Professional Documents
Culture Documents
North Korea and the United States
Carlyle A. Thayer
Presentation to the Conference on Authoritarianism in East
Asia, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong
Kong, Hong Kong, June 29‐July 1, 2010
VIETNAM’S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: THE NEXT FIVE YEARS
Carlyle A. Thayer
This report presents a forward‐looking analysis of likely Vietnamese foreign policy
initiatives towards China and North Korea over the next five years. It explores two major
questions. What is Hanoi seeking to gain from diplomatic, military and economic
exchanges with Beijing and Pyongyang? What sort of influence does China and North
Korea assert over Vietnam?
Background
In January 1950, both the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea extended diplomatic recognition to Vietnam’s fledgling communist
regime, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (later renamed the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam). China supported the Vietnamese communists in their successful resistance to
French colonialism. Relations were described “as close as lips and teeth.” Both China
and North Korea provided material and personnel support to North Vietnam during the
Vietnam War (1965‐73).
Hanoi’s relations with Beijing, and to a lesser extent Pyongyang, deteriorated during the
Cambodian conflict (1979‐91). When Vietnam invaded Cambodia China retaliated by
attacking Vietnam and providing military support to the Khmer Rouge. North Korea
provided a sanctuary to Cambodia’s Prince Norodom Sihanouk.
Vietnam and China normalized diplomatic relations in 1991 after an international
conference in Paris reached a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. In March
1999, a summit meeting of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) adopted a fourteen‐character guideline calling for
2
relations.” The following year at a summit meeting of state presidents, China and
Vietnam codified bilateral relations in a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation
in the New Century. This document served as a framework for long‐term state‐to‐state
relations.
In 2006, Vietnam and China agreed to coordinate all aspects of their bilateral
relationship through a Joint Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation which met on
an annual basis at deputy prime minister level. In June 2008, following another summit
of party leaders in Beijing, bilateral relations were raised to that of “strategic partners,”
and a year later this was upgraded to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” At the third
meeting of the Joint Steering Committee in March 2009, Vietnam and China set up a hot
line to deal with urgent issues (particularly clashes in the South China Sea).
In sum, Sino‐Vietnamese relations have been structured through the framework of a
long‐term cooperation agreement, a Joint Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation,
and regular high‐level summit meetings between party and state leaders. This has
resulted in a dense network of agreements between party, state, military and mass
organizations at all levels. In 2009, Vietnam and China exchanged 267 delegations of
which 108 were at deputy minister level or higher.
Vietnam’s relations with North Korea pale by comparison. In 1958, Ho Chi Minh and Kim
Il Sung paid reciprocal visits marking the high‐point in bilateral relations. In 1989, the
two countries set up an Intergovernmental Committee on Economic, Scientific and
3
Technological Cooperation. It met annually for the first three years and then went into
hibernation for a decade as North Korea reacted negatively to the warming of Vietnam’s
relations with South Korea and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992. No
high‐level delegations between Vietnam and North Korea were exchanged for eight
years.
In 2000, North Korea resumed high‐level diplomatic contacts with Vietnam by sending
its foreign minister to Hanoi. The Intergovernmental Committee was revived and held its
fourth meeting in October 2001. The following year Vietnam’s state president, Tran Duc
Luong, visited Pyongyang and signed six cooperation agreements. The fifth, and most
recent, meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee was held in November 2003.
Bilateral relations have continued their slow upward trajectory; in 2007 Vietnam’s party
Secretary General, Nong Duc Manh, and Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister, Pham
Gia Khiem, visited North Korea. North Korea’s Deputy Prime Minister journeyed to
Hanoi. In 2008 it was anticipated that Kim Jong Il would visit Vietnam to mark the 50th
anniversary of his father’s first trip to Hanoi. But no such visit eventuated.
Vietnam and China
The relationship between Vietnam and China is a highly asymmetric one in all
dimensions of power. Vietnam, with a population of 89 million, ranks as the world’s
thirteenth most populous country, yet it is only a middle sized Chinese province by
comparison. The major strategic preoccupation of the Vietnamese leadership is how to
use the levers of diplomacy, military ties and economic relations to maintain their
autonomy and independence and prevent from being pulled into China’s orbit.
4
Vietnam uses high‐level party and state visits as a diplomatic tool to codify its relations
with China. Vietnam has negotiated a web of joint statements, agreements, and
treaties in order to make Chinese behavior more predictable and less likely to harm
Vietnam’s national interests.
Vietnam has built on the normalization of political relations through a diplomatic
strategy that stresses the legacy of past close relations and mutual benefit over
contemporary differences. A prime example may be found in Vietnam’s approach to
managing territorial disputes with China. Vietnam obtained Chinese agreement to
detach these issues from high‐level consideration and to relegate them to technical
working groups, and to solve the easier problems before the more difficult. Vietnam’s
diplomatic strategy emphasized common interests, such as making the land border safe
and secure so that both sides could benefit from cross‐border trade. As a result a treaty
on the land border and agreement demarcating the Gulf of Tonkin were reached.
Over the next five years Vietnam will set a priority on ensuring that its territorial
conflicts with China in the South China Sea are kept peaceful and that a modus vivendi is
worked out to jointly exploit the resources of the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China
Sea. Vietnam will rely primarily on diplomacy, but it will also back this up with enhanced
maritime defense capabilities.
Vietnam will pursue three strategies. First, it will continue bilateral negotiations with
China to conclude an agreement on the principles to govern their actions in contested
5
waters. Discussions are already in train. Once agreement is reached Vietnam will
explore with China the possibilities of joint development in less sensitive areas.
Vietnam’s second strategy will be to promote multilateral efforts to maintain peace and
stability in the South China Sea. Vietnam will seek to involve other foreign companies in
joint development in order to ensure that their home governments have a continuing
interest in stability in this region. The challenge for Vietnam will be to work out how
much foreign involvement China will tolerate. Vietnam will also seek to upgrade
ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea into a more
binding Code of Conduct. As ASEAN Chair in 2010 Vietnam has a window of opportunity
to promote an ASEAN‐China Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
Vietnam’s third strategy will be to develop sufficient military capacity to deter China
from using force. For example, Vietnam will take delivery of six Kilo‐class submarines
from Russia over a six‐year period. Vietnam will also develop integrated or joint air naval
forces and command headquarters. This is a defensive strategy aimed at area denial.
Vietnam’s military relations with China are at a nascent stage. Over the next five years
Vietnam will seek to gradually expand defense cooperation for political and practical
reasons. Vietnam will seek enhanced military ties with China as a form of confidence
building, but also as a means to develop influence with the People’s Liberation Army, an
important actor in China’s political system. Confidence building measures will take the
6
form of border security cooperation in remote areas, increased naval port visits,1 search
and rescue exercises and stepped up joint naval patrols to protect fisheries in the Gulf of
Tonkin and later the South China Sea.
On the practical side, Vietnam will seek to build on recent agreements to expand
training exchanges at all levels and to promote cooperation by national defense
industries in military technology, light arms and ammunition production. Vietnam will
seek material benefits from defense cooperation; but will use military relations with
China as “political cover” for enhanced military ties with the United States. Vietnam will
also seek to shape its defense relations with China through multilateral channels such as
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and the ASEAN
Defense Ministers Meeting with dialogue partners. This process has just got off the
ground and Vietnam, as ASEAN Chair for 2010, is planning to host its first meeting.
When Vietnam normalized relations with China smuggling became a major issue as
Chinese goods flooded into Vietnam’s domestic market. The opening of the land frontier
quickly led to increased cross‐border trade and greater autonomy for local government
authorities. Regularizing trade with China has served to reinforce Hanoi’s authority over
the localities. Since 1991, trade between China and Vietnam has grown astronomically.
China is now Vietnam’s largest trading partner. China supplies Vietnam with machinery,
refined oil and steel. In return, Vietnam supplies China with unrefined oil, coal and
rubber. The single most important issue in the trade relationship is the imbalance in
1Since normalization in 1991, the People’s Liberation Army‐Navy has made only three
port calls to Vietnam, and the Vietnamese navy has visited China only once.
7
China’s favor ($11.1 billion in 2008). In 2008, China exported $15.7 billion worth of
goods to Vietnam, while Vietnam managed to export only $4.6 billion to China.
China’s trade surplus has figured at every high‐level summit in recent years. Party and
state leaders agree that efforts should be make to make it more balanced. But how?
Restricting Chinese imports is not on the cards. The structure of Vietnamese exports had
changed little over the years and no major change is expected in the coming years.
Vietnamese domestic manufacturers cannot produce quality goods that are competitive
in the Chinese market place. Vietnamese leaders have called for increased Chinese
investment; although China has responded the total amount of investment ($3 billion) is
modest when compared to other foreign investors.
Future trade between China and Vietnam will be influenced by the ASEAN‐China Free
Trade Agreement that took effect in January 2010. Chinese tariffs will be lowered
making it easier for Vietnam to sell its goods in China. And Vietnam will also be able to
take part in a regional division of labor by producing components for assembly
elsewhere within the free trade area. For Vietnam to fully take advantage of these trade
opportunities it will have to get its domestic house in order and make Vietnamese
businesses more competitive in the Chinese market.
Vietnam’s massive trade deficit with China must be placed in the context of Vietnam’s
current trade deficit of $19 billion with the rest of the world (2009). Vietnam needs
continued access to markets in the United States where it has a $9 billion surplus (2009).
8
In addition to the economic benefits of trade, there are also geo‐strategic
considerations at play. The growth of trade has been accompanied by a massive
upgrading and construction of infrastructure – roads, bridges, railways – much of it
funded by the Asian Development Bank and World Bank as part of the Greater Mekong
Sub‐region. Increasingly mainland Southeast Asia is being linked to southwestern China.
In addition, Vietnam and China are promoting the development of the “two corridors
and one economic beltway” linking southern China, Hainan island and northern
Vietnam. From Hanoi’s point of view, this not only serves Vietnam’s development
needs, but also enmeshes China and provides Beijing incentives for cooperative
behavior.
Vietnam utilizes diplomatic, military and economic means to achieve the strategic
autonomy in return for which Vietnam recognizes China’s regional primacy.
Vietnam and North Korea
Vietnam’s diplomacy towards North Korea is guided by its foreign policy principle of
becoming a “friend and credible partner of all nations in the international community.”
North Korea’s failed economy and status as a rogue nation presents opportunities for
Vietnamese diplomacy. Vietnam supported North Korea’s membership in the ASEAN
Regional Forum and later sponsored North Korean‐Japanese reconciliation talks. Over
the next five years, when the occasion arises, Vietnam can be expected to play a
constructive role in encouraging North Korea to come out of its self‐imposed isolation.
9
Hanoi will quietly counsel Pyongyang and will also consider sympathetically third party
requests to use its good offices as a diplomatic go between.
In the 1990s North Korea’s famine conditions presented Vietnam with the opportunity
to engage in barter trade. In 1996 this resulted in a rice‐for‐weapons swap. Vietnam
acquired Igla (SA‐16 Gimlet) portable air defense missiles, two Yugo‐class mini
submarines and a small number of Scud C ballistic missiles. Defense relations then went
into the doldrums for six years before they were renewed. Currently the development
of certain defense ties is restricted by UN sanctions against North Korea. Vietnam
supported these sanctions and can be expected to fully observe them. While future rice‐
for‐weapons barter agreements cannot be ruled out, Vietnam will be extraordinarily
circumspect and attentive to international reactions before proceeding.
Vietnam and North Korea have never had a robust trade relationship. Two‐way trade
has probably never exceeded $30 million in value in any one year. Vietnam has sold rice
in the past but the relationship soured in 1997 in a dispute over terms of payment.
North Korea even rejected emergency aid from Vietnam in response to domestic
famine. Because North Korea lacks hard currency barter agreements are likely. The
most promising avenue for future relations lie in Vietnam’s status as a role model for
economic development under a one‐party system. In past years North Korea has sent
study missions to Vietnam to see how Vietnam’s economic success was achieved.
Vietnam will definitely be opened to similar approaches in the future, but progress is
contingent on North Korea’s willingness.
10
China and Vietnam
China asserts considerable direct and indirect influence on Vietnam. Probably no
major decision of any nature is made in Hanoi without taking Chinese interests and
likely responses into account. China exerts direct pressure through high‐level
for Chinese influence. Vietnam’s model of economic development borrows heavily
but not exclusively from Chinese experience. Vietnamese foreign policy also infused
mimics Chinese formulations, such as the general strategic trend in Asia Pacific is
one of “peace, cooperation and development.” Hanoi also adapts Chinese ideology to
its own needs, such as “the threat of peaceful evolution.” Entire Chinese books on
the subject have been translated into Vietnamese and made compulsory reading for
Central Committee members and delegates to national party congresses. The slow
pace of U.S.‐Vietnam military‐to‐military relations can be attributed in part to
concerns about China’s reaction. The 2009 Defense White paper makes no mention
of the 1979 border war with China so as not to offend Beijing. The Chinese Embassy
regularly intervenes to protest any publication or action that is seen as infringing
Chinese sovereignty, especially in the South China Sea. No other foreign state is as
assertive or influential in Hanoi than China.
North Korea and Vietnam
In contrast, North Korea asserts what might be termed “negative influence” in its
relations with Vietnam. It can oppose and block bilateral cooperation but little else.
Vietnam is privately disdainful of North Korea’s cult of personality and failed model
of juche. North Korea must play the role of suitor for the relationship to advance.
VIETNAM’S RELATIONS WITH CHINA: DOMESTIC DIMENSIONS
Carlyle A. Thayer
This report analyses the difficulties faced by Vietnamese authorities in their efforts to
maintain control over rising domestic anti‐China sentiments among Vietnamese
intellectuals and college students who view China as Vietnam's ‘historic enemy’.
Vietnam’s management of relations with China has always been the prerogative of a small
group within the party and state elite. Vietnam’s elite has not always been unified on how to
manage relations with its northern neighbor. Historically internal party contention on relations
with China has been insulated from the general public through party discipline and strict
controls on the media and publishing industry. Since 2007, the emergence of an anti‐China
backlash among a widening circle of Vietnam’s political elite has broken through this insulation
and posed two major difficulties for the Vietnamese leadership.
1. The first difficulty is gaining consensus within the party Central Committee about the best
way to respond to China’s increasingly assertive actions in the South China Sea.
In January 2007, the party Central Committee’s fourth plenum resolved to draw up a national
“Maritime Strategy Towards the Year 2020” to integrate economic development of coastal
areas with the exploitation of marine resources in the East Sea. Vietnamese economists
estimated that by 2020, the marine economy would contribute up to 55 percent of GDP and
between 55‐60 percent of exports. Vietnam’s maritime development strategy was completed
during 2007 but was not released publicly. According to a very senior party official, Chinese
intelligence acquired a copy of this classified document and then began to apply pressure on
foreign companies, such as ExxonMobil and India’s ONGC, that were likely to be involved in
developing Vietnam’s maritime sector. These companies were warned that their commercial
interests in China would suffer if they developed areas claimed by China.
2
China’s actions impacted negatively on Vietnamese party conservatives who had gained
influence during the global financial crisis by touting the Chinese economic model and “the
threat of peaceful evolution.” Prior to 2007, party conservatives supported pro‐China policies
and put a brake on foreign policy initiatives towards closer security relations with the United
States. After 2007, party conservatives supported “self‐help” policies in defense through major
equipment procurements (Kilo‐class submarines and Su‐30 multirole fighters) and continued to
warn of “the threat of peaceful evolution” in domestic affairs.
The key difficulty in forging internal party consensus lies in the extent to which Vietnam should
move beyond self‐help to soliciting external support from the United States and other countries
to counter Chinese assertiveness. Developing defense and security ties (as distinct from political
and diplomatic relations) with the U.S. is likely to be the most contentious foreign policy issue
to be considered in advance of the forthcoming eleventh national party congress.
2. The second difficulty for Vietnam relates to the domestic management of rising anti‐China
sentiment. In short, how should the regime harness rising patriotic anti‐China sentiment to
buttress one‐party rule without overplaying their hand and provoking sanctions from China.
In 2007, student demonstrations elicited a protest from the Chinese Embassy. Vietnam
responded by assuring China (and all ASEAN ambassadors) that the protests were spontaneous
and not officially sanctioned. China has kept up its diplomatic pressure by continually lodging
objections to any action that challenges Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea, including
revisions in provincial history textbooks and press reporting.
The emergence of anti‐China student protests in 2007 presented Vietnamese leaders with a
unique dilemma. Should they suppress independent political activity? Or should they harness
the students’ nationalism to bolster regime legitimacy?
The Vietnamese state routinely exercises censorship over media reporting that could harm
relations with China. This policy is pragmatic but it is also shaped by repeated Chinese
diplomatic interventions protesting any slights on Chinese sovereignty in general and the South
China Sea in particular. In 2007, Vietnamese students were able to demonstrate that they could
by‐pass state controls over the media to obtain independent information on Chinese actions in
3
the South China Sea. Not only that, but the students also demonstrated they were able to use
cell phones and internet chat rooms to create a network and organize public demonstrations
complete with color‐coded t‐shirts (bearing the gold star on a red background).
The dilemma for Vietnamese authorities was how to respond to student protests. Clearly, the
government could not be seen as repressing actions that were widely viewed as patriotic by a
growing number of Vietnam’s political elite. But from the point of view of officialdom, if
students were permitted to independently access information, form networks, and stage public
protests against China, where would this lead? Indeed, in 2006 political activists formed a pro‐
democracy network known as Bloc 8406 on the same basis. Vietnamese authorities quietly
clamped down on student activism by sending security officials to universities and colleges to
warn administrators and the students involved of the consequences of further protests.
Propaganda sessions were held in party cells and units to reinforce the party’s line towards
China.
The student demonstrations specifically protested Chinese actions in the South China Sea and
were not overtly critical of government policy. Some foreign affairs officials privately welcomed
the student protests as strengthening their hand in negotiations with China. But security
officials showed no sympathy when political dissidents expanded their agenda by criticizing
China domestic human rights record and raising questions about the government’s handling of
relations with China on Vietnamese language blog sites. Vietnamese security officials moved
swiftly to repress such actions, especially when dissidents sought to disrupt the carrying of
China’s Olympic torch through Ho Chi Minh City.
In 2008‐09, Vietnam’s domestic anti‐China backlash spread from the political fringe to a wider
circle of the political elite who not only criticized Chinese actions but also began to question
their government’s handling of relations with China. Two developments spurred this shift. The
first was related to the government’s decision to grant a Chinese company rights to mine
bauxite ore in the Central Highlands. What began as a protest about environmental protection
quickly became highly political when national security concerns were raised by no less a figure
than General Vo Nguyen Giap. General Giap’s intervention, in the form of three open letters to
party and state leaders, served as a catalyst for other retired high‐ranking state, military and
4
party officials to voice similar concerns. These views were widely circulated in Vietnam over the
internet and in photocopy form.
The second development to elicit an anti‐China response in Vietnam arose from increased
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, especially the aggressive manner in which China
enforced its unilateral fishing ban in May‐August 2009 at the expense of Vietnam’s domestic
fishing industry. Anti‐China sentiment thus spread from the political elite to fishing
communities along the coast. Provincial officials reported expressed frustration at the central
government’s inability to secure the quick release of fishermen held in detention on Hainan
island. Four prominent bloggers were detained and questioned about their internet sites when
they posted commentary, inter alia, criticizing Vietnam’s handling of relations with China.
The spreading anti‐China backlash resulted in pressures on the national leadership to take
action “to stand up to China.” These pressures were amplified by overseas Vietnamese who
criticized the Hanoi government for not doing enough to defend Vietnamese sovereignty. In
sum, the Vietnamese regime found that its appeal to nationalism as one of the basis of its
legitimacy was being undermined. The regime responded by changing its media strategy to give
more coverage to the government’s diplomatic protests to China, by publicizing stories that
documented Vietnam’s long historical claims to the South China Sea and the views of foreign
analysts sympathetic to Vietnam. The press also was permitted to report on the negative
impact of China’s unilateral fishing ban on the domestic fleet at the height of the Vietnamese
fishing season. In 2009, however, when two Vietnamese papers published retrospect accounts
of the 2007 anti‐China protests and described the students as “patriots” they were temporarily
shut down.
Despite attempts by the Vietnamese regime to co‐opt anti‐China patriotism for its own ends,
the nationalist genie may be out of the bottle. In August 2009, when Chinese netizens
published an invasion plan on the internet showing how China could attack and conquer
Vietnam in an amphibious invasion, Vietnamese netizens fired salvos into cyberspace defending
their country’s sovereignty. A review of some of the more accessible web site indicates hits in
the tens of thousands. Later in the year security officials blocked Facebook and imposed
5
restrictions on Twitter and YouTube in part to restrict discussion of Vietnam’s relations with
China.
Conclusion
It is clear that a loose network has emerged in Vietnam among university students and the
political elite that is united by its concerns over China’s threat to Vietnam’s territorial integrity
and sovereignty. The network can be expected to be activated in response to any action by
China that threatens these interests.
Vietnam’s one‐party state rests on multiple sources of legitimacy (rational‐legal, economic
performance and nationalism). Since late 2007 rising anti‐Chinese patriotism has opened a new
front in challenges to the legitimacy of Vietnam’s one‐party state. The anti‐China backlash
quickly spread from the political fringe to the center of the political elite (intellectuals,
journalists, academics, retired officials, bloggers, union leaders, retired senior military and party
officials, National Assembly deputies and party members) who began to question the state’s
perceived inadequate response to Chinese derogation of Vietnamese sovereignty and national
security. In sum, the Vietnamese party‐state’s claim to nationalism as one of the mainstays of
regime legitimacy has come under challenge over its handling of relations with China (with
respect to bauxite mining in the Central Highlands and Chinese assertiveness in the South China
Sea). The emergence of popular opinion adds a new dimension to the functioning of Vietnam’s
one‐party state.
1
VIETNAM’S DEFENCE RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES
Carlyle A. Thayer
This reply provides a comparative assessment of Vietnam’s military relations with China and the
United States under six headings: high‐level exchanges, naval port visits, professional military
education and training, other defense cooperation, arms and equipment sales and strategic
cooperation.
Background
Vietnam has fought wars with both the United States (1965‐73) and China (the February‐March
1979 border war and, by proxy, the Cambodian conflict 1979‐89). China granted diplomatic
recognition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1950. Unlike the United States, Vietnam
and China maintained diplomatic relations throughout armed hostilities. Although Vietnam
withdrew all of its formed military units from Cambodia in September 1989, China refused to
normalize political relations until Vietnam agreed to a comprehensive political settlement. The
two sides explored the restoration of friendly diplomatic relations at a secret summit held in
Chengdu in southern China in September 1990. Formal restoration of political relations took
place in November 1991 at a summit meeting in Beijing.
The first defense contacts between Vietnam and China since their 1979 border war were
initiated in 1992 with the exchange of delegations from the External Relations Departments of
the Vietnamese and Chinese defense ministries in February and May, respectively. Nine years
elapsed before Vietnam and China formally agreed to “multi‐level military exchanges” (Joint
Statement on Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century, December 2000).
In contrast, the United States withheld diplomatic recognition from Vietnam for over two
decades following the end of the Vietnam War. In 1994, the U.S. lifted its trade embargo and in
July 1995 extended diplomatic recognition to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The main
2
impediment to normal diplomatic relations was Vietnam’s satisfactory progress in providing a
full accounting of all U.S. servicemen who went missing in action or were held as prisoners of
war (MIA/POW). A further six years elapsed before the United States could negotiate its first
substantive agreement with Vietnam, the Bilateral Trade Agreement of 2001. It was only in
mid‐2003, thirty years after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, that Vietnam decided to upgrade its
defense relations with the United States (decision of the eighth plenum of the Vietnam
Communist Party Central Committee, July 2‐12, 2003). Vietnam’s Minister of National Defense
made an official visit to Washington late that year.
It is significant that Vietnam agreed to an annual defense dialogue with the United States in
2004 and bilateral defense security consultations with China in 2005. Vietnam and China
upgraded their bilateral relations to strategic partners in 2008 and comprehensive strategic
partners the following year. At the same time, in October 2008, U.S.‐Vietnam bilateral defense
ties took a significant step forward with the holding of the first political‐military dialogue in
Washington convened by the U.S. State Department and Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
1. High‐Level Visits
The United States and Vietnam have exchanged two reciprocal visits by defense
ministers/secretary of defense. These have been spaced at three‐year intervals (see table
below). In contrast, the patterns of ministerial level visits between Vietnam and China is more
erratic and heavily weighted China’s favor. Vietnam’s defense minister has journeyed to China
on seven occasions since 1991. A six‐year gap occurred between the second and third visits and
a five‐year gap took place between the fourth and fifth visits. The exchanges are not reciprocal.
China’s defense minister has visited Vietnam only twice with a thirteen year gap between visits.
Vietnam hosted its most recent ministerial‐level visits from China in April 2006 and the United
States in July of the same year. Vietnam’s Defense Minister visited the United States in
November 2009 and China in April 2010.
3
Table 1
Exchanges of Defense Ministers, Vietnam, China and the United States, 1991‐2009
1991 July
1992 December 1993 May
1998 January
2000 July 2000 March
2007 August
April 2010
A review of high‐level defense exchanges below secretary/minister level for the period 2002‐
mid‐2009 reveals that Vietnam has received roughly equal delegations from China (ten) and the
United States (eleven).* But there is a marked imbalance in delegations from Vietnam. Eleven
high‐level Vietnamese delegations visited China, while only four visited the United States.
High‐level exchanges between Vietnam and China may be classified into three broad
categories: general staff, general political department and regional military commands. There is
a rough balance in exchanges at general staff and general political department level. China has
dispatched three delegations of regional military commanders to Vietnam and received only
one return visit.
*
Data on exchanges was taken from Vietnam’s 2004 and 2009 Defense White Papers. Data for
the year 2004 was omitted from these publications. See Appendices A and B.
4
Because Vietnam and China are both communist states and maintain a system of political
control over their armed forces, they have an avenue of defense cooperation not available to
the United States. Also, Vietnam and China share a common border and both have put in a
major effort to demine and demarcate their common frontier.
High‐level exchanges between Vietnam and the United States are markedly different because
the U.S. Defense Department and armed forces are not structured that same way as China.
There have been no exchanges between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Vietnamese counter
parts, for example. U.S. delegations to Vietnam may be grouped into three categories: (1) visits
by the Commander U.S. Pacific Command; (2) visits at Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
level; and (3) visits by component commanders, U.S. Pacific Command.
The United States has sent an equivalent number of high‐level delegations to Vietnam as China
has between 2002 and mid‐2009 (eleven as compared to China’s ten). U.S. delegations reflect a
greater diversity of interest and potential for cooperation. By far the most frequent U.S. visitor
to Vietnam is the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command who logged four visits between
2002 and mid‐2009 (and a total of seven visits from 1994). In addition, Vietnam has received
visits by the commanders of the U.S. Army Pacific (May 2004), 13th Air Force (May 2008), Pacific
Fleet (March 2009) and Pacific Air Force (June 2009).* It is notable that visits by component
commanders are a relatively new feature of U.S.‐Vietnam defense relations.
U.S.‐Vietnam defense relations are poised to enter a new phase following the visit of Defense
Minister Phung Quang Thanh to Washington in late 2009 with agreement for Hanoi to host
direct military‐to military talks in 2010. This may prove to be the venue for advancing concrete
proposals for defense cooperation.
2. Naval Port visits
In November 1991, as Vietnam and China were normalizing their political relations, a People’s
Liberation Army‐Navy (PLAN) Jiangwei II guided missile frigate made the first visit by a Chinese
*
Vietnam’s 2006 Defense White Paper lists a visit by the Commandant of the United States
Marine Corps in September‐October 2002 but this visit appears to have been cancelled.
5
warship to a Vietnamese port since unification in 1975. The frigate visited Ho Chi Minh City. No
further port calls were made until November 2008 and August 2009.
In 2000, Vietnam and China reached agreement to delimit the Gulf of Tonkin and on fisheries.
In April 2006, the navies of both countries commenced joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin and
nine patrols have been conducted between then and the June 2010. The last joint patrol also
included the first Search and Rescue Exercise between China and Vietnam.
In June 2009, in an historic first, two Vietnamese naval ships made a visit to Zhanjiang port in
Guangdong province in Southwestern China.
Vietnamese‐Chinese naval exchanges pale in comparison to the regular annual visits by U.S.
Navy warships supplemented by a slowly growing number of non‐combatant and humanitarian
ships (see Table 2).
Table 2
U.S. Naval Ship Visits to Vietnamese Ports, 2003‐2010
Date of Visit Ships Involved Port Visited
2003 November USS Vandergrift Ho Chi Minh City
2004 July USS Curtis Wilbur Da Nang
2005 March‐April USS Gary Ho Chi Minh City
2006 July USS Patriot and USS Salvor Ho Chi Minh City
2007 July USS Peleliu Da Nang
2007 October USNS Bruce Heezen Da Nang
2007 November USS Patriot and USS Guardian Hai Phong
2008 June USNS Mercy Nha Trang
2009 June USNS Bruce Heezen Da Nang
2009 August‐Sept. USNS Safeguard Ho Chi Minh City
2009 November USS Blue Ridge* and USS Lassen Da Nang
2010 Feb.‐March USNS Richard E. Byrd Hon Khoi Port
2010 May USNS Mercy Qui Nhon
th
*U.S. 7 Fleet Flag Ship and escort.
In addition to the “show the flag” and protocol nature of these visits, the U.S. adds value to port
calls by providing humanitarian and medical assistance to the surrounding community. The
visits by the USNS Safeguard in 2009 and USNS Byrd in 2010 for ship repairs may be harbingers
of more permanent arrangements. Now that the Vietnamese navy has made port visits to
Thailand, Malaysia and China it is possible they may agree to visit a U.S. port such as Guam.
6
Finally, the United States has added a new dimension to naval relations by flying Vietnamese
military officers out to the USS John Stennis to observe flight operations in the South China Sea
in April 2009.
3. Professional Military Education and Training
Vietnamese‐Chinese cooperation in the area of professional military education and training is at
the nascent stage. The visits by senior officials from their respective General Political
Departments invariably include discussions on exchanging experiences in army‐building on their
agenda. In 2008, Vietnam’s Deputy Defense Minister held discussions in Beijing on cooperation
in personnel training. Both sides also have discussed Vietnamese participation in courses
offered by China’s National Defense University.*
Vietnamese participation in professional military education and training with the United States
is of longer standing but involves only limited number of Vietnamese personnel. Perhaps the
first opportunity for military education was offered by the Asia‐Pacific Center for Security
Studies in Hawaii in the late 1990s. Incomplete data suggests that numbers have slowly risen:
1998 (2), 1999 (4), 2000 (1), 2001 (3), 2002‐03 (no data), 2004 (13) and 2005 (9).
Since 2005, Vietnam has been eligible for Extended IMET and later IMET (English language and
medical training). Eight Vietnamese military personnel participated in FY2005.
In 2007 the United States asked Vietnam to accept U.S. officers and cadets for training in
Vietnamese universities. The status of this proposal is uncertain.*
4. Other Defense Cooperation
As noted above, defense cooperation between Vietnam and China has been mainly of a
confidence building nature involving demining and demarcating their common land border and
joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tokin.
*
A major delegation from China’s National Defense University first visited Hanoi in late 2004.
*
For comparison, Australia has hosted more than 80 senior Vietnamese Defense visitors and
over 150 Vietnamese Defense students since February 1999. During the same period over 900
Australian Defence officials have visited Vietnam.
7
By contrast, Vietnam’s other defense cooperation relations with the United States have been
and continue to be more extensive. Obviously MIA‐POW full accounting has been the main
focal point for decades. But Vietnam and the United States also cooperate on other programs
designed to address the legacies of the Vietnam War such as demining and unexploded
ordnance removal and joint research into Agent Orange. Other areas of defense/security
cooperation include: military medical research (HIV/AIDS), humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief (flood control), counter‐terrorism (including information sharing), and counter drug
trafficking.
The United States also funds Vietnamese participation at a number of defense‐related seminars
and exercises in the region such as COBRA GOLD, Western Pacific Naval Symposium and U.S.‐
Southeast Asia bilateral joint exercises in 2007‐08.
In the past, Vietnam has turned down a number of requests for small joint exercises. In 1997,
for example, the U.S. unsuccessfully proposed tactical discussions and joint training exchanges
in jungle warfare. More recently (2009), the United States has invited Vietnam to participate in
search and rescue exercises.
5. Arms Sales and National Defense Industry
In 2005, Vietnam and China initiated discussions at ministerial level on cooperation between
their respective national defense industries. That year a delegation from China’s Commission
for Science, Technology and Industry visited Vietnam. It was later reported that NORINCO, a
Chinese state‐owned arms manufacturer, agreed to sell ammunition for small arms, artillery
and military vehicles to Vietnam. NORINCO was also reported to be discussing co‐production
arrangements for heavy machine guns and ammunition with a Vietnamese counterpart. In
2008, Vietnam’s Deputy Defense Minister held discussions with China’s Commission for
Science, Technology and Industry in Beijing. No doubt that the prospects for Chinese defense
industry cooperation with Vietnam have been limited by recent arms and servicing agreements
between Vietnam and the Russian Federation.
Military equipment sales between the United States and Vietnam have been raised over a
number of years. In 1994, for example, the Commander in Chief Pacific Command proposed
8
equipment exchanges and sales while on a visit to Vietnam. In 2005, the U.S. Ambassador to
Vietnam raised the possibility of joint cooperation in repair and maintenance and the purchase
of supplies by the U.S. Navy. The following year, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, while
on a visit to Vietnam, suggested that Vietnam might buy military spare parts.
All of these proposals were subject to legal restrictions. In 2006, the Secretary of State
approved the sale, lease, export and/or transfer of non‐lethal defense articles and defense
services to Vietnam. This was followed by a Presidential Memorandum establishing Vietnam’s
eligibility under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to make certain purchases. Vietnam was
excluded, however, from lethal end items or their components including non‐lethal crowd
control and night vision devices. In 2007, the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations were
amended to allow sales to Vietnam on case‐by‐case basis.
The U.S. would like to see Vietnam take part in the Foreign Military Sales process. U.S. officials
have already explained the process involved and how to submit a Letter of Request for Price
and Availability. Vietnam could seek approval to acquire spare parts for its stock of captured
U.S. Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and UH‐1 (Huey) helicopters which are presently
inoperable. In 2009, the head of the Pentagon’s Defense Cooperation Agency singled out
maritime patrol craft and coastal radar as possible items for sale. But U.S. officials have made
clear that non‐lethal arms sales are contingent upon Vietnam engaging more fully with the
United Sates.
As early 2003, U.S. private sector defense industry sources began to identify Vietnam as a
potentially attractive arms market. In 2007, the U.S.‐ASEAN Business Council opened an office
in Hanoi and hosted a visit by a U.S. Defense and Security Corporate Executive Delegation
representing ITT, Aerospace, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Oracle.
6. Strategic Cooperation
The United States has engaged with Vietnam more fully to promote strategic cooperation than
China. Vietnam conducts strategic cooperation with its northern neighbor mainly through
multilateral channels such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN
Regional Forum. Vietnam is keen to promote what is known as the “ASEAN Defense Ministers
9
Meeting (ADMM) Plus” process involving ASEAN Defense Ministers and their dialogue partners
(Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States).
Vietnam will host the first ADMM Plus meeting in Hanoi in 2010.
Vietnam’s strategic cooperation with the United States includes more channels for cooperation
than the ASEAN process. In 2004, Vietnam attended the Asia‐Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD)
meeting held in Tokyo for the first time. A Vietnamese observer reportedly attended a meeting
of the Proliferation Security Initiative held in New Zealand. Vietnam has also discussed, but
remained noncommittal on, its participation in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative.
Vietnam continues to send defense officials to the Shangri‐La Dialogue in Singapore. In 2008,
the Chairman of the JCS met with Vietnamese representatives for the first time.
Conclusion
Bilateral defense cooperation between Vietnam and China and Vietnam and the United States
are heavily tinged by political considerations. No doubt defense officials in both Beijing and
Washington would like to see an increase in bilateral military‐to‐military cooperation with
Vietnam. Vietnam moves slowly and deliberately and generally sets the pace. When Vietnam
decides to move forward, its policies towards China and the United States appear to move in
tandem. The initiation of defense dialogues with the U.S. and China is 2004‐05 is an example.
Vietnam also maintains a rough equivalency in the number of high‐level exchanges it receives
from both countries.
China is relatively new to the defense cooperation game. The scope of what China can offer is
limited in comparison to long‐established programs in the U.S. China and Vietnam share a
special political‐ideological conduit for relations between their armed forces that is closed to
the United States. This conduit provides China a means to influence Vietnam but the extent of
China’s ability to do so in practice appears quite limited. Vietnam and China have made
concrete progress in addressing land and maritime (Gulf of Tonkin) border issues.
The United States engages in defense cooperation on a global scale. It can offer an
extraordinarily wide scope of programs that are of long‐standing. The unique role of Combatant
Commanders in the U.S. system gives the U.S. Pacific Command a special edge in offering
10
opportunities for cooperation with Vietnam. Although Vietnam has sent nearly three times as
many high‐level defense delegations to China (eleven) as the United States (four) from 2002 to
mid‐2009, that has not resulted in greater Chinese influence or defense cooperation.
11
Appendix A
High‐Level Defense Delegations from Vietnam to China and the United States, 2002‐mid‐2009
1991 July Defence Minister
1992 December Defence Minister
1998 January Defence Minister
2000 July Defence Minister
2002 July Chief of the General Political
Department
2002 October Chief of the General Political
Department
2003 October‐November Chief of the General Staff
2003 November Defence Minister
2004 No delegation recorded No delegation recorded
2005 April Deputy Chief of the General
Staff
2005 June Deputy Minister of Defence
2005 October Defence Minister
2005 November Chief of the General Political
Department
2006 September‐October Vice Chairman National
Committee of Search and
Rescue
2006 October Chief of the General Political
Department
2007 April Commanders Military
Regions 1, 2, 3, 7 and
Capital Military Region
2007 August Defence Minister
2007 October‐November Deputy Chief of the General
Staff
2008 January Deputy Minister of National
Defence
2008 April Navy Commander
2008 September Deputy Chief of the General
Staff
2008 November‐December Chief of the General Staff
2009 May Standing Deputy Chairman
of the National Committee
on Search and Rescue
12
Appendix B
High‐Level Defense Delegations from China and the United States to Vietnam, 2002‐mid‐2009