Ortigas & Co v Ruiz (1987)
Facts:
Petitioner is the duly registered owner of several
adjacent parcels of land and has been in continuous
possession since 1862 or 125 years ago. Sometime in
1967, a civil case (first one) was filed against
petitioner by a certain Pedro del Rosario and three
others, as a class suit, in their own behalf and in
behalf of 104 others seeking the declaration of
petitioners titles null and void, allegedly for lack of
publication in the land registration proceeding from
which they were derived and for alleged fraud
employed in registering under Act No. 496 certain
parcels of agricultural land in Quezon City and Pasig,
Rizal which form part of the Mandaloyon Estate the
declaration of plaintiffs thereon as lawful owners and
possessors of their respective landholdings. In this
case, respondent Court issued a restraining order ex-
parte, still in force and effect when the instant
petition was filed. As a result, petitioner was
constrained to go up on certiorari to the Court of
Appeals, which enjoined respondent Court from
taking any further action. petitioner filed a motion for
new trial within the reglementary period on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence which motion
was denied by the court.
On Aug. 10, 1971, another civil case (second civil
case) was filed by Bernardo and 5 others, as a class
suit, similar to the civil case above seeking to declare
null and void the titles for lack of publication in land
registration proceedings.
An urgent ex-parte motion of Bernardo and the others
opposing among others, petitioners construction of
fences and high walls, roads, streets and canals on the
land in dispute, having been filed, respondent Court
issued the afore- quoted questioned Order of August
13, 1971.
Hence, this petition.
On August 26, 1971, petitioner filed with the lower
court an omnibus motion praying for the Court to
order the dropping of persons as plaintiffs, except
Inocencio Bernardo for improper class suit pursuant
to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
argues further that a class suit is not proper in this
case as such presupposes a common and general
interest by several plaintiffs in a single specific thing
[Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court]. Consequently, it
cannot be maintained when each of those impleaded
as alleged plaintiffs has only a special or particular
interest in the specific thing completely different
from another thing in which the defendants have a
like interest.
Issue: w/n the class suit is proper
Held/Ratio: Yes.
There is merit in petitioners contention that only the
principal plaintiff named in the complaint, Inocencio
Bernardo, can remain as party plaintiff, and all the
rest must be dropped from the case, pursuant to
Section 11, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. And since
Bernardo does not pretend to own almost two million
square meters involved in the case, the restraining
order of respondent Judge, granting that it could be
maintained, must be co- extensive with the
boundaries of Bernardos claim. Otherwise stated,
respondent Judge cannot restrain petitioner from
performing acts of ownership or dominion over the
entire 200 hectares involved in this case.
Newsweek v. IAC (1986)
Facts:
An article entitled An Island of Fear was published in
Newsweek magazine in February 1981. This article is
subject of a libel suit filed against Newsweek by the
private respondents, incorporated association of
sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental, as a
class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the
area. The sugarcane planters alleged that Newsweek
committed libel against them by portraying Negros
Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners
or sugarcane planters who not only exploit
impoverished and underpaid workers and laborers,
but also brutalized and killed them with impunity.
Newsweek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint does not contain allegations that
state, much less support a cause of action.
Newsweek maintains that the article is not libelous in
nature so there is no cause of action.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals denied
the motion to dismiss saying that there was a cause of
action.
Issues:
1. W/N there is a cause of action
Held/Ratio:
1. No, there is no cause of action
Newsweek correctly argued that there is no cause of
action because the complaint filed by the sugarcane
planters did not contain any allegation that
anything written in the article referred specifically
to any one of the private respondents. For a
complaint of libel to prosper, there must be an
identifiable victim.
The rule is: when the libel is alleged to be directed at
a group or class, as in the case, it is essential that the
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to
apply to every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the
class or group can prove that the defamatory
statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately.
The action brought by the sugar planters is not really
a class suit in behalf of the 8300 sugarcane planters
in Negros Occidental. Each of the private
respondents has a separate and distinct reputation in
the community. The defect that there was no specific
victim of libel in the article cannot be cured by filing
a class suit.
Board of Liquidators v. Heirs of Deceased
Maximo M. Kalaw
Facts:
In 1940, the government established a non-profit
government corporation, the National Coconut
Corporation or NACOCO. Maximo M. Kalaw was
appointed as general manager. NACOCO was
authorized to buy and sell coconut products like
copra, to get rid of mostly foreigner middlemen who
employed unscrupulous schemes to earn so much to
the detriment of poor coconut planters. NACOCO,
through Maximo Kalaw, entered into copra trading
contracts with major copra buyers here and abroad,
including General Foods, Pacific Vegetable
Company, and Louis Dreyfus Co.
However, force majeure came in the way. In the
fateful year of 1947, three typhoons devastated the
country, one after another. Consequently, coconut
trees were severely damaged, copra production
decreased, and so, the copra trading contracts
executed by NACOCO became unprofitable. One
copra buyer, Louis Dreyfus Company, sued
NACOCO for undelivered copra.
In 1949, NACOCO as a separate juridical personality,
sued its own Board of Directors headed by its general
manager Maximo Kalaw, for negligence and bad faith
for entering into the unprofitable contracts. In 1950,
during the pendency of the case, NACOCO was
abolished and the Board of Liquidators was entrusted
with settling and closing its affairs. Also during the
pendency of the case, in 1955, Maximo Kalaw died.
Issue:
1. CivPro: W/N the action was personal to Maximo
Kalaw
2. CivPro: W/N the action survived the death of
Kalaw
Held:
The heirs of Kalaw were contending that the
judgment is unenforceable against them because the
action was a claim for money against the decedent,
arising from contract, express or implied, which must
be filed in the estate proceedings of the deceased.
(This was the old rule; now, actions for contractual
money claims is governed by Rule 3 Section 20
... shall not be dismissed but instead shall be
allowed to continue until entry of final judgment.)
Actions to recover real and personal property, actions
to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person and property and
suits based on the alleged tortuous acts of a defendant
survive the death
of a party.
2. And so, because it is a tort, yes, the action survived
the death of Kalaw. The present case is not a mere
action for the recovery of money nor a claim for
money arising from contract. The action involves the
alleged negligence of Kalaw in entering into the
contracts, allegedly to the prejudice of NACOCO, as
well as the bad faith of the Board of Directors for
subsequently approving it. The suit thus involves
alleged tortious acts.
Tort is an action embraced in suits filed to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, which survive the plaintiff.
Actions to recover real and personal property, actions
to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person and property and
suits based on the alleged tortuous acts of a defendant
survive the death of a party.
Sps. Algura v. City of Naga (2006)
Facts:
On September 1, 1999, Spouses Antonio and
Lorencita Algura filed an action for damages against
the city government of Naga for demolishing their
house. Allegedly, the house blocked the road right of
way and was thus a nuisance per se. The spouses
filed a motion for them to litigate as indigents,
attaching thereto documentary proof that Antonio, a
policeman, had a monthly gross income of P10,474
and a net pay of P3,616.99. Initially, the motion was
granted.
The respondents filed a motion to disqualify
petitioners from non-payment of filing fees.
According to respondents, the first floor of the
petitioners 2-story house had a sari-sari store and a
computer shop. The second floor was the petitioners
residence and was also partly rented to boarders.
Petitioners were disqualified as indigent litigants
because they were not able to meet the standards
under Rule 141, Section 18 (used to be Sec. 16, now
Sec. 19) which sets a specific qualifying amount (at
that time, those outside MM having a gross income
not exceeding 1,500) for pauper litigants. Petitioners
now challenge this ruling.
W/N the disqualification ordered by the court was
proper
Held: NO, Rule 141, Section 19 (previously Sec. 16
and Sec.18) providing for definite standards (gross
income) for pauper litigants does not conflict with
Rule 3, Sec. 21.
It is true that the petitioners failed to meet the
requirements of Rule 141, Sec.19 but it was wrong to
disqualify them outright. The court should have
called for a hearing,` as provided in Rule 3, Sec.21,
to ascertain the petitioners financial status. Only
after the hearing can the judge decide on whether or
not they qualify to litigate as indigents.Sulo ng
Bayan v. Araneta (1976)
Facts:
Sulo ng Bayan Inc. (SNB) filed an accion de
revindicacion against Araneta to recover the
ownership and possession of a land in Bulacan
registered under the Torrens system. It alleged that
SNB is a corporation and its members had pioneered
in the clearing of the land since the Spanish regime
and held the property under the concept of
ownership. They claimed that Gregorio Araneta,
through force and intimidation, ejected them from the
land. The land was fraudulently or erroneously
included in the OCT. There was also no survey plan
and no notice of such proceeding was given so CFI
Bulacan did not acquire jurisdiction over the land.
*There were basically 3 transfers Araneta -> National
Waterworks -> Hacienda Caretas.
Araneta filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that (1) the complaint states no cause of
action and (2) the cause of action, if any, is barred by
prescription and laches.
During the pendency of the motion to dismiss, SNB
filed a motion praying that the case be transferred to
another branch sitting at Bulacan. However, Araneta
did not receive a copy of this motion. Since the
respondents DID Not receive a copy, the trial court
issued an order dismissing the amended complaint.
SNB filed a motion to reconsider the order of
dismissal on the grounds that the court had no
jurisdiction to issue the order of dismissal, because its
request for the transfer of the case from Valenzuela
Branch to Malolos Branch had been approved by the
DOJ and that the complaint states a sufficient cause
of action because the subject matter of the
controversy in one of common interest to the
members of the corporation who are so numerous
that the present complaint should be treated as a class
suit.
Issue: w/n this is a class suit
Held: NO
A class suit DOES NOT lie in actions for the
recovery of property where several persons claim
ownership of their respective portions of property, as
each one could allege and prove his respective right
in a different way for each portion of the land, so that
they cannot be held to have identical title through
acquisitive prescription.
Aguas v. Llemos (1962)
Facts:
The case springs forth from the action to recover
damages filed by Francisco Salinas and the spouses
Guardinoand Aguas before the CFI of Samar. They
alleged that herein respondent Llemos caused the
petitioners mental anguish and undue embarrassment
by making them believe that a certain writ of
possession was issued that compelled them to go to
Samar with their lawyers to appear in court. Llemos
died before answering complaint. With this, the
plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the
heirs of the deceased and the claims for damages
chargeable against the estate of Llemos. The trial
court dismissed this claiming that the legal
representatives should have been made the party
since this is the action for recovery of money.
Issue:
1. W/N the claims for damages in this case survive
the death of the defendant, Llemos.
Held/Ratio: 1. NO.
The Supreme Court made mention of the two
concerned rules under Rules of Court: Rule 87, Sec 5
or claims that are abated (ended) by death and barred
if not filed in the estate settlement proceedings. On
the other hand, theres also Rule 88, Sec 1 or those
that survive the death and can be claimed against his
executors and administrators. Rule 87 are said to
include purely personal obligation thus the death of
the defendant put an end to case actions. Such claims
for money must also be expressed or implied in a
contract.
The Supreme Court held that what must be followed
in this case is Rule 88, Section 1. This includes action
to recover real and personal property from estate,
actions to enforce a lien, and actions to recover
damages for injury to person or property. In this case,
the third kind of action is applicable. The defendant
maliciously caused the party to incur unnecessary
expense, thus it is injurious to partys property.
NOTE: the case was rendered moot because
according to the CFI the parties have arrived at an
amicable settle of their differences and dismissed the
appeal.
Board of Liquidators v. Heirs of Deceased
Maximo M. Kalaw (1967)
Facts:
NACOCO was established with Maxilom kalaw as
general maanger. It was authorized to buy and sell
coconut products to get rid of foreigner middlemen
who employed unscrupulous schemes to earn so
much to the detriment of poor coconut planters.
NACOCO, through Maximo Kalaw, entered into
copra trading contracts with major copra buyers here
and abroad, including General Foods, Pacific
Vegetable Company, and Louis Dreyfus Co.
However, 3 typhoons devastated the country and the
coconut trees were severely damaged. The copra
trading contracts executed by NACOCO became
unprofitable.
Louis Dreyfus Company, sued NACOCO for
undelivered copra.
NACOCO as a separate juridical personality, sued its
own Board of Directors headed by its general
manager Maximo Kalaw, for negligence and bad faith
for entering into the unprofitable contracts.
during the pendency of the case, NACOCO was
abolished and the Board of Liquidators was entrusted
with settling and closing its affairs. Later on, Maximo
Kalaw died.
Issues: w/N the action was personal to Maximo
Kalaw
W/N the action survived the death of Kalaw
Held: No. The action was not personal to Kalaw.
Heirs of Kalaw: the judgment is unenforceable
against them because the action was a claim for
money against the decedent, arising from contract,
express or implied, which must be filed in the estate
proceedings of the deceased. (This was the old rule;
now, actions for contractual money claims is
governed by Rule 3 Section 20 ... shall not be
dismissed but instead shall be allowed to continue
until entry of final judgment.)
The present case is not a mere action for the recovery
of money nor a claim for money arising from
contract. The action involves the alleged negligence
of Kalaw in entering into the contracts, to
theprejudice of NACOCO and the bad faith of the
BOD for subsequently approving it. The suit involves
alleged tortious acts.
Because it involves tort, it survived the death of
Kalaw.
Sps. Algura v. City of Naga (2006)
Facts:
Spouses Antonio and Lorencita Algura filed an action
for damages against the city government of Naga for
demolishing their house. Allegedly, the house
blocked the road right of way and was thus a
nuisance per se. The spouses filed a motion for them
to litigate as indigents, attaching thereto documentary
proof that Antonio, a policeman, had a monthly gross
income of P10,474 and a net pay of P3,616.99.
Initially, the motion was granted.
The respondents filed a motion to disqualify
petitioners from non-payment of filing fees.
According to respondents, the first floor of the
petitioners 2-story house had a sari-sari store and a
computer shop. The second floor was the petitioners
residence and was also partly rented to boarders.
Petitioners were disqualified as indigent litigants
because they were not able to meet the standards
under Rule 141, Section 18 (used to be Sec. 16, now
Sec. 19) which sets a specific qualifying amount (at
that time, those outside MM having a gross income
not exceeding 1,500) for pauper litigants.
Petitioners now challenge this ruling.
Issue: w/n the disqualification order was proper
Held: NO, Rule 141, Section 19 (previously Sec. 16
and Sec.18) providing for definite standards (gross
income) for pauper litigants does not conflict with
Rule 3, Sec. 21.
It is true that the petitioners failed to meet the
requirements of Rule 141, Sec.19 but it was wrong to
disqualify them outright. The court should have
called for a hearing,` as provided in Rule 3, Sec.21,
to ascertain the petitioners financial status. Only
after the hearing can the judge decide on whether or
not they qualify to litigate as indigents.