PEOPLE V BAYOTAS

Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof.
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died. Consequently, the Supreme Court
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor
General to file its comment with regard to the civil liability of Bayotas arising from
his commission of the offense charged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish
his civil liability.
HELD:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by death of the convict personal
liabilities are extinguished, as to pecuniary penalties liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

Thus the court made a ruling as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon;
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Aricle 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission: Law, Contracts, Quasi-contracts, Delicts,Quasi-delicts;
3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be
pursued but only by way of separate civil action and may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator of the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation aside from delicts;
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

In the case at bar, the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability
based solely on the act of rape. Hence, his civil liability also extinguished together
with his criminal liability upon his death.

Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines

Philippine Rabbit vs. People

G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court
further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable
for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had
become final and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the
institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising
from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-
employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.

Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.

Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon
motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps
bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court
when they abscond.

2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed
instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed
impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to
the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the
judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising
from the crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may
-- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that,
strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this
fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist
their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present
case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend
the accused.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency. Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the
subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the
accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind
the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a
criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable
them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their
employees without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending,
nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a
criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to
the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an
employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary
civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has
become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary
civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in
arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition
of the primary civil liability.

Air France v Carrascoso (Torts)

AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO September 28, 1966 AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but
at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first
class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to
the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be
expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over
his dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat
in the plane.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20
representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the
portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal
rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for
attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other
respects", with costs against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class
protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee
that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the
availability of first class seats.

ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?

RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first
class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his
seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not
been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has
assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."

For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.

The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration.

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and
nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The
stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.
This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper.

7NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF
OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
(by: Vanel Beltejar)

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land in Biga (Biluso) Silang,
Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of
La Salette, Inc. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants
and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against officers and directors of
the respondent corporation for destruction by means of inundation. Subsequently,
on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case against respondent corporation
for damages before the same court.
Respondent corporation filed motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action until after
judgment in the criminal case. Trial court dismissed the civil case and the Appellate
Court affirmed such decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioners contend
that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing civil case since it is
predicated on a quasi-delict.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case is based on quasi-delict that can proceed
independently of the criminal case.
HELD:
The civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered
by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
In quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case
according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.