EN BANC Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code.
Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in
damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver
employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro
Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its
passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted
and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and
Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the
plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the
Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was
instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on
the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it
is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for
violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal
Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla,
the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on
page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to
prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on
applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in
arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of
the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only
to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable
by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him
in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of
Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his
negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against
Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code
as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable
by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal
code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide
the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled
together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless
principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous
presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of
this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of
the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the
Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and
omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this
book.
xxx xxx xxx
 ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused
by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused
by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on
occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the
damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing
the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be
applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove
that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the
latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal
liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article
11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the
following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by
any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but
under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having
such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the
harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be
liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability
also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification
shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the
fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be
liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any
other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by
the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period;
if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be imposed.
 Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to
cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or
omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not
only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse
confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts
does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-
delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal
institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact,
in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also
contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6,
Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas
en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the
five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . .
en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of
obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This
portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-
delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal
law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or
negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of
the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil,"
Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's
primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII,
p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl
lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la
penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different
persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it
any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability
as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision between
two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee
of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as
subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the
employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the
Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte.
Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that
there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the
losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is
based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in
the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to
penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor
upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty
itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the
prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired,
the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does
not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not
pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code,
from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without
the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code,
bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and
regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime
under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative
precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between
the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa;
but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor,
make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the
guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the
wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard,
the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the
next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service
or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in
 judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases
because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice
and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different
fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch
as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case
and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for
indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub
judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained
intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of
acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after the
criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the
non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter
upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil
obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and
is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish
Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to
those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which
corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it
implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in
the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at
least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer)
is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol.
20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the
responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those
persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it
is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there
is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion
would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that
everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is
imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of
the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor
or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons
enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices)
causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an
act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by
the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in
reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is
subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol," says
in Vol. VII, p. 743:
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his
own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of
those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this
responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes
between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other,
declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter,
subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903,
the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for
precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above
set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution,
independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under
article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon
Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric
Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted.
Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company, paying for damages in the
amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme
Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the
non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal,
saying:
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the
trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage caused by the
death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence
of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact
that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as
the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did
not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being
the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is
not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code,
affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of
establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under certain
conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this
latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the
damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation
with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading
attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the
decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company.
This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil
action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the
part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found
guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime,
he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held
subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility
because of his own presumed negligence which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there
were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver
arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second
remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff
choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had
just been released, and besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any
judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly,
notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater
reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed
against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the
Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the
previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought against a
railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly
and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain
held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares, in
relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor
of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be
returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached
their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent without
justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when
they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable
importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the
profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as the
original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a
contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on
any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of
Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to
asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to
the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant company,
because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by relations of
economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could
have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee
who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial
court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed
to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught
the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion
from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a
criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and
his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have
procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track,
and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and
secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of
the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law,
subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out
that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain
safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and
falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We
should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific
codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect,
would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of
their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and
render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions.
Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but
clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of
Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands,
was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both
classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the
penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action
once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the
party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil
action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private
complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in
harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles
suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even
to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly
liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a
third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as
subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process
of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which
liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is
not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal
proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the
Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally
determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that
fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in
force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the
briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or
negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer
arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived
from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than
this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the
consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to
which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties,
whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to
articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be
found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the
employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to
the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would
originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador
Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who
had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered
judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in
affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop
his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the
latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed
that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along
Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating
until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street.
But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this
accident could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the
fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a
northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the
sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that
after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already been
stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this
circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a
high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken
by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child would not have
occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore
a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with
its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso
vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child,
Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns
caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday
procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had
come from another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with
two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice
Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction.
The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to
run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing.
The child died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory
negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic
occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge.
 The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on
the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing that of his servant.
the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]).
ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs.
In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code
automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and
must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does
damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs.
not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
damages.

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the death of
the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an
automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The
defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in
carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay
P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground
that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the
presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as
appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage,
were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly
competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is
clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also
provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a
business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his
master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton &
Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for
the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister
Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing
him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of
defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence
and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias.
This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad
Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff
brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen
C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly
licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the
appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in
the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under
avoid the damage."
article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence
vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a
on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and
P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and
to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric
he is relieve from liability.
Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was
that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was
governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language
authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling
under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent
act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the
Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms
its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code.
Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape
scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the
selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a
strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated
on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that
the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations
to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093
and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of Appeals
based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the
Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other
words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different
theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee,
whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's
primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and
independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in
the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and
sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then
brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The
defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the
motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption
from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided
in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the action
there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code,
while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's
contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility under
article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the
distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the
responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the
importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set forth.
Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as
inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and
directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this
case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might
not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we
were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by
law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana
would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only
through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would
remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to
1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There
are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible
in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances
of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the
driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to
follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws,
but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the
defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for
civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it
being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance
usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be
required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In
construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their
presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be
carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who
principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that
they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As
Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their
poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just
that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used
such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many
jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the
principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third
persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del
dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person
of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar
force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating
the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack
of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the
more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the
harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into
that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private
rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the defendant-petitioner.
 Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case
No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants,
the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the
time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when
criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because
of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107,
which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-
adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he
was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such
denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14,
1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court
finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby

reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SECOND DIVISION
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on
Appeal.)
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said following assignment of errors:
minor, defendants-appellees.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants. THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
 I result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion
holds:
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION
OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come
COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
APPLICABLE; killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer
II
and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL

OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE
CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN
OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE.
(page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald
Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision
of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the
court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father,
Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-
referred to.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in
a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was
punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of
negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have
been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been
criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but
also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court
awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that
have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate
their foundations.

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution
are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein
the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual
character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established
in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a
scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury
to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the
slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability
arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to
bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of
the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to
1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
 sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising
from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our
laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course.
But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice
and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream
of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its
waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This
will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is
more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault
or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article
1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations
"which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene
shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely
the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth
lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so,
because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new
Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer
uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa
aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary
or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162,
simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2,
Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article
2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-
delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito"
has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and
perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar
to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to
a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles
29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with
modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent
acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible
civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that
Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority
over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but
he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother,
or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the
instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise
their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand,
the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not,
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry
with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See
Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering
of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399;
Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation
by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance
with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by
accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational
conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs.
Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that
"the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same
extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
 Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO
HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.

Eriberto Seno for appellant.

Jose M. Mesina for appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered
on November 5, 1970.

The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:

Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu,
Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a
jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being
the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver,
Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private
respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit,
invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;

The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the civil
case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner
elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on
September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending
the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2

On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as
damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that petitioner
has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in
the criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is
improper; and that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of
mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an
Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
FIRST DIVISION

Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on February 25, 1971. 3
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

Petitioner makes these:

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
 1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE
CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A
FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID
DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES
IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR
certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS
INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS
DEFECTIVE. 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an independent civil
action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that the
nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is caned a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot,
in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile
and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision; that there was a
direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private
respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana Pepito,
observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant
Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil
action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is
readily discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has been expounded
in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import
of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have
very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would
have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil hability arising from
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for quasidelito or culpa
aquiliana We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a
situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We
will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to
11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code,
otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective,
and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method
of obtaining a reliel True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a
more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of
the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more
likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually
do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the
plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this round-about, unnecessary, and
 probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the injured party
shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice. during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required
in the preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article
order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but
right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding the civil
patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all
"other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111
for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and
above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising
just that such responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who could
from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the such employee
found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil
because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.)
action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended
Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle
after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action
of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work
based on quasi-delict
already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee
vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la
de quien la emplea y utihza (become as one personality by the merging of the Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these
observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
owners of motor vehicles. the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not arising
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this
of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
efficacy of the action for culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and (1) Law;
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high
(2) Contracts;
time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle
of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code
to its full rigor. It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana (3) Quasi-contracts;
to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into
that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the bet ter (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending
on the issues, stations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by (5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
the party wronged or his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress. (Garcia vs. Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis (Emphasis supplied)
supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasidelica
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2, Rule as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to
111 of the Rules of Court, reading: persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one
hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact,
examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the
Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful to persons or property."

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge gravely abused
his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil
action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Having arrived at this
conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.
THIRD DIVISION
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
Without pronouncement as to costs. vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the
Decision 1of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16
October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of
promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial
court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty
lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other
hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August
1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would
get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in
October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her
to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with
a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering
the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies
as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as
averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special
and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he
discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation
took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint
is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and
compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for
an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying the
stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano
Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City,
College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3,
1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October
1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter
damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic)
litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who
readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed
herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made some preparations for the wedding
that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and
relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts
of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's
testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and
expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after
they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his
love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he
went with her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get
married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant
with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on
that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he
intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because
plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal
for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house
and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When
plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987,
defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even
gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day
and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still
plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to
marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married
to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to
her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay
captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod
sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry
plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at
the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed
them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the
wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and
even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case
as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the
case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial
court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made
the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio
lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would
(sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made
by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff
and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought
because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed
herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender
poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress
at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to
plaintiff's hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the
town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party
together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March
3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's
mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant
have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to
go to plaintiff's hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of
special relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed have
led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not
only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the
restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage
to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the
restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character
and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that
he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he
had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another
woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to
plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in
pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful
country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on
the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree
to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs,
and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our
women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality
of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and
injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its
decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the
single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem,
he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to
marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem
upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives
and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral
character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been
solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship,
the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner
asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special
circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner
had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it
is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised.
It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the
credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to
observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked
facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any
fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh
all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to
enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
 (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]);
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453
[1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v.
Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v.
Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance
Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
(Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142
SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence
on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this
case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from
which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The
history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown
that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in
the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made,
or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is
no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong
has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable
moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such
as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine
legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised
Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article
21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated
that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the
Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered
her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner
could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the
Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry
where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court
denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not
only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been
moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction
existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the
idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S.
vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some
sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by
the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which
are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which
result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the
enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the
injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises
out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the
commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization
of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by
which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47
Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged,
no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this
Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra
vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248,
Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the
EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or
moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other
way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust
has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding
presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding
the incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The example given by the
Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal
sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished
 without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the
that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity. party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to
deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman
thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury,
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action
there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal
by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for
interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less,
that reason.
equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other
one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault.
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court
According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and
condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same
the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the
room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the
petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or
honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic SO ORDERED.
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May
18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have
been offered by the petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth,
inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously
then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with
a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and
promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor
woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was
nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his
proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner
clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have
for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard
of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have
been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not
out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about
the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she
left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a
similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto.
 BIDIN, J.:

This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29,
1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil
Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the
"Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security
guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela
and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or
Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:

1. . . .

Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC.,

(Defendant Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION
(Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly organized and existing in accordance
with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza
Santa Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the
former appears to be the employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant
TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged responsibility for the acts of
defendant TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.

Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant

SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident
complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . .
SECOND DIVISION
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was
on duty as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38
caliber revolver belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995 (per Police Report dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br.
84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and
reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the
negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its
having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.

xxx xxx xxx

 (Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said
Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided
by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting
Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability
under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In
addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering
that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary
liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based
on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or an industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the
Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint
is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that
Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its
sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to
dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the
complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention
any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the
performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of
the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere
conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was one for
damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as
distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13,
1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts
alleged in the verified complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the
matter as well as precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the complaint against
the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo,
p. 110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof
was denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of
negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195
[1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are
primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This liability
is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary
civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the employer may
therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent
SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently In the cases provided for
in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended
 party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the
civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private
respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no cause
of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article
2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being
purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security
guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done within the scope of the
employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon
Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action
presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do
in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is
founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in
dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause
of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief,
but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would
show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private
respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting
and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already
held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195
[1990]), wherein the Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. [citing
Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should
be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb the above
doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33
has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of
the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in
the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where
the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the
case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was
charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial
they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela
and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is
SO ORDERED.
caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363
[1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employee.

Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it
was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it
failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.

With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general
rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the
defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are present, namely:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines
v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])

This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable
breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is
enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's
death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to
establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and
wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties;
whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are questions which can be better
resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective
allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a
cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts
proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits
of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of
the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992]
citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not
exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v.
Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights
under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT
CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.
Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.
Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private respondents.
Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.
ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, in
Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated October 21, 1971,
dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala
"without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case
filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court dated
January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together
with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a
PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and
driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the
purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and
bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car
was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W
Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a
result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their
medical treatment and hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving
their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car,
petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with
respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850)
against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that
figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the aforementioned
Civil Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that
the accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo
Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25 coming from the opposite direction
ascending the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in
order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU
car, thus causing the accident in question, and, therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable
for the damages caused on petitioners.
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to
dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action; 2) that the
complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but without the requisite verification, hence defective
under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the defendants (respondents),
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with
maximum care and prudence.
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action
for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro
Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and less serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could
be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because
the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been
rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not
applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent
act or imprudence of the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the aforesaid
action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the
same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised
Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the
party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained the arguments
of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or not "the action
for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil
Code or tort under American law" there "should be a showing that the offended party expressly waived the
civil action or reserved his right to institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in
culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and
because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally
liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the action was not
based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. We explained in Meneses vs.
Luat 3 that when the criminal action for physical injuries against the defendant did not proceed to trial as
he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on the matter or damages
suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended
party in said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to
press a claim for damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages
subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by
the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been
terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in
effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to
recover them in the present civil case.

As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972, hence this appeal
be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the
on certiorari.
prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right
to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his
There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint in Civil interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New
Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability
negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro
arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation
Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages
of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own
sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the
foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing
civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal
contractual relations between the parties. The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents
negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with
violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and
reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said
imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers
articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule
aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa
stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the
unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not
protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
provide for the reservation required in the proviso." 4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the
justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of
civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be
traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the
governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured
criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil
party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of
action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints
the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where
would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages
reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the
may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an
Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This
from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for
distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). 1
respondent court's order of dismissal.

It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the court a
effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code,
quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to
institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111
fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v. Palileo, 2 where the reservation was
made after the tort-feasor had already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his Separate Opinions
appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the criminal proceedings, and the tort-
feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by final judgment in said
criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally ineffective because the offended party cannot BARREDO, J., concurring:
I believe that the only substantive legal provision involved in this case are Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code which read as follows:
ART 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
These provisions definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from
the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated on the
above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I cannot see
why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in
Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative, it being
substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it
were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an
enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.
Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required, there being
no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil
Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured party is entitled exclusively to the
bigger one.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF
OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation, which
has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing
inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and
Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of
inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this
time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the
land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or
suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after
judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on
August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the
criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on
the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil
actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with Section 3
(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred
in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid
point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint
as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including
the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an
action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading or
complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as
well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to
prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or
opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete
hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the
provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected
cement culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise
beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower
portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said
cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by defendant to the
cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by defendant, which runs
northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant thru the
lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates the land of
plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the
floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-
point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or
stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of
plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil,
which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-
connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during
rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the
excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned
water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to
death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and
converted to deep, wide and long canals, such that the same
can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several
occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and
their laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the
land of plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose
acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are
alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if
proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code
and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or
communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party
who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable
to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of
the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances
built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to
the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence,
and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation
between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as
not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable
care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the
latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or
omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged
also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is
not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is
a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal
or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of
an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in
which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no
logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated
August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case
No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of
La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately
executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
W. H. Lawrence, for appellant.
W. L. Wright, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor,
by his father, his nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light
system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig
River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat
or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age,
the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable
aptitude and training in mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age,
crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr.
Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the
unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the
company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or
spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked
across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and
ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the
ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has
attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They
are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to
take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried
them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old,
and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the
caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to
break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got
matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion
followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a
match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the
neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of
the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by
the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's
premises, nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that some
months before the accident, during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same
size and kind as those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant near the place
where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or about the time when these caps were found,
similarly caps were in use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William
McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been lying for a
considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem to have been discarded as
detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.
No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from
entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in
defendant counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes crossed the foot
bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed premises of the defendant,
in the neighborhood of the place where the caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was
made to forbid these children from visiting the defendant company's premises, although it must be
assumed that the company or its employees were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland
transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical
engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and
continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of
more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of
fifteen.
The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively established by the
evidence of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact which are
seriously disputed are plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by plaintiff on defendant
company's premises were the property of the defendant, or that they had come from its possession and
control, and that the company or some of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the point
where they were found.
The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, apparently relying on
the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence
in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is
sufficient to sustain a finding in accord with his allegations in this regard.
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively, on the
McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used in blasting a
well on the company's premises a few months before the accident; that not far from the place where the
caps were found the company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth, used by it in its
operations as a street railway and a purveyor of electric light; and that the place, in the neighborhood of
which the caps were found, was being used by the company as a sort of dumping ground for ashes and
cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are
not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of
all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where
they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant
company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control. We
think also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly
thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they
would be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they
being old and perhaps defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient
to sustain a finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left
them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at play, where not
prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that young boys were
likely to roam about in pastime or in play.
Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on which these
conclusions are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the company's well and
on its McKinley extension was done by contractors. It was conclusively proven, however, that while the
workman employed in blasting the well was regularly employed by J. G. White and Co., a firm of
contractors, he did the work on the well directly and immediately under the supervision and control of one
of defendant company's foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the
McKinley extension was done by independent contractors. Only one witness testified upon this point, and
while he stated that he understood that a part of this work was done by contract, he could not say so of his
own knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the alleged contract, or of the relations
of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The fact having been proven that detonating caps were
more or less extensively employed on work done by the defendant company's directions and on its behalf,
we think that the company should have introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it
wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference that it was the owner of the material used in these
operations and that it was responsible for tortious or negligent acts of the agents employed therein, on the
ground that this work had been intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts the
maxim respondent superior should not be applied. If the company did not in fact own or make use of caps
such as those found on its premises, as intimated by counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to prove
that fact, and in the absence of such proof we think that the other evidence in the record sufficiently
establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on
its premises were its property, and were left where they were found by the company or some of its
employees.
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the
provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on
account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for
kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven
at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these articles,
and since we agree with this view of the case, it is not necessary for us to consider the various questions as
to form and the right of action (analogous to those raised in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would, perhaps, be involved in a decision affirming the judgment of
the court below.
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in
the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right
to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in
the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the
point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate
place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express
permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant
which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied
a match to its contents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon
defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held
to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of
defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and
this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him.
In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of
last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases
based thereon.
In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury
received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of amusement,
enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had good
reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there found explosive signal torpedoes left
unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one of which when carried away by the visitor, exploded
and injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable,
left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident
or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.
In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises
liable.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was
whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises, from
idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under circumstances, attributable to the
negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is
not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that
it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries
arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is
not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an
adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another
he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The
care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be
determined in each case by the circumstances of the case."
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized
in several state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463)
formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases, especially that laid down
in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1)
That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his
wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by
dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license
to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to
interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children and adults as to the
circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in by the courts
in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349). And the
doctrine has been questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in other States.
On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing and approving
the doctrine laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q. B., 29, 35, 36), lay down
the rule in these cases in accord with that announced in the Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra), and the
Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harlan in the case
of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonal and reconsidered the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs.
Stout, and after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of many of the adjudged cases, both English
and American, formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co.
vs. Stout."
In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as follows: The plaintiff, a
boy 12 years of age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon and visited the defendant's
premises, without defendant's express permission or invitation, and while there, was by accident injured
by falling into a burning slack pile of whose existence he had no knowledge, but which had been left by
defendant on its premises without any fence around it or anything to give warning of its dangerous
condition, although defendant knew or had reason the interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these facts the
court held that the plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety and protection
while on the premises in question, against the unseen danger referred to, the defendant was under no
obligation to make provision.
We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles involved to the
facts in that case, because what is said there is strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and would seem to
dispose of defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the defendant company
owed him no duty, and in no case could be held liable for injuries which would not have resulted but for
the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises.
We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to the case
now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of negligence in leaving
unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its depot building. It could have
forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity and
pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit its
mine, and witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a narrow
path skirting its slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people of the village, old and
young, would often assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of frequenting that
locality and playing around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The
slightest regard for the safety of these children would have suggested that they were in danger
from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except when snow, wind,
or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might accidentally fall and be
burned to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad company ought not to be heard to say
that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit,
was a trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for whose protection it was under no obligation
to make provisions.
In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous traps, baited
with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the premises of another, that dogs
passing along the highway, or kept in his neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by
their instinct into the traps, and in consequence of such act his neighbor's dogs be so attracted
and thereby injured, an action on the case would lie. "What difference," said Lord
Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason between drawing the animal into the trap by means of
his instinct which he can not resist, and putting him there by manual force?" What difference,
in reason we may observe in this case, is there between an express license to the children of
this village to visit the defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied
license, resulting from the habit of the defendant to permit them, without objection or warning,
to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring it the case of Townsend vs.
Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of Negligence, volume 1, page 305, note,
well says: "It would be a barbarous rule of law that would make the owner of land liable for
setting a trap thereon, baited with stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog attracted by his
natural instinct, might run into it and be killed, and which would exempt him from liability for
the consequence of leaving exposed and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that
his neighbor's child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally
strong, might thereby be killed or maimed for life."
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of Powers vs.
Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses; and
others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon
this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children
anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment might
naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to
be taken.
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied invitation to visit the
premises of another, says:
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might
sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for
children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be
equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away
upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication
should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the cases of Railroad
Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and
convincing in this jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases originated. Children here are actuated by
similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth,
boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The
movement of machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring
mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes
within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to
children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon
which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must
calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be
heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a
trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable
precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know
that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to
attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such
conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from
unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty,
responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the
premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all
the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or
occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a
right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents
or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in
doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is acquired and held under the
tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights and interests of the community (see
U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender years it
would be absurd and unreasonable in a community organized as is that in which we lived to hold that
parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or imprudence in every case wherein they permit growing
boys and girls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child the
negligence of the parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it a right to recover in
such cases a point which we neither discuss nor decide.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express
invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there
by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the
defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant
in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the
plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant,"
and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting
match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon
the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth
the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise
to the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine
of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at
length in this decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule
in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or
negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant
of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only,
and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case ." As we think we have shown,
under the reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would
relieve defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the
plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises
without express permission or invitation' but it is wholly different question whether such youth can be said
to have been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a
match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion. On
this point, which must be determined by "the particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down
in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of
the "Torpedo" and analogous cases which our attention has been directed, the record discloses that the
plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender years that they were held not
to have the capacity to understand the nature or character of the explosive instruments which fell into their
hands.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to
earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record
discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of
record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive
character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other
explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it
with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a
match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any
reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact
that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of
the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might
be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant
injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected
from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far
to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might
reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for
injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand
and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail
to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable
and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily
depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences;
and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and
their consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary
in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. But some
idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an
examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be
capable of exercising certain rights and incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that
these provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they
illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with the
varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of
age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible therefore,
although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as an
extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under certain
circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may
petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id.,
sec. 765). And males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art.
83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of
the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui
juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity
for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his
own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate
result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have
been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the
injury.
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire. (Digest,
book 50, tit. 17 rule 203.)
The Patidas contain the following provisions:
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own
fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. 5, Partida 3.)
And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance
should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7, Partida 2.)
According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance
should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down the law
touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its
provisions by the supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to recover damages
from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries sustained by him.
The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is
directly in point. In that case the court said:
According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence is a
source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of
cause and effect; but if the injury produced should not be the result of acts or omissions of a
third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omission were
imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the injury
was the negligence of the injured party himself.
The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the alleged fault or negligence
is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause, gave rise to the damage."
See also judgment of October 21, 1903.
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in
his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the decision of
March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an obligation when between
it and the damage there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the damage caused does
not arise from the acts or omissions of a third person, there is no obligation to make good upon
the latter, even though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when it
is shown that the immediate cause of the damage has been the recklessness of the injured party
himself.
And again
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the
plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their
existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and September 27, 1898, have
especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary points of the
proof, which are two: An act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with
the liability, and the production of the damage by said act or omission.
This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act or
omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the
decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages result immediately and
directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully; "necessarily presupposing a legal
ground for imputability." (Decision of October 29, 1887.)
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.
(Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)
Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely settled in this
court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held
that while "There are many cases (personal injury cases) was exonerated," on the ground that "the
negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of January, the
19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases
decided by the supreme court of Spain "define the effect to be given the negligence of its causes, though
not the principal one, and we are left to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other countries;"
and in such cases we declared that law in this jurisdiction to require the application of "the principle of
proportional damages," but expressly and definitely denied the right of recovery when the acts of the
injured party were the immediate causes of the accident.
The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made
between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have
been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was
the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces the event giving
occasion for damagesthat is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this
event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it
was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place
wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the
determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where
he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less
a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion, the
accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the
cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not
recover."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon defendant's
premises the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the relation of cause and effect
between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps. Under the doctrine of the
Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant of very tender years would have no effect in relieving
defendant of responsibility, but whether in view of the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that
"boys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be
deemed without fault in picking up the caps in question under all the circumstances of this case, we
neither discuss nor decide.
Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court
below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the
court wherein it originated, where the judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in
first instance and the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.
 Hence, the petitioners interposed the present petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the order of
respondent Judge dated April 13, 1977, claiming that the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of
his jurisdiction and for with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed order, and that there is no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru the present petition.

SECOND DIVISION
After the private respondents had filed their comment, 12 this Court Resolved to consider the said comment
as answer to the petition, and the case was deemed submitted for decision on September 3, 1979.
G.R. No. L-50959 July 23, 1980
The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in
HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., petitioners, excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.
vs.
HONORABLE FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and
The petition is meritorious. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
ROMEO VILLA Y CUNANAN, respondents.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, premised upon the following facts:
On September 25, 1974, the petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., namely: Crisanta Salazar, Pedro Tayag,
Jr., Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag, Corazon Tayag and Rodolfo Tayag, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac, Branch I, presided over by the respondent Judge, a complaint 1 for damages against the private
respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 5114 alleging among others that in the afternoon of September 2, 1974, while Pedro Tayag
Sr. was riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac on his way home,
he was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74,
driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous death. In
due time, the private respondents filed their answer, 2 admitting some allegations and denying the other
allegations of the complaint
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial 3 dated April 30, 1975, on the ground
that the criminal case 4 against the driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still pending in said court, and that
Section 3, Rule Ill of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil action until the
criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the
hearing of Civil Case No. 5114. 5
On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision 6 in Criminal Case No. 836, acquitting the
accused Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on the act or
omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from other
sources, 13 like quasi delict. 14
In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners' cause of action was based
upon a quasi delict. 15 Thus, the complaint alleged among others:
xxxxxxxxx
4. That on September 2, 1974, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Sitio Pag-
asa, Bo. San Rafael Tarlac, Tarlac, along MacArthur Highway and while riding on a
bicycle on his way home to Bo. San Sebastian, Tarlac, Tarlac, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was
bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No.
YL 604 PUB '74 and as result of which he sustained physical injuries which cause
his instantaneous death and the bicycle he was riding on was damaged and
destroyed;
5. That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at the time of the accident being driven by
defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a faster and greater speed than what was
reasonable and proper and in a gray negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent
manner, without due regards to injuries to persons and damage to properties and in
violation of traffic rules and regulations;

Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss 7 Civil Case No. 5114 on the ground that the
6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. has failed to exercise the
petitioners have no cause of action against them the driver of the bus having been acquitted in the criminal
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
action. The petitioners opposed the motions 8 alleging that their cause of action is not based on crime but
employees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan otherwise the accident in
on quasi-delict.
question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property
would not have occurred.
Acting upon the said motion as well as the opposition thereto, the respondent Judge issued an order 9 dated
April 13, 1978, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 5114.
xxxxxxxxx
10
The petitioners moved to reconsider; however, the same was denied by respondent Judge in his
order 11 dated May 30, 1979.
All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission
constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or
commission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-
Separate Opinions
existing contractual relation between the parties. In the case of Elcano vs. Hill, 16 this Court held that:

BARREDO, J., concurring:

... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminality prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not snowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to receiver
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e), Section 3, Rule III,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver, private respondent
Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case
No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-delict. 17
In the light of the foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private respondents.
I concur and also in the opinion of Justice Aquino. I just like to add that in my view the proceeding and
trial in Civil Case No. 5114 should not have been suspended at all just because of the filing of the criminal
case. Aquino, J., see concurrence below.
I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code, under which,
according to the Code Commission, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shag not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Article 33 Of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages since the
term "physical in. juries" therein embraces death Dyogi vs. Yateo, 100 Phil 1095).
Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was base on reasonable doubt. The petitioners, as plaintiffs in the
civil case, can amend their complaint and base their action also on article 29 of the Civil Code which
allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation in the
criminal cases of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law (Garcia vs. Florida L-
35095, August 31, 1973, 52 SCRA 420, 429).

SO ORDERED.