GENERAL PROVISIONS: EXTENT OF THE AUTHORITY AND POWER OF from further demolition, with the warning that violation
ning that violation of said order
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
SIMON VS. CHR
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO,
AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS
AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 100150
January 5, 1994
PONENTE: VITUG, J.:
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for prohibition, with prayer for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction.
BRIEF: The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from
further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled
"Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al.
FACTS: A "Demolition Notice " was sent to the private respondents, the
officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated. In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period
of three days to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. The
group filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with
the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Bautista
for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to
stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR
Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing
the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at
North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint
before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before
the CHR.
The CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of
financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private
respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist
would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest."
In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in
contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of
P500.00 on each of them.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction: to
investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private
respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the
instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City; to impose the
fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and to disburse the amount of
P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
CHR: Denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and supplemental
motion to dismiss; motion for reconsideration was also denied.
SC: Initially dismissed the petition; issued a temporary restraining order
directing CHR to CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-
1580
RATIONALE: The Commission on Human Rights was created by the
1987
Constitution. It was formally constituted by then President Corazon
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, issued on 5 May 1987, in the
exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.
The powers and functions of the Commission are defined by the 1987
Constitution, thus:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
 (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection
of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education,
and information to enhance respect for the primacy of
human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
promote human rights and to provide for compensation to
victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the
truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with
law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be
provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the
CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional
Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. In Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights, the Court, through then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only
the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can
in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court
explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the
way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more
specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests
that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that
relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil
relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally
accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights,
encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Converging the courts attention to the records of the Constitutional
Commission, the final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of
the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on
Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights"
(Sec. 1).
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more
severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political
detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3)
fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and
hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While
the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive
effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is,
nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the
delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction.
They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may
provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation." 35
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00
by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not
an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack
of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the
disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the
appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by
the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it
(CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the
matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a
preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and
not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to
promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition
has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from
precisely doing that.

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to SC RULING: The writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The
be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further
temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the
planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore
adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and
limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical
that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in
the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt

its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised
rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt,
and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the
procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power
to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial powers.

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate

action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of
government.
 Facts
Marcelino Libanan is the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern
Samar and was a member of the Sagguniang Panlalawigan of
that Province prior to the May 11, 1992 elections.
He was among those charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, for conspiring
and willfully and unlawfully, through evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, prevent and exclude Agustin B. Docena, a
duly appointed and Qualified replacement of deceased
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Luis A. Capito, from
exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said
body, by promulgating in their official capacities Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Resolution No. 01, Series of 1991, wherein
accused expressed their recognition of Atty. Socrates B. Alar as
the official replacement of aforesaid deceased member,
notwithstanding the recall of his appointment by the
Department of Local Government, to the damage and prejudice
of Agustin B. Docena.
The prosecution filed motion for suspension of the accused
public officials, and finding that said accused were charged
under a valid information, the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution suspending the said public
officials from their respective public positions, or from any other
public office that they may be holding.
Accused Barbo and Libanan filed for motion for reconsideration
but denied by the Sandiganbayan in its resolution. From the
orders, Libanan appealed.

ISSUE/S of the CASE:

(a) Whether the order of suspension if executed would constitute
an affront on petitioner(s) constitutional right to due process.
(b) Whether the order of suspension once implemented would
Constitutional Rights to Due Process
amount to an assault of the sacred covenant reposed on
petitioner Vice-Governor by the people of eastern samar.
GR. No. 112386 | June 14, 1994
(c) Whether the reasons sought to be prevented by the
Marcelino Libanan, petitioner vs.
suspension order pendent lite no longer exist.
Sandiganbayan and Agustin B. Docena, respondents
Nature of Case: SUPREME COURT RULING
Appeal from the denial of Sandiganbayan on the petitioners
motion for reconsideration. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed resolution of
respondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMEDin toto.
Dispositive: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed
Sandiganbayans decision in toto. The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law. Public office is "a public agency or
trust," and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional
provision which petitioner invokes.
1Libanans so-called "covenant" with the people of Eastern Samar is far
from being synonymous to, or the equivalent of, license, and it is not
one that can cut athwart the long arm of the law. In Oliveros vs.
Villaluz, we have said:
Since the criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is concededly
not abated by the fact of his reelection, the pendency of such criminal
case under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 may clearly be
and supplies the legal basis for his suspension from office in a
subsequent term in the event of his reelection by virtue of the provisions
of section 13 of the Act.
The third assigned error raised by petitioner need not be delved into.
When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any
extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. Republic Act
No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official
from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. This Court has
repeatedly held that
such preventive suspension is mandatory, and there are no "ifs" and
"buts" about it.
Doctrine:
Due Process of Law
G.R. Nos. 111624-25 March 9, 1995
ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu
were among the candidates in the synchronized elections of May 11,
1992 for a seat in the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth Legislative District. Ten (10)
municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise
the said district.
During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COC's) for these
ten (10) municipalities by respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers
(PBC) on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu objected to the
inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the ground that it contained false
statements. Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9)
municipalities were included in the canvass. On May 21, 1992, the PBC
rules against the objection of private respondent.
On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution
and tabulated the votes obtained by candidates for the position of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of the province of Pangasinan, using
as basis the statement of votes by precinct submitted by the
municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, as a result of said examination.
The actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso C. Bince in
the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereas
petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu obtained 1,535 votes for the
same municipality.
Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of
Pangasinan is directed to CREDIT in favor of petitioner/appellant Atty.
Emiliano S. Micu with 1,535 votes and candidate Alfonso C. Bince with
1,055 votes in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan.
Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs for the nine (9)
municipalities, private respondent Micu together with the Municipal
Boards of Canvassers (MBCs) of Tayug and San Manuel filed with the PBC
petitions for correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs) earlier
prepared for alledged manifest errors committed in the computation
thereof.
PBC, on June 18, 1992, credited in favor of the petitioner and private
respondent the votes for each as indicated in the said resolution and on
the basis of the COCs for San Quintin and the other nine (9)
municipalities, petitioner had a total of 27,370 votes while the private
respondent had 27,369 votes. Petitioner who won by a margin of 1 vote
was not, however, proclaimed winner because of the absence of
authority from the COMELEC.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a formal motion for such authority.
On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Supplemental
Order directing the PBC "to reconvene, continue with the provincial
canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for the Province of Pangasinan, and other candidates for
provincial offices who have not been proclaimed as of that date.
PBC, acting on the petitions for correction of the SOVs of Tayug and San
Manuel filed by private respondent and the MBCs of the said
municipalities, rules "to allow the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the
municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan to correct the
Statement of Votes and Certificates of Canvass and on the basis of the
corrected documents, the Board (PBC) will continue the canvass and
thereafter proclaim the winning candidate.
On July 8, 1992, private respondent Micu filed before the COMELEC an
urgent motion for the issuance of an order directing the PBC to
reconvene and proceed with the canvass. He alleged that the
promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 on June 29, 1992
affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated June 24, 1992. Similarly, petitioner
Bince filed an urgent petition to cite Atty. Felimon Asperin and Supt.
Primo. A. Mina, Chairman and Member, respectively, of the PBC, for
Contempt with alternative prayer for proclamation as winner and
Injunction with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO).
PBC Chairman, Atty. Felimon Asperin, filed a petition with the COMELEC
seeking a "definitive ruling and a clear directive or order as to who of
the two (2) contending parties should be proclaimed" averring that
"there were corrections already made in a separate sheet of paper of the
Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug and San
Manuel, Pangasinan which corrections if to be considered by the Board
in its canvass and proclamation, candidate Emiliano will win by 72 votes.
On the other hand, if these corrections will not be considered, candidate
Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote.
As directed therein, the PBC on July 21, 1992, by a vote of 2-1 with its
Chairman Atty. Felimon Asperin dissenting, proclaimed candidate Bince
as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Pangasinan. Assailing the proclamation of Bince, private respondent
Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and
Amended Urgent Petition for Contempt and Annul Proclamation on July
22 and 29, 1992, respectively, alleging that the PBC defied the directive
of the COMELEC in its resolution of July 9, 1992. Acting thereon, the
COMELEC promulgated a resolution to direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio
Guillermo and Supt. Primo Mina to show cause why they should not be
declared in contempt of defying and disobeying the Resolution of this
Commission and to annul the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the
said Provincial Board of Canvassers (dissented by Chairman Felimon
Asperin), of candidate Alfonso Bince.
Consequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before
this Court seeking to set aside the foregoing resolution of the COMELEC,
contending that the same was promulgated without prior notice and
hearing with respect to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384.
Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of office and had
assumed the position of the second elected member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan for its Sixth Legislative
District. Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularly and
validity.
Issue:
WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in annulling the petitioner's proclamation without the requisite
due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter of due process.
Held:
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law.
Although public office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to public
office, it is, nevertheless, protected. Due process in proceedings before
the respondent COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires
due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC
possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the
proclamation of any candidate, We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission
on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections that the
COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or
suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.
Doctrines on substantive issues:
a. Legality of Search and Seizure
b. Operation of Bill of Rights during Interregnum

Republic of the Philippines vs.

Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas, Elizabeth

Dimaano G.R. No. 104768

July 21, 2003, Carpio (J)

Nature:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set
aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) dated 18
November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037.
Facts:
Upon assuming to Office, Pres. Cory Aquino immediately enacts
Executive Order 1 (EO No. 1) or the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance (PCGG). It is mandated to recover all ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its
then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP
Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. The
AFP Board, in line with its mandate, investigates Major General Q.
Josephus Ramas. On July 1987, the AFP Board issues a resolution and
findings on Ramas alleged ill gotten wealth. The AFP Board finds a
prima facie case against Major General Josephus Ramas for ill gotten
wealth and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars. It recommended that Ramas be prosecuted with
violation of RA 3091, anti- grant and corrupt practices act. The findings
submits that Ramas is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan
St., La Vista, Quezon City. The aforementioned property in Quezon City
may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00. He is also the owner of a
house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square
meters. Communication equipment and facilities are found in the
premises of Elizabeth Dimaano, a Confidential Agent of the Military
Security Unit, and are confiscated by elements of the PC Command of
Batangas. These items could not have been in the possession of
Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. Aside from the military equipment/items
and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to
confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986. Aside from
the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the
raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano on 3 March 1986. Ramas denied the allegations and Dimaano
claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry
and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary
raiding team.
Actions of the Courts:
- Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance
with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino which involve the
same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary
investigations in criminal cases was conducted against
Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not
constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the
items confiscated.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are
likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered
returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
ISSUES BEFORE THE SC:
1. WON PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate Ramas.
2. WON dismissal of case before completion of presentation of
evidence.
3. WON Search and Seizure in this case valid.
Ruling:
1. NO. The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who
fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of
EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-
gotten wealth during the administration of former President
Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their
public office or using their powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP
personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption
provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. Ramas
case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before
the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner
argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former
President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas
position enabled him to receive orders directly from his
commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of
former President Marcos. We hold that Ramas was not a
subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense
contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments. Mere position
held by a military officer does not automatically make him a
subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos.
2. Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of
this case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-
completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has
been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed
it.
3. Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative
at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power in
the name and by the will of the Filipino people. Petitioner asserts
that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents exclusionary right. Moreover, petitioner argues that
the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of
Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of
the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the
monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in
evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private
respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right. The correct
issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government
was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution
during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and
effective take-over of power by the revolutionary
government following the cessation of resistance by
loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before
the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2)
whether the protection accorded to individuals under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the
interregnum. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the
1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection
accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government were the supreme law because
no constitution limited the extent and scope of such
directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973
Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum,
a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a
Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution
nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. During the
interregnum, the government in power was concededly a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No
one could validly question the sequestration orders as
violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of
Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered
companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary
to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution. The
revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant
or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its
obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is
another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say
that the Court considers the Declaration as part of
customary international law, and that Filipinos as human
beings are proper subjects of the rules of international
law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the
revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant
or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility
for the States good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law. During the
interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights
existed, directives and orders issued by government
officers were valid so long as these officers did not
exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary
government. The directives and orders should not have
also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this
case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary
government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a
judge upon proper application, specified the items to be
searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with
respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that
the warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team
confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly
describe these items and the raiding team confiscated
them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal
basis to seize these items without showing that these
items could be the subject of warrantless search and
seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority
when it seized these items.The seizure of these items was
therefore void, and unless these items are contraband
per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the
person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we
do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of
these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant
could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these
 items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items
should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned

Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25
March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this
case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence
may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

Requisites on Proper Exercise of Police Power

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. VS. JAC LINER

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
JAC LINER, INC., respondent
G.R. No. 148339
February 23, 2005
Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review Under Rule 45
BRIEF:
This is an appeal assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
FACTS:
The City of Lucena enacted Ordinance No. 1631 granting the Lucena
Grand Terminal, Inc. a franchise to construct, finance, establish, operate
and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena. Ordinance No. 1778 was also enacted which provides that all
buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be
prohibited from entering the city and are directed to proceed to the
common terminal for picking-up and/or dropping-off of their passengers.
It also declared all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena as
inoperable starting from the effectivity of the ordinance. It also provides
that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central
terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as
unconstitutional on the ground that the same constituted an invalid
exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and
violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of
police power (i.e. lawful subject and lawful means)
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
RTC: Declared (1) Ordinance No. 1631 as valid except for the provision
of Section 4(c) to the effect that the City Government shall not grant any
third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus/jeepney
terminal which was declared as illegal as it contravenes Republic Act No.
7160 (The Local Government Code); and (2) Ordinance No. 1778 as null
and void for being oppressive and unreasonable exercise of police
power.
CA: Decision of RTC is AFFIRMED.
SC: Decision of CA is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
The local government may be considered as having properly exercised
its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interest
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise
stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
means.
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of
relieving the traffic congestion in the City of Lucena involve the public
interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for
the proper exercise of police power is thus present.
The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They
go beyond what is reasonably necessary to resolve the traffic problem.
Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by
petitioner would subject the users to fees, rentals and charges, such
measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court.
What should have been done was to determine exactly where the
problem lies and then stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of
the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its
reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its
constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its
effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they
happen to be effective.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Preliminary Investigation
Due Process
TAN UY V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Victor Jose Tan Uy, petitioner,
vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, People of the Philippines, Sandiganbayan
(Special Division), Carlos S. Caacbay of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Romeo T. Capulong, Leonard De Vera, and Dennis B. Funa,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 15639-400
27 June 2008
Ponente: Brion
Nature of Case:
Petition for Certiorari
BRIEF
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court to assail the interrelated Orders dated 13 September 2002 and 16
October 2002 of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-00-17203 and OMB-0-00-
17564 for grave abuse of discretion and/or lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS
The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an information charging
former President Joseph Ejercito, among others, as well as Eleuterio Tan
a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan, with the crime of plunder. The Ombudsman
moved to amend the information twice to introduce changes in the
Information (particularly the appellation of the accused Eleuterio Tan)
and to include Jaime C. Dichaves as accused.
The case, which originated from OMB-0-00-1720 and OMB-0-00-1756,
was docketed in the Sandiganbayan as Criminal Case No. 26558. In the
course of the proceedings, the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion
seeking, among others, the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Victor
Jose Tan Uy alias Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, allegedly
following a positive identification that has been made by Ma. Caridad
Manahan-Rodenas of Land Bank of the Philippines through photographs
that Eleuterio Tan and Victor Jose Tan Uy are one and the same person.
The Ombudsman attached copies of the photographs identified at the
Senate Impeachment Trial and the Sworn Statement of Ms. Rodenas
(hereinafter referred to as the identification documents).
Mr. Tan Uy filed a Petition to Conduct Preliminary Investigation with the
Ombudsman, arguing that he was not subject of the preliminary
investigation or any previous inquiry to determine the existence of
probable cause against him for the crime of plunder or any other offense
as [i] he was not included as respondent in either of the two
Ombudsman cases, [ii] neither his name nor his address in Cebu City
was mentioned at any stage of the preliminary investigation conducted
in the criminal cases, [iii] the preliminary investigation in the cases that
led to the filing of the criminal case was conducted without notice to him
and without his participation, and [iv] he was not served any subpoena
at his address or at any other address, for the purpose of informing him
of any complaint against him for plunder or any other offense. He
further contends that he filed a complaint with the RTC of Cebu City
against a certain Eleuterio Tan for maligning him by using his picture,
address, and other personal circumstances without his consent or
authority.
In a parallel Manifestation and Motion filed with the Sandiganbayan, Mr.
Tan Uy asked for the suspension of the criminal proceedings insofar as
he is concerned and likewise moved for a preliminary investigation.
The Ombudsman refuted Mr. Tan Uys various claims, and denied in an
Order the petition for the conduct of a preliminary investigation
reasoning that the request has long been terminated given that the
resulting case is already filed with the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, granted Mr. Tan Uys petition
and directed the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation.
In compliance with the Sandiganbayans Resolution, the Ombudsman
issued an Order requiring the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit, the
affidavits of his witnesses, and other supporting documents and
thereafter issued an order requiring the attendance of Rodenas and the
petitioner in a clarificatory hearing. Mr. Tan Uys counsel then submitted
a manifestation to dispense with the hearing given the patent want of
probable cause against his client.
At this point, the Ombudsman issued the the orders assailed in the
present petition, by finding probable cause to charge and indict Mr. Tan
Uy before the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether the orders of the Ombudsman exercising judicial or quasi
judicial functions was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction?
ACTIONS of the COURT
Sandiganbayan: The Sandiganbayan granted the petition and
directed the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation.
SC: The petition for certiorari was granted.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on trial to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive
prosecution; to protect him from an open and public accusation of a
crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public
trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct
useless and expensive trials.
While the right is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a component
of due process in administering criminal justice. The right to have a
preliminary investigation conducted before being bound for trial and
before being exposed to the risk of incarceration and penalty is not a
mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the
accuseds claim to a preliminary investigation is to deprive him of the
full measure of his right to due process.
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not
intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair.
The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts
concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of
determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the
accused.
Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that
when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of
law to order an acquittal.
In light of the due process requirement, the standards that at the very
least assume great materiality and significance are those enunciated in
the leading case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. This case
instructively tells usin defining the basic due process safeguards in
administrative proceedingsthat the decision (by an administrative
body) must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; only
by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the
case against them; it should not, however, detract from the tribunals
duty to actively see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to
use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing
itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy.
Mindful of these considerations, we hold that the petitioners right to
due process has been violated.
We find merit in the contention of the movant that there was no showing
of any effort on the part of the Office of Ombudsman to determine
whether the names Eleuterio Tan and Eleuterio Ramos Tan are mere
aliases of an unidentified person.
The Ombudsman still failed to establish in the Sandiganbayan-ordered
preliminary investigation the direct link between the individual identified
by aliases and the petitioner. As a rule, too, no clarificatory hearing is
necessary if the evidence on record already shows the existence of
probable cause; conversely, a clarificatory hearing is necessary to
establish the probable cause that up to the time of the clarificatory
hearing has not been shown.
Following the Ang Tibay doctrine, a decision in a proceeding must be
rendered based on the evidence presented at the hearing (of the
proceeding), or at least contained in the record (of the proceeding) and
disclosed to the parties affected (during or at the proceeding).
The courts are thus guided in this regard by the basic due process
requirement that the right to know and to meet a case requires that a
person be fully informed of the pertinent and material facts unique to
the inquiry to which he is called as a party respondent.
Under this requirement, reasonable opportunity to contest evidence as
critical as the identification documents should have been given the
petitioner at the Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary investigation as
part of the facts he must controvert; otherwise, there is nothing to
controvert as the burden of evidence lies with the one who asserts that
a probable cause exists.
The Ombudsmans failure in this regard tainted its findings of probable
cause with grave abuse of discretion that effectively nullifies them. We
cannot avoid this conclusion under the constitutional truism that in the
hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of
the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales
of justice tilt towards the former.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and
accordingly ANNUL the Ombudsmans interrelated Orders dated 13
September 2002 and 16 October 2002 in OMB-0-00-1720 and OMB-0-00-
1756.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
Doctrines/Concepts: Delegation of Legislative Power
Liberty, Due Process of Law, Equal Protection
of the Laws
Slavery and Involuntary Servitude
Police Power
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO,defendant
G.R. No. L-14078
March 7, 1919
Ponente: Malcolm, J
Nature of the Case:
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro.
Facts:
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board pursuant to
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 directed the
Manguianes to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of
Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the
provincial board. Said act was duly approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.
Section 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected
by provincial governor. - With prior approval of the Department
Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such course
is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by
provincial board.
Also, any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon
conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with
section 2759 of the Code.
It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their
liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and those living in
his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of
Tigbao and are therefore liable to be punished in accordance with
section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code.
Issue:
Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
-There is an unlawful delegation of legislative power to a provincial
official and a department head
-Such act deprives the Manguianes of liberty of abode without due
process of law and thus deny them the equal protection of the laws
-This amounts to slavery and involuntary servitude
-There in unlawful exertion of police power
SC Ruling:
No. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not
unconstitutional. Action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative
Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law
and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. Further, section 2145 of
the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power.
Accordingly, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of
their liberty.
Delegation of Legislative Power
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial
official and a department head. The general rule is that, the Legislature
could not delegate legislative power to provincial authorities. An power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its
exception is sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial
board.

Liberty, Due Process of Law, Equal Protection of the Laws

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. Requisites of due process of law and equal protection of the
law are: there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
it applies alike to all of a class.

Slavery and Involuntary Servitude

The Manguianes in question have been directed to live together at
Tigbao. There they are being taught and guided to improve their living
conditions. They are being made to understand that the object of the
government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent
communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are
being educated in a school especially established for them. In short,
everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in
civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living
together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition
compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but
for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.

Police Power
Police power is that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society. Among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the
people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State,
develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. The
Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority
the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the
general welfare and the public interest. There can be no doubt that the
exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the
Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress
and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government. Purely as an exercise of the police
 Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the
local elections of 1967. On 25 January 1971, an administrative complaint
was filed against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for
harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. As required, petitioner
filed a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with
administrdatively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in
accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185.

On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public

respondent Provincial Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited
administrative case. During the hearing, private respondent Pedro T.
Wycoco was allowed to present evidence, testimonial and documentary,
ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the respondent
Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending
petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE/S of the CASE

Right to property and due process of law
Whether petitioner was denied due process of law.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33237 April 15, 1988 ACTIONS of the COURT
GREGORIO T. CRESPO, in His Capacity as Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva
Ecija, petitioner, Provincial board of Nueva Ecija:
vs.
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA and PEDRO T. WYCOCO, Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending
respondents. petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija
Bernardo P. Abesamis for petitioner.
Cecilio F. Wycoco for respondents. SC:
On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. We agree with
Nature of Case: the petitioner that he was denied due process by respondent Provincial
Board.
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
preliminary injunction. The petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on 3 May 1971 is LIFTED.
BRIEF
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public
respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending him from office In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. this Court held:
and to enjoin public respondent from enforcing and/or implementing the It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-
order of preventive suspension and from proceeding further with the recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade
administrative case. or calling is a "property right," and the wrongful interference therewith is
an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the
FACTS protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law.

Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without
giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of
petitioner that he was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing,
respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends that "Atty.
Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by
a request in writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his
desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said
petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's meeting,
but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the
petitioner mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal.
The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence
presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not
show that in the last local elections held on 18 January 1988, petitioner
was elected to any public office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction
issued by this Court on 3 May 1971 is LIFTED.
Rights against unreasonable searches and seizure
Right to Privacy
Art. 3, Sec. 2-3 1987 Constitution -PH
PEOPLE VS MARTI
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 81561
Janurary 18, 1991
Ponente: BELLOSILLO
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal
Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-
appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4,
Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
FACTS
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and
his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes
(the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary
for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date
of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland".
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or
Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
export forwarders, following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar
odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the
bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening
one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from
the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job
Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from
the cellophane wrapper.
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the
Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about
1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was
interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the
NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job
Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes'
office at Ermita, Manila.
Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any
had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of
unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986.
and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should
be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
SUPREME COURT RULING:
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the constitutional rights against unreasonable search Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in
and seizure and privacy of communication of the accused-appellant rendering the assailed judgment.
were violated. WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Appellants were convicted for violation of RA 6425.
NBI incurred no violation of Sec. 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
SC: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS

On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since
the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without
the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been
violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly
in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the
State?

We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference,

the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State.

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why
the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional

democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The
Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the
state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a
private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to

Sec. 4 Art. II of the Constitution Freedom of speech, of expression,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances
Sec. 5 Art. II of the Constitution Promotion of social justice
Sec.6 Art. XIV of the Constitution Protection to Labor
Industrial Peace Act to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by
encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to
self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the
promotion of their moral, social, and economic well-being
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION
(officers of Union - PBMEO) petitioners
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. & COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS respondents
G.R. No. L-31195
June 5, 1973
Ponente: J. Makasiar
Nature of the Case: Appeal
Brief: An appeal (without waiting for any resolution on their petition for
relief) to the Supreme Court of the decision of Judge Joaquin Salvador,
finding PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and declaring the officers
and members directly responsible for perpetrating unfair labor practice;
that the members are to be dismissed from work. A motion of
reconsideration was filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a
petition for relief from the order, on the ground that their failure to file
their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable
negligence and honest mistake.
Facts: Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. (PBMEO)
were dismissed for allegedly violating the no strike-no lockout provision
of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) after staging a mass
demonstration at Malacanang.
Petitioners claimed that they decided to stage a mass demonstration in
protest against the abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by
the workers in the first shift as well as those in the regular second and
third shifts. They have informed the Company with regard to the said
demonstration.
A day before the demonstration, the Company stated that the rally
should not prejudice normal office operations, thus employees without
prior filing of a leave of absence who fail to report for the first and
regular shifts on the proposed date of the demonstration shall be
dismissed for violating their collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
Union officers claimed that there was no violation as the demonstration
was against the Pasig police and not the Company. They added that the
rally was an exercise of their freedom of speech.
In a decision made by Judge Joaquin Salvador of the CIR, eight of the
PBMEO officers were found guilty, thus removed from work. PBMEO filed
a motion for reconsideration, which the CIR dismissed for late
submission (2 days); the Court allowed only up to 10 days. PBMEO then
filed a petition for relief with the CIR. Without waiting for any resolution
though on the petition, PBMEO filed with the Supreme Court a notice of
appeal.

Issue/s: W/N CIR and PBM Company violated PBMEOs freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, on the grounds that the Company illegally dismissed its
employees for participating the demonstration.
Although the demonstration paralyzed to a large extent the operations
of the complainant company, there is no finding involving the loss
sustained by the firm. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable
amount in the form of wages. The Management has shown not only lack
of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding.

Court Rationale: The demonstration, being directed against alleged SC RULING: The orders of the respondent CIR shall be SET ASIDE as
abuses of policemen and not against the Company was purely and NULL AND VOID; the eight employees are to be reinstated with full
completely an exercise of the members freedom of expression in back pay from date of their separation from service until reinstated,
general and of their right of assemble and of petition for redress of minus one days pay. Cost against private respondent Philippine
grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency. Blooming Company, Inc.
There was no violation of the CBA. The members exercised their civil and
political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what they believe
were police excesses. It was then the duty of the firm to protect the
Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers.

Furthermore, the dismissal of the eight (8) workers constitutes a denial

of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to the
employees. Sec. 5 Art. II of the Constitution imposes upon the state the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people, which guarantee is emphasized by the other
directive in Sec. 6 Art XIV of the Constitution that the State shall afford
protection to laborCIR is under obligation to give meaning and
substance to the constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man.
Under the Industrial Peace Act, the CIR is enjoined to effect the policy of
the law to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and
protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their
moral, social, and economic well-being. Violation of a constitutional
right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment
is null and void and confers no rights.

Also, the procedural rule does not prevail over constitutional rights. The
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and
regulations. The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration
could have been only one day if only 28 September 1969 was not a
Sunday. The CIR is authorized to act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms. Many a time, the Court deviated from procedure technicalities
when they ceased to be instruments of justice, just like the case at
hand.
 LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

G.R. No. 118075

May 29, 1987
Ponente: Cortes

Nature of Case:
Writ of Mandamus

BRIEF
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public
concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission.

FACTS

Valentin L. Legaspi had been denied on his request for information from the Civil
Service Commissionon on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, both employed as sanitarian and who allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations
for sanitarians.

ISSUE/S of the CASE

Whether or not the information sought by Legaspi is within the ambit of
the constitutional guarantee.

ACTIONS of the COURT

SC: The Writ of Mandamus was granted.

ARTICLE III, Sec. Section 7

Right of the people to information on matters of public concern COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The constitutional guarantee to the right of information on matters of public
concern is
not absolute - it does not open every door to any and all information.
Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The
law may therefore exempt
certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting
national security). It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a
particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information
sought:
(a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and,
(b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of
certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the
positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a
State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit
and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to
positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).
is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case,
the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the
public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from
the Civil Service Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the
absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil
service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position
becomes imperative.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register
of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil
service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said
position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate
concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all
times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective
positions.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the
respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would
limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service
eligibles. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who
pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request