Vda.
de Manalo vs CA 1) The decedent resided in QC for 3 months before
GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001
FACTS:
Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was
survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The deceased
left several real properties in Manila and a business in
Tarlac. In November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the
surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for
the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father
and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as
administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11,
1993 and the herein petitioners were granted 10 days
within which to file their opposition to the petition.
ISSUE:
WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151
where earnest efforts toward compromise should first
be made prior the filing of the petition.
HELD:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the
nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and
the character of the relief were sought in the complaint
or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of
the petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement and distribution of the
estate belies herein petitioners claim that the same is
in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision
of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions. It is clear from the term suit that it refers to
an action by one person or persons against another or
other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues
the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of
an injury or enforcement of a right. It is also the
intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the
Report of the Code Commission to make the provision
be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as
such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence,
it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not
being sued in such case for any cause of action as in
fact no defendant was pronounced therein.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA, PRECIOSA B.
GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, 74 SCRA 189
(1976)
FACTS:
Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of
Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging
that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court. At the same time,
she moved ex parte for her appointment as special
administratix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the
motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia, the surviving spouse of the
deceased, contending that:
his death as shown by his death certificate and
therefore have an improper venue.
2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the
petition.
CFI denied the motion.
CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the
administratix.
Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by
certiorari.
ISSUES:
a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be
determined in the present case?
b.) What does the word resides in Revised Rules of
Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?
c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the
estate?
Held:
1. No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to
try, hear and decide a case base on the merits
or the substance of the facts. It is a substantive
aspect of the trial proceeding. It is granted by
law or by the constitution and cannot be
waived or stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court
define venue as the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein real property
involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue
is the location of the court with jurisdiction. It is
more on convenience purposes. Its more on
procedural aspect of the case. In some cases it
may be waived or stipulated by the parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate.
2. Resides should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence,
not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it ones domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must
be more than temporary.
3. In the present case, SC ruled that the last place
of residence of the deceased should be the
 venue of the court. Amado G. Garcia was in
Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna base
on his death certificate. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the
venue for Virginia C. Fules petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore Preciosa B.
Garcia was granted as a special administratix.
UNION BANK v SANTIBANEZ
Facts:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit
Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez entered
into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00.
The amount was intended for the payment of the
purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural
All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and
his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor
of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal
annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31,
1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31,
1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered
into another loan agreement, this time in the amount
of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of
the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600
Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with
accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model
AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note for the said amount in favor of the
FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also
signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan
dated December 13, 1980. Sometime in February
1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings
commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. On April 9,
1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as
the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated
July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession of the three (3)
tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one
(1) tractor for Florence.
Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their
late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between
FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein
the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all
its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank.
Demand letters for the settlement of his account were
sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP)
to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and
refused to pay.
Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a
Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibaez, Edmund and Florence. Summonses were
issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund
was not served since he was in the United States and
there was no information on his address or the date of
his return to the Philippines.
Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola
filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents
did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and
her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate
court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to
the petitioner under the joint agreement.
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a
decision was subsequently rendered by the court
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal
portion of the RTC decision reads:
The appellate court found that the appeal was not
meritorious and held that the petitioner should
have filed its claim with the probate court. It
further held that the partition made in the
agreement was null and void, since no valid
partition may be had until after the will has been
probated.
Issue:
Whether or not the joint agreement was valid.
Ruling:
No, the joint agreement is invalid. The Court is posed to
resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the
partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is
valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether
the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation
of the deceased.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated.
The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public
requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice
thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person
to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory.
The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator
and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
a will.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be
partitioned are the same properties embraced in the
will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim
Santibaez, left a holographic will which contained,
inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
 (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I
own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in
the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the
heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent
is binding. We rule in the negative. The partition being
invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not
receive any such tractor. It follows then that the
assumption of liability cannot be given any force and
effect.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72
November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, et. al., vs. HON. AMOR A.
REYES
Facts:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement
of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioners
opposed contending that Segundo left a holographic
will disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause, thus, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically
suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will. A petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Segundo was subsequently filed by
petitioners before the RTC. Private respondents moved
for its dismissal on the ground that the document
purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does
not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a
will under Article 783 of the Civil Code as the will only
shows an alleged act of disinheritance and nothing
else. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to
dismiss contending that disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a decedent and that the
rule on preterition does not apply because Segundos
will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the
exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. The RTC
issued its order dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings as the will clearly shows that there is
preterition since the other heirs were omitted, Article
854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. Petitioner filed
for motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Issue:
WON the will executed is a holographic will.
Ruling:
Segundos document, although it may initially come
across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms
to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by
law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of
Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can
be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument,
and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of
the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other
words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of
the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those
who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Holographic wills, therefore, should be construed in a
manner where the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator should be taken into account. Considering that
the questioned document is Segundos holographic
will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. It is
settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the decedent take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
Roberts v. Leonidas
129 SCRA 754
FACTS:
Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977.
He was survived by his second wife (Maxine), their two
children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children by a
first marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by
divorce.
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California
on January 23, 1959. One will disposed of his Philippine
estate described as conjugal property of himself and
his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate
outside the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were
presented for probate in Utah by Maxine on March
1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the
intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January
1978. The Utah Court admitted the two wills and codicil
to probate on April 1978 and was issued upon
consideration of the stipulation between the attorneys
for Maxine and Ethel.
Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of
the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a
compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.
As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding
was instituted by Ethel. On March 1978, Maxine filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate
proceeding on the ground of pendency of the Utah
probate proceedings. She submitted to the court a
copy of Grimms will. However, pursuant to the
compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the
opposition and the motion to dismiss. The court
ignored the will found in the record.The estate was
partitioned.
In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate
of the two wills (already probated in Utah), that the
partition approved by the intestate court be set aside
and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine
be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to
account for the properties received by them and return
the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were
defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel that the
compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate
proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so
partition was contrary to the decedents wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was
denied by Judge Leonidas for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying
Ethels motion to dismiss.
HELD:
We hold that respondent judge did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethels motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because
Grimm died with two wills and no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of
Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous
that the estate of a person who died testate should be
settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the
intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate
proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
VICENTE URIARTE vs. CFI, et. al. G.R. Nos. L-
21938-39 May 29, 1970
Facts: Petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y
Goite, a non-resident alien, in CFI Negros Oriental,
alleging that he is an acknowledged natural son of the
decedent and his sole heir. Petitioner had previously
initiated an action before the same court for
compulsory acknowledgment as natural son but there
was no final judgment yet. Private respondents,
nephews of the decedent, filed an opposition alleging
that the decedent had left a will in Spain. Later, the
same respondents filed a petition for probate in CFI
Manila using the alleged last will of the decedent, and
then filed a motion to dismiss the special proceedings
in CFI Negros Oriental. The CFI Manila allowed the
petition for probate, and the CFI Negros dismissed the
intestate proceeding. Petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration in CFI Negros which was denied. He
also filed an omnibus motion in CFI Manila asking for
the dismissal of the probate proceeding on the ground
that it was the CFI Negros that took first cognizance of
the case. Said motion was denied by CFI Manila. Hence
this petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion of the two courts in CFI Manila and Negros
Oriental.
Issues: Whether or not the dismissal of the special
proceedings in CFI Negros was proper; and whether or
not CFI Manila has jurisdiction to probate the alleged
will.
Held: On the first issue, it was proper that the
intestate proceeding in Negros CFI be discontinued
because of the fact that the decedent had left a will. It
is well-settled that testacy is favored over intestacy,
and that any intestate proceeding may be terminated
at any time when it is discovered that the deceased
had left a will. However, the proper thing the private
respondents should have done was to file the petition
for probate in CFI Negros which was already hearing
the intestate proceeding. The issue now is improper
venue, not jurisdiction. Unfortunately for petitioner, he
is now guilty of laches for failing to timely object to the
filing of the petition for probate in CFI Manila. It is
settled that questions of venue may be waived when
not timely objected to. Hence, the CFI Manila may
continue with the probate case, without prejudice to
petitioner's successful action for his compulsory
recognition as heir.
Petition for certiorari was denied.
Cuenco vs. CA
G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was
survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in
Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing
in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first
marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that
the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of
Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal
for the probate of the last will and testament, where
she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition
and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI
Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI
Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or
improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon
appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of
prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of
prohibition
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction
over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI
Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to
the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings
HELD:
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City
court from proceeding with the testate proceedings
and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last
will and testament of the deceased and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his
estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it
would affect the prompt administration of justice.
The court with whom the petition is first filed must also
first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in
order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of
all other courts.
[G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014.]
THELMA M. ARANAS, petitioner, vs. TERESITA V.
MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA
M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA.
TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L.
MERCADO, respondents.
FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January
12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V.
Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely:
Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M.
Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage,
namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner
Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during
his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He
assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate
stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in
Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu
City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the
petition considering that there was no opposition. The
letters of administration in favor of Teresita.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory
of the estate of Emigdio for the consideration and
approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory
that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real
properties but only personal properties" worth
P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20;
furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of
jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of
Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of
stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that
were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that
the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to
be examined regarding it. Teresita filed a compliance
with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her
inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks
covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4
the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on
January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the
market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407
Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of
P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued on
January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P30,000.00.
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be
examined under oath on the inventory. The RTC issued
an order expressing the need for the parties to present
evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the
court to resolve the motion for approval of the
inventory. Thelma opposed the approval of the
inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita
on the inventory.
The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and
holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had
excluded properties that should be included. The RTC
denied the administratrix's motion for approval of
inventory and orders the said administratrix to re-do
the inventory of properties which are supposed to
constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado.
The RTC also directed the administratrix to render an
account of her administration of the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought
the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on
the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot
No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been
sold to Mervir Realty,
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as
the inclusion of the inclusion of parcels of land known
as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of
53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various
parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of
Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10,
1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix is concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
directing the inclusion of certain properties in the
inventory notwithstanding that such properties had
been either transferred by sale or exchanged for
corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent
during his lifetime?
RULING:
No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders
issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special
Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of
the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner,
and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents
to pay the costs of suit.
RATIO:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue
of ownership of properties for purposes of their
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be
submitted by the administrator, but its determination
shall only be provisional unless the interested parties
are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether
property included in the inventory is the conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the
letters of administration may be granted at the
discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is
competent and willing to serve when the person dies
intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to
the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to
direct the preparation and submission of the inventory
of the properties of the estate, and the surviving
spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and
responsibility to submit the inventory within three
months from the issuance of letters of administration
pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be
returned within three months. Within three
(3) months after his appointment every
executor or administrator shall return to the
court a true inventory and appraisal of all the
real and personal estate of the deceased which
has come into his possession or knowledge. In
the appraisement of such estate, the court may
order one or more of the inheritance tax
appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands
the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of
the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is
qualified by the phrase which has come into his
possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to
belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the
administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the
phrase true inventory implies that no properties
appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded
from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the
inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is
"to aid the court in revising the accounts and
determining the liabilities of the executor or the
administrator, and in malting a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to
facilitate the administration of the estate." Hence, the
RTC that presides over the administration of an estate
is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
properties should be included in the inventory.
According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose
its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the
issue of which properties are to be included or
excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive
abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the
estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample
discretionary powers and the appellate courts should
not interfere with or attempt to replace the action
taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been
a positive abuse of discretion." As long as the RTC
commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its
orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial
court as an intestate court is special and limited. The
trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed
to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to
third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent
and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the decedent. All that the trial court can do
regarding said properties is to determine whether or
not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator.
Such determination is provisional and may be still
revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the
trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having
to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule
is that such court merely exercises special and
limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a
probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate,
cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to that
of the deceased and his estate. All that the
said court could do as regards said properties
is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as
justified by expediency and convenience.
The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece
of property without prejudice to final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to
resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether
the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.
The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be
prepared and submitted for the important purpose of
resolving the difficult issues of collation and
advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil
Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving
spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass
of the estate any property or right which he (or she)
may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by
the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard
and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings, and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded
the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court about the matters relating to the
inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing
it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or
bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by
the decedent.
The determination of which properties should be
excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion
of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and
proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to
include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties
that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the
estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave
abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as
part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial
or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.
Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran
Facts:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal)
married Paz Lazo.
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner
Isabel de la Puerta.
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave
birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas
Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,
later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal,
herein respondent.
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
Waiver of Rights over the estate of their father,
Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November
2, 1964. In the deed, Portugals siblings waived
their rights, interests, and participation over a 155
sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his
favor.
The Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued TCT
in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C.
Lazo. Paz died. Portugal died intestate.
Respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication
by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person
adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land.
Petitioners then filed before the RTC of Caloocan
City a complaint against respondent for annulment
of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and
the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
RTC, without resolving the issues raised during
the pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of
action on the ground that petitioners status and
right as putative heirs had not been established
before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction
over the case. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Held:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or
wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate,
executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit
of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an
exception to the general rule that when a person dies
leaving a property, it should be judicially administered
and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule
78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did,
he failed to name an executor therein.
A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction
to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present
case, there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a
determination of petitioners status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial
court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-
trial.
Petition granted. Case was remanded to the trial court
for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties
during the pre-trial.