UPDATES IN

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Justice Magdangal M. de Leon

 ACTIONS IN GENERAL
Basic rule in filing of action (Rule 2, Secs. 3-
4)
1. For one cause of action ((one delict or
wrong), file only ONE ACTION or suit.
Generally, NO SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE
OF ACTION. Reasons: a. to avoid multiplicity of
suits; b.
b to minimize expenses,
expenses inconvenience
and harassment.
2 Remedy
2. R d against
i t splitting
litti a single
i l cause
of action (two complaints separately filed for
one action) - defendant may file:
 a motion to dismiss on the ground of
a.
(1) litis pendentia, if first complaint is still
pending
di (Rule
(R l 16,
16 Sec.
S 1 [e])
[ ])
(2) res judicata, if first complaint is
terminated by final judgment (Rule 16,
Sec. 1 [f])
b. answer alleging either of above grounds as
affirmative defense ((Rule 16,, Sec. 6))
If defendant fails to raise ground on time, he is
deemed to have WAIVED them. them Splitting must be
questioned in the trial court; cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.
appeal
The requisites of litis pendentia are the following:
((a)) identity y of p parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions;
((b)) identityy of rights
g asserted and relief p
prayed
y for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
identityy of the two cases such that jjudgment g in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res jjudicata in the other. ( Romullo vs.
Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan
Compound Homeowners Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 180687, October 6, 2010)
What are the requisites for joinder of causes of
action? (Rule 2, Sec. 5)
1. Co
Compliance
p a ce with the e rules
u es o
on jo
joinder
de oof pa
parties
es
under Rule 3, Sec. 6.
2 A party cannot join in an ordinary action any of
2.
the special civil actions. Reason: special civil
actions are governed by special rules.
rules
3. Where the causes of action are between the
SAME PARTIES but pertain to DIFFERENT
VENUES OR JURISDICTIONS, the joinder
may be allowed in the RTC,
RTC provided ONE OF
THE CAUSES OF ACTION falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC and the venue lies
therein.
 Exception: ejectment case may not be joined
with an action within the jurisdiction of the RTC as
the same comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the MTC.
H
However, if a party
t invokes
i k the
th jurisdiction
j i di ti off the
th
court, he cannot thereafter challenge the courts
j i di ti
jurisdiction i the
in th same case. He H isi barred
b d byb
estoppel from doing so. (Hinog vs. Melicor, G.R.
N 140954,
No. 140954 April
A il 12,
12 2005)
N.B. As to joinder in the MTC, it must have
jurisdiction over ALL THE CAUSES OF ACTION
and must have common venue.
 4. Where the claims in all the causes of action
4
are principally for recovery of money, jurisdiction is
determined by the AGGREGATE OR TOTAL
AMOUNT claimed (totality rule).
N B The
N.B. Th totality
t t lit rule
l applies
li onlyl to
t the
th MTC
totality of claims cannot exceed the jurisdictional
amountt off the
th MTC.
MTC
There is no totality rule for the RTC because its
jurisdictional amount is without limit. Exc. In tax
cases where the limit is below P1 million. Amounts
of P1 million or more fall within the jurisdiction of
the CTA.
 PARTIES
Lack of legal g capacity
p y to sue pplaintiffs
general disability to sue, such as on account
of minority,
minority insanity,
insanity incompetence,
incompetence lack of
juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party.
party
Plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue is a
ground for motion to dismiss (Rule 16, Sec.
1[d}).
Ex. A foreign corporation doing business
without
ith t a license
li l k legal
lacks l l capacity
it to
t sue.
 Lack of personality to sue the fact that
plaintiff is not the real party in interest.
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff s lack of personality to sue is a
ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
fact that the complaint,
complaint on its face,
face states no
cause of action (Rule 16, Sec. 1 [g])
(Evangelista vs. Santiago, 457 SCRA 744
[
[2005])])
 A suit may only be instituted by the real party
i interest.
in i t t The
Th original
i i l petition
titi was instituted
i tit t d byb
Win, which is a SEC-registered corporation. It
filed a collection of sum of money suit which
involved a construction contract entered into by
petitioner and Multi-Rich,, a sole p
p proprietorship.
p p
The counsel of Win wanted to change the name
of the plaintiff in the suit to Multi-Rich. The
change
h cannott be
b countenanced.
t d The
Th plaintiff
l i tiff in
i
the collection suit is a corporation. The name
cannot be changed to that of a sole
proprietorship. Again, a sole proprietorship is
not vested with jjuridical p personalityy to file or
defend an action. (Excellent Quality Apparel,
Inc. vs. Win Multi Rich Builders, Inc., G.R.
No 175048,
No. 175048 February 10,10 2009)
 In a case involving constitutional issues,
issues
standing or locus standi means a personal
i t
interest t in
i the
th case such
h that
th t the
th partyt has
h
sustained or will sustained DIRECT INJURY
as a result of the government act that is
being g challenged.
g
 To have legal standing, the petitioner must have
DIRECT, PERSONAL and SUBSTANTIAL
INTEREST to protect. Here, petitioners, retired
COA Chairmen and Commissioners, have not
shown any direct and personal interest in the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no
indication that they have sustained or are in
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its implementation. Clearly, they have
no legal standing to file the instant suit (Domingo
vs. Carague, 456 SCRA 450 [2005]).
 JOINDER OF PARTIES

Where the obligation of the parties is

solidary, either of the parties is
i di
indispensable,
bl and d the
th other
th is i nott even
a necessary party because complete
relief is available from either. (Cerezo vs.
Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004).
Procedure for dismissal if indispensable party
is not impleaded

Anent the alleged non

non-joinder
joinder of indispensable
parties, it is settled that the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action.
action The remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
Parties may be added by order of the court on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and/or such times as are just.
It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the
court, that the latter may dismiss the complaint.
In this case, no such order was issued by the trial
court. ( Limos vs. Spouses Odones, G.R. No.
186979 August 11,
186979, 11 2010)
 Whenever it appears to the court in the course
of the proceeding that an indispensable party has
not been joined, it is the duty of the court to STOP
THE TRIAL and to ORDER THE INCLUSION of
such party. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actuations of the court
NULL and VOID, for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties, but even as to those
present (Uy vs. CA, 494 SCRA 535 [July 11,
2006]).
Intervention (Rule 19, Sec. 1)

Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed

when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter
in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the
parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or disposition of property in the
custody of the court or an officer thereof. (Alfelor
vs Halasan,
vs. Halasan G.R.
G R No.
No 165987,
165987 March 31,31 2006).
2006)
 Requirements: [a] legal interest in the matter in
litigation; and [b] consideration must be given as to
whether the adjudication of the original parties may
be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenor's
intervenor s rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not.
Legal interest must be of such DIRECT and
IMMEDIATE character that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of
the judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct
and material,
material and not simply contingent and
expectant. (Perez vs. CA, G.R. No. 162580.
January 27,27 2006)
 What is the effect of non-substitution of a
d
deceased d party?
t ?
Non-compliance with the rule on substitution
would render the proceedings and judgment of the
trial court infirm because the court acquires NO
JURISDICTION over the persons of the legal
representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial
and the judgment would be binding.
Thus, proper substitution of heirs must be
effected for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over their persons and to obviate any future claim
by any heir that he was not apprised of the litigation
against Bertuldo or that he did not authorize Atty.
Petalcorin to represent him.
 No formal substitution of the parties was
effected
ff t d within
ithi thirty
thi t days
d f
from d t off death
date d th off
Bertuldo, as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the
R l
Rules off Court.
C t Needless
N dl t stress,
to t th purpose
the
behind the rule on substitution is the protection of
th right
the i ht off every party t to
t due
d process. It isi to
t
ensure that the deceased party would continue to
b properly
be l represented
t d in
i the
th suitit through
th h the
th duly
d l
appointed legal representative of his estate. (Hinog
vs. Melicor,
M li 455 SCRA 460 [2005])
 The Rules require
q the legal
g representatives
p of
a dead litigant to be substituted as parties to a
litigation.
g This requirement
q is necessitated by y
due process. Thus, when the rights of the legal
representatives of a decedent are actually
recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated
formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the
validity of the promulgated decision. After all, due
process had thereby been satisfied.
When a party to a pending action dies and the
claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require
a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is
specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3. (Dela
Cruz vs. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005).
 Failure of counsel to comply with his duty
under Section 16 to inform the court of the
death of his client and no substitution of such
party is effected, will not invalidate the
proceedings and the judgment thereon if the
action survives the death of such party.
Moreover, the decision rendered shall bind his
successor-in-interest. The instant action for
unlawful detainer, like any action for recovery of
real property, is a real action and as such survives
the death of Faustino Acosta. His heirs have taken
his place and now represent his interests in the
instant petition. (Limbauan vs. Acosta, G.R. No.
148606, June 30, 2008)
 SELECTION OF COURT
Subject
j matter jjurisdiction is conferred byy
law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the
trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial
C t exclusive
Courts l i original
i i l jurisdiction
j i di ti over civil
i il
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An
action for specific performance,
performance such as
petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on
jjoint child custody,
y, belongsg to this species
p of
actions. (Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon
Del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785,
F b
February 5 2010)
5,
 The arbitration clause is a commitment on the part
of the parties to submit to arbitration the disputes
covered since that clause is binding,
binding and they are
expected to abide by it in good faith. Clearly, the
RTC should not have taken cognizance of the
collection suit. The presence of the arbitration
clause vested jurisdiction on the CIAC over all
construction disputes between Petitioner and
Multi-Rich
Multi Rich. The RTC does not have
jurisdiction.(Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. vs.
Win Multi Rich Builders,
Builders Inc.,
Inc represented by
its president, Wilson G. Chua, G.R. No. 175048,
February 10,
10 2009)
What is hierarchy of courts?
Pursuant to this doctrine,
doctrine direct resort from the
lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be
entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot
be obtained in the lower tribunals.
Rationale: (a) to prevent inordinate demands
upon the SCs time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and (b) to prevent further overcrowding
of the SC
SCss docket.
docket
 Thus, although the SC, CA and the RTC have
CONCURRRENT jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence
does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice off court forum.
f
The SC will NOT ENTERTAIN DIRECT RESORT
to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts, and EXCEPTIONAL AND
COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES, such as cases
of national interest and of serious implications,
justify the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari,
calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
(Hinog vs. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 [2005])
 VENUE
The venue of the action for the nullification of the
foreclosure sale is properly laid with the Malolos
RTC although two of the properties together with the
Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. The
venue of real actions affecting properties found in
different provinces is determined by the
SINGULARITY or PLURALITY of the transactions
involving said parcels of land. Where said parcels
are the
th object
bj t off one and d the
th same transaction,
t ti th
the
venue is in the court of any of the provinces wherein
a parcell off land
l d is
i situated
it t d (United
(U it d Overseas
O B k
Bank
Phils. (formerly Westmont Bank) vs. Rosemoore
Mining & Development Corp., Corp G.R.
G R Nos.
Nos 159669 &
163521, March 12, 2007).
 Venue stipulations in a contract do
not as a rule,
not, rule supersede the general rule
set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
C
Court t in
i the
th absence
b off qualifying
lif i or
restrictive words. They should be
considered merely as an agreement or
additional
add o a forum,
o u , not
o as limiting
g venue
e ue too the
e
specified place. (Pacific Consutants
International Asia,
Asia Inc.
Inc vs.
vs Schonfeld
Schonfeld,
G.R. No. 166920, February 19, 2007)
 ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT

Section 8,
8 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable when the adverse party does not
appear to be a party to the instrument.
instrument
(Municipality of Tiwi vs. Betito, G.R. No.
171873, July 9, 2010)
Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to
actions or defenses founded upon a written
instrument and p provides the manner of
denying it. It is more controlling than Rule
6,, Section 10 which merely y pprovides the
effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where
the defense in the Answer is based on an
actionable document, a Reply specifically
denying
y g it under oath must be made;; otherwise,,
the genuineness and due execution of the
document will be deemed admitted. (Casent
(
Realty Development Corp. vs. Philbanking
Corporation,
p , G.R. No. 150731,, September
p
14, 2007 )
 SUMMONS
Service of summons on resident defendant
in an action in personam: If he is temporarily
out of the country, any of the following modes
of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted
service set forth in Section 8 of Rule 14; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave
of court; (3) service by publication, also with
l
leave off court;
t or (4) any other
th manner the th
court may deem sufficient.(Belen vs. Chavez,
G R No.
G.R. N 175334,
175334 March
M h 26,26 2008)
 Section
S ti 16 off Rule
R l 14 regarding di service
i off
summons on residents temporarily out of the
Phili i
Philippines uses the
th words d may
andd also.
l
Thus, extraterritorial service is not mandatory.
Oth
Other methods
th d off service i off summons allowed
ll d
under the Rules may also be availed of by the
serving
i officer
ffi on a defendant-seaman.
d f d t Th
The
normal method of service of summons on one
t
temporarilyil absent
b t is
i by b substituted
b tit t d service
i
because personal service abroad and service by
publication
bli ti are nott ordinary
di means off summoning i
defendants. (Montefalcon vs. Vasquez, G.R.
N 165016 June
No.165016, J 17 2008)
17,
 Substituted service on resident defendant
temporarily out of the country.
country The Sheriff
Sheriff's
s
Return stated that private respondent was out of the
country; Thus,
Thus the service of summons was made at
her residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo,
acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was
presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was
residing in that place and,therefore, was competent
to receive the summons on private respondent's
behalf. The RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction
over the person of private respondent when the
latter's counsel entered his appearance on private
respondent's
p behalf, without q
qualification and without
questioning the propriety of the service of summons,
and even filed two Motions for Extension of Time to
Fil Answer.
File A (P l
(Palma vs. Galvez
G l , G.R.
G R No.
N 165273,
165273
March 10, 2010)
Pursuant to Sec. 14,, Rule 14,, summons by y
publication applies in any action. The rule
does not distinquish whether the action is in
personam, in rem or quasi in rem. It authorizes
summons by publication whatever the action
may be as long as the identity of the defendant
is unknown or his whereabouts are unknown.
(S t
(Santos vs. PNOC Exploration
E l ti C
Corporation,
ti
G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008)
For substituted
s bstit ted service
ser ice to be justified,
j stified the
following circumstances must be clearly
established: (a) personal service of
summons within a reasonable time was
impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to
locate the party; and (c) the summons was
served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion residing at the partys residence
or upon a competent person in charge of
the partys office or place of business.
Failure to do so would invalidate all
subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional
g
grounds.
However, we frown upon an overly strict application
off the
th Rules.
R l It is
i the
th spirit,
i it rather
th than
th the
th letter
l tt off
the procedural rules, that governs. In his Return,
Sh iff Potente
Sheriff P t t declared
d l d thatth t he
h was refused
f d entry
t
by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The
latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him from
allowing anybody to proceed to her residence
whenever she is out. out It was impossible for the sheriff
to effect personal or substituted service of summons
upon petitioner.
petitioner Considering her strict instruction to
the security guard, she must bear its consequences.
Thus summons has been properly served upon
Thus,
petitioner and it has acquired jurisdiction over her. (
Robinson vs. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584,
December 12, 2006)
In case of substituted service, there should be a
reportt indicating
i di ti th t the
that th person whoh received
i d
the summons in the defendants behalf was one
with
ith whomh th defendant
the d f d t had h d a relation
l ti off
confidence ensuring that the latter would
actually receive the summons.
summons Here,
Here petitioner
failed to show that the security guard who received
the summons in respondent
respondents
s behalf shared such
relation of confidence that respondent would surely
receive the summons.
summons Hence,Hence we are unable to
accept petitioners contention that service on the
security guard constituted substantial compliance
with the requirements of substituted service. (Orion
Security Corporation vs. Kalfam Enterprises,
Inc., G.R. No. 163287, April 27, 2007)
 General rule: filing pleadings seeking affirmative
relief constitutes voluntary appearance and the
consequent submission of ones person to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Exceptions: Pleadings whose prayer is precisely for
the avoidance of the jurisdiction, which only leads to
a special appearance. (1) in civil cases, motions to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of defendant, whether or not other grounds
for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases,
motions to quash the complaint on the ground of lack
off jurisdiction
j i di ti over the
th person off the
th accused; d and d
(3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first
t
two are consequences off the
th fact
f t that
th t failure
f il t file
to fil
them would constitute a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person The third is a
Defendants filing of a motion for resetting of the
hearing effectively cured the defect of the
substituted service of summons. Although the
substituted service of summons on defendant is patently
defective as the sheriffs return does not contain any
statement with regard to the impossibility off personal
service, said defect was cured by his voluntary
appearance. AfterAft plaintiff
l i tiff moved
d for
f the
th execution
ti off
the trial courts decision, defendant filed a motion for a
re setting of the courts hearing thereon.
re-setting thereon An appearance
in whatever form without expressly objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person,
person is a submission
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant or respondent.
respondent (Cezar vs.vs Ricafort-Bautista,
Ricafort-Bautista
G.R. No. 136415,. October 31, 2006)
 Under Section 15,, Rule 14,, there are only y four
instances wherein a defendant who is a non-
resident and is not found in the Philippinespp may
y
be served with summons by extraterritorial
service: (1) when the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to,
or the subject of which ia property, within the
Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or
an interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief
demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding the defendant from any interest in
property
t located
l t d within
ithi the
th Philippines;
Phili i and
d (4) when
h
the defendant non-residents property has been
attached
tt h d within
ithi the
th Philippines.
Phili i
In these instances, service of summons may be
effected
ff t d byb (a)
( ) personall service
i outt off the
th country,
t
with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of
court;
t or (c)
( ) any other
th manner the th courtt may deem
d
sufficient. Extraterritorial service of summons applies
only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem and
not when the action is in personam. The case for
collection of sum of money and damages filed by
the respondent against the petitioner being an
action in personam,
personam then personal service of
summons upon the petitioner within the
Philippines is essential for the RTC to validly
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. Having failed to do so, the RTC can
never subject petitioner to its jurisdiction.
The mere allegation made by the respondent that
the petitioner had shares of stock within the
Philippines was not enough to convert the action
from one in personam to one that was quasi in rem,
for ppetitioners p
purported
p personal p
p property
p y was
never attached (Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd.
vs. Dakila Trading g Corporation,
p G.R. No. 172242,
August 14, 2007).
 PLEADINGS
Non-forum shopping certification signed by
counsel and not by the principal party is a
defective certification
This is because it is the p
principal
p p party
y who
has actual knowledge whether he has initiated
similar action/s in other courts, agencies or
tribunals (Go vs. Rico, G.R. No. 140682, April
25, 2006)
Not fatal defect when only one petitioner
signed the certification of non-forum
shopping
Such fact is not fatal to the petition because
it satisifies the requirement that the petition be
signed by a principal party (Bases Conversion
Development Authority vs. vs Uy,
Uy G.R.G R No.
No
144062, November 2, 2006)
Effect of forum shopping
1 If the forum shopping is NOT considered
1.
WILFUL and DELIBERATE, the
subsequent cases shall be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE on one of the
two grounds mentioned above
2. If the forum shopping is WILFUL and
DELIBERATE both
DELIBERATE, b h (or
( all,
ll if there
h are
more than two actions) shall be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Ao-As
vs. CA, 491 SCRA 353 [2006])
What are the requirements of forum shopping
certificate for a corporation?
Onlyy individuals vested with authorityy byy a valid
board resolution may sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. In
addition, the Court has required that proof of said
authority must be attached. Failure to provide a
certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient ground
to dismiss the petition. Likewise, the petition is
subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted
unaccompanied by proof of the signatory's authority.
(Phili i
(Philippine Ai li
Airlines, I
Inc. vs. Flight
Fli ht Attendants
Att d t
and Stewards Association of the Philippines
(FASAP) G.R.
(FASAP), G R No.
N 143088.
143088 January
J 24 2006)
24,
 However, subsequent submission of
Secretarys
Secretary s Certificate is substantial
compliance with the requirement that a
B d Resolution
Board R l ti mustt authorize
th i th officer
the ffi
executing the non-forum certification on
behalf of the corporation. (International
Construction
Co st uct o Inc. c vs. s Feb
eb Leasing
eas g a andd
Financing Corp., G.R. No. 157195, April 22,
2005)
 The lack of certification against forum shopping
is generally not curable by the submission thereof
after the filing of the petition. Section 5 of Rule 45
provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit
the required
req ired documents
doc ments that should
sho ld accompany
accompan the
petition, including the certification against forum
shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to
certifications against forum shopping signed by a
person on behalf of a corporation which are
unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file a petition on behalf of the
corporation. In certain exceptional circumstances,
however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of
the certification.(Mediserv,
certification (Mediserv inc.inc vs.
vs Court of
Appeals (special former 13th division) and
Landheights
a d e g ts Development
e e op e t Co Corporation,
po at o , GG.R.
No. 161368, April 5, 2010)
 Litis pendentia is not present between a
petition for writ of possession and action for
annulment of foreclosure. The issuance of the
writ of possession being a ministerial function, and
summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a
judgment on the merits, but simply an incident in
the transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for
annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale
cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata.
Thus, insofar as Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D and
Civil Case No. 99-03169-D pending before different
branches of RTC Dagupan City are concerned,
there is no litis pendentia. (Yu vs. PCIB, G.R. No.
147902. March 17, 2006)
 The pendency of a SEC case may be
invoked as posing a prejudicial question
to an RTC civil case. Since the
determination of the SEC as to which of the
two factions is the de jure board of NUI is
crucial to the resolution of the case before
the RTC, we find that the trial court should
suspend its proceedings until the SEC
comes out with its findings. (Abacan, Jr., et.
al. vs. Northwestern University, Inc., G.R.
No. 140777, April
p 8, 2005))
Whatt is
Wh i judicial
j di i l courtesy?
t ?
There
eea are
e instances
sta ces where
eee even
e if tthere
e e is
s
no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order issued by a higher court,
court it
would be proper for a lower court or court of
origin
i i tot suspend d its
it proceedings
di on the
th
precept of judicial courtesy. As the Supreme
Court explained in Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park v. Court of Appeals,
pp , 164 SCRA 421,,
427-428 (1988):
 Due respect for the Supreme Court and
practical and ethical considerations should have
prompted the appellate court to wait for the final
determination of the petition before taking
cognizance of the case and trying to render moot
exactly what was before this court x x x. This Court
explained, however, that the rule on judicial
courtesy
t applies
li where
h th
there i a STRONG
is
PROBABILITY that the issues before the higher
court would be rendered MOOT AND MORIBUND
as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in
the lower court or court of origin.
origin (Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859, June 26,
2006)
 Effect of amendment of Rule 65,
Section 7 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
December 12, 12 2007 on the principle
of judicial courtesy. Judicial courtesy
can no longer be used as an excuse by
courts or tribunals not to proceed with
the principal case.
 Section
S i 7. E
Expediting
di i proceedings;
di
injunctive relief. - The court in which the
petition is filed may issue orders expediting
the proceedings, and it may also grant a
temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of
the rights
g of the p parties p
pending
g such
proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt
the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued
against
i t the
th public
bli respondent
d t from
f f th
further
proceeding in the case.
 The public respondent shall proceed
with the principal case within ten (10) days
from the filing of a petition for certiorari
with a higher court or tribunal, absent a
temporary restraining order or a
preliminary
li i i j
injunction,
ti or upon its it
expiration. Failure of the public
respondent to proceed with the principal
case may be a ground for an
administrative charge.
 A compulsory counterclaim does not require a
certificate of non-forum shopping because a
compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory
pleading.
The Rule distinctly provides that the required
certification against forum shopping is intended to cover
an "initiatory pleading," meaning an "incipient application
off a party
t asserting
ti a claim
l i forf relief."
li f " Respondent
R d t bank's
b k'
Answer with Counterclaim is not a responsive pleading,
filed merelyy to counter p petitioners' complaint
p that initiates
the civil action. In other words, the rule requiring such
certification does not contemplate a defendant's/
respondent's
respondent s claim for relief that is derived only from,
from or is
necessarily connected with, the main action or complaint.
In fact, upon failure by the plaintiff to comply with such
requirement, Section 5, quoted above, directs the
"dismissal of the case without prejudice," not the
dismissal of respondent
respondent's s counterclaim.
counterclaim (Carpio vs. vs
Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas (Batangas), Inc., G.R. No.
153171. May 4, 2006)
What are the tests or criteria to determine
compulsory or permissive nature of specific
counterclaims?
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the
claim and counterclaim largely
g y the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants claim absent the compulsory p y
counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantiallyy the same evidence support
pp or
refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants
counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim
and the counterclaim?
 The evidence
Th id off the
th petitioner
titi on its
it claim
l i ini its
it
complaint, and that of the respondents on their
counterclaims
t l i are thus
th different.
diff t There
Th i likewise,
is, lik i
no logical relation between the claim of the
petitioner
titi andd the
th counterclaim
t l i off theth respondents.
d t
Hence, the counterclaim of the respondents is an
initiator pleading,
initiatory pleading whichhich requires
req ires the respondents
to append thereto a certificate of non-forum
shopping Their failure to do so results to the
shopping.
dismissal of their counterclaim without prejudice.
(Korea Exchange Bank vs. vs Hon.
Hon Gonzales,
Gonzales et. et
al., G.R. Nos. 142286-87, April 15, 2005)
 The elementary test for failure to state a
cause of action is whether the complaint
alleges
ll f t which
facts hi h if true
t would
ld justify
j tif the
th
relief demanded. The inquiry is into the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations. If the allegations in the complaint
furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
maintained it should not be dismissed regardless
maintained,
of the defense that may be presented by the
defendant. (Heirs of Tomas Dolleton vs. Fil
Estate Management, Inc., G.R. No. 170750, April
7, 2009)
 When a motion to dismiss is premised on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause
of action (Rule 16, 16 Section 1 (g)),(g)) the ruling
thereon should be based only on the facts
alleged
g in the complaint.
p The court must resolve
the issue on the strength of such allegations,
assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of
a cause of action rests on whether,
whether hypothetically
admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be
true, the court can render a valid jjudgment
g upon
p the
same, in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint. However, there is no hypothetical
admission of the veracity of the allegations if:
1. the falsity of the allegations is subject to
judicial notice; 2. such allegations are legally
impossible; 3. the allegations refer to facts
which
hi h are inadmissible
i d i ibl in i evidence;
id 4 by
4. b the
th
record or document in the pleading, the
allegations appear unfounded; or 5. there is
evidence which has been presented to the court
by stipulation of the parties or in the course of
th hearings
the h i related
l t d to
t the
th case. ( Heirs
H i off
Loreto Maramag vs. Maramag, G.R. No. 181132,
2009 June 5, 2009)
A ground raised in a motion to dismiss may not
be the subject of preliminary hearing as special
and affirmative defense in the answer, except
when there are several defendants but only y one
filed a motion to dismiss.
Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
the defendant may reiterate any of the grounds for
dismissal pprovided under Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court as affirmative defenses but a preliminary
hearingg mayy no longer
g be had thereon if a motion to
dismiss had already been filed. This section,
however, does not recontemplate a situation, such as
the one obtaining in this case, where there are
several defendants but only one filed a motion to
dismiss. (Abrajano vs. Salas, Jr., G.R. No. 158895.
February 16, 2006)
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT under
Rule 17, Sec. 1
The trial court has no discretion or option to deny
the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff under
Section 1,1 Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of
right to the plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the
most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal,
dismissal the trial
court has no choice but to consider the complaint
as dismissed,
dismissed since the plaintiff may opt for such
dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground
(O B Jovenir Construction and Development
(O.B.
Corp. vs. Macamir Realty and CA, G.R. No.
135803 March 28,
135803, 28 2006).
2006)
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT DUE TO
PLAINTIFFS
PLAINTIFF S FAULT under Rule 17, Sec. 3.
Sec. 3, Rule 17 enumerates the instances where
th complaint
the l i t may be b dismissed
di i d due
d t plaintiffs
to l i tiff
fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the
presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the rules or any
order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for
failure to prosecute,
prosecute this has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits and is understood to
be with prejudice to the filing of another action
unless otherwise provided in the order of
dismissal. In other words, unless there be a
qualification in the order of dismissal that it is without
prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an
 In situations contemplated in Section 3, Rule
17 where a complaint is dismissed for failure of
17,
the plaintiff to comply with a lawful order of the
court such dismissal has the effect of an
court,
adjudication upon the merits. A dismissal for
failure to prosecute has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits, and operates as res
judicata particularly when the court did not direct
judicata,
that the dismissal was without prejudice. (Court of
Appeals vs.vs Alvarez,
Alvarez G.R.
G R No.
No 142439,
142439 December
3, 2006)
 Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure,
Procedure the dismissal of the complaint due
to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry
with it the dismissal of the counterclaim,
counterclaim
compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of
the complaint is without prejudice to the right
of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.
(Pinga vs.
vs Santiago,
Santiago G.R.G R No.
No 170354,
170354 June 30,30
2006).
 Pinga vs.
vs Santiago which refers to
instances covered by Section 3, Rule 17 on
dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of
the p plaintiff also applies
pp where the
dismissal of the complaint was upon the
instance of the petitioner who correctly
argued lack of jurisdiction over its
person.
person
 Petitioners counterclaim against respondent is
for damages and attorney
attorneyss fees arising from the
unfounded suit. While respondents complaint
against petitioner is already dismissed,
dismissed petitioner
may have very well already incurred damages and
litigation expenses such as attorney
attorneyss fees since it
was forced to engage legal representation in the
Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of
jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of
the improper service of summons upon it. it Hence,
Hence
the cause of action of petitioners counterclaim
is not eliminated by the mere dismissal of
respondents complaint. (Perkin Elmer
Singapore Pte Ltd. Ltd vs
vs. Dakila Trading
Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007)
Remedy from order of dismissal for failure to
prosecute ordinary appeal.
A order
An d off dismissal
di i l for
f failure
f il t prosecute
to t
has the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
P titi
Petitioners counsell should
h ld have
h fil d a notice
filed ti off
appeal with the appellate court within the
reglementary
l t period.
i d Instead
I t d off filing
fili a petition
titi
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper
recourse was an ordinary
di appeall with ith the
th Court
C t off
Appeals under Rule 41. (Ko vs. PNB, 479 SCRA
298 January
298, J 20 2006)
20,
Effect of declaration of default.
Th mere fact
The f t that
th t a defendant
d f d t isi declared
d l d in i
default does not automatically result in the grant of
th prayers off the
the th plaintiff.
l i tiff To
T win,
i the
th latter
l tt mustt
still present the same quantum of evidence that
would ld be
b required
i d if the
th defendant
d f d t were stilltill
present. A party that defaults is not deprived of its
rights except
rights, e cept the right to be heard and to
present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence
presented does not support a judgment for the
plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if
the defendant may not have been heard or allowed
to present any countervailing evidence (Gajudo vs.
Traders Royal Bank,Bank G.R.
G R No.No 151098,
151098 March 21,
21
2006).
 A defendant party declared in default retains
the right to appeal from the judgment by default on
the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the
material allegations of the complaint,
complaint or that the
decision is contrary to law, even without need of
the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of
default (Martinez vs. Republic, G.R. No. 160895,
October 30,
30 2006).
2006)
Procedure trial court must take when a
defendant fails to file an answer.
Under Sec.
Sec 3 of Rule 9,
9 the court "shall
shall proceed
to render judgment granting the claimant such relief
as his pleading may warrant,
warrant " subject to the court
courts
s
discretion on whether to require the presentation of
evidence ex parte.
parte The same provision also sets
down guidelines on the nature and extent of the
relief that may be granted.
granted In particular,
particular the court
courts
s
judgment "shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award
unliquidated damages." (Gajudo vs. Traders
Royal Bank,
Bank supra)
 DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
The importance of discovery procedures is well
recognized by the Court. It approved A.M. No. 03-
1-09-SC on July 13, 2004 which provided for the
guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and
clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of
deposition-discovery measures. Under A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue
orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories
to parties under Rule 25 and request for admission
of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their
discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23
or other measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5
days from the filing of the answer. The parties are
likewise required to submit, at least 3 days before
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
provides that a judgment on the pleadings is
proper when an answer fails to tender an issue
or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading. The essential
question is whether there are issues generated by
the pleadings. A judgment on the pleadings may be
sought only by a claimant, who is the party seeking
to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim; or to obtain a declaratory relief. (Meneses
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
156304, October 23, 2006)
 Judgment on the pleadings is improper when
the answer to the complaint tenders several issues.
issues
A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the
truth of all the material and relevant allegations of
the opposing party and the judgment must rest on
those allegations taken together with such other
allegations as are admitted in the pleadings.
pleadings It is
proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse
d party's
' pleading.
l di H
However, when
h iti
appears that not all the material allegations of the
complaint were admitted in the answer for some of
them were either denied or disputed, and the
defendant has set up certain special defenses
which,
hi h if proven, wouldld have
h th effect
the ff t off nullifying
llif i
plaintiff's main cause of action, judgment on the
pleadings cannot be rendered.(Municipality
rendered (Municipality of
Tiwi vs. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010)
 SUMMARY JUDGMENT

For summary judgment to be proper, two

(2) requisites
i it mustt concur: (1) there
th mustt be
b
no genuine issue on any material fact,
except for the amount of damages; and (2)
the moving party must be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
 When, on their face,
When face the pleadings tender a
genuine issue, summary judgment is not
proper. An
A issue
i i genuine
is i if it requires
i th
the
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived
or false claim. The trial courts decision was
merely denominated as summary judgment. But
in essence, it is actuallyy equivalent
q to a
judgment on the merits, making the rule on
summary
su a y judg
judgment
e inapplicable
app cab e in thiss case
case.
(Ontimare vs. Elep, G.R. No. 159224, January
20 2006).
20, 2006)
 When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested
or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue
or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is
called for. The p party
y who moves for summaryy
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the
absence of anyy g genuine issue of fact,, or that the
issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial
so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial
courts have limited authority to render summary
judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.
When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial (Asian
C
Construction
t ti and d Development
D l t Corp.
C vs. PCIB,
PCIB
G.R. No. 153827, April 25, 2006).
 Under the Rules, summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of
fact which call for the presentation of evidence in
a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the
pleadings appear to raise issues, when the
affidavits, depositions and admissions show that
such issues are not g genuine, then summary y
judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue
as a matter of law. The determinative factor,,
therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is
the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to
any material fact. (Philippine Bank Of
Communications vs. Spouses Go , G.R. No.
175514, February 14, 2011)
 The trial court cannot motu proprio decide
that summary judgment on an action is in
order. Under the applicable provisions of Rule 35,
the defending party or the claimant, as the case
may be, must invoke the rule on summary
judgment by filing a motion. The adverse party
must be notified of the motion for summary
judgment and furnished with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions before hearing is
conducted. More importantly, a summary judgment
is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. (Pineda vs. Guevara,
G.R. No. 143188, February 14, 2007).
 TRIAL
Lack of cause of action may be cured by
evidence presented during the trial and
amendments to conform to the evidence.
evidence
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule
10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that
the actual merits of a case may be determined in the
most expeditious
p and inexpensive
p manner without
regard to technicalities, and that all other matters
included in the case may be determined in a single
proceeding thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits.
proceeding, suits
Section 5 thereof applies to situations wherein
evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings
i presented
is t d by
b the
th parties
ti d i
during th trial,
the t i l and
d to
t
conform to such evidence the pleadings are
subsequently amended on motion of a party. party
(Swagman Hotels & Travel, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No.
161135, April 8, 2005).
 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Since respondent failed to deny the
genuineness and due execution of the Dacion
and Confirmation Statement under oath, then
these are deemed admitted and must be
considered by y the court in resolving
g the demurrer
to evidence. We held in Philippine American
General Insurance Co.,, Inc. v. Sweet Lines,, Inc. that
[w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an
instrument are deemed admitted because of the
adverse partys failure to make a specific verified
denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented
formally in evidence for it may be considered an
admitted fact. ( Casent Realty Development Corp.
vs. Philbanking Corporation, G.R. No. 150731,
September 14, 2007 )
 Upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the
appellate
ll t court,t the
th defendant
d f d t loses l th right
the i ht to
t
present his evidence and the appellate court shall
th proceed
then d to
t render
d judgment
j d t on the
th merits
it on the
th
basis of plaintiffs evidence. The rule, however,
imposes the condition that if his demurrer is granted
by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is
reversed on appeal,
appeal the movant loses his right to
present evidence in his behalf and he shall have
been deemed to have elected to stand on the
insufficiency of plaintiffs case and evidence. In such
event the appellate court which reverses the order of
event,
dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the
merits on the basis of plaintiff
plaintiffs
s evidence (Republic
vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. 148246, February 16, 2007).
 Distinction between motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action and motion
to dismiss based on lack of cause of action.
The first is raised in a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16, Sec. 1 (g) before a responsive
pleading is filed and can be determined only
from the allegations of the pleading and not
from evidentiary matters.
matters The second is raised
in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after
the plaintiff has rested his case and can be
resolved only on the basis of the evidence he
has presented in support of his claim(The
M il Banking
Manila B ki C
Corp. vs. University
U i i off
Baguio, Inc., G.R. No. 159189, February 21,
2007)
 APPEAL AND REVIEW
The Supreme Court may review factual findings
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
The petitioner admits that the issues on
appeal are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court only questions of law may be raised,
Court, raised for
the simple reason that the Court is not a trier of
facts The findings of the trial court as affirmed by
facts.
the CA are conclusive on this Court, absent proof
of any of the recognized exceptional
circumstances such as: (1) the conclusion is
grounded on speculations,
speculations surmises or
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken absurd or impossible; (3) there is
mistaken,
grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension
off facts;
f t (5) theth findings
fi di off fact
f t are conflicting;
fli ti (6)
there is no citation of specific evidence on which
the factual
fact al findings are based;
based (7) the finding of
absence of facts is contradicted by the presence
of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA
are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (10) the
findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the
case; and (11) the findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties. (Asian Construction
& Devt.
Devt Corp.
Corp vs. vs Tulabut,
Tulabut G.R.G R No.
No 161904,
161904
April 26, 2005)
 The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over
the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the
intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower
court viz., on the basis either of the law or the
facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of
the court are incorrect, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari.
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an
error of law or fact a mistake of judgment
appeal is the proper remedy. Vios vs. Pantangco,
Jr., G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009)
 Regional trial courts have jurisdiction over
complaints for recovery of ownership or accion
reivindicatoria. Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules
on Civil Procedure nonetheless allows the RTC
to decide the case brought on appeal from the
MTC which, even without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, may decide the case on the
merits. In the instant case, the MTC of Mambajao
should have dismissed the complaint outright for
lack of jurisdiction but since it decided the case on
its merits, the RTC rendered a decision based on
the findings of the MTC. (Provost vs. CA, G.R. No.
160406, June 26, 2006).
 The RTC should
Th h ld haveh t k
taken cognizance
i off the
th
case. If the case is tried on the merits by the
M i i l Court
Municipal C t without
ith t jurisdiction
j i di ti over theth
subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no
l
longer di i
dismiss th case if it has
the h original
i i l
jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no
l
longer t the
try th case on the th merits,
it but
b t shall
h ll decide
d id
the case on the basis of the evidence presented in
th lower
the l court,
t without
ith t prejudice
j di tot the
th admission
d i i
of the amended pleadings and additional evidence
i the
in th interest
i t t off justice.
j ti (E
(Encarnacion
i vs. Amigo,
A i
G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006).
 Inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve
questions of ownership whenever it is necessary
to decide the question of possession in an
ejectment case.
case
The RTC erred when it agreed with the MTCs
decision to dismiss the case. case At first glance,
glance it
appears that based on the P13,300.00 assessed
value of the subject property as declared by
respondents, the RTC would have no jurisdiction
over the case. But the above
above-quoted
quoted provision refers
to the original jurisdiction of the RTC. Section 22
of BP 129
o 9 vests
es s upo
upon the e RTCC the
e eexercise
e c se o
of
appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the
Metropolitan
p Trial Courts,, Municipal
p Trial Courts,, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, the amount
Appeal from RTC decision rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction petition
for review under Rule 42.
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with
the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners
should have filed a Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals under Rule 42 and not a Notice
of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider
this to have been remedied by the timely filing of
the Motion for Reconsideration on the following
day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court
allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a
matter of right, before the filing of the appellees
brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of
the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed
 RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
No petition for relief in the Court of Appeals
andd Supreme
S C
Courtt
While Rule 38 uses the phrase any court,
it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and
Regional
g Trial Courts. The pprocedure in the CA
and the Supreme Court are governed by
separate provisions of the Rules of Court. There
is no provision in the Rules of Court making the
petition for rellief applicable in the CA or this
Court.(Purcon vs. MRM Philippines, Inc.,
G R No.
G.R. No 182718,
182718 September 26, 26 2008)
 ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
Section
S ti 1 Rule
1, R l 47 off theth 1987 Rules R l off Civil
Ci il
Procedure provides that the remedy of annulment of
judgments or final orders/resolutions of a Regional
Trial Court in civil actions can only be availed of
where "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition
titi f relief
for li f or other
th appropriate i t remedies
di are
no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner." A petition for annulment of judgment
petitioner.
under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under
exceptional circumstances where a party, without
f lt on his
fault hi part, t has
h failed
f il d to
t availil off the
th ordinary
di or
other appropriate remedies provided by law. Such
action is never resorted to as a substitute for a
partys own neglect in not promptly availing of the
ordinary or other appropriate remedies. (Republic
of the Philippines vs. s Spouses
Spo ses De Castro , G.R. GR
No. 189724, February 7, 2011)
 Rule 47 applies only to annulment by the Court
of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil cases of Regional Trial Courts
it does not apply to criminal actions (People vs.
Bitanga, G.R. No. 159222, June 26 2007); final
judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals or
administrative bodies such as the National Labor
Relations Commission, the Ombudsman, the Civil
Service Commission, the Office of the President,
and the PARAD (Fraginal vs. Paranal, G.R. No.
150207, February 223, 2007).; or to nullification of
decisions of the Court of Appeals (Grande vs.
University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148456,
September 15, 2006).
 Although the RTC has the authority to annul
fi l judgments,
final j d t such h authority
th it pertains
t i only
l tot
final judgments rendered by inferior courts and
quasi-judicial
i j di i l bodies
b di off equall ranking
ki with
ith such h
inferior courts. Given that DARAB decisions are
appealable
l bl tot the
th CA,
CA the
th inevitable
i it bl conclusion
l i i
is
that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC
andd its
it decisions
d i i are beyond
b d the
th RTCs
RTC control t l
(Springfield Development Corp. vs. Presiding
J d
Judge off RTC off Misamis
Mi i Oriental,
O i t l Branch
B h 40,
40
G.R. No. 142628, February 6, 2007).
 EXECUTION
Execution pending appeal applies to election
cases Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules
cases.
of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a
writ of execution pending appeal, there is no reason
to dispute the COMELECs authority to do so,
considering
co s de g tthatat tthe
e supp
suppletory
eto y app
application
cat o oof tthe
e
Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1,
Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
provides that absent any applicable provisions
therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court
shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect. (Balajonda vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 166032, February 28, 2005).
When title has been consolidated in name of
mortgagee,
g g writ of p
possession is a matter of
right. Once a mortgaged estate is extrajudicially
sold, and is not redeemed within the reglementary
g y
period, no separate and independent action is
necessaryy to obtain ppossession of the pproperty.
p y
The purchaser at the public auction has only to file
a ppetition for issuance of a writ of ppossession
pursuant to Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. ((DBP vs. Spouses Gatal, G.R. No. 138567,
March 4, 2005).
Execution of money judgments under Rule 39,
Sec. 9 p promissory y note not allowed.
The law mandates that in the execution of a money
jjudgment,
g , the jjudgment
g debtor shall p
pay
y either in
cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment
obligee,
g or anyy other form of p payment
y acceptable
p to
the latter. Nowhere does the law mention promissory
notes as a form of payment. The only exception is
when such form of payment is acceptable to the
judgment debtor. But it was obviously not acceptable
to complainant, otherwise she would not have filed
this case against respondent sheriff. In fact, she
objected to it because the promissory notes of the
defendants did not satisfy the money judgment in her
f
favor. (D
(Dagooc vs. Erlina,
E li A M No.
A.M. N P 04 1857
P-04-1857
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1429-P), March 16, 2005)
Venue of action for revival of judgment
If the action for revival of jjudgment
g affects title
to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, then it is a real action that must be filed
with the court of the place where the real
property is located. (Infante vs. Aran Builders,
Inc., G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007)
 PROVISIONAL
O SO REMEDIES
S
Improper issuance and service of writ
of attachment
A distinction should be made between
issuance and implementation
p of the writ of
attachment. This is necessary to determine
when jurisdiction over the defendant should
be acquired to validly implement the writ.
 The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment
involves three stages: first, the court issues the
order granting the application; second, second the writ of
attachment issues pursuant to the order granting
tthee writ;
t; a
and
d tthird,
d, tthe
e writt iss implemented.
p e e ted For
o tthe
e
initial two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be
first obtained, but once the implementation of
the writ commences, the court must have
acquired
i d jurisdiction
j i di ti over theth d f d t
defendant
(Mangila vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125027,
August 12,12 2002,
2002 387 SCRA 162). 162)
Preference of levy on attachment duly
registered over a prior unregistered sale
The settled rule is that levy on attachment,
attachment duly
registered, takes preference over a prior
unregistered sale. The preference created by the
levy on attachment is not diminished even by the
subsequent registration of the prior sale. This is so
because an attachment is a proceeding in rem. It
is against the particular property, enforceable
against
i t the
th whole
h l world.ld The
Th attaching
tt hi creditor
dit
acquires a specific lien on the attached
property which nothing can subsequently
destroy except the very dissolution of the
attachment or levy itself.
The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is
had under execution issued on the judgment, or
until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment
discharged or vacated in some manner provided by
law. Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of
respondents appeared in the nature of a real lien
when
h petitioner
titi h d his
had hi purchaseh recorded.
d d TheTh
effect of the notation of said lien was to subject and
subordinate the right of petitioner,
petitioner as purchaser,
purchaser to
the lien (Valdevieso vs. Damalerio, G.R. No.
133303 February 17,
133303, 17 2005,
2005 451 SCRA 664, 664 670).
670)
Judge's authority to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction only within his/her / territorial
jurisdiction
A the
As h presiding
idi j d
judge off RTC,
RTC Marawi
M i City,
Ci
he should have known that Makati City was way
beyond the boundaries of his territorial jurisdiction
insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction
is concerned.
concerned Section 21(1) of B.P. B P Blg.
Blg 129,
129 as
amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise
original
g jjurisdiction in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions
(Gomos vs. Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863,
O t b 22,
October 22 2004,
2004 441 SCRA 162).
162)
Original action for injunction outside the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
What petitioner filed with the appellate
court was an original action for preliminary
i j
injunction
ti which
hi h isi a provisional
i i l andd
extraordinary remedy calculated to preserve
or maintain the status quo of things and is
availed of to p prevent actual or threatened
acts, until the merits of the case can be
heard An original action for injunction is
heard.
outside the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals however.
Appeals, however
Under B.P. 129, the appellate courts
j i di ti
jurisdiction t grantt a writ
to it off preliminary
li i
injunction is limited to actions or
proceedings pending before it (Section 2
of Rule 58) or in a petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus (Section 7 of
Rule 65). In the case at bar, petitioners
complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No.
00-196 was p pending
g before Branch 256 of
the Muntinlupa RTC, not with the appellate
court. ((Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie
g Phils.,, Inc.,,
vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.,
Honorable N. C. Perello,, G.R. No. 159296 ,
February 10, 2006).
Injunction to restrain extrajudicial foreclosure
involving several parcels located in different
provinces
Separate injunction suits may be filed for
breach of mortgage contract with injunction to
restrain extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings of
mortgaged properties located in different provinces
without
t out violating
o at g tthee rule
u e aga
against
st forum
o u sshopping
opp g
since injunction is enforceable only within the
territorial limits of the trial court, thus the mortgagor
is left without remedy as to the properties located
outside the jurisdiction of the issuing court unless
an application
li ti f injunction
for i j ti i made
is d with
ith another
th
court which has jurisdiction over the latter court
(Benguet Management Corporation vs. vs Court of
Appeals, September 18, 2003, 411 SCRA 347).
 CHANGE
C G IN THE RULE
U
The last paragraph which was added to
Section 5, Rule 58 states that a higher court
((RTC, Court of Appeals,
pp Sandiganbayan,
g y
Court of Tax Appeals) which issues a writ of
preliminary injunction against a lower court,
b d officer
board, ffi or quasi-judicial
i j di i l agency mustt
decide the main case or petition within six
(6) months from the issuance of the writ. writ
(AM 07-7-12, effective December 27, 2007).
Purpose: in order not to unduly delay
the main case lodged in the lower court.
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
A petition for declaratory relief should be brought
in
in the appropriate regional trial court. court The
purpose of the petition is to ask the court to
determine any question of construction or validity
arising from the sujbect matter thereof , and for the
declaration of rightsg and duties thereunder. Hence,,
the subject matter of such petition raises issues
which are not capable of pecuniary estimation and
must be filed in the RTC (Sec. 19 [1], BP 129; Sec. 1,
Rule 63). It would be error to file the petition the
petition
titi with
ith the
th Supreme
S C t which
Court hi h has
h no original
i i l
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief
(Ortega vs. vs Quezon City Government,
Government G.R. G R No.No
161400, September 2, 2005).
 However, where the action is for quieting of title
which is a similar remedy under the second paragraph
of Sec. 1 of Rule 63, the jurisdiction will depend upon
the assessed value of the property.
property
Re-filing of petition for certiorari should be done
within the 60-day period.
period Where the dismissal by the
Court of Appeals of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R.
SP No.No 69744 for non non-submission
submission of a non non-forum
forum
shopping certification was without prejudice and
petitioner could have re re-filed
filed such petition, such rere-
filing should still be done within the prescribed period
under
u de Sec
Section
o 4,, Rule
u e 65 o of the
e 1997
99 Rules
u es o
of CCivil
Procedure, or not later than sixty days from notice of
the assailed Order of the RTC. ((Estrera vs. CA,, G.R.
No. 154235-36, August 16, 2006)
 CHANGES IN THE RULE
Period to file petition for certiorari now
inextendible. Last paragraph of Section 4, Rule
65: No
No extension of time to file the petition
shall be granted except for compelling reasons
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days days has
been DELETED by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
effective December 27, 2007. Hence, petitions
for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days
from notice of jjudgment
g or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration.
 If the Court intended to retain the authority of
the proper courts to grant extensions under
S ti
Section 4 off Rule
R l 65,
65 the
th paragraph h providing
idi
for such authority would have been preserved.
The removal of the said paragraph under the
amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of
Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there
can no longer g be any y extension of the 60-
day period within which to file a petition for
certiorari.
ce to a ((Laguna
agu a Metts
etts Co
Corporation
po at o vs. s
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185220, July 27,
2009)
 A. M. No. 07-7-12 has also amended the second
paragraph
h off Sec.
S 4
4:
If the petition relates to an act or
omission of a municipal trial court or of a
corporation,
p , board,, officer or p
person,, it shall be filed
with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined byy the Supreme p
Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or with the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an
act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition
shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.
 IIn election
l ti cases involving
i l i an actt or
omission of a municipal or regional trial court,
the petition shall be filed exclusively with the
Commission on Elections, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction

Following the hierarchy off courts, no

certiorari against the RTC shall be filed with the
Supreme Court. This will help prevent the
clogging
gg g of the Supreme
p Courts dockets as
litigants will be discouraged from filing petitions
directlyy with the Supreme
p Court.
 Section
S ti 7.7 Expediting
E diti proceedings;
di
injunctive relief. - The court in which the
petition
titi isi filed
fil d may issue
i orders
d expediting
diti the th
proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary
restraining
t i i order
d or a writ it off preliminary
li i
injunction for the preservation of the rights of
th parties
the ti pending
di suchh proceedings.
di Th
The
petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal
i i l case unless l a temporary
t restraining
t i i
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
b
been i
issuedd against
i t the
th public
bli respondent
d t from
f
further proceeding in the case.
 The public respondent shall proceed with
the principal case within ten (10) days from
the filing of a petition for certiorari with a
higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public
respondent to proceed with the principal
case may be a ground for an administrative
charge
 Unless there is a temporary restraining order
or ppreliminaryy injunction
j issued byy a higher
g
court, the main or principal case should proceed
despite the filing of a petition for certiorari
questioning an act or omission of a court or
tribunal
Judicial courtesy, therefore, can no longer
b used
be d as an excuse byb courtst or tribunals
t ib l nott
to proceed with the principal case.
 Section 8. Proceedings after comment is
filed. - After the comment or other pleadings
required by the court are filed, or the time for
the filing thereof has expired, the court may
hear the case or require the parties to submit
memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of
memoranda or the expiration of the period for
filing, the court finds that the allegations of the
petition are true, it shall render judgment for
such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.
 However, the court may dismiss the petition if
it finds
fi d the
th same patently
t tl without
ith t meritit or
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the
questions
ti raised
i d therein
th i are too
t unsubstantial
b t ti l to
t
require consideration. In such event, the court
may award in favor of the respondent treble
costs solidarily against the petitioner and
counsel in addition to subjecting counsel to
counsel,
administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and
139-B of the Rules of Court.
Court
The Court may impose motu proprio, based
on rep ipsa loquitur,
loquitur other disciplinary
sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for
patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions
for certiorari.
 The writ of prohibition does not lie against
the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.function
Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No.
9207 the National Government Administration
9207,
Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial function,
function which is the scope of
a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
Procedure the instant
prohibition should be dismissed outright. Where the
principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, IRR
petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification an action which properly falls under
nullification,
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. (Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association vs. vs Defensor,
Defensor
G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006).
 A writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG is
unavailing. Mandamus is available only to
compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined
by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that
mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC
to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At
most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. E O No.
No 290
in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 to grant preferential and
exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC)
or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the
results of the DOTC surveys
surveys (Henares,
(Henares Jr.
Jr vs.
vs
Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board,
Board G.R.
G R No.
No 158290,
158290 October 23, 23
2006).
 Actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp p an office in a corporation,
p which were
formerly cognizable by the Securities and
Exchange g Commission under PD 902-A, have
been transferred to the courts of general
jjurisdiction. But, this does not change
g the fact that
Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
does not apply
pp y to q quo warranto cases against
g
persons who usurp an office in a private
corporation ((Calleja j vs. Panday,y G.R. No.
168696. February 28, 2006).
 EXPROPRIATION
Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate
payment of the initial just compensation prior
to the issuance of the writ of possession in
favor of the government. RA 8974 requires that
the g government make a direct p payment
y to the
property owner before the writ may issue. Such
payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR
in the case of land,
land the value of the improvements
or structures under the replacement cost method,
or if no such valuation is available and in cases of
utmost urgency, the proffered value of the property
to be seized. It is the plain intent of RA 8974 to
supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67
with the scheme of immediate payment in cases
involving national government infrastructure
projects (Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166249,
December 19, 2005).
 Section 9 of Rule 67 empowers the court to
order payment to itself of the proceeds of the
expropriation whenever questions of ownership are
yet to be settled.
settled There is no reason why this rule
should not be applied even where the settlement of
such questions is to be made by another tribunal,
tribunal
i.e., the DARAB. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs.
Bases Conversion Development Authority, Authority
G.R. No. 173085, January 19, 2011)
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE

A writ of possession is a writ of

execution employed to enforce a
judgment to recover the possession of
land. It commands the sheriff to enter the
land and ggive ppossession of it to the p
person
entitled under the judgment.
 A writ of possession may be issued under the
following instances: (1) in land registration
proceedings under Section 17 of Act 496; (2) in a
judicial foreclosure,
foreclosure provided the debtor is in
possession of the mortgaged realty and no third
person not a party to the foreclosure suit,
person, suit had
intervened; (3) in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a
real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. No
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (4) in
execution sales (last paragraph of Section 33,
33 Rule
39 of the Rules of Court).
 The present case falls under the third instance.
Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118, a writ of possession may be issued
either (1) within the one-year redemption period,
upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of
the redemption period, without need of a bond.
(PNB vs. Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R.
No. 153951, July 29, 2005
 A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to
preventt an extrajudicial
t j di i l foreclosure,
f l onlyl upon a
clear showing of a violation of the mortgagors
unmistakable
i t k bl right.
i ht Unsubstantiated
U b t ti t d allegations
ll ti off
denial of due process and prematurity of a loan are
nott sufficient
ffi i t tot d f t the
defeat th mortgagees
t
unmistakable right to an extrajudicial foreclosure.
(S l
(Selegna M
Management t and d Development
D l t
Corporation vs. UCPB, G.R. No. 165662, May 31,
2006)
An action to invalidate the mortgage or the
foreclosure sale is not a valid ground to
oppose issuance of writ of possession.
possession

As a rule,, anyy q
question regarding
g g the validityy of
the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal
ground for refusing
g g the issuance of a writ of
possession. Regardless of whether or not there
is a p
pending g suit for annulment of the mortgage
g g
or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled
to a writ of p possession,, without pprejudice
j of
course to the eventual outcome of said case.
((Sps.
p Arquiza
q vs. Court of Appeals,
pp , G.R. No.
160479, June 8, 2005)
 FORCIBLE ENTRY AND
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
In forcible entryy or unlawful detainer cases,, the
only damage that can be recovered is the fair
rental value or the reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the leased
property. The reason for this is that the only issue
raised in ejectment
j cases is that of rightful
g
possession; hence, the damages which could be
recovered are those which the plaintiff could have
sustained as a mere possessor,
possessor or those caused
by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property,
p p y and not the damages g which he mayy have
suffered but which have no direct relation to his
loss of material possession. (Teraa vs. Hon. De
Sagun G.R.
Sagun, G R No.No 152131,
152131 April 29,
29 2009; Dumo
vs. Espinas, G.R. No. 141962, January 25, 2006)
 The jjudgment
g rendered in an action for unlawful
detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the
possession only
p y and shall in no wise bind the title
or affect the ownership of the land or building.
Such jjudgment
g would not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title to the land or
building.
g Section 18,, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the defendant raises the
defense of ownership p in his p
pleadings
g and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding
g the issue of ownership, p, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of ppossession. ((Roberts vs. Papio,
p , G.R. No.
166714, February 9, 2007)
 Accion publiciana is one for the recovery
of possession of the right to possess.
possess It is
also referred to as an ejectment suit filed
after the expiration of one year after the
occurrence of the cause of action or from the
unlawful
l f l withholding
i hh ldi off possession
i off the
h
y ((Hilario, etc., et. al. vs. Salvador, et.
realty.
al., G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005)
 Does the RTC have jurisdiction over all
cases of recovery of possession regardless of
the value of the property involved?
NO. The doctrine that all cases of recovery of
possession
i or accioni publiciana
bli i li
lies with
ith the
th
regional trial courts regardless of the value of the
property
t no longer
l h ld true.
holds t A things
As thi now
stand, a distinction must be made between those
properties
ti th assessed
the d value
l off which
hi h is i below
b l
P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and
P50 000 00 if within
P50,000.00, ithi (Quinagoran
(Q i vs. Court
C t off
Appeals, G.R. No. 155179. August 24, 2007)
 Specifically, the regional trial court exercises
exclusive original
g jjurisdiction "in all civil actions
which involve possession of real property."
However, if the assessed value of the real
property involved does not exceed
P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00
outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial
court exercises jjurisdiction over actions to
recover possession of real property (Atuel vs.
Valdez, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 517, 528). )
 All cases involving title to or possession
of real property with an assessed value of
less than P20,000.00 iff outside Metro
Manila, fall under the original
g jjurisdiction of
the municipal trial court. (Aliabo v.
Carampatan G.R.
Carampatan, G R No.
No 128922,
128922 March 16, 16
2001, 354 SCRA 548, 552).
 A complaint
p must allege
g the assessed value
of the real property subject of the complaint or
the interest thereon to determine which court
h jurisdiction
has j i di ti over the
th action.
ti Thi is
This i because
b
the nature of the action and which court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is
determined by the material allegations of the
complaint the type of relief prayed for by the
complaint,
plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is
filed,, irrespective
p of whether the p plaintiffs are
entitled to some or all of the claims asserted
therein. ( Laresma v. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973,
November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 156; Hilario v.
Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457
SCRA 815).
815)
 A complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of
land which involves title to or interest in real
property should allege the assessed value of
the land. The complaint specified only the market
value or estimated value which is P15,000.00.
P15 000 00 In
the absence of an assessed value, or in lieu
thereof, the estimated value may be alleged.
Sec. 22 of BP 129 as amended by R.A. No.
7691 (where the assessed value of the real
property does not exceed P20,000.00 P20 000 00 or
P50,000.00 in Metro Manila) grants the MTC
exclusive jurisdiction over subject case.The nature
of an action is determined not by what is stated in
the caption of the complaint but its allegations and
the reliefs p
prayed
y for. Where the ultimate objective
j
off the plaintiff
ff is to obtain title to real property, it
should be filed in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property
subject thereof. (Barangay Piapi vs. Talip, 469
SCRA 409 [2005]).
 The determining jurisdictional element for
the accion reivindicatoria is, is as RA 7691
discloses, the assessed value of the property in
question. For properties in the provinces, the
RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value
exceeds P20,000, and the MTC, if the value is
P20 000 or below.
P20,000 below An assessed value can have
reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality
where the property is located, and is contained in
the
h tax declaration.
d l i I is
It i the
h amount in i the
h tax
declaration that should be consulted and no other
kind of value,
value and as appearing in Exhibit B, B this is
P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
C t off Romblon
Court R bl which
hi h has
h j i di ti
jurisdiction over the
th
territory where the property is located, and not the
court a quo.
quo . (Hilario vs.vs Salvador,
Salvador G.R. G R No.
No
160384. April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815)
 The actions envisaged in the aforequoted
provisions (Secs. 19 and 33. BP 129, as
amended by RA 7691) are accion publiciana
and reivindicatoria. To determine which court
has jurisdiction over the action,
action the complaint
must allege the assessed value of the real
property subject of the complaint or the interest
thereon. The complaint does not contain any
allegation of the assessed value of Lot 4-E covered
by TCT No.
No 47171.
47171 There is,
is thus,
thus no showing on
the face of the complaint that the RTC had
exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the
respondent.
d
Moreover, as gleaned from the receipt of realty tax
payments issued to the respondent, the assessed
value of the property in 1993 was P8,300.00.
P8 300 00
Patently then, the Municipal Trial Court of
Aloguinsan,
g Cebu, and not the Regional
g Trial
Court of Toledo City, had exclusive jurisdiction
over the action of the respondent. Hence, all
the proceedings in the RTC, RTC including its
decision, are null and void (Laresma vs.
Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, November 11, 2004,
442 SCRA 156; Aliabo vs. Carampatan, G.R. No.
128922, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 548).; Ouano
vs PGTT Int
vs. Int'll. Investment Corporation,
Corporation G.R.
G R No.
No
134230, July 17, 2002, 384 SCRA 589 ).
 Accion publiciana is the plenary action to
recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year
(Canlas vs. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September
25 2009).
25, 2009)
 Mandatory allegations for the municipal trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over forcible entry
First the plaintiff must allege his prior physical
First,
possession of the property. Second, he must also
allege that he was deprived of his possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. If the
alleged dispossession did not occur by any of
these means, the proper recourse is to file not an
action for forcible entry but a plenary action to
recover possession with the Regional Trial Court
(Benguet Corporation vs. vs Cordillera Caraballo
Mission, Inc., G.R. No.155343, September 2,
2005)..
2005)
Whatt determines
Wh d t i j i di ti
jurisdiction i
in unlawful
l f l
detainer?
To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts
as brings the party clearly within the class of cases
for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint
must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol testimony.
 The jurisdictional facts must appear on
the face of the complaint. When the
complaint
l i t fails
f il to
t aver facts
f t constitutive
tit ti off
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where
it does not state how entry was effected or
how and when dispossession
p started,, the
remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the
proper regional trial court. (Valdez, Jr. vs.
C
Court t off Appeals,
A l G.R
G R No.
N 132424,
132424 May M 4, 4
2006)
Possession by tolerance becomes unlawful
f
from th time
the ti off demand
d d to
t vacate.
t
Petitioner s cause of action for unlawful
Petitioners
detainer springs from respondents failure to
vacate the questioned premises upon his
demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year
therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner
filed the instant complaint.
Possession by tolerance is lawful,
lawful but such
possession becomes unlawful when the
possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon
demand made by the owner. (Santos vs. Sps.
Ayon G.R.
Ayon, G R No.
No 137013,
137013 May 6, 6 2005)
 Where the period of the lease has expired
andd severall demands
d d were sentt to
t the
th lessee
l t
to
vacate, when should the one year period to file
unlawful
l f l detainer
d t i b reckoned?
be k d? From
F th date
the d t
of the original demand or from the date of the
l t demand?
last d d?

From the date of the original demand if the

subsequent
q demands are merelyy in the nature of
reminders or reiterations of the original demand.
 Demand or notice to vacate is not a
jurisdictional requirement when the action is based
on the expiration of the lease.. The law requires
notice to be served only when the action is due to
the lessees failure to pay or the failure to comply
with the conditions off the lease. The one-year
period is thus counted from the date of first
di
dispossession.
i Th allegation
The ll i that
h theh lease
l was
on a month-to-month basis is tantamount to saying
that
h theh lease
l expired
i d every month. h Since
Si the
h lease
l
already expired mid-year in 1995, as
communicated
i t d in
i petitioners
titi letter
l tt dated
d t d July
J l 1,
1
1995, it was at that time that respondents
occupancy became
b unlawful.
l f l (Racaza
(R vs. Gozum,
G
June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 313)
 As a generall rule,
A l an ejectment
j t t suit
it cannott
be abated or suspended by the mere filing
b f
before th regional
the i l trial
t i l courtt (RTC) off another
th
action raising ownership of the property as an
i
issue. A an exception,
As ti h
however, unlawful
l f l detainer
d t i
actions may be suspended even on appeal, on
considerations
id ti off equity,it suchh as when h th
the
demolition of petitioners' house would result from
th enforcement
the f t off the
th municipal
i i l circuit
i it trial
t i l courtt
(MCTC) judgment (Amagan vs. Marayag, G.R.
N 138377,
No. 138377 February
F b 28 2000).
28, 2000)
 Even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer
cases are immediately executory,
executory preliminary
injunction may still be granted. There need only
be clear showing that there exists a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the writ is
to be directed violate said right. In this case, we
note that the petition for review filed with the Court
of Appeals raises substantial issues meriting
serious consideration. Chuas putative right to
continued possession of the premises stands to be
violated
i l t d if the
th adverse
d j d
judgment t off the
th RTC were to
t
be fully executed. Hence, the complete execution
of the RTC judgment could be held in abeyance,
abeyance
through a writ of preliminary injunction, until final
resolution of the main controversy (Benedicto vs.
CA, G.R. No. 157604, October 19, 2005)
 CONTEMPT
Respondent Judge
Judgess blunder was compounded
when she immediately cited complainant in
contempt of court and issued the bench warrant
without requiring the latter to explain the reason for
his non-appearance
pp and non-compliance
p with a
standing order. Under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, complainants alleged disobedience is an
indirect contempt the punishment for which
requires that a respondent should be first
asked to show
sho cause
ca se why h he should
sho ld not be
punished for contempt.
 Respondent also abused her contempt powers.
If at all, complainant was guilty of indirect contempt
and not direct contempt. For not affording
complainant the opportunity to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt, she blatantly
di
disregardedd d Rule
R l 71 off the th Rules
R l off Court
C t
(Tabujara vs. Judge Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2126
[Formerly OCA I.P.I.
I P I No.
No 08-2896-RTJ],
08 2896 RTJ] January
20, 2009 Jan 20, En Banc)
 Before one may be convicted of indirect
contempt, there must be compliance with the
following requisites: (a) a charge in writing to
be filed; (b) an opportunity for respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be
f
fixed by the court; and (c)
( ) an opportunity to be
heard by himself or by counsel. (Tokio Marine
M l
Malayan I
Insurance C
Company I
Inc. vs. Valdez,
V ld
G.R. No. 150107, January 28, 2008).
Use of falsified and forged documents
constitutes indirect contempt not direct
contempt ( Judge Dolores Espanol vs. Atty.
Benjamin Formoso, G.R. No. 150949, June 21,
2007).