of "Military Strategy in Vietnam" read as
follows:
"The war in Vietnam has two highly interdependent parts: (1) the 'regular' war against the main force
VC/NVA battalions and regiments, and the interdiction of their men and supplies flowing down from
North Vietnam, and (2) the 'Pacification' or revolutionary development war to neutralize the local VC
guerrillas and gain the permanent support of the SVN population.
"The infiltrated men and supplies serve to bolster the regular units whose function is to support the local
VC guerrillas and infrastructure by defeating the GVN forces in the area and generally exposing the
GVN's inability to protect the rural populace. The local guerrillas and infrastructure maintain a constant
VC presence in their area and support the offensive efforts of the regular units by providing intelligence,

terrain guidance, supplies, and recruits. In addition, the guerrillas conduct many of the thousands of
incidents of terror, harassment, and sabotage reported each month. The principal task of U.S. military
forces in SVN must be to eliminate the offensive capability of the regular units in order to allow the
GVN to counter the guerrilla forces and extend permanent control over areas from which regular units
have been cleared.
"We now face a choice of two approaches to the threat of the regular VC/NVA forces. The first
approach would be to continue in 1967 to increase friendly forces as rapidly as possible, and without
limit, and employ them primarily in large-scale 'seek out and destroy' operations to destroy the main
force VC/NVA units.
"This approach appears to have some distinct disadvantages. First, we are finding very strongly
diminishing marginal returns in the destruction of VC/NVA forces. If our estimates of enemy losses
(killed, captured and defected) are correct, VC/NVA losses increased by only 115 per week (less than
15%) during a period in which we increased friendly strength by 160,000 including 140,000 U.S.
military personnel and 42 U.S. and Third Country maneuver battalions. At this rate, an additional
100,000 friendly personnel deployed would increase VC/NVA losses by some 70 per week. Second,
expanding U.S. deployments have contributed to a very serious inflation in South Vietnam. Prices
increased 75-90% in FY66. An extra 100,000 U.S. forces would add at least P9 billion to our piaster
expenditures, doubling the 1967 inflationary gap in SVN. Third, the high and increasing cost of the war
to the United States is likely to encourage the Communists to doubt our staying power and to try to 'wait
us out.'
"The second approach is to follow a similarly aggressive strategy of 'seek out and destroy,' but to build
friendly forces only to that level required to neutralize the large enemy units and prevent them from
interfering with the pacification program. It is essential to this approach that such a level be consistent
with a stable economy in SVN, and consistent with a military posture that the United States credibly
would maintain indefinitely, thus making a Communist attempt to 'wait us out' less attractive.
"I believe that this level is about 470,000 U.S. and 52,000 Free World personnel and less than half of the
ARVN.* The remainder of the ARVN, plus a portion of the U.S. force, would give priority to improving
the pacification effort. The enemy regular units would cease to perform what I believe to be their
primary function of diverting our effort to give security to the population. This, plus the effects of a
successful interdiction campaign to cut off their other support, would effectively neutralize them,
possibly at the cost of far fewer casualties to both sides than the first approach would allow.
"*Admiral Sharp has recommended a 12/31/67 U.S. strength of 570,000. However, I believe both he and
General Westmoreland recognize that the danger of inflation will probably force a 6/30/68 deployment
limit of about 470,000. [Footnote in the source text.]
"I believe it is time to adopt the second approach for three reasons: (1) if MACV estimates of enemy
strength are correct, we have not been able to attrite the enemy forces fast enough to break their morale
and more U.S. forces are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future; (2) we cannot deploy more than
about 470,000 personnel by the end of 1967 without a high probability of generating a self-defeating
runaway inflation in SVN and (3) an endless escalation of U.S. deployments is not likely to be
acceptable in the U.S. or to induce the enemy to believe that the U.S. is prepared to stay as long as is
required to produce a secure non-communist SVN. Obviously a greatly improved pacification campaign
must be waged to take advantage of the protection offered by the major friendly forces. Alternatively, if
enemy strength is greatly overstated and our 'seek out and destroy' operations have been more effective
than our strength and loss estimates would imply--a possibility discussed below--more than 470,000
U.S. personnel should not be required to neutralize the VC/NVA main force."

313. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 17, 1966, 1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15.
Top Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Rusk and Katzenbach.
Mr. President:
This memorandum suggests that the optimum form of negotiation with Hanoi may be:
--a secret negotiation of a total deal;
--a dramatic joint announcement followed by a complete end of hostilities, infiltration, and the
beginning of troop withdrawals.
1. A Possible Problem
It is certain that the men in Hanoi have not yet decided that their best option is to negotiate. And there is
still a probability that they believe that the burden of the war on the U.S. will give them a better
resolution in the future than they could get at present, although that conviction may be waning.
But there may be another problem. They may be willing to accept the outcome we have outlined; but
they may not be able to see how they can get from here to there without a complete collapse in their
negotiating position along the way. Therefore, they may think a different outcome than the one we
promise would result. That is why they may, with some candor, call our proposals "trickery"--or worse.
Their problem is this: If they stop infiltration and if they stop terror in the South, two things are likely to
happen:
--the Viet Cong movement will quickly collapse;
--they will then lose their international bargaining position.
This is because the Viet Cong are so dependent on northern supplies, men, and leadership and because
the ability to disrupt and to terrorize is the only serious bargaining leverage they have--or believe they
have.
Once the Viet Cong movement collapses, it is almost impossible to envisage its starting up again. For
example, they may well feel that any substantial de-escalation by Hanoi--in infiltrated men, supplies,
etc.--would be immediately recognized by the Viet Cong as the beginning of the end. The Viet Cong
might scramble for their place in the society of South Viet Nam. On the other hand, we could sustain
various degrees of de-escalation without a collapse in our position or that of South Viet Nam.
With a patent collapse in the Viet Cong they may feel Saigon and we could claim a "new situation" and
ignore prior commitments. Communists, as a matter of doctrine, are trained to rely on effective power,
not verbal promises or good will.
In this context we should remember that, quite contrary to a popular cliche in the West, guerrilla wars
have been won or lost clean: mainland China; Malaya; Philippines; Greece. The only compromise

solutions were not political but territorial; e.g., the split of Indo-China at the 17th parallel. (I do not
count the Laos solution because it is not a solution--the war continues, awaiting the outcome in Viet
Nam.) We are, thus, up against a tough problem in trying to talk our way to a satisfactory resolution of a
guerrilla war--with no clear precedents.
2. A Possible Solution
If I have correctly described a part of Hanoi's problem in ending the war by negotiation, the answer may
lie in communicating to them a solution which takes that problem into account and making it credible.
Specifically, we must communicate three things:
--an end position which Hanoi and the Viet Cong could live with;
--a way of making our guarantee of that position credible;
--a way of getting there which would minimize the significance of Hanoi's and Viet Cong's weak
bargaining leverage along the way.
Now each element in turn.
3. An End Position
We can offer the Viet Cong only two things in South Viet Nam and the substance of one of them is
dependent on how soon they move towards peace:
--a guarantee against slaughter, as in Indonesia.
--a right to organize politically and to vote, but only after arms are laid down. They cannot mix terror
and political status.
The meaning of the second offer is contingent on when it is picked up; for example, they have already
missed the constitutional assembly; if they want to get in on the next round of village and provincial
elections, they had better move fast (before early 1967), and this could prove important in establishing a
local political base for them; if they want to influence the presidential elections under the new
constitution, they have only between now and September 1967.
Since they know that their prospects on a one-man-one-vote basis are not good in South Viet Nam, the
Viet Cong may not find a role in domestic politics worth much; it may be more important to Hanoi
which could be concerned to save some face for their proteges and protect them from the reprisals that
could come if they persist in violence once the game from the North is called off.
As for Hanoi, we can only offer them our withdrawal six months after they are out and violence
subsides, plus a free Viet Cong run at peaceful politics plus the promise of an ultimate plebiscite on
unity under peaceful conditions plus economic assistance in reconstruction as part of Southeast Asia if
they want it.
[It may, incidentally, be important to communicate to them soon that we do not intend to let the war
drag; that we plan to up the ante; and our present offers to them may not hold indefinitely.]/2/

/2/Brackets in the source text.

4. The Problem of Credibility
The credibility problem can only be fully solved in conjunction with the bargaining leverage problem
discussed in Section 5 below. But two things could contribute:
--negotiating in secret the end position while the war goes on;
--announcing it publicly (and perhaps registering it before the UN)--the process described in Section 5
begins.
Specifically, the U.S. and the fighting allies would join the government of South Viet Nam in
guaranteeing the amnesty to the Viet Cong. If the Viet Cong wanted promptly to participate in peaceful
elections--for example at the local level--we (and the government in Saigon) would accept international
supervision. If asked what our sanctions would be in the case of violation of the amnesty, we could point
out that the South Vietnamese would remain for a long time extremely dependent on our assistance and
on the political support of the rest of the world. But no guarantee to the Viet Cong as an organization
could be secure unless they cut out violence and did not revive it.
5. The Bargaining Leverage Problem
There is only one answer to the Communist bargaining problem: speed. Once the end position is
negotiated in secret and announced, then the war--North and South, main force and guerrilla--must stop
dramatically; the North Viet Nam units must immediately begin heading home (from Laos, too); and we
must begin immediately some withdrawals. All infiltration and supply movements south must stop on a
given day--100%.
The drama of the joint announcement of the agreement by ourselves, Hanoi, Saigon, and the NLF is the
best facesaver they could have, with symmetrical movements promptly following.
Then a Geneva conference could take place on the details of the international aspects of the deal--a
beefed up control commission; straightening out Laos, etc.
6. How to Probe the Viability of this Concept
The probe should be a direct U.S.-Hanoi gambit, with no intermediaries.
It should be conducted in great secrecy, and evident seriousness, by a completely credible U.S. official.
He should leave behind an aide-memoire for communication to Hanoi./3/
/3/In the agenda prepared for the President for November 19 (during Johnson's stay at Bethesda Naval
Hospital), Rostow included an item entitled "Direct Hanoi Probe" and noted: "Sec. Rusk is thinking
about my suggestion. I believe we should try it as a supplementary track." (Ibid.)
W.W. Rostow/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sweden/1/

Washington, November 19, 1966, 5:46 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ASPEN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis;
Aspen. Drafted by Unger and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the
Vietnam War, pp. 662-663.
88128. 1. At luncheon meeting November 11 Foreign Minister Nilsson assisted by Mr. Bergstrom
presented to the Secretary an account of Swedish contacts in Warsaw with North Vietnamese
representatives and of the late October visit of Swedish Ambassador Petri to Hanoi and his
conversations with the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh. Memcon of that conversation together
with Swedish precis of these recent contacts with North Vietnamese/2/ and our analysis of Hanoi's
positions as reflected therein/3/ being pouched.
/2/See Document 303.
/3/Apparently a reference to a memorandum from Fred Greene of INR to Unger, November 12.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ASPEN)
2. On November 17 Unger conveyed to Minister Nilsson, Bergstrom, Oberg and Ambassador de Besche
in New York Secretary's formal thanks, results of our analysis of message transmitted by Swedes and
"Points for Clarification" which we would like to have Petri discuss with North Vietnamese Foreign
Minister on next visit to Hanoi, speaking always of course for Swedish Government and without
reference to conversations with us. Text of "Points for Clarification" follows:
"1. What does the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister intend that his government would do when he
says 'We know what we will have to do' [i.e., if US stops bombing of NVN]?/4/ Mr. Trinh named two
conditions which the United States must fulfill to bring about a climate for negotiations. It is understood
of course that if those conditions were fulfilled, negotiations could promptly be undertaken, but since the
fulfillment of those conditions would represent significant steps for the United States, what would be the
reciprocal actions by North Viet-Nam? It is encouraging to know that the North Vietnamese apparently
recognize this reciprocity but it is essential, if their position is to be accurately evaluated, to know what
it is that they recognize they 'will have to do'.
/4/Brackets in the source text. Telegram 653 from Stockholm, November 29, quoted the text of a paper
provided by the Swedish Government stating that, in further talks with Petri, he "has now made clear
that he repeatedly tried to make Mr. Trinh elaborate on this statement. Mr. Trinh, however, avoided to
do so." (Ibid.)
"2. What is the significance of the FNL being characterized, as Mr. Trinh put it, as 'the most valid'
spokesman for the South Vietnamese people? What is this intended to convey concerning the status of
the FNL vis-a-vis other spokesmen?
"3. With reference to the question of reunification, Mr. Trinh referred to the necessity of creating
conditions in South Viet-Nam 'to permit a move in the direction of a future reunification'. The
conditions in South Viet-Nam as Mr. Trinh himself implied would grow out of general elections held in
an atmosphere of freedom and democracy. Would Mr. Trinh not envisage that the question of
unification would be resolved at that time in accordance with the mandate given a new government by
the people through those general elections?
"4. If Mr. Trinh should mention the point raised by the North Vietnamese representative in Warsaw,

namely that 'no military actions should be taken in the demilitarized zone', Mr. Trinh might be asked
whether this is intended to be in effect a proposal for the strict observance of the Geneva Accords in the
demilitarized zone north and south of the demarcation line with the full functioning of the ICC
throughout the zone."
3. In reply to Nilsson's request for any additional comments Unger referred to Secretary's letter/5/ which
mentions possibility that Petri might be asked by North Vietnamese about our knowledge of his contact
there and of his conversations, and our suggestion that he respond with a query as to whether North
Vietnamese Government would wish Swedish Government to inform us of these matters, in which case
Swedes would be happy to explore question./6/ Unger explained that while there are many channels to
Hanoi we have thus far been unable to set up any significant dialogue, and if North Viet-Nam should
show a disposition to begin to communicate with us substantively, we would be happy to consider this.
It was agreed that Petri and the Swedes in general might not turn out to be most suitable intermediary
and that in fact the North Vietnamese might choose to turn to direct contact with us, but it was
considered nonetheless useful for Petri to explore the matter of communication if he had any opening
from the North Vietnamese.
/5/Not further identified.
/6/Telegram 652 from Stockholm, November 29, stated that, according to Swedish officials who had had
further "exhaustive talks with Petri to doublecheck accuracy his reports," there was "no doubt at all in
Petri's mind that Trinh meant and expected what he had said to be passed on to US." (Ibid.)
4. Petri will of course be reporting his conversations directly with Stockholm and it was agreed that our
further communications with the Swedes on this subject should be carried out through Ambassador
Parsons there. This will be channel for conveying to us Petri's reactions to exchanges which have taken
place during Nilsson's visit here, instructions he is given for his next visit to Hanoi and any other followup.
5. Unger indicated we would hope that Petri would again visit Hanoi as soon as this can be done without
raising suspicions about any special role he may be playing. Swedes agreed and said that as soon as he
makes visit to Stockholm, expected soon, on export questions as well as his Hanoi contact, he can then
again visit Hanoi and this will be logical in view of his having reported on his previous visit to his own
Foreign Office and presumably received instructions. They thought early December would be a likely
time./7/
/7/Telegram 653 from Stockholm, November 29, indicated that it was intended that Petri would return to
Hanoi about December 10. (Ibid.) However, Petri did not return to Hanoi until January 1967.
6. There was some substantive discussion of the issues which might arise in Petri's next conversations in
Hanoi, it being understood that this exchange was between the Swedes and ourselves and not for
discussion in Hanoi. Unger mentioned Goldberg formula's reference to private and other assurances
about a response to bombing cessation and illustrated the kinds of de-escalatory actions by Hanoi which
we would take to be appropriate responses, such as a cessation of infiltration, a reduction of the level of
military activity and/or terror in South Viet-Nam or some troop withdrawal from South to North. In
response to further Swedish probing as to what would come next after these first steps toward deescalation and their mention of a possible ceasefire, Unger said it was not possible, without knowing
more of Hanoi's views, to carry the process further. We would hope that once a beginning has been
made it would be possible to establish some mode of communication with Hanoi to arrive at some
understanding of the next phases of de-escalation, although it was not to be ruled out that this might

proceed by mutual example. He also made clear our recognition of the problem of face for Hanoi and
our readiness to consider ways to meet with problem. With reference to the fourth point in the "Points
for Clarification," Unger emphasized that we were suggesting this be raised only if the North
Vietnamese themselves refer to the DMZ problem. He added that it would always have to be understood
that any arrangements that might conceivably be worked out for the DMZ would have to provide for a
reasonably reliable means of detecting and dealing with violations; we could not agree to putting
American and Vietnamese forces in jeopardy, exposed to surprise action by the North Vietnamese or
Viet Cong.
7. The Swedes referred to their contacts with NLF representatives outside Viet-Nam and it was agreed
that there was no reason not to continue these but at the same time no mention should be made in that
channel of the contacts with the North Vietnamese or ourselves. Unger said we would of course be
interested if there were any indications from NLF representatives of a desire to talk about bringing the
conflict to an end or of any divisions within the VC. It was considered unlikely that the latter would
come through these channels which are all outside the country.
8. The need for absolute secrecy concerning the present exercise was emphasized and the Swedes were
particularly intent on keeping word of this out of their UN mission in New York.
9. We anticipate that Bergstrom will be in touch with Ambassador Parsons early this coming week to
reopen contact on this matter but we envisage no further action required until Petri is in Stockholm and
preparing for a return trip to Hanoi. At that point we will of course wish to be kept informed and have an
opportunity to pass on our thoughts before he again leaves Stockholm. You will note this traffic is being
handled Nodis and identified with the code word "Aspen".
Rusk
315. Report Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/
Washington, November 22, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15.
Secret. Harriman forwarded the report to the President and Rusk on November 28, and Rostow
forwarded it to the President under cover of a November 29 memorandum stating that "Governor
Harriman obviously did a first-class job." (Ibid.) See Document 281 for information on Harriman's trip.
REPORT OF POST-MANILA TRIP
In my talks with Heads of State and Ministers, I found, everywhere, that the Manila Conference and the
President's Asian trip had made a most favorable impression. It was evident that several points in the
communique and declarations were viewed as being of particular significance, and I stressed these in my
presentation:
1) The fact that the President sat at a round table with six Asian leaders as equals;
2) The favorable military developments in South Vietnam;
3) Agreement that objectives were limited to giving South Vietnamese people the opportunity to decide
their own future;

4) The desire to reduce hostilities as soon as possible and undertake negotiations for a peaceful
settlement;
5) Agreement that when aggression from the North had ceased, Allied troops would be withdrawn
within six months;
6) The fact that the only discussion of escalation dealt with increased effort on pacification;
7) The commitment by the Government of South Vietnam to complete the Constitution, hold national
elections next year, and village and hamlet elections in January. (In this connection, the September
elections had made a favorable impression, and the commitment to take these further steps increased the
prestige of the Saigon Government);
8) The further commitment of the GVN to undertake a program of national reconciliation giving hope
that discussions would eventually take place between all political factions within South Vietnam;
9) The pledge for regional cooperation in social and economic development in which the US would
participate;
10) Although a number of these points had been previously stated by the Government of the United
States or South Vietnam, the fact that they were agreed to at this meeting of seven nations gave them
greater weight and credence.
I found uniform acceptance of the President's sincerity in seeking a peaceful solution. In response to my
request all government leaders stated their willingness to do everything they could to bring about private
or public negotiations. Particularly in Italy and in London, the Ministers were interested in discussing
this subject in detail. In other countries, good will was expressed but no specific suggestions emerged.
There was also considerable opinion that it would probably be more practical to get negotiations started
through private conversations between the United States and North Vietnam rather than through a
Geneva-type conference. Some thought that the North Vietnamese would want to know where they and
the NLF would come out in a settlement before agreeing to engage in public negotiations. In addition,
some suggested that since Red China would continue to oppose negotiations, Hanoi might wish to face
Peking with a fait accompli rather than an argument as to whether or not to negotiate.
In almost every conversation the subject of a suspension of the bombing was raised, particularly now
that the military situation had improved. Almost all expressed the belief that talks could be gotten under
way if we would stop the bombing, but no one could give any positive assurances. In most cases the
opinions expressed were based on contacts with Eastern European countries, although in India there had
been direct discussions by Indian representatives in Hanoi./2/
/2/A memorandum of Harriman's conversation on October 31 with L.K. Jha, Secretary to the Indian
Prime Minister, and T.N. Kaul, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Exernal Affairs, is in Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.
I expressed as my personal opinion that calls for unilateral action on the part of the United States, as
proposed by President de Gaulle in Phnom Penh,/3/ did not further the cause of peace but, in fact,
increased Hanoi's intransigence. I suggested that if anyone had proposals to make, a call be made to both
sides to reduce hostilities.

/3/For more information on de Gaulle's speech of September 1, see footnote 4, Document 229.
I explained that the President had expressed his willingness to stop the bombing, but only if reciprocal
action were taken by Hanoi. I pointed out that the same people who were now asking for a cessation in
bombing had done so last year, and were again holding out the hope for a favorable reaction from Hanoi.
The suggestions last year had been for a pause of at most two to three weeks, whereas, in fact, the
President had continued the pause for over five weeks. The only reaction from Hanoi was to take
military advantage of the pause by substantially increasing shipments to the South, rebuilding bridges,
constructing detours and repairing roads. I furthermore explained that the bombing was a military
necessity and had to be continued unless there was parallel deescalation of hostilities on the part of
North Vietnam.
Although these discussions helped clarify the situation with the governments, they brought out the fact
that bombing was extremely unpopular among the people everywhere. The bombing is thought of in
terms of experiences of World War II with the heavy civilian casualties and suffering. In addition, the
idea of a great power such as the United States hitting a small country was repugnant. Fear was also
expressed that bombing would expand the war to a confrontation with China or the Soviet Union.
I emphasized both in talks with the governments and with the press the restricted nature of the targets
and the care exercised to avoid as far as practicable, civilian casualties. I pointed out that although the
President was determined to achieve his minimum objectives, he had stated that he had no intention of
enlarging the conflict. Nevertheless, in every country I visited I found the strongest hope that some way
could be found to stop the bombing in the North, and particularly that there would be no further
escalation. I gained the impression that the favorable reaction from the Manila Conference would be
dissipated if there was an evident escalation of the bombing. George Brown, who has done much to keep
the Labor Party in line on Vietnam, stated flatly that any further escalation "might well lose you the
support of all your friends in Europe like me who are trying to help."
I took advantage of the opportunity to state to the press, and on television and radio where available, on
my arrival and departure at the airports and at special press conferences the salient points I made to the
governments. I had a remarkably good press, even in Pakistan where the press usually distorts anything
an American visitor says. I believe this good reaction was primarily because of the good will the
President had generated by the Manila Conference and his Asian visits.
[Here follow specific reports on each of the ten countries visited by Harriman.]
316. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 27, 1966, 1315Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Exdis.
11814. Ref: Saigon 11790./2/
/2/Dated November 26. (Ibid.)
1. Subsequent to various discussions with Vietnamese officials described in reftel, Zorthian and Habib
held lengthy discussion with Minister of Info and Chieu Hoi Nguyen Bao Tri Saturday afternoon to
obtain latest GVN thinking on national reconciliation campaign and to stimulate action.

2. Tri said GVN discussions on basic principles to be incorporated in effort are now under way and
reported on various talks he has had with Thieu, Ky, General Khang of III Corps and others. He said that
present prospects are for proclamation by Thieu about one month before Tet, to be followed up with
nation-wide radio and TV speech by Prime Minister.
3. Proclamation would outline government's proposals in terms of intent and appeal to Viet Cong to join
hands with government. Prime Minister's speech would provide more specifics, including commitments
on rehabilitation into Vietnamese society, political rights and other specific measures designed to absorb
VC into active government programs at level roughly equivalent to their present status.
4. Tri said in his talks with other government officials he had found a good deal of sentiment for
initiating reconciliation campaign at time of promulgation of constitution sometime in March but that he
personally felt period before Tet was preferable in order to exploit Tet sentiment.
5. We encouraged Tri to maintain this stand but we should also be aware that any proclamation prior to
January 1st would be difficult to obtain in view of these pressures for further postponement.
6. Tri also said that his thinking, on which he believes he has Thieu's and Ky's concurrence, would
include explicit opportunities for VC middle and high level cadre to assume responsibilities in
Vietnamese society commensurate with their experience and present status. He said there would
undoubtedly be a requirement for some sort of review of qualifications but subject to this screening
process, military personnel would find opportunities in Vietnamese army, civil administrators would be
able to obtain appointment, in the first instance, as contract employees for the Vietnamese Government,
doctors would be able to practice their profession after period of national service in Vietnamese
hospitals, teachers would be utilized as required in many educational institutions, etc. He also said that
present thinking would permit all such returnees to enjoy full political rights, including the right of
participation and voting in the forthcoming national elections.
7. Tri also outlined the highlights of his Ministry's exploitation campaign, which was described in reftel
and on which we are working closely with the Vietnamese.
8. Meanwhile, we are accelerating our own efforts within U.S. Mission to provide Vietnamese with
necessary support in this effort. To replace Koren, I have appointed Zorthian as overall Mission director
for our support of the reconciliation campaign. He now has the time to devote to this effort because
JUSPAO field operations have been taken over by Porter. Specific assignments in fields of psyops,
follow-up actions, Chieu Hoi camps, policy direction, approaches to middle level and high level cadre
and the various other arrangements necessary for conduct of this campaign have now been made and
detailed document incorporating US ideas in all these fields are under preparation. This will serve to
crystalize our own thinking and to provide a coordinated US approach to the Vietnamese as they prepare
their own plans. Central to the whole effort, of course, is the necessity for the Vietnamese to be in the
forefront of this effort, with the US role kept as much in the background as possible.
9. These various developments will be further pursued and refined in the coming weeks. As necessary, I
will undertake further discussions with General Thieu and Prime Minister Ky in the course of the days
to come and certainly I expect to have a long talk with both on the major elements of the program before
my departure for Washington. We expect to provide more detailed information on the contents of the
anticipated proclamation and speech in the near future but at this point Vietnamese thinking has not
progressed to a stage where draft texts are available. We will, however, have more progress on
preparations in general to report by the end of next week and will continue to inform you as events
unfold. At this stage, however, believe it would be unwise to press Vietnamese for more immediate

surfacing of campaign than they visualize or to draw more than cursory public attention to this effort.
10. As General Tri has indicated, the Vietnamese are going about this effort with deliberation and
considerable advance preparation and I believe this sort of solid foundation is far preferable to any hasty
announcements on their part which would be premature in terms of actual follow up actions and which
would have been true had they made announcement on November 1. Given the sentiment described by
Tri for postponement of the effort until the promulgation of the constitution, I would suggest it is far
wiser on our part to push for actual public proclamation the first week of January rather than at an earlier
time.
11. Meanwhile, we will of course continue to press for detailed preparations so that campaign may be
conducted effectively and vigorously once it is initiated. I believe we are now moving in the right
direction on this effort at a pace which will bring along the Vietnamese but not outpace them.
Lodge
317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, November 27, 1966, 2:18 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
91787. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: London's 4337, para 3./2/
/2/The reference to telegram 4337 is in error; it should be to telegram 4377, paragraph 3, in which Bruce
asked about Brown's message to Rusk. (Ibid., POL UK-USSR)
1. Following text message to me from George Brown delivered by UK Embassy here. "Gromyko gave
me the thumbs up sign as I went aboard the 'plane at Moscow this morning. I am not sure I can give the
same to you, but I am satisfied that my journey was fully worthwhile. I would like to be able to tell you
about it in detail at once but see no chance of doing so before Paris. If however you could spare one of
your trusted people to come here within the next few days I would happily give him my impression
whilst it is fresh in my mind.
On the first day/3/ I tried hard to get Gromyko to lay off his gramophone record and get down to the
question of the three issues (paragraph 10 of your message)./4/ However, he gave no ground but his
interest was sufficiently intent to encourage me to give him an outline of the package (paragraph 14 of
your message)./5/ This I did orally before dinner on the first evening, giving it to him as my own
proposal. Next morning, purely for the sake of clarity, I gave him a piece of paper. The actual words
used are enclosed. He was pretty suspicious but promised to pass it on to Kosygin only.
/3/November 23.
/4/Paragraph 10 of telegram 86196 to London, November 16 (see footnote 7, Document 300),
introduced the following three issues, each of which was then discussed at some length: "What degree of
assurance should there be that Hanoi will take appropriate reciprocal action? How soon might a response
from Hanoi be expected (and, perhaps, how can it be verified)? And what sort of action would we regard
as reciprocal?" (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
/5/Paragraph 14 of telegram 86196 discussed the Phase A-Phase B formula, using the same language as

that used in paragraph 3d of telegram 83786, Document 305.

It was on the basis of this piece of paper that I talked with Kosygin this morning. He was very friendly
and after being at pains to establish my credentials and the status of the paper I had given to Gromyko
we had a full discussion. I told him that in my view the time was ripe for progress, and given a little help
from him, we could perhaps get the result we both wanted. He listened carefully but was totally noncommittal. I had to satisfy him that what I had proposed was no substitution for negotiations on the
substance but only a way in. On his side after a lot of the usual stuff, pretty muted, about American
aggression, he said that they were prepared to make the North Vietnamese four points and the NLF five
points 'a basis for discussion.' When I said that I had interpreted a basis of discussion as meaning that
they would be flexible neither he nor Mr. Gromyko contradicted me. Their package would seem to be an
unconditional stopping of the bombing, some de-escalation in the South and then negotiations on the
basis as above. I reminded him that I would be seeing you in Paris in mid-December and that Christmas
itself might give some opportunity. On leaving I asked him if I could expect to hear from them again. To
this he was pretty cool and said that they would hardly have anything to add unless Gromyko had some
foreign policy of his own. However, he characterised our discussions as 'very useful.'
I cannot really tell what this music means. Greenhill, who was with me and has been at our other
meetings with Gromyko and Kosygin over the past year, says that without being able to quote precise
words from either Kosygin or Gromyko as a basis for his impression feels sure that their interest in what
I had to say was both earnest and profound. He doubts if they have yet made up their minds where to go
from here but would not be surprised if in the end we get some bonus. You may hear of this before I
do."
2. Text enclosure to message, headed "Text of Unsigned Piece of Paper Foreign Secretary Handed to
Mr. Gromyko on 24 November, 1966," reads "The following plan is suggested to meet the situation in
which the North Vietnamese require the cessation of bombing to be unconditional while the Americans
require some assurance that a measure of de-escalation would follow.
Consideration might be given to the possibility of the parties agreeing secretly on mutual measures of
de-escalation which would be put into effect once the bombing had stopped. In this the first step would
be to stop the bombing and the second step would be further action of de-escalation by the American
side to which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong would respond by similar acts of de-escalation: but
with both phases forming part of a firm prior understanding.
The order of events would therefore be: phase A. stop the bombing, while phase B., which would
follow, would see the execution of the other agreed measures of de-escalation by both sides."
All this would require careful study in which you and I might have to help before there was direct
contact between the two sides.
Rusk

NOVEMBER 28-DECEMBER 31: PLANNING FOR 1967;

MARIGOLD AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER BOMBING
318. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to Secretary of Defense
McNamara/1/

Washington, November 29, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, McNamara-Vance-McNaughton.
Secret; Eyes Only. Komer forwarded a copy of the attachment to this letter to Rostow the same day,
noting in his covering memorandum that "while it gives less weight to bombing NVN than does your
paper [attachment to Document 319], and more weight to creating a bandwagon psychology in SVN, we
are basically on the same track. We both see 1967 as crucial, and the key to success in 1967 as
developing, then effectively managing, a multi-faceted strategic plan." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy)
Dear Bob:
Here's the personal prognosis of events in Vietnam 1967-1968 which you requested. Sorry to be late, but
I hope you'll find it worth the delay.
On re-reading, I see it as less my view of what will happen than of what reasonably can and should
happen--other things being equal--if we play our cards right.
My prognosis seems to me quite consistent with the proposals in your October memorandum to the
President,/2/ even though it makes a rather more hopeful estimate.
/2/Document 268.
Whether or not it is over-optimistic, however, it does suggest the sort of orchestrated strategic program
we ought to pursue in 1967 to optimize our prospects. This won't just happen, so I for one strongly favor
drafting such a program (perhaps initially in the Katzenbach "non-group") for submission to the
President. In my view, it should include not only policy and program guidelines for 1967, but the
necessary management corollaries to give them life.
I'd greatly appreciate your reactions.
R.W. Komer/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Komer signed the original.
Attachment
Washington, November 28, 1966.
VIETNAM PROGNOSIS FOR 1967-68
I. WHERE WE ARE TODAY. Any prognosis for 1967 must start with one's premises about end-1966,
which I daresay are quite "optimistic." But let me make my case:
A. Westy's spoiling strategy (accelerating search-and-destroy operations) has already succeeded in
throwing Hanoi's phase III strategy way off balance. Thus we are well past the first turning point where
we stopped losing the war.
B. My guess, though I can't prove it, is that we have also passed a second major turning point. I suspect
that we have reached the point where we are killing, defecting, or otherwise attriting more VC/NVA

strength than the enemy can build up. I'd support this by citing kill ratios, weapons loss ratios, the
decline in enemy-initiated attacks, and the fact that even J-2 MACV's current O/B estimates now
indicate a slight decrease in total enemy strength. I'm also impressed with the increasing evidence of VC
recruiting difficulties, food shortages, and sickness. There is also enough inconsistency between our
estimates of VC/NVA strength and what the VC/NVA have been able to do over the last several months
as to justify the inference that either they do not have as many troops as we estimate, or they are a lot
less effective than we've estimated. Our O/B estimates, especially of VC main force and infrastructure
strength, are so flabby that my guess may be as good as anyone's--and consistent with actual VC/NVA
performance. Granted that the enemy may be increasing NVA infiltration, but he may well have passed
the peak on VC southerner strength.
C. We may also have passed a critical psychological turning point, in that the bulk of SVN's population
increasingly believe that we're winning the war. This to me was the chief significance of the 80% voter
turnout on 11 September. Even if one regards it as an exercise in competitive coercion, the fact is that
80% of those who could vote (in daylight) listened to the GVN rather than the VC. The ever-increasing
weight of the US commitment, now felt literally everywhere in SVN, contributes greatly to this growing
attitude.
In sum--slow, painful, and incredibly expensive though it may be--we're beginning to "win" the war in
Vietnam. This is a far cry from saying, however, that we're going to win it--in any meaningful sense.
II. WHAT ARE THE CHIEF IMPONDERABLES FOR 1967-68? To me these make prognosis very
difficult:
A. Will Hanoi materially increase its infiltration rate? I gather this is feasible (though will the barrier
make a major difference?).
B. Will the enemy escalate? Aside from increasing infiltration, I see little more Hanoi itself could do. Or
Moscow. Peking could intervene in Vietnam or widen the area of hostilities in SEA, but this seems quite
unlikely.
C. Will the enemy revert to a guerrilla strategy? This could be a serious complication before we get a
major pacification effort underway. But the evidence suggests that the VC are still attempting to
organize regiments and divisions. I'd also agree with Doug Pike's conclusion in his new book "Viet
Cong"/4/ that such de-escalation would shatter VC morale.
/4/Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam, Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966.
D. Will Hanoi play the negotiating card, and how? If I'm right about the trend line, Hanoi would find it
wiser to negotiate. The only other options are escalation, growing attrition, or fading away. If Hanoi
decides to talk sometime in 1967, a whole new calculus intervenes, involving questions of cease-fire,
standstill, bombing pauses, etc. In this case we'll have to do a new prognosis.
E. Will the GVN fall apart politically? While it was a risk worth taking, we've opened Pandora's box by
promoting a political evolution to representative government. A series of coups or political crises in
Cochin China or Annam could so undermine GVN cohesiveness as to cause a major setback or popular
revulsion in the US. I expect plenty of political trouble, but would hazard that a crisis of such magnitude
can be avoided in 1967 if we work hard at it.

F. Will our new pacification program work? This too is a major imponderable. But we've nowhere to go
but up. We're at long last planning a major new resource input plus the necessary focus on improving
US management and redirecting ARVN assets. So to me the chief variable is how much progress we can
make how soon. Will it be enough to make a significant difference in 1967 or even 1968?
G. Last but not least, will the US appear to settle down for a long pull if necessary? This is hardest to
predict, yet crucial from the standpoint of SVN and NVN reactions.
III. THE MOST LIKELY COURSE OF EVENTS IN 1967. Netting out the imponderables, I see the
odds as better than even for a gradual acceleration of present trends in 1967--with gains outweighing
setbacks enough to show major progress in achieving our aims by the end of the year. But this prognosis
is based on the assumption that the US will make a maximum effort to influence these trends in the
desired direction--as a matter of systematic, orchestrated US policy and the more active use of leverage
on the GVN.
A. Trends by Mid-1967. Even so, I doubt that within the next seven months we could demonstrate such
progress as to force Hanoi to negotiate or to convince most observers that we're "winning" the war. But
we could lay enough groundwork to offer reasonable confidence of such demonstrable results by end1967.
1. We can expect continued success in spoiling the VC/NVA main force effort. What we had achieved
by October 1966 with 80-odd maneuver battalions, we should do much better in 1967 with the added
flexibility 120-odd will give. Despite possible increase in NVA infiltration, I believe it will be
increasingly offset by an increasing enemy loss rate, a decline in VC recruiting and an upswing in
returnees (I'll guess at least 15,000 in January-June 1967). Once the barrier is in, it should also help. As
a result we should be in a position to increase our control of critical communications routes (Routes 15
and 20 should be early targets).
2. But pacification will not show a substantial upturn so early. Both ARVN and US forces will still be
on a learning curve. The critical element will be the speed and effectiveness of ARVN retraining. Even
so, we should begin to get rolling--if only because we'll deploy more resources while VC guerrilla and
infrastructure strength will probably decline (as the VC raid it for main force replacements). The civil
side will become marginally better, as cleared and held territory increases, but it will still be small
potatoes.
3. With luck (and hard pushing) we should get at least some of the Manila program through. Despite a
lot of political jockeying, we've a better than even chance of getting village-hamlet elections started, a
national reconciliation program begun, some land reform, a renewed, if low-level, anti-corruption drive,
and a start on postwar planning. The new Constitution should be promulgated, and some workable
division of power has begun to emerge between military and civilians, and between northerners and
southerners. These last are most important--and most questionable.
4. We should at least hold our own economically. Despite some price rises, I think we can prevent the
kind of runaway inflation in January-June 1967 that characterized January-June 1966. Easing port
congestion will help. But the key will be the enforcement of a tough across-the-board stabilization
program. Its outlines are now in hand: a GVN budget held to P-75 billion, US spending to P-58 billion,
an import program of $725 million annually and port throughput of four million tons of non-military
cargo.
5. We will continue bombing the North (perhaps at a reduced level) to impose a cost on NVN.

6. If the above prognosis is reasonably accurate we'll also get some upswing in SVN morale. This
intangible is most important, as emergence of a bandwagon psychology would help erode VC strength
and give new confidence to the GVN. I doubt that we'll see a real surge of confidence as early as mid1967 (enough things will go wrong to fuzz the issue), but the people in the cities already see the tide
turning.
7. If the above trends occur, they will register in Hanoi too, and may just lead to negotiating feelers
before June 1967. I'd see no more than a 1 in 3 chance of this, and if it comes it may be an attempt to
throw us off balance rather than to strike a bargain. But Hanoi will start reassessing its strategy of
waiting us out if it sees the US settling down for the long pull, increasing US forces by another 35% and
building a barrier, VC southerner strength eroding, NVN losses mounting, the GVN building at least a
partial base of legitimacy, and pacification at last beginning to be undertaken seriously.
B. Trends by End-1967. By this time, if not before, I see a better than even chance that the trends
described above will have shown results demonstrable to all. At this point the key issue will become one
of whether the US appears prepared to stick it out as long as necessary or to be tiring of the war.
1. If Westy can't clobber the large units with 470,000-odd Americans, plus ROKs, plus barriers, plus
bombing, plus an even better logistic base, something unforeseeable will have happened. Indeed, my
hunch is that he'll have enough left over for 20-30% of his maneuver battalions to help ARVN in
pacification if needed. By then we should have small US combat forces in the Delta too, which I think
would start making a difference. Since we're asked to be bold, I'll estimate enemy end-1967 strength at
not over 220-250,000 despite NVA infiltration. This is consistent with the thrust of CIA's 22 August
1966 study on The Vietnamese Communists' Will to Persist.
2. Pacification ought to show quite visible progress by end-1967, even if only the corridors between
many of the towns plus some of the countryside is secure. (I don't equate security with total absence of
incidents.) Many key roads should be reasonably secure for unescorted traffic (at least Route 4 to Can
Tho, Route 15 to Vung Tau, Route 20 to Dalat) and the Saigon environs largely cleared. VC capability
to recruit, tax, and collect rice in the south should decline significantly. Returnee totals should approach
45,000 for the year, and special operations should have turned up some higher quality defectors. The
contrast between living conditions in GVN and VC areas should work increasingly to our advantage.
3. There is a 50/50 chance of a representative GVN emerging with a presidential system, an elected
assembly, and reasonable checks and balances between the military and civilians. It won't be a strong
government (perhaps even weaker or more erratic than the present one), but its very existence will be a
major political plus. I'd also hope to see further progress on land reform, local elections leading to a
better administration in the countryside, etc. In fact, if the erosion of southern VC strength has gone far
enough by mid-year, I'd consider asking the GVN to let the NLF run in the elections (a gesture of
confidence which most experts think the NLF would refuse--to its cost). This ploy would also help split
the NLF from Hanoi--if this is at all possible.
4. If the above trends occur, I'd predict a growing shift to a bandwagon psychology on the part of SVN's
people. I believe that it will be stronger than war-weariness at this point.
5. Logically, Hanoi would start negotiating or withdrawing somewhere along this curve--if only to (a)
preserve southern assets by slowing down the attrition; (b) prevent consolidation of GVN authority; and
(c) secure a bombing halt. But I'd put the odds at only 50/50, the other real options being (a) to revert to
a guerrilla strategy (forced on them) and still wait us out; or (b) to fade away for the time being. If I'm
right about a growing erosion of southern VC strength, those NVA battalions will look a bit naked by

end-1967.
IV. PROGNOSIS FOR 1968. The farther ahead one tries to predict, the greater the role of the
imponderables. So, other things being equal, I'd foresee more of the same for 1968--with enough
declining VC southerner strength and improved ARVN performance that we might even be able to begin
redeploying some forces.
But to be realistic, I'd prudently allow for six months' slippage in my end-1967 projection. Even if we
reached that point only by mid-1968, it would still be apparent to everybody--including Hanoi--that we
were indisputably "winning." Again, the critical variable will probably be less what Hanoi (or Peking, or
Moscow) does than the US popular and Hill reaction and their impact on Administration policy. And,
finally, though the above might seem grossly optimistic, even I am not prognosticating that by end-1968
(or 1969 for that matter) we will have "won" the war. If the enemy retains the will to persist despite the
trends I see as likely, Vietnam could still be with us for some years.
V. THE LESS LIKELY CASES IN 1967-68. I won't spell these out in detail, because they would simply
be a different weighting, and/or time-phasing, of the trends and imponderables outlined above.
Pacification could go more slowly or more rapidly, for example. We might have another military coup.
We might get into serious negotiation, which could change the name of the game.
VI. LESSONS TO BE DRAWN. My prognosis of what is more likely than not to happen in Vietnam is
reasonable only if we and the GVN mount a maximum effort in 1967-68 to make it so. The key is better
orchestration and management of our Vietnam effort--both in Washington and Saigon. To me, the most
important ingredient of such an outcome is less another 200,000 troops, or stepped-up bombing, or a $2
billion civil aid program--than it is more effective use of the assets we already have.
A. The war will be "won" (if we can use that term) in the South. Now that we are successfully
countering NVA infiltration and the enemy's semi-conventional strategy, what needs to be added is
increasing erosion of southern VC strength (it has probably already peaked out).
B. Assuming the above is broadly valid, the key to success in the South is an effective pacification
program, plus a stepped-up defection program and successful evolution toward a more dynamic,
representative and thus more attractive GVN. These efforts will reinforce each other in convincing the
Southern VC and Hanoi that they are losing.
C. Our most important under-utilized asset is the RVNAF. Getting greater efficiency out of the 700,00
men we're already supporting and financing is the cheapest and soundest way to get results in
pacification.
D. By themselves, none of our Vietnam programs offer high confidence of a successful outcome
(forcing the enemy either to fade away or to negotiate). Cumulatively, however, they can produce
enough of a bandwagon psychology among the southerners to lead to such results by end-1967 or
sometime in 1968. At any rate do we have a better option?
319. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 30, 1966, 9:20 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy. Secret. On
November 17 Rostow forwarded to the President a 9-page paper by Edward Lansdale, "The

Battleground in 1967," which presented Lansdale's views on strategy in Vietnam for 1967. In his
covering memorandum, Rostow called the paper "Lansdale at his best--worth reading." (Ibid., Memos to
the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15)
Mr. President:
You may be interested in the attached paper I wrote to clear my own mind and to share with my
colleagues on the special committee you set up, chaired by Nick Katzenbach and including Cy Vance
and Bob Komer along with myself.
It is a map of the problem with, I believe, the right action headings.
On reflection, we need three things to make it move:
--Westmoreland must allocate more of his own military resources to pacification as well as press the
ARVN forward into this task; and he should work up a plan for the military side of pacification for
1967.
--We shall need in Saigon a vigorous Ambassador with great managerial skill, to drive forward hard this
kind of program at that end.
--As suggested on pages 24-25,/2/ we need to tighten the back-stopping of this whole program in
Washington.
/2/Part V. "Organization."
I am also considering, but did not put into this paper, further ways in which military power might be
used in the course of 1967 to force a decision on the other side without excessive risk of escalating the
war.
Walt
Attachment/3/
Washington, November 28, 1966.
/3/Under cover of a November 28 memorandum, Rostow sent copies of the paper, which is marked
"Draft for discussion; Limited distribution," to Katzenbach, Vance, and Komer. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
A STRATEGY FOR VIET NAM, 1967
I. Object. The object of the plan outlined below is to maximize the chance that we force a decision by
Hanoi in the course of the calendar year 1967 to end the war in Viet Nam on terms compatible with our
interests; that is, an end to hostilities in Laos as well as in Viet Nam; the accept-ance of the Geneva
framework for Southeast Asia; acceptance of an essentially independent South Viet Nam that can
determine its future on a one-man, one-vote basis or a reasonable approximation thereof.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the problem that will be posed for us if the war continues well
into 1968.

II. The problem: the Hanoi equation. We must assume that Hanoi will accept something like our terms
only when a combination of factors makes it clear that it is more in Hanoi's interest to end the war than
to continue. Hanoi remains in the war now because, on balance, each of the factors listed below has not
tipped far enough, individually or in combination, to make it urgent and desirable to stop hostilities; the
advantages and costs of continuing the war still outweigh the advantages and costs of getting out.
A. The Situation in the South. The VC infrastructure in the South, although damaged, is still in being
and capable of continuing to impose a heavy cost on South Viet Nam and to require the presence of
massive allied forces to prevent a VC victory. In addition to this technical fact, Hanoi is thus far
unwilling to take the decision to cut off support in men, supplies, and leadership to the South for reasons
of ideology, self-respect, and, presumably, Chinese Communist pressure or threat. It does not now
pretend to cherish the high hopes for early military victory of 1964 and 1965; but it clings to a position
like that of 1962-63, when it believed that its staying power would be greater than that of the U.S.:
"Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars--and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus
we are sure to win" (Pham Van Dong, autumn 1962)./4/
/4/See Document 232 and footnote 3 thereto.
B. Damage in the North. There is no doubt that the bombing in the North constitutes a heavy burden on
Hanoi. This is the principal difference between its view of the endurance doctrine of 1962-63 and its
view in 1966-67. Thus far, however, with the support of other Communist nations it has been able to
cushion the results of this bombing to some extent and has thus far accepted stagnation or decline in its
over-all domestic development plus a massive diversion of manpower to fend off the most dangerous
consequences of the bombing. What we do not know is whether the effects of the bombing are judged in
Hanoi a major degenerative factor, with a time limit on what is endurable, or a stabilized factor, given
the level of external assistance. Evidence runs both ways. What can be said is this: At its present level
and targetting, bombing appears to involve the same kind of painful but endurable pressure on the North
as small-scale guerrilla warfare in the South.
C. Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Just as Hanoi is unwilling to take the
ideological and political decision of cutting off the VC in the South, the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe are unwilling to take the decision to cut off military and economic aid to Hanoi. This is true
despite the fact that the costs of economic aid to Hanoi are rising rapidly and are an awkward marginal
burden on economies where resource allocation is, in any case, a difficult matter. In part, this reluctance
is due to the ideological competition with Communist China and the fear that Chinese Communist
influence might become decisive in Hanoi if the Soviet Union were to cut off economic aid.
Nevertheless, the net influence of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on Hanoi is probably towards a
negotiated end to the war: to counter Chinese Communist influence; to remove a situation which is both
a demonstration of relative impotence and a threat of escalation; and to cut aid costs.
D. Communist China. Hanoi has already permitted a substantial number of Chinese Communist
engineering and anti-aircraft forces to enter North Viet Nam. It wishes, for purposes of its own long-run
future to maintain a relationship with Communist China which is supportive but not dominating. It does
not feel free, probably because of geographical and logistical circumstances, to move toward the kind of
independ-ence of Communist China which North Korea felt free to assert because of the proximity of
the Soviet Union and the credibility of Moscow's security as well as economic guarantees. Nor does it
now appear credible to Hanoi to seek greater independence of Communist China by an understanding
with the other major power which might offer that guarantee; that is, the United States. Communist
China has thus far thrown its weight in Hanoi towards continuing the war. It may, in addition, exercise
some direct influence over the leadership of the VC--almost certainly more direct influence than
Moscow and Eastern Europe.

It is probably true that Hanoi can make peace without risking a Chinese Communist invasion; but
Chinese Communist influence is evidently an inhibiting factor of some importance.
E. The Political Situation in the South. Although undoubtedly disappointed by the outcome of the I
Corps crisis of April-May 1966 and by the outcome of the election for the Constituent Assembly, Hanoi
may maintain hopes of either a political breakdown in the South which might permit it to join dissident
non-Communist elements in the seizure of power, or the emergence of a civil government with which it
could more easily negotiate a favorable solution than with the present military government in Saigon.
Such hopes of a popular front or coalition government may be countered by fears that the potential VC
role in South Vietnamese politics may progressively diminish if the constitutional process moves
forward on present planned lines.
F. Free World Diplomacy. With the assistance of other Communist nations, Hanoi has conducted a
massive political and psychological campaign in the Free World with minimum and maximum
objectives. The minimum objective is to restrain U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam to targets which
constitute thus far livable levels of damage, given the outside assistance available to Hanoi. At the
maximum, the objective has been to press the U.S. unilaterally to cease bombing the North and, even,
unilaterally to withdraw from support of South Viet Nam. Although Hanoi has failed in its maximum
objectives, it must judge that it has succeeded tolerably well in its minimum objectives and will continue
the effort.
G. The United States. Thus far Hanoi has avoided all direct negotiation with the U.S., while leaving
many channels open for contact and negotiation should the equation shift in ways which made such
negotiation desirable in Hanoi's interest. It may judge that knowledge of direct negotiation with the U.S.
would leak and damage morale among the VC, notably at a time when the VC are on the defensive.
Therefore, so long as the Communists are on the defensive, an indicated willingness to negotiate directly
may signal a willingness to end the war soon.
H. Conclusion.
In short, while it has suffered a profound setback from its hopeful position in 1964 and early 1965,
Hanoi has found, thus far, a rationale for continuing the conflict and a domestic and foreign policy
strategy which permits it to continue. The most important factors holding Hanoi in the war appear to be:
--the continued existence of the VC infrastructure and the VC capacity to continue guerrilla operations;
--the possibility of rendering bombing of the North with existing targetting endurable by its own
measures and expanded external assist-ance;
--Chinese Communist influence, pressure, and (conceivably) threat.
The other factors in the equation are either neutral or argue that the war should be ended.
III. The Situation: the United States Equation. The equation for U.S. policy is, essentially, the other side
of the coin of the seven variables which enter the Hanoi equation. We have been operating and we shall
have to continue to operate in such a way as to shift these variables to a point where Hanoi concludes
that it is its interest to end the war rather than to continue it. It is not a question of simply "proving that
they cannot win." In a military sense that has already happened; and what follows assumes we shall
continue to keep the initiative against and impose heavy attrition on VC and NVN main force units. It is
a question of creating a situation in which they feel there is more to gain (or less to lose) by ending the

war now than by continuing it on current and foreseeable terms.

In any situation as complex as this, the answer lies in acting on all of the variables available to the extent
that one has a grip on them, rather than on any single variable; and, in any case, we can only guess at the
weights attached to them in Hanoi's calculations. Some may prove more critical than others. Some may
be more susceptible to our initiative and action than others. But if the picture of Hanoi's equation is
correct, the object of U.S. policy is to produce in 1967 a sense that all the factors judged relevant by
Hanoi are moving unfavorably--or as many of them as we can move.
The following action program is based on this judgment about our task plus the concluding assessment
in paragraph III, H, above.
IV. The Proposed U.S. Program.
A. Action against the VC.
The relatively viable state of the VC infrastructure was judged in para. III to be a major factor keeping
Hanoi in the war. Given Communist doctrines about guerrilla warfare--and especially the doctrine of
superior endurance in protracted conflict--it is clear that perhaps the most important task in 1967 is to
produce a setting in which the VC appear to be disintegrating. This would make the rationale for
continuing to accept the costs of bombing in the North less persuasive. It would increase the leverage of
Moscow and Eastern Europe over Hanoi. It would undercut the position of the Chinese Communists.
The major headings for such a policy for accelerating the disintegration of the VC are familiar and
appear to be the following.
1. A dramatic and sustained political and psychological appeal to the VC to join in the making of a new
South Vietnamese nation
a. an amnesty offer in which the Constituent Assembly might be associated with the government
b. enlarged and sustained efforts to defect VC leaders
c. a radical expansion in Chieu Hoi efforts
2. Accelerated pacification
a. new organizational arrangements
b. converting ARVN forces to pacification functions
c. rapid pacification of certain key areas
3. A workable land reform scheme
B. Increasing the cost in the North. The object of our bombing, against the background of A, above, is to
make Hanoi feel that it is paying a higher and higher price to preserve a probably diminishing asset. To
do this, three measures should be accelerated.
1. The barrier. The coming in of the barrier would promise Hanoi that the cost of infiltration is likely to
increase and that it might, even, find difficulty in withdrawing its regular forces now in the South. Since

the barrier will come in slowly, it is to be assumed that Hanoi will seek and find limited
countermeasures. The barrier will evidently not work 100%. It is, however, an important cost-increasing
tool.
2. Attrition against infiltration routes. We do not yet know the dispositions of Hanoi with respect to
infiltration in 1967, either with respect to scale or routes. In particular, we do not know the extent to
which the Laos routes will be used as opposed to direct crossing of the DMZ or various seaborne efforts.
Given our experience with attacks on infiltration routes in 1966, it should be possible for us to mount in
1967 a more purposeful and effective attritional campaign against infiltration than we did last year,
including the extension of close-in attack of coastal shipping in North Vietnamese waters.
3. The attack on high priority targets in Hanoi-Haiphong area. At various times we have already hit oil
targets, power plants, SAM installations, docks, coal mines. Without drama or sudden escalation, we
should gradually, steadily, hit more such targets where the problem of replacement requires time and
expense, and the costs of the war economy are substantial. We should continue as an important
insurance policy the attack on oil. Power plants appear particularly attractive because of the wide
dependence on them.
So long as the situation remains as it is within Communist China, the mining of the sea approaches to
Haiphong should be ruled out because of the dependence on Communist China that would result; but
this judgment should be periodically reexamined in the light of all the circumstances.
In the meanwhile, ways of blocking access between Haiphong and Hanoi should be studied, including
the possibility of systematic interdiction--the object being not to close off access to the USSR and
Eastern Europe but to render the delivery of such supplies increasingly costly.
C. Diplomacy via the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It is a fact that Moscow and the Eastern
European capitals have in recent months become more activist with respect to Hanoi and the ending of
the war. We do not completely understand this shift. It may stem from some combination of these three
elements:
--A sense that the forces in Hanoi willing to end the war are gathering strength.
--A sense that Hanoi is more willing to listen to Moscow due to the troubles inside Communist China.
--Increased interest in peace (and increased leverage) due to the radical rise in aid to Hanoi required
from the USSR and Eastern Europe because of our bombing the North.
It is also clear that the influence of Mosocw and its friends has its limits in Hanoi. We cannot count on
this influence and leverage alone to bring peace. We have to operate on all the other elements in the
equation which might bring Hanoi around. But we should maintain as close and direct a dialogue with
the USSR and Eastern Europe as we can, and, especially, try to understand better the reasons for their
recent activism.
In this connection, we should be prepared to discuss with Moscow, as soon and as explicitly as Moscow
is prepared to discuss with us, the character of a Southeast Asian settlement, including what we believe
our role and the role of the Soviet Union in that area might be over the long run. There are great
inhibitions in discussing such matters explicitly. The Soviet Union has preferred to move in parallel and
implicitly in similar circumstances; for example, the Indian subcontinent. Nevertheless, it is an area in
which the Soviet Union evidently intends to maintain an influence in competition with both Communist

China and the U.S.--an influence with which we can live to a certain degree.
D. Communist China. Chinese Communist policy towards the war in Viet Nam may be one
consideration at stake in the struggle within Communist China. Our direct influence on the outcome of
that struggle is exceedingly limited, although our indirect influence has been considerable via our
policies in various parts of the world which have contributed to the failure of Mao's expansionist plans
and tactics. We do not know enough about the so-called moderate forces inside Communist China to
understand whether, if they gained the upper hand, they would join the Soviet Union in encouraging
Hanoi to seek a settlement and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet Nam. Mao has clearly
taken the view that the pinning down in Southeast Asia of massive U.S. forces was good for Communist
China because it would lead to failure and a once-and-for-all withdrawal in humiliation of U.S. from the
Asian mainland. It is conceivable that moderate forces might emerge which would settle for a negotiated
withdrawal of the U.S. from its Viet Nam bases and the neutralization of South Viet Nam and Laos,
implicit in the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. This kind of shift is a matter to which we should be
sensitive; but it is in the hands of domestic Chinese Communist politics rather than U.S. diplomacy or
communication.
Of all the variables, the Chinese Communist policy towards the war in Viet Nam and the nature of its
influence over Hanoi is least in our hands except to the extent that we and the Vietnamese succeeded in
producing erosion and disintegration of the VC infrastructure--a fact which will undoubtedly impress
Peiping, given the experience of its leaders and, indeed, the nature of its doctrines of protracted warfare.
E. Political situation in the South. Here we have two major tasks with minimum and maximum
objectives. At the minimum we must assure that the political life of South Viet Nam moves forward on
the constitutional path to which it is committed, without conflict and disorder which would leave major
openings for the VC, or produce, through instability and recurrent crises, a sense of hopelessness within
the U.S. As part of this effort, we must contain inflation at the minimum within limits that are tolerable
and do not produce social and economic disruption in the life of the country.
At the maximum we must play for the emergence of a political and economic situation in South Viet
Nam which is inherently attractive to the VC and projects to the world a vision of forward movement.
On the political side, the key problem is clearly this: to develop a relationship between the military and
civil politicians that would permit a constitutional government to emerge in 1967, which has legitimacy
before the world and sufficient linkage to the military establishment; for the military will remain the
heart of South Vietnamese organized nationhood for the foreseeable future. We must avoid either acute
military-civil conflict or a military takeover which aborts the constitutional track.
In cases where these conditions have been met at similar stages of history (for example, Turkey in the
inter-war years, Pakistan since 1958, Korea since 1961), the key to the transition has been the
emergence of a political leader or leaders who have the confidence of both the armed forces and a
sizeable proportion of the civilian politicians. This is so critical an issue that we cannot afford to be
passive with respect to it.
A second maximum objective is to open the ports and roads at a pace which gives a short-run lift to the
Vietnamese economy while pressing forward rapidly and dramatically with the formulation of a postwar
development program.
F. Free World diplomacy. The two critical elements here are:
--An expansion--even a modest expansion--in Free World forces fighting beside us in South Viet Nam.

--Pressing out to the world systematically the dual concept; a new and vital Free Asia is emerging; it is
with us in our intent to see the war in Viet Nam through to an honorable peace.
We have made progress with this doctrine as a result of the President's trip to Asia. It must be
systematically projected by every device of communication at our disposal.
G. The United States base. The outcome of the Congressional election of 1966 has given us a base to
pursue the strategy outlined above for 1967. The object of that strategy should be to shift the variables
during 1967 to the point where Hanoi is willing to end the war. For 1967--and as a hedge against a
continuation of the war into 1968--we face, nevertheless, certain fundamental, unsolved problems with
domestic opinion:
--The need to give our citizens a better sense of how to measure progress in a war of this kind. All our
people now have is a bewildering statement of daily and weekly casualty figures plus accounts of
occasional pitched battles on the ground and of raids on the North. These are accompanied by evidence
that the VC still have the capacity to shoot up U.S. installations, throw mortars into the center of Saigon,
etc. We have not found a way to make clear, even, the character of our progress against main force units,
let alone a way of showing what progress we may make in the countryside towards pacification and
development. A special task force in the government should take this problem in hand, coordinating
with Saigon, so that in 1967 we get more mature and shapely reporting of the war.
--We must drive home systematically the message of the President's trip to Asia; that is, a new and vital
Asia is emerging, which is determined to work together and is with us on Viet Nam.
This must be, again, a steady campaign in which we find and project all the concrete evidence of
forward movement in Free Asia and evidence of Asian attitudes towards Viet Nam.
--By every device we can conceive, we should make the war a bipartisan venture in domestic political
terms, reaching out to the Republicans for advice and engaging them with the fullest possible briefings.
H. Negotiating with Hanoi. Our basic tactic with Hanoi has been to pick up their desire to have us stop
bombing in the North and move them towards the conference table by asking them what compensatory
de-escalation in the South they are prepared to undertake. Since various other nations, notably in Eastern
Europe, are apparently prepared to talk to Hanoi along these lines, it should be pursued. But it should be
pursued with a consciousness that it may have arisen not from an authentic desire of Hanoi to negotiate,
but from a desire to lift from North Viet Nam and its allies the burden of bombing so that the war can be
pursued in greater confidence with greater prospects of North Vietnamese success.
It is also possible that the de-escalation formula poses a great danger to Hanoi because a cutback or end
to infiltration might produce very serious consequences for the VC, both technically, in terms of
supplies, and psychologically, in terms of a conviction that Hanoi was deserting the VC and making
terms at their expense. Therefore, we should mount a parallel line of communication with Hanoi
directly. The object should be the discussion of the end position--a complete package deal--while the
war goes on; with the object of ending the war briskly and completely when the end position is agreed.
V. Organization. The premium which attaches to ending the war in 1967 is obvious. The nature of the
problem is such that if we are to maximize the chances that the war will be ended in 1967, we must force
the pace of movement in a coordinated way along each of the lines of the program set out above. This
requires:

--A common understanding of the concept of working intensively on each of the elements of the
equation, shared fully by Saigon and Washington.
--The most vigorous possible leadership in Saigon, both by the Ambassador and MACV--and both in
coordination.
--Centralized drive and direction in Washington of all the elements of the program, cutting to the
minimum normal delays in making decisions here.
Under Secretary Katzenbach and his committee should undertake the latter assignment; but it will only
work if the Under Secretary himself can allocate the time to lead the enterprise.
It would be disastrous if present centers of initiative felt they were layered by such an undertaking--and
the buck had passed somewhere else. The Under Secretary's committee should:
--spot delays in implementing the agreed plan and end them;
--spot gaps in implementing the agreed plan and fill them;
--re-survey the evolving situation and make recommendations for changes in the plan.
VII. 1968
If the war cannot be ended in 1967 and runs through the election of 1968, the task will be:
--to have achieved maximum progress;
--to be able to demonstrate the reality of that progress persuasively to our people;
--to achieve maximum bipartisan support for continuing our Viet Nam and Asian policies.
We must be able to hold a position of: don't throw away a winning effort and defeat a position of: don't
throw good men and money after bad.
In seeking a decision in 1967 we must, as an insurance policy, lay the groundwork for such a stance in
1968.
320. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, December 1, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret.
A Top Manager for Saigon. I've talked this over with our little sub-cabinet "war cabinet" of Katzenbach,
Vance and Rostow (and only with them).
Except for the few obvious candidates who are probably unavailable, we have some differences as to
who or even what type of man ought to replace Lodge. For example, they tend to react in terms of
imagery--we need a "public presence" and preferably a Republican. To me, Vietnam itself has become
so big an issue as to dwarf the role of any ambassador in Saigon. The only imagery that will really count

in 1967-68 is whether we seem to be winning the war. So it's much more important that we get the man
best capable of producing than whether he is suitably prominent. First and foremost, this means a top
manager who can run a $20-25 billion show, make the military perform, and quietly lead the GVN by
the nose.
It also means, if we want early results, an insider who already knows his Vietnam. We don't have time to
break in a totally new man.
Where I think we all agree is that your choice for Vietnam might well be the single most important
appointment you make in 1967-68. It is my own belief that the right "top manager" in Saigon could
make a major difference between success and lack of it in 1967-68. This is frankly based on a more
optimistic appraisal of our Vietnam prospects than McNamara's, for example, but I think he underplays
the political and psychological factors.
The only two candidates who would almost unquestionably meet all non-political criteria are McNamara
and Mac Bundy. If neither is in the cards, I'd think next of a DOD-type manager who'd know also how
to move the military. You say Vance is out, so I'd suggest McNaughton. He may grate on some people,
but he's a first-class doer. Nitze would be a poor third in this category. Ros Gilpatric would also be well
qualified, but could we get him?
Tough-minded managers are harder to come by at State. Katzenbach would be great but--. Doug
MacArthur or Alex Johnson would be the only pros I'd even consider. Everyone I know agrees that
Ellsworth Bunker has all the judgment needed, but he like Harriman may be too old (even though we
could back them with a strong staff).
When we get to others on the outside I'm on less firm ground. From the Cabinet there are Goldberg,
Freeman, and John Gardner You know their management abilities far better than I, but they'd all need at
least six crucial months to learn the ropes. If Lodge left in February, this would mean September before
they really found their feet.
The same is equally true of non-government people. To mention some names, however, Doug Dillon
looks perhaps most interesting. Vance speaks highly of Governor Connally's managerial ability. Nelson
Rockefeller is certainly public-spirited. Tom Gates is probably not good enough. Clark Clifford is, but
would he go to Saigon? Scranton may be available, but Nick says he hasn't got it.
Rather than a largely unknown quantity (can we afford one if results are what we want?), I'd opt if
necessary for McNamara's solution--give Westy the job. I'm out of my element on the political calculus,
but hazard that it would be a popular appointment with most Americans (as was Max Taylor's); the
"intellectuals" are against us anyway. Westy knows the drill, has real clout with the GVN, would take
orders (unlike MacAr-thur), and would listen to political advice from the bright State types we could put
at his side.
On the other hand, even an unknown quantity from the above list of 19 would in my judgment be better
than keeping Lodge on. Cabot really wants to come home (not because he smells defeat or is
disgruntled) but because he's done two tours (now 26 out of the last 30 months). He actually feels that
overstaying his time increases the odds of physical harm--he's a nut on security. If you have not already
done so, I'd urge you have Dean Rusk sound Cabot out and give an independent confirmation.
Whoever replaces Lodge, it is important that Porter stay--not just for continuity but because he's good. If
you agree, Rusk should also tell Porter this (it will save having to do so later).

R. W. Komer
P. S. I attach two long papers which I hope you'll read. The first is my prognosis of how we can "win"
by 1968 if we really sweat it./2/ The second is my outline plan for how to do so./3/ If we can decide on
some such plan before 1 January and pick the right man to carry out the mandate, I believe we'll have
chosen the optimum road to solving the biggest (and messiest) problem on our plates for 1967-68--and
the prerequisite to solving all the others. My recipe does not guarantee success but, as I wrote Bob
McNamara, does anybody have a better one?
/2/Attachment to Document 318.
/3/"A Strategic Plan for 1967 in Vietnam," dated November 29. (Johnson Library, Komer Files,
McNamara-Vance-McNaughton) In an introduction to his Strategic Plan, Komer stated that it should be
read in conjunction with McNamara's October memorandum (Document 268) and Bundy's and his
papers (attachments to Documents 318 and 319). "All three have a common central thrust, even though
they differ in detail and emphasis, and in the prospect they foresee as likely." Komer's Strategic Plan
provided the basis for a draft NSAM, Document 336

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
321. Memorandum From Richard Holbrooke of the White House Staff to the President's Special
Assistant (Komer)/1/
Washington, December 1, 1966.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075,
Vietnam--1966. Secret. Also sent to Leonhart. On December 1 Komer sent copies to Rusk, McNamara,
Gaud, Vance, Katzenbach, McNaughton, and William Bundy. (Ibid.) The source text is marked "Sec
Def has seen."
SUBJECT
Vietnam Trip Report: October 26-November 18, 1966
Returning to Vietnam after an absence of five months, I was first struck by how little things have
changed. Sitting in on discussions within the Mission and hearing the same tired old arguments, visiting
the Delta and listening to the same recital of difficulties and shortcomings, getting a constant refrain
from each part of the Vietnam mosaic produced as if by rote--all emphasized the glacial pace at which
real events happen in Vietnam, as opposed to the wild fluctuations in mood that grip the U.S.
Government.
Political
The most encouraging developments were unquestionably political. The September elections were
important primarily because they took place. The first hesitant steps of the Constituent Assembly, while
they give no clear picture of the future course, hint at the encouraging possibility of a new and younger
leadership emerging for Vietnam--not tied to the old French ways, and less reliant on the dangerous
covert and conspiratorial methods of politics which are a Vietnamese tradition. While I was in Saigon
the C.A. chose its "blocs," and the delegates began tentative groupings. The most observant members of
the Political Section were impressed with the process.
But the dangers in the political situation are still very near the surface. Both regionalism and the
growing civilian-military split are issues now out in the open. If they ever reinforce each other through
some unfortunate combination, then the delicate balances that now exist could tumble. It is still not
unfair to say that there is no real government in Vietnam, in the sense of a functioning administrative
and political structure which can pass the word out, and get the job done. This is not merely because the
GVN lacks good leaders; it is also the result of a political structure still so fragmented and weak that
division commanders can choose those orders they intend to obey, and Ministries can follow their own

paths regardless of the desires of the Prime Minister. With such fragmentation as a backdrop it is
difficult to get the GVN to swing its entire weight behind a single program (Revolutionary
Development, Hop Tac, and the efforts to break the port bottleneck are recent examples). When all the
factions agree on something, they can do it, as demonstrated September 11. A final danger to an
evolving political process is the American presence, which can be both a beneficial catalyst and an
oppressive burden. While we often play a vitally constructive role--as we did in encouraging the
elections--or an essential preventive role--in stopping coup attempts--our massive presence creates some
dangerous vulnerabilities (see last section).
The US Mission
In the almost four years I have worked on Vietnam, and served in the Mission, I have never seen the
Americans in such disarray. This is the result of a rapid buildup, great pressure from higher
headquarters, rapid personnel turnover, poor results in the effort against the VC and great personal
frustration, poor leadership, fatigue, the absence of families and the resulting abnormal social life.
MACV and the civilian mission have been steadily drifting apart. The Ambassador has tended to allow
this to happen, showing little inclination for the difficult job of welding together the entire mission./2/ In
this atmosphere, with the Vietnamese getting further away every day from a mission turning steadily
inward, a reorganization along the lines of your paper of August 7/3/ could only serve to strengthen and
streamline the Mission, and provide the tools with which to exert greater influence over the GVN. Such
a reorganization is now taking place, along lines virtually identical to Alternative Two of the August
paper. (Most significant difference: Westmoreland has so far rejected a Deputy Commander for
Pacification/RD.)
/2/In a November 9 letter to Rufus Phillips, Lansdale stated: "There's such a dirty power-struggle going
on behind-the-scenes among Americans that it's time that someone talked plain turkey to them about the
war and Viet Nam. Incidentally, the civilian vs. military aspects are getting ludicrous--in Mission
Council meetings, Porter's bi-weekly meetings, etc." (Hoover Institution, Lansdale Papers,
Correspondence, Phillips, Rufus)
/3/Not further identified.
I think the reorganization plans look good. They will put every American civilian in the provinces into a
single operational chain of command, reporting directly to the Deputy Ambassador. USAID, JUSPAO,
and CAS will no longer have their own men in the provinces; rather, they will assume a staff
relationship to Ambassador Porter and the field, and all communications to the provinces will go
through a new Office of Operations, to be headed by Wade Lathram, who will be a member of the
Mission Council. His headquarters staff will consist of the combined staffs now called USAID/Field
Operations, USAID/Refugees, USAID/Public Safety, JUSPAO/Field Services, and OSA/Cadre
Operations. Porter intends to regroup these offices, now spread out across the city of Saigon, into a
single building, USAID #2 (the building next to the Xa Loi pagoda on Ngo Thoi Nghiem street), and he
will locate himself there.
In each Region/Corps, Porter will select a Senior Civilian Repre-sentative, who will command all US
civilian operations in the area. His staff will be the merged staffs of the existing agencies. At the
province level, a senior civilian representative will be chosen, who will also command the US civilians
in the province. The Senior Civilian Province Representative, who will be chosen by Porter on the basis
of merit regardless of parent agency, will write the efficiency reports of all the American civilians in the
province, and will be the sole US civilian advisor to the Province Chief--the equivalent of the MACV
Sector Advisor. The present system of multiple advisors, often giving conflicting advice, will cease.

Porter gives every indication of digging in and taking charge. He is definitely looking forward to the
new organization. Its importance is substantial. For the first time since the buildup, American civilians
in the field will look to one office in Saigon for guidance. At the same time, the job remaining to the
agency chiefs--MacDonald, Hart, and Zorthian--is substantial. MacDonald will retain control of the
technical divisions of USAID, and be responsible for programs operating through the technical
ministries such as Agriculture, Health, and Public Works. He retains primary responsibility, along with
Wehrle, for the economic stabilization program. He must administer the huge CIP program. Zorthian is
still responsible for elements of advice to the Ministry of Information, although his Field Services
Division and the advice for VIS and Chieu Hoi both pass to the new organization. He remains the
channel for technical assist-ance and advice. He still handles directly for the Ambassador the delicate
problem of the U.S. correspondents in Vietnam. Hart remains in control of the covert operations of his
agency. Special arrangements are now being worked out to safeguard covert and unilateral activity,
particularly those of the Special Branch. All this is quite hopeful. Within the next ninety days, it is
unlikely that measurable results will be available showing that this new structure is going to enable us to
win the war any faster. But within ninety days we will be able to see whether or not this new
organization holds promise of more effective management of the US Mission. I believe it does, and that
it could have been accomplished months ago. But at least the Mission has finally made a start; now it
needs support in Washington. This will include support for a better and more responsive personnel
recruiting system here, drawing far more from the Foreign Service, finding better people from AID.
Ambassador Porter expressed particular concern over the difficulty of finding good people for the senior
positions in the new Office of Operations, including the jobs of Senior Regional Representative. He
wants you to give him any suggestions you can think of.
Personnel
The problem of personnel is going to get more serious in the next six to eight months, and it is not too
early to start thinking about it. Many of the better "old hands" have served as long as they are going to
serve without their families. They simply cannot extend their tours again, except at the risk of a broken
family. It is not generally realized that so many people of quality will leave but it is true. Only now are
the tours of the first post-evacuation group of people beginning to come to an end, and it will prove
impossible to keep any of them if they cannot have their wives with them. Examples are easy to find:
Phil Habib, Roy Wehrle (the exception which proves the rule: only the special arrangements that were
made kept him on), George Jacobson, Len Maynard, Bob Oakley, Ev Baumgardner. There is a saying
now in Saigon that you can't be a good counterinsurgent unless you have wrecked your marriage. There
is a grim truth to it. The situation forces people to choose between their commitment to our effort in
Vietnam and their families. Most men can only choose Vietnam for a limited period of time. If our
commitment in Vietnam is indeed a serious long-range one, we are going to need a cadre of superior
officers who are willing and interested to serve extended tours out there, and see the war through. We
cannot build such a cadre from unmarried and divorced men alone. The visitation program is no
solution; trips every month to Bangkok or every six months to the States create a difficult situation, and
frequent gaps in the staffing pattern. This is a growing problem, and deserves high-level attention. My
recommendation is similar to one once made by Ambassador Lodge: Permit people who have served 18
months and who are needed for another tour bring their wives--no children--with them for the second
tour. I think this is reasonable, does not cause unsurmountable housing problems (this is a minor issue),
and does not cause undue security problems.
US Relations With the Vietnamese
The reaction of various elements of Vietnamese society to the continuing U.S. military and civilian
buildup is baffling and contradictory. On one hand there are vague and elusive signs of growing

annoyance on the part of many Vietnamese with American behavior. This can manifest itself in many
ways. There are the continual complaints of General Nguyen Duc Thang, who feels that the U.S. simply
does not understand Vietnam. (Despite these complaints, there is no question now of Thang's continued
pro-American attitude.) There is the growing chorus of urban Vietnamese who see their cities being
changed by the American presence. Ironically many of those who complain are also profiting from the
buildup. There are the surprisingly strong neutralist statements of many student leaders in Saigon, who
despite their family positions do not seem to feel any sense of commitment to the anti-VC effort, and
blame the U.S. for every problem in their own country. Only a few of these anti-American sentiments
are of value to the VC at this time; the great majority of the people are still not ready to turn grumblings
of discontent into open action that would precipitate an anti-American crisis. But there is enough latent
feeling about the Americans so that if the war continues for too long without victory in sight, warweariness could merge with anti-American feelings to produce a reaction among the population. A
clear-cut issue does not now exist, nor has a leader yet emerged to articulate and intensify these feelings.
But the danger exists, and it may eventually create a strange sort of time limit for us, so that we must
either win the war fast for the GVN or else face a reaction from the very Vietnamese whose original
shortcomings caused us to increase our involvement.
On the other hand, there are many other Vietnamese who are consciously deciding to cast their lot with
the Americans, and become "our Vietnamese." For the Vietnamese, if they understand anything,
understand the colonial relationship, and no matter how hard we try to avoid it, as the buildup proceeds,
more and more Vietnamese will assume that we are indeed becoming the new masters of Indochina.
This does not mean that we behave like the French did; but in a situation in which many people do not
take the GVN seriously and in which most Vietnamese think that we (i.e., the CIA) control events, many
Vietnamese are going to see quick profits and possible power if they can become popular with the
Americans. By our very presence, we are therefore creating a group of people--some totally sincere,
some wholly devious--who are making a commitment to the American Marines, or the Army, or the
"Embassy." Despite the theories VIPs get in briefings, this commitment cannot be transferred from the
Americans to the GVN.
People who make this commitment and cast their lot with the Americans--be they village chiefs or
farmers in the Da Nang TAOR, or government officials, or covert agents or VC defectors--are choosing
Americans, not the GVN. We have given such people something to hope for, either security or a chance
for quick profits. Whatever the reasons for their choice, the majority of those making this choice have
decided that we are going to be in Vietnam for a long time no matter what we say publicly. People in
this category--including 2 VC defectors and a village leader--told me that the VC would win in a matter
of weeks if the U.S. even thought of withdrawal. They based this feeling not only on the military power
of the enemy, but on his political sub-structure.
So if the war drags on, we may find ourselves cast increasingly in the role of the only governing force in
a given area, more and more embroiled in the business of running that area. This may sometimes be
unavoidable, but we should minimize the area in which it happens. We are not trained or equipped to do
what must be done in rebuilding government in the villages; moreover, it is an open-ended commitment
in terms of both time and men, and could well lure us unwillingly and unwittingly into a strange sort of
"revolutionary colonialism"--our ends are "revolutionary," our means quasi-colonial. As this happens,
we can be caught in the trap of trying to get the least revolutionary Vietnamese--"our Vietnamese"--to
carry out programs with which they are in basic disagreement. (National Reconciliation and Land
Reform are recent examples.)
Thus, our very presence may prevent the emergence of a new leadership which would be willing to carry
out the revolutionary programs which we are advocating and which are vital to our success--unless we
exercise a rare combination of self-restraint and gentle covert encouragement to selected younger

civilian leaders.
Richard Holbrooke
322. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, December 1, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 11:04 a.m. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at the LBJ Ranch on December 2 and
commented in a separate telegram to the President, CAP 66134, December 2, that both Rusk and
Thompson believed the message was of importance and that he himself was impressed by several
factors, "above all, by the phrase 'as fast as possible.' As you know, I have felt that if Hanoi was ever
serious they would want a quick complete deal, not a slow negotiation." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 16)
12247. A. When I arrived at D'Orlandi's apartment December 1 at 6:15 for our meeting with
Lewandowski, D'Orlandi met me in the hall, saying that something big had happened. When we went
into the room where Lewandowski was waiting and we sat down around the table, D'Orlandi said that it
was imperative that continued secrecy be assured. Hanoi, he said, had made a specific point of leakage.
If there should ever be any leak, there will be an immediate denial by Hanoi and by the Polish
Government.
B. I assured him that I was totally in sympathy with the policy of secrecy and that so was the United
States Government. They could absolutely count on our leaving no stone unturned to preserve secrecy.
C. Lewandowski then began his statement. He first thanked me for coming today. He then said: "My trip
to Hanoi was very important. You should understand that what has been reached up to now in our
conversations in Saigon and in my conversations in Hanoi may be decisive. Both Mr. Rapacki and Mr.
Gomulka think so.
D. "I presented to Hanoi my understanding of the U.S. position based on our conversations of November
14 and our previous conversations." He indicated the numbers of the paragraphs as he went along, as
follows:
"1. I have insisted that the United States is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations.
"2. Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the United
States in Viet-Nam. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the
problems, having in mind that the present status quo in South Viet-Nam must be changed in order to
take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the United States in South
Viet-Nam, and that such a solution may be reached in an honorable and dignified way not detrimental to
national pride and prestige.
"3. That the United States are not interested from a point of view of its national interests in having a
permanent or long term military presence in South Viet-Nam once a peaceful solution to the conflict has
been reached. That is why the offer made in Manila regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the
liquidation of American bases should be considered in all seriousness.

"4. The United States would be ready, should other parties show a constructive interest in a negotiated
settlement, to work out and to discuss with them proposals of such a settlement covering all important
problems involved from a cease-fire to a final solution and withdrawal of U.S. troops.
"5. That the United States, within a general solution, would not oppose the formation of a South
Vietnamese Government based on the true will of the Vietnamese people with participation of all
through free democratic elections, and that the United States would be prepared to accept the necessary
control machinery to secure the democratic and free character of such elections and to respect the results
of such elections.
"6. The United States hold the view that unification of Viet-Nam must be decided by the Vietnamese
themselves for which the restoration of peace and the formation of proper representative organs of the
people in South Viet-Nam is a necessary condition.
"7. The United States are ready to accept and respect a true and complete neutrality of South Viet-Nam.
"8. The United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam if this will
facilitate such a peaceful solution. In doing so, the United States are ready to avoid any appearance that
North Viet-Nam is forced to negotiate by bombings or that North Viet-Nam have negotiated in exchange
for cessation of bombing. Stopping of bombings would not involve recognition or confirmation by
North Viet-Nam that its armed forces are or were infiltrating into South Viet-Nam.
Comment: At this point Lewandowski cited Phase A and Phase B of our last conversation in which I
quoted para 3D of your 83786./2/ End comment.
/2/Document 305.
"9. I have informed the proper governmental sources that at the same time, the United States, while not
excluding the unification of Viet-Nam, would not agree to unification under military pressure.
"10. While the United States are seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, it would be unrealistic to
expect that the United States will declare now or in the future its acceptance of North Viet-Nam's four or
five points." End of statement.
E. He then stopped and said, "I ask you whether this is a correct statement of the United States point of
view."
F. I said that obviously on a matter of such importance, I would have to refer to my government for a
definitive reply, but I could say off hand that much of what he cited was in keeping with the spirit of our
policy.
G. Personally, I would like to have a closer definition of the language in his paragraph 2 stating that the
"present status quo in Viet-Nam must be changed in order to take into account the interested parties
opposing the policy of the United States in South Viet-Nam." He said that he would be glad to change
the word from "must" to "would." I said that this was obviously something which could be discussed.
H. Another point which I felt might need some clarification would be the first sentence in paragraph 8
which stated: "The United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam if
this will facilitate a peaceful solution."

I. In general, it was correct to say that we were interested in a peaceful solution, we wished to humiliate
nobody, we did not wish anyone to lose pride or prestige, and that our offer at Manila was made in good
faith.
J. Lewandowski then said that what he had just read was "very firmly based on conversations with the
most respectable government sources in Hanoi" and that it was in addition "vouched for by Mr.
Rapacki." He said that he made that statement so as to "avoid any belief on your part that this was not a
serious proposition."
K. He added: "I am authorized to say that if the United States are really of the views which I have
presented, it would be advisable to confirm them directly by conversation with the North Vietnamese
Ambassador in Warsaw."
L. He then repeated once again that "in case of any leak, a denial would be issued." He repeated that
"secrecy is of fundamental importance in this case. In fact, it is an essential element of the whole
proposition."
M. He then said: "The United States should stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam apart from all other
things."
N. He stated: "I was also informed by Hanoi and Warsaw that I should be ready to place myself at your
disposal for any comment that you might wish to make."
O. I said that I would be interested in knowing who was the "responsible government source in Hanoi"
with whom he spoke. After some hesitation, he said that it was Pham Van Dong, who spoke after
"collective debate among all the proper authorities." In other words, this had "the Presidium behind it."
He then said:
P. "If you agree that my presentation is in accord with yours and are ready to confirm it with the North
Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow, I would ask for another meeting to clear up things of a practical
character." I asked what these were, and he said "the identity of the U.S. representative." He added that
both Rapacki and Gomulka attached great importance to his talks with me. "They specifically want to
convince you of the importance which should be attached by the United States," he added.
Q. I assured him that we did attach great importance to this. He added that Moscow had been informed.
R. He then said that he hoped we would get at this as "fast as possible." The more delay, the greater the
danger. The dangers were two-fold--1) the danger of a leak, and 2) that there would be someone
"working against a solution." He felt that we should "keep the present channel" and that we should "not
try other channels." To do so would not only create the danger of a leak but also the danger of
misinterpretation./3/
/3/In telegram 94660 to Saigon, December 1, the Department of State told Lodge that telegram 12247
was "receiving urgent consideration with virtually no distribution" and then asked for clarification of
several points, which Lodge provided in telegram 12323, December 1. (Department of State, Central
Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
Lodge
323. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Roche) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 2, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, John Roche. Secret.
In going over my memos to you on Vietnam, I realize that they have a somewhat disjointed, ad hoc
character. Each was addressed to some specific issue, and nowhere have I pulled together the main
aspects of the problem as I see them.
Let me try to put the pieces together in coherent fashion. I trust you realize my bluntness implies no
disrespect for you or for those involved, I am desperately concerned with the institutional dimension and
to the extent that individuals are criticized, it arises from their failure--in my view--to fulfill their
institutional obligations.
The heart of my critique involves the character of the American Mission. The Mission is a shambles.
The Ambassador does not provide forceful leadership himself but at the same time makes it impossible
for his subordinates to act forcefully.
--item: Deputy Ambassador Porter did not want Zorthian as Mission Coordinator for National
Reconciliation. Porter is theoretically in charge of operations, but Zorthian was imposed upon him by
the Ambassador. This is a bad beginning, particularly since the first man assigned as Coordinator
(Double-Deputy Ambassador Koren) was hastily dumped shortly after he held his first briefing.
The Mission is thus stalled at dead-center and policy slippage is appalling:
--item: The National Reconciliation program, scheduled for announcement on November 1st, is not yet
off the ground and the Vietnamese seem to be pushing it off still further: "General Tri said . . . he had
found a good deal of sentiment for initiating reconciliation campaign at time of promulgation of
constitution sometime in March."--Saigon 11814./2/
/2/Document 316.
--item: local elections are being pushed off: "we doubt that GVN has any firm idea of election date . . .
so date may come anywhere from March to June 1967."--Saigon 11763./3/
/3/Dated November 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18-1 VIET S)
--In short, the GVN is welshing on the firm commitments they made to you at Manila. And while the
State Department finds this "disturbing" (State 93272),/4/ nothing can really be done by cable.
/4/Dated November 29. (Ibid.)
Indeed, the Mission seems to think that we are lucky to be as well off as we are. When Tri said, in the
best French tradition, that he, of course, supports the launching of the National Reconciliation before
Tet, but cannot vouch for Ky and Thieu, the Mission noted soberly:
"We encouraged Tri to maintain this stand, but we should also be aware that any proclamation prior to
January 1st would be difficult to obtain in view of these pressures for further postponement." (Saigon
11814)
--This is the oldest form of political blackmail in the world: "I am on your side, but look at the pressure I

am getting from the others." I have no objection to the Vietnamese trying it out (I have used it myself on
occasion), but I do get furious when they consistently get away with it.
Furthermore, the Mission loves to project itself as a few wise men beleaguered by mad utopians in
Washington. The Evans columns reflect completely the localism that pervades the top echelons. If they
could just be left alone (without constituent assemblies, elections, reconciliation programs, etc.) with
their man Ky and a military blank check, everything would be fine.
At the same time, presumably to make the utopians happy, the Ambassador can cable the following
sentiments (Saigon 12113)/5/-- to which I have added a running commentary.
/5/Not found.
1. "Progress towards a constitutional democracy also makes for stability."
Comment: This is simply untrue. The introduction of representative institutions into a military
government is obviously destabilizing in short run terms.
2. "Anyone tempted to make a coup must now consider the reaction both here and abroad toward
interference with the democratization process. The chances of a coup may be really lessened by the
awareness that any frustration of the movement toward constitutional government would be extremely
unpopular."
Comment: The kind of men who make coups are seldom deterred by the knowledge that they will be
chastised in the editorial pages of the New York Times, they are not competing in a popularity contest.
The one sure deterrent is the knowledge that MACV will not permit a coup.
3. "Even if there were a coup, it seems actually likely that the coup makers would feel compelled to
endorse the assembly and allow it to continue working on the constitution."
Comment: "Even if there were a coup. . . " What comment could be adequate?
Conclusions:
1. At the moment we have a Mission in Saigon which is far closer in viewpoint to Ky than to
Washington.
2. The Mission thus unconsciously (I am not for a second suggesting duplicity) sympathizes with the Ky
government and uses Vietnamese "sovereignty" as an excuse for permitting sabotage of United States
foreign policy, e.g., the silent death of Ky's Manila commitments.
3. The Mission is beyond control by cable. Implementation of presidential policy, in my judgment, thus
requires a new chief of mission who appreciates the fact that the war in Vietnam is not being fought to
make the countryside safe for Ky, but rather as part of a diplomatic, political and military confrontation
with Communist power, a confrontation with worldwide implications and consequences.
4. Moreover, in immediate terms, there will be a dangerous gap even in what authority we do exercise
over the GVN when Ambassador Lodge leaves for a month about December 12th. No one else in the
Mission has been permitted to deal with the top levels of the GVN.

--A number of things will be coming to a head in the next few months. In particular, the GVN has so far
refused to compromise with the Constituent Assembly (Saigon 11876)/6/ and does not seem interested
in working out a viable reconciliation. In my opinion, the Assembly has proposed a very reasonable
bargain; the Directorate (and the Mission) have simply not responded.
/6/Dated November 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 VIET S)
The Directorate could, for example, make the Constituent Assembly very happy by providing that
between the time it finishes the Constitution and the establishment of the new constitutional
government, the Assembly shall remain in session for "consultative" purposes. This ducks all the
juridical issues, gets both sides off the hook, and increases civilian prestige without undermining the
status of the Directorate.
5. At the risk of sounding slightly paranoic, I would even go so far as to suggest that Bill Bundy be left
off by Secretary Rusk in Saigon for a month. We are playing for huge stakes in Vietnam and we need a
wholesale reform of our civilian team.
Aside from myself, nobody in policy circles in Washington has recently spent any sustained period of
time in Saigon. The experts at State suspect me of hysteria, but my guess is that if Bundy spent a month
there he would make me sound calm and moderate./7/
/7/Roche's memorandum is attached to a note that indicates that, upon reading the memorandum on
December 4, the President instructed his secretary to have the following message passed to Bill Moyers:
"I like this last paragraph, and I don't think we can get in a problem with Lodge, and I don't want to get
in a fight with him right now, but I sure do think it would be good if we could keep Bill Bundy there for
a while." The message was relayed to Moyers by telephone on December 5.
John P. Roche
324. Editorial Note
On December 2, 4, 13, and 14, 1966, U.S. aircraft carried out strikes on two targets in the Hanoi area
that had been authorized on November 10 as part of Rolling Thunder 52 (see footnote 4, Document 299)
but had not been previously struck. The Van Dien vehicle depot, located 5 nautical miles south of the
center of Hanoi, was a military transportation center for trucks and other vehicles moving men and
materiel to the war in South Vietnam. The Yen Vien railroad yards, located 5 nautical miles northeast of
the center of Hanoi, controlled North Vietnam's railroad traffic north of Hanoi. Both targets were outside
Hanoi's city limits. (Telegram 103849, December 16; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET
S) The Van Dien vehicle depot was struck on December 2, 13, and 14 by a total of 66 strike aircraft. The
Yen Vien railroad yards were struck on December 4, 13, and 14 by a total of 58 strike aircraft.
(Memorandum from Major General John McPherson to Admiral David McDonald, December 15;
Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rolling Thunder 52, 9155 (18 Feb. 65)
Section 13)
On December 3, following the December 2 strike, the North Vietnamese Government filed a protest
with the International Control Commission, stating that U.S. aircraft had "bombed and strafed a
populated area in the southern suburb of Hanoi and attacked two residential quarters inside the city." On
December 14, following the December 13 and 14 attacks, the North Vietnamese Government issued a
statement claiming that U.S. aircraft had attacked "a number of places in Hanoi, including the foreign
embassy quarter and the suburbs of the town, killing or wounding over 100 people." (American Foreign

Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pages 883, 885-886)

U.S. officials responded in public statements that the attacks were against the same kinds of military
targets that had been under air attack for more than a year and did not represent an intensification of the
bombing. A spokesman for the Department of State did indicate at a December 22 news conference,
however, that the possibility of an accident could not be ruled out completely. (Ibid., pages 884, 886,
890-891) The Department of State provided information explaining and defending the air strikes to all
diplomatic posts on December 16 and to British Foreign Secretary George Brown on December 30.
(Telegram 103849; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; and Material to be passed to
Mr. George Brown; ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) Much the same information was
used by Ambassador Gronouski in his meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki on December 19
(see Document 345).
325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/
Washington, December 2, 1966, 6:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Thompson and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Saigon.
95711. Lewandowski has told Lodge that he has presented to Hanoi a ten point statement of our position
on a possible Viet-Nam settlement. He has suggested that we confirm his statement of our position
directly to the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw.
If talks should take place in Warsaw we would wish you to guide them. It is of the highest importance
however that there be no leak and we are most anxious to avoid arousing any suspicion that we are in
direct contact with North Vietnamese. We therefore believe that it would be too conspicuous for you
personally to contact North Vietnamese if in fact they agree to talk in Warsaw. We would like your
judgment as to whether Jenkins would be suitable to carry on these important discussions after
appropriate briefing here or whether we should arrange to send someone with requisite background from
Washington.
In any event Jenkins or any officer you select should endeavor to see North Vietnamese Ambassador on
December 6 or as soon thereafter as possible. If received by him he should state that he has been
instructed to inform North Vietnamese that Polish Representative in Saigon Lewandowski has informed
our Ambassador that he had informed North Viet-Nam Government of our position on Vietnamese
problem in a ten point statement based on his knowledge of our views. He should say that while
Lewandowski's report of what he says he told the North Viet-Nam Government is basically correct,
certain of the points as phrased by him are subject to important differences of interpretation.
He should say that if North Viet-Nam is prepared to discuss the matter we would be glad to arrange to
do so anywhere that is suitable to them. If they prefer Warsaw we would arrange for suitable officer to
be briefed authoritatively to carry on discussions and inform them directly of our position./2/
/2/In telegram 1359 from Warsaw, December 3, Gronouski proposed that he, rather than Jenkins, make
the initial contact and carry on subsequent discussions. He also proposed that Rapacki be asked to serve
as an intermediary, given the considerable risk of detection and publicity if a U.S. Embassy officer made
direct contact with the North Vietnamese Ambassador. (Ibid.)
Rusk

326. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, December 3, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 4:55 a.m.
12428. 1. I met D'Orlandi and Lewandowski Saturday afternoon/2/ pursuant to your 95709,/3/ and
stated:
/2/December 3.
/3/Dated December 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
2. "I am instructed to tell you that the United States Government is instructing the American Embassy in
Warsaw to contact the North Vietnamese representative there on December 6. Our Embassy will be able
to confirm that the ten points outlined by you broadly represent our position. We will have to say,
however, that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation."
3. Lewandowski said he assumed from what I had said that some of the ten paragraphs in our opinion
need clarification and that this interpretation will be done in Warsaw, to which I agreed. He asked
whether the U.S. would be ready on December 6, and I said that we would be ready to make contact.
4. He said: "Probably for the first meeting we will extend to you some help in getting in touch with the
North Vietnamese. Someone from the Ministry will be in touch with the Embassy and will effectuate a
contact."
5. He then said that he was under instructions from Rapacki to tell me that on December 2, there was the
most heavy bombardment of Hanoi since last July. Rapacki thinks, said Lewandowski, that when we are
on the brink of such a delicate undertaking, it is wise to avoid anything which would create the
impression that the United States interprets anything in Hanoi as a sign of weakness. To do this would
be a most unhappy interpretation.
6. I said that I was confident that the event of which he spoke was undertaken for military reasons
having nothing to do with the matter on which we had been working, and said that I would transmit
what he said to the U.S. Government.
7. Lewandowski then referred to the paragraph of his statement which dealt with the cessation of
bombing, and asked whether that was right.
8. I said that it was my understanding that broadly speaking, it gave a fair picture of our position, in that
we agreed with them in not linking the cessation of bombing to anything but the broad cause of getting
peace.
9. Lewandowski then said that if we reached no progress this time, it might be a long time indeed before
there is another opportunity. He added, "I am not excluding the possibility that we three will be occupied
with this again. I strongly believe that at the next stage, we may be useful in opening another channel,
Not necessarily through Hanoi but to the representative of the 'Front.'"

10. I said that there is nothing about that in anything that I had said. Lewandowski agreed and said he
mentioned this on his own personal initiative.
11. D'Orlandi then said that it is obvious that this matter would come up, and that it was very
complicated and it would be more easily dealt with by men who were here on the ground and knew all
the ins and outs than by men in a distant place who had no first hand familiarity with Viet-Nam. It might
have been useful for us to have been authorized to proceed one step further. It is difficult for those who
don't know what we know. But then, he said, "We wanted speed and we stressed speed, and we certainly
got it, and our work has really led to a very significant result. We can congratulate ourselves."
12. Lewandowski said that it was not for him to dwell on what he had said about the Front. He was not
raising it under instructions, but he felt that it was a question which would arise.
Lodge
327. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, December 5, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at
10:43 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 275-277.
1363. Department pass at its discretion to Saigon./2/ Ref: State 96235./3/ For the President and
Secretary.
/2/A note on the source text indicates the telegram was not sent to Saigon.
/3/In telegram 96235, December 3, the Department of State discussed procedures for the first contact
with the North Vietnamese in Warsaw. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14
VIET/MARIGOLD)
1. I was called to FornMin 11:30 a.m. Dec. 5 by DirGen Michalowski who, after determing that I knew
what meeting was about, took me in to see FornMin Rapacki.
2. Rapacki remarked that Poles are again trying to play constructive role in ending Viet Nam war and
expressed hope and wish that this attempt will bear fruit.
3. Rapacki then recounted prior events, beginning with two November meetings between Lodge and
Lewandowski in which Lodge expressed USG desire for political settlement and described USG attitude
toward basis of peaceful settlement. Because during second talk Lodge said he was expressing not only
his views but those of "decisive center of authority in Washington," Poles have concluded that Lodge
expressed official USG position.
4. Rapacki continued that on Dec. 1, after return of Lewandowski from Hanoi, Lewandowski had third
meeting with Lodge in which he gave a resume of USG position as he had understood it from the two
previous conversations. After Lodge confirmed Lewandowski's resume, Lewandowski said contact of
USG and North Vietnamese Ambassadors in Warsaw would have support of Poles.
5. Continuing his account of prior events, Rapacki said that on the afternoon of Dec. 3, at a fourth

meeting between Lodge and Lewandowski, Lodge, on the basis of the President's instructions, read a
statement as follows:
A. The President will instruct the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw to contact the North Vietnamese
Ambassador in Warsaw on Dec. 6 or as soon as possible thereafter.
B. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw will be in a position on Dec. 6 to confirm to the North Vietnamese
Ambassador that the Lewandowski Dec. 1 resume of the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations broadly
reflects the position of the USG.
C. "We must add that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation."
6. Rapacki said that Lodge was unable at the Dec. 3 meeting to precisely say which points were subject
to differences of interpretation and what the nature of these differences of interpretation might be.
7. Rapacki then stated that question of interpretation put in doubt whole basis on which contact with
North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw was to have taken place. He expressed grave concern as to
how equivocation will be read by Hanoi. He added that Poles must transmit USG position to NVN
Govt., and that rather than a general reference to differences of interpretation it would be better if
position transmitted contained statement defining differences of interpretation we have in mind. He said
such a statement might have a significant effect on Hanoi's attitude toward both a meeting in Warsaw
and the whole problem.
8. Rapacki then asked what can be the position of Poland in its role as intermediary if after all the
conversations which were held and statements made there still remains this doubt? He asked again how
this reservation will be read by Hanoi, particularly with intensification of bombing near Hanoi
subsequent to the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations? He said these questions had already been raised
by Lewandowski during his Dec. 3 conversation with Lodge.
9. Rapacki said that it would be desirable if last para of Lodge's Dec. 3 statement (on differences in
interpretation) had not been formulated in the first place. He suggested that this para be deleted on the
basis that it was inserted as a result of misunderstandings which have now been clarified.
10. Rapacki said that if Poles were to transmit to Hanoi statement as read by Lodge on Dec. 3, the most
favorable response that could be forseen as reaction by Hanoi is a reexamination of whole matter again
from the beginning. This would mean, he added, that the contact in Warsaw would have to be
postponed.
11. Rapacki said that Lewandowski has been asked to contact Lodge for clarification of Dec. 3 note./4/
He said that the Poles are holding up conveying information to Hanoi in hopes of obtaining improved
version, but observed that they have no right to delay too long conveying information to Hanoi.
/4/Lodge reported on this meeting with Lewandowski in telegram 12601, December 6, indicating that he
responded by paraphrasing telegram 97016, Document 329. (Department of State, Central Files, POL
27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
12. Rapacki asked that I transmit to the President the Poles deep concern caused by modification of
USG position which has been signaled by the Dec. 3 declaration of Mr. Lodge and his hope that para on
differences of interpretation can be deleted on grounds that it was based on misunderstandings which
have since been clarified.

13. I told Rapacki that I would immediately convey his concern and proposal to the President and
Secretary and contact him as soon as I received a reply.
Gronouski
328. Editorial Note
On December 5, 1966, Walt Rostow forwarded to President Johnson a 16-page memorandum on "The
View from Hanoi," which Sherman Kent, Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, had sent to
Director of Central Intelligence Helms on November 30. The memorandum discussed Hanoi's current
evaluation of: a) the course of the war; b) the political situation in South Vietnam; and c) the
international climate, including U.S. domestic opinion. It noted that from a military viewpoint, Hanoi
must have found the previous 12 months "fairly discouraging," while on the political front Hanoi was
confronted with the "surprising durability of the Ky government despite repeated crises."
The memorandum then considered Hanoi's future strategy and concluded with the following paragraph:
"Our best judgment is that faced with the defeat of its present strategy and confronted with unpalatable
options, Hanoi is procrastinating. Next spring, after the dry season, is a more likely time than now for
modifications in strategy. But if Hanoi is now reconsidering its fortunes, then the two live options are a
modification of military tactics toward guerrilla operations or a shift toward the political track, with all
its hazards. Our view is that the military option--i.e., some new combination of guerrilla and large unit
operations--is still likely to be the preferred course; and given time to work out the consequences and
problems, Hanoi may move this way. But this is by no means certain, and for the first time in the last
two years, there is a chance of a serious political move from the Communist side." (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII)
329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/
Washington, December 5, 1966, 8:58 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Katzenbach, cleared by Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to
Saigon for Lodge and to Tokyo for Rusk.
97016. Ref: Your 1363./2/ You should tell Rapacki we believe we have gone quite far in stating our
position without anything directly or indirectly from the other side other than the monotonous repetition
of their four points. Lewandowski's statement to Lodge was an oral one and we presume this was also
true of his contact with Hanoi. The points he described covered matters of great complexity and of the
highest importance. They were, moreover, stated in very general terms and subject to the imprecision of
multiple translation. We might expose ourselves to charges of bad faith in any subsequent negotiations if
we did not make clear that there is a wide latitude for interpretation of the general language used by
Lewandoski.
/2/Document 327.
Lewandowski's formulation broadly reflects the position of the US Government on the issues covered
and we would be prepared to accept it as the basis for direct discussions with the North Vietnamese if
they are in fact interested in pursuing the matter, and if they are informed that latitude for interpretation
of such general language is inevitable.

We greatly appreciate the personal interest and efforts of the Foreign Minister and it is for this reason
that we wish to avoid any possible misunderstandings on matters of highest importance./3/
/3/In telegram 1375 from Warsaw, December 6, Gronouski reported on the discussion that ensued after
he conveyed the contents of telegram 97016 to Rapacki at a meeting on December 6. Rapacki disagreed
with the U.S. position regarding "room for interpretation" but indicated that he would transmit the
information to Hanoi. Rapacki and Gronouski then discussed the substance of the first U.S.-NVN
meeting, should it take place. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD;
printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 275-277)
Katzenbach
330. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/
Washington, December 6, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking.
Attached to the source text is a draft with extensive handwritten corrections. In a memorandum of his
conversation with Dobrynin on December 7, Llewellyn Thompson reported that he handed the letter to
Kosygin, who read it carefully and indicated that he would carry it back to Moscow. (Ibid.)
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Ambassador Kohler has reported to me on his recent conversation with you in Moscow./2/ I have
studied your remarks carefully and appreciate the frankness of your observations.
/2/Kohler's farewell conversation with Kosygin on November 14 was reported to the President in
telegram 2238 from Moscow, November 14. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
USSR, vol. XIII)
[Here follow comments on the non-proliferation treaty.]
I believe that it is important for us to search out every possibility of agreement, whether on large
questions or small questions. We are prepared to consider seriously any thoughts which you might have
about the improvement of bilateral relations.
With respect to Viet-Nam, it is clear that we have important differences in our views of that problem.
You accuse us of flagrant aggression. We consider that we are helping a small nation resist outside
aggression which is contrary to existing international agreements such as the Geneva Accords of 1954
and 1962. When the authorities in Hanoi decided to launch their attack against South Viet-Nam, they
were fully aware of the fact that we had entered into treaty commitments which required us "to meet the
common danger" if a protocol state of the Manila Treaty were attacked and asked for our assistance.
Without polemics, but in order that you can understand what we think, I would draw attention to the fact
that we did not bomb North Viet-Nam until after the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese regular
army moved into South Viet-Nam. American combat forces did not move into South Viet-Nam until
after substantial movements of regular army units from North Viet-Nam were moved into the South.
Long before that time, we had ample evidence that the effort of the so-called Liberation Front in South
Viet-Nam was directed from Hanoi. Moreover, the transit of the territory of Laos by military infiltrators

proceeded steadily after the Geneva Accords of 1962 came into effect in violation of that agreement. I
would note the special obligation assumed by the Soviet Union, as a Co-Chairman under Article 8 of the
Protocol to that agreement . . . an obligation elaborated upon by the Soviet Representative, the late Mr.
Pushkin, to the American Representative, Mr. Harriman.
These are our views and the basis of our policy. Our sole objective is to permit the South Vietnamese to
decide their own future for themselves within the framework of the Accords of 1954 and 1962. We
cannot have that future imposed upon them by force from the North.
From your remarks to Ambassador Kohler, it is clear that we both agree on the most important
objective--that the fighting should be brought to an end as quickly as possible. I quite agree with your
remarks about the dangers in the present situation. I know that you will not misinterpret the earnestness
with which we seek peace to mean that we are prepared to abandon our commitment to the people of
South Viet-Nam. On the contrary we shall do all that is necessary to meet that commitment.
Nevertheless, I have tried by every means I know of to seek a peaceful solution of this problem.
As we see it, there are two major possibilities for achieving peace. One path would be that of
negotiation, and we are prepared to take this course either by direct contact, through an intermediary, or
by means of a formal conference, or any combination of these. Our aim would be to permit selfdetermination for South Viet-Nam. This would enable us to withdraw our combat forces entirely from
South Viet-Nam. Do not be misled by the enormous investment we have made in bases in South VietNam. I can assure you that we are prepared to give them up and to withdraw our troops. At the Manila
conference, I tried to respond to Mr. Gromyko's suggestion that we should be more precise about our
willingness to withdraw. I stated that we were prepared to carry out such withdrawal within six months-the minimum time required physically to carry out such an operation.
I can understand that it may be difficult for North Viet-Nam to agree to formal negotiations, particularly
in view of the pressure which they are evidently under from Peking. It was for this reason that I
endeavored to see if they would agree to secret exploratory talks either directly or through an
intermediary.
We have also made far-reaching suggestions on the substance of the issues involved. For example, we
have stated that the kind of government which could exist in Saigon and what the result might be on the
question of reunification are matters to be decided by the South Vietnamese people themselves. We have
supported Prince Sihanouk's request for stronger assurances of his own neutrality. We support action by
the ICC to demilitarize in fact the zone along the 17th Parallel. We accept the 1954 and 1962
Agreements as the basis for peace in Southeast Asia.
Another possible path to peace might be a simple tapering off of military action on both sides, including
the campaign of terror against the Government of South Viet-Nam. To this end, we have unsuccessfully
tried to enlist the interest of the other side in such a mutual de-escalation of the violence.
Neither of these paths to peace involves any injury to North Viet-Nam; we do not ask them to surrender
an acre of ground or a single man; we only want them to stop shooting at somebody else.
I draw your attention to the many efforts toward peace which have come from our side. In the advance
of negotiations or any quid pro quo from Hanoi, I have made the public commitment to withdraw our
troops and give up our bases. I have publicly stated that arrangements could be made for the NLF to
express its point of view. I have twice suspended our bombing of North Viet-Nam. I have refrained from
using much of the power available to the United States in order to minimize the risk of widening the

conflict. All we have heard from the other side is a reiteration of a position which they know amounts to
the surrender of South Viet-Nam.
You remarked to Ambassador Kohler that you could develop your thought further but preferred for us to
think about your observations since the problem was most complex. I should be most grateful for any
further observations you may have and any efforts you may be able to make to bring to an end this
conflict which appears to us to be without justification and which carries the risks which you have
pointed out.
Objectively considered, Mr. Chairman, there need be no basic conflict of interest between the Soviet
Union and the United States on this matter. We fully recognize and respect the interest of the Soviet
Union in the security of North Viet-Nam. We know you understand our interest in and our treaty
commitments to the security of South Viet-Nam. Surely it is to the best interests of both of us as well as
both South and North Viet-Nam to find a way to stop the fighting and let any outstanding questions be
settled by peaceful means.
Since writing the foregoing, our Ambassador in Saigon has forwarded an important message from the
Polish representative, Mr. Lew-andowski, about which I am told you have been informed./3/ We shall
be giving this urgent consideration.
/3/Presumably a reference to Document 322.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
331. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/
Washington, December 7, 1966, 12:03 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority;
Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Read, cleared by Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to
Saigon. Also printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 283-286.
97930. Ref: Warsaw's 1375./2/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 329.
1. Your reference telegram will receive urgent consideration here tomorrow and you will receive further
guidance from us then./3/
/3/Document 333.
2. In the meantime, you should take no further initiative with GOP.
3. In the unlikely event that, before receiving further instructions, you should receive notice that NVN
representative is ready and available for talks with us, we submit the following for your interim
guidance.
4. If such a meeting with NVN representative should occur, you should follow prior instructions. If
desirable, you are then authorized to read to him Lewandowski's 10-point presentation of USG position

as set forth at end of this cable, stressing that it is Lewandowski's formulation.

5. You should then inquire whether points as presented by you are the same in all particulars as those
passed on to Hanoi by Lewandowski.
6. For your information only, one of our principal concerns about the ten points is set forth in the next
following paragraph, but even if pressed you should avoid discussing the substantive problems relating
to these points with the NVN representative at this stage and stress that such discussions should be the
subject of actual negotiations. We would assume that NVN representative would have no authority on
this first contact to do more than report your presentation to Hanoi so we would not anticipate such
probing at this time. Further cable tomorrow will spell out our thinking in greater detail and may suggest
initiative to be taken if you have heard nothing, after additional lapse of time.
7. Lewandowski's point two relating to change of present status quo in SVN is obviously most
troublesome. This point could be interpreted variously to mean (a) NLF must be put into government of
South Vietnam forthwith or (b) simple endorsement of election process under constitution now being
drafted. If it is necessary to point out ambiguities in Lewandowski's statement, however, you should not
refer to this point but allude to less contentious ambiguities elsewhere in statement.
8. Lewandowski's 10-point statement follows:
"1. I have insisted that the United States is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations.
"2. Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the United
States in Viet-Nam. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the
problems, having in mind that the present status quo in South Viet-Nam would be changed in order to
take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the United States in South
Viet-Nam, and that such a solution may be reached in an honorable and dignified way not detrimental to
national pride and prestige. (FYI: Lewandow-ski's original presentation states status quo "must" be
changed but when Lodge questioned this point Lewandowski said he would be glad to change word
from "must" to "would". End FYI.)
"3. That the United States are not interested from a point of view of its national interests in having a
permanent or long term military presence in South Viet-Nam once a peaceful solution to the conflict has
been reached. That is why the offer made in Manila regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the
liquidation of American bases should be considered in all seriousness.
"4. The United States would be ready, should other parties show a constructive interest in a negotiated
settlement, to work out and to discuss with them proposals of such a settlement covering all important
problems involved from a cease-fire to a final solution and withdrawal of U.S. troops.
"5. That the United States, within a general solution, would not oppose the formation of a South
Vietnamese Government based on the true will of the Vietnamese people with participation of all
through free democratic elections, and that the United States would be prepared to accept the necessary
control machinery to secure the democratic and free character of such elections and to respect the results
of such elections.
"6. The United States held the view that unification of Viet-Nam must be decided by the Vietnamese
themselves for which the restoration of peace and the formation of proper representative organs of the
people in South Viet-Nam is a necessary condition.

"7. The United States are ready to accept and respect a true and complete neutrality of South Viet-Nam.
"8. The United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam if this will
facilitate such a peaceful solution. In doing so, the United States are ready to avoid any appearance that
North Viet-Nam is forced to negotiate by bombings or that North Viet-Nam have negotiated in exchange
for cessation of bombing. Stopping of bombings would not involve recognition or confirmation by
North Viet-Nam that its armed forces are or were infiltrating into South Viet-Nam."
At this point you should interrupt recitation of Lewandowski's points and state as follows: "Mr.
Lewandowski clearly implied to Ambassador Lodge that in Hanoi he had given his presentation in
connection with the point on the bombing of North Viet-Nam in accordance with Ambassador Lodge's
earlier formulation, which was as follows: A package could be worked out which in its totality
represented what both the United States and North Viet-Nam would agree to as a reasonable measure of
de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing
suspension, while Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of
all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. North Viet-Nam's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be
in response to United States actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension." You should then
resume the recitation of the ten points.
"9. I have informed the proper governmental sources that at the same time, the United States, while not
excluding the unification of Viet-Nam, would not agree to unification under military pressure.
"10. While the United States are seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, it would be unrealistic to
expect that the United States will declare now or in the future its acceptance of North Viet-Nam's four or
five points." (End of Lewandowski's statement)
9. If NVN representative probes further on cessation of bombing, you should merely state that as you
have already indicated Mr. Lewandowski has suggested a possible procedure for agreeing on phasing
and timing which could be the subject of later discussions.
Katzenbach
332. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, December 7, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 4:31 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 281-282.
1394. Reference: Warsaw 1376./2/
/2/In telegram 1376 from Warsaw, December 7, Gronouski reported on a discussion the previous
evening with Michalowski, during which Michalowski indicated that Rapacki had conveyed the U.S.
position to Hanoi earlier that day. Michalowski also stated that the Poles had been "in frequent contact
with Hanoi," and that the "NVN Govt. and even some in Polish Govt. are suspicious that recently
stepped up bombing outside Hanoi is the work of some elements in the USG who are trying to undercut
President's peace move." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in
part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 280-281)

1. FonMin Rapacki called me to his office at 1800 hours Dec. 7. As in previous two meetings with
Rapacki, DirGen FonMin Michalowski took notes and chief North American Sec FonMin Janczewski
acted as interpretor.
2. Rapacki opened oral presentation by saying that misgivings, warnings of which he had informed us,
are materializing. He stated that the "interpretation clause" conveyed by Lodge coincided with
intensified bombing of NVN, in particular in the vicinity of Hanoi, and have been understood
accordingly. He said this has led to impression that this new stage of bombing is either the work of those
who are trying to complicate and undermine the peace effort or constitutes an effort to bring pressure on
North Vietnam. He added that "in these circumstances I wouldn't see a possibility of fulfilling by Poland
of its role in a fruitful way."/3/
/3/In telegram 12953 from Saigon, December 9, Lodge and Rusk reported that D'Orlandi had just
informed them of a conversation on December 8 with Lewandowski during which Lewandowski
expressed "grave concern" over the bombing. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14
VIET/MARIGOLD)
3. Rapacki then said that Poland could not continue in its role unless it is convinced that we have or will
put an end to this intensified bombing. He added that if Poland has been satisfied on this score, and if it
so happens that contact in Warsaw between the USG and NVN Govt. will occur, then "I avail myself of
this opportunity to state" that it is necessary for the USG to recapitulate to the NVN representative its
whole position as described by Lodge with a degree of clarity so that the other side could no longer fear
that the USG position as formulated might subsequently be changed through recourse to Lodge's
"important differences of interpretation" clause. Rapacki concluded by saying that "it is necessary to
gain clarity on these two points fairly early."
4. I asked Rapacki if it had occurred to him that there might be a third reason for what appeared to him
to be an intensification of bombing. I said that if I recall correctly, there was a lull in bombing flights in
late October and early November simply because of bad weather conditions, and what appears to him to
be an intensification of bombing may simply be a resumption of bombing to its normal level.
5. Rapacki responded that "policy is more important than weather." He added that what Poles are trying
to do is create the proper conditions for peace negotiations, and if we don't want NVN to think we are
attempting to exert pressure "one avoids everything which creates that impression" even if the other side
is not entirely justified in harboring that impression. (He quickly added that in this case there is
justification.)
6. Rapacki went on to say that at the very time when Lewandowski stated to Lodge that it was advisable
for USG to restate its position to NVN in Warsaw, bombing against the whole of NVN was intensified
and also was more directed to Hanoi. This, he added, clearly appears to be provoking.
7. I asked Rapacki if he were expressing to me the reaction of the NVN Govt. He replied, emphatically,
that he was expressing the Polish position, and only that of the Poles. He added that nothing he said
came from or was inspired by the NVN Govt. or anyone else. (Comment: Despite this statement to the
contrary, Rapacki's calling me in at an unusually late hour today to express a much tougher position than
he did yesterday could very well reflect Hanoi's response to the message transmitted by Rapacki to
Hanoi yesterday afternoon.)
Gronouski

333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/

Washington, December 7, 1966, 10:33 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority;
Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Rostow, Thompson, and McNamara; and approved by
Katzenbach. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp 286-288.
98754. Ref: State 97930./2/
/2/Document 331.
1. If a meeting with North Vietnamese is arranged, you should proceed in accordance with instructions
contained in State 96235/3/ and State 95711/4/ except as modified below. As regards the presentation to
the North Vietnamese representative of our position, you should follow closely the following
formulation:
/3/Telegram 96235 to Warsaw, December 3, stated that Gronouski could make initial contact with the
North Vietnamese if security permitted. However, the Department of State indicated continuing concern
over someone at Gronouski's level carrying on extended discussions without discovery. (Department of
State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
/4/Document 325.
"a. Lewandowski has informed us of his discussions with your government in Hanoi and of the position
he communicated to them as that of the US, based on Lewandowski's prior oral discussions with
Ambassador Lodge in Saigon. We assume that his discussions in Hanoi were conducted entirely orally
as they were with Lodge in Saigon and that no pieces of paper have been exchanged which purport to
state government positions. We are prepared to enter into direct discussions with your government on
the basis of the position which Lewandowski has informed us he presented to your government in
Hanoi.
b. The position was stated to us by Lewandowski as follows: (Here you should read the ten points as
contained in State 97930, para 8 with the additional point about bombing covered under Point 8).
c. We wish to emphasize that this language is that of Lewandowski and not that of the United States.
Nevertheless it presents a general statement of the US position on the basis of which we would be
prepared to enter into direct discussions."
2. FYI. The North Vietnamese and perhaps the Poles as well appear to be seeking a reformulation of our
position in order to compare it with what Lewandowski has said. While we are entirely prepared to have
Lewandowski's formulation stand as "presenting a general statement of the US position", we are anxious
to avoid a restatement of our position in our own words because (a) this would oblige us to take some
harder positions than those put forward by Lewandowski which apparently have gone far enough to
make the North Vietnamese ready to consider talking with us and (b) any formulation which can be
attributed directly to us could be used to embarrass the GVN or to embarrass us in our relating with
them. In other words, if we stand on Lewandowski's formulation through the first step in discussions
with the North Vietnamese, we can always say with regard to any specific point that we don't accept just
those words used by Lewandowski and thus maintain some room for maneuver at least until we know
the discussions are really under way. End FYI.

3. After reading the ten points you should point out to the North Vietnamese that some matters, because
of their complexity and the danger of varying interpretation, would be the subject of further elaboration
by us as soon as discussions were to get under way. One of these has to do with the package agreement
containing the so-called phases A and B with respect to bombing and a program of de-escalation. The
second relates to certain points which directly involve matters of basic concern to the people of South
Viet-Nam (as for example points 2 and 5). Whatever detailed arrangements are made on those matters
would have to be acceptable to the South Vietnamese people, however this could be ascertained through
consultations and negotiations there.
4. If the North Vietnamese refer to the earlier point made by us that several specific points are subject to
important differences of interpretation, you should explain that this is not intended to suggest that the
statement as it stands is any less a general statement of the US position but rather that it is inevitable
with matters as complex and controversial as those covered in the ten points that they would be subject
to interpretation and that their clarification would be the normal function of the discussions which we
hope we will be embarking on. If the North Vietnamese press for an illustration you might refer to the
phrase "long-term " in Point 3, noting that it was specifically to clarify this point that the Manila
Communique specified a six-month period.
5. Otherwise you should be guided in your discussion with the North Vietnamese by the limitations set
forth in para 6 of State 97930, stressing that further discussion of substantive questions should be the
subject of the actual direct negotiations which we hope can be got under way promptly.
6. In conclusion you should say that your government is prepared to enter into secret discussions with
the North Vietnamese Government at any time and we regard this as a mater of the highest importance
and urgency.
7. We understand from your latest reports that the next step, if all goes well, will be the opening of the
direct discussions with the North Vietnamese and if this in fact materializes you should avoid any
further substantive discussions with the Poles. We, of course, are anxious for direct and private
discussions with the North Vietnamese and hope that the Poles have no idea of participating therein.
8. Have just received your 1394/5/ and will reply soonest. Meanwhile, if the Poles reopen the question
of our position, before an answer is received from Hanoi you may tell them that you have now consulted
with Washington and are prepared to confirm to the North Vietnamese Government the position of the
US with respect to negotiations in terms which will be consistent with the discussions which
Lewandowski has had with them and with us. You may add that we are looking forward to an early
opening of talks with the North Vietnamese in order to reduce the possibilities of leaks and resulting
publicity which none of us desires.
/5/Document 332.
Katzenbach
334. Editorial Note
From 4:35 to 5:02 p.m. on December 9, 1966, President Johnson met in the Cabinet Room with
Secretary of Defense McNamara, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Vance, Vice President Humphrey, General Earle Wheeler, and Special Assistants Walt Rostow and
Robert Kintner. (Johnson Liabrary, President's Daily Diary) According to a note prepared for his Daily
Diary, the President "considered the problem of next steps in hitting targets in North Vietnam." "Broadly

speaking, the decision was made to carry forward with what was necessary but at this particular moment
not to expand our targeting." (Ibid., Meeting Notes File)
On December 10, General Wheeler reported in JCS telegram 7591-66 to General Westmoreland that he
had met the previous day with President Johnson "to discuss Rolling Thunder withheld targets" (presumably the four targets authorized but deferred on November 10 and 11; see footnote 4, Document
299). Wheeler's message continued: the President "declined to make an affirmative decision at that time
because of certain political problems; however, he stated that he wished to renew the discussion in about
a week." (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)
Also on December 10, the Department of State notified Ambassador Gronouski in telegram 100627 to
Warsaw that "for the immediate future the bombing pattern will remain unchanged from what it has
been over the past several weeks. This may well involve some targets which Rapacki will insist
represent further escalation, just as in the past he took to be escalation certain variations in our bombing
pattern which in fact represented no real new departures in the pattern as a whole." (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
335. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, December 9, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 8:57 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 293-295.
1421. Reference: State 98924./2/
/2/Dated December 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in
part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 288-289)
1. Met Rapacki at my request at 1600 Dec. 9. Michalowski and Janczewski present.
2. My opening remarks, based on reftel, were as follows:
A. "I have requested today's meeting as a result of consultations I have had with Washington since our
meeting Wednesday afternoon./3/
/3/December 7; see Document 332.
B. I can now assure you that at the time of the first Warsaw meeting with representatives of the North
Vietnamese Government, I will be prepared to confirm to the NVN Govt the position of the USG with
respect to negotiations. I can also assure you that this confirmation will be consistent with the
discussions Mr. Lewandowski had with them and with us.
C. With respect to the question you raised Wednesday on bombing, I can state flatly that the pattern of
our bombing in NVN has nothing to do with the current effort of the Polish and USGs to get underway
the projected US-NVN talks. The pattern of bombing is dictated solely by military considerations and is,
of course, always subject to operational considerations such as vagaries of the weather. The record will
confirm that there have been numerous variations in the bombing pattern over time. There is no basis
whatsoever for attributing any changes which you believe you have detected in the recent period to an

effort on our part to bring pressure on NVN with respect to these talks.
D. You will recall that the subject of bombing NVN was one of the matters discussed in Hanoi by Mr.
Lewandowski. After his return from Hanoi Mr. Lewandowski clearly implied to Amb Lodge that he had
discussed this matter in Hanoi in accordance with Amb Lodge's earlier formulation. Amb Lodge had
suggested that a package could be worked out which in its totality represented what both the US and
NVN would agree to as reasonable measure of de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases
in its execution. The first phase, Phase A, would be a bombing suspension. Phase B, which would
follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalation actions.
NVN's actions taken in Phase B thus would appear to be in response to US actions in Phase B rather
than to the bombing suspension. Inherent in this formulation is the package approach to de-escalation
which I assume you had in mind when you referred to 'a new package deal' during our conversation last
Tuesday./4/
/4/See footnote 3, Document 329.
E. I would like to conclude by saying that we are looking forward to an early opening of talks with the
North Vietnamese in order to reduce the possibilities of leaks and resulting publicity which none of us
desires. We again express our appreciation to the Polish Govt for the constructive role it has played, and
hope it will make every effort to move forward what appears to us to be a promising possibility for
peace."
3. Rapacki responded by saying that the contents of my remarks do not advance us and if first
impressions are correct could mean a step backward. He added that there appears to be no advance on
the two points which were subject of our last talk (Warsaw 1394)./5/
/5/Document 332.
4. However, with respect to my first point (presentation of USG negotiating position to NVN) he said if
this is done in a way which will dispel doubt on invoking interpretation clause, then one of the
difficulties has been reduced.
5. On bombing question, he said there is nothing new in my argument and he is loathe to transmit to
Hanoi our interpretation that we are carrying on military business as usual and abstracting from any
political considerations. He said Poles had asked avoidance of steps that would have to be considered
provoking to Hanoi. He said he takes note of our intentions but he doesn't know if this will be
convincing. Adding that bombing was clearly intensified at the precise time it would create provocation,
he said what Poles had in mind in their presentations on this subject was, "Do not create new elements
of tensions particularly when critical decisions are at stake." He added that the USG is ignoring this
consideration in making its military decisions.
6. Rapacki read what he said was Nov. 14 statement by Lodge: USG understands that the Liberation
Front and Hanoi have deep-seated distrust of USG; that is why USG is willing to take practical measures
to show good intentions, and would be willing to hear any suggestions. Rapacki said this statement by
Lodge was treated as addressed "only to Polish ears," adding Poles have been proved right in treating it
so because in the case of their bombing suggestion they have not found such readiness to listen to
suggestions as Lodge indicated.
7. Rapacki expressed concern over my use of term "de-escalation," noting that Lodge said Washington
was convinced that not much can be accomplished in getting talks under way with partial de-escalation.

He said Lodge's accent was on the package deal which would cover all problems, including withdrawal
of US troops. If my use of de-escalation represents a short-cut for a package deal including cessation of
hostilities and the resolution of a variety of other outstanding problems, then his concern over my use of
the term is simply a matter of semantics. He asked if my use of the term was consistent with Lodge's
declaration on a package deal.
8. I said I did not clearly understand what he was driving at but referred to my opening text and pointed
out that the degree or manner of de-escalation is not subject to unilateral determination. I said that this
would have to be resolved in negotiating sessions between the USG and NVN. I said I could not tell him
in advance nor could anyone else how de-escalation will be defined in the ultimate package deal. I said
one must assume that both parties entering negotiations will enter them with the objective of ending the
war in Vietnam and that through negotiations directed toward that end the package deal will include
whatever is possible for the two sides to agree upon. I concluded that the package deal idea was
suggested by Lodge in context of our failure to elicit from NVN an answer to our question, "How will
you respond if we quit bombing?" I went on to say that the conception of a package deal involving two
steps was designed to solve the problem of achieving mutual de-escalation without treating NVN deescalation as a direct response to the cessation of bombing. I concluded that only time will tell exactly
what the negotiators will include in the final package; that the definition of de-escalation will be a
product of negotiation.
9. After this long dissertation, I was surprised to hear Rapacki say that inasmuch as the term deescalation is used in Phase B, his concern has been resolved.
10. Rapacki returned to the question of "important differences of interpretation." He said if this merely
meant hammering out greater precision in negotiations then he could perfectly well understand what we
were getting at; but if this is the case why did we mention it at all? But if we have important substantive
reservations, and that would seem to be the most logical reason for inserting the clause, then Poles still
do not know what is meant by "important differences" and are still concerned about the suspicions of
Hanoi that this clause will be invoked during the actual negotiations to reverse USG position as stated
by Lewandowski. He asked for my comment.
12. I said whether the differences that are bound to exist are simply a refinement or would fall into the
category of important differences cannot be determined until the matter is tested in negotiations. What
one side at one point may judge to be a refinement to gain more precision, the other side might regard as
a very important departure from the original intent. I cannot predict the kind of differences that will arise
in negotiations because the resolution of this question will be a product of the negotiations.
13. Recapitulating his position, Rapacki said that we still have not achieved clarity on the manner of
presentation of the USG position in the first Warsaw meeting. He added that Poles are also disappointed
in having to draw the conclusion that in intensifying bombing the U.S. took into consideration only
military factors, rejecting consideration of suspicions that the intensification is designed either to exert
political pressure or to undermine the peace effort.
14. I replied that I have felt during the year I have been here, and have expressed this feeling to my govt,
that Mr. Rapacki was genuinely interested in helping to advance a negotiated solution to the Vietnam
war. I said I felt that at no time since I have been here has the possibility appeared so hopeful to me, and
that it behooves all of us to bend every effort to induce Hanoi to begin the Warsaw talks. I said that no
one knows whether these talks, once begun, will succeed or fail but that this is a risk well worth taking. I
said if they succeeded, nothing that he or I could do in a lifetime would have been quite so important. I
added that it is inevitable when we are attempting to start negotiations between two who have been
military adversaries that there will be doubts on both sides as to the good will of the other. I said I can

understand how the NVN may have doubts about our good intentions as I hoped he could understand
how we could have doubts about their genuine interest in wanting to come to the conference table and
negotiate with good faith toward a peace agreement; these doubts will linger until they are finally
resolved through the HACC process of negotiation. I continued by asking him to view our intentions in
terms of the whole series of discussions in Saigon and here that began almost six months ago. I said I am
convinced that no reasonably objective man could have any serious doubt, if he looked at the overall
picture, including those suggestions advanced by Lodge on Nov 14 and 15, and the comments we have
made recently here in Warsaw, that the President and the whole USG is genuinely interested in moving
forward toward a negotiated settlement. The fact that doubts exist and will persist should not be
permitted to blind anyone to the overwhelming evidence of our deep and genuine interest in finding the
basis for a negotiated settlement.
15. I concluded by saying that it is essential that we take the first step. Nothing will be accomplished
unless we begin the meetings; what will happen once they begin, I cannot predict. All I can tell, I said, is
that the USG will enter the negotiations in good faith and with the intention of coming out of the
negotiations having found a mutually agreeable solution to the problem. I added that the fact that we
cannot predict how the negotiations will go is no justification for not getting them started; it would be
criminal if after having reached this point their efforts and ours to get the two parties together failed. I
hoped and trusted that the Poles would do their best to bring about a commencement of negotiations.
16. Rapacki concluded by saying that you are attaching great importance to this first meeting./6/ It is not
easy, however, and we will have to wait and see what happens. He said he would be in touch with me if
there is anything to report.
/6/In telegram 1422 from Warsaw, Gronouski added a clarification to paragraph 16 at this point, based
on a review of his notes, that included the following: "He continued, it looked as if we could move
forward. You know the reasons for our concern: what basis do I have in our conversations to dispel
suspicions of other side arising out of intensified bombing, bombing of Hanoi, the 'important differences
of interpretation' clause? In such circumstances it is difficult for me to get a reply, to move the matter
forward." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
17. Comment: Rapacki's position was much less intransigent today than during Dec 7 meeting. I thought
it significant that when I stressed importance of initiating talks Michalowski, Rapacki's major adviser on
Vietnam war, nodded his head affirmatively three or four times. Because I found no threat to break off
talks that was implied Dec 7, I did not use para 2 of reftel./7/
/7/Paragraph 2 of telegram 98924 to Warsaw reads "If Rapacki attempts to nail us to anything on
bombing beyond our first contact with the North Vietnamese, or again threatens to break off the
operation, you should inform him in no uncertain terms that if he maintains this position he will have to
accept the full responsibility for the breakdown of what appears to us to be a promising possibility for
peace."
Gronouski

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
336. Draft National Security Action Memorandum/1/
Washington, December 10, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Viet S. Secret. Rostow forwarded the draft to
Katzenbach and McNamara under cover of a December 12 memorandum stating that the President
wanted to issue an NSAM "embracing guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam" and wanted comments on it "if
you believe it constitutes a basis for such a NSAM." This draft was based on a paper by Komer, "A
Strategic Plan for 1967 in Vietnam," November 29. (Johnson Library, Komer Files, McNamara-VanceMcNaugton; see footnote 3, Document 320) In a December 5 memorandum to Katzenbach, Komer
proposed that Katzenbach's "non-group" prepare a strategic plan for the President, working from his
paper. "All it really needs is a preamble, and a bit of cleaning up." (Johnson Library, Komer Files,
Katzenbach) On December 10 Rostow forwarded the draft NSAM to the President, who wrote on
Rostow's covering memorandum: "It's good. Come in with Bob on Monday." (Ibid., Rostow Files,
Vietnam Strategy) The President met with Rostow and Komer on Monday, December 12, from 12:20 to
1:03 p.m., presumably prior to circulating the draft NSAM to McNamara and Katzenbach, but no record
of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
SUBJECT
Strategic Guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam
Now that the extensive deployment and skillful use of U.S. forces has greatly improved our military
position in Vietnam, it is imperative that we mount and effectively orchestrate a concerted military,
civil, and political effort to achieve a satisfactory outcome as soon as possible.
To this end, I approve the following guidelines for such an effort, and for ensuring that it is effectively
carried out.
I. Our Strategic Aims. These must be to:
A. Maximize the prospects for a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam by December 1967 or, if this is not
possible, put us in the best position for the longer pull.
B. Be equally suited to (a) forcing Hanoi to negotiate; (b) weakening the VC/NVA to the point where
Hanoi will opt to fade away; or (c) at the minimum, making it patently clear to all that the war is
demonstrably being won.

C. Complement our anti-main force campaign and bombing offensive by greatly increased efforts to
pacify the countryside and increase the attractive power of the GVN--all these to the end of accelerating
the erosion of southern VC strength and creating a bandwagon psychology among the people of SVN.
This strategy is also well suited to exploiting any possibilities of a Hanoi/NLF split.
II. Action Programs for 1967. To achieve our strategic aims will require a maximum continuing effort in
the following nine program areas:
A. Press a Major Pacification Effort, employing the bulk of the RVNAF.
1. Devise a concrete and detailed US/GVN pacification plan for 1967 which will: (a) set realistic goals
by region and by province, with emphasis on areas or LOCs where early results are possible; (b) provide
for adequate force allocations and time-phasing; (c) properly dovetail the military and civil programs.
2. Retrain, re-motivate and deploy a steadily increasing proportion of ARVN in supporting the RF and
PF in clear-and-hold operations as the key to pacification.
3. Progressively open essential roads, railroad and canals on a planned schedule.
4. Revitalize and accelerate the civil side of pacification.
5. Devise improved techniques for measuring pacification progress and presenting them to the public.
B. Step up the Anti-Main Force Spoiling Offensive, as made feasible by the increase in FW maneuver
battalions.
1. Introduce modest US forces into certain key Delta areas.
2. Stress offensive actions to clear VC base areas and LOCs around Saigon.
3. Lay on a major re-examination of our intelligence on VC/NVA strength.
C. Make More Effective Programs to Limit Infiltration and Impose a Cost on Hanoi for the Aggression.
1. Refine the bombing offensive with respect to both efficiency of route harassment and quality of
targets.
2. Press forward with barrier system.
3. Examine other ways to apply military pressure on the North.
D. Mount a Major, Continuing National Reconciliation Program, designed to maximize the inducements
aimed at eroding VC strength.
1. Expand and revitalize Chieu Hoi Program to handle 45,000 lower level defectors a year.
2. Press a sustained middle and high level defector program under appropriate auspices.
3. Ensure that new Constitution is consistent with reintegration of VC into the national life.

4. Develop a US contingency plan on how to handle VC/NLF in the next local and national elections,
examining options of allowing VC to vote or perhaps even inviting NLF to run as a party in next
national election.
5. Enlarge efforts to establish contacts with the VC/NLF.
E. Press for the Emergence of a Popularly-Based GVN, with adequate checks and balances between the
civilians and the military, and between northerners and southerners.
1. Make clear well in advance to the Directory that the US cannot accept a retrogression to military
government, another coup, or blatant election rigging.
2. Press home to all--civilian and military--the importance of national unity and pulling together, as a
minimum US condition for continued US support of SVN.
3. Use all our influence behind the scenes to bring about a smooth transition to a representative GVN,
but one in which the still indispensable military role is not submerged.
F. Press for Other Key Elements of the Manila Program which will enhance the GVN's attractiveness.
1. Encourage better local government, including elected hamlet, village, and district/province officials.
2. Insist on a workable scheme of land reform, land tenure, and rent moratorium.
3. Vigorously attack corruption and misuse of US aid.
G. Maintain the Civil Economy and Keep a Firm Lid on Inflation.
1. Enforce a vigorous stabilization program.
2. Definitively lick the port bottleneck--both movement into the warehouses and movement out.
3. Maintain an adequate import level.
4. Generate more rice from the countryside.
5. Accelerate the creation of infrastructure for economic development.
6. Mount an imaginative postwar planning exercise.
H. Devise a Pre-Negotiating and Negotiating Strategy Consistent with the Above.
1. Take such initiatives as will credibly enhance our posture that we are always ready to talk and ever
alert for new avenues to negotiation.
2. Vigorously pursue serious negotiating leads.
I. Mount a Major Information Campaign to inform both the US electorate and world opinion of the
realities in Vietnam, finding ways credibly to measure progress./2/

/2/The NSAM was never issued. State Department and Defense Department comments on the draft (and
on a revised draft circulated in January 1967) are discussed and excerpted in Gibbons, The U.S.
Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, pp. 490-494, and The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol.
IV, pp. 392-440. Several internal Defense Department documents commenting on the draft are in the
Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 381 Vietnam, filed
under December 23 and 27. In telegram 14767 from Saigon, January 3, 1967, Porter stated that he did
not understand the need for such a document: "It does not provide guidelines, and it does not include
priorities. Instead, it sets out a series of desirable objectives, all of which are already known and
accepted." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

Bangkok, December 11, 1966, 0701Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Rusk was in Saigon
on December 9-11, following visits to Tokyo (December 5-7) and Taipei (December 7-9). He then
proceeded to Bangkok (December 11-12), New Delhi (December 12), and Tehran (December 12-13),
prior to attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris December 13-16.
7466. Secto 38. Following were highlights of Secretary's discussions with Thieu, Ky, and Do. (Third
country assistance and Cambodia being covered septels.)/2/
/2/Telegram 7467 from Bangkok, December 11. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
1. In all conversations, Secretary stressed great importance of showing real progress in 1967 and
demonstrating clearly that we were on right track. Not only would such progress avoid any political
problems in U.S., but it was particularly vital to try to achieve successful conclusion of conflict while
Communist China continued to be engaged in major power struggle. If Mao and his cohorts emerge on
top in that struggle, dangerously militant policy might result, while victory for more pragmatic group
tending to "peaceful coexistence" might create different dangers even including reconciliation between
Peking and Moscow. These arguments seemed to impress GVN leaders, who concurred in sense of
urgency.
2. ARVN pacification role. Both Thieu and Ky profess themselves completely in accord with devoting
ARVN wholly to pacification. Both had just spoken top military leaders and corps commanders in this
sense, and Thieu particularly stressed to Secretary that ARVN could and should regard clear and hold
missions as real central job to be done in conflict and natural division of labor, with allied forces
concentrated on search and destroy operations, which Thieu described as "really secondary." Both
further agreed with Secretary's observations, based on several reports, that Hanoi believes true test of its
success or failure will be fate of subversive infrastructure in South. Thieu indicated he and other leaders
would personally undertake to "brainwash"officers still influenced by ideas of prestige and glamour
(perhaps implying a considerable indoctrination along these lines was necessary).
3. Leadership changes. Ky referred to recent shakeup (Quang) as helpful, and said three to four corrupt
province chief would be removed in near future, with full agreement of corps commanders. (Another
symptom of the committee at the top.)
4. Future Popular Forces and Combat Youth. Thieu initiated long discussion of problems GVN would

face at end of hostility. He said Popular Forces (which he still calls SDC) could not be maintained
financially at adequate levels and also indicated that they were not too good at dealing with local
population. Moreover, there were not enough PF to protect all the hamlets and recruiting for the PF was
more difficult now. Hence, he thought it useful to develop something larger along the lines of the old
Combat Youth--despite the Nhu label--i.e., giving arms to village inhabitants under 18 and over 45 to
provide security now and to deal with future threats when major hostilities had ended. Ambassador
Lodge commented that combined action teams in I Corps seemed to fit this general concept, and Thieu
agreed. Nonetheless, he was apparently trying out a more far-reaching idea. (While his purpose can only
be surmised, fact that he referred favorably at one other point to the old spirit in 1963 might indicate that
he has a political design in mind as Nhu most certainly did at that period.)
5. Chieu Hoi. In response to Secretary's question whether defections would increase in future, Thieu
responded that if GVN had strong government and army by 1968, and controlled 60-70 percent of
country, lower level VC might become discouraged on large scale. (Secretary noted this made major
progress in 1967 all the more crucial.) As to specifics of Chieu Hoi program, Thieu expressed concern
that 32,000 out of the 40,000 total Hoi Chanh to date had gone back to their villages and were now
totally out of GVN control. He thought progress to date was still not major and would not be so long as
defector motives were primarily hardship and difficulty rather than positive appeal of GVN. For future,
he thought GVN must offer better assurance of appropriate jobs and must likewise find better ways to
control Hoi Chanh and see that they did not revert to VC. Finally, he noted that heavy military pressure
would have major effect in increasing defections.
6. On same topic, Ky made virtually same points. Secretary suggested one control method might be to
have Hoi Chanh report once a month to some designated official to be sure what they were doing.
7. Reconciliation. Secretary stressed great importance of this, along side Chieu Hoi increase, as part of
overall pressure on VC. He also mentioned recent Eastern European inquiries about amnesty program,
suggesting that it took the place in their minds of dangerous coalition ideas. While Ky appeared to agree,
specifics and timing of reconciliation plans were not discussed.
8. Post hostilities prospects. Thieu devoted substantial discussion to this topic. He thought (as did Ky)
that Ho might maintain the hope of victory until 1968. After that, if the U.S. showed itself still
determined, Ho's attitude might change. However, Ho would then act so as not to lose too much, simply
fading away, asserting that infiltration had stopped, perhaps pulling out divisions, and thus trying to get
the U.S. out. If the GVN was not then capable of coping with its affairs, there could be a subdued
conflict for many years, with the DRV possibly sending back more subversives, or aiming at a coalition
or a "pink" National Assembly. Thieu reverted to the need for adequate armed manpower to cope with
this kind of situation, and said that GVN must never repeat 1954 error of immediate sharp reduction in
military forces. At same time, they could not afford to maintain VNAF at full strength. Hence, he had
thought of the idea of converting discharged veterans to civilian employment for the GVN, which would
provide good lives for these men, while at the same time there would have to be enough armed strength
to control the country. Secretary responded that there would almost certainly be a rather long period of
transition after hostilities have ceased. While the U.S. would withdraw its forces if the Manila
conditions were met, U.S. interest would most definitely go on toward effective reconstruction. He
agreed with Thieu that there should be no sharp reduction in GVN forces until we were really convinced
of Hanoi's attitude.
9. Constitutional timetable. Both Thieu and Ky agreed with Secretary's stress on importance of smooth
transition to new constitutional government. Thieu implied that Directorate still holding to Article 20 but
hoped to persuade CA that amendment provisions would not have to be used "too much;" he said CA
making sound progress and that form of government appeared virtually agreed. (Ky made same point,

saying majority now clearly favored President/Prime Minister executive with strong powers along
Korean model.) Thieu said CA and Directorate really had co-responsibility for constitution. He said at
least 50 percent of CA were able men, with only few extremists. Government could work with them and,
he concluded quite frankly, there was no intent to maintain military power. Secretary asked about local
councils, and Thieu responded rather vaguely that Peoples Army Council should act soon on local
elections. Ky said more specifically that constitution should be definitely completed by end of February,
then elections within six months. He agreed fully on vital importance of big participation in elections.
10. In informal closing exchange, Ky remarked that constitution as such did not mean much to common
people of SVN. However, he then agreed fully with Secretary's observation that political process could
play vital role, not only for GVN image in eyes of world but in bringing about cooperation among
divergent SVN groups. In relaxed and frank way, Ky then stressed that most important single aspect
would be selection of a single leader who would unify the nation.
11. Negotiating prospects. To Thieu inquiry whether there was any sign from Hanoi, Secretary
responded that we had had no such indication, and specifically no indication on the point so stressed by
Soviets and Eastern Europeans, of what would happen if we stopped the bombing. Secretary thought
Kosygin declaration in Paris/3/ contained little new, but did note our relations with Soviets not really
stymied by Viet-Nam issue (referring specifically to civil air and space agreements), and that he attached
importance to Soviet reference to Geneva agreements in Bucharest Communique last July. We believed
that Soviets and Eastern Europeans would accept return to Geneva agreements, but were immobilized,
perhaps by concern for Peking, from bringing effective influence to bear on Hanoi.
/3/For text of the Joint Declaration of Kosygin and de Gaulle, issued at Paris on December 8, see
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 422-425.
12. Conversation with Ky touched specifically on the Christmas truce. Secretary noted we must be alert
against betrayal, including possible use of truce period by other side for maneuver. He reiterated firm
U.S. position on bombing cessation. Ky responded that much peace negotiating talk had been futile and
that this was Communist game which could affect GVN morale badly. Hence, he had welcomed standfirm declarations at Honolulu and Manila and appreciated Secretary's attitude toward truce and bombing
cessation.
13. Anti-American feeling. Both Thieu and Ky said they saw no significant signs of this, and
specifically no belief that the U.S. had any selfish designs in SVN. Ky said that the majority of articulate
Vietnamese understood why we were there, and that common people were deriving substantial
economic benefits from U.S. presence. He said that of course there were some critics, but these same
people were the first to protest when the U.S. moved its forces, for example out of the cities. In the
countryside, he said U.S. personnel were well received and liked, and in general there was not the
slightest resemblance between the U.S. position and that of the French.
14. Economic situation. This came up only with Ky. He said port problem should show improvement in
1967 with target of 2,000 tons per day (sic). Black market problem should be less because of recent
strong measures. On piaster spending level, he said GVN would hold to 75 billion level, despite
pressures from Ministries. Tax revenues were not as large as expected but were improving slowly; he
had been startled to find many manufacturing concerns provided no records of their revenues, and he
had introduced a new system to get such figures and to try to tax them at the source. At another point,
Ky made general reference to rice price question, saying that key objective must be to prevent rice going
to VC and Cambodia, and that rise in price, even if it caused loss and expense, would be worth it. (He
did not indicate any specific plan of action on this point.)

Rusk
338. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, December 12, 1966, 0035Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Limdis. Received at 8:56
p.m. on December 11.
13122. 1. Following is current status Mission and GVN efforts on national reconciliation campaign:
2. Preliminary papers have been developed by Chieu Hoi Director Lt. Col. Pham Anh with assistance
and cooperation Mission representatives. These include basic concept paper transmitted to Washington
as Saigon 11958/2/ and suggestions on basic themes for inclusion in national proclamation. We have
also prepared list of necessary administrative actions which we are now reviewing and will present to
Colonel Anh during coming week.
/2/Dated November 29. (Ibid.)
3. General Tri, MinInfo, has been in Taipei for most of this week but is planning review of proposals
over weekend in anticipation presentation entire project to Cabinet on December 15th. Anh's plans will
be presented in form of national reconciliation action plan.
4. December 15th meeting is critical meeting in progress on these proposals. As of now, only top-level
GVN leadership and Col. Anh have done any real thinking about reconciliation effort. Presentation to
Cabinet will represent first exposure of detailed proposals to other ministers. Until Cabinet endorsement
is obtained, national reconciliation remains a concept in minds of Thieu and Ky and Tri rather than a
GVN Government program. We will make every effort, therefore, to obtain strong endorsement these
proposals by Cabinet.
5. SecState discussed subject with both General Thieu and Prime Minister Ky during course of calls
Saturday and found both still committed to idea, although expressing some reservations about problems
raised by such concepts as guarantees for employment at appropriate levels in Vietnamese society and
restoration full political rights. We intend continue to work on these points with Thieu, Ky and Tri in
order to ensure firm presentation to Cabinet next week.
6. On US side, our own preparatory planning continues and various elements of Mission have proceeded
about as far as possible without actual endorsement of plan by GVN. When this endorsement obtained,
we will urge GVN to inform corps and province officials promptly and we in turn will brief our own
field personnel.
7. Col. Anh proposals to Cabinet recommend national proclamation by Chief of State on January 7 and
all-media speech by Prime Minister Ky promptly thereafter. We believe this is earliest date on which we
can expect public announcement in view continuation some sentiment to delay entire project until
"Constitution Day," presumably in March. Basic themes we are suggesting to GVN for inclusion in
national proclamation, which we expect to be included in Cabinet presentation next week, transmitted by
septel./3/
/3/Telegram 13123, December 11. (Ibid.) In telegram 14681, December 31, Porter reported that he had
been advised by South Vietnamese officials that National Reconciliation would not come before the

Cabinet until the first week of January and thus "some brief slippage in timing of proclamation will be
inevitable." (Ibid.)
Lodge
339. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, December 12, 1966, 0330Z.
/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top
Secret; Personal. Also sent to Admiral Sharp.
MAC 10822. 1. The past several weeks have witnessed emergence within US civilian circles here,
notably among senior State Department personnel, of allegations that the ills of revolutionary
development may be laid at the feet of ARVN and MACV. According to the proponents of this theme,
ARVN was organized improperly at the outset by its US military sponsors. The basic error is said to
have been creation of a so-called conventional force instead of one tailored to excel in the counterguerrilla role. The argument goes on to assert that the basic error, having been compounded over the
years by short-sighted advisors, has produced today an ARVN that is powerless in terms of organization
and attitude to cope with the security tasks incident to destruction of Communist infrastructure and
guerrilla forces.
2. This body of opinion reflects a condemnation of the military, both Vietnamese and US. Particularly
disturbing is the suggestion that MACV is delinquent in having failed to reorient and reeducate ARVN
in the course of yesteryear's assistance programs. I do not rule out the possibility, let me add, that
projects such as the Enke-Aspin study entitled, "Cost-Benefit Among Armed Forces in South
Vietnam,"/2/ which dwells on the notion that ARVN may be "a poor buy," are associated directly or
indirectly with this proposition.
/2/Not further identified.
3. In an effort not only to set the record straight with respect to evolutionary development of ARVN, but
to counter a potentially dangerous groundswell of misguided reasoning, I addressed the Mission Council
meeting on 6 December. My presentation embraced the following approach:
A. As opposed to residing in organizational and doctrinal problems, real or imaginary, ARVN's structure
and capabilities have been moulded by the necessity for its employment against major conventional
enemy forces as well as against guerrillas. It will be remembered, in this regard, that as recently as the
Spring of 1965, victories by enemy regulars produced a state of near defeat for the Republic. If ARVN
had been organized as a lighter force, the results could have been disastrous.
B. Only through maturing of the US/Free World buildup has it been possible to contemplate major
reemphasis on ARVN capabilities from operations against enemy regular formations to security tasks in
support of revolutionary development.
C. Without a visible indigenous mobilization effort, expansion of US assistance to Vietnam would have
been unacceptable politically during this decade. As the one viable organizational entity within the
Republic, RVNAF provided the only feasible framework for mobilization of a major segment of RVN
manpower. With the zenith of mobilization having been reached, emphasis can and is being shifted to

improving the quality of the Vietnamese armed forces.

D. Irrespective of organizational patterns and assigned missions, the fundamental weakness within
RVNAF continues to be inadequacy of leadership at all levels. Although various measures are being
applied to overcome this problem, leadership deficiencies will continue for an extended period./3/
/3/In a December 23 memorandum to the President, Roche summarized the gist of a CIA study, "The
South Vietnamese Army Today," December 12, which, Roche said, called the ARVN poorly trained,
understrength, short of experienced leaders, and at a serious disadvantage in firepower. Roche
concluded: "If this is the case now, the disruption of ARVN into battalions and companies to pacify
provinces could lead to complete disintegration of the ARVN order of battle." (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII) The CIA study is ibid.
4. Although I have tried to forestall widespread circulation of the unfounded and uninformed thesis
discussed above, I would not be surprised to learn that it had reached Honolulu and Washington. On the
premise that it has or will, you may wish to consider counter actions.
340. Editorial Note
During a telephone conversation with President Johnson that began at 12:36 p.m. on December 12,
1966, Secretary McNamara informed the President that he was sending General Starbird to Vietnam to
talk with General Westmoreland about plans to build a barrier. McNamara continued:
"Westmoreland would like to do it, I think, but he wants additional forces to monitor it, so Starbird's
going to go out and talk to him and see what he thinks, and he'll be back the end of this week or early
next and I'll be able to give you a much better report at that time. Basically the military leaders, with the
possible exception of Westmoreland and Wheeler, are opposed to it because philosophically they are
opposed to static defense. And this of course is static defense, and they use the analogy of the Maginot
Line and so on. There are some who are opposed to it because they think it might in some way or other
reduce the arguments in favor of bombing of North Vietnam. But, Mr. President, when we don't have a
winning plan for you, and we can't tell you how and when we're going to win, it seems to me we need to
buy a little insurance, and that's the way I look upon this, and I think we definitely should go ahead and
take this preparatory step so that you later can have the option of putting it in, and basically that's what
I've asked Starbird to try to work out with Westmoreland. I don't want to have us sit here in the position
of ordering this to be done over the objection of all the military leaders. We're trying to avoid that
situation."
The President then said "OK," and the conversation ended. (Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F6612.01,
PNO 001)
341. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, December 13, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 1:36 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 296-297.
1458. Ref: Warsaw 1429./2/

/2/In telegram 1429, December 12, Gronouski notified the Department of State of a meeting with
Rapacki scheduled for December 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14
VIET/MARIGOLD)
1. At 1400 Dec 13 meeting (attended also by Michalowski and Jan-czewski) Rapacki opened by
observing that today's meeting was not urgent but he felt it was good for us to meet frequently to
transmit information and recapitulate attitudes. (Comment: At outset and throughout meeting Rapacki
struck me as being in relaxed and reflective mood.)
2. He stated that as result of our conversations, Poles have informed Democratic Republic of North
Vietnam (DRNVN) that our conversations took place, and have transmitted those parts destined for
transmittal.
3. Rapacki then recapitulated present situation: In mid-November Lodge presented the American view
on possibilities of solving problem; Lewandowski then carried these observations and opinions to
Hanoi. On basis of Hanoi conversations, Lewandowski was able subsequently to transmit to Lodge idea
of Warsaw meetings.
4. Rapacki continued "We thought at that point that the meetings could be held soon and we were
generally hopeful." However starting with Lodge's interpretation clause, complications have since
arisen. On Dec 3 suburbs of Hanoi were bombed and NVN bombing intensified. Poles immediately and
without asking anyone at that point presented their opinion to US. Thus, he concluded, in December new
elements appeared on the scene which were negatively assessed in Hanoi. Not surprisingly, therefore,
with this new situation and considering UGS's reaction to Poles' concern, there was reappraisal by party
most directly involved. As a result, we are faced with this postponement of Warsaw meetings./3/
/3/In telegram 102298 to Rusk in Paris, December 14, Katzenbach stated that he did "not interpret
Rapacki's statement of December 13 to Gronouski as a negative reply from Hanoi in effect closing the
Marigold door." (Ibid.)
5. Rapacki said he was not insensitive to USG's expression of appreciation for role Poles were playing;
however he was afraid US does not understand nature of Poland's role. He said he feels we are assuming
that all of his words come from Hanoi and everything we say to him goes to Hanoi. He said this is not
the case; "True, we have our own views and we are friends of Hanoi, but our role is neither that of
postman nor advocate; what we want is peace." He said that having knowledge of views of both sides,
which neither of participants have, "we think we can play a contributing role."
6. Rapacki continued, saying that Poles are sincere and in this sincerity they must say that they are not
sure what USG wants: talks, or to get soundings as to how far DRNVN is ready to yield under pressure.
He added that Poles assume that prevailing intention of USG is to bring about talks. He said this is why
they are engaged; they are acting on this working hypothesis.
7. He continued that if this working hypothesis reflects reality then he must say that USG did great harm
to its own objectives in December. The USG cannot afford a repetition in future, especially at time when
this matter is reassessed. He added that if we want peace then we must realize that the carrot-and-stick
approach does not work with DRNVN.
8. Rapacki added that we should realize leadership of DRNVN does not want to and cannot yield under
pressure; every step from our side that evokes impression that NVN is acting under pressure would be
interpreted as sign of weakness and be utilized by all those who have a different vision of this peace

move than we have here in Warsaw. (Comment: Rapacki repeated this point with emphasis and was, I
believe, making a clear reference to Communist China.)
9. Rapacki said that in first position expressed by Lodge it appeared that this truth was grasped by USG
and this is why Poles were so hopeful. However the events of December mean, if the working
hypothesis Poles are using is sound, that US does not fully appreciate this situation. He added that recent
statements by USG officials leave the impression that USG wants to evoke pressure. He quoted from
Reuters news story of Dec 12 US Navy spokesman's statement that US intends gradually to increase air
raids on NVN; Rapacki interjected at this point his realization that the Navy spokesman may not have
known all that was going on and this could very well be an old idea. But he added that the Navy
spokesman's subsequent reference to escalation and to new targets having been recently placed on
bombing list represented current information. He said "You can assume what effects such statements
have in Hanoi, given the fact that in recent weeks new targets have in fact been added."
10. Rapacki then said that he even must allude to a statement by Secy Rusk, who has full knowledge of
current developments, made in Saigon Dec 9./4/ He quoted Secy Rusk as saying that he did not detect
on side of NVN "any indication which allows me to entertain hope, but this indication will come one
day; it must come; NVN cannot win here, we are much stronger." Rapacki asked me to visualize how
this would be interpreted in Hanoi.
/4/Not further identified.
11. In summary Rapacki said that in judgement of Poles the US did a lot of harm in December and it
would be good if no more harm is done in future. This, he said, is advice of Poles. He added that he did
not expect me to respond immediately to his remarks.
12. I said that I would convey his comments to Washington but that I would like also to make one
general observation. I said that in situation where war is going on and neither side is sure that peace talks
will eventuate, it is understandable, if perhaps unfortunate, why both sides continue their operations in
whatever manner appears to them to provide military advantage. I added that the NVN in recent weeks
have shown no decline in their military aggressiveness. I mentioned the attempted bombing of the
Italian Embassy in Saigon (which caused Rapacki and Michalowski to look at each other in surprise and
then break out in broad smiles), attempts to bomb bridges, a movie theater, to kidnap and assassinate
leading citizens of Saigon, and other kinds of war activities. I said I was raising these points simply to
bring out that there has been no relaxation of the war effort on NVN side and we did not expect it to
happen until peace negotiations actually commence, after which I would hope that a sharp change in the
picture could result. I added that this is reason I feel it so important to do everything we can to begin
Warsaw talks.
13. Rapacki said he did not intend to suggest that there had been an armistice and realized that the war
was still going on, but he said, "Recognizing this does not change anything that I have said up to this
point." He added that we should also realize that bombing of NVN is the really sensitive point. He then
concluded with a smile that this was what he had to say and he will wait for our response.
Gronouski
342. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, December 15, 1966.

/1/Source : Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 12:30 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 302-304. Rostow
forwarded the telegram to the President at 9:50 a.m. on December 15. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 17) Gronouski amplified his comments in
telegram 1475 from Warsaw, December 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14
VIET/MARIGOLD)
1471. For the President from Ambassador Gronouski.
1. I met with Rapacki (Michalowski and Janczewski present) at Poles' request at 1800 Dec 14. (In
contrast to previous meetings, Rapacki entered the room unsmiling, and during entire meeting
maintained a calm, serious and matter-of-fact attitude.)
2. Rapacki said that first he would like to bring some precision with respect to our conversation of
yesterday (Warsaw 1458)./2/ He said that this conversation took place before Poles were aware of last
bombing of Hanoi. He said, "If I had had this news then, our conversation of course would have had
different character than it did."
/2/Document 341.
3. Rapacki continued, "Today I must state the following facts. First, that the U.S. had to be conscious of
and realize the importance of establishing direct contact with Hanoi." He added, "You had stressed the
unique possibility of a peaceful settlement that the Warsaw talks with Hanoi presented." He continued,
"We thought so too, ever since we obtained the signal for which the USG had asked for for so long in so
many official statements." He added, "In this instance we received more than a signal; we received a
direct, positive response from Hanoi about the possibility of talks in Warsaw."
4. Rapacki said that immediately after this direct response was transmitted to the USG the US reserved
the possibility of modifying their attitude and, of far greater importance, entered a new stage of
escalation.
5. Rapacki continued that the USG was bound to be conscious of the reaction which its conduct would
evoke and of the consequences of such action. He added that the Poles have done everything in their
power to dispel any illusions, noting that on six occasions in Warsaw and Saigon "we have warned the
USG side in all seriousness and with the greatest emphasis of the consequences of their actions."
6. "Yesterday," Rapacki continued, "the US Air Force engaged in a new and particularly brutal raid on
the residential area in Hanoi precisely at the moment when the USG knew that the matter of a Warsaw
contact with Hanoi was actively being considered. This," he added, "was the last drop that spilled over
the cup. From that moment, in Hanoi and Warsaw, all doubts as to the real intentions of the USG
disappeared, including doubts not only in the present case but with respect to all other instances in the
past when the US has advanced positions which it has described as peaceful initiatives."
7. Rapacki then said, "We understand therefore and fully share the wish of the Democratic Republic of
North Vietnam, which was transmitted to us today, that we terminate all conversations begun months
ago in Saigon. The Polish Govt states that the whole responsibility for losing this chance of a peaceful
solution to the Vietnam war rests on the USG." He added, "I would like to express more than regrets
because of the utilization by the USG of our good will. Once again it becomes clear how difficult it is to
believe in your words." He added "In future only facts can be taken into consideration."

8. I said that I would have no comment except to say that I regretted this turn of events and would
immediately convey these observations to Washington.
9. Comment: If Moscow dateline account of latest Hanoi bombing published in Dec 14 Paris edition of
New York Times and Herald Tribune, and recounted to me tonight by Rapacki, is true then we are in an
incredibly difficult position. I am convinced that if this represents the breakdown of the current peace
initiative--and it surely does unless we take decisive and immediate action--then the Soviets, the Poles
and the North Vietnamese will have no trouble convincing the leadership in every capital of the world
that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere. If we treat this turn of events as anything less
than a crisis in our world leadership role then I believe we are making a tragic mistake.
10. I am convinced that up till now the Poles, accepting the genuineness of our interests in negotiation,
have used whatever influence they have in Hanoi (in all likelihood with Soviet backing) in an effort to
initiate US-NVN peace talks. I also am convinced that Rapacki was expressing genuine concern when
he warned that the increase in bombing was destroying what appeared to him a good chance that NVN
would overcome Chinese influence and engage in Warsaw talks.
11. We have no choice but to take immediate action to try to get discussions back on track. For any
chance of success this would require, in my judgment, conveying to Poles that we are willing to accept
Rapacki's Dec 13 reasoning (Warsaw 1458) and are prepared now to assure the Poles that we will take
care not to create impression of bombing intensification in NVN during the period of delicate
negotiations over the holding of Warsaw USG-NVN peace talks. We would also assure the Poles that
we do not intend to bomb in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong during this period. We
would again express our deep desire for the initiation of talks and ask the Poles to continue their efforts.
12. I do not know whether this presentation will achieve its purpose, but I am deeply convinced it is
imperative that we try. The alternative is not only to lose an opportunity for initiating negotiations, but
also to do serious damage to the credibility of the USG's stated objectives.
Gronouski
343. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 53-66
Washington, December 15, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam: INR & Other Studies, 1966. Secret;
Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of NSA and the
Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was
submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S.
Intelligence Board, except the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the
Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject
was outside their jurisdiction.
PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM OVER THE NEXT YEAR
OR SO

Conclusions
A. Over the last 18 months, there have been a number of favorable developments in the South
Vietnamese political scene: the Ky-Thieu regime has successfully ridden out a series of crises; it has
shown an ability to fashion reasonably acceptable compromises of troublesome issues; a Constituent
Assembly has been elected; the military and civilian leaders have demonstrated an increasing
willingness to work together. The longer the process continues, the more difficult it may become to
reverse it by a single sudden move. Finally, the US presence has contributed significantly to stability,
and the improved military situation adds generally to a better political climate.
B. Nevertheless, South Vietnam is still plagued by important political weaknesses: divisive regional
animosities, religious enmities, civilian-military rivalries, and factionalism within the military. Over the
next year, crises are bound to occur, particularly as the process of developing a constitution and moving
toward a more permanent form of government unfolds. No assurance can be given that some crisis
might not undo the political progress made to date.
C. On balance, we believe that the Constituent Assembly will succeed in drafting a constitution. If so,
political maneuvering for new national elections may actually exacerbate the basic factors which
threaten political stability. Nonetheless, we believe the chances are better than even that national
elections will be conducted successfully during the period of this estimate.
D. If presidential elections are held, the military would probably find it easier to maintain unity behind a
military candidate (or a military man who resigned in order to run). It is not clear, however, whether the
military consider it essential that a military leader occupy the presidential seat or whether a civilian
would be acceptable. Much would depend on which civilian. The election of a candidate who was
opposed by the military leadership would raise the chances of a military coup attempt. Whether or not
such an attempt succeeded, political development would have received a serious setback.
E. Even if a relatively smooth transition to an elected government can be achieved, continuing political
stability cannot be maintained without military unity and support. The military is probably more
cohesive and certainly commands greater resources than any other group in the country. Thus for some
time to come, any regime in South Vietnam will be dependent on military support and almost certainly
under strong military influence.
Discussion
I. Introduction
1. When South Vietnam achieved independence in 1954, it was already burdened with certain basic
liabilities. Despite a deep sense of Vietnamese identity, there was no corresponding commitment to a
concept of national government. Virtually no preparation for self government had been made during the
decades of French rule. Not only was the country partitioned at the 17th parallel, but South Vietnam
itself was also divided by ethnic, religious, regional, and other conflicts. Under the Diem regime, though
some political stability was for a time achieved, little progress was made in resolving these basic
problems. Moreover, a new threat emerged as it became apparent that Hanoi was determined to wage a
revolutionary war against the South. Thus, when the Diem regime was toppled in late 1963, its various
successors found no adequate base on which to build a stable government and faced a rapidly
deteriorating military situation. One regime after another rose, quickly floundered, and fell.
2. By early 1965, the South Vietnamese Government--beset by military defeats, deprived of control of

large sections of the countryside, incapable of effective bureaucratic performance, and ruling over a
population in varying degrees indifferent, resentful, and deeply divid-ed--seemed in danger of imminent
collapse. The vastly expanded US presence in South Vietnam, civilian as well as military, has retrieved
this situation. In particular, the buildup of US combat forces was viewed by South Vietnamese as
evidence of US determination to see the war through and to prevent a Communist victory. Thus
bolstered, the Ky regime which assumed power in June 1965 has had more room to maneuver and has
retained control far longer than any other regime since the fall of Diem.
3. These circumstances have given the government new strengths, although it remains subject to most of
the same stresses and weaknesses as its predecessors. Like them, it must operate within the limits of a
domestic political situation established as the result of Diem's downfall. On the one hand, the military
leadership assumed the reins of power while lacking the cohesiveness and single-mindedness that had
enabled the Diem regime to establish its tightly-knit, centrally-controlled power structure. On the other
hand, Diem's overthrow also unleashed still other political forces--the religious sects (principally the
Buddhists), the students, labor, and a variety of politicians and intellectuals. Since Diem's overthrow,
political developments have focused on two basic issues: the relative roles and power positions of these
forces in the new body politic, and the pace and nature of the transition to a more broadly-based
constitutional government. In varying degrees, these issues precipitated or underlay each of the political
crises since 1963.
II. Major Sources of Weakness
4. Regionalism. South Vietnam has long been plagued by regional animosities. Native Southerners
(Cochinchinese) generally regard those of Northern (Tonkinese) origin as "carpetbaggers," who wield
power within the government and the military establishment far out of proportion to their numbers. In
addition, those native to Central Vietnam (Annamites) are viewed with suspicion by both Northerners
and Southerners. The regional antipathies hamper efforts to forge truly national South Vietnamese
institutions. In one way or another, regional biases intrude into most of South Vietnam's problems and
touch all groups, including the military, where factionalism is often on regional lines. In short,
regionalism remains a basic weakness of Vietnamese politics and shows no indication of becoming less
divisive in the near future.
5. Religion. Political developments during the Diem period and particularly since 1963 have created
deep suspicions between South Vietnam's badly split Buddhist majority and its active but less
factionalized Catholic minority. The Buddhist and the Catholic mistrust each other's influence in
government and each fears the emergence of a government dominated by the other. This rivalry is of
less immediate importance, however, than the political role of the militant wing of the Buddhist
movement led by Thich Tri Quang, an adept and wily political tactician./2/ Although the militant
Buddhist were weakened by their failure to topple Ky last spring and by their unsuccessful boycott of
the Constituent Assembly elections, they remain a likely source of trouble. They still seem to constitute
the largest body within organized Buddhism and may in time be able to reunite the Buddhists under their
control. In any event, they still possess a substantial political base in the northern provinces of South
Vietnam, from which they could reenter the political arena if they wished. In the shorter run, there
remains a possibility of a new round of militant Buddhist demonstrations, given their assets among the
students and the remnants of last spring's "struggle movement."
/2/Tri Quang's base of power is in Central Vietnam, particularly around Hue. The more flexible wing of
the Buddhist Institute, led by Thich Tam Chau, is strongest in the Saigon area; much of its strength is
based on Buddhists originally from North Vietnam. In addition, there are many Buddhists, including
most of those from the southern provinces, who do not participate in the Buddhist Institute. [Footnote in
the source text.]

6. Civilian-Military Rivalry. The relationship between the military and civilian elements is fragile;
neither group particularly respects the intentions or competence of the other. As the ultimate arbiter of
power, the military is sometimes prone to ignore civilian interests. For their part, the civilian politicians
tend to overreact to real or imagined provocations and thereby run the risk of needlessly precipitating
reaction by the military. Frictions between the military and various civilian groups are unavoidable.
There will almost certainly be occasional events which will threaten to burgeon into a serious civilianmilitary confrontation./3/
/3/In a December 23 memorandum to Rusk, Denney discussed NIE 53-66, summarizing a number of
factors that needed to be taken into account in deciding on a U.S. response should a serious civilianmilitary confrontation develop. (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, NIE 53-66)
7. Military Factionalism. Factionalism has been chronic among Vietnamese military leaders, and plots
and counterplots, personal rivalries, and jealousies have been common. This lack of cohesiveness among
the military leaders has presented nonmilitary opponents of the government tempting opportunities to
strike alliances with discontented commanders. The command structure itself is conducive to
factionalism, since it has allowed the Corps Commanders to run their areas as personal satrapies.
8. Lack of National Awareness. As a result of the factionalism and parochialism which characterize
politics in Vietnam, there is little awareness of broad national issues. There is nothing approaching a
national political party. Most politicians think primarily in terms of advancing their own or their group's
interests. Moreover, activity by the multiplicity of political groups is generally restricted to urban areas,
with the rank-and-file support seldom extending beyond personal and group loyalties. The rural
peasantry, which constitutes the bulk of the population, has been largely unconcerned and unaffected by
political developments in Saigon.
9. Inflation. Among the many economic problems, inflation presents the greatest threat to governmental
security. For over a year, South Vietnam has been gripped by severe inflation, caused in part by the
large war-related budget deficit and in part by heavy US spending also caused by the war. Since January
1965, the cost of living has increased by over 125 percent. Despite the salutary effects of the regime's
recent currency devaluation, the cost of living during 1967 will jump by at least another 20 percent, and
probably by much more. Although the effects of inflation fall most heavily on the urban population, the
rural areas also suffer difficulties which are often compounded by disruptions in the supply and
distribution system. In general, inflation has increased dissatisfaction with the government and has
provided the Viet Cong and other opponents with an exploitable popular issue.
10. Bureaucratic Inadequacies. South Vietnam has failed to develop an effective bureaucracy and
administrative apparatus. There has been a separation of authority from responsibility; military officers
administer most programs at the province and district levels, and the ministers have little control over
them. Government procedures tend to be both rigid and cumbersome. Moreover, many trained
individuals have been reluctant to work with the government, preferring instead to remain uninvolved.
The succession of regimes and coups has resulted in frequent reorganizations, many of them inspired by
political considerations rather than concern with increased efficiency, and has made many competent
administrators politically unacceptable. It has also made them hesitant to commit themselves to a
regime, out of fear that its tenure and their own were likely to be of short duration. In addition,
corruption is rampant throughout the system, and its corrosive effect not only impedes government
activities but adversely affects attitudes toward the government.
11. The War. These various problems would obstruct political development even in peacetime. The war,
however, exacerbates every problem, magnifies every weakness, and makes even the simplest tasks of
governing exceedingly difficult. Viet Cong control of large parts of the country, and varying degrees of

insecurity elsewhere, greatly restrict the ability of the government to carry forward programs of social
and economic development. Finally, the refugees who have fled from the country-side to the cities, and
who may number a million in Saigon alone, add to the administrative burdens of the regime and may
provide an object for exploitation by its enemies, including of course the Viet Cong.
III. Major Sources of Strength
12. Consensus on the War. A significant and often overlooked source of strength in South Vietnam is
the consistently anti-Communist attitude of the country's politically active elements. Despite concern
over various GVN policies toward war and peace and over the impact of the large US involvement in
Vietnamese affairs, none has called for an end to the fighting or a withdrawal of US forces. The many
governmental shakeups that have taken place have not been over basic policy concerning the
continuation of the war or over the GVN's steadfast refusal to deal with the Communists. Thus the
Communists have been denied the opportunity of gaining power through the back door in league with
other South Vietnamese groups. Anticommunism is strongest among the Catholics and military, many of
whom fled from communism in North Vietnam in 1954.
13. Continuity of Government. The Ky regime has now survived for 18 months. This remarkable
longevity, reversing what appeared to be a persistent trend toward ever-changing, short-lived
governments, has had positive psychological effects at home and abroad which have been reinforced by
the impact of US military operations. The government has at least had time to begin implementing a
number of major programs which heretofore had progressed little beyond the planning stage. Progress
has been limited, and much of the emphasis and initiative have come from the US and US prodding.
Nevertheless, Ky and his advisors have demonstrated greater insight into the issues facing them and
have shown greater flexibility in adopting remedial measures.
14. Political Continuity. Politically, the regime has also profited from its ability to maintain itself in
power, especially from its success in facing down both militant Buddhist opposition and military
plotting. Most politically active Vietnamese viewed the September elections for the Constituent
Assembly as an earnest of the regime's willingness to sanction a larger civilian role in the government;
about 80 percent of those registered and over 50 percent of the total adult population of South Vietnam
voted, despite the opposition of both the militant Buddhists and the Viet Cong. The cabinet crisis in
October demonstrated the persistence of regional rivalries, but the regime managed to dilute the impact
of this episode. In any event, increasing numbers of politicians are probably coming to feel that there is
political advantage in coexisting with the Ky regime as long as they see reasonable prospects for a
transition to elected government.
15. Political Development. For the first time since Diem's downfall, political activity is manifested more
in legal channels than in demonstrations and coup plotting. This political activity, while creating a raft
of new frictions and problems, is essential and healthy in terms of political development. Moreover, the
military leadership, which will remain the final arbiter of power in any case, is actively taking part in
this political evolution. Borrowing from the experience of the South Korean military, the Ky regime is
seeking to find political means to insure the military's participation in any future government. With this
insurance, they appear to be prepared to accept an elected government with a constitutional mandate;
such a development would be a promising step toward the creation of a government with a popular
national base.
16. US Support. Obviously crucial in the military and economic fields, the greatly increased US
presence has injected a new element of major importance into the South Vietnamese body politic. The
US role carries great weight among the Vietnamese, so much so in fact that even inaction by the US is a
form of involvement or, at the very least, has the same impact by being seen as such. For example,

several previous regimes became vulnerable when their opponents suspected that US support was
weakening. Ky's regime is strengthened by the fact that most Vietnamese consider the US to be solidly
behind it. The expanding US presence has obviously increased the disruptive effect of the war on the
Vietnamese economy, and there are some latent anti-American sentiments. These negative factors are
likely to be aggravated by the infusion of larger numbers of US troops into the more heavily populated
areas of the country. Nevertheless, the overall effect of the US presence has thus far been to contribute
significantly to stability.
IV. Current Situation
17. The Directorate. During the past year, the Directorate strengthened its position within the military
establishment, enhanced its standing in the country, and preserved a considerable degree of
cohesiveness. The successful removal of two deeply entrenched Corps Commanders, Generals Thi and
Quang, added to the stature of both Ky and Thieu. The precise relationship between these two leaders is
not clear, but Ky certainly has the leading public role. He also draws strength from the aura of US
support, from the air force which he still commands, and from a group of younger officers called the
Baby Turks. This latter group includes General Loan, Director of Police and Chief of Military Security
and a close confidant of Ky's, and General Khang, Commander of III Corps and the Capital Military
Zone. This combination has provided physical security for the Ky regime.
18. There are persistent rumors of friction between Thieu and Ky, though we see no evidence that such
friction is now of serious proportions. But the future cohesiveness of the Directorate depends to a great
extent on the cooperation, or at least continuing mutual tolerance, of these two officers.
19. The Constituent Assembly. Except for the Buddhist Institute, all the traditional political, regional
and religious groups are reflected in the 117-member Constituent Assembly. The Assembly includes
professional politicians, representatives of the Dai Viet and VNQDD parties (badly split themselves),
regionalists (such as the militant Movement for the Renaissance of the South), and a large number of
young and inexperienced delegates. Four political "blocs" were formed for the election of Assembly
officers and committees, but each is a conglomerate of differing interests, and their membership and the
lines between them continue to shift.
20. For the next few months at least, the Assembly will be the source of the issues on which the civilian
politician and the regime will confront one another. The Directorate has not yet shown its hand, but its
military members would almost certainly resist any move which would deprive them of a constitutional
role in a new government. The precise goals of the civilians are not clear. In general, however, they
distrust the Directorate and appear to believe that the time is ripe for the creation of a constitutional
government with a much larger role for the civilian elements. The September elections whetted their
political appetites, and since the military gave up some political power then, the civilians are pressing
for more. Their motives range from parochial self-interest to genuine concern for a legitimate
government. The many divisions and rivalries within the Assembly will impair its ability to present a
solid front against the Directorate.
21. There are a number of potential problems that could lead to an open break, either by design or by
accident, between the Assembly and the Directorate. The Assembly will continue to interpret its
mandate for constitution-drafting broadly, while the Directorate will be suspicious of incursions into its
domain of power. There is considerable resentment in the Assembly over the power of the Directorate to
change items in the draft constitution, reversible only by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. The regime,
for its part, is reluctant to relinquish this power until it has a fairly good idea of what will be in the
constitution. The desire of some Assembly members to retain the Assembly in being until the
convocation of an elected legislature may also cause friction with the Directorate.

22. There are, however, factors that could lead toward compromise. The majority of the Assembly
members probably are not interested in pursuing a collision course with the government, in large part
because they realize that if the Assembly fails, they are unlikely for some time to have another chance of
sharing power. Moreover, there may be many who will advocate caution in the expectation that the very
establishment of a constitutional system, even if it is not fully in accord with their desires, will provide
new opportunities for change. The Directorate also has reason to try to avoid a showdown. It probably
believes that the real test is not so much the question of a constitution but that of power afterwards, and
it is aware of the US concern that there be a constitution. Within limits, the regime will probably try to
be forthcoming on this matter. On balance, we believe that an open break between the Directorate and
the Assembly will be avoided and that a constitution will be produced.
23. Although we consider it unlikely that the Ky regime will be overthrown during the near future, its
downfall could seriously endanger the promulgation of a constitution as well as the political progress
made to date. Much would depend on how Ky was overthrown and what sort of regime succeeded him.
Progress would not necessarily be wholly lost, for example, if Ky were overthrown by an internal palace
coup with a minimum of violence and disruption, or if the new regime were no less disposed to work
toward constitutional government. Should the coup be violent, however, or should there be a series of
coups and countercoups, the whole structure created by past political development would almost
certainly disintegrate.
V. Problems and Prospects Over the Next Year or So
24. Judgments concerning the course of political development in South Vietnam must be highly
tentative. The country is in the throes of political evolution, the course of which will be disputed even
after a constitution is adopted. In a very real sense, political development in South Vietnam will be a
day-to-day, month-to-month phenomenon for some time to come, and periodic upheavals and crises will
threaten the entire process. Indeed, as the pace of political events quickens, the factors that work against
stability may actually be exacerbated. Regionalism in particular is likely to be a politically volatile
factor. The Southern elements are resentful of the Northern/Central coloration of Ky's regime and fear
that Ky and Loan are conniving to perpetuate it at Southern expense. No assurance can be given that
some crisis might not prove to be the ultimate undoing of the government.
25. A falling out among the military leaders could have serious consequences. As political activity
increases, the possibility of frictions between Ky and Thieu also increases. Ky has thus far been skillful
and fortunate in his efforts to contain the political power of individual Corps Commanders; on a future
occasion, he might be less successful. The question of how much political power is to be shared with the
civilian elements might become a cause of contention within the military, particularly since the Baby
Turks appear to be less inclined to compromise with the civilians than is the Directorate.
26. The prospect of negotiations could introduce unsettling influences into the political situation over the
next year or so. At present, no significant Vietnamese group publicly advocates negotiations and the
military leaders are quite opposed to them except on terms that amount to Communist capitulation.
Hence, any government that, in the near term, agreed to negotiations would increase its vulnerability to
attack by its political enemies. On the other hand, the large US presence may encourage the Vietnamese
to believe that the US will agree to no settlement that does not effectively insure the survival of a nonCommunist SVN. The degree to which this confidence would remain as a counterweight to disruptive
effects would depend heavily on the circumstances in which negotiations seemed an imminent
possibility.
27. Nevertheless, there are developments which tend to make us cautiously optimistic about the
prospects for a more stable political situation. These include the continuity of the Ky regime, its success

in riding out a series of crises and potential crises, and its ability to fashion reasonably acceptable
compromises without resorting to outright repression. In addition, the election of a Constituent
Assembly, and the willingness of both the military leadership and civilian elements to attempt to work
together augur well for continued political progress. The longer the process continues and is reflected in
the development of new institutions and working relations, the more difficult it may become to reverse it
by some single sudden move. Finally, the improved military situation contributes generally to a better
political climate.
28. During the next year or so, the successful holding of national elections would be an important
indication of growing political stability. Actually, events are moving in this direction; a constitution will
almost certainly call for presidential elections, and probably legislative ones as well. Political
maneuvering among the various civilian elements is already underway in anticipation of elections and
will grow more intense. New political alliances will eventually emerge, although it is too early to
determine what they are likely to be. The Directorate's final decision concerning elections will depend
on its assessment of the situation at the time; if the military felt that elections seriously threatened their
basic interests, they might move to postpone them. But we believe the chances are better than even that
national elections will be conducted successfully during the period of this estimate.
29. If presidential elections are held, there will probably be a military candidate (or a military man who
has resigned in order to run), perhaps Ky or Thieu, as well as civilian candidates. It is not clear whether
the military considers it essential that a military leader occupy the presidential seat or whether a civilian
would be acceptable. Much of course would depend on the civilian. The military would probably find it
easier to maintain unity behind a military candidate. The election of a candidate who was opposed by the
military leadership would raise the chances of a military coup attempt. Whether or not such an attempt
succeeded, political development would have received a serious setback.
30. Even assuming a relatively smooth transition to an elected government, continuing political stability
cannot be maintained without military unity and support. There is little evidence of any significant
growth of a sense of national commitment that would submerge special interests. Civilian-military and
other rivalries will persist and will manifest themselves in recurring conflicts over the distribution of
power within the government. Any government, particularly a civilian one, will almost certainly be
subject to debilitating bickering and jockeying for influence, and vulnerable to plots from within and
without. As long as the military leadership remains relatively united, it will have the upper hand over
others. It is probably more cohesive and certainly commands greater resources than any other group in
the country. Thus for some time to come, any regime in South Vietnam will be dependent on military
support and almost certainly under strong military influence.

344. Notes of Meeting With President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 16, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files. Top Secret. Prepared by Rostow on
December 19. Rostow states incorrectly that the meeting was held on Friday, December 17, in Austin,
Texas. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the meeting was held on Friday, December 16, at the
White House, prior to the President's departure for Texas that evening. (Ibid.)
PRESENT
Secretary McNamara

Under Secretary Katzenbach

Ambassador Harriman
Ambassador Lodge
Ambassador Goldberg
W. W. Rostow
The President asked Amb. Lodge for his views on the situation in Viet Nam./2/
/2/Telegram 7472 from Bangkok, December 11, contained a memorandum, prepared by Lodge for Rusk,
which also provided Lodge's views on the overall situation in Vietnam. (Ibid., Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, vol. 16)
Amb. Lodge stated that many of the worries they had in Saigon a year ago they did not have now.
--They no longer feared the Viet Cong might cut the country in half.
--They no longer feared that regionalism backed by the Buddhists might tear the country apart.
--They no longer feared a Communist coup from within.
The President's commitment announced July 28, 1965, to put major U.S. forces in South Viet Nam had
made this progress possible and also denied the "great edge of Asia" to the Communists--from Korea to
Malaysia. This region was moving forward with confidence based on our commitment in Viet Nam.
On the other hand, we haven't won. The military war against the main force units had gone well. The
Ambassador "expects brilliant results in 1967." The constitutional process is evolving. The writ of the
Saigon government runs throughout all the regions, except those directly controlled by the VC. They are
moving well towards the making of a constitution and he expects it to be promulgated by February 9.
Like everything in South Viet Nam, the political process is precarious; but there is progress.
Inflation has been contained in the economy, although it is an endless struggle. On the other hand, no
one in South Viet Nam is starving.
The weakest point is failure to deal with terrorism, and this problem touches others. To get at terrorism,
the retraining of the ARVN is critical. They must become a constabulary. The job will best be done by
the soldiers if they operate where they live. They would then be more inclined to leave the chickens and
the girls alone.
General Westmoreland understands this but all the officers in MACV do not. He cited a U.S. general in
II Corps who didn't appear to realize that 39 village chiefs had been assassinated in II Corps in the past
year. The military do not think in terms of the police measures now required to achieve security in the
countryside. He believes they need direct word from the President that this is their job. At present Amb.
Lodge's view is that a basic reorganization of the ARVN is required. Gen. Westmoreland is not sure. It
is the kind of issue where judgment from outside might be helpful.
With respect to third country participation, we have made progress and should make more. We have
about reached the limit of generating such assistance by exhortation. For example, we need the kind of
British policemen who have worked in Kenya. We ought to pressure the British to get some--perhaps by
holding up shipments of scotch whisky to the U.S.

U.S. AID does not have enough people. It could use some good foreigners.
Latin Americans who trained with our Navy could help with Operation Market Time./3/
/3/Operation Market Time referred to U.S. Navy counter-sea-infiltration operations along the coast of
South Vietnam.
He cited an old friend of his, Tom Pappas, who helped in the rehabil-itation of Greece. He believes
Greece ought to send some troops to South Viet Nam. Mr. Pappas says he will pay for this as well as
organize it.
Mr. Rostow asked if it would not be wise for Thieu to get into the field and lead the ARVN in the
process of pacification, stressing the dignity of the job and its importance to the future of the country.
Amb. Lodge said this was something he might do. He is conscious of the problem and he may do it if he
decides he cannot run for the presidency.
With respect to corruption, he said, we are still dealing with a country where relatives are important. For
example, Chin cannot be removed because he is Thieu's brother-in-law. In that culture if one lets down a
member of the family, one loses face.
The generals around Saigon are weak, partly because the government does not want strong leaders
controlling troops too near Saigon for fear of a coup. Those are things one must take into account in
Asia. But with Americans beginning to engage in pacification in the Saigon area, things may improve.
The President then turned to Gov. Harriman who described his probing of peace feelers in Algeria/4/
and Paris. The Algerians are prepared to follow up in Hanoi. He talked with Sainteny/5/ and
recommended Sainteny be given permission to probe in Hanoi. He feels either the Algerians or Sainteny
would do better job than East Europeans. The people in Hanoi are suspicious. They feel they have been
twice fooled in negotiations.
/4/Harriman reported on his 3-hour talk on December 9 with Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz
Bouteflika in telegram 1863 from Algiers, December 10. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27
VIET S)
/5/A memorandum of Harriman's conversation with Sainteny on December 2 is ibid. Bohlen reported on
the conversation in telegram 8474 from Paris, December 3. (Ibid.)
In Paris he found Mana'ch constructive this time and also had a good talk with the Director of North
African Affairs who said he thinks the U.S. should play an active part in Africa.
Gov. Harriman found Franco full of plans for the future of his country and also for settling problems in
the disputed areas of Africa. He was contemptuous of de Gaulle. He believes we have been too friendly
with the French. When Gov. Harriman cited our ties to Lafayette, he replied that we "have milked that
cow dry."
In general, he found Spain moving ahead very fast and recalled his opposition to Jimmy Byrnes'
negative attitude towards Spain when Byrnes followed Molotov's line. President Truman followed
Byrnes on this matter because he hadn't liked the way Spain treated the Baptists. They are now treating
them better.

He underlined the urgency and importance of South Vietnamese moving in the campaign for national
reconciliation.
Under Secretary Katzenbach then commented the most difficult thing is to get a handle on the ARVN in
the pacification problem. How to convert the ARVN was the problem. In terms of organization, the
division commanders and corps commanders controlled the military now when what was needed was
unambiguous control by the province chiefs and the political system. Amb. Lodge said we need senior
Vietnamese leadership for pacification. We need the argument about ARVN reorganization settled:
Westy saying it was unnecessary but Thieu feeling the ARVN has to be rebuilt from the bottom up; and
we need a talented man from the U.S. military to lead our side of pacification--a three-star general. Gen.
Wyant/6/ is the best man in Lodge's view.
/6/Apparently a reference to Major General Frederick C. Weyand.
We shall learn something out of the Long An experiment, with Sam Wilson in effect leading both the
military and civilian teams.
Amb. Goldberg asked Amb. Lodge what is the view ahead: Can the North Vietnamese maintain their
ability to infiltrate; can the VC maintain their ability to conduct terrorist operations? Amb. Lodge replied
that he expected brilliant results in 1967 in conventional military operations; we would move ahead
politically; we would hold inflation although it would be a great struggle; we would make limited
progress in pacification. Ho would not decide to end the war until, in his own phrase, the "guerrilla
infrastructure" was destroyed. This embraces about 150,000 people. It might take 5 years to complete
the job. But it ought to be clear during 1967 that we were on a winning track. He expected U.S.
casualties to be way down by the middle of 1967.
He returned again to the ARVN and said they were disliked by the people. The proper pattern was the
kind of combined force he had seen when outside Danang, with 25 U.S. Marines and 50 local
Vietnamese working together in local security operations. The regional forces and the popular forces
killed more VC than the ARVN. We should be moving to convert the ARVN to RF and PF. That was
only way to disengage them from bad habits derived from their training under French colonial rule.
As for the national reconciliation program, this had taken hold at the top of South Vietnamese
government. Zorthian was doing a good job and there should be an important announcement at the time
of Tet concerning the national reconciliation program.
The President then asked Secretary McNamara to report on the bombing situation in North Viet Nam
and the NATO meeting. Secretary McNamara said that two targets outside Hanoi had been attacked on
December 2d, 3d, 13th and 14th: a railroad yard and a vehicle depot. Some photos were available on
14th which showed the railroad yard had been hit, with some but not extensive damage. Some civilian
buildings near the railroad yard were hit. There were no photos of the area within the city limits.
There was some possibility that a SAM had fallen in the city limits. On the evidence, McNamara doubts
that U.S. bombs fell within the city limits; but there were probably some civilian casualties near the
targets.
As for the Peking Embassy, we have no evidence that we hit it. Nor the Rumanian Embassy. It is
exceedingly difficult, however, to prove a negative. A great deal of antiaircraft debris falls on the city
during our attacks nearby.

[Here follows discussion of NATO and United Nations issues.]

345. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, December 19, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at
9:44 a.m.
1508. Ref: Warsaw 1506./2/
/2/In telegram 1506 from Warsaw, December 19, Gronouski briefly discussed his meeting with Rapacki
set for later that day. (Ibid.)
1. To save time of transmission after 1400 Dec. 19 meeting with Rapacki, following is advance text of
my oral presentation to Rapacki (as derived from State's 102960,/3/ 103342,/4/ 103586,/5/ and
83786)./6/ Any variations or interspersed comments by Rapacki will be included with report of meeting.
/3/In telegram 102960 to Warsaw, December 14, the Department of State responded to telegram 1458
(Document 341). The Department wondered whether the Poles "ever had any NVN commitment to a
meeting in Warsaw." In any event, in further conversation with the Poles, the Department wanted "to
keep the door open as long as there seems to be any possibility of talks developing" while refuting the
Polish contention that U.S. actions and statements had thrown a roadblock in the way of talks.
Gronouski was instructed to ask for a further meeting with Rapacki and present him with the position
statement spelled out in the telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14
VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 300-302)
/4/In telegram 103342 to Warsaw, December 14, the Department of State notified Gronouski that
telegram 1471 (Document 343) did not alter the basic assessment conveyed in telegram 102960.
Therefore its arguments should be conveyed to Rapacki as soon as possible, supplemented by several
points discussed in telegram 103342. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14
VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 305-306)
/5/Telegram 103586 to Warsaw, December 15, provided material on the air war used by Gronouski in
paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 A-F of telegram 1508 printed here. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2714 VIET/MARIGOLD)
/6/Document 305.
2. "I would like to begin with a brief recapitulation of recent events. Before Lewandowski went to Hanoi
we had discussed with him quite fully and frankly our position with regard to undertaking of
negotiations, bombing suspension and other types of de-escalation, terms of settlement, and related
matters. After his return from Hanoi, Lewandowski outlined to us on Dec. 1 what he said he had
conveyed to Hanoi as the U.S. position. Amb. Lodge confirmed to him that this statement, despite the
general language in which it was couched, represented our position, subject of course to interpretation
which, to use your own terms, meant merely hammering out greater precision in negotiations. Following
this, Lewandowski proposed, and we agreed, to meet with North Vietnamese representatives in Warsaw,

something which it was strongly implied the North Vietnamese were prepared to do.
3. Before, during and after all this was taking place, the conflict in Viet-Nam continued, including the
bombing of NVN, the infiltration of NV men and supplies into SVN, Viet Cong terrorist bombings,
assassinations, kidnappings and so on. In the conversations in Saigon leading up to the proposal to meet
in Warsaw, nothing was said to relate this continuing waging of the war to efforts to get underway talks
to work out a peaceful settlement. Those talks, of course, were expressly intended to bring the fighting,
bombing and terrorist activities to an end. It was precisely for this reason that we had been at such pains
to elaborate a possible procedure, the package proposal with Phases A and B, to facilitate the arranging
of a process of de-escalation as soon as possible after we and the NVN began to talk.
4. In any case, in a desire to promote a peaceful settlement, we responded quickly to Lewandowski's
suggestion, on Dec. 3, and were ready to talk in Warsaw.
5. As soon as we began to talk with the Polish Govt in Warsaw, pre-sumably preparatory to our meeting
directly with the NVN representatives, we found that new terms and conditions seemed to be put
forward, with the opening of direct talks contingent on our fulfilling them. It was stated that we had
escalated our bombing during these most recent conversations, in contrast to a de-escalation which the
Poles through the NVN had detected and favorably noted during Lewandowski's last visit to Hanoi.
6. Regarding your recent comments on intensification of bombing of NVN, we wish to remind you once
more that there has been no such escalation, or de-escalation; that there are variations that result from
weather conditions and other technical factors; and that continued Polish references to the bombing have
introduced a new issue which was not involved in the arrangements leading up to the opening of
discussions in Warsaw.
7. There has been neither escalation on our part, allegedly to put pressure on Hanoi, nor has there been
any de-escalation in NVN's infiltration and terrorist activities in the South. In fact, if there has been a
change in the South it has been an increase in mortaring of not only military but also civilian targets and
in assassinations, including that of an important individual. The bombing of NVN has proceeded on
essentially the same pattern as before with no significant changes in intensity, proximity to Hanoi or
type of targets. All targets are military and a good number of those struck recently had also been struck
before; as long ago as last June a target closer to Hanoi than any of the current ones was struck. Great
care has been and is being exercised to avoid civilian casualties. No raid has taken place on "a
residential area in Hanoi." Absolutely no target within Hanoi city limits was bombed. The nearest target
was more than two miles from city limits and more than five miles from the point where it is claimed
damage was done. We have inspected with the greatest care all our reports of the pertinent bombing
missions and find no evidence to support your charges.
8. The latest strikes near Hanoi were Yen Vien railroad yard and Van Dien vehicle depot, which are five
nautical miles northeast and south of Hanoi respectively, and well outside of Hanoi city limits. Both of
these targets were struck on Dec. 13 and 14 but this was not the first time in either case. The Van Dien
vehicle depot is a major military transportation center for operation, storage and support of trucks and
other vehicles used for movement of men and materiel to the war in SVN. The Yen Vien railroad yard is
the largest railroad classification yard in NVN. It controls all of the country's rail traffic north of Hanoi
and so represents a vital transportation link for all military equipment and supplies coming into NVN
from this direction. This important yard services over a third of the nation's military cargo handling
capacity. Our effort against both targets is part of our continuing program to strike against major
facilities that support Hanoi's war against SVN. These strikes represent no departure from policy. The
types of targets are in categories struck previously and this targeting constitutes no change in purpose or
procedures. The Hanoi oil facility struck last June is closer to Hanoi than either of these two targets.

9. I want to comment specifically on the allegation that our aircraft bombed a built-up area of Hanoi at
the west end of the Red River Bridge and the suburb of Dhatram to the southwest. Nothing received in
detailed follow-up reports has substantiated this; this area of the alleged attack is nowhere near the areas
targeted for attack. It is important to note that there was heavy surface-to-air missile, anti-aircraft and
MIG activity and that our aircraft took action against these missile sites. Missiles were fired at our
aircraft; an objective observer should not overlook the possibility that stray missiles or anti-aircraft
shells could have caused the damage cited.
10. Careful review of specifics, as well as the general pattern of our bombing attacks against NVN over
the past several months, brings out the following points which must be quite clear to Hanoi:
A. U.S. bombing is directed against military and military-related targets, with an obvious effort to avoid
civilian population centers, large and small. This, I might add, is in stark contrast to Viet Cong activities
in SVN, which expressly include terrorism against civilian population as part of their tactics to gain
control.
B. U.S. attacks against NVN have consisted entirely of tactical, precision bombing against military and
military-related targets, avoiding (except on a few occasions against infiltration routes at the NVN
frontier which is away from settled areas) "carpet bombing" technique such as was used in World War
II. This clearly shows that our intention is not to bring the Hanoi regime to its knees, but rather to direct
attacks solely at destroying Hanoi's capability and willingness to support and supply the Viet Cong
effort in the South.
C. There is no basis for charging U.S. with escalation of the conflict over the past few days, either in
geographic terms or as to types of targets. Hanoi's oil facility three nautical miles from the center of
Hanoi was struck on June 29, and oil facilities on the edge of Haiphong were struck on June 29, July 7,
and August 2. The two targets of Dec. 14 are both five nautical miles from Hanoi's center and both had
been struck earlier.
D. U.S. aircraft have attacked a number of targets close to Hanoi and Haiphong (ranging from 33 to 3
nautical miles away from the center of Hanoi) since early July and even before. These targets have been
struck repeatedly, at least since early July. U.S. aircraft have not at any time struck cities themselves or
civilian populated areas.
E. The Hanoi-Haiphong area is heavily defended by surface-to-air missiles and regular anti-aircraft
defenses, reflecting the concentration of military and military-related installations. Our aircraft are
authorized to strike these installations in self-defense and have frequently been required to do so since
early July and even before.
F. It must be as clear to the NVN as to us that weather factors affect our pattern of air activity, and that
this pattern in December and late November could not reasonably be interpreted by Hanoi as escalation
or conscious effort to exert pressure on the NVN authorities. In comparable periods of good weather,
such as Nov. 22 and 23, Dec. 2, 3, 4 and 5, and Dec. 13-14, essentially the same type of targets were
struck and the same intensity of air activity in and around Hanoi took place as has frequently been the
case during the last six months, and the same general areas of NVN were affected.
11. When you referred on Tuesday, Dec. 13, to complications having arisen, these have been introduced
by the Polish side which has in Warsaw changed the basis of our discussions from what had been
worked out with Lewandowski. This applies not only to the question of escalation and de-escalation of
military activity but also to the exaggerated importance attached to Amb. Lodge's perfectly natural

statement about interpretation and also to the observations about statements of American officials--the
Navy spokesman and Secy Rusk./7/ If the Polish Govt is concerned about public statements, it should
review the monotonous consistency with which Hanoi has publicly declared its total unwillingness to
take even the first minor steps toward opening up explorations for possible peaceful settlement.
/7/See Document 341.
12. We have been waiting now in Warsaw for almost two weeks to get started on discussions, and your
govt must bear the responsibility for the fact that these have yet to get underway. You well know that
one important subject for such discussions would be to arrange for mutual de-escalation, including
bombing of NVN. You also know that in all of the discussions leading up to the Polish proposal and our
agreement to meet with the NVN in Warsaw, there was no condition relating to bombing. All of the
increasingly indignant charges we have heard here, including the threat to terminate the conversations,
are based on events subsequent to the agreement reached with the Polish Govt on Dec. 3, events which
are extraneous to what was the basis of our agreement at that time.
13. We are deeply concerned over the gravity of Polish actions which serve the basic, long-run interests
of neither of the parties whom you say you mean to be helping. We regretfully find ourselves being led
to the conclusion that the Polish Govt, whether on its own or in response to promptings from the NVN
Govt, is seeking to make a case which is based on false premises and does not relate to the facts as we
know them. This gives us concern not only because of the damaging effect it could have on prospects
for working out a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam but because we would find it difficult not to have our
attitude about our relations with the Polish Govt also affected.
14. But our desire is to move toward peace and our conviction is that the best road to take is one of
direct discussion with Hanoi's representatives. We are somewhat confused as a result of our
conversations here as to what Hanoi has said and what represents the views of the Polish Govt. Our
strong impression is that, in spite of our readiness both in Saigon with Lewandowski and now in
Warsaw to present quite fully and frankly our position, we have not received any communication at all
from the NVN Govt. The issues that stand between us and a peaceful settlement are exceedingly
complex and difficult and we despair of progress being made until the way is open for an exchange of
views rather than a unilateral declaration from our side.
15. Nevertheless we want to leave no stone unturned in our search for peace and would like to turn for a
moment from the total picture to one sector of it in which conceivably we might begin to move. This is
with respect to the possible beginning of de-escalation through a two-phased arrangement referred to in
Lewandowski's eighth point. This, you will recall, involves a package deal, to be worked out, which in
its totality would represent what both we and Hanoi could agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual
de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing
suspension, while Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of
all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. Hanoi's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in
response to our actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension.
16. We are ready to sit down with NVN representatives tomorrow to see whether an arrangement along
these lines could be worked out. On the other hand, the NVN may prefer in the initial stages to deal
through the Polish Govt. In that case we are ready to consider whatever proposals the NVN would wish
to put forward as to the elements which would go into such a two-phase package arrangement.
Agreement here would solve beyond cavil the problems, real or imagined, which you present repeatedly.
17. On the other hand, if Hanoi officials wish to proceed promptly to a total agreement representing the

terms of an agreed settlement, we are prepared to move along that track, including de-escalation as the
final item.
18. Perhaps the coming holidays and the truces associated with them offer an opportune occasion to take
some useful steps along these lines. This in turn should make it easier for the authorities in Hanoi to
proceed then to discuss the other matters standing between us and a peaceful settlement."
Gronouski
346. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, December 19, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 9:06 p.m.
1513. Ref: Warsaw 1508./2/
/2/Document 345.
1. I opened by saying that my presentation was going to be unusually lengthy but that I felt it important
at this stage to have before the Polish Govt as full a statement of the USG position as possible. I then
commenced reading statement in reftel.
2. After para 9, Rapacki asked where the missile sites are that our pilots are authorized to hit. I answered
that I did not know their specific location but I presumed that they were in vicinity of vehicle depot and
railroad yards.
3. When I finished reading the first sentence of para 12 reftel (saying Polish Govt must bear
responsibility), Rapacki banged his fist on the table vigorously and in great agitation said, "Stop! I will
hear no more of this." In angry tone, Rapacki said he categorically rejected this attempt to shift
responsibility to Poles, that responsibility is squarely on us for destroying chance for peace talks, and
that our attempt to shift responsibility is wholly unprecedented and unwarranted.
4. I started to fold my notes but Rapacki, the storm having receded, said that he was keenly disappointed
in what I had said so far because he had anticipated, when I asked for appointment today, that I had
information to present to him that would be helpful in reducing the suspicions in Hanoi that had led to
their asking the Poles to break off these discussions. I said I wanted to express our continuing desire to
move toward peace and our conviction that best road to take is one of direct discussions with Hanoi's
representatives. (Thus I resumed reftel remarks starting with para 14 and continuing through para 18.)
(Comment: Inasmuch as Rapacki had gotten point on responsibility and given his reaction to the first
sentence, I thought it best to pass over remarks from second sentence para 12 through para 13.)
5. Rapacki referred to our last meeting in which he had said it was difficult to believe words of USG
representatives as they relate to position of USG and that in future Poles would be influenced only by
facts. "Yet I find in your remarks," he said, "no facts." He said that USG, after nullifying that possibility
of meeting NVN representatives in Warsaw, is ignoring everything that has happened and maintaining
that nothing has happened; this in total disregard of everything that brought on nullification. He said,
"Nothing in your statement is a new fact, even the last paragraph referring to holiday suspension of

bombing." He added, "You must realize that this suspension of bombing is taking place during a period
of escalation; that taking up Warsaw talks during holiday suspension, immediately after intensification
of bombing and in midst of escalation, could give rise to misgivings and suspicions in Hanoi that such
meetings were result of military pressure." He alluded to the statement he had previously attributed to
Lodge that US wants to avoid impression that talks are response to bombing suspension. Yet, he said, all
USG actions are contrary to Lodge; "What you have said to me today does not dispel the concern that
negotiations now would be the result of bombing pressure." He noted that after experience of first part
of this month, we have to take account of sensitivity of Hanoi.
6. Rapacki said that only conclusion he could draw from our assertion that our bombs did not fall on
residential districts of Hanoi is that military has not informed the govt of the character and facts of the
bombing. He said, "I could admit to this idea, but I also must assume that you transmitted to your govt
accurately our concern about the negative impact that bombing of Hanoi and the escalation of bombing
of NVN would have on the possibilities of Warsaw talks. Having been warned of this and having
accepted responsibility for the bombing intensification that occurred, there is no basis whatsoever for
allegations that it is our responsibility."
7. Rapacki added that in Saigon Lewandowski had declared in a most formal way that bombing should
be stopped in any case. He added that in subsequent Warsaw meetings they had told us that we had
weakened our position because of the interpretation clause; that we had changed our position. "Now," he
said, "you want to shift to Poles responsibility for introducing new elements."
8. "As to bombing," he said, "we have warned repeatedly against escalation at precise time discussions
are under consideration; yet you went right ahead and escalated your bombing. Having done so you
assumed responsibility and your attempt now to shift it to us is unprecedented and cynical."
9. With respect to bombing of Hanoi, he said bombing of railroad yards was presumably more important
to USG than chance for peace. He said not just Poles but the whole world press is outraged by this. He
repeated what he had said during previous meetings that this Dec. 3 resumption of bombing "came
precisely when we received more than a signal from Hanoi." He added that Poles did not put forth new
conditions but "recalling speeches of Goldberg, the President, Secy Rusk and others, once we received
the signal we did we would have had every right to call for a stop in the bombing." He said, "You have
said over and over again that you would end all bombing if there was an assurance from Hanoi that there
would be a response toward peace from Hanoi; however, we did not ask that you stop bombing but only
that you not intensify it."
10. With respect to bombing of city of Hanoi, Rapacki read from what he referred to as "on the spot
report from ICC in Hanoi" saying that a workingman's residential district called Fukton (phonetic) was
completely destroyed; two trade union buildings, university, and Chinese Embassy were damaged, and
bombs fell 200 meters from Polish Embassy. He said in face of this evidence it is hard to take seriously
the assertion that there is no evidence our bombs fell in Hanoi.
11. I said that since our last meeting I have consulted with Washington on all matters relating to our last
two conversations, that we had made an exhaustive study aimed at determining whether or not our
bombs landed in residential sections of Hanoi, and that not one shred of evidence had turned up to
indicate that they did. I said I am further personally convinced that we have never during this war
selected a residential area as a bombing target. All of our targets had been related to military activity and
we have avoided many targets that could be designated as military simply because they were located in
built-up areas. I said I served on a bomber during World War II and I know it is inevitable that
occasionally the target is missed and a bomb goes astray, but we found no evidence that this happened
on Dec. 13 and 14.

12. Rapacki said, "Your whole presentation today cannot be described except as confirmation of fears
that USG has decided to withdraw from attitude expressed by Lodge, has chosen a brutal way to do this,
and is now trying to twist facts and shift responsibility to Poland. I reject categorically," he went on, "as
outright cynical the statement on Poland's being responsible for postponement of Warsaw meetings. The
Warsaw meetings were bombed by the U.S."
13. Referring to suggestions I made in paras 16 and 17 reftel, he said, "I am astonished that at same time
you accuse us of stalling talks, you ask us to help you get them going again." He added that Poland
rejects categorically our analysis, our accusations against Poland and the NVN side, and sees no new
elements in last part of my statement. Inasmuch as NVN asked Poles to discontinue these discussions,
what was new to justify returning to NVN on this matter? Rapacki continued, "I suspect that if we did
approach Hanoi their response would be that USG has proposed nothing new which would overcome the
reason why Hanoi asked for discontinuation of talks in the first place."
14. I said it wasn't a question of something new as much as it was a question of bending every effort to
bring two govts together to negotiate the end of this war. I continued that we should not deny the
elementary fact that both sides in this war are continuing their military action, and neither side will let
up until such time as they find some basis for gaining confidence that the other side prefers a negotiated
peace to continued war. I added that the only way I know for the development of such confidence is for
both sides to lay their positions side by side on a conference table, see how far they are apart, and make
an attempt through negotiations to bring them together.
15. I said the longer we wait the worse the situation becomes, adding that reasons can always be found
to keep negotiations from happening. I said that we must face the fact that unless we find some way to
cut through and get negotiations started bombing and military action will go on and on, making it
increasingly difficult to find a solution.
16. I said we should realize that antagonists in a war are naturally suspicious of each other. I added that I
have a firm knowledge and personal conviction that President Johnson is deeply committed to
negotiating a peaceful solution to the war, but I cannot frankly say that I have the same confidence in
Hanoi's desire for negotiations. Many people in the U.S. and elsewhere believe that Hanoi is not
interested in negotiation; that NVN officials want to continue the war because of their expectations that
the U.S. will eventually lose its will to continue and Hanoi will thereby win by default. I added that from
our conversations I gained some hope that Hanoi wanted to enter negotiations, but frankly I was not
confident that this was the case.
17. I said that until we can get both sides together this confidence will never develop. I continued, this is
your basic reason for trying again with Hanoi; to convince them to at least start the negotiations. If the
peace negotiations fail we haven't lost anything, but we cannot hope to gain until we get the two sides
together.
18. Rapacki referred again to absence of anything new and asked how I expected Hanoi to change its
position of last week when Poles were asked to break off discussions. I said I hope there was somebody
making as strong a presentation and putting as much pressure on Hanoi to come to the negotiating table
as the Poles were putting on us. Rapacki replied with reference to those who are attempting to convince
Hanoi to come to the negotiating table, saying whenever they feel that they are making progress the U.S.
bombs their efforts.
19. At the end Rapacki had mellowed a bit, saying that of course if we convey to Hanoi everything you
told us today we will destroy any possibility of their engaging in negotiations. Rapacki did not say Poles

would take any further action; neither, however, did he say they would not./3/
/3/The Department of State responded to this telegram and telegram 1508 (Document 345) in telegram
105909 to Warsaw, December 20, proposing that Gronouski return to Washington for a day or two of
consultations. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
Gronouski
347. Draft Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
(Bundy)/1/
Washington, December 21, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret.
1967 AND BEYOND IN VIETNAM
The Rostow and Komer papers/2/ provide a basis for a very large area of agreement on the action
programs we should attempt to follow during 1967. These could be summarized in a single action
program, subject to the vital caveat of maintaining flexibility at all times. Nonetheless, the general
outlines of what we want to do seem fairly clear.
/2/Attachments to Documents 318 and 319.
However, these two papers do not fully consider three inter-related factors that must enter into our
present thinking:
A. The prospect of the 1968 US elections and their impact on our ability to maintain a prolonged
struggle.
B. The question of negotiation, including specifically the possibility of attempting a direct "package
deal" negotiation with Hanoi--and above all the question any such deal would necessarily raise of just
what risks we might be prepared to assume in connection with a VC/NLF role in South Vietnam.
C. The vital importance of developing a responsible and effective GVN, and whether this argues in some
ways against certain types of US involvement and action that might, in the short-term sense, appear to
make sense.
These three factors are the subject of this memorandum. However, it must start with a median prognosis
of what we can hope to achieve by the end of 1967 and mid-1968, when the impact of the US election
will start to become really acute.
In brief, such a median prognosis, in our judgment, is not comforting. 1967 will be slow going at best on
the pacification front, as the Komer paper admits; however effectively we organize the US side, ARVN
will take time to do a passable job of security for pacification, and the mainspring of GVN government
performance--already showing signs of slowing down because of a pervading "caretaker" spirit--is most
unlikely to have shown really sharp improvement by the end of 1967 at least. The very existence of a
timetable for a new type of government is bound to create continuing uncertainty, at least until late in
the year, in the tenure and position of key government and province officials on whom any real progress
in pacification ultimately depends. In short, even if the GVN and we both do the best we possibly can,

the odds are on the whole against a major strengthening of the GVN position or a true crack in
NVA/VC/NLF morale during 1967. The possibility of such a morale break is present, but its chances
cannot be rated better than about one in three for 1967.
We believe that it is against such a prognosis that we must weigh the three factors stated above.
A.
We are not the proper experts to appraise just what the 1968 election campaign would be like if the
situation reaches that date without clearly evident signs of major progress. On the merits, it seems
unlikely that an opposing candidate--be he Romney/3/ or anyone else--will be able to present the
American people with a clear and convincing alternative to the policy we will have been pursuing. On
the whole, we will probably see a Republican strategy of trying to have it both ways--claiming that more
might have been done (although with emphasis on bombing the North alone probably rather muted),
while at the same time arguing that possibilities for peace have somehow been neglected and that a
Republican administration, as would be alleged of Korea, can find the right handle of threatening greater
force and thus bringing about peace.
/3/George W. Romney, Governor of Michigan and a Republican.
The point really may be much less what the Republican Party appears to offer than the basic fact of a
prolonged and diffuse national debate. Whether or not such a debate brings the Republicans to power-however important in itself--may be secondary to the effect of the debate alone in weakening and
dividing Americans. However the election comes out, a sharp deepening of the kind of malaise so
clearly evident in the 1966 Congressional election would leave any repeat any newly elected
administration in a much weaker position to carry the conflict forward.
Worst of all, this is almost certainly the way Hanoi would calculate it. In a revealing remark only the
other day, the North Vietnamese representative in Paris said in effect that Hanoi had only to hang on
through the 1968 elections, and that only a Republican, or Conservative, administration could liquidate
"wars or empires."/4/ Apart from this being the way Hanoi would interpret a possible Republican
victory, they would almost certainly interpret a Democratic victory, after a sharply divisive campaign, as
indicating that we would weaken in due course.
/4/This remark by Mai Van Bo has not been further identified.
In short, under the median prognosis given above, mid-1968 and beyond looks all too likely to be a
period when the US position will be substantially weakened.
B.
These thoughts alone must lead us to the question of seeking in the meantime, and indeed as soon as
possible, to find a negotiated answer. Yet we must reckon, at the same time, that a negotiated
"settlement" that involved major early risks of Communist takeover--whether or not this had come about
before the 1968 elections--would in itself virtually doom the Administration to defeat and might well set
off a wave of isolationist revulsion against all of our now-promising efforts in the rest of East Asia.
Thus, we are not talking at all about "negotiation at any price" even from a domestic political standpoint.
Yet, the need for seeking a negotiated solution is still acute, and we must reckon that the bargaining
factors may now be very close indeed to a situation where both sides would see advantage in

negotiation. A recent detached paper by the Office of National Estimates/5/ points up the pressures and
difficulties not only in Hanoi but between Hanoi and Moscow and Peking. It concludes flatly that for the
first time in the last two years the present may be a time in which the other side would be prepared to
talk seriously about a peaceful settlement falling well short of its maximum objectives.
/5/See Document 328.
More specifically, whether the recent negotiating nibbles by third parties were authorized by Hanoi or
not, they most certainly indicate how very seriously the Soviets and Eastern Europeans are working
toward this end. They are very tough indeed--and some of them are slippery--but in the last analysis they
at least want Vietnam to end and would accept, we can be reasonably sure, a return to the Geneva status
quo, albeit with some measures for protecting the lives and the political role of present members of the
NLF and VC.
In short, the time is ripe. Moreover, the recent negotiating nibbles and the views of such responsible
third persons as Sainteny all point in the direction of discussions being initiated on the basis of the
outlines of a total settlement, i.e., what we have called the "package deal." The recent Cooper paper/6/
comes very close indeed to the kind of package we might try to work out, although it is very much open
to question whether we should table the whole thing as flatly as that paper indicates, at the outset.
/6/Memorandum from Cooper to Katzenbach, December 1, entitled "A Package Deal for Hanoi," which
was discussed at the December 1 meeting of Harriman's Negotiations Committee. (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET)
From the standpoint of our over-all pattern of action, there is one clear implication that must not be
overlooked. If we are to pursue a serious negotiating track on a "package deal" basis, we simply must
accept that we will not hit politically sensitive targets, and specifically the Hanoi and Haiphong areas,
while we are pursuing such a track. Whether or not the nibbles of November and December 1966 were
actually author-ized, their present status has undoubtedly been communicated to Hanoi with the
conclusion that the US cannot be serious as long as it even appears to escalate the bombing in this
politically sensitive sense. Moreover, there is rather more murky evidence from August of 1965 that
Hanoi is sensitive to apparent escalation. We have brought them to the point where they may understand
and accept continuation of the bombing at its present levels and target patterns, but they simply will not
enter into serious discussions if we appear to be escalating, particularly during key periods of contact.
The second major implication of seriously pursuing a negotiating track is that we must face as nearly
exactly as possible the risks that we are prepared to run of an ultimate Communist takeover. Right from
the beginning, and specifically in the planning papers of 1964, our analysis in the Department--then
regarded as heretical by our military--was that there was a certain irreducible minimum possibility of
Communist takeover that could not be avoided in the best of circumstances. The Manila commitment for
withdrawal--and the practical reality behind that commitment that we simply cannot effectively occupy
South Vietnam for any long period--simply underscore that at some point we have to accept, say, a 20%
chance that the South Vietnam we leave behind will so mismanage its affairs that it will eventually fall
prey to the highly disciplined NLF and VC organization, even if the latter is then receiving only the
most covert assistance from the North.
The issue is whether we should be prepared to accept a settlement that increases the irreducible 20% to
perhaps 30%, or more. As of now, a guaranteed institutional NLF role in the government appears to
raise the risk to something on the order of 60 to 70%, and we would now reject it as unacceptable. But,
short of this point, the question of safeguards at successive stages, and possibly the question of

accepting NLF individuals into the political structure at a senior level, raise these marginal issues of
acceptability that might turn out to be the very crux of getting an agreement.
This paper does not assess exactly what concessions we might make that involve these greater degrees
of risk. But it does flag the vital importance of our looking hard at this issue, as indeed we are doing in
the analysis of the Cooper proposal.
C.
Finally, there is the question of building up the GVN. All of us, in mid-1965, foresaw a danger that a
massive American presence would simply smother the GVN, and inhibit the very development of
responsibility and effectiveness that is the object of the whole exercise. To some degree, this has plainly
already been the case, and continued massive infusions on the US side, or especially the US taking over
where it does not absolutely have to (as it may on the economic front), will simply deepen the problem.
The marginal issues in the assessment of our action programs for 1967 must be weighed heavily from
the standpoint of this intangible factor, and not merely on the basis of such clear and concrete inhibiting
elements as the piaster budget ceiling (although we think our conclusions from the latter have been
wise).
The point--and a most difficult one--is that, unless an added US element really changes the prognosis
very markedly, we should be leery of such added elements wherever possible. This might be true in any
event and on any timetable of the GVN being on its own. But it is particularly acute if we visualize a
serious effort to work out some negotiated arrangement that puts the GVN in this position by mid-1968.
348. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, December 21, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 8:07 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 311.
1535. Reference: State 105909./2/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 346.
1. I saw Rapacki 1800 Dec. 21 and explained trip to U.S., economic discussions excuse for trip, and fact
that DCM is fully briefed on our discussions and would be available to continue discussions during my
absence.
2. I asked Rapacki to clarify for me the role that Hanoi played in our discussions. Rapacki replied that
the message Lewandowski gave to Lodge (he referred to "three sentences") upon his return from Hanoi
expressing NVN positive response to Warsaw talks, Rapacki's warning after the Dec. 3 bombing, that
Hanoi would have to reassess the situation, and the decision to terminate discussions in Warsaw were all
decisions by NVN which were conveyed to us by the Poles. He said further that comments Poles made
regarding danger of creating the impression of pressure on Hanoi were comments of the Polish Govt, but
the fears that Poles expressed in this regard were verified subsequently by Hanoi. He also said that
during process of Warsaw discussions there were a number of other exchanges between Warsaw and
Hanoi, adding that the Poles are confident that what they expressed on their own initiative accurately
reflected Hanoi's opinion.

3. Rapacki then made the point, in reference to our accusation that Poles have raised new conditions
since talks shifted to Warsaw, that interpretation clause question was raised by Lewandowski
immediately upon hearing it expressed by Lodge on Dec. 3. He said "Clearly you know that we felt this
was a matter of concern from the very beginning; it wasn't something interjected as a new condition
afterwards." He added, "Our concern was well taken because the reaction to interpretation clause from
Hanoi turned out to be what we predicted."
4. He expressed pleasure that I was going to Washington, noting that telegraphic communication is less
than completely satisfactory in conveying all the nuances of positions and attitudes, and expressed hope
that I would convey to Washington Poland's dedication to solving the VN war. He also observed that the
critical problem of bringing Hanoi to the conference table involves question of pressure; that Hanoi
could never respond to pressure or give the impression that it was responding to pressure. This, he said,
is the reason why the bombing issue is so important.
5. Rapacki added that the main problem at this point is the lack of confidence developed in Hanoi
subsequent to the Dec. 3 bombing. He added that at time Lewandowski left Hanoi NVN officials were
convinced that USG was genuinely interested in a negotiated settlement, but that after Dec. 3 and
subsequent bombing attacks on Hanoi NVN concluded that U.S. was attempting to bring pressure on
them to negotiate, to improve its tactical position in order to win greater concessions from Hanoi, or to
sabotage the whole peace effort. He said what is needed now is to restore the degree of confidence in
U.S. intention that existed in Hanoi at the time Lewandowski was there. He said, "If you genuinely want
to initiate negotiations, this is the problem you face."
6. Re State 106358,/3/ I have appointment 0100 hours December 22 with Minister Rapacki. Will report
following meeting. Intend to maintain Warsaw 1529 schedule unless advised to the contrary./4/
/3/See footnote 2, Document 349.
/4/In telegram 1529 from Warsaw, December 21, Gronouski indicated that he planned to leave Warsaw
for Washington on December 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
Gronouski left Washington to return to Warsaw on the evening of December 23, arriving in Warsaw on
December 24. (Telegram 107809 to Warsaw, December 23; ibid.)
Gronouski
349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/
Washington, December 23, 1966, 4:21 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority;
Nodis; Marigold. Drafted and approved by Read. In a telephone conversation with the President at 1:01
p.m. on December 23, McNamara informed Johnson that Wheeler had agreed to the action authorized in
this telegram. Johnson then asked McNamara, "Would it give you any problem, do you think, before the
hawks later on in your testimony?" McNamara responded, "I don't think so. We wrote this first to try to
get these things [talks] started but secondly, in the event they don't start and this thing all leaks, to have a
reasonable position with both the hawks and doves." Johnson then said, "All right, it's OK with
me." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between
Johnson and McNamara, Tape F6612.03, PNO 1) At 4:08 p.m. on December 23, the JCS notified
CINCPAC in telegram 2135 that "until further notice from JCS you will not conduct air operations that
involve attacks against targets within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi." (Department of Defense, Records

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Section 13, Rolling Thunder 52)
107911. The following four paragraphs are intended to replace paragraph 2 of State 106358/2/ and are
transmitted for Ambassador's use tomorrow after his return and to obviate his carrying sensitive message
on flight.
/2/Paragraph 2 of telegram 106358 to Warsaw, December 21, informed Gronouski that the United States
was "prepared to state that there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city center . . . for an
indefinite period if talks with North Vietnamese can be gotten underway shortly." It also stated that
"reciprocal action with respect to bombs, mortar and similar terrorist activities within ten miles of the
center of Saigon . . . would be anticipated by us as evidence of good faith." (Department of State,
Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD) In telegram 1537 from Warsaw, December 22,
Gronouski reported on Rapacki's reaction to the U.S. proposal. Noting that it linked U.S. action to an
appropriate step by Hanoi in the Saigon area and appeared to make U.S. action dependent on a signal
from Hanoi that contact would be established, Rapacki stated that he preferred to delay a day or two
before transmitting the proposal to Hanoi. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Vietnam, box 147, Marigold; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 313314)
Begin Text: In our discussions you have repeatedly stated that bombing in the vicinity of Hanoi during
the first half of December has created the impression in Hanoi that we are attempting to pressure Hanoi
into beginning negotiations. This suspicion on Hanoi's part, you have stressed, has created a serious
impediment to the beginning of the projected Warsaw talks.
We have pointed out that this is not the case; that there is no basis for concluding that our pattern of
bombing has been altered in any way with the intention of creating such pressure. However, we want to
leave no stone unturned to get negotiations started. We are assuming that you share our interest in the
early commencement of direct negotiations between the United States Government and North
Vietnamese representatives.
With this in mind we have removed what you regard as the major impediment to the initiation of direct
United States Government-North Vietnamese negotiations. We have issued orders to insure that there
will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city center measured from 21 degrees 1 minute 37
seconds north, 105 degrees 51 minutes 21 seconds east, for an indefinite period. If we have understood
you correctly, this action by us will permit the Warsaw talks to begin promptly.
Let me add, Mr. Rapacki, that in judging as to whether Hanoi is as interested in successful negotiations
as we are, we would be impressed by similar restraint on their part. This could take the form of a
suspension of incidents in the area of Saigon, or a redisposition of North Vietnamese forces in the area
of the DMZ, or action affecting infiltration. Perhaps other examples will occur to the other side. End
Text.
Rusk
350. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Washington, December 24, 1966, 2142Z.
/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top

Secret. Repeated to General Westmoreland.

A. JCS 2135/232114Z Dec 66./2/
/2/See footnote 1, Document 349.
1. We were just starting to put some real pressure on Hanoi. Our air strikes on the rail yard and the
vehicle depot were hitting the enemy where it was beginning to hurt. Then, Hanoi complains that we
have killed a few civilians, hoping that they would get a favorable reaction. And they did, more than
they could have hoped for.
Not only did we say we regretted it if any civilians were killed but we also stopped our pilots from
striking within ten miles of Hanoi. Hanoi has been successful once again in getting the pressure
removed. They will be encouraged to continue their aggression, hoping to outlast us.
2. With nearly 400,000 U.S. fighting men in RVN it must be apparent to Hanoi that they can't take over
the country by force. But they can fight a protracted guerrilla war, terrorize the countryside, make
revolutionary development very difficult, and kill a lot of people, including Americans. This kind of war
can go on for a long time if we let them get away with it.
3. My limited sounding of public opinion, including the thoughts of quite a few members of Congress,
leads me to believe that we had better do what we can to bring this war to a successful conclusion as
rapidly as possible. The American people can become aroused either for or against this war. At the
moment, with no end in sight, they are more apt to become aroused against it. It's up to us to convince
our people and Hanoi that there is an end in sight and that it is clearly defeat for Hanoi. However, our
actions these last few days can only encourage the enemy to continue.
4. When Hanoi complains about civilians being killed, is it not possible to say, "Perhaps some were
killed, we try to avoid that, but this is a war and some civilians are bound to get killed. Hanoi can
prevent it by calling off the aggression in SVN."
5. If the enemy avoids major engagements in SVN and gets back to Phase II of their plan, the guerrilla
phase, then it becomes urgently important to step up the pressure in the North by hitting targets that hurt
them. And if some civilians get killed in the course of these stepped up air attacks, we should recognize
it as part of the increased pressure. This war is a dirty business, like all wars. We need to get hardheaded about it. That is the only kind of action that these tough Communists will respect. That is the
way to get this war over soonest.
6. Let's roll up our sleeves and get on with this war. We have the power. I would like authority to use it.
We should be authorized to hit all RT 52 targets. The restrictions of Ref A should be removed. And then
when Hanoi screams in anguish, we should hit them again.
7. I realize that there are other considerations which are important in Washington. It is my duty,
however, to report to you my strong belief that we need to change some aspects of our current posture as
the enemy must view it. This I have done. Warm regards.
351. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, December 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received
at 8:20 p.m.
1555. Reference: State 107911./2/
/2/Document 349.
1. At 1900 Warsaw time Dec 24, accompanied by DCM, I called on Rapacki (Michalowski and
Janczewski were present). After opening pleasantries about Christmas Eve, I read text of reftel. I
reiterated our willingness to talk with NVN representatives in Warsaw or, if NVN prefers, in another
third country.
2. I then mentioned current discussion of the possibility of an ICC meeting in New Delhi,/3/ which I
termed a good idea for two reasons: (1) they might be substantively helpful; and (2) if they took place,
they would distract attention from the Warsaw discussions. I expressed our hope that Poles would give
this proposal most serious consideration.
/3/In telegram 9077 from Paris, December 14, Rusk, who was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting,
reported that Paul Martin told him that morning that Canada had received a proposal from the Indian
Government for the ICC countries to meet shortly in New Delhi. (Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD) In telegrams 105378 and 105380, December 19, the Department of
State briefed six Embassies on the proposed ICC meeting. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S and POL 27-14 VIET,
respectively)
3. After thanking me for trouble I had taken in going to Washington, Rapacki expressed regret that this
action had not occurred Dec 4 or earlier. Had that been the case, he said, we might already have first
Warsaw meeting behind us and have good results by now.
4. Rapacki referred to his doubts about our Dec 22 proposal (Warsaw 1537)/4/ stating that we now have
come in with a concrete proposal which Poles will immediately transmit to Hanoi. While unwilling to
directly predict when we can expect Hanoi's response, during later discussion of timing of my Garmisch
trip, he referred to unlikelihood of response in next day or two in matter which leads me to believe he
expects fairly quick response.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 349, for a summary of the December 22 proposal and Rapacki's reaction,
which was reported in telegram 1537 from Warsaw.
5. I asked if he would permit me to express my personal views on reftel proposal. I said I had gone to
Washington bearing in mind the problems which Rapacki felt were impediments to initiation of talks
and that I believe Washington has responded very positively to Rapacki's views. I pointed out that our
elimination of bombing around Hanoi had gone beyond his concern about intensification of bombing,
noting that in the Hanoi area we had in effect implemented Phase A of the two-phase proposal,
negotiation of which was agreed to be first order of business after the beginning of negotiations.
6. I added that in our Dec 22 proposal, by making stopping of Hanoi bombing conditional on a sign from
Hanoi with respect to Viet Cong actions in area of Saigon, Rapacki had expressed concern that we were
still trying to put pressure on Hanoi. I said that the present proposal eliminates this concern, because the
order to stop bombing was ordered yesterday and thus could not be regarded as a contingent action. I
added that our proposal for Hanoi to take some reciprocal action as an indication of good faith should be

read in the context of the basic necessity of both sides taking reciprocal actions once negotiations get
underway.
7. I concluded by referring to Rapacki's Dec 22 hope that I could bring back a message to convey to
Hanoi which would be easier for him to give his blessing. I said I hope he agrees with me that this is the
case.
8. Rapacki replied that present proposal has eliminated problem as far as bombing of Hanoi is concerned
and modified his objections to the second point (Saigon). He noted, however, that we must distinguish
between NVN and actions around Saigon which are an NLF matter, adding that he can well imagine
Hanoi's response to this suggestion. I pointed out that we had not limited our present proposal to Saigon,
but had noted that many alternatives are available to Hanoi.
9. Rapacki then said that he would like to look for other ways to get a more favorable start to talks but at
this point any comments would be in his own name and not appropriate. He did not exclude the
possibility that after hearing Hanoi's response the Poles might make proposals to both sides. (Comment:
Rapacki gave no hint but could conceivably have reference to second sentence para 16, Warsaw 1508:/5/
"On the other hand, the NVN may prefer in the initial stages to deal through the Polish Govt.")
/5/Document 345.
10. Rapacki then expressed hope that U.S. order terminating bombing around Hanoi was more than
simply a gambit to get negotiations started, and that it pointed way to an attitude that other drastic steps
elsewhere would not be taken which would interfere with getting negotiations started. When asked for
clarification, he repeated that he hoped that drastic action would be avoided elsewhere as well as Hanoi-possibly action initiated by those opposed to negotiations--so that Hanoi bombing cessation could be
viewed as symbol of a trend toward a future broader approach.
11. I replied that I hope he was not looking on our cessation of the Hanoi bombing merely as one phase
of a trend in our actions to get negotiations started. I regard it as a measure which removed the
impediment to initiation of negotiations which you yourself had singled out. I said there are two sides to
the picture, and in Washington there are those who have real questions about drastic actions around
Saigon during the critical phase of discussions in the first half of December. I emphasized that the
quicker we get talks going, the better the opportunity to avoid such problems in the future. (Comment:
At this point, Michalowski nodded his head affirmatively, as he had done on a previous occasion when I
made a similar remark.)
12. I discussed briefly advisability of my joining family in Garmisch for Christmas, noting fact DCM
Jenkins could notify me, at moment's notice, if something comes in from Hanoi. Rapacki concurred that
this would work out all right.
13. I am leaving for Garmisch morning Dec 25 and returning Dec 27 unless DCM informs me of
necessity to return sooner./6/
/6/On December 25 the President and Rusk had the following exchange regarding Marigold during an
11-minute telephone conversation that began at 7:45 p.m.:"President: I've never thought it was anything
but propaganda but maybe we're wrong. I gather you are more hopeful."Rusk: Only marginally because
I don't think the intermediary is very good on this. I think he's playing a separate hand there and I don't
like the way he's handled it very much." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of
Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape F6612.03, PNO 2)

Gronouski
352. Editorial Note
On December 25, 1966, The New York Times published the first of 15 dispatches from North Vietnam
by Assistant Managing Editor Harrison E. Salisbury. The dispatches reported on the situation in North
Vietnam and the effects of U.S. bombing, implying that U.S. aircraft were regularly striking civilian
areas. During his 2-week stay in North Vietnam, Salisbury talked with North Vietnamese officials and
private citizens and toured Hanoi and a number of towns and villages. Salisbury's last dispatch from
North Vietnam appeared in The New York Times on January 9, 1967, but upon departing the country he
filed an additional eight dispatches from Hong Kong "summing up observations on his visit to North
Vietnam." These articles appeared in The New York Times between January 11 and January 18, 1967.
For Salisbury's account of his trip to North Vietnam, published in 1967, see Behind the Lines--Hanoi,
December 23, 1966-January 7, 1967. For a description of the controversy in the United States touched
off by Salisbury's dispatches, see William Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 19621968 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988), pages 274-279. The Department of State
discussed the dispatches in a 7-page telegram to all diplomatic posts, December 31, stating that they
were "based to a large extent on official North Vietnamese information" and contained inaccuracies but
could not "be dismissed out of hand." (Circular telegram 111162; Department of State, Central Files,
POL 27 VIET S) The Department provided material discussing Salisbury's articles to British Foreign
Secretary George Brown on December 30. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) For
President Johnson's response when asked about the Salisbury articles at a news conference on December
31, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pages
1461-1462.
353. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson/1/
Washington, December 30, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret.
SUBJECT
Visit to Vietnam--December, 1966
Report and Recommendations
Most of this visit--my third in 1966--was spent outside Saigon in working sessions with US field teams
at the four regional/corps headquarters and at a province in each region--Thua Thien, Pleiku, Binh
Duong, Vinh Long. I also had useful talks with Porter and Westmoreland and their staffs, but my
impressions and recommendations in this memorandum are largely views from the field not Saigon.
My main purposes were (1) to consult with our field staffs on the non-military projects on which Bob
Komer and I have been working (2) to see what effect the civil side reorganization has had on field
operations (3) to find out more about what is being done to speed up pacification, including redirection
of ARVN assets to the hard tasks of local security which underlie Revolutionary Development.
1. Non-Military Programs
The main lines of our policies are moving ahead in all but one area--pacification. We have had a

minimum of strains in the massive and necessary build-up of US forces and economic assistance. We
have checked ruinous inflation, installed a basic set of stabilization controls, have a better understanding
of the Vietnamese market. We have made some improvement in the management and coordination of
our civil operations. We have helped launch a promising constitutional process which thus far the
Vietnamese have managed competently. There are stirrings toward a modern party system which, if
fostered skillfully, should reduce the religious-sectarian rivalries, North-South tensions, and civilmilitary suspicions that have riddled Vietnam.
But the GVN, as matters now stand, is likely to be an increasingly uncertain instrument in the first half
of 1967. On the tough policies which support our main lines, the GVN seems both less effective and
more reluctant to act.
At Saigon, despite continuing exhortation, the Mission has been unable to bring the GVN to decisions
on the stabilization agreement, port clearance, rice policy. Land reform, national reconciliation, anticorruption, new revenue measures remain on dead center. Little has been done to give content to the
GVN's Manila Declarations./2/ The Mission says that it is now holding 21 matters of importance which
Washington has instructed it to take up with the GVN and on which it has not been able to obtain
meaningful action.
/2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II,
pp. 1260-1261.
In the field, the situation may be worse. Our people complain of increasing GVN inertia or resistance
even within agreed policies. They say that, more than before, there are unnecessary delays and
unexplained evasions, lost files, inconclusive discussions, buck-passing of problems to Saigon--with few
results. They speak of the "porcupine tendency" of their counterparts: when prodded, they roll up and
when approached they shed needles.
What seems involved in all this is the lame duck psychology now strongly at work in Saigon and the
field. The 1967 elections will replace the Military Directorate, the Cabinet and most regional and
provincial officials. The spin-offs are familiar: at the political level--jockeying for election odds; at the
ministerial--difficulties in recruiting first-rate men; at the bureaucratic--reluctance to take decisions or
even deal with the papers.
As matters now stand, the prospect is that the gap will widen between a US sense of urgency that the
first six months of 1967 should be used to the full and GVN impulses to waffle until after the next
election. The basic question is--do we wait for a new GVN?
The stakes are too great for us to waste half this year. Moreover, we have no necessary reason to
suppose that a new GVN will act on matters which the Directorate has put off. It may be more reluctant
to do so on the grounds that it is more "nationalistic" or "independent" than its predecessor. So we
should press hard for what is crucial to us and for what we believe will shorten the war. We should try
for as many irreversible commitments to social change as we can obtain from the present GVN. If
persuasion and inducements are not enough, we must look to a more active use of leverage and influence
to accomplish what we consider important to us over the next six months--in terms of impact on
Vietnam and US public opinion.
On our own side, staffing at the Mission in Saigon and in the new Porter organization in the field will
require urgent attention this spring. Many of the key officers in Saigon and the field are now shorttermers. Among them: Habib (Political Counselor), Wehrle (Economic Counselor), Zorthian (JUSPAO

Director), Heymann (Regional Director--IV Corps). The turnover among middle grade officers in
substantive work and junior officers with Vietnamese language capability will be high. Few
replacements have yet been named.
Additionally about 1,200 US civilians are in process of being transferred to the new Porter organization.
Many of them will be in place only shortly before their tours are up. Moreover, we now have, or can
expect, requests for about 60 additional positions needed at regional and provincial levels.
Recruitment of first-rate people or voluntary extensions of duty remain severe problems, more difficult
perhaps because of the no-wife policy than for any other reason. We will need special priorities to meet
these requirements.
2. Civil-Side Reorganization and the Field
Whether Porter's new Office of Civil Operations (OCO) is viewed as a final organizational solution or as
an inevitable intermediate step it is achieving a number of useful purposes. It establishes, on the civil
side for the first time, unified inter-agency direction with a chain of command and communication from
Saigon to the regions and provinces. It centralizes US-GVN field coordination of civil matters in one US
official at each level. It affords a civil-side framework which can work more effectively with US
military for politico-military coordination and more integrated pacification planning.
At the time of my visit, OCO's impact had been felt mainly in Saigon. Its headquarters organization was
largely completed. Three of the four Regional Directors had been named, all were at work, and one was
in full time residence in his region. Regional staffs were being assembled but not yet in place. At
province level, teams were being interviewed for the selection of Provincial Representatives. Porter
expects them to be designated by January 1. Some slippage is possible, and it may be 90 days or so
before the new organization is functioning. I participated in the initial briefings of the province teams I
visited, passing along and emphasizing Bob Komer's admonitions against over-bureaucratization of
effort and for fast and hard action. These were well-received. Morale was good. All the GVN Province
Chiefs with whom I talked thought the new structure a great improvement.
But OCO's first test will come in the coordination of the out-of-phase GVN Revolutionary Development
Plan with the military's Combined Campaign Plan for 1967 and in the influence it can bring to bear on
the redirection of ARVN assets to the clear-and-hold operations which underlie RD. The next section
reviews the status of these matters.
3. Pacification: 1967
The lack of progress in pacification remains the crux of the Vietnam problem, largely determining
duration and extent of the war, persistence or fade-away of the NVA/VC forces, and the likelihood of
negotiations. We may get negotiations without an internal resolution of Vietnam's security situation. We
are unlikely to have negotiations or withdrawal without some significant progress toward genuine
pacification. Despite the substantial results our arms have achieved against the enemy's main force in
1966 and our civil successes, we have not yet found a way to assist the GVN to achieve continuous local
security below the provincial level--or to impose its obverse: continuous local insecurity for the VC
guerrillas. This is the gap in our line. Closing it is a major task for 1967.
The crucial inputs seem to me to be two: targetted civil-military planning at corps and province;
redirection of ARVN to clear-and-hold.

a. Civil-Military Planning
The lack of detailed, coordinated, and focused civil-military pacification planning is appalling. The
GVN's RD plans are built from the village level up. The military's Combined Campaign Plan (AB-142)
from the national level down. Different time schedules compound the problem. Scatteration of security
resources, RD cadre placement, economic development projects is the accepted order. At local levels we
lack a systematic means for reinforcing situations of strength or exploiting opportunities presented by
vigorous local leadership or favoring circumstances.
The critical factor is the interface between civil and military programs. In the field this does not yet
exist. AB-142 has been sent to Corps for detailed corps and sector planning. Final corps plans were due
in Saigon on December 15 but had not yet been examined by any civilian agency for compatibility with
RD cadre and police positioning, other GVN inputs, or the distribution of US economic projects and
commodities. None of the civilian Regional Directors or provincial staffs with whom I talked knew of
GVN plans for the time-phasing and deployment of the retrained ARVN battalions that are to be
assigned to clear-and-hold in the regions or provinces of their responsibility.
The need is to convert the largely separate functional planning of the past into integrated area planning
based on provinces, districts, villages and lines of communication. The new plans should set concrete
and detailed local goals, concentrate resources for their achievement, be developed on predictable force
allocations and time-phasing, and coordinate civil and military means. This concept is generally
accepted at Saigon. But at no corps or province I visited has this type of planning process been begun.
b. ARVN Redirection
In my report to you on August 30, I referred to the MACV effort to improve the quality and
effectiveness of GVN forces as "the most significant event now taking place in Vietnam." The effort has
since gained some momentum. Manila provided a powerful new impetus.
At the top of the GVN, there seems complete agreement. Thieu and Ky are abundantly on record. The
Minister of Defense, General Co, spoke to me privately and eloquently on the need for a change in
ARVN attitudes towards the civil population, retraining in tactics, new pacification medals and
promotion criteria based on RD accomplishments, and tighter discipline and mobile court martials (to
try offenders in the locale of their misdeeds). The rhetoric could not have been improved. And all is not
words. At II Corps, I was told that General Vinh Loc had submitted his 1967 campaign plan using all of
his 22 battalions on search-and-destroy. He was called in to Saigon, put on the carpet successively by
Ky and Co, and told to redo it. His plan now assigns 10 of his 22 battalions to retraining for clear-andhold.
Yet in the field a different view emerges. None of the MACV advisers I met at sector or sub-sector level
believes that the job is being attacked with sufficient urgency, comprehension or scope. They have much
skepticism about retraining plans based on 14 ARVN teams, one for each division and corps, each
receiving a two-week training course and sent out to lecture individual ARVN battalions from January
through August 1967. They speak of long-standing reforms in attitude, behavior, and tactics needed and
unlikely to be produced quickly by troop indoctrination courses. They note resistance developing on the
part of ARVN officers who feel they are about to be downgraded from combat to secondary missions.
They suspect this attitude is not dissimilar to the preference for combat over pacification or advisor duty
held by many US officers. Generally, they favor a more comprehensive approach: improvements in
ARVN living standards and dependent care, more use of combined US/ARVN units for clear-and-hold,
an upgrading of advisor rank, and greater participation by MACV to speed up the redirection process.

Underlying these matters, there was a deeper division of US opinion on priorities in the Vietnam war
than I had previously found. The split was more in evidence in the field than in Saigon where daily
relationships cushion acerbities of opinion. The controversy concerns the relation between the main
force and the guerrilla threats, tends to polarize on civil-military lines (although there are dissenters on
each), and centers on differences in estimates of NVA/VC order-of-battle, infiltration, and recruitment in
the south.
a. The military generally argue the unresolved and increasing main force threat and view the guerrillas
and their political infrastructure as a supporting arm which can be readily dealt with once the main force
war is won. They accept a main force O/B of 175 NVA/VC battalions, substantial deployment of main
force units inside Cambodia, monthly average rates of infiltration from the north at 8,600 for calendar
1966, and steadily rising, VC recruitment in the south at 3,500 a month, and have much skepticism
about reports of declining VC morale and capacity. These projections dictate an emphasis on one kind of
war.
b. The civilians stress the VC guerrillas and their political apparatus as the decisive enemy; view the
NVA main force as a supporting and reactive arm; question the current intelligence estimates. They
argue the Maoist theory that in highly developed nations, control of the central government and the
cities ensures eventual control of the countryside; but that in Vietnam, as in most weak and
underdeveloped states, the opposite is the more likely case: domination of rural areas will strangle the
cities and eventually wear out the center. They emphasize that none of the indices of pacification
progress shows much advance: secured hamlets, cleared roads and canals, collected rice, destroyed
enemy infrastructure, arrested subversives. They center on Viet Cong assassinations of village officials
and hamlet chiefs which will total more than 3,500 for 1966 and on forcible abductions which will be
over 6,000. (For the month of November, the respective figures were 123 VC assassinations and 503
abductions.) In their view the shortest route to the enfeeblement or withdrawal of the NVA/VN main
force is the destruction of the totalitarian revolutionary apparatus in the south and its replacement by a
broad base of popular support for the GVN in the districts and villages and hamlets of Vietnam.
It will be useful to end or narrow this cleavage quickly if it is possible to do so. There will be no black
or white choice. But it is central to planning, strategy, training schedules, deployments (both US and
GVN), an appropriate mix in the allocation of resources, and the emphasis to be applied to ARVN
retraining. It is producing stresses and strains between the civil and military establishments at Saigon
and in the field. These may grow worse. More importantly this unresolved difference, if prolonged, will
impede concentration on the main vulnerabilities of the enemy.
(I think it right that you have my personal view on what is implicit in this entire section. The civil-side
reorganization is a move in the right direction. It should be fully supported and given every opportunity
over a reasonable period to succeed. If it works it will have other advantages as well. But I remain
doubtful that we can get pacification moving quickly or effectively enough with the present organization
or that we will have the requisite planning, retraining, and leverage applied to ARVN until MACV is
tasked with a single responsibility for the pacification program.)
4. Recommendations
a. The Next Six Months: Reduce the number of items now being negotiated at Saigon. Reset our
priorities in terms of what is crucial for us. My own choices would be: ARVN redirection, economic
stabilization, a national reconciliation program, local elections.
b. GVN Inertia: Reexamine and recapture the leverage of our aid programs, regain MAP control,

reestablish flexibility in counterpart disbursal, commodity deliveries and budget support.

Our threats to use such pressures in 1966 have been too ad hoc and sporadic. If you approve, Komer and
I will organize an interagency lev-erage study to develop a system of graduated pressures and a scenario
for applying them to our priority purposes within the limits of our legislation and our agreements with
the GVN. The aim would be to produce a set of well-ordered contingency actions whenever decision is
made to invoke them. But this will be a painful process and we will need your support.
c. US Staffing:
--Reissue your June 6, 1964 inter-agency directive/3/ on the importance of an affirmative response by
US officials recommended for service in Vietnam.
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, p. 205.
--Reexamine the no-wife policy, at least during a second tour.
--Resubmit to the Congress last year's Vietnam provisions of the Hays Bill for additional hazardous zone
benefits for civilian employees.
--Request the prompt compilation of an all-agency list of critical positions with designated replacement
for each. Saigon should not be asked to absorb staffing gaps because of transfer or assignment delays.
And security and health conditions may require unexpected reliefs.
d. Pacification:
Priorities--Require a basic reexamination of our intelligence on NVA/VC force levels, infiltration and
recruitment rates. The estimates involved are embedded in specialized fields. You may wish to consider
a broader special blue-ribbon committee of inquiry--without publicity and with a mandate to report to
you by the end of February.
Planning--Insist on combined provincial RD/P plans by February 1 at the latest, coordinating civil and
military programs and containing specific and detailed provincial goals for 1967. Request a prompt
report to Washington of any major RD revision required for military security factors.
ARVN Redirection--Press for an accelerated schedule for ARVN retraining. Insist on rapid and full
implementation of ways and means, now identified, to increase ARVN effectiveness, including
expanded use of US/ARVN combined units in pacification operations.
William Leonhart

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966
354. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 30, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold II. Top
Secret; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL. Printed in part in Herring, Secret
Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 321-322.
SUBEJCT
Reply to President's Letter to Kosygin
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson
I asked the Ambassador if he had brought back any reply to the President's letter to Kosygin./2/ He
replied that if he could speak completely off the record he could tell me that a reply had nearly been
completed and that it was one we would have liked but then the bombing of Hanoi had occurred and this
draft had been torn up and another one of quite a different character started. He said he had seen the
report from their Embassy in Hanoi and that there was no doubt in the Soviet minds as a result of this
report that our bombs had fallen on Hanoi itself. He said his own recommendation had been that in view
of this change of circumstance, it was better for the Soviet Government not to reply immediately but he
said that a reply would be made in due course.
/2/Document 330.
I said I could tell him categorically that it was not our intention to bomb the civilian areas of Hanoi and
we were sure that some SAMs had fallen on the city. I said that one of the targets was so situated that
our planes came over the city after dropping their bombs and it was always possible that one of the
bombs had been hung up and subject to a delayed release. The Ambassador remarked that even if a
SAM missile had landed in the city it would not have left the kind of crater that had been caused there.
The Ambassador referred to our conversation with the Poles and asked if anything new had developed. I
inquired whether he was aware of our action in stating we had stopped bombing within a certain radius
of Hanoi. He said he was. I said that our Ambassador in Warsaw had an appointment with the Foreign
Minister but I did not know yet what had transpired.

The Ambassador remarked that the initial stages of this affair had given the Soviet Government
considerable hope and he said rather cryptically that they had other reasons for some optimism but that
our action in bombing Hanoi had spoiled everything. I pointed out that our targets were selected several
weeks in advance and that it had been pure coincidence that the attacks on the targets near Hanoi had
occurred at this time.
The Ambassador said that his Government was frankly baffled by our actions in Viet-Nam and did not
know how to judge our policy. He said there were many, and he was one of them, that wondered
whether some of our military were deliberately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward
negotiations or whether our policy really was one of military victory.
I said that I could assure him that we were genuinely interested in negotiations and that although there
were some who felt that we should take a stronger action, this was not a question of military officers
disobeying orders.
Toward the end of our conversation, which covered other subjects, the Ambassador asked if I thought
there was real hope of getting the Viet-Namese affair settled during the coming year. I said that I was
personally hopeful, although the difficulties were obvious. He remarked that perhaps during my stay in
Moscow I would be able to have contact with a certain Ambassador, obviously meaning the North VietNamese.
355. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/
Washington, December 30, 1966, 2313Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold-Incomplete. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Marigold. The source text is marked with an indication that the
President saw the telegram.
CAP 661394. Literally eyes only for the President. Herewith Hanoi's negative response via Warsaw.
We are at the end of a phase if not at the end of the line with Marigold.
We shall now have to pause and consider next steps.
Warsaw 1596
1. Rapacki opened by saying Poles have taken further action on my statement of Dec 24,/2/ but
unfortunately this step could not make up for damage done by previous actions, particularly Air Force,
during first part of December.
/2/See Document 351.
2. Rapacki added that "we have to consider our role at this stage as terminated." He continued "We
regret very much that matter took such a turn," adding that Poles think they did everything they could
have toward objective of peaceful settlement.
3. Rapacki expressed appreciation for my personal efforts which unfortunately have not been able to
make up for what happened before. He said "It has been said that work done in a good cause sooner or
later will yield results. I don't know if this is always the case, but we hope." He added that this becomes

possible only when proper conclusions are drawn for the reasons why this action did not succeed.
4. "As for the Poles," Rapacki continued, "what has happened only strengthens us in belief that only
unconditional stopping of bombing DRVN might create atmosphere for peaceful solution."
5. Rapacki then thanked me for my cooperation, expressing regret that my holiday was ruined,
particularly in that the results "we had hoped for" were not achieved.
6. I replied that it is not the holiday that matters, but I am keenly disappointed because after my
Washington visit--during which the USG made substantial movement in the right direction--I had high
hopes. I said I know there is a point where one gives up but I do not like to. What most concerns me is
where we go from here. Having lost what I felt was a very good opportunity, and having personally full
confidence in our keen interest in getting negotiations started, this development leaves me feeling that
maybe we have been kidded from the very beginning.
I added that it seems to me we went a great distance to meet a critical problem. I know I am speaking
from deep disappointment, but I hate to go to the end of the road without knowing where we go from
here. However, if that is the case, I can only report it. I am sure there will be the same deep
disappointment in Washington.
7. Rapacki said, "I understand your personal feelings, but I don't think that those authoritative people
were kidding from the beginning. I don't make such an accusation against Lodge or anyone else. But
how the bombing could start at just that moment is something which evades me. No, I make no
accusations; I only repeat my personal view that if that step you brought from Washington (on 24
December) had occurred on December 4--admittedly after the first bombing of Hanoi--then I feel
personally we would have had the first contact with the DRV behind us. Moreover, I think I have
sufficient reasons for my personal feeling. Even between Dec 4 and Dec 13, the matter was again
actively being reconsidered. There had been no negative reaction as yet. We know, because we had
contact with the proper quarter. The decision regarding breaking off the talks was made after Dec 13.
The bombing again took place on Dec 14. But this is history known to all of us and it is hardly worth
returning to it. What next is the real question. On some occasion we may talk about it in a different
capacity and not in the framework of our present efforts. We share common misgivings and concerns;
but our views on a solution differ."
8. I said I know I may be repeating out of frustration. But despite what happened before, we made a very
major step on the 24th of Dec--stopping bombing without requiring reciprocal action. What concerns me
is that after taking this step we obtained a negative response anyway; this will influence many people to
think Hanoi just does not want to negotiate.
I said I am reluctant to give up this opportunity; slowly but surely the conditions for negotiations were
being created. To recapture this, we would have to go way back to recreate the conditions we now have.
This is a tragic development.
9. Rapacki said that, "You must have sensed on Dec 24 that my first reaction, while mixed, was not
negative. But it was very difficult to separate that step from what had already happened beforehand.
Therefore I expressed the regret that this action was 20 days late. It seems to me that what you called an
inclination towards talks was demonstrated quite clearly by the DRVN. You are right that arguments to
the contrary could be made. This is the aspect of the situation that concerns us. There are many reasons
on the NVN side to believe that your proposals were not sincere. It does not seem very good when
events take a turn which create new difficulties to move ahead. But the key to the situation is in your

hands. You are a great power. You can use this key to turn the situation back."
10. I replied that I thought we provided that key on December 24. But now there is no sense, as the
saying goes, to cry over spilt milk. Particularly in light of these considerations, I hope you are giving
serious consideration to the possibility of ICC talks in New Delhi where it might be possible to pick up a
few of the pieces.
11. To Rapacki's query as to what could be expected from such talks, I replied that I did not know.
However, I added there are three interested governments involved, each playing an important role and
each with independent thoughts. I said it is very important to maintain contact. Whatever you think of
the ICC, it is an existing agency, it may be weak but it is an agency involved in the Vietnam situation.
12. Rapacki replied that Poles cooperate with India and Canada in this organization, adding, "I cannot
say that during the years of this cooperation that there have been any brilliant achievements: we are
always ready to exchange ideas, primarily on the work of the Commission, as well as on other
situations. The question is whether it is worthwhile at this moment holding another meeting on Vietnam,
while there is still bombing. And if it takes place without a result--without a solution--its impact could
really be negative." He added that second objection just occurred to him: "We (Poland and the U.S.)
have had a common experience over the past six weeks. The two remaining members of the
Commission are not aware of these events. In the conversations within the Commission the countries
involved might be divorced from the realities of the situation."
13. I replied that I think that without divulging the last six weeks, the Polish Govt might present some
insights and could make contributions. On another subject, I continued, we have maintained absolute
silence regarding these talks. We have assumed that, except for Fanfani and presumably the USSR,
which has a direct interest in the problem, your govt has not divulged the talks to any government or
party./3/ Rapacki replied "What you say is in accordance with the fact, but probably the Pope is also
informed." I said, "The Pope is informed? By whom?" Rapacki answered, "Possibly Fanfani, but I don't
know, I am not saying it was Fanfani, I don't know, but the Pope probably is informed." I said I presume
that unless we inform each other to the contrary, the rule of secrecy will prevail even though the talks
are broken off. Rapacki replied affirmatively.
/3/In telegram 13640 from Saigon, December 17, Lodge reported that Lewandowski had leaked
information on the negotiations and was "obviously loose-tongued." In telegram 14206 from Saigon,
December 24, Porter reported that the Polish Ambassador in Rome had revealed "all details" of the
negotiations to Pope Paul. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
14. Comment: In this moment of frustration it would be easy to conclude that Poles have led us down
the primrose path. But I think this would be an unfortunate misinterpretation of events. If the Poles had
been playing this kind of game they would have come in today asking us to sweeten the pot. Instead,
they threw up their hands and bowed out.
15. The posture of both Rapacki and Michalowski today was one of regret. I am convinced that Poles
have had at least limited authority from Hanoi to investigate negotiation and Warsaw meeting terms, that
they felt that our Dec 24 position was a satisfactory one, and that since Dec 24 they did what they could
to induce Hanoi to enter negotiations. Failing this, they recognized Hanoi's intransigence and bowed out.
16. I recommend that we immediately request Soviets to take over and that cessation of bombing around
Hanoi be continued at least until proposed Soviet effort fails or USSR responds negatively to our
request. I believe we now have the initiative and should exploit it with the Soviets, the Pope and U

Thant with the alternative objectives of either moving along the path toward negotiations or, if this fails,
leaving us in a strong public relations position. Hasty withdrawal of our Dec 24 position would, I
believe, seriously compromise either objective. (In retrospect, I am not sure I should have suggested that
secrecy be maintained, but my intention was to curb possible inclination for public propaganda by Poles.
At any rate, it is clear that we can talk to Pope and Soviets, and possibly U Thant, without violating
spirit of my suggestion.)
Gronouski
356. Editorial Note
On December 31, 1966, President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg had a 47-minute telephone
conversation commencing at 8:45 a.m. A principal topic of conversation was Vietnam. Included were
the following comments:
"President: I just think that Hanoi is not ready. Everybody thinks that Hanoi is ready; the Pope, the
Poles, the Russians, but when you really get down to it, they just cannot make a budge there with this
situation as it is.
"Goldberg: I don't disagree with that assessment."
Later during the same conversation:
"President: So I say OK, tell you [North Vietnam] what I'll do. You will not see a plane fly over Hanoi,
and you won't see a plane fly over Haiphong. And we got a circle here, and we won't do anything. Now
you give me some reciprocate action. And by God, they just shoot down one of my patrols immediately.
They don't do one damn thing and they don't acknowledge it. And you can't hear from them and you ask
the Russians why they can't deliver something and they say, well, they're not quite ready yet. Now I
haven't been over Hanoi in days. I haven't been over Haiphong in weeks. And I'm just sitting here urging
them. But I've got all the weight of the world saying for God's sake quit letting these trucks assemble
there and come down here and just kill our people. I think I'm going to be tried not by Bertrand Russell
but by Mrs. Goldberg for killing her boy without giving him the weapons to protect himself.
"Goldberg: Bertrand Russell has become a nut.
"President: No but do you heed my point, sir? I think my great danger is how can a commander in chief
stop his men from fighting unless the other side is just willing to do something." (Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Goldberg,
December 31, 1966, 8:23 p.m., Tape F6612.04, PNO 3