VICAR INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION, INC v .

FEB LEASING AND immediately to avoid the trial courts quashal of their counterbond and, thus,
FINANCE CORPORATION the immediate seizure of their equipment -- their only means of livelihood.

G.R. No. 157195. April 22, 2005
Once more, the Court stresses that procedural rules must be used to
promote, not obstruct, substantial justice. The failure to attach the Resolution
authorizing herein individual petitioner to represent herein corporate
petitioner is, under the circumstances, excusable. The immediate correction
of the defect should have been deemed sufficient compliance with the rules.
Their counsel allegedly believed in good faith that the secretarys
Certificate was attached to the Petition. When they received a copy of the
October 23, 2002 CA Resolution on November 11, 2002, they lost no time in
filing the following day their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
Admission of the Attached Secretarys Certificate.
ISSUES:

GIST: Petitioner submitted a certification of non forum shopping but WoN the summarily dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari is proper - NO
merely failed to show that the signatory was authorized to do so.
WoN petitioners subsequent submission of the secretarys certificate is a
FACTS: sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law - YES

Vicar International Contsruction Inc (Vicar) filed a Complaint for

unjust enrichment and damages, in the RTC of Makati, against Respondent
FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation (now BPI Leasing Corporation) and
the Far East Bank and Trust Company. In turn, FEB Leasing and Finance
Corporation filed a Complaint[against Vicar et al, for a sum of money,
damages and replevin.

RTC issued an order which quashed the property counterbond

filed by Vicar and denied the latters Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which
HELD:
was grounded on forum shopping.

In Bernardo v. NLRC, the Court explained that a literal

Vicar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, to
interpretation of the Circular should be avoided if doing so would subvert its
stop the implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued against the subject
very rationale. Said the Court:
equipment.

x x x. Indeed, while the requirement as to certificate of non-forum

The Petition was, however, instantly dismissed by the CA,
because the Verification and the Certification against forum shopping
had been executed by Petitioner Carmelita V. Lim without any showing
that she had the authority to sign for and on behalf of petitioner-
corporation.
On the day right after it received the copy of resolution,V icar filed
an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached
Secretarys Certificate. Nevertheless, the CA denied the Omnibus Motion
and held that the belated filing by the petitioners of the Certification of their
Corporate Secretary, did not cure the defect of said petition. Absent any
compelling reason for petitioners failure to comply at the first instance with
the required certification, we cannot, therefore, accept their subsequent
compliance.
Vicars Contention:
shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be
interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum-shopping.
Clearly, petitioners did not deliberately ignore SC Circular 28-91.
In fact, a Verification/Certification, stating the information required under the
Circular, was attached to the Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA.
Petitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a
concrete proof of Lims authority from Vicar to execute the said
Verification/Certification on its behalf. The latter, however, lost no time in
submitting its corporate secretarys Certificate attesting to the fact that,
indeed, Petitioner Vicars board of directors had unanimously approved a
Resolution on October 2, 2002, authorizing its president and general
manager, Carmelita V. Lim, to file the Petition and to execute and sign x x x
the verification and certification against forum shopping.

Petitioners assert that Carmelita V. Lim was duly authorized to

execute, for and on behalf of Vicar, the Verification and Certification against
forum shopping. Attached to the Petition and signed by Petitioner Lim was
the Verification/Certification, in which was explicitly stated the authorization
and affirmation.
Petitioners candidly admit that they inadvertently failed to attach
the above Resolution to their CA Petition. In preparing the Petition, their
counsel supposedly worked overnight without sleep. She wanted to file it
The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after
it had denied the Petition. Such swiftness of action indicates that the
Resolution -- authorizing Petitioner Lim to file the Petition and execute
the Verification and the Certification against forum shopping on behalf
of Petitioner Vicar -- did exist at the time the Petition was filed. Such fact
also lends credence to the assertion of petitioners that it was only due to
inadvertence and oversight that they failed to attach the Secretarys
Certificate to their Petition for Certiorari.
 In closing, the Court stresses once more that technical rules of
procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the
swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of
substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. Rules of procedure are but
tools designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice.
OTHER CASES CITED BY THE COURT:
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, the petitioner had not
attached any proof that its resident manager was authorized to sign the
Verification and the non-forum shopping Certification, as a consequence of
which the Petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Subsequent to the
dismissal, however, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, to which
was already attached a Certificate issued by its board secretary who stated
that, prior to the filing of the Petition, the resident manager had been
authorized by the board of directors to file the Petition.
Citing several case excusing noncompliance with the requirement of a
certificate of non-forum shopping, the Court held that with more reason
should x x x the instant petition [be allowed,] since petitioner herein did
submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that
the signatory was authorized to do so. The Court further said that the
subsequent submission of the Secretarys Certificate, attesting that the
signatory to the certification was authorized to file the action on behalf of
petitioner, mitigated the oversight.
Similarly, in General Milling Corporation v. NLRC, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the Petition, which was not accompanied by any board
resolution or certification by the corporate secretary showing that the person
who had signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was duly
authorized to represent the petitioner-corporation in the case. In the Motion
for Reconsideration, however, the petitioner attached a board Resolution
stating that the signatory of the Certification had been duly authorized to do
so.
Under those circumstances, the Court held that there was at least
substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the
prescribed procedural requirements, except that the petition was not
accompanied by a board resolution or a secretarys certificate that the
person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to represent it in the
case.[
Also, in BA Savings Bank v. Sia, the Court of Appeals denied
due course to a Petition for certiorari filed by BA Savings Bank. The CAs
action was grounded on the fact that the Certification on anti-forum shopping
incorporated in the Petition had been signed merely by the banks counsel,
not by a duly authorized representative, as required under Supreme Court
Circular No. 28-91. Subsequently filed by the petitioner was a Motion for
Reconsideration, to which was attached a Certificate issued by the corporate
secretary. The Certificate showed that the Resolution promulgated by the
board of directors had authorized the lawyers of petitioner to represent it in
any action or proceeding before any court, tribunal or agency; and to sign,
execute and deliver the certificate of non-forum shopping, among others.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals de
MELLON BANK V MAGSINO
In an action filed by the bank to recover the money transmitted by
mistake, can the bank be allowed to present the accounts which it
believed were responsible for the acquisition of the money?
Facts:
On May 27, 1977, Dolores Ventosa requested the transfer of $1,000 from the
First National Bank of Moundsville, West Virginia, U.S.A. to Victoria Javier in
Manila through the Prudential Bank. Accordingly, the First National Bank
requested the petitioner, Mellon Bank, to effect the transfer. Unfortunately the
wire sent by Mellon Bank to Manufacturers Hanover Bank, a correspondent
of Prudential Bank, indicated the amount transferred as US$1,000,000.00
instead of US$1,000.00. Hence Manufacturers Hanover Bank transferred
one million dollars less bank charges of $6.30 to the Prudential Bank for the
account of Victoria Javier.
Javier withdrew $475,000 from account No. 343 and converted it into eight
cashiers checks made out to the following: (a) F.C. Hagedorn & Co., Inc.,
two cheeks for the total amount of P1,000,000; (b) Elnor Investment Co.,
Inc., two checks for P1,000,000; (c) Paramount Finance Corporation, two
checks for P1,000,000; and (d) M. Javier, Jr., two checks for P496,000.
Javier also brought several properties in the United States including the one
of his lawyer, Poblador.
Mellon Bank filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of
Kern, against Melchor Javier, Jane Doe Javier, Honorio Poblador, Jrn, and
Does I through V. In its first amended complaint to impose constructive trust.
The testimonies of these witnesses were objected to by the defense on the
grounds of res inter alios acta, immateriality, irrelevancy and confidentiality
due to RA 1405. The Javier spouses also contend that inasmuch as the
Mellon Bank had filed in California an action to impose constructive trust on
the California property and to recover the same.
Issues:
1) Whether or not an account deposit which is relevant and material to the
resolution of the case may be covered under R.A. No. 1405.
2) Whether or not the principle of election of remedies bars recovery of
Mellon Bank
Held:
1. YES. Section 2 of said law allows the disclosure of bank deposits in cases
where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. 24
Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 26899 is aimed at recovering the amount
converted by the Javiers for their own benefit, necessarily, an inquiry into the
whereabouts of the illegally acquired amount extends to whatever is
concealed by being held or recorded in the name of persons other than the
one responsible for the illegal acquisition.
2. The spouses Javiers relied on the procedural principle of election of
remedies as part of their ploy to terminate Civil Case No. 26899 prematurely.
With the exception of the Javiers, respondents failed to raise it as a defense
in their answers and therefore, by virtue of Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court, such defense is deemed waived. Notwithstanding its lengthy
and thorough discussion during the hearing and in pleadings subsequent to
the answers, the issue of election of remedies has not, contrary to the lower
courts assertion, been elevated to a substantive one. Having been waived
as a defense, it cannot be treated as if it has been raised in a motion to
dismiss based on the nonexistence of a cause of action.
Moreover, granting that the defense was properly raised, it is inapplicable in
this case. In its broad sense, election of remedies refers to the choice by a
party to an action of one of two or more coexisting remedial rights, where
several such rights arise out of the same facts, but the term has been
generally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights,
the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to, or a repudiation of, the
other. In its technical and more restricted sense, election of remedies is the
adoption of one of two or more coexisting remedies, with the effect of
precluding a resort to the others.
RE:DOCTRINE of ELECTION of REMEDIES
As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose of the doctrine of election of
remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double
redress for a single wrong. x x
It is regarded as an application
of the law of estoppel, upon the theory that a party cannot, in the assertion of
his right occupy inconsistent positions which form the basis of his respective
remedies. However, when a certain state of facts under the law entitles a
party to alternative remedies, both founded upon the Identical state of facts,
these remedies are not considered inconsistent remedies. In such case, the
invocation of one remedy is not an election which will bar the other, unless
the suit upon the remedy first invoked shall reach the stage of final
adjudication or unless by the invocation of the remedy first sought to be
enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an advantage thereby or caused
detriment or change of situation to the other. 9 It must be pointed out that
ordinarily, election of remedies is not made until the judicial proceedings has
gone to judgment on the merits.
Consonant with these rulings, this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
opined that while some American authorities hold that the mere initiation of
proceedings constitutes a binding choice of remedies that precludes pursuit
of alternative courses, the better rule is that no binding election occurs
before a decision on the merits is had or a detriment to the other party
supervenes. 31 This is because the principle of election of remedies is
discordant with the modern procedural concepts embodied in the Code of
Civil Procedure which Permits a party to seek inconsistent remedies in his
claim for relief without being required to elect between them at the pleading
stage of the litigation. 32
It should be noted that the remedies pursued in the California case and in
Civil Case No. 26899 are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each
other. If ever, they are merely alternative in view of the inclusion of parties in
the latter case who are not named defendants in the former. The causes of
action, although they all stem from the erroneous transmittal of dollars, are
distinct as shown by the complaints lengthily set out above. The bar of an
election of remedies does not apply to the assertion of distinct causes of
action against different persons arising out of independent transactions.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, the doctrine of election of remedies
is not favored in the United States for being harsh. Its application with regard
to two cases filed in two different jurisdictions is also circumscribed by
jurisprudence on abatement of suits. Thus, in Brooks Erection Co. v. William
R. Montgomery & Associates, Inc., it is held:
The pendency of an action in the courts of one state or country is not a bar to
the institution of another action between the same parties and for the same
cause of action in a court of another state or country, nor is it the duty of the
court in which the latter action is brought to stay the same pending a
determination of the earlier action, even though the court in which the earlier
action is brought has jurisdiction sufficient to dispose of the entire controversy.
Nevertheless, sometimes stated as a matter of comity not of right, it is usual for
the court in which the later action is brought to stay proceedings under such
circumstances until the earlier action is determined.
However, in view of the fact that the California court wherein the case for
recovery of the Kern property was first filed against the Javiers had stayed
proceedings therein until after the termination of Civil Case No. 26899, the
court below can do no less than expedite the disposition of said case.
LEDDA v BPI
G.R. No. 200868 : November 21, 2012
FACTS:
As one of BPIs valued clients, Anita Ledda (Ledda) was issued a pre-
approved BPI credit card. Thereafter, Ledda used the credit card for various
purchases of goods and services and cash advances. Ledda defaulted in the
payment of her credit card obligation. Consequently, BPI sent her demand
letters but to no avail. Thus, BPI filed an action for collection of sum of
money against Ledda. The RTC gave due course to BPIs complaint and
ordered Ledda to pay her obligation.
On appeal to the CA, Ledda argued that the document containing the Terms
and Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is an actionable
document contemplated in Sec.7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the
document should have been set forth in and attached in BPIs complaint.
Ledda also averred that since there was no written agreement to pay a
higher interest, the interest rate to be imposed is only 6% pursuant to Article
2209 of the Civil Code. The CA rejected Leddas arguments.
ISSUE:
WoN the document containing the Terms and Conditions governing the use
of credit card is an actionable document - NO
HELD:
NO.
REMEDIAL LAW: actionable document
BPIs cause of action is primarily based on Leddas (1) acceptance of the BPI
credit card, (2) usage of the BPI credit card to purchase goods, avail
services and secure cash advances, and (3) non-payment of the amount due
for such credit card transactions, despite demands. In other words, BPIs
cause of action is not based only on the document containing the Terms and
Conditions accompanying the issuance of the BPI credit card in favor of
Ledda. Therefore, the document containing the Terms and Conditions
governing the use of the BPI credit card is not an actionable document
contemplated in Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.As
such, it is not required by the Rules to be set forth in and attached to the
complaint.
CIVIL LAW: interest; forbearance of money
Since there is no dispute that Ledda received, accepted and used the BPI
credit card issued to her and that she defaulted in the payment of the total
amount arising from the use of such credit card,Ledda is liable to pay BPI
P322,138.58 representing the principal amount of her unpaid credit card
obligation. Ledda must also pay interest on the total unpaid credit card
amount at the rate of 12% per annum since her credit card obligation
consists of a loan or forbearance of money. We reject Leddas contention
that, since there was no written agreement to pay a higher interest rate, the
interest rate should only be 6%. Ledda erroneously invokes Article 2209 of
the Civil Code. Article 2209 refers to indemnity for damages and not interest
on loan or forbearance of money, which is the case here.
In accordance with Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the 12% legal interest shall
be reckoned from the date BPI extrajudicially demands from Ledda the
payment of her overdue credit card obligation.
RULE 10
SUPERCLEAN SERVICES CORPORATION v CA and HDMF
G.R. No. 107824 July 5, 1996
FACTS: Superclean Services Corporation (SUPERCLEAN) alleged that at
the public bidding for janitorial services for the year 1990 it was the "lowest
or best bidder," but Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), refused
without just cause to award the contract to it and instead caused the
publication on October 23, 1989 of a Notice of Rebidding. Superclean filed
with the RTC of Manila a complaint for Mandamus / Certiorari with
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order against the HDMF.
The HDMF defended its action on the ground that not a single bid submitted
complied with the terms and conditions agreed upon in the pre-bidding
conference. The RTC ordered the HDMF to desist from rebidding and hire
janitorial services for month-to-month basis. Superclean moved for the
admission of Supplemental Complaint because contract of services was for
the furnishing of janitorial service for the previous year 1990, the delay in the
decision of the case had rendered the case moot and academic "without
petitioner obtaining complete relief to redress the wrong committed against it
by respondent, which relief consists in unrealized profits, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees." Thus, instead of pursuing its prayer for a writ
of mandamus, petitioner sought the payment of damages to it. The trial court
finds no merit and no basis on the motion. On appeal, CA affirms the
decision on the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. WoN Supplemental Complaint is admissible;
2. Whether or not petition for Mandamus is rendered moot and academic.
HELD:
The transaction, occurrence or event happening since the filing of the
pleading, which is sought to be supplemented, must be pleaded in aid of a
party's right or defense as the case may be. The supervening event is not
invoked for that purpose but to justify the new relief sought. What was
alleged in the motion as a supervening event causing damage to petitioner
was the fact that the year for which the contract should have been made had
passed without the resolution of the case. Only incidentally was it claimed
that because of the award of a contract for janitorial services, on a month-to-
month basis to a third party, petitioner failed to realize profits. The
supervening event cited was not to reinforce or aid the original demand,
which was for the execution of a contract in petitioner's favor, because
petitioner's demand could no longer be enforced, thus justifying petitioner in
changing the relief sought to one for recovery of damages. Petitioner's
remedy was not to supplement, but rather to amend its complaint.
It is true that a supplemental or an amended pleading presupposes the
existence of a pleading. What was rendered moot and academic, however,
was not petitioner's cause of action but only its prayer for the writ
of mandamus. There was still an alternative remedy left to petitioner of
seeking damages in lieu of an award of the contract. The basic allegations of
fact in the original and in the amended complaints are the same, that
respondent, without justification, refused to award the contract of services to
petitioner. Through no fault of petitioner, the year for which janitorial services
were to be rendered expired without the resolution of petitioner's case. It
would be to exalt technicality over substance to require that petitioner file a
new complaint. It would best serve the interests of justice if the so-called
Supplemental Complaint is simply considered as embodying amendments to
the original complaint.
CAs decision is reversed, Remanded to RTC to admit Supplemental
Complaint and to treat it as an amendment to the original complaint or to
require petitioner to file an amended complaint, merging the relevant
allegations of its original complaint and "Supplemental Complaint," and
thereafter to allow private respondent to file an answer.
VERSOZA V CA (299 SCRA 100)
Facts:
Fe Uson is the owner of a parcel of land in Sual, Pangasinan. She
mortgaged the land to Wilfredo Versoza. For failing to pay her obligation,
Versoza foreclosed the property. The Provincial Sheriff set the foreclosure
sale.
To prevent from proceeding with the foreclosure sale, Uson filed for
annulment of mortgage with a prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The complaint of Uson was dismissed on the ground that it was ot
personally verified by Uson. The court granted Usons Motion for
Reconsideration and filed an amended complaint with the required
verification.
In the meantime, Versoza asked the Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure.
Uson requested that the sale be deferred since there was a pending action
(annulment of mortgage) in court. However, the sale continued and the
property was sold to Versoza.
After the redemption period, Sheriff issued the Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale.
The lot is now under Versozas name. Sometime after, Versoza sold the lot to
Pilar Martinez.
Uson filed an application for preliminary injunction in her 2nd amended
complaint impleading Martinez and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan as
defendants to the case.
Trial Court granted the injunction and ordered Martinez to cease and desist
from performing acts of ownership over the lot.
Versoza and Martinez now claims that the status quo to be preserved refers
to the point before the filing of the 2 nd complaint and before Martinez
acquired the property. They also contend that consummated acts can no
longer be restrained by injunction. The judge of the case clarified that the
status quo being maintained in this case is the possession of Uson of the
land and does not refer to Martinez being the registered owner of the lot.
Issue:
1. WoN CA erred in not taking into account or dealing squarely with the
nature, effects and proper interpretation and/or application of the doctrine on
amendment of pleadings/complaints to the instant case
2. WoN Uson is entitled to an injunctive writ
3. What is the status quo ante that the writ seeks to preserve?
4. WoN consummated acts can be restrained by injunction in this case
Held:
1. NO.
Petitioners contend that the controversy started only when the
Amended Complaint was filed, because the previous Complaints were
expunged from the records. Petitioners invoke Ruymann v. Director of
Lands, in which the Court ruled that the filing of an amended pleading does
not retroact to the date of the filing of the original. Citing other jurisprudence,
such as Waje v. Court of Appeals and Paradise v. Ng, petitioners contend
that the original pleading is deemed abandoned when it is amended.
The cited cases offer scant support to the thesis of petitioners.
In Ruymann, the Court held that an amendment to a complaint which
introduces a new or different cause of action, making a new or different
demand, is equivalent to a fresh suit upon a new cause of action, and the
statute of limitations continues to run until the amendment is filed. In the said
case, a complaint for injunction was amended to include a larger tract of land
which had not been included in the original suit. The Court held that the suit
will be deemed to have been commenced upon the date of amendment, in
determining whether the defendant had acquired title by adverse possession
to the portion of the tract of land not included in the original complaint
(Montgomery v. Shaver, 40 Oregon 244). It is clear therein that the
Complaint was amended to include a new or different cause of action or
demand; hence, it was as if a new complaint was filed.
It follows that when the amended complaint does not introduce new
issues, causes of action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have
commenced on the date the original complaint was filed, not on the date of
the filing of the amended complaint. In other words, for demands already
included in the original complaint, the suit is deemed to have commenced
upon the filing of such original complaint. In short, for purposes of
determining the commencement of a suit, the original complaint is
deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if
the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action or
demand.
Hence, it has been held that an amendment which merely
supplements and amplifies the facts originally alleged relates back to the
date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of
limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint
but before service of amendment. It is the actual filing in court that controls
and not the date of the formal admission of the amended pleading. The
Court in Republic v. Marsman elucidated:
While in the procedural sense, especially in relation to the possible necessity
of and time for the filing of responsive and other corresponding pleadings, an
amended complaint is deemed filed only as of the date of its admission, xxx ,
the self-evident proposition [is] that for practical reasons and to avoid the
complications that may arise from undue delays in the admission thereof,
such an amended complaint must be considered as filed, for the purpose of
such a substantive matter as prescription, on the date it is actually filed with
the court, regardless of when it is ultimately formally admitted by the
court. After all, the only purpose of requiring leave of and formal admission
by the court of an amended pleading after issues have already been joined
as to the original ones is to prevent the injection of other issues which ought
either to be considered as barred already or made the subject of another
proceeding, if they are not anyway indispensable for the resolution of the
original ones and no unnecessary multiplicity of suits would result; so, when
the court ultimately admits the amendment, the legal effect, for substantive
purposes, of such admission retroacts as a rule to the date of its actual filing.
In the instant case, the Amended Complaint did not introduce a
new or different cause of action or demand. The original Complaint was
amended only to rectify the lack of verification and thereafter to
implead Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from
Verzosa.
In the same vein, Waje and Paradise do not apply because the
Amended Complaints therein alleged new causes of action.
Similarly unavailing is petitioners contention that the injunctive writ
was applied retroactively and, hence, violative of Ruymann and other
subsequent cases. To repeat, Ruymann was wrongly applied by
petitioners. There being no new issues introduced in the Amended Complaint
herein, the present suit is deemed to have commenced on the date of the
filing of the original Complaint. Hence, the CA was correct in upholding the
trial court that the status quo was the situation of the parties at the time of the
filing of the original Complaint.
2. YES. The requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ are:
The invasion of the right is material and substantial;
The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
The requisites are all present in the case. Uson had title to and possession
of the property. She also claimed to have paid her obligation except for a
nominal unpaid balance which she agrees to consign judicially. Hence, she
has a clear and unmistakable right to protect her title and possession of the
mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale.
3. Status quo maintained is from Usons possession of the land. As
defined, status quo is the last peaceful uncontested situation which precedes
a controversy. Its preservation is the function of the injunctive suit. When the
amended complaint does not introduce new issues or causes of action, the
suit is deemed to commence on the date when the original complaint was
filed.
4. YES. While the general rule is that injunction will not issue to restrain
the performance of an act already done, there is an exception where the
acts performed after an injunction suit is brought, a defendant may not as a
matter of right proceed to perform the acts sought to restrained and then be
heard to assert in a suit that the injunction will not lie because he has already
performed the acts before the final hearing.
The court said that, a court should not (by means of preliminary injunction)
transfer the property from the possession of a party to another where legal
title is in dispute and the party having possession of the property asserts its
ownership. One who does the act sought to be restrained, does so at his
own peril.
In the case, when Uson filed the complaint, she had title to and was
asserting ownership of the lot. An action was brought to enjoin Versoza from
proceeding with the sale but he continued it. In doing so, Versoza was acting
at his own peril.