Revision of Electoral Reform in Lebanon

REVISION OF LEBANESE ELECTORAL LAW 201603061 / GHAZZAL / 1
Proposing Electoral Reform for Lebanese Electoral Law as a means to establish fair
representation in a strong and accountable government
Salah Ghazzal
201603061
American University of Beirut
PSPA 223
Professor Rabih Maalouf
Due: December 8, 2016

Table of Contents:
Title Page 1
Table of Contents 2
Outline 3
Abstract 4
Introduction 5
Discussion 6
Conclusion 23
Appendix A 25
References and Works Cited 26
Initial Outline*: *deferred from in paper
Thesis: Revision of Lebanons Electoral Law system from a majority system to a proportional
representation system is necessary to allow for fair representation in government and for a
system less susceptible to corruption and manipulation.
Discussion Outline:
I. Electoral Systems
II. Electoral Systems in Lebanon
A. Current
B. Issues
III. Electoral Reforms
A. Majority system w/ districting reform: algorithm
B. Majority system w/ districting reform: independent commissions
C. Mixed system (majority and proportional representation): Fouad Boutros Law Reform
D. Proportional Representation system
IV. Opinionated Electoral Reform
A. Semi-proportional Representation system
1. Adjustment for multi-ethnical/multi-confessional polity
a) dHondst Formula
b) Party List systems
c) More effective reapportionment

Abstract:
RevisionofLebanonsElectoralLawsystemfromamajoritysystemtoaproportionalrepresentation
systemisnecessarytoallowforfairrepresentationingovernmentandtoestablishasystemless
susceptibletocorruptionandmanipulation.Thispaperaimsatansweringquestionsontheelectoral
reforminLebanon.Specifically,majorityandproportionalrepresentationsystemswillbeevaluatedand
discussedasapplicationsforelectoralreform.Itbringsintoquestiontheefficacyofthecurrentelectoral
lawofLebanoninestablishingfairrepresentationinLebanonslegislativeandexecutivebranch.Through
evaluation,analysis,anddiscussion,itwillbeestablishedthatrevisionofLebanonsElectoralLaw
systemfromamajoritysystemtoasemiproportionalrepresentationsystemisnecessarytoallowforfair
representationandforasystemlesssusceptibletocorruptionandmanipulation.Thescopeoftheresearch
includesthecrosscountryanalysisofdifferentelectoralsystemsinthelightofLebanonselectorallaw.
Themethodbywhichanationselectorallawisevaluatedistheanalysisandevaluationoftheextentto
whichitestablishesfairrepresentationasrequestedbythepolities votes.Thetypeofinformation
processedtoreachsuchaconclusionareelectorallawsthemselvesaswellasrevisions,evaluations,and
resultsoftheelectorallawsofconsideringstates.
Introduction:
The process by which the people of a state elect its representatives of government, either
for a states executive or legislative branch, is a constitutional issue with a historically argued and
debated controversy. Due to the innumerous types and forms of polity-specific governments,
different electoral systems have been designed to properly reflect and correspond with the
respective polities and societies. These different electoral systems can differ between states as a
whole or within the same government at its many different levels. As discussed by Georgetown
University political researcher Charles King, a states electoral system is the method used to
calculate the number of elected positions in government that individuals and parties are awarded
after elections (King, 2000).
In Lebanon, a multi-confessional and multi-ethnical polity characterized by historic
political strife and instability, an appropriate electoral law - in terms of fair representation and
efficient operation - is far from what is currently being exercised. Its issues are plenty and
seemingly never-changing. These issues can be argued as one of the many reasons the Lebanons
governance is weak and ineffective. For many reasons to be discussed, specifically that of
gerrymandering and redistricting. Electoral reform is heavily deliberated in Lebanese civil
society as a solution to issues, such as gerrymandering and manipulative redistricting, that have
led to ineffective governance. This debate is often in terms of full reform as a system as well as
the milder proposal of tweaks to the procedures. To effectively argue which electoral procedure
proposal would fit or not in Lebanons political scene, the many different proposals should be
considered to many degrees. In this paper, it will be argued that the current system is in need of
reform. After discussion and evaluation of the application of different electoral systems in
Lebanon, it will be concluded that an alternative system characterized by the polity being applied
to it is most appropriate. Revision of Lebanons Electoral Law system from a majority system to
a proportional representation system is necessary to allow for fair representation in government
and to establish a system less susceptible to corruption and manipulation.
Discussion:
Electoral systems are often recognized as benchmarks of democracy in governments. A
government is the representation of the people as means for determining and facilitating state
policy. Therefore, an electoral system should itself reflect a fair representation of all the voices
included in the state. Yet, there is an ongoing debate as to whether an electoral system should be
judged on its efficacy in constructing a strong and accountable government (Norris, 1997, 5) or
on its ability to establish a fair representation of the people being governed and the inclusion of
minority voices (Norris, 1997, 5). Generally, there are four main electoral systems that are
implemented in different forms by most states around the world: majoritarian formulas, semi-
proportional systems, proportional representation, and mixed systems. Each of these systems
effectively meet different criterions in regards to their efficacy.
It is clear how proponents of majoritarian formulas (Norris, 1997, 5), like those in the
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and India, prioritize government effectiveness
(Norris, 1997, 5). Majoritarian formulas are designed to establish single-party governments in
contrast to coalition governments. This produces effective governance as cohesive parties with a
majority of parliamentary seats are able to implement their manifesto policies without the need to
engage in post-election negotiations with coalition partners (Norris, 1997, 5-6). Majoritarian
system candidates win a plurality or an absolute majority - which is 50+ percent of votes - be
elected. This provide[s] for a greater degree of representativeness by requiring that candidates
achieve a majority of votes in order to win (King, 2000). Majority systems are often
implemented through a basic element that ensures an extent of fair representation. Elections
occur in territorial districts known as electoral constituencies or congressional districts. Countries
are divided into these constituencies that classify which voters vote for which representative. In
most majoritarian systems, the divided districts are single-member constituencies meaning that
voters within each constituency cast a single ballot [] for one candidate (Norris, 1997, 3).
The candidate with the most votes earns a seat for that constituency. Fair representation comes
into play here when each congressional district or constituency are divided so that they are
roughly equal in population in a process called districting. Due to demographical changes states
undergo, districting has to be implemented periodically to ensure up-to-date representation.
A form of majoritarian electoral systems that is less representative is the plurality system.
It is otherwise also known as first-past-the-post or winner-take-all procedures. In plurality
systems, the focus is effective governance, not representation of all minority views (Norris,
1997, 3). This is established as such a system encourages the growth of relatively stable political
systems dominated by two major parties (King, 2000). This is otherwise known as Duvergers
Law. This system produces an effective working parliamentary majority for a government, while
simultaneously penalizing [spatially dispersed] minor parties (Norris, 1997, 3). An example of
this is the United States political system where two major parties, the Republican party and the
Democratic party, dominate elections and are for the most part the only parties represented in
government. Plurality systems work by ensuring election to candidates that can ensure a larger
number of votes than all other candidates (King, 2000) within their respective constituency. As a
type of majoritarian electoral systems, plurality systems also require that elections occur in
single-member constituencies. Therefore, in a congressional district, a candidate running would
simply need more votes than the rest of the candidates to win the election of that seat.
Majoritarian and plurality systems are often criticized as lacking fair representation. In a
classical majoritarian system, a large part of the voters can still be against the elected candidate.
Moreover, in plurality systems, a candidate can be elected by having more votes than other
candidates despite the fact that most voters voted against him. For example, in a single-member
constituency A where three candidates ran for one seat, a candidate could win a seat by collecting
40% of votes - being the most amongst all candidates. The candidate won by gathering a
plurality majority of votes while 60% of voters, despite the fact that they voted for other
candidates, voted against him. Many are critical of such electoral procedures as they often dont
reflect the desires of the voters to its best ability. This is an issue for minority parties that can
never run against majority parties due to their dominance and the convenience of the electoral
law to the larger parties. Yet, fair representation of parties is not only limited to minority parties.
Manipulated redistricting can result in unfair representation for all parties except those in power.
As the aforementioned discussion mentioned, in order to establish fair representation
amongst the voting in single-member constituencies, redistricting occurs to ensure all districts
are of equal population. This redistricting is usually the responsibility of law makers and
legislators in office at the time of redistricting. Redistricting is often not a straight forward
process that requires the consideration of multiple factors before being implemented. For
example, in the United States, redistricting is done every ten years as census reapportionment.
The responsibility of drawing district lines for years to come is one that parties in power often
abuse in majoritarian systems to increase their partys guarantee of winning seats during
elections. This can be done through gerrymandering.
Douglas J. Amy, a political researcher at Mount Holyoke College, defines
gerrymandering as the manipulation of district lines for political advantage (Amy, 2013).
Gerrymandering is used to protect the seats of incumbents and to allow the dominant party in a
state to win more seats than it deserves (Amy, 2013). This can be done by wasting as many of
[the opposing partys] votes as possible (Amy, 2013) preventing the election of opposition
candidates. These unfair districts are constructed by packing one groups voters into a small
number of districts with lopsided majorities and distributing its remaining voters among a larger
number of districts where they constitute inconsequential voting minorities (McDonald and
Best, 2015). This is done in two strategies known as packing and cracking.
Cracking occurs when district lines are redrawn to ensure that the opposing artys
pockets of voting strength are divided up so that they become permanent minorities in most
districts (Amy, 2013) dominated by the leading party majority. Packing is used when the
opposing partys strength is too large to be completed divided and lines are redrawn to
concentrate most of that partys voters in one district so that many of its votes will be wasted in
an overly large majority (Amy, 2013).

All in all, gerrymandering results in the misrepresentation of the public [as] the party
controlling redistricting artificially inflates the number of seats it gets (Amy, 2013). This turns
what may be originally competitive districts into safe districts. The election process is supposed
to be the voters choosing their politicians to represent - not politicians choosing their voters.
Instead of using appropriate measures and factors to redistrict, mapmakers use their own political
motives. This a flaw in majoritarian electoral systems that has brought much criticism onto it.
Gerrymandering render majoritarian and plurality electoral systems as those of corruption and
manipulation that almost never discerns fair representation in government as a criterion worth
meeting.
Another type of electoral system used in democratic states throughout the world are semi-
proportional systems. Semi-proportional systems are often designed to meet the criteria of fair
representation of government as it most popular electoral procedure is characterized by
preference. Voters using Single Transferable Vote or STV [] cast a single vote in a multi-
member district (Norris, 1997, 4). Legislative electoral procedures in Ireland, Malta, and the
Australian Senate often employ STV as a means of rewarding votes. In multi-member districts,
voters rank their preference of candidates numerically. The total number of votes are counted and
divided by the number of seats to establish a quota. All those reaching the quota acquire a seat.
Any extra votes for a elected candidate are deferred to the second candidate on the preference list
until all seat are filled. This system is limited to a few legislative elections and does well to
establish a fair representation in government.

A more used electoral system, and one that rivals the majoritarian system in popularity, is
the proportional representation system. Proportional representation is a class of voting systems
that attempt to make the percentage of offices awarded to candidates reflect as closely as
possible the percentage of votes that they received in the election (King, 2000). Norris discusses
that where majoritarian systems emphasize governability, proportional systems focus on the
inclusion of minority voices (Norris, 1997, 4). Proportional representation systems are widely
used internationally as they are straightforward and best enables voters to select the
representatives they support. This can result in coalition governments characterized by the
inclusion of many parties and minorities working together in legislation and policy
making/implementing. Electoral systems following proportional representation procedures often
design a government installed with a system of checks and balances and power-sharing
mechanisms. This type of a electoral system does not work well for a polity dominated by two
major parties but instead for a polity with multiple parties demanding their own needs be met.
Proportional representation can often bring simplicity to an otherwise complicated election
process. Proportional representation is often straight forward with simple procedures such as
directly award[ing] a party the same percentage of seats in parliament as it gets votes at the
polls (King, 2000). Yet, this can produce issues when it comes to the translation of percentages
such as 2.5% or 0.001% into whole seats. Therefore, certain adjustments are made to the classic
proportional representation system that allow for ease in allocation of seats and fair
representation.
Congressional districts under proportional representation electoral systems can apply
close or open party lists to their voting procedures. With party lists, voters normally vote for
parties rather than for individual candidates (King, 2000). In a closed party list system, the
parties themselves determine who will fill the seats they have been allocated [meaning] the
voters vote only for a particular party, and then ti is up to the party to decide which party member
will actually serve as representatives (King, 2000). This is attribute of proportional
representation legislative elections in Israel and Germany. Inversely, in Denmark, Finland, Italy,
Switzerland and other nations, open party list systems give voters some degree of choice among
individual candidates, in addition to voting for entire parties (King, 2000).
Furthermore, aspects of proportional representation that are included to fine out the
crudities of the process are employing a voting threshold and using the dHondt Formula to
allocate seats after elections. The dHondt Formula is a method designed by Belgian
mathematician Victor dHondt that is referred to as the highest average method. Furthermore,
vote thresholds are used to eliminate candidates that have not earned enough votes from the
allocation process. An example used by Charles King will be used to explain the application of
such a formula in the election process.For instance, upon the assumption that an election
occurred and tallied 1,000 votes, five parties are to be considered for the seat allocation of three
seats. These are the results for Parties A, B, C, D, and E:
Party A Party B Party C Party D Party E
Number of 100 150 300 400 50

Votes
Percentage of 10% 15% 30% 40% 5%
votes
It is clear to see how Party D received the highest number of votes being 400 votes and 40% of
all votes while Party E received the lowest number of votes being 50 votes and 5% of all votes.
Voting thresholds comes into when parties earn an underserving amount of votes in regards to
seat allocation. A voting threshold is established by law [as] an arbitrary percentage of the vote
that parties have to pass before they can be considered in the allocation of seats (King, 2000). In
this example, it is assumed that the states voting threshold is 7% which eliminates Party E from
consideration. The dHondt Formula for seat allocation proceeds to allocate seats to candidates
upon methods of division and selection of the highest quotients otherwise known as the highest
average method1. Upon final allocation, Party C would be allocated one seat being 33% of the
seats available in that constituency and Party D would be allocated two seats and around 66% of
the seat available. This system is one that reflects an imperfect fair representation of government.
It is a system that works well when the government being elected is one consisting of a multitude
of parties working in unison for policy making and implementation.
As discussed, different electoral systems are used in different polities and for different
governments. It can be seen that these electoral systems work most efficiently when paired with
the appropriate polity and form of government. Furthermore, it can be argued that an electoral
system that is applied to a polity or society that it does not coincide with can result in negative
consequences for said state. This is discussed by Duverger when he speaks of the law-like
relationship (Duverger, 1954) between an electoral system and a political scene. Duverger
argues that the plurality rule favors a two-party system while proportional systems led to
multipartyism (Duverger, 1954). This can be seen when the example of Lebanon is brought into
question.
1 Further explained in Appendix A

Lebanon is a multi-ethnical and multi-confessional polity and is an example of a nation
typified by ethnical division where [multiple] minorities strive to attain political equality
amongst [] majority parties2* (Ghazzal, 2016, 3). The government is built up of an arguable
number of 18 political parties as a consensus democracy. A consensus democracy, otherwise
known as consociational democracy, is a constitutional inclination on the part of [democratic]
governments towards an involvement in operations of checks and balances, bargaining and
compromise, consensual decision-making, and other power sharing mechanisms to settle issues
of public policy* (Ghazzal, 2016, 3). When applying Duvergers analysis on electoral
procedures and party systems, it is clear that Lebanon is a nation that is perfectly fit for a
proportional representation electoral law that reflects the many different confessions that make
up Lebanons sociopolitical setting. Unfortunately, that is not the case.
In Lebanon, voting takes place according to a majoritarian, first-past-the-post system [where]
the candidate who receives the most votes, even if [] only a plurality, wins their seat (US-
Lebanon Dialogue Program, 2009). Lebanon holds legislative parliamentary elections every four
years. This parliament hold presidential elections every six years. Despite the fact that the
electoral system in Lebanon is based on confessional representation (Ekmeji, 2012, 2), the
elected representatives still do not reflect the choices of the voters in Lebanon. Candidates are
limited to running only within their sects due to a customary, power-sharing mechnicism
established during Lebanons national birth that the parliament would be under a confessional
2 Quote taken from mid-term paper // cited in-text and in reference section // are denoted with *
ratio in regards to seat allocation. The multitude of confessions and parties present in Lebanon
conflict with the majoritarian plurality electoral system. The electoral system in place establishes
that two main parties are represented in government and excludes minority parties. This is a clear
conflict that stands as a constitutional issue for Lebanon. In a state where inter-communal
harmony between multiple parties is necessary for successful governance, employing a partisan
electoral system sets the government up for political deadlock and failure. This is a constitutional
issue as stated in Article 27 of the Lebanese Constitution, a member of the Chamber shall
represent the whole nation. No restriction or condition may be imposed upon his mandate by his
electors (Lebanese Constitution, Article 27). Plurality election systems are not the best electoral
system to follow such a clause due to pluralitys lack of representation in its results.
Furthermore, with a majoritarian system in place, electoral law in Lebanon inevitably
implies acts of gerrymandering that affect the balance of power (Wimmen, 2013).
Gerrymandering has been a common act throughout many Lebanese elections. Dating back to the
1950s, different Lebanese governments are accused of holding elections under gerrymandered
laws that kept them in power (Dagher, 2015). More recently, parliamentary elections in 2005
were held with highly gerrymandered electoral districts (US-Lebanon Dialogue Program, 2009).
The electoral districts used were blatantly gerrymandered to marginalize Christian voters in
North and South Lebanon and in Beirut (US-Lebanon Dialogue Program, 2009). The districting
implemented in Lebanon is that there are five large governorates or muhafazat that are
subdivided into smaller constituencies or qadaas (Ekmeji, 2012). Unfortunately, these districts
are heavily manipulated when political leadership attempt to eliminate an opponents chances of
being elected or to increase the probability of partisan government [by] gerrymanders and
clustering districts (Ekmeji, 2012). Furthermore, the seat distribution amongst these
constituencies are poorly calculated. For example, Baalbak-Hermel was awarded 10 seats while
Beirut was awarded 19 seats (Dagher, 2015). These leads to even more unfair representation in
government. In a multi-ethnical polity, such lack of representation is dangerous where power-
sharing is the key to avoidng political deadlock.With such issues in consideration, there are many
electoral reforms that have been proposed to solve the flaws within the Lebanese electoral law or
for the electoral law as a whole.
Many proponents of the majoritarian electoral system propose that redistricting is the
only fault in the system susceptible to corruption and manipulation. Solutions to such aspects of
the electoral process include the shifting of the responsibility of redistricting to independent
commissions or the implementation of an algorithm to handle districting.
In the United States, some states are tasking independent commissions to handle
redistricting instead of politically motivated and biased legislators. Michael McDonald, a
political scientist at George Mason University, argues that publicly [drawn maps] can illuminate
what opportunities there are for improving district maps (Greenblatt, 2011). The state of
Virginia set up advisory commissions to produce maps that can serve as guidelines (Greenblatt,
2011). California voters established in 2008 a 14-member commission to draw legislative maps
and create congressional districts on the orders to ignore incumbent protection (Greenblatt,
2011).
Yet, these commissions usually lacked real authority (Greenblatt, 2011) and most of its
products were criticized by either Democrats and/or Republicans for disadvantaging [] parties
and violating is own rules (Greenblatt, 2011). It can be seen that when in the hands of the
people, redistricting is a process susceptible to a multitude of errors. That is why many suggest
taking it out of the hands of people in general.
Gregory Lush, a political researcher and statistical analyst developed an algorithm to
eliminate gerrymandering by putting the task of redistricting in the hands of calculations and out
of the hands of politically motivated legislators. With an objective of limiting the weirdness
(Lush, 2015) of district shapes and the inclusion of factors such as geographic location, income,
rural or urban status, number of children, and other classification parameters. This system itself
takes corruption out of the equation due to the unbiased approach of the algorithm. Another
method known as the split line method is an algorithmic procedure that finds the shortest line
that divides a region as closely as possible into two equally populous groups repeated until the
desired district size is acquired (Cima, 2016). Moreover, another computerized way of handling
districting is the BDistricting tool used by Brain Olson in an attempt to minimize
gerrymandering by drawing districts specifically with compactness in mind (Cima, 2016).
Yet, economist and political analyst Rosie Cima evaluates algorithmic districting to a
more realistic degree concluding that algorithmic method may be less biased than human
district-drawers, but they often result in even less fair elections (Cima, 2016). Cima recognizes
the success such algorithmic procedures have in creating compact and unbiased districts. But
Cima argues that even these districts aren't fair. Chris Fedor, a programmer supports Cimas
argument by justifying that simulated algorithmic districting voter results deviated even farther
from representing the popular vote of actual districts (Cima, 2016). The popular vote, a basic
poll measuring direct opinions of the public, can be established as the closest thing to the actual
positions of voters. With algorithmic systems deviating from the popular vote, and independent
commission district maps being biased, both of these proposed solutions to gerrymandering are
rendered as failures. That is why most electoral reformers suggest not the reform of the system,
but the change of the system as a whole.
In 2006, the National Commission for Electoral Law published a draft law that suggested
full system reform. It included clauses such as the reduction of the voting age from 21 to age 18,
the implementation of gender quota in electoral lists, and the allowing of expatriates to vote.
Otherwise known as the Fouad Boutros Law Reform, this draft electoral law was focused on the
proposal of a mixed-electoral system between majority and proportionate systems (Ekmeji,
2012). This electoral proposal suggested an electoral law designed to have small districts or
cazas with majority representation and larger districts or muhafazas with proportional
representation (Dagher, 2015). This is what is known as a mixed electoral system. Mixed
systems are fairly new to the political world and most often seen implemented in European
nations like Italy and Germany. Germany is most famous for implementing a form of mixed
electoral systems in their legislative elections known as additional member systems (Norris,
1997, 5). The Fouad Boutros Electoral Law makes such a suggestion for Lebanon as a means to
properly represent voters in constituencies of differing populations and ethnicities while also
moving the country from the outdated religious-confessional model (Ekmeji, 2012) it is
characterized by.
Nonetheless, many opponents of such reform - and they are plenty - argue that such a
proposal is too hopeful to be implemented in Lebanon. Politicians argue that the law would not
even be discussed. Lebanons Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri as well as member of
parliament Jamal Jarrah dismissed the consideration of this proposal (Berri, An-Nahar, 2013)
(Jarrah, Voice of Lebanon, 2013). This is understandable as such a mixed system would threaten
the incumbent protection of current members of parliament. But a more considerable issue with
such electoral reform is the potential for misrepresentation towards regions (Dagher, 2015) and
the lack of clarity within the system. With the law designating seats to cazas and muhafazas,
allocation gets doubtful when considering the fact that cazas exist within muhafazas. A muhafaza
could receive overrepresentation if its cazas receive a high number of votes. Furthermore, it is
argued that there is no clear/simple mechanism of how the seats would be allocated, and their
distribution would hence be restricted to the government (Dagher, 2015). This in turn could lead
to political manipulation in the same way legislators can control voting outcome through
gerrymandering. A purely constitutional issue with the Fouad Boutros Law proposal is the
legitimacy of elected members of parliament. With Article 27 of the Constitution preaching the
equality of elected representatives, the election of such representatives separates those elected in
cazas from those selected in muhafazas.
It can be seen how despite the fact that such an electoral reform may appear to be a
solution to a flawed electoral process, details in the society and polity of a state can turn well
designed electoral systems into inappropriate ones. On this note, it can be seen that one system is
yet to be evaluated and applied to Lebanons political scene: proportional representation.
I, as well as other political scholars, argue that proportional representation electoral
systems fit most effectively in Lebanon. Being a country littered with a multitude of political
parties and confessions, some minorities and others major political actors in the government, fair
representation does not come at the cost of strong and effective governance as stipulated by
Norris. In Lebanon, fair representation and effective governance ride hand in hand due to the
power-sharing aspects of the consensus democracy that is Lebanon. As previously discussed,
proportional representation electoral systems make developing a fair and representative
government a focal point of its aims. In most states, this can develop coalition governments
made of multiple parties resulting in the extension of policy making and implementation
procedure due to the introduction of full consensus as a factor in said procedures. In a bipartisan
political system, like the US or United Kingdom, such a situation in government would be far
from ideal. Yet, in an ethnically and confessionally divided state such as Lebanon where
consensus is already a huge component of the decision making processes in government, such a
political set up is appropriate. A very important reason for as to why this is true is that
proportional representation elections in Lebanon would include all voices of the people -
especially minorities.
It can be inferred that this would increase the equality amongst political parties and
eliminate some aspects of sectarianism in the political scene in Lebanon - a dream-of-sorts for
the Lebanese people. Majoritarian systems, as discussed by Norris and others, have a tendency to
follow Duvergers Law. Duverger's law proposes that the simple-majority single-ballot system
favors the two-party system (Riker, 1982). Furthermore, Duverger analyzed how "the simple-
majority system with [] proportional representation favors multipartyism (Riker, 1982). The
inclusion of all parties and represented voices in a nation where quality amongst parties was a
condition installed decades ago is of great necessity.
As political researchers and analysts Duverger and Lijphart discuss, plural societies with sharp
cultural, ethnic, religious, or linguistic cleavages, multiparty systems could be more propitious in
promoting stable democracy (Mainwaring, 1990). Inversely, with a two-party system,
significant minorities [are in] a situation that could reduce their willingness to abide by the rules
of the game [while] a multiparty system could enable these minorities to attain meaningful
representation and to participate in governing coalitions (Mainwaring, 1990). To do that, a few
things need to happen in Lebanon concerning political and electoral reform.
By not only changing the system to a proportional representation electoral law, but
redistricting for demographic changes is a step that needs to be taken in Lebanon by electoral
reformers. Demographic changes are plenty in Lebanon. Despite being a geographically small
state, it holds plenty of different ethnicities and confessions. For that reason, its odd as to why
the current Lebanese Electoral Law has divided the nation into many electoral districts - about 27
constituencies. It is argued that these many electoral districts are where most of the political
gerrymandering is made (Dagher, 2015). Many opinions on this specific aspect of electoral arise
with some suggesting Lebanon adopt a districting system similar to the Israeli system where
Lebanon is one whole congressional district, and others suggesting to divide Lebanon into 128
districts to match the 128 seats in parliament. But, the former suggestion would lead to unfair
voter representation where some ethnical groups may be underrepresented with others
overrepresented. The later suggestion of further dividing up Lebanon would only help to
facilitate gerrymanders in Lebanon. Fortunately, there is a way to redistrict Lebanon that works
to perfect the flawed system.
To properly combat the gerrymandering of these small districts and unfair representation
of registered voters, the best choice for an electoral map of Lebanon would be to choose the five
historical regions as constituencies (Dagher, 2015). This means Beirut, Mount-Lebanon, the
Greater North, the Greater Bekaa, and the Greater South would be the five congressional districts
where voting would occur. This would eliminate the possibility of gerrymandering as they
eliminate the wasted votes that make gerrymandering possible [] [and ensures] even small
political minorities do not waste their votes (Amy, 2013). This way of districting would work
very suitably for Lebanon considering that three largest districts, the Greater North, the Greater
South, and Mount Lebanon, have around the same population of registered voters and the same
weight in seat allocation. This brings us to another condition of the electoral system that needs to
remain untouched during reform: seat allocation based on sects.
As a state that is confessionally divided, the original legislators of Lebanon found it wise
to allocate seats in Parliament with a sect restriction/ratio. It is argued that this facilitates
sectarianism and conflict and therefore ineffective governance. And although this perspective
may be true to some extent, it is an essential part of the electoral process that needs to remain for
the following reason. Lebanons entire government is designed upon a consensus democracy.
Law making needs to happen upon the agreement of all political actors involved within the
government. The sect seat allocation guarantees this aspect of the government in Lebanon to a
great extent. Keeping this condition in the electoral law not only allows electoral reform to
further be constitutional, but also promotes the involvement of all confessions in Lebanon. And
despite the notion that this may not work in favor of minority parties running independent of
confessions, it in fact does not threaten their chance for election.
With constituencies big enough to allow minority parties into government, minority
parties do not have to bow down to the pressure of looming larger parties for entrance into
parliament - conformity is no longer an necessity. Of course, voting thresholds do need to be
installed as to keep extremist minorities from gaining too much power. The introduction of a
voting threshold of per say around 12% would motivate minority and small parties to make
moves and run for election. All in all, these circumstances allow for the growth of minority
parties and more facilitative democracy. Another positive aspect of such electoral procedures is
there effect on ending sectarian division.
The rise of minority parties through the ranks and into government does proportionally
represent the decisions of registered voters to an extent. Yet, healthy political systems do depend
on the productive exchanges between competitive political parties. The reformed procedures
work to facilitate productive political exchange and, moreover, seem to work against sectarian
divisions in Lebanon. With the larger and fewer districts in Lebanon, and sectarian seat
allocation, larger parties imminently will struggle in creating the majorities in government they
once had. This will condition larger parties to work more willingly with other parties in elections
to gain larger representation. Either by conforming and working with opposing large parties to
single out minority parties, or by adopting minority parties on agreed terms, the divisions that
once existed will be weakened. Larger parties will call upon different confessions for
cooperation and defuses the tensions between Lebanons sects (Dagher, 2015). Such procedures
work to not only allow fair representation in government, but also create a government that
endorses inter-communal harmony. The diversification of government allows for law making and
implementation to be more just and more effective due to a more effective consensus in the
scope of legislature.
In hindsight, the current Lebanese electoral law needs appropriate reform. These
procedures of electoral reform effectively ensure the establishment of a fairer and more diverse
government in a state characterized by multi-ethnical and multi-confessional tension. And due to
the fact such a government is built upon the basis of consensus, this will lead to more effective
and accountable government.
Conclusion:
All in all, it can be seen how revision of Lebanons Electoral Law system from a majority
system to a proportional representation system is necessary to allow for fair representation in
government and to establish a system less susceptible to corruption and manipulation. An
electoral system or the process by which the people of a state choose their representative differs
greatly from polity to polity. This is because different electoral systems are meant to focus on
specific criterions of government establishment. It can be understood as to why majoritarian and
plurality electoral systems are ones that are appropriate for polities defined by two competing
parties. Yet, they are very susceptible to manipulation in redistricting and gerrymandering. On
the other hand, it can be argued that proportional representation electoral procedures apply well
to governments that consist of multiple parties and power-sharing establishments.
When discussing Lebanon, a multi-confessional polity suffering from political instability
and weak governance, electoral reform is necessary to develop more fair representation in
government. Lebanons current majoritarian electoral system is susceptible to corruption and

manipulation and has been since Lebanons birth. Districts are highly gerrymandered and elected
candidates are not a proper reflection of voters decisions. Reform is often offered in regards to
redistricting with algorithms and independent commissions to eliminate either legislation
corruption or human corruption as a whole. Yet, independent commission are proven to lack the
authority and expertise to handle redistricting and algorithms, despite being less biased than
gerrymandered districts, deviate more from voter inclination than redistricting done by
legislators.
The most appropriate system to implement as electoral law in Lebanon is proportional
representation, as discussed by many political researchers. As aforementioned, proportional
representation is a electoral system in which fair representation amongst elected candidates is
focused on; and, as analyzed by many scholars, such a system works to create a more effective
government in multi-ethnically divided states and polities. The ensuring of less and larger
districts eliminates corruption through gerrymandering and leads to the inclusion of minorities in
coalition and consensus government. The introduction of new political actors with more weight
into the government suggests more inter-communal harmony and facilitates the decline of
sectarianism in such a government.
Judging by the two standards of measuring electoral systems - fair representation and the
ability to create effective governance - discussed by French political scientist Maurice Duverger,
both criteria are met when applying the aforementioned electoral reform of proportional
representation on Lebanons current flawed electoral law.

Appendix A:
Further explanation of dHondt Formula by Charles King: (King, 2000)
1. Place the total number of votes garnered by the competing parties (A, B, C, and D. E has been
eliminated) in a row.
A(100) B(150) C(300) D(400)
2. Divide each figure in the row by 1, 2, 3, . . ., n. (How far you take the division varies. The
more seats you have to allocate, the further you have to divide. For our purposes, 3 or 4 divisions
should do the trick.)
Party A Party B Party C Party D
# of Votes 100 150 300 400
div. by 1 100 150 300 400
div. by 2 50 75 150 200
div. by 3 33 50 100 133
div. by 4 25 37.5 75 100
3. Pick the highest quotient in the list (including the quotients obtained by dividing the votes by
1). The highest quotient is 400 in the Party D column. We therefore award one seat to Party D.
4. Pick the next highest quotient in the list. The next highest quotient is 300 in the Party C
column. We therefore award one seat to Party C.
5. Pick the next highest quotient in the list. The next highest quotient is 200 in the Party D
column. We therefore award another seat to Party D. We have successfully filled all the seats
available in this constituency.
The final results of the election are therefore:
Party C 1 seat (or 33% of the total available seats)

Party D 2 seats (or 66% of the total available seats)
(King, 2000)
References & Works Cited
Amy, D. J. (2013). How Proportional Representation Would Finally Solve Our Redistricting and
Gerrymandering Problems. Retrieved December 1, 2016, from
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/redistricting.htm
Dagher, R. (2015). A Fair Electoral Law For Lebanon. Retrieved December 3, 2016, from
https://moulahazat.com/2015/08/31/a-fair-electoral-law-for-lebanon/
Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties, their organization and activity in the modern state.
London: Methuen.
Ekmekji, A. A., Ph.D. (2012). Confessionalism and Electoral Reform in Lebanon (pp. 1-20,
Rep.). The Aspen Institute
King, C. (2000). Electoral Systems. Retrieved November 20, 2016, from

http://faculty.georgetown.edu/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm
Landau, J. (1961). Elections in Lebanon. The Western Political Quarterly, 14(1), 120-147.
DOI:10.2307/443935
Lebanese Constitution (1943), Ch. 3: General Provisions-Article 27 (1943). (Article 27

amended by the Constitutional Law of October 17, 1927 and constitutional law of January 21,
1947)
Mainwaring, S. (1990). PRESIDENTIALISM, MULTIPARTY SYSTEMS, AND DEMOCRACY:

THE DIFFICULT EQUATION (Working paper No. 144). The Helen Kellogg Institute for
International Studies. Retrieved December 5, 2016, from
https://www3.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/144.pdf.
McDonald, M. D., & Best, R. E. (2015). Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and Law: A
Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases. Election Law Journal, 14(4), 312-330.
doi:10.1089/elj.2015.0358
Norris, P. (1997, July 01). Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed
Systems. International Political Science Review, 18(3), 297-312.
doi:10.1177/019251297018003005
Salamey, I. (2009). FAILING CONSOCIATIONALISM IN LEBANON AND INTEGRATIVE

OPTIONS. International Journal of Peace Studies, 14(2), 83-105. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41852994
Riker, W. (1982). The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of
Political Science. The American Political Science Review, 76(4), 753-766. doi:10.2307/1962968
Wimmen, H. (2013). Lebanon's Slow-Motion Self-Destruction: State Institutions Disintegrate

under Pressure of the Conflict in Syria (pp. 1-4, Rep.). German Institute for International and
Security Affairs (SWP).

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REVISION OF LEBANESE ELECTORAL LAW 201603061 / GHAZZAL / 1

representation in a strong and accountable government

American University of Beirut

Professor Rabih Maalouf

Due: December 8, 2016

Initial Outline*: *deferred from in paper

system less susceptible to corruption and manipulation.

II. Electoral Systems in Lebanon

III. Electoral Reforms

A. Majority system w/ districting reform: algorithm

B. Majority system w/ districting reform: independent commissions

D. Proportional Representation system

IV. Opinionated Electoral Reform

A. Semi-proportional Representation system

1. Adjustment for multi-ethnical/multi-confessional polity

b) Party List systems

c) More effective reapportionment

after elections (King, 2000).

In Lebanon, a multi-confessional and multi-ethnical polity characterized by historic

gerrymandering and redistricting. Electoral reform is heavily deliberated in Lebanese civil

a proportional representation system is necessary to allow for fair representation in government

and to establish a system less susceptible to corruption and manipulation.

Electoral systems are often recognized as benchmarks of democracy in governments. A

effectively meet different criterions in regards to their efficacy.

occur in territorial districts known as electoral constituencies or congressional districts. Countries

undergo, districting has to be implemented periodically to ensure up-to-date representation.

It is otherwise also known as first-past-the-post or winner-take-all procedures. In plurality

single-member constituencies. Therefore, in a congressional district, a candidate running would

As the aforementioned discussion mentioned, in order to establish fair representation

elections. This can be done through gerrymandering.

Douglas J. Amy, a political researcher at Mount Holyoke College, defines

an overly large majority (Amy, 2013).

representation of government as it most popular electoral procedure is characterized by

establish a fair representation in government.

the proportional representation system. Proportional representation is a class of voting systems

making/implementing. Electoral systems following proportional representation procedures often

Proportional representation can often bring simplicity to an otherwise complicated election

Congressional districts under proportional representation electoral systems can apply

will actually serve as representatives (King, 2000). This is attribute of proportional

individual candidates, in addition to voting for entire parties (King, 2000).

seats. These are the results for Parties A, B, C, D, and E:

Party A Party B Party C Party D Party E

Number of 100 150 300 400 50

of parties working in unison for policy making and implementation.

1 Further explained in Appendix A

Lebanon is a multi-ethnical and multi-confessional polity and is an example of a nation

number of 18 political parties as a consensus democracy. A consensus democracy, otherwise

known as consociational democracy, is a constitutional inclination on the part of [democratic]

governments towards an involvement in operations of checks and balances, bargaining and

up Lebanons sociopolitical setting. Unfortunately, that is not the case.

In Lebanon, voting takes place according to a majoritarian, first-past-the-post system [where]

Furthermore, with a majoritarian system in place, electoral law in Lebanon inevitably

government. In a multi-ethnical polity, such lack of representation is dangerous where power-

for the electoral law as a whole.

commissions or the implementation of an algorithm to handle districting.

redistricting instead of politically motivated and biased legislators. Michael McDonald, a

taking it out of the hands of people in general.

Gregory Lush, a political researcher and statistical analyst developed an algorithm to

districting is the BDistricting tool used by Brain Olson in an attempt to minimize

gerrymandering by drawing districts specifically with compactness in mind (Cima, 2016).

but the change of the system as a whole.

proposal of a mixed-electoral system between majority and proportionate systems (Ekmeji,

cazas from those selected in muhafazas.

Initial Outline: deferred from in paper