REM REV 2 Finals Full Text Part 3 Evidence

i.
Marital disqualification
Alvarez vs Ramirez
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner,

vs.
SUSAN RAMIREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
dated May 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled "Susan Ramirez, petitioner, versus, Hon.
Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr., as Judge RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 72, and Maximo Alvarez,
respondents."
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN
for arson3 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is
Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of
respondent.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the
first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
Esperanza testified as follows:
"ATTY. ALCANTARA:
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear in the witness.
xxx
ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving that the
accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged particularly that
accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9,
Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his sister-in-law Susan
Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of
Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he successfully set the house
on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the
family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused; that as a consequence
of the accused in successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said
house was burned and together with several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs and
others.
COURT:
You may proceed.
xxx
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
xxx
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that scent?
A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of my sister
(and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court room).
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you know?
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?
A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name, he gave his name
as Maximo Alvarez."4
In the course of Esperanzas direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed "uncontrolled
emotions," prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion5 to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition6 to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court
directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza
Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.7 The prosecution
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19,
1999.8
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-
MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari9 with application for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order.10
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the
assailed Orders issued by the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in
Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband
nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants."
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of
an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other.11
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in
civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted
cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a
case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity
is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which
the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave
a void in the unhappy home.12
In Ordoo vs. Daquigan,13 this Court held:
"We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in
Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the
rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and
vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall
not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by)
one against the other."
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation
between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed
against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and
love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez,
knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the
latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the
disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and
domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no
more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a
case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life
which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castaeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any
reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule."
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de
facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that
the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the
State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the
courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to
offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as
stated by this Court in Francisco14), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC,
Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her
husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
People of the Philippines vs Castaneda
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch III, and BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, respondents.
Fiscal Regidor Y Aglipay and Special Counsel Vicente Macalino for petitioner.
Moises Sevilla Ocampo for private petitioner.
Cicero J. Punzalan for respondent.
SANTOS, J.:
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent
Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by respondent
Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public Document committed,
according to the Information, as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named a BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, with deliberate intent to commit
falsification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously counterfeit, imitate and
forge the signature of his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by said
accused wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of said
spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No. 1957, Page No. 72, Book No.
LVII, Series of 1975, notarized by Notary Public Abraham Pa. Gorospe, thereby making it
appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto gave her marital consent to said sale when
in fact and in truth she did not. 2
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to
disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Of Court which provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship The following persons

cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein
enumerated.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent; nor a wife for
or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the
other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.
The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls under the exception
to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other."
Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto
from testifying for or against her husband, in an order dated March 31, 1977. A motion for reconsideration
petition was filed but was denied by respondent Judge in an order dated May 19, 1977.
Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People of the
Philippines, seeking set aside the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge and praying that a preliminary
injunction or a ternporary restraining order be issued by this Court enjoining said judge from further
proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal Case No. 1011.
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved (a) to issue a temporary restraining order, and (b) to require the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Notice of Appearance on June 27, 1977, 4 and its Memorandum in support of the Petition on August 30,
1977. 5 The respondents filed their Memorandum on September 5, 1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was
considered submitted for decision. 7
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the sole issues determinative of the
instant petition, to wit: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against
herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto who allegedly forged the signature of his wife, Victoria
M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the latter gave her marital consent to the
sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not
may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and,
therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal
case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the
accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife
consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth
she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's
name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have
been charged against said husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence
which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to
make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the
aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such
criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a
conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.
2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified as a crime
committed by one spouse against the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus, in the case of
Ordoo v. Daquigan, 8 this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the criterion to be
followed in resolving the issue, stating that:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill v.
State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and the
rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception is too
broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR
DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN
THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except
in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoo v. Daquigan this Court held that the rape
committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime committed by the
husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime committed by the accused in that can was not
his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the exception for the reason that said criminal
act "Positively undermine(d) the connubial relationship. 9
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the
person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself.
And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal
relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts 10 in connection with the instant petition, which
seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the
actuations of the witness-wife underacore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her
and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said
nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in
previous decisions, "identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the
law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home. 11 Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial disqualification rule.
3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be disqualified from
testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General," (t)o
espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband committing as many
falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a license
to injure and prejudice her in secret all with unabashed and complete impunity.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court dated March 31, 1977, disqualifying
Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto, in Criminal Case No.
1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby SET
ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is
hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the case, allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify against her
husband.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
ii. Death or insanity (dead mans statute)
Razon vs Court of Appeals
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992
ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased
JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock
Certificate No. 003 issued on April 23, 1966 and registered under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the corporation. The then
Court of First Instance of Manila, now Regional Trial Court of Manila, declared that Enrique Razon, the petitioner in G.R. No. 74306 is the
owner of the said shares of stock. The then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's decision
and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is the owner of the shares of stock.
Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration. Enrique Razon wanted the appellate court's decision reversed and the trial court's
decision affirmed while Vicente Chuidian asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accruing to the 1,500 shares
of stock be ordered delivered to him. The appellate court denied both motions. Hence, these petitions.
The relevant Antecedent facts are as follows:
In his complaint filed on June 29, 1971, and amended on November 16, 1971, Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that
defendants Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc., Geronimo Velasco, Francisco de Borja, Jose Francisco, Alfredo B. de
Leon, Jr., Gabriel Llamas and Luis M. de Razon be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the
shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an order to restrain the
defendants from disposing of the said shares of stock, for a writ of preliminary attachment v. properties of defendants
having possession of shares of stock and for receivership of the properties of defendant corporation . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In their answer filed on June 18, 1973, defendants alleged that all the shares of stock in the name of stockholders of
record of the corporation were fully paid for by defendant, Razon; that said shares are subject to the agreement
between defendants and incorporators; that the shares of stock were actually owned and remained in the possession
of Razon. Appellees also alleged . . . that neither the late Juan T. Chuidian nor the appellant had paid any amount
whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of stock in question . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence of the plaintiff shown that he is the administrator of the intestate estate of Juan Telesforo Chuidian in
Special Proceedings No. 71054, Court of First Instance of Manila.
Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in
South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators consisted of Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose
Tuason, Jr., Victor Lim, Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle.
On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of defendant corporation was issued in the name
of Juan T. Chuidian.
On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and after him, the plaintiff-appellant, were elected
as directors of E. Razon, Inc. Both of them actually served and were paid compensation as directors of E. Razon, Inc.
From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April 1966 up to April 1971, Enrique Razon had not questioned the
ownership by Juan T. Chuidian of the shares of stock in question and had not brought any action to have the certificate
of stock over the said shares cancelled.
The certificate of stock was in the possession of defendant Razon who refused to deliver said shares to the plaintiff,
until the same was surrendered by defendant Razon and deposited in a safety box in Philippine Bank of Commerce.
Defendants allege that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc., Enrique Razon distributed shares of stock previously placed
in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T. Chuidian
Stock Certificate No. 003 covering 1,500 shares of stock upon instruction of the late Chuidian on April 23, 1986 was
personally delivered by Chuidian on July 1, 1966 to the Corporate Secretary of Attorney Silverio B. de Leon who was
himself an associate of the Chuidian Law Office (Exhs. C & 11). Since then, Enrique Razon was in possession of said
stock certificate even during the lifetime of the late Chuidian, from the time the late Chuidian delivered the said stock
certificate to defendant Razon until the time (sic) of defendant Razon. By agreement of the parties (sic) delivered it for
deposit with the bank under the joint custody of the parties as confirmed by the trial court in its order of August 7, 1971.
Thus, the 1,500 shares of stook under Stock Certificate No. 003 were delivered by the late Chuidian to Enrique
because it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the shares of stock in the defendant corporation and the
understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was the owner of the said shares of stock and was to have possession
thereof until such time as he was paid therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders (TSN., pp. 4, 8, 10, 24-
25, 25-26, 28-31, 31-32, 60, 66-68, July 22, 1980, Exhs. "C", "11", "13" "14"). (Ro11o 74306, pp. 66-68)
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule
under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case.
Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and
the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to
pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship The following persons cannot testify as to matters in
which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any
matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:
The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties were
allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely
impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their
properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party." (Tongco v.
Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 622 [1955])
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an
estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. (See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan
Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in
the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan
Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his
transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel.
Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private
respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. We ruled in the case of Cruz v. Court of Appeals (192 SCRA 209 [1990]):
It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has
been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto. Thus:
. . . The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as the allowance of improper questions
that may be put to him while on the stand is a matter resting in the discretion of the litigant. He may assert his right by
timely objection or he may waive it, expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests with him. Once admitted, the
testimony is in the case for what it is worth and the judge has no power to disregard it for the sole reason that it could
have been excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to strike it out on its own motion (Emphasis supplied). (Marella v.
Reyes, 12 Phil. 1.)
The issue as to whether or not the petitioner's testimony is admissible having been settled, we now proceed to discuss the fundamental issue
on the ownership of the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
E. Razon, Inc. was organized in 1962 by petitioner Enrique Razon for the purpose of participating in the bidding for the arrastre services in
South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators were Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuazon, Jr., Victor L. Lim, Jose F.
Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle. The business, however, did not start operations until 1966. According to the petitioner, some of the
incorporators withdrew from the said corporation. The petitioner then distributed the stocks previously placed in the names of the withdrawing
nominal incorporators to some friends, among them the late Juan T. Chuidian to whom he gave 1,500 shares of stock. The shares of stock
were registered in the name of Chuidian only as nominal stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares of stock were owned and
held by the petitioner but Chuidian was given the option to buy the same. In view of this arrangement, Chuidian in 1966 delivered to the
petitioner the stock certificate covering the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. Since then, the Petitioner had in his possession the
certificate of stock until the time, he delivered it for deposit with the Philippine Bank of Commerce under the parties' joint custody pursuant to
their agreement as embodied in the trial court's order.
The petitioner maintains that his aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true nature of his agreement with the late Juan Chuidian on the
1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is sufficient to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock.
The petitioner's contention is not correct.
In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (188 SCRA 492 [1990]) we ruled:
. . . For an effective, transfer of shares of stock the mode and manner of transfer as prescribed by law must be followed
(Navea v. Peers Marketing Corp., 74 SCRA 65). As provided under Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Bilang, 68 otherwise
known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines, shares of stock may be transferred by delivery to the transferee of
the certificate properly indorsed. Title may be vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of
stock (18 C.J.S. 928, cited in Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643). However, no transfer shall be valid, except as
between the parties until the transfer is properly recorded in the books of the corporation (Sec. 63, Corporation Code of
the Philippines; Section 35 of the Corporation Law)
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the questioned 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. are in the name of the late Juan Chuidian
in the books of the corporation. Moreover, the records show that during his lifetime Chuidian was ellected member of the Board of Directors
of the corporation which clearly shows that he was a stockholder of the corporation. (See Section 30, Corporation Code) From the point of
view of the corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such a case, the petitioner who claims ownership
over the questioned shares of stock must show that the same were transferred to him by proving that all the requirements for the effective
transfer of shares of stock in accordance with the corporation's by laws, if any, were followed (See Nava v. Peers Marketing Corporation, 74
SCRA 65 [1976]) or in accordance with the provisions of law.
The petitioner failed in both instances. The petitioner did not present any by-laws which could show that the 1,500 shares of stock were
effectively transferred to him. In the absence of the corporation's by-laws or rules governing effective transfer of shares of stock, the
provisions of the Corporation Law are made applicable to the instant case.
The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the certificate must be properly indorsed and that title to such
certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. (Section 35, Corporation Code) Since
the certificate of stock covering the questioned 1,500 shares of stock registered in the name of the late Juan Chuidian was never indorsed to
the petitioner, the inevitable conclusion is that the questioned shares of stock belong to Chuidian. The petitioner's asseveration that he did
not require an indorsement of the certificate of stock in view of his intimate friendship with the late Juan Chuidian can not overcome the
failure to follow the procedure required by law or the proper conduct of business even among friends. To reiterate, indorsement of the
certificate of stock is a mandatory requirement of law for an effective transfer of a certificate of stock.
Moreover, the preponderance of evidence supports the appellate court's factual findings that the shares of stock were given to Juan T.
Chuidian for value. Juan T. Chuidian was the legal counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation. We give credence to the
testimony of the private respondent that the shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian in payment of his legal services to the
corporation. Petitioner Razon failed to overcome this testimony.
In G.R. No. 74315, petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian insists that the appellate court's decision declaring his deceased father Juan T. Chuidian
as owner of the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. should have included all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights
accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights are all incidents of stock ownership.
The rights of stockholders are generally enumerated as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [F]irst, to have a certificate or other evidence of his status as stockholder issued to him; second, to vote at meetings
of the corporation; third, to receive his proportionate share of the profits of the corporation; and lastly, to participate
proportionately in the distribution of the corporate assets upon the dissolution or winding up. (Purdy's Beach on Private
Corporations, sec. 554) (Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82, 87)
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
a) In G.R. No. 74306, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the
Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
b) In G.R. No. 74315, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution insofar as it denied the petitioner's motion to clarify the
dispositive portion of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the appellate court is MODIFIED in that all cash and stock dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights that have accrued and
attached to the 1,500 shares in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are declared to belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Sunga Chan Chua
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners,

vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2000 in the case entitled Lamberto T.
Chua vs. Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga and of the Resolution dated May 23, 2000
denying the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia
Sunga (hereafter collectively referred to as petitioners).
The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth
Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia),
daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for
Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience,
respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership,
SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a
sole proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of
P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart
contribution, with the intention that the profits would be equally divided between them. The
partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a
sister of the wife of respondent, Erlinda Sy. As compensation, Jacinto would receive a
managers fee or remuneration of 10% of the gross profit and Josephine would receive 10% of
the net profits, in addition to her wages and other remuneration from the business.
Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July 8, 1977, its business operation
went quite well and was profitable. Respondent claimed that he could attest to the success of
their business because of the volume of orders and deliveries of filled Shellane cylinder tanks
supplied by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. While Jacinto furnished respondent with the
merchandise inventories, balance sheets and net worth of Shellite from 1977 to 1989, respondent
however suspected that the amount indicated in these documents were understated and
undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance.
Upon Jacintos death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and
particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody,
disposition and management of Shellite without respondents consent.
Despite respondents repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal,
winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to
comply. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to her own
use and advantage its properties.
On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out of alibis and reasons
to evade respondents demands, she disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of
P200,000.00 and partially paid the same to respondent. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed
respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the latters share in the
partnership, with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up
of the properties of the business establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly
failed to comply with their duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income
of Shellite to the damage and prejudice of respondent.
On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in Zambaonga del
Norte had jurisdiction over the action. Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss.
On January 12, 1993, the trial court finding the complaint sufficient in form and substance
denied the motion to dismiss.
On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, contending
that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and
attorneys fees, that respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation.
On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this time on the ground that the
claim for winding up of partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership
affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership assets /properties should be dismissed
and prosecuted against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate or intestate proceeding.
On August 16, 1993, the trial court denied the second motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
On November 26, 1993, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32499 questioning the denial of the
motion to dismiss.
On November 29, 1993, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Suspend Pre-trial
Conference.
On December 13, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to suspend pre-trial conference.
On November 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit.
On January 16, 1995, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner,
as petitioners failed to show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court.[2]
On February 20, 1995, entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court and the case was
remanded to the trial court on April 26, 1995.
On September 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre-trial conference and set the hearing of
the case on January 17, 1996. Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were
considered to have waived their right to present evidence for their failure to attend the scheduled
date for reception of evidence despite notice.
On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
as follows:
(1) DIRECTING them to render an accounting in acceptable form under accounting procedures
and standards of the properties, assets, income and profits of the Shellite Gas Appliance Center
since the time of death of Jacinto L. Sunga, from whom they continued the business operations
including all businesses derived from the Shellite Gas Appliance Center; submit an inventory,
and appraisal of all these properties, assets, income, profits, etc. to the Court and to plaintiff for
approval or disapproval;
(2) ORDERING them to return and restitute to the partnership any and all properties, assets,
income and profits they misapplied and converted to their own use and advantage that legally
pertain to the plaintiff and account for the properties mentioned in pars. A and B on pages 4-5 of
this petition as basis;
(3) DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the plaintiff shares and interest of the plaintiff in
the partnership of the listed properties, assets and good will (sic) in schedules A, B and C, on
pages 4-5 of the petition;
(4) ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned but unreceived income and profits from the
partnership from 1988 to may 30, 1992, when the plaintiff learned of the closure of the store the
sum of P35,000.00 per month, with legal rate of interest until fully paid;
(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the partnership and terminate its business
activities pursuant to law, after delivering to the plaintiff all the interest, shares, participation
and equity in the partnership, or the value thereof in money or moneys worth, if the properties
are not physically divisible;
(6) FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga-Chan guilty of breach of trust and in bad faith and
hold them liable to the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and,
(7) DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the sum of P25,000.00 as attorneys (sic) and
P25,00.00 as litigation expenses.
NO special pronouncements as to COSTS.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On October 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, appealing the case
to the Court of Appeals.
On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all
respects.[4]
On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner relies upon the following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in making a legal conclusion that there existed a partnership
between respondent Lamberto T. Chua and the late Jacinto L. Sunga upon the latters invitation
and offer and that upon his death the partnership assets and business were taken over by
petitioners.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that laches and/or prescription did
not apply in the instant case.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that there was competent and
credible evidence to warrant the finding of a partnership, and assuming arguendo that indeed
there was a partnership, the finding of highly exaggerated amounts or values in the partnership
assets and profits.[5]
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacintos death. In the
absence of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto,
petitioners argue that these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of respondent
and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacintos death. To
support this argument, petitioners invoke the Dead Mans Statute or Survivorship Rule
under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:
SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties or

assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of
unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or against
such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego,
Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person
(Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
We are not persuaded.
A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property or real rights
are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall be necessary.[6] Hence, based on
the intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language and
conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may arise.[7] The essential points that must be proven to
show that a partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2)
a joint interest in the profits.[8] Understandably so, in view of the absence of a written contract of
partnership between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction of
documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial issue to settle then
is whether or not the Dead Mans Statute applies to this case so as to render inadmissible
respondents testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.
The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction.[9] But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of
testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person

or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind.[10]
Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Mans Statute to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim[11] against respondent in their answer before
the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively
removed this case from the ambit of the Dead Mans Statute.[12] Well entrenched is the rule
that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the
counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the
deceased to defeat the counterclaim.[13] Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent
is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased,
said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the
deceased.[14]
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple
reason that she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted. Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners insistence that
Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term
assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor
of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen.[15] Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
We are not convinced by petitioners allegation that Josephines testimony lacks probative value
because she was allegedly coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor.
Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that if she
were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude
from this candid admission that Josephines testimony is involuntary when she did not in any
way categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent. Also, the fact that
Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of her testimony
since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses.[16]
Petitioners reliance alone on the Dead Mans Statute to defeat respondents claim cannot
prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was
established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the
documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence
for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.
Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the weight of
judicial precedents, a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between
respondent and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on review.[17] This Court can no
longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh
them to ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were correct in according superior
credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.[18] It must be also pointed out
that petitioners failed to attend the presentation of evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot
now turn to this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the documentary evidence
of respondent when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of the evidence at the time
that such evidence was offered.[19]
With regard to petitioners insistence that laches and/or prescription should have extinguished
respondents claim, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the action for
accounting filed by respondent three (3) years after Jacintos death was well within the
prescribed period. The Civil Code provides that an action to enforce an oral contract prescribes
in six (6) years[20] while the right to demand an accounting for a partners interest as against the
person continuing the business accrues at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary
agreement.[21] Considering that the death of a partner results in the dissolution of the
partnership[22], in this case, it was after Jacintos death that respondent as the surviving partner
had the right to an account of his interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that while
Jacintos death dissolved the partnership, the dissolution did not immediately terminate the
partnership. The Civil Code[23] expressly provides that upon dissolution, the partnership
continues and its legal personality is retained until the complete winding up of its business,
culminating in its termination.[24]
In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral partnership between respondent and
Jacinto, petitioners maintain that said partnership that had an initial capital of P200,000.00
should have been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) since
registration is mandated by the Civil Code. True, Article 1772 of the Civil Code requires that
partnerships with a capital of P3,000.00 or more must register with the SEC, however, this
registration requirement is not mandatory. Article 1768 of the Civil Code[25]explicitly provides
that the partnership retains its juridical personality even if it fails to register. The failure to
register the contract of partnership does not invalidate the same as among the partners, so long as
the contract has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice
to third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their
contract.[26] In the case at bar, non-compliance with this directory provision of the law will not
invalidate the partnership considering that the totality of the evidence proves that respondent and
Jacinto indeed forged the partnership in question.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Bordalba vs Court of Appeals
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112443. January 25, 2002]
TERESITA P. BORDALBA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR

JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLORES, EMANNUEL JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS,
EVELIA JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS OF ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY,
namely, ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY, CARMEN JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME
BACLAY, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the October
20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appealsi[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, which affirmed with
modification the Decisionii[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, in Civil Case
No. MAN-386.
The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853
square meters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is part of a parcel of
land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and originally owned
by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicial
partition,iii[3] written in the Spanish language was executed, describing said parcel of land as
2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look, Mandawe, Cebu, que linda al N. con
la Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme; al E. linda con propiodades de Fernando Antigua; al
S. linda con propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme, y al O. linda con la Calle Plaridel. La
propiodad descrita esta avaluada, con todas sus mejoras, en la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTA
PESOS ------------------------------------------------ P1,050.00.iv[4]
and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows:
1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private
respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and
Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are
private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;
2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P.
Bordalba; and
3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.
Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jaymes house, which his
family occupied since 1945.
Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, petitioners mother, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, Branch IV, an amended application for the registrationv[5] of the lot
described with the following boundaries:
N - Fruelana Jayme & Road
S - Felicitas de Latonio
E - Agustin de Jayme
W - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana

Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of a
land owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme; and
that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition. She further stated that a
portion of the lot for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission.
Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed their oppositionvi[6] contending
that said application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial
partition. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of interest of the parties.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu City an applicationvii[7] dated
January 10, 1979, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the aborted
application of her mother, Elena Jayme, now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C), described as
follows:
North: Froilan Jayme and Road

East: Agustin Jayme
South: Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario Gandecila
West: Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio Abellanosaviii[8]
On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.ix[9] Thereafter, petitioner caused the
subdivision and titling of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), into 6 lots,x[10] as well as the disposition of two
parcels thereof, thus:
1) Lot No. 1242-A with an area of 581 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 22771 (FP) in the name of spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, to whom
petitioner sold said lot;
2) Lot No. 1242-B with an area of 420 square meters covered by TCT No. 22772 in the
name of Teresita P. Bordalba, and which the latter mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Mandaue;
3) Lot No. 1242-C with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22773 in the name of
Teresita P. Bordalba;
4) Lot No. 1242-D with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22774 in the name of
Teresita Bordalba;
5) Lot No. 1242-E with an area of 216 square meters covered by TCT 22775 in the name of
Teresita P. Bordalba;
6) Lot No. 1242-F with an area of 216 square meters and covered by TCT No. 22776 in the
name of Teresita P. Bordalba.
Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent and Original
Certificate of Title over Lot No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner involving
the lot subject of the controversy, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 28, the instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses
Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of
Lands.
In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT
No. 0-571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos. 22771-22776 be declared void and ordered cancelled.
Private respondents also prayed that they be adjudged owners of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), and that
spouses Genaro V. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue be declared
buyers and mortgagee in bad faith, respectively. In addition, they asked the court to award them
actual, compensatory, and moral damages plus attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through
purchase from her mother,xi[11] who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since
1947. In her answer, petitioner traced her mothers ownership of the lot partly from the 1947 deed
of extra-judicial partition presented by private respondents,xii[12] and claimed that Nicanor Jayme,
and Candida Flores occupied a portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) by mere tolerance of her mother.
On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that the properties of the late Carmeno Jayme and
Margarita Espina de Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in 1947, but claimed that she was not
aware of the existence of said Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. She, however, identified one of
the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature of her mother.xiii[13]
On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free
Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and
ordered its cancellation. However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala
as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively;
and consequently upheld as valid the sale of Lot No. 1242-A covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 22771 (FP) to spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, and the mortgage of Lot
No. 1242-B covered by TCT No. 22772 in favor of the Rural Bank of Mandaue. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs by:
1) declaring Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-
57 (FP) and all subsequent certificates of title as a result of the subdivision of Lot No. 1242
except TCT NO. 22771 (FP) as null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue
City to cancel them;
2) declaring spouses defendants Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as buyers in good faith
and are the legal and rightful owners of Lot No. 1242-A as described in TCT No. 22771 (FP);
3) declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as mortgagee in good faith and the mortgage
lien in its favor be carried over to and be annotated in the new certificate of title to be issued
under the names of the plaintiffs;
4) declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners of Lot 1242 and ordering the
issuance of the certificate of title in their names;
5) dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug and Capala and the defendant
Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. for lack of merit;
6) ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:
(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;

(b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, and,
7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.xiv[14]
Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that since private
respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner should be
ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents. The decretal portion of
the respondent court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order the reconveyance of one-third of

the subject land in favor of the plaintiff-appellees in lieu of the cancellation of the Certificates of
Title issued and their declaration as the owners of Lot No. 1242 in its entirety. The rest is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.xv[15]
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which
touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by
the trial court, as the same violated the dead mans statute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right
of private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as
well as the identity between the disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition.
The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
upholding those of the trial court are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this
rule, petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under one of them.xvi[16]
The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioner resorted to
fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot under scrutiny. The
Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that misrepresentation tainted petitioners application,
insofar as her declaration that the land applied for was not occupied or claimed by any other
person. Her declaration is belied by the extra-judicial partition which she acknowledged, her
mothers aborted attempt to have the lot registered, private respondents predecessors-in-interests
opposition thereto, and by the occupancy of a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and his
family since 1945.
It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and
does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means to
enrich oneself at the expense of others.xvii[17]
As to the alleged violation of the dead mans statute,xviii[18] suffice it to state that said rule finds no
application in the present case. The dead mans statute does not operate to close the mouth of a
witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal
dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.xix[19]
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is
based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on
dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly
admitted by the trial court.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of
Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their
heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in
order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary.xx[20]
Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) vis--vis the
boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition can be explained by
the fact that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entire parcel of land described in the
Deed, a 1/3 pro-indiviso portion of which was adjudicated each to, first, petitioners mother,
second, to the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, and third, to an unidentified party.
Logically therefore, their boundaries will not be similar. At any rate, the records show that the
parcel of land adjudicated to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein was the lot found
on the corner of Plaridel and Mabini Streets in Looc, Mandaue City. As admitted further by both
parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the land allotted to their predecessors-in-interest in the
1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. Moreover, petitioners mother acknowledged in her
application for registration of Lot No. 1242 that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was the
source of her claim over the lot sought to be registered. She further admitted that the lot now
known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the parcel of land inherited by her and her co-heirs,
to the extent of 1/3 share each. Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter,
while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.
Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private
respondents predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was disregarded
by petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in her name, to the
exclusion of private respondents predecessors-in-interest, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right of private respondents as co-owners, and
ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is unable to determine what part of Lot No.
1242 (799-C) is within the boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the 1947 Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein. This is so because private
respondents did not show the extent of the said land mentioned in the 1947 Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition in relation to Lot No. 1242 (799-C). While they presented the boundaries of the
parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, to wit:
North: Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme

East: Propiodades de Fernando Antigua
South: Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme
West: Calle Plaridel
they did not, however, show where these boundaries are found in relation to the boundaries of
Lot No. 1242 (799-C). Absent a fixed boundary of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed,
which they claim Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is a part of, the Court cannot determine the extent to
which the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included. Admittedly, the north boundary
of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) (Property of Froilan Jaime and Mabini Street) is similar to the north
boundary of the land mentioned in the Deed. With only one reference point, however, the south,
east and west boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) cannot be established with certainty to be
within the parcel of land described in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
In Beo v. Court of Appeals,xxi[21] the Court held that in order that an action for recovery of
possession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove not
only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed by describing the location, area
and boundaries thereof. So that when the record does not show that the land subject matter of the
action has been exactly determined, the action cannot prosper, inasmuch as the plaintiff's
ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the
trial.
In the present case, while it is true that private respondents were not able to show the extent of
their 1/3 pro indiviso right over Lot No. 1242 (799-C), they have nevertheless established their
claim over the said lot. Hence, in line with our ruling in the case of Laluan v. Malpaya,xxii[22] the
prudent recourse would be to remand the case to the lower court for a new trial.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, and the May 28, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386, insofar as it relates to the recognition
of the 1/3 share of private respondents over Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is AFFIRMED. The case is
remanded to the trial court in order to determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included
in the parcel of land adjudicated in the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition to the predecessors-
in-interest of the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
iii. Privileged Communication
Chan vs Chan
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and
submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband.
The Facts and the Case
On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and
the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and
support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo
hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save
their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital,
two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage
relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and
released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no
longer be repaired.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a
hospital. The form carried a physicians handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
Medical City, covering Johnnys medical records when he was there confined. The request was
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena
duces tecum.2
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielenes
motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action
of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the RTC.
On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielenes petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow
the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever
relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The
prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital
records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this
case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his
alleged forcible confinement.
Question Presented
The central question presented in this case is:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are covered
by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.
The Ruling of the Court
Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records of
Johnnys confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in support of her
action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her request for
subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons

cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken
the reputation of the patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without
the patients consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters reputation. This rule is
intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his
ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of
that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in
the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might
prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.4
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be
made part of the physicians testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in
those records that concern the patients health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such
evidence for admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the
offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielenes request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records. It is when those records are produced
for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence,
but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is
about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielenes motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure
available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action
and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or
operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection
and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
(Emphasis supplied)
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be
disclosed are "not privileged."
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it
is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c)
of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not
cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital recordsthe
results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or
treatment he gave himwould be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patients consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patients records.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latters prior consent.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that
he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth
claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged
character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that
provides:
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder
admissible. When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and
when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other
act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given
in evidence.1wphi1
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already
presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify
Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not
yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of
his hospital records would again be premature.
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request
for the production in court of Johnnys hospital records.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Lacurom vs Jacoba
THIRD DIVISION
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, A.C. No. 5921
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Present:
Pairing Judge, Branch 30,
Complainant, QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and Promulgated:
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA,
Respondents. March 10, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by

Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom (Judge Lacurom), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and
Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (respondents). Complainant charged respondents with
violation of Rules 11.03,1[1] 11.04,2[2] and 19.013[3] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R.
Veneracion (Veneracion) in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant
Federico Barrientos (Barrientos).4[4] The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional
Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as
pairing judge.
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution (Resolution) reversing

the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.5[5] The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated

December 22, 2000, as well as REVERSES the Decision of the court a quo dated
July 22, 1997.
Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to

CEASE and DESIST from ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos
from the 1,000 square meter homelot covered by TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller
area of one hundred forty-seven square meters, within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by
TCT No. T-78613, and the house thereon standing covered by Tax Declaration No.
02006-01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is
ordered to pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration
No. 02006-01137.
SO ORDERED.6[6]
Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for
Inhibition)7[7] dated 30 July 2001 (30 July 2001 motion), pertinent portions of
which read:
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it

is entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the
sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL COURT acted as if it were the
DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW
HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
xxxx
III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily

and Suddenly Reversing the Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular
RTC Presiding Judge:
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very

questionable SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN
REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon. Pairing Judge simply and
peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly
questionable, if not suspicious, hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
xxxx
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and
presumes FACTS not part of the records of the case, all loaded in favor of the
alleged TENANT. Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and
an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process. Need we say more?
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That

the Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question
is That Homelot:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the
Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS
MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
xxxx
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in

Holding and Declaring that The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of
the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter:
Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that

JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of the COMPLAINT and not by
the averments in the answer! This is backed up by a Litany of Cases!
xxxx
7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously

ERRED in Ordering the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment
for Plaintiffs HOUSE:
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the
Manifold GLARING ERRORS committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.
xxxx
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE
to the defendant for the ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the
Long Line of Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing
Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution
should be slain on sight!8[8]
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself in
order to give plaintiff a fighting chance and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and
set aside.9[9] Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (Velasco-Jacoba) signed the motion on
behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before

his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the very
disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.10[10]
In her Explanation, Comments and Answer,11[11] Velasco-Jacoba claimed that His
Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will
show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this
case.12[12] Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any conscious or deliberate intent to degrade
the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the
respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice.13[13] She rationalized as follows:
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident
and hard-striking adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent words at random
and bunch them together, side-by-side x x x then collectively and certainly they
present a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x
xxxx
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a
staccato of incisive and hard-hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to be called
contumacious and contemptuous. They were just articulating their feelings of
shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good fortune, not
driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They
must believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more
no less. x x x The matters involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and
they had to call a spade a spade. x x x 14[14]
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize for whatever

mistake [they] may have committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when
[they] may have stepped on the line and gone out of bounds. She also agreed to have
the allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off the record.15[15]
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of

contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of
P1,000.16[16]
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order.

She recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis
Jacoba (Jacoba) stopped her and said O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka
mahuli. (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the
pleading handed to her without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her husband of
35 years with whom she entrusted her whole life and future.17[17] This pleading
turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign
because of his then suspension from the practice of law.18[18]
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of

contempt without conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring
a personal vendetta, ordering her imprisonment despite her status as senior lady
lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother
many times over.19[19] At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom should have
inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because [Veneracion] had already
filed against him criminal cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman.20[20]
The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-
Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001
accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly rendering unjust judgment through
inexcusable negligence and ignorance21[21] and violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019).22[22] The first charge became
the subject of a preliminary investigation23[23] by the City Prosecutor of
Cabanatuan City. On the second charge, Veneracion set forth his allegations in a
Complaint-Affidavit24[24] filed on 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon.
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time

directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt.25[25] Jacoba
complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied
that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacobas
statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in
evidence.26[26] Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision27[27] finding Jacoba
guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against

respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Report and Recommendation of the IBP

Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing
set by IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro (IBP Commissioner Navarro)
despite sufficient notice.28[28]
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10

October 2002, recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law
for six months.29[29] IBP Commissioner Navarro found that respondents were
prone to us[ing] offensive and derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to
discourtesy and disrespect for authority.30[30] Although the remarks were not
directed at Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at his position as a judge,
which is a smack on the judiciary system as a whole.31[31]
The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted IBP Commissioner

Navarros Report and Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which
the IBP Board reduced to three months.32[32] On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board
transmitted its recommendation to this Court, together with the documents
pertaining to the case.
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board
decision, thus:33[33]
xxxx
3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present

complaint of Judge Lacurom is sub judice; the same issues involved in this case
are raised before the Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-
G.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and
Preliminary Injunction x x x;
4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the

Supreme Court involving the same issues we raised in the aforementioned
Certiorari case, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in
view of the pending Certiorari case before the Court of Appeals;
5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the
present complaint should likewise be dismissed and/or suspended pending
resolution of the certiorari case by the Court of Appeals.34[34] (Emphasis supplied)
The Courts Ruling
On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacobas contention that the present

complaint should be considered sub judice in view of the petition for certiorari and
mandatory inhibition with preliminary injunction (petition for certiorari)35[35] filed
before the Court of Appeals.
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4

October 2001, seeks to nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil
Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001
denying respondents respective motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13 September
2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners allege
that Judge Lacurom acted with grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of
jurisdiction, in violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court.36[36]
Plainly, the issue before us is respondents liability under the Code of

Professional Responsibility. The outcome of this case has no bearing on the
resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is neither identity of issues nor causes
of action.
Neither should the Courts dismissal of the administrative complaint against

Judge Lacurom for being premature impel us to dismiss this complaint. Judge
Lacuroms orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not be the subject of an administrative
complaint against him while a petition for certiorari assailing the same orders is
pending with an appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties
and the same has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final declaration
that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis
to conclude whether the judge is administratively liable.37[37]
The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case.
The corresponding implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities.
We first examine the charge against Velasco-Jacoba.
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001
motion. Velasco-Jacobas responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the party

or counsel representing him x x x.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has

read the pleading, that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or

alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein x x x shall be subject to
appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that

she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of
delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated
its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only
because of her husbands request but she did not know its contents beforehand.
Apparently, this practice of signing each others pleadings is a long-standing
arrangement between the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, [s]o implicit is
[their] trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she]
already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the
other.38[38] By Velasco-Jacobas own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3
of Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a
ground
for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising
from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.39[39]
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear
in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas
statement pointing to him as the author of the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with
Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes account. Instead,
Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he trained his
guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and
monumental.40[40]
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more plausible, for

two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike
Jacobas defense which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from
the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for
Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacobas assertion that she
had not actually participate[d] in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that
Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the
contempt charge against him.41[41] This petition for certiorari anchors some of its
arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacobas handiwork.42[42]
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure
of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be
construed as implied consent.43[43] This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly
admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 11.03.A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04.A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported
by the record or have no materiality to the case.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded
the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his clients cause. We recall his use of the
following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous
mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in
the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created a
cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect.44[44]
Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every

remark in the 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as
a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges.45[45] However, even the most hardened judge would
be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge
Lacuroms Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and
decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyers
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession.46[46] The use of unnecessary language
is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial
administration.47[47]
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined
to use dignified language but also to pursue the clients cause through fair and honest
means, thus:
Rule 19.01.A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case or proceeding.
Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution,
Jacoba assisted his client in instituting two administrative cases against Judge
Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case No. 2836 was then pending before
Judge Lacuroms sala. The Courts attention is drawn to the fact that the timing of the
filing of these administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that the cases
were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.
Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before
this Court. In Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended Jacoba from the practice
of law for a period of six months because of his failure to file an action for the
recovery of possession of property despite the lapse of two and a half years from
receipt by him of P550 which his client gave him as filing and sheriffs fees.48[48]
In Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties
when he failed to file the appellants brief, resulting in the dismissal of his clients
appeal. We imposed the penalty of one year suspension.49[49]
As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing
in barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well the
prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local Government Code.50[50]
In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar
acts would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the question of
whether respondents have conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor
required of them as members of the bar and officers of the court. We find
respondents to have fallen short of the mark.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law

for two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty.
Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon
finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondents that a repetition of the
same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal records as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Samala vs Valencia
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007
CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against
Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on
two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by
submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for
nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate
children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 2
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of
hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda 3 and the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation 4 dated January
12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of
suspension from six months to one year.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as
to the recommended penalty.
On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of
rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel
for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga 6 by filing an Explanation and
Compliance before the RTC. 7
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina
City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for
ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the property
subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City
docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000, 8 Presiding Judge
Reuben P. dela Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of
record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled
"Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as
counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case
No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in
Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for
Bustamante and Bayuga 10 albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of
the tenants. 11 Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804
and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the
counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her
husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property 12
and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. 13 But, while claiming that
respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already severed his
representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa. 14 Thus, the filing of
Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. 15 He may not also undertake to
discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern
rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. 16 It springs from the relation of
attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice. 17
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. 18
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public
policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided
fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding
the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. 19
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but
also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. 20 The bare attorney-client
relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from
the client's adversary either in the same case 21 or in a different but related action. 22 A lawyer is
forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter
of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous
litigation in which he appeared for the former client. 23
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 24 that the termination of the relation of attorney and client
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be
divested by the expiration of the professional employment. 25 Consequently, a lawyer should not,
even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect
his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or
use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. 26
In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the
act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in
connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship
precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former
client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and
Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the
interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-
client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27 citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba, 28 we held that:
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer
has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are
present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them
would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. 29
Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated."
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected
with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong
ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. 30
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against
Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear
case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent
may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the
court, 31 but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests
in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain

from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of
interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the
Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients. 32
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment,
respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a
new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.
Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and
presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property. 33 During
the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the
said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba;
so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. 34 Respondent
further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the
case for rescission was filed in 2002.
Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of
contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000, 35 before
RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know
of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the
hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed
on the same date, although in different courts and at different times.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already
cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's
ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial
court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as
shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is
decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No.
273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500,
was already issued in the name of Alba.
In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and
he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." 38 He should bear in mind that as an
officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of
the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. 39 The courts, on the
other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to
display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense
of truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the
administration of law and the dispensation of justice. 40 As such, he should make himself more
an exemplar for others to emulate. 41
>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-
MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c)
I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave
coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the
two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed
as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of
respondent) for trespass to dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As
payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the
same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement. 42
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43 and 01-036162 44 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala"
for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant
who filed I.S. No. 00-4306 45 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318 46 against
Alvin Valencia 47 for trespass to dwelling.
We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the
aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on
the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly
shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his
client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated
to defend and prosecute the right of his client.
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay
who are all over 20 years of age, 48 while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that
he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and
after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. 49 Respondent further admitted
that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However,
he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship 50 and does not consider the
latter as his second family. 51 He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he
has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina. 52
In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable
on the charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He
even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with
Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider
them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling
the commissioner that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in
Marikina, where Lagmay lives. 53 It is of no moment that respondent eventually married
Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live
up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify
the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of
disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community. 54 Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to
discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of
the community. 55 That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death
of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his
liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of

misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon
receipt of herein Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance,
and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Almonte vs Vasquez
EN BANC
G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent
Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all
evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal
Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous
letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have
been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several
government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.
The letter reads in pertinent parts:
1 These are the things that I have been observing. During the implementation of E.O. 127 on May
1, 1988, one hundred ninety (190) personnel were dismissed. Before that implementation, we had
a monthly savings of P500,000.00 from unfilled plantilla position plus the implementation of RA
6683 wherein seventy (70) regular employees availed a total amount of P1,400,000.00 was
saved from the government monthly. The question is, how do they used or disbursed this
savings? The EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating
funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents"
(EIA). The Commissioner of EIIB has a biggest share on this. Among his activities are:
a) Supporting RAM wherein he is involved. He gives big amount especially

during the Dec. Failed coup.
b) Payment for thirty five (30) mini UZI's.
c) Payment for the purchased of Maxima '87 for personal used of the
Commissioner.
d) Another observation was the agents under the Director of NCR EIIB is
the sole operating unit within Metro Manila which was approved by no less
than the Commissioner due to anomalous activities of almost all agents
assigned at the central office directly under the Commissioner. Retired Brig.
Gen. Almonte as one of the Anti-Graft board member of the Department of
Finance should not tolerate this. However, the Commissioner did not
investigate his own men instead, he placed them under the 15-30 payroll.
e) Many more which are personal.
2. Sir, my question is this. Can your good office investigate EII intelligence funds particularly
Personal Services (01) Funds? I wonder why the Dep't of Budget & Mgmt. cannot compel EIIB to
submit an actual filled up position because almost half of it are vacant and still they are releasing
it. Are EIIB plantilla position classified? It is included in the Personal Services Itemization (PSI)
and I believe it is not classified and a ruling from Civil Service Commission that EIIB is not
exempted from Civil Service. Another info, when we had salary differential last Oct '88 all money
for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to
ghost agents of EIA.
3. Another thing that I have observed was the Chief Budget Division possesses high caliber
firearms such as a mini UZI, Armalite rifle and two (2) 45 cal. pistol issued to him by the Assistant
Commissioner wherein he is not an agent of EIIB and authorized as such according to
memorandum order number 283 signed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines
effective 9 Jan. 1990.
Another observation was when EIIB agents apprehended a certain civilian who possesses
numerous assorted high powered firearms. Agents plus one personnel from the legal proclaimed
only five (5) firearms and the remaining was pilfered by them.
Another observation is almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler
syndicate monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.
Another observation is the commissioner allocates funds coming from the intelligence funds to
the media to sustain their good image of the bureau.
In his comment 1
on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied that as a result of the separation of
personnel, the EIIB had made some savings. He averred that the only funds released to his agency by
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) were those corresponding to 947 plantilla positions
which were filled. He also denied that there were "ghost agents" in the EIIB and claimed that
disbursements for "open" (i.e., "overt" personnel) and "closed" (i.e., "covert" personnel) plantillas of the
agency had been cleared by the Commission on Audit (COA); that the case of the 30 Uzis had already
been investigated by Congress, where it was shown that it was not the EIIB but an agent who had spent
for the firearms and they were only loaned to the EIIB pending appropriation by Congress; that, contrary
to the charge that a Maxima car had been purchased for his use, he was using a government issued car
from the NICA; that it was his prerogative as Commissioner to "ground" agents in the EIIB main office so
that they could be given reorientation and retraining; that the allegation that the EIIB operatives pilfered
smuggled firearms was without factual basis because the firearms were the subject of seizure
proceedings before the Collector of Customs, Port of Manila; that the EIIB had been uncompromising
toward employees found involved in anomalous activities; and that intelligence funds had not been used
for media propaganda and if media people went to the EIIB it was because of newsworthy stories.
Petitioner asked that the complaint be dismissed and the case considered closed.
Similarly petitioner Perez, budget chief of the EIIB, denied in his comment 2 dated April 3, 1990 that
savings had been realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM provided allocations
for only the remaining 947 personnel. He said that the disbursement of funds for the plantilla positions for
"overt" and "covert" personnel had been cleared by the COA and that the high-powered firearms had
been issued for the protection of EIIB personnel attending court hearings and the Finance Officer in
withdrawing funds from the banks.
The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman's office, Jose F. Sao, found the comments
unsatisfactory, being "unverified and plying only on generalizations without meeting specifically the points
raised by complainant as constitutive of the alleged anomalies." 3 He, therefore, asked for authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a subpoena 4 to
petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their
witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum 5 to the Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering
him to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such
as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988."
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum. In his
Order dated June 15, 1990, 6 respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the subpoena in view
of the fact that there were no affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being forced to produce evidence against
themselves, since the subpoena duces tecum was directed to the Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio
Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner
Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for
the year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof."
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for a reconsideration, arguing that Rogado and Rivera were EIIB
employees under their supervision and that the Ombudsman was doing indirectly what he could not do
directly, i.e., compelling them (petitioners Almonte and Perez) to produce evidence against themselves.
Petitioners' motion was denied in respondent Ombudsman's order dated August 6, 1990. Hence, this
petition which questions the orders of June 15, 1990 and August 6, 1990 of respondent Ombudsman.
To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset that it does not concern a demand by a
citizen for information under the freedom of information guarantee of the Constitution. 7 Rather it concerns
the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection with an investigation
conducted by it vis-a-vis the claim of privilege of an agency of the Government. Thus petitioners raise the
following issues: 8
I. WHETHER OR NOT A CASE BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN UNSIGNED

AND UNVERIFIED LETTER COMPLAINT IS AN "APPROPRIATE
CASE" WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF THE CONSTITUTION IN WHICH
PUBLIC RESPONDENT CAN OBLIGE PETITIONERS BY VIRTUE OF
HIS SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO PRODUCE TO HIM "ALL
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS FOR
THE YEAR 1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS
(SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR 1988."
II. WHETHER OR NOT "ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL

SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE YEAR 1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES,
SUCH AS VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE PLANTILLA OF
EIIB FOR 1988" ARE CLASSIFIED AND, THEREFORE, BEYOND THE
REACH OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT'S SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM.
I.
There are several subsidiary issues raised by petitioners, but the principal ones revolve on the question
whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary
vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified. Disclosure of the documents
in question is resisted on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services
Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets,
strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB." 9
Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the
relevancy or materiality of the documents required to be produced, to the pending investigation in the
Ombudsman's office. Accordingly, the focus of discussion should be on the Government's claim of
privilege.
A.
At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even
though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. 10
In addition, in the litigation over the Watergate tape subpoena in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the right of the President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence,
which it likened to "the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations." Said the Court in United States v.
Nixon: 11
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and

correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has
all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to
those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and
even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who
assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of the government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. . . .
Thus, the Court for the first time gave executive privilege a constitutional status and a new name,
although not necessarily a new birth. 12
"The confidentiality of judicial deliberations" mentioned in the opinion of the Court referred to the fact that
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and judges of lower federal courts have traditionally treated their
working papers and judicial notes as private property. A 1977 proposal in the U.S. Congress that Justices
and judges of lower federal courts "should be encouraged to make such arrangements as will assure the
preservation and eventual availability of their personal papers, especially the deposit of their papers in the
same depository they select for [their] Public Papers" 13 was rebuffed by the Justices who, in a letter to
the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulation and Government Information of the U.S. Senate,
referred to "difficult concerns respecting the appropriate separation that must be maintained between the
legislative branch and this Court." 14
There are, in addition to such privileges, statutorily-created ones such as the Government's privilege to
withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of laws. 15
With respect to the privilege based on state secret, the rule was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court as
follows:
Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court may automatically
require a complete disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in
any case. It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case,
that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this is the
case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the
security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the
evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers. . . . In each case, the showing of
necessity which is made will determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself
that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a strong
showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the
most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately
satisfied that military secrets are at stake. A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal
claim of privilege, made under the circumstances of this case, will have to prevail. 16
On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military,
diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his
conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President
against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws. 17
B.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production
of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation
of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as,
but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." 18 Consequently, while in
cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case
that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without
compelling production, 19 no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB
as classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support
their contention that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the "only
item of expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the "purchase of
information and payment of rewards." Thus, part V, No. 7 of the Circular reads:
The only item of expenditure which should be treated as strictly confidential because it
falls under the category of classified information is that relating to purchase of information
and payment of rewards. However, reasonable records should be maintained and kept
for inspection of the Chairman, Commission on Audit or his duly authorized
representative. All other expenditures are to be considered unclassified supported by
invoices, receipts and other documents, and, therefore, subject to reasonable inquiry by
the Chairman or his duly authorized representative. 20
It should be noted that the regulation requires that "reasonable records" be kept justifying the
confidential or privileged character of the information relating to informers. There are no such
reasonable records in this case to substitute for the records claimed to be confidential.
The other statutes and regulations 21 invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the
documents sought in the subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the
confidential nature of the EIIB's functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for its
funds to the proper authorities. Indeed by denying that there were savings made from certain items in the
agency and alleging that the DBM had released to the EIIB only the allocations needed for the 947
personnel retained after its reorganization, petitioners in effect invited inquiry into the veracity of their
claim. If, as petitioners claim, the subpoenaed records have been examined by the COA and found by it
to be regular in all respects, there is no reason why they cannot be shown to another agency of the
government which by constitutional mandate is required to look into any complaint concerning public
office.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled
by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The
plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation. He and his Deputies are designated
by the Constitution "protectors of the people" and as such they are required by it "to act promptly on
complaints in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation." 22
His need for the documents thus outweighs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while
there might have been compelling reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it was asserted by
petitioners, now, seven years later, these reasons may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact
ceased. The agents whose identities could not then be revealed may have ceased from the service of the
EIIB, while the covert missions to which they might have been deployed might either have been
accomplished or abandoned. On the other hand, the Ombudsman's duty to investigate the complaint that
there were in 1988 unfilled positions in the EIIB for which continued funding was received by its officials
and put to illegal use, remains.
Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this decision would
only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. However, as concession to the
nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a confidential character is
disclosed, the examination of records in this case should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman
himself. Reference may be made to the documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman may
render or issue but only to the extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency. Above all, there
must be a scrupulous protection of the documents delivered.
With these safeguards outlined, it is believed that a satisfactory resolution of the conflicting claims of the
parties is achieved. It is not amiss to state that even matters of national security have been inquired into
in appropriate in camera proceedings by the courts. In Lansang v. Garcia 23 this Court held closed door
sessions, with only the immediate parties and their counsel present, to determine claims that because of
subversion there was imminent danger to public safety warranting the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus in 1971. Again in Marcos v. Manglapus 24 the Court met behind closed doors to receive military
briefings on the threat posed to national security by the return to the country of the former President and
his family. In the United States, a similar inquiry into the danger to national security as a result of the
publication of classified documents on the Vietnam war was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. 25 We
see no reason why similar safeguards cannot be made to enable an agency of the Government, like the
Office of the Ombudsman, to carry out its constitutional duty to protect public interests 26 while insuring
the confidentiality of classified documents.
C.
Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, 13(4) the Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" and that because the complaint in this case is
unsigned and unverified, the case is not an appropriate one. This contention lacks merit. As already
stated, the Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in any form or
manner" concerning official acts or omissions. Thus, Art. XI, 12 provides:
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. (Emphasis added)
Similarly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Rep. Act No. 6770) provides in 26(2):
The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form
concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and if it
finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of
such dismissal citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate
further, it shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of
the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two hours from
receipt thereof. If the answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis
added)
Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan 27 the Court held that testimony given at a fact-finding investigation
and charges made in a pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to
commence investigation, because a formal complaint was really not necessary.
Rather than referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI,
12 means any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient." 28 The phrase "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" refers to such limitations
as may be provided by Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be imposed by the
courts. Such limitations may well include a requirement that the investigation be concluded in camera,
with the public excluded, as exception to the general nature of the proceedings in the Office of the
Ombudsman. 29 A reconciliation is thereby made between the demands of national security and the
requirement of accountability enshrined in the Constitution. 30
What has been said above disposes of petitioners' contention that the anonymous letter-complaint
against them is nothing but a vexatious prosecution. It only remains to say that the general investigation
in the Ombudsman' s office is precisely for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is
filed against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the State from useless
and expensive trials. There may also be benefit resulting from such limited in camera inspection in terms
of increased public confidence that the privilege is not being abused and increased likelihood that no
abuse is in fact occurring.
II.
Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in
all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified
complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office
of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no
objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is
apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining
against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject
to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or
dismiss investigations held against them. 31 On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor
and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers. 32
III.
Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right
against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case
are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in
whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by
the EIIB of funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they
should object to the examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents
be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno and
Vitug, JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:
The well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Mendoza would postulate that the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) documents relating to the Personal
Services Funds for the year 1988 and all documentary evidence, including salary
vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988 be produced before the
Ombudsman over the objections of the EIIB Commissioner on the ground that the
documents contain highly confidential matters, apart from the fact that the expenditures
had been cleared in audit by the Commission on Audit (COA). The reasons relied upon
in the ponencia are a) that the EIIB documents at issue are not classified under COA
(Commission on Audit) Circular No. 88-293, Part V No. 7 which limits such matters
exclusively to expenditures relating to the purchase of information and payment of
rewards; and b) the documents relating to disbursement and expenditures of the EIIB
for personal funds had already been previously examined by the Commission on Audit
when such outlay had been passed upon in audit in the said Office, such that there is no
confidentiality privilege to protect.
With due respect, I beg to disagree.
Disclosure of the documents as required by the Ombudsman would necessarily defeat

the legal mandate of the EIIB as the intelligence arm of the executive branch of
government relating to matters affecting the economy of the nation. As such, EIIB's
functions are related to matters affecting national security. In the performance of its
function in relation with the gathering of intelligence information executive privilege
could as well be invoked by the EIIB, especially in relation to its covert operations.
The determination, by the executive branch, through its appropriate agencies, of a

question as affecting the national security is a policy decision for which this Court has
neither the competence nor the mandate to infringe upon. In the absence of a clear
showing a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive, acting through its
(national security) agencies, I am of the opinion that we cannot interfere with a
determination, properly made, on a question affecting economic security lest we are
prepared to ride roughshod over certain prerogatives of our political branches. In an
area obviously affecting the national security, disclosure of confidential information on
the promptings of some dissatisfied employees would potentially disturb a number of
carefully laid-out operations dependent on secrecy and I am not prepared to do this.
The characterization of the documents as classified information is not a shield for
wrongdoing but a barrier against the burden some requests for information which
necessarily interfere with the proper performance of their duties. To give in, at every
turn, to such requests would be greatly disruptive of governmental functions. More so in
this case, since expenditures of the EIIB for personal funds had already been previously
examined and passed upon in audit by the Commission on Audit. There has been no
allegation of any irregularity in the COA's earlier examination, and in the absence of
substantiated allegations, the previous determination ought to be accorded our respect
unless we want to encourage unnecessary and tiresome forays and investigations into
government activities which would not only end up nowhere but which would also
disrupt or derail such activities.
The confidentiality privilege invoked by petitioners attaches in the exercise of the

functions of the EIIB, as presidential immunity is bestowed by reason of the political
functions of the Chief Executive, as a separate and co-equal branch of government. By
the same parity of reasoning, the disclosure of the EIIB documents required to be
examined by the Ombudsman even in camera proceedings will under the pretext of
ascertaining the proper disbursements of the EIIB funds will unnecessarily impair the
performance by the EIIB of its functions especially those affecting national security.
The constitutional right allowing disclosure of governmental documents, i.e., the right to
information on matters of public concern is not absolute. While access to official records
may not be prohibited, it may be regulated. 1 Regulation includes appropriate authority to
determine what documents are of public concern, the manner of access to information contained in such
documents and to withhold information under certain circumstances, particularly, as in this case, those
circumstances affecting the national security. 2
Besides, as I emphasized earlier, the determination of the legality of EIIB's disbursements of funds
allocated to it are properly within the competence of the Commission on Audit, which as the ponencia of
Justice Mendoza finds, has been cleared in audit. The Commission on Audit had adopted, as in the past,
measures to protect "classified information" pertaining to examination of expenditures of intelligence
agencies. In the present case, disclosure of information to any other agency would unnecessarily expose
the covert operations of EIIB, as a government agency charged with national security functions.
I, therefore, vote to give due course to the petition.
Separate Opinions
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:
The well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Mendoza would postulate that the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) documents relating to the Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all
documentary evidence, including salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988 be produced
before the Ombudsman over the objections of the EIIB Commissioner on the ground that the documents
contain highly confidential matters, apart from the fact that the expenditures had been cleared in audit by
the Commission on Audit (COA). The reasons relied upon in the ponencia are a) that the EIIB documents
at issue are not classified under COA (Commission on Audit) Circular No. 88-293, Part V No. 7 which
limits such matters exclusively to expenditures relating to the purchase of information and payment of
rewards; and b) the documents relating to disbursement and expenditures of the EIIB for personal funds
had already been previously examined by the Commission on Audit when such outlay had been passed
upon in audit in the said Office, such that there is no confidentiality privilege to protect.
With due respect, I beg to disagree.
Disclosure of the documents as required by the Ombudsman would necessarily defeat the legal mandate
of the EIIB as the intelligence arm of the executive branch of government relating to matters affecting the
economy of the nation. As such, EIIB's functions are related to matters affecting national security. In the
performance of its function in relation with the gathering of intelligence information executive privilege
could as well be invoked by the EIIB, especially in relation to its covert operations.
The determination, by the executive branch, through its appropriate agencies, of a question as affecting
the national security is a policy decision for which this Court has neither the competence nor the mandate
to infringe upon. In the absence of a clear showing a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Executive, acting through its (national security) agencies, I am of the opinion that we cannot interfere with
a determination, properly made, on a question affecting economic security lest we are prepared to ride
roughshod over certain prerogatives of our political branches. In an area obviously affecting the national
security, disclosure of confidential information on the promptings of some dissatisfied employees would
potentially disturb a number of carefully laid-out operations dependent on secrecy and I am not prepared
to do this. The characterization of the documents as classified information is not a shield for wrongdoing
but a barrier against the burden some requests for information which necessarily interfere with the proper
performance of their duties. To give in, at every turn, to such requests would be greatly disruptive of
governmental functions. More so in this case, since expenditures of the EIIB for personal funds had
already been previously examined and passed upon in audit by the Commission on Audit. There has
been no allegation of any irregularity in the COA's earlier examination, and in the absence of
substantiated allegations, the previous determination ought to be accorded our respect unless we want to
encourage unnecessary and tiresome forays and investigations into government activities which would
not only end up nowhere but which would also disrupt or derail such activities.
The confidentiality privilege invoked by petitioners attaches in the exercise of the functions of the EIIB, as
presidential immunity is bestowed by reason of the political functions of the Chief Executive, as a
separate and co-equal branch of government. By the same parity of reasoning, the disclosure of the EIIB
documents required to be examined by the Ombudsman even in camera proceedings will under the
pretext of ascertaining the proper disbursements of the EIIB funds will unnecessarily impair the
performance by the EIIB of its functions especially those affecting national security.
The constitutional right allowing disclosure of governmental documents, i.e., the right to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. While access to official records may not be prohibited, it may be
regulated. 1 Regulation includes appropriate authority to determine what documents are of public concern,
the manner of access to information contained in such documents and to withhold information under
certain circumstances, particularly, as in this case, those circumstances affecting the national security. 2
Besides, as I emphasized earlier, the determination of the legality of EIIB's disbursements of funds
allocated to it are properly within the competence of the Commission on Audit, which as the ponencia of
Justice Mendoza finds, has been cleared in audit. The Commission on Audit had adopted, as in the past,
measures to protect "classified information" pertaining to examination of expenditures of intelligence
agencies. In the present case, disclosure of information to any other agency would unnecessarily expose
the covert operations of EIIB, as a government agency charged with national security functions.
I, therefore, vote to give due course to the petition.

a. Testimonial Privilege
b. Admissions
Constantino vs Heirs of Pedro Constantino Jr.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181508 October 2, 2013
OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO and CASIMIRA MATURINGAN,

Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR., represented by ASUNCION LAQUINDANUM,
Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the 31 May 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329, which
reversed the 27 October 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of
Malolos City, Bulacan, in a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of "Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman," Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022-02653 & 1002655, With Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction & Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 630-M-99.
The facts
This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of an estate which needed to
be proportionally subdivided among heirs.
Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors of the petitioners and respondents, owned several
parcels of land, one of which is an unregistered parcel of land declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration 208143 consisting of 240 square meters situated at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy,
Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his death, was survived by his six (6) children, namely: 1) PEDRO
CONSTANTINO, JR. (Pedro Jr.), the grandfather of the respondents; 2) ANTONIA
CONSTANTINO, who later died without issue; 3) CLARA CONSTANTINO, who also later
died without issue; 4) BRUNOCONSTANTINO, who was survived by his 6 children including
petitioner Casimira Constantino-Maturingan; 5) EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, who is survived
by his daughter Maura; and 6) SANTIAGO CONSTANTINO, who was survived by his five (5)
children which includes petitioner Oscar Constantino.4
On 17 June 1999, respondents Asuncion Laquindanum (Asuncion)and Josefina Cailipan
(Josefina), great grandchildren of Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a complaint5
against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and Casimira Maturingan,

grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the nullification of a document denominated as "Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman" dated 10 August 1992,6 Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022 (02653)7 and 96-
10022 (02655)8 and reinstatement of Tax Declaration No. 208149 in the name of Pedro Sr.
In the said complaint, respondents alleged that sometime in October 1998, petitioners asserted
their claim of ownership over the whole parcel of land (240 sq m) owned by the late Pedro Sr., to
the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion thereof. Upon verification,
respondents learned that a Tax Declaration No. 02010-2170-33235 in the name of petitioner
Oscar Constantino and his cousin Maxima Constantino was unlawfully issued, which in effect
canceled Tax Declaration No. 20814 in the name of their ancestor Pedro Sr. The issuance of the
new tax declaration was allegedly due to the execution of a simulated, fabricated and fictitious
document denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," wherein the petitioners
misrepresented themselves as the sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr. It was further alleged that
subsequently, the subject land was divided equally between petitioners Oscar and Maxima
resulting in the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-0265310 in the name of Oscar, with an
area of 120sq m and the other half in the name of Maxima covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-
10022-02652.11 The share of Maxima was eventually conveyed to her sister, petitioner Casimira
in whose name a new Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-0265512 was issued.
Thus, respondents sought to annul the "Pagmamana sa Labas ngHukuman" as well as the Tax
Declarations that were issued on the basis of such document.
The petitioners, on the other hand, averred in their Answer With Counterclaim13 that Pedro Sr.,
upon his death, left several parcels of land, namely: 1) a lot with an area of 240 sq m covered by
Tax Declaration No.20814; 2) a lot with an area of 192 sq m also situated at Sta.
Monica,Hagonoy, Bulacan, previously covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534; and 3)an
agricultural land with an area of Four (4) hectares, more or less. The petitioners claimed that the
document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" pertaining to the 240 sq m lot was perfectly valid
and legal, as it was a product of mutual and voluntary agreement between and among the
descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr.
Further, petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against them considering
that the respondents lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr., had already been transferred to
them as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver14 dated 5 December
1968,executed by Angelo Constantino, Maria Constantino (mother of respondent Asuncion),
Arcadio Constantino and Mercedes Constantino, all heirs of Pedro Jr. In the said deed,
respondents adjudicated unto themselves to the exclusion of other heirs, the parcel of land with
an area of 192 sq m by misrepresenting that they were "the only legitimate heirs of Pedro Sr.
Thus, petitioners claimed that in the manner similar to the assailed "Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman," they asserted their rights and ownership over the subject 240 sq m lot without
damage to the respondents.
In essence, petitioners position was that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which
led to the issuance of Tax Declaration No.9534 was acquiesced in by the other heirs of Pedro Sr.,
including the petitioners, on the understanding that the respondent heirs of Pedro Jr. would no
longer share and participate in the settlement and partition of the remaining lot covered by the "
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
On 15 August 2000, pre-trial conference15 was conducted wherein the parties entered into
stipulations and admissions as well as identification of the issues to be litigated. Thereupon, trial
on the merits ensued.
On 27 October 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision16 in favor of the respondents finding that:
As a result of execution of "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated December 5, 1968

(Exh. "2") executed by the heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., a son of Pedro Constantino, Sr. and
the subsequent execution of another deed denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"
dated August 10, 1992 (Exh. "E") executed by the heirs of Santiago and Bruno Constantino, also
other sons of Pedro Constantino, Sr., to the exclusion of the other heirs, namely, those of
ANTONIA, CLARA, and EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, both plaintiffs and defendants acted
equally at fault. They are in pari delicto, whereby the law leaves them as they are and denies
recovery by either one of them. (See:Yu Bun Guan v. Ong, 367 SCRA 559). Parties who are
equally guilty cannot complain against each other. (Sarmiento v. Salud, 45 SCRA 213.)
Supplementing the law on the matter, that is, the provision of Article 19 of the New Civil Code
whereby every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, is the legal maxim that
"he who comes to court to demand equity must come with clean hands." (LBC Express, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 602).
Although, plaintiffs-heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., including Asuncion Laquindanum and

Josefina Cailipan, are not parties or signatories to the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver"
dated December 5, 1968, they are successors-in-interest of Pedro Constantino, Jr. They
areconsidered "privies" to said deed, and are bound by said extrajudicial settlement. (See:
Cabresos v. Tiro, 166 SCRA 400). In other words, they are "PRIVIES IN ESTATE". (Correa v.
Pascual, 99 Phil. 696, 703).
Consequently, plaintiffs are now estopped from claiming otherwise. (See: PNB v. CA, 94 SCRA
357). They are estopped to share in the real property subject matter of this case. In fine, they are
not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.1wphi1 (Communication Materials & Design, Inc. v. CA,
260 SCRA 673).
With respect to alleged damages claimed by plaintiffs against defendants in their Complaint and
counterclaim for damages by defendants against plaintiffs in their Answer, both claims are
hereby dismissed for lack of valid factual and legal foundations.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and disquisition, the deed denominated as
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" of August10, 1992 and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-
02653 in the name of Oscar Constantino and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-02655 in the name
of Casimira C. Maturingan (from Maxima Constantino to Casimira C. Maturingan) stand.
Plaintiffs Complaint for nullification thereof with damages is hereby DISMISSED.17
Not convinced, the respondents appealed the afore quoted decision to the Court of Appeals (CA)
raising, among others, the erroneous application by the trial court of the doctrine of "in pari
delicto" in declaring the validity of the document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
In its 31 May 2007 Decision,18 the CA ruled in favor of the respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr.,
declaring that the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated 5 December 1968 they executed
covering the 192 sq mlot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr.
The CA rationated in this wise:
The 192 square meters lot which was adjudicated in the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver"
dated 5 December 1968 among the heirs of Pedro Jr. namely Angelo, Maria, Arcadio and
Mercedes is a property belonging to Pedro Jr. although there is a typographical error in that the
name of Pedro Jr. was inadvertently typed only as Pedro Constantino. It is clear from the reading
of the document that a typographical error was committed because the four (4) children of
PedroJr. by Felipa dela Cruz were specifically identified. Further, during the presentation of
evidence of the plaintiffs-appellants, it was rebutted that Pedro Sr. had six (6) legitimate children
namely: Pedro Jr., Antonia, Clara, Santiago, Bruno and Eduardo19 and Pedro Jr. had four (4).20
Thus, the CA went on to state that the respondents, heirs of Pedro Jr., did not adjudicate the 192
sq m lot unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Rather, the
adjudication in the document entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver dated 5 December
1968 pertains to a different property and is valid absent any evidence to the contrary. Hence, it is
erroneous for the trial court to declare the parties in pari delicto.
The Issue
The petitioners now question the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the
CA to appreciate the existence of misrepresentation in both documents, thereby ignoring the
propriety of the application of the in pari delicto doctrine. Likewise assailed is the erroneous
disregard by the CA of stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference on which the
application of the doctrine of in pari delicto was based.
Our Ruling
Latin for "in equal fault," in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are
guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties,
when an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto.21 Under the pari
delicto doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no
action against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it finds them. This doctrine finds
expression in the maxims "ex dolo malo nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior est conditio
defendentis."22
When circumstances are presented for the application of such doctrine, courts will take a hands
off stance in interpreting the contract for or against any of the parties. This is illustrated in the
case of Packaging Products Corporation v. NLRC,23 where this Court pronounced that:
This Court cannot give positive relief to either petitioner or respondent because we are asked to
interpret and enforce an illegal and immoral arrangement. (See Articles 1409, 1411, and 1412 of
the Civil Code). Kickback arrangements in the purchase of raw materials, equipment, supplies
and other needs of offices, manufacturers, and industrialists are so widespread and pervasive that
nobody seems to know how to eliminate them. x x x.
Both the petitioners and the private respondent are in pari delicto. Neither one may expect
positive relief from courts of justice in the interpretation of their contract. The courts will leave
them as they were at the time the case was filed.24
As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally governed by Articles 1411 and
1412 of the Civil Code, which state that:
Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract,
and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.
xxx xxx
Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx
1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has
given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the others undertaking;
xxx xxx.
The petition at bench does not speak of an illegal cause of contract constituting a criminal
offense under Article 1411. Neither can it be said that Article 1412 finds application although
such provision which is part of Title II, Book IV of the Civil Code speaks of contracts in general,
as well as contracts which are null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code
such as the subject contracts, which as claimed, are violative of the mandatory provision of the
law on legitimes.
We do not dispute that herein parties, through the Deeds they separately executed deprived each
other of rightful shares in the two lots subject of the separate contracts that is, if the two (2)
parcels of land subject matter thereof, form part of the estate of the late Pedro Sr.
It is asserted by the petitioners that their execution in 1992 of the contract denominated as
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" which excluded other heirs of Pedro Sr., was with an
underlying agreement with the other heirs including Maria Constantino, daughter of Pedro Jr.
and grandmother of respondents.25 The agreement was for the other heirs to recognize the 192
square meters lot subject matter of the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" executed in 1968
as the share of the heirs of Pedro Sr. in the estate of Pedro Sr., Petitioners respected such
agreement, as in fact, Maria Laquindanum and that of her heirs, herein respondents, were not
disturbed in their possession or ownership over the said parcel of land; thus, the heirs of Pedro Jr.
were said to have acquiesced26 to the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" and the underlying
agreement and therefore they have no recourse or reason to question it taking cue from the
doctrine of in paridelicto. This was the basis of the trial courts findings that respondents are now
estopped from claiming otherwise.27
We find that the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine.
This is not to say, however, that the CA was correct in upholding the validity of the contract
denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman." The CA decision being, likewise, based on
pari delicto, is also incorrect.
Finding the inapplicability of the in pari delicto doctrine, We find occasion to stress that Article
1412 of the Civil Code that breathes life to the doctrine speaks of the rights and obligations of
the parties to the contract with an illegal cause or object which does not constitute a criminal
offense. It applies to contracts which are void for illegality of subject matter and not to contracts
rendered void for being simulated,28 or those in which the parties do not really intend to be
bound thereby. Specifically, in pari delicto situations involve the parties in one contract who are
both at fault, such that neither can recover nor have any action against each other.
In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments unto the signatories of the portions
of the estate of an ancestor common to them and another set of signatories likewise assigning
unto themselves portions of the same estate. The separate Deeds came into being out of an
identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share in the
entire estate of Pedro Sr. It was, in reality, an assignment of specific portions of the estate of
Pedro Sr., without resorting to a lawful partition of estate as both sets of heirs intended to
exclude the other heirs.
Clearly, the principle of in pari delicto cannot be applied. The inapplicability is dictated not only
by the fact that two deeds, not one contract, are involved, but because of the more important
reason that such an application would result in the validation of both deeds instead of their
nullification as necessitated by their illegality. It must be emphasized that the underlying
agreement resulting in the execution of the deeds is nothing but a void agreement. Article 1409
of the Civil Code provides that:
ART. 1409. The following contracts are in existent and void from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law; morals, good customs, public order
or public policy;
xxx xxx xxx
Corollarily, given the character and nature of the deeds as being void and in existent, it has, as a
consequence, of no force and effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into and
which cannot be validated either by time or ratification.29
That said, we cannot give credence to the contention of respondents that no fault can be
attributed to them or that they are free from the effects of violation of any laws arising from the
supposed unlawful agreement entered into between Maria Laquindanum, their predecessor-in-
interest, and the other heirs, including petitioners herein, based on the fact that they are not
signatories to said agreement, thus, the lack of any binding effect to them. Respondents argued
and set forth as an issue during the trial that they were not signatories to any of the contract or
privies to such an arrangement. It is not disputed, however, that respondents are successors-in-
interest of Maria Laquindanum, one of the signatories in the Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver who was also allegedly in agreement with the petitioners.
On this note, We agree with the trial court that respondents are "privies" to Maria Laquindanum.
By the term "privies" is meant those between whom an action is deemed binding although they
are not literally parties to the said action.30 This Court, in Correa v. Pascual,31 had occasion to
explain that "privity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and
donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner and their
respective assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A privy in
estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the property in question by purchase; one
who takes by conveyance." In fine, respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right from
and are in the same position as their predecessor in whose shoes they now stand. As such
successors, respondents situation is analogous to that of a transferee pendente lite illustrated in
Santiago Land Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,32 reiterating Fetalino v. Sanz33
where this Court held:
As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the original defendant, and
is bound by the proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to him. He is a
proper, but not an indispensable, party as he would, in any event, have been bound by the
judgment against his predecessor.34
Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is
applicable to respondents who merely succeeded Maria.
This notwithstanding, it must however be shown that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver, referred to a property owned by Pedro Sr. There is such basis from the facts of this case.
The records show that apart from respondent Asuncion Laquindanumss statement that the parcel
of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of the
estate of Pedro Sr., their common ancestor, no other evidence was offered to support it. The CA
in giving credence to the respondents claim, merely relied on the alleged typographical error in
the Deed. The basis for the CAs conclusion was the inclusion of the wife of Pedro Jr. and that of
their children, which the CA considered as proof that the property was owned by Pedro Jr. and
not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. As pointed out by the petitioners, the mention of the names of
the children of Pedro Jr. in the Extrajudicial Settlement is not proof that the subject of the deed is
the property of Pedro Jr. Meant to exclude all the other heirs of Pedro Sr., only the children of
Pedro Jr. appeared in the Extrajudicial Settlement as heirs.
Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the
respondents during the pre-trial conference where they stipulated that the land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 9534 consisting of 192 sq. m belongs to Pedro Sr.35
A portion of the admission and stipulations made by both parties during the pre-trial is hereunder
quoted, thus:
Respondents admissions:
"1. That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by Pedro Constantino,
Sr. was transferred to Maria Constantino under Tax Declaration No. 9535; (highlighting ours)
1. The existence of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver per Doc. No.319, Page No. 44, Book
No. 11, Series of 1968 by Notary Public Romerico Flores, Jr."
Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission against respondents interest of the fact of
ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534, which was
transferred to respondents mother, the daughter of Pedro Jr. Such that, in one of the issues
submitted to be resolved by the trial court, this was included: "Whether or not the "Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" is enforceable against the plaintiffs, thus curing the legal
infirmities, if any, of the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"36 an issue earlier mentioned.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission
in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section
7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall
control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried.
In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al.,37 this Court emphasized that:
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they
become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or
facts stipulated.38 Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to
rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.39 (Highlighting
ours)
Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan,40 this Court declared that:
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a
waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an
admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party,
and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading
are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or
inconsistent with what was pleaded.41 (Citations omitted)
We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court serves as a
caveat for the rule of conclusiveness of judicial admissions for, in the interest of justice, issues
that may arise in the course of the proceedings but which may not have been taken up in the pre-
trial can still be taken up.
Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded.1awp++i1

Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the
matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the
pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall, explicitly define and limit the
issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified before trial to prevent injustice.
In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the general rule
regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of
proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission.42
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the
trial. While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot, respondent Asuncion
Laquindanum, when placed on the stand, offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of
land was acquired by Pedro Jr. A portion of her testimony43 is hereto reproduced as follows:
"ATTY. DOMINGO:
Q: Do you know if as part of the estate of the late Pedro Constantino, Sr. is another parcel of land
also situated at Sta. Maria, Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area of 192 square meters?
A: It is not owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr., sir. It is our property owned by Pedro Constantino,
Jr. that was inherited by my mother Maria Constantino.
Q: And do you know how Pedro Constantino, Jr. acquired that parcel of land, the one that you
mentioned a while ago?
A: Kinagisnan ko na po yong lupang yon pagkabata pa na yon e amin." (Highlighting ours)
The above assertion of denial is simply a self-serving declarationunsupported by evidence. This

renders conclusive the stipulations made during the pre-trial conference. Consequently,
respondents are bound by the infirmities of the contract on which they based their right over the
property subject matter thereof. Considering that the infirmities in the two deeds relate to
exclusion of heirs, a circumvention of an heirs right to his or her legitime, it is apt to reiterate
our ruling in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy,44 disposing that:
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
in favour of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Annunciation should have participated. Considering that
Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity. (Highlighting ours)
Further highlighting the effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate, the case of
Segura v. Segura,45 elucidated thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and
void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only partition. The partition in the
present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was
a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold
that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution x x x.
In light of the foregoing, while both parties acted in violation of the law on legitimes, the pari
delicto rule, expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur action" and "in pari delicto potior
est condition defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and
leaves them where they are, does not apply in this case. (Underline supplied)46 As held in De
Leon v. CA:47
In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both acted in violation of laws. However, the pari delicto rule
expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur action" and "In pari delicto potior est
condition defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves
them where they are does not apply in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to
adhere to the pari delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws,
positive relief should be granted to Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be
placed in the position in which she was before the transaction was entered into.
Accordingly, in order not to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws as contemplated by
the parties in the instant case, we must declare both contracts as void. Indeed, any circumvention
of the law cannot be48 countenanced.
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329 is
hereby REVERSED. The Pagmamana sa Lahas ng Hukuman and Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver are hereby declared void without prejudice to the partition of the estate of Pedro
Constantino Sr. with the full participation of all the latter's heirs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
People vs Gandia
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLENDO GAUDIA @ LENDOY or DODO,

appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
There can be no greater violation of a persons right to feel safe and secure than the crime of rape.
When one commits such a horrible act on another, he degrades not only that persons body; more
importantly, he defiles that persons mind. When the victim is a little child, the act and the
perpetrator himself assume a bestiality beyond the comprehension of normal human beings. Yet,
the law must apply equally upon saints and sinners alike, even to the most salacious ruffian.
Before us is the Decision51[1] dated 10 July 2000 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of
Digos, Davao del Sur, finding appellant Rolendo Gaudia52[2] guilty of the crime of rape, meting
upon him the penalty of death, and ordering him to pay to private complainant Remelyn Loyola
the amounts of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and costs of suit.
The Information filed against the accused-appellant reads as follows:
That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, in the Municipality of
Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor,
against her will to her damage and prejudice.
The prosecution presented Remelyns mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia
testified that on 24 March 1997, she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old)53[3]and
Kimberly (1 year old)54[4] at their house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to gather pigs food at
Bulatukan. At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in
the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and
proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her
any information. On her way home, she shouted and called out Remelyns name. At about 6:00
p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, Ma, I am here, from a grove of ipil-ipil trees.55[5]
Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30)
meters from their house.56[6] She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking with her
legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her
forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed
her. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyns
private organ.57[7]
The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya
Coring, a quack doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the
relatives and parents of the appellant.58[8] The quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh
blood oozing in Remelyns vagina, and told Amalia, Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being (sic)
raped.59[9] At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had
seen the appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn.60[10] At this point, the parents of
appellant told Amalia, Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle this, we are willing to
pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed.61[11] Police officers came
and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police precinct of
Hagonoy for investigation. Amalias statement was taken.62[12]
On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy Health Center in Davao del Sur.
Dr. Patricio Hernane, the municipal health officer,63[13] conducted a genital examination of
Remelyn, and made the following findings:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Absence of Pubic Hair (Tanner Stage I). No contusions are noted on the external genitalia. Dried
blood are (sic) noted on the labia minora. Fresh hymenal lacerations are noted at 12, 3, 6, 10
oclock (sic) are noted with fresh vaginal laceration noted at the posterior commissure but not
extending to the perineum. No lacerations were noted at the anal opening.
Speculum examination is not done because even exposure of the labia minora make the child cry.
(sic)
CONCLUSION: Physical virginity lost.64[14]
The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the insertion of a foreign
object, such as the penis of a man.65[15]
On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint.66[16] Amalia stated therein that
Remelyn had told her Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos.67[17] (Meaning crazy lendoy he forced me in
the Visayan dialect.) Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two weeks after the incident,
Remelyn told her, Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic) brought me to the ipil-ipil trees.68[18]
The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their
area. Mik testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way
home after registering at the COMELEC office. They were in a hurry as their child was running
a fever. Mik saw appellant carrying a small girl in his arms.69[19] He identified the little girl as
Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward
the ipil-ipil trees.70[20]
The next morning, 25 March 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., a neighbor informed Mik that Remelyn
had been raped. He proceeded to the house of the quack doctor where Amalia brought Remelyn
for examination. Amalia confirmed to Mik that Remelyn had been raped. Mik told Amalia that
appellant committed the crime. Mik then informed Barangay Official Rodrigo Malud71[21] and
the other tanods of the incident. They were instructed to locate the appellant. They passed to the
police the information that appellant was in Barangay Mahayahay. The policemen came and took
appellant for investigation. 72[22]
The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24
March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for
the National Elections. With him was Totong Loyola, the brother-in-law of Amalia Loyola. They
finished at 5:00 p.m., left and repaired to the house of Catalina Cabano, appellants aunt, to ask
for vinegar for their kinilaw (a dish composed of raw fish steeped in vinegar). They found
Daylen Cabano, the small grandchild of Catalina, alone at her house. Daylen was crying, hence,
they brought her with them as they proceeded to the place where Catalina was collecting tuba
(fermented coconut wine). It was appellant who carried Daylen.73[23] They reached Catalinas
place after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they went to the house of appellant. Dodo Malon and appellants
parents were in the house. At around 9:00 p.m., Totong and Dodo Malon left, after partaking of
the kinilaw. Appellant stayed home. The following morning (25 March 1997), appellant and
Dodo Malon went to the river to fish. At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to the house of his
aunt, Victoria Gayod, in Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was located by the police and
investigated.74[24] He claimed that it was Daylen and not the victim Remelyn whom he was
carrying.
As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex Totong Loyola. Totong testified that on 24
March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., they registered as voters in the barangay. After registering, they
went home to appellants house, but again left to get vinegar from his aunt Catalina Cabano, for
their kinilaw. In Catalinas house, they found her drunk husband, her 10-year old daughter, and
her 3-year old grandchild Daylen.75[25] Catalinas daughter directed them to the place where she
was gathering tuba. As Daylen was crying, appellant carried her on their way to Catalina. It was
then about 4:00 p.m. After Catalina finished gathering tuba, the four of them appellant, Totong,
Catalina and Daylen, left together and repaired to Catalinas house for the vinegar. Appellant and
Totong returned to appellants house where they spent the night.76[26] Totong woke up at 6:00 a.m.
the following day, and left appellants house. Totong came to know of appellants arrest the
following day.77[27]
Catalina Cabano also corroborated appellants story. She relates that on 24 March 1997, she was
gathering tuba, at a place around 2 kilometers from her house. She left Maritess, her youngest
child and Daylen, her grandchild, at her house.78[28] At about 5:30 p.m., appellant and Totong
arrived. Appellant was carrying Daylen. They waited for Catalina to finish gathering tuba until
6:00 p.m. Appellant and Totong went to the formers house, had a drinking spree, and then parted
ways at about 6:30 p.m. That night, according to Catalina, she talked to Tulon Mik at the
premises near the house. Mik was looking for Remelyn. At that time, appellant was already at
the house of Catalinas younger sister, which is located across the river, about 4 kilometers
away.79[29]
After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict
appellant for the crime of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven
years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the victim the sums of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
In his Brief80[30] to the Court, appellant assigned the following errors in the judgment of the trial
court:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ROLANDO

(sic) GAUDIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY

OF THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT STILL ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
STATE WITH CERTAINTY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF AGE IN THE
INFORMATION.
We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.
Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on
circumstantial evidence provided three requisites concur: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.81[31]
The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness
Tulon Mik that at 4:00 p.m. on 24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the
direction of the ipil-ipil grove, some 130 meters from her house.82[32] As a neighbor and relative
of Remelyns stepfather, Mik had sufficient familiarity with the child Remelyn. The possibility
that he could have been mistaken in identifying the victim is nil.
The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalias testimony that Remelyn
emerged naked from the same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead.
Remelyn was crying and walking with her legs spread far apart. Remelyns private organ was
bleeding and excreting a white mucus-like substance.83[33]
The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyns statement to her mother that it
was appellant who had brought her to the ipil-ipil grove84[34] and forced her to do something
against her will.85[35]
There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio
Hernane, the Municipal Health Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well
as fresh vaginal lacerations.
From these, the culpability of the appellant can be inferred with moral certainty. All the
aforementioned circumstances have been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, and by the inability of the appellant to
discredit their veracity.
The attempt of appellant to discredit the circumstantial evidence against him is futile. Appellant
contends, first, that Tulon Miks testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a relative of the
husband of Amalia.86[36] He also questions the credibility of Mik because of his failure to
confront appellant when he saw him carrying Remelyn. Neither did Mik inform Amalia about
what he saw when Amalia was looking for Remelyn. Appellant insists that it was Daylen whom
he carried and not Remelyn. Second, he stresses the fact that Remelyn did not make any
categorical statement that he sexually molested her. Third, he maintains that the accusation of
flight against him is false. Fourth, he avers that the offer of compromise by his parents as
tendered to Amalia Loyola should not be taken against him,87[37] while the offer of compromise
he allegedly made to Amalias husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should be
excluded as evidence for being hearsay.88[38] Finally, he submits that inconsistencies in the
testimony of Alex Loyola and Cabano should not be counted against him on the ground that any
finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecutions evidence.
We reject appellants arguments.
First, appellants attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik cannot succeed. It is true that Mik is a
relative by affinity of Amalia Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere relationship
to one of the parties, without a showing of any other improper motive, is not sufficient basis to
impair the credibility of the witness.89[39] In the case at bar, appellant cannot impute any ill
motive for Mik to testify adversely against him.
Appellant questions the failure of Mik to challenge him why he was carrying Remelyn. Also, he
assails Mik for failing to inform Amalia Loyola of such a sight. Mik had an explanation for the
inadvertence. He said his own child was down with a fever, and he and his wife were hurrying
home.90[40] For this same reason, he revealed the fact that he saw appellant carrying Remelyn
toward the ipil-ipil grove only when he learned of Remelyns fate. But thereafter, he lost no time
in reporting the matter to the barangay chairman.91[41] As a barangay kagawad, he also assisted in
the pursuit and arrest of appellant at Barangay Mahayahay.92[42] These subsequent actions
strengthen Miks credibility.
The trial court accorded more credence to Miks narration of the events over the testimonies of
Cabano and Loyola. It is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence that the trial judge's evaluation of the
testimony of a witness and its factual findings are accorded not only the highest respect, but also
finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood which could alter
the result of the judgment rendered. In the case at bar, there is no irregularity in the assessment of
evidence by the lower court. It granted utmost credibility to Miks testimony. Given the direct
opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess
his demeanor and determine if he was telling the truth or not.93[43] The trial court found Miks
testimony more worthy of credence over those of Catalina and Loyola. We have no reason to
reverse its findings.
Next, appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never made any statement that he
sexually molested her. This is a specious argument. Remelyn had told her mother, Crazy Lendoy
forced me.94[44] Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old at the time. At such an infantile age, she could not
be expected to have a comprehension of the concept of rape. Studies show that children,
particularly very young children, make the perfect victims. They naturally follow the authority of
adults as the socialization process teaches children that adults are to be respected. The childs age
and developmental level will govern how much she comprehends about the abuse and therefore
how much it affects her. If the child is too young to understand what has happened to her, the
effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension of the consequences. Certainly,
children have more problems in providing accounts of events because they do not understand
everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences from which to draw upon
in making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a limited
vocabulary.95[45] The fact that Remelyn called appellant Buang or crazy shows that he did
something which she knew was not right or proper. By saying iya kong lugos, Remelyn clearly
conveyed that he forced her to do something bad. With her limited comprehension, the child
could not have a perfect way of relating that she had been sexually abused. Finally, it must also
be considered that there is no actual counterpart for the word rape in Visayan parlance.
Appellants charge that the trial court erred when it ruled that he fled arrest, even if correct, is not
pivotal to his guilt. There are enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to convict him. Neither
will it affect the penalty or the award of damages rendered against him.
Similarly, appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the
appellant to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been
taken against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the
offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyolas husband is hearsay
evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer,96[46]
and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal
Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or
perception.97[47] The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to Amalia
may have been the subject of testimony98[48] of Amalia. However, following the principle of res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,99[49] the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the
appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to
the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as
evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the
conviction of the appellant.
Appellants defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note that appellant and his witnesses
claim that it was at around 5:00 p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her
grandmother Catalina at the place where she was gathering tuba. Mik testified that it was around
4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove. Given the 130-
meter distance between the ipil-ipil grove and the houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola,
appellant could have easily taken Remelyn from her house, raped her at the ipil-ipil grove, and
left her there, all in a matter of a few minutes. Sometime past 4:00 p.m., he could then have
returned to his house, and together with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the COMELEC office to
register, and did all the subsequent acts he claims to have done.
The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of Catalina and Loyola. The
discrepancies in the witnesses narration as to the time of arrival of appellant at the place where
Catalina was gathering tuba, his time of arrival at his own house, and the time when Loyola and
appellant actually parted ways, are not mere trivial details which could be forgotten by witnesses
because of the passage of time. To make matters worse, the appellants testimony was, at times,
contradicted by his own witnesses. Particularly telling was the conflict between appellants
statement that Totong had already left his house on the night of 24 March 1997 and Totong and
Catalinas own averments that Totong had stayed the night at appellants house. These
contradictory testimonies only made more incredulous appellants tale.
We now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant. In the case at bar, the Information
states that appellant, by means of force and intimidationwillfully, unlawfully and feloniously
(had) carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and
prejudice.100[50] (emphasis ours) The Information did not allege that Remelyn was below seven
years old when she was violated. Appellant was therefore charged with simple rape, under
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death
Penalty Law). Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659 introduced seven new attendant circumstances,
which when present, will transform the crime to qualified rape, punishable by death. We again
stress that these new attendant circumstances must be properly pleaded in the information to
justify the imposition of the death penalty. The facts stated in the body of the information
determine the crime for which the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried.101[51]
The main purpose of requiring all the elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. It would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if
he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death,
although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment
was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.102[52]
We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. Time and again, we have ruled that
when there is a finding that rape had been committed, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is
mandatory.103[53] If the death penalty has been imposed, the indemnity should be P75,000.00;
otherwise the victim is entitled to P50,000.00 for each count of rape.104[54] Thus, the appellant is
ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to Remelyn Loyola.105[55]
We affirm the award of moral damages. This is automatically awarded in rape cases without
need of further proof other than the commission of the crime, as it is assumed that a rape victim
has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.106[56]
We also find the award of exemplary damages made by the lower court in favor of complainant
as proper because complainant has been correctly granted moral damages and the offense against
her was committed with the aggravating circumstance107[57] of age. However, the amount
awarded must be reduced to P25,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.108[58]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Digos,
Davao del Sur in Criminal Case No. 213(97) is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of
the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
ordered to pay to complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Doldol vs People of the Philippines
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 164481 September 20, 2005
CONRADO C. DOLDOL, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Conformably to the Memorandum1 dated April 6, 1995 of the Provincial Auditor, a team of State
Auditors led by State Auditor Emilie S. Ritua, with State Auditors Lydia Naoe and Beverly T.
Cruz as members, conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of Conrado C. Doldol, the
Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The audit covered the General Fund, Special
Education Fund and Trust Fund in his custody for the period of November 30, 1994 to June 8,
1995. Doldol and the Municipal
Accountant were present during the audit. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a
shortage of P801,933.26. They also noted that on June 5, 1995, he made cash withdrawals from
the municipalitys deposit account with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) amounting to
P360,000.59. The withdrawal, purportedly for salaries, wages, allowances and mid-year bonuses
of municipal officers and employees, had not been recorded in the General Fund Cashbook as of
June 8, 1995. The State Auditors also noted that Doldol made adjustments in the said cashbook
on June 8, 1995, increasing his P801,933.26 shortage to P1,134,421.54. In a Letter2 dated July 5,
1995, the State Auditors demanded the immediate refund of the said amount, and for Doldol to
submit within 72 hours a written explanation on the said shortage. Doldol failed to respond and
was, thereafter, relieved of his duties. On July 20, 1995, he was directed to transfer the account
to Assistant Municipal Treasurer Loida Cancino.
The State Auditors then conducted another audit of the said account, this time covering the
period of June 8, 1995 to July 19, 1995. They discovered that Doldol incurred an added cash
shortage of P149,905.92. In a Letter to Doldol dated July 27, 1995, the State Auditors demanded
the immediate restitution of the missing fund, and directed him to submit within 72 hours a
written explanation why he incurred such shortage. Again, Doldol failed to respond. The State
Auditors submitted their Report to the Provincial Auditor on their examinations showing his
shortages. On August 3, 1995, the State Auditors submitted their Memorandum on the result of
the audits to the Provincial Auditor.
On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer requesting that a re-audit be conducted
on his cash and cash account, taking exception to the findings of the State Auditors.
Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On
September 15, 1995, he remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he
was issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to pay the balance of his shortage, as
follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995.
However, he reneged on his promise.
On February 6, 1996, the Provincial Auditor transmitted the Memorandum and Consolidated
Report of the State Auditors to the Ombudsman, and requested that Doldol be charged for
malversation of public funds. Despite the extensions given to him, Doldol failed to file his
counter-affidavit.
Two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City. The first Information, docketed as Criminal Case
No. SCC-2760, reads:
That on or about June 8, 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Urbiztondo,

Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, CONRADO C.
DOLDOL, a public officer, being then the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan, and as such accountable for public funds received and/or entrusted to him by reason
of his office, acting in relation of his office and taking
advantage of the same, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, use and benefit
the amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE PESOS and 54/100 (P1,134,421.54) from such public funds
received by him by reason of his office, to the damage of the government in the amount
aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SCC-2763, reads:
That sometime between June 8, 1995 and July 19, 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
CONRADO C. DOLDOL, a public officer, being then the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of
Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, and as such accountable for public funds received and/or entrusted to
him by reason of his office, acting in relation of his office and taking advantage of the same, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, misappropriate and convert to his
personal use and benefit the amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and 92/100 (P149,905.92) from such public funds received by him by
reason of his office, to the damage of the government in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Doldol testified that the funds which the State Auditors found missing were, in fact, cash
advances availed of by the municipal employees. He insisted that not a single centavo was used
for his personal benefit. He averred that the charges lodged against him were premature because
the same were based on an incomplete audit.
In a Joint Decision, the trial court convicted the accused of the crimes charged. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Conrado Doldol is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds in Criminal Case No. SCC-2760
and in Criminal Case No. SCC-2763, as defined and penalized by Art. 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. In both cases, the amount involved is more than P22,000.00, as such the penalty to be
imposed is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Considering that the
accused surrendered to the police in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan (See Exh. 4) and being entitled to
the provision of [the] Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 10 years, 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years, 8 months of
reclusion temporal as maximum in each of the two cases. Further, he is ordered to pay the
amount of P1,134,421.54 in Criminal Case No. SCC-2760 and another amount of P149,905.92 in
Criminal Case No. SCC-2763 minus, of course, his advance payment of P200,187.80. In
addition, he should be made to suffer the accessory penalties corresponding to the principal
penalty imposed upon him which includes perpetual absolute disqualification (Art. 41, Rev.
Penal Code) and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.5
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), Doldol alleged:
1. That the trial court erred in rejecting the defenses put up by the accused as follows:
a. The evidence shows that the audits were not yet completed when the letters of demand were
served upon him to produce the alleged missing funds.
b. He was not given the chance to further verify the records despite his request to that effect.
c. There is no evidence that he took the money from the vault or brought it home.
d. The missing funds, if any, were cash advances of certain municipal employees.
e. His having borrowed money from the bank negates the charge of misappropriation of public
funds.
2. That the trial court erred in convicting the accused based on the testimonies of the auditors and
the documentary evidence adduced by them.
3. That the trial court erred in sentencing the accused to suffer the penalties imposed by the
assailed joint decision.6
On February 11, 2001, the CA rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision, and, likewise,
denied Doldols motion for reconsideration thereof.
Doldol, now the petitioner, forthwith filed the present petition for review on certiorari, faulting
the CA as follows:
1. In affirming the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan in Crim. Case Nos. SCC-2760 and SCC-2763;
2. In convicting the accused-petitioner on the basis of an erroneous and incomplete audit;
3. In not dismissing the cases against the accused-petitioner.7
The petitioner reiterates his arguments that the audit of his accountabilities had not been
completed because the State Auditors had yet to conduct a verification of their initial findings
based on the cashbook and a reconciliation of the bank deposits of the municipality. The
petitioner insists that the State Auditors did not submit any bank reconciliation statement. The
petitioner argues that he was never given a chance to explain and point out that he did not incur
any shortage of public funds, and that the charges against him should be dismissed. To bolster
his claim, he cites the ruling of this Court in Dumagat v. Sandiganbayan8 and Section 560 of the
Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors and other Guidelines to bolster his claim.
The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that the public funds were for his
personal use. In fact, the petitioner insists, the evidence shows that the alleged missing funds
were unliquidated cash advances of employees. Hence, the petitioner concludes, the prima facie
presumption under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the issues
raised by the petitioner are factual and, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of
law may be raised. The OSG posits that the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA, are conclusive on this Court, absent a showing that the trial court ignored, misconstrued or
misunderstood cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome
of the case. The OSG maintains that the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that
the petitioner malversed the public funds subject of the two Informations. Moreover, the
petitioners contention that the charges against him were premature, because the audit of his
accountabilities had not yet been completed and he was not given a chance to explain the
whereabouts of the subject funds before the said charges were filed, is belied by the fact that he
even made a partial restitution of the public funds. The OSG notes that as found by the trial
court, the petitioner even failed to specify the names of the employees who were granted cash
advances and the accounts of the said advances. It further avers that the ruling of this Court in
Dumagat v. Sandiganbayan9 does not apply because:
In his vain attempt to exculpate himself from criminal liability, petitioner invokes the doctrine
established in Dumagat vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., [211 SCRA 171, 177 (1992)]], wherein this
Honorable Court acquitted the accused of the crime of malversation of public funds, holding that
"[s]ince the audit examination left much to be desired in terms of thoroughness and completeness
as there were accounts which were not considered, the same cannot be made the basis for
holding petitioner liable for malversation."
It is submitted that the ruling in Dumagat vs. Sandiganbayan (supra) is not applicable to the
instant case as the two cases are based on different factual circumstances.
In the first place, in Dumagat vs. Sandiganbayan (supra, at p. 178), there was a finding that the
"haphazard examination of the cash accountability of petitioner" was made by the auditor "in
violation of the Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors" and that "the missing funds
would have been discovered if only the auditor took into consideration the contents of the two
vaults in Sindangan and Tampisilan and the fact that her collection in Dipolog City were
deposited with the NFA cashier." In the instant case, there was sufficient compliance with the
Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors as the two (2) auditing teams had completed
their examination and, thereafter, required herein petitioner to produce or explain the shortages
of funds in his custody. Notwithstanding the demand for him to explain the shortages, petitioner
totally disregarded the same and further failed to produce upon demand the missing funds
amounting to P1,134,421.54 and P149,905.92. There was, thus, nothing left for the team of
auditors to do in the instant case. If at all, State Auditor Ritua requested for the return of
petitioners cashbook and passbooks merely to reconcile and confirm the correctness of their
findings.10
The petition has no merit.
The evidence on record shows that the team of State Auditors conducted its first audit of cash
and cash accounts of the General Fund, Special Education Fund and Trust Fund in the custody of
the petitioner, and discovered that he had a shortage of P1,134,421.54.11
In a Letter12 dated July 5, 1995, the State Auditors demanded that the petitioner immediately
produce the missing funds. He was also required to submit within 72 hours a written explanation
why the shortage occurred. In the meantime, the State Auditors conducted another audit of the
cash and cash accounts of the petitioner during the period of June 8, 1995 to July 19, 1995, and
he was found to have a shortage of P149,905.92. The petitioner was informed of the results of
the audit in a Letter dated July 27, 1995, where he was directed to refund his shortage of
P149,905.92 and to submit a written explanation thereon within 72 hours.13 However, the
petitioner failed to respond to such demand, and failed to object to the findings and conclusions
of the State Auditors. It bears stressing that the petitioner was present during the said audit.
While it is true that the petitioner requested for a re-audit on August 3, 1995 and objected to
some of the findings of the audit team, he addressed the letter-request to the Provincial
Treasurer, and not to the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan. We note that while the Provincial
Auditor had already signed the Transmittal Letter dated August 3, 1995 on the State Auditors
Report and request for the petitioners prosecution for malversation of public funds, it was filed
only on February 6, 1996. In the meantime, the Provincial Auditor never received any letter from
the petitioner requesting for a re-audit of his account.
Admittedly, State Auditor Ritua conducted an audit of the General Fund, the Special Education
Fund and Trust Fund Passbook, and the LBP and DBP Passbooks on July 11, 1995 for
verification and reconciliation purposes. However, the petitioner was not barred from examining
and receiving the same, preparatory to the submission of his explanation to the State Auditors
demand-letters. Indeed, the petitioner was even able to write the Provincial Treasurer on August
3, 1995, and requested his objection to such findings. The following findings and ratiocination of
the CA, as supported by the evidence on record, negate the submission of the petitioner:
[T]he records at the depository banks confirmed the correctness of the COAs findings that
there were, indeed, shortages in the funds under appellants control, thus, rendering appellants
request for a re-audit as a mere superfluous and redundant procedure (TSN, Amando T. Sison;
Emelie Ritua, supra).
Appellants contention that he was not given the chance to verify the records under audit despite
a request to that effect deserves scant consideration. The records show that appellant was twice
afforded ample opportunity to replenish the funds or explain the reason for its disappearance.
Verily, this could have been the perfect opportunity for the appellant to verify the records and
provide an acceptable reason behind the shortages in the municipal funds under his custody.
Appellant, however, on both instances failed to reply to the demands given by the COA. For
having refused "to face the music," so to speak, and disregarded the demands sent by the COA,
appellant has only himself to blame if he has lost any opportunity to further verify the financial
records of the municipality.14
The record of the Ombudsman shows that the petitioner was required to submit his counter-
affidavit, but requested for time to do so, on his representation that his request to the
Commission on Audit for a re-audit was still pending. It turned out that the petitioner made no
such request.
Moreover, the petitioner failed to submit his counter-affidavit to the Ombudsman. Thus, the
petitioners submission that the audit of his account had not been completed before the report of
the State Auditors was referred to the Ombudsman is not correct.
Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to prove
that the missing funds were actually cash advances of employees in the municipality. The
petitioner could have offered in evidence the documents evidencing the names of the recipients
and amounts of the cash advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote the
Provincial Auditor and offered to refund the missing funds as follows: P200,000.00 on
September 15, 1995, P200,000.00 on or before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on November
30, 1995. He was able to pay only P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, and failed to remit the
balance of his shortage. Such partial restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an
implied admission of misappropriation of the missing funds. The ruling of the CA on this matter
is correct:
As We have already stated hereinabove, on September 15, 1995, not too long after the shortages
in the municipal funds were discovered, appellant made a partial payment/settlement in the
amount of 200,187.80 pesos as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 436756 (Exhibit "8," Record,
Volume III, p. 6). With respect to the balance of the missing funds, appellant promised to pay the
same in installment basis. Appellant, though, failed to comply with his undertaking (Record,
Volume I, p. 457; TSN, Amando T. Sison, July 27, 1998, pp. 32-33). Said payment is of no
moment and could not have legally brought acquittal for the appellant. On the contrary, as
guided by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, We hold that said payment,
particularly when taken in conjunction with appellants commitment to gradually pay the
remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an
implied admission of appellants guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his
personal use.15
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25845 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
c. Confessions
Ladiana vs People of the Philippines
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144293. December 4, 2002]
JOSUE R. LADIANA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from
the accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial
investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during the
preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as
evidence against the affiant.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 10,
2000 Decision109[1] and August 4, 2000 Resolution110[2] of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in
Criminal Case No. 16988. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JOSUE R. LADIANA GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and, in the absence of any modifying
circumstance, sentencing the said accused to: (a) suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum[;] (b) suffer all the appropriate accessory
penalties consequent thereto; (c) indemnify the heirs of the victim, Francisco San Juan, in the
total amount of Fifty Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P56,500.00); and (d) pay the costs.111[3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was originally charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan in an Information 112[4]
dated August 5, 1991. However, the anti-graft court issued an Order113[5] dated October 14, 1991,
noting that besides the allegation that the crime was allegedly committed by the accused while he
was taking advantage of his official position, nothing else is in the Information to indicate this
fact so that, as the Information stands, nothing except a conclusion of fact exists to vest
jurisdiction [in] this Court over the accused and over the crime for which he is charged.
Further, the Order gave the government sufficient time to amend the Information to show
adequate facts to vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over the case. Subsequently, an
Amended Information,114[6] still charging petitioner with murder, was filed on April 1, 1992. The
accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of December 1989, in the Municipality of Lumban, Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National Police (INP now PNP) assigned at
the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is primarily to
enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of his official position
confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel pipes which were
previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street,
Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of persons passing along the
said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused that the latter has no business in
stopping him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, with intent to kill and with treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and sho[o]t Francisco San Juan
with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds
thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.115[7]
During his arraignment on May 8, 1992, petitioner, assisted by his counsel de parte,116[8] pled not
guilty.117[9] After due trial, the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of homicide, not murder.
The Facts
In their Memoranda, both the prosecution and the defense substantially relied upon the
Sandiganbayans narration of the facts as follows:
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely: Caridad M. San Juan, PO2 Leopoldo
Cacalda, Dr. Rogelio M. Javan, SPO2 Percival A. Gabinete, and Maria T. Cortez. Their
respective testimonies, in essence are as follows, to wit:
1. CARIDAD MARGALLO SAN JUAN (hereinafter, Caridad) declared that she is the wife
of Francisco San Juan (hereinafter Francisco), the victim in the case at bar. Caridad testified that
Francisco was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, until he was shot and
killed by accused Ladiana, who happens to be also a distant relative of the decedent.
Caridad recounted that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house when an unidentified
woman came and told her that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana. She immediately
called up her sister-in-law before rushing to Jacinto Street where the gruesome incident allegedly
transpired. Thereat, many people were milling around, and Caridad saw the lifeless body of
Francisco lying in the middle of the road and being examined by [SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete.
Caridad recalled that it was around 11:00 oclock a.m. when she reached the place of the subject
incident. At that point in time, she was not even allowed by the police to touch, much less get
near to, the cadaver of Francisco. Caridad, expectedly, was crying and one of her aunts advised
her to go home.
Caridad maintained that she was aware that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana because
this was what the woman actually told her. Moreover, accused Ladiana had given himself up to
the police authorities.
Caridad went on to narrate that, on December 30, 1989, she was at the police station, where she
gave her written statement before police investigator PFC Virgilio Halili (hereinafter, Halili).
Additionally, Caridad presented the Death Certificate of her husband and testified that he was
eventually buried at the Lumban Cemetery. She declared that she had incurred about Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for the funeral, burial and other incidental expenses by reason of
the death of Francisco.
On cross-examination, Caridad testified that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house and
that she did not hear any gunshot between 10:30 and 11:00 oclock a.m. Caridad also admitted
she did not witness the killing of her husband.
On questions propounded by the Court, Caridad narrated that her husband suffered two gunshot
wounds - one on the upper right temple and the other on the left cheek. However, Caridad stated
that she was told that the wounds were the entry and the exit points. She also told the Court that
her husband was wearing short pants at the time of his death and that she found some bruises on
his knees.
Finally, Caridad recalled that, on the date of the incident, her husband was with his close friend,
a certain Rodolfo Cabrera, and some other persons, and that they went to Jacinto Street to repair
the steel humps which were used to block the street during school days for the protection and
safety of the school children.
2. PO2 LEOPOLDO DE RAMOS CACALDA, JR. (hereinafter, CACALDA) declared that

he is a policeman assigned at the Lumban Police Station in Lumban, Laguna. He has been
designated as the radio operator of the station since 1989.
Cacalda recounted that, on December 29, 1989, at around 11:00 oclock a.m., somebody, whose
name he could no longer recall, reported to him about an existing trouble along Jacinto Street in
Barangay Salac Cacalda responded by going to the scene, where he was accompanied by Alberto
Mercado, a member of the CAGFIL. Thereat, Cacalda saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying
face up on the road. Cacalda did not examine the body of Francisco. He left the place of the
incident when [SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete and other policemen subsequently arrived.
Cacalda had gathered from the people milling around the body of Francisco that it was accused
Ladiana who shot and killed Francisco. Cacalda immediately left to look for accused Ladiana.
However, he eventually saw accused Ladiana already inside the jail of the police station and
thereafter learned that said accused had surrendered to the police authority.
Cacalda recalled that he was later on investigated by Halili because he was the responding
policeman who went to the scene of the incident. Consequently, Cacalda executed a written
statement in relation to the subject incident.
On cross-examination, Cacalda testified that he was a radio operator and not an investigator of
the police station. He also testified that he did not witness the incident subject matter of the case
at bar.
Cacalda went on to testify that the people milling around the place of the incident told him that
accused Ladiana had already left. Because of this development, Cacalda proceeded to accused
Ladianaa house but was told that he had already gone to the police station. Cacalda accordingly
went to the police station where he saw accused Ladiana already locked inside the jail. He also
saw a stab wound on accused Ladianas right bicep but he did not anymore ask him how he
sustained the said injury.
3. DR. ROGELIO JAVAN y MAGRACIA (hereinafter, Javan) declared that he is a
physician and the Municipal Health Officer of Lumban, Laguna.
Javan recounted that he was the one who performed the necropsy on the cadaver of Francisco
and that he had prepared the corresponding reports and/or documents relating thereto. Javan
made a sketch representing the anterior and posterior views of the body of Francisco, and labeled
and placed red markings on the gunshot wounds found on the said cadaver. The marking
Gunshot wound A is the point of entry, which is one (1) centimeter in diameter and situated two
(2) inches behind the left ear. The marking Gunshot wound B is the point of exit of Gunshot
wound A, which is two (2) centimeters in diameter and found above the right cheekbone and one
(1) inch below the right eye. Javan also testified that there is another gunshot wound and the
point of entry and exit are labeled as Gunshot wound C and Gunshot wound D, respectively.
Gunshot wound D is one and one-half (1-1/2) centimeters in diameter and located at the left
cheek, three and one-half (3-1/2) centimeters below the left eye, while Gunshot wound C is one
(1) centimeter in diameter and found at the right lateral aspect of the neck, at the level of the
adams apple.
According to Javan, the assailant must be behind the victim when he inflicted Gunshot wound A.
As regards Gunshot wound C, the assailant likewise must be behind the victim, at a distance of
more than twenty-four (24) inches away.
Lastly, Javan testified that he was not able to retrieve any bullet during the examination.
However, judging from the size of the wound and the point of entry, Javan opined that the
firearm used was probably a caliber 38.
On questions propounded by the Court, Javan testified that Gunshot wound A could have been
fired first because the trajectory is on the same level so much so that the assailant and the victim
could have been both standing. Javan inferred that Gunshot wound C could have been inflicted
while the victim was already falling down. Javan then stressed that both wounds are fatal in
nature.
4. SPO2 PERCIVAL AMBROSIO GABINETE (hereinafter, Gabinete) declared that he is a

police officer and a resident of No. 4055 Villa Josefina Subdivision, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
The testimony of Gabinete was subsequently dispensed with, upon the admission of the defense
that he was part of the group of policemen who proceeded to the place of the subject incident and
that he found the body of Francisco lying along the road. Additionally, the defense admitted the
existence of the receipt issued by Funeraria de Mesa dated January 3, 1990 in the sum of Six
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00).
5. MARIO TALAVERA CORTEZ (hereinafter, Cortez) declared that he is a retired

Assistant Prosecutor of Laguna.
Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made an
admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-
affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. In said counter-
affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the fatal shots on Francisco. However,
accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense as Francisco was then purportedly attacking
accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on the arm of accused Ladiana.
However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary
investigation of the complaint which led to the filing of the subject case. Additionally, Cortez
testified that he would not be able to anymore recognize the face of the affiant in the said
counter-affidavit, but maintained that there was a person who appeared and identified himself as
Josue Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter-affidavit.
After the presentation of Cortez, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its
case.
On May 31, 1995, this Court issued a resolution admitting all the documentary evidence
submitted by the prosecution.
On August 20, 1996, accused Ladiana filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to
Evidence dated August 16, 1995, claiming that: (i) a review of the documentary and testimonial
evidence adduced by the prosecution allegedly failed to show that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged; (ii) at best, the evidence submitted by the prosecution are allegedly hearsay in
character, considering that the supposed eyewitness in the person of Rodolfo Cabrera was never
presented in court; and (iii) the prosecution was allegedly merely able to prove the fact of death
of the victim, but not the identity of the person who caused said death.
On August 23, 1996, this Court issued an Order of even date holding that the filing of a demurrer
to evidence is no longer appropriate considering that accused Ladiana received a copy of this
Courts resolution dated May 31, 1995 on the admission of the prosecutions documentary exhibits
as early as May 25, 1995.
On September 2, 1996, in view of his perception that the evidence submitted by the prosecution
is allegedly inadequate to sustain a conviction, accused Ladiana, through counsel, waived his
right to present controverting evidence. Instead, he asked for time to file a written memorandum.
Thus, both parties were given time within which to do so, after which the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.
Thereafter, this Court received on October 25, 1996 by mail the Memorandum for the defense.
As for the prosecution, it opted not to file any.118[10] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that his Counter-Affidavit,119[11] in which he had
admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victims death,120[12] may be used as
evidence against him. It underscored the admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the
authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit.121[13] In short, it
ruled that the document had sufficiently established his responsibility for the death of the victim.
However, it found no evidence of treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only.122[14]
Hence, this Petition.123[15]
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
I. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may convict the accused-petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide even in the absence of any eyewitness who personally saw the
sho[o]ting of the victim by the accused, basing it only on the testimony of the prosecutor who
had administered the oath on the Counter-affidavit filed by petitioner-accused.
II. Whether or not the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable doubt to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused and his right against self-
incrimination on the basis of the Counter-affidavit whose execution was admitted by the counsel
of the petitioner, but not by the accused personally.
III. Whether or not the Counter-affidavit of the accused-petitioner which was considered by
the Sandiganbayan in its decision as similar to an extrajudicial confession may [be] admitted
against him as evidenc[e] of guilt beyond reasonable doubt even if he was not assi[s]ted then by
counsel and while he was under custodial investigation.
IV. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is constitutionally and legally correct in issuing the
Order of August 23, 1996 denying the Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence
dated August 16, 1995 filed by the accused in accordance with Sec. 15 of Rule 120 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure in relation to Rule XXI of the Revised Rules of Sandiganbayan.
V. Whether or not accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender which fact was admitted by the prosecution as it even used the same as proof of the
guilt of the accused.124[16]
In short, petitioner raises the following questions in this appeal: (1) whether the Counter-
Affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation of this case is admissible proof
showing his complicity in the crime, (2) whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying his Motion
for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence, and (3) whether he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit
Undeniably, the resolution of this case hinges mainly on the admissibility of the Counter-
Affidavit125[17] submitted by petitioner during the preliminary investigation. He argues that no
counsel was present when the Affidavit was executed. In support of his argument, he cites the
Constitution thus:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.126[18]
It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land
apply only to extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodial
investigations.127[19] Indeed, the rights enumerated in the constitutional provision exist only in
custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of accused persons.128[20]
Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.129[21]
In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the
preliminary investigation, not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the
right to competent and independent counsel also applies during preliminary investigations.
We disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether

there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.130[22]
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally declared
that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation.131[23] It explained as follows:
His [accused] interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended
at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors office). Hence,
with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutors
office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under custodial interrogation laid down
by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the obvious reason that he is no longer under
custodial interrogation.132[24]
There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his
Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed
facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or interrogation. Hence,
the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation as embodied in Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case.
However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the
public prosecutor -- unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded. These include: 1)
the right to refuse to be made witnesses; 2) the right not to have any prejudice whatsoever
imputed to them by such refusal; 3) the right to testify on their own behalf, subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying, the right to refuse to answer a specific
question that tends to incriminate them for some crime other than that for which they are being
prosecuted.133[25]
We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayans characterization of petitioners Counter-

Affidavit as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130
of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.
SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement

of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which one is charged.134[26] Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused
admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with
criminal intent is an admission, not a confession.135[27]
The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim
when the latter was attacking him. We quote the pertinent portion:
[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-
shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng
aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay
hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan;136[28]
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the
latters death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in
self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is
admissible in evidence against him.
Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted
it to the public prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It
escapes this Court how he can cavalierly deny a document that he has voluntarily submitted and
originally relied upon in his defense.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were
made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission was
made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the true
state of facts.137[29] Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions had
been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the
case at bar, are evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the burden of
showing a mistake.138[30]
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the transcripts of this case can it be found that he has
admitted to the authorship, the authenticity or the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. We
quote verbatim the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan:
PJ GARCHITORENA
Well, he will identify the person who took the oath before him. Will you deny that it was your
client who took the oath before the Fiscal at the preliminary investigation?
ATTY. ILAGAN
We will admit that, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
So in that case we will have no question about the authorship, authenticity and the voluntariness
of the execution of the counter-affidavit dated July 31, 1990? Companiero?
ATTY ILAGAN
Admitted, your Honor.139[31]
The admissions of petitioner made through his counsel cannot be any clearer. To be sure, the
unbroken stream of judicial dicta is that, in the conduct of their case, clients are bound by the
actions of their counsels, save when the latters negligence is so gross, reckless and inexcusable
that the former are deprived of their day in court.140[32] Also, clients, being bound by the actions
of their counsels, cannot complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had
their lawyers proceeded differently.141[33] A counsel may err as to the competency of witnesses,
the sufficiency and the relevance of evidence, the proper defense, the burden of proof, the
introduction or the withholding of witnesses or pieces of evidence, or the manner of arguing the
case. This Court, however, has ruled several times that those are not even proper grounds for a
new trial, unless the counsels incompetence is so gross that the clients are prevented from fairly
presenting their case.142[34]
Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the
killing was justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor.143[35] Petitioner
should have relied on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the
prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has
admitted the killing.144[36]
Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-defense.
Hence, he could not be bound by it. This argument deserves scant consideration. As discussed
earlier, the declarations contained in his Counter-Affidavit are admissions that may be used as
evidence against him.145[37] The Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had indeed
raised the theory of self-defense, because this argument had already been laid out in his Counter-
Affidavit. No presumption was necessary, because the admission was clear and unequivocal.
Neither do we believe petitioners claim that the anti-graft court miserably failed to give equal
effect or treatment to all the allegations found therein (Counter-Affidavit) choosing deliberately
and without reasonable basis the parts which are incriminating in character, and ignoring without
sufficient legal basis the exculpatory assertions of the accused.146[38]
The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are

utterly insufficient to discharge his burden of proving that the act of killing was justified. It is
hornbook doctrine that self-defense must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person
invoking it.147[39] It cannot be entertained if it is uncorroborated by any separate and competent
evidence, and it is also doubtful.148[40] The question whether the accused acted in self-defense is
essentially a question of fact properly evaluated by the lower court; in this case, the
Sandiganbayan.149[41]
By itself, the Counter-Affidavit miserably fails to establish the requisites of self-defense
enumerated in the law.150[42] Had petitioner been more vigilant in protecting his rights, he could
have presented clear and cogent evidence to prove those elements. But, as found by the court a
quo, he not only failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense; he did not even bother to present any evidence at all.151[43] So, we
do not see how the Sandiganbayan could have been selective in its treatment of his Counter-
Affidavit.
Verily, if the accused fails to discharge the burden of proving the existence of self-defense or of
any other circumstance that eliminates criminal liability, his conviction shall of necessity follow,
on the basis of his admission of the killing.152[44] Upholding this principle does not in any way
violate his right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. When he admitted to having killed
the victim, the burden of proving his innocence fell on him. It became his duty to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the killing.
Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the
crime charged.153[45] As far as he is concerned, homicide has already been established. The fact
of death and its cause were established by his admissions coupled with the other prosecution
evidence including the Certificate of Death,154[46] the Certificate of Post-Mortem
Examination155[47] and the Medico-Legal Findings.156[48] The intent to kill is likewise presumed
from the fact of death.157[49]
Second Issue:
Denial of Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
Petitioner then argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving due course to his Motion for
Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. He brands this denial as legally and constitutionally
wrong.158[50]
We disagree. Prior leave to file a demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court.159[51]
And, unless there is grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial, the trial
courts resolution may not be disturbed.160[52]
Final Issue:
Voluntary Surrender
After vigorously arguing against his own Counter-Affidavit, petitioner, in a surprising change of
tenor, implores this Court to consider his voluntary surrender to the police authorities as a
mitigating circumstance. He argues that two of the prosecution witnesses testified that he had
surrendered to the police authorities after the shooting incident.161[53] To buttress his argument,
he contends that the main reason for his voluntary surrender is that he sincerely believe[d] that he
was legally justified in defending himself as a policeman when he fought the victim after he was
attacked by the latter.162[54] It goes without saying that this statement only reaffirms the
admissions contained in his Counter-Affidavit, which he so vehemently tried to discredit.
For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in
authority or to the latters agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary.163[55] To be sufficient, the
surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused
to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the
authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and
capturing them.164[56]
The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by petitioner are
statements made by two (2) prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told by other people
that he had already gone to the police station. There is no showing that he was not actually
arrested; or that when he went to the police station, he surrendered himself to a person in
authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a desire to own to any complicity in
the killing.
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to
report the shooting incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the killing.
Thus, he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered.165[57] In the absence of sufficient
and convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances, we cannot
appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioners penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., abroad on official business.
People of the Philippines vs Ulit
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 131799-801. February 23, 2004]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision166[1] dated December 17, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 to 97-388
finding appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
qualified rape.167[2] In the same decision, the appellant was convicted of two counts of acts of
lasciviousness. For each count of rape, the trial court sentenced him to suffer the supreme
penalty of death, while for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the appellant was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment from eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in
its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The appellant was, likewise, ordered to
indemnify the victim Lucelle Serrano, the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape and P20,000
for each count of acts of lasciviousness.
The Indictments
Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four Informations were filed against
her uncle, the appellant. The docket number and the accusatory portion of each Information
reads:
Criminal Case No. 97-385
That sometime in the month of November 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
who is the uncle of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence, her relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree, while armed with a knife, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl,
without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.168[3]
That sometime in the month of February 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines,
a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the
uncle of complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence her relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree, while armed with a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant
LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, without her consent and against her
will, to her damage and prejudice.
That sometime in the month of December 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE
SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, by then and there kissing her and touching her
sexual organ, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
That on or about the 2nd day of March 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an
eleven (11) year old girl, by then and there dragging her inside a bathroom and repeatedly
kissing her on her checks [sic], without her consent and against her will, to her damage and
prejudice.
The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Joint trial of all the
cases ensued.
In the meantime, Lucelle was undergoing psychiatric treatment at the Philippine General
Hospital. On May 5, 1997, the prosecution presented her as its first witness.
On direct examination, Lucelle testified that she was born on February 19, 1986.172[7] In
November 1996, her uncle, the appellant, did something to her. When the prosecution asked her
what happened, Lucelle did not answer. When asked if she wanted to continue with her
testimony, again, she did not respond. The trial was reset to June 2 and 9, 1997. When trial
resumed on June 9, 1997, Lucelle was questioned by the prosecution on direct examination, but
still, she gave no answer. She cried profusely in open court. When asked by the court if she
wanted to proceed with the trial, she remained silent. The trial was reset anew to July 9 and 14,
1997.
In the meantime, the trial court ordered that Lucelle be subjected to physical and psychological
examinations at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH). Dr. Rochelflume Samson
examined Lucelle and submitted her Report dated August 29, 1997 with the following remarks
and recommendation:
Based on clinical history, mental status examination and psychological evaluation, this patient is
suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. This illness is characterized by intense fear and
feeling of helplessness whenever she recalls her traumatic experience of being raped. It causes
her intense psychological distress whenever asked to talk about the rape scene or incident. Thus,
she avoids recollections of the trauma.
At present, she is still manifesting symptoms described above. She would be having difficulties
testifying in court because of this. She requires psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient
Section.173[8]
During the trial on July 14, 1997, Lucelle refused to take the witness stand. The trial was reset to
July 21, 1997.
During the hearing on October 20, 1997, the prosecution presented Lucelle anew to continue
with her testimony on direct examination. She declared that the appellant raped her in November
1996 and many other times thereafter in her residence at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Makati
City. Instead of asking questions to elicit the facts and circumstances before and during the
commission of the crimes, the prosecutor asked Lucelle to identify her signature in her sworn
statement174[9] and to affirm the truth of its contents. She did so. The public prosecutor then
marked the sworn statement in evidence as Exhibit H, and then manifested to the court that he
had no more questions for the witness on direct examination.
On clarificatory questions by the court, Lucelle testified that she was born on February 19, 1986.
The appellant mounted her, removed her pants, poked a knife at her and threatened her.175[10]
On cross-examination, Lucelle testified that the appellant was her mothers older brother. In
November 1996, she was not enrolled in any school. Her father was working at a construction
firm, the appellant was employed at the Department of Environment and Sanitation in Makati
City, while her grandmother, who lived with her, worked as a maid in Bel Air Subdivison. Her
mother worked for one of her fathers cousins. On re-direct examination, the prosecution elicited
from Lucelle that the appellant raped her in November 1996 at 11:00 p.m. inside the room of her
aunt Marina in her grandmothers house at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia, Makati City,
and that her aunt, Marina, and her Ate Sharon were inside the room. When asked where her aunt
and Ate Sharon were when she was being raped in her aunts room, Lucelle did not respond.
When asked why she did not respond to the questions propounded to her during the previous
hearings and why she had been crying in open court, Lucelle replied that she was afraid of her
uncle, the appellant.
In her sworn statement,176[11] Lucelle alleged that sometime in November 1996, she was sleeping
in a room in the house. It was about 6 oclock in the evening. She was awakened when she felt
someone kissing her on the cheek. When she opened her eyes, she saw her uncle, the appellant,
armed with a bladed weapon (balisong). He poked the weapon on the left side of her neck. He
warned her that if she told her parents, he would kill her. He removed her panties, undressed
himself and mounted her. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain in her private
part and cried. The appellant, thereafter, left the room. Also during the month of November
1996, the appellant continued kissing her whenever her parents were out of the house.
In December 1996, Lucelle was in the room when the appellant entered and kissed her and
mashed her private parts. Sometime in February 1997, the appellant again abused her (sinalbahe)
while she was in the same room. It was about 11 oclock in the evening. He again warned her not
to divulge to her parents what he did to her. At 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997, Lucelle urinated in
the bathroom and when she was about to go out, the appellant entered, pushed her inside and
kissed her on her cheeks several times.
Celso Serrano, Lucelles father, testified that sometime in November 1996, at dawn, he was in
bed and noticed that the appellant was in the bedroom of his cousin-in-law. Sometime later, he
went to the bathroom. He then heard his wife ask the appellant where he had come from and the
latter replied that he just came from the roof of the house. On another occasion, one early Sunday
morning, he noticed blood stains on Lucelles short pants. When she declared that she had her
monthly period, he gave her P5.00 with which to buy sanitary napkins. Lucelle refused to accept
the money. He suggested that she wash herself but she just nodded her head. When he asked her
why she refused to accept the money, Lucelle replied that she was afraid to tell him because she
might be killed.
Lourdes Serrano testified that she was Lucelles mother. Lucelle was born on February 19,
1986.177[12] She and her husband Celso Serrano and their daughter Lucelle resided with her
mother, Guadalupe Ulit, at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia, Makati City. Her sister
Marina and the appellant, her brother, also resided in the same house. The family slept together
in the evenings in the sala of the house while Marina slept in her bedroom. At times, Marina
allowed her niece Lucelle to sleep in her bedroom. At 11:00 p.m. on February 19, 1997, Lourdes
noticed that Lucelle was not at her side. The appellant, who usually also slept in the sala, was not
there either. Lourdes went to Marinas bedroom and saw Lucelle in bed (papag), covered with a
blanket. Beside her was the appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt.
When the appellant saw Lourdes, he slid down from the bed, went under the papag, and furtively
left the room. When Lourdes removed the blanket, she saw Lucelle lying sideways with her
knees up to her chin (nakabaluktot). Lucelle was trembling with fear. When Lourdes asked
Lucelle what happened, she did not respond. Lourdes left the room and went back to the sala.
She wanted to talk to the appellant but decided against it when she saw him seated in the sala,
playing with his balisong.
Lourdes further testified that at 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997, she and her husband were having
dinner when she noticed that Lucelle was nowhere to be found. She looked for her daughter in
the house, but failed to find her. She then asked her cousin Nita if she had seen Lucelle. Nita
replied in the negative. When Lourdes asked Nita if Lucelle was inside the bathroom, Nita
responded that the appellant was using it. Momentarily, Lourdes saw the appellant emerge from
the bathroom. He was in his short pants and his shirt was on his shoulder. He was perspiring
profusely. Lourdes was flabbergasted when she saw Lucelle come out of the bathroom after the
appellant. Lucelle was crying and looked pale. When Lourdes asked Lucelle why she was crying,
she told her mother that she had just urinated. The appellant later told her sister Lourdes that he
did not do anything to Lucelle.
Believing that the appellant had been abusing their daughter, Celso and Lourdes brought Lucelle
on March 5, 1997, to Barangay Chairman Romeo Medina. On their way, Lucelle adamantly
refused to tell her parents what the appellant did to her. However, when they reached the
barangay headquarters, Lucelle told the barangay chairman that the appellant sexually abused
her. Thereafter, Lourdes filed a complaint with the barangay chairman against the appellant for
sexually molesting Lucelle.
Barangay Tanod Fernando David testified that on March 6, 1997, the barangay chairman ordered
him and Barangay Tanod Antonio Echavez to invite and bring the appellant to the barangay hall.
The barangay chairman asked the appellant if he raped Lucelle and the latter replied that he did.
A Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared in the Office of the Barangay Chairman in which the
appellant admitted that he raped Lucelle in February 1997, and on March 2, 1997, despite her
resistance, and that he threatened to kill her and her family if she divulged the incidents to her
parents.178[13] The appellant signed his statement in the presence of the barangay chairman and
the barangay tanods.
From the barangay headquarters, the appellant was brought to the Makati City Police
Headquarters where Celso, Lourdes and Lucelle filed a complaint against him for rape and acts
of laciviousness. SPO4 Lilia Hogar of the Womens Desk Unit took the sworn statements of
Lourdes and Lucelle.179[14] She conducted a custodial investigation of the appellant who was
without counsel during which the latter admitted having raped the victim. SPO4 Hogar also
prepared a report on her investigation of the victims complaint.180[15]
On July 28, 1997, Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that on March
12, 1997, she conducted genital and vaginal examinations on Lucelle and submitted Living Case
Report No. MG-97-355 which contained the following findings:
GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Height: 141 cm. Weight: 78 lbs.
Normally developed, fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject.

Breasts, developing, conical, firm. Areolae, light-brown, 2.6 cms. in diameter. Nipples,
light-brown, protruding, 0.8 cm. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injuries noted.
GENERAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette,
lax. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact, distensible. Hymenal orifice, admits a
tube 2.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal walls, lax. Rugosities, shallow.
CONCLUSIONS
1.) No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at
the time of examination.
2.) Hymen, intact but distensible, and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to allow
complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without
producing any genital injury.181[16]
When the prosecution offered in evidence the appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay before the
barangay chairman182[17] as part of the testimony of Barangay Tanod Fernando David, the
appellant objected to its admission on the ground that the appellant was not assisted by counsel
and that, he was forced and coerced into signing the same. Nevertheless, the trial court admitted
the statement as part of Davids testimony. The appellants counsel, likewise, objected to the
admissibility of Lucelles sworn statement on the ground that she was incompetent to give the
same because of her mental illness. The trial court admitted the sworn statement of Lucelle in
evidence as part of her testimony.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset the hearing to November 5, 1997 for
the appellant to adduce his evidence. When the case was called for trial on that date, his counsel
manifested to the court that the appellant was changing his plea in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385
and 97-387 from not guilty to guilty. He also manifested that he would no longer adduce any
evidence in his defense in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-386 and 97-388 because the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged therein. The trial court
suspended the proceedings and gave the appellant forty-five minutes to confer with his counsel.
When trial resumed, the appellant reiterated his earlier manifestation. When told by the court that
he could be sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant stood pat on his decision to
plead guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387, and to no longer present any evidence in
his defense in the other two cases. The appellant was re-arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385
and 97-387 with the assistance of the same counsel and entered his plea of guilty to the charges.
On December 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of all the
crimes charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, for rape, the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in the
two counts of statutory rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. He is hereby declare[d] CONVICTED in each of the cases. Accordingly he is
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty [of] DEATH in each of the two cases; and indemnify the
victim LUCELLE SERRANO, in the amount of P50,000 as moral damages for each of the cases;
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-387 and 97-388, for acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution has
proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO ULIT Y TAMPOY, as
principal in two counts of acts of lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code and penalized under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in
each of the two cases; and, accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer in each of the cases an
indeterminate prison term from eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum; and, indemnify the victim,
LUCELLE SERRANO, in the amount of P20,000 as moral damages for each of the cases.
SO ORDERED.183[18]
The trial court declared that even prescinding from the appellants plea of guilty, the prosecutor
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant for qualified rape in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386. The trial court ruled that although Lucelle did not
testify on the contents of her sworn statement184[19] the same were admissible in evidence as part
of the res gestae.
The appellant did not appeal from the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-387 and 97-388. In
view of the trial courts imposition of the death penalty on the appellant in Criminal Cases Nos.
97-385 and 97-386, the said cases were brought to this Court on automatic appeal.
The appellant assails the decision of the trial court with the lone assignment of error, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED FELICIANO ULIT WITH
A DEATH PENALTY DESPITE HIS ADMISSION OF GUILT.185[20]
The appellant does not contest his conviction for rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-
386, and the validity of the proceedings in the said cases in the trial court. He pleads, however,
that he be spared the death penalty. He asserts that he was so remorseful for the crimes he
committed and that he pleaded guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387; he no longer
presented any evidence in Criminal Case No. 97-388 so that the proceedings before the court
would be shortened and simplified. Nevertheless, the appeal in a criminal case is a review de
novo and the court is not limited to the assigned errors.186[21] An appeal thus opens the whole
case for review, and the appellate tribunal may consider and correct errors though unassigned
and even reverse the decision of the trial court on the grounds other than those the parties raised
as errors.187[22]
Appellants Plea of Guilty in

was Imprudently Made.
In Criminal Case No. 97-385, the appellant was charged with qualified rape, i.e., the rape of his
niece, who was a minor, punishable by death under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Undoubtedly, the appellant was charged with a capital
offense. When the appellant informed the trial court of his decision to change his plea of not
guilty to guilty, it behooved the trial court to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea as mandated by Section 6, Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In People vs. Camay,188[23] this Court enumerated the
following duties of the trial court under the rule:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
[by the accused] of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to
do so if he desires.189[24]
The raison detre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with extreme care where the
imposable penalty is death, considering that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable.
Experience has shown that even innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. Improvident
pleas of guilty to a capital offense on the part of the accused must be averted since by admitting
his guilt before the trial court, the accused would forfeit his life and liberty without having fully
understood the meaning, significance and the dire consequences of his plea.190[25]
There is no hard and fast rule as to how the trial judge may conduct a searching inquiry. It has
been held, however, that the focus of the inquiry must be on the voluntariness of the plea and the
full or complete comprehension by the accused of his plea of guilty so that it can truly be said
that it is based on a free and informed judgment. In People vs. Aranzado,191[26] we formulated the
following guidelines as to how the trial court may conduct its searching inquiry:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index
of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because
of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him
or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to
supply missing details or significance.192[27]
In People vs. Ostia,193[28] we held that the trial court is also required to probe thoroughly into the
reasons or motivations, as well as the facts and circumstances for a change of plea of the accused
and his comprehension of his plea; explain to him the elements of the crime for which he is
charged as well as the nature and effect of any modifying circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense, inclusive of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, as well as the
qualifying and special qualifying circumstances, and inform him of the imposable penalty and
his civil liabilities for the crime for which he would plead guilty to.194[29]
In this case, the trial court failed to make a searching inquiry into the appellants voluntariness
and full comprehension of his plea of guilty. This is evident by the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on November 5, 1998:
ATTY. MANALO
Your Honor, at todays reception of defense evidence, accused informed this representation that
he will no longer present evidence and instead willing to change his plea from not guilty to that
of guilty. This accuseds representation is therefore praying that he be allowed to change his plea
from that of not guilty to guilty.
COURT
You better confer with your client and explain to him the consequences of his intended change of
plea from not guilty to that of guilty.
ATTY. MANALO
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT (to the accused)
Is your counsels manifestation true, that you would like to change your plea from not guilty to
that of guilty and that you are no longer presenting evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-386 and
97-388?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
(to the accused)
You talk with your lawyer and think twice before asking the court to change your plea of not
guilty to that of guilty. The Court will call your case again.
COURT
(to the accused)
Mr. Ulit, earlier your counsel informed the court that you would like to change your plea from
not guilty to that of guilty, in Criminal Case No. 97-385, for rape and Criminal Case No. 97-387,
for Acts of Lasciviousness, do you affirm the manifestation of your counsel?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.

COURT
(to accused)
Do you know that you are accused here for the crime of rape, a capital offense which carries with
it a capital punishment?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
(to accused)
Despite your knowledge that you are charged with a capital offense which carries with it a
capital penalty you still insists that you are pleading guilty?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT (to accused)
Was there anyone who forced you to change your plea of not guilty to that of guilty?
ACCUSED
None, Your Honor.
COURT
(to accused)
Do you know that by pleading guilty you will be sentenced in accordance with [what] the law
provides?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
(to accused)
Do you know that the penalty provided for by law is death penalty because the Information states
that the victim is eleven years old and your niece and that you used a deadly weapon in the
commission of the rape?
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor. I am willing to plead guilty.
COURT
Alright, arraign the accused.195[30]
First. The trial court did not ask the appellant his reasons for changing his plea, from not guilty to
that of guilty, and the cogent circumstances that led him to decide to do so.
Second. It appears in the Informations filed by the Public Prosecutor that the appellant opted not
to avail himself of his right to a regular preliminary investigation and refused to execute a waiver
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The records also show that the appellant executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the barangay hall where he confessed to having raped
the victim in February 1997 and March 2, 1997. However, the trial court did not ask the
appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when he was brought to the Office of the Public
Prosecutor for inquest investigation. Neither did the court a quo inquire about the circumstances
and the appellants reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver.
The records show that when the prosecution offered the appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay in
evidence to prove that he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2,
1997, the appellant objected thereto on the ground that he was not assisted by counsel and that he
was coerced into signing the same.
Third. The trial court also failed to ascertain from the appellant whether he was assisted by
counsel when he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the barangay hall; and, if
he was not so assisted by counsel, whether he had waived his right thereto, before and when he
signed his Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Fourth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant why he was pleading guilty to a rape committed
in November 1996, when in his Sinumpaang Salaysay,196[31] he confessed to having raped the
victim only in February 1997 and March 2, 1997. The appellant did not admit having raped her
in November 1996 as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 97-385. The trial court did
not even inquire from the appellant who prepared and typed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and if the
contents of his statement were explained to him before he signed the same.
Fifth. The trial court did not explain the following to the appellant, in plain and simple terms so
as to be understood by him: (a) the elements of the crime of qualified rape; (b) the circumstances
of relationship and the minority of the victim; and (c) that his plea of guilty to qualified rape
would not mitigate the penalty for the crime in light of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Sixth. It was not explained to the appellant that if convicted of qualified rape, he would be civilly
liable to the victim in the amount of P50,000 as moral damages and P75,000 as civil indemnity
ex delicto.
Seventh. Neither did the trial court inquire from the appellants counsel whether the meaning and
the consequences of a guilty plea were explained to the appellant in a language or dialect known
to and understood by him.
Eight. The trial court failed to delve into and ascertain from the appellant his age, educational
attainment and socio-economic status.
Ninth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant to narrate the facts and circumstances
surrounding the incident of qualified rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 97-385.
Tenth. The appellant was not asked if he desired to adduce evidence in Criminal Case No. 97-
385 in spite of his plea of guilty.
As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because
of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment.197[32] However, where the trial court receives, independently of his plea of guilty,
evidence to determine whether the accused committed the crimes charged and the precise degree
of his criminal culpability therefor, he may still be convicted if there is ample proof on record,
not contingent on the plea of guilty, on which to predicate conviction.198[33]
In this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when the appellant decided to change his
plea. In fact, the trial court granted the prosecutions motion that the evidence it had presented be
considered proof of the degree of culpability of the appellant. It is, thus, incumbent upon this
Court to determine whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 97-
385 is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the appellants guilt for qualified rape.
In determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the following
considerations: (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove,
but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime which usually involves two persons, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence of the defense.199[34] It, likewise, bears stressing that in all criminal
prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden
of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.200[35]
The Prosecution Adduced Proof

of the Appellants Guilt Beyond
Reasonable Doubt of the Crime
of Rape in Criminal Case
No. 97-385
We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the prosecution adduced
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim in November 1996. The victim
declared in her sworn statement, on direct examination and her testimony on clarificatory
questions made by the trial court, that indeed, the appellant raped her in November 1996. Quoted
hereunder is the testimony of Lucelle on direct and on re-direct examination:
Fiscal
Q So, matapos mong ituro ang tiyuhin mo, ano ang ginawa niya sa iyo?
A Ginahasa niya ako.
Q Ilang ulit kang ginahasa?
A Marami po.
Q Kailan ka ginahasa ng tiyuhin mo?
A November po.
Q 19?
A 1996, po.
Q Saan ka ginahasa?
A 7104 San Maximo St., Makati City, po.201[36]
Fiscal
Q Humigit-kumulang, anong oras ng gabi nang gahasain ka ng Tito Ely mo noong

Nobyembre 1996?
A Alas onse po ng gabi.
Q Samakatuwid, hindi na siya nagtratrabaho, wala na siya sa trabaho?
A Wala na po.
Q Saang lugar ka ginahasa?
A Sa 7104 San Maximo St.
Q Sa loob ba ng bahay?
A Opo.
Q Saang parte ng bahay ka ginahasa ng Tito mo?
A Sa kuwarto po.202[37]
...
COURT
Q Noong Nobyembre 1996, ayon sa iyo ay ginahasa ka ng iyong Tito. Saan ka ginahasa ng
Tito mo?
A Sa 7104 San Maximo St., po.
Q Doon din sa bahay na iyong tinitirhan?
A Opo.203[38]
In her Sworn Statement,204[39] Lucelle narrated in detail how the appellant ravished her:
06. T: Kailan ka unang senalbahe ng iyong TITO ELY?

S: Noon pong Nobyembre 1996 hindi ko na po matandaan ang petsa, mga bandang 6:00 ng
gabi po nang ako ay natutulog sa loob po ng kuwarto ay nagising na lang po ako nang
maramdaman ko na may humahalik sa aking pisngi, at nang ako po ay magising ay nakita ko po
si TITO ELY na may hawak na balisong na humigit kumulang po sa 10 pulgada ang haba na
nakatutok sa aking kaliwang leeg habang humahalik po sa aking pisngi at ang sabi ay kung ako
daw po ay magsusumbong sa aking magulang ay papatayin po niya (TITO ELY) ako.
Pagkatapos po ay hinubaran po ako ng panty at naghubad na rin po si TITO ELY ng kanyang
short pants at pumatong na po sa akin. Ipinasok po ni TITO ELY and kanyang (TITO ELY) ari sa
aking PEPE at ako po ay nasaktan at umiyak na lang po ako at nang makaraos po si TITO ELY
ay umalis na lang .205[40]
We do not agree with the ruling of the trial court that the contents of the sworn statement of
Lucelle are hearsay, simply because she did not testify thereon and merely identified her
signatures therein. By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its
value solely from the credence to be attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in part on
the veracity and competence of some persons from whom the witness has received the
information.206[41] It signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of
the witness from whom it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not subject to cross-
examination.207[42] The basis for the exclusion appears to lie in the fact that such testimony is not
subject to the test which can ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony,
since the declarant is not present and available for cross-examination. In criminal cases, the
admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision while the
accused shall enjoy the right to confront and cross-examine the witness testifying against
him.208[43] Generally, the affidavits of persons who are not presented to testify on the truth of the
contents thereof are hearsay evidence.209[44] Such affidavit must be formally offered in evidence
and accepted by the court; otherwise, it shall not be considered by the court for the simple reason
that the court shall consider such evidence formally offered and accepted.210[45]
In this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn statement
which she herself had given. As gleaned from the said statement, she narrated how and when the
appellant raped and subjected her to lascivious acts. She was cross-examined by the appellants
counsel and answered the trial courts clarificatory questions. The prosecution offered her sworn
statement as part of her testimony and the court admitted the same for the said purpose without
objection on the part of the appellant.
The Prosecution Proved Beyond

Reasonable Doubt that the Appellant
Raped the Victim in February 1997
The trial court convicted the appellant of rape in Criminal Case No. 97-386 on the basis of
Lucelles sworn statement,211[46] the testimony of her mother, Lourdes Serrano, the appellants
statement212[47] executed in the Barangay Chairmans Office, and the testimony of Dr. Armie
Soreta-Umil. We agree with the trial courts findings and conclusion.
First. In Lucelles sworn statement,213[48] she declared that the appellant subjected her to sexual
abuse.
Second. Lourdes saw Lucelle in bed (papag) in Marinas room, covered with a blanket beside the
appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt. He slid down from the papag,
went under the bed and slipped outside. When Lourdes removed the blanket, she saw Lucelle
trembling with fear, lying sidewise, her knees near her chin (nakabaluktot).
Third. The appellant admitted to the barangay chairman on March 5, 1997, that he raped Lucelle
in February 1997:
Na, noong isang araw ng PEBRERO 1997, sa loob ng kuwarto ng aking kapatid na babae,
pumasok ako na nadatnang nakahiga si LUCILLE ULIT sa isang papag na anyong natutulog.
Lumapit ako sa kanya at pinaghihipuan sa maseselang parte ng kanyang katawan at nang siyay
magising tinakot ko siyang huwag sisigaw, habang siya ay aking hinuhubaran ng Short na
kasama pati ang kanyang panty. Nagpupumiglas siya habang ako ay nakadagan sa kanya na
noon din ay hinuhubad ko ang aking brief. Pinaghahalikan ko po siya habang siya ay
nagpupumiglas at umiiyak at noon din ay aking pinasok ang aking ari sa kanyang ari. Umiiyak
siya habang ang aking ari ay labas masok sa kanyang ari. Nang ako ay makaraos ay tinakot ko
siyang huwag magsusumbog sa kanyang mga magulang.214[49]
Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the
barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him
because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his
statement.215[50]
The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers investigation conducted by police authorities
which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and
such other police agencies in our government.216[51] The barangay chairman217[52] is not deemed a
law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellants
statement before the barangay chairman is inadmissible.
The Sufficiency of Evidence on

Lucelles Relationship with the
Appellant, her Minority, and the
Propriety of the Imposition of
the Death Penalty
The appellants conviction for two counts of rape having been duly established by the
prosecution, we now come to the question of the penalty to be meted upon him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,
which was the law in effect at the time of the commission of the subject rapes, provides in part:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
...
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
...
The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur. More importantly, they
must be both alleged and proved, in order to qualify the crime of rape and warrant the imposition
of the death penalty.218[53] In addition to the requirement that the qualifying and aggravating
circumstance must be specifically alleged in the information, it must be established with
certainty that the victim was below eighteen (18) years of age or that she was a minor at the time
of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty,
especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in
capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.219[54]
The relationship between the appellant and the victim has been adequately established. The
allegations in both Informations that the appellant is the victims uncle, a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree is specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship.
In People v. Ferolino,220[55] we said
In this case the allegation that FERLYN is ANTONIO's niece is not specific enough to satisfy
the special qualifying circumstances of relationship. If the offender is merely a relation - not a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common law spouse of the mother of the victim - it
must be alleged in the information that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as the case
may be] within the third civil degree. That relationship by consanguinity or affinity was not
alleged in the informations in these cases. Even if it was, it was still necessary to further allege
that such relationship was within the third civil degree.221[56]
The prosecutions evidence has also shown that the appellant is the victims uncle, being the older
brother of the victims mother, a fact that the appellant himself admitted.
The same cannot, however, be said with respect to the age of the victim. In People v.
Pruna,222[57] the Court, after noting the divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in rape
cases, set out certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as
qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who
is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date
of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be

proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be

proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony

of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.223[58]
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and
offered in evidence to prove Lucelles age. While the victim testified that she was born on
February 19, 1986, therefore 11 years old when the appellant twice raped her, the same will not
suffice as the appellant did not expressly and clearly admit the same as required by Pruna. The
corroboration of Lucelles mother as to her age is not sufficient either, as there is no evidence that
the said certificate of birth was lost or destroyed or was unavailable without the fault of the
prosecution. The fact that there was no objection from the defense regarding the victims age
cannot be taken against the appellant since it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the
same. Moreover, the trial court did not make a categorical finding of the victims minority,
another requirement mandated by Pruna.
Another issue that needs to be settled is the third paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which provides that, [w]henever rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
The evidence on record shows that the appellant raped Lucelle with the use of a deadly weapon
in both rape incidents as alleged in both informations, and under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable penalty for the crime is
reclusion perpetua to death.
In the determination of whether the death penalty should be imposed on the appellant, the
presence of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime is crucial. In the cases at
bar, although the relationship of uncle and niece between the appellant and the victim has been
duly proven, the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against the appellant. While it is true
that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against chastity,
regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party,
it is only taken into consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code when the offended
party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or
relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. The relationship of uncle and niece is not
covered by any of the relationships mentioned.224[59]
Hence, for the prosecutions failure to prove the age of the victim by any means set forth in
Pruna, and considering that the relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the
relationships mentioned in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the appellant can
only be convicted of rape in its aggravated form, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua to death.
There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the crimes, the appellant
should be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, conformably to Article
69 of the Revised Penal Code.
The victim is entitled to moral damages without need of proof other than the fact of the rape
itself because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an
award.225[60] We find the trial courts award of P50,000 as moral damages to the victim in each
rape to be in order.
However, the trial court erred in not awarding civil indemnity to the victim in each case, the
same being mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.226[61] Thus, this Court awards the
victim the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity for each count of rape.
In addition to this, appellant is ordered to pay the victim P25,000 as exemplary damages, the
qualifying aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon having attended the commission
of the crime.227[62]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 to 97-388 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant
Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, and in each case, is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim, Lucelle Serrano, P50,000 as moral
damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; and P25,000 as exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
People of the Philippines vs Sayaboc
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147201. January 15, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA,

PATRICIO ESCORPISO y VALDEZ, MARLON BUENVIAJE y PINEDA, and MIGUEL
BUENVIAJE y FLORES, appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 finding appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death; and (2) finding appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel
Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide.
On 17 April 1995, an information was filed charging Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso,
Marlon Buenviaje, and Miguel Buenviaje with murder, the accusatory portion of which reads as
follows:
That on or about December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, and who were then armed
with a firearm, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with evident
premeditation, by means of treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of Joseph Galam y Antonio, by then and there suddenly firing at the
said Joseph Galam y Antonio who has not given any provocation, thereby inflicting upon him
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs.228[1]
At their arraignment, appellants Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, and Miguel Buenviaje
pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. Marlon Buenviaje, who was arrested only on 10 July
1997, also pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment.
The evidence for the prosecution discloses as follows:
At about 9:00 a.m. of 13 August 1994, while prosecution witness Abel Ramos was at a
vulcanizing shop in Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, he heard one Tessie Pawid
screaming from across the road: Enough, enough, enough! In front of her were Marlon Buenviaje
and Joseph Galam, who were engaged in a fisticuff. By the time Pawid was able to subdue the
two men by standing between them and embracing Galam, Buenviajes face was already bloodied
and Galams shirt collar torn. As Buenviaje was leaving, he turned to face Galam and, with his
right index finger making a slicing motion across his throat, shouted: Putang-ina mo Joseph, may
araw ka rin, papatayin kita. Galam retorted, Gago, traydor, gold digger, halika. Buenviaje did
not respond anymore and left on a tricycle.229[2]
More than three months thereafter, or on 2 December 1994, Galam was shot to death at the
Rooftop Disco and Lodging House (Rooftop, for short) owned by him, which was located at
Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
According to a waitress of the Rooftop Diana Grace Sanchez Jaramillo, earlier or at 3:00 p.m. of
that fateful day, a man whom she later identified as Benjamin Sayaboc rang the doorbell of the
Rooftop and asked whether a woman wearing a green t-shirt had checked in. She answered in the
negative. As she was about to leave, Sayaboc asked another question, What time does your
bosing arrive? She replied that she did not know. She then went to the second floor of the
establishment.230[3]
Tessie Pilar, the caretaker of the lodging house, narrated that between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m.
Sayaboc, who was still seated in the swing beside the information counter with his hands tucked
in the pocket of his jacket, ordered a bottle of beer. She then went up to the kitchen, but was
delayed in delivering the beer because she gave some instructions to the dishwasher. When she
gave the beer to Benjamin, the latter was angry and asked why it took her so long to bring the
beer. Thereafter, she went upstairs and chatted with Jaramillo and some other waitresses. Then
the vehicle of Joseph Galam arrived.231[4]
Shortly thereafter, they heard four gunbursts emanating from the ground floor of the building.
When Jaramillo looked down, she saw Sayaboc shooting Galam, causing the latter to fall to the
ground face up, with blood spurting out of his chest. Sayaboc forthwith ran out and disappeared
into the darkness.232[5]
Meanwhile, at about 5:30 p.m. of that fateful day, as Joselito Parungao, Chief Barangay Tanod
of Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, was on his way to the Kowloon Restaurant
located along the national road, he saw Marlon Buenviaje with his father Miguel Buenviaje and
Patricio Escorpiso. The three were aboard a tricycle parked in a vacant lot between the Rooftop
and Diego Theater. The younger Buenviaje was on the drivers seat, while the older Buenviaje
and Escorpiso were inside the sidecar. Parungao ordered pancit bihon. While he was waiting
outside of the restaurant, he noticed that the tricycle was still parked in the vacant lot, and the
three occupants thereof were talking with each other. After getting his order and while he was
getting out of the restaurant, Parungao heard four gunshots coming from behind the Rooftop
building. He thereafter saw a person, whom he later came to know as Benjamin Sayaboc,
walking briskly toward the tricycle and then rode behind Marlon Buenviaje. Afterwards, the
tricycle sped off towards the center of the town.233[6]
The employees of the Rooftop lost no time in bringing Galam to a hospital, where he was
declared dead on arrival.234[7] Dr. Antonio R. Labasan, who conducted an autopsy on his cadaver,
found four gunshot wounds and opined that the first two of which were inflicted from behind and
the last two were frontal.235[8]
That evening, SPO4 Roberto Cagungao, Chief Investigator of the Solano Police Station, assigned
some investigators to go to the scene of the crime to gather evidence. At about 10:00 to 11:00
p.m., he and Lt. Alejandro Parungao brought Pilar and Jaramillo to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Pilar and Jaramillo were
interviewed by the cartographic artist, who thereafter drew a cartographic sketch showing the
face of the assailant.236[9]
On 8 March 1995, Pilar and Jaramillo identified Benjamin Sayaboc at the PNP Provincial
Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman who shot Joseph Galam to death.237[10]
On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao was called to the Provincial Command
Headquarters in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement of Sayaboc. When he arrived
at the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being interviewed by reporters inside the investigation room.
He then brought Sayaboc to the inner part of the room. Before taking the statement of Sayaboc,
he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he wanted to have a
counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name one, Cagungao asked the police
officers to get a lawyer. Half an hour later, the police officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of
the PAO, who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say,
okay, he continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time.
However, Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave to go
to the comfort room.238[11] That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial confession239[12] in
Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje
for the sum of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The
confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson.
At the hearing on 22 June 1999, after the prosecution rested its case, 1counsel for accused Mike
Buenviaje, Marlon Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso manifested that he be given fifteen days to
file a motion for leave to admit demurrer to the evidence.240[13] The trial court acceded. But
instead of filing such motion first, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence on 12 July 1999.241[14] The
motion for leave to file the pleading was filed the next day only.242[15]
The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence in an order243[16] issued on 16 August 1999.
Further, it ruled that because of they did not seek nor were granted express leave of court prior to
their filing of the demurrer to evidence, the Buenviajes and Escorpiso were deemed to have
submitted their case for judgment in accordance with Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, only Sayaboc was allowed to proceed with the presentation of his defense.
Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the defense of alibi. He also flatly
denied having met Atty. Cornejo or having been informed of his rights. He testified to having
been beaten by six or seven police officers in the investigating room, who then coerced him to
confess to having killed Galam.244[17] Apart from his testimony, he submitted a handwritten
statement dated 20 March 1995245[18] and an affidavit dated 10 April 1995246[19] to support his
claim of police brutality and retraction of his confession.
In its decision dated 9 November 2000,247[20] the trial court found Benjamin Sayaboc guilty of the
crime of murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and craft and price or reward as
aggravating circumstances. It then sentenced him to the maximum penalty of death. As for
Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso, the court held that the treachery
employed by Sayaboc could not be taken against them and, therefore, declared them guilty of the
crime of homicide only, with the first as principal and the two others as accomplices. Each was
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty and to pay solidarily with Sayaboc the amounts of
P115,000 as actual damages; P25,000 as moral damages; and the costs of the suit in favor of the
heirs of Joseph Galam.
From this decision, the appellants raise the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT SAYABOC GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND SENTENCING
HIM TO DEATH.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED SAYABOC IS GUILTY, HE IS GUILTY

ONLY OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL

CONFESSION OF ACCUSED SAYABOC WHEN IT WAS TAKEN WITHOUT THE
ASSISTANCE OF A COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL NOR BY AN
EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FATHER AND SON BUENVIAJE AND
ACCUSED ESCORPISO LIKEWISE GUILTY WHEN IT DENIED THEM THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY THEMSELVES AND COUNSEL AFTER
THEY FILED THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY WITHOUT FIRST
SEEKING EXPRESS LEAVE OF COURT.
In the first and second assigned errors, the appellants contend that the crime committed by
Sayaboc was homicide only, there being no proof of treachery because the two eyewitnesses did
not see the commencement of the shooting. Besides, treachery, as well as evident premeditation,
was not specifically designated as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Neither can the
aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward be appreciated because they were not
alleged in the information, albeit proved during trial. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require aggravating and qualifying circumstances to be
alleged in the information, are beneficial to the accused and should, therefore, be applied
retroactively.
As to the third assigned error, the appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc
may not be admitted in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was
his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and
effective counsel. He was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire proceedings.
He was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in the National Police Commission, which
was holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
Finally, appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso claim that they
were denied due process because they were not able to present evidence in their defense. They
ask this Court to relax the rule of criminal procedure in favor of enforcing their constitutional
right to be heard by themselves and counsel.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that Sayabocs
extrajudicial confession that he shot the victim in the back is adequate proof of treachery.
Invoking People v. Aquino,248[21] the OSG contends that for treachery to be considered as a
qualifying circumstance, it needs only to be specifically alleged in the information and does not
have to be preceded by the words qualifying or qualified by. As to the proven circumstances of
craft and price or reward, the same cannot be appreciated because they were not specifically
alleged in the information, as required by the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are
applicable to actions that are pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
The OSG further asserts that Sayabocs extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence against
him, since it was made after he was informed of, and accorded, his constitutional rights,
particularly the right to an independent counsel of his own choice. No evidence was adduced
during the trial to substantiate the claim that Atty. Cornejo used to be connected with the
NAPOLCOM. Moreover, this claim was made for the first time in this appeal, and was based
merely on an information furnished by defense counsel Atty. Virgil Castro (now deceased) to
Sayabocs counsel in this appeal, which makes the said information hearsay twice removed.
As to the fourth assigned error, the OSG counters that no exceptional circumstance exists in this
case that may warrant the relaxation of the rule that the denial of a unilateral demurrer to
evidence carries with it a waiver of the accuseds right to present evidence.
Beginning with the admissibility of Sayabocs extrajudicial confession, we hold that such cannot
be used in evidence in this case.
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary.249[22] The

condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the
constitutional requirements safeguarding an accuseds rights during custodial investigation have
been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced.
The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would
succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in
custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given
voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for
maltreatment,250[23] the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial
investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.251[24]
In this case, contrary to SPO4 Cagungaos claim that he conferred with Sayaboc for half an hour
informing him about his constitutional rights, the extrajudicial confession provides only the
following:
PRELIMINARY: I would like to inform you Mr. Sayaboc that questions will be
asked to you regarding an incident last December 2, 1994 at the
Rooftop, Brgy. Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, in connection
with the shooting of Joseph Galam, owner of the said Disco House
as a result of his death. Before questions will be asked [of] you I
would like to inform you about your ri[g]hts under the new
Constitution of the Philippines, as follows: That you have the right
to remain silent or refuse to answer the questions which you think
will incriminate you; That you have the right to seek the services
of a counsel of your own choice or if not, this office will provide
you a lawyer if you wish.
QUESTIONS: After informing you all your constitutional rights, are you willing
to give your true statement regarding the death of Joseph Galam?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
QUESTIONS: Do you want to get a lawyer to assist in this investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir. I want to seek the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo.
QUESTIONS: Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo is here now, do you want him to assist you
in this investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir. 252[25]
Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the passing of
information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution. In People v. Jara,253[26] the Court explained:
The stereotyped advice appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal form or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the curt Opo as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or
even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does
not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.254[27] It should allow
the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these
rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of
Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police
officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.
We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel.
While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the
police, still, the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4
Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial
investigation. The trial court attributed the silence of Atty. Cornejo to the garrulous nature and
intelligence of Sayaboc, thus:
As already stated, Sayaboc was a garrulous man and intelligent. It was in his character for him to
want to be a central figure in a drama, albeit tragic for others. He would do what he wanted to do
regardless of the advice of others. Hence, Atty. Cornejo could only advise him of his
constitutional rights, which was apparently done. The said counsel could not stop him from
making his confession even if he did try.255[28]
We find this explanation unacceptable. That Sayaboc was a garrulous man who would do what
he wanted to do regardless of the advice of others is immaterial. The waiver of a right is within
the rights of a suspect. What is lacking is a showing, to the satisfaction of this Court, of a faithful
attempt at each stage of the investigation to make Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his
actions. If anything, it appears that Sayabocs counsel was ineffectual for having been cowed by
his clients enthusiasm to speak, or, worse, was indifferent to it.
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy himself,
during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and consequences
of answering the questions propounded. In People v. Deniega,256[29] we said:
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if
the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of
the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless,
voluntariness is impaired.
This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a confession.
Indeed, as an officer of the court, it is an attorneys duty to, first and foremost, seek the truth.
However, counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the
questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The
duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the
right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time.
We understand the difficulty and frustration of police investigators in obtaining evidence to bring
criminals to justice. But even the hardest of criminals have rights that cannot be interfered with.
Those tasked with the enforcement of the law and who accuse those who violate it carry the
burden of ensuring that all evidence obtained by them in the course of the performance of their
duties are untainted with constitutional infirmity. The purpose of the stringent requirements of
the law is to protect all persons, especially the innocent and the weak, against possible
indiscriminate use of the powers of the government. Any deviation cannot be tolerated, and any
fruit of such deviation shall be excluded from evidence.
For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be used in evidence against
him. We hold, however, that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving his guilt for
the crime of homicide.
From the records of the case, there can be no doubt that Sayaboc shot and killed Galam in the
early evening of 2 December 1994. He was seen waiting at the Rooftop from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m. of
that day, shooting Galam shortly after the latters arrival, and fleeing from the scene of the crime
to a waiting tricycle. Credible witnesses described Sayabocs appearance to the police soon after
the shooting incident and prepared affidavits about the incident. They identified Sayaboc at the
police station while he was in custody, during the preliminary investigation, and, again, in open
court. Such positive identification constitutes more than sufficient direct evidence to uphold the
finding that Sayaboc was Galams killer. It cannot just be rebutted by Sayabocs bare denial and
weak alibi.
Appellants claim that the information against them is insufficient for failure to specifically state
that treachery and evident premeditation were qualifying circumstances holds no water. In
People v. Aquino,257[30] we held that even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as
qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense. Nevertheless, from our review of the
case, we find that neither evident premeditation nor treachery has been sufficiently proved to
qualify the crime to murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Thus, two conditions must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present
and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to
how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed. 258[31]
In this case, the trial court concluded that the fact that the witnesses did not hear any shout or
conversation between the assailant and the victim immediately before the attack could only mean
that Sayaboc had approached his victim through stealth.259[32] While not improbable, that
conclusion is merely an inference. The fact remains that none of the witnesses testified as to how
the aggression began. The witnesses testified having heard four shots, the last two of which were
seen as having been fired while Sayaboc was facing Galam. The autopsy conducted by Dr.
Labasan reveals two frontal wounds at the thigh and the shoulder, and two wounds on the right
side of Galams back. Although it is plausible that the initial shots were fired from behind, such
inference is insufficient to establish treachery.260[33]
Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance. Evident

premeditation exists when it is shown that the execution of a criminal act is preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent. The requisites of
evident premeditation are (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an
act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of
time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of
his act.261[34]
Without the extrajudicial confession narrating when Sayaboc was hired to kill Galam, the
testimony that the former inquired about the latter while waiting in the Rooftop from 3:00 p.m. to
6:00 p.m. of that fateful day does not prove the time when Sayaboc decided to kill Galam.
Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what
time had elapsed before that plan was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be
considered.262[35]
The aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward, even if proved, can neither be
considered because they were not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the information specify the
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for it to be considered in the
imposition of penalty. This requirement is beneficial to an accused and may, therefore, be given
retroactive effect.263[36]
Thus, appellant Benjamin Sayaboc can be found guilty of the crime of homicide only, which is
punishable by reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
appreciated for or against him, the penalty to be imposed upon him should be in the medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be meted a penalty whose
minimum is within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum is within the range of
reclusion temporal in its medium period.
We cannot subscribe to the contention of appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and
Patricio Escorpiso that the case should be remanded to the trial court because they were denied
the right to be heard by the trial court. It must be remembered that their demurrer to evidence
filed on 12 July 1999 was without prior leave of court. The motion for leave to file the said
pleading was filed only the next day. The filing of the demurrer was clearly without leave of
court. The trial court, therefore, correctly applied the rule on demurrer to evidence found in
Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure when it disallowed the
abovementioned appellants to present evidence on their behalf.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right
to present evidence for the accused.264[37] The rationale for this rule is that when the accused
moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he
does so in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him
to present any evidence is negated. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of
judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience.
The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal
as a demurrer to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to
present its evidence.265[38]
The trial court, therefore, correctly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure on demurrer to evidence when it disallowed the abovementioned appellants to present
evidence on their behalf. They cannot now claim that they were denied their right to be heard by
themselves and counsel.
On the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, we find the existence of conspiracy between
Marlon Buenviaje and Sayaboc.
It has been held that price or reward is evidence of conspiracy.266[39] But the same was not
established by competent proof in this case. The extrajudicial confession267[40] and the newspaper
reports268[41] adduced by the prosecution, which both contained Sayabocs statement pointing to
Marlon Buenviaje as the one who paid him P100,000 to kill Galam, are inadmissible in evidence.
The first, as earlier stated, was executed in violation of Sayabocs constitutional rights. The
second are hearsay, since the authors of such reports were not presented as witnesses to affirm
the veracity thereof.269[42]
Conspiracy need not, however, be established by direct proof; it may be shown by circumstantial
evidence.270[43] As correctly found by the trial court and concurred with by the OSG, the
concatenation of circumstantial evidence shows that Marlon Buenviaje conspired with Sayaboc,
thus:
1. On 13 August 1994, Marlon Buenviaje had a fistfight with Joseph Galam, causing him
injuries on his face and prompting him to make a threat to kill the latter;271[44]
2. More than three months later, Galam was killed by Sayaboc, who had no discernible
motive to do so;272[45]
3. Shortly after shooting Galam, Sayaboc joined Marlon Buenviaje and the other appellants
in the tricycle, which was waiting in a vacant lot near the crime scene;273[46]
4. The tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje sped away and disappeared;274[47]
5. Marlon Buenviaje became a fugitive from justice for a long time, or until 10 July 1997;
and
6. During the pendency of the case, the relatives of Marlon Buenviaje offered prosecution
eyewitness Diana Grace Jaramillo a job abroad, allowances, and two motorcycles in
consideration of her retraction of her testimony against Sayaboc. 275[48]
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when (1) there is more than one
circumstances established; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proved;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. All these requisites are present in the case at bar. Being a conspirator equally
guilty as Sayaboc, Marlon Buenviaje must be meted the same penalty as that of Sayaboc.
However, as to Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso, there is paucity of evidence linking
them to the killing. They might have been with Marlon Buenviaje in that tricycle, but there is
nothing to show that they knew of the conspiracy to kill Galam. Absent any active participation
in furtherance of the common design or purpose to kill Galam, their mere presence near the
crime scene or in the tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje does not necessarily make them
conspirators. Even knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without the cooperation and
the agreement to cooperate is not enough to establish conspiracy.276[49]
Now on the civil liability of Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje. The trial courts award of actual
damages, representing the wake and burial expenses, is reduced to P106,436, this being the
amount supported by receipts. The award of moral damages is, however, increased to P50,000
conformably with current jurisprudence.277[50] In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija, Branch
27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 is MODIFIED. Appellants Benjamin Sayaboc and Marlon
Buenviaje are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and are each
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay jointly
and severally the heirs of Joseph Galam the amounts of P106,436 as actual damages; P50,000 as
civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and the cost of the suit. Appellants Miguel
Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso are hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Tanenggee vs People of the Philippines
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
December 12, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 affirming
with modification the June 25, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 30, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-163806-10 finding Carlos L. Tanenggee (petitioner) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents. Likewise questioned is the CAs September 6, 2007 Resolution4 denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration5 and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.6
Factual Antecedents
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations7 for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents were filed against petitioner. The said Informations portray the same mode of
commission of the crime as in Criminal Case No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the
numbers of the checks and promissory notes involved and the dates and amounts thereof, viz: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud, thru
falsification of commercial document, the METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.
(METROBANK), represented by its Legal officer, Atty. Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in the following
manner: herein accused, being then the Manager of the COMMERCIO BRANCH OF
METROBANK located at the New Divisoria Market Bldg., Divisoria, Manila, and taking
advantage of his position as such, prepared and filled up or caused to be prepared and filled up
METROBANK Promissory Note Form No. 366857 with letters and figures reading
BD#083/97 after the letters reading PN, with figures reading 07.24.97 after the word
DATE, with the amount of P16,000,000.00 in words and in figures, and with other words and
figures now appearing thereon, typing or causing to be typed at the right bottom thereof the name
reading ROMEO TAN, feigning and forging or causing to be feigned and forged on top of said
name the signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature at the left bottom thereof
purportedly to show that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by Romeo Tan,
thereafter preparing and filling up or causing to be prepared and filled up METROBANK
CASHIERS CHECK NO. CC 0000001531, a commercial document, with date reading July 24,
1997, with the name reading Romeo Tan as payee, and with the sum of P15,362,666.67 in
words and in figures, which purports to be the proceeds of the loan being obtained, thereafter
affixing his own signature thereon, and [directing] the unsuspecting bank cashier to also affix his
signature on the said check, as authorized signatories, and finally affixing, feigning and forging
or causing to be affixed, feigned and forged four (4) times at the back thereof the signature of
said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear, as it did appear that Romeo Tan had participated in
the [preparation], execution and signing of the said Promissory Note and the signing and
endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIERS CHECK and that he obtained a loan of
P16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew,
such was not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain such loan from METROBANK,
neither did he participate in the preparation, execution and signing of the said promissory note
and signing and endorsement of said METROBANK CASHIERS CHECK, much less authorize
herein accused to prepare, execute and affix his signature in the said documents; that once the
said documents were forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused
released, obtained and received from the METROBANK the sum of P15,363,666.67 purportedly
representing the proceeds of the said loan, which amount, once in his possession, with intent to
defraud, he misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of the said METROBANK in the same sum of P15,363,666.67,
Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter
a plea.9 The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
The proceedings before the RTC as aptly summarized by the CA are as follows: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
During the pre-trial, except for the identity of the accused, the jurisdiction of the court, and that
accused was the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from July 1997 to December
1997, no other stipulations were entered into. Prosecution marked its exhibits A to L and
sub-markings.
xxxx
The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be prepared promissory
notes and cashiers checks in the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of the bank since he has
substantial deposits in his account, in connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter
from the bank. Appellant approved and signed the cashiers check as branch manager of
Metrobank Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or caused to be signed the signature of
Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to show that the
latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the checks to the Loans clerk,
Maria Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said documents were forged and falsified,
appellant released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and
misappropriated the same to his use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an
internal audit was conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of
Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement (marked as Exhibit N) in the
form of questions and answers.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs [D]epartment of Metrobank[,] testified that
he conducted and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in said interview, appellant
admitted having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the
promissory notes; that the proceeds of the loan were secured or personally received by the
appellant although it should be the client of the bank who should receive the same; and that all
the answers of the appellant were contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed,
thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit N).
Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager, testified that the signatures appearing on the
promissory notes were not the signatures of Romeo Tan; that the promissory notes did not bear
her signature although it is required, due to the fact that Romeo Tan is a valued client and her
manager accommodated valued clients; that she signed the corresponding checks upon
instruction of appellant; and that after signing the checks, appellant took the same [which]
remained in his custody.
Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting expert, testified that the signatures
appearing on the promissory notes and specimen signatures on the signature card of Romeo Tan
were not written by one and the same person.
Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that several
cashiers checks were issued in favor of Romeo Tan; that appellant instructed her to encash the
same; and that it was appellant who received the proceeds of the loan.
For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a Masters degree
from the Asian Institute of Management, and was the Branch Manager of Metrobank Commercio
Branch from 1994 until he was charged in 1998 [with] the above-named offense. He was with
Metrobank for nine (9) years starting as assistant manager of Metrobank Dasmarias Branch,
Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw the day to day operations of the [branch], solicited
accounts and processed loans, among others.
Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan as a client-depositor when he was the
branch manager of Metrobank Commercio. As a valued client, Romeo Tan was granted a credit
line for forty million pesos ([P]40,000,000.00) by Metrobank. Tan was also allowed to open a
fictitious account for his personal use and was assisted personally by appellant in his dealings
with the bank. In the middle of 1997, Tan allegedly opened a fictitious account and used the
name Jose Tan. Such practice for valued clients was allowed by and known to the bank to hide
their finances due to rampant kidnappings or from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or from
their spouses.
According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing credit line (through promissory notes) for
five (5) times on the following dates: 1) 24 July 1997 for sixteen million pesos
([P]16,000,000.00), 2) 27 October 1997 for six million pesos ([P]6,000,000.00), 3) 12 November
1997 for three million pesos ([P]3,000,000.00), 4) 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos
([P]16,000,000,00), 5) 22 December 1997 for two million pesos ([P]2,000,000.00). On all these
occasions except the loan on 24 July 1997 when Tan personally went to the bank, Tan allegedly
gave his instructions regarding the loan through the telephone. Upon receiving the instructions,
appellant would order the Loans clerk to prepare the promissory note and send the same through
the banks messenger to Tans office, which was located across the [street]. The latter would
then return to the bank, through his own messenger, the promissory notes already signed by
him. Upon receipt of the promissory note, appellant would order the preparation of the
corresponding cashiers check representing the proceeds of the particular loan, send the same
through the banks messenger to the office of Tan, and the latter would return the same through
his own messenger already endorsed together with a deposit slip under Current Account No.
258-250133-7 of Jose Tan. Only Cashiers Check dated 21 November 1997 for sixteen million
pesos ([P]16,000,000.00) was not endorsed and deposited for, allegedly, it was used to pay the
loan obtained on 24 July 1997. Appellant claimed that all the signatures of Tan appearing on the
promissory notes and the cashiers checks were the genuine signatures of Tan although he never
saw the latter affix them thereon.
In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the Commercio
Branch for more than a week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira
Ong-Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following
day. When appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven (7) other
people present: two (2) senior branch officers, two (2) bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in
uniform and the other in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the
bank, Valentino Elevado.
Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit N) in connection with the
audit investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any
explanation; that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be
brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was
not apprised of the purpose of the meeting; [and] that just to get it over with he signed the
paper which turned out to be a confession. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at
his office but was unable to find the latter. He also tried to phone him but to no avail.10
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision11 dated June 25, 1999 finding
petitioner guilty of the crimes charged, the decretal portion of which states:
cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo Tanenggee, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of estafa thru falsification of commercial document[s] charged in each of the
five (5) Informations filed and hereby sentences him to suffer the following penalties: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-163806[,] to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law.
maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the
sum of P16 Million with interest [at] 18% per annum counted from 27 November 1997 until
fully paid.
sum of P6 Million with interest [at] 18% per annum counted from 27 October 1997 until fully
paid.
sum of P2 Million with interest [at] 18% per annum counted from 22 December 1997 until fully
paid.
sum of P3 Million with interest [at] 18% per annum [counted] from 12 November 1997 until
fully paid.
Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.

As mandated in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum duration of the sentence
imposed shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of
the penalties imposed upon him and such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (40)
years.
SO ORDERED.12 nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA where the case was docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 23653. On December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision13 affirming with
modification the RTC Decision and disposing of the appeal as follows: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated 25 June 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 convicting the accused-appellant Carlos
Lo [Tanenggee] on five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-163806, he is further
ordered to indemnify Metrobank the sum of [P]16 Million with interest [at] 18% per annum
counted from 24 July 1997 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.14
On December 29, 2006,15 petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied per its
September 6, 2007 Resolution.16
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
the basic issues of: (1) whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs admission in evidence of the
petitioners written statement based on its finding that he was not in police custody or under
custodial interrogation when the same was taken; and, (2) whether the essential elements of
estafa through falsification of commercial documents were established by the prosecution.17
The Parties Arguments
While he admits signing a written statement,18 petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof
and alleges that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that
said written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed
of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), maintains that petitioners written statement is admissible in evidence since the
constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context
of private employment but is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus
prays for the affirmance of the appealed CA Decision.
Our Ruling
We find the Petition wanting in merit.
Petitioners written statement is

admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt

obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the
CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach
upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.19 In
the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement
regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the
questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs
manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under
custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the
taking of his written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right to counsel
applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation. Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the
recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:21
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.22
Here, petitioners written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence
and in giving due consideration to petitioners written statement as there is no constitutional
impediment to its admissibility.
Petitioners written statement was given

voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already
prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition
is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress
and intimidation.
Moreover, [i]t is settled that a confession [or admission] is presumed voluntary until the
contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary.23 Petitioner
failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have
been executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of
such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained
therein attest to its voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the CA:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details
which could only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence
which cannot be associated with a mind to which intimidation has been applied. Appellants
answers to questions 14 and 24 were even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the
corrections made therein. The response to every question was fully informative, even beyond the
required answers, which only indicates the mind to be free from extraneous restraints.24
In People v. Muit,25 it was held that [o]ne of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
[petitioners] extrajudicial [statement] is that [it] contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied without the knowledge
and information given by [him].
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or
administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated
him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a
settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no
physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as
having been voluntarily executed.26
Neither will petitioners assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before
affixing his signature thereon just to get it over with prop up the instant Petition. To recall,
petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and had been a bank
manager for quite a number of years. He is thus expected to fully understand and comprehend
the significance of signing an instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due
diligence in the conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.
Forgery duly established.
Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of anothers name with
intent to defraud.27 It can be established by comparing the alleged false signature with the
authentic or genuine one. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of
government handwriting experts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial
judge is not precluded but is even authorized by law28 to conduct an independent examination of
the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the
promissory notes and cashiers checks was not anchored solely on the result of the examination
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner. The trial court
also made an independent examination of the questioned signatures and after analyzing the same,
reached the conclusion that the signatures of Tan appearing in the promissory notes are different
from his genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit Account Information and Specimen
Signature Cards on file with the bank. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the above findings of
the RTC which was affirmed by the CA. A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction is that
findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight and
respect. Absent any reason to deviate from the said findings, as in this case, the same should be
deemed conclusive and binding to this Court.
No suppression of evidence on the

part of the prosecution.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed light on the
matter. His non-presentation created the presumption that his testimony if given would be
adverse to the case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus contends that the prosecution suppressed
its own evidence.
Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the
evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to how it should present its
case.29 Moreover, the presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where
the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution.30 In the present case, if
petitioner believes that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability by
establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the most prudent
thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the right to have compulsory
process to secure Tans attendance during the trial pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2)31 of the
Constitution. The records show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of
these, no suppression of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.
Petitioners denial is unavailing.
The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the
loans covered by the promissory notes and the cashiers checks were personally transacted by
Tan against his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his
signature thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported by
established evidence. It is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. [They merit] no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified
on affirmative matters.32 The chain of events in this case, from the preparation of the
promissory notes to the encashment of the cashiers checks, as narrated by the prosecution
witnesses and based on petitioners own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that he
committed the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.
Elements of falsification of commercial

documents established.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or
employee, who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private or commercial
document. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the
RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not
take advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;33 and, (3) that the falsification was committed in a public,
official or commercial document.
All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private
individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioners (1) counterfeiting or
imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and
genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or
proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed in
promissory notes and checks which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in
general, documents or instruments which are used by merchants or businessmen to promote or
facilitate trade or credit transactions.34 Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a
check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business
transactions. A cashiers check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person
whose name and signature appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount
indicated therein.35
Falsification as a necessary
means to commit estafa.
When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa,
theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there
are two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing
another.
In Domingo v. People,36 we held: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing

estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words,
the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission
of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public,
official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.
Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence,
or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation.37 [D]eceit is the false representation of a matter of fact,
whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he
shall act upon it to his legal injury.38
The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing that Tan requested him to
process purported loans on the latters behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of
Tan in the cashiers checks. Through these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from the
bank. Once in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same in Eurocan
Future Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take hold of the money,
misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use and benefit, and these resulted to the
damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount of about P43 million.
Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner could not have withdrawn the money
without falsifying the questioned documents. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means
to commit estafa, and falsification was already consummated even before the falsified documents
were used to defraud the bank. The conviction of petitioner for the complex crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Document by the lower courts was thus proper.
The Proper Imposable Penalty
The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the RPC is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00.
The penalty in estafa cases, on the other hand, as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the
RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period39 if
the amount defrauded is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount
involved exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its
maximum period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every P10,000.00
but in no case shall the total penalty exceed 20 years of imprisonment.
Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial document. The crime of falsification was established to be a
necessary means to commit estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Code, the penalty to be imposed
in such case should be that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. The applicable penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, being the more
serious offense than falsification.
The amounts involved in this case range from P2 million to P16 million. Said amounts being in
excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposable should be within the maximum term of six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor, adding one
(1) year for each additional P10,000.00. Considering the amounts involved, the additional
penalty of one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 would surely exceed the maximum
limitation provided under Article 315, which is twenty (20) years. Thus, the RTC correctly
imposed the maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
There is need, however, to modify the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the CA
in each case respecting the minimum term of imprisonment. The trial court imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum which
is beyond the lawful range. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the
penalty should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law for the
offense. Since the penalty prescribed for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods which has a duration of six (6) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Petitioner is
therefore sentenced in each case to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence to be imposed upon the petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
d. Conduct and Character
People of the Philippines Santos
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 100225-26 May 11, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAUL SANTOS Y NARCISO, MARIO MORALES Y BACANI, PETER DOE and RICHARD DOE, Accused, RAUL SANTOS y NARCISO,
accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee
Valmonte Law Offices for accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Raul N. Santos appeals from a judgment of the trial court convicting him of murder and frustrated murder.
On 26 October 1989, appellant Santos was charged with the crimes of murder with the use of unlicensed firearms and frustrated murder,
under the following informations:
In Crim. Case No. 8517-MN: 1
That on or about the 26th day of May, 1989 in Navotas, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping with one another, without
any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery and evident premediation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot GLICERIO CUPCUPIN y REYES with the use of unlicensed firearms of unknown
caliber, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which caused his death at the Tondo Medical Center,
Manila.
Contrary to Law.
In Crim. Case No. 8518-MN: 2
That on or about the 26th of May, 1989 in Navotas, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, witout any justifiable cause, with
deliberate intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot ALBERTO BAUTISTA Y CAYETANO, with the use use of firearms of unknown caliber, thereby inflicting upon the
latter serious physical injuries, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
MURDER as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the herein accused, that is due to the timely, able and efficient medical attendance rendered to the victim at the Tondo
Medical Center, Manila.
Contrary to Law.
Three (3) other persons were charged in the same informations. Upon request of the City Prosecutor who had conducted a re-investigation
of the cases, the trial court ordered the amendment of the information on 4 April 1990 so as to insert the name of one Mario Morales, in lieu
of John Doe, as a co-accused. Morales for whom a warrant of arrest was issued, is, however, still at large, The identities of the two (2) other
accused remain unknown.
At arraignment, Raul Santos entered a plea of not guilty. A joint trial of the two 92) criminal cases ensued, culminating in a judagment of
conviction. The dispositive portion of this judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considerd, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Raul Santos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offenses charged against him in these cases. He is accordingly sentenced to two (2) prision
terms as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. 8517-MN for Murder, to life imprisonment, the death penalty which should have been imposed in
this case having been abolished under the present Constitution;
2) In Crim. Case No. 8518-MN for Frustrated Murder, to a prison term ranging from SIX (6) YEARS OF prision
correccional, as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused Santos is also odered to proportionately pay the heirs of Glicerio Cupcupin the sum of P30,000.00 for the loss
of the latter's life and to pay said heirs, proportionately aldo, P100,000.00 by way of indemnification for the expenses
incurred in connection with Cupcupin's death.
Costs against accused in both cases.
SO ORDERED. 3
The relevant facts as found by the trial court are the following:
Glicierio Cupcupin and Alberto Bautista were riding on a jeep driven by the former on May 26, 1989. At around 11:45
o'clock in the morning of said date, the jeep was at a stop at the corner of Estrella and Yangco Streets in navotas,
Metro Manila and was about to make a right turn when two (2) persons armed with short guns approached the jeep and
fired at Cupcupin and Bautista. Cupcupin was hit several itmes in different parts of his body and he died as a result of
the multiple gunshot wounds he sustained (Exh. V). Bautista sustained gunshot wounds, one at the left thigh, one in
theloer abdomen, one at the back of the right foot and another at the back of the body. Bautista was able to run away
even as he was bieng fired upon. He took cover in a store. The one firing the gun at thim was a man he later identified
to be accused Raul Santos. The other one which he saw similary firing his gun was aiming at Cupcupin. He identified
the man to be one Mario Morales. He added that he saw Cupcupin hit by gunshots at the left side of the body near the
waist which made Cupcupin fall-off the steering wheel. After running away, Bautista could not remember anymore what
else happened. He could not rmember anymore what else happened. He at thim and Cupcupin. After hearing a shout
that the ambushers were no longer around, he learned that a woman bystander was hit and was boarded on a jeep to
be brought to the hospital. He was boarded on said jeep too but later transferred to was brought to the Martinez
General Hospital and to the Mary Jonston hospital where he was treated. Bautista was oeporated on (Exhs. B, B-1, C,
D and E). Upon the apprehensionof accused where he picked out from a line-up accused Raul Santos. In another line-
up, he also picked out accused Morales. Bautista also gave a sworn statement narrating the shooting incident (Exh. F).
Police Aide Victorino Bohol was on duty and directing traffic at the corner of Plaza Rizal and Estrella Streets when he
heard gunshots. When he looked around the saw two 92) persons who were holding Cal. 45 pistols firing at persons on
board a stainless steel owner jeep. Bohol was not able to approach the men firing their guns because he was not
provided with a gun. What he did was to run to headquarters to call for policemen and when he returned to the scene of
the shooting he learned that one of hte passengers of the jeep was killed. He learned also that the slain man was killed.
He learned also that the slain man was Glicerio Cupcupin and that his companion was Alberto Bautista alias "Tiwa".
Bohol also added that tere were two (2) other persons who were also firing at the passengers of the jeep although he
did not recognize these two (2) other persons. After the arrest of accused Santos, Bohol was called to the police station
and through a one-way mirror he was able to identify accused Santos as one of the persons who shot Cupcupin and
Bautista. Bohol also gave a sworn statement to the police (Exh. A).
On cross-examination, Bohol admitted that at the time of the shooting he was at the Jim Bread Store talking to
someone. When he heard gunshots thier guns at the same time at the jeep. He added that the accused was arrested
some months later in connectiion with another shooting incident wherein Santos was suspected of involvement. He
confirmed that Bautista was bieng shot at while running away from the place.
Cpl. Sabino Patood of the Navotas Police delcared that he was investigating a shooting incident which resulted in the
death of one Abudl Rosas wherein the suspect was accused Santos when he was tipped by police intelligence
operatives that Santos was involved in the ambush of Cupcupin. This made him conduct further investigation by calling
for Bautista and Bohol. Patood also interviewed Santos who admitted his participation inthe ambush to him. He did not
take any written statement from accused Santos because there was nocounsel available at that time and because
Santos was not willing to give any written statement.
Dr. Maximo Reyes of the NBI Medico Legal Division performed an autorpsy onthecadaver of victim Cupcupin and
found out that the latter sustained nineteen (19) gunshot wounds in different parts of his body. The cause of death
gunshot wounds. Dr. Reyes added that the assailants were probably at the left side of the victim as they were shooting
at the latter with the victim possibly seated at the time he was shot and hit.
The victim's wife Lucia Cupcupin declared that P100,000.00 was spent in connection with the death of her husband
who was earning P5,000.00 a month as a businessman dealing in junk materials and
marbale. 4
The trial court found that the accused Raul Santos had been identified positively by the surviving vicitm of
the shooting incident Alberto Bautista, and by teh Traffic Aide who had witnessed the execution of the
crime Victorino Bohol. The defensse of alibi offered by the accused and supported by the testimonies
of a friend and a sister, was rejected as weak and unavailing. As noted, a judgment of conviction
followed.
Inhis appeal, Raul Santos assings the following as errors committed by the trial court:
i the lower court erred in holding that accused's identification by proscution's witnesses was "positive" and, and,
therefore it erred when it rejected accused's defense of alib.
ii the lower court erred in considering one of the two cases (not the instant ones) filed against the accused in holding
also for his guilt.
iii the lower court erred in convicting the accused. 5
In respect of the first assigned error, appellant Santos contendes that the testimonies of the principal
prosecution witnesses do not coform with the "knowledge and common experience of mankind."
Appellant argues that the two (2) prosecution witnesses, the victim Bautista and Police Aide Bohol,
testified that they saw the accused for the first time in their lives when the crime was committed and yet
identified him as one of the gunmen five (5) months later in the Police headquarters in Navotas. The
ambuscade and the slaying of Glicierio Cupcupin happened on 26 May 1989; appellant Santos was
identified at the police station on 25 October 1989. Appellant argues that this lapse of time was
unreasonable, which, when coupled with the brief, limited and obstructed view which the prosecution
witnesses had of the gunmen at the time of the shooting, casts serious doubt on the accuracy and
reliabitlity of the identification by the witnesses.
Appellant's argument does not persuade.
Police Aide Bohol was only abot twelve (12) armlengths away from teh ambush vehicle. The ambush
slaying occurred under conditions of high visibility: the victim Cupcupin was shot to death at 11:45 o'clock
in the morning, in good weahter, when the sun was almost at its zenith. On cross-examination, Bohol
stated that there were no passing vehicles that blocked his view of the slaying of the victim as the
vehicles stopped some distance away from the jeep when the shooting began. In addition, Bohol testified
that he saw one of teh gunmen take a wrist watch and a gun form Cupcupin's lifeless body. Clearly, Bohol
had the opportunity to observe the extraordinary and startling events which unfolded on the corner of two
(2) busy streets almost at high noon, events which may be expected to leave a strong impression upon
the minds of an eye-witnesses who, like Police Aide Bohol, had a duty to maintain law and order. Alberto
Bautista who had been riding on a jeep and hwo escped death (but not gunshot wounds) by reason of his
quick reflexes, had every reason to remember the faces of those whom he saw firing at the jeep and at
himself. This has been recognized a number of times in ouir case law. In People v. Jacolo, et al., 6 the
Couirt said:
[W]hile evidence as to the identity of the accused as the person who committed the crime should be carefully analyzed,
. . . "were the conditions of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased agains teh man on the
dock, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactore should normally be accpeted. And this is more so where
the witness is the victim or his near-relative, as in this case, because these (people) usually strive to remember the
faces of the assailants." (Emphasis supplied.) 7
Appellant Santos also contended that Police Aide Bohol could not have had a clear view of the
ambuscade and the shooting of Cupcupin since he (Bohol) was situated on the left side of the gunmen.
As observed by teh Solicitor General, however, the trial court had pointed out that "if he [Bohol] was to the
front right of the jeep" then he must [have been] a little by the left side of the persons firing at the jeep . . ."
8
"Bohol's view, therefore," the Solicitor General continued, "was not limited to the left side of the
assilants, especially since he was able to see them [the gunmen] move around the site of the ambush
after the [had] stopped firing, specifically when one of them stripped victim Cupcupin of his gun and
jewelry and they all walked away from the place." 9 The trial court obviously concluded that Bohol had
ample opportunity actually to observe tha events on which he testified, and we find no basis for
overtunring this conclusion of the trial court.
In respect of the identification by Bautista, accused also suggests that Bautista had no real opoortunityto
see and impress upon his memory the faces of the assailants. In his testimony, Bautista stated that two
(2) men armed with handguns suddenly apporoached the jeep in which he and Cupcupin were riding. He
agreed that his attention had been "focused" (defense counsel's own language) on vehicles passing
along Estrella Street as Cupcupin maneuvered the jeep to turn right at the corner and to head towards
Navotas. When the assailants started shooting, Bautista jumped from the jeep, was hit on the left thigh
and other parts of the body, but managed to run for cover from repeated shots or bursts of gunfire.
Bautista testified further that he was shot by appellant Raul Santos while Morales pumped bullets into
Cupcupin; that the gunmen fired at Cupcupin and Bautista from close range, Morales being a mere half
an arm-length to the left of Cupcupin while appellant Santos was about two (2) arm-lengths away from the
ambushed jeep; and that Bautista saw his compaion, Cupcupin, slump on the steering wheel as the
bullets crashed into him. Once more, the trial court was led by the above circumstances to conclude that
Bautista had adequate oportunity to see appellant Santos and to retain his face in his memory. We find
no basis for rejecting this factual conclusion of the trial court.
Appellant Santos makes two (2) additional arguments. Firstly, he complains that he was not afforded his
right to counsel int he course of the police line-up, at the police station where he was identified by the
prosecution witnesses. This argument, of course, assumes that during the police line-up, accused was
under custodial investigation, a stage which, per the appellant, began the instant the police suspected
Santos then had no lawyer present nor was one provided, his counsel argues, Santos's identification was
"tainted" and inadmissible. The argument is creative, but has no legal bais. In Gamboa v. Cruz, 10 the
Court said that there is "no real need to afford a suspect the serivce of counsel at police line-up," 11 a
declaration reiterated in People v. Loveria. 12 The customary practice is, of course, that it is the witness
who is investigaged or interrogated in the course of a police line-up and who gives a statement to the
police, rather than the accused who is not questioned at all at that stage. The Court is aware of the
caveat in Gamboa. 13 But there is nothing in the record of this case which shows that in the course of the
line-up, the police investigators sought to extract any admission or confession from appellant Santos. The
investigators did not in fact interrogate appellant Santos during the line-up and he remained silent after he
had bee identified by Bautista and Bohol.
Appellant Santos's secon dcontention is that there had bee "improper suggestiveness" in the course of
the police line-up amounting to an uncounselled confession. In effect, defense counsel claims that
Bautista and Bohol were induced by the plice investigators to point to appellant Santos as one of the
gunmen. The record does not show that the police investigators had coached Bautista. Appellant
Santos's counsel directed the attention of this Court to a portion of Bohol's testimony during cross-
examination, to wit:
Atty. Valmonte:
Alright, that somebody who told you to go to the office of Capt. Puzon you were informed that on the other side of the
office of Capt. Puzon there was already the person whom they would like to identfy?
Victorino Bohol:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Valmonte:
And was there somebody who asked you who among those in the investigation room the person
whom you saw?
Victorino Bohol:
No, sir. Somebody approached me and said, iyan po. But before answering, I made a very careful
look at the person. 14
We are not convinced, however, that the phrase "iyan po" constituted an "improper suggestion," certainly
not in the context of a situation where, as here, appellant Santos was identified successively by Bautista
and Bohol from a group of person. We consider that the phrase "iyan po" is too cryptic. What that Court
warned against in People v. Acosta, 15 i.e., against an identification process that was "pointedly
suggestive, or generated confidence when there was noen, activated visual imagination, and all told,
subverted [a person's] reliablity as [an] eye-witness [..]," has not been successfully shown in the case at
bar.
Appellant Santos next seeks to assail the credibility of Bautista and Bohol by citing supposed
inconsistencies between statements made in their affidavits before trial and their testimony given in the
course of the trial. Appellant's counsel complains 16 that while witness Bohol could recall the gunmen's
general apperance, he could not remember the kind of shoes that appellant Santos was wearing nor the
color of their guns; that he had stated in his swon statement that he had picked out appellant Santos from
a line-up consisting of seven (7) persons, while he testified in open court that he had identified appellant
when the later was together with only one (1) detainee in the investigation froom of the police station; that
Bohol had intiallystated that Bautista was driving the jeep but on direct examination, he stated that it was
Cupcupin instead who had been driving the jeep; that in his sworn statement, Bohol had claimed that he
was directing traffic when he first heard gunshots, but on cross-examination, stated that at the point he
was engaged in taking his merienda.
Close examination of the record will, however, show that the supposed inconsistenceise adduced by
appellant Santos are either non-existent or clearly minor and inconsequential in character. The fact that
witness Bohol might not have remembered the kind of shoes appellant Santos was wearing onthat violent
occassion nor the color of the gunmen's weapons, is clearly inconsequential. Close scrutiny of the sworn
statement of Bohol (Exhibit "A") does not reveal any statement that he (Bohol) had picked out appellant
Santos from a seven (7) - person line-up nor does the transcript show that witness Bohol had identified
appellant Santos when appellant was alone with only one detainee in the investigation room at the police
station. 17 Appellant's counsel did not document his averments. Moreover, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, 18 whether a police line-up considted of two (2) or seven (7) persons is actually immaterial since
a police line-up is not essential to a proper and positive identification. 19 Whether it was Bautista or
Cupcupin who had been driving the jeep and whether Bohol was direcitng traffic or enjoying his merienda
when the first gun shots rang out, cannot be regarded as critical in nature; such questions do not detract
from the basic facts that Bohol was in a position and Bautista and saw both assailants and the victims.
The netrenched principle is that minro inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness tend to strengthen
rather than to weaken the credibility of the witness as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 20
In his second assignment of error, appellant Santos in effect questions the trial court for admitting a sworn
statement by one Ronaldo Guerrero (Exhibit "EE"), a witnesses in another criminal case (Criminal Case
No. 8117) where appellant Santos was also charged with the murder of one Daniel Nuguera which had
taken place in the very same site where Bautista and Cupcupin were ambushed, i.e., at the corner of
Yangco Street and Estrella Street, Malabon, Metro Manila. When the prosecution first presented the
sworn statement of Guerrero in order to show criminal propensity on the part of appellant Santos, the
defesne objected to admission of such sworn statment; the trial court sustained the objection and rejected
the evidence for the purpose it was initially offered. However, the trial court admitted the same as falling
within one or more of the exceptions set out in Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 34. Similar Acts as Evifence. Evidence that one did or didnot do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific
intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, shceme, habit, custom or usage and the like. (Empahsis supplied).
Appellant Santos now complains that the affidavit of Ronaldo Guerrero was hearsay evidence, considering that the prosecution did not
present Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness during the trial. We consider that the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the
Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose for provign knowledge or plan or shceme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that the
particular corner of two (2) particular streets in Manila was a good place to ambus a vehicle and its passenters. Appellant also had waived
the hearsay character of this evidence by failure seasonably to ojbect to the admission of the affidavit; it is too late in that day to raise the
hearsay rule in the appellant's memorandum after prosecution and defense had presented their respective cases and had made their
repsective offers of evidence. 21 Finally, and in any cae, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the exclusion of
the Guerrero affidavit would not result in any change in the result reache by the trial court. For that result
is esentially and adequately based upon the positive identification of appellant Santos as one of the
gunmen by Baustisa and Bohol.
That it took the police authorities five (5) months to locate and apprehend appellant Santos who, it turned
out, resided close by the very locale of the ambush-slaying, did not in any way weaken the evidence of
the prosecution of detract from the conclusions reached by the trial court. The length of that period of time
shows only that police procedures are not always as efficient as they could be and that witnesses are
frequently reluctant to voluntee information to the police authorities in criminal cases, a point noted so
frequently as to have become a matter of judicial notice. 22
Finally, we come to the defense of alibi which appellant Santos raised before the trial court and which
was recounted by the trial court in the following manner:
Accused Raul Santos, after denying the accusations against him, insisted that he was on the date and time that
Cupcupin and Bautista were ambushed somwhere in Ibaan, Batangas to which place he went on May 20, 1989,
because his sister Teresita received a subpoena in a case involving one Apolonio Nuguera and which subpoena was
given to him by another sister named Isabel. Accused Santos claimed that he was surprised and confused by said
subpoena (Exh. 2) and had to got to Batangas while his sisters are verifying the complaint against him. Accused
Santos also maintained that from the time he left the place on June 12, 1989, he remained continuously in said place.
xxx xxx xxx
The testimony of accused Santos regarding his stay in Batangas was corroborated by Melinda David in show house he
stayed and by this sister Isabel Santos. 23
In respect of the weight properly given to a defense of a alibi, the Court has, times beyond numbering,
ruled that such defense is weak most especially when established exclusively or mainly by the accused
himself and his relatives and nto by independent and credible persons, 24 and that such a defense will not
prevail over the positive idenfication made by credible witnesses, 25 especially where the witness is the
victim-complainant himself.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, we hold that the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court
must be, and it is hereby, AFFIRMED with the following modifications: the civil indemnity payable to the
heirs of Glicerio Cupcupin shall be INCREASED to P50,000.00; the penalty of life imprisonment in
Criminal Case No. 8517-MN shall be CHANGED to reclusion perpetua, which is the proper imposable
penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Costs against apellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Davide Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
People of the Philippines vs Nardo
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133888. March 1, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES,

accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is before this Court on automatic review from the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi
City, Albay, Branch III, which imposed on accused-appellant the death penalty for rape in
Criminal Case No. 7170.
The victim, Lorielyn R. Nardo, is the eldest daughter of accused- appellant. She was born on
September 11, 1981 and, at the time of the incident, was fourteen ( 14) years old.xxiii[1]
On February 24, 1996, around noon, Lorielyn was in their house located in Barangay 3, Camalig,
Albay, together with her father, accused- appellant Alfredo Nardo, two younger brothers, Leonel
and Louie, and maternal grandfather, Vicente Remot. At 1 :30 o'clock in the afternoon, after they
had lunch, Vicente left for work. Alfredo told his sons, Leonel and Louie, to go out. He then
ordered Lorielyn to get his cigarettes in his bedroom. When Lorielyn went inside the bedroom,
her father followed her. He embraced Lorielyn from behind and began mashing her breasts.
Lorielyn pleaded, "Papa, please stop it. Have mercy. " Her father ignored her. Instead, he
undressed her and pushed her to the bed. Lorielyn started to cry , while Alfredo took off his
clothes. Then, he lay on top of her and had sexual intercourse with her. He kissed her from the
neck down. She tried to free herself but Alfredo took hold of a knife from a nearby cabinet and
pointed it at her right ear. He threatened to kill their whole family if Lorielyn told anyone what
he did. When he was finished, Alfredo left the house. During all this time, Lorielyn's mother,
Elizabeth Nardo, was washing clothes about five houses away.xxiv[2]
Elizabeth returned home at about 3:00 o'clock p.m. She saw Lorielyn crying while washing the
dishes. She asked Lorielyn why she was crying, but her daughter said nothing.xxv[3]
On March 19, 1996, Lorielyn was washing clothes when her father approached her and
whispered, "We will play tonight near the river. " Lorielyn understood this to mean that her
father wanted to have sexual intercourse with her again. She finished the laundry and left the
house. She took a passenger jeepney to Barangay Libod, Camalig, Albay and proceeded to the
house of her aunt, Carol Navera. She stayed there until her aunt arrived at around 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon. When it became late, Carol told Lorielyn to go home, but she decided to spend the
night at her aunt's house because she was afraid to undergo the ordeal from her father
again.xxvi[4]
The next day, Lorielyn's brother, Leone, was sent by her father to fetch her, but she refused to go
with him. Her aunt asked her again why she did not want to go home. She merely said she had a
problem. She slept at her aunt's house again that night. The following day, her mother came to
fetch her. Lorielyn told her mother she did not want to go home. She said, "Mama, do you want
me to become pregnant in that house? " Her mother asked, "Who will impregnate you there? "
Lorielyn replied, "Your husband. " Her mother retorted that Alfredo could not do that to her, then
left.xxvii[5]
Lorielyn stayed at her aunt's house until March 22, 1996. On that date, Carol again asked
Lorielyn what her problem was. Finally, she told her aunt that her father raped her. Immediately,
Carol went to report the matter to the police. She later returned home with two policemen, and
together they brought Lorielyn to the Camalig Police Station. The rape was entered in the police
blotter.xxviii[6] The policemen then brought Lorielyn to the Municipal Health Office of Camalig,
Albay, where she was examined by Dr. Melvyn F . Orbe, the Municipal Health Officer.xxix[7]
From there Lorielyn was brought to the Municipal Trial Court of Camalig-Albay to file a formal
complaint for rape against her father, Alfredo Nardo.xxx[8]
On May 29, 1996, an Information for rape was filed against Alfredo Nardo, charging as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of February 1996, at more or less 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, at
Brgy. No.3, Municipality of Camalig, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of the herein victim, with
lewd and unchaste design, by means of violence, force and intimidation, armed with a knife, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with her (sic) own
daughter, LORIELYN R. NARDO, a 14 year old girl, against her will and consent, to her
damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAWxxxi[9]
At the arraignment on August 8, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.xxxii[10]
The prosecution presented Dr. Melvyn Orbe, who testified on the following findings as a result
of his examination of the victim, Lorielyn Nardo:
Pelvic Examination:
.:. whitish to yellowish discharge
.:. irritation lateral aspect of the posterior vulva at 3 o ' clock .
.:. healed laceration hymenal in origin posterior aspect of the fourchetxxxiii[11]
Dr. Orbe stated that based on these findings, it is possible that Lorielyn had sexual
intercourse.xxxiv[12]
Carolina Navera, testifying for the prosecution, corroborated Lorielyn's statement that the latter
went to her house on March 20, 1996. Lorielyn cried and told her that she did not want to go
home because she had a problem. Elizabeth, Lorielyn's mother, came to fetch her but she refused
to go home, saying that she was raped by her father. Upon hearing this, Elizabeth left and told
Carolina not to let Lorielyn leave her house. After Elizabeth was gone, Carolina went to the
police station. She returned later .with two policemen, who then brought Lorielyn to the police
headquarters. xxxv[13]
Ma. Francia Aguilar, the social welfare officer of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, also testified that in the evening of March 22, 1996, she responded to a report of a
rape incident. She met the victim, Lorielyn Nardo, at the house of Cely Bantog, a social worker,
at Camalig, Albay. She interviewed Lorielyn and her mother, Elizabeth, tor the purpose of
preparing a Social Case Study report.xxxvi[14] Thereafter, she endorsed Lorielyn to the DSWD
Center for Girls in Sorsogon, Sorsogon to undergo therapeutics.xxxvii[15]
SPO3 Jose Nuylan, a member of the Camalig police force, testified that he investigated the rape
incident and took the statement of Lorielyn Nardo.xxxviii[16]
Elizabeth Nardo, the victim's mother, was called to the witness stand. She testified that she and
Alfredo are not married, but they have been living together. They have seven children, the eldest
of whom is Lorielyn. She stated that Lorielyn was born on September 11, 1981 at Anei, Claveria,
Misamis Oriental; that Lorielyn's birth certificate was burned in the Municipal Building of
Misamis Oriental.xxxix[17] However, Elizabeth presented and identified Lorielyn's baptismal
certificate showing that she was born on September 11,1981.xl[18]
The defense, on the other hand, presented lawyer Santer G. Gonzales, the employer of accused-
appellant. He testified that accused-appellant worked as a helper at his farm in Quirangay,
Camalig, Albay. On February 24, 1996, accused-appellant arrived at his farm before 8:00 o'clock
in the morning. He was followed by his father-in-law, Vicente Remot, who lived with him in the
same house. It started to rain hard, so they decided not to work that day. Vicente Remot went
home at around 8:30 or 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Accused-appellant stayed behind. After a
while, Paterno Ramas, a neighbor of Atty. Gonzales, arrived. They started to drink. None of
them left the farmhouse since Atty. Gonzales kept bottles of gin and cigarettes in stock. They
were joined later in thc afternoon by. Didjo Mujar, another friend of Atty. Gonzales. They drank
about five bottles of gin and sang while Atty. Gonzales played the guitar. The rain subsided at
around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, so they stopped drinking. At 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
accused-appellant left.xli[19] The farm is located around 400 to 500 meters away from Barangay
3, where accused-appellant and the victim reside, and can be reached in 15 minutes.xlii[20]
When asked to comment on the victim, Lorielyn Nardo, Atty. Gonzales described her as one
capable of telling a lie. He narrated that once, she went to his farm to collect the amount of
P50.00 as daily wage of her grandfather, Vicente Remot, but she gave only P35.00 to her mother.
Elizabeth thus went to Atty. Gonzales' to ask about the deficiency. They later learned from
Lorielyn ' s younger sister that she spent the missing P15.00 on snacks.xliii[21]
Vicente Remot, accused-appellant's father-in-law, corroborated Atty. Gonzales' testimony that he

reported for work at the latter's farm in the morning of February 24, 1996, but he was unable to
work because of the rain, so he went home instead, leaving accused-appellant in the farm. At 1
:00 o ' clock in the afternoon of that day, he was at home watching television with Elizabeth and
his grandchildren, including Lorielyn. He refuted Lorielyn's claim that he left after lunch to
work, saying that he stayed in the house the whole afternoon since it was raining.xliv[22]
Elizabeth also testified that on February 24, 1996, she was at home watching television with her
father and children, namely, Lorielyn, Lewcherd, Lailani, Leonel, Louie Boy and Leo Boy. All
her children were at home because it was a Saturday. She claimed that Lorielyn filed the
complaint for rape against her father because he was very strict with her. She learned from
Lorielyn's best friend that she had a problem with her boyfriend, a certain Erwin Loreno. At one
time, Lorielyn asked permission to attend a holy retreat, but Elizabeth found out from the school
that there was no such retreat. Lorielyn lied on another occasion, when she told Mrs. Bonifacia
"Paz" Nieva that her grandfather was sick so she can borrow money.xlv[23]
Mrs. Bonifacia Nieva testified that her daughter was a classmate of Lorielyn. Once, Lorielyn
visited her saying that she was sent by Elizabeth to borrow money because her grandfather was
sick. Mrs. Nieva gave Lorielyn P200.00. Later, when she went to see Elizabeth to collect
payment, she found out that Lorielyn ' s grandfather did not get sick. Lorielyn admitted to her
that she lied about it to be able to borrow money.xlvi[24]
The prosecution recalled Lorielyn to the witness stand by way of rebuttal evidence. She refuted
Atty. Gonzales' statement that she did not turn over in full the salary of her grandfather in the
amount of P50.00. She denied that she lied to her mother about a holy retreat held by her school.
Anent the amount of P200.00 she borrowed from Mrs. Nieva, she asserted that it was her father
who ordered her to do that, and that she gave the whole sum of P200.00 to him.xlvii[25]
On clarificatory questioning by the presiding judge, Lorielyn maintained that her grandfather,
Vicente Remot, indeed came home in the morning of February 24, 1996, but he left again to go
to Atty. Gonzales' farm after lunch. That afternoon, her mother was at the public faucet located
far away from their house washing clothes. The judge wondered aloud why she was doing the
laundry in the afternoon when this is usually done in the morning. Lorielyn replied that her
mother had started doing the laundry in the morning but that she was not able to finish it, so she
returned in the afternoon to continue her chore. She denied having any male friends, saying all
her friends are girls. When asked once more by the judge, Lorielyn reiterated that her father had
sexual intercourse with her.xlviii[26]
Carolina Nieva and Elizabeth Nardo were presented as sur-rebuttal witnesses. They testified in
sum that Lorielyn had a boyfriend.xlix[27]
Accused-appellant was presented as the last witness. He denied that he raped his daughter on
February 24, 1997, saying that he was at the farm of Atty. Gonzales. He scolded Lorielyn when
he learned from her sister and brother that she was always going around with a boy. He also
stated that
Lorielyn got mad at him because he did not permit her to leave the house whenever she wanted
to.l[28]
On March 3, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this court finds

the accused ALFREDO NARDO Y ROSALES GUlLTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the crime of RAPE and sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The said accused in
likewise ordered to pay Lorielyn Nardo the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for
moral damages.
For humanitarian reasons, however, it is recommended that the DEATH penalty be commuted to
RECLUSION PERPETUA.
SO ORDERED.li[29]
Accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE

VICTIM LORIELYN AND DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECITE THE REASONS WHY IT WAS
RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY FOR THE ACCUSED.lii[30]
Accused-appellant assails the trial court's finding that Atty. Gonzales was his employer and
therefore was likely to testify in his favor; and that he could not have noticed accused-appellant
leave the farm in the afternoon of February 24, 1996 because he had one drink too many.
Accused-appellant contends that the court should not have been too quick to condemn him when
his witness was a lawyer. Furthermore, he argues that Lorielyn's conduct after the alleged rape,
specifically from February 25 to March 19, 1996, during which she stayed in the house with her
father and continued to do her daily chores, creates a doubt on the veracity of the charge.
In the Reply Brief for accused-appellant,liii[31] defense counsel reveals that Lorielyn wrote her
the following letter:
7-13-99
Dear Atty. De Guzman:
Ako nga po pala si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Alfredo Nardo na nakabinbin pa sa ngayon sa
Maximum Security Compound NBP I-D Muntinlupa City. Sumulat po ako sa inyo upang humingi
ng tulong na gawin po sana ang lahat, wala po talagang kasalanan ang aking ama ako na po
mismong nag-akusa ang nagsasabi na walang katotohanan ang lahat ng mga sinabi ko na
pinagsamantalahan niya ako. Nagawa ko lang po yon dahil masyado po kasi siyang mahigpit sa
aming magkakapatid. Atty. tulungan ninyo sana ako, nalaman ko nga po pala ang inyong
address dahil dumalaw po ang mama ko noon sa papa ko at hiningi ko naman po para
masulatan ko po kayo.
Umaasa po akong lubos na ako'y inyong matutulungan.
Lubos na umaasa
LORIELYN
NARDOliv[32]
On May 4, 2000, counsel for accused-appellant filed a Supplemental Reply Brief,lv[33] alleging
that she received another letter from Lorielyn Nardo which states:
04-17-
2000
Dear Atty. Teresita de Guzman,
Unang-una po sa lahat ay nagpapasalamat po ako sa pag-response mo sa letter, Ako nga po

pala si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Mr. Alfredo Nardo na nakapiit ngayon sa DORM I-D ng
Muntinlupa ako po yung nagpadala ng liham sa inyo. Attorney, lagi ko pong ipinagdarasal na
nawa y matapos na ang paghihirap at pagdurusa ng aking ama sa loob ng piitan, naway
matapos na ang lahat ng problema upang manumbalik muli ang sigla ng aming pamilya.
Nagpapasalamat nga rin po pala ako sa ginagawa mong pagtulong sa amin, attorney nawa po
ay makamit nyo ang tagumpay.
Hanggang na lamang po ang aking liham, umaasa po ako sa inyong pang-unawa at tagumpay.
Nagpapasalamat at umaasa,
Lorielyn Nardolvi[34]
In compliance with the Court's Resolution dated November 14, 2000,lvii[35] the Office of the
Solicitor General filed its comment on the letters of Lorielyn Nardo,lviii[36] contending that there
is no mention of her father's innocence in her letter dated April 17, 2000. Rather, she merely
expressed therein her deep sympathy for her father's situation in prison. The Solicitor General
argues that a recantation is not sufficient to warrant the exoneration of accused-appellant after he
has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on Lorielyn's candid, categorical and
straightforwarrd testimony before the trial court.
In the meantime, counsel for accused-appellant, by way of a Manifestation and Motion,lix[37]

submitted two more letters from Lorielyn Nardo which are hereunder reproduced, viz:
August
10, 2000
Dear Attorney,
Unang-una po sa lahat ay ang taos-puso kong pasasalamat, sa dahilang pagpapaunlak niyo sa

kahilingan kong maipasa sa korte ang isang liham ng katotohanan, at kahit wala pa po ang
isang desisyon mula sa korte ay lubos po akong umaasa at nagtitiwala sa inyong kakayahan.
Attorney, kung alam niyo lang po ng matanggap at mabasa ang isang letter na nagmula sa yo ay
punung-puno po ng kaligayahan ang aking puso dahil kahit papaano ay nabawasan na ang pag-
aalinlangan sa aking isipan. Sa ngayon po ay patuloy na lang akong umaasa na sana isang araw
ay makita kong muling masaya ang aking pamilya. Attorney, isang pabor po ang nais kong
hilingin, na sana bago magpasko ay muli ko ng makasama ang aking ama, at gusto ko pong
maging ninyo 'to sa akin sa darating na pasko.
Hanggang dito na lamang po ang aking liham, at lubos po akong nagtitiwala sa inyong
kakayahan na mapapawalang sala ang aking ama.
Truly yours,
Lorielyn Nardolx[38]
January 17, 2001

Dear Atty. Teresita De Guzman,
Ako po muli si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Alfredo Nardo na nakabinbin sa NBP Dorm-I-D
Muntinlupa. Kahit hindi po natupad ang hinihiling kong sanay makalaya ang aking ama noong
nakaraang Disyembre ay patuloy ko pa rin pong inaasahan at hinihiling ang inyong tulong na
sana po ay makalaya na ang aking ama. Patuloy pong nangingibabaw ang aking konsensiya
dahil sa aking ginawa, umaasa po ako na sana ay lalo pang mapadali ang paglabas niya sa loob
ng kulungan, maniwala po kayo wala siyang kasalanan. Attorney, alam ko po na ginagawa niyo
(po) ang lahat kaya't ngayon pa lang po ay nagpapasalamat ako sa inyo at patuloy na umaasa
ng inyong tulong at sanay maunawaan niyo ako.
Patuloy na umaasa,
Lorielyn Nardo
(anak)lxi[39]
Accused-appellant relies on these letters to obtain a reversal of the trial court's judgment of his
conviction. However, the said letters were not subscribed and sworn to by Lorielyn.
Be that as it may, recantations are frowned upon by the courts. A recantation of a testimony is
exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be
itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained
from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration.lxii[40] Especially, recantations made after the conviction
of the accused deserve only scant consideration.lxiii[41]
Moreover, any recantation or affidavit of desistance, by itself, even when construed as a pardon
in the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the
action has been instituted.lxiv[42] The pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint should be
made prior to the institution of the criminal action.lxv[43] Parenthetically, the crime in the case at
bar was committed in 1996, i.e., prior to the passage of the R.A. 8353, The Anti-Rape Law of
1997, which reclassified rape as a crime against persons.
Even if it were sworn, Lorielyn's recantation could hardly suffice to overturn the finding of guilt
by the trial court which was based on her own clear and convincing testimony, given during a
full-blown trial. An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered
inferior to the testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony
taken before a court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his/her
mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the
proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.lxvi[44]
As stated, the trial court arrived at its finding of guilt after a careful assessment of the evidence
presented, foremost of which was the testimony of the victim in open court, where the trial judge
was able to personally evaluate her manner of testifying, and from there reach a studied opinion
as to her credibility. As a rule, we do not disturb the findings by the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses, for the trial court is in a better position to pass upon the same.lxvii[45]
"The trial judge is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, since he personally
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. He had before him
the essential aids to determine whether a witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth does not
always stalk boldly forth naked; she often hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the minds
eye of the judge who tried the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious
shame, the hesitation, the sincere or flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn,
the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the
carriage and mien."lxviii[46]
We find nothing in the records which would indicate that the findings of fact of the trial court are
not supported by the evidence or were arrived at in manifest or palpable error, such as to warrant
a departure from the foregoing rule. The trial court was correct in lending credibility to the
testimony of Lorielyn. The sole testimony of Lorielyn was sufficient to establish the guilt of
accused-appellant. It is settled that a person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the
testimony of the victim if the trial court finds said testimony to be credible, natural, convincing,
and consistent with human nature and the course of things.lxix[47]
Indeed, a daughter, especially one in her minority, would not accuse her own father of such an
unspeakable crime as incestuous rape had she really not been aggrieved.lxx[48] More importantly,
Lorielyn withstood all the rigors of the case, starting from the initial police interrogation, the
medical examination, the formal charge, the public trial, to the cross-examination. She went
through the court hearings, where she came face to face with her father. If it was true that she
merely made up the charge, she should have been bothered by her conscience at the sight of her
father in prison garb and upon the realization of his sorry state while in detention. The fact that
she maintained her story during her testimony-in-chief all the way up to her rebuttal testimony
only serves to substantiate the veracity of her claim.
Well settled is the rule that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via an
open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the culprit
apprehended and punished.lxxi[49] A young girls revelation that she has been raped, coupled with
her voluntary submission to medical examination and her willingness to undergo public trial
where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity by, as in this
case, her own father, cannot be so easily dismissed as a mere concoction.lxxii[50] Courts usually
give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, particularly if it
constitutes incestuous rape because, normally, no person would be willing to undergo the
humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the details of her ordeal were it not to condemn an
injustice. Needless to say, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given
full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.lxxiii[51]
During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar. Occasions
were cited wherein Lorielyn supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents' permission
to leave the house. However, Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: Evidence
that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did
not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific
intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. While
lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming
them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as
charging one's own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.
Accused-appellant argues that the trial court should have given credence to his witness, Atty.
Santer G. Gonzales, because he is a member of the bar. Atty. Gonzales, however, took the
witness stand not as a lawyer but as an ordinary person. He testified in his capacity as accused-
appellant's employer. As such, no special privilege should be accorded him by the trial court by
reason only of his being a member of the bar. He did not appear in that case as an officer of the
court but as a mere witness, and hence should be treated as one.
Likewise, accused-appellant insists that Lorielyn's conduct after the rape, during which she
continued to perform her tasks and lived with her father in their house, negates the commission
of rape. Accused-appellant's proposition is derived from Lorielyn's perfunctory yes-or-no
answers to the leading questions propounded to her on cross-examination. Rather than sustain
this argument, we rely instead on the observations of the Social Welfare Officer, whom we find
to be an impartial witness, in this wise:
Per observation, Lorielyn is a shy and silent type person. She talked in a very small voice and
during the interview she only talks when being asked. She also appears to be very sad and
have been staring blankly (sic).lxxiv[52]
Accused-appellant assigns as error the trial court's failure to give the reasons for recommending
the commutation of his sentence from death to reclusion perpetua. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, the trial court was impelled by humanitarian reason.lxxv[53] Moreover, the
commutation of sentence is a prerogative of the Chief Executive.
As against the positive and categorical testimony of Lorielyn, accused-appellant can only proffer
the defense of alibi. However, in order to overcome the evidence of the prosecution with the
defense of alibi, he must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed.lxxvi[54] In the instant case, the testimonies for the defense
sought to establish that accused-appellant was 400 to 500 meters, or 15 minutes, away from the
scene of the crime. This hardly qualifies as proof that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Accused-appellant's defense of alibi must,
therefore, necessarily fail.
Carefully sifting through the entire body of evidence presented in this case, we find nothing
which would destroy the moral certainty of accused-appellant's guilt. While there may be some
inconsistencies in the testimony of Lorielyn, these to our mind are minor inconsistencies which
serve to strengthen her credibility as they are badges of truth rather than indicia of
falsehood.lxxvii[55] Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may
even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the
substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws
may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.lxxviii[56]
Besides, a rape victim can not be expected to recall vividly all the sordid details of the violation
committed against her virtue.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim. xxx.lxxix[57]
The concurrence of the two special qualifying circumstances, namely the victim's minority and
the relationship between the victim and the culprit, increases the penalty of rape to one (1)
degree, thus resulting in the imposition of the death penalty. In order to be appreciated as
qualifying circumstances, however, these must be properly pleaded in the indictment.lxxx[58] In
addition, the qualifying circumstances should be duly proved during the trial.lxxxi[59]
These requirements are met in this case. The Information sufficiently alleges that accused-
appellant is the father of the victim, and that the latter was fourteen (14) years old at the time of
commission of the rape. These elements, furthermore, were categorically affirmed by Elizabeth
Nardo, the victim's mother and the most competent witness. She testified that accused-appellant
is Lorielyn's father, and that Lorielyn was born on September 11, 1981,lxxxii[60] thus placing her
age at the time of the rape at fourteen (14) years. Moreover, the Lorielyn's birth date and her
relationship to accused-appellant are shown by her Certificate of Baptism.lxxxiii[61] This was
presented by her mother, Elizabeth, in lieu of her Certificate of Live Birth, which was destroyed
by fire.lxxxiv[62] The baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, is sufficient to
establish Lorielyn's age.lxxxv[63]
We therefore affirm the trial court's imposition of the death penalty.
Four justices of the Court have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the
majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.
We likewise affirm the award of P50,000.00 for moral damages which is consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence.lxxxvi[64] No proof is required to substantiate the award of moral
damages in rape cases. In People vs. Prades,lxxxvii[65] we held:
xxx. The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral
damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount
as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has
heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil
procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for
rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such
allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still
require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and
acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary
implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through the superfluity of still
being proved through a testimonial charade.
In addition to moral damages, the amount of P75,000.00 is awarded to the victim as indemnity.
xxx. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of
higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the
civil aspect should follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of
rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the
increased amount of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.lxxxviii[66]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Albay, Branch III,
convicting accused-appellant Alfredo Nardo y Rosales of the crime of rape, sentencing him to
death, and ordering him to pay the victim, Lorielyn Nardo moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is, further, ordered
to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records
of this case, be forwarded without delay to the office of the President for possible exercise of the
clemency or pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines vs Heirs of Alejaga Sr.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146030. December 3, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR., represented by ROQUETA
ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA JR., MARIA DULLA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA III,
ROQUETA ALEJAGA, JENNIFER ALEJAGA, EVERETTE CAPUNDAN, AND LYNETTE
ALEJAGA; THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ROXAS CITY, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
We reiterate the familiar doctrine that a free patent obtained through fraud or misrepresentation
is void. Furthermore, the one-year prescriptive period provided in the Public Land Act does not
bar the State from asking for the reversion of property acquired through such means.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the November 15, 2000 Decision278[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44568.
The decretal portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED, SET ASIDE and

RECALLED.279[2]
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA thus:
On December 28, 1978, [Respondent] Felipe Alejaga, Sr. x x x filed with the District Land
Office, Roxas City, Free Patent Application No. (VI-2) 8442 covering a parcel of land identified
as Lot 1, Mli-06-000020-D, with an area of .3899 hectares, more or less located at Dumolog,
Roxas City (Exh. A; Exh 9). It appears that on December 27, 1978, when the application was
executed under oath, Efren L. Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation and
verification of the land to the District Land Office, Bureau of Lands, City of Roxas. On March
14, 1979, the District Land Officer of Roxas City approved the application and the issuance of
[a] Free Patent to the applicant. On March 16, 1979, the patent was also ordered to be issued and
the patent was forwarded to defendant Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for registration and
issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. P-
15 Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 was issued to [respondent] by defendant Register of Deeds.
On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel in a letter-complaint requested
the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the District Land Officer, Roxas City, and
the Regional Office, Region VI, Iloilo City, for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a
foreshore land in favor of [respondent]. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator,
Legal Division, Land Management Bureau (formerly Bureau of Lands) submitted his Report
dated April 17, 1989. The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management Bureau, Manila,
recommended to the Director of Lands appropriate civil proceeding for the cancellation of Free
Patent Title No. (VI-2) 3358 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the
name of [respondent].
In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan under the Cottage Industry Guarantee
and Loan Fund by the defendant Philippine National Bank (hereinafter referred to as PNB)
executed in Cebu City in the amount of P100,000.00 on August 18, 1981. The loan was secured
by a real estate mortgage in favor of defendant PNB. The promissory note of appellant was
annotated at the back of the title.
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an action for
Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against [respondent], the PNB of
Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free Patent Application
(VI-2) 8442 of the parcel of land with an area of .3899 hectares more or less located at Dumolog,
Roxas City.
On November 17, 1990, while the case is pending hearing, [respondent] died. He was substituted
by his wife Roqueta Alejaga and his children, namely: Everette Alejaga, Lynnette Alejaga,
Felipe Alejaga, Jr., Maria Dulla Alejaga. Roqueta Alejaga, Jennifer Alejaga and Felipe Alejaga
III.
xxx xxx xxx
After hearing, the [trial] court in its dispositive portion decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring that the approval of Free Patent Application No.
3358 and issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the name of Felipe Alejaga is by
means of fraud hence, null and void ab initio and the court orders:
a) the cancellation of the approval of the application No. (VI-2) 8442 covering Lot No. 1,
Mli-06-000020-D with an area of .3899 hectares, more or less, located at Dumulog, Roxas City;
b) the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-15, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 in
the name of Felipe Alejaga;
c) the land covered thereby as above described is reverted to the mass of the public domain;
d) the defendants, Heirs of Felipe Alejaga Sr. or defendant, Philippine National Bank, Roxas
City Branch, to surrender the owners duplicate copy of above described Original Certificate of
Title No. P-15 to the Register of Deeds (now Registries of Land Titles and Deeds), Roxas City;
e) the defendant, Register of Deeds, Roxas City, to cancel Original Certificate of Title No.
P-15 and the owners duplicate copy of said title surrendered by above stated defendants;
f) defendants, Philippine National Bank, cross-claim is dismissed.
Costs against the defendants Heirs of Felipe, Alejaga, Sr.280[3]
In reversing the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove its allegation that respondents
had obtained the free patent and the Certificate of Title through fraud and misrepresentation.281[4]
The appellate court likewise held that, assuming there was misrepresentation or fraud as claimed
by petitioner, the action for reversion should have been brought within one (1) year from the
registration of the patent with the Registry of Deeds.282[5]
Further, the CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagenas testimony that Land Inspector Efren
L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent application of Felipe Alejaga
Sr.283[6] The CA added that petitioner had failed to support its claim that the lot covered by
respondents free patent and title was foreshore land.284[7]
Hence, this Petition.285[8]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the case is already final and executory
as against respondent PNB.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that petitioner has proven the allegations to the
Complaint.
III
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the action for reversion is
unavailing.286[9]
Simply stated, the issues can be summed up into two: (1) the efficacy of the grant of the free
patent and (2) the indefeasibility of the Certificate of Title issued in consequence thereof.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Efficacy of the Grant
Petitioner argues that it has proven fraud in the issuance of Respondent Alejagas free patent and
Certificate of Title.287[10] It also avers that Respondent PNB has failed to file a timely Notice of
Appeal.
On the other hand, the Alejagas contend that they have acquired a vested right over the parcel of
land covered by OCT No. P-15 by virtue of their proven open, actual, exclusive and undisputed
possession of the land for more than 30 years.288[11]
At the outset, we must immediately clarify that the records show receipt by Respondent PNB of
a copy of the Decision on October 27, not on October 3, 1993 as alleged by petitioner.289[12]
Further, the bank filed its Notice of Appeal on November 9, 1993, within the 15-day
reglementary period.
In addition, we must point out that the essential issue raised in this Petition -- the presence of
fraud -- is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review factual matters.290[13] However,
the instant case falls under one of the exceptions, because the findings of the CA conflict with
those of the RTC and with the evidence on record.291[14]
We begin our resolution of this issue with the well-settled rule that the party alleging fraud or
mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof.292[15] The circumstances evidencing fraud are
as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case.293[16] It may assume different shapes and
forms; it may be committed in as many different ways.294[17] Thus, the law requires that it be
established by clear and convincing evidence.295[18]
In the case before us, we find that petitioner has adduced a preponderance of evidence before the
trial court, showing manifest fraud in procuring the patent.296[19] This Court agrees with the RTC
that in obtaining a free patent over the lot under scrutiny, petitioner had resorted to
misrepresentation or fraud, signs of which were297[20] ignored by the Court of Appeals.298[21]
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the procedure laid down
by Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.299[22] Under Section
91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
material facts set out in the application are true.300[23]
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient notice to the municipality
and the barrio where the land is located, in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to
present their claims.301[24] Note that this notice and the verification and investigation of the parcel
of land are to be conducted after an application for free patent has been filed with the Bureau of
Lands.
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.s Application for Free Patent302[25] was dated and filed
on December 28, 1978. On the other hand, the Investigation & Verification Report303[26] prepared
by Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands of Roxas
City was dated December 27, 1978. In that Report, he stated that he had conducted the necessary
investigation and verification in the presence of the applicant. Even if we accept this statement as
gospel truth, the violation of the rule cannot be condoned because, obviously, the required notice
to adverse claimants was not served.
Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and investigation allegedly conducted
by Recio were precipitate and beyond the pale of the Public Land Act.304[27] As correctly pointed
out by the trial court, investigation and verification should have been done only after the filing of
the application. Hence, it would have been highly anomalous for Recio to conduct his own
investigation and verification on December 27, 1998, a day before Felipe Alejaga Sr. filed the
Application for Free Patent.305[28] It must also be noted that while the Alejagas insist that an
investigation was conducted, they do not dispute the fact that it preceded the filing of the
application.306[29]
Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted is not sustained by
the Verification & Investigation Report itself, which bears no signature.307[30] Their reliance on
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty308[31] is thus misplaced. Since
Recios signature does not appear on the December 27, 1978 Report, there can be no presumption
that an investigation and verification of the parcel of land was actually conducted. Strangely,
respondents do not proffer any explanation why the Verification & Investigation Report was not
signed by Recio. Even more important and as will later on be explained, this alleged presumption
of regularity -- assuming it ever existed -- is overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner.
Third, the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been successfully rebutted.
In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an investigation and
ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios alleged admission may
be considered as independently relevant. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another
person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the formers statements may
then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule.309[32]
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination, the
Investigation Report310[33] he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes
part of his testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge,
perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay.311[34] On the other hand, the part referring to the
statement made by Recio may be considered as independently relevant.312[35]
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a

witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they
were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary,
for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue313[36] or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the
existence of such fact.314[37]
Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his
testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.315[38]
Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioners contention that the free patent
granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void.316[39] Such fraud is a ground for impugning the validity of
the Certificate of Title.317[40] The invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the
Certificate of Title issued in consequence thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the
former.318[41] Verily, we must uphold petitioners claim that the issuance of the Alejagas patent
and title was tainted with fraud.319[42]
Second Issue:
Indefeasibility of Title
Petitioner contends that the State has an imprescriptible right to cause the reversion of a piece of
property belonging to the public domain.320[43] On the other hand, the Alejagas claim that,
pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529321[44] -- otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
-- the one-year period for reversion has already lapsed.322[45] Thus, the States Complaint for
reversion should be dismissed.
We agree with petitioner.
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued, the land covered
by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property. Further, the
Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the
latter.323[46] However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation.324[47] Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the
Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrants already existing
one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring ownership.325[48]
Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,326[49] the State -- even after the
lapse of one year -- may still bring an action for the reversion to the public domain of land that
has been fraudulently granted to private individuals.327[50] Further, this indefeasibility cannot be a
bar to an investigation by the State as to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the
investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been committed in securing the title.328[51]
In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by the
Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the title by means of fraud.329[52] Public policy demands that
those who have done so should not be allowed to benefit from their misdeed.330[53] Thus,
prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the State to recover its own property acquired
through fraud by private individuals.331[54] This is settled law.332[55]
Prohibition Against Alienation

or Encumbrance
Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas title was validly issued, there is another basis for the
cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141333[56] proscribes the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under
a free patent or homestead within five years from its grant.334[57] The prohibition against any
alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every
application.335[58]
Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any right or title to, or interest in,
lands that are granted under free or homestead patents; or any improvements thereon. They are
forbidden from enjoying such right, title or interest, if they have not secured the consent of
the grantee and the approval of the secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes other than education, charity, or
easement of way. 336[59]
In the case at bar, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358337[60] was approved and issued on March 14,
1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-15338[61] was issued on the same date. On
August 18, 1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent, Felipe Alejaga Sr. obtained
from Respondent PNB a loan339[62] in the amount of P100,000. Despite the statement on the title
certificate itself that the land granted under the free patent shall be inalienable for five (5) years
from the grant, a real estate mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the parcel of land covered
by OCT No. P-15.340[63] In his testimony, Gabriel D. Aranas Jr., then Cashier III of respondent
bank, even admitted that the PNB was aware of such restriction.
COURT You testified Mr. Aranas that you inspected the title also when you credit
investigated the loan applicant Felipe Alejaga and you have personally examined
this?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT Do you conclude that this Original Certificate of Title is a [free] patent?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT And this [free] patent was granted on March 19, 1979.
A Yes, your honor.
COURT And as such [free] patent it cannot be alienated except [to] the government or
within five years from its issuance?
A Yes, your honor.
COURT Why did you recommend the loan?
A Because it is just a mortgage.341[64]
Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr. falls squarely within the term
encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land Act.342[65] A mortgage constitutes a
legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of the mortgage would necessarily result in the
auction of the property.343[66]
As early as Pascua v. Talens,344[67] we have explained the rationale for the prohibition against the
encumbrance of a homestead -- its lease and mortgage included -- an encumbrance which, by
analogy, applies to a free patent. We ruled as follows:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots
of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent
intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five
years after the grant of the patent.
Further, an encumbrance on a parcel of land acquired through free patent constitutes sufficient
ground for the nullification of such grant, as provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, which
we quote:
SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed
in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and
twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-
three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the
effect of annulling and canceling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized
or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its
improvements to the State.
Mortgage over a parcel of land acquired through a free patent grant nullifies the award and
constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the state, as we held in Republic v. Court
of Appeals:345[68]
The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired
under a free patent or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore,
such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the
public domain.346[69]
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent, within five years from its issuance,
Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not have encumbered the parcel land granted to him. The mortgage he
made over the land violated that condition.347[70] Hence, the property must necessarily revert to
the public domain, pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the RTC of Roxas City (Branch 15) dated October 27, 1993 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., abroad on official business.
e. Hearsay Evidence Rule
Patula vs People of the Philippines
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164457 April 11, 2012

ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the States evidence of guilt in order to
ensure that such evidenceadheres to the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an
accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the judge;
otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is nullified.The accused need
notadduceanythingto rebut evidence that is discredited for failing the test.Acquittal should then
follow.
Antecedents
Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
DumagueteCitythat averred:
That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and for sometime prior
thereto, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.,
Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several
customers of said company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales
and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from complying with her obligation and
after a reasonable period of time despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud
the said company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the said
collection to the said company but instead, did, then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount of
P131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.1
Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of
factswas had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the branch manager
of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footluckers) in Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994;
that petitioner was an employee of Footluckers, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she became
a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was authorized to take orders from
wholesale customers coming from different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia,
Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect payments from them;
that she could issue and sign official receipts of Footluckers for the payments, which she would
then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the payments for tallying and
reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading him
to confront her; that she responded that business was slow; that he summoned the accounting
clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he
decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned from a
customer of petitioners that the customers outstanding balance had already been fully paid
although that balance appeared unpaid in Footluckers records; and that one night later on,
petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny having misappropriated any money of
Footluckers and to plead for him not to push through with a case against her, promising to settle
her account on a monthly basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to
work.2
On March 7, 2002, Gos cross examination, re-direct examination and re-crossexamination were
completed.
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, whomFootluckers employed
as its store auditor since November 16, 1995 until her resignation on March 31, 2001. She
declared that Go had requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him that
they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstandingbalances
for them; that she first conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from Mabinay to
Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the course of her
audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50
customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner
submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report
denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences
in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997" marked as Exhibit A; and that based
on the report, petitioner had misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.3
During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioners various
customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive. Each
of the ledgers had a first column that contained the dates of the entries, a second that identified
the invoices by the number, a third that statedthe debit, a fourth that noted the credit (or the
amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the balances (debit minus credit).Only 49 of
theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by the RTC because the 50thledger could no
longer be found.
In the course of Guivencansdirect-examination,petitioners counsel interposed a continuing

objection on the ground that the figuresentered in Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives,
inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves
presented in court.4With that, petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan,
apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove
falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.
TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits, including Exhibits B to YYand

their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and issued
by petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the accounts
served by petitioner, and Guivencans so-called Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies.5
After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a demurrer to evidence
although it had manifested the intention to do so, and instead rested itscase.The Prosecution and
Defense submitted their respective memoranda, and submitted the case for decision.6
On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted "not to present
evidence for her defense" the Prosecutions evidence remained "unrefuted and
uncontroverted,"7rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Court finds ANNA
LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 par
(1b) of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an
INDETERMINATE PENALTY of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum to 18 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessory
penalties provided by law and to indemnify private complainant the amount of P131,286.92 with
interest at 12% per annum until fully paid and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the cash bail put up by
the accused shall be effective only until the promulgation of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied the motion on May 7, 2004.9
Issues
Insisting that the RTCs judgment "grossly violated [her] Constitutional and statutory right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her because, while the charge against
her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented against
her and upon which her conviction was based, was falsification, an offense not alleged or
included in the Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty," and that said
judgment likewise "blatantly ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on admission of
evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all private
documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in accordance with Sec.
20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence," petitioner has directly appealed to the Court
via petition for review on certiorari, positing the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT MATTER ,

CHARGED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE CAN BE CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION
WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT

TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION
AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED UPON OR BY
EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST
HER IS ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B)
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN

EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS "B" TO "YY"-"YY-2", ALL PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, THE
DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH WERE NOT PROVED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20, RULE 132 OF THE SAID REVISED RULES ON
EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT SAID EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE
FALSIFICATION BY THE ACCUSED, A CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE

TESTIMONY OF KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE OBJECTION THAT SAID
TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED FALSIFIED
EXHIBITS "B" TO "YY"-"YY-2"INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSEDS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE
OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED IS ESTAFA
UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION "REMAINS UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED" DESPITE ACCUSEDS OBJECTION THAT SAID
EVIDENCE IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES NOT CROSS-EXAMINING KAREN

GUIVENCAN FOR THE REASON THAT HER TESTIMONY IS IMMATERIAL AND
IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO PROVE AN OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN
INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE ADMISSION OF SAID TESTIMONY AS
BEING "UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED", AND WHETHER OR NOT
THE DEFENSES OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED WAIVED IF THE
DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT EXHIBIT

"A", WHICH IS THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS COVERED BY SALESWOMAN
LERIMA PATULA WITH DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT HEARSAY AND
SELF-SERVING.10
The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:
1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the falsification of the
duplicate receipts issued by petitioner to her customersviolated petitioners right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of the falsification of the
duplicate receiptsdespite the information not alleging the falsification;
3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioners guilt for estafaas charged despite
their not being duly authenticated;and
4. Whether or not Guivencanstestimony onthe ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY,

and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioners misappropriation or conversion
wasinadmissible for being hearsay.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Failure of information to allege falsification

did not violate petitioners right to be informed
of thenatureand cause of the accusation
Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her Constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation when: (a) it held that the information did not have to allege
her falsification of the duplicate receipts, and (b) when it convicted her of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Codeby relying on the evidence on falsification.
The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every person accused of a crime, among them the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when the information was filed in
the RTC, contained the following provisions on the proper manner of alleging the nature and
cause of the accusation in the information, to wit:
Section 8.Designation of the offense. Whenever possible, a complaint or information should
state the designation given to the offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts or
omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such designation, reference should be made to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (7)
Section 9.Cause of accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms
of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. (8)
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the
informationshould never be taken for granted by the State. An accused cannot be convicted of an
offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense
other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of the Constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.11 Indeed, the accused cannot be
convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in
the information filed against him.
The crime of estafacharged against petitioner was defined and penalized by Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos,
provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following
means:
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.
xxx
The elements of the offense charged were as follows:
(a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such money, goods or other personal
property, or denied his part in its receipt;
(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the prejudice of another; and
(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender for the delivery or return of
such money, goods or other personal property.12
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner misappropriated or converted the
sums paid by her customers, and later falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such
duplicates to her employer to show that the customers had paid less than the amounts actually
reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed the falsification in order to conceal
her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the falsificationwas not an offense separate
and distinct from the estafacharged against her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts
of falsification as its means of establishing her misappropriation or conversion as an essential
ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not infringed or denied to her.
We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein completely pleaded the estafa
defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Codewithin the context
of the substantive lawand the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the information to allege
the acts of falsification by petitioner because falsification was not an element of the
estafacharged.
Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with petitioners concern thuswise:
In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that [the] prosecutions evidence
utterly fails to prove the crime charged. According to the defense, the essence of Karen
Guivencans testimony is that the accused falsified the receipts issued to the customers served by
her by changing or altering the amounts in the duplicates of the receipts and therefore, her
testimony is immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is misappropriation under Art. 315,
paragraph (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation whatsoever of any
falsification or alteration of amounts in the [i]nformation under which the accused was arraigned
and pleaded NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that the testimony of Karen Guivencan
should therefore not be considered at all as it tended to prove an offense not charged or included
in the [i]nformation and would violate [the] accuseds constitutional and statutory right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. The Court is not in accord with
such posture of the accused.
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the crime charged in the [i]nformation
is merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could not
prove falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since the information charges accused
only of misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of the Revised [P]enal Code, the Court
holds that there is no necessity of alleging the falsification in the Information as it is not an
element of the crime charged.
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will constitute as
one complex crime and when they are considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime
of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to falsify certain
documents to be able to obtain money or goods from another person. In other words, the
falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa. However, if the falsification is
committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and falsification are
committed. In the instant case, when accused collected payments from the customers, said
collection which was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or erroneous entries
which she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal some amount
of her collection which she did not remit to the company xxx.13
II
Testimonial and documentary evidence,being hearsay,

did not prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to
prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of
guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein.14 The Prosecution must
further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense.15In doing all
these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success
upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the
Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than
the Constitution has guaranteed.16Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of
proof,17that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the
presumption of innocence in his favor.In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the
accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged
its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the
accused as the malefactor responsible for it.
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner
for the estafa charged in the information?
To establish the elements of estafaearlier mentioned, the Prosecution presented the testimonies
of Go and Guivencan, and various documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by
petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts
pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of
the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself.18The ledgers
and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as
Footluckers sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal
knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customersor remitted by
petitioner to Footluckers.This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to
YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found
in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively deprived the
RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries
as evidence of petitioners misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by
petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of misappropriation or
conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus
devoid of probative value, reference is made toSection 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that
states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of
Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft ofpersonal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the
veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the
facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in
dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such
testimony thendepends not upon theveracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other
person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested
because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness andcannot, therefore, be cross-
examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular,
to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any
obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion
that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.19 Thus, the
rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.20 The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of
justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, it is hearsay just the same.21
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of
the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and,
therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand,
subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as
an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted,
the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies
that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to
prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those
words.22 This kind of utterance ishearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.23The distinction is,
therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not
apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.24
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why
testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to
preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the originaldeclarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.25If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be
denied because the declarant is not in court.26It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-
examine the adverse partys witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to
the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a
dispute while also safeguardinga partys right to cross-examine her adversarys witness,the Rules
of Court offers two solutions. The firstsolution is to require that allthe witnesses in a judicial trial
or hearing be examined only in courtunder oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court formalizes this solution,viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of witnesses presented in a

trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally. (1a)
The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the cross-examination by the
adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtensuresthis solutionthusly:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in
the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal
cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution,which guarantees that: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face
xxx," the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-
criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about
the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or
solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing
counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant
or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.27
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencans testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and
their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of petitioners misappropriation or
conversion.
III
Lack of their proper authentication rendered

Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits B to YY,
and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private documents that were not duly
authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a public document and a private
document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz:
Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments, and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or
a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record
of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private document is any
other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a
notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or
set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or
the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication
of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an
ancient one within the context of Section 21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the
genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under
oath by the adverse party;29(c) when thegenuineness and authenticity of the document
have been admitted;30 or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.31
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because
private individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or uses.
Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be
presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to
their authentication in the manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the signature of petitioner in various receipts,

to wit:
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with the original receipts, do you
have copies of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but its not now in my possession.
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable Court, can you assure this
(Next Page)
ATTY ABIERA (continuing):
Honorable Court that you will be able to present those receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in this case, Anna Lerima Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this case?
A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts also.
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would present this,or offer the
same as soon as the original receipts can be presented, but for purposes only of your
testimony, Im going to point to you a certain signature over this receipt number FLDT96
20441, a receipt from Cirila Askin, kindly go over the signature and tell the Honorable Court
whether you are familiar with the signature?
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word "collector".
(Next Page)
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature rather, of the accused in this case
appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the original receipts Your
Honor, because its quite voluminous, so we will just forego with the testimony of the witness
but we will just present the same using the testimony of another witness, for purposes of
identifying the signature of the accused. We will request that this signature which has been
identified to by the witness in this case be marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to present
the original copy and present the same to offer as our exhibits but for the meantime, this is only
for the purposes of recording, Your Honor, which we request the same, the receipt which has just
been identified awhile ago be marked as our Exhibit "A" You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit "A".
ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "A-1".
(Next Page)
COURT:
Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. "A-1". What is the number of that receipt?
ATTY. ABIERA:
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that: received from Cirila Askin.32
xxx
As the excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication of the signature of petitioner on the
receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked as Exhibit A, while
the purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled out
after the Prosecution admitted that the document was a meremachinecopy, not the original.
Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a
later date the originalsof the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts.
But that promise was not even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution offered to
authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receiptsthrougha different witness (though then
still unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate both
themachinecopy of the receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of
petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and
was no longer evenincluded in the Prosecutions Offer of Documentary Evidence.
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441was
subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not
establishthat the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go had
earliersought to identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy
(Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the
marking nomenclature for the machine copyof the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No.
20441 for all intents and purposes of this case, and used the same nomenclature to referinstead
toan entirely differentdocument entitled "List of Customers covered by ANA LERIMA
PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-20, 1997."
In her case, Guivencans identification of petitioners signature on two receipts based alone on
the fact that the signatures contained the legible family name of Patula was ineffectual, and
exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the documentary evidence against petitioner.
Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioners signature on the receipts either
because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen petitioner affix
her signature on the receipts, as the following excerpts from her testimony bear out:
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation sheet, will you go over these Miss
witness?
A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the customer. The other receipt is the one
showing her payment prior to the last payment.
COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as Exhibit "B-3", receipt number
20441.
(Next Page)
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The signature of the collector be marked as
Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the collector, are your familiar with
that signature? (shown to witness)
A. Yes.
Q. Whose signature is that?
A. Miss Patula.
Q. How do you know?
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.
Q. Are you familiar with her signature?
A. Yes.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "B-3-a"
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit "B-4" and the signature as Exhibit "B-4-
a".
COURT:
Mark it.33
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued to one Divina Cadilig. Will
you please identify this receipt if this is the receipt of your office?
A.Yes.
Q.There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose signature is this?
A.Ms. Patula.
Q.How do you know that this is her signature?

A.Because we can read the Patula.34
We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the ledgers the
Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between the amountspetitioner hadallegedly
received from the customers and the amounts she had actually remitted to Footluckers.
Guivencanexclusively relied on the entries of the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit
report on petitioners supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of
independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the following excerpts of her testimony
show:
Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed that this Cecilia Askin has
an account of P10,791.75?
ATTY. DIEZ:
The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office record.
COURT:
Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and showed it to the
customers for confirmation.
Q. What about the receipts?
COURT:
Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you copied that amount in the ledger
and you had it confirmed by the customers, what was the result when you had it confirmed by
the customers?
WITNESS:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance of P10,971.75.
Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of saying that the balance of this customer is still P10,971.75
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):
[i]n your office?
COURT:
That was already answered paero, the office has a ledger.
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?
A. No, Maam.35
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of

Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)
Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and the duplicate, will you
please enlighten the Honorable Court on that discrepancy which you said?
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her ledger shows a zero
balance she has fully paid while in the original
(Next page)
WITNESS (continuing):
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred Ninety-one Pesos and Seventy-
five Centavos (10,791.75).
COURT:
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated there?
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already forwarded to the Manila Office.
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that it has already a zero balance?
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original receipt she has still a
balance.
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
The confirmation sheet ---
COURT:
The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt in your earlier testimony? Is
that what you referred to as the receipts, the original receipts?
A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed that that particular customer
still has a balance of Ten Thousand something?
A. The receipt is no longer here.
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the ledger?
A. Yes.36
In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions evidence, it should come as no
surprise that petitioners counsel interposed timely objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously
overruled the objections and allowedthe Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated ledgers, as
follows:
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of

Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)
ATTY. ZERNA:
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several ledgers. Where is it now?
A It is here.
Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how much is her account in
your office?
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer the question, let me interpose
our objection on the ground that this ledger has not been duly identified to by the person
who made the same. This witness will be testifying on hearsay matters because the
supposed ledger was not identified to by the person who made the same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think they were already duly
identified by this witness. As a matter of fact, it was she who brought them to court
(Next Page)
COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the entries is not this witness, Your
Honor. How do we know that the entries there is (sic) correct on the receipts submitted to
their office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A Its the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the auditor of Footluckers.
COURT:
I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those entries were taken. So, you
answer the query of counsel.
xxx
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a continuing objection to the questions
profounded(sic) on those ledgers on the ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.
COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.

Q (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who prepared the entries on those ledgers,
is she still connected with Footluckers?
A She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,
COURT:
Alright proceed.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of business. So, exempt from the
hearsay rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.37
The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions flawed presentation was
avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as
withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to prove
the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen
the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted
or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or signing of
the documents,the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That was the onlyfair and just
result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires
Corporation:38
On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne Kings
testimony was hearsay because she had no personal knowledge of the execution of the
documents supporting respondents cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice,
packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even
though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails
and Wires Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of
the facts which gave rise to respondents cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though
she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets received by respondent, she did
not have personal knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that respondents cause of action is founded on breach of insurance
contract covering cargo consisting of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent
has to prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and received by the importer,
namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondents
importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel
billets being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay,
as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.However, she is not
qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not
have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared the
summary of the received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts prepared
by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no probative
value even if not objected to at the trial.
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly authenticate respondents
documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private
document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who
executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was
present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the
signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that King was none of the aforementioned
persons. She merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets based on the
unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel billets
actually received had no proven real basis, and Kings testimony on this point could not be
taken at face value.
xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private. Private documents are
those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.Section 20of the same law, in turn, provides that before any private document is received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting
of the maker. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are private documents. They are not
among those enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity need to
be proved before they can be admitted in evidence.With the exception concerning the
summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent presented no supporting
evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less
of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum, we find
no sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioners liability.
That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because petitioner decided not to subject
Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender her contrary evidencewas inconsequential.
Although the trial court had overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencans testimony
bypetitioners counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied thathearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, had no probative value.39Verily, the flaws of the Prosecutions
evidence were fundamental and substantive, not merely technical and procedural, and were
defects that the adverse partys waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould not set
right or cure. Nor did the trial courts overruling of petitioners objections imbue the flawed
evidence with any virtue and value.
Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application of the hearsay rule by
also terselystating that the ledgers "were prepared in the regular course of business."40Seemingly,
the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position
to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made
the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping mannerof justifying the
application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show the concurrence of the
several requisites before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the hearsay
rule. The requisites are as follows:
(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral, or religious;
(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.41
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the
States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of
admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence.
The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the guarantee of due of process of law in favor
of the accused, who had no obligation to prove her innocence. Heracquittal should follow.
IV
No reliable evidence on damage
Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the Court declares that the disposition
by the RTC ordering petitioner to indemnify Footluckers in the amount of P131,286.92 with
interest of 12% per annum until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually founded. Yet, she
cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that basis. Heracquittal has to bedeclared as without
prejudice to the filing of a civil action against her for the recovery of any amount that she may
still owe to Footluckers.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe decision convicting ANNA

LERIMA PATULAof estafa as charged, and ACQUITS her for failure of the Prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action brought against her
for
the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
i. Dying Declaration: People of the Philippines vs Gatarin
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198022 April 7, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO @ "JAY-R" and EDUARDO QUISAYAS, Accused,
EDUARDO QUISAYAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated February 23, 2011 in CA-
G.R. CR H.C. No. 03593 affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC)2 Decision3 dated June 20,
2008 in Criminal Case No. 13838 convicting appellant Eduardo Quisayas of Robbery with
Homicide committed against the victim Januario Castillo y Masangcay (Januario).
The facts of the case follow:
Appellant and accused Sonny Gatarin y Caballero were charged in an Information4 with
Robbery with Homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 2004, at about 8:00 oclock (sic) in the evening, at
Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Mabini, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon,
conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping each
other, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof and with
violence against or intimidation of person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob, and carry away cash money amounting to Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias "Ka
Maning," to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount and that on the
occasion and by reason of said robbery, the said accused with intent to kill and taking advantage
of their superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab with the said weapon Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias "Ka Maning," thereby
inflicting upon the latter the stab wounds to [the] anterior chest and right shoulder and right
axilla, which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.5
Appellant was arrested, while his co-accused remained at-large. When arraigned, he pleaded
"Not Guilty." Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Maria Castillo, the
victims wife; (2) Howel Umali (Umali), who allegedly saw how the accused mauled the victim;
(3) SPO3 Gregorio G. Mendoza (SPO3 Mendoza) of the Mabini Police Station, who saw the
victim lying on the floor and the accused running away from the crime scene, and testified on the
dying declaration of Januario; (4) Dr. Catalino Ike A. Rasa Jr. (Dr. Rasa), who attended to the
victim when he was brought to the hospital; and (5) PO1 Rogelio Dizon Coronel (PO1 Coronel),
who saw the accused running fast near the crime scene and who, likewise, testified on Januarios
ante mortem statement.
From the testimonies of the above-named witnesses, the prosecution established the following
facts:
On November 3, 2004, at 8 oclock in the evening, Umali was riding a bicycle on his way home
when he saw Januario being mauled by two persons opposite Doms Studio in Poblacion,
Mabini, Batangas. Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front of the church until such time that
the accused ran away and were chased by policemen who alighted from the police patrol
vehicle.6
On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle
performing their routine patrol duty when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who
were running at a fast speed. When asked why they were running, the accused did not answer
prompting the policemen to chase them. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching
them and when it became evident that they could no longer find them, they continued patrolling
the area. There they saw Januario lying on the street in front of Doms studio. As he was severely
injured, the policemen immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the
Zigzag Hospital. While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He
answered that it was "Jay-R and his uncle" who stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be the
appellant herein, while Jay-R is his co-accused who remains at-large.7
At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found him in critical
condition. Three fatal wounds caused by a bladed weapon were found in Januarios body which
eventually caused his death.8
Maria Castillo, for her part, testified on how she learned of what happened to her husband, the
victim herein, the amount allegedly stolen from her husband, as well as on the expenses and loss
incurred by reason of Januarios death. She, further, quantified the sorrow and anxiety the family
suffered by reason of such death.9
In his defense, appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that he is from the
Province of Samar but has been residing in Cupang, Muntinlupa City since 1987. He denied
knowing, much more residing in, Mabini, Batangas, as he only heard about the province from his
employer who happens to be a resident therein. He claimed that he did not know Januario and
that he was, in fact, working in Muntinlupa City on the date and time the crime was allegedly
committed.10
The prosecutions rebuttal witness Mr. Bienvenido Caponpon, however, belied appellants claim
and insisted that appellant was renting a house in Mabini, Batangas and that he was seen there
until the day the crime was committed.11
On June 20, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision against the appellant, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the People having proven the guilt of accused Eduardo Quisayas beyond
reasonable doubt, he is hereby declared "GUILTY" of the offense as charged. Accordingly, he is
hereby sentenced to a prison term of Reclusion Perpetua.
Further, he is hereby ordered to pay herein offended party of the following:
(a) civil indemnity in the amount of Php50,000.00
(b) actual damages in the amount of Php20,000.00, plus Php35,310.00 (funeral and
hospital expenses), and
(c) moral damages in the amount of Php100,000.00
SO ORDERED.12
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Maria Castillo not only as to the fact of taking
money from Januario but also the amount taken.13 The fact of death was, likewise, found by the
court to have been adequately proven by the testimony of Dr. Rasa.14 Though there was no
evidence whether the unlawful taking preceded the killing of Januario, the court held that there
was direct and intimate connection between the two acts.15
As to the identity of the perpetrators, the court considered the victims response to SPO3
Mendozas question as to who committed the crime against him as part of the res gestae, which
is an exception to the hearsay rule.16 As to appellants defense of alibi, the court gave more
weight to the prosecutions rebuttal evidence that indeed the former was an actual resident of
Mabini, Batangas.17
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Contrary, however, to the RTCs conclusion, the
appellate court considered Januarios statement to SPO3 Mendoza, that the accused were the
ones who stabbed him and took his wallet, not only as part of res gestae but also as a dying
declaration.18
Hence, the appeal before the Court.
We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt not of robbery with homicide but of murder.
The trial courts factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the
probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings are
accorded great respect and even conclusive effect. We, nevertheless, fully scrutinize the records,
since the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the CA imposed on appellant demands no less than
this kind of careful and deliberate consideration.19
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3)
with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of
the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed.20
First, in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that
the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime.21 In
order for the crime of robbery with homicide to exist, it must be established that a robbery has
actually taken place and that, as a consequence or on the occasion of robbery, a homicide be
committed.22
For there to be robbery, there must be taking of personal property belonging to another, with
intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon
on things.23 Both the RTC and the CA concluded that robbery was committed based on the
testimonies of Maria Castillo, SPO3 Mendoza, and PO1 Coronel. A closer look at the
testimonies of these witnesses, however, failed to convince us that indeed robbery took place.
Maria Castillos testimony was offered by the prosecution to prove that her husband, the victim
herein, was a victim of robbery with homicide and that he is a businessman, and that she suffered
damages by reason of such death. The pertinent portion of her direct testimony is quoted below
for a closer scrutiny:
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q The victim in this case Januario Castillo, how are you related to him?
WITNESS:
A My husband, sir.
Q On November 3, 2004, do you remember of any unusual incident that has occurred?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is that event?
A At around 8:30 oclock in the evening of November 3, 2004 while I was at home, policemen
arrived and informed me that my husband was wounded, sir.
Q Did these police officers inform you the location (sic) of where your husband was located?
A According to the policemen, my husband was at Zigzag Hospital, sir.
Q Did you go to Zigzag Hospital, Madam Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened, Madam Witness, when you arrived at the hospital?
A I was informed by the nurse there that my husband was already dead.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q Were you informed of the cause of the death of your husband?
WITNESS:
A According to them my husband was wounded, many wounds and he was robbed, sir.
Q Madam Witness, were you able to know who are the persons responsible for the death of your
husband?
ATTY. EBORA:
We will object. That will be misleading.
COURT:
If she is aware.
ATTY. EBORA:
We submit.
COURT:
You ask her if she is aware who the perpetrators are.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q Madam Witness, were you informed who are the perpetrators of the crime on your husband?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, sir. It was not told to me by the policemen because the policemen were in a hurry.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q After the policemen went to your house, was there [any] person who informed you who were
the perpetrators of the crime?
A Yes, sir. My niece.
Q And who is that niece of yours, Madam Witness?
A Josephine Borbon, sir.
Q Did Miss Borbon tell you about the identity of the perpetrators of the crime, Madam Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And who are the persons did Miss Borbon mention?
A My former helper Sonny Gatarin and his uncle Eduardo Quisayas, sir.
Q You were told that your husband was robbed, how much was taken from your husband,
Madam Witness?
A P20,000.00.
Q And can you tell, Madam Witness, why is your husband carrying that amount of money at the
time of his death?
A Yes, sir.
WITNESS:
A Those were the earnings for that day for he delivered merchandise and groceries, sir.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q Do you know, Madam Witness, if your husband is engaged in any business?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is your proof in saying your husband is engaged in business?
A Our business was we delivered bottled goods and groceries, sir.
Q The business wherein your husband is engaged has an existing license with the appropriate
local government?
A Yes, sir.
Q If a copy will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you [a] certified copy of [the] Mayors permit previously marked as Exhibit
"H"?
A This is it, sir.
Q If you know, Madam Witness, how much is your husband earning in his sari-sari or grocery
business?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q How much is he earning at the time?
A He earns P40,000.00.
Q In a month or year?
A P40,000.00 a month, sir.
Q How do you feel or confront the situation that your husband is already dead?
A We felt deep sorrow together with my three (3) children, sir. (Witness is crying)
x x x x24
From the above testimony, it can be inferred that Maria Castillo obviously was not at the scene
of the crime on that fateful night as she was only informed that the incident took place and that
Januario was brought to the Zigzag Hospital. It, likewise, appears that she had no personal
knowledge that Januario was robbed. While she claimed that P20,000.00 was illegally taken
from him, no evidence was presented to show that Januario indeed had that amount at that time
and that the same was in his possession. As Maria Castillo claimed that the said amount was
allegedly received from their clients in their grocery business, said fact could have been proven
by receipts or testimonies of said clients. The prosecutions failure to present such evidence
creates doubt as to the existence of the money.
The trial and appellate courts likewise relied on the testimony of SPO3 Mendoza and PO1
Coronel on the statement of Januario after the commission of the crime. While both policemen
testified as to the dying declaration of Januario pertaining to the cause and circumstances
surrounding his death, only PO1 Coronel testified during his direct examination that when asked
who stabbed him, Januario replied that it was "Jay-Ar and his uncle who stabbed him and took
his wallet."25 In response to the Presiding Judges clarificatory question, however, PO1 Coronel
admitted that when he asked Januario who stabbed him, he replied that it was Jay-Ar and his
uncle. After which, no further question was asked.26 On the other hand, nowhere in SPO3
Mendozas testimony did he talk about the alleged taking of wallet. The pertinent portions of
their testimonies read:
Direct Examination of PO1 Coronel:
xxxx
Q: What did you do next after boarding him inside your vehicle?
A We brought him at the Zigzag Hospital and we asked him who stabbed him.
Q What was his reply Mr. Witness?
A He told us that Jay-ar and his uncle stabbed him and took his wallet.
x x x x27
PO1 Coronels Answers to the questions propounded by the Presiding Judge:
THE COURT:
Alright, the Court will ask.
Q When did you talk with the victim?
A When we were inside the patrol car, your Honor.
Q What exactly did you ask from the victim?

A I asked him who stabbed him, your Honor.
Q Did you tell the victim his condition?
A No, your Honor.
Q You just asked the victim who stabbed him?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What was the answer of the victim?
A That he was stabbed by Jay-ar and his uncle, your Honor.
Q And no other question did you ask him?
A None, your Honor.
x x x x28
Direct Testimony of SPO3 Mendoza:
xxxx
Q And when you saw Januario Castillo lying on the street, what did you do?
A We lifted him and boarded him in our vehicle then we brought him to the hospital.
Q While you were travelling, were you able to talk to the victim Januario Castillo?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your conversation all about?
A I asked Ka Maning Castillo as to who stabbed him and he answered Jay-R and his uncle.
x x x x29
It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the evidence presented to prove the robbery aspect
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, does not show that robbery actually took
place. The prosecution did not convincingly establish the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery.
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense,
refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed. As applied to a particular offense, it
means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.30 In this case, the
element of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged to have been lost and stolen by
appellant, was not adequately established.31 We find no sufficient evidence to show either the
amount of money stolen, or if any amount was in fact stolen from Januario. Even if we consider
Januarios dying declaration, the same pertains only to the stabbing incident and not to the
alleged robbery.
Moreover, assuming that robbery was indeed committed, the prosecution must establish with
certitude that the killing was a mere incident to the robbery, the latter being the perpetrators
main purpose and objective. It is not enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the
homicide was to rob; a mere presumption of such fact is not sufficient.32 Stated in a different
manner, a conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the
taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.33 What is
crucial for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to firmly
establish the offenders intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time
when the homicide is actually carried out.34 In this case, there was no showing of the appellants
intention, determined by their acts prior to, contemporaneous with, and subsequent to the
commission of the crime, to commit robbery.35 No shred of evidence is on record that could
support the conclusion that appellants primary motive was to rob Januario and that he was able
to accomplish it.36 Mere speculation and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required in
establishing the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.37 Where the evidence does not
conclusively prove the robbery, the killing of Januario would be classified either as a simple
homicide or murder, depending upon the absence or presence of any qualifying circumstance,
and not the crime of robbery with homicide.38 To establish the fact that appellant and his co-
accused killed the victim by stabbing him with a bladed weapon, the prosecution presented
Umali as an eyewitness to the mauling incident. It was this same witness who identified the
perpetrators. The trial and appellate courts also relied on the statement of Januario as to the
circumstances of his death, testified to by PO1 Coronel and SPO3 Mendoza as dying declaration
and as part of res gestae.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character,
may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration
concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made
when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the
dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's
death.39
In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the
records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not
appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the
statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending
death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration
admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on
death as certainly impending.40 Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered
as a dying declaration.
However, even if Januarios utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his
statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea
of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and
also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.41
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. When
Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a startling
occurrence which is the stabbing by appellant and his co-accused. At that time, Januario and the
witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to the hospital, and thus, had no time to
contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance about appellant and his co-accused
having stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and
only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is relevant because it
identified the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of Januario, perpetrated by
appellant, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
From the evidence presented, we find that as alleged in the information, abuse of superior
strength attended the commission of the crime, and thus, qualifies the offense to murder. Abuse
of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the commission of the crime.42
It is clear from the records of the case that Januario was then fifty-four (54) years old. Appellant,
on the other hand, was then forty (40) years old. Appellant committed the crime with his co-
accused, his nephew. Clearly, assailants are younger than the victim. These two accused were
seen by Umali as the persons who mauled Januario. Moreover, assailants were armed with a
bladed weapon, while Januario was unarmed. This same bladed weapon was used in repeatedly
stabbing Januario, who no longer showed any act of defense. Dr. Rasa, the medical doctor who
attended to Januario when he was brought to the hospital, also testified as to the nature and
extent of the injury sustained by Januario. He clearly stated that Januario sustained three fatal
injuries which caused his death. The pertinent portion of Dr. Rasas testimony reads:
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q How many injuries were sustained by the victim, Mr. Witness?
A Three.
Q In what parts of the body was the victim injured?
A The victim sustained three injuries: one on the left side of the parasternal border the heart (sic)
and it penetrated, and then the second one was on the right side of the chest near the shoulder and
the third one was under the armpit also to the chest.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q Which of those injuries caused the death of the victim?
A All of them are fatal, because the one over the heart penetrated the heart and the aorta. The one
in the anterior chest near the right shoulder hit the blood vessels of the armpit and the wound
under the armpit apparently hit the lungs.
x x x x43
This same physician issued the Medical Certificate explaining the location of the stab wounds as
well as the cause of death of Januario, to wit:
Location of Stab Wounds:
1. Stab wound penetrating 2nd inter-costal space left para-sternal border, 6" deep
penetrating the heart chambers and aorta
2. Stab wound over the right anterior deltoid muscle, penetrating
3" into the right axilla space; injuring the axilla blood vessels.
3. Stab wound over the right axilla, penetrating to the right chest cavity.
CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate Cause: Hypovolemic Shock
Antecedent Cause: Multiple stab wounds to the anterior chest, right
axilla, and right axilla penetrating the chest cavity.
x x x x44
From the testimony of the eyewitness and corroborated by the medical certificate of Dr. Rasa, it
can be inferred that indeed the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the
commission of the crime. To be sure, with two assailants younger than the victim, armed with a
bladed weapon and inflicting multiple mortal wounds on the victim, there is definitely abuse of
superior strength deliberately taken advantage of by appellant and his co-accused in order to
consummate the offense.
Now on the penalty. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
x x x x45
There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, appellant shall be meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Finally, the award of damages. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity which has been fixed by
jurisprudence at P50,000.00 requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime
and proof of the accuseds responsibility therefor. Moral damages, on the other hand, which in
this case is also P50,000.00 are awarded in view of the violent death of the victim.46 Moreover,
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should likewise be given, considering that the
offense was attended by an aggravating circumstance whether ordinary, or qualifying as in this
case. As duly proven by Maria Castillo, actual damages representing the hospital and funeral
expenses, as evidenced by receipts in the amount of P35,300.00, be awarded. Finally, in addition
and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages
an interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) from date of finality of this decision until full
payment.47
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the Court of Appeals Decision dated

February 23, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03593, affirming the Regional Trial Court Decision
dated June 20, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 13838, convicting appellant Eduardo Quisayas of
Robbery with Homicide. We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
We, likewise, ORDER appellant TO PAY the heirs of the victim Januario Castillo y Masangcay
the following: (1) P35,300.00 actual damages; (2) P50,000.00 civil indemnity; (3) P50,000.00
moral damages; (4) P30,000.00 exemplary damages; plus (5) six percent (6%) interest on all
damages awarded from the date of the finality of this decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ii. Declaration against interest: People of the Philippines vs

Bernal
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113685. June 19, 1997]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN
DOE and PETER DOE, accused-appellants.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping in Criminal Case No.
26658-92 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10, under an informationlxxxix[1]
dated July 13, 1992, which reads as follows:
That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with hand guns, conspiring,
confederating and cooperating together and helping one another, and by means of force,
violence, intimidation and threat, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously grabbed and kidnapped
one Bienvenido Openda, Jr., while the latter was drinking liquor with his friends at Bolton Isla,
this City and was brought, handcuffed and carried away using a PU then fled together with
Bienvenido Openda, Jr., thereby depriving the said Bienvenido Openda, Jr. of his liberty against
his will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial ensued. The
prosecution presented four witnesses.xc[2] On the other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for his
defense.
The material facts and events as found by the court a quo are:
It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and
Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join
them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to fetch
his child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was
Payat.xci[3] When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other
handcuffed him and told him not to run because they were policemen and because he had an
atraso or a score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went
to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latters mother of the abduction.
The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to
establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernals wife Naty and this was the motive
behind the formers kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.
On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police
on August 5, 1991, and hence, was never kidnapped.xcii[4]
On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgmentxciii[5] finding Bernal guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido
Openda, Jr. under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify his mother Teresita Openda in the amount of P50,000.00 for her
mental anguish and moral suffering.xciv[6]
Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses
allegedly illusory testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court.
The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been found. This,
however, does not preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of the case. In kidnapping, what
is important is to determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of
the victim will not exonerate an accused from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can
easily avoid punishment by the simple expedient of disposing of their victims bodies.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
ART. 267. - Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. -
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of
his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victims liberty, which is the
essential element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably
acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals as shown by their concerted acts
evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose.xcv[7] Proof of conspiracy is perhaps
most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only.xcvi[8] The circumstances
present in this case sufficiently indicate the participation of Bernal in the disappearance of
Openda, Jr.
The prosecution has profferred sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal, together with his
two companions, abducted Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. A certain Adonis Sagarino, a
childhood friend and neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw Bernal at the billiard hall at
about 11:00 a.m. with his two companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to
Tarsings Store to check if a certain person was still there. This person later turned out to be
Openda, Jr. He added that after the latters presence was confirmed, the three men left the billiard
hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with Bernals
companions.
Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao City who
knew both Bernal and the victim, the former being his neighbor and compadre. He narrated that
he and the victim were drinking at Tarsings Store on that fateful day when Bernal passed by and
had a drink with them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came
to the store and asked for Payat. When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed Payat, he was
handcuffed and taken away by the unidentified men.
Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in
January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair.
One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel room. He
advised Naty not to do it again because she (was) a married woman.xcvii[9] Undoubtedly, his wifes
infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator.
Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred
that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction.xcviii[10]
Openda, Jr.s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernals wife is
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time
it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it is safe
to assume that declaration against interest has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that
is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.xcix[11]
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that
the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was
contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed
such declaration to be true.c[12]
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with
Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidenceci[13] because no sane person will be presumed
to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.cii[14]
In his brief, Bernal highlights supposed inconsistencies in Sagarinos testimony. He alleges that
the latter could not have seen the actual handcuffing because Tarsings Store could not be seen
from the billiard hall. Sagarinos testimony shows that after Bernal and two others left the billiard
hall, the latter came back with Openda, Jr., already handcuffed.
"Q The three of them together?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what about you, where did you stay?
A I just stayed in the billiard hall.
Q While you stay (sic) in the billiard hall, after a while, what did you see next?
A The two came back.
Q Who were these two whom you said who (sic) came back?
A The companions of Bernal.
Q And what did these two men do?
A They apprehended Jun-jun Openda.ciii[15]
From this proceeding, Bernal wrongly inferred that Sagarino actually saw Openda, Jr. arrested.
The lower court correctly rejected this argument by holding that:
But Sagarino has not said that he saw the actual handcuffing of Openda, Jr. at the Tarsing or
Tarcing store. On the contrary, he says that he had not known who the person was that Bernal
referred to when he requested one of this two companions to go see if that person was still there
at the store, and that he came to know that he was Openda, Jr. only after he saw Openda, Jr. pass
by the billiard hall already handcuffed, with the two unidentified companions of Bernal with
him, on their way out to the main road.civ[16]
If one had a direct view of Tarsings Store from the billiard hall, Bernal would not have requested
his companion to check if Openda, Jr. were still there drinking with Racasa. Another discrepancy
pointed out by Bernal arose from the testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino. Racasa, on cross-
examination, stated:
"Q After Theodore Bernal left you have seen him also returned (sic) with his child, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir, because I was still in the store.cv[17]
On the other hand, Sagarino averred that:
"Q When Theodore Bernal left the place, how long (sic) were you able to see him again?
A Quite a time, sir, because when they left, his two companions came back and proceeded
to Tarcing Store and arrested Jun-jun Openda. When these two men brought out Jun-jun Openda,
fifteen minutes later, Bernal came.
Q Do you know where this Bernal from? (sic)
A He was coming from outside.
Q He has with him his son?
A He was with nobody, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q He was alone?
A Yes, sir.cvi[18]
The testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino are not absolutely inconsistent with each other as to be
irreconcilable. Considering the proximity of the store from the billiard hall, there is a possibility
that when Racasa saw Bernal with his son at the store, the latter could have already brought
home his son before proceeding alone to the billiard hall where he was seen by Sagarino.cvii[19]
Bernal would like the Court to dismiss Sagarinos testimony by imputing revenge as his motive
for testifying. He alleges that on July 29, 1991, or six days before the alleged kidnapping, five
policemen arrived at Kasilak, Bucana on board a patrol car asking for Openda, Jr., Sagarino,
Joseph Mendoza, Dansoy Madelo and Dagoy Balagan. He replied that they were residents of the
place and staying at the billiard hall and mahjong house. The policemen departed and went to the
places he mentioned.
"Q - Minutes later do you know what happened?
"A - They came back.
"Q - What did you do after they came back?
"A - I asked these police officers if they found these (sic) persons they were looking (for)?
"Q - What was their answer?
"A - They answered in the negative.
"Q - Since the answer is in the negative, what did you do?
"A - I asked the police officers why they were looking for these persons.(?)
"Q - What was the answer of the policemen?
"A - The police officer said that those people were wanted by them because accordingly (sic)
they were marijuana pushers.cviii[20]
Bernals position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took place but that an arrest was made
by pursuing policemen. This contention is quite improbable, if not highly preposterous.
The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Sagarino, it being free from any ill-motive
against Bernal. If the latters allegations were true, then Sagarino should have been arrested by
the police at the time he gave his testimony in court. No such arrest was, however, made.
The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez, Racasa and Sagarino
sufficient to convict Bernal. The court said that Sagarinos forthright answers to the questions of
the prosecutor and defense counsel clearly establish the participation of Bernal in the abduction
or kidnapping of Openda, Jr. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness, but must be credible in itself.cix[21] This Court once again finds occasion to
reiterate the established rule that the findings of fact of a trial court carry great weight and are
entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in a
better position to decide the question of credibility of witnesses.cx[22]
We note that after a lapse of a considerable length of time, the victim has yet to resurface.
Considering the circumstances, it is safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is already dead.
Finally, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, recommended to this
Court the penalty of seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion
perpetua, as maximum. The maximum penalty must be determined in accordance with rules and
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. With respect to the minimum penalty, however , " it is left
entirely within the discretion of the court to fix it anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without reference to the periods in to which it may be subdivided."cxi[23] Consistent with
this ruling, this court imposes reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, as the minimum
penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed
decision dated November 18, 1993, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accused-appellant Theodore Bernal.

SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
iii. Declaration about pedigree: Tizon vs Court of Appeals
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on June 30, 1995 1
which affirmed the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 98, granting herein private respondent's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence filed in Civil Case
No. Q-88-1054 pending therein.
The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against
herein private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the
aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon
located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses
Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene
Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is
the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5,
1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero,
and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to
inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin,
executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement 2 adjudicating unto himself,
allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886,
as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin
Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora
Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property
in question by right of representation.
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of the late Teodora
Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation from the estate of the
late Teodora Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the reserved participation of
the plaintiffs to the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
which was duly annotated on the title of the defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney's fees for
the willful and malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in the estate of
Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and knowing fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of
said deceased; and
(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered as conjugal property of the
spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. 3
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the
following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to
wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of
destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of
Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth
of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the
parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and
Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller;
and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. 4 Petitioners thereafter rested their case
and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment 5 was filed by herein private
respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that
petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance
with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon
Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving,
uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article
172 of the Family Code to establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the
records referred to therein, and the joint affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar
certifying to the date, place of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being
hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination. 6
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and
dismissing the complaint for reconveyance. 7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence
presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits
are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is whether or not herein
petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish
legitimacy and filiation. There are two points for consideration before us: first is the issue on
petitioner's legitimacy, and second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and
independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is
important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in the case are basically premised on
the erroneous assumption that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in
an action for reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi
to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the
universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8 And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy
cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period
limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the
legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: "The contest
of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn
the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed,
and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child
born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to
settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which
must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily
available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of
these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory. 9
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller
cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from
the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of
herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless
and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on
herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent
who is disputing the same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to
exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have
delimited the issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists
does not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in
issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. 10 The
presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion
to the party claiming illegitimacy. 11 And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it
operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. 12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13 and unless or until it is
rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or
decision. 14 Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the
theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus
established prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. 15
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the
presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth
of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial
notice and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and
such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's relationship with Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of the present controversy, requires a more intensive and
extensive examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller
Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar,
a family picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified and
explained in the course and as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is
the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime,
or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a statement is
considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree
is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration;
and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement
of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is
the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently
corroborated the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the
pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other
than such declaration.
American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the
declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and
when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from, the
declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant's pedigree, he may not
do by declarant's own statements as to declarant's relationship to the particular family. The reason is
that declarant's declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly there must
be precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of
the particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarant's relationship to the
common family must appear is not met. But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in
order to claim directly from the declarant or the declarant's estate, the situation and the policy of the
law applicable are quite different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in
controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of
the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then disserving, that is not the real
ground for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential value from that
consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the class to which the
declarations belong. The distinction we have note is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the
declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent from reasons of necessity. 17 (Emphasis
ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative
common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate,
the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself.
There must be some independent proof of this fact. 18 As an exception, the requirement that there be
other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is
sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his
declarations to the property of some other member of the family. 19
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general
requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate
of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that
petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such
declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a
failure of justice. 20 More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry
to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's
declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, 21 where the subject of the declaration is the
declarant's own relationship to another person, it seems absurb to require, as a foundation for the
admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The
preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while
the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their
admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of
private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being
offered in evidence. 22 It is elementary that an objection shall
be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, 23 otherwise, the
objection shall be treated as waived, 24 since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party
may waive. 25
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence
that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time,
otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived. The proper time is when from the question
addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the
inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver if
the provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time the
question is asked. An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken
after the testimony has been given, is too late. 27 Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence
given on the stand, where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto. 28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent unreservedly cross-
examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary evidence that were offered. At no time
was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for objection thereto, ever
raised. Instead, private respondent's counsel elicited answers from the witness on the circumstances
and regularity of her obtention of said documents: The observations later made by private respondent
in her comment to petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor were already apparent
at the time these documents were being adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison but which objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify the
legal consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent's failure
to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein
asserted. 29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the parents of Teodora
Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora
Dezoller 30 (Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their
parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries
wherein were made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with the Joint
Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein petitioners are
the children of Hermogenes Dezoller these can be deemed to have sufficiently established the
relationship between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that a
prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is required. 31 Finally, it
may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that both the
declarant and the claimants, who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. 32
III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the
decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit
from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,
they shall inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate,
without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any,
under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or theirs children to the
other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically
reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying
the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower
and herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero
could only validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein
private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided one-
fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence should have
been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer be allowed to present
evidence by reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which
provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence." 33
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject
property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
iv. Family reputation: Jison vs Court of Appeals
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998]
FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON,

respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the 27 April 1995
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860cxii[1] which reversed the
decision of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Civil Case No.
16373.cxiii[2] The latter dismissed the complaint of private respondent Monina Jison
(hereafter MONINA) for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison
(hereafter FRANCISCO).
In issue is whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible

error, which, in this instance, necessitates an inquiry into the facts. While as a general
rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court, nevertheless, in light of the
conflicting findings of facts of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, this case falls
under an exception to this rule.cxiv[3]
In her complaintcxv[4] filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that
FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of
1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar
(who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a
result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had
enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by
his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her
support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became
a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of
FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial
declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as
such.
In his answer,cxvi[5] FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations
with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased
to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then;
further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child.
As affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no right
or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches
and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of
damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.
After MONINA filed her reply,cxvii[6] pre-trial was conducted where the parties stipulated
on the following issues:
1. Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza Am[o]lar about
the end of 1945 or the start of 1946?
2. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the

latters own acts and those of his family?
3. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present action by

estoppel, laches and/or prescription?
4. Damages.cxviii[7]
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses, namely:
herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma,
Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz
and Lope Amolar.
Ruben Castellanes, Sr., a 63-year old resident of Iloilo City, testified that he had worked
for FRANCISCO for a total of six (6) years at Nelly Garden, FRANCISCO's Iloilo
residence. Towards the end of the Japanese occupation, FRANCISCOs wife suffered a
miscarriage or abortion, thereby depriving FRANCISCO of consortium; thereafter,
FRANCISCOs wife managed a nightclub on the ground floor of Nelly Garden which
operated daily from 6:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of the following day, thereby allowing
FRANCISCO free access to MONINAs mother, Esperanza Amolar, who was nicknamed
Pansay.
Adela Casabuena, a 61-year old farmer, testified that she served as the yaya (nanny) of
Lourdes from July 1946 up to February 1947. Although Pansay had left Nelly Garden
two (2) weeks before Adela started working for the Jisons, Pansay returned sometime in
September 1946, or about one month after she gave birth to MONINA, to ask
FRANCISCO for support. As a result, Pansay and Lilia Jison, FRANCISCO's wife,
quarreled in the living room, and in the course thereof, Pansay claimed that
FRANCISCO was the father of her baby. To which, Lilia replied: I did not tell you to
make that baby so it is your fault. During the quarrel which lasted from 10:30 till 11:00
a.m., FRANCISCO was supposedly inside the house listening.
Arsenio Duatin, a 77-year old retired laborer, testified that from 1947 until 1977, he
worked as FRANCISCOs houseboy at the latters house on 12th Street, Capitol
Subdivision, Bacolod City. Arsenio met MONINA in 1967, when Felipe Lagarto, the
bookkeeper at Nelly Garden, informed Arsenio that MONINA, FRANCISCOs daughter,
would arrive at Bacolod City with a letter of introduction from Lagarto.
Initially, Arsenio identified seven (7) black-and-white photographs (Exhs. X-5 to X-11) of
MONINA,cxix[8] and as he paid for the telephone bills, he likewise identified six (6)
telephone cards (Exhs. G to L). Arsenio then declared that when MONINA arrived in
Bacolod City, she introduced herself to him as FRANCISCOs daughter. She stayed at
FRANCISCOs house, but when the latter and his wife would come over, Arsenio would
conceal the presence of MONINA because Mrs. Jison did not like to see her face. Once,
Arsenio hid MONINA in the house of FRANCISCOs sister, Mrs. Luisa Jison Alano, in
Silay City; another time, at the residence of FRANCISCOs cousin, Mrs. Concha Lopez
Cuaycong. Finally, Arsenio declared that the last time he saw MONINA was when she
left for Manila, after having finished her schooling at La Salle College in Bacolod City.
On re-direct and upon questions by the court, Arsenio disclosed that it was
FRANCISCO who instructed that MONINA be hidden whenever FRANCISCO and his
wife were around; that although FRANCISCO and MONINA saw each other at the
Bacolod house only once, they called each other through long distance; and that
MONINA addressed FRANCISCO as Daddy during their lone meeting at the Bacolod
house and were affectionate to each other. Arsenio likewise declared that MONINA
stayed at FRANCISCO's Bacolod house twice: first for a month, then for about a week
the second time. On both occasions, however, FRANCISCO and his wife were abroad.
Finally, Arsenio recalled that FRANCISCO likewise bade Arsenio to treat MONINA like
his (FRANCISCOs) other daughters.
The testimony of Zafiro Ledesma, a 74-year old banker and former mayor of Iloilo City,
initially touched on how he and his wife were related to FRANCISCO, FRANCISCO's
wife and MONINA. Zafiro first identified Exhibit R, a diagram of the family trees of the
Jison and Lopez families, which showed that former Vice-President Fernando Lopez
was the first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, then told the court that the family of Vice-
President Lopez treated MONINA very well because she is considered a relative xxx by
reputation, by actual perception. Zafiro likewise identified Exhibits X-13 to X-18,
photographs taken at the 14 April 1985 birthday celebration of Mrs. Fernando Lopez,
which showed MONINA with the former Vice-President and other members of the Lopez
family.
Zafiro further testified that while MONINA lived with Mrs. Cuaycong, the latter paid for
some of MONINAs school needs and even asked MONINA to work in a hospital owned
by Mrs. Cuaycong; and that another first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, a certain
Remedios Lopez Franco, likewise helped MONINA with her studies and problems, and
even attended MONINAs graduation in 1978 when she obtained a masteral degree in
Business Administration, as evidenced by another photograph (Exh. X-12). Moreover,
upon Remedios recommendation, MONINA was employed as a secretary at Merchant
Financing Company, which was managed by a certain Danthea Lopez, the wife of
another first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, and among whose directors were Zafiro
himself, his wife and Dantheas husband. In closing, Zafiro identified MONINAs Social
Security Record (Exh. W), which was signed by Danthea as employer and where
MONINA designated Remedios as the beneficiary.
Danthea Lopez, a 58-year old housekeeper, declared that FRANCISCO was the first
cousin of her husband, Eusebio D. Lopez; and that she came to know MONINA in the
latter part of 1965 when Remedios Franco recommended MONINA for employment at
Merchant Financing Co., which Danthea managed at that time. Remedios introduced
MONINA to Danthea as being reputedly the daughter of Mr. Frank Jison; and on several
occasions thereafter, Remedios made Danthea and the latters husband understand that
MONINA was reputedly the daughter of [FRANCISCO]. While MONINA worked at
Merchant Financing, Danthea knew that MONINA lived with Remedios; however, in the
latter part of 1966, as Remedios left for Manila and MONINA was still studying at San
Agustin University, Danthea and her husband invited MONINA to live with them. During
MONINAs 6-month stay with them, she was not charged for board and lodging and was
treated as a relative, not a mere employee, all owing to what Remedios had said
regarding MONINAs filiation. As Danthea understood, MONINA resigned from Merchant
Financing as she was called by Mrs. Cuaycong, a first cousin of Dantheas husband who
lived in Bacolod City.
Romeo Bilbao, a 43-year old seaman, testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO
from 1969 up to 1980 at Nelly Garden in various capacities: as a procurement officer,
hacienda overseer and, later, as hacienda administrator. Sometime in May, 1971,
Romeo saw and heard MONINA ask her Daddy (meaning FRANCISCO) for the money
he promised to give her, but FRANCISCO answered that he did not have the money to
give, then told MONINA to go see Mr. Jose Cruz in Bacolod City. Then in the middle of
September that year, FRANCISCO told Romeo to pick up Mr. Cruz at the Iloilo pier and
bring him to the office of Atty. Benjamin Tirol. At said office, Atty. Tirol, Mr. Cruz and
MONINA entered a room while Romeo waited outside. When they came out, Atty. Tirol
had papers for MONINA to sign, but she refused. Atty. Tirol said that a check would be
released to MONINA if she signed the papers, so MONINA acceded, although Atty. Tirol
intended not to give MONINA a copy of the document she signed. Thereafter, Mr. Cruz
gave MONINA a check (Exh. Q), then MONINA grabbed a copy of the document she
signed and ran outside. Romeo then brought Mr. Cruz to Nelly Garden. As to his motive
for testifying, Romeo stated that he wanted to help MONINA be recognized as
FRANCISCOS daughter.
Rudy Tingson, a 45-year old antique dealer, testified that in 1963-1964, he was
employed by FRANCISCOs wife at the Baguio Military Institute in Baguio City; then in
1965, Rudy worked at FRANCISCOs office at Nelly Garden recording hacienda
expenses, typing vouchers and office papers, and, at times, acting as paymaster for the
haciendas. From the nature of his work, Rudy knew the persons receiving money from
FRANCISCOs office, and clearly remembered that in 1965, as part of his job, Rudy
gave MONINA her allowance from FRANCISCO four (4) times, upon instructions of a
certain Mr. Lagarto to give MONINA P15.00 a month. Rudy likewise recalled that he first
met MONINA in 1965, and that she would go to Nelly Garden whenever FRANCISCOs
wife was not around. On some of these occasions, MONINA would speak with and
address FRANCISCO as Daddy, without objection from FRANCISCO. In fact, in 1965,
Rudy saw FRANCISCO give MONINA money thrice. Rudy further declared that in April
1965, FRANCISCOs office paid P250.00 to Funeraria Bernal for the funeral expenses of
MONINAs mother. Finally, as to Rudy's motives for testifying, he told the court that he
simply wanted to help bring out the truth and nothing but the truth, and that MONINAs
filiation was common knowledge among the people in the office at Nelly Garden.
On re-direct, Rudy declared that the moneys given by FRANCISCOs office to MONINA
were not reflected in the books of the office, but were kept in a separate book, as Mr.
Lagarto explained that FRANCISCOs wife and children should not know [of] this. Rudy
further revealed that as to the garden meetings between FRANCISCO and MONINA,
Rudy saw MONINA kiss FRANCISCO on the cheek both upon arriving and before
leaving, and FRANCISCOs reaction upon seeing her was to smile and say in the
Visayan dialect: Kamusta ka iha? (How are you, daughter?); and that MONINA was free
to go inside the house as the household staff knew of her filiation, and that, sometimes,
MONINA would join them for lunch.
Alfredo Baylosis, a 62-year old retired accountant, testified that he worked for
FRANCISCO at Central Santos-Lopez in Iloilo from 1951 up to 1961, then at Nelly
Garden from 1961 until 1972. Alfredo first served FRANCISCO as a bookkeeper, then
when Mr. Lagarto died in 1967 or 1969, Alfredo replaced Mr. Lagarto as office manager.
Alfredo knew MONINA since 1961 as she used to go to Nelly Garden to claim her
P15.00 monthly allowance given upon FRANCISCOs standing order. Alfredo further
declared that MONINAs filiation was pretty well-known in the office; that he had seen
MONINA and FRANCISCO go from the main building to the office, with FRANCISCOs
arm on MONINAs shoulder; and that the office paid for the burial expenses of Pansay,
but this was not recorded in the books in order to hide it from FRANCISCOs wife.
Alfredo also disclosed that the disbursements for MONINAs allowance started in 1961
and were recorded in a separate cash book. In 1967, the allowances ceased when
MONINA stopped schooling and was employed in Bacolod City with Miller, Cruz & Co.,
which served as FRANCISCOs accountant-auditor. Once, when Alfredo went to the
offices of Miller, Cruz & Co. to see the manager, Mr. Atienza, and arrange for the
preparation of FRANCISCOs income tax return, Alfredo chanced upon MONINA. When
Alfredo asked her how she came to work there, she answered that her Daddy,
FRANCISCO, recommended her, a fact confirmed by Mr. Atienza. Alfredo then claimed
that Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., was the most trusted man of
FRANCISCO.
Dominador Savariz, a 55-year old caretaker, testified that he worked as FRANCISCOs

houseboy at Nelly Garden from November 1953 up to 1965. One morning in April 1954,
MONINA and her mother Pansay went to Nelly Garden and spoke with FRANCISCO for
about an hour, during which time, Dominador was vacuuming the carpet about six (6) to
seven (7) meters away. Due to the noise of the vacuum cleaner, FRANCISCO and
MONINA spoke in loud voices, thus Dominador overheard their conversation. As
FRANCISCO asked Pansay why they came, Pansay answered that they came to ask
for the sustenance of his child MONINA. FRANCISCO then touched MONINA's head
and asked: How are you Hija?, to which MONINA answered: Good morning, Daddy.
After FRANCISCO told Pansay and MONINA to wait, he pulled something from his
wallet and said to Pansay: I am giving this for the child.
In May 1954, Dominador saw MONINA at Mr. Lagartos office where Dominador was to
get the days expenses, while MONINA was claiming her allowance from Mr. Diasnes.
The next month, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden and heard in the office that
MONINA was there to get her allowance from her Daddy. In December 1960,
Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden, in the room of Don Vicente (father of
FRANCISCOs wife), where she asked for a Christmas gift and she was calling Don
Vicente, Lolo (grandfather). At that time, FRANCISCO and his wife were not around.
Then sometime in 1961, when Dominador went to Mr. Lagartos office to get the
marketing expenses, Dominador saw MONINA once more claiming her allowance.
Dominador further testified that in February 1966, after he had stopped working for
FRANCISCO, Dominador was at Mrs. Francos residence as she recommended him for
employment with her sister, Mrs. Concha Cuaycong. There, he saw MONINA, who was
then about 15 years old, together with Mrs. Francos daughter and son. Mrs. Franco
pointed at MONINA and asked Dominador if he knew who MONINA was. Dominador
answered that MONINA was FRANCISCOs daughter with Pansay, and then Mrs.
Franco remarked that MONINA was staying with her (Mrs. Franco) and that she was
sending MONINA to school at the University of San Agustin.
Lope Amolar, a 50-year old resident of Dingle, Iloilo, and the younger brother of
Esperanza Amolar (Pansay), testified that he worked for FRANCISCO as a houseboy
from March to November 1945 at Nelly Garden. Thereafter, FRANCISCO sent Lope to
work at Elena Apartments in Manila. By November 1945, Pansay was also working at
Elena Apartments, where she revealed to Lope that FRANCISCO impregnated her.
Lope then confronted FRANCISCO, who told Lope dont get hurt and dont cause any
trouble, because I am willing to support your Inday Pansay and my child. Three (3) days
after this confrontation, Lope asked for and received permission from FRANCISCO to
resign because he (Lope) was hurt.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she was 40
years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that as evidenced by certifications
from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and baptismal certificates
(Exhs. C and D), she was born on 6 August 1946 in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to
Esperanza Amolar (who passed away on 20 April 1965) and FRANCISCO. cxx[9]
MONINA first studied at Sagrado where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado
from 1952 until 1955 (up to Grade 4), her father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees
and other school expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from
Mr. Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give money to her mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay
Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied in different schools, cxxi[10] but
FRANCISCO continuously answered for her schooling.
For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but she later
dropped due to an accident which required a week's hospitalization. Although
FRANCISCO paid for part of the hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most
of them. In 1963, she enrolled at the University of San Agustin, where she stayed with
Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for books, school
supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At the start of each
semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask
her to canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After finishing two (2)
semesters at University of San Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of records (Exh.
Z showing that FRANCISCO was listed as Parent/Guardian [Exh. Z-1]), she transferred
to De Paul College, just in front of Mrs. Francos house, and studied there for a year.
Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at Western Institute of Technology (WIT), where she
obtained a bachelors degree in Commerce in April 1967. During her senior year, she
stayed with Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She
passed the CPA board exams in 1974, and took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University
as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA), wherein FRANCISCO was likewise listed as
Guardian (Exhs. AA-1 and AA-2).
MONINA enumerated the different members of the household staff at Nelly Garden, to
wit: Luz, the household cook; the houseboys Silvestre and Doming; the housemaid
Natang; the yaya of the adopted triplets, Deling; the yaya of Lolo Vicente, Adelina; and
others. MONINA likewise enumerated the members of the office staff (Messrs. Baylosis,
Lagarto, Tingson, Diasnes, Jalandoni, Supertisioso, Doroy, and others), and identified
them from a photograph marked as Exhibit X-2. She then corroborated the prior
testimony regarding her employment at Merchant Financing Co., and her having lived at
Hotel Kahirup and at Mrs. Cuaycongs residence in Bacolod City, while working at the
hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong.
MONINA further testified that in March 1968, she went to Manila and met FRANCISCO
at Elena Apartments at the corner of Romero and Salas Streets, Ermita. She told
FRANCISCO that she was going for a vacation in Baguio City with Mrs. Francos
mother, with whom she stayed up to June 1968. Upon her return from Baguio City,
MONINA told FRANCISCO that she wanted to work, so the latter arranged for her
employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City. MONINA went to Bacolod City, was
interviewed by Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller & Cruz, who told her she would start
working first week of September, sans examination. She resigned from Miller & Cruz in
1971 and lived with Mrs. Cuaycong at her Forbes Park residence in Makati. MONINA
went to see FRANCISCO, told him that she resigned and asked him for money to go to
Spain, but FRANCISCO refused as she could not speak Spanish and would not be able
find a job. The two quarreled and FRANCISCO ordered a helper to send MONINA out
of the house. In the process, MONINA broke many glasses at the pantry and cut her
hand, after which, FRANCISCO hugged her, gave her medicine, calmed her down,
asked her to return to Bacolod City and promised that he would give her the money.
MONINA returned to Bacolod City by plane, using a Filipinas Orient Airways plane ticket
(Exh. M) which FRANCISCO gave. She called Mr. Cruz, then Atty. Tirol, as instructed
by Mr. Cruz. These calls were evidenced by PLDT long distance toll cards (Exhs. G to
L), with annotations at the back reading: charged and paid under the name of Frank L.
Jison and were signed by Arsenio Duatin (Exhs. G-1 to L-1). PLDT issued a certification
as to the veracity of the contents of the toll cards (Exh. BB). Likewise introduced in
evidence was a letter of introduction prepared by Mr. Cruz addressed to Atty. Tirol, on
MONINA's behalf (Exh. N).
MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she would have to go to Iloilo
and sign a certain affidavit, before Mr. Cruz would turn over the money promised by
FRANCISCO. She went to Atty. Tirols office in Iloilo, but after going over the draft of the
affidavit, refused to sign it as it stated that she was not FRANCISCOs daughter. She
explained that all she had agreed with FRANCISCO was that he would pay for her fare
to go abroad, and that since she was a little girl, she knew about her illegitimacy. She
started crying, begged Atty. Tirol to change the affidavit, to which Atty. Tirol responded
that he was also a father and did not want this to happen to his children as they could
not be blamed for being brought into the world. She then wrote a letter (Exh. O) to
FRANCISCO and sent it to the latters Forbes Park residence (Bauhinia Place) by JRS
courier service (Exhs. O-5 to O-7). MONINA subsequently met FRANCISCO in Bacolod
City where they discussed the affidavit which she refused to sign. FRANCISCO told her
that the affidavit was for his wife, that in case she heard about MONINA going abroad,
the affidavit would keep her peace.
MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty. Tirols office, she was
accompanied by one Atty. Fernando Divinagracia, who advised her that the affidavit
(Exh. P)cxxii[11] would boomerang against FRANCISCO as it is contrary to law. MONINA
returned to Bacolod City, then met with Atty. Tirol once more to reiterate her plea, but
Atty. Tirol did not relent. Thus, on the morning of 20 or 21 September 1971, she signed
the affidavit as she was jobless and needed the money to support herself and finish her
studies. In exchange for signing the document, MONINA received a Bank of Asia check
for P15,000.00 (Exh. Q), which was less than the P25,000.00 which FRANCISCO
allegedly promised to give. As Atty. Tirol seemed hesitant to give her a copy of the
affidavit after notarizing it, MONINA merely grabbed a copy and immediately left.
MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which purpose, she procured letters of
introduction (Exhs. S and T) from a cousin, Mike Alano (son of FRANCISCOs elder
sister Luisa); and an uncle, Emilio Jison (FRANCISCOs elder brother), addressed to
another cousin, Beth Jison (Emilios daughter), for Beth to assist MONINA. Exhibit S
contained a statement (Exh. S-1) expressly recognizing that MONINA was
FRANCISCOs daughter. Ultimately though, MONINA decided not to go abroad, opting
instead to spend the proceeds of the P15,000.00 check for her CPA review, board exam
and graduate studies. After finishing her graduate studies, she again planned to travel
abroad, for which reason, she obtained a letter of introduction from former Vice
President Fernando Lopez addressed to then United States Consul Vernon McAnnich
(Exh. V).
As to other acts tending to show her filiation, MONINA related that on one occasion, as
FRANCISCOs wife was going to arrive at the latters Bacolod City residence,
FRANCISCO called Arsenio Duatin and instructed Arsenio to hide MONINA. Thus,
MONINA stayed with Mrs. Luisa Jison for the duration of the stay of FRANCISCOs wife.
MONINA also claimed that she knew Vice President Fernando Lopez and his wife,
Mariquit, even before starting to go to school. Thus, MONINA asked for a
recommendation letter (Exh. U) from Mrs. Mariquit Lopez for possible employment with
Mrs. Rosario Lopez Cooper, another second cousin of FRANCISCO. In Exhibit U, Mrs.
Lopez expressly recognized MONINA as FRANCISCOs daughter. As additional proof of
her close relationship with the family of Vice President Lopez, MONINA identified
photographs taken at a birthday celebration on 14 April 1985.
MONINA finally claimed that she knew the three (3) children of FRANCISCO by wife,
namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr. (Junior) and Elena, but MONINA had met only Lourdes
and Junior. MONINA's testimony dealt lengthily on her dealings with Junior and the two
(2) occasions when she met with Lourdes. The last time MONINA saw FRANCISCO
was in March 1979, when she sought his blessings to get married.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo
Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. As additional witnesses,
FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes
Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal.
FRANCISCO declared that Pansays employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that
while employed by him, Pansay would sleep with the other female helpers on the first
floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the second
floor. At that time, his household staff was composed of three (3) female workers and
two (2) male workers. After Pansay left in October 1944, she never communicated with
him again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied
having had sexual relations with Pansay and disavowed any knowledge about
MONINAs birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for MONINAs tuition fees, in
person or otherwise, and asserted that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these
fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees
despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He likewise categorically
denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or
Remedios Franco, that MONINA was his daughter.
FRANCISCO also disclosed that upon his return from the United States in 1971, he
fired Alfredo Baylosis upon discovering that Alfredo had taken advantage of his position
during the formers absence. FRANCISCO likewise fired Rudy Tingson and Romeo
Bilbao, but did not give the reasons therefor.
Finally, FRANCISCO denied knowledge of MONINAs long distance calls from his
Bacolod residence; nevertheless, when he subsequently discovered this, he fired
certain people in his office for their failure to report this anomaly. As regards the
caretaker of his Bacolod residence, FRANCISCO explained that since MONINA lived at
Mrs. Cuaycongs residence, the caretaker thought that he could allow people who lived
at the Cuaycong residence to use the facilities at his (FRANCISCOs) house.
Nonito Jalandoni, bookkeeper and paymaster at Nellys Garden from 1963 up to 1974,
then from 1980 up to 1986, the assistant overseer of Hacienda Lopez, testified that he
did not know MONINA; that he learned of her only in June 1988, when he was informed
by FRANCISCO that MONINA had sued him; and that he never saw MONINA at Nellys
Garden, neither did he know of any instructions for anyone at Nellys Garden to give
money to MONINA.
Teodoro Zulla, FRANCISCOs bookkeeper and paymaster from 1951 up to 1986,

testified that FRANCISCO dismissed Alfredo Baylosis due to certain unspecified
discrepancies; and that he never saw MONINA receive funds from either Mr. Lagarto or
Mr. Baylosis. Upon questions from the trial court, however, Teodoro admitted that he
prepared vouchers for only one of FRANCISCOs haciendas, and not vouchers
pertaining to the latters personal expenses.
Iigo Supertisioso testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Nellys Garden from 1964
up to 1984 as a field inspector, paymaster, cashier and, eventually, officer-in-charge
(OIC). He confirmed Alfredo Baylosis dismissal due to these unspecified irregularities,
then denied that FRANCISCO ever ordered that MONINA be given her allowance.
Likewise, Iigo never heard FRANCISCO mention that MONINA was his (FRANCISCOs)
daughter.
Lourdes Ledesma, FRANCISCOs daughter, testified that she saw (but did not know)
MONINA at the Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, on the occasion of the birth of Lourdes first
son, Mark. Over lunch one day, Lourdes aunt casually introduced Lourdes and MONINA
to each other, but they were referred to only by their first names. Then sometime in
1983 or 1984, MONINA allegedly went to Lourdes house in Sta. Clara Subdivision
requesting for a letter of introduction or referral as MONINA was then job-hunting.
However, Lourdes did not comply with the request.
Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., testified that MONINA worked at Miller &
Cruz from 1968 up to 1971, however, he did not personally interview her before she
was accepted for employment. Moreover, MONINA underwent the usual screening
procedure before being hired. Jose recalled that one of the accountants, a certain Mr.
Atienza, reported that MONINA claimed to be FRANCISCOs daughter. Jose then told
Mr. Atienza to speak with MONINA and see if he (Mr. Atienza) could stop her from
spreading this rumor. Mr. Atienza reported that he spoke with MONINA, who told him
that she planned to leave for the United States and needed P20,000.00 for that
purpose, and in exchange, she would sign a document disclaiming filiation with
FRANCISCO. Thus, Jose instructed Mr. Atienza to request that MONINA meet with
Jose, and at that meeting, MONINA confirmed Mr. Atienzas report. Jose then informed
Atty. Tirol, FRANCISCOs personal lawyer, about the matter.
Atty. Tirol told Jose to send MONINA and her lawyer to his (Atty. Tirols) office in Iloilo.
Jose then wrote out a letter of introduction for MONINA addressed to Atty. Tirol. Jose
relayed Atty. Tirols message to MONINA through Mr. Atienza, then later, Atty. Tirol told
Jose to go to Iloilo with a check for P15,000.00. Jose complied, and at Atty. Tirols office,
Jose saw MONINA, Atty. Tirol and his secretary reading some documents. MONINA
then expressed her willingness to sign the document, sans revisions. Jose alleged that
he drew the P15,000.00 from his personal funds, subject to reimbursement from and
due to an understanding with FRANCISCO.
Dolores Argenal, a househelper at Nelly Garden from May 1944 up to May 1946,
testified that she knew that Pansay was Lourdes nanny; that Lourdes slept in her
parents room; that she had not seen FRANCISCO give special treatment to Pansay;
that there was no unusual relationship between FRANCISCO and Pansay, and if there
was any, Dolores would have easily detected it since she slept in the same room as
Pansay. Dolores further declared that whenever FRANCISCOs wife was out of town,
Pansay would bring Lourdes downstairs at nighttime, and that Pansay would not sleep
in the room where FRANCISCO slept. Finally, Dolores declared that Pansay stopped
working for FRANCISCO and his wife in October, 1944.
The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties filed their respective
memoranda.
It need be recalled that Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr. presided over trial up to 21
October 1986, thereby hearing only the testimonies of MONINAs witnesses and about
half of MONINAs testimony on direct examination. Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr. heard
the rest of MONINA's testimony and those of FRANCISCOs witnesses.
In its decision of 12 November 1990cxxiii[12] the trial court, through Judge Devera,
dismissed the complaint with costs against MONINA. In the opening paragraph thereof,
it observed:
This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child instituted by plaintiff Monina
Jison against defendant Francisco Jison. This complaint was filed on March 13, 1985 at
the time when plaintiff, reckoned from her death of birth, was already thirty-nine years
old. Noteworthy also is the fact that it was instituted twenty years after the death of
plaintiffs mother, Esperanza Amolar. For the years between plaintiffs birth and
Esperanzas death, no action of any kind was instituted against defendant either by
plaintiff, her mother Esperanza or the latters parents. Neither had plaintiff brought such
an action against defendant immediately upon her mothers death on April 20, 1965,
considering that she was then already nineteen years old or, within a reasonable time
thereafter. Twenty years more had to supervene before this complaint was eventually
instituted.
The trial court then proceeded to discuss the four issues stipulated at pre-trial, without,
however, summarizing the testimonies of the witnesses nor referring to the testimonies
of the witnesses other than those mentioned in the discussion of the issues.
The trial court resolved the first issue in the negative, holding that it was improbable for
witness Lope Amolar to have noticed that Pansay was pregnant upon seeing her at the
Elena Apartments in November 1945, since Pansay was then only in her first month of
pregnancy; that there was no positive assertion that copulation did indeed take place
between Francisco and Esperanza; and that MONINAs attempt to show opportunity on
the part of FRANCISCO failed to consider that there was also the opportunity for
copulation between Esperanza and one of the several domestic helpers admittedly also
residing at Nellys Garden at that time. The RTC also ruled that the probative value of
the birth and baptismal certificates of MONINA paled in light of jurisprudence, especially
when the misspellings therein were considered.
The trial court likewise resolved the second issue in the negative, finding that MONINAs
evidence thereon may either be one of three categories, namely: hearsay evidence,
incredulous evidence, or self-serving evidence." To the first category belonged the
testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis, whose knowledge of MONINAs
filiation was based, as to the former, on utterances of defendants wife Lilia and
Esperanza allegedly during the heat of their quarrel, while as to the latter, Alfredo's
conclusion was based from the rumors going [around] that plaintiff is defendants
daughter, from his personal observation of plaintiffs facial appearance which he
compared with that of defendants and from the way the two (plaintiff and defendant)
acted and treated each other on one occasion that he had then opportunity to closely
observe them together. To the second category belonged that of Dominador Savariz,
as:
At each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nellys Garden and allegedly on
those occasions when defendants wife, Lilia was in Manila, this witness was there and
allegedly heard pieces of conversation between defendant and Esperanza related to the
paternity of the latters child. xxx
The RTC then placed MONINAs testimony regarding the acts of recognition accorded
her by FRANCISCOs relatives under the third category, since the latter were never
presented as witnesses, for which reason the trial court excluded the letters from
FRANCISCOs relatives (Exhs. S to V).
As to the third issue, the trial court held that MONINA was not barred by prescription for
it was of the perception that the benefits of Article 268 accorded to legitimate children
may be availed of or extended to illegitimate children in the same manner as the Family
Code has so provided; or by laches, which is [a] creation of equity applied only to bring
equitable results, and addressed to the sound discretion of the court [and] the
circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff filed this case immediately upon
the death of her mother Esperanza in 1965 or twenty years thereafter in 1985, xxx there
seems to be no inequitable result to defendant as related to the situation of plaintiff.
The RTC ruled, however, that MONINA was barred by estoppel by deed because of the
affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2) which she signed when she was already twenty-five years, a
professional and under the able guidance of counsel.
Finally, the RTC denied FRANCISCOs claim for damages, finding that MONINA did not
file the complaint with malice, she having been propelled by an honest belief, founded
on probable cause.
MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 32860) and
sought reversal of the trial courts decision on the grounds that:
THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUSLY PREDISPOSED TO ADJUDGE THIS

CASE AGAINST APPELLANT DUE TO ITS MISPERCEPTION THAT APPELLANTS
DELAY IN FILING HER COMPLAINT WAS FATAL TO HER CASE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE TESTIMONIES OF

APPELLANTS WITNESSES AS TAILOR-MADE, INADEQUATE AND INCREDIBLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE

CERTIFIED COPIES OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT AS
PART OF HER EVIDENCE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REQUIREMENT THAT A WITNESS TO THE
ACTUAL ACT OF COPULATION BETWEEN THE APPELLEE AND APPELLANTS
MOTHER SHOULD HAVE POSITIVELY TESTIFIED TO SAID EFFECT.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DULY

IDENTIFIED NOTES AND LETTER OF THE RELATIVES OF THE APPELLEE AS
HEARSAY.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANTS AFFIDAVIT (EXH.

P) SERVED AS A BAR AGAINST HER CLAIM FOR RECOGNITION INSTEAD OF
REINFORCING SAID CLAIM.cxxiv[13]
Expectedly, FRANCISCO refuted these alleged errors in his Appellees Brief.cxxv[14]
In its decision of 27 April 1995,cxxvi[15] the Court of Appeals initially declared that as no
vested or acquired rights were affected, the instant case was governed by Article 175, in
relation to Articles 172 and 173, of the Family Code.cxxvii[16] While the Court of Appeals
rejected the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo (Exhs. E
and F) as FRANCISCO did not sign them, said court focused its discussion on the other
means by which illegitimate filiation could be proved, i.e., the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child or, by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, such as the baptismal certificate of the child, a judicial
admission, a family bible wherein the name of the child is entered, common reputation
respecting pedigree, admission by silence, testimonies of witnesses xxx. cxxviii[17] To the
Court of Appeals, the bottom line issue was whether or not MONINA established her
filiation as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter by preponderance of evidence, as to
which issue said court found:
[N]ot just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record to prove that [MONINA] is
the illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] and that she had continuously enjoyed such
status by direct acts of [FRANCISCO] and/or his relatives.
In so ruling, the Court of Appeals observed that the testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela
Casabuena and Dominador Savariz were already sufficient to establish MONINAs
filiation:
As adverted to earlier, the trial court discredited Lope Amolars testimony by saying that
Lope could not have detected Esperanzas pregnant state in November, 1945 since at
that point in time [sic] she was still in the initial stage of pregnancy. Apparently, the trial
court paid more emphasis on the date mentioned by Lope Amolar than on the tenor and
import of his testimony. As xxx Lope xxx was asked about an incident that transpired
more than 41 years back, [u]nder the circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect that
Lope could still be dead right on the specific month in 1945 that [he] met and confronted
his sister. At any rate, what is important is not the month that they met but the essence
of his testimony that his sister pointed to their employer [FRANCISCO] as the one
responsible for her pregnancy, and that upon being confronted, [FRANCISCO] assured
him of support for Esperanza and their child. It would appear then that in an attempt to
find fault with Lopes testimony, the trial court has fallen oblivious to the fact that even
[FRANCISCO], in his deposition, did not deny that he was confronted by Lope about
what he had done to Esperanza, during which he unequivocally acknowledged paternity
by assuring Lope of support for both Esperanza and their child.
The Court of Appelas further noted that Casabuena and Savariz testified on something
that they personally observed or witnessed, which matters FRANCISCO did not deny or
refute. Finally, said court aptly held:
Taking into account all the foregoing uncontroverted testimonies xxx let alone such
circumstantial evidence as [MONINAs] Birth Certificates xxx and Baptismal Certificates
which invariably bear the name of [FRANCISCO] as her father, We cannot go along
with the trial courts theory that [MONINAs] illegitimate filiation has not been satisfactorily
established.
xxx
Significantly, [MONINAs] testimony finds ample corroboration from [FRANCISCOs]

former employees, Arsenio Duatin, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. xxx
xxx
Carefully evaluating appellants evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an

illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] vis-a-vis [FRANCISCOs] controversion thereof,
We find more weight in the former. The positive testimonies of [MONINA] and [her]
witnesses xxx all bearing on [FRANCISCOs] acts and/or conduct indubitably showing
that he had continuously acknowledged [MONINA] as his illegitimate daughter have not
been succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact, [FRANCISCO] himself, in his deposition, only
casually dismissed [MONINAs] exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and with
respect to those given by [MONINAs] witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired
[them] from their employment. Needless to state, [FRANCISCOs] vague denial is
grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight of [MONINAs] testimonial
evidence.
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does
not hold sway in the face of [MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree to
sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly
complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was only
for the consumption of his spouse xxx. Further, the testimony of Jose Cruz concerning
the events that led to the execution of the affidavit xxx could not have been true, for as
pointed out by [MONINA], she signed the affidavit xxx almost five months after she had
resigned from the Miller, Cruz & Co. xxx
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled
for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured [MONINAs] sworn
statement xxx On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the cost
of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his
paternity of [MONINA]. xxx
In fine, We hold that [MONINAs] filiation as [FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter has

been conclusively established by the uncontroverted testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela
Casabuena and Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee himself had admitted his
paternity of the appellee, and also by the testimonies of appellant, Arsenio Duatin,
Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis unerringly demonstrating that by his
own conduct or overt acts like sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees,
school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado Corazon de
Jesus, defraying appellants hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly
allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellants mother, acknowledging
appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija or child, instructing his office
personnel to give appellants monthly allowance, recommending appellant for
employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod
and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in
his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his
surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5),
appellee had continuously recognized appellant as his illegitimate daughter. Added to
these are the acts of [FRANCISCOs] relatives acknowledging or treating [MONINA] as
[FRANCISCOs] daughter (Exh U) or as their relative (Exhs T & V). On this point,
witness Zafiro Ledesma, former Mayor of Iloilo City, whose spouse belongs to the
Lopez clan just like [FRANCISCO], testified that [MONINA] has been considered by the
Lopezes as a relative. He identified pictures of the appellee in the company of the
Lopezes (Exhs X-16 & X-17). Another witness, Danthea H. Lopez, whose husband
Eusebio Lopez is appellees first cousin, testified that appellant was introduced to her by
appellees cousin, Remedios Lopez Franco, as the daughter of appellee Francisco
Jison, for which reason, she took her in as [a] secretary in the Merchants Financing
Corporation of which she was the manager, and further allowed her to stay with her
family free of board and lodging. Still on this aspect, Dominador Savariz declared that
sometime in February, 1966 appellees relative, Ms. Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to
appellant as the daughter of appellee Francisco Jison.
Finally, the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle (Exhs E and F) as well as
[MONINAs] Baptismal Certificates (Exhs C & D) which the trial ocurt admitted in
evidence as part of [MONINAs] testimony, may serve as circumstantial evidence to
further reinforce [MONINAs] claim that she is [FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter by
Esperanza Amolar.
True it is that a trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great
respect on appeal. But the rule admits of certain exceptions. One such exception is
where the judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses
testify. [citations omitted] The other is where the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. [citations omitted] In
the present case, both exceptions obtain. All of [MONINAs] witnesses xxx whose
testimonies were not given credence did not testify before the judge who rendered the
disputed judgment. xxx
The Court of Appeals then decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and
another one is hereby entered for appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the
illegitimate daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights and privileges
granted by law.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution of 29 March 1996,cxxix[18] FRANCISCO filed the instant petition. He urges us
to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, alleging that said court committed
errors of law:
I.
IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING PRIVATE

RESPONDENT AS THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF PETITIONER, CONSIDERING
[THE] IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEXUAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S MOTHER AT THE TIME CONCEPTION WAS
SUPPOSED TO HAVE OCCURRED.
II.
IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE

RESPONDENT'S TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY AND FILIATION IS NOT
CLEAR AND CONVINCING.
III.
IN GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE

PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS EVIDENCE OF FILIATION CONSIDERING THAT THE
SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF-SERVING AND CANNOT BIND THE PETITIONER
UNDER THE BASIC RULES OF EVIDENCE.
IV.
IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S SWORN STATEMENT (EXH.

P/EXH. 2) IN A MANNER NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
V.
IN NOT CONSIDERING THE LONG AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN THE FILING OF

THE PRESENT PATERNITY SUIT AS EQUIVALENT TO LACHES.
As regards the first error, FRANCISCO insists that taking into account the second
paragraph of MONINAs complaint wherein she claimed that he and Pansay had sexual
relations by about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, it was physically impossible for
him and Pansay to have had sexual contact which resulted in MONINAs birth,
considering that:
The normal period of human pregnancy is nine (9) months. If as claimed by private
respondent in her complaint that her mother was impregnated by FRANCISCO at the
end of 1945 or the start of 1946, she would have been born sometime in late September
or early October and not August 6, 1946 xxx. The instant case finds factual and legal
parallels in Constantino vs. Mendez,cxxx[19] thus: xxx
FRANCISCO further claims that his testimony that Pansay was no longer employed by
him at the time in question was unrebutted, moreover, other men had access to Pansay
during the time of or even after her employment by him.
As to the second error, FRANCISCO submits that MONINAs testimonial evidence is

shaky, contradictory and unreliable, and proceeds to attack the credibility of her
witnesses by claiming, in the main, that: (a) Lope Amolar could not have detected
Pansays pregnancy in November 1945 when they met since she would have been only
one (1) month pregnant then; (b) Dominador Savariz did not in fact witness the meeting
between FRANCISCO, Pansay and MONINA; (c) Zafiro Ledesma had an ulterior motive
in testifying for MONINA as he owned a bank in Iloilo which was then under Central
Bank supervision and MONINA was the Bank Examiner assigned to Iloilo; and (d)
Danthea Lopez was not related to him by blood and whatever favorable treatment
MONINA received from Danthea was due to the formers employment at Merchants
Financing Company and additional services rendered at Kahirup Hotel; besides,
Danthea admitted that she had no personal knowledge as to the issue of paternity and
filiation of the contending parties, hence Sections 39 and 40cxxxi[20] of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court did not come into play. FRANCISCO likewise re-echoes the view of the
trial court as regards the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis.
FRANCISCO further asserts that MONINAs testimony that he answered for her
schooling was self-serving and uncorroborated by any receipt or other documentary
evidence; and assuming he did, such should be interpreted as a manifestation of
kindness shown towards the family of a former household helper.
Anent the treatment given by his relatives to MONINA as his daughter, FRANCISCO
points to the fact that Pansay was the former laundrywoman of Mrs. Franco; MONINA
resided with the families of Eusebio Lopez and Concha Cuaycong because she was in
their employ at Kahirup Hotel and Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, respectively; MONINA
failed to present Mrs. Franco, Eusebio Lopez and Mrs. Cuaycong; and MONINAs
employment at the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz & Co. was attributable to her
educational attainment, there being absolutely no evidence to prove that FRANCISCO
ever facilitated her employment thereat. Hence, in light of Baluyot v. Baluyot, cxxxii[21] the
quantum of evidence to prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence, not merely a
preponderance thereof, was not met.
With respect to the third assigned error, FRANCISCO argues that the Court of Appeals
reliance on the certifications of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and Baptismal
Certificates (Exhs. C and D) as circumstantial evidence is misplaced. First, their
genuineness could not be ascertained as the persons who issued them did not testify.
Second, in light of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,cxxxiii[22] the contents of the baptismal
certificates were hearsay, as the data was based only on what was told to the priest
who solemnized the baptism, who likewise was not presented as a witness. Additionally,
the name of the father appearing therein was Franque Jison, which was not
FRANCISCOs name. Third, in both Exhibits E and F, the names of the childs parents
were listed as Frank Heson and Esperanza Amador (not Amolar). FRANCISCO further
points out that in Exhibit F, the status of the child is listed as legitimate, while the fathers
occupation as laborer. Most importantly, there was no showing that FRANCISCO
signed Exhibits E and F or that he was the one who reported the childs birth to the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar. As to MONINAs educational records, FRANCISCO
invokes Baas v. Baascxxxiv[23] which recognized that school records are prepared by
school authorities, not by putative parents, thus incompetent to prove paternity. And, as
to the photographs presented by MONINA, FRANCISCO cites Colorado v. Court of
Appeals,cxxxv[24] and further asserts that MONINA did not present any of the persons with
whom she is seen in the pictures to testify thereon; besides these persons were, at
best, mere second cousins of FRANCISCO. He likewise assails the various notes and
letters written by his relatives (Exhs. S to V) as they were not identified by the authors.
Finally, he stresses that MONINA did not testify as to the telephone cards (Exhs. G to L)
nor did these reveal the circumstances surrounding the calls she made from his
residence.
Anent the fourth assigned error, FRANCISCO contends that the Court of Appeals
interpretation of MONINAs affidavit of 21 September 1971 ran counter to Dequito v.
Llamas,cxxxvi[25] and overlooked that at the time of execution, MONINA was more than 25
years old and assisted by counsel.
As to the last assigned error, FRANCISCO bewails the Court of Appeals failure to
consider the long and unexplained delay in the filing of the case.
In her comment, MONINA forcefully refuted FRANCISCOs arguments, leading
FRANCISCO to file his reply thereto.
On 20 November 1996, we gave due course to this petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda, which they subsequently did.
A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support petitioner.
Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of preliminary matters
relating to the applicable law and the guiding principles in paternity suits. As to the
former, plainly, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209) governs
the present controversy. As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, Uyguangco cxxxvii[26]
served as a judicial confirmation of Article 256 of the Family Code cxxxviii[27] regarding its
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold true
here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the child has passed away and the
former having actually resisted the latters claim below.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children.
Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established, thus:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second
paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence
mentioned in the first paragraph, a high standard of proofcxxxix[28] is required. Specifically,
to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there
must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father
to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection
and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature
that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have
and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.cxl[29]
By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular
length of time.cxli[30]
The foregoing standard of proof required to establish ones filiation is founded on the
principle that an order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be
issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.cxlii[31]
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on
evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence,
and the shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the
burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The
concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability
of truth.cxliii[32]
With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy.
FRANCISCOs arguments in support of his first assigned error deserve scant

consideration. While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not be
presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence,cxliv[33] this does not
favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only
witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding
paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably
redounds to the victims or mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers
protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs mother could no longer testify as to the fact
of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution of the
complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA could no longer prove her
filiation. The fact of her birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other
than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is whether MONINAs
evidence is coherent, logical and natural.cxlv[34]
The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay by about the
end of 1945. We agree with MONINA that this was broad enough to cover the fourth
quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual
relations between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother. In any event, since it was
established that her mother was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at the time MONINA
was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between
FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the
overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered MONINA, has
recognized her as his daughter and that MONINA has been enjoying the open and
continuous possession of the status as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter.
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her
narration of circumstances and events that occurred through the years, concerning her
relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses,
overwhelmingly established the following facts:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINAs father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was in the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and
conduct which the Court of Appeals took pains to enumerate, thus:
[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms,
books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying
appellants hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly allowance,
paying for the funeral expenses of appellants mother, acknowledging
appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija or child, instructing
his office personnel to give appellants monthly allowance, recommending
appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his
house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having
appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes
residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other
records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5)
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
years publicly,cxlvi[35] spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted
manner.cxlvii[36]
Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the second assigned error
must fail.
There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the probative value of
some of MONINAs documentary evidence.
MONINAs reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her
birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of
paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to
record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person.cxlviii[37]
Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying
the information himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is
null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is
not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latters part.cxlix[38] In like manner,
FRANCISCOs lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates (Exhs.
C and D) and school records (Exhs. Z and AA) renders these documents incompetent
to prove paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the administration of the
sacrament of baptism on the date so specified.cl[39] However, despite the inadmissibility
of the school records per se to prove paternity, they may be admitted as part of
MONINAs testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her education.
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued
by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as
circumstantial evidence to prove MONINAs filiation. Since they are per se inadmissible
in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
As to Exhibits S, T, U and V, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs

relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez,
respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINAs filiation, while their due execution and
authenticity are not in issue,cli[40] as MONINA witnessed the authors signing the
documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents
may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or
unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA
shown by evidence other than the documents in question.clii[41] As to the admissibility of
these documents under Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires further
elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or

tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of
any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be
also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles
or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may
be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing
the first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the
documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the
witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored phrase. What must
then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private documents, fall within the
scope of the clause and the like as qualified by the preceding phrase [e]ntries in family
bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits.
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this
provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are
commonly known as family possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect, a
familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.cliii[42] These have been
described as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family, cliv[43] or those which,
if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition. clv[44] Other
examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or
tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones,clvi[45] monuments or coffin
plates.clvii[46]
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions"

as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither
may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common
reputation,clviii[47] it having been observed that:
[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute,
the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that
is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx [Thus] matters of
pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the
neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may
be proved by common reputation in the community.clix[48]
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V, inclusive, may, in like manner as

MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen
her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.
We now direct our attention to MONINAs 21 September 1971 affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2),
subject of the fourth assigned error, where she attests that FRANCISCO is not her
father. MONINA contends that she signed it under duress, i.e., she was jobless, had no
savings and needed the money to support herself and finish her studies. Moreover, she
signed Exhibit P upon the advice of Atty. Divinagracia that filiation could not be waived
and that FRANCISCOs ploy would boomerang upon him. On the other hand,
FRANCISCO asserts that full credence should be afforded Exhibit P as MONINA was
already 25 years old at the time of its execution and was advised by counsel; further,
being a notarized document, its genuineness and due execution could not be
questioned. He relies on the testimony of Jose Cruz, a partner at the accounting firm of
Miller & Cruz, who declared that he intervened in the matter as MONINA was spreading
rumors about her filiation within the firm, which might have had deleterious effects upon
the relationship between the firm and FRANCISCO.
On this issue, we find for MONINA and agree with the following observations of the
Court of Appeals:
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does
not hold sway in the face of [MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree to
sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly
complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was only
for the consumption of his spouse xxx.
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled
for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured [MONINAs] sworn
statement xxx On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the cost
of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his
paternity of [MONINA]. xxx
Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter, it would have
been unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that MONINA
denounce her filiation. For as clearly established before the trial court and properly
appreciated by the Court of Appeals, MONINA had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5)
months prior to the execution of the sworn statement in question, hence negating
FRANCISCOs theory of the need to quash rumors circulating within Miller & Cruz
regarding the identity of MONINAs father. Hence, coupled with the assessment of the
credibility of the testimonial evidence of the parties discussed above, it is evident that
the standard to contradict a notarial document, i.e., clear and convincing evidence and
more than merely preponderant,clx[49] has been met by MONINA.
Plainly then, the burden of evidence fully shifted to FRANCISCO.
Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCOs defense beg to be addressed: First, that his
testimony was comprised of mere denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated responses
such as That is not true, I do not believe that, or None that I know. In declining then to
lend credence to FRANCISCOs testimony, we resort to a guiding principle in adjudging
the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his statements, laid down as early as
1921:
The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the
natural limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to
fabricate and deliver in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost
certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily
refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message.
For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the incidents
immediately related to the principal fact about which they testify, and when asked about
collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers not infrequently
take the stereotyped form of such expressions as I dont know or I dont remember.
xxxclxi[50]
Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were
unspecified or likewise unsubstantiated, hence FRANCISCOs attempt to prove ill-
motive on their part to falsely testify in MONINAs favor may not succeed. As may be
gleaned, the only detail which FRANCISCO could furnish as to the circumstances
surrounding the dismissals of his former employees was that Baylosis allegedly took
advantage of his position while FRANCISCO was in the United States. But aside from
this bare claim, FRANCISCOs account is barren, hence unable to provide the basis for
a finding of bias against FRANCISCO on the part of his former employees.
As to FRANCISCOs other witnesses, nothing substantial could be obtained either.
Nonito Jalandoni avowed that he only came to know of MONINA in June 1988;clxii[51] that
during his employment at Nelly Garden from 1963 up to 1974, he did not recall ever
having seen MONINA there, neither did he know of any instructions from FRANCISCO
nor Mr. Lagarto (FRANCISCOs office manager before passing away) regarding the
disbursement of MONINAs allowance.clxiii[52] Teodoro Zulla corroborated Jalandonis
testimony regarding not having seen MONINA at Nelly Garden and MONINAs
allowance; declared that Alfredo Baylosis was dismissed due to discrepancies
discovered after an audit, without any further elaboration, however; but admitted that he
never prepared the vouchers pertaining to FRANCISCOs personal expenses, merely
those intended for one of FRANCISCOs haciendas.clxiv[53] Then, Iigo Superticioso
confirmed that according to the report of a certain Mr. Atienza, Baylosis was dismissed
by Mr. Jison for irregularities, while Superticioso was informed by FRANCISCO that
Tingson was dismissed for loss of confidence. Superticioso likewise denied that
MONINA received money from FRANCISCOs office, neither was there a standing order
from FRANCISCO to release funds to her.clxv[54]
It is at once obvious that the testimonies of these witnesses for FRANCISCO are
likewise insufficient to overcome MONINAs evidence. The former merely consist of
denials as regards the latters having gone to Nelly Garden or having received her
allowance from FRANCISCOs office, which, being in the form of negative testimony,
necessarily stand infirm as against positive testimony;clxvi[55] bare assertions as regards
the dismissal of Baylosis; ignorance of FRANCISCOs personal expenses incapable of
evincing that FRANCISCO did not provide MONINA with an allowance; or hearsay
evidence as regards the cause for the dismissals of Baylosis and Tingson. But what
then serves as the coup de grce is that despite Superticiosos claim that he did not know
MONINA,clxvii[56] when confronted with Exhibit H, a telephone toll ticket indicating that on
18 May 1971, MONINA called a certain Eing at FRANCISCOs office, Superticioso
admitted that his nickname was Iing and that there was no other person named Iing in
FRANCISCOs office.clxviii[57]
All told, MONINAs evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the success
of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions
regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws; moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere
preponderance of evidence.
The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince. The essential
elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom
he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay
in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of
the defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint would assert
the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. clxix[58] The last
element is the origin of the doctrine that stale demands apply only where by reason of
the lapse of time it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights. clxx[59]
As FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon him to

prove the existence of its elements. However, he only succeeded in showing MONINAs
delay in asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last element. In any event,
it must be stressed that laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat
justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.clxxi[60] Since the instant case involves
paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her action well within the period
granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of
laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860
is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
v. Common Reputation
vi. Res Gestae: People of the Philippines vs Feliciano
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA,
WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-
appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students, faculty, and research personnel
should feel safest. After all, this is where ideas that could probably solve the sordid realities in
this world are peacefully nurtured and debated. Universities produce hope. They incubate all our
youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade misplaced concepts of perverse
brotherhood for these hopes. Fraternity rumbles exist because of past impunity. This has resulted
in a senseless death whose justice is now the subject matter of this case. It is rare that these cases
are prosecuted. It is even more extraordinary that there are credible witnesses who present
themselves courageously before an able and experienced trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this society for hooliganism disguised as
fraternity rumbles. The perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal consequences of their
actions. They must do so for there is an individual who now lies dead, robbed of his dreams and
the dreams of his family. Excruciating grief for them will never be enough.
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7)
members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the
Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several
masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information1 for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113 3, was filed against
several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L.
Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G.
Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay,
Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 219. The information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating with other
persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, and with evident
premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes, and
cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him
on the head and clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious
and mortal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis supplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Sigma Rho
fraternity members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,2 Cristobal Gaston, Jr.,3 and Leandro Lachica,4 and
the frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members Mervin Natalicio5 and Amel Fortes.6
Only 11 of the accused stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at
large.
A trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Derinis Venturina, Mervin Natalicio, Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Felix
Tumaneng,7 and Cesar Magrobang, Jr. are all members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. On
December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1 :00 p.m., they were having lunch at Beach House
Canteen, located at the back of the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
Quezon City.8 Suddenly, Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"9
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked around when
Venturina shouted, and he saw about ten (10) men charging toward them.10 The men were
armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, and their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs
or shirts.11 Within a few seconds, five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him with
their lead pipes.12 During the attack, he recognized one of the attackers as Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off.13
Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and contusions.14
He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education.15 Just before reaching it, he
looked back and saw Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla holding lead pipes and
standing where the commotion was.16 Both of them did not have their masks on.17 He was
familiar with Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla because he often saw them in the College of Social
Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) and Zingapan used to be his friend.18 The attack lasted about
thirty (30) to forty-five (45) seconds.19
According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when
Venturina shouted.20 He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing
masks, running toward them.21 He was stunned, and he started running.22 He stumbled over the
protruding roots of a tree.23 He got up, but the attackers came after him and beat him up with
lead pipes and baseball bats until he fell down.24 While he was parrying the blows, he
recognized two (2) of the attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva since they
were not wearing any masks.25 After about thirty (30) seconds, they stopped hitting him.26
He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to five (5)
men coming toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero.27 This group also beat him up.28 He did not
move until another group of masked men beat him up for about five (5) to eight (8) seconds.29
When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground.30 Several bystanders brought him to
the U.P. Infirmary where he stayed for more than a week for the treatment of his wounds and
fractures.31
According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he also looked back when
Venturina shouted and saw a group of men with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them wore
pieces of cloth around their heads.32 He ran when they attacked, but two (2) men, whose faces
were covered with pieces of cloth, blocked his way and hit him with lead pipes.33 While running
and parrying the blows, he recognized them as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette
Fajardo because their masks fell off.34 He successfully evaded his attackers and ran to the Main
Library.35 He then decided that he needed to help his fraternity brothers and turned back toward
Beach House.36 There, he saw Venturina lying on the ground.37 Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was
beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina.38
When they saw him, they went toward his direction.39 They were about to hit him when
somebody shouted that policemen were coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran away.40
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes. Fortes accompanied him to his car so they could
bring Venturina to the U.P. Infirmary.41 When they brought the car over, other people,
presumably bystanders, were already loading Venturina into another vehicle.42 They followed
that vehicle to the U.P. Infirmary where they saw Natalicio.43 He stayed at the infirmary until
the following morning.44
According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he immediately stood up when he
heard someone shout, "Brods!"45 He saw a group of men charging toward them carrying lead
pipes and baseball bats.46 Most of them had pieces of cloth covering their faces.47 He was about
to run when two (2) of the attackers approached him.48 One struck him with a heavy pipe while
the other stabbed him with a bladed instrument.49 He was able to parry most of the blows from
the lead pipe, but he sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left forearm.50
He was able to run away.51 When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he looked back to
Beach House Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano.52
He decided to go back to the canteen to help his fraternity brothers.53 When he arrived, he did
not see any of his fraternity brothers but only saw the ones who attacked them.54 He ended up
going to their hang-out instead to meet with his other fraternity brothers.55 They then proceeded
to the College of Law where the rest of the fraternity was already discussing the incident.56
According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran when he saw the group of
attackers coming toward them.57 When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting
Venturina.58 He was also able to see Warren Zingapan and George Morano at the scene.59
Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of Education, boarded a jeepney to
the College of Law to wait for their other fraternity brothers.60 One of his fraternity brothers,
Peter Corvera, told him that he received information that members of Scintilla Juris were seen in
the west wing of the Main Library and were regrouping in SM North.61 Lachica and his group
then set off for SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and identify their attackers.62
When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them.63 Lachica saw
Robert Michael Beltran Alvir and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan.64 They had no
choice but to get away from the mall and proceed instead to U.P. where the Sigma Rho
Fraternity members held a meeting.65
On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims to lodge their
complaints with the National Bureau of Investigation.66 Their counsel, Atty. Frank Chavez, told
the U.P. Police that the victims would be giving their statements before the National Bureau of
Investigation, promising to give the U.P. Police copies of their statements. In the meantime,
Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's Hospital on December 8, 1994.
He died on December 10, 1994.67 On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was conducted on the
cadaver of Dennis Venturina.68 Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, found that Venturina had "several contusions located at the back of the
upper left arm and hematoma on the back of both hands,"69 "two (2) lacerated wounds at the
back of the head,70 generalized hematoma on the skull,"71 "several fractures on the head,"72
and "inter-cranial hemorrhage."73 The injuries, according to Dr. Victoria, could have been
caused by a hard blunt object.74 Dr. Victoria concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head
injuries.75
On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston executed their
respective affidavits76 before the National Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico-legal
examinations77 with their medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he
found that Mervin Natalicio had "lacerated wounds on the top of the head, above the left ear, and
on the fingers; contused abrasions on both knees; contusion on the left leg and thigh,"78 all of
which could have been caused by any hard, blunt object. These injuries required medical
attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from the date of infliction.79
Dr. Villena found on Amel Fortes "lacerated wounds on the head and on the right leg which
could have been caused by a blunt instrument."80 These injuries required hospitalization for a
period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from date of infliction.81 He also found on Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr. a "healed abrasion on the left forearm which could possibly be caused by
contact with [a] rough hard surface and would require one (1) to nine (9) days of medical
attention."82 He found on Leandro Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left
forearm and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side."83 On Christopher Gaston, Jr.
he found "lacerated wounds on the anterior chest, left side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of
both hands; contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the
infra scapular area, left side."84
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief, the court granted
the demurrer to evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the ground that he was not identified
by the prosecution's witnesses and that he was not mentioned in any of the documentary
evidence of the prosecution.85
Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense introduced their own statement of the facts,
as follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera,86 a member of the U.P. Police, he was on foot patrol with another
member of the U.P. Police, Oscar Salvador, at the time of the incident. They were near the
College of Arts and Sciences (Palma Hall) when he vaguely heard somebody shouting,
"Rumble!" They went to the place where the alleged rumble was happening and saw injured men
being helped by bystanders. They helped an injured person board the service vehicle of the
Beach House Canteen. They asked what his name was, and he replied that he was Mervin
Natalicio. When he asked Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not able to reply but instead told
him that his attackers were wearing masks. Oscar Salvador87 corroborated his testimony.
Benjamin Lato,88 a utility worker of the Beach House Canteen, likewise testified that the
identities of the attackers were unrecognizable because of their masks. He, however, admitted
that he did not see the attack; he just saw a man sprawled on the ground at the time of the
incident.
Frisco Capilo,89 a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main Library, was buying a cigarette at
a vendor located nearby. From there, he allegedly saw the whole incident. He testified that ten
(10) men, wearing either masks of red and black bonnets or with shirts covering their faces, came
from a red car parked nearby. He also saw three (3) men being hit with lead pipes by the masked
men. Two (2) of the men fell after being hit. One of the victims was lifting the other to help him,
but the attackers overtook him. Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He then saw students helping
those who were injured. He likewise helped in carrying one of the injured victims, which he later
found out to be Amel Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority, Eda Panganiban,90 testified that
she and her friends were in line to order lunch at the Beach House Canteen when a commotion
happened. She saw around fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) masked men attack a group of Sigma
Rhoans. She did not see any mask fall off. Her sorority sister and another U.P. student, Luz
Perez,91 corroborated her story that the masked men were unrecognizable because of their
masks. Perez, however, admitted that a member of Scintilla Juris approached her to make a
statement.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon,92 testified on substantially the same matters as
Panganiban and Perez. She also stated that she saw a person lying on the ground who was being
beaten up by about three (3) to five (5) masked men. She also stated that some of the men were
wearing black masks while some were wearing white t-shirts as masks. She did not see any mask
fall off the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano,93 accused-appellant Danilo Feliciano, Jr.'s motlier, her son
was in Pampanga to visit his sick grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her son
went to Pampanga before lunch that day and visited the school where she teaches to get their
house key from her.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,94 he had not been feeling well since December 5,
1994. He said that he could not have possibly been in U.P. on December 8, 1994 since he was
absent even from work. He also testified that he wore glasses and, thus, could not have possibly
been the person identified by Leandro Lachica. He also stated that he was not enrolled in U.P. at
the time since he was working to support himself.
According to Julius Victor Medalla,95 he and another classmate, Michael Vibas, were working
on a school project on December 8, 1994. He also claimed that he could not have participated in
the rumble as he had an injury affecting his balance. The injury was caused by an incident in
August 1994 when he was struck in the head by an unknown assailant. His testimony was
corroborated by Jose Victor Santos96 who stated that after lunch that day, Medalla played darts
with him and, afterwards, they went to Jollibee.
Christopher Soliva,97 on the other hand, testified that he was eating lunch with his girlfriend and
another friend in Jollibee, Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They went back to U.P. before 1:00
p.m. and went straight to their fraternity hang-out where he was told that there had been a rumble
at the Main Library. He also met several Sigma Rhoans acting suspiciously as they passed by the
hang-out. They were also told by their head, Carlo Taparan, not to react to the Sigma Rhoans and
just go home. Anna Cabahug,98 his girlfriend, corroborated his story.
Warren Zingapan99 also testified that he was not in U.P. at the time of the incident. He claimed
to have gone to SM North to buy a gift for a friend's wedding but ran into a fraternity brother. He
also alleged that some Sigma Rhoans attacked them in SM North that day.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision100 with the finding that Robert
Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren
Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were
sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua.101 The trial court,
however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George
Morano, and Raymund Narag.102 The case against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by
the court until his apprehension.103 The trial court, m evaluating the voluminous evidence at
hand, concluded that:
After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the considered view that of the ten
accused, some were sufficiently identified and some were not. The Court believes that out of the
amorphous images during the pandemonium, the beleaguered victims were able to espy and
identify some of the attackers etching an indelible impression in their memory. In this regard, the
prosecution eyewitnesses were emphatic that they saw the attackers rush towards them wielding
deadly weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of wood and bladed ones, and pounce on
their hapless victims, run after them, and being present with one another at the scene of the crime
during the assault. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals
permanently behind bars, not one .of them testified against all of them. If the prosecution
eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting Scintilla Juris
members for that matter, they could have easily tagged each and every single accused as a
participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure that no one else would escape
conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named only one or two and some were candid enough to
say that they did not see who delivered the blows against them.104
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to this court
on automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal,105 the case was
remanded to the Court of Appeals.106 In the Court of Appeals, the case had to be re-raffled
several Times107 before it was eventually assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. for
the writing of the decision.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five, affirmed108
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, with three (3) members concurring109 an one (1)
dissenting.110
The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this court for review.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellants attacked private complainants and caused the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this court by both parties, the issue may be
further refined, thus:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when the information

against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off; and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on the
basis of the evidence, that accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.
An information is sufficient
when the accused is fully
apprised of the charge against
him to enable him to prepare
his defense
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. They
argue that the prosecution should not have included the phrase "wearing masks and/or other
forms of disguise" in the information since they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all
the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law."111 This includes the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty and "to be informed of the nature and accusation against him."112
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor against the accused,
in compliance with the due process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended pary; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab-ea,113 this court has stated that:
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to

know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to
allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.114
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or
other forms of disguise" in the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such.115 It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for
all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused
were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an
aggravating circumstance.116 What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating
circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of
disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the
commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is
also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of
one is the act of all."117 This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal
their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done
so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and
attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of
the crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons
involved in the offense.
II
Findings of the trial court,

when affirmed by the
appellate court, are entitled
to great weight and credence
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
given great weight and credence on review. The rationale for this was explained in People v.
Daniel Quijada,118 as follows:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the
angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.119
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People v. Leticia Labarias,120 this
court stated that:
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the reasonable
assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the
testimonies of the witnesses, who reveal much of themselves by their deportment on the stand.
The exception that makes the rule is where such findings arc clearly arbitrary or erroneous as
when they are tainted with bias or hostility or are so lacking in basis as to suggest that they were
reached without the careful study and perceptiveness that should characterize a judicial
decision.121 (Emphasis supplied)
In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance since the presumption is always in
favor of innocence. It is only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that a conviction is
sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution and forty-two (42) witnesses for
the defense were put on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In an eighty-three (83)-page decision, the
trial court acquitted six (6) and convicted five (5) of the accused. On the basis of these numbers
alone, it cannot be said that the trial court acted arbitrarily or that its decision was "so lacking in
basis" that it was arrived at without a judicious and exhaustive study of all the evidence
presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great persuasive value, there is also nothing
that precludes this court from coming to its own conclusions based on an independent review of
the facts and the evidence on record.
The accused were sufficiently

identified by the witnesses for
the prosecution
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution to be credible. In its decision, the trial court stated that:
x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently
behind bars, not one testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all
Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they
could have easily tagged each and every accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric
assault to make sure no one would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named only one
or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered the blows against
them.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan, Dennis Gaio and Darwin Asuncion, testified
to have seen it all but they could not, and did not, disclose any name. Lachica, on the other hand,
said that he did not have the opportunity to see and identify the person who hit him in the back
and inflicted a two-inch cut. His forearm was also hit by a lead pipe but he did not see who did it.
Natalicio, one of the other three who were hospitalized, was severely beaten by three waves of
attackers totalling more than 15 but he could only name 3 of them. He added, however, that he
would be able to recognize those he saw if he would see them again. Of them, Mangrobang
pointed to at least 5 but he stressed that he did not see Zingapan, Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario,
Daraoay, Denoista, and Penalosa during the onslaught. Gaston could have named any of the
accused as the one who repeatedly hit him with a heavy pipe and stabbed him but he frankly said
their faces were covered. Like Natalicio, Fortes was repeatedly beaten by several groups but did
not name any of the accused as one of those who attacked him. The persons he identified were
those leading the pack with one of them as the assailant of Venturina, and the two others who he
saw standing while he was running away. He added that he saw some of the accused during the
attack but did not know then their names.122 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of the incident,"123 there would be
slight inconsistencies in their statements. In People v. Adriano Cabrillas,124 it was previously
observed that:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give
varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may
not observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of
narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were prefabricated and
rehearsed.125 (Emphasis supplied)
According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla;126
Natalicio was able to identify Medalla, Zingapan, and Soliva;127 and Fortes was able to identify
Feliciano, Medalla, and Zingapan.128 Their positive identification was due to the fact that they
either wore no masks or that their masks fell off.
It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a crime would
endeavor to find ways to identify the assailant so that in the event that he or she survives, the
criminal could be apprehended. It has also been previously held that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces
of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the
face of the assailant and body movements thereof, creates a lasting impression which cannot be
easily erased from their memory.129
In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked assailants could have lost their masks.
It had been testified by the victims that some of the assailants were wearing masks of either a
piece of cloth or a handkerchief and that Alvir,130 Zingapan,131 Soliva,132 and Feliciano133
had masks on at first but their masks fell off and hung around their necks.
Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco Capilo during cross-examination
who observed that some of the attackers were wearing masks and some were not, thus:
Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris Fraternity?
A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were a lot of people eating in the Beach House
Canteen, and then running towards different directions, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some people were wearing masks and some were not?
A Yes, sir.134
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have had the presence of mind to take
a look at their assailants if they were identifiable. Their positive identification, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, must be upheld to be credible.
It has been argued that the trial court did not give Mangrobang's testimony credence while
Gaston's testimony was found to be "hazy." This argument is unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that the acquittal of the Scintilla Juris
members identified by Mangrobang "should not be. misinterpreted to mean that the tt:'.stimony
of Mangrobang was an absolute fabrication."135 The court went on to state that they "were
exonerated merely because they were accorded the benefit of the doubt as their identification by
Mangrobang, under tumultuous and chaotic circumstances were [sic] not corroborated and their
alibis, not refuted."136 There was, therefore, no basis to say that Mangrobang was not credible;
it was only that the evidence presented was not strong enough to overcome the presumption of
innocence.
Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered "hazy"137 by the trial court only with
regard to his identification of Zingapan's companion. Gaston testified that he saw Zingapan with
Morano, with Zingapan moving and Morano staying in place. Fortes, however, testified that both
Zingapan and Morano were running after him. Lachica also testified that it was Medalla, not
Morano, who was with Zingapan. Because of this confusion, the trial court found that there was
doubt as to who was really beside Zingapan. The uncertainty resulted into an acquittal for
Morano. Despite this, the court still did not" impute doubt in their testimonies that Zingapan was
present at the scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further prove that its decision was
brought about only upon a thorough examination of the evidence presented: It accepted that there
were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victims but that these were minor and did not affect
their credibility. It ruled that "[s]uch inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not unusual 'for
there is no person with perfect faculties or senses."'138
Evidence as part of the res

gestae may be admissible but
have little persuasive value in
this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador,139 when he arrived at the scene, he
interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they
were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res
gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x."140 All other kinds of testimony are
hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several
exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.141
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca,142 this court has previously discussed the admissibility of
testimony taken as part of res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a
general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as
a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as
a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose
to manufacture testimony.143
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is
a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately
after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido,144 however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human
experience:"
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference.
Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot
expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects because different
persons have different impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x145
(Emphasis supplied)
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since
the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different
points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that
the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were
unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the
entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be
given considerably less weight than that of the victims.
The belated identification by

the victims do not detract from
their positive identification of
the appellants
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the incident to the U.P. Police or the
Quezon City Police but instead executed affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation
four (4) days after the incident gives doubt as to the credibility of their testimonies.
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera146 testified that on their way to the U.P. Infirmary, he
interviewed the victims who all told him they could not recognize the attackers because they
were all wearing masks. Meanwhile, Dr. Mislang147 testified to the effect that when she asked
Natalicio who attacked them, Natalicio answered that he did not know because they were
masked.
It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case belong to rival fraternities. While
this court does not condone their archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded that
there are certain practices that are unique to fraternal organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the identities of their attackers but chose
not to disclose it without first conferring with their other fraternity brothers. This probability is
bolstered by the actions of Sigma Rho after the incident, which showed that they confronted the
members of Scintilla Juris in SM North. Because of the tenuous relationship of rival fraternities,
it would not have been prudent for Sigma Rho to retaliate against the wrong fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P. Police or to Dr. Mislang does not
make the police officer or the doctor's testimonies more credible than that of the victims. It
should not be forgotten that the victims actually witnessed the entire incident, while Officer
Salvador, Officer Cabrera, and Dr. Mislang were merely relaying secondhand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident
also does not affect their credibility since most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries
and needed to recover first.
Since a fraternity moves as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait until
all of them were well enough to go to the National Bureau of Investigation headquarters in order
to give their statements.
Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the advice of their senior "brads" and
their legal counsel that they executed their sworn statements before the National Bureau of
Investigation four (4) days after the incident.
The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation instead of to the U.P.
Police was the call of their legal counsel who might have deemed the National Bureau of
Investigation more equipped to handle the investigation. This does not, however, affect the
credibility of the witnesses since they were merely following the legal advice of their counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of Investigation is better equipped
than the U.P. Police to handle the investigation of the case. As stated in the U.P. College of
Economics website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with maintaining campus security. Their station is
located in front of the College of Architecture.
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain peace and order, secure and protect lives and
property, enforce basic laws, applicable Quezon City Ordinances, and University Rules and
Regulations including policies and standards; and to perform such other functions relative to the
general safety and security of the students, employees, and residents in the U.P. Diliman
Campus. x x x.148 (Emphasis supplied)
It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P. primarily for campus security. They are
by no means an actual police force that is equipped to handle a full-blown murder investigation.
Fraternity-related violence in U.P. has also increasingly become more frequent, which might
possibly have desensitized the U.P. Police in such a way that would prevent their objectivity in
the conduct of their investigations. The victims' reliance on the National Bureau of Investigation,
therefore, is understandable.
III
Alibi cannot prevail over the

positive identification of the
victim
It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
victim.149 In People v. Benjamin Peteluna,150 this court stated that:
It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a witness

destroys the defense of alibi and denial. Thus:
x x x. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been
viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They
warrant the least credibility or none at all and cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the appellant by the prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that
appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-
serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating
justification[,] is inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like
alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.151
In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their attackers while the accused-
appellants merely offered alibis and denials as their defense. The credibility of the victims was
upheld by both the trial court and the appellate court while giving little credence to the accused-
appellants' alibis. There is, thus, no reason to disturb their findings.
Accused-appellants were
correctly charged with
murder, and there was
treachery in the commission
of the crime
According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellants
were correctly charged with murder. Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes and baseball
bats attacked Dennis Venturina and his companions, which resulted in Venturina's death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed against
Dennis Venturina was committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and
with the aid of armed men. The appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of
treachery in the commission of the offense.
It has been stated previously by this court that:
[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.152
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz,153 this court stated that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.154 (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, ruled that contrary to
the findings of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that
although the attack was sudden and unexpected, "[i]t was done in broad daylight with a lot of
people who could see them"155 and that "there was a possibility for the victims to have fought
back or that the people in the canteen could have helped the victims."156
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They
were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden
attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only
way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also
happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being
able to help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or
even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
The presence of conspiracy

makes all of the accused-
appellants liable for murder
and attempted murder
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the murder of
Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro
Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The appellate court, however, modified their
liabilities and found that the accused-appellants were guilty of attempted murder only against
Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer
chased by the attackers,"157 it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from
pursuing them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not have the intent to
do more than to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring them."158 It also pointed out that the
wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have been done with an intent to kill."159
Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical
injuries.
This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the accused-
appellants160 and the appellate court sustainedthis finding.161
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of
their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective
active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is
anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal
object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively,
each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for
the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one
is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a
crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in
one case where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view
of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the act
of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x x x.162
(Emphasis supplied)
The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein the
accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the
highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover,
but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already
present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike
when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between
the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of
their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to
kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be
appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight
physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of
the attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended
to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment
the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent to
kill.1wphi1
For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and
the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel
Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note
It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is also the effect on the five other
lives whose once bright futures are now put in jeopardy because of one senseless act of bravado.
There is now more honor for them to accept their responsibility and serve the consequences of
their actions. There is, however, nothing that they can do to bring back Dennis Venturina or fully
compensate for his senseless and painful loss.
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it be the last. Perhaps
this case and many cases like it can empower those who have a better view of masculinity: one
which valorizes courage, sacrifice and honor in more life-saving pursuits.
"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of the Philippines. It colors the
stories of many who choose to expend their energy in order that our people will have better lives.
Fraternity rumbles are an anathema, an immature and useless expenditure of testosterone. It
fosters a culture that retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at dangal."
This_ kind of shameful violence must stop.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November
26, 2010 is AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor
Medalla, Christopher Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in. Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the
MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
People of the Philippines vs Villarico
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 158362 April 4, 2011

vs.
GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. @ "BERTING", GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY
RAMENTOS, and RICKY VILLARICO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J:
The identification of the accused as the person responsible for the imputed crime is the primary
duty of the State in every criminal prosecution. Such identification, to be positive, need not
always be by direct evidence from an eyewitness, for reliable circumstantial evidence can
equally confirm it as to overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused.
On appeal by the accused is the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 6,
2003,1 finding Gilberto Villarico, Sr., Gilberto Villarico, Jr., Jerry Ramentos,2 and Ricky
Villarico guilty of murder for the killing of Haide Cagatan, and imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on each of them, thereby modifying the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 16, in Tangub City that had pronounced them guilty of homicide aggravated by
dwelling.3
With treachery having attended the killing, we affirm the CA but correct the civil liability to
accord with pertinent law and jurisprudence.
Antecedents
On October 7, 1999, an information for murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court in Misamis
Occidental (RTC) against all the accused,4 the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about August 8, 1999, at about 7:50 oclock in the morning at Barangay Bolinsong,
Municipality of Bonifacio, Province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, armed with a short firearms (sic), did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously suddenly and treacherously shoot HAIDE CAGATAN at
the back penetrating through the neck which cause(d) the instant death of said victim and that he
had no chance to avoid or defend himself from the attack.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
All the accused pleaded not guilty at their December 15, 1999 arraignment.
Version of the Prosecution
At around 7:50 p.m. on August 8, 1999, Haide was busy preparing dinner in the kitchen of his
familys residence in Bolinsong, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. The kitchen, located at the rear
of the residence, had a wall whose upper portion was made of three-feet high bamboo slats (sa-
sa) and whose lower portion was also made of bamboo slats arranged like a chessboard with
four-inch gaps in between. At that time, Haides sister-in-law Remedios Cagatan was attending
to her child who was answering the call of nature near the toilet. From where she was, Remedios
saw all the accused as they stood at the rear of the kitchen aiming their firearms at the door
Ricky Villarico was at the left side, and Gilberto, Jr. stood behind him, while Gilberto, Sr. was at
the right side, with Ramentos behind him. When Gilberto, Jr. noticed Remedios, he pointed his
gun at her, prompting Remedios to drop to the ground and to shout to Lolita Cagatan, her
mother-in-law and Haides mother: Nay, Nay tawo Nay (Mother, mother, there are people
outside, mother). At that instant, Remedios heard three gunshots.5
Francisco Cagatan, the father of Haide, also heard the gunshots just as he was coming out of the
toilet, making him instinctively jump into a hole, from where he was able to see and recognize
Gilberto, Sr., Gilberto, Jr. and Ricky who were then standing by the kitchen door. They were
aiming their guns upward, and soon after left together with Ramentos.6
Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala. She recalled that Haide then came
towards her from the kitchen, asking for help and saying: Tabang kay gipusil ko ni Berting (I was
shot by Berting).7 At that, she and Remedios brought the wounded Haide to Clinica Ozarraga,
where he was treated for gunshot wounds on his left scapular region (back of left shoulder) and
right elbow. He succumbed shortly thereafter due to hypovolemic shock or massive loss of
blood.8
Version of the Defense
The accused denied the accusations and each proffered an alibi.
Gilberto, Sr. claimed that he was sleeping in his home with a fever when he heard a gunshot. He
insisted that he learned that Haide had been shot only in the next morning.9 His denial and alibi
were corroborated by his wife Carmelita10 and his daughter Jersel.11
Gilberto, Jr. testified that on the day of the incident, he went to Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis
Occidental at around 5:00 p.m. to visit his girlfriend together with Charlie Bacus and Randy
Hernan. They stayed there until 9:00 p.m. Thereafter, they proceeded to Tiaman to attend the
wake for one Helen Oligario Cuizon, and were there for an hour. They then returned to
Bolinsong and spent the night in the house of Randy. It was only in the morning that Randys
father informed them that Haide had been shot. 12
Ricky declared that he stayed throughout the whole evening of August 8, 1999 in the house of
his aunt Flordeliza.13 Myrna Hernan, a neighbor of Flordeliza, corroborated his testimony.14
Ramentos alleged that he was drinking tuba with others at the store owned by Cinderella Bacus
at the time of the shooting; and that he went home at around 9:00 p.m. after his group was done
drinking. He did not recall hearing any gunshots while drinking and came to know of the
shooting only from a certain Anecito Duyag on the following morning.1avvphi1
To discredit the testimony about Haide being able to identify his assailants, the Defense
presented Peter Ponggos, who narrated that he had been on board a motorcycle (habal-habal)
when Lolita and Remedios asked for his help; and that he then aided Lolita and Remedios in
bringing Haide to the hospital. According to Peter, he asked Haide who had shot him, but Haide
replied that there had been only one assailant whom he did not recognize.15
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC convicted the four accused of homicide aggravated by dwelling, disposing:16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, with one aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences each one of them to a penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day, as its minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day,
as its maximum, to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law, to pay jointly and
solidarily, the heirs of the victim P50,000.00, as civil liability and to pay the costs.
Let all the accused be credited of the time that they were placed in jail under preventive
imprisonment, applying the provisions of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC accorded faith to the positive identification of the accused by the Prosecutions
witnesses, and disbelieved their denial and alibis due to their failure to show the physical
improbability for them to be at the crime scene, for the distances between the crime scene and
the places where the accused allegedly were at the time of the commission of the crime were
shown to range from only 100 to 700 meters.17 The RTC found, however, that the Prosecution
was not able to prove treachery because:
xxx The medical report of "gunshot wound left scapular region" which the doctor interpreted to
be at the back of the left shoulder is not sufficient to prove treachery, it being susceptible to 2
different interpretations: one: that victim had his back towards his assailants, and two: that he
was actually facing them but he turned around for cover upon seeing the armed "group of
Berting". The Court is inclined to believe the second interpretation because the victim was able
to see and identify his assailants. Two prosecution witnesses testified that the victim identified to
them who shot him.18
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate review, the CA modified the RTCs decision, holding instead that murder was
established beyond reasonable doubt because the killing was attended by treachery, viz: 19
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Pursuant to Section 13, paragraph
2 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, We render JUDGMENT without entering it,
as follows:
1. We find all accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER. Each accused is
hereby SENTENCED TO SUFFER the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. The Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to CERTIFY and ELEVATE the entire
records of this case to the Supreme Court for review.
SO ORDERED.20
Citing People v. Valdez,21 the CA explained that the attendance of treachery did not depend on
the position of the victim at the time of the attack, for the essence of treachery was in the element
of surprise the assailants purposely adopted to ensure that the victim would not be able to defend
himself. Considering that the accused had purposely positioned themselves at night outside the
door to the kitchen from where they could see Haide, who was then busy preparing dinner,
through the holes of the kitchen wall, the CA concluded that Haide was thus left unaware of the
impending assault against him.
Issues
In this recourse, the accused raise the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS OF MURDER DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THE IDENTITY OF THE ASSAILANT AS WELL AS ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE

QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT
INDEED ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY.
The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses failed to positively identify them as the
persons who had actually shot Haide; that treachery was not attendant because there was no
proof showing that they had consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attacking the
victim; and that assuming that they committed the killing, they could only be convicted of
homicide.
The decisive queries are, therefore, the following:
(a) Should an identification, to be positive, have to be made by a witness who actually

saw the assailants?
(b) Was treachery attendant in the killing of Haide as to qualify the crime as murder?
Ruling
We affirm the finding of guilt for the crime of murder, but modify the civil liability.
1.
Positive identification refers to

proof of identity of the assailant
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal, for, even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of the identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.22 In that regard, an
identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any
evidentiary force.23 The intervention of any mistake or the appearance of any weakness in the
identification simply means that the accuseds constitutional right of presumption of innocence
until the contrary is proved is not overcome, thereby warranting an acquittal,24 even if doubt may
cloud his innocence.25 Indeed, the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to every
individual is forever of primary importance, and every conviction for crime must rest on the
strength of the evidence of the State, not on the weakness of the defense.26
The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses did not actually see who had shot Haide;
hence, their identification as the malefactors was not positively and credibly made.
We cannot uphold the contention of the accused.
The established circumstances unerringly show that the four accused were the perpetrators of the
fatal shooting of Haide. Their identification as his assailants by Remedios and Francisco was
definitely positive and beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, Remedios saw all the four accused
near the door to the kitchen immediately before the shots were fired and recognized who they
were. She even supplied the detail that Gilberto, Jr. had trained his firearm towards her once he
had noticed her presence at the crime scene. On his part, Francisco attested to seeing the accused
near the door to the kitchen holding their firearms right after he heard the gunshots, and also
recognized them.
The collective recollections of both Remedios and Francisco about seeing the four accused
standing near the door to the kitchen immediately before and after the shooting of Haide inside
the kitchen were categorical enough, and warranted no other logical inference than that the four
accused were the persons who had just shot Haide. Indeed, neither Remedios nor Francisco
needed to have actually seen who of the accused had fired at Haide, for it was enough that they
testified that the four armed accused: (a) had strategically positioned themselves by the kitchen
door prior to the shooting of Haide; (b) had still been in the same positions after the gunshots
were fired; and (c) had continuously aimed their firearms at the kitchen door even as they were
leaving the crime scene.
The close relationship of Remedios and Francisco with the victim as well as their familiarity
with the accused who were their neighbors assured the certainty of their identification as Haides
assailants. In Marturillas v. People,27 the Court observed that the familiarity of the witness with
the assailant erased any doubt that the witness could have erred; and noted that a witness related
to the victim had a natural tendency to remember the faces of the person involved in the attack
on the victim, because relatives, more than anybody else, would be concerned with seeking
justice for the victim and bringing the malefactor before the law.28
Moreover, the following portions of Lolitas testimony show that Haide himself recognized and
identified his assailants, to wit:
Atty. Fernandez:
Q. And where were you at that time when he was shot?
A. In the sala.
Q. Could you possibly tell the Honorable Court what actually took place when your son was
shot?
A. He came from the kitchen at that time when I heard gunreports, he said "Nay" help me
because I was shot by Berting.29
xxx
Atty. Anonat:
Q. And that affidavit was executed by you at the Bonifacio Police Station?
A. Yes.
xxx
Q. And you affirm to the truth of what you have stated in this affidavit?
A. Yes.
Q. On question No. 7 you were asked in this manner "Giunsa man nimo pagkasayod nga sila
maoy responsible sa kamatayon sa imong anak? How do you know that they were responsible
(for) the death of your son? And your answer is this "Tungod kay ang biktima nakasulti pa man
sa wala pa siya namatay ug ang iyang pulong mao nga TABANG NAY KAY GIPUSIL KO
NILA NI BERTING ug nasayod ako nga sila gumikan sa akong mga testigos." which translated
into English Because the victim was able to talk before he died and the words which he told me
help me Nay I am shot by the group of Berting and I know this because of my witnesses. 30
xxx
The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting uttered
in the immediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim was a true part of the res
gestae. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule
under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae. (36 a)
The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act."31 In a general
way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact
and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the
main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.32 The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.33
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.34 A declaration or an
utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.35
We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act the shooting of Haide
was a startling occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother about being shot by the group
of Berting was made before Haide had time to contrive or to devise considering that it was
uttered immediately after the shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned the
startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is, the identities of the assailants).
Verily, the statement was reliable as part of the res gestae for being uttered in spontaneity and
only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
In the face of the positive identification of all the four accused, it did not matter whether only
one or two of them had actually fired the fatal shots. Their actions indicated that a conspiracy
existed among them. Indeed, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.36 Direct proof of a
previous agreement among the accused to commit the crime is not necessary,37 for conspiracy
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused at the time of their commission of the crime that
evinces a common understanding among them on perpetrating the crime.38 Thus, the concerted
acts of the four manifested their agreement to kill Haide, resulting in each of them being guilty of
the crime regardless of whether he actually fired at the victim or not. It is axiomatic that once
conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all;39 and that all the conspirators are then
liable as co-principals.40
But did not the fact that the name Berting without any surname being too generic open the
identification of the accused as the assailants to disquieting doubt about their complicity?
We hold that there was no need for a surname to be attached to the nickname Berting in order to
insulate the identification by Haide from challenge. The victims res gestae statement was only
one of the competent and reliable pieces of identification evidence. As already shown, the
accused were competently incriminated also by Remedios and Francisco in a manner that
warranted the logical inference that they, and no others, were the assailants. Also, that Berting
was the natural nickname for a person whose given name was Gilberto, like herein accused
Gilberto, Sr. and Gilberto, Jr., was a matter of common knowledge in the Philippines. In fine, the
pieces of identification evidence, including Haides res gestae statement, collaborated to render
their identification unassailable.
Relevantly, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v.
Gallarde,41 namely: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of
the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the
victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:
xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of
being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of
positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the
perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This
constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may
not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to
positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when
the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before
and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification,
which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of
evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is
that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual
eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the
exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it
is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively
identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion
and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity
of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community
would be denied proper protection.42
To conclude, the identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does
not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible
in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can
equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the
accused.
Faced with their positive identification, the four accused had to establish convincing defenses.
They opted to rely on denial and their respective alibis, however, but both the RTC and the CA
rightly rejected such defenses.
The rejection was warranted. Long judicial experience instructs that their denial and alibis, being
too easy to invent, could not overcome their positive identification by credible Prosecution
witnesses whose motives for the identification were not shown to be ill or vile. Truly, a positive
identification that is categorical, consistent, and devoid of any showing of ill or vile motive on
the part of the Prosecution witnesses always prevails over alibi and denial that are in the nature
of negative and self-serving evidence.43 To be accepted, the denial and alibi must be
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence establishing not only that the accused did not
take part in the commission of the imputed criminal act but also that it was physically impossible
for the accused to be at or near the place of the commission of the act at or about the time of its
commission. In addition, their proffered alibis were really unworthy of credit because only the
accused themselves and their relatives and other intimates substantiated them.44
2.
The essence of treachery is in the mode of attack,

not in the relative position of the victim and the assailant
The RTC ruled out the attendance of treachery due to its persuasion that the victim must have
been facing his assailants at the time of the assault and was thus not taken by surprise. The CA
differed from the RTC, however, and stressed that regardless of the position of the victim, the
essence of treachery was the element of surprise that the assailants purposely adopted to ensure
that the victim was not able to defend himself.45
We uphold the ruling of the CA.
There is treachery when: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods,
or forms of attack employed by him.46 The essence of treachery lies in the suddenness of the
attack that leaves the victim unable to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the
offense.47 It is the suddenness of the attack coupled with the inability of the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate that brings about treachery; consequently, treachery may still be
appreciated even if the victim was facing the assailant.48
Here, the elements of treachery were present. His assailants gunned Haide down while he was
preoccupied in the kitchen of his own abode with getting dinner ready for the household. He was
absolutely unaware of the imminent deadly assault from outside the kitchen, and was for that
reason in no position to defend himself or to repel his assailants.
The argument of the accused that the Prosecution did not show that they had consciously and
deliberately adopted the manner of killing Haide had no substance, for the testimonies of
Remedios and Francisco disclose the contrary.
Remedios testimony about seeing the four accused taking positions near the door to the kitchen
immediately preceding the shooting of Haide was as follows:
Atty. Fernandez:
xxx
Q. Were you present when the late Haide Cagatan was shot?
A. Yes, I was present.
Q. Could you possibly tell the Court in what particular place you were when the alleged incident
took place?
A. I was in the ground floor.
Q. What were you doing there?
A. I attended my child (to) answer(ing) the call of his (sic) nature.
Q. Now, could you possibly describe before this Honorable Court, Mrs. Cagatan, the exact event
that took place when the alleged shooting incident took place in your presence?
A. At that time, I attended my child (to) answer(ing) the call of (his) nature and after doing that
when I was about to stand up to go up I saw the Villaricos was (sic) at the back of the kitchen.
Q. At the time you saw them was (sic) any one of them saw you likewise?
A. There was.
Q. Who was he?
A. Gilberto Villarico, Jr.
Q. At that precise time when you saw them and one of them saw you, what did Villarico, Jr. do?
A. He aimed his gun to me.
Q. Could you possibly demonstrate that to the Court?
A. (Witness demonstrated by squatting position)
Q. Now at that precise moment when you saw Villarico, Jr. on a squatting position pointing his
gun at you, what was the exact action that you did?
A. When he aimed his gun to me I immediately dropped to the ground.
xxx
Q. Since you were personally present could you still remember Mrs. Cagatan how many gun
burst you head at that precise moment when you dropped to the ground because Villarico Jr. was
aiming his gun at you. How many gun burst did you hear?
A. Three gunbursts.
Q. Let us go back to the time when Villarico, Jr. pointed his gun to you. Do you still remember
what were the other accused doing or where were they at that time?
A. I can remember.
Q. Please tell the Honorable Court.
A. Gilberto Villarico, Sr. was on the right side; Ricky Villarico was on the left side and behind
Gilberto Villarico, Sr. was Jerry Ramientos and behind Ricky Villarico is (sic) Gilberto Villarico
Jr.
Q. What were Ricky and Gilberto Villarico, Jr. doing at the time?
A. They were also dropping themselves on the ground and aimed their guns.
Q. To what particular object that they were aiming their guns?
A. To the door of our kitchen.
Q. How about Ramientos, where was he at that time when you saw the accused pointing their
guns towards the door of your kitchen?
A. Ramientos was standing behind Gilberto Villarico Sr.49
Likewise, Francisco saw the four accused in the same positions that Remedios had seen them
moments prior to the shooting. He claimed that they were aiming their firearms at the kitchen
and continued aiming their firearms even as they were leaving the crime scene, viz:
Atty. Fernandez:
xxx
Q. Now you said that you saw all of the accused at the time when your late son Haide Cagatan
was murdered in the evening of August 8. Could you possibly explain to this Honorable Court at
the very first time what did you see?
A. After I came from the toilet I was proceeding to the kitchen because Haide was preparing
food and he was calling for dinner. When Haide Cagatan was calling for dinner and at the time I
was proceeding to the door of the kitchen, when I was near the door I heard the gun shots.
Q. At the time when you heard gunshots, what did you do?
A. I laid down flat on the ground while my head is (sic) looking up and there I saw the 3
Villaricos bringing a revolver. They came from aiming their guns towards upstairs and they are
about to withdraw from that place together with Jerry Ramientos.
xxx
Q. Now, since you said that you saw the accused Villaricos, could you possibly tell the Court,
what were their responsible position(s) in relation to the door of the kitchen?
A. They were in shooting position as they aimed upward and they were bringing revolver aiming
upstairs.
Q. In relation to the door of the kitchen, could you possibly tell the Court what were their
responsible position at that time when you saw them?
A. The four of them were situated in front of the kitchen door. Villarico Jr. and Villarico Sr. were
facing each other while Ricky Villarico and Jerry Ramientos were also facing each other.50
The testimonies of Remedios and Francisco on how and where the four accused had deliberately
and strategically positioned themselves could not but reveal their deliberate design to thereby
ensure the accomplishment of their design to kill Haide without any possibility of his escape or
of any retaliation from him. Aptly did the CA observe:
A perusal of the information shows that treachery was properly alleged to qualify the killing of
Heide [sic] Cagatan to murder. The prosecution was likewise able to prove treachery through the
element of surprise rendering the victim unable to defend himself. In this case, the evidence
shows that the victim, who was in the kitchen preparing dinner, could be seen from the outside
through the holes of the wall. The witnesses consistently described the kitchens wall as three
feet high bamboo splits (sa-sa), accented with bamboo splits woven to look like a chessboard
with 4-inch holes in between. The accused-appellants, likewise, positioned themselves outside
the kitchen door at night where the victim could not see them. When the accused-appellants shot
him, he was caught unaware.51
3.
Penalty and Damages
There is no question that the CA justly pronounced all the four accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, and punished them with reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 24852 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code,
considering the absence of any generic aggravating circumstance.
However, the CA did not explain why it did not review and revise the grant by the RTC of civil
liability in the amount of only P50,000.00. Thereby, the CA committed a plainly reversible error
for ignoring existing laws, like Article 2206 of the Civil Code,53 which prescribes a death
indemnity separately from moral damages, and Article 2230 of the Civil Code,54 which requires
exemplary damages in case of death due to crime when there is at least one aggravating
circumstance; and applicable jurisprudence, specifically, People v. Gutierrez,55 where we held
that moral damages should be awarded to the heirs without need of proof or pleading in view of
the violent death of the victim, and People v.Catubig,56 where we ruled that exemplary damages
were warranted whenever the crime was attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether
qualifying or ordinary. Here, the aggravating circumstance of treachery, albeit attendant or
qualifying in its effect, justified the grant of exemplary damages.
Plain oversight might have caused both the RTC and the CA to lapse into the serious
omissions.1avvphil Nonetheless, a rectification should now be made, for, indeed, gross
omissions, intended or not, should be eschewed. It is timely, therefore, to remind and to exhort
all the trial and appellate courts to be always mindful of and to apply the pertinent laws and
jurisprudence on the kinds and amounts of indemnities and damages appropriate in criminal
cases lest oversight and omission will unduly add to the sufferings of the victims or their heirs.
Nor should the absence of specific assignment of error thereon inhibit the sua sponte rectification
of the omissions, for the grant of all the proper kinds and amounts of civil liability to the victim
or his heirs is a matter of law and judicial policy not dependent upon or controlled by an
assignment of error. An appellate tribunal has a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of
proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned,57 for technicality should not be
allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of
the parties. Indeed, the trend in modern day procedure is to accord broad discretionary power
such that the appellate court may consider matters bearing on the issues submitted for resolution
that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored.58
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we grant to the heirs of Haide P75,000.00 as death
indemnity;59 P75,000.00 as moral damages;60 and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.61 As
clarified in People v. Arbalate,62 damages in such amounts are to be granted whenever the
accused are adjudged guilty of a crime covered by Republic Act No. 7659, like the murder
charged and proved herein. Indeed, the Court, observing in People v. Sarcia,63 citing People v.
Salome64 and People v. Quiachon,65 that the "principal consideration for the award of damages
xxx is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not
the public penalty actually imposed on the offender," announced that:
The litmus test[,] therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of
the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on June 6, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No.

24711, finding GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR., GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY
RAMENTOS, and RICKY VILLARICO guilty of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer
reclusion perpetua, subject to the modification that they are held jointly and solidarily liable to
pay to the heirs of the late Haide Cagatan death indemnity of P75,000.00, moral damages of
P75,000.00, and exemplary damages of P30,000.00.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
People of the Philippines vs Palanca
vii. Entries in the Course of business: Philippine Airlines vs

Ramos
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO, MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 15, 1990 affirming in toto the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, directing the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL, for short) to pay the private respondents
the amounts specified therein as actual, moral and temperate damages as well as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
The antecedents facts are briefly recounted by the appellate court, as follows:
Plaintiffs Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipe Javalera, are officers of the
Negros Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264 from Naga City to Manila on
September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25 p.m. The tickets were brought sometime in August 1985.
Among the conditions included in plaintiffs tickets is the following:
1. CHECK-IN TIME Please check in at the Airport Passenger check-in counter at least one hour before PUBLISHED
departure time of your flight. We will consider your accommodation forfeited in favor of waitlisted passenger if you fail to
check-in at least 30 minutes before PUBLISHED departure time. (Exhs. (1-A-A, 2-A-1, S-A, O-A-1, tsn. Nov 23, 1987,
p. 8).
Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went tot he check-in counter of the defendant's Naga branch at least one (1)
hour before the published departure time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before departure, but upon
checking -in and presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who showed up, their tickets were cancelled and the
seats awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila by bus, and seek actual, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees for breach of contract of carriage.
Defendant disclaim any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of plaintiff on the said flight was due to their
having check-in (sic) late for their flight. It is averred even if defendant is found liable to the plaintiffs such liability is
confined to, and limited by, the CAB Economic Regulations No. 7 in conjunction with P.D. 589.
The trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of breach of contract of carriage in bumping-off the plaintiffs
from its F264 flight of September 25, 1985, and ordered defendant to pay:
1) P1,250.20 the total value of the tickets:

2) P22.50 the total value of airport security fees and terminal fees;
3) P20,000.00 for each of the plaintiffs for moral and temperate damages; and
4) P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. (Rollo, pp. 35-36)
PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 15, 990, the appellate court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 42)
Hence, this present petition with the following legal questions:
1. Can the Honorable Court of Appeals validity promulgate the questioned decision by the simple expedient of adopting
in toto the trial court's finding that defendant-appellant is liable for damages on the sole issue of credibility of witnesses
without considering the material admissions made by the plaintiffs and other evidence on record that substantiate the
defense of defendant-appellant.
2. Can the Honorable Court award legally moral and temperate damages plus attorney's fees of P5,000.00 contrary to
the evidence and established jurisprudence. (Rollo, p. 9)
Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party in a case is required to prove his affirmative allegations. In civil cases, the
degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is preponderance of evidence or that evidence adduced by one party
which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party (Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
83376, May 29, 1989, 173 SCRA 619, 625).
The case at bar presents a simple question of fact: Whether or not the private respondents were late in checking-in for their flight from Naga
City to Manila on September 24. 1985. It is immediately apparent from the records of this case that the claims of the parties on this question
are dramatically opposed. As a rule, the determination of a question of fact depends largely on the credibility of witnesses unless some
documentary evidence is available which clearly substantiates the issue and whose genuineness and probative value is not disputed
(Legarda v. Miaile, 88 Phil. 637, 642). The exception to the rule now runs true in this case.
We reverse. This case once more illustrates Our power to re-weigh the findings of lower courts when the same are not supported by the
record or not based on substantial evidence (see Cruz v. Villarin, G.R. No. 75679, January 12, 1990, 181 SCRA 53, 61).
It is an admitted fact that the private respondents knew of the required check-in time for passengers. The time requirement is prominently
printed as one of the conditions of carriage on their tickets, i.e., that the airport passenger should check-in at least one hour before published
departure time of his flight and PAL shall consider his accommodation forfeited in favor of waistlisted passengers if he fails to check-in at
least 30 minutes.
We note that while the aforequoted condition has always been applied strictly and without exception (TSN, December 16, 1987, p. 11), the
station manager, however, may exercise his discretion to allow passengers who checked-in late to board provided the flight is not fully
booked and seats are available (ibid, pp. 17-18). On September 24, 1985, flight 264 from Naga to Manila was fully booked owing to the
Peafrancia Festival (TSN, January 25, 1988, p.5). In addition, PAL morning flights 261 and 262 were canceled resulting in a big number o f
waitlisted passengers. (TSN, November 23,
1987, p. 6).
The private respondents claim that they were on time in checking-in for their flight; that no PAL personnel attended to them until much later
which accounted for their late check-in; that PAL advanced the check-in time and the departure of their flight resulting in their non-
accommodation; and that they suffered physical difficulties, anxieties and business losses.
The evidence on record does not support the above contentions. We note that there were two other confirmed passengers who came ahead
of the private respondents but were refused accommodation because they were late. Edmundo Araquel, then the check-in-clerk, testified on
this point, as follows:
Atty. Marcelino C. Calica, counsel for PAL
Q Before the plaintiffs arrive (sic) at the check-in counter, do you recall if there were other
passengers who arrived at the counter and they were advised that they were late?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who were those persons?
A My former classmates at Ateneo, sir, Rose Capati and Go, Merly.
Q Were these two passengers also confirmed passengers on this flight?
A Yes, sir.
Q I show to you a document which is entitled "Passenger Manifest of flight 264, September 24,
1985," which we request to be marked as Exh. "5" you said earlier that aside from the plaintiffs
here there were two other passengers who also checked in but they were also late and you
mentioned the names of these passengers as Capati and Go, please point to us that entry which
will show the names of Go and Capati?
A Here, sir, numbers 13 and 14 of the Manifest.
ATTY. CALICA: We request that passengers 13 and 14 be marked in evidence, Go for 13 and
Capati for 14 as Exh. "5-A."
Q You said that these two passengers you mentioned were also similarly denied
accommodations because they checked in late, did they check in before or after the plaintiffs?
A Before, sir.
Q What time did they appear at the counter?
A 4:01 p.m., sir.
Q What happened when they checked in at 4:01?
A I told them also that they were late so they cannot be accommodated and they tried to protest,
but they decided later on just to refund the ticket. (TSN of November 23, 1987, pp. 11-12)
Shortly after, the private respondents followed the aforesaid two passengers at the counter. At this juncture, Araquel declared, thus:
Q Now, you said that you met the plaintiffs in this case because they were passengers of Flight
264 on September 24, 1985 and they were not accommodated because they checked in late,
what time did these plaintiffs check in?
A Around 4:02 p.m., sir.
Q Who was the clerk at the check in counter who attended to them?
A I was the one, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said when you were presented the tickets of the plaintiffs in this case and noting that they
were late for checking in, immediately after advising them that they were late, you said you made
annotation on the tickets?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you Exhs. "A," "B," "C," and "D," which are the tickets of Mr. & Mrs. Jaime
Ramos for Exh. "A," Exh. "B" ticket of Mr. & Mrs. Daniel Ilano, "C" ticket of Felipa Javalera and
"D" ticket of Erlinda Ilano, will you please go over the same and point to us the notations you said
you made on these tickets?
A This particular time, sir. (Witness pointing to the notation "Late" and the time "4:02" appearing
at the upper righthand of the tickets Exhs. "A," "B," "C," and "D.")
Q How long did it take after the tickets were tendered to you for checking in and before you made
this notation?
A It was just seconds, sir.
Q On the tickets being tendered for check-in and noting that they were late, you mean to say you
immediately made annotations?
A Yes, sir. That is an S.O.P. of the office.
Q So on what time did you base that 4:02?
A At the check-in counter clock, sir.
Q At the time you placed the time, what was the time reflected at the counter clock?
A 4:02, sir. (ibid, pp. 8-11)
The private respondents submitted no controverting evidence. As clearly manifested above, the intervening time between Capati and Go and
the private respondents took only a mere second. If indeed, the private respondents were at the check-in counter at 3:30 p.m., they could
have been the first ones to be attended to by Araquel than Capati and Go. They cold have also protested if they were the earliest passengers
at the counter but were ignored by Araquel in favor of Go and Capati. They did not.
It is likewise improbable that not a single PAL personnel was in attendance at the counter when the check-in counter was supposed to be
opened at 3:25 p.m. It mist be remembered that the morning flight to Manila was canceled and hence, it is not farfetched for Us to believe
that the PAL personnel then have their hands full in dealing with the passengers of the morning flight who became waitlisted passengers.
Moreover, the emphatic assertions of private respondent Daniel Javalora Ilano regarding the absence of a PAL personnel lost its impact
during the cross examination:
ATTY. CALICA
Q So, you maintain therefore that for all the time that you waited for there for the whole twenty
(20) minutes the check-in counter and other PAL Offices there the whole counter was
completely unmanned? I am referring to the whole area there where it is enclosed by a counter.
I will describe to you, for the benefit of the court.
When you approach the counter at Naga Airport, the counter is enclosed, I mean, you cannot just
go inside the PAL office, right? there is some sort of counter where you deal with the PAL
personnel and you approximate this counter to be five (5) to six (6) meters. Now, this space after
the counter, did you observe what fixtures or enclosures are contained there inside the enclosed
space?
A I am not sure whether there are offices or enclosures there.
Q You have been traveling and had opportunity to check-in your tickets so may times. Everytime
that you check-in, how many personnel are manning the check-in counter?
A There are about three (3) or four (4), sir.
Q Everytime, there are three (3) or four (4)?
A Everytime but not that time.
Q I am referring to your previous trips, I am not referring to this incident.
On previous occasions when you took the flight with Pili Airport and you see three (3) or four (4)
personnel everytime, are all these three (3) or four (4) personnel at the counter or some are
standing at the counter or others are seated on the table doing something or what? Will you
describe to us?
A Some are handling the baggages and some are checking-in the tickets.
Q So, on most occasions when you check-in and say, there were at least three (3) of four (4)
people at the check-in counter, one would attend to the tickets, another to the check in baggage,
if any. Now, do you notice if somebody evade when you check-in your ticket. This other person
would receive the flight coupon which is detached from your ticket and record it on what we call
passenger manifest?
A That's true.
Q Now, it is clear one would attend to the baggage, another person would receive the ticket,
detach the coupon and one would record it on the passenger manifest. What about the fourth,
what was he doing, if you recall?
A I think, putting the identification tags on the baggages (sic). (TSN, November 17, 1986, p. 38)
Ilano's declaration becomes even more patently unreliable in the face of the Daily Station Report of PAL dated September 24,
1985 which contained the working hours of its personnel from 0600 to 1700 and their respective assignments, as follows:
ATTY. CALICA
Q Normally upon opening of the check-in counter, how many PAL personnel are assigned to man
the counter?
EDMUNDO ARAQUEL
A A total of four personnel with the assistance of others.
Q Who are these personnel are assigned to the counter and what specific duties they performed?
A Mr. Oropesa handled the cargo, Mr. Espiritu handled the ticketing, Mr. Valencia and me
handled the checking in of passengers.
Q Are you referring to this particular flight 264 on September 24, 1985?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was assigned as check-in clerk that particular time?
A I was the one with Mr. Valencia, sir.
Q What was Mr. Valencia doing?
A He assisted me, sir.
Q How?
A If a group of passengers simultaneously check in, we divided the work between us. (TSN,
November 23, 1987, p. 7)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the plaintiffs testified in this case particularly plaintiff Daniel Ilano and Felipa Javalera at
the previous hearings said plaintiffs stated that they arrived at the check-in counter at about 3:25
or 3:30 and there was nobody in the counter, what can you say to that?
A We cannot leave the counter, sir. That was always manned from 3:25 up to the last minute. We
were there assigned to handle the checking in of the passengers.
Q You mentioned earlier that aside from you there were other personnel assigned to the check-in
counter and you even mentioned about a certain Valencia assisting you, do you have any
evidence to show said assignment of personnel at the airport?
A Yes, sir.
Q I show to you a daily station report from 24 September 1985 covering working hours 0600 to
1700, will you please go over the same and thereafter tell us from the personnel listed in this
Daily Station Report what were the name (sic) of the personnel assigned to man a check-in
counter at that time?
A There (sic) persons assigned were Mr. Oropesa, Mr. Espiritu, Mr. Medevilla, myself and Mr.
Valencia.
Q You mentioned about Mr. Espiritu, what was his specific task at that time?
A He was handling the ticketing, sir.
Q What about Mr. Medevilla?
A He was taking care of the ramp handling.
Q And Mr. Oropesa?
A He was handling the incoming cargo.
ATTY. CALICA: We request that this Daily Station Report be marked Exh. "6" and the portion of
the Report which shows the deployment of personnel of PAL Naga Station on September 24,
1985 as "6-A."
Q Plaintiffs in this case testified that when they checked in there was nobody manning the
counter and they had to wait for twenty minutes before someone came in to the counter, what can
you say to that?
A It is not true because all the time we were there from the start, an hour before the flight we were
there because we were assigned there.
Q Plaintiff Daniel Ilano testified that he went to the counter twice, first at 3:25 and it was only at
4:00 p.m. that somebody went to the counter and attended to him and while he expected his
boarding pass he was told instead that plaintiffs could not be accommodated because they were
late, what can you say to that?
A The truth is we were always there and we never left the counter from the start of the check-in
time of 3:25 we were all there, we never left the counter.
Q Until what time did you remain at the check-in counter?
A At around 4:15 p.m., sir.
Q You said that the check-in counter was closed at 3:55, for what purpose were you still manning
the check-in counter?
A To attend to the passenger who are late in checking in because they also need assistance in
explaining to them the situation.
Q So it was for that purpose you were there?
A Yes, sir. (ibid., pp. 16-18)
It is significant to note that there were no other passenger who checked-in late after the private respondents (TSN, November 23, 1987, p.
13). In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses
are prima facie evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private respondents, exhs. "1," "2," "3," "4," (with emphasis
on the printed condition of the contract of carriage regarding check-in time as well as on the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon
by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. "5," (which
showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go an the private respondents)are entries made in the regular course of business which the
private respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies. Consequently, they carry more
weight and credence. A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue,
when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a
witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection (20 Am Jur S 1179, 1029 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines Annotated, 1973 Edition, Volume VII, Part II, p. 654). Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document
that speaks a uniform language (Spouses Vicente and Salome de Leon v. CA., et al., G.R. No. 95511, January 30, 1992). This dictum is
amply demonstrated by the diverse allegations of the private respondents in their complaint (where they claimed that no one was at the
counter until thirty (30) minutes before the published departure time and that the employee who finally attended to them marked them late,
Records, p. 2) and in their testimonies (where they contended that there were two different PAL personnel who attended to them at the
check-in counter. TSNs of November 17, 1986, pp. 41-45 and of May 18, 1987, pp. 5-6). Private respondents' only objection to these
documents is that they are self-serving cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct
accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize
the act, are admissible as apart of the res gestae (32 C.J.S., S. 411, 30-31). Based on these circumstances, We are inclined to believe the
version of PAL. When the private respondents purchased their tickets, they were instantaneously bound by the conditions of the contract of
carriage particularly the check-in time requirement. The terms of the contract are clear. Their failure to come on time for check-in should not
militate against PAL. Their non-accommodation on that flight was the result of their own action or inaction and the ensuing cancellation of
their tickets by PAL is only proper.
Furthermore, We do not find anything suspicious in the fact that PAL flight 264 departed at 4:13 p.m. instead of 4:25 p.m. Apart from their
verbal assertions, the private respondents did not show any evidence of irregularity. It being clear that all the passengers have already
boarded, there was no sense in keeping them waiting for the scheduled time of departure before the plane could take flight.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 15, 1990 is hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
viii. Entries in official records: Lao vs Standard Insurance
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140023. August 14, 2003]
RUDY LAO, petitioner, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision348[1] dated February 4,
1999, as well as its Resolution,349[2] dated September 7, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 47227. The
assailed decision dismissed petitioners appeal and the resolution denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The original action was lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25, as Civil
Case No. 17045 for breach of contract and damages, as a result of the insurance companys
refusal of petitioners claim on the insurance policy of his truck which figured in an accident
during the effectivity of the policy.
The following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck with Plate No. FCG-538. The truck was insured
with respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc. under Policy No. CV-21074350[3] for the maximum
amount of P200,000 and an additional sum of P50,000 to cover any damages that might be
caused to his goods.
While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April 24, 1985, in
Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another truck, with Plate No. FBS-
917, also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running ahead of the insured truck and
was bumped from the rear. The insured truck sustained damages estimated to be around
P110,692, while the damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the accident,
were placed at P35,000 more or less.
Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds from his policy. However,
the claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that when its adjuster went to
investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not
possess a proper drivers license at the time of the accident. The restriction351[4] in Leonardo Anits
drivers license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than
4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore
violated the authorized driver clause352[5] of the insurance policy. In addition, respondent cited
the following excerpts from the police blotter of the Iloilo INP, to wit:
C-UN-85 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY W/ PHY INJURIES R/ IMPRUDENCE
11:30 PM Sgt. A. Bernas informed this office that a collision took place at Brgy. Buhang, Jaro,
IC. Investigation conducted by Pat. Villahermosa, assisted by Lt. P. Baclaron (OD), disclosed
that at about 8:00 PM this date at the aforementioned place, a collision took place between a
truck (Hino) with Plate Nr FB[S] 917 owned by Rudy Lao and driven by BOY GIDDIE Y
COYEL, 38 yrs, a res. of Balasan, Iloilo, with License Nr DLR 1108142 and another truck with
Plate Nr. FCG-538 owned by Rudy Lao and driver (sic) by LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES, 33
yrs, a res. of Brgy Laya, Balasan, Iloilo with License Nr 1836482. (Emphasis supplied.)353[6]
Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in fact another driver named Giddie Boy
Y Coyel who was driving the insured truck. Giddie Boy possessed a drivers license authorizing
him to drive vehicles such as the truck which weighed more than 4,500 kgs. As evidence,
petitioner presented the Motor Vehicle Accident Report354[7] wherein the Investigating Officer,
Pat. Felipe D. Villahermosa, stated that it was Giddie Boy driving the insured truck and not
Leonardo Anit. The said report was made three days after the accident or on April 27, 1985.
However, respondent insurance company was firm in its denial of the claim.
Hence, petitioner filed the civil case before the RTC. After trial, the court disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that plaintiff lacks sufficient cause of
action against the defendant and hence ordered his case dismissed and further orderes (sic) him
to pay the defendant the following:
1) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P500.00 for appearance fee; and
2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.355[8]
On appeal with the Court of Appeals, the RTC decision was affirmed. The petition was
dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied. The CA stated:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

Consequently, the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.356[9]
In his petition for review now before us, petitioner cites the following as grounds therefor:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT RELIED

MAINLY ON SECTION 44, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
ENTRY IN THE POLICE BLOTTER WHICH STATED THAT THE DRIVER OF THE
INSURED VEHICLE WAS LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES, WHO WAS NOT AN
AUTHORIZED DRIVER. UNDER THE SAID SECTION 44, RULE 130 ITSELF HOWEVER,
THE POLICE BLOTTER IS MERELY A PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS
STATED THEREIN WHICH MAY BE NULLIFIED BY OTHER EVIDENCE;357[10]
B. PERCEPTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ON THE
DIMINISHED CREDIBILITY OF PAT. FELIPE VILLAHERMOSA, THE TRAFFIC POLICE
INVESTIGATOR, IS MISPLACED AND UNFOUNDED;358[11]
C. THE DRIVER OF THE INSURED TRUCK WITH PLATE NR. FCG-538 WAS
GIDDIE BOY Y COYEL, AN AUTHORIZED DRIVER OF THE SAID TRUCK. THE
DRIVER OF THE OTHER TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WITH PLATE NR.
FBS-917 WAS LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES;359[12]
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED ARTICLES 2232 AND

2208 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IN GRANTING EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES TO RESPONDENT. UNDER ARTICLES 2229 AND 2234 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES CANNOT BE AWARDED IN THE ABSENCE OF
AN AWARD FOR MORAL, TEMPERATE, LIQUIDATED OR COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES;360[13]
E. TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT NAMELY, SGT. BERNAS,

THE DESK OFFICER AND ROMEO GUIERGEN, INSURANCE ADJUSTER, WERE
INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE;361[14] and
F. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD THE DECISION OF THE

LOWER COURT DESPITE GLARING MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE ESTABLISHED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AS WELL
AS CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF THE FACTS IN THIS CASE. 362[15]
Three issues must be resolved: (1) The admissibility and probative value of the police blotter as
evidence; (2) The assessment of the credibility of witnesses; and (3) The propriety and basis of
the awards for exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Also pertinent here is the factual issue of
whether or not Leonardo Anit, an unauthorized driver, was driving the insured truck at the time
of the accident.
Petitioner assails the admissibility and evidentiary weight given to the police blotter, as a basis
for the factual finding of the RTC and the CA. He contends that the same entry was belied by the
Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the investigating policeman himself, attesting
that it was Giddie Boy Coyel, not Leonardo Anit, who was driving the insured vehicle.363[16]
Respondent avers that the same police report and testimony were of dubious nature. Both trial
and appellate courts noted that the report was made three days after the accident and did not form
part of the official police records.364[17]
The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court.365[18] Under
the said rule, the following are the requisites for its admissibility:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by
him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.366[19]
We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was properly
admitted as they form part of official records.367[20] Entries in police records made by a police
officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the
fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other
competent evidence.368[21] Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are
nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts
stated therein.
In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information subject of the controversy.
Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was driving the insured truck with plate number
FCG-538. This is unlike People v. Mejia,369[22] where we said that entries in the police blotters
should not be given undue significance or probative value, since the Court there found that the
entries in question are sadly wanting in material particulars.
Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The
person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as
correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the
investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to
him. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange
of names.
Petitioner also assails the credence given by the trial court to the version of the respondents vis--
vis the testimonies of the witnesses. Time and again we have reiterated the settled doctrine that
great weight, and even finality, is given to the factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which
affirm those of the trial courts.370[23] We find on this score no reason to overturn such
conclusions.
On the issue of damages, we agree with petitioner that the award of exemplary damages was
improper. In Tiongco v. Atty. Deguma371[24] we held that the entitlement to the recovery of
exemplary damages must be shown. In the case at bar, respondent have not shown sufficient
evidence that petitioner indeed schemed to procure the dubious documents and lied through his
teeth to establish his version of the facts. What was found was that the document he presented
was inadmissible, and its contents were dubious. However, no proof was adduced to sufficiently
establish that it came to his hands through his employment of underhanded means. In Tiongco,
we further stated:
Although exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they also need not be
proved. But a complainant must still show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded.372[25]
Thus, it was error for the courts below to award exemplary damages in the absence of any award
for moral, temperate or compensatory damages.
The award of attorneys fees must also be deleted. Such award was given in its extraordinary
concept as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. 373[26] But
it was not sufficiently shown that petitioner acted maliciously in instituting the claim for
damages. Perforce, the award of attorneys fees was improper.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees is hereby
DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Callejo, Sr., J., on leave.
Sabili vs COMELEC
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193261 April 24, 2012
MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul the Resolutions in SPA No. 09-047 (DC) dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August
2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due course to and canceled
the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of
Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections. At the
heart of the controversy is whether petitioner Sabili had complied with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials.
When petitioner filed his COC1 for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein
that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010
elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member
representing the 4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the
position of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th District of Batangas
includes Lipa City.2 However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the
2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.)
Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
Private respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course
and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some
Grounds for Disqualification"3 against him before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 09-047
(DC). Citing Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code,4 private
respondent alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC
and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the
Local Government Code. 5 Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he
had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10
May 2010 local elections.
In support of his allegation, private respondent presented the following:
1. Petitioners COC for the 2010 elections filed on 1 December 20096
2. 2009 Tax Declarations for a house and lot (TCT Nos. 173355, 173356 and buildings
thereon) in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City registered under the name of Bernadette Palomares,
petitioners common-law wife7
3. Lipa City Assessor Certification of Property Holdings of properties under the name of
Bernadette Palomares8
4. Affidavit executed by private respondent Florencio Librea9
5. Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Eladio de Torres10
6. Voter Certification on petitioner issued by COMELEC Election Officer Juan D.

Aguila, Jr.11
7. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner12
8. National Statistics Office (NSO) Advisory on Marriages regarding petitioner13
9. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 3, Brgy. Lood, Lipa
City registered in the name of petitioner14
10. NSO Certificate of No Marriage of Bernadette Palomares15
11. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 5, Brgy. Lood,
Lipa City registered in the name of petitioner16
12. Lipa City Permits and Licensing Office Certification that petitioner has no business
therein17
13. Apparent printout of a Facebook webpage of petitioners daughter, Mey Bernadette

Sabili18
14. Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division Certification that the names
Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioners
son) do not appear on its list of graduates19
15. Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that Bernadette
Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili do not appear in its list of
voters20
16. Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez21
17. Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet22
18. Affidavit Executed by Pablo Lorzano23
19. Petitioners 2007 COC for Member of House of Representative24
For ease of later discussion, private respondents evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1)
Certificates regarding ownership of real property; (2) petitioners Voter Registration and
Certification (common exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioners COCs in previous elections; (3)
Certifications regarding petitioners family members; and (4) Affidavits of Lipa City residents.
On the other hand, petitioner presented the following evidence to establish the fact of his
residence in Lipa City:
1. Affidavit executed by Bernadette Palomares25
2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili26
3. Affidavit of Leonila Suarez (Suarez)27
4. Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, Dominador

Honrade28
5. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet29
6. Certificate of Appreciation issued to petitioner by the parish of Sto. Nino of Pinagtong-

ulan30
7. Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa

City Chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.31
8. COMELEC Voter Certification on petitioner issued by Election Officer Juan Aguila,

Jr.32
9. COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with Reactivation dated 6 June 2009

signed by Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.33
10. Petitioners Income Tax Return for 200734
11. Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for 200735
12. Petitioners Income Tax Return for 200836
13. Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for 200837
14. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili38
15. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Cornejo, Sr.39
16. Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including past and
incumbent Pinagtong-ulan officials.40
For ease of later discussion, petitioners evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1) his Income
Tax Returns and corresponding Official Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008; (2) Certification
from the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan; (3) Affidavit of his common-law wife, Bernadette
Palomares; and (4) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, Certificate of
Appreciation from the barangay parish and Memorandum from the local chapter of Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc.
The COMELEC Ruling
In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41 the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition
of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa
City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for
his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC,
during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was
proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast
for the said position. He accordingly filed a Manifestation42 with the COMELEC en banc to
reflect this fact.
In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,43 the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no
prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him.
Meanwhile, Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification Cases
Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2012 Automated National and Local Elections) requires
the parties to be notified in advance of the date of the promulgation of the Resolution.
SEC. 6. Promulgation. The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a

Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance
upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax, or thru the
fastest means of communication.
Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of
this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of
the 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC. Petitioner attached to
his Petition a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and proclamation of Winning Candidates for Lipa
City Mayor and Vice-Mayor issued by the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers,44 as well as a
copy of his Oath of Office.45 He also attached to his Petition another Certification of Residency46
issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade and sworn to before a notary
public.
On 7 September 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order47 requiring the parties to
observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
Thereafter, the parties filed their responsive pleadings.
Issues
The following are the issues for resolution:
1. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of
Procedure; and
2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili
failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials.
The Courts Ruling
1. On whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate
its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure
Petitioner argues that the assailed 17 August 2010 COMELEC Resolution, which denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, is null and void. The Resolution was allegedly not
promulgated in accordance with the COMELECs own Rules of Procedure and, hence, violated
petitioners right to due process of law.
The rules governing the Petition for Cancellation of COC in this case is COMELEC Resolution
No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification of Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections), which was promulgated on 11 November 2009.
Sections 6 and 7 thereof provide as follows:
SEC. 6. Promulgation. - The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a

Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance
upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the
fastest means of communication.
SEC. 7. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a Decision, Resolution, Order or

Ruling of a Division shall be filed within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof. Such
motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the Decision, Resolution,
Order or Ruling.
Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the Commission shall notify
the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the
Commission en banc.
The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the Motion for Reconsideration for the resolution of
the Commission en banc within three (3) days from the certification thereof.
However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 201048 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that "all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the
Commission for immediate promulgation" in view of "the proximity of the Automated National
and Local Elections and lack of material time." The Order states:
ORDER
Considering the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material
time, the Commission hereby suspends Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 8696 promulgated on November
11, 2009, which reads:
Sec. 6. Promulgation. The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a

Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served upon the
parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means
of communication."
Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner claims that he did not receive notice of the said suspension of Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696. Thus, his right to due process was still violated. On the other hand, the
COMELEC claims that it has the power to suspend its own rules of procedure and invokes
Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which gives it the power "to promulgate its own
rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices."
We agree with the COMELEC on this issue.
In Lindo v. Commission on Elections,49 petitioner claimed that there was no valid promulgation
of a Decision in an election protest case when a copy thereof was merely furnished the parties,
instead of first notifying the parties of a set date for the promulgation thereof, in accordance with
Section 20 of Rule 35 of the COMELECs own Rules of Procedure, as follows:
Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. The decision of the court shall be
promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become
final five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Rejecting petitioners argument, we held therein that the additional rule requiring notice to the
parties prior to promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of promulgation. Since lack
of such notice does not prejudice the rights of the parties, noncompliance with this rule is a
procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision. Thus:
This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published,

officially announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing,
coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel (Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-
24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 812). It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court
for filing and publication (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 433). It is the filing of the signed
decision with the clerk of court (Sumbing v. Davide, G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20, 1989, En
Banc Minute Resolution). The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice
in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation. Hence, We do not agree
with petitioners contention that there was no promulgation of the trial court's decision. The trial
court did not deny that it had officially made the decision public. From the recital of facts of both
parties, copies of the decision were sent to petitioner's counsel of record and petitioners (sic)
himself. Another copy was sent to private respondent.
What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was not the promulgation of
the decision but the failure of the trial court to serve notice in advance of the promulgation of its
decision as required by the COMELEC rules. The failure to serve such notice in advance of the
promulgation may be considered a procedural lapse on the part of the trial court which did not
prejudice the rights of the parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court
nor (sic) of the promulgation of said decision.
Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC,50 citing Macabingkil v. Yatco,51 we further held in

the same case that failure to receive advance notice of the promulgation of a decision is not
sufficient to set aside the COMELECs judgment, as long as the parties have been afforded an
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, viz:
The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of the promulgation of the decision in
the election protest cases, in Our view, does not constitute reversible error or a reason sufficient
enough to compel and warrant the setting aside of the judgment rendered by the Comelec.
Petitioners anchor their argument on an alleged denial to them (sic) due process to the deviation
by the Comelec from its own made rules. However, the essence of due process is that, the parties
in the case were afforded an opportunity to be heard.
In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant to the
holding of the countrys first automated national elections had necessitated that the COMELEC
suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation, and that it instead direct the delivery of all
resolutions to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation. Notably, we see no
prejudice to the parties caused thereby. The COMELECs Order did not affect the right of the
parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the COMELEC Decision and were
able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact, petitioner was able to timely lodge a
Petition with this Court.
Clearly, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to make its own
rules of procedure when it issued the 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696. Consequently, the second assailed Resolution of the COMELEC cannot be
set aside on the ground of COMELECs failure to issue to petitioner a notice setting the date of
the promulgation thereof.
2. On whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed
to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials
As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELECs appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the
COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn
into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden
constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.52
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, (G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010), we explained that the
COMELECs use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint
its action with grave abuse of discretion -
As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to

"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse
of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or
irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with
grave abuse of discretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5,
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial
evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a
certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the
COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation
of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the
Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of
discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment
to one of jurisdiction.
Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELECs use of wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of
his residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation. Among others, petitioner
pointed to the COMELECs inordinate emphasis on the issue of property ownership of
petitioners declared residence in Lipa City, its inconsistent stance regarding Palomaress
relationship to the Pinagtong-ulan property, and its failure to consider in the first instance the
certification of residence issued by the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan. Petitioner bewails
that the COMELEC required "more" evidence to show the change in his residence,
notwithstanding the various pieces of evidence he presented and the fact that under the law, the
quantum of evidence required in these cases is merely substantial evidence and not clear and
convincing evidence. Petitioner further ascribes grave abuse of discretion in the COMELECs
brushing aside of the fact that he has been filing his ITR in Lipa City (where he indicates that he
is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan) on the mere expedient that the law allows the filing of the ITR
not only in the place of legal residence but, alternately, in his place of business. Petitioner notes
that private respondents own evidence shows that petitioner has no business in Lipa City,
leaving only his residence therein as basis for filing his ITR therein.
Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that petitioner had not sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least one year
prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence adduced by the parties and the
COMELECs appreciation thereof.
In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the domicile of origin of Sabili was Brgy.
Sico, San Juan, Batangas. He claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and established his
domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby making him qualified to run for
Lipa City mayor. On the other hand, respondent COMELEC held that no such change in
domicile or residence took place and, hence, the entry in his Certificate of Candidacy showing
that he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City constituted a misrepresentation that
disqualified him from running for Lipa City mayor.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode.53 As in
all administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is substantial evidence,
or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.54
The ruling on private respondents evidence
We begin with an evaluation of the COMELECs appreciation of private respondents evidence.
a) Petitioners Voter Certification, Registration and COCs in previous elections
Petitioners Voter Certification is a common exhibit of the parties. It states, among others, that
petitioner is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, Batangas; that he had been a resident of
Lipa City for two (2) years and three (3) months; and that he was so registered on 31 October
2009. The information therein was "certified correct" by COMELEC Election Officer Juan B.
Aguila, Jr.
Private respondent presented this document as proof that petitioner misrepresented that he is a
resident of Lipa City. On the other hand, the latter presented this document as proof of his
residency.
The COMELEC correctly ruled that the Voter Certification issued by the COMELEC Election
Officer, Atty. Juan B. Aguila, Jr., was not conclusive proof that petitioner had been a resident of
Lipa City since April 2007. It noted that Aguila is not the competent public officer to certify the
veracity of this claim, particularly because petitioners COMELEC registration was approved
only in October 2009.
The Voter Registration Record of petitioner accomplished on 21 June 1997 showing that he was
a resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas, as well as his various COCs dated 21 June 1997 and
March 2007 indicating the same thing, were no longer discussed by the COMELEC and rightly
so. These pieces of evidence showing that he was a resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas on the
said dates are irrelevant as, prior to April 2007, petitioner was admittedly a resident of Sico, San
Juan Batangas. Rather, the relevant time period for consideration is that from April 2007
onwards, after petitioners alleged change of domicile.
b) Certificates regarding ownership of real property
The various certificates and tax declarations adduced by private respondent showed that the Lipa
property was solely registered in the name of petitioners common-law wife, Bernadette
Palomares. In discussing the import of this document, the COMELEC reasoned that, being a
"seasoned politician," he should have registered the Lipa property (which he claimed to have
purchased with his personal funds) in his own name. Such action "would have offered positive
proof of intent to change actual residence" from San Juan, Batangas to Lipa City, considering
that he had previously declared his ancestral home in San Juan, Batangas as his domicile. Since
Palomares and petitioner are common-law spouses not capacitated to marry each other, the
property relation between them is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code,55 where only the
parties actual contributions are recognized. Hence, petitioner cannot prove ownership of a
property and residence in Lipa City through the registered ownership of the common-law wife of
the property in Lipa City.
On the other hand, petitioner bewails the inordinate emphasis that the COMELEC bestowed
upon the question of whether the Lipa property could be considered as his residence, for the
reason that it was not registered in his name. He stresses that the issue should be residence, not
property ownership.
It is true that property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local
election.56 Rather, it is a candidates residence in a locality through actual residence in whatever
capacity. Indeed, we sustained the COMELEC when it considered as evidence tending to
establish a candidates domicile of choice the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment
by a candidate in the same province where he ran for the position of governor.57 In the more
recent case of Mitra v. Commission on Elections,58 we reversed the COMELEC ruling that a
candidates sparsely furnished, leased room on the mezzanine of a feedmill could not be
considered as his residence for the purpose of complying with the residency requirement of
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.59
The Dissent claims that the registration of the property in Palomaress name does not prove
petitioners residence as it merely showed "donative intent" without the necessary formalities or
payment of taxes.
However, whatever the nature of the transaction might be, this point is immaterial for the
purpose of ascertaining petitioners residence. We have long held that it is not required that a
candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It
is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or
relative.60 What is of central concern then is that petitioner identified and established a place in
Lipa City where he intended to live in and return to for an indefinite period of time.
Hence, while the COMELEC correctly ruled that, of itself, Palomares ownership of the Lipa
property does not prove that she or and in view of their common-law relations, petitioner
resides in Lipa City, nevertheless, the existence of a house and lot apparently owned by
petitioners common-law wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, makes
plausible petitioners allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the area.
c) Certifications regarding the family members of petitioner
Private respondent presented a Certification from the DepEd, Lipa City Division, indicating that
the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili (petitioners daughter) and Francis
Meynard Sabili (petitioners son) do not appear on the list of graduates of Lipa City. Private
respondent also presented a Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that
the names of these family members of petitioner do not appear in its list of voters.
As the issue at hand is petitioners residence, and not the educational or voting record of his
family, the COMELEC properly did not consider these pieces of evidence in arriving at its
Resolution.
The Dissent nevertheless asserts that because his children do not attend educational institutions
in Lipa and are not registered voters therein, and because petitioner does not maintain a business
therein nor has property
in his name, petitioner is unable to show the existence of real and substantial reason for his stay
in Lipa City.
As to the Dissents first assertion, it must be stressed that the children, like the wife, do not
dictate the family domicile. Even in the context of marriage, the family domicile is jointly
decided by both husband and wife.61 In addition, we note that the transfer to Lipa City occurred
in 2007, when petitioners children were already well into college and could very well have
chosen to study elsewhere than in Lipa City.
Also, it is petitioners domicile which is at issue, and not that of his children. But even assuming
that it was petitioner himself (rather than his children) who attended educational institutions or
who registered as a voter in a place other than Lipa City, we have held that "absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the
place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence."62 In fact, Section 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's
"occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities; work
in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or
national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with
law" is not deemed as loss of residence.
As to the Dissents second assertion, petitioner apparently does not maintain a business in Lipa
City. However, apart from the Pinagtong-ulan property which both Suarez (the previous property
owner) and Palomares swear was purchased with petitioners own funds, the records also
indicate that there are two other lots in Lipa City, particularly in Barangay Lodlod, Lipa City63
which are registered jointly in the name of petitioner and Palomares. In fact, it was private
respondent who presented the Lipa City Assessors Certificate to this effect. Even assuming that
this Court were to disregard the two Lodlod lots, it is well-established that property ownership
(and similarly, business interest) in the locality where one intends to run for local elective post is
not requirement of the Constitution.64
More importantly, we have gone so far as to rule that there is nothing "wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with
reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law."65
d) Affidavits of Lipa City residents
Private respondent also presented the affidavits of Violeta Fernandez66 and Rodrigo Macasaet,67
who were also residents of Pinagtong-ulan. Both stated that petitioner did not reside in
Pinagtong-ulan, as they had "rarely seen" him in the area. Meanwhile, Pablo Lorzano,68 in his
Affidavit, attested that although the Lipa property was sometimes used for gatherings, he did
"not recall having seen" petitioner in their barangay. On the other hand, private respondent69 and
Eladio de Torres,70 both residents of Brgy. Calamias, reasoned that petitioner was not a resident
of Lipa City because he has no work or family there.
The COMELEC did not discuss these Affidavits in its assailed Resolution. It was correct in
doing so, particularly considering that these Affidavits were duly controverted by those
presented by petitioner.
Moreover, even assuming the truth of the allegation in the Affidavits that petitioner was "rarely
seen" in the area, this does not preclude the possibility of his residence therein. In Fernandez v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,71 we held that the averments of certain barangay
health workers that they failed to see a particular candidate whenever they made rounds of the
locality of which he was supposed to be a resident is of no moment. It is possible that the
candidate was out of the house to attend to his own business at the time. The law does not require
a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the
residency requirement.
The ruling on petitioners evidence
We now evaluate how the COMELEC appreciated petitioners evidence:
a) Petitioners Income Tax Returns for 2007 and 2008
The Income Tax Returns of petitioner presented below showed that petitioner had been paying
his Income Tax (2007 and 2008) to the Revenue District Office of Lipa City. In waving aside his
Income Tax Returns, the COMELEC held that these were not indications of residence since
Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code does not only state that it shall be filed in a
persons legal residence, but that it may alternatively be filed in a persons principal place of
business.
In particular, Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code72 provides that the Income
Tax Return shall be filed either in the place where a person resides or where his principal place
of business is located. However, private respondents own evidence a Certification from the
City Permits and Licensing Office of Lipa City showed that there was no business registered in
the City under petitioners name.
Thus, COMELEC failed to appreciate that precisely because an individual income tax return may
only be filed either in the legal residence OR the principal place of business, as prescribed under
the law, the fact that Sabili was filing his Income Tax Returns in Lipa City notwithstanding that
he had no business therein showed that he had actively elected to establish his residence in that
city.
The Dissent claims that since the jurisdiction of RDO Lipa City includes both San Juan and Lipa
City, petitioners filing of his ITR therein can also support an intent to remain in San Juan,
Batangas - petitioners domicile of origin.
However, a simple perusal of the Income Tax Returns and Revenue Official Receipts for 2007
and 2008 shows that petitioner invariably declares his residence to be Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City,
rather than San Juan, Batangas.73 Hence, while petitioner may be submitting his income tax
return in the same RDO, the declaration therein is unmistakable. Petitioner considers Lipa City to
be his domicile.
b) Certification from the Barangay Captain of Pinagtong-ulan
The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan
Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade74 (Honrade) that petitioner had been residing in Brgy
Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this oversight was raised as an issue in petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was
not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, "cannot be relied on." Subsequently, petitioner
presented another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay
Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public.
We disagree with the COMELECs treatment of the Barangay Captains Certification and find
the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrades Certification would not only be
admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration.
Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records.Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose

Cooperative, Inc.,75 we explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries
in official records to be admissible in evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him,
which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to
"keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay."76 Regarding the second requisite, we
have explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections,77 that "it is the business of a
punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay." Anent the third requisite,
the Barangay Captains exercise of powers and duties78 concomitant to his position requires him
to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.
Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrades
Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.
Meanwhile, the Dissent opines that the sworn affidavit of the barangay chair of Pinagtong-ulan
that petitioner is a resident of Lipa City does not help petitioners case because it was not shown
that the term "resident" as used therein carries the same meaning as domicile, that is, not merely
bodily presence but also, animus manendi or intent to return. This Court has ruled otherwise.
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,79 the declaration of Aborlans punong barangay that

petitioner resides in his barangay was taken to have the same meaning as domicile, inasmuch as
the said declaration was made in the face of the Courts recognition that Mitra "might not have
stayed in Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009 because his office and activities as a
Representative were in Manila."
Assuming that the barangay captains certification only pertains to petitioners bodily presence in
Pinagtong-ulan, still, the COMELEC cannot deny the strength of this evidence in establishing
petitioners bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan since 2007.
c) Affidavit of petitioners common law wife
To substantiate his claim of change of domicile, petitioner also presented the affidavit of
Palomares, wherein the latter swore that she and petitioner began residing in Lipa City in 2007,
and that the funds used to purchase the Lipa property were petitioners personal funds. The
COMELEC ruled that the Affidavit was self-serving for having been executed by petitioners
common-law wife. Also, despite the presentation by petitioner of other Affidavits stating that he
and Palomares had lived in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, the latters Affidavit was rejected
by the COMELEC for having no independent collaboration.
Petitioner faults the COMELECs stand, which it claims to be inconsistent. He argues that since
the property regime between him and Palomares is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
(based on the parties actual contribution) as the COMELEC stressed, then Palomaress Affidavit
expressly stating that petitioners money alone had been used to purchase the Lipa property
(notwithstanding that it was registered in her name) was not self-serving, but was in fact, a
declaration against interest.
Petitioners argument that Palomaress affidavit was a "declaration against interest" is, strictly
speaking, inaccurate and irrelevant. A declaration against interest, under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, refers to a "declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify against the
interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far
contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made
the declaration unless he believed it to be true."80 A declaration against interest is an exception to
the hearsay rule.81 As such, it pertains only to the admissibility of, not the weight accorded to,
testimonial evidence.82
Nevertheless, we see the logic in petitioners claim that the COMELEC had committed grave
abuse of discretion in being inconsistent in its stand regarding Palomares, particularly regarding
her assertion that the Lipa property had been purchased solely with petitioners money. If the
COMELEC accepts the registration of the Lipa property in her name to be accurate, her affidavit
disavowing ownership thereof in favor of petitioner was far from self-serving as it ran counter to
her (and her childrens) property interest.
The Dissent states that it was not unreasonable for the COMELEC to believe that Palomares may
have committed misrepresentations in her affidavit considering that she had perjured herself as
an informant on the birth certificates of her children with respect to the supposed date and place
of her marriage to petitioner. However, this was not the reason propounded by the COMELEC
when it rejected Palomares affidavit.
Moreover, it is notable that Palomares assertion in her affidavit that she and petitioner have been
living in the Pinagtong-ulan property since April 2007 is corroborated by other evidence,
including the affidavits of Pinagtong-ulan barangay officials and neighbors.
d) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, certificate from parish and designation
from socio-civic organization
The Affidavit issued by Leonila Suarez83 (erstwhile owner of the Lipa house and lot) states that
in April 2007, after she received the down payment for the Lipa property and signed an
agreement that petitioner would settle her bank obligations in connection with the said
transaction, he and Palomares actually started residing at Pinagtong-ulan. The COMELEC
brushed this Affidavit aside as one that "merely narrates the circumstances surrounding the sale
of the property and mentions in passing that Sabili and Palomares lived in Pinagtong-ulan since
April 2007 up to the present."84
We disagree with the COMELECs appreciation of the Suarez Affidavit. Since she was its
owner, transactions for the purchase of the Lipa property was within her personal knowledge.
Ordinarily, this includes the arrangement regarding who shall pay for the property and when, if
ever, it shall be occupied by the buyers. We thus consider that her statements impact positively
on petitioners claim of residence.
The Dissent on the other hand argues that the claim that petitioner started living in the Lipa
house and lot in April 2007 is made dubious by the fact that (1) there might not be enough time
to effect an actual and physical change in residence a month before the May 2007 elections when
petitioner ran for representative of the 4th District of Batangas; and (2) the Deed of Absolute
Sale was notarized, and the subsequent transfer of ownership in the tax declaration was made,
only in August 2008.
Before further discussing this, it is pertinent to point out that these were not the reasons adduced
by the COMELEC in the assailed Resolutions. Assuming that the above reasons were the
unuttered considerations of the COMELEC in coming up with its conclusions, such reasoning
still exhibits grave abuse of discretion.
As to the Dissents first argument, it must be remembered that a transfer of domicile/residence

need not be completed in one single instance. Thus, in Mitra v. Commission on Elections,85
where the evidence showed that in 2008, petitioner Mitra had leased a small room at Maligaya
Feedmills located in Aborlan and, in 2009 purchased in the same locality a lot where he began
constructing his house, we recognized that petitioner "transferred by incremental process to
Aborlan beginning 2008 and concluded his transfer in early 2009" and thus, he transferred his
residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law. We cannot
treat the transfer to the Pinagtong-ulan house any less than we did Mitras transfer to the
Maligaya Feedmills room.1wphi1
Moreover, the Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including former and
incumbent barangay officials, attests that petitioner had begun living in the Pinagtong-ulan house
and lot before the May 2007 elections such that it was where his coordinators for the May 2007
elections went to meet him.86 Jacinto Cornejo Sr., the contractor who renovated the Pinagtong-
ulan house when it was bought by petitioner, also swore that petitioner and his family began
living therein even while it was being renovated.87 Another Affidavit petitioner adduced was that
of Rosalinda Macasaet, a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan,88 who stated that she also sold a lot
she owned in favor of petitioner and Palomares. The latter bought her lot since it was adjacent to
the Lipa house and lot they had earlier acquired. Macasaet also swore that the couple had
actually resided in the house located in Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007, and that she knew this
because her own house was very near the couples own. Macasaets Affidavit is a positive
assertion of petitioners actual physical presence in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.
While private respondent had adduced affidavits of two Pinagtong-ulan residents (that of Violeta
Fernandez89 and Rodrigo Macasaet)90 attesting that petitioner could not be a resident of
Pinagtong-ulan as he was "rarely seen" in the area, these affidavits were controverted by the
Joint affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents who plainly accused the two of lying.
Meanwhile, the affidavits of private respondent91 and Eladio de Torres92 stating that petitioner is
not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work or family there is hardly worthy of credence
since both are residents of Barangay Calamias, which is, and private respondent does not contest
this, about 15 kilometers from Pinagtong-ulan.
As to the Dissents second argument, the fact that the notarization of the deed of absolute sale of
the property was made months after April 2007 does not negate petitioners claim that he started
residing therein in April 2007. It is clear from the Affidavit of the propertys seller, Leonila
Suarez, that it was not yet fully paid in April 2007, so it was understandable that a deed of
absolute sale was not executed at the time. Thus:
That initially, the contract to sell was entered into by and between Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa
Sabili and Bernadette Palomares and myself, but eventually the spouses changed their mind, and
after the couple settled all my loan obligations to the bank, they requested me to put the name of
Ms. Bernadette P. Palomares instead of Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and Bernadette
Palomares in the absolute deed of sale;
That it was Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili who came to my former residence at Barangay Pinagtong-
ulan sometime in the month of April 2007. At that time, Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili was still
running for Representative (Congressman) in the 4th District of Batangas;
That after payment of the down payment and signing of an agreement that Mr. Meynardo Asa
Sabili will be the one to settle my bank obligations, Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo A. Sabili and
Bernadette Palomares had an actual transfer of their residence at Barangay Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa
City;
That they started living and residing in Pinagtong-ulan in the month of April, 2007 up to this
point in time; xxx93
As to the rest of the documents presented by petitioner, the COMELEC held that the
Memorandum issued by the Guardians Brotherhood Inc. San Jose/Lipa City Chapter merely
declares the designation of petitioner in the organization, without any showing that residence in
the locality was a requirement for that designation. Meanwhile, the Certificate of Appreciation
was nothing more than an acknowledgment of petitioners material and financial support, and not
an indication of residence.
We agree that considered separately, the Guardians Brotherhood Memorandum and the
Pinagtong-ulan Parish Certificate of Appreciation do not establish petitioners residence in
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. Nevertheless, coupled with the fact that petitioner had twice been
elected as Provincial Board Member representing the Fourth District of Batangas, which
encompasses Lipa City, petitioners involvement in the religious life of the community, as
attested to by the certificate of appreciation issued to him by the Pinagtong-ulan parish for his
"material and financial support" as President of the Barangay Fiesta Committee in 2009, as well
as his assumption of a leadership role in the socio-civic sphere of the locality as a member of the
advisory body of the Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa City Chapter of the Guardians Brotherhood
Inc. , manifests a significant level of knowledge of and sensitivity to the needs of the said
community. Such, after all, is the rationale for the residency requirement in our elections laws, to
wit:
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding
elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs,
difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their
constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers qualifications
and fitness for the job they aspire for xxx. 94
Considering all of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that while separately, each evidence
presented by petitioner might fail to convincingly show the fact of his residence at Pinagtong-
ulan since 2007, collectively, these pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently establish the said fact.
Petitioners actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by the presence of a
place (Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various
persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its barangay captain. Petitioners substantial
and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also sufficiently shown not
only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration,
but also his participation in the communitys socio-civic and religious life, as well as his
declaration in his ITR that he is a resident thereof.
We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to adduce substantial evidence to demonstrate
compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law.
In view of this Courts finding that petitioner has not misrepresented his residence at Pinagtong-
ulan and the duration thereof, there is no need to further discuss whether there was material and
deliberate misrepresentation of the residency qualification in his COC.1wphi1
As a final note, we do not lose sight of the fact that Lipa City voters manifested their own
judgment regarding the qualifications of petitioner when they voted for him, notwithstanding that
the issue of his residency qualification had been raised prior to the elections. Petitioner has
garnered the highest number of votes (55,268 votes as opposed to the 48,825 votes in favor of his
opponent, Oscar Gozos)95 legally cast for the position of Mayor of Lipa City and has
consequently been proclaimed duly elected municipal Mayor of Lipa City during the last May
2010 elections96
In this regard, we reiterate our ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections97 that "(t)o
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people,
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."
Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,98 we concluded that "when the evidence of the
alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or
inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by
upholding the victor's right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the
purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters."
In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner sufficiently established his compliance
with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law. We also
recognize that "(a)bove and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should
be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is
the democracy we continue to hold sacred."99
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed COMELEC

Resolutions dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 in Florencio Librea v. Meynardo A.
Sabili [SPA No. 09-047(DC)] are ANNULLED. Private respondents Petition to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Meynardo A. Sabili is DENIED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued
by this Court on 7 September 2010 is MADE PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

(no part)
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 79.
2
The 4th district of Batangas is composed of the municipalities of Ibaan, Padre Garcia,
Rosario, San Jose, San Juan and Taysan, and the City of Lipa.
http://www.batangas.gov.ph/index.php?p=15 (last accessed on 30 January 2012).
3
Rollo, p. 70-76.
4
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city of
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. (Emphasis
supplied.)
5
Section 39. Qualifications. -
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered

voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Underscoring supplied.)
6
Id. at 137.
7
Id. at 138, 152-155.
8
Id. at 139.
9
Id. at 140-141.
10
Id. at 142-143.
11
Id. at 144.
12
Id. at 145-146.
13
Id. at 147.
14
Id. at 148.
15
Id. at 149.
16
Id. at 150.
17
Id. at 156.
18
Id. at 157-158.
19
Id. at 159.
20
Id. at 160.
21
Id. at 161.
22
Id. at 162.
23
Id. at 163.
24
Id. at 164.
25
Id. at 102.
26
Id. at 103.
27
Id. at 104.
28
Id. at 105.
29
Id. at 106.
30
Id. at 107.
31
Id. at 108.
32
Id. at 109.
33
Id. at 110.
34
Id. at 111.
35
Id. at 112.
36
Id. at 113.
37
Id. at 114.
38
Id. at 187.
39
Id. at 190.
40
Id. at 211-212.
41
Id. at 48-62.
42
Id. at 296-299.
43
Id. at 63-69.
44
Id. at 294.
45
Id. at 295.
46
Id. at 300.
47
Id. at 314-315.
48
Id. at 739.
49
271 Phil. 844 (1991).
50
224 Phil. 326, 359 (1985).
51
128 Phil 165 (1967).
52
Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G..R. No. 191938, 19 October 2010, 633 SCRA
580.
53
Domino v. Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798 (1999).
54
Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 347 Phil. 510 (1997).
55
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall
likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
56
Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 187478, 21
December 2009, 608 SCRA 733.
57
Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106 (1999). The other pieces of evidence
considered by the COMELEC in the Perez case were the candidates marriage certificate,
the birth certificate of his daughter, and various letters bearing the address, all showing
that he was a resident of the province for at least one (1) year before the elections.
58
G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
59
As further proof of his change in residence, Mitra had adduced affidavits from the
seller of the lot he purchased, the owner of Maligaya Feedmill, the barangay captain and
sangguniang barangay members of Isaub, Aborlan, as well as an Aborlan councilor. He
also presented photographs of the residential portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he
resides, and of his experimental pineapple plantation and cock farm. He further submitted
the community tax certificate he himself secured, and a House of Representatives
Identification Card, both indicating that he resides in Aborlan.
60
De los Reyes v. Solidum, 61 Phil. 893 (1935).
61
Family Code, Article 69.
62
Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954).
63
Rollo, pp. 148 and 150, Office of the City Assessor of Lipa Certification dated 14
December 2009.
64
Maquerra v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 (1965).
65
Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, citing Aquino
v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil 467 (1995).
66
Supra note 21.
67
Supra note 22.
68
Supra note 23.
69
Rollo, pp. 82-83.
70
Id. at 84-85.
71
G..R. No. 187478, 21December 2009, 608 SCRA 733.
72
SEC. 51. Individual Return. -
(A) Requirements. - ... ...
(B) Where to File. - Except in cases where the Commissioner otherwise permits,
the return shall be filed with an authorized agent bank, Revenue District Officer,
Collection Agent or duly authorized Treasurer of the city or municipality in which
such person has his legal residence or principal place of business in the
Philippines, or if there be no legal residence or place of business in the
Philippines, with the Office of the Commissioner. xxx
73
Rollo, pp. 112-114.
74
Rollo, p. 105.
75
425 Phil. 511 (2002).
76
SEC. 394. Barangay Secretary: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Duties. - (a)
The barangay secretary shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the concurrence
of the majority of all the sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the
barangay secretary shall not be subject to attestation by the Civil Service Commission.
(b) The barangay secretary shall be of legal age, a qualified voter and an actual
resident of the barangay concerned.
(c) No person shall be appointed barangay secretary if he is a sangguniang

barangay member, a government employee, or a relative of the punong barangay
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
(d) The barangay secretary shall:
(1) Keep custody of all records of the sangguniang barangay and the
barangay assembly meetings;
(2) Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the sangguniang
barangay and the barangay assembly;
(3) Prepare a list of members of the barangay assembly, and have the same
posted in conspicuous places within the barangay;
(4) Assist in the preparation of all necessary forms for the conduct of
barangay elections, initiatives, referenda or plebiscites, in coordination
with the Comelec;
(5) Assist the municipal civil registrar in the registration of births, deaths,
and marriages;
(6) Keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay containing
the following items of information: name, address, place and date of birth,
sex, civil status, citizenship, occupation, and such other items of
information as may be prescribed by law or ordinances;
(7) Submit a report on the actual number of barangay residents as often as

may be required by the sangguniang barangay; and
(8) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
77
Supra note 56.
78
SEC. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions. - (a) The punong barangay,
as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall exercise such powers and
perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is
the general welfare of the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code, the punong barangay shall:
(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the
barangay;
(2) Negotiate, enter into, and sign contracts for and in behalf of the
barangay, upon authorization of the sangguniang barangay;
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist
the city or municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in the
performance of their duties and functions;
(4) Call and preside over the sessions of the sangguniang barangay and the
barangay assembly, and vote only to break a tie;
(5) Upon approval by a majority of all the members of the sangguniang

barangay, appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, the barangay
secretary, and other appointive barangay officials;
(6) Organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be
necessary for the maintenance of peace and order or on occasions of
emergency or calamity within the barangay;
(7) In coordination with the barangay development council, prepare the

annual executive and supplemental budgets of the barangay;
(8) Approve vouchers relating to the disbursement of barangay funds;

(9) Enforce laws and regulations relating to pollution control and
protection of the environment;
(10) Administer the operation of the Katarungang Pambarangay in

accordance with the provisions of this Code;
(11) Exercise general supervision over the activities of the sangguniang

kabataan;
(12) Ensure the delivery of basic services as mandated under Section 17 of

this Code;
(13) Conduct an annual palarong barangay which shall feature traditional

sports and disciplines included in national and international games, in
coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports;
(14) Promote the general welfare of the barangay; and
(15) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
79
G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010.
80
Rules of Court, Rule 130C (6), Sec. 38.
81
Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, 16 April 2009, 585 SCRA 421.
82
People v. Catalino, 131 Phil. 194 (1968).
83
Rollo, p. 104.
84
Id. at 66.
85
G.R. No. 191938, 19 October 2010.
86
Rollo, pp. 211-212, Pinagsama-Samang Salaysay executed by 21 Barangay Pingtong-
ulan residents, namely Esmeraldo P. Macasaet (former barangay captain of Pinagtong-
Ulan), Eduardo R. Lorzano (former barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan), Patricia L.
Alvarez (incumbent councilor of Pinagtong-ulan), Pedro Y. Montalba (former councilor
of Pinagtong-ulan), Loida M. Macasaet, Mario P. Lingao, Sancho M. Garcia, Jr., ,
Atilano H. Macasaet, Baby Jean A. Mercado, Ligaya C Mercado, Rosalinda M.
Macasaet, Olga M. Reyes, Jennifer D. Garcia, Sancho C. Garcia, Sr., Marissa G.
Mercado, Wilma C. Mercado, Aireen M. Macasaet, Eden R. Suarez, Noemi R. Ubalde,
Arthur A. del Rosario, and Norberto M. Layog.
87
Rollo, p. 190.
88
Id. at 106.
89
Rollo, p. 161.
90
Rollo, p. 162.
91
Rollo, p. 82-83.
92
Rollo, pp. 84-85.
93
Rollo, p. 188.
94
Torayno v. Commission on Elections, 392 Phil. 343 (2000).
95
http://www.comelec.gov.ph/results/2010_natl_local/res_reg1014000.html (last
accessed on 3 April 2012).
96
Rollo, p. 294.
97
G.R. No. 137329, 9 August 2000, 337 SCRA 574.
98
G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, 576 SCRA 331.
99
Sinaca v. Mula, 373 Phil. 896 (1999).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
DISSENTING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari1 assailing and seeking to set aside the Resolutions2 dated
January 26, 2010 and August 17, 2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA
No. 09-047 (DC), which denied due course to, and canceled, the Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (Sabili) for the position of Mayor of Lipa City in the May 2010
elections on the ground of his misrepresentation that he is a resident of Barangay (Brgy.)
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.
During the 1995 and 1998 elections, petitioner Sabili was elected as a member of the Provincial
Board representing the 4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, he ran for the office
of Congressman of the 4th District of Batangas but lost. During these times, he admitted that he
was a resident of Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas. On December 1, 2009, however, petitioner
Meynardo Sabili filed a COC for Mayor of Lipa City, Batangas for the May 2010 elections. In
his COC, he wrote that he had been a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City for two (2)
years and eight (8) months.
On December 5, 2009, private respondent Florencio Librea (Librea) filed a verified Petition to
Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for
Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualifications with respondent COMELEC, which was
docketed as SPA No. 09-047 (DC). In his petition, private respondent Librea maintained that
petitioner made several material misrepresentations in his COC where he indicated that he was a
resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan for the last two years when in fact he was, and is, a resident of
Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas, and so failed to meet the one-year residence requirement under
Section 39 of the Local Government Code.3
In resolving the controversy, the COMELEC held in its January 26, 2010 Resolution that the
evidence presented by petitioner, as respondent in SPA No. 09-047 (DC), failed to establish an
abandonment of his domicile of origin and the adoption of Lipa City as his domicile of choice or
residence for election law purposes. Hence, petitioner was disqualified to run in the May 2010
elections for the mayoralty position in that city. The COMELEC stated:
In the case before us, it is not denied that Respondents domicile of origin is in San Juan,
Batangas. What Respondent repeatedly asserts is that since 2007, he transferred his domicile to
Lipa City after allegedly acquiring the Bgy. Pinagtong Ulan property and claiming that he
continuously lived there.
In the first place, domicile or origin is not easily lost. If one wishes to successfully effect a
change of domicile, he must demonstrate by evidence an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. These elements must concur, and
absent clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of
origin continues x x x.
xxxx
The above pieces of documentary evidence, all taken together however, fail to convince us that
Respondent Sabili successfully effected a change of domicile. In all, the evidence adduced by
Respondent Sabili plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this
Commission that an abandonment of domicile or origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. The claim of an incidental change of residence, lacking evidence determinative of
abandonment of domicile of origin, without more, would not be sufficient to break the principle,
long followed in cases involving questions of domicile that there was clear intent to abandon and
repudiate his domicile in San Juan, Batangas. To effect abandonment requires the voluntary act
of relinquishing Petitioners former domicile with intent to supplant the former domicile with
one of his own choosing. Since he is a new voter of Lipa City, the records clearly indicating that
officially, his registration came into effect only on October 31, 2009; the said voters document
hardly furnishes sufficient proof of abandonment of domicile of origin and a change of domicile
of choice. Indeed, while we have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a strong presumption
of residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof. Sabili, in fact, has never even voted in Lipa
City x x x.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but
also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode.
In this case, Sabilis claim of a common law relationship with Bernadette Palomares does not
establish his actual physical presence in Bgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. In fact, the documents
pertaining to Palomares actual place of residence are conflicting, since she is listed as a resident
of Paraaque City. The Deed of Sale and registration of the house in Bgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa
City, merely proves Palomares ownership or that she own property in the city. And it is not
impossible that, as indicated in documents presented herein, she is a resident of Paraaque City
owning property in Lipa City.4
On January 28, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELECs January
26, 2010 Resolution, and a Supplemental Motion the following day.
On February 2, 2010, the case was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. In the meantime, the
May 10, 2010 elections were conducted and petitioner emerged as the winning candidate for
Mayor of Lipa City.5 He eventually took his oath and assumed office.6
In a Manifestation dated June 15, 2010, petitioner informed the COMELEC En Banc of these
developments and again prayed for the setting aside of the January 26, 2010 Resolution.
In its August 17, 2010 Resolution, however, the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. Discussing each point petitioner raised in that motion, the COMELEC En
Banc held:
We find that the Second Division fully appreciated the evidence presented by both parties and
correctly found Sabili disqualified for failing to comply with the one (1) year residency
requirement.
Anent Sabilis first ground in his motion for reconsideration, We find it important to state that
Sabili admitted in Paragraph 14 of his Answer that his domicile of origin is in Brgy. Sico, San
Juan, Batangas. This admission on the part of Sabili was construed in conjunction with related
jurisprudence that domicile of origin is not easily lost. In order "[t]o successfully effect a change
of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual change of domicile; 2) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3) acts which
correspond with the purpose." Undoubtedly, Librea must prove his allegations in support of his
petition for disqualification, but since Sabili did not deny that his domicile of origin is different
from the place where he intends to run, he now has to prove that he has abandoned his domicile
of origin in favor of Lipa City. Unfortunately, he failed to prove the same to the satisfaction of
the Second Division.
Sabilis second and third grounds refer to the Second Divisions supposed failure to appreciate
the evidence adduced in this case. We do not find basis for these arguments. The evidence
presented, together with the arguments of the parties, were inextricably interrelated and were
thoroughly discussed and resolved by the Second Division in the assailed 15-page Resolution.
The Second Division was correct in giving little or no weight to the following pieces of evidence
presented by Sabili: a) Affidavit of Bernadette P. Palomares which is self-serving for being
executed by the common-law wife, and has no independent corroboration that they are residing
in Lipa City since 2007 or that the property was purchased with Sabilis personal funds; b)
Affidavit of Lenila G. Suarez, the previous owners of the property in Lipa City supposedly
occupied by Sabili and his family, which merely narrates the circumstances surrounding the sale
of the property and mentions in passing that Sabili and Palomares lived in Pinagtong-ulan since
April 2007 up to the present; c) Certification issued by Hon. Dominador B. Honrade, Barangay
Captain of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, which is unsworn and thus cannot be relied on; d)
Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Parish of Santo Nio, Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City
which is nothing more than an acknowledgment of Sabilis material and financial support and
not an indication of residence; e) Designation as member of the Advisory Body of Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc., San Jose/Lipa City Chapter effective 02 January 2009 which merely declares
the designation of Sabili without any showing that residence in the locality is a requirement for
such designation; f) Voter Certification issued by Atty. Juan B. Aguila, Jr. Election Officer of
COMELEC Lipa City and the Application for Transfer of Registration Record Due to Change of
Residence filed with the COMELEC on 06 June 2009 which are not conclusive proof of change
of domicile; g) Income Tax Returns of respondent for the years 2007 and 2008 and the
corresponding Official Receipts which are not indications of residence since Sec. 51(B) of the
National Internal Revenue Code does not only state that it shall be filed in a persons legal
residence but that it may also be filed in a persons princip[al] place of business, and in most
cases the return is filed where the individual earns his income. The only other evidence for Sabili
on record are the affidavits he submitted which, standing alone, cannot be considered, no matter
how many, as sufficient proof of ones change of domicile. There has to be more.
With regard to Sabilis fourth ground, We find that the Second Division made no pronouncement
adding a property requirement as a qualification of an elective official.
As to the fifth ground, We will sustain the position of the Second Division when it ruled:
In this case, Sabilis claim of a common law relationship with Bernadette Palomares does not
establish his actual physical presence in Bgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City x x x as indicated in
documents presented herein, she is a resident of Paraaque City owning property in Lipa City.
Sabilis sixth and seventh grounds deserve little merit. Nothing in the Assailed Resolution
reveals that Sabilis relationship with Palomares or the property regime governing such
relationship had direct bearing on the Second Divisions determination of Sabilis qualification.
Sabilis relationship was merely discussed in relation to the allegations that Sabili bought a house
using his personal funds but decided to register the property only in the name of Palomares
which is quite peculiar.
Finally, on the eight ground, We hereby declare that Sabilis residence is a matter that will affect
his qualification to run for public office in Lipa City. In view of the evidence presented in this
case, his declaration in his certificate of candidacy that he is a resident of Lipa City, when in fact
he had not yet abandoned his domicile of origin in San Juan, Batangas, may convince the voters
that he has all the qualifications to run for the position of mayor, which tends to mislead the
public from a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible, is precisely what is being referred
to in the case of Ugdoracion.7
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the COMELECs Resolutions for supposedly having
been issued without or in excess of respondent COMELECs jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Among the documents attached to his
petition is a new Certification of Residency issued by the Pinagtong-ulan barangay chairman
Dominador Honrade that had been sworn before a notary public.8
On September 7, 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order requiring the parties to
observe the status quo before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
As pointed out by Justice Sereno in her opinion, the following are the issues for Our Resolution:
(1) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of
Procedure; and
(2) Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili
failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials.
Failure to serve advance notice of the promulgation of the resolution does not affect the validity
of the resolution
On the first issue, petitioner posits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it failed to serve advance notice of the promulgation of the August 17, 2010 Resolution
under Sec. 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification of Cases Filed in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections).9 Hence, so
petitioner claims, his right to due process was violated. Respondents, on the other hand, argue
that Sec. 9 of COMELEC Resolution 8696 had been suspended by COMELEC Order dated May
4, 2010 in view of the exigencies attendant to the holding of the countrys first automated
national elections.
Justice Sereno is of the opinion that petitioner erred in his claim of having been deprived of due
process, adding that the August 17, 2010 Resolution was validly promulgated. On this issue, I
fully agree with my esteemed colleague.
The suspension of Sec. 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and the consequential lack of
advance notice regarding the date of promulgation of the COMELEC En Bancs August 17,
2010 Resolution is in accordance with the COMELECs constitutionally granted power to make
its own rules of procedure. The suspension action, without more, did not violate the petitioners
right to due process or vitiate the validity of the COMELECs resolution. After all, as pointed out
by Justice Sereno, the advance notice of the date of promulgation is not part of the process of
promulgation. More than that, the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution was sufficiently made
known to petitioner who was able to timely file the present petition to assail and question the
same Resolution. Clearly, the suspension of Sec. 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and the
non-service of an advance notice to petitioner are of no consequence to the validity of the
Resolution and the findings of the COMELEC, or to the opportunity granted to petitioner to
assail the Resolution.
A certiorari writ is not available to correct errors in the appreciation of evidence by the lower
tribunal
On the second issue, however, I respectfully disagree with Justice Sereno who maintains that the
COMELEC committed errors in the appreciation and evaluation of evidence so that "the Court is
compelled by it[s] bounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELECs
errors."10
Lest it be forgotten, the present recourse was filed under the aegis of Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Time and again, this Court has emphasized that a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari is a limited remedy to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not of judgment.11 Its only
function is to keep a lower tribunal within its jurisdiction12 and not to authorize the court
exercising certiorari powers to review, reconsider, re-evaluate, and re-calibrate the evidence
previously presented before and considered by the lower tribunal. In First Corporation v. Former
Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,13 We reiterated this elementary precept:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem beyond the ambit of appeal. In
certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence
of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of the evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of the
evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari
will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties,
or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court
to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the
findings of fact of the court a quo.
This rule holds greater force in an application for certiorari against the COMELEC as it is the
institution created by the Constitution precisely to handle election matters and so presumed to be
most competent in matters falling within its domain.14 Hence, the factual findings of the
COMELEC En Banc are binding on this Court15 absent any showing of a grave abuse of its
discretion.
Expectedly, petitioner Sabili attributes grave abuse of discretion to respondent COMELEC to

justify a review and re-evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties. However, not every
claim of an existence of a grave abuse of discretion deserves consideration; otherwise, every
erroneous judgment will be void, appellate courts will be overburdened and the administration of
justice will not survive.16 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
"Grave abuse of discretion" exists only when there is a "capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."17 An unfavorable evaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence presented by a party will not be inquired into unless it is shown that
the evaluation was done in an "arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility."18 This, the petitioner has failed to prove in his petition for certiorari.
In fact, petitioner has not disputed or even mottled the presumption that the COMELEC has
"regularly performed"19 its duties "in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction."20 Thus, this Court
must not, as it cannot, stray beyond the confines of a certiorari review and go so far as to re-
examine and re-assess the evidence of the parties and weigh anew its probative value.21
Nonetheless, Justice Sereno subscribes to the view that the COMELECs appreciation and
evaluation of evidence are so "grossly unreasonable as to turn into errors of jurisdiction."22 I beg
to disagree. Even if We consider the present case as an exception to the rule on the limitations of
a certiorari review, the evidence presented by petitioner does not persuade an actual change of
his domicile.
Petitioner failed to establish compliance with

all the requisites for a change of domicile
Petitioner admits that before April 2007 he was a resident of, and his domicile of origin was, San
Juan, Batangas. This Court has previously ruled that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous
in election law. A domicile is "the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found, at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain."23 Thus, the question of domicile is mainly one of intention24 and
circumstances.25
In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind: (1) a man must have
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) a residence once established remains until a new one is
acquired; and (3) a man can only have one residence or domicile at a time.26 Clearly, therefore,
there is a presumption in favor of a continuance of an existing domicile.27 When the evidence
presented by the contending parties are in equipoise that it is impossible for the court to
determine with certainty the real intent of the person whose domicile is in question, the
presumption requires the Court to decide against a change of domicile and the retention of a
domicile in question.28 Hence, the burden of proving a change of domicile lies on the person who
claims that a change has occurred.29 In this case, the burden lies on the petitioner.
For the petitioner to overcome the presumption of the continuity of his domicile of origin, he
must show by clear and convincing evidence of (1) an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and (3) definite acts which correspond with the purpose.30 Thus, to establish a new
domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of
that intention. Bodily presence in the new locality is not the only requirement; there must be a
declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode.31 Indeed, the
most important requirements for the establishment of a new domicile is (1) an actual and
physical presence in the new locality; and (2) a clear and declared intent to abandon the old
domicile (animus non revertendi) and remain in the new place of residence (animus manendi).
Intending to establish that petitioner failed to meet the foregoing requisites, respondent Librea
presented the following documentary exhibits:
1. Petitioner Sabilis COC filed on December 1, 2009;32
2. Tax Declaration issued in 2009 covering the property in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa
City and in the name of Bernadette Palomares (Palomares);33
3. Certification of Property Holdings issued on November 24, 2009 covering the

properties in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City in the name of Palomares;34
4. Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the lot bought from
spouses Manolito and Leonila Suarez and covered by TCT No. T-173356;35
5. Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the lot bought from
spouses Rodolfo and Rosalinda Macasaet and covered by TCT No. T-173355;36
6. Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the building on the lot
covered by TCT No. TCT No. T-173356 bought from the spouses Suarez and covered by
TCT No. T-173355;37
covered by TCT No. TCT No. T-173355 bought from the spouses Suarez and covered by
TCT No. T-173355;38
no. 5553 bought from the spouses Suarez;39
9. Certification of No Improvement dated December 14, 2009 over Block 2, Lot 3, Brgy.
Lodlod, Lipa City (TCT No. 164454) in the name of Sabili and Palomares;40
10. Certification of No Improvement dated December 14, 2009 over Block 2, Lot 5 Brgy.
Lodlod, Lipa City (TCT No. T-164455) in the name of Sabili and Palomares;41
11. Affidavit of petitioner Florencio Librea dated December 4, 2009;42
12. Sinumpaang Salysay Eladio de Torres dated December 4, 2009;43
13. Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez dated December 28, 2009;44
14. Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet dated December 28, 2009;45
15. Affidavit executed by Pablo Lorzano;46
16. Voter Certification on petitioner Sabili issued by COMELEC Election Officer Juan
D. Aguila, Jr.;47
17. Voters Registration Record No. 07361248 of petitioner Sabili approved on June 21,
1997;48
18. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner;
19. Sabilis 2007 COC for Member of House of Representative;49
20. Certification of No Marriage for Bernadette Palomares issued by the National

Statistics Office (NSO) on December 22, 2009;
21. National Statistics Office (NSO) Advisory on Marriages stating that as of November
28, 2009, Sabili is married to Daisy Cervas;50
22. NSO Certification issued on December 22, 2009 stating that Palomares does not
appear in the National Indices of Marriages;51
23. Lipa City Permits and Licensing Office Certification that Sabili has no business
therein dated December 11, 2009;52
24. Printout of a Facebook webpage of petitioners daughter, Mey Bernadette Sabili

stating that her hometown is "Portofino, Las Pias, Philippines";53
25. Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division Certification that the names
Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioners
son) do not appear on its list of graduates;54
26. Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City dated December 28,
2009 that Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili do
not appear in its list of voters.55
On the other hand, to support his position that he has abandoned his domicile of origin and
adopted Lipa City, Batangas as his domicile of choice, making him qualified to be elected as the
Citys Mayor, petitioner Sabili presented the following documentary evidence:
1. Affidavit of Bernadatte Palomares;56
2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili;57
3. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili;58
4. Affidavit of Leonila G. Suarez;59
5. Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Chairman Dominador

Honrade dated October 30, 2009;60
6. Notarized Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Chairman

Dominador Honrade dated August 25, 2010;61
7. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Honrade Cornejo, Sr.;62
8. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet;63
9. Certificate of Appreciation issued by the parish of Sto. Nio of Pinagtong-ulan;64
10. Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of Pinagtong-ulan, San

Jose/Lipa City Chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.;65
11. COMELEC Voter Certification on petitioner issued by Election Officer Juan Aguila,
Jr.;66
12. COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with Reactivation dated June 6, 2009;67
13. Petitioners Income Tax Return for 2007;68
14. Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for 2007;69
15. Petitioners Income Tax Return for 2008;70
16. Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for 2008;71
17. Pinagsama-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 16, 2010;72
18. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 16, 2010 executed by Dominador Macuha;73
19. Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for Lipa
City Mayor and Vice-Mayor;74
20. Sabilis Panunumpa sa Katungkulan dated July 30, 2010.75
Petitioner claims that the foregoing documents are sufficient to constitute substantial evidence of
his change of domicile pursuant to this Courts pronouncements in Mitra v. COMELEC.76 A
closer inquiry, however, will reveal a whale of difference between the present case and Mitra.
Consider: While there were circumstances in Mitra that led the majority of this Court to conclude
that petitioner Mitra made "incremental transfer moves" to change his domicile (by, among
others, leasing a dwelling, purchasing a lot for his permanent home, building a house thereon,
and maintaining substantial investments in the new locality in the form of an experimental
pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse, and a cock farm), the petitioner in this case, Sabili, failed
to adduce any evidence that would substantially prove a change of his domicile from San Juan,
Batangas to Lipa City whether by incremental acts or an immediate deed. There lies the
difference.
As shown by the Certification of No Improvement issued by the Lipa City assessor, petitioner
made no efforts to build a house on the lots located in Brgy. Lodlod that are actually registered in
his own name.77 Neither has he maintained any business in the locality despite his avowed
profession as a businessman.78 As implied by Mitra, having substantial investments and
constructing improvements on properties bought in the new locality are indicative of animus
manendi. Hence, the non-existence of such evidence in the present case supports respondents
claim of continuance of his domicile of origin in San Juan, Batangas.
Indeed, petitioner heavily anchors his claimed residency in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City since April
2007 primarily on his allegation that he purchased a house and lot thereat in the same month,
registered the property in the name of his "common-law spouse," Bernadette Palomares
(Palomares), and actually resided therein since April 2007 together with Palomares and their
children.
To say the least, this claim is not only questionable but appalling. Petitioners temerity in
asserting that he had been living with Palomares for 20 years, while he was legally married to
another, and so should be considered to have followed his paramours residence simply goes
against the norms of decency, if not the law against concubinage under Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Thus, We cannot now recognize his residency in Lipa City on the pretext that his "common-law
spouse" lives therein. Commodum ex injuria sua non habere debet. No person ought to derive
any advantage of his own wrong.79
Even in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,80 this Court did not consider Mrs. Marcos to have
followed the residence of former President Marcos, her legal spouse. Why should this Court now
consider Sabili to have adopted a domicile of choice in Lipa just because his "common-law
spouse" has a house registered in her name located in the same city? To consider a man to follow
the residence of the woman who he cannot marry is dangerous precedent.
If this Court is disposed to establish a rule that a man can follow the residence of a woman, that
woman must be the mans lawful wife, not his concubine. This is corollary to the provisions of
the Family Code explicitly imposing on the husband the obligation to establish his domicile with
his wife and live with her:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall
not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
Further, even assuming that it was petitioner who negotiated the purchase and paid for the
property in Pinagtong-ulan (no deed of sale was presented), his act of having it registered in the
name of his "common-law" spouse only indicates a donative intent without the necessary
formalities or the payment of taxes, not the intent to abandon his domicile of origin and maintain
a new domicile of choice.
In fact, Sabilis resounding omission to provide the COMELEC and this Court the deeds of sale
over the properties in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City executed by the spouses Manolito and Leonila
Suarez and the spouses Rodolfo and Rosalinda Macasaet in favor of Palomares, as well as the
certificates of title, puts doubt on Sabilis allegation that there was a transfer of ownership over
the properties to Palomares in April 2007 that would have allowed her and/or the petitioner to
claim the right to reside in the properties. This doubt is aggravated by the fact that the tax
declarations over the properties show that the deeds of sale were drawn up and notarized only in
August 2008.81
Indeed, the claim of an actual and physical transfer on the same month of the negotiation, April
2007, strains credulity considering that it is admitted by Sabili that he ran for a position in the
lower house of Congress in the May 2007 elections (for which he filed a COC indicating his
domicile as San Juan, Batangas). Was there enough time to effect an actual and physical change
a month before the elections? If there was time to relocate, why were the deeds of sale drawn up
and notarized only in August 200882 and the tax declarations transferred in the name of
Palomares only in the same month if they had already relocated in April 2007?
All these inconsistencies easily show that when Sabili stated in his COC that he had lived in
Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007, he had deliberately committed a material
misrepresentation obviously to deceive the voting public.
It is also curious to note that even Sabilis common-law spouse, named as the owner of the
property in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, is registered as a resident of 215 Elizalde Street, BF Homes,
Paraaque City in the tax declarations covering the Pinagtong-ulan property.83 Clearly, the
COMELEC could not be held "grossly unreasonable" for holding that while Palomares might be
a Lipa City property owner, she was a resident of Paraaque City. Official documents issued by
the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City clearly establish such fact. This official records
cannot be defeated by a self-serving affidavit drawn up by petitioners common-law wife that she
resides in Lipa City in order to support petitioners claim that he too is a resident of the city.
Parenthetically, Palomares Affidavit cannot be considered as a declaration against her interest

under the rules on evidence because the primary requisite of Sec. 38, Rule 13084 is that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify, and it is not alleged that Palomares has died or is now
unable to testify.
Instead, Palomares Affidavit should be taken with the metaphorical grain of salt. The numerous
falsities committed by Palomares in various official and governmental documents negate any
faith on her word and betray her propensity to lie to favor her "family" so that it is not grossly
unreasonable to hold that Palomares have committed a misrepresentation in her affidavit in order
to support Sabili. This is readily apparent in the very documents presented by Sabili as his own
evidence. For instance, Palomares had previously perjured herself as the informant in the birth
certificates of her children sired by petitioner.85 Palomares asserted in the birth certificate of her
son that she married petitioner on December 2, 1980 in Bulacan, Bulacan. On the other hand, she
claimed that she and petitioner were married on March 2, 1983 in Manila in the birth certificate
of her daughter when the fact certified by the NSO is that she and petitioner had never been
married.86 These misrepresentations are undeniably important as they determine the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of the children. Hence, the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus clearly
applies and the COMELEC had reason not to find Palomares statements worthy of credit.
So are Sabilis statements. It should not escape this Court that Sabili has adopted the untruthful
statements of Palomares in the birth certificates of their children as his own evidence in the
proceedings before the COMELEC and this Court. He has, therefore, clearly sanctioned the
falsities boldly stated thereon. Worse, the same predilection for the untruth can be observed in
Sabilis Voters Certification that he presented as his own evidence. While it is not denied that he
is married to Daisy Cervas Sabili, he did not dispute the entry made on his status as "single." In
fact, in his Income Tax Returns (ITRs) for 2007 and 2008 he claimed that his spouses name was
"Sabili Bernadette Palomares," when the NSO certified that as of November 2009, Sabili was
still legally married to Daisy Cervas. Clearly, petitioner shows a pattern of false machinations
intended to assume a coveted electoral position. Unfortunately for him, deceit cannot take the
place of compliance with the statutory qualifications for office.
It is also notable that petitioners children by Palomares have not attended any of the educational
institutions in Lipa City,87 nor have Palomares or the children been registered as voters of Lipa
City88 despite the fact that Sabili filed a COC for the Mayoralty position. Instead, Sabilis own
daughter made an extra-judicial declaration that she considers "Portofino, Las Pias" as her
hometown, not Batangas.
In the case of Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,89 this Court considered
the existence of "real and substantial reason" to indicate animus manendi in the purported new
domicile of choice:
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his
domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous domicile. To
begin with, petitioner and his wife have owned and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003.
Their children have attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005. Although ownership of
property should never be considered a requirement for any candidacy, petitioner had sufficiently
confirmed his intention to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa by purchasing residential properties in
that city even prior to the May 2007 election, as evidenced by certificates of title issued in the
name of petitioner and his wife. One of these properties is a residence in Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa
which petitioner acquired even before 2006 but which petitioner had been leasing out. He claims
that he rented out this property because prior to 2006 he had not decided to permanently reside in
Sta. Rosa. This could explain why in early 2006 petitioner had to rent a townhouse in Villa de
Toledo his Bel-Air residence was occupied by a tenant. The relatively short period of the lease
was also adequately explained by petitioner they rented a townhouse while they were in the
process of building their own house in Sta. Rosa. True enough, petitioner and his spouse
subsequently purchased a lot also in Villa de Toledo in April 2007, about a month before
election day, where they have constructed a home for their familys use as a residence. In all,
petitioner had adequately shown that his transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona fide and was
not merely for complying with the residency requirement under election laws.90
Unlike in Fernandez where We sustained petitioners change of domicile and qualification for
his office, Sabili has no "real and substantial reason" to establish his domicile in Lipa City and
abandon his domicile of origin in San Juan, Batangas. With no children or wife actually residing
in Lipa City, or business interests therein, it is not "grossly unreasonable" for the COMELEC to
conclude that petitioner had no "declared and probative intent" to adopt Lipa City as his domicile
of choice in the absence of a real and substantial reason to do so.
Contrary to Justice Serenos Opinion, Sabilis act of filing his ITR in Revenue District Office
No. (RDO) 59 in Lipa City for the years 2007 and 2008 does not indicate a change of domicile
from San Juan to Lipa City, Batangas. RDO 59s jurisdiction includes both San Juan and Lipa
City91 so that the intent to remain cannot immediately be ascribed to Lipa City. On the contrary,
his filing of the ITR in RDO 59 can also be used to support his intent to remain in San Juan,
Batangashis domicile of origin. In fact, petitioner left the space for his residence in his 2007
ITR blank without indicating where he was actually residing. To reiterate, any doubt on
residency or domicile shall be resolved in favor of the domicile of origin.
In the clear absence of the most important element in the establishment of a domicileanimus
manendiit is of no use to discuss the consequence of testimonies as to his bodily presence in
the locality. As stated, all the requisites for a valid change of domicile or residence is necessary
for election law purposes. In the absence of even just one element, the presumption is in favor of
the maintenance and continuity of the domicile of origin. Hence, in this case, petitioner is
presumed to still be a resident of San Juan, Batangas and disqualified from taking the mayoralty
position in Lipa City, Batangas.
The notarized certification of the Baranggay Chairman of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City does
not bar Us from holding this position contrary to Justice Serenos opinion. My esteemed
colleague bases her appreciation of the notarized certification on Section 44, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, which states:
Section 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
As is readily apparent, Section 44, Rule 130 pertains to "entries in official records." Needless to
state, no such "entries" or "records" were referred to in the certification, much less presented
before the COMELEC or this Court. Instead, the certification plainly states in a pro-forma way:
"This is to certify that Meynardo A. Sabili, 53 years old is a resident of Zone 5 of Barangay
Pinagtong-ulan Lipa City since April 2007." Neither does the certification mention any record
kept by the Baranggay Secretary, or even cite any of its entries. Clearly, Section 44, Rule 130
cannot clothe the certification executed by the Baranggay Chairman of Pinagtong-ulan with
finality and conclusiveness. Instead, as it is not the duty of the Baranggay Chairman, but the duty
of the Baranggay Secretary, "to keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the baranggay,"92 the
certification must be dismissed as nothing but containing hearsay statements.
In fact, even if we consider arguendo the Baranggay Chairmans certification stating that Sabili
is a resident of his baranggay, there is no indication that the term "resident" used therein carries
the same meaning as the "resident" used in the provision requiring residence as a qualification
for candidacy, which is equivalent to domicile that requires not just physical presence but, again,
animus manendi. At most, the certification may only attest to the bodily presence of petitioner in
his baranggay, but not the element of Sabilis intent to remain therein which, as indicated by
circumstances, is patently absent.
The certification is also negated given the conflicting testimonies of residents of the Brgy.
Pinagtong-ulan where petitioner claims to be residing.93 Again, the rule is in the presence of
conflicting evidence on the issue of domicile, the Court is behooved to uphold the presumption
of the continuity of the domicile of origin.94
Both the Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Parish of Santo Nio and Sabilis Designation
as a Member of the Advisory Body of Guardians Brotherhood Incorporated cannot be considered
to establish Sabilis domicile in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since, as noted by the COMELEC, the first
merely mentions material and financial support to the fiesta celebration. And there is nothing in
the second document making residency in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan as a requisite for the designation
in the Advisory Board.
Furthermore, it notable that Sabili applied for transfer of his registration record only on June 9,
2009 and the same was approved in October 31, 2009 as proven by Sabilis voter certification.
Technically, therefore, Sabili is a registered voter of Lipa City only in October 2009, seven
months prior to the May 2010 elections.
Indeed, it is not only that "each evidence presented by petitioner fail(s) to convincingly show
that fact of his residence at Pinagtong-ulan since 2007,"95 even collectively considered, these
pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently establish such failure.
As Sabilis acts belie his intent to change his domicile and be a resident of Lipa City, he had
deliberately and falsely misrepresented in his COC that he is resident of Lipa City, knowing fully
well that he is not, in order to qualify as a candidate for the office of the Mayor. Sabilis
statement in the COC cannot be dismissed as a simple mistake that does not warrant its
cancellation since residence being primarily a matter of intent, any falsehood with regards
thereto, as in this case, reveals an intentional and deliberate misrepresentation that cannot be
sanctioned by this Court. Hence, the misrepresentation committed by Sabili regarding his
residence is a clear ground for the cancellation of his COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) and his disqualification from the office he is presently occupying.
Sabilis subsequent election is of no consequence considering that an invalid COC cannot give
rise to a valid candidacy, much less valid votes. More importantly, while the electorates will is
indeed primary, the electorate likewise deserves a person who is unwilling to resort to a
Machiavellian circumvention of the laws and blatant falsehood just to suit his own purposes. He
is not only disqualified from a public office but more importantly does not deserve the publics
trust.
I, therefore, submit that the COMELECs Resolutions be upheld and the instant petition for
certiorari be denied.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
ix. Commercial lists: Meralco vs Quisimbing
3 cases in GR
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127598. January 27, 1999]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF

LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING AND MERALCO EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS
ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) seeks to annul the
orders of the Secretary of labor dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, wherein the
Secretary required MERALCO and its rank and file union- the Meralco Workers Association
(MEWA) to execute a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for the remainder of the parties
1992-1997 CBA cycle, and to incorporate in this new CBA the Secretarys dispositions on the
disputed economic and non-economic issues.
MEWA is the duly recognized labor organization of the rank-and-file employees of MERALCO.
On September 7, 1995, MEWA informed MERALCO of its intention to re-negotiate the terms
and conditions of their existing 1992-1997 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering the
remaining period of two years starting from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.clxxii[1]
MERALCO signified its willingness to re-negotiate through its letter dated October 17,
1995clxxiii[2] and formed a CBA negotiating panel for the purpose. On November 10, 1995,
MEWA submitted its proposalclxxiv[3] to MERALCO, which, in turn, presented a counter-
proposal. Thereafter, collective bargaining negotiations proceeded. However, despite the series
of meetings between the negotiating panels of MERALCO and MEWA, the parties failed to
arrive at terms and conditions acceptable to both of them.
On April 23, 1996, MEWA filed a Notice of Strike with the National Capital Region Branch of
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-152-96, on the grounds of
bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practices. The NCMB then conducted a series of
conciliation meetings but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Faced with the
imminence of a strike, MERALCO on May 2, 1996, filed an Urgent Petitionclxxv[4] with the
Department of Labor and Employment which was docketed as OS-AJ No. 0503[1]96 praying
that the Secretary assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and to enjoin the striking employees
to go back to work.
The Labor Secretary granted the petition through its Orderclxxvi[5] of May 8, 1996, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office now assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute
obtaining between the parties pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. Accordingly, the
parties are here enjoined from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation. To speed up
the resolution of the dispute, the parties are also directed to submit their respective Position
Papers within ten (10) days from receipt.
Undersecretary Jose M. Espanol, Jr. is deputized to conduct conciliation conferences between the
parties to bridge their differences and eventually hammer out a solution that is mutually
acceptable. He shall be assisted by the Legal Service.
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and on August 19, 1996, the
Secretary resolved the labor dispute through an Order,clxxvii[6] containing the following
awards:
ECONOMIC DEMANDS
Wage increase - P2,300.00 for the first year covering the
period from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1996
- P2,200.00 for the second year covering
the period December 1, 1996 to November 30, 1997.
Red Circle Rate (RCR) Allowance- all RCR allowances (promotional increases that go beyond
the maximum range of a job classification salary) shall be integrated into the basic salary of
employees effective December 1, 1995.
Longevity Allowance- the integration of the longevity allowance into the basic wage is denied;
the present policy is maintained.
Longevity Increase- the present longevity bonus is maintained but the bonus shall be
incorporated into the new CBA.
Sick Leave- MEWAs demand for upgrading is denied; the companys present policy is
maintained. However, those who have not used the sick leave benefit during a particular year
shall be entitled to a one-day sick leave incentive.
Sick leave reserve- the present reserve of 25 days shall be reduced to 15 days; the employee has
the option either to convert the excess of 10 days to cash or let it remain as long as he wants. In
case he opts to let it remain, he may later on convert it to cash at his retirement or separation.
Vacation Leave - MEWAs demand for upgrading denied & the companys present policy is
maintained which must be incorporated into the new CBA but scheduled vacation leave may be
rounded off to one full day at a time in case of a benefit involving a fraction of a day.
Union Leave- of MEWAs officers, directors or stewards assigned to perform union duties or
legitimate union activity is increased from 30 to 40 Mondays per month.
Maternity, Paternity and Funeral leaves- the existing policy is to be maintained and must be
incorporated in the new CBA unless a new law granting paternity leave benefit is enacted which
is superior to what the company has already granted.
Birthday Leave - unions demand is granted. If birthday falls on the employees rest day or on a
non-working holiday, the worker shall be entitled to go on leave with pay on the next working
day.
Group Hospitalization & Surgical Insurance Plan (GHSIP) and Health Maintenance Plan (HMP)-
present policy is maintained insofar as the cost sharing is concerned- 70% for the Company and
30% for MEWA.
Health Maintenance Plan (HMP) for dependents - subsidized dependents increased from three to
five dependents.
Longevity Bonus- is increased from P140.00 to P200.00 for every year of service to be received
by the employee after serving the Company for 5 years.
Christmas Bonus and Special Christmas Grant- MEWAs demand of one month salary as
Christmas Bonus and two months salary as Special Christmas Grant is granted and to be
incorporated in the new CBA.
Midyear Bonus- one months pay to be included in the CBA.
Anniversary Bonus - unions demand is denied.
Christmas Gift Certificate - company has the discretion as to whether it will give it to its
employees.
Retirement Benefits:
a. Full retirement-present policy is maintained;
b. one cavan of rice per month is granted to retirees;
c. special retirement leave and allowance-present policy is maintained;
d. HMP coverage for retirees- HMP coverage is granted to retirees who have not
reached the age of 70, with MERALCO subsidizing 100% of the monthly
premium; those over 70 are entitled to not more than 30 days of hospitalization at
the J.F. Cotton Hospital with the company shouldering the entire cost.
e. HMP coverage for retirees dependents is denied
f. Monthly pension of P3,000.00 for each retiree is denied.
g. Death benefit for retirees beneficiaries is denied.
Optional retirement - unions demand is denied; present policy is maintained; employee is eligible
for optional retirement if he has rendered at least 18 years of service.
Dental, Medical and Hospitalization Benefits- grant of all the allowable medical, surgical, dental
and annual physical examination benefits, including free medicine whenever the same is not
available at the JFCH.
Resignation benefits- unions demand is denied.
Night work- union demand is denied but present policy must be incorporated in CBA.
Shortswing- work in another shift within the same day shall be considered as the employees
work for the following day and the employee shall be given additional four (4) hours straight
time and the applicable excess time premium if he works beyond 8 hours in the other shift.
High Voltage allowance- is increased from P45.00 to P55.00 to be given to any employee
authorized by the Safety Division to perform work on or near energized bare lines & bus
including stockman drivers & crane operators and other crew members on ground.
High Pole Allowance- is increased from P30.00 to P40.00 to be given to those authorized to
climb poles up to at least 60 ft. from the ground. Members of the team including stockman
drivers, crane operators and other crew members on the ground, are entitled to this benefit.
Towing Allowance- where stockmen drive tow trailers with long poles and equipment on board,
they shall be entitled to a towing allowance of P20.00 whether they perform the job on regular
shift or on overtime.
Employees Cooperative- a loan of P3 M seed money is granted to the proposed establishment of

a cooperative, payable in twenty (20) years starting one year from the start of operations.
Holdup Allowance- the union demand is denied; the present policy shall be maintained.
Meal and Lodging Allowance- shall be increased effective December 1, 1995 as follows:
Breakfast - from P25.00 to P35.00

Lunch - from P35.00 to P45.00
Dinner - from P35.00 to P45.00
Lodging - from P135.00 to P180.00 a night in all MERALCO franchise areas
Payroll Treatment for Accident while on Duty- an employee shall be paid his salary and
allowance if any is due plus average excess time for the past 12 months from the time of the
accident up to the time of full recovery and placing of the employee back to normal duty or an
allowance of P2,000.00, whichever is higher.
Housing and Equity Assistance Loan- is increased to P60,000.00; those who have already
availed of the privilege shall be allowed to get the difference.
Benefits for Collectors:
a. Company shall reduce proportionately the quota and monthly average product
level (MAPL) in terms of equivalent bill assignment when an employee is on sick
leave and paid vacation leave.
b. When required to work on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, an employee shall

receive P60.00 lunch allowance and applicable transportation allowance as
determined by the Company and shall also receive an additional compensation to
one day fixed portion in addition to lunch and transportation allowance.
c. The collector shall be entitled to an incentive pay of P25.00 for every delinquent
account disconnected.
d. When a collector voluntarily performs other work on regular shift or overtime, he

shall be entitled to remuneration based on his computed hourly compensation and
the reimbursement of actually incurred transportation expenses.
e. Collectors shall be provided with bobcat belt bags every year
f. Collectors cash bond shall be deposited under his capital contribution to

MESALA.
g. Collectors quota and MAPL shall be proportionately reduced during typhoons,

floods, earthquakes and other similar force majeure events when it is impossible
for a collector to perform collection work.
Political Demands:
a. Scope of the collective bargaining unit- the collective bargaining unit shall be
composed of all regular rank-and-file employees hired by the company in all its
offices and operative centers throughout its franchise area and those it may
employ by reason of expansion, reorganization or as a result of operational
exigencies.
b. Union recognition and security -
i. The union shall be recognized by the Company as sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees included in the bargaining unit.
The Company shall agree to meet only with Union officers and its authorized
representatives on all matters involving the Union and all issues arising from the
implementation and interpretation of the new CBA.
ii. The union shall meet with the newly regularized employees for a period not to
exceed four (4) hours, on company time, to acquaint the new regular employees
of the rights, duties and benefits of Union membership.
iii. The right of all rank-and-file employees to join the union shall be recognized in
accordance with the maintenance of membership principle as a form of union
security.
c. Transfer of assignment and job security-
i. No transfer of an employee from one position to another shall be made if

motivated by considerations of sex, race, creed, political and religious belief,
seniority or union activity.
ii. If the transfer is due to the reorganization or decentralization, the distance from
the employees residence shall be considered unless the transfer is accepted by
the employee. If the transfer is extremely necessary, the transfer shall be made
within the offices in the same district.
iii. Personnel hired through agencies or contractors to perform the work done by
covered employees shall not exceed one month. If extension is necessary, the
union shall be informed. But the Company shall not permanently contract out
regular or permanent positions that are necessary in the normal operation of the
Company.
d. Check off Union Dues- where the union increases its dues as approved by the
Board of Directors, the Company shall check off such increase from the salaries
of union members after the union submits check off authorizations signed by
majority of the members. The Company shall honor only those individual
authorizations signed by the majority of the union members and collectively
submitted by the union to the Companys Salary Administration.
e. Payroll Reinstatement- shall be in accordance with Article 223, p. 3 of the Labor

Code.
f. Union Representation in Committees- the union is allowed to participate in policy

formulation and in the decision-making process on matters affecting their rights
and welfare, particularly in the Uniform Committee, the Safety Committee and
other committees that may be formed in the future.
Signing Bonus- P4,000.00 per member of the bargaining unit for the conclusion of the CBA
Existing benefits already granted by the Company but which are not expressly or impliedly
repealed in the new agreement shall remain subsisting and shall be included in the new
agreement to be signed by the parties effective December 1, 1995.
On August 30, 1996, MERALCO filed a motion for reconsiderationclxxviii[7] alleging that the
Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction:
1. in awarding to MEWA a package that would cost at least P1.142 billion, a package that is
grossly excessive and exorbitant, would not be affordable to MERALCO and would imperil
its viability as a public utility affected with national interest.
2. in ordering the grant of a P4,500.00 wage increase, as well as a new and improved fringe
benefits, under the remaining two (2) years of the CBA for the rank-and-file employees.
3. in ordering the incorporation into the CBA of all existing employee benefits, on the one
hand, and those that MERALCO has unilaterally granted to its employees by virtue of
voluntary company policy or practice, on the other hand.
4. in granting certain political demands presented by the union.
5. in ordering the CBA to be effective December 1995 instead of August 19, 1996 when he
resolved the dispute.
MERALCO filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration on September 18, 1995,
alleging that the Secretary of Labor did not properly appreciate the effect of the awarded wages
and benefits on MERALCOs financial viability.
MEWA likewise filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to reconsider its Order on the wage
increase, leaves, decentralized filing of paternity and maternity leaves, bonuses, retirement
benefits, optional retirement, medical, dental and hospitalization benefits, short swing and
payroll treatment. On its political demands, MEWA asked the Secretary to rule its proposal to
institute a Code of Discipline for its members and the unions representation in the administration
of the Pension Fund.
On December 28, 1996, the Secretary issued an Orderclxxix[8] resolving the parties separate
motions, the modifications of the August 19, 1996 Order being highlighted hereunder:
1) Effectivity of Agreement - December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.
Economic Demands
2) Wage Increase:
First year - P2,200.00 per month;

Second year - P2,200.00 per month.
3) Integration of Red Circle Rate (RCR) and Longevity Allowance into Basic Salary -the RCR
allowance shall be integrated into the basic salary of employees as of August 19, 1996 (the date
of the disputed Order).
4) Longevity Bonus - P170 per year of service starting from 10 years of continuous service.
5) Vacation Leave - The status quo shall be maintained as to the number of vacation leave but
employees scheduled vacation may be taken one day at a time in the manner that this has
been provided in the supervisory CBA.
6) Sick Leave Reserve - is reduced to 15 days, with any excess payable at the end of the year.
The employee has the option to avail of this cash conversion or to accumulate his sick leave
credits up to 25 days for conversion to cash at retirement or separation from the service.
7) Birthday Leave - the grant of a day off when an employees birthday falls on a non-
working day is deleted.
8) Retirement Benefits for Retirees - The benefits granted shall be effective on August 19, 1996,
the date of the disputed order up to November 30, 1997, which is the date the CBA expires and
shall apply to those who are members of the bargaining unit at the time the award is made.
One sack of rice per quarter of the year shall be given to those retiring between August 19,
1996 and November 30, 1997.
On HMP Coverage for Retirees- The parties maintain the status quo, that is, with the Company
complying with the present arrangement and the obligations to retirees as is.
9) Medical, Dental and Hospitalization Benefits - The cost of medicine unavailable at the J.F.
Cotton Hospital shall be in accordance with MERALCOs Memorandum dated September 14,
1976.
10) GHSIP and HMP for Dependents - The number of dependents to be subsidized shall be
reduced from 5 to 4 provided that their premiums are proportionately increased.
11) Employees Cooperative - The original award of P3 million pesos as seed money for the
proposed Cooperative is reduced to P1.5 million pesos.
12) Shortswing - the original award is deleted.
13) Payroll Treatment for Accident on Duty - Company ordered to continue its present practice
on payroll treatment for accident on duty without need to pay the excess time the Union
demanded.
Political Demands:
14) Scope of the collective bargaining unit - The bargaining unit shall be composed of all rank
and file employees hired by the Company in accordance with the original Order.
15) Union recognition and security - The incorporation of a closed shop form of union
security in the CBA; the Company is prohibited from entertaining individuals or groups of
individuals only on matters that are exclusively within the domain of the union; the Company
shall furnish the union with a complete list of newly regularized employees within a week from
regularization so that the Union can meet these employees on the Unions and the employees own
time.
16) Transfer of assignment and job security - Transfer is a prerogative of the Company but the
transfer must be for a valid business reason, made in good faith and must be reasonably
exercised. The CBA shall provide that No transfer of an employee from one position to another,
without the employees written consent, shall be made if motivated by considerations of sex, race,
creed, political and religious belief, age or union activity.
17) Contracting Out - The Company has the prerogative to contract out services provided that
this move is based on valid business reasons in accordance with law, is made in good faith, is
reasonably exercised and, provided further that if the contracting out involves more than six
months, the Union must be consulted before its implementation.
18) Check off of union dues
In any increase of union dues or contributions for mandatory activities, the union must submit to
the Company a copy of its board resolution increasing the union dues or authorizing such
contributions;
If a board resolution is submitted, the Company shall deduct union dues from all union members
after a majority of the union members have submitted their individual written authorizations.
Only those check-off authorizations submitted by the union shall be honored by the Company.
With respect to special assessments, attorneys fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary
fees, individual authorizations shall be necessary before the company may so deduct the same.
19) Union Representation in Committees - The union is granted representation in the Safety
Committee, the Uniform Committee and other committees of a similar nature and purpose
involving personnel welfare, rights and benefits as well as duties.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed this petition contending that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused
his discretion:
1). . . in awarding wage increases of P2,200.00 for 1996 and P2,200.00 for 1997;
2) . . . in awarding the following economic benefits:
a. Two months Christmas bonus;

b. Rice Subsidy and retirement benefits for retirees;
c. Loan for the employees cooperative;
d. Social benefits such as GHSIP and HMP for dependents, employees
cooperative and housing equity assistance loan;
e. Signing bonus;
f. Integration of the Red Circle Rate Allowance
g. Sick leave reserve of 15 days
h. The 40-day union leave;
i. High pole/high voltage and towing allowance;
and
j. Benefits for collectors
3) . . . in expanding the scope of the bargaining unit to all regular rank and file employees hired
by the company in all its offices and operating centers and those it may employ by reason of
expansion, reorganization or as a result of operational exigencies;
4) . . . in ordering for a closed shop when his original order for a maintenance of membership
arrangement was not questioned by the parties;
5) . . . in ordering that Meralco should consult the union before any contracting out for more than
six months;
6) . . . in decreeing that the union be allowed to have representation in policy and decision
making into matters affecting personnel welfare, rights and benefits as well as duties;
7) . . . in ruling for the inclusion of all terms and conditions of employment in the collective
bargaining agreement;
8) . . . in exercising discretion in determining the retroactivity of the CBA;
Both MEWA and the Solicitor General; on behalf of the Secretary of Labor, filed their comments
to the petition. While the case was also set for oral argument on Feb 10, 1997, this hearing was
cancelled due to MERALCO not having received the comment of the opposing parties. The
parties were instead required to submit written memoranda, which they did. Subsequently, both
petitioner and private respondent MEWA also filed replies to the opposing parties Memoranda,
all of which We took into account in the resolution of this case.
The union disputes the allegation of MERALCO that the Secretary abused his discretion in
issuing the assailed orders arguing that he acted within the scope of the powers granted him by
law and by the Constitution. The union contends that any judicial review is limited to an
examination of the Secretarys decision-making/discretion - exercising process to determine if
this process was attended by some capricious or whimsical act that constitutes grave abuse; in
the absence of such abuse, his findings - considering that he has both jurisdiction and expertise to
make them - are valid.
The unions position is anchored on two premises:
First, no reviewable abuse of discretion could have attended the Secretarys arbitral award
because the Secretary complied with constitutional norms in rendering the dispute award. The
union posits that the yardstick for comparison and for the determination of the validity of the
Secretarys actions should be the specific standards laid down by the Constitution itself. To the
union, these standards include the State policy on the promotion of workers welfare,clxxx[9] the
principle of distributive justice,clxxxi[10] the right of the State to regulate the use of
property,clxxxii[11] the obligation of the State to protect workers, both organized and
unorganized, and insure their enjoyment of humane conditions of work and a living wage, and
the right of labor to a just share in the fruits of production.clxxxiii[12]
Second, no reversible abuse of discretion attended the Secretarys decision because the Secretary
took all the relevant evidence into account, judiciously weighed them, and rendered a decision
based on the facts and law. Also, the arbitral award should not be reversed given the Secretarys
expertise in his field and the general rule that findings of fact based on such expertise is
generally binding on this Court.
To put matters in proper perspective, we go back to basic principles. The Secretary of Labors
statutory power under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and, to render an award on compulsory
arbitration, does not exempt the exercise of this power from the judicial review that Sec. 1, Art. 8
of the Constitution mandates. This constitutional provision states:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
Under this constitutional mandate, every legal power of the Secretary of Labor under the Labor
Code, or, for that matter, any act of the Executive, that is attended by grave abuse of discretion is
subject to review by this Court in an appropriate proceeding. To be sure, the existence of an
executive power alone - whether granted by statute or by the Constitution - cannot exempt the
executive action from judicial oversight, interference or reversal when grave abuse of discretion
is, or is alleged to be, present. This is particularly true when constitutional norms are cited as the
applicable yardsticks since this Court is the final interpreter of the meaning and intent of the
Constitution.clxxxiv[13]
The extent of judicial review over the Secretary of Labors arbitral award is not limited to a
determination of grave abuse in the manner of the secretarys exercise of his statutory powers.
This Court is entitled to, and must - in the exercise of its judicial power - review the substance of
the Secretarys award when grave abuse of discretion is alleged to exist in the award, i.e., in the
appreciation of and the conclusions the Secretary drew from the evidence presented.
The natural and ever present limitation on the Secretarys acts is, of course, the Constitution. And
we recognize that indeed the constitutional provisions the union cited are State policies on labor
and social justice that can serve as standards in assessing the validity of a Secretary of Labors
actions. However, we note that these provisions do not provide clear, precise and objective
standards of conduct that lend themselves to easy application. We likewise recognize that the
Constitution is not a lopsided document that only recognizes the interests of the working man; it
too protects the interests of the property owner and employer as well.clxxxv[14]
For these reasons - and more importantly because a ruling on the breadth and scope of the
suggested constitutional yardsticks is not absolutely necessary in the disposition of this case - we
shall not use these yardsticks in accordance with the time-honored practice of avoiding
constitutional interpretations when a decision can be reached using non-constitutional standards.
We have repeatedly held that one of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into
constitutional questions is that the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary in
deciding the case.clxxxvi[15]
In this case we believe that the more appropriate and available standard - and one does not
require a constitutional interpretation - is simply the standard of reasonableness. In laymans
terms, reasonableness implies the absence of arbitrariness;clxxxvii[16] in legal parlance, this
translates into the exercise of proper discretion and to the observance of due process. Thus, the
question we have to answer in deciding this case is whether the Secretarys actions have been
reasonable in light of the parties positions and the evidence they presented.
MEWAs second premise - i.e., that the Secretary duly considered the evidence presented - is the
main issue that we shall discuss at length below. Additionally, MEWA implied that we should
take great care before reading an abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary because of his
expertise on labor issues and because his findings of fact deserve the highest respect from this
Court.
This Court has recognized the Secretary of Labors distinct expertise in the study and settlement
of labor disputes falling under his power of compulsory arbitration.clxxxviii[17] It is also well-
settled that factual findings of labor administrative officials, if supported by substantial evidence,
are entitled not only to great respect but even to finality.clxxxix[18] We, therefore, have no
difficulty in accepting the unions caveat on how to handle a Secretary of Labors arbitral award.
But at the same time, we also recognize the possibility that abuse of discretion may attend the
exercise of the Secretarys arbitral functions; his findings in an arbitration case are usually based
on position papers and their supporting documents (as they are in the present case), and not on
the thorough examination of the parties contending claims that may be present in a court trial and
in the face-to-face adversarial process that better insures the proper presentation and appreciation
of evidence.cxc[19] There may also be grave abuse of discretion where the board, tribunal or
officer exercising judicial function fails to consider evidence adduced by the parties.cxci[20]
Given the parties positions on the justiciability of the issues before us, the question we have to
answer is one that goes into the substance of the Secretarys disputed orders: Did the Secretary
properly consider and appreciate the evidence presented before him?
We find, based on our consideration of the parties positions and the evidence on record, that the
Secretary of Labor disregarded and misappreciated evidence, particularly with respect to the
wage award. The Secretary of Labor apparently also acted arbitrarily and even whimsically in
considering a number of legal points; even the Solicitor General himself considered that the
Secretary gravely abused his discretion on at least three major points: (a) on the signing bonus
issue; (b) on the inclusion of confidential employees in the rank and file bargaining unit, and (c)
in mandating a union security closed-shop regime in the bargaining unit.
We begin with a discussion on the wages issue. The focal point in the consideration of the wage
award is the projected net income for 1996 which became the basis for the 1996 wage award,
which in turn - by extrapolation - became the basis for the (2nd Year) 1997 award. MERALCO
projected that the net operating income for 1996 was 14.7% above the 1999 level or a total net
operating income of 4.171 Billion, while the union placed the 1996 net operating income at
5.795 Billion.
MERALCO based its projection on the increase of the income for the first 6 months of 1996 over
the same period in 1995. The union, on the other hand, projected that the 1996 income would
increase by 29% to 35% because the consumption of electric power is at its highest during the
last two quarters with the advent of the Yuletide season. The union likewise relied heavily on a
newspaper report citing an estimate by an all Asia capital financial analyst that the net operating
income would amount to 5.795 Billion.cxcii[21]
Based essentially on these considerations, the Secretary made the following computations and
ordered his disputed wage award:
Projected net operating

Income for 1996 5,795,000,000
Principals and interests 1,426,571,703
Dividends at 1995 rate 1,636,949,000
Net amount left with the Company 2,729,479,297
Add: Tax credit equivalent to 35% of labor cost 231,804,940
Companys net operating income 2,961,284,237
For 1997, the projected income is P7,613,612 which can easily absorb the incremental increase
of P2,200 per month or a total of P4,500 during the last year of the CBA period.
xxx xxx xxx
An overriding aim is to estimate the amount that is left with the Company after the awarded
wages and benefits and the companys customary obligations are paid. This amount can be the
source of an item not found in the above computations but which the Company must provide for,
that is - the amount the company can use for expansion.
Considering the expansion plans stated in the Companys Supplement that calls for capital
expenditures of 6 billion, 6.263 billion and 5.802 billion for 1996, 1997 and 1998 respectively,
We conclude that our original award of P2,300 per month for the first year and P2,200 for the
second year will still leave much by way of retained income that can be used for
expansion.cxciii[22] (Underscoring ours.)
We find after considering the records that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion in making
this wage award because he disregarded evidence on record. Where he considered MERALCOs
evidence at all, he apparently misappreciated this evidence in favor of claims that do not have
evidentiary support. To our mind, the MERALCO projection had every reason to be reliable
because it was based on actual and undisputed figures for the first six months of 1996.cxciv[23]
On the other hand, the union projection was based on a speculation of Yuletide consumption that
the union failed to substantiate. In fact, as against the unions unsubstantiated Yuletide
consumption claim, MERALCO adduced evidence in the form of historical consumption data
showing that a lengthy consumption does not tend to rise during the Christmas period.cxcv[24]
Additionally, the All-Asia Capital Report was nothing more than a newspaper report that did not
show any specific breakdown or computations. While the union claimed that its cited figure is
based on MERALCOs 10-year income stream,cxcvi[25] no data or computation of this 10-year
stream appear in the record.
While the Secretary is not expected to accept the company-offered figures wholesale in
determining a wage award, we find it a grave abuse of discretion to completely disregard data
that is based on actual and undisputed record of financial performance in favor of the third-hand
and unfounded claims the Secretary eventually relied upon. At the very least, the Secretary
should have properly justified his disregard of the company figures. The Secretary should have
also reasonably insured that the figure that served as the starting point for his computation had
some substantial basis.
Both parties extensely discussed the factors that the decision maker should consider in making a
wage award. While We do not seek to enumerate in this decision the factors that should affect
wage determination, we must emphasize that a collective bargaining dispute such as this one
requires due consideration and proper balancing of the interests of the parties to the dispute
and of those who might be affected by the dispute. To our mind, the best way in approaching
this task holistically is to consider the available objective facts, including, where applicable,
factors such as the bargaining history of the company, the trends and amounts of arbitrated and
agreed wage awards and the companys previous CBAs, and industry trends in general. As a rule,
affordability or capacity to pay should be taken into account but cannot be the sole yardstick in
determining the wage award, especially in a public utility like MERALCO. In considering a
public utility, the decision maker must always take into account the public interest aspects of the
case; MERALCOs income and the amount of money available for operating expenses - including
labor costs - are subject to State regulation. We must also keep in mind that high operating costs
will certainly and eventually be passed on to the consuming public as MERALCO has bluntly
warned in its pleadings.
We take note of the middle ground approach employed by the Secretary in this case which we do
not necessarily find to be the best method of resolving a wage dispute. Merely finding the
midway point between the demands of the company and the union, and splitting the difference is
a simplistic solution that fails to recognize that the parties may already be at the limits of the
wage levels they can afford. It may lead to the danger too that neither of the parties will engage
in principled bargaining; the company may keep its position artificially low while the union
presents an artificially high position, on the fear that a Solomonic solution cannot be avoided.
Thus, rather than encourage agreement, a middle ground approach instead promotes a play safe
attitude that leads to more deadlocks than to successfully negotiated CBAs.
After considering the various factors the parties cited, we believe that the interests of both labor
and management are best served by a wage increase of P1,900.00 per month for the first year and
another P1,900.00 per month for the second year of the two-year CBA term. Our reason for this
is that these increases sufficiently protects the interest of the worker as they are roughly 15% of
the monthly average salary of P11,600.00.cxcvii[26] They likewise sufficiently consider the
employers costs and its overall wage structure, while at the same time, being within the range
that will not disrupt the wage trends in Philippine industries.
The records shows that MERALCO, throughout its long years of existence, was never remiss in
its obligation towards its employees. In fact, as a manifestation of its strong commitment to the
promotion of the welfare and well-being of its employees, it has consistently improved their
compensation package. For instance, MERALCO has granted salary increasescxcviii[27]
through the collective bargaining agreement the amount of which since 1980 for both rank-and-
file and supervisory employees were as follows:
AMOUNT OF CBA INCREASES DIFFERENCE

CBA RANK-AND- SUPERVISORY AMOUNT PERCENT
COVERAGE FILE
1980 230.00 342.50 112.50 48.91%
1981 210.00 322.50 112.50 53.57
1982 200.00 312.50 112.50 56.25
TOTAL 640.00 977.50 337.50 52.73
1983 320.00 432.50 112.50 35.16
1984 350.00 462.50 112.50 32.14
1985 370.00 482.50 112.50 30.41
TOTAL 1,040.00 1,377.50 337.50 32.45
1986 860.00 972.50 112.50 13.08
1987 640.00 752.50 112.50 17.58
1988 600.00 712.50 112.50 18.75
TOTAL 2,100.00 2,437.50 337.50 16.07
1989 1,100.00 1,212.50 112.50 10.23
1990 1,200.00 1,312.50 112.50 9.38
1991 1,300.00 1,412.50 112.50 8.65
TOTAL 3,600.00 3,937.50 337.50 9.38
1992 1,400.00 1,742.50 342.50 24.46
1993 1,350.00 1,682.50 332.50 24.63
1994 1,150.00 1,442.50 292.50 25.43
TOTAL 3,900.00 4,867.50 967.50 24.81
Based on the above-quoted table, specifically under the column RANK-AND-FILE, it is easily
discernible that the total wage increase of P3,800.00 for 1996 to 1997 which we are granting in
the instant case is significantly higher than the total increases given in 1992 to 1994, or a span of
three (3) years, which is only P3,900.00 a month. Thus, the Secretarys grant of P2,200.00
monthly wage increase in the assailed order is unreasonably high a burden for MERALCO to
shoulder.
We now go to the economic issues.
1. CHRISTMAS BONUS
MERALCO questions the Secretarys award of Christmas bonuses on the ground that what it had
given its employees were special bonuses to mark or celebrate special occasions, such as when
the Asia Money Magazine recognized MERALCO as the best managed company in Asia. These
grants were given on or about Christmas time, and the timing of the grant apparently led the
Secretary to the conclusion that what were given were Christmas bonuses given by way of a
company practice on top of the legally required 13th month pay.
The Secretary in granting the two-month bonus, considered the following factual finding, to wit:
We note that each of the grant mentioned in the commonly adopted table of grants has a special
description. Christmas bonuses were given in 1988 and 1989. However, the amounts of bonuses
given differed. In 1988, it was P1,500. In 1989, it was month salary. The use of Christmas bonus
title stopped after 1989. In 1990, what was given was a cash gift of months salary. The grants
thereafter bore different titles and were for varying amounts. Significantly, the Company
explained the reason for the 1995 bonuses and this explanation was not substantially contradicted
by the Union.
What comes out from all these is that while the Company has consistently given some amount by
way of bonuses since 1988, these awards were not given uniformly as Christmas bonuses or
special Christmas grants although they may have been given at or about Christmas time.
xxx xxx xxx
The Company is not therefore correct in its position that there is not established practice of
giving Christmas bonuses that has ripened to the status of being a term and condition of
employment. Regardless of its nomenclature and purpose, the act of giving this bonus in the
spirit of Christmas has ripened into a Company practice.cxcix[28]
It is MERALCOs position that the Secretary erred when he recognized that there was an
established practice of giving a two-month Christmas bonus based on the fact that bonuses were
given on or about Christmas time. It points out that the established practice attributed to
MERALCO was neither for a considerable period of time nor identical in either amount or
purpose. The purpose and title of the grants were never the same except for the Christmas
bonuses of 1988 and 1989, and were not in the same amounts.
We do not agree.
As a rule, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation;cc[29] it may nevertheless be

granted on equitable considerationcci[30] as when the giving of such bonus has been the
companys long and regular practice.ccii[31] To be considered a regular practice, the giving of
the bonus should have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been
consistent and deliberate.cciii[32] Thus we have ruled in National Sugar Refineries
Corporation vs. NLRC:cciv[33]
The test or rationale of this rule on long practice requires an indubitable showing that the
employer agreed to continue giving the benefits knowing fully well that said employees are not
covered by the law requiring payment thereof.
In the case at bar, the record shows the MERALCO, aside from complying with the regular 13th
month bonus, has further been giving its employees an additional Christmas bonus at the tail-end
of the year since 1988. While the special bonuses differed in amount and bore different titles, it
can not be denied that these were given voluntarily and continuously on or about Christmas time.
The considerable length of time MERALCO has been giving the special grants to its employees
indicates a unilateral and voluntary act on its part, to continue giving said benefits knowing that
such act was not required by law.
Indeed, a company practice favorable to the employees has been established and the payments
made by MERALCO pursuant thereto ripened into benefits enjoyed by the employees.
Consequently, the giving of the special bonus can no longer be withdrawn by the company as
this would amount to a diminution of the employees existing benefits.ccv[34]
We can not, however, affirm the Secretarys award of a two-month special Christmas bonus to the
employees since there was no recognized company practice of giving a two-month special grant.
The two-month special bonus was given only in 1995 in recognition of the employees prompt
and efficient response during the calamities. Instead, a one-month special bonus, We believe, is
sufficient, this being merely a generous act on the part of MERALCO.
2. RICE SUBSIDY and RETIREMENT BENEFITS for RETIREES
It appears that the Secretary of Labor originally ordered the increase of the retirement pay, rice
subsidy and medical benefits of MERALCO retirees. This ruling was reconsidered based on the
position that retirees are no longer employees of the company and therefore are no longer
bargaining members who can benefit from a compulsory arbitration award. The Secretary,
however, ruled that all members of the bargaining unit who retire between August 19, 1996 and
November 30, 1997 (i.e., the term of the disputed CBA under the Secretarys disputed orders) are
entitled to receive an additional rice subsidy.
The question squarely brought in this petition is whether the Secretary can issue an order that
binds the retirement fund. The company alleges that a separate and independent trust fund is the
source of retirement benefits for MERALCO retirees, while the union maintains that MERALCO
controls these funds and may therefore be compelled to improve this benefit in an arbitral award.
The issue requires a finding of fact on the legal personality of the retirement fund. In the absence
of any evidence on record indicating the nature of the retirement funds legal personality, we rule
that the issue should be remanded to the Secretary for reception of evidence as whether or not the
MERALCO retirement fund is a separate and independent trust fund. The existence of a separate
and independent juridical entity which controls an irrevocable retirement trust fund means that
these retirement funds are beyond the scope of collective bargaining: they are administered by an
entity not a party to the collective bargaining and the funds may not be touched without the
trustees conformity.
On the other hand, MERALCO control over these funds means that MERALCO may be
compelled in the compulsory arbitration of a CBA deadlock where it is the employer, to improve
retirement benefits since retirement is a term or condition of employment that is a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
3. EMPLOYEES COOPERATIVE
The Secretarys disputed ruling requires MERALCO to provide the employees covered by the
bargaining unit with a loan of 1.5 Million as seed money for the employees formation of a
cooperative under the Cooperative Law, R.A. 6938. We see nothing in this law - whether
expressed or implied - that requires employers to provide funds, by loan or otherwise, that
employees can use to form a cooperative. The formation of a cooperative is a purely voluntary
act under this law, and no party in any context or relationship is required by law to set up a
cooperative or to provide the funds therefor. In the absence of such legal requirement, the
Secretary has no basis to order the grant of a 1.5 million loan to MERALCO employees for the
formation of a cooperative. Furthermore, we do not see the formation of an employees
cooperative, in the absence of an agreement by the collective bargaining parties that this is a
bargainable term or condition of employment, to be a term or condition of employment that can
be imposed on the parties on compulsory arbitration.
4. GHSIP, HMP BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS and HOUSING EQUITY LOAN
MERALCO contends that it is not bound to bargain on these benefits because these do not relate
to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment hence, the denial of these
demands cannot result in a bargaining impasse.
The GHSIP, HMP benefits for dependents and the housing equity loan have been the subject of
bargaining and arbitral awards in the past. We do not see any reason why MERALCO should not
now bargain on these benefits. Thus, we agree with the Secretarys ruling:
x x x Additionally and more importantly, GHSIP and HMP, aside from being contributory plans,
have been the subject of previous rulings from this Office as bargainable matters. At this point,
we cannot do any less and must recognize that GHSIP and HMP are matters where the union can
demand and negotiate for improvements within the framework of the collective bargaining
system.ccvi[35]
Moreover, MERALCO have long been extending these benefits to the employees and their
dependents that they now become part of the terms and conditions of employment. In fact,
MERALCO even pledged to continue giving these benefits. Hence, these benefits should be
With regard to the increase of the housing equity grant, we find P60,000.00 reasonable
considering the prevailing economic crisis.
5. SIGNING BONUS
On the signing bonus issue, we agree with the positions commonly taken by MERALCO and by
the Office of the Solicitor General that the signing bonus is a grant motivated by the goodwill
generated when a CBA is successfully negotiated and signed between the employer and the
union. In the present case, this goodwill does not exist. In the words of the Solicitor General:
When negotiations for the last two years of the 1992-1997 CBA broke down and the parties
sought the assistance of the NCMB, but which failed to reconcile their differences, and when
petitioner MERALCO bluntly invoked the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor in the resolution
of the labor dispute, whatever goodwill existed between petitioner MERALCO and respondent
union disappeared. xxx.ccvii[36]
In contractual terms, a signing bonus is justified by and is the consideration paid for the goodwill
that existed in the negotiations that culminated in the signing of a CBA. Without the goodwill,
the payment of a signing bonus cannot be justified and any order for such payment, to our mind,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. This is more so where the signing bonus is in the not
insignificant total amount of P16 Million.
6. RED-CIRCLE-RATE ALLOWANCE
An RCR allowance is an amount, not included in the basic salary, that is granted by the company
to an employee who is promoted to a higher position grade but whose actual basic salary at the
time of the promotion already exceeds the maximum salary for the position to which he or she is
promoted. As an allowance, it applies only to specifics individuals whose salary levels are
unique with respect to their new and higher positions. It is for these reasons that MERALCO
prays that it be allowed to maintain the RCR allowance as a separate benefit and not be
integrated in the basic salary.
The integration of the RCR allowance in the basic salary of the employees had consistently been
raised in the past CBAs (1989 and 1992) and in those cases, the Secretary decreed the integration
of the RCR allowance in the basic salary. We do not see any reason why it should not be
included in the present CBA. In fact, in the 1995 CBA between MERALCO and the supervisory
union (FLAMES), the integration of the RCR allowance was recognized. Thus, Sec. 4 of the
CBA provides:
All Red-Circle-Rate Allowance as of December 1, 1995 shall be integrated in the basic salary of
the covered employees who as of such date are receiving such allowance. Thereafter, the
company rules on RCR allowance shall continue to be observed/applied.ccviii[37]
For purposes of uniformity, we affirm the Secretarys order on the integration of the RCR
allowance in the basic salary of the employees.
7. SICK LEAVE RESERVE OF 15 DAYS
MERALCO assails the Secretarys reduction of the sick leave reserve benefit from 25 days to 15
days, contending that the sick leave reserve of 15 days has reached the lowest safe level that
should be maintained to give employees sufficient buffer in the event they fall ill.
We find no compelling reason to deviate from the Secretarys ruling that the sick leave reserve is
reduced to 15 days, with any excess convertible to cash at the end of the year. The employee has
the option to avail of this cash conversion or to accumulate his sick leave credits up to 25 days
for conversion to cash at his retirement or separation from the service. This arrangement is, in
fact, beneficial to MERALCO. The latter admits that the diminution of this reserve does not
seriously affect MERALCO because whatever is in reserve are sick leave credits that are payable
to the employee upon separation from service. In fact, it may be to MERALCOs financial
interest to pay these leave credits now under present salary levels than pay them at future higher
salary levels.ccix[38]
8. 40-DAY UNION LEAVE
MERALCO objects to the demand increase in union leave because the union leave granted to the
union is already substantial. It argues that the union has not demonstrated any real need for
additional union leave.
The thirty (30) days union leave granted by the Secretary, to our mind, constitute sufficient time
within which the union can carry out its union activities such as but not limited to the election of
union officers, selection or election of appropriate bargaining agents, conduct referendum on
union matters and other union-related matters in furtherance of union objectives. Furthermore,
the union already enjoys a special union leave with pay for union authorized representatives to
attend work education seminars, meetings, conventions and conferences where union
representation is required or necessary, and Paid-Time-off for union officers, stewards and
representatives for purpose of handling or processing grievances.
9. HIGH VOLTAGE/HIGH POLE/TOWING ALLOWANCE
MERALCO argues that there is no justification for the increase of these allowances. The
personnel concerned will not receive any additional risk during the life of the current CBA that
would justify the increase demanded by the union. In the absence of such risk, then these
personnel deserve only the same salary increase that all other members of the bargaining unit
will get as a result of the disputed CBA. MERALCO likewise assails the grant of the high
voltage/high pole allowance to members of the team who are not exposed to the high
voltage/high pole risks. The risks that justify the higher salary and the added allowance are
personal to those who are exposed to those risks. They are not granted to a team because some
members of the team are exposed to the given risks.
The increase in the high-voltage allowance (from P45.00 to P55.00), high-pole allowance (from
P30.00 to P40.00), and towing allowance is justified considering the heavy risk the employees
concerned are exposed to. The high-voltage allowance is granted to an employee who is
authorized by the company to actually perform work on or near energized bare lines and bus,
while the high-pole allowance is given to those authorized to climb poles on a height of at least
60 feet from the ground to work thereat. The towing allowance, on the other hand, is granted to
the stockman drivers who tow trailers with long poles and equipment on board. Based on the
nature of the job of these concerned employees, it is imperative to give them these additional
allowances for taking additional risks. These increases are not even commensurate to the danger
the employees concerned are subjected to. Besides, no increase has been given by the company
since 1992.ccx[39]
We do not, however, subscribe to the Secretarys order granting these allowances to the members
of the team who are not exposed to the given risks. The reason is obvious- no risk, no pay. To
award them the said allowances would be manifestly unfair for the company and even to those
who are exposed to the risks, as well as to the other members of the bargaining unit who do not
receive the said allowances.
10. BENEFITS FOR COLLECTORS
MERALCO opposes the Secretarys grant of benefits for collectors on the ground that this is
grossly unreasonable both in scope and on the premise it is founded.
We have considered the arguments of the opposing parties regarding these benefits and find the
Secretarys ruling on the (a) lunch allowance; (b) disconnection fee for delinquent accounts; (c)
voluntary performance of other work at the instance of the Company; (d) bobcat belt bags; and
(e) reduction of quota and MAPL during typhoons and other force majeure events, reasonable
considering the risks taken by the company personnel involved, the nature of the employees
functions and responsibilities and the prevailing standard of living. We do not however subscribe
to the Secretarys award on the following:
(a) Reduction of quota and MAPL when the collector is on sick leave because the previous
CBA has already provided for a reduction of this demand. There is no need to further
reduce this.
(b) Deposit of cash bond at MESALA because this is no longer necessary in view of the fact
that collectors are no longer required to post a bond.
We shall now resolve the non-economic issues.
1. SCOPE OF THE BARGAINING UNIT
The Secretarys ruling on this issue states that:
a. Scope of the collective bargaining unit. The union is demanding that the collective bargaining
unit shall be composed of all regular rank and file employees hired by the company in all its
offices and operating centers through its franchise and those it may employ by reason of
expansion, reorganization or as a result of operational exigencies. The law is that only
managerial employees are excluded from any collective bargaining unit and supervisors are now
allowed to form their own union (Art. 254 of the Labor Code as amended by R.A. 6715). We
grant the union demand.
Both MERALCO and the Office of the Solicitor General dispute this ruling because if disregards
the rule We have established on the exclusion of confidential employee from the rank and file
bargaining unit.
In Pier 8 Arrastre vs. Confesor and General Maritime and Stevedores Union,ccxi[40] we ruled
that:
Put another way, the confidential employee does not share in the same community of interest that
might otherwise make him eligible to join his rank and file co-workers, precisely because of a
conflict in those interests.
Thus, in Metrolab Industries vs. Roldan-Confesor,ccxii[41] We ruled:
..that the Secretarys order should exclude the confidential employees from the regular rank and
file employees qualified to become members of the MEWA bargaining unit.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that employees holding a confidential position are
prohibited from joining the union of the rank and file employees.
2. ISSUE OF UNION SECURITY
The Secretary in his Order of August 19, 1996,ccxiii[42] ruled that:
b. Union recognition and security. The union is proposing that it be recognized by the Company
as sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees included in the
bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining regarding rates of pay, wages, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment. For this reason, the Company shall agree to
meet only with the Union officers and its authorized representatives on all matters involving the
Union as an organization and all issues arising from the implementation and interpretation of the
new CBA. Towards this end, the Company shall not entertain any individual or group of
individuals on matters within the exclusive domain of the Union.
Additionally, the Union is demanding that the right of all rank and file employees to join the
Union shall be recognized by the Company. Accordingly, all rank and file employees shall join
the union.
xxx xxx xxx
These demands are fairly reasonable. We grant the same in accordance with the maintenance of
membership principle as a form of union security."
The Secretary reconsidered this portion of his original order when he said in his December 28,
1996 order that:
x x x. when we decreed that all rank and file employees shall join the Union, we were actually
decreeing the incorporation of a closed shop form of union security in the CBA between the
parties. In Ferrer v. NLRC, 224 SCRA 410, the Supreme Court ruled that a CBA provision for a
closed shop is a valid form of union security and is not a restriction on the right or freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution, citing Lirag v. Blanco, 109 SCRA 87.
MERALCO objected to this ruling on the grounds that: (a) it was never questioned by the
parties; (b) there is no evidence presented that would justify the restriction on employee's union
membership; and (c) the Secretary cannot rule on the union security demand because this is not a
mandatory subject for collective bargaining agreement.
We agree with MERALCOs contention.
An examination of the records of the case shows that the union did not ask for a closed shop
security regime; the Secretary in the first instance expressly stated that a maintenance of
membership clause should govern; neither MERALCO nor MEWA raised the issue of union
security in their respective motions for reconsideration of the Secretarys first disputed order; and
that despite the parties clear acceptance of the Secretarys first ruling, the Secretary motu proprio
reconsidered his maintenance of membership ruling in favor of the more stringent union shop
regime.
Under these circumstances, it is indubitably clear that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion
when he ordered a union shop in his order of December 28, 1996. The distinctions between a
maintenance of membership regime from a closed shop and their consequences in the
relationship between the union and the company are well established and need no further
elaboration.
Consequently, We rule that the maintenance of membership regime should govern at

MERALCO in accordance with the Secretarys order of August 19, 1996 which neither party
disputed.
3. THE CONTRACTING OUT ISSUE
This issue is limited to the validity of the requirement that the union be consulted before the
implementation of any contracting out that would last for 6 months or more. Proceeding from our
ruling in San Miguel Employees Union-PTGWO vs Bersamina,ccxiv[43] (where we recognized
that contracting out of work is a proprietary right of the employer in the exercise of an inherent
management prerogative) the issue we see is whether the Secretarys consultation requirement is
reasonable or unduly restrictive of the companys management prerogative. We note that the
Secretary himself has considered that management should not be hampered in the operations of
its business when he said that:
We feel that the limitations imposed by the union advocates are too specific and may not be
applicable to the situations that the company and the union may face in the future. To our mind,
the greater risk with this type of limitation is that it will tend to curtail rather than allow the
business growth that the company and the union must aspire for. Hence, we are for the general
limitations we have stated above because they will allow a calibrated response to specific future
situations the company and the union may face.ccxv[44]
Additionally, We recognize that contracting out is not unlimited; rather, it is a prerogative that
management enjoys subject to well-defined legal limitations. As we have previously held, the
company can determine in its best business judgment whether it should contract out the
performance of some of its work for as long as the employer is motivated by good faith, and the
contracting out must not have been resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the
result of malicious or arbitrary action.ccxvi[45] The Labor Code and its implementing rules also
contain specific rules governing contracting out (Department of Labor Order No. 10, May 30,
1997, Sections. 1-25).
Given these realities, we recognize that a balance already exist in the parties relationship with
respect to contracting out; MERALCO has its legally defined and protected management
prerogatives while workers are guaranteed their own protection through specific labor provisions
and the recognition of limits to the exercise of management prerogatives. From these premises,
we can only conclude that the Secretarys added requirement only introduces an imbalance in the
parties collective bargaining relationship on a matter that the law already sufficiently regulates.
Hence, we rule that the Secretarys added requirement, being unreasonable, restrictive and
potentially disruptive should be struck down.
4. UNION REPRESENTATION IN COMMITTEES
As regards this issue, We quote with approval the holding of the Secretary in his Order of
December 28, 1996, to wit:
We see no convincing reason to modify our original Order on union representation in

committees. It reiterates what the Article 211 (A)(g) of the Labor Codes provides: To ensure the
participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their rights, duties
and welfare. Denying this opportunity to the Union is to lay the claim that only management has
the monopoly of ideas that may improve management strategies in enhancing the Companys
growth. What every company should remember is that there might be one among the Union
members who may offer productive and viable ideas on expanding the Companys business
horizons. The unions participation in such committees might just be the opportune time for
dormant ideas to come forward. So, the Company must welcome this development (see also PAL
v. NLRC, et. al., G.R. 85985, August 13, 1995). It must be understood, however, that the
committees referred to here are the Safety Committee, the Uniform Committee and other
committees of a similar nature and purpose involving personnel welfare, rights and benefits as
well as duties.
We do not find merit in MERALCOs contention that the above-quoted ruling of the Secretary is
an intrusion into the management prerogatives of MERALCO. It is worthwhile to note that all
the Union demands and what the Secretarys order granted is that the Union be allowed to
participate in policy formulation and decision-making process on matters affecting the Union
members right, duties and welfare as required in Article 211 (A)(g) of the Labor Code. And
this can only be done when the Union is allowed to have representatives in the Safety
Committee, Uniform Committee and other committees of a similar nature. Certainly, such
participation by the Union in the said committees is not in the nature of a co-management control
of the business of MERALCO. What is granted by the Secretary is participation and
representation. Thus, there is no impairment of management prerogatives.
5. INCLUSION OF ALL TERMS AND CONDITIONS IN THE CBA
MERALCO also decries the Secretarys ruling in both the assailed Orders that-
All other benefits being enjoyed by the companys employees but which are not expressly or
impliedly repealed in this new agreement shall remain subsisting and shall likewise be included
in the new collective bargaining agreement to be signed by the parties effective December 1,
1995.ccxvii[46]
claiming that the above-quoted ruling intruded into the employers freedom to contract by
ordering the inclusion in the new CBA all other benefits presently enjoyed by the employees
even if they are not incorporated in the new CBA. This matter of inclusion, MERALCO argues,
was never discussed and agreed upon in the negotiations; nor presented as issues before the
Secretary; nor were part of the previous CBAs between the parties.
We agree with MERALCO.
The Secretary acted in excess of the discretion allowed him by law when he ordered the
inclusion of benefits, terms and conditions that the law and the parties did not intend to be
reflected in their CBA.
To avoid the possible problems that the disputed orders may bring, we are constrained to rule
that only the terms and conditions already existing in the current CBA and was granted by the
Secretary (subject to the modifications decreed in this decision) should be incorporated in the
CBA, and that the Secretarys disputed orders should accordingly be modified.
6. RETROACTIVITY OF THE CBA
Finally, MERALCO also assails the Secretarys order that the effectivity of the new CBA shall
retroact to December 1, 1995, the date of the commencement of the last two years of the
effectivity of the existing CBA. This retroactive date, MERALCO argues, is contrary to the
ruling of this Court in Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Roldan-
Confessorccxviii[47] which mandates that the effective date of the new CBA should be the date
the Secretary of Labor has resolved the labor disputes.
On the other hand, MEWA supports the ruling of the Secretary on the theory that he has plenary
power and discretion to fix the date of effectivity of his arbitral award citing our ruling in St.
Lukes Medical Center, Inc. vs. Torres.ccxix[48] MEWA also contends that if the arbitral award
takes effect on the date of the Secretary Labors ruling on the parties motion for reconsideration
(i.e., on December 28, 1996), an anomaly situation will result when CBA would be more than
the 5-year term mandated by Article 253-A of the Labor Code.
However, neither party took into account the factors necessary for a proper resolution of this
aspect. Pier 8, for instance, does not involve a mid-term negotiation similar to this case, while St.
Lukes does not take the hold over principle into account, i.e., the rule that although a CBA has
expired, it continues to have legal effects as between the parties until a new CBA has been
entered into.ccxx[49]
Article 253-A serves as the guide in determining when the effectivity of the CBA at bar is to take
effect. It provides that the representation aspect of the CBA is to be for a term of 5 years, while
x x x [A]ll other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be re-negotiated not
later than 3 years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement entered into within 6 months from the date of expiry of the term of such
other provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining Agreement shall retroact to the day
immediately following such date. If such agreement is entered into beyond 6 months, the parties
shall agree on the duration of the effectivity thereof. x x x.
Under these terms, it is clear that the 5-year term requirement is specific to the representation
aspect. What the law additionally requires is that a CBA must be re-negotiated within 3 years
after its execution. It is in this re-negotiation that gives rise to the present CBA deadlock.
If no agreement is reached within 6 months from the expiry date of the 3 years that follow the
CBA execution, the law expressly gives the parties - not anybody else - the discretion to fix the
effectivity of the agreement.
Significantly, the law does not specifically cover the situation where 6 months have elapsed but
no agreement has been reached with respect to effectivity. In this eventuality, we hold that any
provision of law should then apply for the law abhors a vacuum.ccxxi[50]
One such provision is the principle of hold over, i.e., that in the absence of a new CBA, the
parties must maintain the status quo and must continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement until a new agreement is reached.ccxxii[51] In this manner,
the law prevents the existence of a gap in the relationship between the collective bargaining
parties. Another legal principle that should apply is that in the absence of an agreement between
the parties, then, an arbitrated CBA takes on the nature of any judicial or quasi-judicial award; it
operates and may be executed only respectively unless there are legal justifications for its
retroactive application.
Consequently, we find no sufficient legal ground on the other justification for the retroactive
application of the disputed CBA, and therefore hold that the CBA should be effective for a term
of 2 years counted from December 28, 1996 (the date of the Secretary of Labors disputed order
on the parties motion for reconsideration) up to December 27, 1999.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor
dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent set forth above. The
parties are directed to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and
conditions contained in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labors order of August 19,
1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth above. The retirement fund issue is
remanded to the Secretary of Labor for reception of evidence and determination of the legal
personality of the MERALCO retirement fund.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Melo, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127598. February 22, 2000]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor

Leonardo Quisumbing and Meralco Employees and Workers Association
(MEWA), respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court disposed of the case as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent

Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996 are set
aside to the extent set forth above. The parties are directed to execute a
Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions
contained in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labors orders of
August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth
above. The retirement fund issue is remanded to the Secretary of Labor
for reception of evidence and determination of the legal personality of the
Meralco retirement fund."374[1]
The modifications of the public respondents resolutions include the following:
January 27, 1999 decision Secretarys resolution
Wages -P1,900.00 for 1995-96 P2,200.00
Xmas bonus -modified to one month 2 months
Retirees -remanded to the Secretary granted
Loan to coops -denied granted
GHSIP, HMP
and Housing loans -granted up to P60,000.00 granted
Signing bonus -denied granted
Union leave -40 days (typo error) 30 days

High voltage/pole -not apply to those who are members of a team
not exposed to the risk
Collectors -no need for cash bond, no
need to reduce quota and MAPL
CBU -exclude confidential employees include
Union security -maintenance of membership closed shop
Contracting out -no need to consult union consult first
All benefits -existing terms and conditions all terms
Retroactivity -Dec 28, 1996-Dec 27, 199(9) from Dec 1, 1995
Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private respondent union
(Union for brevity) filed a motion for intervention and a motion for reconsideration of the
said Decision. A separate intervention was likewise made by the supervisors union
(FLAMES375[2]) of petitioner corporation alleging that it has bona fide legal interest in the
outcome of the case.376[3] The Court required the "proper parties" to file a comment to
the three motions for reconsideration but the Solicitor-General asked that he be
excused from filing the comment because the "petition filed in the instant case was
granted" by the Court.377[4] Consequently, petitioner filed its own consolidated comment.
An "Appeal Seeking Immediate Reconsideration" was also filed by the alleged newly
elected president of the Union.378[5] Other subsequent pleadings were filed by the
parties and intervenors.
The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had already been passed upon by
the Court in the January 27, 1999 decision. No new arguments were presented for
consideration of the Court. Nonetheless, certain matters will be considered herein,
particularly those involving the amount of wages and the retroactivity of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) arbitral awards.
Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the
Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to the
consumers through an increase in the rate of electricity. This is a non sequitur. The
Court cannot be threatened with such a misleading argument. An increase in the prices
of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency
and does not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of petitioners
employees. Besides, this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a
wage increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its
position regarding the wage issue can not be an accurate basis and conclusive
determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence
provides:
"Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of statements of matters of

interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register,
periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove
the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published
for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein."
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be

admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in
our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and
not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no
persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were
presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no
evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in
touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable.
Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible.379[6] In the
same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence
when the source of the reports is available.380[7] With more reason, mere analyses or
projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in
this case can be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for
compliance with certain governmental requirements.
Nonetheless, by petitioners own allegations, its actual total net income for 1996 was
P5.1 billion.381[8] An estimate by the All Asia financial analyst stated that petitioners net
operating income for the same year was about P5.7 billion, a figure which the Union
relies on to support its claim. Assuming without admitting the truth thereof, the figure is
higher than the P4.171 billion allegedly suggested by petitioner as its projected net
operating income. The P5.7 billion which was the Secretarys basis for granting the
P2,200.00 is higher than the actual net income of P5.1 billion admitted by petitioner. It
would be proper then to increase this Courts award of P1,900.00 to P2,000.00 for the
two years of the CBA award. For 1992, the agreed CBA wage increase for rank-and-file
was P1,400.00 and was reduced to P1,350.00, for 1993; further reduced to P1,150.00
for 1994. For supervisory employees, the agreed wage increase for the years 1992-
1994 are P1,742.50, P1,682.50 and P1,442.50, respectively. Based on the foregoing
figures, the P2,000.00 increase for the two-year period awarded to the rank-and-file is
much higher than the highest increase granted to supervisory employees.382[9] As
mentioned in the January 27, 1999 Decision, the Court does "not seek to enumerate in
this decision the factors that should affect wage determination" because collective
bargaining disputes particularly those affecting the national interest and public service
"requires due consideration and proper balancing of the interests of the parties to the
dispute and of those who might be affected by the dispute."383[10] The Court takes
judicial notice that the new amounts granted herein are significantly higher than the
weighted average salary currently enjoyed by other rank-and-file employees within the
community. It should be noted that the relations between labor and capital is impressed
with public interest which must yield to the common good.384[11] Neither party should act
oppressively against the other or impair the interest or convenience of the public. 385[12]
Besides, matters of salary increases are part of management prerogative. 386[13]
On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, it is well to recall that this petition had its
origin in the renegotiation of the parties 1992-1997 CBA insofar as the last two-year
period thereof is concerned. When the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and
granted the arbitral awards, there was no question that these arbitral awards were to be
given retroactive effect. However, the parties dispute the reckoning period when
retroaction shall commence. Petitioner claims that the award should retroact only from
such time that the Secretary of Labor rendered the award, invoking the 1995 decision in
Pier 8 case387[14] where the Court, citing Union of Filipino Employees v. NLRC,388[15]
said:
"The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be signed by the

parties was promulgated on June 5, 1989, the expiry date of the past
CBA. Based on the provision of Section 253-A, its retroactivity should be
agreed upon by the parties. But since no agreement to that effect was
made, public respondent did not abuse its discretion in giving the said
CBA a prospective effect. The action of the public respondent is within the
ambit of its authority vested by existing law."
On the other hand, the Union argues that the award should retroact to such time
granted by the Secretary, citing the 1993 decision of St Lukes.389[16]
"Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must retroact to
the date of the expiration of the previous CBA, contrary to the position of
petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be
properly applied to herein case. As correctly stated by public respondent
in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991 dismissing petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration---
Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity provisions

awarded, we would stress that the provision of law invoked
by the Hospital, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, speaks of
agreements by and between the parties, and not arbitral
awards . . .
"Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting

retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of
Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein
involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and
discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof."
In the 1997 case of Mindanao Terminal,390[17] the Court applied the St. Lukes doctrine
and ruled that:
"In St. Lukes Medical Center v. Torres, a deadlock also developed during
the CBA negotiations between management and the union. The Secretary
of Labor assumed jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of the CBA to
the date of expiration of the previous CBA. As in this case, it was alleged
that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused its discretion in making his
award retroactive. In dismissing this contention this Court held:
"Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law

prohibiting retroactive of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g)
of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public
respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary
powers to determine the effectivity thereof."
The Court in the January 27, 1999 Decision, stated that the CBA shall be "effective for a
period of 2 years counted from December 28, 1996 up to December 27, 1999."
Parenthetically, this actually covers a three-year period. Labor laws are silent as to
when an arbitral award in a labor dispute where the Secretary had assumed jurisdiction
by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code shall retroact. In general, a CBA
negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the day
immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the effectivity depends on the
agreement of the parties.391[18] On the other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity
of a CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the
parties but by intervention of the government. Despite the silence of the law, the Court
rules herein that CBA arbitral awards granted after six months from the expiration of the
last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the employees
or their union. Absent such an agreement as to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to
the first day after the six-month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA
should there be one. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretarys determination of the date
of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.
It is true that an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily

entered into by the parties because it requires the interference and imposing power of
the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction. However, the
arbitral award can be considered as an approximation of a collective bargaining
agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties. 392[19] The
terms or periods set forth in Article 253-A pertains explicitly to a CBA. But there is
nothing that would prevent its application by analogy to an arbitral award by the
Secretary considering the absence of an applicable law. Under Article 253-A: "(I)f any
such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shal! agree on the duration
of retroactivity thereof." In other words, the law contemplates retroactivity whether the
agreement be entered into before or after the said six-month period. The agreement of
the parties need not be categorically stated for their acts may be considered in
determining the duration of retroactivity. In this connection, the Court considers the
letter of petitioners Chairman of the Board and its President addressed to their
stockholders, which states that the CBA "for the rank-and-file employees covering the
period December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997 is still with the Supreme Court," 393[20]
as indicative of petitioners recognition that the CBA award covers the said period.
Earlier, petitioners negotiating panel transmitted to the Union a copy of its proposed
CBA covering the same period inclusive.394[21] In addition, petitioner does not dispute
the allegation that in the past CBA arbitral awards, the Secretary granted retroactivity
commencing from the period immediately following the last day of the expired CBA.
Thus, by petitioners own actions, the Court sees no reason to retroact the subject CBA
awards to a different date. The period is herein set at two (2) years from December 1,
1995 to November 30, 1997.
On the allegation concerning the grant of loan to a cooperative, there is no merit in the
unions claim that it is no different from housing loans granted by the employer. The
award of loans for housing is justified because it pertains to a basic necessity of life. It is
part of a privilege recognized by the employer and allowed by law. In contrast, providing
seed money for the establishment of the employees cooperative is a matter in which the
employer has no business interest or legal obligation. Courts should not be utilized as a
tool to compel any person to grant loans to another nor to force parties to undertake an
obligation without justification. On the contrary, it is the government that has the
obligation to render financial assistance to cooperatives and the Cooperative Code does
not make it an obligation of the employer or any private individual. 395[22]
Anent the 40-day union leave, the Court finds that the same is a typographical error. In
order to avoid any confusion, it is herein declared that the union leave is only thirty (30)
days as granted by the Secretary of Labor and affirmed in the Decision of this Court.
The added requirement of consultation imposed by the Secretary in cases of contracting

out for six (6) months or more has been rejected by the Court. Suffice it to say that the
employer is allowed to contract out services for six months or more. However, a line
must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per
se and those which affect the rights of employees, and in treating the latter, the
employer should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its
decision or modes of action in order to attain a harmonious labor-management
relationship and enlighten the workers concerning their rights.396[23] Hiring of workers is
within the employers inherent freedom to regulate and is a valid exercise of its
management prerogative subject only to special laws and agreements on the matter
and the fair standards of justice.397[24] The management cannot be denied the faculty of
promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its
operation. It has the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by
its personnel or contracted to outside agencies. While there should be mutual
consultation, eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides. 398[25]
Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or management
prerogative.399[26] Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary
manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer.400[27]
As mentioned in the January 27, 1999 Decision, the law already sufficiently regulates
this matter.401[28] Jurisprudence also provides adequate limitations, such that the
employer must be motivated by good faith and the contracting out should not be
resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the result of malicious or arbitrary
actions.402[29] These are matters that may be categorically determined only when an
actual suit on the matter arises.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is partially granted and the assailed
Decision is modified as follows: (1) the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1,
1995 to November 30, 1997; and (2) the award of wage is increased from the original
amount of One Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P1,900.00) to Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) for the years 1995 and 1996. This Resolution is subject to the monetary
advances granted by petitioner to its rank-and-file employees during the pendency of
this case assuming such advances had actually been distributed to them. The assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127598. August 1, 2000]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY

OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING and MERALCO EMPLOYEES
AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondents.
RESOLUTION
On February 22, 2000, this Court promulgated a Resolution with the following
decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED

and the assailed Decision is MODIFIED as follows: (1) the arbitral award
shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997; and (2) the
award of wage is increased from the original amount of One Thousand
Nine Hundred Pesos (P1,900.00) to Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for
the years 1995 and 1996. This Resolution is subject to the monetary
advances granted by petitioner to its rank-and-file employees during the
pendency of this case assuming such advances had actually been
distributed to them. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Manila Electric Company filed with this Court, on March 17, 2000, a
"Motion for Partial Modification (Re: Resolution Dated 22 February 2000)"
anchored on the following grounds:
With due respect, this Honorable Courts ruling on the retroactivity issue: (a) fails
to account for previous rulings of the Court on the same issue; (b) fails to indicate
the reasons for reversing the original ruling in this case on the retroactivity issue;
and (c) is internally inconsistent.
II
With due respect, the Honorable Courts ruling on the retroactivity issue does not
take into account the huge cost that this award imposes on petitioner, estimated
at no less than P800 Million.
In the assailed Resolution, it was held:
Labor laws are silent as to when an arbitral award in a labor dispute where
the Secretary (of Labor and Employment) had assumed jurisdiction by
virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code shall retroact. In general, a CBA
negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA
retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed
thereafter, the effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. On the
other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award
or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by
intervention of the government. Despite the silence of the law, the Court
rules herein that CBA arbitral awards granted after six months from the
expiration of the last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both
employer and the employees or their union. Absent such an agreement as
to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month
period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA should there be
one. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretarys determination of the date of
retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall
control.
Petitioner specifically assails the foregoing portion of the Resolution as being

logically flawed, arguing, first, that while it alludes to the Secretarys discretionary
powers only in the absence of a CBA, Article 253-A of the Labor Code always
presupposes the existence of a prior or subsisting CBA; hence the exercise by
the Secretary of his discretionary powers will never come to pass. Second,
petitioner claims that the Resolution contravenes the jurisprudential rule laid
down in the cases of Union of Filipro Employees v. NLRC,403[1] Pier 8 Arrastre
and Stevedoring Services v. Roldan-Confesor404[2] and St. Luke s Medical Center
v. Torres.405[3] Third, petitioner contends that this Court erred in holding that the
effectivity of CBA provisions are automatically retroactive. Petitioner invokes,
rather, this Courts ruling in the Decision dated January 27, 1999, which was
modified in the assailed Resolution, that in the absence of an agreement
between the parties, an arbitrated CBA takes on the nature of any judicial or
quasi-judicial award; it operates and may be executed only prospectively unless
there are legal justifications for its retroactive application. Fourth, petitioner
assigns as error this Courts interpretation of certain acts of petitioner as consent
to the retroactive application of the arbitral award. Fifth, petitioner contends that
the Resolution is internally flawed because when it held that the award shall
retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the expiration of the
last day of the CBA, the reckoning date should have been June 1, 1996, not
December 1, 1995, which is the last day of the three-year lifetime of the
economic provisions of the CBA.
Anent the second ground, petitioner alleges that the retroactive application of the
arbitral award will cost it no less than P800 Million. Thus, petitioner prays that the
two-year term of the CBA be fixed from December 28, 1996 to December 27,
1998. Petitioner also seeks this Courts declaration that the award of P2,000.00
be paid to petitioners rank-and-file employees during this two-year period. In the
alternative, petitioner prays that the award of P2,000.00 be made to retroact to
June 1, 1996 as the effectivity date of the CBA.
Private respondent MEWA filed its Comment on May 19, 2000, contending that
the Motion for Partial Modification was unauthorized inasmuch as Mr. Manuel M.
Lopez, President of petitioner corporation, has categorically stated in a
memorandum to the rank-and-file employees that management will comply with
this Courts ruling and will not file any motion for reconsideration; and that the
assailed Resolution should be modified to conform to the St. Lukes ruling, to the
effect that, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of
the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, he is deemed vested with plenary and
discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.
This Court has re-examined the assailed portion of the Resolution in this case
vis--vis the rulings cited by petitioner. Invariably, these cases involve Articles
253-A in relation to Article 263 (g)406[4]of the Labor Code. Article 253-A is
hereunder reproduced for ready reference:
ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. --- Any

Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall,
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5)
years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be
conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the
sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year
term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three
(3) years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into within six (6) months
from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in
such Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the day
immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into
beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity
thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the collective
bargaining agreement, the parties may exercise their rights under this
Code.407[5]
The parties respective positions are both well supported by jurisprudence. For its
part, petitioner invokes the ruling in Union of Filipro Employees408[6], wherein this
Court upheld the NLRCs act of giving prospective effect to the CBA, and argues
that the two-year arbitral award in the case at bar should likewise be applied
prospectively, counted from December 28, 1996 to December 27, 1998.
Petitioner maintains that there is nothing in Article 253-A of the Labor Code
which states that arbitral awards or renewals of a collective bargaining
agreement shall always have retroactive effect. The Filipro case was applied
more recently in Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Roldan-
Confesor409[7] thus:
In Union of Filipro Employees v. NLRC, 192 SCRA 414 (1990), this Court
interpreted the above law as follows:
"In light of the foregoing, this Court upholds the

pronouncement of the NLRC holding the CBA to be signed
by the parties effective upon the promulgation of the assailed
resolution. It is clear and explicit from Article 253-A that any
agreement on such other provisions of the CBA shall be
given retroactive effect only when it is entered into within six
(6) months from its expiry date. If the agreement was
entered into outside the six (6) month period, then the
parties shall agree on the duration of the retroactivity thereof.
"The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be

signed by the parties was promulgated June 5, 1989, and
hence, outside the 6 month period from June 30, 1987, the
expiry date of the past CBA. Based on the provision of
Section 253-A, its retroactivity should be agreed upon by the
parties. But since no agreement to that effect was made,
public respondent did not abuse its discretion in giving the
said CBA a prospective effect. The action of the public
respondent is within the ambit of its authority vested by
existing laws."
In the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers,

189 SCRA 179 (1991), this Court reiterated the rule that although a CBA
has expired, it continues to have legal effects as between the parties until
a new CBA has been entered into. It is the duty of both parties to the CBA
to keep the status quo, and to continue in full force and effect the terms
and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day freedom
period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties (National
Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines v. Ferrer-
Calleja, 205 SCRA 478 [1992]). Applied to the case at bench, the legal
effects of the immediate past CBA between petitioner and private
respondent terminated, and the effectivity of the new CBA began, only on
March 4, 1993, when public respondent resolved their dispute.410[8]
On the other hand, respondent MEWA invokes the ruling in St. Lukes Medical
Center, Inc. v. Torres,411[9] which held that the Secretary of Labor has plenary
and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity of arbitral awards.412[10]
Thus, respondent maintains that the arbitral award in this case should be made
effective from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997. The ruling in the St.
Lukes case was restated in the 1998 case of Manila Central Line Corporation v.
Manila Central Line Free Workers Union-National Federation of Labor, et
al.,413[11] where it was held that:
Art. 253-A refers to collective bargaining agreements entered into by the

parties as a result of their mutual agreement. The CBA in this case, on the
other hand, is part of an arbitral award. As such, it may be made
retroactive to the date of expiration of the previous agreement. As held in
St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. v. Torres:
Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must

retroact to the date of the expiration of the previous CBA,
contrary to the position of petitioner. Under the
circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be properly
applied to herein case. As correctly stated by public
respondent in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991 dismissing
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity

provisions awarded, we would stress that the
provision of law invoked by the Hospital, Article 253-A
of the Labor Code, speaks of agreements by and
between the parties, and not arbitral awards . . . (p.
818 Rollo).
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law

prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g)
of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public
respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary
powers to determine the effectivity thereof (223 SCRA 779,
792-793 [1993]; reiterated in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.
Confessor 231 SCRA 41 [1994]).
Indeed, petitioner has not shown that the question of effectivity was not
included in the general agreement of the parties to submit their dispute for
arbitration. To the contrary, as the order of the labor arbiter states, this
question was among those submitted for arbitration by the parties:
As regards the "Effectivity and Duration" clause, the

company proposes that the collective bargaining agreement
shall take effect only upon its signing and shall remain in full
force and effect for a period of five years. The union
proposes that the agreement shall take effect retroactive to
March 15, 1989, the expiration date of the old CBA.
And after an evaluation of the parties respective contention

and argument thereof, it is believed that that of the union is
fair and reasonable. It is the observation of this Arbitrator
that in almost subsequent CBAs, the effectivity of the
renegotiated CBA, usually and most often is made effective
retroactive to the date when the immediately preceding CBA
expires so as to give a semblance of continuity. Hence, for
this particular case, it is believed that there is nothing wrong
adopting the stand of the union, that is that this CBA be
made retroactive effective March 15, 1989.414[12]
Parenthetically, the Decision rendered in the case at bar on January 27,

1999415[13] ordered that the CBA should be effective for a term of two years
counted from December 28, 1996 (the date of the Secretary of Labors disputed
Order on the parties motion for reconsideration) up to December 27, 1998.416[14]
That is to say, the arbitral award was given prospective effect.
Upon a reconsideration of the Decision, this Court issued the assailed Resolution
which ruled that where an arbitral award granted beyond six months after the
expiration of the existing CBA, and there is no agreement between the parties as
to the date of effectivity thereof, the arbitral award shall retroact to the first day
after the six-month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA. In
the dispositive portion, however, the period to which the award shall retroact was
inadvertently stated as beginning on December 1, 1995 up to November 30,
1997.
In resolving the motions for reconsideration in this case, this Court took into
account the fact that petitioner belongs to an industry imbued with public interest.
As such, this Court can not ignore the enormous cost that petitioner will have to
bear as a consequence of the full retroaction of the arbitral award to the date of
expiry of the CBA, and the inevitable effect that it would have on the national
economy. On the other hand, under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law. 417[15]
Balancing these two contrasting interests, this Court turned to the dictates of
fairness and equitable justice and thus arrived at a formula that would address
the concerns of both sides. Hence, this Court held that the arbitral award in this
case be made to retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the
expiration of the last day of the CBA, i.e., from June 1, 1996 to May 31, 1998.
This Court, therefore, maintains the foregoing rule in the assailed Resolution pro
hac vice. It must be clarified, however, that consonant with this rule, the two-year
effectivity period must start from June 1, 1996 up to May 31, 1998, not December
1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.
During the interregnum between the expiration of the economic provisions of the
CBA and the date of effectivity of the arbitral award, it is understood that the
hold-over principle shall govern, viz:
"[I]t shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue
in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement
during the 60-day freedom period and/or until a new agreement is reached
by the parties." Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the
law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new
CBA shall have been validly executed.418[16]
Finally, this Court finds that petitioners prayer, that the award of Two Thousand
Pesos shall be paid to rank-and-file employees during the two-year period, is
well-taken. The award does not extend to supervisory employees of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Modification is GRANTED. The Resolution

of February 22, 2000 is PARTIALLY MODIFIED as follows: (a) the arbitral award
shall retroact to the two-year period from June 1, 1996 to May 31, 1998; (b) the
increased wage award of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) shall be paid to the
rank-and-file employees during the said two-year period. This Resolution is
subject to the monetary advances granted by petitioner to said employees during
the pendency of this case, assuming such advances had actually been
distributed to them.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127598. January 27, 1999]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING AND MERALCO EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS
ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) seeks to annul the
orders of the Secretary of labor dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, wherein the
Secretary required MERALCO and its rank and file union- the Meralco Workers Association
(MEWA) to execute a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for the remainder of the parties
1992-1997 CBA cycle, and to incorporate in this new CBA the Secretarys dispositions on the
disputed economic and non-economic issues.
MEWA is the duly recognized labor organization of the rank-and-file employees of MERALCO.
On September 7, 1995, MEWA informed MERALCO of its intention to re-negotiate the terms
and conditions of their existing 1992-1997 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering the
remaining period of two years starting from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.ccxxiii[1]
MERALCO signified its willingness to re-negotiate through its letter dated October 17,
1995ccxxiv[2] and formed a CBA negotiating panel for the purpose. On November 10, 1995,
MEWA submitted its proposalccxxv[3] to MERALCO, which, in turn, presented a counter-
proposal. Thereafter, collective bargaining negotiations proceeded. However, despite the series
of meetings between the negotiating panels of MERALCO and MEWA, the parties failed to
arrive at terms and conditions acceptable to both of them.
On April 23, 1996, MEWA filed a Notice of Strike with the National Capital Region Branch of
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-152-96, on the grounds of
bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practices. The NCMB then conducted a series of
conciliation meetings but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Faced with the
imminence of a strike, MERALCO on May 2, 1996, filed an Urgent Petitionccxxvi[4] with the
Department of Labor and Employment which was docketed as OS-AJ No. 0503[1]96 praying
that the Secretary assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and to enjoin the striking employees
to go back to work.
The Labor Secretary granted the petition through its Orderccxxvii[5] of May 8, 1996, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office now assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute
obtaining between the parties pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. Accordingly, the
parties are here enjoined from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation. To speed up
the resolution of the dispute, the parties are also directed to submit their respective Position
Papers within ten (10) days from receipt.
Undersecretary Jose M. Espanol, Jr. is deputized to conduct conciliation conferences between the
parties to bridge their differences and eventually hammer out a solution that is mutually
acceptable. He shall be assisted by the Legal Service.
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and on August 19, 1996, the
Secretary resolved the labor dispute through an Order,ccxxviii[6] containing the following
awards:
ECONOMIC DEMANDS
Wage increase - P2,300.00 for the first year covering the

period from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1996
- P2,200.00 for the second year covering
the period December 1, 1996 to November 30, 1997.
Red Circle Rate (RCR) Allowance- all RCR allowances (promotional increases that go beyond
the maximum range of a job classification salary) shall be integrated into the basic salary of
employees effective December 1, 1995.
Longevity Allowance- the integration of the longevity allowance into the basic wage is denied;
the present policy is maintained.
Longevity Increase- the present longevity bonus is maintained but the bonus shall be
incorporated into the new CBA.
Sick Leave- MEWAs demand for upgrading is denied; the companys present policy is
maintained. However, those who have not used the sick leave benefit during a particular year
shall be entitled to a one-day sick leave incentive.
Sick leave reserve- the present reserve of 25 days shall be reduced to 15 days; the employee has
the option either to convert the excess of 10 days to cash or let it remain as long as he wants. In
case he opts to let it remain, he may later on convert it to cash at his retirement or separation.
Vacation Leave - MEWAs demand for upgrading denied & the companys present policy is
maintained which must be incorporated into the new CBA but scheduled vacation leave may be
rounded off to one full day at a time in case of a benefit involving a fraction of a day.
Union Leave- of MEWAs officers, directors or stewards assigned to perform union duties or
legitimate union activity is increased from 30 to 40 Mondays per month.
Maternity, Paternity and Funeral leaves- the existing policy is to be maintained and must be
incorporated in the new CBA unless a new law granting paternity leave benefit is enacted which
is superior to what the company has already granted.
Birthday Leave - unions demand is granted. If birthday falls on the employees rest day or on a
non-working holiday, the worker shall be entitled to go on leave with pay on the next working
day.
Group Hospitalization & Surgical Insurance Plan (GHSIP) and Health Maintenance Plan (HMP)-
present policy is maintained insofar as the cost sharing is concerned- 70% for the Company and
30% for MEWA.
Health Maintenance Plan (HMP) for dependents - subsidized dependents increased from three to
five dependents.
Longevity Bonus- is increased from P140.00 to P200.00 for every year of service to be received
by the employee after serving the Company for 5 years.
Christmas Bonus and Special Christmas Grant- MEWAs demand of one month salary as
Christmas Bonus and two months salary as Special Christmas Grant is granted and to be
Midyear Bonus- one months pay to be included in the CBA.
Anniversary Bonus - unions demand is denied.
Christmas Gift Certificate - company has the discretion as to whether it will give it to its
employees.
Retirement Benefits:
a. Full retirement-present policy is maintained;
b. one cavan of rice per month is granted to retirees;
c. special retirement leave and allowance-present policy is maintained;
d. HMP coverage for retirees- HMP coverage is granted to retirees who have not
reached the age of 70, with MERALCO subsidizing 100% of the monthly
premium; those over 70 are entitled to not more than 30 days of hospitalization at
the J.F. Cotton Hospital with the company shouldering the entire cost.
e. HMP coverage for retirees dependents is denied
f. Monthly pension of P3,000.00 for each retiree is denied.
g. Death benefit for retirees beneficiaries is denied.
Optional retirement - unions demand is denied; present policy is maintained; employee is eligible
for optional retirement if he has rendered at least 18 years of service.
Dental, Medical and Hospitalization Benefits- grant of all the allowable medical, surgical, dental
and annual physical examination benefits, including free medicine whenever the same is not
available at the JFCH.
Resignation benefits- unions demand is denied.
Night work- union demand is denied but present policy must be incorporated in CBA.
Shortswing- work in another shift within the same day shall be considered as the employees
work for the following day and the employee shall be given additional four (4) hours straight
time and the applicable excess time premium if he works beyond 8 hours in the other shift.
High Voltage allowance- is increased from P45.00 to P55.00 to be given to any employee
authorized by the Safety Division to perform work on or near energized bare lines & bus
including stockman drivers & crane operators and other crew members on ground.
High Pole Allowance- is increased from P30.00 to P40.00 to be given to those authorized to
climb poles up to at least 60 ft. from the ground. Members of the team including stockman
drivers, crane operators and other crew members on the ground, are entitled to this benefit.
Towing Allowance- where stockmen drive tow trailers with long poles and equipment on board,
they shall be entitled to a towing allowance of P20.00 whether they perform the job on regular
shift or on overtime.
Employees Cooperative- a loan of P3 M seed money is granted to the proposed establishment of

a cooperative, payable in twenty (20) years starting one year from the start of operations.
Holdup Allowance- the union demand is denied; the present policy shall be maintained.
Meal and Lodging Allowance- shall be increased effective December 1, 1995 as follows:
Breakfast - from P25.00 to P35.00

Lunch - from P35.00 to P45.00
Dinner - from P35.00 to P45.00
Lodging - from P135.00 to P180.00 a night in all MERALCO franchise areas
Payroll Treatment for Accident while on Duty- an employee shall be paid his salary and
allowance if any is due plus average excess time for the past 12 months from the time of the
accident up to the time of full recovery and placing of the employee back to normal duty or an
allowance of P2,000.00, whichever is higher.
Housing and Equity Assistance Loan- is increased to P60,000.00; those who have already
availed of the privilege shall be allowed to get the difference.
Benefits for Collectors:

a. Company shall reduce proportionately the quota and monthly average product
level (MAPL) in terms of equivalent bill assignment when an employee is on sick
leave and paid vacation leave.
b. When required to work on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, an employee shall

receive P60.00 lunch allowance and applicable transportation allowance as
determined by the Company and shall also receive an additional compensation to
one day fixed portion in addition to lunch and transportation allowance.
c. The collector shall be entitled to an incentive pay of P25.00 for every delinquent
account disconnected.
d. When a collector voluntarily performs other work on regular shift or overtime, he

shall be entitled to remuneration based on his computed hourly compensation and
the reimbursement of actually incurred transportation expenses.
e. Collectors shall be provided with bobcat belt bags every year
f. Collectors cash bond shall be deposited under his capital contribution to

MESALA.
g. Collectors quota and MAPL shall be proportionately reduced during typhoons,

floods, earthquakes and other similar force majeure events when it is impossible
for a collector to perform collection work.
Political Demands:
a. Scope of the collective bargaining unit- the collective bargaining unit shall be
composed of all regular rank-and-file employees hired by the company in all its
offices and operative centers throughout its franchise area and those it may
employ by reason of expansion, reorganization or as a result of operational
exigencies.
b. Union recognition and security -
i. The union shall be recognized by the Company as sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees included in the bargaining unit.
The Company shall agree to meet only with Union officers and its authorized
representatives on all matters involving the Union and all issues arising from the
implementation and interpretation of the new CBA.
ii. The union shall meet with the newly regularized employees for a period not to
exceed four (4) hours, on company time, to acquaint the new regular employees
of the rights, duties and benefits of Union membership.
iii. The right of all rank-and-file employees to join the union shall be recognized in
accordance with the maintenance of membership principle as a form of union
security.
c. Transfer of assignment and job security-
i. No transfer of an employee from one position to another shall be made if

motivated by considerations of sex, race, creed, political and religious belief,
seniority or union activity.
ii. If the transfer is due to the reorganization or decentralization, the distance from
the employees residence shall be considered unless the transfer is accepted by
the employee. If the transfer is extremely necessary, the transfer shall be made
within the offices in the same district.
iii. Personnel hired through agencies or contractors to perform the work done by
covered employees shall not exceed one month. If extension is necessary, the
union shall be informed. But the Company shall not permanently contract out
regular or permanent positions that are necessary in the normal operation of the
Company.
d. Check off Union Dues- where the union increases its dues as approved by the
Board of Directors, the Company shall check off such increase from the salaries
of union members after the union submits check off authorizations signed by
majority of the members. The Company shall honor only those individual
authorizations signed by the majority of the union members and collectively
submitted by the union to the Companys Salary Administration.
e. Payroll Reinstatement- shall be in accordance with Article 223, p. 3 of the Labor

Code.
f. Union Representation in Committees- the union is allowed to participate in policy

formulation and in the decision-making process on matters affecting their rights
and welfare, particularly in the Uniform Committee, the Safety Committee and
other committees that may be formed in the future.
Signing Bonus- P4,000.00 per member of the bargaining unit for the conclusion of the CBA
Existing benefits already granted by the Company but which are not expressly or impliedly
repealed in the new agreement shall remain subsisting and shall be included in the new
agreement to be signed by the parties effective December 1, 1995.
On August 30, 1996, MERALCO filed a motion for reconsiderationccxxix[7] alleging that the
Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction:
1. in awarding to MEWA a package that would cost at least P1.142 billion, a package that is
grossly excessive and exorbitant, would not be affordable to MERALCO and would imperil
its viability as a public utility affected with national interest.
2. in ordering the grant of a P4,500.00 wage increase, as well as a new and improved fringe
benefits, under the remaining two (2) years of the CBA for the rank-and-file employees.
3. in ordering the incorporation into the CBA of all existing employee benefits, on the one
hand, and those that MERALCO has unilaterally granted to its employees by virtue of
voluntary company policy or practice, on the other hand.
4. in granting certain political demands presented by the union.
5. in ordering the CBA to be effective December 1995 instead of August 19, 1996 when he
resolved the dispute.
MERALCO filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration on September 18, 1995,
alleging that the Secretary of Labor did not properly appreciate the effect of the awarded wages
and benefits on MERALCOs financial viability.
MEWA likewise filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to reconsider its Order on the wage
increase, leaves, decentralized filing of paternity and maternity leaves, bonuses, retirement
benefits, optional retirement, medical, dental and hospitalization benefits, short swing and
payroll treatment. On its political demands, MEWA asked the Secretary to rule its proposal to
institute a Code of Discipline for its members and the unions representation in the administration
of the Pension Fund.
On December 28, 1996, the Secretary issued an Orderccxxx[8] resolving the parties separate
motions, the modifications of the August 19, 1996 Order being highlighted hereunder:
1) Effectivity of Agreement - December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.
Economic Demands
2) Wage Increase:
First year - P2,200.00 per month;

Second year - P2,200.00 per month.
3) Integration of Red Circle Rate (RCR) and Longevity Allowance into Basic Salary -the RCR
allowance shall be integrated into the basic salary of employees as of August 19, 1996 (the date
of the disputed Order).
4) Longevity Bonus - P170 per year of service starting from 10 years of continuous service.
5) Vacation Leave - The status quo shall be maintained as to the number of vacation leave but
employees scheduled vacation may be taken one day at a time in the manner that this has
been provided in the supervisory CBA.
6) Sick Leave Reserve - is reduced to 15 days, with any excess payable at the end of the year.
The employee has the option to avail of this cash conversion or to accumulate his sick leave
credits up to 25 days for conversion to cash at retirement or separation from the service.
7) Birthday Leave - the grant of a day off when an employees birthday falls on a non-
working day is deleted.
8) Retirement Benefits for Retirees - The benefits granted shall be effective on August 19, 1996,
the date of the disputed order up to November 30, 1997, which is the date the CBA expires and
shall apply to those who are members of the bargaining unit at the time the award is made.
One sack of rice per quarter of the year shall be given to those retiring between August 19,
1996 and November 30, 1997.
On HMP Coverage for Retirees- The parties maintain the status quo, that is, with the Company
complying with the present arrangement and the obligations to retirees as is.
9) Medical, Dental and Hospitalization Benefits - The cost of medicine unavailable at the J.F.
Cotton Hospital shall be in accordance with MERALCOs Memorandum dated September 14,
1976.
10) GHSIP and HMP for Dependents - The number of dependents to be subsidized shall be
reduced from 5 to 4 provided that their premiums are proportionately increased.
11) Employees Cooperative - The original award of P3 million pesos as seed money for the
proposed Cooperative is reduced to P1.5 million pesos.
12) Shortswing - the original award is deleted.
13) Payroll Treatment for Accident on Duty - Company ordered to continue its present practice
on payroll treatment for accident on duty without need to pay the excess time the Union
demanded.
Political Demands:
14) Scope of the collective bargaining unit - The bargaining unit shall be composed of all rank
and file employees hired by the Company in accordance with the original Order.
15) Union recognition and security - The incorporation of a closed shop form of union
security in the CBA; the Company is prohibited from entertaining individuals or groups of
individuals only on matters that are exclusively within the domain of the union; the Company
shall furnish the union with a complete list of newly regularized employees within a week from
regularization so that the Union can meet these employees on the Unions and the employees own
time.
16) Transfer of assignment and job security - Transfer is a prerogative of the Company but the
transfer must be for a valid business reason, made in good faith and must be reasonably
exercised. The CBA shall provide that No transfer of an employee from one position to another,
without the employees written consent, shall be made if motivated by considerations of sex, race,
creed, political and religious belief, age or union activity.
17) Contracting Out - The Company has the prerogative to contract out services provided that
this move is based on valid business reasons in accordance with law, is made in good faith, is
reasonably exercised and, provided further that if the contracting out involves more than six
months, the Union must be consulted before its implementation.
18) Check off of union dues
In any increase of union dues or contributions for mandatory activities, the union must submit to
the Company a copy of its board resolution increasing the union dues or authorizing such
contributions;
If a board resolution is submitted, the Company shall deduct union dues from all union members
after a majority of the union members have submitted their individual written authorizations.
Only those check-off authorizations submitted by the union shall be honored by the Company.
With respect to special assessments, attorneys fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary
fees, individual authorizations shall be necessary before the company may so deduct the same.
19) Union Representation in Committees - The union is granted representation in the Safety
Committee, the Uniform Committee and other committees of a similar nature and purpose
involving personnel welfare, rights and benefits as well as duties.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed this petition contending that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused
his discretion:
1). . . in awarding wage increases of P2,200.00 for 1996 and P2,200.00 for 1997;
2) . . . in awarding the following economic benefits:
a. Two months Christmas bonus;

b. Rice Subsidy and retirement benefits for retirees;
c. Loan for the employees cooperative;
d. Social benefits such as GHSIP and HMP for dependents, employees
cooperative and housing equity assistance loan;
e. Signing bonus;
f. Integration of the Red Circle Rate Allowance
g. Sick leave reserve of 15 days
h. The 40-day union leave;
i. High pole/high voltage and towing allowance;
and
j. Benefits for collectors
3) . . . in expanding the scope of the bargaining unit to all regular rank and file employees hired
by the company in all its offices and operating centers and those it may employ by reason of
expansion, reorganization or as a result of operational exigencies;
4) . . . in ordering for a closed shop when his original order for a maintenance of membership
arrangement was not questioned by the parties;
5) . . . in ordering that Meralco should consult the union before any contracting out for more than
six months;
6) . . . in decreeing that the union be allowed to have representation in policy and decision
making into matters affecting personnel welfare, rights and benefits as well as duties;
7) . . . in ruling for the inclusion of all terms and conditions of employment in the collective
bargaining agreement;
8) . . . in exercising discretion in determining the retroactivity of the CBA;
Both MEWA and the Solicitor General; on behalf of the Secretary of Labor, filed their comments
to the petition. While the case was also set for oral argument on Feb 10, 1997, this hearing was
cancelled due to MERALCO not having received the comment of the opposing parties. The
parties were instead required to submit written memoranda, which they did. Subsequently, both
petitioner and private respondent MEWA also filed replies to the opposing parties Memoranda,
all of which We took into account in the resolution of this case.
The union disputes the allegation of MERALCO that the Secretary abused his discretion in
issuing the assailed orders arguing that he acted within the scope of the powers granted him by
law and by the Constitution. The union contends that any judicial review is limited to an
examination of the Secretarys decision-making/discretion - exercising process to determine if
this process was attended by some capricious or whimsical act that constitutes grave abuse; in
the absence of such abuse, his findings - considering that he has both jurisdiction and expertise to
make them - are valid.
The unions position is anchored on two premises:
First, no reviewable abuse of discretion could have attended the Secretarys arbitral award
because the Secretary complied with constitutional norms in rendering the dispute award. The
union posits that the yardstick for comparison and for the determination of the validity of the
Secretarys actions should be the specific standards laid down by the Constitution itself. To the
union, these standards include the State policy on the promotion of workers welfare,ccxxxi[9]
the principle of distributive justice,ccxxxii[10] the right of the State to regulate the use of
property,ccxxxiii[11] the obligation of the State to protect workers, both organized and
unorganized, and insure their enjoyment of humane conditions of work and a living wage, and
the right of labor to a just share in the fruits of production.ccxxxiv[12]
Second, no reversible abuse of discretion attended the Secretarys decision because the Secretary
took all the relevant evidence into account, judiciously weighed them, and rendered a decision
based on the facts and law. Also, the arbitral award should not be reversed given the Secretarys
expertise in his field and the general rule that findings of fact based on such expertise is
generally binding on this Court.
To put matters in proper perspective, we go back to basic principles. The Secretary of Labors
statutory power under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and, to render an award on compulsory
arbitration, does not exempt the exercise of this power from the judicial review that Sec. 1, Art. 8
of the Constitution mandates. This constitutional provision states:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
Under this constitutional mandate, every legal power of the Secretary of Labor under the Labor
Code, or, for that matter, any act of the Executive, that is attended by grave abuse of discretion is
subject to review by this Court in an appropriate proceeding. To be sure, the existence of an
executive power alone - whether granted by statute or by the Constitution - cannot exempt the
executive action from judicial oversight, interference or reversal when grave abuse of discretion
is, or is alleged to be, present. This is particularly true when constitutional norms are cited as the
applicable yardsticks since this Court is the final interpreter of the meaning and intent of the
Constitution.ccxxxv[13]
The extent of judicial review over the Secretary of Labors arbitral award is not limited to a
determination of grave abuse in the manner of the secretarys exercise of his statutory powers.
This Court is entitled to, and must - in the exercise of its judicial power - review the substance of
the Secretarys award when grave abuse of discretion is alleged to exist in the award, i.e., in the
appreciation of and the conclusions the Secretary drew from the evidence presented.
The natural and ever present limitation on the Secretarys acts is, of course, the Constitution. And
we recognize that indeed the constitutional provisions the union cited are State policies on labor
and social justice that can serve as standards in assessing the validity of a Secretary of Labors
actions. However, we note that these provisions do not provide clear, precise and objective
standards of conduct that lend themselves to easy application. We likewise recognize that the
Constitution is not a lopsided document that only recognizes the interests of the working man; it
too protects the interests of the property owner and employer as well.ccxxxvi[14]
For these reasons - and more importantly because a ruling on the breadth and scope of the
suggested constitutional yardsticks is not absolutely necessary in the disposition of this case - we
shall not use these yardsticks in accordance with the time-honored practice of avoiding
constitutional interpretations when a decision can be reached using non-constitutional standards.
We have repeatedly held that one of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into
constitutional questions is that the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary in
deciding the case.ccxxxvii[15]
In this case we believe that the more appropriate and available standard - and one does not
require a constitutional interpretation - is simply the standard of reasonableness. In laymans
terms, reasonableness implies the absence of arbitrariness;ccxxxviii[16] in legal parlance, this
translates into the exercise of proper discretion and to the observance of due process. Thus, the
question we have to answer in deciding this case is whether the Secretarys actions have been
reasonable in light of the parties positions and the evidence they presented.
MEWAs second premise - i.e., that the Secretary duly considered the evidence presented - is the
main issue that we shall discuss at length below. Additionally, MEWA implied that we should
take great care before reading an abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary because of his
expertise on labor issues and because his findings of fact deserve the highest respect from this
Court.
This Court has recognized the Secretary of Labors distinct expertise in the study and settlement
of labor disputes falling under his power of compulsory arbitration.ccxxxix[17] It is also well-
settled that factual findings of labor administrative officials, if supported by substantial evidence,
are entitled not only to great respect but even to finality.ccxl[18] We, therefore, have no
difficulty in accepting the unions caveat on how to handle a Secretary of Labors arbitral award.
But at the same time, we also recognize the possibility that abuse of discretion may attend the
exercise of the Secretarys arbitral functions; his findings in an arbitration case are usually based
on position papers and their supporting documents (as they are in the present case), and not on
the thorough examination of the parties contending claims that may be present in a court trial and
in the face-to-face adversarial process that better insures the proper presentation and appreciation
of evidence.ccxli[19] There may also be grave abuse of discretion where the board, tribunal or
officer exercising judicial function fails to consider evidence adduced by the parties.ccxlii[20]
Given the parties positions on the justiciability of the issues before us, the question we have to
answer is one that goes into the substance of the Secretarys disputed orders: Did the Secretary
properly consider and appreciate the evidence presented before him?
We find, based on our consideration of the parties positions and the evidence on record, that the
Secretary of Labor disregarded and misappreciated evidence, particularly with respect to the
wage award. The Secretary of Labor apparently also acted arbitrarily and even whimsically in
considering a number of legal points; even the Solicitor General himself considered that the
Secretary gravely abused his discretion on at least three major points: (a) on the signing bonus
issue; (b) on the inclusion of confidential employees in the rank and file bargaining unit, and (c)
in mandating a union security closed-shop regime in the bargaining unit.
We begin with a discussion on the wages issue. The focal point in the consideration of the wage
award is the projected net income for 1996 which became the basis for the 1996 wage award,
which in turn - by extrapolation - became the basis for the (2nd Year) 1997 award. MERALCO
projected that the net operating income for 1996 was 14.7% above the 1999 level or a total net
operating income of 4.171 Billion, while the union placed the 1996 net operating income at
5.795 Billion.
MERALCO based its projection on the increase of the income for the first 6 months of 1996 over
the same period in 1995. The union, on the other hand, projected that the 1996 income would
increase by 29% to 35% because the consumption of electric power is at its highest during the
last two quarters with the advent of the Yuletide season. The union likewise relied heavily on a
newspaper report citing an estimate by an all Asia capital financial analyst that the net operating
income would amount to 5.795 Billion.ccxliii[21]
Based essentially on these considerations, the Secretary made the following computations and
ordered his disputed wage award:
Projected net operating

Income for 1996 5,795,000,000
Principals and interests 1,426,571,703
Dividends at 1995 rate 1,636,949,000
Net amount left with the Company 2,729,479,297
Add: Tax credit equivalent to 35% of labor cost 231,804,940
Companys net operating income 2,961,284,237
For 1997, the projected income is P7,613,612 which can easily absorb the incremental increase
of P2,200 per month or a total of P4,500 during the last year of the CBA period.
xxx xxx xxx
An overriding aim is to estimate the amount that is left with the Company after the awarded
wages and benefits and the companys customary obligations are paid. This amount can be the
source of an item not found in the above computations but which the Company must provide for,
that is - the amount the company can use for expansion.
Considering the expansion plans stated in the Companys Supplement that calls for capital
expenditures of 6 billion, 6.263 billion and 5.802 billion for 1996, 1997 and 1998 respectively,
We conclude that our original award of P2,300 per month for the first year and P2,200 for the
second year will still leave much by way of retained income that can be used for
expansion.ccxliv[22] (Underscoring ours.)
We find after considering the records that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion in making
this wage award because he disregarded evidence on record. Where he considered MERALCOs
evidence at all, he apparently misappreciated this evidence in favor of claims that do not have
evidentiary support. To our mind, the MERALCO projection had every reason to be reliable
because it was based on actual and undisputed figures for the first six months of 1996.ccxlv[23]
On the other hand, the union projection was based on a speculation of Yuletide consumption that
the union failed to substantiate. In fact, as against the unions unsubstantiated Yuletide
consumption claim, MERALCO adduced evidence in the form of historical consumption data
showing that a lengthy consumption does not tend to rise during the Christmas period.ccxlvi[24]
Additionally, the All-Asia Capital Report was nothing more than a newspaper report that did not
show any specific breakdown or computations. While the union claimed that its cited figure is
based on MERALCOs 10-year income stream,ccxlvii[25] no data or computation of this 10-year
stream appear in the record.
While the Secretary is not expected to accept the company-offered figures wholesale in
determining a wage award, we find it a grave abuse of discretion to completely disregard data
that is based on actual and undisputed record of financial performance in favor of the third-hand
and unfounded claims the Secretary eventually relied upon. At the very least, the Secretary
should have properly justified his disregard of the company figures. The Secretary should have
also reasonably insured that the figure that served as the starting point for his computation had
some substantial basis.
Both parties extensely discussed the factors that the decision maker should consider in making a
wage award. While We do not seek to enumerate in this decision the factors that should affect
wage determination, we must emphasize that a collective bargaining dispute such as this one
requires due consideration and proper balancing of the interests of the parties to the dispute
and of those who might be affected by the dispute. To our mind, the best way in approaching
this task holistically is to consider the available objective facts, including, where applicable,
factors such as the bargaining history of the company, the trends and amounts of arbitrated and
agreed wage awards and the companys previous CBAs, and industry trends in general. As a rule,
affordability or capacity to pay should be taken into account but cannot be the sole yardstick in
determining the wage award, especially in a public utility like MERALCO. In considering a
public utility, the decision maker must always take into account the public interest aspects of the
case; MERALCOs income and the amount of money available for operating expenses - including
labor costs - are subject to State regulation. We must also keep in mind that high operating costs
will certainly and eventually be passed on to the consuming public as MERALCO has bluntly
warned in its pleadings.
We take note of the middle ground approach employed by the Secretary in this case which we do
not necessarily find to be the best method of resolving a wage dispute. Merely finding the
midway point between the demands of the company and the union, and splitting the difference is
a simplistic solution that fails to recognize that the parties may already be at the limits of the
wage levels they can afford. It may lead to the danger too that neither of the parties will engage
in principled bargaining; the company may keep its position artificially low while the union
presents an artificially high position, on the fear that a Solomonic solution cannot be avoided.
Thus, rather than encourage agreement, a middle ground approach instead promotes a play safe
attitude that leads to more deadlocks than to successfully negotiated CBAs.
After considering the various factors the parties cited, we believe that the interests of both labor
and management are best served by a wage increase of P1,900.00 per month for the first year and
another P1,900.00 per month for the second year of the two-year CBA term. Our reason for this
is that these increases sufficiently protects the interest of the worker as they are roughly 15% of
the monthly average salary of P11,600.00.ccxlviii[26] They likewise sufficiently consider the
employers costs and its overall wage structure, while at the same time, being within the range
that will not disrupt the wage trends in Philippine industries.
The records shows that MERALCO, throughout its long years of existence, was never remiss in
its obligation towards its employees. In fact, as a manifestation of its strong commitment to the
promotion of the welfare and well-being of its employees, it has consistently improved their
compensation package. For instance, MERALCO has granted salary increasesccxlix[27] through
the collective bargaining agreement the amount of which since 1980 for both rank-and-file and
supervisory employees were as follows:
AMOUNT OF CBA INCREASES DIFFERENCE

CBA RANK-AND- SUPERVISORY AMOUNT PERCENT
COVERAGE FILE
1980 230.00 342.50 112.50 48.91%
1981 210.00 322.50 112.50 53.57
1982 200.00 312.50 112.50 56.25
TOTAL 640.00 977.50 337.50 52.73
1983 320.00 432.50 112.50 35.16
1984 350.00 462.50 112.50 32.14
1985 370.00 482.50 112.50 30.41
TOTAL 1,040.00 1,377.50 337.50 32.45
1986 860.00 972.50 112.50 13.08
1987 640.00 752.50 112.50 17.58
1988 600.00 712.50 112.50 18.75
TOTAL 2,100.00 2,437.50 337.50 16.07
1989 1,100.00 1,212.50 112.50 10.23
1990 1,200.00 1,312.50 112.50 9.38
1991 1,300.00 1,412.50 112.50 8.65
TOTAL 3,600.00 3,937.50 337.50 9.38
1992 1,400.00 1,742.50 342.50 24.46
1993 1,350.00 1,682.50 332.50 24.63
1994 1,150.00 1,442.50 292.50 25.43
TOTAL 3,900.00 4,867.50 967.50 24.81
Based on the above-quoted table, specifically under the column RANK-AND-FILE, it is easily
discernible that the total wage increase of P3,800.00 for 1996 to 1997 which we are granting in
the instant case is significantly higher than the total increases given in 1992 to 1994, or a span of
three (3) years, which is only P3,900.00 a month. Thus, the Secretarys grant of P2,200.00
monthly wage increase in the assailed order is unreasonably high a burden for MERALCO to
shoulder.
We now go to the economic issues.
1. CHRISTMAS BONUS
MERALCO questions the Secretarys award of Christmas bonuses on the ground that what it had
given its employees were special bonuses to mark or celebrate special occasions, such as when
the Asia Money Magazine recognized MERALCO as the best managed company in Asia. These
grants were given on or about Christmas time, and the timing of the grant apparently led the
Secretary to the conclusion that what were given were Christmas bonuses given by way of a
company practice on top of the legally required 13th month pay.
The Secretary in granting the two-month bonus, considered the following factual finding, to wit:
We note that each of the grant mentioned in the commonly adopted table of grants has a special
description. Christmas bonuses were given in 1988 and 1989. However, the amounts of bonuses
given differed. In 1988, it was P1,500. In 1989, it was month salary. The use of Christmas bonus
title stopped after 1989. In 1990, what was given was a cash gift of months salary. The grants
thereafter bore different titles and were for varying amounts. Significantly, the Company
explained the reason for the 1995 bonuses and this explanation was not substantially contradicted
by the Union.
What comes out from all these is that while the Company has consistently given some amount by
way of bonuses since 1988, these awards were not given uniformly as Christmas bonuses or
special Christmas grants although they may have been given at or about Christmas time.
xxx xxx xxx
The Company is not therefore correct in its position that there is not established practice of
giving Christmas bonuses that has ripened to the status of being a term and condition of
employment. Regardless of its nomenclature and purpose, the act of giving this bonus in the
spirit of Christmas has ripened into a Company practice.ccl[28]
It is MERALCOs position that the Secretary erred when he recognized that there was an
established practice of giving a two-month Christmas bonus based on the fact that bonuses were
given on or about Christmas time. It points out that the established practice attributed to
MERALCO was neither for a considerable period of time nor identical in either amount or
purpose. The purpose and title of the grants were never the same except for the Christmas
bonuses of 1988 and 1989, and were not in the same amounts.
We do not agree.
As a rule, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation;ccli[29] it may nevertheless be

granted on equitable considerationcclii[30] as when the giving of such bonus has been the
companys long and regular practice.ccliii[31] To be considered a regular practice, the giving
of the bonus should have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been
consistent and deliberate.ccliv[32] Thus we have ruled in National Sugar Refineries
Corporation vs. NLRC:cclv[33]
The test or rationale of this rule on long practice requires an indubitable showing that the
employer agreed to continue giving the benefits knowing fully well that said employees are not
covered by the law requiring payment thereof.
In the case at bar, the record shows the MERALCO, aside from complying with the regular 13th
month bonus, has further been giving its employees an additional Christmas bonus at the tail-end
of the year since 1988. While the special bonuses differed in amount and bore different titles, it
can not be denied that these were given voluntarily and continuously on or about Christmas time.
The considerable length of time MERALCO has been giving the special grants to its employees
indicates a unilateral and voluntary act on its part, to continue giving said benefits knowing that
such act was not required by law.
Indeed, a company practice favorable to the employees has been established and the payments
made by MERALCO pursuant thereto ripened into benefits enjoyed by the employees.
Consequently, the giving of the special bonus can no longer be withdrawn by the company as
this would amount to a diminution of the employees existing benefits.cclvi[34]
We can not, however, affirm the Secretarys award of a two-month special Christmas bonus to the
employees since there was no recognized company practice of giving a two-month special grant.
The two-month special bonus was given only in 1995 in recognition of the employees prompt
and efficient response during the calamities. Instead, a one-month special bonus, We believe, is
sufficient, this being merely a generous act on the part of MERALCO.
2. RICE SUBSIDY and RETIREMENT BENEFITS for RETIREES
It appears that the Secretary of Labor originally ordered the increase of the retirement pay, rice
subsidy and medical benefits of MERALCO retirees. This ruling was reconsidered based on the
position that retirees are no longer employees of the company and therefore are no longer
bargaining members who can benefit from a compulsory arbitration award. The Secretary,
however, ruled that all members of the bargaining unit who retire between August 19, 1996 and
November 30, 1997 (i.e., the term of the disputed CBA under the Secretarys disputed orders) are
entitled to receive an additional rice subsidy.
The question squarely brought in this petition is whether the Secretary can issue an order that
binds the retirement fund. The company alleges that a separate and independent trust fund is the
source of retirement benefits for MERALCO retirees, while the union maintains that MERALCO
controls these funds and may therefore be compelled to improve this benefit in an arbitral award.
The issue requires a finding of fact on the legal personality of the retirement fund. In the absence
of any evidence on record indicating the nature of the retirement funds legal personality, we rule
that the issue should be remanded to the Secretary for reception of evidence as whether or not the
MERALCO retirement fund is a separate and independent trust fund. The existence of a separate
and independent juridical entity which controls an irrevocable retirement trust fund means that
these retirement funds are beyond the scope of collective bargaining: they are administered by an
entity not a party to the collective bargaining and the funds may not be touched without the
trustees conformity.
On the other hand, MERALCO control over these funds means that MERALCO may be
compelled in the compulsory arbitration of a CBA deadlock where it is the employer, to improve
retirement benefits since retirement is a term or condition of employment that is a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
3. EMPLOYEES COOPERATIVE
The Secretarys disputed ruling requires MERALCO to provide the employees covered by the
bargaining unit with a loan of 1.5 Million as seed money for the employees formation of a
cooperative under the Cooperative Law, R.A. 6938. We see nothing in this law - whether
expressed or implied - that requires employers to provide funds, by loan or otherwise, that
employees can use to form a cooperative. The formation of a cooperative is a purely voluntary
act under this law, and no party in any context or relationship is required by law to set up a
cooperative or to provide the funds therefor. In the absence of such legal requirement, the
Secretary has no basis to order the grant of a 1.5 million loan to MERALCO employees for the
formation of a cooperative. Furthermore, we do not see the formation of an employees
cooperative, in the absence of an agreement by the collective bargaining parties that this is a
bargainable term or condition of employment, to be a term or condition of employment that can
be imposed on the parties on compulsory arbitration.
4. GHSIP, HMP BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS and HOUSING EQUITY LOAN
MERALCO contends that it is not bound to bargain on these benefits because these do not relate
to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment hence, the denial of these
demands cannot result in a bargaining impasse.
The GHSIP, HMP benefits for dependents and the housing equity loan have been the subject of
bargaining and arbitral awards in the past. We do not see any reason why MERALCO should not
now bargain on these benefits. Thus, we agree with the Secretarys ruling:
x x x Additionally and more importantly, GHSIP and HMP, aside from being contributory plans,
have been the subject of previous rulings from this Office as bargainable matters. At this point,
we cannot do any less and must recognize that GHSIP and HMP are matters where the union can
demand and negotiate for improvements within the framework of the collective bargaining
system.cclvii[35]
Moreover, MERALCO have long been extending these benefits to the employees and their
dependents that they now become part of the terms and conditions of employment. In fact,
MERALCO even pledged to continue giving these benefits. Hence, these benefits should be
With regard to the increase of the housing equity grant, we find P60,000.00 reasonable
considering the prevailing economic crisis.
5. SIGNING BONUS
On the signing bonus issue, we agree with the positions commonly taken by MERALCO and by
the Office of the Solicitor General that the signing bonus is a grant motivated by the goodwill
generated when a CBA is successfully negotiated and signed between the employer and the
union. In the present case, this goodwill does not exist. In the words of the Solicitor General:
When negotiations for the last two years of the 1992-1997 CBA broke down and the parties
sought the assistance of the NCMB, but which failed to reconcile their differences, and when
petitioner MERALCO bluntly invoked the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor in the resolution
of the labor dispute, whatever goodwill existed between petitioner MERALCO and respondent
union disappeared. xxx.cclviii[36]
In contractual terms, a signing bonus is justified by and is the consideration paid for the goodwill
that existed in the negotiations that culminated in the signing of a CBA. Without the goodwill,
the payment of a signing bonus cannot be justified and any order for such payment, to our mind,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. This is more so where the signing bonus is in the not
insignificant total amount of P16 Million.
6. RED-CIRCLE-RATE ALLOWANCE
An RCR allowance is an amount, not included in the basic salary, that is granted by the company
to an employee who is promoted to a higher position grade but whose actual basic salary at the
time of the promotion already exceeds the maximum salary for the position to which he or she is
promoted. As an allowance, it applies only to specifics individuals whose salary levels are
unique with respect to their new and higher positions. It is for these reasons that MERALCO
prays that it be allowed to maintain the RCR allowance as a separate benefit and not be
integrated in the basic salary.
The integration of the RCR allowance in the basic salary of the employees had consistently been
raised in the past CBAs (1989 and 1992) and in those cases, the Secretary decreed the integration
of the RCR allowance in the basic salary. We do not see any reason why it should not be
included in the present CBA. In fact, in the 1995 CBA between MERALCO and the supervisory
union (FLAMES), the integration of the RCR allowance was recognized. Thus, Sec. 4 of the
CBA provides:
All Red-Circle-Rate Allowance as of December 1, 1995 shall be integrated in the basic salary of
the covered employees who as of such date are receiving such allowance. Thereafter, the
company rules on RCR allowance shall continue to be observed/applied.cclix[37]
For purposes of uniformity, we affirm the Secretarys order on the integration of the RCR
allowance in the basic salary of the employees.
7. SICK LEAVE RESERVE OF 15 DAYS
MERALCO assails the Secretarys reduction of the sick leave reserve benefit from 25 days to 15
days, contending that the sick leave reserve of 15 days has reached the lowest safe level that
should be maintained to give employees sufficient buffer in the event they fall ill.
We find no compelling reason to deviate from the Secretarys ruling that the sick leave reserve is
reduced to 15 days, with any excess convertible to cash at the end of the year. The employee has
the option to avail of this cash conversion or to accumulate his sick leave credits up to 25 days
for conversion to cash at his retirement or separation from the service. This arrangement is, in
fact, beneficial to MERALCO. The latter admits that the diminution of this reserve does not
seriously affect MERALCO because whatever is in reserve are sick leave credits that are payable
to the employee upon separation from service. In fact, it may be to MERALCOs financial
interest to pay these leave credits now under present salary levels than pay them at future higher
salary levels.cclx[38]
8. 40-DAY UNION LEAVE
MERALCO objects to the demand increase in union leave because the union leave granted to the
union is already substantial. It argues that the union has not demonstrated any real need for
additional union leave.
The thirty (30) days union leave granted by the Secretary, to our mind, constitute sufficient time
within which the union can carry out its union activities such as but not limited to the election of
union officers, selection or election of appropriate bargaining agents, conduct referendum on
union matters and other union-related matters in furtherance of union objectives. Furthermore,
the union already enjoys a special union leave with pay for union authorized representatives to
attend work education seminars, meetings, conventions and conferences where union
representation is required or necessary, and Paid-Time-off for union officers, stewards and
representatives for purpose of handling or processing grievances.
9. HIGH VOLTAGE/HIGH POLE/TOWING ALLOWANCE
MERALCO argues that there is no justification for the increase of these allowances. The
personnel concerned will not receive any additional risk during the life of the current CBA that
would justify the increase demanded by the union. In the absence of such risk, then these
personnel deserve only the same salary increase that all other members of the bargaining unit
will get as a result of the disputed CBA. MERALCO likewise assails the grant of the high
voltage/high pole allowance to members of the team who are not exposed to the high
voltage/high pole risks. The risks that justify the higher salary and the added allowance are
personal to those who are exposed to those risks. They are not granted to a team because some
members of the team are exposed to the given risks.
The increase in the high-voltage allowance (from P45.00 to P55.00), high-pole allowance (from
P30.00 to P40.00), and towing allowance is justified considering the heavy risk the employees
concerned are exposed to. The high-voltage allowance is granted to an employee who is
authorized by the company to actually perform work on or near energized bare lines and bus,
while the high-pole allowance is given to those authorized to climb poles on a height of at least
60 feet from the ground to work thereat. The towing allowance, on the other hand, is granted to
the stockman drivers who tow trailers with long poles and equipment on board. Based on the
nature of the job of these concerned employees, it is imperative to give them these additional
allowances for taking additional risks. These increases are not even commensurate to the danger
the employees concerned are subjected to. Besides, no increase has been given by the company
since 1992.cclxi[39]
We do not, however, subscribe to the Secretarys order granting these allowances to the members
of the team who are not exposed to the given risks. The reason is obvious- no risk, no pay. To
award them the said allowances would be manifestly unfair for the company and even to those
who are exposed to the risks, as well as to the other members of the bargaining unit who do not
receive the said allowances.
10. BENEFITS FOR COLLECTORS
MERALCO opposes the Secretarys grant of benefits for collectors on the ground that this is
grossly unreasonable both in scope and on the premise it is founded.
We have considered the arguments of the opposing parties regarding these benefits and find the
Secretarys ruling on the (a) lunch allowance; (b) disconnection fee for delinquent accounts; (c)
voluntary performance of other work at the instance of the Company; (d) bobcat belt bags; and
(e) reduction of quota and MAPL during typhoons and other force majeure events, reasonable
considering the risks taken by the company personnel involved, the nature of the employees
functions and responsibilities and the prevailing standard of living. We do not however subscribe
to the Secretarys award on the following:
(a) Reduction of quota and MAPL when the collector is on sick leave because the previous
CBA has already provided for a reduction of this demand. There is no need to further
reduce this.
(b) Deposit of cash bond at MESALA because this is no longer necessary in view of the fact
that collectors are no longer required to post a bond.
We shall now resolve the non-economic issues.
1. SCOPE OF THE BARGAINING UNIT
The Secretarys ruling on this issue states that:
a. Scope of the collective bargaining unit. The union is demanding that the collective bargaining
unit shall be composed of all regular rank and file employees hired by the company in all its
offices and operating centers through its franchise and those it may employ by reason of
expansion, reorganization or as a result of operational exigencies. The law is that only
managerial employees are excluded from any collective bargaining unit and supervisors are now
allowed to form their own union (Art. 254 of the Labor Code as amended by R.A. 6715). We
grant the union demand.
Both MERALCO and the Office of the Solicitor General dispute this ruling because if disregards
the rule We have established on the exclusion of confidential employee from the rank and file
bargaining unit.
In Pier 8 Arrastre vs. Confesor and General Maritime and Stevedores Union,cclxii[40] we
ruled that:
Put another way, the confidential employee does not share in the same community of interest that
might otherwise make him eligible to join his rank and file co-workers, precisely because of a
conflict in those interests.
Thus, in Metrolab Industries vs. Roldan-Confesor,cclxiii[41] We ruled:
..that the Secretarys order should exclude the confidential employees from the regular rank and
file employees qualified to become members of the MEWA bargaining unit.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that employees holding a confidential position are
prohibited from joining the union of the rank and file employees.
2. ISSUE OF UNION SECURITY
The Secretary in his Order of August 19, 1996,cclxiv[42] ruled that:
b. Union recognition and security. The union is proposing that it be recognized by the Company
as sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees included in the
bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining regarding rates of pay, wages, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment. For this reason, the Company shall agree to
meet only with the Union officers and its authorized representatives on all matters involving the
Union as an organization and all issues arising from the implementation and interpretation of the
new CBA. Towards this end, the Company shall not entertain any individual or group of
individuals on matters within the exclusive domain of the Union.
Additionally, the Union is demanding that the right of all rank and file employees to join the
Union shall be recognized by the Company. Accordingly, all rank and file employees shall join
the union.
xxx xxx xxx
These demands are fairly reasonable. We grant the same in accordance with the maintenance of
membership principle as a form of union security."
The Secretary reconsidered this portion of his original order when he said in his December 28,
1996 order that:
x x x. when we decreed that all rank and file employees shall join the Union, we were actually
decreeing the incorporation of a closed shop form of union security in the CBA between the
parties. In Ferrer v. NLRC, 224 SCRA 410, the Supreme Court ruled that a CBA provision for a
closed shop is a valid form of union security and is not a restriction on the right or freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution, citing Lirag v. Blanco, 109 SCRA 87.
MERALCO objected to this ruling on the grounds that: (a) it was never questioned by the
parties; (b) there is no evidence presented that would justify the restriction on employee's union
membership; and (c) the Secretary cannot rule on the union security demand because this is not a
mandatory subject for collective bargaining agreement.
We agree with MERALCOs contention.
An examination of the records of the case shows that the union did not ask for a closed shop
security regime; the Secretary in the first instance expressly stated that a maintenance of
membership clause should govern; neither MERALCO nor MEWA raised the issue of union
security in their respective motions for reconsideration of the Secretarys first disputed order; and
that despite the parties clear acceptance of the Secretarys first ruling, the Secretary motu proprio
reconsidered his maintenance of membership ruling in favor of the more stringent union shop
regime.
Under these circumstances, it is indubitably clear that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion
when he ordered a union shop in his order of December 28, 1996. The distinctions between a
maintenance of membership regime from a closed shop and their consequences in the
relationship between the union and the company are well established and need no further
elaboration.
Consequently, We rule that the maintenance of membership regime should govern at

MERALCO in accordance with the Secretarys order of August 19, 1996 which neither party
disputed.
3. THE CONTRACTING OUT ISSUE
This issue is limited to the validity of the requirement that the union be consulted before the
implementation of any contracting out that would last for 6 months or more. Proceeding from our
ruling in San Miguel Employees Union-PTGWO vs Bersamina,cclxv[43] (where we recognized
that contracting out of work is a proprietary right of the employer in the exercise of an inherent
management prerogative) the issue we see is whether the Secretarys consultation requirement is
reasonable or unduly restrictive of the companys management prerogative. We note that the
Secretary himself has considered that management should not be hampered in the operations of
its business when he said that:
We feel that the limitations imposed by the union advocates are too specific and may not be
applicable to the situations that the company and the union may face in the future. To our mind,
the greater risk with this type of limitation is that it will tend to curtail rather than allow the
business growth that the company and the union must aspire for. Hence, we are for the general
limitations we have stated above because they will allow a calibrated response to specific future
situations the company and the union may face.cclxvi[44]
Additionally, We recognize that contracting out is not unlimited; rather, it is a prerogative that
management enjoys subject to well-defined legal limitations. As we have previously held, the
company can determine in its best business judgment whether it should contract out the
performance of some of its work for as long as the employer is motivated by good faith, and the
contracting out must not have been resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the
result of malicious or arbitrary action.cclxvii[45] The Labor Code and its implementing rules
also contain specific rules governing contracting out (Department of Labor Order No. 10, May
30, 1997, Sections. 1-25).
Given these realities, we recognize that a balance already exist in the parties relationship with
respect to contracting out; MERALCO has its legally defined and protected management
prerogatives while workers are guaranteed their own protection through specific labor provisions
and the recognition of limits to the exercise of management prerogatives. From these premises,
we can only conclude that the Secretarys added requirement only introduces an imbalance in the
parties collective bargaining relationship on a matter that the law already sufficiently regulates.
Hence, we rule that the Secretarys added requirement, being unreasonable, restrictive and
potentially disruptive should be struck down.
4. UNION REPRESENTATION IN COMMITTEES
As regards this issue, We quote with approval the holding of the Secretary in his Order of
December 28, 1996, to wit:
We see no convincing reason to modify our original Order on union representation in

committees. It reiterates what the Article 211 (A)(g) of the Labor Codes provides: To ensure the
participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their rights, duties
and welfare. Denying this opportunity to the Union is to lay the claim that only management has
the monopoly of ideas that may improve management strategies in enhancing the Companys
growth. What every company should remember is that there might be one among the Union
members who may offer productive and viable ideas on expanding the Companys business
horizons. The unions participation in such committees might just be the opportune time for
dormant ideas to come forward. So, the Company must welcome this development (see also PAL
v. NLRC, et. al., G.R. 85985, August 13, 1995). It must be understood, however, that the
committees referred to here are the Safety Committee, the Uniform Committee and other
committees of a similar nature and purpose involving personnel welfare, rights and benefits as
well as duties.
We do not find merit in MERALCOs contention that the above-quoted ruling of the Secretary is
an intrusion into the management prerogatives of MERALCO. It is worthwhile to note that all
the Union demands and what the Secretarys order granted is that the Union be allowed to
participate in policy formulation and decision-making process on matters affecting the Union
members right, duties and welfare as required in Article 211 (A)(g) of the Labor Code. And
this can only be done when the Union is allowed to have representatives in the Safety
Committee, Uniform Committee and other committees of a similar nature. Certainly, such
participation by the Union in the said committees is not in the nature of a co-management control
of the business of MERALCO. What is granted by the Secretary is participation and
representation. Thus, there is no impairment of management prerogatives.
5. INCLUSION OF ALL TERMS AND CONDITIONS IN THE CBA
MERALCO also decries the Secretarys ruling in both the assailed Orders that-
All other benefits being enjoyed by the companys employees but which are not expressly or
impliedly repealed in this new agreement shall remain subsisting and shall likewise be included
in the new collective bargaining agreement to be signed by the parties effective December 1,
1995.cclxviii[46]
claiming that the above-quoted ruling intruded into the employers freedom to contract by
ordering the inclusion in the new CBA all other benefits presently enjoyed by the employees
even if they are not incorporated in the new CBA. This matter of inclusion, MERALCO argues,
was never discussed and agreed upon in the negotiations; nor presented as issues before the
Secretary; nor were part of the previous CBAs between the parties.
We agree with MERALCO.
The Secretary acted in excess of the discretion allowed him by law when he ordered the
inclusion of benefits, terms and conditions that the law and the parties did not intend to be
reflected in their CBA.
To avoid the possible problems that the disputed orders may bring, we are constrained to rule
that only the terms and conditions already existing in the current CBA and was granted by the
Secretary (subject to the modifications decreed in this decision) should be incorporated in the
CBA, and that the Secretarys disputed orders should accordingly be modified.
6. RETROACTIVITY OF THE CBA
Finally, MERALCO also assails the Secretarys order that the effectivity of the new CBA shall
retroact to December 1, 1995, the date of the commencement of the last two years of the
effectivity of the existing CBA. This retroactive date, MERALCO argues, is contrary to the
ruling of this Court in Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Roldan-
Confessorcclxix[47] which mandates that the effective date of the new CBA should be the date
the Secretary of Labor has resolved the labor disputes.
On the other hand, MEWA supports the ruling of the Secretary on the theory that he has plenary
power and discretion to fix the date of effectivity of his arbitral award citing our ruling in St.
Lukes Medical Center, Inc. vs. Torres.cclxx[48] MEWA also contends that if the arbitral award
takes effect on the date of the Secretary Labors ruling on the parties motion for reconsideration
(i.e., on December 28, 1996), an anomaly situation will result when CBA would be more than
the 5-year term mandated by Article 253-A of the Labor Code.
However, neither party took into account the factors necessary for a proper resolution of this
aspect. Pier 8, for instance, does not involve a mid-term negotiation similar to this case, while St.
Lukes does not take the hold over principle into account, i.e., the rule that although a CBA has
expired, it continues to have legal effects as between the parties until a new CBA has been
entered into.cclxxi[49]
Article 253-A serves as the guide in determining when the effectivity of the CBA at bar is to take
effect. It provides that the representation aspect of the CBA is to be for a term of 5 years, while
x x x [A]ll other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be re-negotiated not
later than 3 years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement entered into within 6 months from the date of expiry of the term of such
other provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining Agreement shall retroact to the day
immediately following such date. If such agreement is entered into beyond 6 months, the parties
shall agree on the duration of the effectivity thereof. x x x.
Under these terms, it is clear that the 5-year term requirement is specific to the representation
aspect. What the law additionally requires is that a CBA must be re-negotiated within 3 years
after its execution. It is in this re-negotiation that gives rise to the present CBA deadlock.
If no agreement is reached within 6 months from the expiry date of the 3 years that follow the
CBA execution, the law expressly gives the parties - not anybody else - the discretion to fix the
effectivity of the agreement.
Significantly, the law does not specifically cover the situation where 6 months have elapsed but
no agreement has been reached with respect to effectivity. In this eventuality, we hold that any
provision of law should then apply for the law abhors a vacuum.cclxxii[50]
One such provision is the principle of hold over, i.e., that in the absence of a new CBA, the
parties must maintain the status quo and must continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement until a new agreement is reached.cclxxiii[51] In this
manner, the law prevents the existence of a gap in the relationship between the collective
bargaining parties. Another legal principle that should apply is that in the absence of an
agreement between the parties, then, an arbitrated CBA takes on the nature of any judicial or
quasi-judicial award; it operates and may be executed only respectively unless there are legal
justifications for its retroactive application.
Consequently, we find no sufficient legal ground on the other justification for the retroactive
application of the disputed CBA, and therefore hold that the CBA should be effective for a term
of 2 years counted from December 28, 1996 (the date of the Secretary of Labors disputed order
on the parties motion for reconsideration) up to December 27, 1999.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor
dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent set forth above. The
parties are directed to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and
conditions contained in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labors order of August 19,
1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth above. The retirement fund issue is
remanded to the Secretary of Labor for reception of evidence and determination of the legal
personality of the MERALCO retirement fund.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Melo, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
x. Learned Treaties
xi. Testimony or disposition at a former proceeding: People
of the Philippines vs Ortiz Miyako
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 115338-39. September 16, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE accused-

appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo
and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in
the same court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan alone.
The information in the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case No. 92-6153
reads as follows:
That in or about the period comprised from June 1992 to August 1992, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, falsely representing herself to have the capacity and power to contract,
enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously collect for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to the
following persons, to wit: 1) Rosamar del Rosario; 2) Elenita Marasigan; 3) Imelda Generillo,
without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment, thus amounting to illegal recruitment in large scale, in violation of the aforecited
law. cclxxiv[1]
The information in the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-6154 alleges:
That in or about or sometime in the month of August, 1992, in the Municipality of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud, falsely pretending to have the capacity and power to send complainant Elenita
Marasigan to work abroad, succeeded in inducing the latter to give and deliver to her the total
sum of P23,000.00, the accused knowing fully well that the said manifestations and
representation are false and fraudulent and calculated only to deceive the said complainant to
part with her money, and, once in possession thereof, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, apply and convert the same to her own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Elenita Marasigan, in the
aforementioned amount of P23,000.00. cclxxv[2]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and the cases were tried jointly in
Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Of the three complainants in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale, Marasigan was the
only one who testified at the trial. The two other complainants, Generillo and Del Rosario, were
unable to testify as they were then abroad.
Marasigan testified that she was a 32 year-old unmarried sales representative in 1992 when she
was introduced to appellant by her co-complainants. cclxxvi[3] Appellant promised Marasigan a job
as a factory worker in Taiwan for a P5,000.00 fee. At that time, Marasigan had a pending
application for overseas employment pending in a recruitment agency. Realizing that the fee
charged by appellant was much lower than that of the agency, Marasigan withdrew her money
from the agency and gave it to appellant. cclxxvii[4]
Marasigan paid appellant P5,000.00, but she was later required to make additional payments. By
the middle of the year, she had paid a total of P23,000.00 on installment basis. cclxxviii[5] Save for
two receipts, cclxxix[6] Marasigan was not issued receipts for the foregoing payments despite her
persistence in requesting for the same.
Marasigan was assured by appellant that obtaining a Taiwanese visa would not be a problem.
cclxxx[7] She was also shown a plane ticket to Taiwan, allegedly issued in her name. cclxxxi[8]
Appellant issued Marasigan a photocopy of her plane ticket, cclxxxii[9] the original of which was
promised to be given to her before her departure. cclxxxiii[10]
Marasigan was never issued a visa. cclxxxiv[11] Neither was she given the promised plane ticket.
Unable to depart for Taiwan, she went to the travel agency which issued the ticket and was
informed that not only was she not booked by appellant for the alleged flight, but that the staff in
the agency did not even know appellant.
Later, Marasigan proceeded to the supposed residence of appellant and was informed that
appellant did not live there. cclxxxv[12] Upon verification with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), it was revealed that appellant was not authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment. cclxxxvi[13] Marasigan wanted to recover her money but, by then, appellant
could no longer be located.
The prosecution sought to prove that Generillo and Del Rosario, the two other complainants in
the illegal recruitment case, were also victimized by appellant. In lieu of their testimonies, the
prosecution presented as witnesses Lilia Generillo, the mother of Imelda Generillo, and Victoria
Amin, the sister of Del Rosario.
Lilia Generillo claimed that she gave her daughter P8,000.00 to cover her application for
placement abroad which was made through appellant. cclxxxvii[14] Twice, she accompanied her
daughter to the residence of appellant so that she could meet her; however, she was not involved
in the transactions between her daughter and appellant. cclxxxviii[15] Neither was she around when
payments were made to appellant. Imelda Generillo was unable to leave for abroad and Lilia
Generillo concluded that she had become a victim of illegal recruitment.
The prosecution presented Victoria Amin, the sister of Rosamar Del Rosario, to show that the
latter was also a victim of illegal recruitment. Victoria Amin testified that appellant was
supposed to provide her sister a job abroad. She claimed that she gave her sister a total of
P10,000.00 which was intended to cover the latters processing fee. cclxxxix[16]
Victoria Amin never met appellant and was not around when her sister made payments. She
assumed that the money was paid to appellant based on receipts, allegedly issued by appellant,
which her sister showed her. ccxc[17] Del Rosario was unable to leave for abroad despite the
representations of appellant. Victoria Amin claimed that her sister, like Marasigan and Generillo,
was a victim of illegal recruitment.
The final witness for the prosecution was Riza Balberte, ccxci[18] a representative of the POEA,
who testified that appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment, POEA certificate certification. ccxcii[19]
Upon the foregoing evidence, the prosecution sought to prove that although two of the three
complainants in the illegal recruitment case were unable to testify, appellant was guilty of
committing the offense against all three complainants and, therefore, should be convicted as
charged.
On the other hand, appellant, who was the sole witness for the defense, denied that she recruited
the complainants for overseas employment and claimed that the payments made to her were
solely for purchasing plane tickets at a discounted rate as she had connections with a travel
agency. ccxciii[20]
She denied that she was paid by Marasigan the amount of P23,000.00, claiming that she was paid
only P8,000.00, as shown by a receipt. She further insisted that, through the travel agency,
ccxciv[21] she was able to purchase discounted plane tickets for the complainants upon partial
payment of the ticket prices, the balance of which she guaranteed. According to her, the
complainants were supposed to pay her the balance but because they failed to do so, she was
obliged to pay the entire cost of each ticket.
The evidence presented by the parties were thus contradictory but the trial court found the
prosecutions evidence more credible. On December 17, 1993, judgment was rendered by said
court convicting appellant of both crimes as charged. ccxcv[22]
In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous
decision of Branch 78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque as a basis for the judgment.
Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa promulgated on July 26, 1993, ccxcvi[23]
rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 74852-53, involving the same circumstances in the instant case,
wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa.
This decision was not appealed and had become final and executory.
In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the decision therein of the Regional
Trial Court stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were the same as those in the illegal
recruitment case before it. It, therefore, adopted the facts and conclusions established in the
earlier decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale for the conviction in the case
before it. ccxcvii[24]
In Criminal Case No. 92-6153, the Makati court sentenced appellant to serve the penalty of life
imprisonment for illegal recruitment in large scale, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00.
Appellant was also ordered to reimburse the complainants the following payments made to her,
viz.: (a) Marasigan, P23,000.00; (b) Generillo, P2,500.00; and (c) Del Rosario, P2,500.00.
In the same judgment and for the estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 92-6154, the Makati court
sentenced appellant to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
In the instant petition, appellant seeks the reversal of the foregoing judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati convicting her of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. Specifically,
she insists that the trial court erred in convicting her of illegal recruitment in large scale as the
evidence presented was insufficient.
Moreover, appellant claims that she is not guilty of acts constituting illegal recruitment, in large
scale or otherwise, because contrary to the findings of the trial court, she did not recruit the
complainants but merely purchased plane tickets for them. Finally, she contends that in
convicting her of estafa, the lower court erred as she did not misappropriate the money paid to
her by Marasigan, hence there was no damage to the complainants which would substantiate the
conviction.
We uphold the finding that appellant is guilty but we are, compelled to modify the judgment for
the offenses she should be convicted of and the corresponding penalties therefor.
Appellant maintains that her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale is erroneous. It is
her view that in the prosecution of a case for such offense, at least three complainants are
required to appear as witnesses in the trial and, since Marasigan was the only complainant
presented as a witness, the conviction was groundless.
The Solicitor General also advocates the conviction of appellant for simple illegal recruitment
which provides a lower penalty. The Court finds the arguments of the Solicitor General
meritorious and adopts his position.
The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as x x x any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not x
x x. ccxcviii[25]
Illegal recruitment is likewise defined and made punishable under the Labor Code, thus:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. -
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39
hereof.
x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.
Art. 39. Penalties. -
(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
shall be imposed if Illegal Recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein;
xxx
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating
any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof,
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years or
a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00, or both such imprisonment and
fine, at the discretion of the court. x x x ccxcix[26]
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, was passed increasing the penalty for illegal
recruitment. This new law, however, does not apply to the instant case because the offense
charged herein was committed in 1992, before the effectivity of said Republic Act No. 8042.
Hence, what are applicable are the aforecited Labor Code provisions.
It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of persons victimized is determinative.
Where illegal recruitment is committed against a lone victim, the accused may be convicted of
simple illegal recruitment which is punishable with a lower penalty under Article 39(c) of the
Labor Code. Corollarily, where the offense is committed against three or more persons, it is
qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a)
of the same Code.
The position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of appellant should be merely for the
lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment. He submits that the Regional Trial Court of Makati
erred in convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale because the conviction was
based on an earlier decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque where appellant was
found guilty of estafa committed against Generillo and Del Rosario.
It is argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of
the Paraaque court to show that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del
Rosario as well. Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven to have been committed against only
one person, particularly, Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may only be held guilty of
simple illegal recruitment and not of such offense in large scale.
He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the facts in the decision of the
Paraaque court for estafa to constitute the basis of the subsequent conviction for illegal
recruitment is erroneous as it is a violation of the right of appellant to confront the witnesses, that
is, complainants Generillo and Del Rosario, during trial before it. He cites the pertinent provision
of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled:
xxx
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize
as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot, with due
diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
xxx
It will be noted that the principle embodied in the foregoing rule is likewise found in the
following provision of Rule 130:
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a

witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation.
Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second,
to allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying.
ccc[27]
This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or
produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous
testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay
rule. ccci[28] The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the administration of
justice orderly and expeditious. cccii[29]
Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the
Paraaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the
exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses
made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or
judgments.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo
and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and
utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the
previous decision in the estafa case.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused
was previously convicted of a crime. ccciii[30] It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty
of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission
of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for
conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him.
As earlier stated, the Makati courts utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the
Paraaque court must be rejected. Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by
a trial court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be
based merely on the findings of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is only
its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon
which the decision is based.
Furthermore, this is not the only reason why appellant may not be held liable for illegal
recruitment in large scale. An evaluation of the evidence presented before the trial court shows
us that, apart from the adopted decision in the previous estafa case, there was no other basis for
said trial courts conclusion that illegal recruitment in large scale was committed against all three
complainants.
The distinction between simple illegal recruitment and illegal recruitment in large scale are
emphasized by jurisprudence. Simple illegal recruitment is committed where a person: (a)
undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. ccciv[31] On the other
hand, illegal recruitment in large scale further requires a third element, that is, the offense is
committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group. cccv[32]
In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does not require that at least three victims
testify at the trial, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was
committed against three or more persons. This Court agrees with the trial court that the evidence
presented sufficiently proves that illegal recruitment was committed by appellant against
Marasigan, but the same conclusion cannot be made as regards Generillo and Del Rosario as
well.
The testimonies of Generillos mother, Lilia Generillo, and Del Rosarios sister, Victoria Amin,
reveal that these witnesses had no personal knowledge of the actual circumstances surrounding
the charges filed by Generillo and Del Rosario for illegal recruitment in large scale. Neither of
these witnesses was privy to the transactions between appellant and each of the two
complainants. The witnesses claimed that appellant illegally recruited Generillo and Del Rosario.
Nonetheless, we find their averments to be unfounded as they were not even present when
Generillo and Del Rosario negotiated with and made payments to appellant.
For insufficiency of evidence and in the absence of the third element of illegal recruitment in
large scale, particularly, that the offense is committed against three or more persons, we cannot
affirm the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale. Nonetheless, we agree with the
finding of the trial court that appellant illegally recruited Marasigan, for which she must be held
liable for the lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment.
Appellants defense that she did not recruit Marasigan but merely purchased a plane ticket for her
is belied by the evidence as it is undeniable that she represented to Marasigan that she had the
ability to send people to work as factory workers in Taiwan. Her pretext that the fees paid to her
were merely payments for a plane ticket is a desperate attempt to exonerate herself from the
charges and cannot be sustained.
Furthermore, no improper motive may be attributed to Marasigan in charging appellant. The fact
that Marasigan was poor does not make her so heartless as to contrive a criminal charge against
appellant. She was a simple woman with big dreams and it was appellants duplicity which
reduced those dreams to naught. Marasigan had no motive to testify falsely against appellant
except to tell the truth. cccvi[33]
Besides, if there was anyone whose testimony needed corroboration, it was appellant as there
was nothing in her testimony except the bare denial of the accusations. cccvii[34] If appellant really
intended to purchase a plane ticket and not to recruit Marasigan, she should have presented
evidence to support this claim. Also, in her testimony, appellant named an employee in the travel
agency who was allegedly her contact person for the purchase of the ticket. She could have
presented that person, or some other employee of the agency, to show that the transaction was
merely for buying a ticket. Her failure to do the foregoing acts belies her pretensions.
The Court likewise affirms the conviction of appellant for estafa which was committed against
Marasigan. Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment does not preclude
punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the felony of estafa. cccviii[35] This Court is
convinced that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant violated Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that estafa is committed:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The evidence is clear that in falsely pretending to possess power to deploy persons for overseas
placement, appellant deceived the complainant into believing that she would provide her a job in
Taiwan. Her assurances made Marasigan exhaust whatever resources she had to pay the
placement fee required in exchange for the promised job. The elements of deceit and damage for
this form of estafa are indisputably present, hence the conviction for estafa in Criminal Case No.
92-6154 should be affirmed.
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused found guilty of estafa shall be sentenced to:
x x x The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos x x x. cccix[36]
The amount involved in the estafa case is P23,000.00. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the maximum period of the foregoing basic
penalty, specifically, within the range of imprisonment from six (6) years, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years.
On the other hand, the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower in degree to that provided by law, without considering the incremental
penalty for the amount in excess of P22,000.00. cccx[37] That penalty immediately lower in degree
is prison correccional in its minimum and medium periods, with a duration of six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. On these considerations, the trial court
correctly fixed the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate sentence in the estafa
case.
While we must be vigilant and should punish, to the fullest extent of the law, those who prey
upon the desperate with empty promises of better lives, only to feed on their aspirations, we must
not be heedless of the basic rule that a conviction may be sustained only where it is for the
correct offense and the burden of proof of the guilt of the accused has been met by the
prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case
No. 92-6153) and estafa (Criminal Case No. 92-6154) is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1) Accused-appellant is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple illegal recruitment, as

defined in Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended. She is hereby ordered to serve an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of P100,000.00.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-6154 for estafa, herein accused-appellant is ordered to serve an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to reimburse Elenita Marasigan
the sum of P23,000.00.
In all other respects, the aforestated judgment is AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-
appellant in both instances.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Go vs People of the Philippines
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,
Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to
preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It
cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a
prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused
of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioners
seek to nullify and set aside the February 19, 2008 Decision1 and November 28, 2008
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99383, which reversed the
September 12, 2006 Order3 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27 in
Civil Case No. 06-114844 and upheld the grant of the prosecutions motion to take the testimony
of a witness by oral depositions in Laos, Cambodia.
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) docketed as Criminal Case No. 396447. The Information4 dated September 24, 2003, later
amended5 on September 14, 2004, reads:
"That sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping, in the following
manner, to wit: all said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
which they made to said Li Luen Ping to the effect that they have chattels such as machinery,
spare parts, equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial
Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles,
Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of $464,266.90 or its
peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML Resources and Highdone
Company Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in
fact the accused well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and
foreclosed by CHINA BANK CORPORATION as early as September 1994 thereby causing
damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD., in the said amount of
$464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less."
Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos,
Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing
held on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his
unavailability.
On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral
Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the
Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make
the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition,7 the MeTC granted8 the motion after the prosecution
complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought
its reconsideration which the MeTC denied,9 prompting petitioners to file a Petition for
Certiorari10 before the RTC.
On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and
void.11 The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil
cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of
Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which
is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness
against him face to face.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an Order dated March 5,
2006,12 the prosecution elevated the case to the CA.
On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held that no grave abuse
of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the
complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of
depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity
to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking of the
oral deposition either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the
deposition of the witness.
On November 28, 2008, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition alleging that
I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT INFRINGED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
OF THE PETITIONERS TO A PUBLIC TRIAL IN ALLOWING THE TAKING OF
THE DEPOSITION OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA.
II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEPOSITION

TAKING OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA IS AN
INFRINGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO
CONFRONT THE SAID WITNESS FACE TO FACE.
III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDICIAL

LEGISLATION COMMITTED BY THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN
APPLYING THE RULES ON DEPOSITION-TAKING IN CIVIL CASES TO
CRIMINAL CASES.
IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING THE TRADITIONAL

DEFINITION OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, OVERLOOKING THE
ESTABLISHED RULE THAT VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW
OR JURISPRUDENCE SIMILARLY COMES WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
We rule in favor of petitioners.
The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered

Under Section 15, Rule 119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.13 This is true
especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public
trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility
through his manner and deportment while testifying.14 It is not without exceptions, however, as
the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination
of witnesses both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling
in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos15 explicitly states that
"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of
discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to
perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings,
Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect
on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution
witnesses." (Underscoring supplied)16
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil
cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or
person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a

foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the
other party.17
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be
made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the
clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent
provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than
the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the
motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos,
Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the
provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially
provides that he should be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending.
Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to
require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor
and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of
deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines
whether the deponent is sick or not.18 (Underscoring supplied)
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very
same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.
This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra19 where we further declared that
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to
prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the
accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls
for a strict construction of the rules.20 (Underscoring supplied)
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both
civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine
consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances.
However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial examination of an

unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case of
Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure
apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of
civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we
find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise." (Underscoring supplied)
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused
to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses
The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and overlooked
fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right to
a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. Section 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution provides as follows:
Section 14. (1) x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied)
In dismissing petitioners' apprehensions concerning the deprivation of their constitutional rights

to a public trial and confrontation, the CA opined that petitioners would still be accorded the
right to cross-examine the deponent witness and raise their objections during the deposition-
taking in the same manner as in a regular court trial.
We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a
public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness
in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of
People v. Estenzo,21 the Court noted the uniqueness and significance of a witness testifying in
open court, thus:
"The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to
secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to
an eminent authority, "demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the
witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot
be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers."
There is also the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this it enables the judge as
trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while
testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the
witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and
expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the
physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory,
and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be
observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. x x x"22 (Underscoring
supplied)1wphi1
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal
proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the
testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the
deportment of witnesses.23 The Court explained in People v. Seneris24 that the constitutional
requirement "insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by
the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable
instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe
the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility."25
As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to be tried as far as
facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination,"26 it is properly viewed
as a guarantee against the use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials. In the American case of
Crawford v. Washington,27 the US Supreme Court had expounded on the procedural intent of the
confrontation requirement, thus:
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment's right to confront witness face to face protection to the vagaries of the rules of
evidence, much less to amorphous notions of "reliability". Certainly, none of the authorities
discussed above acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common-law rule.
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of
confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but
that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.
The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point
on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined."
(Underscoring supplied)
The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours with the Instant Case
The CA found the frail and infirm condition of the prosecution witness as sufficient and
compelling reason to uphold the MeTC Orders granting the deposition-taking, following the
ruling in the case of People v. Webb28 that the taking of an unavailable witness' deposition is in
the nature of a discovery procedure the use of which is within the trial court's sound discretion
which needs only to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the
law.29
But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the factual settings are not
similar.1wphi1 The accused in the Webb case had sought to take the oral deposition of five
defense witnesses before a Philippine consular agent in lieu of presenting them as live witnesses,
alleging that they were all residents of the United States who could not be compelled by
subpoena to testify in court. The trial court denied the motion of the accused but the CA differed
and ordered the deposition taken. When the matter was raised before this Court, we sustained the
trial court's disallowance of the deposition-taking on the limited ground that there was no
necessity for the procedure as the matter sought to be proved by way of deposition was
considered merely corroborative of the evidence for the defense.30
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining witness against the
accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating
the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the
initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen
Ping's old age and fragile constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the
prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken
before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it
should have been imperative for the prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen
Ping's testimony at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a non-resident alien who
can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of return. Obviously, the prosecution
allowed its main witness to leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure
intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to no
other party.
Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional examination before the MeTC prior
to said witness' becoming sick and unavailable, the prosecution would capitalize upon its own
failure by pleading for a liberal application of the rules on depositions. It must be emphasized
that while the prosecution must provide the accused every opportunity to take the deposition of
witnesses that are material to his defense in order to avoid charges of violating the right of the
accused to compulsory process, the State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is
to guard against accusations of violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against
him face to face. Great care must be observed in the taking and use of depositions of prosecution
witnesses to the end that no conviction of an accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and
deposition.31
Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for taking
the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld the trial court's order
allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take place in a venue other than
the court where the case is pending. This was certainly grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 19,
2008 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court which disallowed the
deposition-taking in Laos, Cambodia is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate justice
xii. Child Witness Rule: People of the Philippines vs Ibanez
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 197813 September 25, 2013

vs.
EDWIN IBANEZ y ALBANTE and ALFREDO (FREDDIE) NULLA y IBANEZ, Accused-
appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal via a Notice of Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04051.1 The appellate court affirmed in toto the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch18, Malolos, Bulacan which convicted accused-appellants Edwin
Ibaez y Albante (Edwin) and Alfredo Nulla y Ibaez (Alfredo) of Murder in Criminal Case No.
3517-M-2004.
Appellants Edwin and Alfredo, with Jesus Monsillo y Taniares (Jesus), were all charged in an
Information for Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Jesus Montisillo y Taniares @ Dodong,
Edwin Ibaez y Albante and Alfredo(Freddie) Nulla y Ibaez of the crime of murder, penalized
under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 2004, in the municipality of Bocaue, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a soil digger (bareta) and with intent to kill one Wilfredo Atendido y
Dohenog, conspiring, confederating and helping one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery,
attack, assault and hit with the said soildigger (bareta) the said Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog,
hitting the latter on his head, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which directly
caused his death.3
During arraignment, Edwin and Alfredo pleaded not guilty. Jesus, on the other hand, remained at
large; the case against him was archived. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecutions version was testified to by the victims wife and daughter, in succession.
On that fateful day, Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog (Wilfredo) was invited by Alfredo to a
drinking session with Jesus and Edwin making them a party of four. Rachel, Wilfredos
daughter, an adolescent at the time, was underneath the house (silong in the vernacular) of a
neighbor, three (3)meters away from the place where Wilfredo and his companions were
ostensibly in merrymaking.
Rachel saw her father step away from the group to urinate. While Wilfredo relieved himself,
Edwin snatched a t-shirt from a nearby clothesline, and hooded the t-shirt over the head and face
of Wilfredo. Robbed of vision as his head was fully covered, Wilfredo was wrestled and pinned
down by Edwin, while Alfredo boxed the left side of Wilfredos chest. Jesus, armed with a long
iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo in the head. Terrified, Rachel stood immobilized as she
watched the attack on father. Thereafter, she saw her mother running out of their house and
crying for help.
On that same auspicious date, 29 August 2004, Rowena, Wilfredos wife and Rachels mother,
was inside their house taking care of their youngest daughter. She heard a commotion coming
from the neighboring house, about eight (8) steps away, so she rushed in that direction. Once
outside their house, she saw Wilfredo prostrate on the ground covered with blood on his face and
forehead. Upon reaching Wilfredo, Rowena saw accused Jesus, standing one meter away from
Wilfredo, holding an iron bar. Edwin and Alfredo stood beside Jesus; Edwin held a white shirt.
Forthwith, Jesus and Alfredo ran away while Edwin went home. Rowena asked for help to bring
Wilfredo to the hospital. However, Wilfredo did not reach the hospital alive and was pronounced
dead on arrival.
Expectedly, the defense mainly of Edwin and Alfredo, proffered an altogether different version
of the events.
The two accused-appellants pointed to Jesus as the sole culprit, proclaimed their innocence and
professed to being at the scene of the crime only because of their curiosity for what had occurred.
Allegedly, on that day, the two buddies were having their regular drinking session at Edwins
house when they heard a commotion outside. Curious about the ruckus, they approached and saw
Wilfredo prostrate on the ground; Jesus, held an iron bar and was being held back by his sister
who was shouting, "Tama na! Tama na!." Edwin then called for a tricycle so Wilfredo could be
brought to a hospital and given medical attention. Alfredo stood by and merely watched as
events transpired.
To corroborate their claim of innocence, the defense called Aniceta Dosil (Aniceta) to the
witness stand who testified as follows:
(1) She sold doormats for a living which she peddled on the road;
(2) On 29 August 2004, Rachel helped her in selling the doormats;
(3) On that day, they finished at around 6:00 p.m. and headed to their respective
residences along the railroad track;
(4) Upon arriving at their vicinity, Aniceta witnessed the immediate aftermath of the
purported fight between Jesus and Wilfredo;
(5) At that juncture, Jesus was being embraced by his sister, Marilou, and the two were
two meters away from the body of Wilfredo;
(6) Marilou recounted to Aniceta that Jesus had hit Wilfredo with an iron bar, a
preemptive move because Wilfredo was about to stab Jesus;
(7) While Aniceta and Marilou discussed the incident, Rachel stood and listened to them;
(8) At that time, only the four of them, Jesus, Marilou, Aniceta and Rachel, were at the
place of the incident;
(9) After learning the entirety of what had transpired, Aniceta, who was afraid to get
involved, and Rachel, ran to their respective houses;
(10) For the duration of the day, Aniceta did not step out of her house, neither did she
volunteer information to the police when the case was investigated in the following days;
and
(11) Aniceta only came forward to testify at the request of Adela Ibaez, wife of Edwin.
As previously adverted to, the trial court convicted Edwin and Alfredo of Murder. It disposed of
the case, to wit:
WHEREFORE, accused Edwin Ibaez y Albante and Alfredo (Freddie) Nulla y Ibaez are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and are hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Wilfredo D.
Atendido in the amount of:
a) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity;
b) Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages;
c) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
d) Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
e) One Million Nine Hundred Forty-Six Thousand and One Hundred Eighty Pesos
(P1,946,180.00) for the unearned income of Wilfredo Atendido.4
On appeal, Edwin and Alfredo found no reprieve. The Court of Appeals did not deviate from the
RTCs ruling and affirmed in toto its finding of guilt.
In this appeal, Edwin and Alfredo assign the following as errors:
THE LOWER COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULLWEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THEALLEGED PROSECUTION
EYEWITNESS.
II
THE LOWER COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVINGWEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSES EVIDENCE.
III
THE LOWER COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THEACCUSED-
APPELLANTS WHEN THEIR GUILT WAS NOT PROVENBEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.5
In sum, the issue is whether the accused are guilty of murder.
Edwin and Alfredo maintain their innocence and point to Jesus as the sole perpetrator of the
crime. They insist that they were at the scene of the crime only because they wanted to know
what the commotion was all about. They claim that, in fact, Edwin called for a tricycle so
Wilfredo could be brought to a hospital. To discredit the eyewitness testimony of Rachel, they
presented Aniceta who testified that she and Rachel were out on that day selling doormats and
only returned at 6:00 p.m. Thus, Rachel could not have witnessed the murder of Wilfredo.
Both lower courts, however, found the testimony of Rachel credible:
This Court finds the testimony of Rachel clear and convincing. The testimony flows from a
person who was present in the place where the killing occurred. They are replete with details
sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to appellants. We have no reason to doubt Rachels
credibility. Her candid account of the incident, standing alone, clearly established the
components of the crime of murder. Appellants defense of denial, not sufficiently proven,
cannot overcome the conclusions drawn from said evidence. We find no cogent reason to deviate
from the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Rachels testimony was delivered in a firm,
candid, and straightforward manner. There is no showing that Rachel wavered from the basic
facts of her testimony, even when she was subjected to a rigorous examination.
Rachel was only ten (10) years old when she witnessed the murder of the victim. She testified in
open court two (2) years later. Thus, she cannot be expected to give an error-free narration of the
events that happened two years earlier. The alleged inconsistencies between her sworn statement
and testimony referred to by appellants do not affect her credibility. What is important is that in
all her narrations she consistently and clearly identified appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime. Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and the testimony in court do not militate
against witness credibility since sworn statements are generally considered inferior to the
testimony in open court.6
We find no error in the lower courts disposal of the issue.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is that the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of a witness
is accorded the highest respect because of its direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the
stand and to determine if they are telling the truth or not.7 This opportunity enables the trial judge
to detect better that thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the
impersonal record by the reviewing court. Thus, the trial judge's evaluation of the competence
and credibility of a witness will not be disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the records
that his judgment is erroneous.8
We have scrutinized the testimony of lone eyewitness, Rachel. Throughout her testimony, in her
direct, cross and re-direct and re-cross examinations, she candidly recounted the events
surrounding the killing of her father as follows:
PROS. LAGROSA:
Your Honor please, may we invoke the right of the child the provisions (sic) under the child
witness wherein we can ask leading questions and in Tagalog.
COURT:
Anyway, the questions can be interpreted.
PROS. LAGROSA:
Only the leading questions, your Honor.
Q: You said that your father came from sleeping in your house, did you know what time of the
day your father went to sleep?
A: I do not know because I do not know how to read time.
xxxx
Q: But do you know whether or when your father went to sleep? It was morning, noon or
afternoon or nighttime or daytime?
A: "Hapon po." (In the afternoon.)
Q: Early afternoon, late afternoon or mid-afternoon?
A: Late in the afternoon, Your Honor. ("bandang hapon-hapon po.")
Q: Was it already dark?
A: Not yet, your Honor.
PROS. LAGROSA:
Q: According to you, your father went to sleep, where were you when your father went to sleep?
A: I was in the house, maam.
xxxx
Q: And when your father woke up, were you still in the house?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Also inside the house?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: When your father woke up, what did he do?
A: All of us ate rice, maam. ("Kumain po kaming lahat ng kanin.")
Q: Can you tell us if that is already dark or still daytime?
A: It was still daytime, maam.
xxxx
Q: After eating rice, will you tell us what happened, if you still remember?
A: My father was called by his compadre, maam.
Q: And who was that compadre who called your father?
A: Freddie, maam.
Q: Do you know the full name of this Freddie?
A: Freddie Nulla, maam.
Q: Why do you know Freddie Nulla?
A: He is a compadre of my father, maam.
Q: Did you often see him in your place?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Is Freddie Nulla now here in court?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Will you look around and point to him?
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a detention prisoner (sic) when asked to identify himself answered FREDDIE
NULLA.Q: Now, you said that Freddie Nulla, the compadre, called your father, do you still
remember how he was called?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: How?
A: "Pare. Pare."
Q: And when your father was called, what did your father do?
A: My father followed Freddie at the back of the house of Kuya Edwin.
Q: At the time your father followed Freddie at the back of the house of your Kuya Edwin, where
were you?
A: I was under the house of Kuya Unyo, maam.
Q: Now, you mentioned that your father followed Freddie at the back of the house of Kuya
Edwin, who is this Kuya Edwin?
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a detention prisoner who identified himself as EDWIN IBAEZ.PROS.

LAGROSA:
Q: You said that at that time you were under the house of Kuya Unyo, what is the full name of
this Kuya Unyo, if you know?
A: I do not know, maam.
Q: What were you doing under the house of Kuya Unyo?
A: I was throwing stones, maam.
Q: And this house of Kuya Unyo, is that near or far from your house?
A: Just near our house, maam.
Q: Can you point a place here where you are now sitted (sic) up to this courtroom to show the
distance between your house and the house of Kuya Unyo?
PROS. LAGROSA
The witness pointed up to the wall.

ATTY. MALLILLIN:
Can we estimate, your Honor.
A: Just near, maam, 3 to 4 meters.9
xxxx
Q: Rachel, last time you testified that your father followed Freddie Nulla at the back of the house
of Kuya Unyo and at that time you were under the house of Kuya Unyo, do you remember
having stated that last time?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: While you were at the house of Kuya Unyo, do you remember anything unusual that
happened at that time?
A: When my father was being killed, maam.
Q: You said that your father was being killed or "pinapatay na po si papa ko," who killed your
father?
A: Kuya Edwin, Kuya Freddie and Kuya Dodong, maam.
Q: You said that Kuya Freddie, Kuya Edwin and Kuya Dodong were killing your father, how did
Kuya Edwin, how was he killing your father as you said?
A: "Pinuluputan po sa mukha ng damit ni Kuya Edwin." (Kuya Edwin put around a piece of
cloth).
Q: You said that Kuya Edwin put around a piece of cloth on your papa, in what part of your
fathers body (sic) that cloth being put around by Kuya Edwin?
A: He put it around all over the face and the head, maam.
PROS. LAGROSA:
The witness was demonstrating by making a circling movement or motion of her hand all over
the head and the face.
Q: And then what happened when Kuya Edwin put around that piece of cloth all over the head
and face of your papa?
A: "Itinumba po siya."
Q: You said "itinumba po siya," who caused your father to tumble down?
A: After Kuya Edwin had put around the piece of cloth on my father, he tumbled him down.
Q: And when your father tumbled down, what else happened?
A: Kuya Freddie boxed him, maam.
Q: Did you see in what part of your fathers body was he boxed by Kuya Freddie?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: What part of his body was boxed?
A: On the left portion of the shoulder blade, maam.
Q: And how about Kuya Dodong when Kuya Edwin put around a piece of cloth and when Kuya
Freddie boxed your father, where was Kuya Dodong at that time?
A: He was also there, maam.
Q: And what was he doing, if he was doing anything at that time?
A: "Binareta na po yong papa ko sa ulo."
COURT:
Q: What did he use noong" binareta"?
A: It is a long iron bar used in digging soil?
PROS. LAGROSA:
Q: Now, what happened after Kuya Dodong " binareta" (sic) your father on the head?
A: "Nandoon pa po ako sa silong nila Kuya Unyo nakita ko nalang ponandoon na po ang nanay
ko pati po mga kapatid ko tsaka na poako lumabas."10
As the lower courts have done, we accord full faith and credence to Rachels testimony. She was
young and unschooled, but her narration of the incident was categorical, without wavering. It has
no markings of a concocted story, impressed upon her by other people.
The defense, accused-appellants herein, tried to further discredit Rachels testimony by arguing
that Rachel was a mere child who had studied only until the first grade of elementary school and
could barely read, and did not know how to tell time.
We cannot take Rachels testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child when she
witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her
mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully.
With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court,11 all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified
to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the
child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to
perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell
the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency
examination of a child.12 Thus, petitioners flimsy objections on Rachels lack of education and
inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing
testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.
We likewise note that the line of questioning of the defense during cross-examination on the
competency of Rachel to read and tell time did not distract her in recollecting how her father was
attacked by accused-appellants. From her position underneath the house of her "Kuya Unyo," she
saw her father, Wilfredo, attacked by accused-appellants. Although she was astonished as the
happening unfolded, her ability to perceive, remember, and make known her perception was not
diminished.
As regards Anicetas version of the events that Jesus was the sole perpetrator of the crime who
attacked Wilfredo only in self-defense, we easily see the fatal flaw: Aniceta arrived after the
supposed fight between Wilfredo and Jesus, and what transpired was merely relayed to her by
Jesus sister, Marilou.
Quite apparent from Anicetas narration of events is that she has no personal knowledge of
Wilfredos killing. Anicetas testimony is mainly hearsay, specially on the purported fight
between Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in Wilfredos death. Anicetas testimony as such carries
no probative weight. At best, Anicetas testimony is an independent relevant statement: offered
only as to the fact of its declaration and the substance of what had been relayed to Aniceta by
Marilou, not as to the truth thereof.13
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
We detect a clever, albeit transparent ploy, to pin Jesus who had already fled and is temporarily
out of reach of the law. Thus, with Jesus temporarily shielded from punishment, accused-
appellants freely accuse and point to him as the sole perpetrator of the crime. This cannot trump
the solid testimony of Rachel on accused-appellants direct participation in killing Wilfredo.
We likewise affirm the lower courts appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of treachery:
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. Treachery attended the
killing of the victim because he was unarmed and the attack on him was swift and sudden. He
had not means and there was no time for him to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be more
sudden and unexpected than when petitioners Edwin and Alfredo attacked the victim. The latter
did not have the slightest idea that he was going to be attacked because he was urinating and his
back was turned from his assailants. The prosecution was able to establish that petitioners attack
on the victim was without any slightest provocation on the latters part and that it was sudden
and unexpected. This is a clear case of treachery.14
Finally, we affirm the lower courts award of damages consistent with jurisprudence:15 (1)
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and (3) P50,000.00 as
moral damages. Consistent with current jurisprudence, we increase the award of exemplary
damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.16 However, we delete the award of P1,946,180.00
representing the unearned income of Wilfredo.
To obviate confusion on the award of loss of earning capacity, we reiterate herein that
compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and as such requires due proof of the
damages suffered; there must be unbiased proof of the deceaseds average income.17 In this case,
we only had he testimony of Wilfredos spouse, Rowena, who claimed that Wilfredo earned
P400.00 to P500.00 daily as a doormat vendor.
On more than one occasion, we have held that the bare testimony of a deceaseds mother or
spouse as to the income or earning capacity of the deceased must be supported by competent
evidence like income tax returns or receipts.18
In People v. Caraig,19 we have drawn two exceptions to the rule that "documentary evidence
should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity," and have
thus awarded damages where there is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken
of the fact that in the victim's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws."
Although Wilfredos occupation as a doormat vendor may fall under the first exception, the
minimum wage for Region III, which includes the province of Bulacan, is below P400.00 as per
the National Wages and Productivity Commission Regional Daily Minimum Wage Rates as of
August 2013.20 Regrettably, except for the bare assertion of Rowena, Wilfredo's spouse, we have
nothing to anchor the award for loss of earning capacity. Thus, we delete the award for loss of
earning capacity in the amount of P1,946,180.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
H.C. No. 04051 and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case
No. 3517-M-2004 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of exemplary damages is
increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 and we delete the award for loss of earning capacity in
the amount of P1,946, 180.00.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
f. Opinion Rule
i. Expert Witness: People of the Philippines vs Abriol
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123137. October 17, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL, MACARIO

ASTELLERO, and JANUARIO DOSDOS, accused-appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated May 17, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
10, in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-30350 for murder and CBU-33664 for illegal possession of
firearms, finding appellants Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero, and Januario Dosdos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 on Illegal
Possession of Firearms. Its decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-30350 for Murder, the Court finds accused Albert Abriol, Macario
Astellero and Januario Dosdos, GUILTY of murder beyond reasonable doubt and each is hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the
heirs of deceased Alejandro Flores the sum of P50,000.00; actual damages of P30,000.00,
representing a reasonable amount for the embalming, vigil, wake, and burial expenses;
P30,000.00 for attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.
For insufficiency of evidence, accused Gaudioso Navales is hereby ACQUITTED with costs de
officio.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-33664 for Illegal Possession of Firearms, accused Albert Abriol,
Macario Astellero and Januario Dosdos, are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months and to pay the costs.
The .38 caliber revolver, SN P08445 and the two .45 caliber pistols with SN PGO 13506 and SN
52469, are hereby confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and accordingly, the
Clerk of Court of this Branch is directed to turn over the said firearms to the Chief of Police,
Cebu City, or to the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP Region 7, upon proper
receipt.
The Cebu City Chief of Police is directed to release immediately upon receipt hereof, the person
of Gaudioso Navales, unless there be any other valid reason for his continued detention.
SO ORDERED.cccxi[1]
This judgment was the culmination of proceedings beginning with the Amended Information
dated September 6, 1993, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-30350, wherein appellants PO2
Albert Abriol of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Macario Astellero, Januario Dosdos, and
PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were charged with murder allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1993, at about 11:50 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with handguns,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, did then and there shot one
Alejandro Flores alias Alex with the said handguns, hitting him on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries:
CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK AND HEMORRHAGE

SECONDARY TO MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK AND THE
HEAD
as a consequence of which the said Alejandro Flores alias Alex died later.
CONTRARY TO LAW.cccxii[2]
At the time of the incident, appellant Abriol, a policeman previously detailed as a jailguard at the
Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center (BBRC) in Cebu City, was himself a detention prisoner in
BBRC. He was charged with murder, a non-bailable offense, in Criminal Case No. CBU-28843
before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 14.cccxiii[3]
Appellant Astellero was a former prisoner at BBRC, who had served time for grave
threats.cccxiv[4] The warden then, Chief Inspector Navales,cccxv[5] employed him as his
personal driver and general factotum.cccxvi[6] Navales was found guilty of grave misconduct in
Administrative Case No. 01-93 for allowing Abriol and Dosdos out of BBRC on the day of the
murder and was summarily dismissed from the police force.
Dosdos had been convicted by the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 10, of highway robbery in
Criminal Case No. CBU-18152 but Navales failed to act on the mittimus ordering Dosdos
transfer to the national penitentiary, and he remained in BBRC.cccxvii[7] Abriol and Dosdos
enjoyed special privileges at BBRC as the wardens errand boyscccxviii[8] or trustees.
The victim, Alejandro Flores alias Alex, was a former policeman. He was dismissed from the
PNP in August 1992 after testing positive for prohibited drugs.cccxix[9]
Abriol, Astellero, and Dosdos were also indicted for illegal possession of firearms in Criminal
Case No. CBU-33664. The charge sheet reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June 1993 at about 11:48 P.M. in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, did then and
there keep under their control and possession the following:
1. one (1) .38 cal. revolver (Armscor) with SN P08445 with six empty shells;
2. one (1) .45 cal. pistol (Colt) with SN P6013506 with 9 live ammunitions
(sic);
3. one (1) .45 cal. Pistol (Colt) with SN 52469 with five live ammunitions.
without first obtaining a permit or license therefor from competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.cccxx[10]
When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges. Since the indictments arose
from the same incident, the cases were jointly tried.
The facts of the case are as follows:
At around 11:50 P.M., June 5, 1993, Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news reporter then aboard his
jeep, had just reached the ABS-CBN compound in P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, when he
heard a couple of gunshots. He looked around and saw a man running unsteadily towards the
intersection of P. del Rosario Street and Jones Avenue (Osmea Boulevard). The man was
shouting Tabang, tabang! (Help! Help!). Sta. Cruz, Jr., saw a red Jiffy make a U-turn near the
gate of the city central school that nearly ran over the man shouting for help. The man turned
back and staggered towards the direction of Bacalso Avenue and Urgello Private Road, but after
a few meters on wobbly legs, he stopped and collapsed.
Meanwhile, the Jiffy followed. It stopped beside the fallen figure and a tall, thin man alighted.
The man fired several shots at the prostrate figure. He boarded the Jiffy which sped away
towards Leon Kilat Street. Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., moved his jeep and focused its headlights on
the victim.
In the meantime, PO3 Alexander Rustela was at a vulcanizing shop near the intersection of
Bacalso Avenue and Leon Kilat Street, when he heard gunshots coming from the north. He ran
towards where the gunshots came and saw people scampering. All of a sudden, the Jiffy with
three persons on board sped past him and made an abrupt left turn at Leon Kilat Street. Rustela
immediately radioed for assistance. Minutes later, patrol car No. 201 with PO2 Herbert Ramos
on board arrived. Rustela boarded the car and they followed the Jiffy, while broadcasting an
alarm to police headquarters and other mobile patrol cars.
On nearby Colon Street, SPO1 Eleazar Abrigana and PO2 Romeo Abellana were cruising aboard
patrol car No. 208, when they heard a radio message that the suspects in the shooting incident
were aboard a Jiffy. As they turned left at Leon Kilat Street, they saw the Jiffy heading towards
Carbon Market. They pursued the Jiffy which stopped in front of the Don Bosco Building near
BBRC, when police car No. 205, with PO Eugenio Badrinas and PO2 Gerald Cue aboard,
blocked the Jiffys path. Cue fired a warning shot and three persons alighted. The driver was
appellant Astellero, whom Cue had recognized and seen before at the BBRC. Abrigana and Cue
approached the trio who stood a meter away from the Jiffy. SPO1 Abrigana frisked Abriol and
seized from his waist a .38 caliber revolver with serial number PO8485 with six (6) empty shells
in its cylinder.cccxxi[11] Under Abriols seat, the police also found a .45 caliber pistol bearing
serial number PGO 13506 with nine (9) live rounds in its magazine and another .45 caliber pistol
with serial number 52469 loaded with five (5) unfired bullets.cccxxii[12]
While the patrol cars were chasing the Jiffy, another police team proceeded to the crime scene in
response to the alarm. This team from Police Station No. 3 in San Nicolas, Cebu City rushed the
victim to the Cebu City Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Meanwhile,
PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police Station No. 3 found four (4) .45 caliber
shells some four (4) feet away from the victims body, and two (2) deformed slugs where the
victim had lain, and submitted them to the Region 7 PNP Crime Laboratory for ballistics
testing.cccxxiii[13]
Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory autopsied the victims body.
He found that the cause of the victims death was cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and
hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds to the trunk and head.cccxxiv[14] Dr. Diola
recovered a .38 caliber slug from the corpse, which he later submitted for ballistics examination.
SPO4 Lemuel Caser, ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory, reported the following:
1. Fired cartridge cases marked JA-1 to JA-3 possesses similar individual characteristics
markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 with SN: PGO13506;
2. Fired cartridge cases marked JA-4 and E-69-6 possesses similar individual characteristics
markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 pistol with SN: 52469;
3. Fired bullet metal jacket marked JA-5 possesses similar individual characteristics markings
with test bullets fired from cal .45 pistol with SN: PGO13506;
4. Fired cartridge cases marked E-45-1 to E-45-6 possesses similar individual characteristics
markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445;
5. Fired bullets marked as JA-6 and LD possesses similar individual characteristic markings with
the test bullets fired from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445.cccxxv[15]
The following day, appellants underwent a paraffin test. The hands of appellants were found
positive for gunpowder residues. A chemistry test on the firearms showed that the three
handguns were also positive. Inspector Myrna Areola, Chief of the Chemistry Section of the PNP
Region 7 Crime Laboratory, stated in her testimony that the firearms had been fired,cccxxvi[16]
and that appellants had fired the guns within a period of seventy-two (72) hours prior to the
examination.
The widow and relatives of the victim testified on the possible motive behind the killing. They
claimed the victim, a confessed drug user, may have been rubbed out on the orders of Navales
for failure to remit P31,000 as proceeds from pushing prohibited drugs. After failing to deliver
the drug money to Navales, for whom he was repeatedly pushing drugs, the victim went into
hiding, but later returned to Cebu City because he missed his family.cccxxvii[17]
Appellants deny the accusations. Abriol averred that he and Dosdos were among the several
trustees at BBRC assigned to work in the kitchen. Appellant Astellero, who was the wardens
driver, was also in charge of marketing for the prisoners food. On the day of the incident,
Astellero realized that there was no money for the next days marketing so he asked Abriol to
accompany him to the house of Navales, but since he was not in, they returned to BBRC and saw
Navales an hour later. After they received the money from Navales niece on their way back to
BBRC, Dosdos heard gunshots. Abriol ordered Astellero, who was driving, to turn back. Then
Abriol claimed he saw a tall, slim man alight from a Jiffy and shoot at a prone figure on the
ground. Seconds later, the gunman returned to the Jiffy, which sped off. Abriol said he ordered
Astellero to chase that Jiffy but it had too much of a headstart and they lost sight of it. Abriol
ordered Astellero to proceed to BBRC. At Colon Street, they heard gunshots behind them and
the blaring siren of a police car. They explained that since they were detention prisoners, they
had to evade meeting the police. They heard more gun shots. Upon reaching BBRC, the gates
were closed, so they drove to the old airport. On their way back to BBRC several police cars
blocked them and arrested them. SPO4 Eleazar Abrigana frisked him and took the .38 service
revolver from his waist.cccxxviii[18]
Abriol also testified that he surrendered his service firearm to the BBRC Administrative Officer
when he was served a warrant of arrest for murder in Criminal Case No. CBU-28843. However,
the handgun was defective and it was returned to him for repair by Armscor, and upon repair he
handed it over to the BBRC armory. The armorer returned it to him since there was no place to
keep it. He said that although he was a detention prisoner, he had yet to be discharged from the
service. He was assigned guard and escort duties by the warden.cccxxix[19] Abriol said that on
the day of the incident he was, as a BBRC jailguard, authorized to carry his service
firearm.cccxxx[20] He presented a Memorandum Receiptcccxxxi[21] authorizing him to carry
the government-issued .38 revolver.cccxxxii[22]
On the witness stand, Astellero and Dosdos narrated a similar version of the incident as did
Abriol. Both vehemently denied having any knowledge of the two .45 caliber pistols found by
PO3 Cue in the Jiffy.cccxxxiii[23]
The defense also presented Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal officer of the Cebu City PNP
Command, to testify on the caliber of the firearms which might have caused the gunshot wounds
of the victim. Relying on the Necropsy Report prepared by Dr. Diola, Dr. Cerna declared that
wound nos. 1 and 2, which each measured 0.6 cm. by 0.6 cm., may have been caused by a .38
caliber firearm. As to wound nos. 3 and 4, which each measured 0.5 cm. by 0.5 cm., it was
possible that a .38 handgun was used, or one with a smaller bore. Dr. Cerna opined that a .45
pistol could not have inflicted all the foregoing wounds, as the entry points were too small for a
.45 caliber bullet. With respect to the grazing wounds found on the victims body, Dr. Cerna
testified that it was impossible to determine the caliber of the firearm used.cccxxxiv[24]
The trial court found appellants version of the incident neither convincing and credible and, as
earlier stated, it believed the prosecutions version. Petitioners were convicted of the offenses
charged.
Hence, this appeal, with appellants assigning the following errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE

CRIMES OF MURDER AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS DESPITE THE
FLIMSY AND UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
At issue is whether the prosecutions evidence, which is mainly circumstantial, suffices to convict
appellants for murder and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, beyond reasonable doubt.
A. Criminal Case No. CBU-30350
On their conviction for murder, appellants argue that the prosecutions circumstantial evidence
against them is weak, ambiguous, and inconclusive. Specifically, appellants contend that they
should be acquitted because:
First, eyewitness Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., did not personally identify them as the culprits. At no
point in his testimony did eyewitness Sta. Cruz, Jr., positively identify any of the appellants or
appellant Abriol as the gunman. Sta. Cruz, Jr. only gave a general description of the assailants,
despite attempts to make him give a categorical identification. He admitted he found out the
name of Abriol from television and news reports and could not identify Abriol as the one whom
he saw shot the victim. The transcript of his testimony is revealing.
Q: Then after the Jiffy stopped in front of the fallen victim, what happened next?
A: I saw that there was a man who disembarked from the Jiffy. He was a tall, thin fellow
who disembarked from the Jiffy and at the same time, he shot the fallen victim.
Q: How many times did he shoot the victim?
A: I cannot count attorney but I saw him shooting the victim.
Q: In your affidavit, you said that the person who disembarked from the Jiffy, whose name
you know later on as PO2 Albert Abriol, PNP, shot the victim in the different parts of his body.
If Albert Abriol is now in the courtroom, will you please point to him?
A: I will know him attorney because of the TV shows and newspapers.
COURT: (TO WITNESS)
Q: You are referring to the name of that man who disembarked from the Jiffy and fired
several shots at the fallen victim?
A: Yes, I know his name Your Honor on (sic) the news cast.
COURT: (TO WITNESS)
Q: Alright, forget the news. The man you saw when he alighted from the Jiffy and poured
(sic) several bullets on the fallen man, look around if he is in the courtroom?
A: I cannot identify Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: You cannot?
A: But [because] what I saw is a man who is tall and thin because it was dark.
xxx
Q: How many persons fired a shot at the fallen man?
A: I only saw that man Your Honor who alighted from the Jiffy.
Q: Did you see his physical features?

A: Only (t)his, I can only tell his height, he was tall and his body build is thin. Tall and thin.
(Emphasis supplied)cccxxxv[25]
Since the sole eyewitness could not identify the gunman and his companions, the prosecution
relied on circumstantial evidence from which the trial court could draw its findings and
conclusion of culpability.cccxxxvi[26] Circumstantial evidence may be relied upon, as in this
case, when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free.
Second, appellants assert that the paraffin tests are judicially recognized as unreliable and
inconclusive. A paraffin test could establish the presence or absence of nitrates on the hand.
However, it cannot establish that the source of the nitrates was the discharge of firearms. Nitrates
are also found in substances other than gunpowder. A person who tests positive may have
handled one or more substances with the same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives,
fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and leguminous plants. Hence, the presence of
nitrates should only be taken as an indication of a possibility that a person has fired a
gun.cccxxxvii[27] However, it must be borne in mind that appellants were not convicted on the
sole basis of the paraffin test.
Third, appellants claim that the autopsy report of prosecution witness Dr. Ladislao Diola
revealed serious ambiguities.cccxxxviii[28] Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, using the same autopsy report,
said that the gunshot wounds measuring 0.6 x 0.6 centimeters could not have been caused by a
.45 caliber pistol because an entrance wound of that size was too small for a .45 caliber
bullet.cccxxxix[29] Dr. Cerna claimed that a wound inflicted by a .45 pistol would have an entry
point of anywhere from 1.1 to 1.3 centimeters. He declared that it was with more reason that an
entrance wound measuring .5 x .5 centimeters could not be caused by a caliber .45
bullet.cccxl[30] Since no firearm smaller than a .38 caliber pistol was seized from appellants,
they claim the observation of Dr. Cerna only shows that they could not have shot the victim.
We note, however, that during cross-examination, Dr. Diola carefully explained that a firearms
caliber is not the only basis for determining the cause of the gunshot wound. He said:
ATTY. REMOTIQUE:
Q: So, normally the size of .5 cm x .5 cm which is the point of entry of gunshot wound No. 3
this may have been caused by a firearm of lesser caliber than caliber .38?
A: Not necessarily. There is a very small difference in the size and this does not preclude
that gunshot wound No. 3 may have also been caused by the same firearm which caused gunshot
wounds Nos. 1 and 2. There are factors which often affect the size of the wounds at the time of
the examination, perhaps a recission (sic) of the skin in the area where gunshot Wound No. 3
was inflicted so that gunshot wound becomes smaller.
Q: Did you not say that normally the point of entry of the gunshot wounds vary with the
caliber of the firearm which caused it, so that the point of entry caused by one firearm of a
particular caliber may be bigger than the point of entry of a gunshot wound caused by another
firearm of lesser caliber?
A: I told you of other factors that often affect the size of the entry of the bullet although the
caliber is one basis of the size of the wounds.
xxx
Q: Will you explain further on that because my understanding is that .5 cm wound must
perforce be caused by a firearm of lesser caliber than that which caused the .6 cm wound?
A: As I said there are ranges in the size of the wounds. The variance in the size of the wound
when it is minimal does not exclude the possibility that a wound with a .5 cm size and .6 cm size
could have been caused by the same caliber. (Emphasis supplied).cccxli[31]
The Office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr. Diolas testimony is supported by Dr.
Pedro P. Solis, a medical expert, in his book entitled Legal Medicine. The factors which could
make the wound of entrance bigger than the caliber include: (1) shooting in contact or near fire;
(2) deformity of the bullet which entered; (3) a bullet which might have entered the skin
sidewise; and (4) an acute angular approach of the bullet. However, where the wound of entrance
is smaller than the firearms caliber, the same may be attributed to the fragmentation of the bullet
before entering the skin or to a contraction of the elastic tissues of the skin (stress
supplied).cccxlii[32] Dr. Diola testified that a .45 caliber pistol could have caused the grazing
wounds on the victims head and extremities.cccxliii[33] Dr. Cerna corroborated Dr. Diolas
findings in this regard.cccxliv[34] Such expert opinions disprove appellants theory that the .45
caliber handguns confiscated from them could not have been used in killing the victim.
Fourth, appellants allege that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser, the prosecutions
ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as
the micrometer, goniometer, and pressure barrel.cccxlv[35] (2) He is not conversant with the
required references concerning ballistics, particularly books on the subject by foreign
authorities.cccxlvi[36] (3) He could not scientifically determine the caliber of a
bullet.cccxlvii[37] Since P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and expertise in ballistics,
they claim that his opinion that the test bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges
recovered from the scene of the crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Casers failure to
take the necessary photographs to support his findings.
An expert witness is one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of
the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to
express an opinion.cccxlviii[38] There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill
or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the
following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with
the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is
based.cccxlix[39] The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert
opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court.cccl[40]
In giving credence to Casers expert testimony, the trial court explained:

The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics and identifying firearms.
Much stress is given to the absence of photographs of his examination. Nonetheless, the Court is
satisfied (with) Casers examination, findings and conclusions with the use of a microscope.
Casers conclusion based on his examination deserves credit. He found the impressions on the
primer of the fired cartridges that were test-fired to have the same characteristics with those
recovered at the scene of the crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet (into) the body of his
victim, he releases a chunk of concrete evidence that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun
barrel deeply imprints on every bullet its characteristic marking peculiar to that gun and that gun
alone. These marking might be microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their
origin. And they are as infallible for purposes of identification, as the print left by the human
finger.cccli[41]
We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a
licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort
Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of
Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27)
murder and homicide cases all over the country.ccclii[42] An expert witness need not present
comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his findings.cccliii[43]
Examination under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet
both came from the same gun is sufficient.cccliv[44] Moreover, the ballistician conclusively
found similar characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs.
Fifth, appellants aver that the prosecution failed to show any plausible motive for appellants to
kill the victim. The prosecution tried to prove that their co-accused Navales instigated them to
kill the victim because Navales had a grudge against him. However, as Navales was acquitted,
appellants insist that Navales acquittal should redound to their benefit since no motive was
imputed on their part.
Motive is not an essential element of a crime,ccclv[45] particularly of murder.ccclvi[46] It

becomes relevant only where there is no positive evidence of an accuseds direct participation in
the commission of a crime.ccclvii[47] Stated otherwise, proof of motive becomes essential to a
conviction only where the evidence of an accuseds participation in an offense is
circumstantial.ccclviii[48] A careful perusal of the States evidence reveals that the prosecution
had established sufficient motive why appellants killed the victim, independent of any grudge
which Navales may have had against the latter. At the time of the incident, appellants Abriol and
Dosdos were both BBRC detention prisoners during Navales term as warden. Abriol and Dosdos
were treated as highly favored trustees of Navales and were never locked up. Abriol and Dosdos
were even allowed to go out of BBRC to do the marketing for the prisons kitchen. Appellant
Astellero, a former detention prisoner, was also a recipient of Navales favors. Navales hired
Astellero as his personal driver after the latter served his sentence. Navales and the victim, a
former BBRC jailguard, were associates in dealing with prohibited drugs, until they had a falling
out allegedly after the victim failed to remit to Navales proceeds from the sale of illegal drugs
amounting to P31,000. Appellants apparently killed the victim to return the special favors
Navales had showered them. Lack of a motive does not necessarily preclude conviction. Persons
have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all, and friendship or even relationship is no
deterrent to the commission of a crime.ccclix[49]
Sixth, in the present case, appellants contend that the PNP cannot be presumed to have done their
work since it committed errors and blunders in transferring possession and custody of the
physical evidence. They allege there was a possibility that the evidence was tainted, planted, or
manufactured. Besides, appellants point out that the presumption of regularity cannot prevail
over the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
The record shows that the police officers did not issue acknowledgement receipts in some
instances. However, minor lapses do not mean that the State had failed to show an unbroken
chain of custody of the subject firearms and ammunition, nor that said firearms and ammunition
were tampered. The slugs and spent shells recovered from the scene of the crime and the victims
corpse were plainly identified in open court by the PNP investigators. The ballistician testified
that the bullets and cartridges recovered from the crime scene had been fired from the subject
handguns. Under these circumstances, we must respect the presumption of the regularity in the
performance of duties.
Seventh, appellants insist that the prosecution failed to show that the red Jiffy used by them and
seized by the police officers was the same vehicle used by the gunmen who killed Alejandro
Flores. Appellants point out that PO3 Rustela, who was aboard police car No. 201, testified that
they lost sight of the red Jiffy while chasing it along Leon Kilat Street. Appellants argue that the
Jiffy which was chased by patrol car No. 208 until it was cornered near BBRC by the other
pursuing patrol cars was not the same vehicle originally sighted and tailed by patrol car No. 201.
In rejecting this theory, the trial court stated that:
PO3 Rustela who was nearby, immediately ran to the scene of the crime and met the red jiffy
with three persons on board, that speedily passed by him proceeding towards Leon Kilat Street.
Car 208 readily picked up the trail and pursued the red jiffy from Leon Kilat, then making abrupt
turns on downtown streets until other patrol cars joined the chase and captured them in Lahug,
near the BBRC. The identity of the red jiffy was never interrupted. Members of the Mobile
Patrol Cars identified in court without batting an eyelash, the red jiffy which was the object of
the shooting alarm. There was no interruption, no let-up in the chase, right after Alejandro Flores
was shot and there was no other red jiffy that the crews of the (pursuing) patrol cars noticed.
The Court rejects their claim of innocence, for their very acts belied the same.
Astellero could have stopped the jeep upon noticing that patrol cars were already running after
them with sirens, blinkers and warning shots fired. From Leon Kilat Street to Lahug airport,
there were several police stations that they could have sought shelter and police assistance. Guilt
has many ways of surfacing. Instead of stopping, Abriol ordered Astellero to accelerate their
speed. Their obvious purpose was to elude the patrol cars. Flight is indicative of guilt.ccclx[50]
But, in this case, is the totality of the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court
sufficient to support a conviction?
Circumstantial evidence is that which indirectly proves a fact in issue. For circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other possible,
rational hypothesis, except that of guilt.ccclxi[51] An accused can be convicted on the basis of
circumstantial evidence where all the circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
culprit.ccclxii[52]
In our assessment, the prosecutions evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of events leading to
the inevitable conclusion of guilt on the part of appellants. First, the fatal shooting of Alejandro
Flores occurred at around 11:50 P.M. of June 5, 1993 in front of the ABS-CBN compound in
Cebu City. The gunman, who was tall and thin, alighted from a red Jiffy, pumped several bullets
into the prone victim, and got back aboard the Jiffy which then sped towards Leon Kilat Street.
Second, eyewitness Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr.s description of the gunman as tall and thin perfectly
matches the physique of appellant Abriol. Third, PO3 Alexander Rustela, who was close to the
crime scene, heard the gunshots and ran towards the place where the sound of gunshots
emanated. A red Jiffy with three persons aboard whizzed by him and abruptly turned at Leon
Kilat Street. After Sta. Cruz, Jr. informed him that the gunmen were aboard a red Jiffy, Rustela
boarded patrol car No. 201, radioed an alarm, and commenced a pursuit of the fleeing vehicle.
Police car no. 208 received the alarm, and on turning into Leon Kilat Street, encountered the
speeding red Jiffy. They immediately chased the Jiffy but failed to catch it. Police cars Nos. 208
and 205 cornered the vehicle in front of the Don Bosco building near BBRC. PO2 Gerald Cue,
on patrol car no. 205 fired a warning shot at the vehicle and directed all those aboard to
disembark. Three men got out, with their hands raised. SPO1 Abrigana, on patrol car no. 208 and
PO2 Cue approached the trio. Abrigana frisked the man who was seated in the front passenger
seat, who turned out to be appellant Abriol, and recovered from his waist a .38 caliber revolver
with six empty shells. Cue searched the red Jiffy and found two loaded .45 caliber pistols under
the front seat where Abriol had sat. Other police officers immediately went to the crime scene
where they found the victim barely alive. PO3 Seville retrieved four .45 caliber slugs and two
deformed slugs at the spot where the victim was shot. The autopsy of the victims remains
showed that he died of cardio respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to
gunshot wounds. A deformed metal jacket of a .38 caliber slug was recovered from the corpse.
Ballistics tests showed that the bullets and cartridges had identical individual characteristics with
those of the test bullets and cartridges. Paraffin tests conducted on each of the appellants, one
day after the incident, revealed that all were positive for gunpowder residues. The subject
firearms were also chemically examined and found positive for gunpowder residue. Before the
shooting incident, appellants were seen at Navales house until around 7:30 P.M., when they left
aboard Navales red Jiffy with Astellero driving, Abriol in the front passenger seat, and Dosdos in
the back seat.ccclxiii[53] Appellants seating arrangements were exactly the same, several hours
later, after they were pursued and cornered by police cars near BBRC. Appellants admitted that
they dropped by the Navales residence at around 7:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M.
These unbroken chain of events prove not only appellants identities but also their participation
and collective responsibility in the murder of Alejandro Flores. They reveal a unity of purpose
and concerted action evidencing their conspiracy to kill him. Against this matrix of facts and
circumstances, appellants bare denials cannot stand. Their story of chasing a red Jiffy is merely a
disingenuous diversion of no evidentiary value for the defense.
Finally, the information for murder alleged treachery and evident premeditation. We note,
though, that the trial court did not state which circumstance qualified the killing into murder.
A review of the record would reveal that there was no evident premeditation. There is evident
premeditation when the following are shown: (a) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and (c) a lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the
execution thereof sufficient to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.ccclxiv[54]
Evident premeditation indicates deliberate planning and preparation. Nowhere in the record is it
shown when and how appellants planned and prepared to kill the victim.
Concerning treachery, however, it was shown that: (1) the means of execution employed gave
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution
was deliberately or consciously adopted.ccclxv[55] These twin requisites were adequately
proved.
Appellants had superiority in numbers and weapons. The victim was without any means to
defend himself as no weapon was found or even intimated to be in his possession. The victim
was running away from the Jiffy prior to the killing. That he was warned or threatened earlier is
of no moment. Even when the victim is warned of danger to his person, if the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate, treachery can still be
appreciated.ccclxvi[56] The victim was lying prostrate on the ground when he was deliberately
and mercilessly riddled with bullets. The weapons used, the number of assailants, the swift and
planned manner of the attack, and the multiple number of wounds inflicted upon the victim all
demonstrate a determined assault with intent to kill the victim. No doubt there was treachery.
B. Criminal Case No. CBU-33664
On their conviction for illegal possession of firearms, appellants contend that the handguns and
ammunitions allegedly taken from them by the police officers were illegally seized. They assert
that the police had no warrant to effect a search and seizure, such that these illegally seized
firearms were inadmissible as evidence, and it was error for the trial court to admit them.
There are eight (8) instances where a warrantless search and seizure is valid. They are: (1)
consented searches;ccclxvii[57] (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest;ccclxviii[58] (3) searches of
vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws;ccclxix[59] (4) searches
of moving vehicles;ccclxx[60] (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6)
where the prohibited articles are in plain view;ccclxxi[61] (7) searches of buildings and premises
to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) stop and frisk operations.ccclxxii[62]
In this case, the warrantless search and seizure of the subject handguns and ammunition is valid
for two reasons. It was a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal shooting,
and pursuit of a fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police officers, and a more than
reasonable belief on the part of the police officers that the fleeing suspects aboard said vehicle
had just engaged in criminal activity. The urgent need of the police to take immediate action in
the light of the foregoing exigencies clearly satisfies the requirements for warrantless arrests
under the Rules of Court.ccclxxiii[63] Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with firearms
and ammunition which they were not authorized to carry, appellants were actually violating P.D.
No. 1866, another ground for valid arrest under the Rules.ccclxxiv[64]
Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in convicting appellants Astellero and
Dosdos of illegal possession of firearms. They point out that the .38 caliber revolver was
recovered from appellant Abriol, who as a policeman was authorized to carry and possess said
firearm, as evidenced by his Memorandum Receipt (MR), which had not been recalled, cancelled
or revoked until the time of the trial of these cases. Appellants claim that the two .45 caliber
pistols could have been left in the vehicle by PNP personnel assigned at BBRC, considering that
the red Jiffy was generally used as a service vehicle by BBRC personnel. They also argue that
the prosecution failed to prove appellants ownership, control, and possession of the .45 caliber
pistols, considering that appellants were six meters away from the Jiffy when said handguns
were allegedly found.
To sustain a conviction for violation of P.D. No. 1866, the prosecution must prove two elements
of the offense: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; (2) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess it.ccclxxv[65]
These the prosecution did. It presented a .38 caliber revolver with serial number PO8445, a .45
caliber pistol with serial number PGO 13506 Para Ordinance, and a .45 caliber pistol with serial
number 52469. The .38 caliber handgun was recovered from appellant Abriol, while the two .45
caliber automatics were found and seized from under the front passenger seat of appellants
vehicle. SPO4 Aquilles Famoso of the Cebu City PNP Metropolitan District Commands
Firearms and Explosive Unit testified that appellants were not listed as licensed firearm owners
in Cebu City.ccclxxvi[66] The prosecution also presented a certification from P/Senior Inspector
Edwin Roque of the Firearms and Explosives Division of PNP Headquarters at Camp Crame,
Quezon City that appellant Abriol is not licensed to hold any firearm; that the .45 caliber pistols
were unlicensed; and that a certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office attesting
that a person is not a licensee of any firearm, proves beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of illegal possession of firearm.ccclxxvii[67]
Abriol insists that he had a valid MR authorizing him to carry the .38 revolver. We agree with
the observation of the trial court that:
The claim of Abriol that .38 caliber was issued to him, as evidenced by the corresponding receipt
(MR), is of no moment. While an MR is an authority of Abriol to possess the government
firearm that was issued to him, when he was charged and detained at BBRC for an earlier case of
murder, other than the case at bar, he was already then at that moment a detained prisoner and
therefore, (un)authorized to carry a firearm. A military man or a member of the PNP who
commits a crime, is immediately disarmed upon his arrest and stripped of all the rights and
privileges that go with the function of his office, and this includes, in the case of Abriol, his MR.
Thus, when he shot Alejandro Flores with his .38 caliber revolver, this firearm was already
unauthorized and its use and possession illegal.ccclxxviii[68]
Even if Abriols MR was valid, said authorization was limited only to the .38 caliber revolver and
not the two .45 caliber automatic pistols found under the front passenger seat of the Jiffy.
Appellants were still in the unlawful possession of the .45 caliber pistols. Under P.D. No. 1866,
possession is not limited to actual possession.ccclxxix[69] In this case, appellants had control
over the pistols. They were all liable since conspiracy was established and the act of one is the
act of all.ccclxxx[70]
Appellants claim that they were six meters away from the Jiffy when it was searched and the two
.45 caliber pistols were seized. They suggest that the policemen who searched the vehicle could
have planted said firearms. The trial court found that they were in fact only one meter away from
the vehicle. Findings of fact of the trial court, when supported by the evidence on record, are
binding and conclusive upon appellate courts.ccclxxxi[71]
All told, on the charge of illegal possession of firearms, no reversible error was committed by the
trial court when it found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The Office of the Solicitor General recommends that although appellants were charged with and
convicted of two separate offenses of murder and violation of P.D. No. 1866, R.A. No. 8294,
which amended said decree, should be applied to appellants retroactively, citing People v.
Molina, 292 SCRA 742, 779 (1998) interpreting R.A. No. 8294.
We agree. We ruled in Molina that with the passage of R.A. No. 8294 on June 6, 1997, the use of
an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is not a separate crime, but merely a special
aggravating circumstance. This was recently reiterated in People v. Castillo, G.R. Nos. 131592-
93, February 15, 2000.ccclxxxii[72] Appellants are thus guilty only of murder with the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. The imposition of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua cannot however be modified since the murder took place before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.
A final word on the damages. In addition to the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, the
trial court awarded P30,000 in actual damages, representing a reasonable amount for the
embalming, vigil, wake and burial expenses, and P30,000 as attorneys fees. To be entitled to
actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof, and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured
party.ccclxxxiii[73] No such evidence was offered. The award of actual damages must, therefore,
be deleted. However, temperate damages may be awarded since the family of the victim has
demonstrably spent for the wake, funeral and burial arrangements. The amount of P20,000
should suffice as temperate damages. In addition, we find an award of exemplary damages in
order, pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code.ccclxxxiv[74] The killing was attended by the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. Moreover, the public good
demands that detained prisoners should not abuse their status as trustees. Had the police been
unsuccessful in their pursuit of appellants, the latter would have used the BBRC as shelter and as
an alibi that they could not have committed the crime since they were then in detention. Thus, we
find an award of P10,000 as exemplary damages in order. Accordingly, the award of attorneys
fees is sustained.ccclxxxv[75]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-30350 and CBU-33664 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellants Albert
Abriol, Macario Astellero, and Januario Dosdos are hereby found GUILTY of murder, qualified
by treachery, with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms and are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
provided for by law. Appellants Abriol, Astellero, and Dosdos are also ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, the heirs of Alejandro Flores the sum of P50,000 as death indemnity, P20,000 as
temperate damages, P10,000 as exemplary damages, and P30,000 as attorneys fees, as well as
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bautista vs Court of Appeals
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 158015. August 11, 2004]
LAURA and ERIBERTO BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
FERNANDO MORELOS, respondents.
DECISION
On appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure is a Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45549,419[1] reversing and
setting aside the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII in Civil Case No.
83-17900420[2] and entering a new one declaring the April 5, 1982 Deed of Absolute Sale
between the late Cesar Morelos and Laura Bautista null and void.
The dispute involves a parcel of land situated along Maceda (formerly Washington) Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, containing an area of approximately 105 square meters. This parcel of land
was previously owned and registered in the name of the late Cesar Morelos under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 27604. Cesar is the uncle of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, being the
brother of her mother, Rosario Morelos.421[3]
Cesar, who was married to Rosario Duran, did not have any children. Rosario died in 1972.
Cesar died of cardiac arrest on April 15, 1982. During his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the
above-mentioned parcel of land in favor of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by Luis M. de Guzman. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 254843 was issued in the name of petitioner Laura Bautista.422[4]
Respondent Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of Cesar Morelos with
Angelina Lim-Gue, instituted a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale and title with
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 83-17900, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch VII. At the trial, he presented testimonies of expert witnesses who claimed that the
signature of Cesar Morelos on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the fingerprint appearing on his
Residence Certificate were not his.423[5]
Petitioners countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid. The witness to the Deed,
Carmelita Marcelino, testified that she saw Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista sign the
same.424[6]
After hearing, the court a quo rendered judgment declaring the Deed of Sale dated April 5, 1982
executed between the late Cesar Morelos in favor of Laura Bautista valid, and dismissed for
insufficient evidence the claims and counterclaims for damages of the parties.425[7]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the judgment of the
trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another one is entered declaring AS NULL AND VOID the Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated April 5, 1982, executed between the late Cesar G. Morelos and defendant-
appellee Laura R. Bautista. The Register of Deeds of Manila is DIRECTED to cause the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 154043 in the name of defendant-appellee
LAURA R. BAUTISTA and to issue another one in the name of the ESTATE OF CESAR G.
MORELOS. Defendants-appellees are also directed to surrender possession of the disputed
property to plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.426[8]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONIES OF EXPERT WITNESSES ARE CONCLUSIVE

TO BE A STRONG BASIS TO NULLIFY A DULY EXECUTED AND NOTARIZED DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (ANNEX 3) IS VALID.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO

SEEK THE ANNULMENT OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.427[9]
Petitioner asserts the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale and invoke the testimony of
Carmelita Marcelino, the instrumental witness to the signing of the document, who confirmed
that it was the decedent Cesar Morelos who affixed his signature to the document.
On the other hand, respondent contends that the decedents signature on the Deed was forged. He
presented the testimony of Francisco Cruz, Jr., Chief Examiner of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory
Service, that the signature of decedent on the questioned instrument, when compared to other
documents bearing the authentic signature of Cesar Morelos, did not match and appeared to have
been authored by a different person. Cruz, Jr. declared that the latest document bearing the
genuine signature of the decedent is dated March 31, 1982, while the alleged forged signature
was made on April 5, 1982, or a mere lapse of five days. According to him, it is not possible to
have significant variation between the two signatures, considering the proximity of time when
the signatures where affixed.428[10]
Another witness, Major Braulio Monge, Chief of the Fingerprint Division of the PC-INP,
testified that the thumbmark of Cesar Morelos appearing on the residence certificate indicated in
the Deed of Absolute Sale, when compared to those affixed on previous residence certificates
issued to the decedent, did not match and appears to be the thumbmark of another person.
Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be
proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity
and due execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument.429[11] To
overturn this legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract.
As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. In Heirs of Severa
P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals,430[12] we held that due to the technicality of the procedure
involved in the examination of the forged documents, the expertise of questioned document
examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to questioned document examiners is not
mandatory and while probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or comparing
handwriting.
Hence, a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts.
Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the
issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the
handwriting expert.431[13]
The authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions
concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of
a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a
questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by
a specialist on a highly technical issue.432[14]
In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery
and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was
physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the
testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. Carmelita
Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of Absolute Sale, confirmed the genuineness, authenticity and
due execution thereof.433[15] Having been physically present to see the decedent Cesar Morelos
and petitioner Laura Bautista affix their signatures on the document, the weight of evidence
preponderates in favor of petitioners.
Witness Francisco Cruz, Jr. failed to establish the fact that the signature on the Deed of Absolute
Sale was not that of Cesar Morelos. He merely concluded that the document was a forgery
without citing any factual basis for arriving at that conclusion. Cruz did not point out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing, which would ordinarily escape detection by an ordinary lay person.434[16]
When the trial court and the appellate court arrived at divergent factual assessments in their
respective decisions and the bases therefor refer to documents made available to the scrutiny of
both courts, the well-settled rule that factual findings of trial courts deserve respect and even
finality will not apply.435[17] In the case at bar, the varying factual assessments pertained to the
authenticity of the signature of the late Cesar Morelos on the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying the 105-square meter property in favor of his niece, Laura Bautista.
In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian

Church in the United States of America,436[18] we held that the authenticity of a questioned
signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or
dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm,
pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, that may be found between the
questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the formers
authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid
of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must
be taken into consideration, such as the position of the writer, the condition of the surface on
which the paper where the questioned signature is written, his state of mind, feelings and nerves,
and the kind of pen and paper used. These play an important role on the general appearance of
the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of
direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much
weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between a questioned
handwriting and an authentic one.
Besides, a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein
expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.437[19] The authenticity and due
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale must therefore be upheld.
As to the alleged insufficient consideration of the sale of the property, the mere inadequacy of
the price does not affect its validity when both parties are in a position to form an independent
judgment concerning the transaction,438[20] unless fraud, mistake or undue influence indicative of
a defect in consent is present.439[21] A contract may consequently be annulled on the ground of
vitiated consent and not due to the inadequacy of the price. In the case at bar, however, no
evidence to prove fraud, mistake or undue influence indicative of vitiated consent was presented
other than the respondents self-serving allegations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45549 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch VII in Civil Case No. 83-17900, declaring the Deed of
Absolute Sale between petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista and Cesar Morelos over the subject
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2760 as valid is REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Avelino vs People of the Philippines
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181444, July 17, 2013
BOBBY ABEL AVELINO Y BULAWAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal are the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02297
which affirmed petitioners conviction for murder in Criminal Case No. 01-189130,2 and the
CAs Resolution3 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Bobby Abel Avelino y Bulawan, together with Ricardo Tolentino, Alias Sonny
Muslim, Farouk Musa a.k.a. Boy Muslim, Alias Bubut Tuwad, Alias Angkol, Alias Mon, Renato
Meneses a.k.a. Nato, Benjamin Elbona a.k.a. Toto Mata, and Dominic Apan a.k.a. Domeng
Bakukang, was charged with murder4 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Upon arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused Renato Meneses, Benjamin Elbona, and Farouk
Musa entered a plea of not guilty. The other accused remain at-large.
At the trial, the prosecution presented eight witnesses: Delia Hispano, the wife of the victim;
Diana Espinosa; Alfredo Manalangsang (Manalangsang); Mary Ann Caada (Caada); Renato
Sosas; Dr. Romeo T. Salen; P/Insp. Mario Prado; and National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
agent Rizaldi Jaymalin.5
The facts, as culled from the CA Decision which cited the brief of the Office of the Solicitor
General, are as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of September 2000, Renato Sosas y Verzosa, an employee
of appellant Bobby Avelino y Bulawan in his wood business, was directed by appellant to
summon Toto Mata, Nato, Domeng Bakukang, Bobot Tuwad, Boy Muslim, Angkol, Charlie,
Sonny Muslim and Mon (TSN, January 29, 2002, pp. 5-6). An hour later, the group called by
Renato Sosas met at appellants warehouse in Tagaytay, Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila.
Renato Sosas, who was just a step away from the group, was astounded when he heard appellant
utter Papatayin si Chairman. Bobot Tuwad reacted by asking appellant Sino pong
chairman?, to which appellant Avelino replied Sino pa, Ninong Chairman Gener. Terrified,
Sosas kept mum about what he discovered (TSN, January 29, 2002, pp.10-12).
On October 5, 2000, around 9:00 oclock in the evening, Alfredo Manalangsang was riding on a
tricycle going to Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila. Since Manalangsang was the last passenger
to board the tricycle, he sat behind the driver. Upon reaching a certain point between Muelle Del
Rio and 2nd Street, Port Area, Manila, the tricycle which Manalangsang was riding on passed at
the left lane instead of the right lane of the road to give way to the owner-type (sic) jeep owned
by the barangay and driven by its Chairman[,] Generoso Hispano, herein victim (TSN,
September 26, 2001, pp. 11-17, Exhs. R-1 and 4).
While Chairman Hispano was entering the nearest route near the center island, a man suddenly
emerged and blocked Chairman Hispanos vehicle. Instantaneously, Manalangsang heard bursts
of gunshot which prompted him to jump from the tricycle. Manalangsang instinctively hid
behind the center island of the road (TSN, September 26, 2001, pp. 17-21).
At this juncture, Manalangsang peeped at the direction of Chairman Hispanos jeep and saw
three (3) men wearing bonnets, two of whom were strategically blocking the jeep of Chairman
Hispano. The third man, who was wearing a green jacket and positioned himself near the gutter,
fired successive shots at Chairman Hispano and thereafter approached the jeep of Chairman
Hispano. He pulled down from the jeep the almost lifeless body of Chairman Hispano. Since
Manalangsang was situated near the third assailant, he failed to identify the other two assailants.
However, Manalangsang positively identified the third assailant as appellant Bobby Abel
Avelino, whom he saw stooping down at the Chairmans body and pulling the opening of his
bonnet down to his chin to ascertain if the Chairman was still alive. Sensing that it was safe for
him to leave the scene, Manalangsang boarded a tricycle again and went home (TSN, September
26, 2001, pp. 22-26).
Thereafter, appellant and the other assailants drove away using the owner-type jeep of Chairman
Hispano. However, on their way towards Divisoria, the jeep was incidentally blocked by a
tricycle and a white car which prompted the companion of appellant to shout tabi-tabi. At that
moment, Mary Ann Ca[]ada saw appellant, who was wearing a green jacket and a bonnet rolled
up to his forehead, driving the owner-type (sic) jeep of Chairman Hispano. Ca[]ada readily
recognized appellant as she was familiar with the face of appellant having seen him driving the
jeep of the Chairman on several occasions before (TSN, November 19, 2001, pp. 17-28).
When the police arrived at the crime scene, Chairman Hispano was already dead. The owner-
type (sic) jeep of Chairman Hispano was recovered in front of house No. 440, Orbiztondo Street,
Binondo, Manila, with several pieces of empty shells of 9 mm caliber gun scattered on its floor
(TSN, May 7, 2003, pp. 6-7) (Rollo, pages 120-123).6
Denying the accusation, the defense presented as evidence the testimonies of petitioner, PO2
Anthony P. Galang, Adonis T. Bantiling and Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito D.
Cabamongan (Cabamongan).7
Petitioner advanced the defense of denial and alibi. He testified that on October 5, 2000, he and
his wife went to the Land Transportation Office in Pasay City to renew his license as they
planned to go to Baguio that day. But as he was issued a temporary license late in the afternoon,
instead of going home, he and his wife checked in at the Pharaoh Hotel in Sta. Cruz, Manila to
spend the night. He parked his car along Dasmarias Bridge and slept. Later, he woke up to
transfer his car but his car was gone. Thus, he and his wife went to the police station in Sta. Cruz,
Manila then to the Anti-Carnapping Unit along U.N. Avenue to report the incident. At the latter
location, they learned from a certain Tata Randy, an acquaintance and former police officer, that
the victim had been gunned down. Around 1:00 a.m., he and his wife returned to the hotel. On
October 23, 2000, he was arrested by agents of the NBI.8
After trial, the RTC, on April 28, 2006, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder qualified by treachery, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The RTC likewise ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Generoso Hispano (Hispano)
the sum of P50,000 and to pay them an additional sum of P50,000 as moral damages, the sum of
P158,471.75 as actual damages, and costs.9
For failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused Farouk
Musa, Benjamin Elbona, and Renato Meneses were acquitted of the crime charged.10
As aforesaid, the CA, in its assailed decision, denied petitioners appeal and upheld the RTC
decision with modification by increasing the award of actual damages to P171,128.75.11
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the appellate court on January 25,
2008.12
Aggrieved, petitioner now seeks to reverse his conviction, arguing that the CA erred in relying
on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Caada and disregarding the
inconsistencies between the statements of Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal
and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman. He also reiterated his defense of
denial and alibi.
We have carefully studied the records of this case and find no cogent reason to overturn the
ruling of the CA which is in accord with law and jurisprudence.
As for the defense of the petitioner which is grounded, firstly, upon denial and alibi, basic is the
rule that the defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witness positive identification of
the accused-appellants.13 Moreover, as oft-repeated in jurisprudence
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime
was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.
Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification[,] is inherently weak and if uncorroborated
regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.14
In this case, the defense failed to establish that it was physically impossible for the petitioner to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Pharaoh Hotel, where
petitioner claims to have stayed with his wife at the time of the commission of the crime, is in
Sta. Cruz, Manila.15 The said hotel is not so far from the scene of the crime, which is in Baseco
Compound in Tondo, Manila, so as not to afford the petitioner an opportunity to easily go to the
place of the shooting at the time Hispano was killed. Indeed, for the defense of alibi to prosper,
the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of
the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. These,
the defense failed to do.
The defense of the petitioner is based, secondly, on his allegations that prosecution witnesses
Manalangsang and Caada failed to positively identify him as the gunman who mortally
wounded Hispano, and that Manalangsangs testimony as to the locations and number of gunshot
wounds, as well as the position of the gunman, is inconsistent with the physical evidence as
provided by the medico-legal officer and the testimony of SOCO PSI Cabamongan.
These allegations cannot exculpate the petitioner from criminal liability.
Manalangsang unequivocally identified the petitioner as the gunman. Manalangsang was able to
identify the petitioner because the latter revealed his face when he pulled down the bonnet he
was wearing, thereby exposing his eyes, nose, mouth, and chin.16 Moreover, the certainty of
Manalangsang in identifying the petitioner as the one who shot Hispano is bolstered by the fact
that he and petitioner were neighbors for five years in Baseco.17 The RTC cites the following
statement by Manalangsang as an added indication of his certainty Si Avelino, kahit ubod ng
layo, kahit naglalakad lang, kilala ko na. Dahil unang-una, matagal ko na siyang kilala, dahil
ako hindi niya ako gaanong kilala, pero sila kilala ko, kahit nakatagili[d], kilala ko siya.18 It
cannot be denied that once a person gains familiarity of another, identification becomes quite an
easy task even from a considerable distance.19
Even the theory of the defense that identification of the petitioner by Manalangsang and Caada
is unlikely due allegedly to the lack of sufficient illumination at the scene of the crime, has been
overcome by the fact that there are lampposts and signboards in the subject area which can
provide illumination despite the black of night. Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the
lampposts were not functioning at the time, the headlights of passing vehicles provided sufficient
illumination at the crime scene.20 The Court has previously held that the light from the stars or
the moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or gasera can give ample illumination to enable a person to
identify or recognize another.21 Similarly, the headlights of vehicles are sufficient to enable
eyewitnesses to identify individuals at a distance of four to ten meters,22 and it should be noted
that the distance between Manalangsang and the jeep where Hispano was felled was only 31
feet23 or a little over nine meters.24
The identification made by Manalangsang was likewise sufficiently corroborated by the

testimony of Caada, that she saw the petitioner, with whom she was familiar, drive away in
Hispanos owner-type jeep, wearing a green jacket and black bonnet rolled up to his forehead.25
Further, as can be gleaned from the excerpt below, the petitioners defense that Manalangsangs
testimony contradicts with the medical findings, and should then be disregarded, must fail.
Petitioner claims that Manalangsangs statements that Hispano was shot in a downward direction
conflict with the findings of the medico-legal that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward
direction. The testimony of Dr. Salen is pertinent and enlightening: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Q: [T]he trajectory of the bullet is upward?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: [S]o the gunman must be at a lower level from the decease[d]?
A: We can not [sic] say that, sir.
Q: But the trajectory of the bullet is upward?
A: It depends on the matter of the position of the head when the head was hit. It could be
when the trajectory is upward it [sic] could be lying down with his back and the
gunman and the barrel of the gun is here and if we will put the normal position of the
body it is still upward but the normal position is like that so
COURT: Make of record that the witness is demonstrating a slightly incline position of the
head and the body.
WITNESS:
A: So we can not [sic] determine the position of the gunman when it was related [sic] the
gunshot wound of the entry and the victim it will depend on the position of the
gunman but likewise the position of the victim during the infliction [sic] of the gun.
ATTY. VARGAS:
Q: Mr. Witness[,] if the gunman is standing on an elevated floor of about three feet do
you think that the trajectory of a bullet is upward?
A: It is possible also.26
Clearly, the fact that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward direction does not negate the
veracity of Manalangsangs statement that Hispano was shot by the gunman from an elevated
plane.
The CA was also correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan as
regards the position of the gunman when the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the
gunman was on board the owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot, which is opposed to
Manalangsangs testimony. However, case records reveal that Cabamongan was presented as an
ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion regarding the location of the gunman in relation to the place
where the empty shells were found is immaterial.
Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires
expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert.27 In this case, counsel for the
petitioner failed to make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.
Jurisprudence further provides that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do not destroy the
probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused. The case of
Madali v. People28 elucidates thus: cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material details
of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly
weaken their probative value. It is well settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not
discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of
accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on
material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the gunman by Manalangsang, as

corroborated by Caada, must stand. Indeed, it has been consistently held by this Court that in
criminal cases the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge
has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling
the truth or not. Absent any showing that the lower courts overlooked substantial facts and
circumstances, which if considered, would change the result of the case, this Court gives
deference to the trial courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses,
especially since Manalangsang and Caadas testimony meets the test of credibility.29 The Court
also notes that other than his claim of denial, petitioner failed to show how the prosecution failed
to overcome the presumption of innocence.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery or alevosia was additionally properly appreciated in

this case.
The two elements that must be proven to establish treachery are: (a) the employment of means of
execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of
the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the means, method and
manner of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender.30 The two
elements are present in this case.
These elements are established by the testimony of Manalangsang showing the unexpected attack
by the petitioner on the unsuspecting Hispano whose vehicle was suddenly blocked by three
men, at least one of whom was armed with a firearm.31 The victim was then unarmed and had no
opportunity to defend himself.
Thus, considering all the above-mentioned facts, we uphold the conviction of the petitioner for
the crime of murder.
Regarding the award of damages, we affirm the trial court and CA in ordering the petitioner to
pay the heirs of Generoso Hispano the amount of P50,000 as moral damages. In cases of murder
and homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim.32 Similarly, the CA correctly awarded his heirs the amount of
P171,128.75 as actual damages, as said amount which was spent for funeral and burial expenses
was duly supported by receipts. However, as regards the award of civil indemnity, the same
should be increased to P75,000 to conform with recent jurisprudence.33 Also, the heirs of the
victim are entitled to exemplary damages which recent jurisprudence pegs at P30,00034
considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery. Lastly, we impose on all
the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid, consistent with current policy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 22, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02297 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner BOBBY ABEL
AVELINO y BULAWAN is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of
Generoso Hispano the amounts of P171,128.75 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary
awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ii. Ordinary Witness: People of the Philippines vs Duranan
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 134074-75. January 16, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO DURANAN, a.k.a.

Kalbo,accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decisionccclxxxvi[i][1] of the Regional Trial Court, xxx, finding
accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a. Kalbo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts
of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and
to indemnify private complainant AAA in the amount of P50,000.00.
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55711 alleged
That on or about the 8th of March 1994, in xxx, Philippines, said accused with lewd designs and
by means of force and intimidation, to wit, by then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously taking advantage of undersigned complainant, AAAs feeblemindedness and
thereafter have carnal knowledge with (sic) the undersigned complainant against her will and
without her consent.
Contrary to law.ccclxxxvii[ii][2]
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55712 averred
That on or about the 7th of March 1994, in xxx, Philippines, the said accused with lewd designs
and by means of force and intimidation, to wit, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously taking (sic) advantage of the undersigned (sic) feeblemindedness, and thereafter have
carnal knowledge with (sic) the undersigned complainant against her will and without her
consent.
Contrary to law.ccclxxxviii[iii][3]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each charge of rape against him,
whereupon he was tried.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant AAA, complainants mother
BBB, and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.
Complainant AAA, who was 25 years old at the time of the incidents in question, is considered
to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply does
household chores for her family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainants family in the
same apartment in xxx where he rented a room that he shared with several other people.
The first rape took place in the afternoon of March 7, 1994.ccclxxxix[iv][4] AAA was standing
by the door of her grandfathers house when accused-appellant suddenly placed his arm on her
neck and dragged her inside the common bathroom.cccxc[v][5] Complainant said that accused-
appellant kissed her and then removed her shorts and underwear as he held her hands with his
other hand. She did not cry for help because accused-appellant threatened her that he would get
angry if she did.cccxci[vi][6] She claimed that accused-appellant was able to rape her while
standing up despite her resistance.cccxcii[vii][7] After the incident, complainant was sent out of
the bathroom and went directly home.cccxciii[viii][8]
The second incident occurred in the early morning of March 8, 1994,cccxciv[ix][9] according to
complainant. She said she was cleaning the premises of her family residence when accused-
appellant pulled her from her house and took her to his room. According to complainant,
accused-appellant asked his brother, who was then cooking, to leave the room. As soon as his
brother had left, accused-appellant laid her on the floor and raped her.cccxcv[x][10] Complainant
said she was forced to submit to accused-appellants lust because of his threats.cccxcvi[xi][11]
After the incident, accused-appellant sent her letters professing love for her and telling her how
beautiful she was. Complainant said she tore up the letters after reading them.cccxcvii[xii][12]
In another incident, on March 12, 1994, accused-appellant asked complainant to let him use their
bathroom. However, after being given permission, he grabbed complainant by the hand, pulled
her inside the bathroom, and started kissing her on the lips and neck after closing the door behind
them. He only stopped molesting her when he heard somebody coming.cccxcviii[xiii][13]
BBB testified that she saw her daughter leave the bathroom, quickly followed by accused-
appellant. BBB noticed that her daughters lower lip was bruised. When she confronted her
daughter about it, the latter revealed for the first time what had happened to her. BBB went to
Camp Karingal, together with complainant and her other children, CCC and DDD, where they
filed affidavits and two informations. They then took complainant to Camp Crame for
examination.cccxcix[xiv][14] Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon, who examined complainant, submitted a
report which contained the following findings:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with
pale brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat
and soft. There is injury noted at the head;
Contusion, mucosa of the lower lip, measuring 1.2 x 0.3 cm, and 1 cm left of the anterior
midline.
GENITAL
There is an abundant growth of pubic hair. Labia minora are full, convex and gaping with the
pinkish brown and congested labia minor presenting in between. On separating, the same is
disclosed an abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type hymen with shallow healing
laceration at 5 oclock position. External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the
introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal
is narrow with prominent rugosities.
CONCLUSION
Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity.

Barring unforeseen complications, it is estimated that the above injury will resolve in 7 to 9 days
REMARKS
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and for
spermatozoa.cd[xv][15]
Dr. Cosidon explained that the term congested used in reference to the labia minora meant that
there was some inflammation that could have been caused by friction due to
intercourse.cdi[xvi][16] Taken together with the presence of a shallow hymenal laceration, this
finding indicates the possibility of intercourse that caused complainants loss of virginity within
the last five days.cdii[xvii][17]
Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence, but the trial court denied it in its November
17, 1995 order.cdiii[xviii][18] The defense thereafter presented its witnesses, namely, accused-
appellant Emiliano Duranan, accused-appellants alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and Carlito
Catubig, and his wife Carlita Duranan.
With respect to the first incident of rape, which allegedly took place in the afternoon of March 7,
1994, it is contended that accused-appellant could not have committed such, because his daily
schedule was such that he was not at home at that time. He said that because of his work, he used
to leave the house at 3 a.m., arrive home at 1 p.m., and leave for work again at 3 p.m. and arrive
home at 6:30 p.m.cdiv[xix][19] He also alleged that on March 7, 1994 he left and was with Rico
Bariquit throughout the day.cdv[xx][20] As to the second incident of rape, accused-appellant
contends that it was impossible for him to commit rape in his room because there were at least
six other people there at the time (i.e., morning of March 8, 1994) of the alleged
rape.cdvi[xxi][21] He charged that the complaints were filed against him because complainants
family wanted to evict him and his housemates from their house.cdvii[xxii][22]
Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig confirmed accused-appellants schedule.cdviii[xxiii][23]

Bariquit claimed that he was always with accused-appellant and knew where he was all the time.
Both witnesses said rape could not have been committed in a room where at least five other
people were sleeping.cdix[xxiv][24]
BBB and complainant denied seeing Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig before the two testified in
court.cdx[xxv][25]
Based on the evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on April 22, 1998,
finding the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads:cdxi[xxvi][26]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal for two (2) counts of rape punishable under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R. A. 7659, and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) counts of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties
and to indemnify the private complainant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,
000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Hence this appeal.
Accused-appellant assigns two errors as having been allegedly committed by the trial court:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE

OFFENDED PARTY IS DEPRIVED OF REASON DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
TESTIMONY BY A COMPETENT MEDICAL EXPERT TO THAT EFFECT AND DESPITE
STRONG EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD TO THE CONTRARY.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ALTERNATIVELY HOLDING THAT

THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED WOMAN THROUGH
FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
First. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victims mental
age was not proven. He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential
element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the
complainants mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve.cdxii[xxvii][27] He
further claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical
deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.
The contention has no merit.
Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may
be received in evidence regarding ---
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
Discussing this provision of the Rules on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J. Francisco writes in his
treatise:
The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the
physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and
what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.
....
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of
a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner,
habits, and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the
factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the
Supreme Court of Vermont said: A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or
insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such
person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the
witness own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings,
appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.cdxiii[xxviii][28]
In the case at bar, BBB testified on the mental condition of her daughter, thus:
Q: How would you described your daughter? (sic)
A: When she was still a child while walking she accidentally bumped her head and then on
she acted quite not normal from then on we noticed changes because she acted like a child.
Q: How old is (sic) AAA when this happened?
A: 3 to 4 years old.
Q: At the age of 25, how would you described? (sic)
A: She still thinks like a child but from her narration or statement we can see that her
declaration are (sic) true or believable.
Q: You mean to say that she could be intelligent.
A: Yes, ma'am. She finished her elementary and I can say she is quite intelligent.
Q: So she can somewhat understand what is happening around us?
A: Yes, she can understand things around as along as she would be provided some basis and
some reference inorder (sic) to establish time, places and incident (sic).
Q: At your house do you still assigned (sic) household chores(?)
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Could she relied (sic) upon madam witness?
A: Yes maam.cdxiv[xxix][29]
To rebut this, accused-appellant points to the mothers statement that complainant is quite
intelligent. The statement that complainant is quite intelligent must be read in the context of
BBBs previous statement that complainant thinks like a child but from her narration or statement
we can see that her declaration are (sic) true or believable. Thus, what complainants mother
meant was that complainant, although she thought like a child, nevertheless could tell others
what happened to her. Indeed, even the trial court admonished the defense counsel not to use
inculpatory questions because complainant might give inculpatory answers.cdxv[xxx][30] At
another stage of the trial, the trial court reminded counsel, The witness [complainant] is not very
intelligent. I think the witness cannot even distinguish dates.cdxvi[xxxi][31]
Thus, the trial court itself found in dealing with complainant that she was mentally deficient. The
rule that findings of fact of the trial court should not be disturbed since the trial court is in the
best position to determine the findings of factcdxvii[xxxii][32]cannot be more apt than in this
case.
Accused-appellant cites the medico-legal report which describes complainant as coherent and
contends that this is an evaluation of the mental state of complainant. This contention is totally
without basis. The medicolegal report categorically states that the purpose of the medical
examination is limited to determining whether the complainant had been sexually
abused.cdxviii[xxxiii][33] In other words, the purpose of the examination was to determine her
physical, not her mental, state.
Second. On the alternative, accused-appellant argues that indeed, complainant could not be a
competent witness if she is a retardate. Under Rule 130, 20, any person who can perceive and
make known his/her perception is qualified to be a witness. In this case, although complainant is
a retardate, she was nevertheless able to tell the court what accused-appellant had done to her
and to answer the questions of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel. This is clear from her
testimony, thus:
Q: Now, you said that you were raped by Emiliano Duranan. Where did this happen?
A: In the bathroom of my Tiya Ineng.
Q: Where is this bathroom of your Tiya Ineng?
A: This bathroom is located at an alley, a pasillo towards our house.
Q: Where is your house, Miss Witness?
A: Our house is located at xxx.
Q: You said that you were raped inside the bathroom of your Tiya Ineng. How were you
able to get inside that bathroom of your Tiya Ineng?
A: I was able to get inside the bathroom of Tiya Ineng because Emiliano Duranan pulled me
inside.
Q: How did Emiliano Duranan pulled you? (sic)

A: He pulled me inside the bathroom by holding his arm against my neck, pulling me
towards the bathroom.
....
Q: When Emiliano Duranan pulled you inside the bathroom, what happened after that?
A: He kissed me.
(Witness is gesturing his (sic) hands towards her neck)
And he had my panty removed.
Q: Now, you said that when you were inside the bathroom of your Tiya Ineng, Emiliano
Duranan kissed you in (sic) your lips?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Aside from kissing you, what did Emiliano do, if any?
A: Aside from kissing me on my lips and my neck, he removed my underwear, my panty

and he inserted his sex organ into my sex organ.
Q: When Kalbo inserted his sex organ in your sex organ, what position were you then?
A: We were standing.
Q: Inside the bathroom?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: AAA, do you know how to tell the days of the week?
A: No, maam.
Q: How about the dates?
A: No, maam.
Q: Do you know what day is today?
A: Wednesday.
Q: How about yesterday, what date was that?
A: Tuesday.
Q: Do you know what date is today?
COURT:
She knows that today is Wednesday but she doesnt know the exact date.cdxix[xxxiv][34]
....
Q: You also testified before that you were rape (sic) by Kalbo twice, is that correct?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: When was the second time?
A: The second time at their house that was Tuesday.
Q: Is that the next day? After the incident in the bathroom?
A: Yes, Maam.
....
Q: So you said that you were laid down by Kalbo on the floor and then Kalbo kissed you,
where did Kalbo kiss you?
A: From (sic) my lips.
Q: After that what did Kalbo do if any?
A: Proceeded to removed (sic) my panty and inserted his organ to mine.cdxx[xxxv][35]
At all events, any objection to the competency of complainant to testify should have been raised
by the defense at the outset. It cannot be raised for the first time in this appeal. It has been held:
A party may waive his objections to the competency of a witness and permit him to testify.... [I]f,
after such incompetency appears, there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having
knowledge of the incompetency, the objection will be deemed waived, whether it is on the
ground of want of mental capacity or for some other reason. If the objection could have been
taken during the trial, a new trial will be refused and the objection will not be available on writ of
error.cdxxi[xxxvi][36]
Third. Accused-appellant contends that the absence of injury sustained by complainant negates
the presence of any force and intimidation. This contention is likewise without merit. The
presence or absence of injuries is not essential in proving rape. What is essential is proof that
sexual intercourse with a woman was accomplished without her consent. In this case, the absence
of consent is shown by the fact that complainant is a mental retardate vulnerable to intimidation
by accused-appellant.
Indeed, the degree of force or intimidation required for the act to constitute rape is relative, and
must be viewed in the light of the complainants perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the offense.cdxxii[xxxvii][37] What is vital is that such force or intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose that accused-appellant had in mind.cdxxiii[xxxviii][38] In
this case, due to the complainants mental retardation, the force or intimidation required is not
very great since it does not take much to force a child into submission. Indeed, complainant said
she submitted to accused-appellants demands because she was afraid he would get angry at her if
she refused them. In People v. Rosare,cdxxiv[xxxix][39] it was held that, in the instances where
the victim is so weak in intellect that she is incapable of rational consent, the force applied may
be constructive.
In sum, the mental retardation of the complainant is proven by the testimony of her
mother,cdxxv[xl][40] the trial courts observations during the trial of her demeanor, behavior, and
her intelligence,cdxxvi[xli][41] while the fact of sexual intercourse is proven by the medico-legal
certificate.cdxxvii[xlii][42] In addition, the prosecution proved the presence of force and
intimidation, and the court appreciated such.cdxxviii[xliii][43] The intimidation, in this case, is
constituted by the threats that accused-appellant made to the complainant,cdxxix[xliv][44] not to
mention the force employed by accused-appellant in placing his arm on the complainants
neckcdxxx[xlv][45] and holding her hands while undressing her.cdxxxi[xlvi][46]
However, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should be doubled because there are two
counts of rape. In addition, complainant should also be awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages
for each count of rape, or a total of P100,000.00 in accordance with our
rulings.cdxxxii[xlvii][47]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, xxx, finding accusedappellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is increased to P100,000.00 and, in addition, accused-
appellant is ordered to pay complainant AAA the further sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
g. Character Evidence
People of the Philippines vs Deopita
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130601. December 4, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN,

Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN appeals from the Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Davao City finding him guilty of Robbery with
Rape, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay the victim, Dominga Pikit-pikit, P8,500.00 for
actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral damages.[1 chanrobles virtual law library
Culled principally from the testimonies of Dominga Pikit-pikit and

PO3 Steve dela Cruz, the inculpatory facts follow: At about 9:00
o'clock in the evening of 16 April 1995 complaining witness Dominga
Pikit-pikit, 24 years old, was walking towards Emiville Subdivision,
Diversion Road, Sasa, Davao City, on her way home from work.
Suddenly, a man appeared from behind, looped his arm around her
neck and warned her not to shout or else she would die.2 The man
then dragged her through the banana plantation towards the
cornfields where the plants were a meter high and far apart.3 When
Dominga shouted for help, the man pushed her to the ground and
punched her on the stomach saying, "Leche ka, why are you
shouting? What do you want me to do, make you unconscious?"4 chanrobles virtual law library
Dominga Pikit-pikit got a good look at the man, who turned out to be
accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman, as he sat on her thighs
and proceeded to divest her of her belongings - ladies watch,
bracelet, ring with russian diamonds, wedding ring and P1,000.00
cash. With the full moon shining on his face, the victim clearly saw
Diopita place the items on the right pocket of his shorts.5 chanrobles virtual law library
Thereafter, accused-appellant Diopita announced his desire to have

carnal knowledge of Dominga. Forthwith, he pulled up her t-shirt
and unfastened her brassiere. He also loosened her belt, unzipped
her pants and struggled to pull it down, nearly ripping her zipper.
Annoyed at the tightness of her pants, Diopita hit her and ordered
her to help him pull them down.6 Dominga, fearing for her life and
thinking of Diopitas punches, obeyed. She pulled her pants to her
hips. Then accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down further and
got irritated in fact when he was told that she was wearing a girdle
and panty. In frustration, he punched her repeatedly and kept on
muttering, "Why is this very tight? What kind of panty is this?"
Finally, he succeeded in pulling the girdle and panty down.[7 chanrobles virtual law librar y
Accused-appellant Diopita then took off his shorts. He kissed the

victim, lasciviously caressed her breasts, bit her nipples, and
fornicated with her. As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga
made desperate struggles and frantic calls for help but her efforts
proved futile until he finally satiated his lust. He then warned
Dominga not to tell anyone and that should he hear that she told
anybody about the incident he would shoot her to death. Then he
dressed up and left, walking casually to the opposite direction of the
subdivision before disappearing in the darkness.8 chanrobles virtual law librar y
Exhausted, Dominga slowly stood up, put on her clothes and walked
away in the direction of her house. Finding it locked, she asked help
from her neighbors who called the police. Thereafter, Dominga was
brought to Precinct No. 4 of Sasa, Davao City, where SPO1 Stephen
Batacan entered her complaint in the police blotter. Later, she was
examined by Dr. Floranne Lam-Vergara at the Davao Medical Center
who found her "positive for spermatocytes."[9 chanrobles virtual law library
PO3 Steve dela Cruz, who was on duty at the Intelligence and
Investigation Section, made a follow-up on the case. He went to the
victims house and interviewed her between the hours of 1:00 oclock
and 3:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, 17 April 1995.
Dominga gave a description of the suspect and his possible
whereabouts.10 Acting on that information, PO3 dela Cruz went to
the scene of the crime to investigate and there he recovered a
colored white/yellow, size ten (10) slipper. Since the victim earlier
disclosed that the suspect headed north after committing the crime,
he proceeded to that direction where he came upon four (4) houses
about fifteen (15) to fifty (50) meters away from the scene of the
crime. A back-up team was called and they rounded up all the
residents therein. Afterwards, four (4) men who fitted the
description of the suspect were invited to the police station for
questioning. They were Placido Laput, William Silvano, Vicente
Silvano and accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman.[11 chanrobles virtual law library
At about 6:00 oclock in the morning of 17 April 1995, the police

invited Dominga to identify the suspect at the police station.
Thereat, Dominga saw the four (4) men in a police line-up and
readily pointed at accused-appellant.12 The police then had him try
on the recovered slipper; it easily fitted him.13 Thus, Diopita was
detained while the others were released. ch anrobles virtual law library
The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant

claimed that between 8:30 to 12:00 oclock in the evening of 16 April
1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and fellow Jehovahs
Witnesses Roger Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio
Nisnisan for an informal Bible session upon the invitation of Juan
Nisnisan.[14 Accused-appellant also claimed that during those hours,
he never left the place. Flora, Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan
corroborated his alibi and testified on his good moral character as a
ministerial servant of their faith. chanrobles virtual law library
On 18 June 1997, the trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi
and convicted him of the crime charged; consequently, accused-
appellant is now before us on appeal. The trial court ruled - chanrobles virtu al law librar y
Alibi is a weak defense because it can easily be fabricated that it is so easy for witnesses to
get confused as to dates and time. The precision with which the witnesses for the defense,
who are his co-members in the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when the
participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and
deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted and
fabricated. chanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, private complainant Dominga Pikit-Pikit positively identified Rafael
Diopita as the person who robbed and raped her on April 16, 1995. She testified in a clear,
straightforward and convincing manner and no ill-motive on her part had been shown to
have prompted her to testify falsely. The failure of the defense to attribute any ill-motive on
the part of Pikit-Pikit to pin responsibility on Diopita adds more credence to complainants
testimony. cha nrobles virtua l law library
In a long line of cases, it has been held that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by the victim. Pikit-Pikit testified that she was able to
see the face of her attacker because the moon was shining brightly that evening. This Court
takes judicial notice of the fact that in the month of April 1995 the full moon came out on
April 15, 1995, a day before the date of the crime. cha nrobles virtua l law library
We affirm his conviction; the guilt of accused-appellant has been

established by the evidence beyond reasonable doubt. chanrobles virtual law librar y
First. Complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit positively and

categorically identified accused-appellant as her assailant, first
during the police line-up where she singled him out from among the
four (4) suspects and, later during the trial where she pointed at
accused-appellant as the one who robbed and sexually molested her
- chanrobles virtual law library
Q: Where did you go? chanrobles virtual law library
A: To the Police Station, there were four persons who lined up for identification. chanrobles virtual law library
Q: And then? chanrobles virtua l law library
A: First, when I arrived, I peeped behind the place where there were four persons lining
up. After that I went to the place where they were receiving visitors and I saw the four
persons who were there already and lined up. chanrobles virtual law library
Q: And then? chanrobles virtua l law library
A: After that the police told me to identify the person who molested me, and I pointed to
that person there (witness pointing to the accused whom she previously identified).[15 chanrobles virtual law library
From the circumstances of this case, it cannot be denied that

complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit had a good look at the face
and physical features of accused-appellant during the commission of
the crime. While the robbery was in progress, the moonlight
sufficiently illumined his face and clothes, thus making it possible for
private complainant to identify him.16 During the rape, private
complainant was as close to accused-appellant as was physically
possible, for a man and a woman cannot be more physically close to
each other than during a sexual act.[17 Victims of criminal violence
naturally strive to know the identity of their assailants and observe
the manner the crime was perpetrated, creating a lasting impression
which may not be erased easily in their memory.18 There is therefore
no reason to doubt the accuracy of private complainants visual
perception of accused-appellant as the criminal. Nor is there any
reason to doubt her honesty of intention for there is no showing that
she implicated accused-appellant due to an evil or corrupt motive.
library
chanrobles virtual law
We do not subscribe to accused-appellants contentions that the

complaining witness hesitated to point at him during the police line-
up, and that she was just forced by the police to choose him from
among the four (4) suspects. The identification was made with such
certainty by the complaining witness that even accused-appellant
had to comment on it - chanrobles virtual l aw library
Atty. Galicia: What made you say she was hesitant to point at you? x x x x chanro bles virt ual law library
Rafael Diopita: Because during that time, sir, when we confronted each other in the police
station, she was looking at me when there were four of us there. So, I asked why x x x x19 chanrobles v irtual law library
The foregoing testimony belied the allegation of hesitancy on the

part of Dominga Pikit-pikit to pinpoint accused-appellant during the
line-up. His very own words project his guilt as well. Only the guilty
experiences neurotic fear in the face of imminent discovery of his
malefaction. His paranoia colors his interpretation of the events
during the line-up. Consider accused-appellants assertion that
Dominga Pikit-pikit was forced by the police to point at him, and
Prosecutor Esparagoza's objection thereto - chanrobles virtual law librar y
Sur-rebuttal of Atty. Galicia: Mr. Diopita, according to private complainant Dominga

Pikit-pikit during her rebuttal testimony that she was not forced by the police to point
at you when you were in the police station. What can you say to that? cha nrobles virtual law library
Rafael Diopita: That woman hesitated to point at me but the police said you point at
him. cha nrobles virtua l law library
Q: What made you say she was hesitant to point at you? chanro bles v irtual law library
Prosecutor Esparagoza: The witness said ITUDLO! ITUDLO! (YOU POINT! YOU
POINT!). He did not say he was the one pointed to, your Honor.20 chanrobles virtual law library
Gleaned from the aforequoted testimony was the absence of

suggestiveness in the identification process. There were four (4)
men in the line-up and the police did not specifically suggest to
Dominga to point particularly at accused-appellant. Not even the
shodding of the slipper recovered from the scene of the crime could
provide any suggestiveness to the line-up as it came after accused-
appellant was already identified by Dominga Pikit-pikit. chanrobles virtual law library
Second. In light of this positive and direct evidence of accused-

appellants culpability, the trial court correctly discarded his defense
of alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the
clear and positive identification of the accused as the very person
who committed the crime. Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal
based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that (a) he was in another place at the time of
the commission of the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.21 This, accused-appellant miserably failed to do. chanrobles virtual law library
Accused-appellant admitted that at the time in question he was with

his wife, son and fellow members of the Jehovahs Witnesses at the
house of one Eulalio Nisnisan supposedly attending Bible studies,
which is merely fifteen (15) to fifty (50) meters away from the crime
scene. Considering the short and insignificant distance, it was not
impossible for accused-appellant to surreptitiously slip away from
the house of Nisnisan, commit the crime and then return without
arousing the suspicion of his companions who were then busy with
their Bible session. This is obviously the situation in this case and,
taken together with the preceding considerations, we likewise reject
this poor and discredited defense as did the trial court. Verily, even
if the defense of alibi is corroborated by the testimony of the friends
of accused-appellant, it deserves the barest consideration and will
not be given weight if it would not preclude any doubt that he could
have been physically present at the locus criminis or its immediate
vecino at the time of its commission.22 chanrobles virtual law library
Third. Perhaps aware of the crushing impact of complainants

positive identification of accused-appellant, the defense attacked the
supposed inconsistencies and discrepancies in her testimony in a
vain attempt to make it completely unreliable, claiming that: (a) the
victim declared that the culprit wore short pants with a zipper, and
he had no short pants with zipper; (b) the yellow slipper retrieved
by the police did not belong to him as his slippers were colored blue,
with his initials inscribed thereon; and, (c) the description given by
complainant in the police blotter did not fit the physical appearance
of accused-appellant. chanrobles virtual law librar y
We are not persuaded. Suffice it to say that these are mere trifles
which do not detract from complainants straightforward and
consistent identification of accused-appellant as the one who robbed
and raped her. Trivial inconsistencies do not shake the pedestal
upon which the complainants credibility rests. On the contrary, they
are taken as badges of truth rather than as indicia of falsehood for
they manifest spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.[23 Furthermore, entries in police blotters should not be
given undue significance or probative value for they are normally
incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestion
or want of suggestion or inquiry.24 chanrobles virtual law librar y
Fourth. We now deal with the more substantial arguments raised by

accused-appellant in his brief. He tenaciously maintains that it was
impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is
a person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of
"Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses,
and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family
man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God. chanrobles virtual law librar y
We are not impressed. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed

with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he
is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the
position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against
any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed,
religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the
unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An
accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous
good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or
reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of
whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt
beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime
in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of
good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing. chanrobles virtu al law librar y
Accused-appellant likewise bewails and assigns as reversible error

the failure of the trial court to give credence to the testimonies of
the defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovahs
Witnesses, and as such, they are God-fearing people who would
never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in question. This
argument is as puerile as the first. We quote once more, and with
approval, the pertinent portion of the trial courts ruling on this point
- chanrobles virtual law library
x x x x it is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time. The precision with
which the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovahs Witnesses,
quoted the respective hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly
arrived is, at best, self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility with
which it may be concocted and fabricated (underscoring supplied). chanrobles virtual law library
The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is

best and most competently performed by the trial court who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
testifying, and to assess their credibility using various indicia
available but not reflected in the records.[25 Hence, the court a quo's
appraisal on the matter is entitled to the highest respect, and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result
of the case.26 There is no compelling reason in the present case to
depart from this rule. ch anrobles virtual law library
In sum, we find that all the elements of robbery with rape are
present in this case. There was asportation of the jewelry and cash
of the victim by means of force and violence on her person, showing
the initial animus lucrandi of accused-appellant,27 and then his
lecherous intent when he raped his victim. Accordingly, we hold that
the court below did not commit any reversible error in ruling that the
requisite quantum of evidence for a finding of guilt has been
sufficiently met by the prosecution as to call for our affirmance of
the judgment of the court a quo.28 chanrobles virtual law library
However, in addition to the actual and moral damages awarded by

the trial court in the amounts of P8,500.00 and P50,000.00,
respectively, another amount of P50,000.00 should have also been
awarded to the victim Dominga Pikit-pikit for civil indemnity, as it is
mandatory upon a conviction of rape. Such indemnity is distinct from
moral damages and based on different jural foundations.[29 chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Davao City, convicting accused-appellant RAFAEL DIOPITA y
GUZMAN of ROBBERY WITH RAPE, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay DOMINGA PIKIT-PIKIT the sums
of P8,500.00 for actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral damages,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, in addition, civil
indemnity of another P50,000.00 is further awarded to her. Costs
against accused-appellant. chanrobles virtual l aw library
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtu al law librar y
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
A. Burden of Proof and Presumptions
1. Burden of Proof vs Burden of Evidence

FEBTC vs Chante
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170598 October 9, 2013

FAR EAST BANK TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERTO MAR CHANTE, a.k.a. ROBERT MAR G. CHAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In this dispute between a. bank and its depositor over liability for several supposedly fraudulent
withdrawals from the latter s account through an automated tellering machine (ATM), we hereby
resolve the issue of liability against the bank because of the intervention of a system bug that
facilitated the purported withdrawals.
The Case
Under review on certiorari is the decision promulgated on August l, 2005,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, in Manila (RTC)
rendered in favor of the petitioner on May 14, 1998 in Civil Case No. 92-61706.2 Thereby, the
CA relieved the depositor of any liability for the supposedly fraudulent withdrawals.
Antecedents
Robert Mar Chante, also known as Robert Mar G. Chan (Chan), was a current account depositor
of petitioner Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC) at its Ongpin Branch (Current Account No.
5012-00340-3). FEBTC issued to him Far East Card No. 05-01120-5-0 with July 1993 as the
expiry date. The card, known as a "Do-It-All" card to handle credit card and ATM transactions,
was tagged in his current account. As a security feature, a personal identification number (PIN),
known only to Chan as the depositor, was required in order to gain access to the account. Upon
the cards issuance, FEBTC required him as the depositor to key in the six-digit PIN. Thus, with
the use of his card and the PIN, he could then deposit and withdraw funds from his current
account from any FEBTC ATM facility, including the MEGALINK facilities of other member
banks that included the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
Civil Case No. 92-61706 sprang from the complaint brought by petitioner Far East Bank & Trust
Co. (FEBTC) on July 1, 1992 in the RTC,3 to recover from Chan the principal sum of
P770,488.30 representing the unpaid balance of the amount fraudulently withdrawn from Chans
Current Account No. 5012-00340-3 with the use of Far East Card No. 05-01120-5-0.
FEBTC alleged that between 8:52 p.m. of May 4, 1992 and 4:06 a.m. of May 5, 1992, Chan had
used Far East Card No. 05-01120-5-0 to withdraw funds totaling P967,000.00 from the PNB-
MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila; that the withdrawals were
done in a series of 242 transactions with the use of the same machine, at P4,000.00/withdrawal,
except for transaction No. 108 at 3:51 a.m. of May 5, 1992, when the machine dispensed only
P3,000.00; that MEGALINKS journal tapes showed that Far East Card No. 05-01120-5-0 had
been used in all the 242 transactions; and that the transactions were processed and recorded by
the respective computer systems of PNB and MEGALINK despite the following circumstances,
namely: (a) the offline status of the branch of account (FEBTC Ongpin Branch); (b) Chans
account balance being only P198,511.70 at the time, as shown in the bank statement; (c) the
maximum withdrawal limit of the ATM facility being P50,000.00/day; and (d) his withdrawal
transactions not being reflected in his account, and no debits or deductions from his current
account with the FEBTC Ongpin Branch being recorded.
FEBTC added that at the time of the ATM withdrawal transactions, there was an error in its
computer system known as "system bug" whose nature had allowed Chan to successfully
withdraw funds in excess of his current credit balance of P198,511.70; and that Chan had taken
advantage of the system bug to do the withdrawal transactions.
On his part, Chan denied liability. Although admitting his physical possession of Far East Card
No. 05-01120-5-0 on May 4 and May 5, 1992, he denied making the ATM withdrawals totaling
P967,000.00, and instead insisted that he had been actually home at the time of the withdrawals.
He alluded to a possible "inside job" as the cause of the supposed withdrawals, citing a
newspaper report to the effect that an employee of FEBTCs had admitted having debited
accounts of its depositors by using his knowledge of computers as well as information available
to him. Chan claimed that it would be physically impossible for any human being like him to
stand long hours in front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds. He contested the debiting of
his account, stating that the debiting had affected his business and had caused him to suffer great
humiliation after the dishonor of his sufficiently-funded checks by FEBTC.
The records show that FEBTC discovered the system bug only after its routine reconciliation of
the ATM-MEGALINK transactions on May 7, 1992; that it immediately adopted remedial and
corrective measures to protect its interest in order to avoid incurring further damage as well as to
prevent a recurrence of the incident; that one of the measures it adopted pursuant to its ATM
Service Agreement with Chan was to program its computer system to repossess his ATM card;
that his ATM card was repossessed at the Ermita Branch of FEBTC when he again attempted to
withdraw at the ATM facility there; that the ATM facility retained his ATM card until its
recovery by the bank; and that FEBTC conducted an in-depth investigation and a time-and-
motion study of the withdrawals in question.
On May 14, 1992, FEBTC debited his current account in the amount of P192,517.20 pursuant to
Chans ATM Service Agreement. It debited the further sum of P3,000.00 on May 18, 1992,
leaving the unrecovered portion of the funds allegedly withdrawn by him at P770,488.30. Thus,
on May 14 and May 18, 1992, FEBTC sent to Chan letters demanding the reimbursement of the
unrecovered balance of P770,488.30, but he turned a deaf ear to the demands, impelling it to
bring this case on July 1, 1992.4
Ruling of the RTC
As reflected in the pre-trial order of October 19, 1992, the issues to be resolved were, firstly,
whether or not Chan had himself withdrawn the total sum of P967,000.00 with the use of his Far
East Card No. 05-01120-5-0 at the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility; and, secondly, if the answer
to the first issue was that he did, whether or not he was liable to reimburse to FEBTC the amount
of P770,488.30 as actual damages, plus interest.5
On May 14, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of FEBTC, pertinently holding and
ruling as follows:6
In the instant case, what happened was that the defendant who was at the U.N. Branch of the
PNB used his card. He entered his PIN to have access to a withdrawal transaction from his
account in Far East Bank, Ongpin Branch. However, after recognizing the card and went to the
path of his account it could not get a signal to proceed with the transaction so it proceeded to the
other path who gave the signal to go on and dispense money. But there was a computer error as it
did not only dispense the money limit for the day buty it continued to dispense a lot more until it
reached the amount of P967,000.00 which took the defendant till the hours of the morning to
obtain. But defendant says he did not use his card. He alleges that it could be an inside job just
like what happened to the said bank which was published in the newspaper wherein the bank
employee admitted having done the theft through his knowledge of the computer. Could this be
true?
The Court opines that it is not far-fetched. However why did this Court state that plaintiffs cause
of action will survive? The action of the defendant after the incident gave him away. Merely two
days after the heavy withdrawal, the defendant returned not at the exact scene of the incident but
at a nearby branch which is also in Ermita and tried again to withdraw. But at this time the bank
already knew what happened so it blocked the card and retained it being a hot card. The
defendant was not successful this time so what he did was to issue a check almost for the whole
amount of his balance in his account leaving only a minimal amount. This incident puzzles the
Court. Maybe the defendant was hoping that the machine nearby may likewise dispense so much
amount without being detected. He will not definitely go back to the U.N. branch as he may
think that it is being watched and so he went to a nearby branch. Unfortunately, luck was not
with him this time and his card was taken by the bank. The fact that he hastily withdrew the
balance of his account after his card was retained by the bank only showed his knowledge that
the bank may debit his account. It also showed his intent to do something further other than first
inquire why his card was considered a hot card if he is really innocent. When he went to the
Ermita branch to withdraw from the ATM booth he was intending to withdraw not more than
P50,000.00 as it is the banks limit for the day and if ever he needed a bigger amount than
P50,000.00 immediately he should have gone to the branch for an over the counter transaction
but he did not do so and instead issued a check for P190,000.00 dated May 7, 1992 and another
check for P5,000.00 dated May 13, 1992. To the mind of the Court, to take advantage of a
computer error, to gain sudden and undeserved amount of money should be condemned in the
strongest terms.
There are no available precedents in this case regarding computer errors, but the Court feels that
defendant should be held liable for the mistaken amount he was able to get from the machine
based on the following provisions of the law.
Articles 19, 21, 22 and 23 of the Civil Code x x x.
xxxx
There is likewise one point that the Court would like to discuss about the allegation of the
defendant that it was impossible for him to withdraw the money in such long period and almost
minute after minute. This Court believes that money is the least of all, a person may give priority
in life. There are many who would sacrifice a lot just to have lots of it, so it would not be
impossible for one to take time, stand for several hours and just enter some items in the computer
if the return would be something like a million or close to a million. In fact, the effort exerted
was just peanuts compared to other legitimate ways of earning a living as the only capital or
means used to obtain it was the defendants loss of sleep and the time spent in withdrawing the
same. Moreover, though the cause of action in this case may be the erroneous dispensation of
money due to computer bug which is not of defendants wrong doing, the Court sees that what
was wrong was the failure to return the amount in excess of what was legally his. There is such a
thing as JUSTICE. Justice means rendering to others their due. A person is just when he is
careful about respecting the rights of others, and who knows too, how to claim what he rightfully
deserves as a consequence of fulfilling his duties.
From the foregoing, the conclusion is manifest that plaintiff is within its right in initiating the
instant suit, as defendants refusal to pay the claim constitutes the cause of action for sum of
money.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Far East Bank and Trust
Company and against the defendant Robert Mar Chante a.k.a. Robert Mar G. Chan ordering the
latter to pay the former the following:
1. the amount of P770,488.30 as actual damages representing the unrecovered balance of

the amounts withdrawn by defendant;
2. interest of 24% per annum on the actual damages from July 1, 1992, the date of the
filing of the complaint until fully paid;
3. the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. the sum of P30,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
5. the costs of the suit. Defendants counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
Chan appealed,7 assigning the following errors to the RTC, to wit:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT LIABLE

FOR THE ALLEGED WITHDRAWAL OF THE AMOUNT OF P967,000.00 WITH
INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 24% PER ANNUM BASED MERELY ON
CONJECTURES AND SUSPICIONS NOT ESTABLISHED BY SOLID EVIDENCE;
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P100,000.00 AND ATTORNEYS
FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P30,000.00;
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE RESTITUTION OF THE

AMOUNT OF P196,521.30 ILLEGALLY DEBITED BY APPELLEE FROM
APPELLANTS ACCOUNT.
On August 1, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed decision, reversing the RTCs judgment, to
wit:
x x x. The issues really before us are issues of contract application and issues of fact that would
require an examination and appreciation of the evidence presented. The first order therefore in
our review of the trial courts decision is to take stock of the established and undisputed facts,
and of the evidence the parties have presented. We say this at the outset as we believe that it was
in this respect that the lower court failed in its consideration and appreciation of the case.
xxxx
An evidentiary dilemma we face in this case is the fact that there is no direct evidence on the
issue of who made the actual withdrawals. Chan correctly claims that the bank failed to present
any witness testifying that he (Chan) made the actual withdrawals. At the same time, Chan can
only rely on his own uncorroborated testimony that he was at home on the night that withdrawals
were made. We recognize that the bank can claim that no other evidence of actual withdrawal is
necessary because the PIN unique to Chan is already evidence that only Chan or his authorized
representative and none other could have accessed his account. But at the same time, we
cannot close our eyes to the fact that computers and the ATM system is not perfect as shown by
an incident cited by Chan involving the FEBTC itself. Aside from the vulnerability to inside staff
members, we take judicial notice that no less than our own Central Bank has publicly warned
banks about other nefarious schemes involving ATM machines. In a March 7, 2003 letter, the
Central Bank stated:
March 7, 2003
BSP CIRCULAR LETTER
TO : All Banks
SUBJECT : Technology Fraud on ATM Systems
Please be advised that there were incidents in other countries regarding technology fraud in ATM
systems perpetrated by unscrupulous individuals and/ or syndicates.
These acts are carried out by:
1. A specialized scanner attached to the ATM card slot, and;
2. A pinhole camera
xxxx
In light of the absence of conclusive direct evidence of actual withdrawal that we can rely upon,
we have to depend on evidence "other than direct" to reach verdict in this case.
xxxx
WHEREFORE , premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and accordingly

REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated May 14, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 51, in Civil Case No. 92-61706. We accordingly ORDER plaintiff-appellee Far
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) to return to Chan the amount of Php196,571.30 plus
12% interest per annum computed from August 7, 1992 the time Chan filed his counterclaim
until the obligation is satisfied. Costs against the plaintiff-appellee FEBTC.
SO ORDERED.8
FEBTC moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion on November 24, 2005.9
Issues
Hence, FEBTC has appealed, urging the reversal of the CAs adverse decision, and praying that
Chan be held liable for the withdrawals made from his account on May 4 and May 5, 1992; and
that it should not be held liable to return to Chan the sum of P196,571.30 debited from his
account.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
FEBTC would want us to hold that Chan had authored the May 4 and May 5, 1992 ATM
withdrawals based on the following attendant factors, namely: (a) ATM transactions were
processed and identified by the PIN, among others; (b) the PIN was exclusive and known only to
the account holder; (c) the ATM was tagged in the cardholders account where the ATM
transactions were debited or credited; (d) the account number tagged in the ATM card identified
the cardholder; (e) the ATM withdrawals were documented transactions; and (f) the transactions
were strictly monitored and recorded not only by FEBTC as the bank of account but also by the
ATM machine and MEGALINK. In other words, the ATM transactions in question would not be
processed unless the PIN, which was known only to Chan as the cardholder, had been correctly
entered, an indication both that it was his ATM card that had been used, and that all the
transactions had been processed successfully by the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the
Manila Pavilion Hotel with the use of the correct PIN.
We disagree with FEBTC.
Although there was no question that Chan had the physical possession of Far East Card No. 05-
01120-5-0 at the time of the withdrawals, the exclusive possession of the card alone did not
suffice to preponderantly establish that he had himself made the withdrawals, or that he had
caused the withdrawals to be made. In his answer, he denied using the card to withdraw funds
from his account on the dates in question, and averred that the withdrawals had been an "inside
job." His denial effectively traversed FEBTCs claim of his direct and personal liability for the
withdrawals, that it would lose the case unless it competently and sufficiently established that he
had personally made the withdrawals himself, or that he had caused the withdrawals. In other
words, it carried the burden of proof.
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely: (a) the
risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the
duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the
production burden or the burden of evidence.10 In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the
truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the
case at which the issue arises.11 In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the
beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case.
Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second concept passes from party to party as the case
progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of
the issue.12
The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere allegation of
the fact is not evidence of it.13 Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.14
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given
on either side.15 This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of
investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the
respective parties.16 The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is
on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner
required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the
essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would
exculpate him from liability.17
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court sets the quantum of evidence for civil actions, and
delineates how preponderance of evidence is determined, viz :
Section 1. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the
case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number. (Emphasis supplied)
As the rule indicates, preponderant evidence refers to evidence that is of greater weight, or more
convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition to it.18 It is proof that leads the trier of facts
to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.19
Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon the
weakness of Chans evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly demonstrate
that his ATM card had been used to make the withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card
and PIN by himself or by another person to make the fraudulent withdrawals. Otherwise, it could
not recover from him any funds supposedly improperly withdrawn from the ATM account. We
remind that as a banking institution, FEBTC had the duty and responsibility to ensure the safety
of the funds it held in trust for its depositors. It could not avoid the duty or evade the
responsibility because it alone should bear the price for the fraud resulting from the system bug
on account of its exclusive control of its computer system.
Did FEBTC discharge its burden of proof?
The CA ruled that FEBTC did not because
After a review of the records of this case, we find the totality of evidence submitted by FEBTC
insufficient to establish the crucial facts that would justify a judgment in its favor.
To our mind, the fact that Chans account number and ATM card number were the ones used for
the withdrawals, by itself, is not sufficient to support the conclusion that he should be deemed to
have made the withdrawals.
FEBTC offers in this regard the PNB ATMs journal tapes to prove the withdrawals and their
details the time of the transactions; the account number used; the ATM card number; and the
amount withdrawn and at the same time declared that these tapes are authentic and genuine.
These tapes, however, are not as reliable as FEBTC represented them to be as they are not even
internally consistent. A disturbing internal discrepancy we note relates to the amounts reflected
as "ledger balance" and "available balance". We find it strange that for every 4,000.00 pesos
allegedly withdrawn by Chan, the available balance increased rather than diminished. Worse, the
amount of available balance as reflected in the tapes was way above the actual available balance
of less than Php200,000.00 that Chans current account had at that time. These discrepancies
must inevitably reflect on the integrity of the journal tapes; the proven inconsistencies in some
aspects of these tapes leave the other aspects suspect and uncertain.
But more than this, we are not convinced that the tapes lead us to the inevitable conclusion that
Chans card, rather than a replacement card containing Chans PIN and card number or some
other equivalent scheme, was used. To our mind, we cannot discount this possibility given the
available technology making computer fraud a possibility, the cited instances of computer
security breaches, the admitted system bug, and most notably the fact that the withdrawals
were made under circumstances that took advantage of the system bug. System errors of this
kind, when taken advantage of to the extent that had happened in this case, are planned for.
Indeed, prior preparation must take place to avoid suspicion and attention where the withdrawal
was made for seven (7) long hours in a place frequented by hundreds of guests, over 242
transactions where the physical volume of the money withdrawn was not insignificant. To say
that this was done by the owner of the account based solely on the records of the transactions, is
a convenient but not a convincing explanation.20
In our view, the CAs ruling was correct.
To start with, Edgar Munarriz, FEBTCs very own Systems Analyst, admitted that the bug
infecting the banks computer system had facilitated the fraudulent withdrawals.21 This
admission impelled the CA to thoroughly dissect the situation in order to determine the
consequences of the intervention of the system bug in FEBTCs computer system. It ultimately
determined thusly:
Significantly, FEBTC made the admission that there was a program bug in its computer system.
To digress, computers are run based on specific pre-arranged instructions or "programs" that act
on data or information that computer users input. Computers can only process these inputted data
or information according to the installed programs. Thus, computers are as efficient, as accurate
and as convenient to use as the instructions in their installed programs. They can count, sort,
compute and arrive at decisions but they do so only and strictly in accordance with the programs
that make them work. To cite an easy example, a computer can be programmed to sort a stack of
cards prepared by male and female clients, into male and female stacks, respectively. To do this,
the computer will first scan a card and look at the place ("a field") where the male/female
information can be found. This information may be in an appropriate box which the bank client
checks or shades to indicate if he/she is male or female. The computer will check if the box
beside the word "Female" is shaded. If it is, it will send the card to the "Female" bin. If the box
beside the "male" is shaded, it will send the card to the "Male" bin. If both the squares are shaded
or none is shaded or the card cannot be read, it will send the card to the "Unknown" bin. This
way, the female cards and the male cards can be sorted efficiently. However, the program
instructions can be written in such a way that the computer can only make two decisions, that is,
if the Female box is shaded, then the card goes to the "Female" bin; otherwise, the card goes to
the "Male" bin. In this program, all the Female cards will be sorted correctly but the Male bin
will contain all the other cards, that is, the Male cards, the cards with no shading at all, and all
the other cards that cannot be classified.
The imperfect results arose from the imperfect program instructions or from a program "bug".
Something very close to this example happened in the present case.
According to the testimony of the FEBTCs systems analyst, there were two computer programs
that were involved in the transactions: CAPDROTH and SCPUP 900. CAPDROTH is the
program that validates if the account exists in the FEBTC files, if the transaction is valid, and if
the branch where the account is maintained is ON-LINE (i.e. continuously sending data). When
the Chan transaction entered the system, it was validated by CAPDROTH which, on seeing that
the FEBTC-Ongpin branch was off-line, returned a decision code passing on the decision to
authorize the transaction to the SCPUP 900, another module. However, SCPUP 900 was not
expecting this type of response or decision code. As the SCPUP 900 program was originally
written, it will send back an error message and abort a requested transaction if it receives an error
message from any other module; otherwise, it will send a message authorizing the transaction. In
other words, SCPUP 900 had only two decisions to make: check if the message is an error
message, if not then, authorize. Since what it received in the disputed transactions were not error
messages and were not also authorizations, it sent back authorization messages allowing the cash
withdrawals. It kept on sending authorization messages for the 242 cash withdrawal transactions
made from Chans account between the evening of May 4 and early morning of May 5, 1992.
This program bug was the reason the 242 cash withdrawals were allowed by the PNB ATM-
Megalink machine.
The program bug occurred because of the simultaneous presence of three conditions that allowed
it to happen: (1) the withdrawal transactions involved a current account; (2) the current account
was with a branch that at that time was off-line; and (3) the transaction originated from
MEGALINK (i.e., through MEGALINK through a member bank other than FEBTC). Because of
the bug, Chans account was not accessed at the time of the transactions so that withdrawals in
excess of what the account contained were allowed. Additionally, FEBTCs rule that only a
maximum withdrawable amount per day (in the present case P50,000.00 per day) can be made
from an ATM account, was by-passed. Thus, 242 withdrawals were made over an eight hour
period, in the total amount of P967,000.00.22
Secondly, the RTCs deductions on the cause of the withdrawals were faulty. In holding against
Chan, the RTC chiefly relied on inferences drawn from his acts subsequent to the series of
withdrawals, specifically his attempt to withdraw funds from his account at an FEBTC ATM
facility in Ermita, Manila barely two days after the questioned withdrawals; his issuance of a
check for P190,000.00 immediately after the capture of his ATM card by the ATM facility; his
failure to immediately report the capture of his ATM card to FEBTC; and his going to FEBTC
only after the dishonor of the check he had issued following the freezing of his account. The
inferences were not warranted, however, because the subsequent acts would not persuasively
establish his actual participation in the withdrawals due to their being actually susceptible of
other interpretations consistent with his innocence.
We join the CAs observation that Chans subsequent acts "could have been impelled by so
many reasons and motivations, and cannot simply be given the meaning that the lower court
attributed to them," and, instead, were even consistent with the purpose and nature of his
maintaining the current account deposit with FEBTC, rendering the acts "not unusual nor
illegal."23 Although he was expected to forthwith bring his cards capture to FEBTCs attention,
that he did not do so could have other plausible explanations consistent with good faith, among
them his being constantly occupied as a businessman to attend to the multifarious activities of his
business. He might have also honestly believed that he still had the sufficient funds in his current
account, as borne out by his issuance of a check instead after the capture of the card so as not for
him to undermine any financial obligation then becoming due. Nor should his opting to withdraw
funds from his account at the ATM facility in Ermita in less than two days after the questioned
withdrawals manifest responsibility on his part, for he could also be properly presumed to be
then still unaware of the situation involving his account. We note that his letters24 written in
response to FEBTCs written demands to him disclosed honest intentions rather than malice.
Thirdly, the RTC ignored the likelihood that somebody other than Chan familiar with the bug
infection of FEBTCs computer system at the time of the withdrawals and adept with the
workings of the computer system had committed the fraud. This likelihood was not far-fetched
considering that FEBTC had immediately adopted corrective measures upon its discovery of the
system bug, by which FEBTC admitted its negligence in ensuring an error-free computer system;
and that the system bug had affected only the account of Chan.25 Truly, the trial court
misapprehended the extent to which the system bug had made the computer system of FEBTC
stumble in serious error.
Fourthly, and perhaps the most damaging lapse, was that FEBTC failed to establish that the
PNB-MEGALINKs ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel had actually dispensed cash in
the very significantly large amount alleged during the series of questioned withdrawals. For sure,
FEBTC should have proved the actual dispensing of funds from the ATM facility as the factual
basis for its claim against Chan. It did require PNB to furnish a validated showing of the exact
level of cash then carried by the latters ATM facility in the Manila Pavilion Hotel on May 4,
1992.26 Yet, when PNB employee Erwin Arellano stood as a witness for FEBTC, he confirmed
the authenticity of the journal tapes that had recorded Chans May 4 and May 5, 1992 supposed
ATM transactions but did not categorically state how much funds PNB-MEGALINKs ATM
facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel had exactly carried at the time of the withdrawals,
particularly the amounts immediately preceding and immediately following the series of
withdrawals. The omission left a yawning gap in the evidence against Chan.
And lastly, Chans allegation of an "inside job" accounting for the anomalous withdrawals
should not be quickly dismissed as unworthy of credence or weight. FEBTC employee Manuel
Del Castillo, another witness for FEBTC, revealed that FEBTC had previously encountered
problems of bank accounts being debited despite the absence of any withdrawal transactions by
their owners. He attributed the problems to the erroneous tagging of the affected accounts as
somebody elses account, allowing the latter to withdraw from the affected accounts with the use
of the latters own ATM card, and to the formers account being debited.27 The revelation of Del
Castillo tended to support Chans denial of liability, as it showed the possibility of withdrawals
being made by another person despite the PIN being an exclusive access number known only to
the cardholder.28
It is true that Del Castillo also declared that FEBTC did not store the PINs of its clients ATM
cards.1wphi1 However, he mentioned that FEBTC had stored the opposite numbers
corresponding to the PINs, which meant that the PINs did not remain entirely irretrievable at all
times and in all cases by any of its officers or employees with access to the banks computer
system. Accordingly, Del Castillos assertion that the PINs were rendered useless upon being
entered in the banks computer system did not entirely disclose how the information on the PINs
of the depositors was stored or discarded as to become useless for any purpose.
In view of the foregoing, FEBTC did not present preponderant evidence proving Chans liability
for the supposedly fraudulent withdrawals. It thus failed in discharging its burden of persuasion.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals; and DIRECTS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court s Division.

Chief Justice
2. Presumptions
a. Conclusive presumptions
Ibaan Rural Bank vs Court of Appeals
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123817. December 17, 1999]
IBAAN RURAL BANK INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR. and MRS.
RAMON TARNATE, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32984 affirming with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 534, as well as the resolution of
the Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Spouses Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of three (3) lots covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 33206, 33207 and 33208 of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City.
On March 21, 1976, the spouses mortgaged these lots to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. [herein
petitioner]. On June 11, 1976, with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner, the spouses as
sellers, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Tarnate [herein private respondents] as buyers, entered into a
Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question. Private respondents
failed to pay the loan and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The
Provincial Sheriff conducted a public auction of the lots and awarded the lots to the bank, the
sole bidder. On December 13, 1978, the Provincial Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was
registered on October 16, 1979. The certificate stated that the redemption period expires two (2)
years from the registration of the sale. No notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was given to the
private respondents. On September 23, 1981, private respondents offered to redeem the
foreclosed lots and tendered the redemption amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank
refused the redemption on the ground that it had consolidated its titles over the lots. The
Provincial Sheriff also denied the redemption on the ground that private respondents did not
appear on the title to be the owners of the lots.
Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the
foreclosed lots. They alleged that the extra-judicial foreclosure was null and void for lack of
valid notice and demand upon them. They further argued that they were entitled to redeem the
foreclosed lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before October
16, 1981, the deadline of the 2-year redemption period.
The bank opposed the redemption, contending that the private respondents had no right to
redeem the lots because they were not the real parties in interest; that at the time they offered to
redeem on September 23, 1981, the right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one year had
elapsed from the registration of the Certificate of Sale on October 16, 1979; that there was no
need of personal notice to them because under Section 3 of Act 3135, only the posting of notice
of sale at three public places of the municipality where the properties are located was
required.cdxxxiii[1]
After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled in favor of herein private respondents and against
the petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, to wit:
(a) Ordering the defendant Ibaan Rural Bank Inc., and Provincial Sheriff of Batangas for the
redemption of the foreclosed properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-33206,
T-33207 and T-33208 of the Registry of Deeds, Lipa City by the plaintiffs by paying the
mortgaged obligation.
(b) Ordering the Provincial Sheriff of Batangas to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Titles issued
to defendant Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. and its successors-in-interest and to issue the corresponding
Transfer of Certificate of Titles to plaintiffs upon payment of the required legal fees.
(c) Ordering the defendant Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc., to pay plaintiffs moral damages in the amount
of P200,000.00, and attorneys fees in the sum of P20,000.00.
All other claims not having been duly proved are ordered DISMISSED.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.cdxxxiv[2]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the lower court. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. The register of Deeds of Lipa City is hereby ordered to cancel the Certificate of Titles issued
to defendant Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. and its successor-in-interest and to issue the corresponding
Transfer Certificate of Title to plaintiffs-appellees upon proper redemption of the properties and
payment of the required legal fees.
2. Defendant Ibaan Rural bank, is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiffs the amount of P15,000.00
as attorneys fees.
3. The moral damages awarded in favor of plaintiffs is hereby ordered deleted.
SO ORDERED.cdxxxv[3]
A timely Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated February 14, 1996. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE PETITIONER IS

ENTITLED TO A REVIEW OF ITS DECISION, WHEN IT SUSTAINED AVAILABILITY
OF REDEMPTION DESPITE THE LAPSE OF ONE YEAR FROM DATE OF
REGISTRATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE PETITIONER IS

ENTITLED TO A REVIEW OF ITS DECISION, WHEN THE RESPONDENT COURT
ALLOWED RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS FEES SIMPLY BECAUSE THE PETITIONER
DID NOT ALLOW THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO EXERCISE BELATEDLY
REDEMPTION OF THE FORECLOSED PROPERTY.cdxxxvi[4]
Essentially, two issues are raised for resolution. What was the period of redemption: two years as
unilaterally fixed by the sheriff in the contract, or one year as fixed by law? May respondent
court properly award attorneys fees solely on the basis of the refusal of the bank to allow
redemption?
We now resolve these issues.
When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its
contents.cdxxxvii[5] For two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in
the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period
specially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on
the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as
consent.cdxxxviii[6] By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe
that they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years,
petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that
the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and
acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence
of such facts.cdxxxix[7]
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on Lazo vs. Republic
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.,cdxl[8] where the court held that the one year period of redemption
provided in Act No. 3135 is only directory and can be extended by agreement of the parties.
True, but it bears noting that in Lazo the parties voluntarily agreed to extend the redemption
period. Thus, the concept of legal redemption was converted by the parties in Lazo into
conventional redemption. This is not so in the instant case. There was no voluntary agreement. In
fact, the sheriff unilaterally and arbitrarily extended the period of redemption to two (2) years in
the Certificate of Sale. The parties were not even privy to the extension made by the sheriff.
Nonetheless, as above discussed, the bank can not after the lapse of two years insist that the
redemption period was one year only.
Additionally, the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of a
property. The fact alone that he is allowed the right to redeem clearly demonstrates the
solicitousness of the law in giving him another opportunity, should his fortune improve, to
recover his lost property.cdxli[9]
Lastly, petitioner is a banking institution on whom the public expects diligence, meticulousness
and mastery of its transactions. Had petitioner diligently reviewed the Certificate of Sale it could
have easily discovered that the period was extended one year beyond the usual period for
redemption. Banks, being greatly affected with public interest, are expected to exercise a degree
of diligence in the handling of its affairs higher than that expected of an ordinary business
firm.cdxlii[10]
On the second issue, the award of attorneys fees must be disallowed for lack of legal basis. The
fact that private respondents were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect and enforce
their claim does not justify the award of attorneys fees. The general rule is that attorneys fees
cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the public policy that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate.cdxliii[11] The award of attorneys fees must be deleted where the
award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.cdxliv[12]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32984 is

AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is deleted. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Alcaraz vs Tangga an
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128568. April 9, 2003]
SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA ALCARAZ, petitioners, vs. PEDRO

M. TANGGA-AN, MENAS R. TANGGA-AN, VIRGINIA III YVETTE R. TANGGA-AN,
CECIL T. VILLAFLOR, HERMES R. TANGGA-AN, VENUS R. TANGGA-AN, JUPITER R.
TANGGA-AN, YVONNE T. FRI, VIVIEN R. TANGGA-AN and HON. JUDGE P. BURGOS
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision440[1] dated January 10, 1997 of the Court of
Appeals441[2] affirming the decision442[3] dated June 26, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 17, which in turn upheld the decision443[4] dated January 5, 1995 of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cebu City, Branch 2, ordering the ejectment of the petitioner
spouses from the house they were renting from respondents.
On October 4, 1994, respondents Pedro Tangga-an, Menas Tangga-an, Virginia III Yvette
Tangga-an, Cecil Villaflor, Hermes Tangga-an, Venus Tangga-an, Jupiter Tangga-an, Yvonne
Fri and Vivien Tangga-an filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. R-33928, against petitioner spouses Reynaldo Alcaraz and Esmeralda Alcaraz.
The complaint alleged that the late Virginia Tangga-an (the spouse of respondent Pedro Tangaa-
an and mother of the rest of the respondents) leased a residential building (house) located at
Premier Street, Hipodromo, Cebu City to the petitioner spouses. The lease contract was limited
to the use and occupancy of the said residential building and did not include the lot on which it
was constructed because the said lot was then owned by the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Under the contract, the petitioner spouses bound themselves for five years to pay Virginia a
monthly rental of P4,000 beginning November 22, 1991. However, since November 1993, they
failed to pay rent. Thus, as of October, 1994, they were in arrears in the amount of P48,000.
Despite repeated demands by respondents to pay the rentals in arrears and to surrender the
possession of the residential building, the petitioner spouses refused to vacate the same.
Respondents sought to repossess the property for their own use and benefit.
On the other hand, the petitioner spouses alleged that, on July 23, 1993, the ownership of the lot
on which the house stood was transferred by the NHA to Virgilio and Angelita D. Tangga-an.
Virgilio Tangga-an is the son of the late Virgilia Tangga-an and respondent Pedro Tangga-an,
and the brother of the other respondents. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125657 was
consequently issued in the name of Virgilio Tangga-an. According to the petitioner spouses, the
subsequent change in ownership of the lot and the house resulted in the cancellation of the
contract of lease between respondents and petitioner spouses. Thereafter, they paid the rent to the
new owners of the lot (Virgilio and Angelita) and not to respondents since the latter supposedly
no longer had the legal right to collect rentals.
On January 5, 1995, the MTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is entered by way of preponderance of evidence in favor of plaintiffs

and against the defendants, Ordering the latter to vacate the premises immediately, including all
those who are occupying the subject house in relation to them; They are also jointly ordered to
pay the sum of P48,000 representing rental payment in arrears from November, 1993 up to
October, 1994 and to update monthly payment of P4,000 thereafter until their vacation
therefrom; They are saddled to pay attorneys fees in the sum of P5,000 and litigation costs in the
amount of P1,000.
SO ORDERED.444[5]
In ruling in favor of the respondents, the MTC held that the petitioner spouses clearly violated
the contract of lease due to non-payment of rent. They failed to show that the subject house
belonged to Virgilio alone. On the other hand, the respondents proved that, after the death of
Virgilia, they registered said house in the name of their trustees, co-respondents Hermes Tangga-
an and his wife. Furthermore, considering that Virgilios claim of ownership over the lot was the
subject of a pending litigation for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance of property
involving the Tangga-ans, the MTC ruled that it cannot usurp to pass judgment on the issues, as
well as the conflicting claims of the parties therein.445[6]
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC, and held that:
xxx [D]efendants failed to present any documentary evidence modifying or amending the
contract of lease (Annex C, complaint) to justify the transfer of payment of the monthly rental to
Virgilio Tanga-an who claims only as the registered owner of the lot on which the leased house
is located. It appears that Virgilio Tanga-an does not possess any proof of ownership of the
rented house. Clearly, defendants had violated the lease agreement executed between them and
the deceased lessor Virginia R. Tangga-an (sic) the predecessor in interest of Hermes Tangaa-an
and his wife as shown in the Tax Declaration of the said spouses (Annex A, complaint) whose
name appears under the space for previous owner by stopping payment of rental to the present
owner despite the existence of the contract of lease which expires on November 22, 1996. The
law on contracts basically states:
Obligations arising fro contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should
be complied with in good faith. (Article 1159, New Civil Code of the Philippines).
xxx xxx xxx446[7]
In denying the petition for review and affirming the judgments of the courts a quo, the Court of
Appeals ruled that:
We also concur with the holding of both courts that as heirs of Virginia Tangga-an, private
respondents have the right to institute the action for ejectment, in accordance with Article 487 of
the Civil Code; and that the claim of petitioner that Virgilio Tangga-an owns the lot where the
leased residential building stands and occupied by petitioners is still the subject of a civil action
for annulment of the sale of the lot before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It does not follow as
a matter of course that whoever owns the lot owns the building in question. Ownership of the lot
cannot change the nature and ownership of the building, which belongs to the plaintiffs as heirs
of the late Virginia Tangga-an through Ernest Tangga-an and his wife. Respondent court
correctly reasoned out that xxx defendants cannot hide over the cloak of Virgilio Tangga-an, his
claim of ownership over the lot as far as the Court is concerned being irrelevant to this case xxx.
Most importantly, the action involving the question of ownership of the lot is not a lawful ground
to suspend/abate the ejectment proceeding. The rationale of the rule being that an ejecment suit
involves only the issue of material possession or possession de facto (San Pedro vs. Court of
Appeals, 235 SCRA 145, 150, and cases cited).447[8]
Hence, this petition on the following assignments of error:
THE LEASE CONTRACT EXECUTED BY PETITIONERS WITH VIRGINIA

TANGGA-AN, PLAINTIFFS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, COVERED NOT ONLY THE
LAND, BUT ALSO THE IMPROVEMENT THEREON, INCLUDING THE BUILDING.
II
VIRGILIO TANGGA-AN, AS ONE OF THE HEIRS OF VIRGINIA, HAD THE SAME

RIGHTS OVER THE PROPERTY AS THOSE OF THE OTHER HEIRS, THE PLAINTIFFS.
HENCE, VIRGILIO MAY NOT BE EXCLUDED UNILATERALLY BY THE OTHER HEIRS
IN HIS ENJOYMENT OF HIS HEREDITARY RIGHTS.
III
THE REGISTRATION OF THE LAND, INCLUDING THE IMPROVEMENTS THEREON,

IN THE NAME OF VIRGILIO TANGGA-AN UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM IS
INDEFEASIBLE AND MAY NOT BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY IN THE PRESENT
ILLEGAL DETAINER CASE.448[9]
We rule in favor of the respondents.
Section 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant raises the defense of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
The issue of ownership is precisely what the petitioner spouses raised to justify their non-
payment of rent and to resist eviction from the house they leased from respondents. Being
indispensable to the resolution of the issue of possession, we herein render a provisional ruling
on ownership.
Petitioner spouses seek a dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction claiming that the only issue
to be resolved is ownership over the house which is improper in an ejectment case. We disagree.
The issue in the case at bar is whether the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were excused from
paying the rent because of the change in the ownership of the land on which the rented house
was built. The main question therefore is still the lawful possession of the subject premises by
the petitioner spouses. To resolve it, a discussion of the ownership issue is necessary.
The petitioner spouses insist that the courts a quo erred in not finding that Virgilio Tangga-an
became the new owner not only of the lot but also of the residential house. They claim that,
before she died, Virginia, the original owner of the subject house, waived and ceded her rights
over the land in favor of Virgilio. The said transfer allegedly included the subject house because,
pursuant to Article 440 of the Civil Code, the ownership of the property gives the right of
accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto,
either naturally or artificially. They also maintain that the NHA executed a deed of sale of both
the house and the lot in favor of Virgilio. According to the petitioner spouses, the tax declaration
over the house in the name of respondent Hermes Tangga-an, as trustee of the other respondents,
was self-serving and had no probative value compared to the certificate of title over the lot in the
name of Virgilio Tangga-an.
We find no merit in petitioners arguments.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for
review before this Court should only raise questions of law. In the absence of showing that the
case falls under one of the exceptions,449[10] factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court. And they carry even more weight
when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court. As such, this Court is
not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below.450[11]
The courts a quo were unanimous in holding that the petitioner spouses failed to substantiate
their factual averment that Virgilio not only acquired the lot but also the house. After examining
the records, we found nothing to disprove the facts determined by the lower courts. All the
petitioner spouses presented was Virgilios uncertified xerox copy of the certificate of title over
the lot. No document was ever shown evidencing cession of the subject house in Virgilios favor.
Virgilios title could not be used to prove ownership over the house built on said lot as it carried
no reference at all to the house. A building by itself is a real or immovable property distinct from
the land on which it is constructed451[12] and therefore can be a separate subject of contracts.
On the other hand, the respondents proved that, as compulsory heirs of Virginia, they were the
rightful owners of the subject house. They presented a tax declaration in the name of their
trustees, co-respondent Hermes Tangga-an and his wife, which tax declaration sufficiently
evidences their co-ownership and acquisition of title following the death of the decedent
Virginia. We have ruled that:
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.452[13]
One of the factual issues raised by the petitioner spouses concerns the alleged waiver and cession
of Virginias rights over the house and lot to Virgilio. But the petitioner spouses did not mention
any consideration received by Virginia for the waiver of the house, in effect making said waiver
a donation thereof to Virgilio. However, in order for a donation of real property like a house to
be valid, a public instrument duly signed by the donor and accepted by the donee (which
acceptance must be known to the donor while alive) must be executed.453[14] Moreover, said
donation must not impair the legitime of the forced heirs of the donor in order for the same not to
be inofficious.454[15] In the case at bar, no such public instrument was presented. Neither was it
explained why said waiver did not impair the rights of the other compulsory heirs of Virginia.
To support their argument that the house necessarily became Virgilios property as a result of the
acquisition of the lot on which the same was built, the petitioner spouses invoke the principle
that the accessory follows the principal. Being an accessory, the house is necessarily owned by
the owner of the lot on which it is built.
There is no need, however, to disturb and analyze the applicability of this well-entrenched
principle because the petitioner spouses are estopped from raising the same. Both parties knew
that their contract pertained only to the lease of the house, without including the land. The
contract states: 1. That the lessor is the owner of a building of mixed materials situated at
Premier St., Mabolo, Hipodromo, Cebu City.455[16] At the time of the perfection of the contract,
the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor, owned
the land on which the rented house stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to comply
with the terms thereof for five years and performed their obligations as lessees for two years.
Now they assume a completely different legal position. They claim that the lease contract ceased
to be effective because Virgilios assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents of
ownership of the building. They argue that, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, Virgilios title
over the lot necessarily included the house on the said lot, thus automatically canceling the
contract.
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
xxx xxx xxx
After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are
barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the
respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.
We also note that the petitioner spouses rescinded the contract of lease without judicial approval.
Due to the change in ownership of the land, the petitioner spouses decided to unilaterally cancel
the contract because Virgilio supposedly became the new owner of the house after acquiring title
to the lot. They alleged that there was no reason anymore to perform their obligations as lessees
because the lessor had ceased to be the owner of the house. But there is nothing in their lease
contract that allows the parties to extrajudicially rescind the same in case of violation of the
terms thereof. Extrajudicial rescission of a contract is not possible without an express stipulation
to that effect.456[17] What the petitioner spouses should have done was to file a special civil action
for interpleader for the claimants to litigate their claims and to deposit the rentals in court.
The petitioner spouses aver that their payments to Virgilio beginning November, 1993 were
payments made in good faith to a person in possession of the credit, in consonance with Article
1242 of the Civil Code.457[18] This therefore released them from their obligation. They claim that
Virgilio collected the rentals in his capacity as a co-owner. Being a son of Virginia, he was also
entitled to the rent of the subject house. We disagree. Virgilio collected the rentals not as a co-
owner but as the alleged sole owner of the subject house. The petitioner spouses themselves
admitted that Virgilio claimed sole ownership of the house and lot. It would be incongruous for
them to now assert payment in good faith to a person they believed was collecting in behalf of
his co-heirs after admitting that they paid rent to Virgilio as the sole owner thereof.
Hence, for violating of the terms of the lease contract, i.e., payment of rent, respondents can
legally demand the ejectment of the petitioner spouses.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
b. Disputable presumptions
Rosaroso vs Soria
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 194846 June 19, 2013

*HOSPICIOD. ROSAROSO, ANTONIO D. ROSAROSO, MANUEL D. ROSAROSO,
ALGERICA D. ROSAROSO, and CLEOFE R. LABINDAO, Petitioners,
vs.
LUCILA LABORTE SORIA, SPOUSES HAM SOLUTAN and **LAILA SOLUTAN, and
MERIDIAN REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
December 4, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA). in CA G.R. CV No. 00351, which
reversed and set aside the July 30, 2004 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, 7th
Judicial Region, Cebu City (RTC), in Civil Case No. CEB-16957, an action for declaration of
nullity of documents.
The Facts
Spouses Luis Rosaroso (Luis) and Honorata Duazo (Honorata) acquired several real properties in
Daan Bantayan, Cebu City, including the subject properties. The couple had nine (9) children
namely: Hospicio, Arturo, Florita, Lucila, Eduardo, Manuel, Cleofe, Antonio, and Angelica. On
April 25, 1952, Honorata died. Later on, Luis married Lourdes Pastor Rosaroso (Lourdes).
On January 16, 1995, a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages was
filed by Luis, as one of the plaintiffs, against his daughter, Lucila R. Soria (Lucila); Lucilas
daughter, Laila S. Solutan (Laila); and Meridian Realty Corporation (Meridian). Due to Luis
untimely death, however, an amended complaint was filed on January 6, 1996, with the spouse
of Laila, Ham Solutan (Ham); and Luis second wife, Lourdes, included as defendants.3
In the Amended Complaint, it was alleged by petitioners Hospicio D. Rosaroso, Antonio D.

Rosaroso (Antonio), Angelica D. Rosaroso (Angelica), and Cleofe R. Labindao (petitioners) that
on November 4, 1991, Luis, with the full knowledge and consent of his second wife, Lourdes,
executed the Deed of Absolute Sale4 (First Sale) covering the properties with Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 31852 (Lot No. 8); TCT. No. 11155 (Lot 19); TCT No. 10885 (Lot No. 22);
TCT No. 10886 (Lot No. 23); and Lot Nos. 5665 and 7967, all located at Daanbantayan, Cebu,
in their favor.5
They also alleged that, despite the fact that the said properties had already been sold to them,
respondent Laila, in conspiracy with her mother, Lucila, obtained the Special Power of Attorney
(SPA),6 dated April 3, 1993, from Luis (First SPA); that Luis was then sick, infirm, blind, and of
unsound mind; that Lucila and Laila accomplished this by affixing Luis thumb mark on the SPA
which purportedly authorized Laila to sell and convey, among others, Lot Nos. 8, 22 and 23,
which had already been sold to them; and that on the strength of another SPA7 by Luis, dated
July 21, 1993 (Second SPA), respondents Laila and Ham mortgaged Lot No. 19 to Vital Lending
Investors, Inc. for and in consideration of the amount of P150,000.00 with the concurrence of
Lourdes.8
Petitioners further averred that a second sale took place on August 23, 1994, when the
respondents made Luis sign the Deed of Absolute Sale9 conveying to Meridian three (3) parcels
of residential land for P960,500.00 (Second Sale); that Meridian was in bad faith when it did not
make any inquiry as to who were the occupants and owners of said lots; and that if Meridian had
only investigated, it would have been informed as to the true status of the subject properties and
would have desisted in pursuing their acquisition.
Petitioners, thus, prayed that they be awarded moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, actual damages, and litigation expenses and that the two SPAs and the deed of sale in favor
of Meridian be declared null and void ab initio.10
On their part, respondents Lucila and Laila contested the First Sale in favor of petitioners. They
submitted that even assuming that it was valid, petitioners were estopped from questioning the
Second Sale in favor of Meridian because they failed not only in effecting the necessary transfer
of the title, but also in annotating their interests on the titles of the questioned properties. With
respect to the assailed SPAs and the deed of absolute sale executed by Luis, they claimed that the
documents were valid because he was conscious and of sound mind and body when he executed
them. In fact, it was Luis together with his wife who received the check payment issued by
Meridian where a big part of it was used to foot his hospital and medical expenses.11
Respondent Meridian, in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred that Luis was fully
aware of the conveyances he made. In fact, Sophia Sanchez (Sanchez), Vice-President of the
corporation, personally witnessed Luis affix his thumb mark on the deed of sale in its favor. As
to petitioners contention that Meridian acted in bad faith when it did not endeavor to make some
inquiries as to the status of the properties in question, it countered that before purchasing the
properties, it checked the titles of the said lots with the Register of Deeds of Cebu and discovered
therein that the First Sale purportedly executed in favor of the plaintiffs was not registered with
the said Register of Deeds. Finally, it argued that the suit against it was filed in bad faith.12
On her part, Lourdes posited that her signature as well as that of Luis appearing on the deed of
sale in favor of petitioners, was obtained through fraud, deceit and trickery. She explained that
they signed the prepared deed out of pity because petitioners told them that it was necessary for a
loan application. In fact, there was no consideration involved in the First Sale. With respect to
the Second Sale, she never encouraged the same and neither did she participate in it. It was
purely her husbands own volition that the Second Sale materialized. She, however, affirmed that
she received Meridians payment on behalf of her husband who was then bedridden.13
RTC Ruling
After the case was submitted for decision, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. It held that when
Luis executed the second deed of sale in favor of Meridian, he was no longer the owner of Lot
Nos. 19, 22 and 23 as he had already sold them to his children by his first marriage. In fact, the
subject properties had already been delivered to the vendees who had been living there since
birth and so had been in actual possession of the said properties. The trial court stated that
although the deed of sale was not registered, this fact was not prejudicial to their interest. It was
of the view that the actual registration of the deed of sale was not necessary to render a contract
valid and effective because where the vendor delivered the possession of the parcel of land to the
vendee and no superior rights of third persons had intervened, the efficacy of said deed was not
destroyed. In other words, Luis lost his right to dispose of the said properties to Meridian from
the time he executed the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The same held true with his
alleged sale of Lot 8 to Lucila Soria.14 Specifically, the dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds that a preponderance of evidence exists in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. Judgment is hereby rendered:
a. Declaring that the Special Power of Attorney, Exhibit "K," for the plaintiffs and
Exhibit "3" for the defendants null and void including all transactions subsequent thereto
and all proceedings arising therefrom;
b. Declaring the Deed of Sale marked as Exhibit "E" valid and binding;
c. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale of Three (3) Parcels of Residential Land marked
as Exhibit "F" null and void from the beginning;
d. Declaring the Deed of Sale, Exhibit "16" (Solutan) or Exhibit "FF," null and void from
the beginning;
e. Declaring the vendees named in the Deed of Sale marked as Exhibit "E" to be the
lawful, exclusive and absolute owners and possessors of Lots Nos. 8, 19, 22, and 23;
f. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally each plaintiff P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and
g. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs P50,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

P20,000.00 as litigation expenses.
The crossclaim made by defendant Meridian Realty Corporation against defendants Soria and
Solutan is ordered dismissed for lack of sufficient evidentiary basis.
SO ORDERED."15
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. The CA ruled that the first deed of
sale in favor of petitioners was void because they failed to prove that they indeed tendered a
consideration for the four (4) parcels of land. It relied on the testimony of Lourdes that
petitioners did not pay her husband. The price or consideration for the sale was simulated to
make it appear that payment had been tendered when in fact no payment was made at all.16
With respect to the validity of the Second Sale, the CA stated that it was valid because the
documents were notarized and, as such, they enjoyed the presumption of regularity. Although
petitioners alleged that Luis was manipulated into signing the SPAs, the CA opined that evidence
was wanting in this regard. Dr. Arlene Letigio Pesquira, the attending physician of Luis, testified
that while the latter was physically infirmed, he was of sound mind when he executed the first
SPA.17
With regard to petitioners assertion that the First SPA was revoked by Luis when he executed
the affidavit, dated November 24, 1994, the CA ruled that the Second Sale remained valid. The
Second Sale was transacted on August 23, 1994, before the First SPA was revoked. In other
words, when the Second Sale was consummated, the First SPA was still valid and subsisting.
Thus, "Meridian had all the reasons to rely on the said SPA during the time of its validity until
the time of its actual filing with the Register of Deeds considering that constructive notice of the
revocation of the SPA only came into effect upon the filing of the Adverse Claim and the
aforementioned Letters addressed to the Register of Deeds on 17 December 1994 and 25
November 1994, respectively, informing the Register of Deeds of the revocation of the first
SPA."18 Moreover, the CA observed that the affidavit revoking the first SPA was also revoked
by Luis on December 12, 1994.19
Furthermore, although Luis revoked the First SPA, he did not revoke the Second SPA which
authorized respondent Laila to sell, convey and mortgage, among others, the property covered by
TCT T-11155 (Lot No. 19). The CA opined that had it been the intention of Luis to discredit the
Second Sale, he should have revoked not only the First SPA but also the Second SPA. The latter
being valid, all transactions emanating from it, particularly the mortgage of Lot 19, its
subsequent redemption and its second sale, were valid.20 Thus, the CA disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 30 July 2004 is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and in its stead a new decision is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the Special Power of Attorney, dated 21 July 1993, as valid;
2. DECLARING the Special Power of Attorney, dated 03 April 1993, as valid up to the
time of its revocation on 24 November 1994;
3. DECLARING the Deed of Absolute sale, dated 04 November 1991, as ineffective and
without any force and effect;
4. DECLARING the Deed of Absolute Sale of Three (3) Parcels of Residential Land,
dated 23 August 1994, valid and binding from the very beginning;
5. DECLARING the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 27 September 1994, also valid and
binding from the very beginning;
6. ORDERING the substituted plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally the defendant-
appellant Meridian Realty Corporation the sum of Php100,000.00 as moral damages,
Php100,000.00 as attorneys fee and Php100,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
7. ORDERING the substituted plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally the defendant-
appellants Leila Solutan et al., the sum of Php50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.21
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in the CA Resolution,22 dated
November 18, 2010. Consequently, they filed the present petition with the following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (19TH DIVISION) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN

IT DECLARED AS VOID THE FIRST SALE EXECUTED BY THE LATE LUIS ROSAROSO
IN FAVOR OF HIS CHILDREN OF HIS FIRST MARRIAGE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING AND

AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING THE MERIDIAN
REALTY CORPORATION A BUYER IN BAD FAITH, DESPITE THE TRIAL COURTS
FINDINGS THAT THE DEED OF SALE (First Sale), IS GENUINE AND HAD FULLY
COMPLIED WITH ALL THE LEGAL FORMALITIES.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THE
SALE (DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 1994), NULL AND VOID FROM THE VERY BEGINNING
SINCE LUIS ROSAROSO ON NOVEMBER 4, 1991 WAS NO LONGER THE OWNER OF
LOTS 8, 19, 22 AND 23 AS HE HAD EARLIER DISPOSED SAID LOTS IN FAVOR OF THE
CHILDREN OF HIS (LUIS ROSAROSO) FIRST MARRIAGE.23
Petitioners argue that the second deed of sale was null and void because Luis could not have
validly transferred the ownership of the subject properties to Meridian, he being no longer the
owner after selling them to his children. No less than Atty. William Boco, the lawyer who
notarized the first deed of sale, appeared and testified in court that the said deed was the one he
notarized and that Luis and his second wife, Lourdes, signed the same before him. He also
identified the signatures of the subscribing witnesses.24 Thus, they invoke the finding of the RTC
which wrote:
In the case of Heirs of Joaquin Teves, Ricardo Teves versus Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
109963, October 13, 1999, the Supreme Court held that a public document executed [with] all
the legal formalities is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals contained therein. In
order to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the effect that a grantor executed a certain
document and acknowledged the fact of its execution before him, mere preponderance of
evidence will not suffice. Rather, the evidence must (be) so clear, strong and convincing as to
exclude all reasonable dispute as to the falsity of the certificate. When the evidence is
conflicting, the certificate will be upheld x x x .
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. (Ramirez vs. Ner, 21
SCRA 207). As such it must be sustained in full force and effect so long as he who impugns it
shall not have presented strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account
of some flaw or defect provided against by law (Robinson vs. Villafuerte, 18 Phil. 171, 189-
190).25
Furthermore, petitioners aver that it was erroneous for the CA to say that the records of the case
were bereft of evidence that they paid the price of the lots sold to them. In fact, a perusal of the
records would reveal that during the cross-examination of Antonio Rosaroso, when asked if there
was a monetary consideration, he testified that they indeed paid their father and their payment
helped him sustain his daily needs.26
Petitioners also assert that Meridian was a buyer in bad faith because when its representative
visited the site, she did not make the necessary inquiries. The fact that there were already houses
on the said lots should have put Meridian on its guard and, for said reason, should have made
inquiries as to who owned those houses and what their rights were over the same.27
Meridians assertion that the Second Sale was registered in the Register of Deeds was a falsity.
The subject titles, namely: TCT No. 11155 for Lot 19, TCT No. 10885 for Lot 22, and TCT No.
10886 for Lot 23 were free from any annotation of the alleged sale.28
After an assiduous assessment of the records, the Court finds for the petitioners.
The First Deed Of Sale Was Valid
The fact that the first deed of sale was executed, conveying the subject properties in favor of
petitioners, was never contested by the respondents. What they vehemently insist, though, is that
the said sale was simulated because the purported sale was made without a valid consideration.
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1)
private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been
followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract.29 These presumptions operate
against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of
presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the
contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by
the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing
evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence
unless rebutted.30
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare
allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and
convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural law that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.31
The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied
heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and
convinced him to sign the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application,
but they did not pay the purchase price for the subject properties.32 This testimony, however, is
self-serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence required by law to dispute
the said presumption. As such, the presumption that there was sufficient consideration will not be
disturbed.
Granting that there was no delivery of the consideration, the seller would have no right to sell
again what he no longer owned. His remedy would be to rescind the sale for failure on the part of
the buyer to perform his part of their obligation pursuant to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of Clara M. Balatbat v. Court Of Appeals and Spouses Jose Repuyan and Aurora
Repuyan,33 it was written:
The failure of the buyer to make good the price does not, in law, cause the ownership to revest to
the seller unless the bilateral contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant to Article
1191 of the New Civil Code. Non-payment only creates a right to demand the fulfillment of the
obligation or to rescind the contract. [Emphases supplied]
Meridian is Not a
Buyer in Good Faith
Respondents Meridian and Lucila argue that, granting that the First Sale was valid, the properties
belong to them as they acquired these in good faith and had them first recorded in the Registry of
Property, as they were unaware of the First Sale.34
Again, the Court is not persuaded.
The fact that Meridian had them first registered will not help its cause. In case of double sale,
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in possession; and, in the absence thereof; to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
Otherwise stated, ownership of an immovable property which is the subject of a double sale shall
be transferred: (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in
default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. The
requirement of the law then is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and registration in good faith.
Good faith must concur with the registration. If it would be shown that a buyer was in bad faith,
the alleged registration they have made amounted to no registration at all.
The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right) gains greater
significance in case of a double sale of immovable property. When the thing sold twice is an
immovable, the one who acquires it and first records it in the Registry of Property, both made in
good faith, shall be deemed the owner. Verily, the act of registration must be coupled with good
faith that is, the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his vendor
or must not have been aware of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and
investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.)35
[Emphases and underlining supplied]
When a piece of land is in the actual possession of persons other than the seller, the buyer must
be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Without making such inquiry,
one cannot claim that he is a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy or deal with
realty, his duty is to read the public manuscript, that is, to look and see who is there upon it and
what his rights are. A want of caution and diligence, which an honest man of ordinary prudence
is accustomed to exercise in making purchases, is in contemplation of law, a want of good faith.
The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in adverse possession
of another is a buyer in bad faith.36 In the case of Spouses Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,37 it
was written:
Verily, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. Thus, the general rule is that a purchaser
may be considered a purchaser in good faith when he has examined the latest certificate of title.
An exception to this rule is when there exist important facts that would create suspicion in an
otherwise reasonable man to go beyond the present title and to investigate those that preceded it.
Thus, it has been said that a person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would
create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value. A
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and
then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor. As we have held:
The failure of appellees to take the ordinary precautions which a prudent man would have taken
under the circumstances, specially in buying a piece of land in the actual, visible and public
possession of another person, other than the vendor, constitutes gross negligence amounting to
bad faith.
In this connection, it has been held that where, as in this case, the land sold is in the possession
of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser is required to go beyond the certificate of title to
make inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor. Failure to do so would make him a
purchaser in bad faith. (Citations omitted).
One who purchases real property which is in the actual possession of another should, at least
make some inquiry concerning the right of those in possession. The actual possession by other
than the vendor should, at least put the purchaser upon inquiry. He can scarely, in the absence of
such inquiry, be regarded as a bona fide purchaser as against such possessors. (Emphases
supplied)
Prescinding from the foregoing, the fact that private respondent RRC did not investigate the
Sarmiento spouses' claim over the subject land despite its knowledge that Pedro Ogsiner, as their
overseer, was in actual possession thereof means that it was not an innocent purchaser for value
upon said land. Article 524 of the Civil Code directs that possession may be exercised in one's
name or in that of another. In herein case, Pedro Ogsiner had informed RRC that he was
occupying the subject land on behalf of the Sarmiento spouses. Being a corporation engaged in
the business of buying and selling real estate, it was gross negligence on its part to merely rely
on Mr. Puzon's assurance that the occupants of the property were mere squatters considering the
invaluable information it acquired from Pedro Ogsiner and considering further that it had the
means and the opportunity to investigate for itself the accuracy of such information. [Emphases
supplied]
In another case, it was held that if a vendee in a double sale registers the sale after he has
acquired knowledge of a previous sale, the registration constitutes a registration in bad faith and
does not confer upon him any right. If the registration is done in bad faith, it is as if there is no
registration at all, and the buyer who has first taken possession of the property in good faith shall
be preferred.38
In the case at bench, the fact that the subject properties were already in the possession of persons
other than Luis was never disputed. Sanchez, representative and witness for Meridian, even
testified as follows:
x x x; that she together with the two agents, defendant Laila Solutan and Corazon Lua, the
president of Meridian Realty Corporation, went immediately to site of the lots; that the agents
brought with them the three titles of the lots and Laila Solutan brought with her a special power
of attorney executed by Luis B. Rosaroso in her favor but she went instead directly to Luis
Rosaroso to be sure; that the lots were pointed to them and she saw that there were houses on it
but she did not have any interest of the houses because her interest was on the lots; that Luis
Rosaroso said that the houses belonged to him; that he owns the property and that he will sell the
same because he is very sickly and he wanted to buy medicines; that she requested someone to
check the records of the lots in the Register of Deeds; that one of the titles was mortgaged and
she told them to redeem the mortgage because the corporation will buy the property; that the
registered owner of the lots was Luis Rosaroso; that in more or less three months, the
encumbrance was cancelled and she told the prospective sellers to prepare the deed of sale; that
there were no encumbrances or liens in the title; that when the deed of absolute sale was
prepared it was signed by the vendor Luis Rosaroso in their house in Opra x x x.39 (Underscoring
supplied)
From the above testimony, it is clear that Meridian, through its agent, knew that the subject
properties were in possession of persons other than the seller. Instead of investigating the rights
and interests of the persons occupying the said lots, however, it chose to just believe that Luis
still owned them. Simply, Meridian Realty failed to exercise the due diligence required by law of
purchasers in acquiring a piece of land in the possession of person or persons other than the
seller.
In this regard, great weight is accorded to the findings of fact of the RTC. Basic is the rule that
the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence as well as to observe the demeanor
of witnesses who testify in the case.40
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 4, 2009 Decision and the November
18, 201 0 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 00351, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The July 30, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, 7th Judicial
Region, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-16957, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
Heirs vs Trazona vs Heir of Canada
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175874 December 11, 2013

HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA, Namely: FRANCISCA T. MATBAGON,
NATIVIDAD T. ABADIANO, CARLITO C. TRAZONA; and Heirs of EDELBERTO C.
TRAZONA represented by his daughter DOMICINA T. ARANAS, ELADIA T.
ALICAMEN (Now Deceased) Substituted by DOMINGO ALICAMEN, LUPECIO
ALICAMEN, REBECCA ALICAMEN-BALBUTIN, ELSEI ALICAMEN, GLENN
ALICAMEN, LENNEI ALICAMEN-GEONZON, DANILO ALICAMEN, JOVELYN
ALICAMEN-VILLETA, JIMBIE ALICAMEN and HERMOGENES C. TRAZONA (Now
Deceased) Substituted by LILYBETH TRAZONA-MANGILA, GEMMA TRAZONA,
ELIZALDE TRAZONA, BOBBY TRAZONA, and PALABIANA B. TRAZONA,
Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF DIONISIO CANADA, Namely: ROSITA C. GERSALINA, CONCEPTION C.
GEONZON, DANIEL CANADA, GORGONIO CANADA, LEOPOLDO CANADA,
SUSANA C. DUNGOG, LUZVIMINDA C. TABUADA, AND CEFERINA CANADA;
PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR of Cebu and MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR of Minglanilla, Cebu,
Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals Cebu City (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00099.
The CA reversed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 57 (RTC) in
Civil Case No. CEB-20620, which annulled the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 and
ordered the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959 in the name of Dionisio Caada
(Dionisio), predecessor of respondents.
Petitioners are heirs of Cipriano Trazona (Cipriano), who owned an untitled parcel of land
referred to as Lot No. 5053-H. The property, located in Minglanilla, Cebu, is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 07764 and has an area of 9,515 square meters.4 The land was purchased from
the government in 1940.5 Since then, Cipriano had taken possession of the land, cultivated it and
diligently paid taxes thereon.6
In 1949, Dionisio bought the adjacent parcel of land from Pilar Diaz.7 It was later found that he
had encroached on a small portion of Lot No. 5053-H. He was then summoned by Cipriano for a
confrontation before the barangay captain in 1952.8 Dionisio offered to buy the encroached
portion, but Cipriano refused the offer.9 In 1956, the latter gave Dionisio permission to
temporarily build a house on said portion, where it still stands.10 No action for ejectment was
filed against Dionisio during the lifetime of Cipriano,11 who eventually died on 18 May 1982.12
The latters son Hermogenes, one of the petitioners herein who had cultivated the lot since 1972,
took over.13 On 24 March 1992, Dionisio died.14
The present controversy arose in 1997. Petitioners went to the Office of the Municipal Assessor
to secure a copy of Tax Declaration No. 07764, as they intended to sell Lot No. 5053-H to an
interested buyer.15 To their surprise, they were informed that Tax Declaration No. 07764 had
been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Tax Declaration No. 23959 was issued on 24 June 1996 in
the name of Dionisio.16 Apparently, respondents had caused the issuance of Tax Declaration No.
23959 by submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 supposedly executed by
Cipriano in favor of Dionisio.17 That sale involved a portion of Lot No. 5053-H described as
follows:
x x x that portion of land of Lot No. FIVE THOUSAND FIFTY THREE-H (5053-H) under
subdivision plan FLR-133 approved by the Director of Lands Jose P. Dans on September 5,
1953, covered by monuments No. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, of said Lot No. 5053 bounded on the North by
Lot No. 5954 & portion of Lot 5053-H; East by portion of Lot 5053-H; South by Lot no. 5053-J
of Domingo Ababon; West by Lot no. 9479; x x x.18
Petitioners summoned respondents before the Lupon Tagapamayapa, but the conciliation was
not successful.19 On 28 July 1997, petitioners filed a Complaint20 against respondents for
quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale, cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959, recovery
of possession and ownership, damages, and payment of attorneys fees. Petitioners alleged
therein that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 was a forgery. Respondents, in their
Answer,21 alleged that the assailed deed was a genuine document and asked for the payment of
moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees, as counterclaims.
During trial, among the witnesses presented by petitioners was Romeo O. Varona, document
examiner of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Region VII. He testified that
according to his comparative analysis of Ciprianos signature on the assailed deed and standard
signatures on other documents, Ciprianos signature on the deed in question was a forgery.22
For their part, respondents presented Dionisios son Gorgonio, who testified that he was present
when the assailed deed was executed.23 He also stated that they had enjoyed the fruits of the lot
in question from 1956 until 1960, when they were confronted by petitioners. Respondents were
asked to show proof of ownership, but could not present any.24 Thus, from 1960 onwards,
petitioners enjoyed the fruits of the property.25 Later, respondents were able to find a copy of the
assailed deed in the National Archives, thereby enabling them to cause the issuance of Tax
Declaration No. 23959.26
In the presentation of their rebuttal evidence, petitioners presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
11 April 1953,27 executed by Pilar Diaz in favor of Dionisio. This prior sale involved the exact
same portion allegedly sold to him by Cipriano except that in the date of approval of the
subdivision plan by the Director of Lands, two figures were interchanged. Whereas the assailed
deed showed the date as "September 5, 1953," the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 11 April 1953
showed the date as "September 5, 1935."
In its Decision dated 6 April 2004, the RTC annulled the assailed deed and ordered the
cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959, as well as the reinstatement of Tax Declaration No.
07764.28 Respondents were also ordered to demolish their residential house on Lot No. 5053-H
and to pay petitioners attorneys fees and litigation expenses.29
The RTC found that respondents failure to present the deed for 40 years from its alleged
execution had not been satisfactorily and convincingly explained.30 It also found that the
assailed deed was indeed a forgery for the following reasons:
1. It would have been pointless for Dionisio to buy the same property twice from different
owners.
2. Ciprianos residence certificate, whose number was indicated in the assailed deed, as well as
in the notarial register where the deed was recorded, was allegedly issued in Minglanilla, Cebu.
The other persons residence certificates, whose numbers were indicated on the same page of the
notarial register, appear to have come from the same booklet as the residence certificate of
Cipriano, judging from their numerical sequence. However, the residence certificates of these
other persons had been issued in Sogod, Cebu.
3. There was indeed a glaring difference between the alleged signature of Cipriano in the assailed
deed and in his standard signatures in 10 other documents submitted by plaintiffs.
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal dated 30 April 2004.
RULING OF THE CA
On 25 May 2006, the CA issued a Decision reversing that of the RTC. The appellate court ruled
that petitioners had failed to prove by requisite evidence their allegation that the assailed deed
was a forgery.31 The deed, being a notarized document, enjoyed the presumption of authenticity
and due execution. Also, the fact that it was an ancient document that "remained unaltered after
so many years, bodes well for its authenticity."32
The CA also concluded that the document examiner was not able to determine the forgery with
certainty. What he had examined was a mere machine copy of the assailed deed.33 Furthermore,
even he admitted that the standard signatures of Cipriano had shown variations among
themselves.
Finally, the CA ruled that respondents were the actual possessors of Lot No. 5053-H, since it was
their house that was standing on the property.34 Thus, the CA granted the appeal and
consequently dismissed the Complaint of petitioners.
ISSUES
Petitioners come before us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari35
alleging that the CA erred as follows:
1. Ruling that petitioners were not able to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed
deed;
2. Finding that the document examiner was not able to establish the forgery with certainty;
3. Finding that respondents were in actual possession of Lot No. 5053-H;
4. Ruling that there was no merit in petitioners prayer for the award of attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
OUR RULING
Petitioners presented clear and convincing
evidence that the assailed deed is a forgery.
Well-settled is the rule that petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before this Court
should involve only questions of law.36 A reading of the issues raised by petitioners readily
show that they are questions of fact, which are generally not within the purview of this Court.
When a question involves facts, the findings of the CA, including the probative weight accorded
to certain pieces of evidence, are binding on this Court. Also well-settled, however, are
exceptions to this rule,37 such as when the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of the
RTC, as in this case.
We sustain the findings of the RTC.
At the outset, it is worth pointing out that the sale of a mere portion of Lot No. 5053-H was what
brought about the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 07764 and the consequent issuance of Tax
Declaration No. 23959, each of which covered the entire lot. The fact that the assailed deed
covers only a portion of Lot No. 5053-H becomes clearer still when one considers that it was
bounded on the north and the east by portions of Lot No. 5053-H itself.
As will be shown below, the assailed deed is a forgery. Assuming it were genuine, petitioners
have a right to the rest of the property not covered by the purported sale. If the procedure for the
issuance of tax declarations was followed if care had been observed to make sure that all
papers were in order and understood this irregularity would not have taken place.
It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due
execution.38 Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this
presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and
more than merely preponderant.39 Here, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we find clear and
convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed
deed.
First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed had
been forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise. The finding of the CA that he had
examined a mere machine copy of the assailed deed was erroneous. The pertinent portion of his
testimony clearly shows otherwise, to wit:
ATTY. DURANO:
Q: Now you made mention of the standard documents, could you kindly tell the Honorable Court
what is [the] questioned document stated in your report?
[ROMEO O. VARONA]
[A]: The questioned document is the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 27, 1956.
Q: Do you have a copy of that Deed of Sale as examined by you?
A: Well, I have a machine copy. I have examined the original copy at the archives office,
Mandaue City.40 (Emphasis supplied)
In concluding that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed was a forgery, the document
examiner found that there were "significant differences in letter formation, construction and
other individual handwriting characteristics" between the assailed and the standard signatures of
Cipriano.41
The fact that the document examiner himself admitted that even the standard signatures of
Cipriano showed variations among themselves does not make the formers determination any
less convincing. He explained that while every signature of the same person varies, the
individual handwriting characteristics of the person remain the same.42 In Cesar v.
Sandiganbayan,43 we recognized that there is bound to be some variation in the different
samples of genuine signatures of the same person.
Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. It
likewise supported its finding that the signature was forged through independent observation:
Finally, a scrutiny of the signature on the questioned deed of sale compared to the eleven (11)
signatures on the ten (10) standard documents there exists a glaring difference in the letter
formation of capital letters "C" in Cipriano and "T" in Trazona. The capital C in questioned
signature, the initial stroke stopped at the upper curve of the letter C while in the standard
signatures, it overlaps from the upper curve. In the word Trazona, the capital T in the questioned
signature is disconnected from the T bar to the body of the questioned signature whereas, in the
standard signatures, the capital T is connected. These discrepancies can easily be noticed by
mere physical appearance that the letters C and T were written.44
Third, the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 11 April 1953 brings into question the
regularity of the assailed deed. This deed was never disputed by respondents at any stage of the
proceedings, and was in fact admitted by them in their Comments to Plaintiffs Additional
Formal Offer of Exhibits.45 Indeed, the RTC was correct in its observation that no one in
complete possession of ones mental faculties would buy the same property twice from different
owners. Respondents never provided any explanation for this anomalous situation. In any case, it
has been established that Lot No. 5053-H is in the name of Cipriano, who bought it from the
government in 1940. Thus, only Cipriano had the right to dispose of the property, or portions
thereof.
Fourth, Cipriano had cultivated the property and paid taxes thereon since the time he acquired it
from the government, and even after its purported sale to Dionisio, until his death.46 Petitioners
continued paying the taxes thereon even after Cipriano had died.47 Respondents started paying
taxes on the property only after Tax Declaration No. 23959 was issued in Dionisios name in
1997.48 It would be absurd for petitioners to pay taxes on a property they do not own.
Fifth, as admitted by Gorgonio himself, petitioners were the ones enjoying the fruits of the
property from 1960 until the present controversy.49 Again, it is incongruous for petitioners to
enjoy the fruits if respondents owned the property.
Sixth, as the RTC noted, there was an irregularity regarding the place of issuance of Ciprianos
residence certificate indicated in the assailed deed, as compared with the residence certificates of
the other persons indicated on the same page of the notarial register.
Finally, when the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed
deed, the paper was noted to be white, while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from
where it was taken had turned yellow with age. 50 Further, when the analyst was asked the
question of when- the assailed deed was received by the Bureau of Archives, she answered that it
was forwarded to them only on 28 September 1987 by RTC Region 7, Notarial Division.51
Clearly, the evidence adduced fully supports the position of petitioners that the assailed deed of
sale is forged and that they are the owners of the property. Having been forced to litigate in order
to protect their interest therein, the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses to them is in
order.
The actual possession of Lot No. 5053-H by petitioners has been properly ruled on by the RTC.
Much has been made by the CA of the fact that respondents' house was standing on the property.
However, petitioners have explained that the house was erected only after Cipriano permitted it.
Dionisio was then well aware that this temporary arrangement may be terminated at any time.
Respondents cannot now refuse to vacate the property or eventually demand reimbursement of
necessary and useful expenses under Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, because the
provisions apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief
that he is the owner thereof. 52 Persons who occupy land by virtue of tolerance of the owners are
not possessors in good faith. 53 Thus, the directive of the RTC for respondents to demolish their
residential house on Lot No. 5053-H was also proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00099 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 57, in Civil Case No. CEB-20620 is REINSTATED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice, Chairperson
Suppression of testimony: People of the Philippines vs
Padrigone
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137664. May 9, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a.

ROBERTO SAN MIGUEL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Michael San Antonio, Jocel Ibaneta and Abelardo
Triumpante were charged with rape in an amended information which reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of January, 1995, in Salvacion, Buhi, Camarines Sur, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping each other and by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic)
Rowena Contridas against her will, to her damage and prejudice in the amount that may be
proven in court.
Acts contrary to law.cdxlv[1]
All the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
It appears that at 3:00 in the morning of January 3, 1995, appellant Roberto Padrigone and the
other accused broke into the house of Rowena Contridas, then 16 years old, situated in San
Benito, Salvacion, Buhi, Camarines Sur. Appellant Roberto Padrigone and accused Jocel Ibaneta
poked a knife at Rowena and her fourteen year-old sister, Nimfa,cdxlvi[2] and threatened to kill
them if they reported the incident to others. They gagged Rowena with a handkerchief and Nimfa
with a handtowel. Then, appellant undressed Rowena, forced her to lie down and sexually
violated her while his co-accused watched with glee. Accused Jocel Ibanita tried to rape Nimfa
but failed because she was able to elude him.
After appellant satisfied his lust on Rowena, the other accused took their turns. Every one of the
accused raped Rowena. Before they left, they warned the sisters not to report the incident or else
they will kill them.
Despite the threats, Rowena and Nimfa reported the incident to the police and identified
appellant and his co-accused as the perpetrators. However, based on the police blotter, Rowena
stated that it was only appellant who raped her.
Dr. Damiana Claveria, Municipal Health Officer, conducted a medical examination on Rowena
and found the following:
patient very talkative, incoherent as to questions asked.
PE no signs of external injury
IE hymenal tear, recent 6, 9 dont bleed on manipulation, but complained of tenderness upon
insertion of 1 finger, copious vaginal discharge.cdxlvii[3]
According to Dr. Claveria, there is a possibility that the fluids found inside Rowenas vagina may
be semen. She added that it was possible for Rowena to have only two hymenal tears even if four
men had sexual intercourse with her.
Dr. Chona C. Belmonte, a psychiatrist of Cadlan Mental Hospital in Pili, Camarines Sur, testified
that while she interviewed Rowena, the latter was crying, incoherent and had shouting episodes.
She was confined at the Cadlan Mental Hospital for further treatment. Upon further medical
consultation, Dr. Belmonte observed thus:
Rowena was in a depressed mood and at the same time overactive. She was combative, violent,
and was experiencing auditory hallucination, meaning, she heard things that only she could hear.
She was also grandiously deluded, falsely believing that she could do things others could not do.
By that time, according to Dr. Belmonte, Rowena had already lost touch with reality.cdxlviii[4]
Dr. Belmonte diagnosed her illness as Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition.cdxlix[5] She found
that her mental disorder was not hereditary because before the incident took place, she did not
exhibit any unusual behavior. She concluded that her mental illness was strongly related to a
traumatic experience. She noted that at one point in the treatment, Rowena confided to her that
she was raped.cdl[6]
All the accused, including appellant Roberto Padrigone, interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. Appellant claimed that in the evening of January 2, 1995, he and his companions, Jocel
Ibanita and Michael San Antonio, visited Rowena at her house. According to him, Rowena was
crying when they arrived. When appellant asked her what was wrong, she told him that she
wanted to elope with him. He replied that he was not ready as he was still studying. Rowena
snapped, its up to him but he might regret it.cdli[7] While appellant and Rowena were talking,
Jocel Ibanita and Michael San Antonio were in the kitchen cooking noodles. Later, a certain
Ismeraldo Quirante, in the presence of several barangay watchmen patrolling the area, passed by
the Contridas house and advised the accused to go home because it was getting late. They heeded
the advice and left the Contridas house at around 11:30 p.m.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution evidence and rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused,
ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a. ROBERTO SAN MIGUEL, GUILTY of the crime of Rape,
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659) and hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA, considering the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. He is likewise directed to indemnify the offended party,
Rowena Contridas, the amount of Fifty thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and to
pay the costs of this suit. Accused JOCEL IBANITA, MICHAEL SAN ANTONIO and
ABELARDO TRIUMPANTE are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. It being shown
that the three accused are presently detained at the Municipal Jail at PNP, Buhi, Camarines Sur,
their immediate release is hereby ordered.
SO ORDERED.cdlii[8]
Appellant interposed the instant appeal based on the following arguments:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

THE CRIME OF RAPE INSPITE OF THE INHERENT WEAKNESSES AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING THE INSTANT CASE NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE IN CRIMINAL LAW THAT THE
PROSECUTION MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE AND NOT ON
THE WEAKNESS OF THAT OF THE DEFENSE.
Appellant contends that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that according to the prosecution witness, Nimfa, he and his co-accused
Michael San Antonio, Abelardo Triumpante and Jocel Ibanita, took turns in raping Rowena
while Jocel Ibanita also attempted to rape her. However, after preliminary investigation, the
Municipal Trial Court of Buhi, Camarines Sur, dismissed Nimfas complaint for attempted rape
against Jocel Ibanita because of its findings that the latter committed only acts of lasciviousness,
considering his voluntary and spontaneous desistance from continuing to perform the acts
leading to carnal knowledge. Furthermore, the investigating Judge entertained doubts about the
truth of her story, which was uncorroborated.cdliii[9]
We agree with the following observation of the Solicitor General:

[T]he dismissal of the complaint for attempted rape filed by Nimfa against one of the accused,
Jocel Ibanita, during the preliminary investigation stage should not detract from the credibility of
her testimony. Even if the prosecution wanted to, the merits of the dismissal of Nimfas complaint
for attempted rape could not be properly challenged in the criminal proceedings below since the
said proceedings involved only the culpability of the four accused for the crime of rape
committed against Rowena, the sister of Nimfa.cdliv[10]
Appellant further claims that Nimfas lack of credibility was underscored when the trial court
acquitted appellants co-accused. Appellants claim is not well taken. Evidence shows that the trial
court acquitted appellants co-accused because of doubt engendered on the extent of their
participation in the sexual assault committed against Rowena in light of Rowenas own statement
as recorded in the police blotter.cdlv[11]
Appellant alleges that Nimfas reactions after the rape of her sister are unnatural, unexpected and
mind-boggling,cdlvi[12] specifically when she resumed her sleep after having been raped and
even reported for work the following day. The contention deserves scant consideration. It is an
accepted maxim that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and
there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or
startling experience.cdlvii[13]
Further, appellant argues that Nimfa admitted before the police that she did not recognize the
rapists of Rowena. In this connection, we quote with approval the observation of the Solicitor
General, to wit:
Anent the portion of Nimfas testimony wherein she admitted to the defense counsel that she told
the Chief of Police that she was not able to recognize the persons who raped her sister Rowena,
the same is capable of explanation. Accused-appellant Roberto Padrigone was present when
Nimfa uttered the statement. Hence, she was afraid to tell the truth because of the earlier threat to
her and sister Rowenas lives by accused-appellant Padrigone.cdlviii[14]
We find that Nimfas credibility has not been impaired despite rigorous cross-examination. In
fact, defense counsel was not able to point to any inconsistency in Nimfas testimony. A perusal
of the transcripts of stenographic notes reveals that she was steadfast in narrating the
circumstances of the rape and in pointing to appellant as one of the perpetrators.
Appellant likewise alleges that it was error for the trial court to have dismissed his sweetheart
defense by the mere absence of love notes, mementos or pictures.
In People v. Corea,cdlix[15] we held that:
x x x Moreover, even if such averment is true, it does not necessarily follow that no rape can be
committed against ones sweetheart. Such a relationship provides no license to explore and invade
that which every virtuous woman holds so dearly and trample upon her honor and dignity. That
relationship is held sacred by many x x x. A sweetheart cannot be forced to engage in sexual
intercourse against her will. As a matter of fact, proof even of a prior history of a common-law
marital relationship will not prevail over clear and positive evidence of copulation by the use of
force or intimidation.
Regardless, the most telling indication that would belie appellants sweetheart theory was the fact
that he had carnal knowledge of Rowena in the presence of Nimfa and his co-accused. It is most
unnatural for lovers to engage in the ultimate expression of their love for each other in the
presence of other people.
Appellant assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial
court. He claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena, the victim,
when the latter should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived
appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief
of Police of Buhi that it was only appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for
the latters conviction.
Appellants contention is misplaced if not misleading. The basis of his conviction was not
Rowenas declaration before the Chief of Police but rather Nimfas testimony before the trial court
that it was him who raped Rowena, among others.cdlx[16] In fact, the trial court found, thus:
x x x The evidence adduced by the parties in this case disclosed that accused Roberto Padrigone,
a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Jocel Ibanita, Michael San Antonio and Abel Triumpante entered the
dwelling of the Contridas sisters at 3:00 a.m. of January 3, 1995, and at knifepoint successively
raped Rowena Contridas, a 16 year old lass. The victim became insane after the incident and was
not able to testify in Court. Nimfa Contridas, her fourteen year old sister, who was also present
that time narrated the incident when her elder sisters innocence was forcibly violated. Accused
interposed the defense of denial and alibi. x x x
The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused Roberto Padrigone
ravished Rowena Contridas against her will and consent, and with the use of a bladed
weapon.cdlxi[17]
Besides, the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as

suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the evidence is
at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative
or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.cdlxii[18]
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the opportunity
to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense
failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute
Psychotic Depressive Condition and thus cannot stand judicial proceedings yet.cdlxiii[19] The
non-presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was
the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.
Appellant cannot claim that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of Rowenas
statement as recorded in the police blotter. His conviction was based on the trial courts findings
of facts and assessment of the witnesses credibility. Well-settled is the rule that the findings of
facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of
its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate
courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath, all of which
are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. The trial courts
findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which,
if properly considered, would alter the results of the case.cdlxiv[20]
Besides, in rape cases where the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of
twelve to sixteen, we have consistently held that the victims version of what transpired deserves
credence, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment
to which such a grueling experience as a court trial, where they are called upon to lay bare what
perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, exposed them to. This is not to say that an uncritical
acceptance should be the rule. It is only to emphasize that skepticism should be kept under
control.cdlxv[21]
Nonetheless, no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished and her
honor tainted unless the same were true, for it would be instinctive on her part to protect her
honor and obtain justice for the wicked acts committed upon her.cdlxvi[22] Not to be overlooked
is the complainants willingness to face police investigators and to submit to a physical
examination which are eloquent and sufficient affirmations of the truth of her charge.cdlxvii[23]
As regards the matter of damages, the trial court ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the
offended party, Rowena Contridas, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages.cdlxviii[24] In People v. Belga,cdlxix[25] it was held that civil indemnity is mandatory
upon the finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral
damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise
of sound discretion. Thus, consistently with present case law which treats the imposition of civil
indemnity as mandatory upon a finding of rape, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
additional amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity ex delicto.cdlxx[26]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the assailed Decision, finding accused-appellant

Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay Rowena Contridas civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 in addition to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Metrobank vs Court of Appeals

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122899. June 8, 2000]
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails (1) the
amended decision of public respondent Court of Appeals 458[1] dated 03 July 1995 in
CA-GR CV No. 33395 affirming the trial court's judgment ordering herein petitioner
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (hereafter, METROBANK) to release/cancel the
real estate mortgage constituted over the subject property, and (2) the respondent
court's resolution dated 04 December 1995 denying petitioner METROBANK's motion
for reconsideration.
The subject property is a parcel of land in Diliman, Quezon City consisting of six
hundred ninety (690) square meters originally owned by businessman Tomas Chia
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-16753 (106901) of the Registry of Deeds for
Quezon City. Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr. Chia offered the subject
property for sale to private respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation (hereafter,
GTP), with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner
METROBANK secured by the subject property.
Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting in behalf of
respondent GTP, went to the METROBANK branch in Quiapo, Manila sometime in the
last week of August 1980 to inquire on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on the real estate
mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to
about P115,000.00 as of August ,1980.
The deed of sale459[2] and the memorandum of agreement460[3] between Mr. Chia and
respondent GTP were eventually executed and signed on 04 September 1980 in the
office of Atty. Atienza. Twelve (12) days later, or on 16 September 1980, Atty. Atienza
went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid one hundred sixteen thousand four
hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71),461[4] for which
METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment.
This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate

mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus
prompting respondent GTP to file on October 17, 1980 an action for specific
performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia.
In answer to the complaint, Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of sale in favor
of respondent GTP involving the subject property. Petitioner for its part justified its non-
release of the real estate mortgage (1) upon the advise of Mr. Chia that he never
executed any sales agreement with respondent GTP, and (2) by the fact that there are
other loans incurred by Mr. Chia which are also secured by the subject property.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the regional trial court on 11 December 1990
granting the reliefs prayed for by respondent GTP as plaintiff, viz:
"WHEREFORE, after a careful and thorough study of the record, this

Court holds that in view of the facts contained in the records, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants, ordering -
"1.....Defendant Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. to execute the release or

cancellation of the real estate mortgages executed by the deceased
defendant Tomas Chia and his wife, defendant Vicenta Chia, over the
property described in TCT No. 106901 of the registry of deeds for Quezon
City;
"2.....Defendants to surrender or deliver the owner's duplicate copy of said

TCT No. 106901; and,
"3.....Defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P10,000.00 as

and for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
"The counterclaims set up by both defendants are dismissed.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."462[5]
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 24 October

1994463[6] reversing the trial court's 11 December 1990 judgment, ruling in the main that
the one hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one
centavos (P116,416.71) paid by respondent GTP to petitioner METROBANK did not
extinguish the real estate mortgage inasmuch as there are other unliquidated past due
loans secured by the subject property.
With this unfavorable turn of events, respondent GTP, on 07 November 1994,464[7] filed
before respondent Court of Appeals a "motion for reconsideration with alternative prayer
to require METROBANK to furnish appellee (GTP) of the alleged unpaid balance of Mr.
Chia." At the re-scheduled date of oral arguments on 08 March 1995 where
METROBANK was supposed to bring before the respondent Court the current
statement of the mortgage debt of Mr. Chia secured by the deeds of mortgage sought to
be released, METROBANK's counsel did not appear; only the lawyers of respondent
GTP and Mr. Chia appeared. Thus, the Court required GTP's counsel to file a
memorandum in lieu of oral arguments in support of its motion for reconsideration.465[8]
GTP filed its memorandum on March 17, 1995466[9] to which a reply memorandum was
filed by METROBANK on April 10, 1995.467[10]
On 03 July 1995,468[11] the now assailed amended decision was rendered reconsidering
the original 24 October 1994 Decision and thus affirming the 11 December 1990
judgment of the regional trial court. Respondent Court of Appeals took a second hard
look at the evidence on hand and seriously considered METROBANK's refusal to
specify any unpaid debt secured by the subject property, in concluding anew that "the
present case for specific performance is well-grounded, absent indubitable showing that
the aforesaid amount of P116,416.71 paid by appellee on September 16, 1980 did not
suffice to pay in full the mortgage debt assumed under the Deed of Absolute Sale, with
assumption of mortgage, it inked with the late Tomas Chia. There is therefore merit in
its motion for reconsideration at bench." Petitioner METROBANK is now before us after
its motion for reconsideration of the 03 July 1995 amended decision was denied by
respondent Court of Appeals per Resolution of 04 December 1995.469[12]
We find no compelling reasons to disturb the assailed decision.
We quote with favor the following pronouncements of respondent Court of Appeals in

the Amended Decision, thus:
"x x x. In the case under scrutiny, we are convinced that we erred in

reversing the appealed judgment despite the finding that subject property
covered by TCT 106901- Quezon City had been sold, in a manner
absolute and irrevocable, by the spouses, Tomas Chia and Vicenta Chan,
to plaintiff-appellee, and on September 16, 1980, the latter complied with
its contractual obligation thereunder by paying the total mortgage debt it
assumed, amounting according to Metrobank itself, to P116,416.71, as of
September 16, 1980.
"All things studiedly viewed in proper perspective, we are of the opinion,

and so rule, that whatever debts or loans mortgagor Chia contracted with
Metrobank after September 4, 1980, without the conformity of plaintiff-
appellee, could not be adjudged as part of the mortgage debt the latter so
assumed. We are persuaded that the contrary ruling on this point in Our
October 24, 1994 decision would be unfair and unjust to plaintiff-appellee
because, before buying subject property and assuming the mortgage debt
thereon, the latter inquired from Metrobank about the exact amount of the
mortgage debt involved.
"The stipulation in subject Deeds of Mortgage that mortgagors' debts

subsequently obtained would be covered by the same security became
inapplicable, when mortgagor sold to appellee the mortgaged property
with the knowledge of the mortgagee bank. Thus, since September 4,
1980, it was obvious that whatever additional loan mortgagor got from
Metrobank, the same was not chargeable to and collectible from plaintiff-
appellee. It is then decisively clear that Metrobank is without any valid
cause or ground not to release the Deeds of Mortgage in question, despite
full payment of the mortgage debt assumed by appellee."470[13]
Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate
mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past
due loans." In Maneclang vs. Baun,471[14] this Court enumerated the requisites for
estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit:
"1.....there must have been a representation or concealment of material

facts;
"2.....the representation must have been with knowledge of the facts;
"3.....the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth
of the matter; and
"4.....it must have been with the intention that the other party would act
upon it.
Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, requested from METROBANK that he be furnished
a copy of the full indebtedness secured by the real estate mortgage. 472[15] In response
thereto, petitioner METROBANK issued a statement of account as of September 15,
1980473[16] which amount was immediately settled and paid the next day amounting to
P116, 416.71. Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred from taking a stand inconsistent
with its representation upon which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the
real mortgage agreement, placed exclusive reliance. Respondent GTP had the
reasonable right to rely upon such representations as true, considering that it had no
participation whatsoever in the mortgage agreement and the preparation of the
statement of account, coupled with the expectation that a reputable banking institution
such as petitioner METROBANK do conduct their business concerns in the highest
standards of efficiency and professionalism. For an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against a person relying thereon. A party may not go back on his own acts and
representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of
evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such
belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be
permitted to falsify it.474[17]
Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of

Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due
loans" at the scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. It was a golden opportunity, so to
speak, lost for petitioner METROBANK to defend its non-release of the real estate
mortgage. Thus, the following pronouncements of this Court in Manila Bay Club
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals et. al,475[18] speaking thru Mr. Justice Ricardo
Francisco,476[19] find rightful application, viz.-
"It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material
fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to
produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case
made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce
such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced,
would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. x x
x"
"No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to
prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to
prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist."
x x x......................x x x......................x x x
"Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to

establish the ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the
party to be affected by the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny
or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all the effect of
the inferences afforded. x x x"
"The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own
control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the
most unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers that a
disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing
party."
Verily, petitioner METROBANK's omission to present its evidence only created an

adverse inference against its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain
since respondent Court extended a reasonable opportunity to petitioner METROBANK
that it did not avail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The amended decision of respondent Court of

Appeals dated 3 July 1995 as well as its resolution of 4 December 1995 is AFFIRMED,
with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Official Duty: Delos Santos vs Commission on Audit
EN BANC
G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013

FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A. ANTONI,
AND MAUREEN A. BIEN, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED
BY ITS COMMISSIONERS, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
are Decision Nos. 2010-0512 and 2011-045,3 dated April 8, 2010 and August 8, 2011,
respectively, of respondent Commission on Audit (CoA) which affirmed Notice of Disallowance
(ND) No. 2008-09-01 (SAT)4 dated September 8, 2008 for the amount of P3,386,697.10 and
thereby held petitioners Filomena G. Delos Santos, Josefa A. Bacaltos, Nelanie A. Antoni, and
Maureen A. Bien (petitioners), inter alia, solidarily liable therefor.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second
District of Cebu City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement5 (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto
Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr. Eusebio M. Alquizalas (Dr.
Alquizalas), Medical Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00
from his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of
indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program).6 It was
agreed, inter alia, that: (a) Cuenco shall identify and recommend the indigent patients who may
avail of the benefits of the TNT Program for an amount not exceeding P5,000.00 per patient,
except those with major illnesses for whom a separate limit may be specified; (b) an indigent
patient who has been a beneficiary will be subsequently disqualified from seeking further
medical assistance; and (c) the hospital shall purchase medicines intended for the indigent
patients from outside sources if the same are not available in its pharmacy, subject to
reimbursement when such expenses are supported by official receipts and other documents.7 In
line with this, Ma. Isabel Cuenco, Project Director of the TNT Program, wrote8 petitioner
Nelanie Antoni (Antoni), Pharmacist V of VSMMC, requesting the latter to purchase needed
medicines not available at the hospital pharmacy from Sacred Heart Pharmacy or Dell Pharmacy
which were supposedly accredited suppliers of the Department of Health. The said request was
approved.9 cralaw virtualaw library
The Audit Proceedings
Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of
prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. On
December 14, 2004, petitioner Filomena G. Delos Santos (Delos Santos), who succeeded10 Dr.
Alquizalas, created, through Hospital Order No. 1112,11 a fact-finding committee to investigate
the matter.
Within the same month, Beatriz M. Booc (Booc), State Auditor IV, who was assigned to audit
the hospital, came up with her own review of the account for drugs and medicines charged to the
PDAF of Cuenco. She furnished Delos Santos the results of her review as contained in Audit
Observation Memoranda (AOM) Nos. 2004-21,12 2004-21B,13 and 2004-21C,14 all dated
December 29, 2004, recommending the investigation of the following irregularities:
a. AOM No. 2004-21 x x x involving fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions

for anti-rabies and drugs costing P3,290,083.29; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
b. AOM No. 2004-21B x x x involving issuance of vitamins worth P138,964.80

mostly to the staff of VSMMC and TNT Office covering the period January to
April 2004; and
c. AOM No. 2004-21C x x x covering fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions

for other drugs and medicines worth P552,853.85 and unpaid falsified
prescriptions and referral letters for drugs and medicines costing P602,063.50.15 cralaw virtualaw library
Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee created by Delos Santos submitted its Report16 dated
January 18, 2005 essentially affirming the unseen and unnoticeable irregularities attendant to
the availment of the TNT Program but pointing out, however, that: (a) VSMMC was made an
unwilling tool to perpetuate a scandal involving government funds;17 (b) the VSMMC
management was completely blinded as its participation involved merely a routinary
ministerial duty in issuing the checks upon receipt of the referral slips, prescriptions, and
delivery receipts that appeared on their faces to be regular and complete;18 and (c) the detection
of the falsification and forgeries could not be attained even in the exercise of the highest degree
or form of diligence19 as the VSMMC personnel were not handwriting experts.
In the initial investigation conducted by the CoA, the results of which were reflected in AOM
No. 2005-00120 dated October 26, 2005, it was found that: (a) 133 prescriptions for vaccines,
drugs and medicines for anti-rabies allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing
P3,407,108.40, and already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco appeared to be
falsified;21 (b) 46 prescriptions for other drugs and medicines allegedly dispensed by Dell
Pharmacy costing P705,750.50, and already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco
likewise appeared to be falsified;22 and (c) 25 prescriptions for drugs and medicines allegedly
issued by Dell Pharmacy costing P602,063.50 were also ascertained to be falsified and have not
been paid by VSMMC.23 cralaw virtualaw library
In her Comment/Reply24 to the aforementioned AOM No. 2005-001 addressed to Leonor D.

Boado (Boado), Director of the CoA Regional Office VII in Cebu City, Delos Santos explained
that during the initial stage of the implementation of the MOA (i.e., from 2000 to 2002) the
hospital screened, interviewed, and determined the qualifications of the patients-beneficiaries
through the hospitals social worker.25 However, sometime in 2002, Cuenco put up the TNT
Office in VSMMC, which was run by his own staff who took all pro forma referral slips bearing
the names of the social worker and the Medical Center Chief, as well as the logbook.26 From
then on, the hospital had no more participation in the said program and was relegated to a mere
bag keeper.27 Since the benefactor of the funds chose Dell Pharmacy as the sole supplier, anti-
rabies medicines were purchased from the said pharmacy and, by practice, no public bidding was
anymore required.28 cralaw virtualaw library
Consequently, a special audit team (SAT), led by Team Leader Atty. Federico E. Dinapo, Jr.,
State Auditor V, was formed pursuant to Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO) Order Nos. 2005-
019-A dated August 17, 2005 and 2005-019-B dated March 10, 2006 to conduct a special audit
investigation with respect to the findings of Booc and her team.29 Due to time constraints,
however, AOM No. 2005-001 was no longer included in the SAT focus.30 On October 15, 2007,
the SAT reported31 the following findings and observations:
1. The provision of National Budget Circular No. 476 dated September 20, 2001
prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for the PDAF authorized under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8760, as Reenacted (GAA for CY 2001) were not
followed;32 cralaw virtualaw library
2. Existing auditing law, rules and regulations governing procurement of medicines

were not followed in the [program's] implementation;33 cralaw virtualaw library
3. The [program's] implementation did not follow the provisions of the MOA by and
between [Congressman Cuenco] and the Hospital;34 and
4. Acts committed in the implementation of the project were as follows:

a. There were [one hundred thirty-three (133)] falsified prescriptions for
anti-rabies vaccines, drugs and medicines [costing] P3,345,515.75
[allegedly] dispensed by Dell Pharmacy [were] paid by VSMMC from the
[PDAF of Congressman Cuenco]; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
b. [Forty-six (46) falsified prescriptions] for other drugs and medicines

costing P695,410.10 [were likewise reportedly] dispensed by Dell
Pharmacy and paid by VSMMC from the [said PDAF] x x x; and
c. [Twenty-five (25) prescriptions worth] P602,063.50 [were also claimed to

have been] served by Dell Pharmacy but still unpaid x x x.35 cralaw virtualaw library
Examination by the SAT of the records and interviews with the personnel involved showed that
the purported patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was
no actual procedure followed except for the mere preparation of payment documents which were
found to be falsified as evidenced by the following:
1. Thirteen (13) hospital surgeons disowned the signatures on the prescriptions

supporting the claims. Surgeons do not prescribe anti-rabies vaccines; they
operate on patients.
2. Almost all of the patients named in the prescriptions were not treated or admitted
at the Hospital or in its Out-patient Department. Those whose names appeared on
Hospital records were treated at different dates than those appearing on the
prescriptions:
DATE OF
PATIENT TREATED BILL
PRESCRIPTION
Leah Clamon
Nov. 12, 2003 11/11/03 11/03/03
Jean Caacao
Nov. 30, 2003 11/25/03 11/18/03
Felipe Sumalinog
Dec. 17, 2004 12/10/03 12/08/03
Vicente Perez
Mar. 12, 2004 11/26/03 11/17/03
Vincent Rabaya
Sept. 8, 2003 12/12/03 11/28/03
Rodulfo Caete
July 24, 2004 01/16/04 01/12/04
3. Full dosages of anti-rabies vaccines were allegedly given to the patients although
it is gross error to do so for these medicines are highly perishable. These should
be refrigerated and injected immediately and periodically. For instance:
a. Mr. Vicente Perez received the full dosage on November 26, 2003
and again on November 27, 2003. (Hospital records showed that
Mr. Perez was admitted in March 2003 for surgery.)
b. Mr. Maximo Buaya received the full dosage on January 25 and on

February 29, 2004.
c. Mr. Gregorio Rabago received his full dosage on December 6,

2003.
4. The dates of 80 prescriptions for anti-rabies and 45 for other drugs and medicines
are earlier than the dates of the corresponding delivery receipts. The gaps in the
dates ranged from 1 to 47 days. On the other hand, 33 prescriptions for anti-rabies
had later dates than the dates of the delivery receipts. The difference in the dates
ranged from 1 to 22 days.
5. The Pharmacy Unit still prepared Purchase Request [PR] for the claims Dell
[Pharmacy] submitted to that office when the PR is no longer necessary as the
medicines have already been taken by the patients.
6. Of the three South District residents personally interviewed by the Team, two
denied having sought or received help from the [TNT] Program or being
hospitalized at VSMMC for dog bite.
7. The hospital social worker, Ms. Mergin Acido, declared that she was bypassed in
the evaluation of the alleged patients for the TNT Office has clerks who
evaluate the eligibility of the patients. The prescriptions and referral slips were
directly forwarded to the Pharmacy Unit for stamping and submission to the Dell
Pharmacy. She had no opportunity then to see the patients personally.
8. Mr. Louies James S. Yrastorza has stated under oath the falsity of the claims for
payment. He stated that he was ordered to submit to the Pharmacy Unit falsified
prescriptions accompanied by referral slips signed by Mr. James Cuenco for non-
existing patients. Subsequently, sometime in September 2007 Mr. Yrastorza
clarified his statements effectively recanting his first oath.
9. The Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor certified that out of the 30 names
of the patients randomly selected, only 15 were found listed in the registered
voters' database.
10. Prescriptions were stamped VSMMC signed/initialed by the Pharmacist who is

off duty as shown by the attendance record, e.g. Mesdames Arly Capuyan, Norma
Chiong, Corazon Quiao, Rowena Rabillas, and Riza Sei[s]mundo.36 cralaw virtualaw library
Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008, the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado, issued ND No. 2008-
09-01,37 disallowing the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for
anti-rabies with falsified prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other
VSMMC officials, solidarily liable therefor.38 Petitioners respective participations were detailed
as follows: (a) for Delos Santos, in her capacity as Medical Center Chief, for signing and
approving the disbursement vouchers and checks; (b) for petitioner Dr. Josefa A. Bacaltos, in her
capacity as Chief Administrative Officer, for certifying in Box A that the expenses were lawful,
necessary and incurred in her direct supervision; (c) for Antoni, in her capacity as Chief of the
Pharmacy Unit, for approving the supporting documents when the imputed delivery of the
medicines had already been consummated; (d) for petitioner Maureen A. Bien, in her capacity as
Hospital Accountant, for certifying in Box B of the disbursement voucher that the supporting
documents for the payment to Dell Pharmacy were complete and proper.39 cralaw virtualaw library
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective appeals40 before the CoA which were denied through
Decision No. 2010-05141 dated April 8, 2010, maintaining their solidary liability, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal[s] of Dr. Filomena [G]. Delos Santos, Dr.
Josefa A. Bacaltos, Ms. Nelanie A. Antoni and Ms. Maureen A. Bien [are] hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. However, the appeal of Ms. Corazon Quiao, Ms. Norma Chiong, Ms. Rowena
Rabillas and Ms. Riza Seismundo is hereby given due course. Likewise, Ms. Arly Capuyan who
is similarly situated is excluded although she did not file her appeal. ND No. 2008-09-01 (SAT)
dated September 8, 2008 involving the amount of P3,386,697.10 is hereby affirmed with the
modification by excluding therein the names [of[ Ms. Corazon Quiao, Ms. Norma Chiong, Ms.
Rowena Rabillas, Ms. Riza Seismundo, and Ms. Arly Capuyan as persons liable. The other
persons named liable therein, i.e., Ma. Isabel Cuenco and Mr. James R. Cuenco, TNT Health
Program Directors, and Mr. Sisinio Villacin, Jr., proprietor of Dell Pharmacy, and herein
appellants Delos Santos, Bacaltos, Antoni and Bien remain solidarily liable for the
disallowance.42 (Emphasis supplied)
The Motion for Reconsideration43 of the foregoing decision was further denied in Decision No.
2011-04544 dated August 8, 2011. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding petitioners solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding
the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its
general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of government.45 cralaw virtualaw library
Corollary thereto, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the
basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws
they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect
but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is grave abuse of
discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on
law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism.46 In this case, the Court finds no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CoA in issuing the assailed Decisions as will be discussed
below.
The CoA correctly pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply
involved in the implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as
such, has acted as custodian and disbursing agency of Cuencos PDAF.47 Further, under the
MOA executed between VSMMC and Cuenco, the hospital represented itself as willing to
cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation of a Medical Indigent Support Program.48
More importantly, it undertook to ascertain that [a]ll payments and releases under [the] program
x x x shall be made in accordance with existing government accounting and auditing rules and
regulations.49 It is a standing rule that public officers who are custodians of government funds
shall be liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or
damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in accordance with the
law and existing regulations, and on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary records.50
However, as pointed out by the SAT, provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC)
47651 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for a
congressmans PDAF authorized under Republic Act No. 876052 were not followed in the
implementation of the TNT Program, as well as other existing auditing laws, rules and
regulations governing the procurement of medicines.
In particular, the TNT Program was not implemented by the appropriate implementing agency,
i.e., the Department of Health, but by the office set up by Cuenco. Further, the medicines
purchased from Dell Pharmacy did not go through the required public bidding in violation of the
applicable procurement laws and rules.53 Similarly, specific provisions of the MOA itself setting
standards for the implementation of the same program were not observed. For instance, only
seven of the 133 prescriptions served and paid were within the maximum limit of P5,000.00 that
an indigent patient can avail of from Cuencos PDAF. Also, several indigent patients availed of
the benefits more than once, again in violation of the provisions of the MOA.54 Clearly, by
allowing the TNT Office and the staff of Cuenco to take over the entire process of availing of the
benefits of the TNT Program without proper monitoring and observance of internal control
safeguards, the hospital and its accountable officers reneged on their undertaking under the MOA
to cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation of the said health program. They
likewise violated paragraph 555 of NBC 476 which requires a regular monitoring activity of all
programs and projects funded by the PDAF, as well as Sections 12356 and 12457 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445,58 otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines
(Auditing Code), which mandates the installation, implementation, and monitoring of a sound
system of internal control to safeguard assets and check the accuracy and reliability of the
accounting data.
By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC was merely a passive entity in
the disbursement of funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith in the
performance of their respective duties, capitalizing on the failure of the assailed Decisions of the
CoA to show that their lapses in the implementation of the TNT Program were attended by
malice or bad faith.
The Court is not persuaded.
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the
presence of an explicit rule that was violated.59 For instance, in Reyna v. CoA60 (Reyna), the
Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered claims
of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines
Manual on Lending Operations.61 In similar regard, the Court, in Casal v. CoA62 (Casal),
sustained the liability of certain officers of the National Museum who again, notwithstanding
their good faith participated in approving and authorizing the incentive award granted to its
officials and employees in violation of Administrative Order Nos. 268 and 29 which prohibit the
grant of productivity incentive benefits or other allowances of similar nature unless authorized
by the Office of the President.63 In Casal, it was held that, even if the grant of the incentive
award was not for a dishonest purpose, the patent disregard of the issuances of the President and
the directives of the CoA amounts to gross negligence, making the [approving officers] liable
for the refund [of the disallowed incentive award].64cralaw virtualaw library
Just as the foregoing public officers in Reyna and Casal were not able to dispute their respective
violations of the applicable rules in those cases, the Court finds that the petitioners herein have
equally failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules and
regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners neglect to properly
monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of
133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the
VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and
prescriptions related thereto.65 Had there been an internal control system installed by petitioners,
the irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital would have been prevented from
processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily,
petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT
Office on the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that it was his money.66 Neither may
deviations, from the usual procedure at the hospital, such as the admitted bypassing of the
VSMMC social worker in the qualification of the indigent-beneficiaries,67 be justified as a
welcome relief to the already overworked and undermanned section of the hospital.68 cralaw virtualaw library
In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos argument that the practices of the TNT Office
were already pre-existing when she assumed her post and that she found no reason to change the
same69 remains highly untenable. Records clearly reveal that she, in fact, admitted that when she
was installed as the new Medical Center Chief of VSMMC sometime in the late 2003, Antoni
disclosed to her the irregularities occurring in the hospital specifically on pre-signed and forged
prescriptions.70 Hence, having known this significant information, she and Antoni should have
probed into the matter further, and, likewise, have taken more stringent measures to correct the
situation. Instead, Delos Santos contented herself with giving oral instructions to resident
doctors, training officers, and Chiefs of Clinics not to leave pre-signed prescriptions pads, which
Antoni allegedly followed during the orientations for new doctors.71 But, just the same, the
falsification and forgeries continued, and it was only a year after, or in December 2004, that
Delos Santos ordered a formal investigation of the attendant irregularities. By then, too much
damage had already been done.
All told, petitioners acts and/or omissions as detailed in the assailed CoA issuances72 and as
aforedescribed reasonably figure into the finding that they failed to faithfully discharge their
respective duties and to exercise the required diligence which resulted to the irregular
disbursements from Cuencos PDAF. In this light, their liability pursuant to Sections 10473 and
10574 of the Auditing Code, as well as Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on
Settlement of Accounts,75 as prescribed in CoA Circular No. 2009-006, must perforce be upheld.
Truly, the degree of their neglect in handling Cuencos PDAF and the resulting detriment to the
public cannot pass unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability be loosely protected
and even rendered illusory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
People of the Philippines vs Candidia

Cohabition: People of the Philippines Edualino
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 119072. April 11, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS

EDUALINO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with rape in an information dated 5 July 1994 reading
as follows:
"That on or about the 12th day of May, 1994, at Bgy. xxx, Municipality of xxx,
Province of xxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with one AAA, a pregnant woman, against her will and
consent to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW." [1]
The case for the prosecution, as told by complainant AAA, is as follows:

On 12 May 1994, the complainant and her mother BBB were in xxx to attend a dance. At
about ten (10) o'clock in the evening of that day AAA saw her cousin CCC at the dance and she
asked him to drink beer with her.
CCC got drunk and fell asleep. It was at this time that accused Jesus Edualino approached
her and offered her a glass of beer. AAA noticed that Edualino was drunk so she accepted the
glass. She then felt dizzy after drinking the beer.
Edualino then dragged her towards a grassy area where no people were present. The
accused then forced himself on top of her and succeeded in raping her while she was in a semi-
unconscious state.
AAA further stated that she was continuously resisting the assault upon her but Edualino was
stronger and he even boxed her in the stomach. She stated that she passed out after the rape
was consummated.
Prosecution witness DDD testified that she saw the accused in the act of raping AAA in the
grassy area near the store of a certain Sgt. Edep and the house of a certain Mrs. Adier.
DDD stated that she was looking for her cousin AAA in the early morning of 12 May 1994 at
xxx where a dance was being held. She saw AAA with the accused on top of her in a dark grassy
area near the site of the dance. Both the accused and AAA were naked. She was able to identify
the accused by pointing her flashlight from a distance of less than two (2) meters away.
She then called her aunt EEE, the victim's mother, but when they returned, the accused
immediately left when he noticed their presence.
Dr. xxx, a physician at the xxx District Hospital, testified that on 13 May 1994, he examined
AAA who alleged that she was sexually abused.
The medical certificate issued by Dr. xxx reads as follows:
"Medical Certificate
This is to certify that Mrs. AAA, 22 years old, married, of xxx, with a 2-1/2 yrs old
child, was examined of this date. She alleged to have been sexually forcefully
assaulted by a known person, last May 12, 1994. She was accompanied by her
mother.
The patient upon admission was found to be combative, with emotional outburst,
shouting and crying. She was then put to sleep.
Findings
1. General: Fairly developed and nourished, patient was still under sedation
during the exam. Approximately 5'4" in Ht.; wt.: 118 lbs.
2. Head & Face: contusion left temporal area 2 x 2 cm. dia. Multiple superficial
abrasions on the left forehead, right and left side of the face.
3. Abdomen: Linear abrasion, post. lumbar, 3 inches length, longitudinal
4. Breast: slightly globular, dark brown areola and nipple, presence of multiple
contusion just below the areola on both breast.
5. Upper extremities: presence of multiple linear abrasions on both arm and
forearm.
6. External genitalia: numerous pubic hair, labia majora and minora both gaping,
presence of numerous dry leaves (grass) noted on both buttocks.
7. I.E. hymen fimbriated in shape, no laceration noted, easily admits 2 fingers
vaginal wall lax, less prominent rugae, uterus enlarges to 2-3 mos. gestation.
Note: no sperm cell exam. done. no available microscope.

Conclusion: hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers, it can admit an average size
penis in erection without laceration, uterus enlarges to 2-3 months gestation.
(SGD.) Rogelio C. xxx, M.D.

Medical Officer" [2]
The defense had a different version of the incident.

Accused Jesus Edualino, while admitting that he was at the dance at xxx on 11 May 1994,
denied that he raped complainant AAA.
Edualino testified that after leaving the dance, he and a certain Calixto Flora went to the store
of Sgt. Edep to drink beer. After he and Flora had finished a big bottle of beer, complainant AAA
and a certain CCC arrived. They noticed that AAA and CCC were already drunk. Accused
Edualino testified that complainant AAA then began teasing him to kiss her. He (Edualino) stood
up to get away from her but the latter followed him. Flora then held on to AAA's arm to prevent
the latter from following him. Edualino testified that he and Flora then went to his house where
they stayed until the morning of 12 May 1994.
Edualino also testified that CCC and AAA may have been under the influence of marijuana
since he heard the two (2) talking about having taken drugs.
Calixto Flora corroborated the accused-appellant's version of the incident.
Felix Alberto, a resident of xxx, testified that in the evening of 11 May 1994 while they were
walking towards the place where the dance was being held, he and his sister Rose saw
complainant AAA sitting by the roadside with her hands cupped covering her mouth. Upon seeing
them, AAA allegedly called out "Rose, halika, tikman mo, masarap ito." (Rose, come and try
this. It's tasty). When they approached AAA, Alberto testified that he saw her holding what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Alberto then testified that he even scolded AAA saying,
"Why are you doing that? You have already two children and you know that is bad." Alberto then
took his sister and left.
Rodolfo Caabay, then barangay captain of xxx testified that in the early morning of 12 May
1994, an unusual incident was reported to him. BBB complained that her daughter AAA was
found lying on the ground about eight (8) meters from the store owned by a certain Sgt. Edep. He
found AAA was very hysterical and he observed that she had too much to drink. He turned over
AAA to the police. He later learned that accused-appellant was picked up for questioning
regarding his alleged rape of AAA.
Epifania Caabay, Rodolfo's wife, testified that she accompanied AAA and her mother on
board the police vehicle which took them to xxx District Hospital. She stated that AAA was
hysterical and kept on shouting in the vernacular, "I want water! " Epifania further stated that
AAA's mother slapped her and hit her on different parts of the body to quiet her down. Epifania
agreed with the other defense witnesses that AAA was quite drunk at the time.
On 23 December 1994, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and considerations, the Court hereby
finds the herein accused, JESUS EDUALINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of RAPE charged in the above-entitled case as defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to and as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 and accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH in
the gas chamber or in the electric chair and ordered to indemnify the raped victim,
AAA moral and exemplary damages amounting to P60,000.00, and to pay the costs.
With this conviction and imposition of the death penalty to the accused, he is hereby
ordered immediately shipped to the national penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila, under maximum security, to await the execution of this sentence there and
the review of this decision by the Honorable Supreme Court, Manila, Philippines.
SO ORDERED." [3]
The conviction of accused-appellant is now before this Court on automatic review.

Accused-appellant assigns the following errors to the trial court.
1. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion and demonstrated bias and
partiality in favor of the prosecution during the entire proceedings of the case;
2. The trial court erred in giving credence to the false and incredible testimony of the
complainant and other witnesses for the prosecution and in not giving due credence
to the evidence for the defense;
3. The trial court erred in making findings of facts not supported by the evidence and in
making conclusions based on mere surmises, conjectures and speculation; and
4. The trial court erred in convicting the appellant of the heinous crime of rape instead of
upholding his innocence based on the evidence and the law.[4]
Accused-appellant contends that the trial judge actively and "enthusiastically" assisted the
prosecution, both in the direct and cross-examination of the witnesses. It is argued that "the undue
interest and bias of (the trial judge) is revealed by his active participation in the entire proceeding,
consistently taking the cudgels for the prosecution, instead of conducting the trial with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge."[5]
A close and careful scrutiny of the transcripts of the proceedings before the trial court shows
that the trial court judge may have exhibited a degree of zeal which could lead to impressions of
partiality and bias. However, this per se does not warrant nullification of the entire proceedings
in the case.
In People v. Hatton[6], this Court citing People v. Ibasan[7] held thus:
"x x x. It is not denied that the court had at certain points conducted its own
questioning during the proceedings. The records, however, show that the court's
questions did not amount to interference as to make the case for the prosecution
and deprive the accused of their defense. The question of the judge addressed to
the witnesses and the accused were merely to clarify certain points and confirm
certain statements. The number of times that a judge intervenes is not necessarily
an indication of bias. It cannot be taken against a judge if the clarificatory questions
he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of
one party.
'As held in the case of Ventura v. Yatco (105 Phil. 287) 'Judges are not mere referees
like those of a boxing bout, only to watch and decide the results of a game; they
should have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation
of evidence calling attention of counsel to points at issue that are overlooked,
directing them to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved,
clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses, etc.'
A judge may properly intervene in the trial of a case to promote expedition and avoid
unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some obscurity (People v. Catindihan, 97
SCRA 196; Par. 14 Canons of Judicial Ethics; Administrative Order No. 162 dated
August 1, 1946, 42 O.G. 1803). In this respect, the record shows no irregularity in the
conduct of the trial judge."
Moreover, it is of note that counsel for accused-appellant did not object, during the trial, to
the manner of questioning of the trial judge nor was his inhibition sought by the defense for alleged
bias and technicality for the prosecution.
The Court will now proceed to determine if the guilt of accused-appellant has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of the crime of rape, as allegedly committed by accused-appellant, are:
1. That the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the complainant;
2. That the act was done against the complainant's will;
3. That force and/or intimidation was used in the commission of the act.
In the present case, the prosecution's evidence consists mainly of the testimonies of the
complainant AAA, DDD and Dr. xxx.
On the other hand, accused-appellant relies on alternative defenses of alibi and consent on
the part of complainant. While accused-appellant's defense before the trial court alleges that he
had left the scene of the incident together with defense witness Calixto Flora, he alternatively
raises before this Court the contention that the elements of the crime of rape have not been
established.[8]
Accused-appellant posits the following arguments:
1) No carnal knowledge occurred
It is argued that since Dr. xxx did not examine specimens from the complainant's
private parts for the presence of spermatozoa, then complainant's testimony to the
effect she, although in a state of semi-unconsciousness, felt accused-appellant on
top of her consummating the sexual act, deserves no credence.
2) No force or intimidation was employed
It is argued that the force allegedly employed to consummate the rape was merely
implied by the trial court from complainant's testimony that she did not enjoy the
sexual act. Accused-appellant contends that even assuming that the sexual act was
consummated, the same could only have been successfully done with the consent of
the complainant, "for if she ever attempted to resist or evade the thrust of the penis
of appellant, the latter could not have successfully hit the mark and penetrate the
vagina".[9]
Accused-appellant likewise argues that the medical examination conducted on

complainant fails to support the latter's testimony that accused-appellant boxed her
in the stomach.
3) The identity of the assailant has not been established
Accused-appellant assails the finding that the complainant and prosecution witness
DDD had adequately established that it was accused-appellant who committed the
rape.
It is argued that complainant, who admitted being only semi-conscious, could not
have seen who raped her and DDD who, in a written statement before trial, stated
that she only saw accused-appellant in shorts beside the complainant, at the time
and place of the alleged rape, contradicted herself when she testified at the trial that
she saw accused-appellant on top of the complainant in a grassy area behind the
store of Sgt. Edep.
4) The offense of rape has not been established.
Accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the complainant tends to show

"that there was foreplay before the alleged rape whereby the accused allegedly
kissed her, caressed her breast and bit her nipple; that the accused was on top of her
and inserted his penis in her vagina and did the push and pull movement; that she
cannot remember how long it lasted but she knew [accused] had an orgasm after
which the accused stood up and left, all this bear the earmarks of a voluntary and
mutual coition, a consensual intercourse. There was no rape." [10]
Finally, accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant AAA. It is argued
that a responsible and decent married woman, who was then three (3) months pregnant, would
not be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a
man to accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that complainant merely concocted the
charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs
and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-
appellant on 11 May 1994 while she was under the influence of drugs and alcohol.
At the outset of this discussion, it should be pointed out that the moral character of a rape
victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled that
prostitutes can be the victims of rape.[11]
In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was drunk and
under the influence of drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and
responsible married woman, were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that
she was raped.
Accused-appellant cannot successfully argue that no rape occurred because no medical
examination was conducted to confirm the presence of spermatozoa in her private parts.
The Court has repeatedly held that a medical examination of the victim is not a prerequisite
in prosecutions for rape.[12]
A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the
testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the
course of things.[13]
After a careful and thorough study of the records of the case, the Court is convinced that the
constitutional presumption of accused-appellant's innocence has been overcome by proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
On accused-appellant's contention that the presence of force and intimidation was not
proven, the Court has consistently ruled that force and intimidation should be viewed in the light
of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the offense.[14]
Indeed, there can be no hard and fast rule on the matter specially in a situation like the
present case where the victim testified to being in a state of semi-consciousness after drinking a
glass of beer given to her by accused-appellant.
Besides, the testimony of the victim is supported by the findings in the aforequoted medical
certificate which shows that the injuries suffered by the victim are consistent with the charges of
rape and contrary to the theory of the defense that the injuries were inflicted by the victim's mother
when she was trying to quiet her daughter who was hysterical.
The allegation that accused-appellant's identity has not been established deserves scant
consideration. It is to be noted that accused-appellant was known to the victim and prosecution
witness DDD long before the incident. Both witnesses positively identified the accused as the
perpetrator of the rape. There is nothing to show that these two (2) witnesses would or did falsely
implicate accused-appellant.
On whether the acts of accused-appellant constitute rape, the victim AAA's testimony was
sufficiently clear to show that the carnal knowledge was without her consent and with force and
intimidation. There is no doubt that the crime committed by accused-appellant is rape.
Accused-appellant in a final attempt to absolve himself argues that the charge of rape was
concocted by the victim to save her marriage.
The Court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in
an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. We fail to
understand how a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances averred by
accused-appellant.
The other arguments adduced by accused-appellant pertaining to credibility of the two (2)
prosecution witnesses are basically issues that cannot be reviewed by the Court absent attendant
circumstances that do not exist in this case.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pertain to minor
matters and are even badges that the witnesses were unrehearsed and honest.
Besides, in reviewing the entire records of this case, we find no reversible error in the
judgment of conviction except as to the penalty of death imposed by the trial court.
The Solicitor General correctly points out that absent the attending circumstances provided
for under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 wherein
the penalty for rape is death, the correct penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A. No. 7659:
"x x x.
The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation. (As amended by Sec. 11, RA 7659.)" [15]
In the present case, the prosecution has not proved any circumstance which would justify or
call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
Finally, with regard to the award of P60,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, it is noted
that there is no basis for said award. Consequently the award of moral and exemplary damages
is deleted. However, the accused-appellant is liable to indemnify the victim the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court finding accused-
appellant Jesus Edualino guilty of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1) Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
and
2) He is ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) in lieu of the award of moral and exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, andTorres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Francisco, See Dissenting Opinion.
B. Presentation of Evidence
1. Order of Presentation of Evidence: People of the Philippines vs Fabre
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 146697. July 23, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONARDO FABRE y
VICENTE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court, Br. VI, of Prosperidad,
Agusan del Sur, of raping his own daughter Marilou Fabre, and he was sentenced to
suffer the extreme penalty of death.
Fabre was indicted in an Information that read:cdlxxi[1]
That on or about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 26, 1995 in the house of the
accused located at Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by force, threats and
intimidation, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
succeed in having sexual intercourse with his own daughter MARILOU FABRE, a girl
thirteen (13) years of age, of good reputation, against her will and consent to the
damage and prejudice of the said victim consisting of moral, actual and compensatory
damages.
Accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented
the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife of the accused,
and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou, along with the
medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the
criminal complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the
presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the accused himself. It also
called Adela Fabre back to the witness stand.
The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to
the narration of the young complainant, expressing a quote from an observation once
made by this Tribunal in one of its decision that even when consumed with revenge, it
(would) take a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct
a story which (could) put her own father for the rest of his remaining life in jail and drag
herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame.cdlxxii[2] Convinced that the
accused committed the crime of rape on his own daughter, the trial judge disposed of
the case thusly:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE alias Nardo,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of RAPE as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659
Section 11 thereof and hereby imposes upon the accused Leonardo Fabre y Vicente
alias Nardo the penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim Marilou Fabre civil indemnity in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS and the costs.cdlxxiii[3]
In this automatic review, the convicted accused assigned the following alleged errors
committed by the court a quo.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND DENIAL.
II
ASSUMING IN ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL

COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH SENTENCE UPON
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
ESTABLISH THE ACTUAL AGE OF MARILOU FABRE AT THE TIME OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED RAPE.cdlxxiv[4]
The defense argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant should acquire
added strength for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him
and to present any rebuttal evidence. The cross-examination of a witness is a
prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called.cdlxxv[5] The purpose of cross-
examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on
direct examination.cdlxxvi[6] The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any
further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore
adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of
the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the
testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-examined
by the other party.
The alibi of appellant itself would not appear to be deserving of serious consideration.
His account that at the time of the alleged rape he was working at a coconut plantation,
just about one kilometer away from the place of the crime, hardly would amount to
much. Nor would the testimony of Adela Fabre, his wife, merit any better regard. At first,
she testified that on the day of the rape incident, she had left their house at four oclock
in the afternoon. Later, however, she changed her story by saying that she had left the
house in the morning and returned only at ten oclock that same morning, staying home
the whole day thereafter. In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be
enough for an accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he would have to demonstrate likewise that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.cdlxxvii[7] Clearly, in the instant case, it was not at all impossible nor even
improbable for appellant to have been at the crime scene.
Upon the other hand, the evidently candid and straightforward testimony of Marilou
should be more than enough to rebut the claim of innocence made by appellant. cdlxxviii[8]
On 26 April 1995, around four oclock in the afternoon, Marilou Fabre was alone in their
house in Barangay Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Adela Fabre, her mother, had gone
to Purok 4 to buy fish while her siblings were out strolling. After cleaning their yard,
Marilou went to the adjacent palm plantation, about fourteen to fifteen meters away from
their house, to gather palm oil. Marilou had been gathering palm oil for about a minute
when her father, appellant Leonardo Fabre, arrived. He suddenly gripped Marilous
hands and forcibly dragged her towards the house. He closed the door and removed his
daughters underwear. He took off his pants and asked Marilou to hold his sex organ. In
tears, Marilou obeyed her father. He then began touching the girls breasts and vagina.
He forced her to lie down, mounted her and sought to insert his penis into her organ.
Marilou cried in pain. When after some time he still could not insert his penis into
Marilous vagina, he applied coconut oil to lubricate his and his daughters sexual organs.
He was finally able to penetrate her. Once inside her, appellant made push and pull
movements until he was through with her. Appellant threatened to kill her if she would
tell anybody about the sexual encounter. The young girls mother, Adela Fabre, arrived
home about five oclock that afternoon but, remembering her fathers threats, she kept
mum about her ordeal.
The credibility of Marilou would not be all that difficult to discern from her narration that,
as so described by the prosecution, was full of graphic details which a young provincial
girl could not possibly have concocted and which could only have come from someone
who must have personally experienced a brutal rape assault. She testified:
PROS. ENRIQUEZ:
Q Now, Miss Marilou, can you recall where were you on April 26, 1995 at about
4:00 oclock in the afternoon?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you that time?
A In our house, sir.
Q What were you doing in your house?
A I was cleaning our yard, sir.
Q How far is your yard where you were doing some works from your house?
A (Witness pointing a distance of around 2 to 3 meters.)
Q Now, while you were doing your work in your yard, can you recall if there was an
incident that occurred?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that incident that occurred?
A While I was gathering a palm oil my father arrived and suddenly dragged me to
our house, sir.
COURT:
Q Where is your house located?
A At Purok 4, Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, Your Honor.
PROS. ENRIQUEZ:
Q What did you do when your father dragged you to your house?
A Because I was dragged by my father to our house I just went with him, sir.
Q While you were in your house after having been dragged by your father, what
happened if any?
A He closed our house and he removed my panty, sir.
Q And after removing your panty, what did your father do next?
A He removed his pants and he let me hold his penis, sir.
Q And what did you do next after holding his penis?
A I was crying, sir.
Q While you were crying what did your father do?
A He was touching my breast and my vagina, sir.
Q After that what did he do next?
A He let me lie down, sir.
Q And while lying down, what did your father do?
A He mounted me and he inserted his penis, to my vagina, sir.
Q And what did you feel while your father was inserting his penis to your vagina?
A Very painful, sir.

Q And what did you do while your father was inserting his penis to your vagina?
A I was crying, sir.
Q And while you were crying what did your father do if any?
A He told me not to tell anybody because if I will do it he will kill me, sir.
Q Now, did your father find it easy to insert his penis to your vagina?
A It [took] a long time, sir.
Q And did he use anything to facilitate the insertion of his penis to your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A He used coconut oil in his penis and also in my vagina so that his penis can
easily insert my vagina, sir.
Q Now, while his penis was in your vagina, can you tell this Honorable Court if he
did anything also on top of you and while his penis was inside your vagina?
A None, sir.
Q Did he make any movement?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that movement?
A He made a push and pull movement on my body, sir.
Q Now, while your father was doing it to you where was your mother that time?
A She was in Purok 4, Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, sir.
Q And did you report this incident to your mother?
A Not yet sir because he told me not to tell anybody.
Q So when did you had a chance to tell your mother about this incident?
A On May 1, 1995, sir.

Q And what did your mother do after you reported to her this incident?
A She reported [the matter] to the Kagawad, sir.cdlxxix[9]
It has been stressed quite often enough that the testimony of a rape victim, who is
young and still immature, deserves faith and credencecdlxxx[10] for it simply would be
unnatural for a young and innocent girl to invent a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter subject herself and her family to the
trauma of a public trial unless she indeed has spoken the truth.cdlxxxi[11] Most especially,
a daughter would not accuse her own father of such a serious offense or allow herself to
be perverted if she were not truly motivated by a desire to seek a just retribution for a
violation brazenly committed against her.cdlxxxii[12]
Confirming Marilous story was the medical report and testimony of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon,
the government physician stationed at the Bunawan District Hospital in Agusan del Sur,
who examined Marilou. Dr. Jalalon made these findings; viz:
Abrasion at (L) labia minora at 3:00 oclock position.

Vaginal smear (-) negative for spermatozoa.cdlxxxiii[13]
The doctor concluded that it was possible that genital penetration on the victim did
occur and that a penis could have caused the abrasion on the victims labia minora.
There is merit, however, in the plea of the defense, seconded by the prosecution, that
the penalty of death imposed by the trial court should be reduced to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11
of Republic Act No. 7659, provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the
parent of the victim.
While the father-daughter relationship between appellant and private complainant has
been sufficiently established, the fact of minority of the victim, although specifically
averred in the information, has not been equally shown in evidence. These qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority are twin requirements that should be both
alleged in the information and established beyond reasonable doubt during trial in order
to sustain an imposition of the death penalty.cdlxxxiv[14] Neither an obvious minority of the
victim nor the failure of the defense to contest her real age always excuse the
prosecution from the desired proof required by law. cdlxxxv[15] Judicial notice of the issue of
age without the requisite hearing conducted under Section 3, Rule 129, of the Rules of
Court, would not be considered sufficient compliance with the law. The birth certificate
of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence, like a baptismal
certificate, school records and documents of similar nature, or credible testimonial
evidence, that can help establish the age of the victim should be presented. cdlxxxvi[16]
While the declaration of a victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay
proscription, would be admissible under the rule on pedigree, the question on the
relative weight that may be accorded to it is a totally different matter.cdlxxxvii[17]
In the case at bar, the complainant claimed that she was 13 years old at the time of the
incident.cdlxxxviii[18] Her mother stated, however, that she was 14.cdlxxxix[19] The birth
certificate of the victim, at least already in her teens, was not presented to ascertain her
true age on the bare allegation that the document was lost when their house burned
down.cdxc[20] No other document that could somehow help establish the real age of the
victim was submitted.
The Court, in sum, upholds the decision of the trial court convicting Leonardo Fabre of
the crime of rape but must reduce, on account of insufficiency of proof on the qualifying
circumstance of minority of the victim, the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua. With
respect to the civil liability, the Court sustains the award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity
but, in keeping with prevailing jurisprudence, must additionally order the payment of
P50,000.00 moral damagescdxci[21] and P20,000.00 exemplary damages.cdxcii[22]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding LEONARDO FABRE guilty of
rape is AFFIRMED but the sentence of death therein imposed should be, as it is hereby
so, reduced to reclusion perpetua. The award of P50,000.00 civil liability in favor of
victim, Marilou Fabre, is sustained; however, appellant is further ordered to pay to the
victim the amounts of P50,000.00 moral damages and P20,000.00 exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Acting C.J.), Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-

Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on leave.
2. Leading and Misleading Questions: People of the Philippines vs Perez
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142556. February 5, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review is the Decision477[1] dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez
(appellant for brevity), guilty of raping Mayia P. Ponseca (Mayia for brevity) and imposing on
appellant the death penalty.
On January 22, 1997, the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor478[2] of Zambales filed an
Information479[3] charging appellant with the crime of rape penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1997 at 12:00 noon at Sitio Baco, Brgy. Macarang, in
the Municipality of Palauig, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with lewd design and by means of coercion, inducement
and other consideration, did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one Mayia P. Ponseca, a minor of 6 years old, without her consent and against
her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio Atty. Genaro N. Montefalcon,

pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.480[4] Subsequently, the trial court allowed the
withdrawal of Atty. Montefalcon as counsel for health reasons. The trial court appointed Atty.
Roberto Blanco as appellants counsel de oficio.481[5]
At the pre-trial, the prosecution and defense stipulated on the following facts:
1. The identity of the accused;
2. The accused was at the time of the incident in the vicinity thereof;
3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca, was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her
birth certificate;
4. That after the incident, the child was subjected to a medico-legal examination to which a
medico-legal certificate was issued by Dr. Editha Divino.
The prosecution marked in evidence the birth certificate of the victim Mayia O. Ponseca as
Exhibit A, and the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Editha Divino as Exhibit B.482[6]
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: the victim, Mayia
Ponseca; the victims mother, Hermie Ponseca; the victims father, Osias Ponseca; Virginia Espejo
Giron; and Dr. Editha dela Cruz Divino. On the other hand, the defense presented appellant and
his employer, Bartolome Tolentino.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG for brevity) summarized the prosecutions version of
the incident in the appellees brief, to wit:
On January 17, 1997, about noontime, in Sitio Baco, Barangay Macarang, Palauig, Zambales,
six-year old Mayia Ponseca was walking along Sulok on her way to her house in Sitio Camiling
when appellant Jesus Sebunga Perez approached her (pp. 7-8, TSN, December 15, 1998).
Appellant introduced himself as Johnny and immediately afterwards, strangled her neck and
boxed her abdomen (p. 10, TSN, December 15, 1998). Still in shock, Mayia fell down (id.). At
that point, a dog arrived and barked at them.
Appellant then proceeded to lower his black denim pants while simultaneously removing Mayias
panty. He then inserted his penis inside Mayias vagina (p. 11, id.). Mayia felt excruciating pain
in her private parts (sic) but was not able to repel her aggressor whose strength and weight totally
engulfed her. Her only recourse was to cry while her young body was being ravished (p. 13, id.).
After satisfying his beastly desires, appellant raised his pants and ran away (p. 14, id.).
Notwithstanding that her vagina was bleeding profusely and her dress now covered with her own
blood, Mayia managed to stand up and seek help. She ran to the house of Virginia Giron, which
was only fifty (50) meters away from the scene of the crime. In fact, Giron was outside when she
heard her dog barking (apparently, it was the same dog barking at appellant while he was
consummating his lust on Mayia, pp. 2-3, TSN, January 12, 1999; p. 11, TSN, December 15,
1998). Looking at the direction of the noise, she saw a confused Mayia approaching her with
blood dripping from her private parts and thighs. When Giron asked Mayia what happened, the
latter shouted ni-rape ako, ni-rape ako (p. 4, TSN, January 4, 1999). Giron then summoned her
husband and other companions to look for Mayias attacker but was unable to find him. Giron
then proceeded to Hermie Ponseca and Osias Ponseca, Mayias parents, to inform them of what
happened (p. 5, TSN, January 5, 1999; p. 2, TSN, January 19, 1999).
When her parents asked Mayia if she knew her assailant, the latter answered the name Johnny.
(id.) The couple brought their daughter to the President Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital
for medical examination (p. 2, TSN, February 24, 1999). She was examined by Dra. Editha Dela
Cruz Divino, who issued a medico-legal certificate dated January 23, 1997 stating the following:
a. Bleeding of genitalia coming from median laceration at the vaginal floor
around four (4) centimeters in size. Possible cause, a fall and then hitting a
sharp object and also an alleged sexual assault (p. 4, TSN, February 24,
1999).
b. Genitalia had hymenal lacerations at 3, 6, 9 and 12 oclock positions.
(pp. 4-6 id.)
Because of the extent of the damage on her genitals, Mayia undertook an IV sedation operation
to repair her lacerations (p. 6, id.) During her confinement at the hospital, the Ponseca couple
reported the incident to the Palauig PNP Police Station and recounted their daughters narration
including the name of the culprit as Johnny who, according to their neighbors, was a worker at
the fishpond of Bartolome Tolentino (pp. 11-12, TSN, January 5, 1999). Police operatives then
proceeded to the said fishpond and arrested appellant. After her discharge from the hospital,
Mayia learned that appellant was already apprehended (pp. 3-8, TSN, January 5, 1999). In the
police station, she was able to positively identify the appellant as the person who sexually
assaulted her (p. 18, TSN, December 15, 1998).483[7]
Appellant denied raping Mayia. Appellant testified that on the date of the alleged rape incident,
he was working at a fishpond at Macarang, Zambales. He heard of the rape of a young girl from
his manager, Bartolome Tolentino (Tolentino for brevity).484[8] Appellant further testified that on
January 25, 1997, policemen went to the fishpond where he worked. The policemen arrested
appellant and brought him to the police station at Palauig. Later, the policemen took him to the
municipal jail of Palauig.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that his nickname is not Johnny but Jessie.485[9] He
testified that on January 17, 1997, at around 12 oclock noon, he left the fishpond and walked
home to Barangay Alwa which was about thirty meters from the fishpond.486[10]
The defense formally offered the testimony of witness Tolentino to prove that appellant was
employed as caretaker of Tolentinos fishpond for almost two years before the alleged rape
incident. Appellant was purportedly of good moral character while employed as a fishpond
caretaker. The prosecution admitted the offer of testimony. Hence, the trial court dispensed with
the testimony of Tolentino in open court.487[11]
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment488[12] on October 26, 1999, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, accused Jesus Perez y Sabung (SIC) is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutore Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was only 6 years old
at the time of the commission of the offense, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III, Republic Act
7610, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Jesus Perez is directed to pay to the
private complainant the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as and by way of
civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as and by way of moral damages.
Hence, this automatic review.
In his brief, appellant raises the following lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Appellant
points out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt
when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that when
Mayia identified him in open court, she referred to him as a man named Johnny and did not give
any description or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell
when Mayia identified him after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification
was not done with the usual police line-up.
Appellants contention is untenable.
As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the
witness is a child of tender years489[13] as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without
prompting or suggestion.490[14] Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their
reluctant lips.491[15] In the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to
Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not
uncertain.492[16] As explained in People v. Rodito Dagamos:493[17]
The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the
questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of
the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level
of the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid
waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same
will further the interests of justice.
The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a child of tender age,
inexperienced in the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical
examination of her private part, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her familys honor and
reputation, unless she was motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed
against her.494[18]
Mayia recounted her harrowing experience, thus:
Q What time was this when Johnny introduced himself to you?
A I do not recall, mam.
Q Was it in the morning, noontime or in the afternoon or in the evening?
A Noontime, mam.
Q So, when Johnny said, Ako si Johnny, what did you do?
A None, mam.
Q After that when Johnny said, Ako si Johnny, what happened?
A He strangled (sinakal) me.
Q Were there persons around in the place when Johnny strangled you?
A None, mam.
Q So, what did he do then after he strangled you?
A He boxed me on my stomach, mam.
Q When he boxed you on your stomach, what happened to you?
A I was shocked, mam.

Q Did you fall down?
A Before that, I was already lying down, so when he boxed me, I was shocked.
Q You said that you were already lying down. Who made you lie down?
A The person, mam.
Q Why were you shocked, Mayia?
A Because he strangled me and boxed me.
Q After he boxed you on your abdomen, what happened? What else did he do to you?
A There was a dog that arrived in the place and it barked at us. Then Johnny moved in a
hurry by penetrating my private part and after he dressing (SIC) me, he ran away.
Q You said that Johnny penetrated your private part. With what instrument did he use in
penetrating your private part?
A His penis, mam.
Q What was he wearing at that time?
A A black denim, mam.
Q When he used his penis in entering your private part, did he remove his pants?
A No, mam.
Q What did he do with his pants?
A He brought out his penis, mam.
Q You mean to say Mayia, he lowered his pants?
A Yes, mam.
Q What about you, were you wearing any panty?
A Yes, mam.
Q What was your clothes at that time?
A A dress, mam.
Q When his penis entered your vagina Mayia, did he remove your panty?
A Yes, mam.495[19]
The identity of appellant as the rapist has been established by the clear, convincing and
straightforward testimony of Mayia. During the trial, she testified as follows:
Q Mayia, there is a man sitting wearing orange t-shirt, do you know this man?
A Yes, mam.
Q Do you know his name?
A Yes, mam.
Q What is his name?
A Johnny, mam.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because he introduced himself to me.
Q Where did he introduced himself to you?
A At Sulok, mam.
Q Sulok is a place?
A Yes, mam.
Q Do you have any companion when this man introduced himself to you?
A None, mam.
Q How did he introduce himself to you?
A The man introduced himself to me by saying, Kilala mo ba ako? Hindi po. Ako si
Johnny.496[20]
The trial court further asked Mayia:

Q You were talking of a certain Johnny. s this Johnny in court now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you point to him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Point to him.
A (Witness pointing to the person sitting at the accused bench and when asked of his name
answered Jesus Perez)
Q Is this Johnny whom you point to the person whom you saw in that Sulok?
A Yes, sir. 497[21]
Mayias simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the witness stand of her harrowing
experience lends credence to her accusation. Her tender age belies any allegation that her
accusation was a mere invention impelled by some ill-motive. As the Court has stressed in
numerous cases, when a woman or a child victim says that she has been raped, she in effect says
all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.498[22]
Mayia had a clear sight of appellants face since the rape occurred at noontime.499[23] Her
proximity to appellant during the sexual assault leaves no doubt as to the correctness of her
identification for a man and woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during the
sexual act.500[24] Thus, even if Mayia did not give the identifying marks of appellant, her positive
identification of appellant sufficed to establish clearly the identity of her sexual assailant.
Appellants claim that the police improperly suggested to Mayia to identify appellant is without
basis. True, Mayia did not identify appellant in a police line-up when Mayia identified appellant
in his cell. However, appellant, in his testimony admitted that he had two other companions in
his cell.501[25] Moreover, the Court has held that there is no law requiring a police line-up as
essential to a proper identification. Even without a police line-up, there could still be a proper
identification as long as the police did not suggest such identification to the witnesses.502[26] The
records are bereft of any indication that the police suggested to Mayia to identify appellant as the
rapist.
Mayias identification in open court of appellant as her rapist dispels any doubt as to the proper
identification of appellant. Mayia positively identified and pointed to appellant as her rapist. We
are satisfied that her testimony, by itself, is sufficient identification of her rapist. As held in
People v. Marquez:503[27]
xxx. Indeed, the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit,
as the willingness of complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and
humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint. Stated
differently, it is most improbable for a five-year old girl of tender years, so innocent and so
guileless as the herein offended party, to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if
it were not true.
In his Reply Brief, appellant contends that even assuming that the guilt of appellant has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. Appellant
maintains that the death penalty cannot be imposed on him for failure of the prosecution to prove
Mayias age by independent evidence. Appellant points out that while Mayias birth certificate
was duly marked during the pre-trial, it was not presented and identified during the trial.
Appellant asserts that Mayias minority must not only be specifically alleged in the Information
but must also be established beyond reasonable doubt during the trial.
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration.
At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory disposition of the criminal case.
Appellant, assisted by counsel, signed a Pre-Trial Agreement504[28] which, as incorporated in the
Pre-Trial Order, stated that:
x x x.
3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by
her birth certificate;
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayias birth certificate as Exhibit
A.505[29] The prosecution submitted its Offer of Evidence506[30] which included Exhibit A, a
certified true copy of Mayias birth certificate. The trial court admitted Exhibit A507[31] without
any objection from the defense.
The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility
of evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes
lawful defenses; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal
and civil aspects of the case.508[32] Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind
the parties. Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure509[33] provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the
actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties,
limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial,
unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on December 15,
1998, which was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident occurred on January 17,
1997, Mayia testified on cross-examination that she was 8 years old last May 23.510[34] Thus, by
deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 as shown in her birth certificate, she was
about six (6) years and seven (7) months old on January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place.
We rule that the prosecution has indisputably proven that Mayia was below seven years old at
the time appellant raped her.
Finally, the trial court was correct in imposing the death penalty on appellant. Under Article
335511[35] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,512[36]
the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child below seven
(7) years old. Mayia was six (6) years and seven (7) months old when appellant raped her.
If rape is qualified by any of the circumstances513[37] warranting the imposition of the death
penalty, the civil indemnity for actual or compensatory damages is mandatory. 514[38] Following
prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity is fixed at P75,000.00. In addition, moral damages
of P50,000.00 should also be awarded to the rape victim without need for pleading or proving
it.515[39]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, sentencing him to suffer the death
penalty,516[40] and ordering him to pay the victim Mayia P. Ponseca the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED in toto.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of the
Republic Act No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President of the Philippines for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
3. Impeachment People of the Philippines vs Castellano
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139412. April 2, 2003]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. alias Talino,
RONALD CASTILLANO alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun, accused,
RONALD CASTILLANO alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun, appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision517[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur,
Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. P-2542, convicting appellants Ronald Castillano alias Nono and
Jaime Castillano, Jr. of murder, meting on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordering them to pay, jointly and severally, damages to the heirs of the victim Diosdado Volante.
The Evidence or the Prosecution
Diosdado Volante, who eked out a living as a farmer, his wife Luz,518[2] and their four children
lived in their farmland located in the outskirt of Sitio Danawan, Barangay Sagrada, Bula,
Camarines Sur.
About 200 meters away from Diosdados farmland was the farmhouse of Jaime Castillano,
Sr.519[3] He tasked his son, Jaime Castillano, Jr., to take care of the farmhouse and allowed him to
reside there.520[4] Jaime, Sr., his wife Concepcion, their son Ronald (Nono) Castillano and other
children lived at their family residence in Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur, approximately three
kilometers away from their farmhouse in Sitio Danawan.521[5]
Sometime in the early part of June 1996,522[6] Jaime, Sr. fired his gun indiscriminately. Afraid
that a stray bullet might hit any member of his family, Diosdado accosted Jaime, Sr. and asked
him to desist from firing his gun indiscriminately. Jaime, Sr. resented the intrusion. He
remonstrated that neighbors did not even complain about him firing his gun. A heated altercation
ensued. Jaime, Sr. then fired his gun towards the house of Diosdado. The incident germinated
deep animosity between the two and their respective families.523[7] Jaime, Sr. always carried a
bolo whenever he passed by the house of Diosdado.
On July 8, 1996, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., Levy Avila, a teacher, was in his house doing
some repairs. He noticed Jaime, Jr. and Ronald talking by the roadside near the gate of his
(Levys) house. Levy overheard the two planning to go to Diosdados house. Jaime, Jr. and Ronald
even told Levy: Ayaw namin kasing inaasar. Suspecting that the two were intending to harm
Diosdado, Levy urged them to amicably settle their differences with Diosdado.
At around 8:00 p.m., Luz and Diosdado were about to retire for the night. Their children were
already fast asleep. Diosdado was tired after a days work of spraying chemicals at the rice field.
He reclined on a bamboo bench near the main door of their house. A kerosene lamp lighted the
house. Suddenly, Luz heard voices near their house. She saw Jaime, Sr. holding a flashlight and
his two sons, Jaime Jr. and Ronald, on their way to the house. Luz immediately alerted her
husband and told him that the Castillanos were in their yard. However, Diosdado was nonchalant
and simply told Luz not to mind them. All of a sudden, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun at Diosdados
house. Terrified, Luz hastily carried her baby daughter Mary Jane, sought cover and hid near the
rear door. She was about five meters away from her husband when the Castillanos barged inside
their house and ganged up on Diosdado. Jaime, Jr. and Ronald, armed with bladed weapons, took
turns in stabbing Diosdado. Ronald stabbed Diosdado on the right side of his breast, right thigh
and on the back. He also struck him with a one-meter long pipe. Not satisfied, Jaime, Sr. fired his
gun hitting the right thigh of Diosdado. Luz was so shocked by the sudden turn of events. To
silence her one year old baby, she breastfed her. As soon as she could, Luz fled to the rice
paddies where she hid for a time. The Castillanos fled on board a jeep parked in the NIA road
about 200 meters from the house of Diosdado. When Luz returned to their house, she saw her
husband sprawled on the ground in a pool of his own blood. Diosdado, at the point of death,
asked her for help. Not knowing what to do, Luz lost no time and ran to the house of their
neighbor Celedonio Espiritu for help. Celedonio rushed to the Bula Police Station and reported
the incident.
A team composed of SPO4 Jaime Javier, SPO3 Jaime Bellano and SPO3 Nilo Fornillos,524[8] the
duty investigator,525[9] went to the crime scene526[10] to conduct an on-the-spot investigation.
Photographs were taken of the cadaver.527[11] SPO3 Fornillo drew rough sketch528[12] of the scene.
The policemen saw a bolo at the place where Diosdado was sprawled near the door of their
house. A scabbard of a bolo was found a meter away from the house of Diosdado.529[13] The
policemen also found a bullet hole on the wall of the house.530[14] Thereafter, the cadaver was
placed on a hamak [hammock] brought to the police station. The police investigators turned over
the scabbard and bolo to the desk officer of the police station.531[15]
From the police station, SPO4 Javier, SPO3 Bellano and Sgt. Rogelio Palacio boarded their
mobile police car and set out a manhunt for the malefactors. They proceeded towards the
boundary in Sto. Domingo where they put up a checkpoint. The police officers inspected every
vehicle that passed by. At around 12:45 a.m., SPO4 Javier halted a passenger jeepney. On board
were Jaime, Sr. and his two sons, Jaime Jr. and Ronald, each of whom carried a bag containing
their clothes. The policemen brought the Castillanos to the police station.532[16] The bags of
Jaime, Jr. and Ronald were turned over to the police investigators. The three were placed under
arrest for the killing of Diosdado. The policemen submitted their investigation report.533[17]
In the meantime, at 7:00 a.m., Dr. Evangeline Consolacion, the Municipal Health Officer of
Bula, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Diosdado. Her autopsy report revealed the
following findings:
External Findings
1. Incise Wound 3 cm Superior pinna R ear
2. Incise woud (sic) 10 cm. from nasal bridge extending to mandible R
3. Stab wound 2 cm.x 5 cm. Epigastrium R
4. Stab wound 2 cm.x 4 cm. Epigastrium L
5. Stab wound 2.5 cm. Middle third Arm R
6. Stab wound 2cm x 5 cm. posterior Back.
7. Amputating middle third finger L
8. Hacked wound posterior ankle L
9. Gunshot wound POE 2 x 2cm. with contusion collar medial aspect middle third R
thigh
No point of exit noted
Internal Findings:
Fracture femur with Foreign body bullet lodge in middle third femur with hematoma about about
100 cc R thigh
Cause of Death; Hypovolemia secondary to Multiple Stab Wound534[18]

The doctor recovered a slug from the right thigh of Diosdado. She later signed the victims post-
mortem certificate of death.535[19] Senior Inspector Edgardo B. Sambo, Chief of Police of Bula
Police Station, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Bula, Camarines Sur, a criminal
complaint536[20] for murder against the Castillano brothers.537[21] Judge Francisco O. Tolentino
conducted the preliminary examination and thereafter issued an order of arrest against the
Castillanos.538[22] No bail was recommended for their provisional release. On July 9, 1996, Luz
gave a sworn statement to the police investigators.539[23]
On July 10, 1996, the accused were transferred to the Tinangis Penal Farm. Senior Inspector
Sambo requested the PNP-CLRU5 Provincial Unit to conduct a paraffin test on the
Castillanos.540[24]
On July 12, 1997, Major Lorlie Arroyo, the Head Forensic Chemist of PNP-Region 5, conducted
the paraffin test on the Castillanos. Ronald was found positive for gunpowder residue.541[25]
Jaime, Sr. and Jaime, Jr. were found negative for gunpowder residue.
The MTC issued a subpoena requiring the accused to submit their counter-affidavits from notice
thereof. However, the accused failed to submit any counter-affidavit.542[26]
On August 2, 1996, an Information for murder was filed against Jaime, Sr., Ronald and Jaime Jr.
with the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of July 1996 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening at Barangay
Sagrada, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation armed
with a handgun, bladed weapon and piece of wood did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot and stab one DIOSDADO VOLANTE y LOZANO inflicting
upon the latter several mortal wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Diosdado Volante the
amount of which to be proven in Court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.543[27]
Upon their arraignment544[28] on August 29, 1996, accused Jaime Sr., Jaime, Jr and Ronald, duly
assisted by counsel de parte, Atty. Avelino Sales Jr., pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Luz testified that when Diosdado was still alive, he had an annual income of over P65,000. She
spent P18,000 for the funeral services,545[29] P300 for religious services,546[30] P9,111 for food
and other expenses547[31] during her husbands wake and funeral. She suffered sleepless nights and
mental anguish for his sudden death.
The Defenses and Evidence of the Accused
Ronald admitted when he testified that he killed Diosdado but insisted that he did so in self-
defense and in defense of his brother Jaime, Jr. He asserted that his father Jaime, Sr. and brother
Jaime, Jr. had nothing to do with Diosdados death. Ronald alleged that on September 8, 1996, at
about 7:30 p.m., he was driving a passenger jeepney on his way to the poblacion of Bula. Jaime,
Jr. flagged down the jeepney. He boarded the jeepney and told Ronald that he was instructed by
their mother to go to the house of Jose del Socorro to ask the latter to accompany them to their
farmhouse in order to fetch Gilda Albes. Ronald was armed with a .38 paltik gun, while Jaime,
Jr. was armed with a bolo sheathed in a scabbard. They fetched Jose and then Ronald parked the
jeepney at the NIA road. Jaime, Jr., who was holding a flashlight, walked along the footpath on
top of a pilapil (a narrow earthen barrier between two rice fields). Ronald and Jose walked
behind Jaime, Jr. As they passed by the house of Diosdado, a man suddenly shouted: you shit, I
have await (sic) for you for a while, why just now. Surprised, Jaime, Jr. forthwith focused his
flashlight towards the man who shouted. He was aghast when he saw Diosdado armed with a
bolo running towards them and about to attack them with his bolo. Ronald shoved Jaime, Jr. who
fell on the muddy rice paddies below the pilapil. Ronald forthwith shot Diosdado. Diosdado took
a step but fell on a kneeling position. Diosdado brandished his bolo. Ronald shot Diosdado once
more but his gun misfired. To defend himself, Ronald took Jaime, Jr.s bolo and hacked Diosdado
to death.548[32] Ronald then fled from the scene and ran to the jeepney at the NIA road. Jaime, Jr.
and Jose boarded the jeep and left the scene. Ronald threw the bolo along the way. He threw his
gun into a rice farm in Danawan.
Jaime, Jr. corroborated the testimony of his brother. He, however, testified that he did not see his
brother hack and kill Diosdado. He claimed that when Ronald got hold of his bolo, he ran away
and proceeded to their jeepney which was then parked at the roadside. Minutes later, Ronald
followed. They then hastily went home to Sagrada and told their father Jaime, Sr. of the
incident.549[33]
Jose Del Socorro corroborated the testimony of Ronald. He testified that on July 8, 1996, at
about 5:00 p.m. he was on his way home when he met Diosdado whom he noticed to be
inebriated and unruly Diosdado was throwing dried mud at the farmhouse of the Castillanos and
challenging the occupants of the farmhouse to a fight. He advised Diosdado to stop what he was
doing and warned him that he was only inviting trouble. Diosdado told him to mind his own
business and not to intervene. Jose thereafter left Diosdado and went, home.550[34] When Jose
arrived home, Dominador Bria was waiting for him. He and Dominador talked business for a
while and subsequently had dinner. After some time, Jaime, Jr. and Ronald arrived at Joses
house.
Concepcion Castillano testified that on July 8, 1996 at around 5:00 a.m., her son Jaime, Jr.
arrived home and told her that Diosdado threw stones at their farmhouse and challenged
everybody to a fight. She felt nervous and reported the incident to the police and caused the same
to be entered in the police blotter.551[35] Thereafter, she went home and told her sons Jaime, Jr.
and Ronald to immediately fetch Gilda. She, likewise, instructed her sons to first drop by the
house of Jose so that the latter could accompany them to the farmhouse.
Jaime, Sr. vehemently denied any participation in the killing of Diosdado. He claimed that at the
time of the alleged incident, he was at their house in Sagrada, bedridden due to his debilitating
diabetes. He narrated to the trial court his medical history and his confinement at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center sometime in 1994.552[36] He presented documents and receipts
showing that he had been and is still under medication.553[37] He declared that upon learning from
his son Ronald that the latter killed Diosdado, he advised his sons to look for a lawyer for legal
representation. He told the trial court that at around 11:30 p.m., he and his two sons had decided
to go to Andangnan in order to meet a cousin of his who knew of a lawyer named Atty. Rotor.
As they traversed the road to Andangan, they were stopped by some policemen at a checkpoint
and were invited to the police station where they were investigated and eventually
incarcerated.554[38]
Gilda Abes, the last witness for the defense, affirmed that she was the girlfriend of Jaime, Jr. She
told the trial court that on July 8, 1996 she was at the farmhouse of the Castillanos. She
corroborated the testimony of Jose that Diosdado was combative and drunk. According to Gilda,
Jaime, Jr. left the farmhouse before sundown to go to his parents place at Sagrada. Jaime, Jr.
never returned to the farmhouse that night. Gilda learned of the incident the next morning when
she went home.555[39]
The Verdict of the Trial Court
On December 22, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting Jaime, Jr. and Ronald of
murder qualified by evident premeditation and treachery. The trial court exonerated Jaime, Sr. of
the crime on reasonable doubt. The trial court gave no credence to Ronalds claim that he acted in
self-defense. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the two (2)
accused RONALD CASTILLANO and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of MURDER and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties imposed thereby.
Further, as civil liability, the said two (2) accused are hereby ordered to pay the legal heirs of the
late Diosdado L. Volante, through his widow Luz R. Volante, the total sum of ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY ONE PESOS (P177,421.00)
Philippine Currency as actual and moral damages including death indemnity, with costs against
both accused.
The accused Jaime Castillano, Sr. is hereby acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.556[40]
The accused, now appellants, interposed their appeal from the decision of the trial court
contending that it committed reversible errors:
(a) in rejecting appellant Ronalds plea of self-defense; and (b) in not acquitting appellant Jaime,
Jr. of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Anent the first issue, appellant Ronald posits that he adduced proof that he acted in self-defense
when he stabbed the victim.
The Court disagrees with appellant Ronald. The Court has consistently held that like alibi, self-
defense is inherently weak because it is easy to fabricate.557[41] In a case where self-defense and
defense of relatives is invoked by the accused, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove
with clear and convincing evidence the essential requisites of self-defense, namely (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or
prevent it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
There can be no complete or incomplete self-defense or defense of relatives unless the accused
proves unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.558[42] The accused must rely on the strength
of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution for by pleading self-
defense, the accused thereby admits having killed the victim and he can no longer be exonerated
of the crime charged if he fails to prove the confluence of the essential requisites for self-defense
and defense of a relative.559[43]
Appellant Ronald failed to discharge his burden.
First. After shooting and stabbing Diosdado, appellant Ronald fled from the situs criminis. Flight
from the situs of the crime is a veritable badge of guilt and negates his plea of self-defense.560[44]
Second. Appellant Ronald threw away his paltik .38 gun and the bolo he used in hacking
Diosdado as he fled from the scene of the crime instead of surrendering the same to the police
authorities. Appellant Ronald admitted that he had no license for the gun:
Q Where is that gun now that you use?
A I do not know, Your Honor, I think I was able to throw it away.
Q Where?
A At Danawan, Your Honor.
Q Danawan, is that a lake?
A No, Your Honor, it is a ricefarm.
Q What kind of gun is this?

A Paltik .38, Your Honor.561[45]
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
q By the way, where is that bolo that you used in hacking and stabbing Diosdado Volante?
a I do not know anymore because I was able to throw it away also when I ran away.
q Where is that place where you throw it?
a It was by the NIA road.
q You mentioned also a while ago that this gun that you said is a paltik and you throw it
away also, is it not?
a Yes, Maam.
q And that gun had been in your possession the whole day that you are driving up to the
time you shot the victim, Diosdado Volante?
a Yes, Maam.
q Do you have license to possess that firearm?
a None, Maam.562[46]
The failure of appellant Ronald to surrender the bolo and his gun to the police authorities belies
his claim of self-defense.
Third. Appellant Ronald failed to report the incident to the police authorities even when they
arrested him. Curiously, he failed to inform the police officers who arrested him that he acted in
self-defense when he shot and stabbed the victim The resounding silence of the appellant is
another indicium of the incredibility of his defense.563[47] Moreover, the records show that the
municipal trial court issued a subpoena on July 9, 1996 requiring appellant Ronald to submit his
counter-affidavit but he refused and/or failed to submit the same despite service on him of the
subpoena. It was only during the trial that appellant Ronald, for the first time, invoked self-
defense and defense of a relative.
Fourth. The cadaver of the victim was found inside his house when the police investigators
arrived.564[48] This belies appellant Ronalds claim that he shot the victim in the rice paddies, near
his house and that he (appellant Ronald) took the bolo of appellant Jaime, Jr. and used it to stab
the victim. Appellant Ronald failed to prove his claim that when the police investigators arrived
in the victims house, they carried his (the victims) body from the rice paddies to the house. The
only evidence adduced by appellant Ronald was his testimony which is hearsay, and besides
being hearsay, it is speculative and mere conjecture.
Fifth. Appellant Ronald hacked the victim no less than five times. Two of the stab wounds
sustained by the victim were at his back and posterior portion of his left ankle. The number and
nature of the wounds of the victim negate the appellants claim that he shot the victim in self-
defense. On the contrary, they prove that appellant Ronald was determined to kill the
victim.565[49]
Appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged. He asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of Diosdado, was
inconsistent with her testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal trial court
and her sworn statement before the police investigators as well as the testimonies of SPO1
Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime Favier, and the physical evidence on record. The appellant catalogued
said inconsistencies, thus:
1. He was lying on the bench inside just upon entering. (Tsn p. 9, 2/17/97).
-I was lying down with my husband inside our house but we were still awake (9th Answer, Prel.
Exam. MTC, 7/9/96).
2. JCS fired towards our house hitting the wall (Tsn p. 11, 2/17/96).
JCS fired twice (16th answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96).
JCS kept on firing the gun pointing towards the body of my husband (9th Answer, Sworn
Statement, PNP, 7/9/96).
JCS shot my husband three (3) times (Tsn p. 16, 2/17/97)
3. My husband was shot and hit on the right thigh (Tsn p. 14, 2/17/97). He was hit on the
left lap (23rd Answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96). He was hit on his side (Tsn p. 43, 2/17/97).
4. RC struck my husband with a 1-meter long Pipe (Tsn p. 13, 2/17/97). RC & JCJ smashed
my husband with a hard object (5th Answer, Sworn Statement, 7/9/96).
RC smashed my husband (22nd Answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96).
5. He was not able to fight back (Tsn p. 43, 2/17/97). He was standing and was trying to
parry the attack of the accused (26th Answer, Prel. Exam. 7/9/96).
6. When I went back to the house, he was still alive (Tsn p. 19, 2/17/97). - LV Yes, the
victim could have died instantly (Tsn p. 35, 2/3/97) With wounds sustained, he could have died
instantly (p. 8, Complainants Memorandum).
7. It was bright inside our house with a kerosene and a bottle lamp (Tsn pp. 33-34,
2/17/97). Only one kerosene lamp - bottle of gin with wick and light (Tsn p. 10, 4/1/97 -
SPO1 Pornillos
Surrounding house, dark, total darkness (Tsn pp. 12-13, 4/1/97).
8. Scene Photography by Jaime Jornales (Tsn, p. 21, 2/17/97).
-do- by Mr. Lozano (Tsn., p. 12, 3/7/97).
9. SPO1 Nilo Pornillos learned of the incident at 8:00 oclock of July 8, 1996 (page 5 of
Complainants Memorandum.
SPO4 Jaime Javier received report at 9:00 oclock P.M. of July 8, 1996 of Complainants
Memorandum.
SPO4 Jaime Javier received report at 8:00 P.M. (page 7 of Complainants Memorandum).566[50]
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony
of Luz, the prosecutions principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the
preliminary examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the
police investigators for the reason that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked
and offered in evidence by the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover,
the appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and
her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was not, therefore, accorded a chance to
explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Evidence which reads:
How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement. - Before a witness can be

impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places
and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before
any question is put to him concerning them.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before the credibility of a witness and
the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements
which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or
the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-
examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent
inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were
made.567[51] This Court held in People v. Escosura568[52] that the statements of a witness prior to
her present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her credibility unless her attention
was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an opportunity to explain
said inconsistencies. In a case where the cross-examiner tries to impeach the credibility and
truthfulness of a witness via her testimony during a preliminary examination, this Court outlined
the procedure in United States vs. Baluyot,569[53] thus:
...For instance, if the attorney for the accused had information that a certain witness, say Pedro
Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal materially different from that
given in his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when cross-
examining said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not
make such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement different
from that delivered in court. If the witness admits the making of such contradictory statement,
the accused has the benefit of the admission, while the witness has the opportunity to explain the
discrepancy, if he can. On the other hand, if the witness denies making any such contradictory
statement, the accused has the right to prove that the witness did make such statement; and if the
fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the document, secondary evidence of the
contents thereof would be admissible. This process of cross-examining a witness upon the point
of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the American courts laying a
predicate for the introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted that
unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not
admissible to impeach a witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the
discretion of the court.
In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any
discrepancies between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the
said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her
present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said
transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.570[54]
On the purported inconsistencies or discrepancies catalogued by the appellants relating to the
testimony of Luz during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement, the Office of the
Solicitor General posits that:
Sixth, Volante indeed testified that when she returned to their house from the ricefield, after the
three accused had left the premises, her husband was still alive (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 19)
as he was still able to ask for her assistance (Ibid, p. 20). But it is not inconsistent with the expert
opinion of Dr. Consolacion that by the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim, the latter
could have died thereof instantaneously (TSN, February 3, 1997, p. 35). It is clear that the said
physician was merely stating a possibility and not what happened in the instant case because in
the first place, she was not present at the scene right after the incident.
Seventh, Volante was insistent in her testimony that at the time of the commission of the subject
crime, it was bright inside their house because they had a kerosene lamp and a bottle lamp both
lighted up, one placed on the wall and the other on the ceiling (Ibid, pp. 33, 52-53). While it may
appear contradictory to SPO1 Pornillos testimony that there was only a kerosene lamp at the
time, he could not have been expected to notice all the things found inside the house, including
the bottle lamp, because he might not have been familiar with its interiors. Or, he could have
focused his attention primarily on the body of the fallen victim and the objects that may be used
later as evidence against the perpetrators of the crime.
Eight, it is admitted that the testimonies of Volante and SPO1 Pornillos as to who took pictures
of the crime scene including the lifeless body of the victim are contradictory. But again, such
contradiction, being only minor and irrelevant, does not affect the credibility of their testimonies.
And ninth, the apparently inconsistent statements of the prosecution witnesses (SPO1 Pornillos
and SPO4 Javier) as to the exact time the subject incident was reported to the police authorities
are similarly irrelevant to the matters in issue. Of consequence here is the fact that on the night
the crime was committed, it was reported to the authorities who later effected the arrest of the
perpetrators thereof.571[55]
The Court fully agrees with the foregoing ruminations of the Office of the Solicitor General. The
inconsistencies adverted to by the appellants pertained only to minor and collateral matters and
not to the elements of the crime charged; hence, they do not dilute the probative weight of the
testimony. It bears stressing that even the most truthful witness can make mistakes but such
innocent lapses do not necessarily affect his credibility. The testimonies of witnesses must be
considered and calibrated in their entirety and not by their truncated portions or isolated
passages.572[56] And then again, minor contradictions among several witnesses of a particular
incident and aspect thereof which do not relate to the gravamen of the crime charged are to be
expected in view of their differences in impressions, memory, vantage points and other related
factors.573[57]
Contrary to appellant Jaime, Jr.s claim, the prosecution adduced proof that he and appellant
Ronald conspired to kill and did kill Diosdado by their simultaneous acts of stabbing the victim.
As narrated by Luz:
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
Q Now after Jaime Castillano Sr. fired at your house, what happened next if any?
A They entered our house.
Q Now, when you say they to whom are you referring to?
A Jaime Castillano Sr., Jaime Castillano, Jr., and Ronald Castillano.
Q Now, where did they enter?
A In the other door.
Q Now at the time they entered your house was the door of your house closed or opened?
A It was closed.
Q Now, after the accused entered your house what happened next, if any?
A Jaime Castillano Jr. stabbed my husband and also Ronal Castillano stabbed my husband.
Q Now, was your husband hit by the stabbing of Ronald Castillano, Jr. (sic)?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you tell us on what part of his body was he hit?
A My husband was still struck by Ronald Castillano hitting him on his right side of his body
including on his right thigh and also on his back..
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
Q Now, you said Ronald Castillano struck your husband, now with what instrument did he
use in strucking (sic) your husband?
ATTY. BERNALES:
We object, misleading, your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A A pipe.
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
Q Now, will you tell us more or less how long was that pipe that was used by Ronald
Castillano?
A About one (1) meter, Maam.574[58]
Luz was merely five meters away from where Diosado was attacked and stabbed by the
appellants. Appellant Jaime, Jr. even tried to cut the ankle of the victim:
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
Q Now during this incident, how far were you from the accused and your husband?
A From where I am sitting up to that window which is about five (5) meters.
Q Now after the accused strucked (sic) and shot your husband, what else happened if any?
A Jaime Castillano Jr. stabbed my husband on his breast (Witness is pointing to her breast).
ATTY. BERNALES:
We will move that the answer be striken off from the records because it is not responsive to the
question. The question is after your husband has been stabbed strucked (sic) and shot.
COURT:
Q Your are being asked what happened after the accused was already stabbed, strucked (sic)
and shot, what happened next?
WITNESS:
Q Jaime Castillano Junior still stabbed my husband and try to cut his ankle, Your Honor.
COURT:
Strike our (sic) the previous answer of the witness.
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
Q By the way, will you tell us how many times did Ronald Castillano stab your husband?
A I cannot determine how many times he even stabbed my husband on his left eye.
Q How about Jaime Castillano Jr., how many times did he stab your husband?
A I cannot determine exactly how many times but he repeatedly stabbed my husband.575[59]
The mere denial appellant Jaime, Jr. of the crime charged is but a negative self-serving which
cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward testimony of Luz and the physical evidence
on record.576[60]
The Crime Committed by Appellants
The trial court correctly convicted the appellants of murder, qualified by treachery, under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court, however, does not agree with the trial courts finding
that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.
Case law has it that the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt qualifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime. For evident premeditation to qualify a crime, the
prosecution must prove the confluence of the essential requites thereof: (a) the time when the
offender has determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender
has clung to his determination; (c) an interval of time between the determination and the
execution of the crime enough to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.577[61]
There must be proof beyond cavil when and how the offender planned to kill the victim and that
sufficient time had elapsed between the time he had decided to kill the victim and the actual
killing of the victim, and that in the interim, the offender performed overt acts positively and
conclusively showing his determination to commit the said crime.578[62] In this case, the only
evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove evident premeditation is the testimony of Levy
Avila that between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on July 8, 1996, he heard the appellants planning to
go to the house of Diosdado and that he heard them say: Ayaw namin kasing inaasar, and that at
8:00 p.m., the appellants arrived in the house of the victim and stabbed him to death. There is no
evidence of any overt acts of the appellants when they decided to kill Diosdado and how they
would consummate the crime. There is no evidence of any overt acts perpetrated by the
appellants between 5:00 and 8:00 p.m. that they clung to their determination to kill Diosdado.
There is treachery in the commission of a crime when (a) at the time of attack, the victim was not
in a position to defend himself; (b) the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods and forms of attack employed by him.579[63] Even a frontal attack may
be treacherous when unexpected on an unarmed victim who would not be in a position to repel
the attack or avoid it.580[64] In this case, the victim was unarmed and was supinely resting before
sleeping after a hard days work. Although Luz warned the victim that the appellants were already
approaching their house, however, the victim remained unperturbed when the appellants barged
into the victims house. They stabbed him repeatedly with diverse deadly weapons. The victim
had nary a chance to defend himself and avoid the fatal thrusts of the appellants.
The crime was committed in the house of the victim. There was no provocation on the part of the
victim. Dwelling thus aggravated the crime. However, dwelling was not alleged in the
information, as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
The use by appellant Ronald of an unlicensed firearm to shoot Diosdado on the thigh is not an
aggravating circumstance because (1) there is no allegation in the information that said appellant
had no license to possess the firearm. That appellant lacked the license to possess the firearm is
an essential element of the crime and must be alleged in the information.581[65] Although the
crime was committed before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2002, the rule should,
however, be applied retroactively as it is favorable to the appellants.582[66]
The appellants are not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The
evidence shows that the appellants were arrested when the police officers manning the
checkpoint stopped the passenger jeepney driven by appellant Ronald and arrested the
appellants. The fact that the appellants did not resist but went peacefully with the peace officers
does not mean that they surrendered voluntarily.583[67]
There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
appellants should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Civil Liabilities of the Appellants
The trial court awarded the total amount of P177,421 as civil indemnity, actual and moral
damages in favor of the heirs of the victim Diosdado. The Court has to modify the awards.
Appellants Ronald and Jaime, Jr. are obliged to pay jointly and severally the amount of P50,000
as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; P25,000 as exemplary damages in view of the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling;584[68] and the amount of P18,300 for funeral and religious
services. The heirs of the victim failed to adduce in evidence any receipts or documentary
evidence to prove their claim for food and other expenses during the wake. However, they are
entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P5,000, conformably with the ruling of the Court
in People v. dela Tongga.585[69] His wife Luzs testimony that the victim had an annual income of
more than P65,000 is not sufficient as basis for an award for unearned income for being self-
serving. There was no proof of the average expense of the victim and his family and his net
income. In People v. Ereo,586[70] this Court held that:
It bears stress that compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and as such requires
due proof of the damage suffered; there must be unbiased proof of the deceaseds average
income. In the instant case, the victims mother, Lita Honrubia, gave only a self-serving hence
unreliable statement of her deceased daughters income. Moreover, the award for lost income
refers to the net income of the deceased, that is, her total income less her average expenses. No
proof of the victims average expenses was presented. Hence, there can be no reliable estimate of
the deceaseds lost income.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Sur, Branch 31 in Criminal Case No. P-2542 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellants Ronald Castillano alias Nono and Jaime Castillano, Jr. alias Junjun are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances in
the commission of the crime, the appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. They are, likewise, ordered to
pay jointly and severally to the heirs of the victim, Diosdado Volante, the amounts of P50,000 as
civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; P18,300 as actual damages; P25,000 as exemplary
damages; and P5,000 as temperate damages. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
4. Reference to Memorandum
a. Present memory revived: People vs Plasencia
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 90198 November 7, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO alias "Tonying," ROBERTO DESCARTIN y PASICARAN alias "Ruby" and JOELITO
(JULITO), DESCARTIN y PASICARAN, accused-appellants.
VITUG, J.:
Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery with homicide in an information, dated 20
December 1984, that read:
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1984 at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, in sitio San
Juan, Barangay Patao, Municipality of Bantayan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their
superior number and strength and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and use personal violence upon
Herminio Mansueto, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries:
1. Stab wounds which was approximately two inches in length, parallel to the ribs and is located 1
1/2 inches below the right nipple on the right anterior axillary line and on the fifth intercostal
space. On probing the wound was penetrating immediately up to the left parasternal border
approximately hitting the heart;
2. Hacking wound 9 inches in length extending from the coracoid process of the left clavicle
passing between the left anterior and the left mid axillary line up to the left 4th intercostal space
including all muscle underlying the skin exposing the ribs.
Cause of death: Internal hemorrhage due to stab wound.
after which the body was placed inside a plastic bag and brought to an open sea by the pump boat owned by Roberto
Descartin y Pasicaran and operated by Joelito Descartin y Pasicaran and dumped to the water by herein accused, and
as a result of which said Herminio Mansueto died, herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and with intent to gain, took and carried away the personal property belonging to Herminio Mansueto,
namely: one (1) Seiko 5 "Stop Watch" valued at P3,000.00; one (1) Bicycle (standard size) valued at P1,000.00; and
cash in the amount of P10,000.00, all in the total amount of FOUR-TEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P14,000.00),
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said oner (sic) in the said total sum.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, and the generic aggravating circumstance of
known premeditation.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
When arraigned, all the accused entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge; whereupon, trial
commenced.
The prosecution sought to establish, as follows:
At around ten o'clock in the morning of 29 November 1984, Herminio Mansueto, wearing a blue and white
striped t-shirt, maong pants, Seiko 5 stop watch and a pandan hat, left on his bicycle for Barangay Patao,
Bantayan, Cebu. He had with him P10,000.00 cash which he would use to purchase hogs from a certain
"Ruby."
In Patao, Francisca Espina, also known in the locality as Pansing and whose house was just across the
street from the respective residences of the three accused, saw at the roadside Herminio Mansueto and
Roberto Descartin alias "Ruby" engaged in conversation. Pansing approached them and asked Mansueto
if he would be interested in buying two of her pigs for P1,400.00. Mansueto said "yes" and promised that
he would be right back.
Mansueto and Ruby meantime proceeded to the latter's piggery. Joelito Descartin and his brother-in-law
Rene were also seen going to the place. After some time, Pansing noticed Joelito take Mansueto's
bicycle. Believing that Mansueto was already preparing to leave and in her desire to catch up with him,
Pansing promptly walked towards the piggery which was around 100 meters away from her house. She
could see Mansueto leaning on the pigsty with Ruby on his right side and Antonio Plasencia alias
"Tonying" on his left; behind was Joelito. 2 Midway, she was halted on her tracks; she suddenly saw
Antonio stab Mansueto. The latter staggered towards Ruby who himself then delivered another stab blow.
Mansueto fell on his back. Joelito started hitting Mansueto on the forehead while Rene held Mansueto's
legs. 3 Except for a coconut tree and some ipil-ipil trees around the area, nothing obstructed Pansing's
line of vision. Pansing rushed back home. The image of Antonio waving the weapon and the thought that
she might herself be killed kept her from revealing to anyone what she saw. 4
The following day, in Kodia, Madridejos, Cebu, where Mansueto resided, his daughter Rosalinda reported
to Francisca Tayo, the barangay captain, that her father had not returned home. Tayo proceeded to
Putian, which was in Mansueto's itinerary, and then to Ruby's piggery in Patao, where a youngster, who
turned out to be Ruby's son, innocently informed her that Mansueto's bicycle was taken by Joelito. 5
The day after, Francisca Tayo, accompanied by police officers of Madridejos, Cebu, and some relatives
of Mansueto, went back to Ruby's place. On a railing of the pigpen, she saw blood stains. When she
asked Ruby's father about it, he said that the stains had come from chicken blood. Going around the
piggery, she also saw blood stains on a bamboo pole, which Ruby's father once again so identified as
chicken blood. At the back of the piggery, Francisca noticed a digging which looked like an empty grave.
The digging was measured and photos were taken. The police found a hat at the back of a hut beside the
piggery, which was later recognized to be that which belonged to Mansueto. 6
In the morning of 30 November 1984, Patrolman Elpidio Desquitado of the Bantayan police went back to
the piggery. This time, the police learned from Pansing herself that Joelito took Mansueto's bicycle. 7
Joelito was invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the case. Later, Joelito, waiving his right to
counsel, executed a "confession." 8
Joelito narrated that, upon Ruby's instruction, he brought the bicycle to the piggery. Unexpectedly, he
said, Tonying Plasencia stabbed Mansueto. Stunned, Joelito tried to run away but Tonying stopped him.
Tonying then dragged the victim to a nearby house. Threatened by Tonying, Joelito agreed to later return
to where the victim's body was dragged. At around eleven o'clock that evening, tonying and Joelito placed
the body in a sack. Tonying asked Ruby to allow the use of the latter's pumpboat to ferry the body.
Tonying paddled the pumpboat to the island of Po-Po'o where he picked up some pieces of stones. Then,
again paddling the pumpboat farther away from the island, he ordered Joelito to start the engine of the
boat. They headed for the islet of Gilotongin (Hilotongan). On the way, Tonying filled the sack with stones
and, using a rope, tied to it the body of the victim. Tonying then unloaded their cargo into the sea.
Guided by Joelito, members of the Bantayan police force headed for the islet of Hilotongan on two
pumpboats 9 in the area pinpointed to be the place where the body was dumped. On the second day of
the search, the group was informed that the body had already surfaced near the vicinity of the search and
delivered to the municipal building. 10
The municipal health officer of Bantayan, Dr. Oscar Quirante, examined the body and concluded that the
victim died of internal hemorrhage due to stab wounds. 11 The bloated body was in a late stage of
decomposition and its skin had sloughed off. 12 He found the victim's face to be "beyond recognition."
There were "some rope signs in the body particularly in the waistline and in the knees." 13
The main defense interposed is one of alibi.
Antonio stated that on the whole day of 29 November 1984, he was out at sea fishing with his son.
Joelito, on his part, asserted that he was in Barrio Baod, about an hour's walk from his residence, at the
house of his fiancee. He returned to his house, he said, only the day after. Roberto ("Ruby"), Joelito's
uncle, testified that on that fateful day, he was in Samoco Purok 2, Iligan City, and then left for Cebu on
06 December 1984 only after receiving a telegraph that Joelito was implicated in the crime.
The Regional Trial Court 14 did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted the three accused of
murder (punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code), instead of robbery with homicide,
explaining that the term "homicide" was used in the information in its generic sense. 15 Finding
conspiracy, the trial court ruled that the killing was qualified by both treachery and abuse of superior
strength with the latter, however, being absorbed by the former. No other aggravating or mitigating
circumstances being attendant in the commission of the crime, the trial court said, the penalty that could
be imposed upon each of the accused was reclusion perpetua with a joint and several civil liability for
indemnification to the heirs of Herminio Mansueto in the amount of P30,000.00.
The instant appeal was interposed by the three convicted appellants.
Appellant Antonio Plasencia attacks the credibility of the prosecution's lone eyewitness, Francisca
Espina, alleging that she is a pejured witness who has an axe to grind against him because his dog had
once bitten Francisca's child. 16 He bewails the fact that it has taken Francisca until 29 December 1984 to
reveal what she supposedly has seen to the police authorities. Contending that treachery has not been
duly proven as "no wound was inflicted at the back and as a matter of fact only one wound was fatal," 17
appellant argues that even if conspiracy were to be considered to have attended the commission of the
crime, he could be held liable with the others, if at all, only for homicide.
Appellant Roberto Descartin, likewise challenging Francisca Espina's credibility because of her alleged
inconsistencies, faults the trial court for allowing the witness to glance at the notes written on her palm
while testifying. He also argues that his alibi, being corroborated, should have been given weight.
Appellant Joelito Descartin, in assailing the credibility of Francisca, has noted her "jittery actuation" while
giving her testimony. He also questions the findings of the ponente for not being the presiding judge
during the examination of Francisca on the witness stand.
The focus of this appeal is clearly one of credibility. The initial assessment on the testimony of a witness
is done by the trial court, and its findings still deserve due regard notwithstanding that the presiding judge
who pens the decision is not the one who personally may have heard the testimony. 18 The reliance on
the transcript of stenographic notes should not, for that reason alone, render the judgment subject to
challenge. 19 The continuity of the court and the efficacy of its decision are not affected by the cessation
from the service of the judge presiding it 20 or by the fact that its writer merely took over from a colleague
who presided at the trial. 21
It is asserted that the testimony of Francisca Espina should not be given worth since, while testifying, she
would at times be seen reading some notes written on her left palm. Thus
Q. May I see your left hand, may I see what is written there?
A. Witness showing to the court her left palm and the following words
have been written in her palm in ball pen handwritten words and number
of the pumpboat No. 56 and there is another word "petsa" and there are
words which cannot be deciphered and all found in the palm of the left
hand.
ATTY. MONTECLAR:
That is all.
ATTY. GONZALES: RE-CROSS
Q Mrs. witness, you cannot deny of what these physical evidences or

writings on the palm of your left hand. I want you to be honest, the law
will not allow you to lie, you are subject to punishment and penalty. My
question is, who wrote this on the palm of your left hand?
A I was the one who wrote this.
Q Why did you write that down?
A I was the one who wrote this.
Q Why, what was your purpose of writing that in your palm?
A I wrote this in my palm because I wanted to be sure of what time the

incident happened, was the same as that I wrote in my palm.
Q And who furnished you the data in which you wrote in the palm of your
hand?
A I was the one who made that.
ATTY. GONZALES:
Q You don't understand my question. You wrote that writing but where
did you get that data?
A. This is just of what I know.
Q Since you claim to have all this knowledge of your mind, why did you
find it necessary to write that in the palm of your hand and I notice during
the trial that you used to look in your palm, why, is that necessary in your
believe to testify here to what you knew about the incident.
A Because of the fact that I have an headache.
Q When did this headache occur?
A After I left my house because my sick child.
Q Now, knowing that you have an headache, did you not bring this to the
attention of the Fiscal?
A No, I did not tell the Fiscal.
Q Do you know of your own that doing this is unfair and is not allowable
while testifying in open court, do you know that is illegal act?
A No, I did not, know.
Q And you did all of this claiming that you do not know about the incident
for the purpose of giving here testimony against the accused?
A Yes, sir. 22
The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule
132, of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to
refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under
his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other
time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly
written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon
it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or
record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that
the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must
be received with caution. (Emphasis supplied.)
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. 23 In this
case, the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that
she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.
Appellants see inadvertency on Francisca's appearing to be "jittery" on the witness stand. Nervousness
and anxiety of a witness is a natural reaction particularly in the case of those who are called to testify for
the first time. The real concern, in fact, should be when they show no such emotions.
Francisca did fail in immediately reporting the killing to the police authorities. Delay or vacillation,
24
however, in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily adulterate the credibility of the witness.
Francisca, in her case, has expressed fears for her life considering that the assailants, being her
neighbors, could easily exact retribution on her. 25 Also, the hesitancy in reporting the occurrence of a
crime in rural areas is not unknown. 26
Francisca's inability to respond to the summons for another appearance in court for further questioning
was satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. Francisca at the time just had a miscarriage and was
found to be too weak to travel. The recall of the witness was, after all, at the sound discretion of the trial
court. 27
The claim of appellant Roberto Descartin that Francisca and her husband, a tuba-gatherer, owed him
P300.00, and the assertion made by appellant Antonio Plasencia on the dog-biting story involving
Francisca's son truly were too petty to consider. It would be absurd to think that Francisca, for such trivial
reasons was actually impelled to falsely implicate appellants for so grave an offense as murder.
Appellants questioned Francisca's ability to recognize them from a distance. Francisca knew appellants
well; they all were her neighbors while Antonio Plasencia himself was her cousin. 28 The crime occurred
at around three o'clock in the afternoon only about fifty (50) meters away from her. With an unobstructed
view, Francisca's positive identification of the culprits should be a foregone matter. 29
The alleged inconsistencies in Francisca's testimony and in her sworn statement of 18 December 1984,
cover matters of little significance. Minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses do not detract
from their credibility; 30 on the contrary, they serve to strengthen their credibility and are taken as badges
of truth rather than as indicia of falsehood 31 even as they also erase suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 32
All considered, the case against the appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt even with the
retracted extra-judicial admission of Joelito Descartin. 33 The testimony of a single witness, if found to be
credible, is adequate for conviction, 34 The defense of alibi hardly can overcome the positive identification
of an unprejudiced eyewitness. 35
Like the trial court, we are not persuaded that robbery has been proven to be the principal motive for the
crime that can warrant the conviction of appellants for the complex crime of robbery with homicide. 36
Appellants could only thus be held responsible for the killing of Mansueto. Conspiracy among the
appellants has been established beyond doubt by the sum of their deeds pointing to a joint purpose and
design. 37
Three aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information, i.e., treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength. The trial court disregarded the circumstance of evident premeditation and
concluded that the attack upon Mansueto was committed with treachery and abuse of superior strength.
On its finding that the assault was unexpectedly perpetrated upon the unarmed victim to ensure its
execution without risk to themselves from the defense that the victim might make, the trial court
appreciated treachery, which it deemed as having so absorbed abuse of superior strength.
The trial court was correct when it concluded that the crime committed was murder, a crime technically
lower than robbery with homicide, 38 not, however, because of the attendance of treachery but of abuse of
superior strength. Treachery, in our view, was not satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. Francisca
Espina simply testified that appellant Plasencia stabbed Mansueto while the latter and the appellants
were in a huddle. There was nothing adduced on whether or not the victim gave provocation, an
indispensable issue in the proper appreciation of treachery. 39 The presence, nonetheless, of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder. 40 The three
appellants utilized superiority in numbers and employed deadly weapons in assaulting the unarmed
Mansueto.
There being no other aggravating or mitigating circumstances to consider, the trial court aptly imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the medium period 41 of the penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to
death prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In conformity with prevailing jurisprudential
law, the heirs of the victim should be indemnified in the amount of P50,000.00. 42
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting appellants Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin
and Joelito (Julito) Descartin of the crime of murder and imposing on each of them the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the indemnity to the heirs of the victim,
Herminio Mansueto, is raised to P50,000.00. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Romero, Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
b. Past Recollection Recorded: Canque vs Court of Appeals
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 96202. April 13, 1999]
ROSELLA D. CANQUE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks a reversal of the decisioncdxciii[1] of the
Court of Appeals affirming the judgmentcdxciv[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City ordering petitioner -
. . . to pay [private respondent] the principal sum of Two Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand
Seven Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Seventy Five Centavos (P299,717.75) plus
interest thereon at 12% per annum from September 22, 1986, the date of the filing of
the complaint until fully paid; to pay [private respondent] the further sum of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for reasonable attorneys fees; to pay the sum of Five
Hundred Fifty Two Pesos and Eighty Six Centavos (P552.86) for filing fees and to pay
the costs of suit. Since [private respondent] withdrew its prayer for an alias writ of
preliminary attachment vis-a-vis the [petitioners] counterbound, the incident on the alias
writ of preliminary attachment has become moot and academic.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style
RDC Construction. At the time material to this case, she had contracts with the
government for (a) the restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road; (b) the asphalting of
Lutopan access road; and (c) the asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City.cdxcv[3] In
connection with these projects, petitioner entered into two contracts with private
respondent Socor Construction Corporation. The first contract (Exh. A),cdxcvi[4] dated
April 26, 1985, provided:
The Sub-Contractor (SOCOR Corporation) and the Contractor (RDC Construction) for
the consideration hereinafter named, hereby agree as follows:
1. SCOPE OF WORK:
a. The Sub-Contractor agrees to perform and execute the Supply, Lay and
Compact Item 310 and Item 302;
b. That Contractor shall provide the labor and materials needed to complete
the project;
c. That the Contractor agrees to pay the Sub-Contractor the price of One
Thousand Pesos only (P1,000.00) per Metric Ton of Item 310 and Eight
Thousand Only (P8,000.00) per Metric Ton of Item 302.
d. That the Contractor shall pay the Sub-Contractor the volume of the supplied
Item based on the actual weight in Metric Tons delivered, laid and compacted
and accepted by the MPWH;
e. The construction will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.
The second contract (Exh. B),cdxcvii[5] dated July 23, 1985, stated:
The Supplier (SOCOR Construction) and the Contractor (RDC Construction) for the
consideration hereinafter named, hereby agree as follows:
1. SCOPE OF WORK:
a. The Supplier agrees to perform and execute the delivery of Item 310 and Item 302 to
the jobsite for the Asphalting of DAS Access Road and the Front Gate of ACMDC,
Toledo City;
b. That the Contractor should inform or give notice to the Supplier two (2) days before
the delivery of such items;
c. That the Contractor shall pay the Supplier the volume of the supplied items on the
actual weight in metric tons delivered and accepted by the MPWH fifteen (15) days after
the submission of the bill;
d. The delivery will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill (Exh. C), containing a revised
computation,cdxcviii[6] for P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month,
representing the balance of petitioners total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials
delivered and services rendered by private respondent under the two contracts.
However, petitioner refused to pay the amount, claiming that private respondent failed
to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items
delivered and the acceptance thereof by the government.cdxcix[7]
Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent brought suit in the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu to recover from petitioner the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the
rate of 3% a month.
In her answer, petitioner admitted the existence of the contracts with private respondent
as well as receipt of the billing (Exh. C), dated May 28, 1986. However, she disputed
the correctness of the bill
. . . considering that the deliveries of [private respondent] were not signed and
acknowledged by the checkers of [petitioner], the bituminous tack coat it delivered to
[petitioner] consisted of 60% water, and [petitioner] has already paid [private
respondent] about P1,400,000.00 but [private respondent] has not issued any receipt to
[petitioner] for said payments and there is no agreement that [private respondent] will
charge 3% per month interest.d[8]
Petitioner subsequently amended her answer denying she had entered into sub-
contracts with private respondent.di[9]
During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vice-president, Sofia O.
Sanchez, and Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper.
Petitioners evidence consisted of her lone testimony.dii[10]
On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus interest at 12% per annum, and costs. It held:
. . . . [B]y analyzing the plaintiffs Book of Collectible Accounts particularly page 17

thereof (Exh. K) this Court is convinced that the entries (both payments and billings)
recorded thereat are credible. Undeniably, the book contains a detailed account of
SOCORs commercial transactions with RDC which were entered therein in the course
of business. We cannot therefore disregard the entries recorded under Exhibit K
because the fact of their having been made in the course of business carries with it
some degree of trustworthiness. Besides, no proof was ever offered to demonstrate the
irregularity of the said entries thus, there is then no cogent reason for us to doubt their
authenticity.diii[11]
The trial court further ruled that in spite of the fact that the contracts did not have any
stipulation on interest, interest may be awarded in the form of damages under Article
2209 of the Civil Code.div[12]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It upheld the trial courts reliance on private
respondents Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis of Rule 130, 37dv[13] of
the Rules of Court.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends that

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AS
ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS THE ENTRIES IN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS BOOK OF COLLECTIBLE ACCOUNTS CONSIDERING THAT THE
PERSON WHO MADE SAID ENTRIES ACTUALLY TESTIFIED IN THIS CASE BUT
UNFORTUNATELY HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF SAID ENTRIES.
II. THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED AS

IT HAS ONLY INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.
First. Petitioner contends that the presentation of the delivery receipts duly accepted by
the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) is required under the
contracts (Exhs. A and B) and is a condition precedent for her payment of the amount
claimed by private respondent. Petitioner argues that the entries in private respondents
Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) cannot take the place of the delivery receipts and
that such entries are mere hearsay and, thus, inadmissible in evidence.dvi[14]
We agree with the appellate court that the stipulation in the two contracts requiring the
submission of delivery receipts does not preclude proof of delivery of materials by
private respondent in some other way. The question is whether the entries in the Book
of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) constitute competent evidence to show such delivery.
Private respondent cites Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court and argues that the entries
in question constitute entries in the course of business sufficient to prove deliveries
made for the government projects. This provision reads:
Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to testify,
who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.dvii[15]
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the
following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to
testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a

duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or

duty.dviii[16]
As petitioner points out, the business entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet the first
and third requisites. Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by private
respondent to testify on the account of RDC Construction. It was in the course of her
testimony that the entries were presented and marked in evidence. There was,
therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as the
person who made them was available to testify in court.
Necessity is given as a ground for admitting entries, in that they are the best available
evidence. Said a learned judge: What a man has actually done and committed to writing
when under obligation to do the act, it being in the course of the business he has
undertaken, and he being dead, there seems to be no danger in submitting to the
consideration of the court. The person who may be called to court to testify on these
entries being dead, there arises the necessity of their admission without the one who
made them being called to court be sworn and subjected to cross-examination. And this
is permissible in order to prevent a failure of justice.dix[17]
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting
the entry. She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no
knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the
materials stated in the bills were supervised by an engineer for (such) functions.dx[18]
The person, therefore, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated in the entries,
i.e., that such deliveries were made in the amounts and on the dates stated, was the
companys project engineer. The entries made by Aday show only that the billings had
been submitted to her by the engineer and that she faithfully recorded the amounts
stated therein in the books of account. Whether or not the bills given to Aday correctly
reflected the deliveries made in the amounts and on the dates indicated was a fact that
could be established by the project engineer alone who, however, was not presented
during trial. The rule is stated by former Chief Justice Moran, thus:
[W]hen the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the
person who gave him the information is individually known and may testify as to the
facts stated in the entry which is not part of a system of entries where scores of
employees have intervened, such entry is not admissible without the testimony of the
informer.dxi[19]
Second. It is nonetheless argued by private respondent that although the entries cannot
be considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132,
10dxii[20] of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to
refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his
direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other
time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly
stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness
upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing,
though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the
writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received
with caution.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the
purpose for which it was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose. She cites the
following from Chief Justice Morans commentaries:
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. Where the offer is
general, and the evidence is admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another,
the evidence should be rejected. Likewise, where the offer is made for two or more
purposes and the evidence is incompetent for one of them, the evidence should be
excluded. The reason for the rule is that it is the duty of a party to select the competent
from the incompetent in offering testimony, and he cannot impose this duty upon the
trial court. Where the evidence is inadmissible for the purpose stated in the offer, it must
be rejected, though the same may be admissible for another purpose. The rule is stated
thus: If a party x x x opens the particular view with which he offers any part of his
evidence, or states the object to be attained by it, he precludes himself from insisting on
its operation in any other direction, or for any other object; and the reason is, that the
opposite party is prevented from objecting to its competency in any view different from
the one proposed.dxiii[21]
It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another
purpose. Private respondents counsel offered it for the purpose of showing the amount
of petitioners indebtedness. He said:
Exhibit K, your Honor - faithful reproduction of page (17) of the book on Collectible
Accounts of the plaintiff, reflecting the principal indebtedness of defendant in
the amount of Two hundred ninety-nine thousand seven hundred seventeen
pesos and seventy-five centavos (P299,717.75) and reflecting as well the
accumulated interest of three percent (3%) monthly compounded such that as
of December 11, 1987, the amount collectible from the defendant by the
plaintiff is Six hundred sixteen thousand four hundred thirty-five pesos and
seventy-two centavos (P616,435.72);dxiv[22]
This is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh
the memory of Dolores Aday as a witness. In other words, it is the nature of the
evidence that is changed, not the purpose for which it is offered.
Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute

evidence. As explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:dxv[23]
Under the above provision (Rule 132, 10), the memorandum used to refresh the
memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such,
for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of
refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified independently of or
after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such
memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a
witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He
cannot be more credible just because he supports his open-court declaration with
written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in
dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is
more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule
itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very
difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the
witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence . . .
.dxvi[24]
As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they
could only corroborate Dolores Adays testimony that she made the entries as she
received the bills.
Third. Does this, therefore, mean there is no competent evidence of private

respondents claim as petitioner argues?dxvii[25] The answer is in the negative. Aside
from Exh. K, private respondent presented the following documents:
1) Exhibit A - Contract Agreement dated 26 April 1985 which contract covers both
the Toledo wharf project and the Babag Road project in Lapulapu City.
2) Exhibit B - Contract Agreement dated 23 July 1985 which covers the DAS
Asphalting Project.
3) Exhibit C - Revised Computation of Billings submitted on May 28, 1986.
4) Exhibit D - an affidavit executed by [petitioner] to the effect that she has no more
pending or unsettled obligations as far as Toledo Wharf Road is concerned.
5) Exhibit D-1 - Statement of Work Accomplished on the Road Restoration of Cebu-

Toledo wharf project.
6) Exhibit E - another affidavit executed by [petitioner] attesting that she has

completely paid her laborers at the project located at Babag, Lapulapu City
7) Exhibits F, G, G-1, G-2, G-3 - Premiums paid by [private respondent] together

with the receipts for filing fees.
8) Exhibits H, I, J - certifications issued by OIC, MPWH, Regional Office; Lapulapu

City, City Engineer; Toledo City Treasurers Office respectively, proving that RDC
construction has no more collectibles with all the said government offices in connection
with its projects.
10) Exhibit L - Bill No. 057 under the account of RDC Construction in the amount of
P153,382.75 dated August 24, 1985.
11) Exhibit M - Bill No. 069 (RDCs account), in the amount of P1,701,795.00 dated
November 20, 1985.
12) Exhibit N - Bill No. 071 (RDCs account) in the amount of P47,250.00 dated
November 22, 1985.
13) Exhibit O - Bill No. 079 (RDCs account) in the amount of P7,290.00 dated
December 6, 1985.
As the trial court found:
The entries recorded under Exhibit K were supported by Exhibits L, M, N, O which are
all Socor Billings under the account of RDC Construction. These billings were presented
and duly received by the authorized representatives of defendant. The circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar clearly show that for a long period of time after receipt
thereof, RDC never manifested its dissatisfaction or objection to the aforestated billings
submitted by plaintiff. Neither did defendant immediately protest to plaintiffs alleged
incomplete or irregular performance. In view of these facts, we believe Art. 1235 of the
New Civil Code is applicable.
Art. 1235. When the obligee accepts the performance, knowing its incompleteness and
irregularity and without expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is deemed
complied with.
FINALLY, after a conscientious scrutiny of the records, we find Exhibit D-1 (p. 85
record) to be a material proof of plaintiffs complete fulfillment of its obligation.
There is no question that plaintiff supplied RDC Construction with Item 302 (Bitunimous
Prime Coat), Item 303 (Bituminous Tack Coat) and Item 310 (Bitunimous Concrete
Surface Course) in all the three projects of the latter. The Lutopan Access Road project,
the Toledo wharf project and the Babag-Lapulapu Road project.
On the other hand, no proof was ever offered by defendant to show the presence of
other contractors in those projects. We can therefore conclude that it was Socor
Construction Corp. ALONE who supplied RDC with Bituminous Prime Coat, Bituminous
Tack Coat and Bituminous Concrete Surface Course for all the aforenamed three
projects.dxviii[26]
Indeed, while petitioner had previously paid private respondent about P1,400,000.00 for
deliveries made in the past, she did not show that she made such payments only after
the delivery receipts had been presented by private respondent. On the other hand, it
appears that petitioner was able to collect the full amount of project costs from the
government, so that petitioner would be unjustly enriched at the expense of private
respondent if she is not made to pay what is her just obligation under the contracts.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
5. Classes of Documents
a. Public Document
Iwasawa vs Gangan
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013
YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER,

vs.
FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO, AND FELISA
GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the September 4, 2012 Decision2 and October 16, 2012 Order3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, of Manila in Civil Case No. 11-126203. The RTC
denied the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa with
private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan due to insufficient evidence.
The antecedents follow:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to
the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before."
Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the
Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the
wedding, the couple resided in Japan.4
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might
have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private
respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed away.5
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wifes confession and discovered that indeed, she
was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20,
1994.6 This prompted petitioner to file a petition7 for the declaration of his marriage to private
respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article
35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces of
documentary evidence issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO):
(1)
Certificate of Marriage8 between petitioner and private respondent marked as Exhibit "A"
to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on November 28, 2002;
(2)
Certificate of Marriage9 between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo

marked as Exhibit "B" to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994;
(3)
Certificate of Death10 of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibits "C" and "C-
1" to prove the fact of the latters death on July 14, 2009; and
(4)
Certification11 from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded
by the office pertaining to private respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to prove that private
respondent in fact contracted two marriages, the first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo
Arambulo on June 20, 1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admitted the
authenticity and due execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial.12
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was
insufficient evidence to prove private respondents prior existing valid marriage to another man.
It held that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo,
it was only petitioner who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioners
testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private respondents prior
marriage nor of Arambulos death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage
certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the latters death certificate. It further
ruled that petitioners testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a
stranger to the preparation of said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order
dated October 16, 2012.
Hence this petition raising the sole legal issue of whether the testimony of the NSO records
custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public documents issued by said
office was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.
Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are public documents which are
considered self-authenticating and thus it was unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as
witness. He cites Article 410 of the Civil Code which provides that books making up the civil
register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Moreover, the trial prosecutor himself also
admitted the authenticity of said documents.
The OSG, in its Comment,13 submits that the findings of the RTC are not in accord with law and
established jurisprudence. It contends that both Republic Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the
Law on Registry of Civil Status, and the Civil Code elaborated on the character of documents
arising from records and entries made by the civil registrar and categorically declared them as
public documents. Being public documents, said documents are admissible in evidence even
without further proof of their due execution and genuineness and consequently, there was no
need for the court to require petitioner to present the records custodian or officer from the NSO
to testify on them. The OSG further contends that public documents have probative value since
they are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein as provided in the above-quoted
provision of the Civil Code. Thus, the OSG submits that the public documents presented by
petitioner, considered together, completely establish the facts in issue.
In her letter14 dated March 19, 2013 to this Court, private respondent indicated that she is not
against her husbands petition to have their marriage declared null and void. She likewise
admitted therein that she contracted marriage with Arambulo on June 20, 1994 and contracted a
second marriage with petitioner on November 28, 2002. She further admitted that it was due to
poverty and joblessness that she married petitioner without telling the latter that she was
previously married. Private respondent also confirmed that it was when she found out that
Arambulo passed away on July 14, 2009 that she had the guts to confess to petitioner about her
previous marriage. Thereafter, she and petitioner have separated.
We grant the petition.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public
documents.1wphi1 As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the
sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them
to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution
was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to
be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the
private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,16 which
is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines.
And this is what transpired in the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely
establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their
marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent
married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted
a second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there
was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the
time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said
date that private respondents marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and
(4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void,
since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The September 4, 2012
Decision and October 16, 2012 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil
Case No. 11-126203 are hereby SET ASIDE. The marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and
private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is declared NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and the National Statistics Office are hereby ORDERED
to make proper entries into the records of the abovementioned parties in accordance with this
Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
Asian Terminals vs Philam Insurance

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181163 July 24, 2013
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (now Chartis Philippines Insurance, Inc.), Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 181262
PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (now Chartis Philippines Insurance, Inc.), Petitioner,
vs.
WESTWIND SHIPPING CORPORATION and ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 181319
WESTWIND SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (now Chartis Philippines Insurance, Inc.) and ASIAN
TERMINALS, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are three consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated
October 15, 2007 and the Resolution2 dated January 11, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 148, in Civil Case No. 96-062. The RTC had ordered Westwind Shipping
Corporation (Westwind) and Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) to pay, jointly and severally, Philam
Insurance Co., Inc. (Philam) the sum of P633,957.15, with interest at 12% per annum from the
date of judicial demand and P158,989.28 as attorneys fees.
The facts of the case follow:
On April 15, 1995, Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors Corporation (Universal
Motors) 219 packages containing 120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup Truck Double Cab 4x2
model, without engine, tires and batteries, on board the vessel S/S "Calayan Iris" from Japan to
Manila. The shipment, which had a declared value of US$81,368 or P29,400,000, was insured
with Philam against all risks under Marine Policy No. 708-8006717-4.4
The carrying vessel arrived at the port of Manila on April 20, 1995, and when the shipment was
unloaded by the staff of ATI, it was found that the package marked as 03-245-42K/1 was in bad
order.5 The Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes6 dated April 21, 1995 identified two
packages, labeled 03-245-42K/1 and 03/237/7CK/2, as being dented and broken. Thereafter, the
cargoes were stored for temporary safekeeping inside CFS Warehouse in Pier No. 5.
On May 11, 1995, the shipment was withdrawn by R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc., the
authorized broker of Universal Motors, and delivered to the latters warehouse in Mandaluyong
City. Upon the request7 of Universal Motors, a bad order survey was conducted on the cargoes
and it was found that one Frame Axle Sub without LWR was deeply dented on the buffle plate
while six Frame Assembly with Bush were deformed and misaligned.8 Owing to the extent of the
damage to said cargoes, Universal Motors declared them a total loss.
On August 4, 1995, Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages in the amount of
P643,963.84 against Westwind,9 ATI10 and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc.11 When
Universal Motors demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was compensated
in the sum of P633,957.15 by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors issued a Subrogation
Receipt12 dated November 15, 1995 in favor of Philam.
On January 18, 1996, Philam, as subrogee of Universal Motors, filed a Complaint13 for damages
against Westwind, ATI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. before the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 148.
On September 24, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind
and ATI to pay Philam, jointly and severally, the sum of P633,957.15 with interest at the rate of
12% per annum, P158,989.28 by way of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
The court a quo ruled that there was sufficient evidence to establish the respective participation
of Westwind and ATI in the discharge of and consequent damage to the shipment. It found that
the subject cargoes were compressed while being hoisted using a cable that was too short and
taut.
The trial court observed that while the staff of ATI undertook the physical unloading of the
cargoes from the carrying vessel, Westwinds duty officer exercised full supervision and control
throughout the process. It held Westwind vicariously liable for failing to prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence in the supervision of the ATI stevedores who unloaded the cargoes from
the vessel. However, the court absolved R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. from liability in
light of its finding that the cargoes had been damaged before delivery to the consignee.
The trial court acknowledged the subrogation between Philam and Universal Motors on the
strength of the Subrogation Receipt dated November 15, 1995. It likewise upheld Philams claim
for the value of the alleged damaged vehicle parts contained in Case Nos. 03-245-42K/1 and 03-
245-51K or specifically for "7 pieces of Frame Axle Sub Without Lower and Frame Assembly
with Bush."14
Westwind filed a Motion for Reconsideration15 which was, however, denied in an Order16 dated
October 26, 2000.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. In a Decision dated
October 15, 2007, the appellate court directed Westwind and ATI to pay Philam, jointly and
severally, the amount of P190,684.48 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum until fully paid,
attorneys fees of P47,671 and litigation expenses.
The CA stressed that Philam may not modify its allegations by claiming in its Appellees Brief17
that the six pieces of Frame Assembly with Bush, which were purportedly damaged, were also
inside Case No. 03-245-42K/1. The CA noted that in its Complaint, Philam alleged that "one (1)
pc. FRAME AXLE SUB W/O LWR from Case No. 03-245-42K/1 was completely deformed and
misaligned, and six (6) other pcs. of FRAME ASSEMBLY WITH BUSH from Case No. 03-245-
51K were likewise completely deformed and misaligned."18
The appellate court accordingly affirmed Westwind and ATIs joint and solidary liability for the
damage to only one (1) unit of Frame Axle Sub without Lower inside Case No. 03-245-42K/1. It
also noted that when said cargo sustained damage, it was not yet in the custody of the consignee
or the person who had the right to receive it. The CA pointed out that Westwinds duty to
observe extraordinary diligence in the care of the cargoes subsisted during unloading thereof by
ATIs personnel since the former exercised full control and supervision over the discharging
operation.
Similarly, the appellate court held ATI liable for the negligence of its employees who carried out
the offloading of cargoes from the ship to the pier. As regards the extent of ATIs liability, the
CA ruled that ATI cannot limit its liability to P5,000 per damaged package. It explained that
Section 7.0119 of the Contract for Cargo Handling Services20 does not apply in this case since
ATI was not yet in custody and control of the cargoes when the Frame Axle Sub without Lower
suffered damage.
Citing Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping N.V. v. Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc.,21
the appellate court also held that Philams action for damages had not prescribed notwithstanding
the absence of a notice of claim.
All the parties moved for reconsideration, but their motions were denied in a Resolution dated
January 11, 2008. Thus, they each filed a petition for review on certiorari which were
consolidated together by this Court considering that all three petitions assail the same CA
decision and resolution and involve the same parties.
Essentially, the issues posed by petitioner ATI in G.R. No. 181163, petitioner Philam in G.R.
No. 181262 and petitioner Westwind in G.R. No. 181319 can be summed up into and resolved
by addressing three questions: (1) Has Philams action for damages prescribed? (2) Who
between Westwind and ATI should be held liable for the damaged cargoes? and (3) What is the
extent of their liability?
Petitioners Arguments
G.R. No. 181163
Petitioner ATI disowns liability for the damage to the Frame Axle Sub without Lower inside
Case No. 03-245-42K/1. It shifts the blame to Westwind, whom it charges with negligence in the
supervision of the stevedores who unloaded the cargoes. ATI admits that the damage could have
been averted had Westwind observed extraordinary diligence in handling the goods. Even so,
ATI suspects that Case No. 03-245-42K/1 is "weak and defective"22 considering that it alone
sustained damage out of the 219 packages.
Notwithstanding, petitioner ATI submits that, at most, it can be held liable to pay only P5,000
per package pursuant to its Contract for Cargo Handling Services. ATI maintains that it was not
properly notified of the actual value of the cargoes prior to their discharge from the vessel.
G.R. No. 181262
Petitioner Philam supports the CA in holding both Westwind and ATI liable for the deformed
and misaligned Frame Axle Sub without Lower inside Case No. 03-245-42K/1. It, however,
faults the appellate court for disallowing its claim for the value of six Chassis Frame Assembly
which were likewise supposedly inside Case Nos. 03-245-51K and 03-245-42K/1. As to the
latter container, Philam anchors its claim on the results of the Inspection/Survey Report23 of
Chartered Adjusters, Inc., which the court received without objection from Westwind and ATI.
Petitioner believes that with the offer and consequent admission of evidence to the effect that
Case No. 03-245-42K/1 contains six pieces of dented Chassis Frame Assembly, Philams claim
thereon should be treated, in all respects, as if it has been raised in the pleadings. Thus, Philam
insists on the reinstatement of the trial courts award in its favor for the payment of P633,957.15
plus legal interest, P158,989.28 as attorneys fees and costs.
G.R. No. 181319
Petitioner Westwind denies joint liability with ATI for the value of the deformed Frame Axle
Sub without Lower in Case No. 03-245-42K/1. Westwind argues that the evidence shows that
ATI was already in actual custody of said case when the Frame Axle Sub without Lower inside it
was misaligned from being compressed by the tight cable used to unload it. Accordingly,
Westwind ceased to have responsibility over the cargoes as provided in paragraph 4 of the Bill of
Lading which provides that the responsibility of the carrier shall cease when the goods are taken
into the custody of the arrastre.
Westwind contends that sole liability for the damage rests on ATI since it was the latters
stevedores who operated the ships gear to unload the cargoes. Westwind reasons that ATI is an
independent company, over whose employees and operations it does not exercise control.
Moreover, it was ATIs employees who selected and used the wrong cable to lift the box
containing the cargo which was damaged.
Westwind likewise believes that ATI is bound by its acceptance of the goods in good order
despite a finding that Case No. 03-245-42K/1 was partly torn and crumpled on one side.
Westwind also notes that the discovery that a piece of Frame Axle Sub without Lower was
completely deformed and misaligned came only on May 12, 1995 or 22 days after the cargoes
were turned over to ATI and after the same had been hauled by R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage,
Inc.
Westwind further argues that the CA erred in holding it liable considering that Philams cause of
action has prescribed since the latter filed a formal claim with it only on August 17, 1995 or four
months after the cargoes arrived on April 20, 1995. Westwind stresses that according to the
provisions of clause 20, paragraph 224 of the Bill of Lading as well as Article 36625 of the Code
of Commerce, the consignee had until April 20, 1995 within which to make a claim considering
the readily apparent nature of the damage, or until April 27, 1995 at the latest, if it is assumed
that the damage is not readily apparent.
Lastly, petitioner Westwind contests the imposition of 12% interest on the award of damages to
Philam reckoned from the time of extrajudicial demand. Westwind asserts that, at most, it can
only be charged with 6% interest since the damages claimed by Philam does not constitute a loan
or forbearance of money.
The Courts Ruling
The three consolidated petitions before us call for a determination of who between ATI and
Westwind is liable for the damage suffered by the subject cargo and to what extent. However, the
resolution of the issues raised by the present petitions is predicated on the appreciation of factual
issues which is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only
questions of law may be put in issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained.26
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.27
In the present petitions, the resolution of the question as to who between Westwind and ATI
should be liable for the damages to the cargo and to what extent would have this Court pass upon
the evidence on record. But while it is not our duty to review, examine and evaluate or weigh all
over again the probative value of the evidence presented,28 the Court may nonetheless resolve
questions of fact when the case falls under any of the following exceptions:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.29
In the cases at bar, the fifth and seventh exceptions apply. While the CA affirmed the joint
liability of ATI and Westwind, it held them liable only for the value of one unit of Frame Axle
Sub without Lower inside Case No. 03-245-42K/1. The appellate court disallowed the award of
damages for the six pieces of Frame Assembly with Bush, which petitioner Philam alleged, for
the first time in its Appellees Brief, to be likewise inside Case No. 03-245-42K/1. Lastly, the
CA reduced the award of attorneys fees to P47,671.
Foremost, the Court holds that petitioner Philam has adequately established the basis of its claim
against petitioners ATI and Westwind. Philam, as insurer, was subrogated to the rights of the
consignee, Universal Motors Corporation, pursuant to the Subrogation Receipt executed by the
latter in favor of the former. The right of subrogation accrues simply upon payment by the
insurance company of the insurance claim.30 Petitioner Philams action finds support in Article
2207 of the Civil Code, which provides as follows:
Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the
insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract
complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the
wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. x x x.
In their respective comments31 to Philams Formal Offer of Evidence,32 petitioners ATI and
Westwind objected to the admission of Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the
Subrogation Receipt as documentary exhibits "B" and "P," respectively. Petitioner Westwind
objects to the admission of both documents for being hearsay as they were not authenticated by
the persons who executed them. For the same reason, petitioner ATI assails the admissibility of
the Subrogation Receipt. As regards Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4, ATI makes issue of
the fact that the same was issued only on April 27, 1995 or 12 days after the shipment was
loaded on and transported via S/S "Calayan Iris."
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19,33 Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court.34
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private
person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a
public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires
authentication35 in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances,

specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21,36 Rule
132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not
been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered
as genuine.37
Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private
documents which Philam and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business.
Since none of the exceptions to the requirement of authentication of a private document obtains
in these cases, said documents may not be admitted in evidence for Philam without being
properly authenticated.
Contrary to the contention of petitioners ATI and Westwind, however, Philam presented its
claims officer, Ricardo Ongchangco, Jr. to testify on the execution of the Subrogation Receipt, as
follows:
ATTY. PALACIOS
Q How were you able to get hold of this subrogation receipt?
A Because I personally delivered the claim check to consignee and have them receive the said
check.
Q I see. Therefore, what you are saying is that you personally delivered the claim check of
Universal Motors Corporation to that company and you have the subrogation receipt signed by
them personally?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it was signed in your presence?
A Yes, sir.38
Indeed, all that the Rules require to establish the authenticity of a document is the testimony of a
person who saw the document executed or written. Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting
the Subrogation Receipt in evidence despite petitioners ATI and Westwinds objections that it
was not authenticated by the person who signed it.
However, the same cannot be said about Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 which
Ongchangcho, Jr. merely identified in court. There is nothing in Ongchangco, Jr.s testimony
which indicates that he saw Philams authorized representative sign said document, thus:
ATTY. PALACIOS
Q Now, I am presenting to you a copy of this marine certificate 708-8006717-4 issued by Philam
Insurance Company, Inc. to Universal Motors Corporation on April 15, 1995. Will you tell us
what relation does it have to that policy risk claim mentioned in that letter?
A This is a photocopy of the said policy issued by the consignee Universal Motors Corporation.
ATTY. PALACIOS
I see. May I request, if Your Honor please, that this marine risk policy of the plaintiff as
submitted by claimant Universal Motors Corporation be marked as Exhibit B.
COURT
Mark it.39
As regards the issuance of Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 after the fact of loss occurred,
suffice it to say that said document simply certifies the existence of an open insurance policy in
favor of the consignee. Hence, the reference to an "Open Policy Number 9595093" in said
certificate. The Court finds it completely absurd to suppose that any insurance company, of
sound business practice, would assume a loss that has already been realized, when the
profitability of its business rests precisely on the non-happening of the risk insured against.
Yet, even with the exclusion of Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4, the Subrogation Receipt,
on its own, is adequate proof that petitioner Philam paid the consignees claim on the damaged
goods. Petitioners ATI and Westwind failed to offer any evidence to controvert the same. In
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Alberto,40 the Court explained the effect of payment by the
insurer of the insurance claim in this wise:
We have held that payment by the insurer to the insured operates as an equitable assignment to
the insurer of all the remedies that the insured may have against the third party whose negligence
or wrongful act caused the loss. The right of subrogation is not dependent upon, nor does it grow
out of, any privity of contract. It accrues simply upon payment by the insurance company of the
insurance claim. The doctrine of subrogation has its roots in equity. It is designed to promote and
accomplish justice; and is the mode that equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt
by one who, in justice, equity, and good conscience, ought to pay.41
Neither do we find support in petitioner Westwinds contention that Philams right of action has
prescribed.
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) or Public Act No. 521 of the 74th US Congress,
was accepted to be made applicable to all contracts for the carriage of goods by sea to and from
Philippine ports in foreign trade by virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 65.42 Section 1 of
C.A. No. 65 states:
Section 1. That the provisions of Public Act Numbered Five hundred and twenty-one of the
Seventy-fourth Congress of the United States, approved on April sixteenth, nineteen hundred and
thirty-six, be accepted, as it is hereby accepted to be made applicable to all contracts for the
carriage of goods by sea to and from Philippine ports in foreign trade: Provided, That nothing in
the Act shall be construed as repealing any existing provision of the Code of Commerce which is
now in force, or as limiting its application.
The prescriptive period for filing an action for the loss or damage of the goods under the
COGSA is found in paragraph (6), Section 3, thus:
(6) Unless notice of loss or damage and the general nature of such loss or damage be given in
writing to the carrier or his agent at the port of discharge before or at the time of the removal of
the goods into the custody of the person entitled to delivery thereof under the contract of
carriage, such removal shall be prima facie evidence of the delivery by the carrier of the goods as
described in the bill of lading. If the loss or damage is not apparent, the notice must be given
within three days of the delivery.
Said notice of loss or damage maybe endorsed upon the receipt for the goods given by the person
taking delivery thereof.
The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods has at the time of their receipt
been the subject of joint survey or inspection.
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or
damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the
goods should have been delivered: Provided, That if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent
or concealed, is not given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the
right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when
the goods should have been delivered.
In the Bill of Lading43 dated April 15, 1995, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) is
indicated as the consignee while Universal Motors is listed as the notify party. These
designations are in line with the subject shipment being covered by Letter of Credit No. I501054,
which RCBC issued upon the request of Universal Motors.
A letter of credit is a financial device developed by merchants as a convenient and relatively safe
mode of dealing with sales of goods to satisfy the seemingly irreconcilable interests of a seller,
who refuses to part with his goods before he is paid, and a buyer, who wants to have control of
his goods before paying.44 However, letters of credit are employed by the parties desiring to
enter into commercial transactions, not for the benefit of the issuing bank but mainly for the
benefit of the parties to the original transaction,45 in these cases, Nichimen Corporation as the
seller and Universal Motors as the buyer. Hence, the latter, as the buyer of the Nissan CKD parts,
should be regarded as the person entitled to delivery of the goods. Accordingly, for purposes of
reckoning when notice of loss or damage should be given to the carrier or its agent, the date of
delivery to Universal Motors is controlling.
S/S "Calayan Iris" arrived at the port of Manila on April 20, 1995, and the subject cargoes were
discharged to the custody of ATI the next day. The goods were then withdrawn from the CFS
Warehouse on May 11, 1995 and the last of the packages delivered to Universal Motors on May
17, 1995. Prior to this, the latter filed a Request for Bad Order Survey46 on May 12,1995
following a joint inspection where it was discovered that six pieces of Chassis Frame Assembly
from two bundles were deformed and one Front Axle Sub without Lower from a steel case was
dented. Yet, it was not until August 4, 1995 that Universal Motors filed a formal claim for
damages against petitioner Westwind.
Even so, we have held in Insurance Company of North America v. Asian Terminals, Inc. that a
request for, and the result of a bad order examination, done within the reglementary period for
furnishing notice of loss or damage to the carrier or its agent, serves the purpose of a claim. A
claim is required to be filed within the reglementary period to afford the carrier or depositary
reasonable opportunity and facilities to check the validity of the claims while facts are still fresh
in the minds of the persons who took part in the transaction and documents are still available.47
Here, Universal Motors filed a request for bad order survey on May 12, 1995, even before all the
packages could be unloaded to its warehouse.
Moreover, paragraph (6), Section 3 of the COGSA clearly states that failure to comply with the
notice requirement shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one
year after delivery of the goods. Petitioner Philam, as subrogee of Universal Motors, filed the
Complaint for damages on January 18, 1996, just eight months after all the packages were
delivered to its possession on May 17, 1995. Evidently, petitioner Philams action against
petitioners Westwind and ATI was seasonably filed.
This brings us to the question that must be resolved in these consolidated petitions. Who between
Westwind and ATI should be liable for the damage to the cargo?
It is undisputed that Steel Case No. 03-245-42K/1 was partly torn and crumpled on one side
while it was being unloaded from the carrying vessel. The damage to said container was noted in
the Bad Order Cargo Receipt48 dated April 20, 1995 and Turn Over Survey of Bad Order
Cargoes dated April 21, 1995. The Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes indicates that said
steel case was not opened at the time of survey and was accepted by the arrastre in good order.
Meanwhile, the Bad Order Cargo Receipt bore a notation "B.O. not yet t/over to ATI." On the
basis of these documents, petitioner ATI claims that the contents of Steel Case No. 03-245-
42K/1 were damaged while in the custody of petitioner Westwind.
We agree.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Subject to
certain exceptions enumerated under Article 173449 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The extraordinary
responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in
the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered,
actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to
receive them.50
The court a quo, however, found both petitioners Westwind and ATI, jointly and severally, liable
for the damage to the cargo. It observed that while the staff of ATI undertook the physical
unloading of the cargoes from the carrying vessel, Westwinds duty officer exercised full
supervision and control over the entire process. The appellate court affirmed the solidary liability
of Westwind and ATI, but only for the damage to one Frame Axle Sub without Lower.
Upon a careful review of the records, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the finding that
petitioners Westwind and ATI are concurrently accountable for the damage to the content of
Steel Case No. 03-245-42K/1.
Section 251 of the COGSA provides that under every contract of carriage of goods by the sea, the
carrier in relation to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care and discharge of such
goods, shall be subject to the responsibilities and liabilities and entitled to the rights and
immunities set forth in the Act. Section 3 (2)52 thereof then states that among the carriers
responsibilities are to properly load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the goods
carried.53
At the trial, Westwinds Operation Assistant, Menandro G. Ramirez, testified on the presence of
a ship officer to supervise the unloading of the subject cargoes.
ATTY. LLAMAS
Q Having been present during the entire discharging operation, do you remember who else were
present at that time?
A Our surveyor and our checker the foreman of ATI.
Q Were there officials of the ship present also?
A Yes, sir there was an officer of the vessel on duty at that time.54
xxxx
Q Who selected the cable slink to be used?
A ATI Operation.
Q Are you aware of how they made that selection?

A Before the vessel arrived we issued a manifesto of the storage plan informing the ATI of what
type of cargo and equipment will be utilitized in discharging the cargo.55
xxxx
Q You testified that it was the ATI foremen who select the cable slink to be used in discharging,
is that correct?
A Yes sir, because they are the one who select the slink and they know the kind of cargoes
because they inspected it before the discharge of said cargo.
Q Are you aware that the ship captain is consulted in the selection of the cable sling?
A Because the ship captain knows for a fact the equipment being utilized in the discharge of the
cargoes because before the ship leave the port of Japan the crew already utilized the proper
equipment fitted to the cargo.56 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded generally remain
under the custody of the carrier.57 The Damage Survey Report58 of the survey conducted by Phil.
Navtech Services, Inc. from April 20-21, 1995 reveals that Case No. 03-245-42K/1 was damaged
by ATI stevedores due to overtightening of a cable sling hold during discharge from the vessels
hatch to the pier. Since the damage to the cargo was incurred during the discharge of the
shipment and while under the supervision of the carrier, the latter is liable for the damage caused
to the cargo.
This is not to say, however, that petitioner ATI is without liability for the damaged cargo.
The functions of an arrastre operator involve the handling of cargo deposited on the wharf or
between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ships tackle. Being the custodian
of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operators duty is to take good care of the
goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their possession.59
Handling cargo is mainly the arrastre operators principal work so its drivers/operators or
employees should observe the standards and measures necessary to prevent losses and damage to
shipments under its custody.60
While it is true that an arrastre operator and a carrier may not be held solidarily liable at all
times,61 the facts of these cases show that apart from ATIs stevedores being directly in charge of
the physical unloading of the cargo, its foreman picked the cable sling that was used to hoist the
packages for transfer to the dock. Moreover, the fact that 218 of the 219 packages were unloaded
with the same sling unharmed is telling of the inadequate care with which ATIs stevedore
handled and discharged Case No. 03-245-42K/1.
With respect to petitioners ATI and Westwinds liability, we agree with the CA that the same
should be confined to the value of the one piece Frame Axle Sub without Lower.
In the Bad Order Inspection Report62 prepared by Universal Motors, the latter referred to Case
No. 03-245-42K/1 as the source of said Frame Axle Sub without Lower which suffered a deep
dent on its buffle plate. Yet, it identified Case No. 03-245-51K as the container which bore the
six pieces Frame Assembly with Bush. Thus, in Philams Complaint, it alleged that "the entire
shipment showed one (1) pc. FRAME AXLE SUB W/O LWR from Case No. 03-245-42K/1 was
completely deformed and misaligned, and six (6) other pcs. of FRAME ASSEMBLY WITH
BUSH from Case No. 03-245-51K were likewise completely deformed and misaligned."63
Philam later claimed in its Appellees Brief that the six pieces of Frame Assembly with Bush
were also inside the damaged Case No. 03-245-42K/1.
However, there is nothing in the records to show conclusively that the six Frame Assembly with
Bush were likewise contained in and damaged inside Case No. 03-245-42K/1. In the Inspection
Survey Report of Chartered Adjusters, Inc., it mentioned six pieces of chassis frame assembly
with deformed body mounting bracket. However, it merely noted the same as coming from two
bundles with no identifying marks.
Lastly, we agree with petitioner Westwind that the CA erred in imposing an interest rate of 12%
on the award of damages. Under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, when an obligation not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.64 In the
similar case of Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping NV v. Philippine First Insurance Co.,
lnc.,65 the Court reduced the rate of interest on the damages awarded to the carrier therein to 6%
from the time of the filing of the complaint until the finality of the decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated October
15,2007 and the Resolution dated January 11, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
69284 in that the interest rate on the award of P190,684.48 is reduced to 6% per annum from the
date of extrajudicial demand, until fully paid.
With costs against the petitioners in G.R. No. 181163 and G.R. No. 181319, respectively.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
6. Offer of Evidence: Aludos vs Suerte
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165285 June 18, 2012

LOMISES ALUDOS, deceased, substituted by FLORA ALUDOS, Petitioner,
vs.
JOHNNY M. SUERTE,* Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
by Lomises Aludos, through his wife Flora Aludos (Lomises).1 Lomises seeks the reversal of the
decision2 dated August 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63113, as
well as the resolution3 dated August 17, 2004.
THE FACTS
Sometime in January 1969, Lomises acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to
occupy two stalls in the Hangar Market in Baguio City, as evidenced by a permit issued by the
City Treasurer.4
On September 8, 1984, Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. Suerte for
the transfer of all improvements and rights over the two market stalls (Stall Nos. 9 and 10) for
the amount of P260,000.00. Johnny gave a down payment of P45,000.00 to Lomises, who
acknowledged receipt of the amount in a document5 executed on the same date as the agreement:
RECEIPT
P45,000.00 September 8, 1984
Received the Sum of Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) from JOHNNY M. SUERTE,
with postal address at Kamog, Sablan, Benguet Province, Philippine Currency as an advance or
partial downpayment of Improvements and Rights over Stall Nos. 9 and 10, situated at
Refreshment Section, Hangar Market Compound, Baguio City, and the said amount will be
deducted from the agreed proceeds of the transaction in the amount of Two Hundred Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P260,000.00), Philippine Currency and payable starting from September 1984
up to December 1985, and/or (16) months.
This receipt will be formalise (sic) later, and the Deed of Absolute Transfer of Improvements and
Rights over the said Stall be executed immediately upon full payment of the balance stated in the
above.
Right hand thumbmark:
[Thumbmark affixed]
LOMISES F. ALUDOS
(Registered Stall Holder)
With the Consent of the Wife:
[Signature affixed]
FLORA MENES
(Wife)
Witness to Thumbmark and/or

Paid in the presence of:
[Signature affixed] [Signature affixed]

Domes M. Suerte (witness) Agnes M. Boras (witness)

Ana Comnad (witness) Dolores Aludos (with
her consent/witness)
Johnny made a subsequent payment of P23,000.00; hence, a total of P68,000.00 of the

P260,000.00 purchase price had been made as of 1984. Before full payment could be made,
however, Lomises backed out of the agreement and returned the P68,000.00 to Domes and Jaime
Suerte, the mother and the father of Johnny, respectively. The return of the P68,000.00 down
payment was embodied in a handwritten receipt6 dated October 9, 1985:
RECEIPT
P68,000.00
Received from Mr. Lomises Aludos the sum of Sixty-eight thousand (P68,000.00) Pesos as
reimbursement of my money.
Baguio City, October 9, 1985.

JAIME SUERTE DOMES SUERTE
Witnesses
[Illegible signature] [Illegible signature]
Through a letter dated October 15, 1985, Johnny protested the return of his money, and insisted
on the continuation and enforcement of his agreement with Lomises. When Lomises refused
Johnnys protest, Johnny filed a complaint against Lomises before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 7, Baguio City, for specific performance with damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 720-R. Johnny prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered ordering Lomises to
(1) accept the payment of the balance of P192,000.00; and (2) execute a final deed of sale and/or
transfer the improvements and rights over the two market stalls in his favor.
In a decision dated November 24, 1998,7 the RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and
Lomises for failure to secure the consent of the Baguio City Government to the agreement. The
RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the market stalls, and the Baguio City Government
was the owner-lessor of the stalls. Under Article 1649 of the Civil Code, "[t]he lessee cannot
assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary." As
the permit issued to Lomises did not contain any provision that the lease of the market stalls
could further be assigned, and in the absence of the consent of the Baguio City Government to
the agreement, the RTC declared the agreement between Lomises and Johnny null and void. The
nullification of the agreement required the parties to return what had been received under the
agreement; thus, the RTC ordered Lomises to return the down payment made by Johnny, with
interest of 12% per annum, computed from the time the complaint was filed until the amount is
fully paid. It dismissed the parties claims for damages.
Lomises appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing that the real agreement between the
parties was merely one of loan, and not of sale; he further claimed that the loan had been
extinguished upon the return of the P68,000.00 to Johnnys mother, Domes.
In a decision dated August 29, 2002,8 the CA rejected Lomises claim that the true agreement
was one of loan. The CA found that there were two agreements entered into between Johnny and
Lomises: one was for the assignment of leasehold rights and the other was for the sale of the
improvements on the market stalls. The CA agreed with the RTC that the assignment of the
leasehold rights was void for lack of consent of the lessor, the Baguio City Government. The sale
of the improvements, however, was valid because these were Lomises private properties. For
this reason, the CA remanded the case to the RTC to determine the value of the improvements on
the two market stalls, existing at the time of the execution of the agreement.
Lomises moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling, contending that no valid sale of the
improvements could be made because the lease contract, dated May 1, 1985, between Lomises
and the Baguio City Government, supposedly marked as Exh. "A," provided that "[a]ll
improvements [introduced shall] ipso facto become properties of the City of Baguio."9
In a resolution dated August 17, 2004,10 the CA denied the motion after finding that Lomises
lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo Lockey, misrepresented Exh. "A" as the governing lease contract between
Lomises and the Baguio City Government; the records reveal that Exh. "A" was merely a permit
issued by the City Treasurer in favor of Lomises. The contract of lease dated May 1, 1985 was
never formally offered in evidence before the RTC and could thus not be considered pursuant to
the rules of evidence.
Lomises now appeals the CA rulings through the present petition for review on certiorari.
THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS
Lomises insists that the agreement was merely one of loan, not of sale of improvements and
leasehold rights. Johnny could not afford to purchase from Lomises the two market stalls for
P260,000.00 because the former was a mere college student when the agreement was entered
into in 1984 and was dependent on his parents for support. The actual lender of the amount was
Johnnys mother, Domes; Johnnys name was placed on the receipt dated September 8, 1984 so
that in case the loan was not paid, the rights over the market stalls would be transferred to
Johnnys name, not to Domes who already had a market stall and was thus disqualified from
acquiring another. The receipt dated September 8, 1984, Lomises pointed out, bears the signature
of Domes, not of Johnny.
Even assuming that Johnny was the real creditor, Lomises alleges that the loan had been fully
paid when he turned over the amount of P68,000.00 to Johnnys parents, as evidenced by the
receipt dated October 9, 1985. Domes claim that she was pressured to accept the amount is
an implied admission that payment had nonetheless been received. When Johnny died during the
pendency of the case before the RTC, his parents became his successors and inherited all his
rights. For having received the full amount of the loan, Johnnys parents can no longer enforce
payment of the loan.
Lomises contends that there were no improvements made on the market stalls other than the
stalls themselves, and these belong to the Baguio City Government as the lessor. A transfer of
the stalls cannot be made without a transfer of the leasehold rights, in which case, there would be
an indirect violation of the lease contract with the Baguio City Government. Lomises further
alleges that, at present, the market stalls are leased by Flora and her daughter who both obtained
the lease in their own right and not as Lomises successors.
Johnny, through his remaining successor Domes (Johnnys mother), opposed Lomises claim.
The receipt dated September 8, 1984 clearly referred to a contract of sale of the market stalls and
not a contract of loan that Lomises alleges. Although Johnny conceded that the sale of leasehold
rights to the market stalls were void for lack of consent of the Baguio City Government, he
alleged that the sale of the improvements should be upheld as valid, as the CA did.
THE COURTS RULING
The Court does not find the petition meritorious.
The Nature of the Agreement between the Parties
Lomises questions the nature of the agreement between him and Johnny, insisting that it was a
contract of loan, not an assignment of leasehold rights and sale of improvements. In other words,
what existed was an equitable mortgage, as contemplated in Article 1602, in relation with Article
1604, of the Civil Code. "An equitable mortgage has been defined as one which although
lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt,
there being no impossibility nor anything contrary to law in this intent."11 Article 1602 of the
Civil Code lists down the circumstances that may indicate that a contract is an equitable
mortgage:
Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following
cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is
that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee as
rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.
[Emphases ours.]
Based on Lomises allegations in his pleadings, we consider three circumstances to determine

whether his claim is well-supported. First, Johnny was a mere college student dependent on his
parents for support when the agreement was executed, and it was Johnnys mother, Domes, who
was the party actually interested in acquiring the market stalls. Second, Lomises received only
P48,000.00 of the P68,000.00 that Johnny claimed he gave as down payment; Lomises said that
the P20,000.00 represented interests on the loan. Third, Lomises retained possession of the
market stalls even after the execution of the agreement.
Whether separately or taken together, these circumstances do not support a conclusion that the
parties only intended to enter into a contract of loan.
That Johnny was a mere student when the agreement was executed does not indicate that he had
no financial capacity to pay the purchase price of P260,000.00. At that time, Johnny was a 26-
year old third year engineering student who operated as a businessman as a sideline activity and
who helped his family sell goods in the Hangar Market.12 During trial, Johnny was asked where
he was to get the funds to pay the P260,000.00 purchase price, and he said he would get a loan
from his grandfather.13 That he did not have the full amount at the time the agreement was
executed does not necessarily negate his capacity to pay the purchase price, since he had 16
months to complete the payment. Apart from Lomises bare claim that it was Johnnys mother,
Domes, who was interested in acquiring his market stalls, we find no other evidence supporting
the claim that Johnny was merely acting as a dummy for his mother.
Lomises contends that of the P68,000.00 given by Johnny, he only received P48,000.00, with the
remaining P20,000.00 retained by Johnny as interest on the loan. However, the testimonies of the
witnesses presented during trial, including Lomises himself, negate this claim. Judge Rodolfo
Rodrigo (RTC of Baguio City, Branch VII) asked Lomises lawyer, Atty. Lockey, if they deny
receipt of the P68,000.00; Atty. Lockey said that they were not denying receipt, and added that
they had in fact returned the same amount.14 Judge Rodrigo accurately summarized their point by
stating that "there is no need to dispute whether the P68,000.00 was given, because if [Lomises]
tried to return that x x x he had received that."15 Witness Atty. Albert Umaming said he counted
the money before he drafted the October 9, 1985 receipt evidencing the return; he said that
Lomises returned P68,000.00 in total.16 Thus, if the transaction was indeed a loan and the
P20,000.00 interest was already prepaid by Lomises, the return of the full amount of P68,000.00
by Lomises to Johnny (through his mother, Domes) would not make sense.
That Lomises retained possession of the market stalls even after the execution of his agreement
with Johnny is also not an indication that the true transaction between them was one of loan.
Johnny had yet to complete his payment and, until Lomises decided to forego with their
agreement, had four more months to pay; until then, Lomises retained ownership and possession
of the market stalls.17
Lomises cannot feign ignorance of the import of the terms of the receipt of September 8, 1984 by
claiming that he was an illiterate old man. A witness (Ana Comnad) testified not only of the fact
of the sale, but also that Lomises daughter, Dolores, translated the terms of the agreement from
English to Ilocano for Lomises benefit;18 Lomises himself admitted this fact.19 If Lomises
believed that the receipt of September 8, 1984 did not express the parties true intent, he could
have refused to sign it or subsequently requested for a reformation of its terms. Lomises rejected
the agreement only after Johnny sought to enforce it.
Hence, the CA was correct in characterizing the agreement between Johnny and Lomises as a
sale of improvements and assignment of leasehold rights.
The Validity of the Agreement
Both the RTC and the CA correctly declared that the assignment of the leasehold rights over the
two market stalls was void since it was made without the consent of the lessor, the Baguio City
Government, as required under Article 1649 of the Civil Code.20 Neither party appears to have
contested this ruling.
Lomises, however, objects to the CA ruling upholding the validity of the agreement insofar as it
involved the sale of improvements on the stalls. Lomises alleges that the sale of the
improvements should similarly be voided because it was made without the consent of the Baguio
City Government, the owner of the improvements, pursuant to the May 1, 1985 lease contract.21
Lomises further claims that the stalls themselves are the only improvements on the property and
a transfer of the stalls cannot be made without transferring the leasehold rights. Hence, both the
assignment of leasehold rights and the sale of improvements should be voided.
The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the May 1, 1985 lease contract between the
Baguio City Government and Lomises, as it was not formally offered in evidence before the
RTC; in fact, the CA admonished Lomises lawyer, Atty. Lockey, for making it appear that it
was part of the records of the case. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. "The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a
scrap of paper barren of probative weight."22 Although the contract was referred to in Lomises
answer to Johnnys complaint23 and marked as Exhibit "2" in his pre-trial brief,24 a copy of it was
never attached. In fact, a copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract "surfaced" only after Lomises
filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. What was formally offered was the 1969
permit, which only stated that Lomises was permitted to occupy a stall in the Baguio City market
and nothing else.25 In other words, no evidence was presented and formally offered showing that
any and all improvements in the market stalls shall be owned by the Baguio City Government.
Likewise unsupported by evidence is Lomises claim that the stalls themselves were the only
improvements. Hence, the CA found it proper to order the remand of the case for the RTC to
determine the value of the improvements on the market stalls existing as of September 8, 1984.26
We agree with the CAs order of remand. We note, however, that Lomises had already returned
the P68,000.00 and receipt of the amount has been duly acknowledged by Johnnys mother,
Domes. Johnny testified on October 6, 1986 that the money was still with his mother.27 Thus,
upon determination by the RTC of the actual value of the improvements on the market stalls, the
heirs of Johnny Suerte should pay the ascertained value of these improvements to Lomises, who
shall thereafter be required to execute the deed of sale over the improvements in favor of the
heirs of Johnny.
WHEREFORE, under these premises, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the ruling of the Court of
Appeals for the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, for the
determination of the value of the improvements on Stall Nos. 9 and 10 at the Refreshment
Section of the Hangar Market Compound, Baguio City as of September 8, 1984. After this
determination, the Court ORDERS the heirs of Johnny M. Suerte to pay the amount determined
to the heirs of Lomises Aludos, who shall thereafter execute the deed of sale covering the
improvements in favor of the heirs of Johnny M. Suerte and deliver the deed to them. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Investment Corporation vs Francia Jr.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 194128 December 7, 2011
WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., CECILIA ZAMORA, BENJAMIN FRANCIA, and
PEARLBANK SECURITIES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
At bench is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
(1) July 27, 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84725, which
affirmed with modification the September 27, 2004 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 56, Makati City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 01-507; and (2) its October 14, 2010
Resolution,3 which denied the motion for the reconsideration thereof.
THE FACTS:
On March 27, 2001, respondents Amos P. Francia, Jr., Cecilia Zamora and Benjamin Francia
(the Francias) filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages4 arising from
their investments against petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp) and respondent
Pearlbank Securities Inc. (Pearlbank) before the RTC.
Wincorp and Pearlbank filed their separate motions to dismiss.5 Both motions were anchored on
the ground that the complaint of the Francias failed to state a cause of action. On July 16, 2001,
after several exchanges of pleadings, the RTC issued an order6 dismissing the motions to dismiss
of Wincorp and Pearlbank for lack of merit.
Wincorp then filed its Answer,7 while Pearlbank filed its Answer with Counterclaim and
Crossclaim (against Wincorp).8
The case was set for pre-trial but before pre-trial conference could be held, Wincorp filed its
Motion to Dismiss Crossclaim9 of Pearlbank to which the latter filed an opposition.10 The RTC
denied Wincorps motion to dismiss crossclaim.11
The pre-trial conference was later conducted after the parties had filed their respective pre-trial
briefs. The parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts, as contained in the Pre-Trial
Order12 issued by the RTC on April 17, 2002:
1. The personal and juridical circumstances of the parties meaning, the plaintiffs and both
corporate defendants;
2. That plaintiffs caused the service of a demand letter on Pearl Bank on February 13,
2001 marked as Exhibit E;
3. Plaintiffs do not have personal knowledge as to whether or not Pearl Bank indeed
borrowed the funds allegedly invested by the plaintiff from Wincorp; and
4. That the alleged confirmation advices which indicate Pearl Bank as alleged
borrower of the funds allegedly invested by the plaintiffs in Wincorp do not bear the
signature or acknowledgment of Pearl Bank. (Emphases supplied)
After several postponements requested by Wincorp, trial on the merits finally ensued. The gist of
the testimony of Amos Francia, Jr. (Amos) is as follows:
1. Sometime in 1999, he was enticed by Ms. Lalaine Alcaraz, the bank manager of
Westmont Bank, Meycauayan, Bulacan Branch, to make an investment with Wincorp,
the banks financial investment arm, as it was offering interest rates that were 3% to 5%
higher than regular bank interest rates. Due to the promise of a good return of investment,
he was convinced to invest. He even invited his sister, Cecilia Zamora and his brother,
Benjamin Francia, to join him. Eventually, they placed their investment in the amounts of
P 1,420,352.72 and P 2,522,745.34 with Wincorp in consideration of a net interest rate of
11% over a 43-day spread. Thereafter, Wincorp, through Westmont Bank, issued Official
Receipt Nos. 47084413 and 470845,14 both dated January 27, 2000, evidencing the said
transactions.15
2. When the 43-day placement matured, the Francias wanted to retire their investments
but they were told that Wincorp had no funds. Instead, Wincorp "rolled-over" their
placements and issued Confirmation Advices16 extending their placements for another 34
days. The said confirmation advices indicated the name of the borrower as Pearlbank.
The maturity values were P 1,435,108.61 and P 2,548,953.86 with a due date of April 13,
2000.
3. On April 13, 2000, they again tried to get back the principal amount they invested plus
interest but, again, they were frustrated.17
4. Constrained, they demanded from Pearlbank18 their investments. There were several
attempts to settle the case, but all proved futile.
After the testimony of Amos Francia, Jr., the Francias filed their Formal Offer of Evidence.19
Pearlbank filed its Comment/Objection,20 while Wincorp did not file any comment or objection.
After all the exhibits of the Francias were admitted for the purposes they were offered, the
Francias rested their case.
Thereafter, the case was set for the presentation of the defense evidence of Wincorp. On March
7, 2003, three (3) days before the scheduled hearing, Wincorp filed a written motion to postpone
the hearing on even date, as its witness, Antonio T. Ong, was unavailable because he had to
attend a congressional hearing. Wincorps substitute witness, Atty. Nemesio Briones, was
likewise unavailable due to a previous commitment in the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The RTC denied Wincorps Motion to Postpone and considered it to have waived its right to
present evidence.21 The Motion for Reconsideration of Wincorp was likewise denied.22
On August 14, 2003, Pearlbank filed its Demurrer to Evidence.23 The RTC granted the same in
its Order24 dated January 12, 2004. Hence, the complaint against Pearlbank was dismissed, while
the case was considered submitted for decision insofar as Wincorp was concerned.
On September 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision25 in favor of the Francias and held
Wincorp solely liable to them. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Westmont Investment Corporation to

pay the plaintiffs, the following amounts:
1. P 3,984,062.47 representing the aggregate amount of investment placements made by

plaintiffs, plus 11% per annum by way of stipulated interest, to be counted from 10
March 2000 until fully paid; and
2. 10% of the above-mentioned amount as and for attorneys fees and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Wincorp then filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC in its Order26
dated November 10, 2004.
Not in conformity with the pronouncement of the RTC, Wincorp interposed an appeal with the
CA, alleging the following arguments:
I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT WINCORP AS

AGENT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WAS LIABLE TO THE LATTER
NOTWITHSTANDING THE CLEAR WRITTEN AGREEMENT TO THE
CONTRARY;
II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
PEARLBANK, THE ACTUAL BORROWER AND RECIPIENT OF THE MONEY
INVOLVED IS NOT LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES; and
III. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ALL TOGETHER

THE CROSS-CLAIM OF WINCORP AGAINST PEARLBANK.27
The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC in its July 27, 2010 Decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 27
September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Makati City in Civil Case No. 01-507 is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION of the awards. Defendant-appellant Wincorp is
hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellees the amounts of P 3,984,062.47 plus 11% per annum by
way of stipulated interest to be computed from 13 April 2000 until fully paid and P 100,000.00
as attorneys fees and cost of suit."
SO ORDERED.
The CA explained:
After a careful and judicious scrutiny of the records of the present case, together with the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds defendant-appellant Wincorp solely liable to
pay the amount of P 3,984,062.47 plus 11% interest per annum computed from 10 March 2000
to plaintiffs-appellees.
Preliminarily, the Court will rule on the procedural issues raised to know what pieces of evidence
will be considered in this appeal.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence states that:
"The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified."
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to
enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to
its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to
review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Evidence not formally offered
during the trial can not be used for or against a party litigant. Neither may it be taken into
account on appeal.
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within
a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, any evidence
that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.
Prescinding therefrom, the very glaring conclusion is that all the documents attached in the
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court and all the documents attached in the
defendant-appellants brief filed by defendant-appellant Wincorp cannot be given any
probative weight or credit for the sole reason that the said documents were not formally
offered as evidence in the trial court because to consider them at this stage will deny the
other parties the right to rebut them.
The arguments of defendant-appellant Wincorp that the plaintiffs-appellees made an erroneous
offer of evidence as the documents were offered to prove what is contrary to its content and that
they made a violation of the parol evidence rule do not hold water.
It is basic in the rule of evidence that objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is
formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the
party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being
offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence
may be made.
As to oral evidence, objection thereto must likewise be raised at the earliest possible time, that is,
after the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable issue
becomes apparent only after the answer was given.
xxx
In the case at bench, a perusal of the records shows that the plaintiffs-appellees have sufficiently
established their cause of action by preponderance of evidence. The fact that on 27 January 2000,
plaintiffs-appellees placed their investment in the amounts of P 1,420,352.72 and P 2,522,754.34
with defendant-appellant Wincorp to earn a net interest at the rate of 11% over a 43-day period
was distinctly proved by the testimony of plaintiff-appellee Amos Francia, Jr. and supported by
Official Receipt Nos. 470844 and 470845 issued by defendant-appellant Wincorp through
Westmont Bank. The facts that plaintiffs-appellees failed to get back their investment after 43
days and that their investment was rolled over for another 34 days were also established by their
oral evidence and confirmed by the Confirmation Advices issued by defendant-appellant
Wincorp, which indicate that their investment already amounted to P 1,435,108.61 and P
2,548,953.86 upon its maturity on 13 April 2000. Likewise, the fact that plaintiffs-appellees
investment was not returned to them until this date by defendant-appellant Wincorp was proved
by their evidence. To top it all, defendant-appellant Wincorp never negated these established
facts because defendant-appellant Wincorps claim is that it received the money of plaintiffs-
appellees but it merely acted as an agent of plaintiffs-appellees and that the actual borrower of
plaintiffs-appellees money is defendant-appellee PearlBank. Hence, defendant-appellant
Wincorp alleges that it should be the latter who must be held liable to the plaintiffs-appellees.
However, the contract of agency and the fact that defendant-appellee PearlBank actually
received their money were never proven. The records are bereft of any showing that defendant-
appellee PearlBank is the actual borrower of the money invested by plaintiffs-appellees as
defendant-appellant Wincorp never presented any evidence to prove the same.
Moreover, the trial court did not err in dismissing defendant-appellant Wincorps crossclaim as
nothing in the records supports its claim. And such was solely due to defendant-appellant
Wincorp because it failed to present any scintilla of evidence that would implicate defendant-
appellee PearlBank to the transactions involved in this case. The fact that the name of defendant-
appellee PearlBank was printed in the Confirmation Advices as the actual borrower does not
automatically makes defendant-appellee PearlBank liable to the plaintiffs-appellees as nothing
therein shows that defendant-appellee PearlBank adhered or acknowledged that it is the actual
borrower of the amount specified therein.
Clearly, the plaintiffs-appellees were able to establish their cause of action against defendant-
appellant Wincorp, while the latter failed to establish its cause of action against defendant-
appellee PearlBank.
Hence, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds defendant-appellant Wincorp solely liable to
pay the amount of P 3,984,062.47 representing the matured value of the plaintiffs-appellees
investment as of 13 April 2000 plus 11% interest per annum by way of stipulated interest
counted from maturity date (13 April 2000).
As to the award of attorneys fees, this Court finds that the undeniable source of the present
controversy is the failure of defendant-appellant Wincorp to return the principal amount and the
interest of the investment money of plaintiffs-appellees, thus, the latter was forced to engage the
services of their counsel to protect their right. It is elementary that when attorneys fees is
awarded, they are so adjudicated, because it is in the nature of actual damages suffered by the
party to whom it is awarded, as he was constrained to engage the services of a counsel to
represent him for the protection of his interest. Thus, although the award of attorneys fees to
plaintiffs-appellees was warranted by the circumstances obtained in this case, this Court finds it
equitable to reduce the same from 10% of the total award to a fixed amount of P 100,000.00.28
Wincorps Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its October 14, 2010
Resolution.29
Not in conformity, Wincorp seeks relief with this Court via this petition for review alleging that
PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST WINCORP

AS THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWS THAT THE ACTUAL BENEFICIARY OF
THE PROCEEDS OF THE LOAN TRANSACTIONS WAS PEARLBANK
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DICTATES THAT THE EVIDENCE PROFERRED BY

WINCORP SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO DETERMINE WHO, AMONG THE
PARTIES, ARE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS30
ISSUE
The core issue in this case is whether or not the CA is correct in finding Wincorp solely liable to
pay the Francias the amount of P 3,984,062.47 plus interest of 11% per annum.
Quite clearly, the case at bench presents a factual issue.
As a rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law.
Questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by this Court in the exercise of
its power to review. The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is
established. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a
certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts.31 This being so, the findings of fact of the CA are final and
conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal.
While it goes without saying that only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, the same admits of exceptions, namely: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.32
The Court finds that no cogent reason exists in this case to deviate from the general rule.
Wincorp insists that the CA should have based its decision on the express terms, stipulations, and
agreements provided for in the documents offered by the Francias as the legal relationship of the
parties was clearly spelled out in the very documents introduced by them which indicated that it
merely brokered the loan transaction between the Francias and Pearlbank.33
Wincorp would want the Court to rule that there was a contract of agency between it and the
Francias with the latter authorizing the former as their agent to lend money to Pearlbank.
According to Wincorp, the two Confirmation Advices presented as evidence by the Francias and
admitted by the court, were competent proof that the recipient of the loan proceeds was
Pearlbank.34
The Court is not persuaded.
In a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in

representation or on behalf of another with the latters consent.35 It is said that the underlying
principle of the contract of agency is to accomplish results by using the services of others to do
a great variety of things. Its aim is to extend the personality of the principal or the party for
whom another acts and from whom he or she derives the authority to act. Its basis is
representation.36
Significantly, the elements of the contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the
parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to
a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within
the scope of his authority.37
In this case, the principal-agent relationship between the Francias and Wincorp was not duly
established by evidence. The records are bereft of any showing that Wincorp merely brokered
the loan transactions between the Francias and Pearlbank and the latter was the actual recipient
of the money invested by the former. Pearlbank did not authorize Wincorp to borrow money for
it. Neither was there a ratification, expressly or impliedly, that it had authorized or consented to
said transaction.
As to Pearlbank, records bear out that the Francias anchor their cause of action against it merely
on the strength of the subject Confirmation Advices bearing the name "PearlBank" as the
supposed borrower of their investments. Apparently, the Francias ran after Pearlbank only after
learning that Wincorp was reportedly bankrupt.38 The Francias were consistent in saying that
they only dealt with Wincorp and not with Pearlbank. It bears noting that even in their Complaint
and during the pre-trial conference, the Francias alleged that they did not have any personal
knowledge if Pearlbank was indeed the recipient/beneficiary of their investments.
Although the subject Confirmation Advices indicate the name of Pearlbank as the purported
borrower of the said investments, said documents do not bear the signature or acknowledgment
of Pearlbank or any of its officers. This cannot prove the position of Wincorp that it was
Pearlbank which received and benefited from the investments made by the Francias. There was
not even a promissory note validly and duly executed by Pearlbank which would in any way
serve as evidence of the said borrowing.
Another significant point which would support the stand of Pearlbank that it was not the
borrower of whatever funds supposedly invested by the Francias was the fact that it initiated,
filed and pursued several cases against Wincorp, questioning, among others, the latters acts of
naming it as borrower of funds from investors.391avvphi1
It bears stressing too that all the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before the CA
cannot be given any weight or evidentiary value for the sole reason that, as correctly observed by
the CA, these documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To consider
them now would deny the other parties the right to examine and rebut them. Section 34, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
"The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact
and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until
admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is
offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight."40
The Court cannot, likewise, disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA as to the evidence
presented by the Francias. It is elementary that objection to evidence must be made after
evidence is formally offered.41 It appears that Wincorp was given ample opportunity to file its
Comment/Objection to the formal offer of evidence of the Francias but it chose not to file any.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error in rendering the assailed July 27, 2010 Decision
and in issuing the challenged October 14, 2010 Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
C. Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Hierarchy of Evidence
i. Overwhelming evidence
ii. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People of the Philippines vs Caliso
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011

vs.
DELFIN CALISO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decisive question that seeks an answer is whether the identification of the perpetrator of the
crime by an eyewitness who did not get a look at the face of the perpetrator was reliable and
positive enough to support the conviction of appellant Delfin Caliso (Caliso).
Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 21, in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA,1 a
mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death in its decision dated August 19,
2002.2 The appeal of the conviction was brought automatically to the Court. On June 28, 2005,3
the Court transferred the records to the Court of Appeals (CA) for intermediate review pursuant
to the ruling in People v. Mateo.4 On October 26, 2007,5 the CA, although affirming the
conviction, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua and modified the civil awards. Now, Caliso
is before us in a final bid to overturn his conviction.
Antecedents
The information dated August 5, 1997 charged Caliso with rape with homicide perpetrated in the
following manner:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1997, at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge upon one AAA, who is a minor of 16 years old and a mentally retarded girl, against
her will and consent; that on the occasion of said rape and in furtherance of the accuseds
criminal designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, and
taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon said AAA
by mauling her, pulling her towards a muddy water and submerging her underneath, which
caused the death of said AAA soon thereafter.
CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the "Heinous Crimes Law".6
At his arraignment on November 12, 1997,7 Caliso pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The records show that AAA died on June 5, 1997 at around 11:00 am in the river located in
Barangay Tiacongan, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte; that the immediate cause of her death was
asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to smothering; that the lone eyewitness, 34-year old
Soledad Amegable (Amegable), had been clearing her farm when she heard the anguished cries
of a girl pleading for mercy: Please stop noy, it is painful noy!;8 that the cries came from an area
with lush bamboo growth that made it difficult for Amegable to see what was going on; that
Amegable subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that soon ended the girls cries;
that Amegable then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was happening, hiding behind a
cluster of banana trees in order not to be seen, and from there she saw a man wearing gray short
pants bearing the number "11" mark, who dragged a girls limp body into the river, where he
submerged the girl into the knee-high muddy water and stood over her body; that he later lifted
the limp body and tossed it to deeper water; that he next jumped into the other side of the river;
that in that whole time, Amegable could not have a look at his face because he always had his
back turned towards her;9 that she nonetheless insisted that the man was Caliso, whose physical
features she was familiar with due to having seen him pass by their barangay several times prior
to the incident;10 that after the man fled the crime scene, Amegable went straight to her house
and told her husband what she had witnessed; and that her husband instantly reported the
incident to the barangay chairman.
It appears that one SPO3 Romulo R. Pancipanci declared in an affidavit11 that upon his station
receiving the incident report on AAAs death at about 12:45 pm of June 5, 1997, he and two
other officers proceeded to the crime scene to investigate; that he interviewed Amegable who
identified the killer by his physical features and clothing (short pants); that based on such
information, he traced Caliso as AAAs killer; and that Caliso gave an extrajudicial admission of
the killing of AAA. However, the declarations in the affidavit remained worthless because the
Prosecution did not present SPO3 Pancipanci as its witness.
Leo Bering, the barangay chairman of San Vicente, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte, attested that on
the occasion of Calisos arrest and his custodial interrogation, he heard Caliso admit to the
investigating police officer the ownership of the short pants recovered from the crime scene; that
the admission was the reason why SPO3 Pancipanci arrested Caliso from among the curious
onlookers that had gathered in the area; that Amegable, who saw SPO3 Pancipancis arrest of
Caliso at the crime scene, surmised that Caliso had gone home and returned to the crime scene
thereafter.12
Municipal Health Officer Dr. Joseph G.B. Fuentecilla conducted the post-mortem examination
on the body of AAA on June 6, 1997, and found the following injuries, to wit:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. The dead body was generally pale wearing a heavily soiled old sleeveless shirt and
garter skirts.
2. The body was wet and heavily soiled with mud both nostrils and mouth was filled with
mud.
3. The skin of hands and feet is bleached and corrugated in appearance.
4. 2 cm. linear lacerated wound on the left cheek (sic).
5. Multiple small (sic) reddish contusions on anterior neck area.
6. Circular hematoma formation 3 inches in diameter epigastric area of abdomen.
7. Four erythematus linear abrasion of the left cheek (sic).
8. Presence of a 6x8 inches bulge on the back just below the inferior angle of both
scapula extending downwards.
9. The body was wearing an improperly placed underwear with the garter vertically
oriented to the right stained with moderate amount of yellowish fecal material.
10. Minimal amount of pubic hair in the lower pubis with labia majora contracted and
retracted.
11. Theres no swelling abrasion, laceration, blood hematoma formation in the vulva.
There were old healed hymenal lacerations at 5 and 9 oclock position.
12. Vaginal canal admits one finger with no foreign body recovered (sic).
13. Oval shaped contusion/hematoma 6 cm at its greatest diameter anterior surface

middle 3rd left thigh.
14. Presence of 2 contusion laceration 1x0.5 cm in size medial aspect left knee.13
Dr. Fuentecilla also conducted a physical examination on the body of Caliso and summed up his
findings thusly:
P.E. FINDINGS:
1. Presence of a 7x0.1 cm. horizontally averted linear erythematus contusion left side of
neck (Post ).
2. 8x0.2 cm. reddish linear abrasion (probably a scratch mark) from the left midclavicular
line extending to the left anterioraxillary line.
3. Presence of 2 erythematus abrasion 3 cmx0.1 cm in average size dorsal surface

(probably a scratch mark) middle 3rd left arm.
4. 2.5 cm. abrasion dorsal surface middle and right forearm.
5. Presence of a linear erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 2x7 cm. in

average size lateral boarder of scapula extending to left posterior axillary line.
6. Presence of 2 oblique oriented erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark)

14x022 cm. and 5x0.2 cm. in size respectively at the upper left flank of the lower back
extending downward to the midline.
7. Presence of 5 linear reddish pressure contusion parallel to each other with an average 5
cm left flank area.14
In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting that on the day of
the killing, he plowed the rice field of Alac Yangyang from 7:00 am until 4:00 pm.
Yangyang corroborated Calisos alibi, recalling that Caliso had plowed his rice field from 8 am
to 4 pm of June 5, 1997. He further recalled that Caliso was in his farm around 12:00 noon
because he brought lunch to Caliso. He conceded, however, that he was not aware where Caliso
was at the time of the killing.
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment on August 19, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused DELFIN CALISO is hereby

sentenced to death and to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. The accused
is also hereby ordered to pay the said heirs the amount of P50, 000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA because the old-
healed hymenal lacerations of AAA and the fact that the victims underwear had been irregularly
placed could not establish the commission of carnal knowledge; that the examining physician
also found no physical signs of rape on the body of AAA; and that as to the killing of AAA, the
identification by Amegable that the man she had seen submerging AAA in the murky river was
no other than Caliso himself was reliable.
Nevertheless, the RTC did not take into consideration the testimony of Bering on Calisos
extrajudicial admission of the ownership of the short pants because the pants were not presented
as evidence and because the police officers involved did not testify about the pants in court.16
The RTC cited the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength to raise the crime from
homicide to murder, regarding the word homicide in the information to be used in its generic
sense as to include all types of killing.
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate review, the following errors were raised in the brief for the accused-appellant,17
namely:
i. The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of
murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
ii. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible and
inconsistent testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
iii. The court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance
of taking advantage of superior strength and the generic aggravating circumstance of
disregard of sex[; and]
iv. The court a quo gravely erred in imposing the death penalty.
As stated, the CA affirmed Calisos conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the
RTC had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his
back being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she made
a positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident
happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that Amegables
view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAAs body had been submerged in
the water; that the RTC expressly found her testimony as clear and straightforward and worthy of
credence; that no reason existed why Amegable would falsely testify against Caliso; that Caliso
did not prove the physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene or at its immediate
vicinity at the time of the incident, for both Barangay San Vicente, where AAAs body was
found, and Barangay Tiacongan, where the rice field of Yangyang was located, were contiguous;
that the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing of AAA to
murder; that disregard of sex should not have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
due to its not being alleged in the information and its not being proven during trial; and that the
death penalty could not be imposed because of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,
prohibiting its imposition in the Philippines.
The CA decreed in its judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 19, 2002, finding
appellant guilty of Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant
Delfin Caliso is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and is directed to pay the victims heirs the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, as well as the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 he had been adjudged to pay by the
trial court.
SO ORDERED.18
Issue
The primordial issue is whether Amegables identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA
at noon of July 5, 1997 was positive and reliable.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to
prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime
can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond
reasonable doubt.19
The CA rejected the challenge Caliso mounted against the reliability of his identification as the
culprit by Amegable in the following manner:20
As to the first two errors raised, appellant contends that the testimony of Soledad Amegable was
replete with discrepancies. Appellant avers, for instance, that Soledad failed to see the assailants
face. Moreover, considering the distance between where Soledad was supposedly hiding and
where the incident transpired, appellant states that it was inconceivable for her to have heard and
seen the incident. According to appellant, witness Soledad could not even remember if at that
time, she hid behind a banana plant, or a coconut tree.
At bench, the incident happened at noon, when the sun was at its brightest. Soledad could very
well recognize appellant. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that it was his back that was
facing her, she asserted being familiar with the physical features of appellant, considering that he
frequented their barangay. Even during her cross-examination by the defense counsel, Soledad
remained steadfast in categorically stating that she recognized appellant:
Q: Mrs. Amegable, you said during your direct examination that you saw Delfin Caliso,
the accused in this case, several times passed by your barangay, am I correct?
A: Several times.
Q: By any chance prior to the incident, did you talk to him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you acquainted with him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Even if he is in his back position?
A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis Supplied)
Given the circumstances as stated above, it was even probable that Soledad caught glimpses of
the profile of the appellant at the time of the incident. She related, in addition, that when the
victim was being submerged in the water, there was no object obstructing her view.
The inconsistencies as alleged by appellant, between Soledad Amegables declaration in court

and her affidavit, such as the tree or plant from where she was hiding behind at the time of the
incident, are insignificant and cannot negate appellants criminal liability. Her whole attention
was riveted to the incident that was unfolding before her. Besides, any such inconsistencies are
minor. Slight contradictions are indicative of an unrehearsed testimony and could even serve to
strengthen the witness credibility. A witness who is telling the truth is not always expected to
give a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory.
In fact, the testimony of a single eye-witness is sufficient to support a conviction, so long as such
testimony is found to be clear and straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court.
Furthermore, over here, witness Soledad had no reason to testify falsely against appellant.
Besides, the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude.lawphi1 Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding
and conclusive on the appellate court.
Contrary to the CAs holding that the identification of Caliso based on Amegables recognition
of him was reliable, the Court considers the identification not reliable and beyond doubt as to
meet the requirement of moral certainty.
When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough for establishing
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always
require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes
where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally
confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused.
Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde,21 to
wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b)
that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim
immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:
xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of
being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of
positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the
perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This
constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may
not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to
positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when
the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before
and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification,
which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of
evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is
that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual
eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the
exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it
is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively
identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion
and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity
of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community
would be denied proper protection.22
Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in her
barangay several times prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that she was obviously
assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso. As matters stand, therefore, Calisos
conviction hangs by a single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of Amegables identification
of him as the perpetrator of the killing. But that single thread was thin, and cannot stand sincere
scrutiny. In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is required in establishing
the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her identification of Caliso as the
perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by which it might be said to be
positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its
imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness,
the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the
face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA,
or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.
A witness familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive identification,
does not always pass the test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake.
No matter how honest Amegables testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a
sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that
moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable
circumstances showing him to be AAAs killer. Her identification of him in that manner lacked
the qualities of exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being mistaken. Indeed,
there could be so many other individuals in the community where the crime was committed
whose backs might have looked like Calisos back. Moreover, many factors could have
influenced her perception, including her lack of keenness of observation, her emotional stress of
the moment, her proneness to suggestion from others, her excitement, and her tendency to
assume. The extent of such factors are not part of the records; hence, the trial court and the CA
could not have taken them into consideration. But the influence of such varied factors could not
simply be ignored or taken for granted, for it is even a well-known phenomenon that the
members of the same family, whose familiarity with one another could be easily granted, often
inaccurately identify one another through a sheer view of anothers back. Certainly, an
identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any
evidentiary force.23
Amegables recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number "11" did not
enhance the reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-a-kind
apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had been admitted
in evidence, it remained doubtful that they could have been linked to Caliso without proof of his
ownership or possession of them in the moments before the crime was perpetrated.
Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute the killing to Caliso
guarantee the reliability and accuracy of her identification of him. The dearth of competent
additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of any human error in Amegables
identification of Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive irrelevant and immaterial, for
even the most sincere person could easily be mistaken about her impressions of persons involved
in startling occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is neither fair nor judicious,
therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable raise her
identification to the level of moral certainty.
The injuries found on the person of Caliso by Dr. Fuentecilla, as borne out by the medical
certificate dated June 9, 1997,24 did not support the culpability of Caliso. The injuries, which
were mostly mere scratch marks,25 were not even linked by the examining physician to the crime
charged. Inasmuch as the injuries of Caliso might also have been due to other causes, including
one related to his doing menial labor most of the time, their significance as evidence of guilt is
nil.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accuseds
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he
is entitled to an acquittal,26 though his innocence may be doubted.27 The constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the
conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the
strength of the evidence for the Prosecution.28
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on October 26, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
for insufficiency of evidence, and accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime
of murder.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City is directed to forthwith release
Delfin Caliso from confinement, unless there is another lawful cause warranting his further
detention.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
People of the Philippines vs Patentes
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. FELIMON PATENTES Y

ZAMORA, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely upon the word
of the private complainant because it is essentially committed in relative isolation or even in
secrecy, and it is usually only the victim who can testify of the unconsented coitus. Thus, the
long standing rule is that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed. Since the participants are
usually the only witnesses in crimes of this nature and the accuseds conviction or acquittal
virtually depends on the private complainants testimony, it must be received with utmost
caution. It is then incumbent upon the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the
credibility of the victims testimony. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be
overprotective of every woman claiming to have been sexually abused and demanding
punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the
rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice according to law.1
Before Us is an appeal from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification
the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The present case involves eight (8) sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape filed by
private complainant (AAA) against appellant, Felimon Patentes.
The Prosecutions Case
On 5 December 1998, at about 11:00 a.m., AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit
and bring medicines to her sick grandmother. While seated at the rear portion of the bus,
appellant suddenly sat next to her. It was the second time AAA met appellant; the first time was
on 4 December 1998, when appellant persistently courted her. She only knew appellant as he
was a friend of her brother.
After a brief conversation, appellant suddenly showed her his bolo, covered by a red scabbard
tucked in his right side while he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which he used to
threaten to kill AAA should AAA disobey him. Appellant then accompanied AAA to her
grandmothers place and returned to Davao City proper by bus. As they walked around, appellant
placed his right hand on AAAs shoulder. Appellant also held AAAs right hand, which covers
her mouth with a handkerchief.
Upon reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and alighted at a nearby convenience
store. Upon arrival, a man gave something to appellant, which he immediately placed inside his
pocket. Appellant then brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his
parents, sister, brotherinlaw, nephews and nieces live.
Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her to a sewing
machine. Appellant then started to smoke something, which he also forced AAA to inhale,
causing AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy. This prevented AAA from fighting back as appellant
removed AAAs clothes. Doffed of his own clothes, appellant mounted her and inserted his penis
into her vagina.
The following day, 6 December 1998, appellant again forced AAA to inhale the smoke from his
cigarette, causing her to feel weak and dizzy as appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.
On 7 December 1998, appellant again had carnal knowledge of AAA using threats, force and
intimidation, causing bruises on AAAs arms.
On 8 December 1998, while appellant was sleeping beside AAA, AAA slowly got up to escape.
However, AAAs attempt, while feeble, woke up appellant. Appellant then punched her in the
stomach, causing AAA to lose consciousness. When AAA gained a little strength, appellant
again mauled her and raped her again.
On 9 December 1998, after AAA took a bath, appellant raped AAA while pointing a bolo to her
neck.
On 10, 11 and 12 December 1998, appellant raped AAA while threatening her with bodily harm.
He also threatened to kill her family, in case she tells anyone of her ordeal.
On 13 December 1998, to free herself from her predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she
will marry him. Appellant agreed. Appellants mother accompanied AAA to the latters house to
discuss the marital plans with AAAs family. Surprised by the marital plans, AAAs mother
asked for a private moment with AAA. In their conversation, AAA confessed how appellant
forcibly took her to his house on 5 December 1998 and raped her for more than a week. AAAs
mother then accompanied AAA to report her ordeal to the police, where AAA was examined by
a doctor, Dr. Samuel Cruz, the City Health Officer of Davao City.
Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following observations
about AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can
readily admit a normalsized erect male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal
canal was negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was
AAAs first sexual intercourse as the vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations.
The AccusedAppellants Defense
On 5 December 1998, pursuant to their previous agreement, appellant accompanied AAA to

Bansalan to visit and bring medicines to AAAs grandmother. After going around Davao City,
they went to his house at about 7:00 p.m. Appellant then offered to bring AAA to her house but
the latter refused, insisting that she wanted to live with appellant because she was fed up with her
mother, who often called her buntog or prostitute.
AAA stayed in appellants house together with the latters parents, sister, brotherinlaw,
nephews and nieces. AAA slept in the same room with appellant and had consented sexual
intercourse. Throughout AAAs stay, she was free to roam around the house and even helped in
the household chores. Pursuant to their marital plans, AAAs grandfather went to appellants
house on 7 December 1998. As a result, they agreed to set the wedding date on 27 May 1999.
Appellants mother also went to AAAs house to discuss the marital plans on 14 December 1998.
However, AAAs mother rejected the marriage proposal because of appellants social standing.
Leonora Gerondio (Gerondio), appellants neighbor, testified that she first met AAA in
appellants house on 5 December 1998. The following day, Gerondio again saw AAA when she
went to appellants house. Appellant told her that he will marry AAA. Since then, Gerondio saw
AAA everyday from 7 to 11 December 1998, cleaning the surroundings, doing the laundry, and
walking around the vicinity. AAA even visited her house and talked about AAA and appellants
marital plans. In her observation, AAA and appellant acted like a couple. Gerondio also
accompanied appellants mother to AAAs house to discuss AAA and appellants marital plans.
However, AAAs mother rejected the marriage proposal.
Wilma Enriquez (Enriquez), a common friend of AAA and appellant, testified that between 5 to
12 December 1998, she went twice to appellants house upon AAAs invitation to talk about the
couples marital plans.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, private complainant
herself; (2) Dr. Samuel Cruz; (3) PO1 Lennie Ronquillo; (4) private complainants mother; and
(5) Julie Dayaday.
On the other hand, the defense presented: (1) Felimon Patentes, accusedappellant himself; (2)
Leonora Gerondio; (3) Wilma Enriquez; and (4) Francisca Patentes.
After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of
Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:chanRoblesv irtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
Felimon Patentes a.k.a. Arnold Patentes is hereby sentenced as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 42,78699 Reclusion Perpetua
The accused shall indemnify AAA Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) in each of the eight
cases for a total of Two Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P240,000.00).
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED as to the conviction of appellant FELIMON

PATENTES for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of eight (8)
counts of Rape and as to the imposition upon him of the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
of the eight (8) offenses. His civil liability, however, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
Appellant FELIMON PATENTES is hereby directed to pay the following amounts:
1. P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of P400,000.00;
2. P75,000.00 each as moral damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of P600,000.00; and
3. P25,000.00 each as temperate damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape
and seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.5 ChanRoblesV irtualawlibrary
The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution. According to the appellate court, AAAs account of her ordeal in
the hands of appellant was straightforward, firm, candid and consistent. Notwithstanding the
rigid, lengthy and rigorous crossexamination by the defense, AAA remained steadfast in her
narration of the details of her harrowing experience. A thorough reading of the transcript shows
that AAAs testimony bears the earmarks of truth and credibility.6
Hence, this appeal.
The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or
intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when
the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.7 In the case at bar, appellant never denied
having carnal knowledge of AAA. The only matter, thus, to be resolved by this Court is whether
appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation, or
that AAA was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or was under 12 years of age or is
demented.
Appellant argues that if AAA really was raped for more than an entire week, it is perplexing why
she did not escape, or even seek the help of the neighbors despite several opportunities to do so.8
Appellant further alleges that AAAs failure to escape and her helping in the household chores in
appellants house prove that she was not raped and that they had consensual sexual intercourse.9
About this position, the appellate court noted and reasoned that, appellant threatened AAA with
harm in the event that she told anyone of what happened between them. The lingering fear
instilled upon AAA is understandable considering that appellant was always armed with a bolo
and was constantly showing it to AAA. The possibility of him making good his threat was not at
all remote and the fear for her life remained palpable.10
Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. There is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.11 Nevertheless, the Court
must be guided by established principles.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of
rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2)
inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense.12 So long as the private complainants testimony meets the test
of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.13
Following these legal precepts, AAAs testimony, placed side by side with the prosecutions
evidence, must stand the test of credibility.
1. Absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape since
proof of injuries is not an essential element of the crime.14 And, it is also a precept that physical
evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.15 In
the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present any scintilla of proof to support its claim. In fact,
contrary to the prosecutions claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and boxed, the
medical certificate revealed no telltale sign of the prosecutions allegations. It has to be noted
that the medical examination was conducted the day after AAAs supposed escape from
appellant. As shown by the medical certificate, AAA had no external signs of physical injuries,
save for a kiss mark, to wit:16
EXTRAGENITAL PHYSICAL INJURY:
Contusion, reddish purple, breast, right side, lowerinner quadrant, 2.0x1.0 cm. xxx
CONCLUSIONS:
1. The above physical injury was noted on the body of the subject, age of which is consistent
with the alleged date of infliction.
2. That under normal conditions without subsequent complications and unless a deeper
involvement might be present but which is not clinically apparent at the time of examination,
said injury will require medical attendance of not more than seven (7) days from date of
infliction.
3. Hymen intact and its orifice, wide as to allow complete penetration by an averagesized male
organ in erection without causing hymenal injury.17 ChanRoblesVir tualawlibrary
2. The timehonored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its
compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common experience of man.18 Thus,
whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience
becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.19
As culled from the records, AAA lived with appellants family for eight (8) days in the same
house where appellants parents, sister, brotherinlaw, nephews and nieces also lived. AAA
even called appellants mother, mama. As argued by the defense, the members of the
appellants family could have noticed that she was being forced and raped by the accused if the
accusations were really true.20 Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex
slave for eight (8) days in a house where the abusers entire family, including the abusers minor
nephews and nieces live.
When appellant and AAA arrived in the formers house, they were greeted by appellants father.
If AAAs account were true that appellant dragged her to a room upstairs and then tied her to a
sewing machine, appellants father could have noticed and reacted to the obvious violence. To
say the least, he would have talked to the appellant about the deed. Instead, and incredibly,
appellants mother went to AAAs house to propose marriage contrary to the common
experience.
Contrary to the prosecutions claim that AAA only saw appellant on 4 December 1998, a day
before the alleged commission of the crime, it was stipulated that AAA knew appellant as
appellant was a neighbor and friend of AAAs brother.21 Furthermore, appellants mother was
the midwife who assisted AAAs housemaid in giving birth.22 Lastly, AAA and appellant have a
common friend, Enriquez, who testified that she saw the two in appellants house, through
AAAs invitation.23 The TSN reflects the inconsistencies in AAAs testimony:24
Q: Do you know that his mother is a midwife?
A: No, Sir.
Because she helped in the delivery of our housemaid.
Q: When did your housemaid give birth?

When I went to Bansalan on December 5 I passed by the house she was about to
A:
deliver and I saw the mother of the accused thats the time I came to know his mother.
Q: Is it not that your stepfather even went to the house where you stayed?
A: No, sir.
Q: You will deny that?

A: I did not see him.
xxx
Q: Is it not you said you were being locked?

A: I was locked at the door when my father arrived.
I do not know because he locked me at the room. [Emphasis supplied]
For several days that AAA had been missing, which would have caused worry and anxiety
among AAAs family members, AAAs father, instead of reporting the matter to police
authorities, went to appellants house to discuss AAA and appellants marital plans on 7
December 1998.25 Clearly, this is contrary to human logic and experience, and inconsistent with
the prosecutions claim.
3. The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost
importance in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.26 In the case at bar, the
actuations of AAA after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It
is contrary to normal human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abusers mother, and
worse, to live with her abusers entire family in one roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to
escape.
It goes against the grain of human experience for a woman who has been robbed of her honor
and chastity not to seize an opportunity to escape from the clutches of her malefactor.27 Instead
of escaping from her abuser, AAA visited appellants neighbor.28 Even if AAA had several
opportunities to share her ordeal to be rescued by her friend, Wilma, AAA inexplicably failed
and instead described the details of her marital plans. What is truly exceptional, however, is the
testimony of AAA that she visited her grandmother during the period of her alleged abduction.
Despite inconsistencies in her testimony as shown in the TSN, AAA admitted the visit to her
grandmother:29
Q: So you did not proceed to your grandmothers house, where is the house of your
grandmother?
A: Km. 81.
Q: Near the Dulo?

A: A bit farther of Dulo.
Q: You rode in a jeep and the driver is your cousin?

A: No sir we rode (sic) pedicab going to my grandmothers place.
Q: There were no people?

A: We are used to ride (sic) pedicab.
Q: So you rode a pedicab at that time?

A: No, Sir. [Emphasis supplied]
We are mindful that appellants bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It
must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters,
notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.30 There is such
corroboration in this case. To support its sweetheart theory, the defense presented appellant and
AAAs common friend, Enriquez, who attested to the veracity of appellants claim:31
Q: When you arrived at their house did you see the complainant AAA?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to her?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell the court what was the subject of your conversation?
A: She told me that she and Felimon Patentes are getting married, saying where they will
live and that they will go into the buy and sell business.
Q: Did you notice AAA to be happy with Felimon Patentes?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the second time you went to their place do you remember what was the subject of your
conversation?
A: Regarding their plan of getting married. [Emphasis supplied]
Appellants neighbor, Gerondio, corroborated the testimony:32
Q: Do you remember seeing the accused sometime on December 5, 1998?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you see him?
A: In their house, he just arrived.
Q: Was he alone?
A: He is with AAA.
xxx
Q: On the following day did you see again AAA?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you see her?

A: Inside their house, she was walking.
xxx
Q: When was that when you saw her?

A: The next day, December 6, 1998.
xxx
Q: On the succeeding days, from December 7 to 11 were you able to see AAA in the house of
F[e]limon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you see her?

A: In the house of the accused, F[e]limon.
Q: What was she doing?

A: She was cleaning the surroundings of the house and did the laundry, and she was also
going around.
Q: When you said going around or suroysuroy where did she go around?
A: She also went to our house.
Q: Were you able to talk to her personally?

A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: What did you observe from them?

A: As if they are married.
Q: What were the actions that you saw in them?

A: They were loving with each other.
Q: What do you mean by loving?
A: They are close to each other, they joke, and F[e[limon would place his arm on the
shoulder of AAA. [Emphasis supplied]
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which
means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the
prosecution.33 In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing
with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA
against her will using threats, force or intimidation.
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with
precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted.34 Courts should be wary of giving
undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged
victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to
conflicting interpretations.35 While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation
that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice based on the law.36
The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable
doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in
favor of appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short
of the quantum of proof to support a conviction.37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, finding
appellant FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Forcible
Abduction with Rape, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA
is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. His immediate release from confinement is
hereby ordered unless he is being detained for some other charge. Chan RoblesVir tualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo, and PerlasBernabe, JJ., concur.
iii. Clear and convincing
Supreme Court vs Delgado
EN BANC
A.M. No. 2011-07-SC October 4, 2011
SUPREME COURT, Complainant,

vs.
EDDIE V. DELGADO, UTILITY WORKER II, JOSEPH LAWRENCE M. MADEJA,
CLERK IV, AND WILFREDO A. FLORENDO, UTILITY WORKER II, ALL OF THE
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, SECOND DIVISION Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The present administrative matter is based on the following facts:
On 2 June 2011, Supreme Court Associate Justice and Second Division Chairperson Antonio T.
Carpio caused the transmittal of two (2) sealed Agenda to the Office of Clerk of Court Second
Division (OCC-SD).1 Contained in the Agenda are the itemized lists of cases taken up by the
Courts Second Division during the sessions held on 30 May and 1 June 2011, as well as the
handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio showing the specific actions adopted by the
division on each case item.2 The transmittal of the Agenda was made for the purpose of allowing
the Second Division Clerk of Court to prepare the draft minutes of the 30 May and 1 June 2011
sessions.3
Inside the OCC-SD
Ms. Christine S. Puno (Ms. Puno), an Executive Assistant III at the OCC-SD, received the two
(2) Agenda on behalf of the office.4 Ms. Puno is the duly designated personnel of the OCC-SD
authorized to receive and open the sealed Agenda coming from the Office of Justice Carpio.5
Promptly, Ms. Puno forwarded both Agenda to Atty. Ma. Luisa L. Laurea (Atty. Laurea)the
Second Division Clerk of Court.6
Atty. Laurea instructed Ms. Puno to have the Agenda photocopied, beginning with the one for
the 30 May 2011 session.7 As is customary, the 30 May 2011 Agenda was ordered to be
photocopied in two (2) sets: one to serve as a duplicate of Atty. Laurea, while the other as a copy
of the Agenda Division of the office.8 The original Agenda will be left with the Minutes
Division, which will draft the minutes of the session.9
Following the instructions of Atty. Laurea, Ms. Puno gave the 30 May 2011 Agenda to Mr.
Julius Irving C. Tanael (Mr. Tanael)a Utility Worker II at the OCC-SDfor photocopying.10
Mr. Tanael is one of only four personnel in the OCC-SD who are authorized to make
photocopies of Agenda with actions.11
Upon completing his task, Mr. Tanael reckoned that the copies of the 30 May 2011 Agenda were
too voluminous to be bound by mere staple wire.12 Hence, Mr. Tanael gave the finished copies to
herein respondent Eddie V. Delgado (Delgado) for stitching.13
Upon finishing with the stitching, respondent Delgado returned the two (2) copies of the 30 May
2011 Agenda to Mr. Tanael.14 In turn, Mr. Tanael gave one copy to the Agenda Division and
another copy to Ms. Puno for transmittal to Atty. Laurea.15
Before Ms. Puno could furnish Atty. Laurea her copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda, however, she
caught respondent Delgado acting suspiciously while holding and reading sheets of pink-colored
papers, which are similar to that used by the OCC-SD in photocopying Agenda.16 She then saw
respondent Delgado keep the same sheets inside the drawer of his office desk.17
It was at that point that Ms. Puno began to suspect that the sheets held, read and kept by
respondent Delgado might have been taken from the copies of the 30 May 2011 Agenda.18 Thus,
Ms. Puno at once requested Mr. Tanael to help check whether the pages of the said photocopies
were complete.19
The inspection of the duplicates revealed that one copy of the 30 May 2011 Agendathe one
given to the Agenda Divisionhad missing pages, pages 58, 59 and 70.20 Later, Ms. Puno was
able to confirm her suspicion as she found two (2) of the missing pages i.e., pages 58 and 59,
hidden below a pile of expediente21 inside the drawer of respondent Delgados desk.22 She and
Mr. Tanael then stapled back the recovered pages 58 and 59, and replaced the still unaccounted
page 70 in the copy of the Agenda Division.23
After office hours, Ms. Puno confided what happened to Ms. Auralyn Veloso (Ms. Veloso) and
Atty. Teresita A. Tuazon (Atty. Tuazon).24 Ms. Veloso is an Assistant Records Officer in OCC-
SD, while Atty. Tuazon is the Assistant Clerk of Court of the Second Division.25
On 6 June 2011, Atty. Tuazon reported the incident involving the missing pages of a copy of the
30 May 2011 Agenda to Atty. Laurea.26 Alarmed, Atty. Laurea called respondent Delgado, Ms.
Puno and Atty. Tuazon in her office for an initial investigation.27
Initial Investigation
In the presence of Atty. Laurea, Atty. Tuazon and Ms. Puno, respondent Delgado candidly
admitted during the initial investigation that he took pages 58, 59 and 70 from one of the copies
of the 30 May 2011 Agenda.28 However, respondent Delgado also disclosed that he removed the
pages from the subject Agenda only as a favor to herein respondents Joseph Lawrence Madeja
(Madeja) and Wilfredo A. Florendo (Florendo).29
As it turned out, after respondent Delgado received the copies of the 30 May 2011 Agenda for
stitching, he was approached by respondents Madeja and Florendo who expressed interest on
certain items apparently included in the Agenda.30 Respondents Madeja and Florendo then asked
respondent Delgado if he could provide them with a copy.31 Respondent Delgado professed that
out of "pakikisama" he removed the would-be missing pages from one of the copies entrusted to
him for stitching and gave them to respondents Madeja and Florendo.32 Respondents Madeja and
Florendo, however, would eventually return these pages to respondent Delgado because,
purportedly, none of the items about which they were interested was in them.33
After hearing the confession and incriminating statements of respondent Delgado, Atty. Laurea
called for respondents Madeja and Florendo to join the initial investigation.34
For their part, respondents Madeja and Florendo admitted during the initial investigation that
they asked for and, in fact, obtained the missing pages in the 30 May 2011 Agenda.35
Respondent Madeja even admitted giving his copy of the missing pages to a certain "Dading."36
Dading was later identified to be Melquiades S. Briones, (Mr. Briones) a Clerk III in the Office
of the Clerk of Court En Banc.37 Both respondents Madeja and Florendo attested that court
employees from other Divisions had been requesting for copies of the Agenda, to which they
were inclined to accede in exchange for tokens like "pang-merienda" or "pamasahe."38
Upon conclusion of the initial investigation, Atty. Laurea and Atty. Tuazon prepared a
Memorandum39 summarizing the statements made by the respondents during the course of the
investigation. This Memorandum was then submitted to Justice Carpio, as Chairman of this
Courts Second Division.40
Formal Investigation
On 8 June 2011, this Court, through its Second Division, issued a Resolution41 treating the
Memorandum submitted by Atty. Laurea and Atty. Tuazon as a formal administrative complaint
against the respondents. In the same Resolution, the Complaints and Investigation Division of
the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) was tasked to conduct a formal investigation on the
matter and to thereafter submit an evaluation, report and recommendation.42 The Resolution also
placed the respondents under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days.43
Acting on the Resolution, the OAS directed the respondents to submit their respective written
explanations on the Memorandum.44 In compliance with this directive, respondent Florendo
submitted a Plea for Judicial Clemency and Understanding with Motion to Lift Preventive
Suspension45 on 15 June 2011. On 17 June 2011, respondent Madeja filed his
Comment/Explanation.46 Respondent Delgado, however, failed to submit any written
explanation.47
The OAS also conducted separate hearings on 15 June 2011 and 4 July 2011, wherein the
statements of the respondents,48 Atty. Tuazon,49 Ms. Puno,50 Mr. Tanael,51 Mr. Briones52 and one
Mr. Willy M. Mercado53 were taken.
In their written explanations as well as statements during the formal hearings, both respondent
Madeja and Florendo adamantly denied having made any admission during the initial
investigation regarding their complicity in the removal of the missing pages in the copy of the 30
May 2011 Agenda.54 They submit that there is no actual evidence that shows that they have
knowledge of or involvement in the actions of respondent Delgado.55
Respondent Delgado in his statement during the formal hearings, on the other hand, stood by his
admissions during the initial investigation.56
The OAS Recommendation
On 1 September 2011, the OAS submitted to this Court a Memorandum57 embodying its findings
and evaluation. In sum, it considered respondent Delgado guilty of Grave Misconduct for his
unauthorized removal of pages 58, 59 and 70 in a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda.58 The OAS
also found respondents Madeja and Florendo guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, for their participation in the unauthorized removal of the said pages.59
Thus, following the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,60 the
OAS made the following recommendations:61
a. that Eddie V. Delgado, casual Utility Worker II, be found guilty of grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having been directly
involved in the unauthorized taking of three (3) pages from the Agenda with Action dated
May 30, 2011, and be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except
accrued leave credits, if he has any, and with prohibition from reemployment in any
branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or
controlled corporations; and
b. that Joseph Lawrence M. Madeja, Clerk IV, and Wilfredo A. Florendo, Utility Worker
II, be found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and be
suspended for six (6) months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. The period of ninety
(90) days preventive suspension they have thus served so far shall be credited to them in
the service of said penalty. (Emphasis supplied)
OUR RULING
We modify the findings and recommendations of the OAS.
We begin with the obvious and from the admissions during the initial investigation when there
was yet not enough time for device and advice. Respondents Madeja and Florendo asked
respondent Delgado for a copy of several items included in the 30 May 2011 Agenda. Acceding
to the request, respondent Delgado removed pages 58, 59 and 70 from a copy of the Agenda
entrusted to him for stitching and gave them to respondents Madeja and Delgado. Veritably, the
acts of respondents complement each other; they are but completions of a common Grave
Misconduct.
Respondents Complicity
It must be stressed that insofar as the involvement of respondent Delgado is concerned, there is
no longer any issue to be resolved. Respondent Delgado has been consistent with his admission
of involvement during both the initial investigation in the OCC-SD and the formal investigation
of the OAS.62 It is, therefore, already settled fact that respondent Delgado was the person who
actually removed the pages 58, 59 and 70 from the subject Agenda.
What remains in dispute is the participation of respondents Madeja and Florendo in the removal
of the pages in the subject Agenda. As stated earlier, both respondents Madeja and Florendo
vehemently denied having been involved in the taking of the missing Agenda pages during the
formal investigation of the OAS.63 This sharply contradicts their reported admission of
complicity during the initial investigation conducted by the OCC-SD.
The evidence at hand, however, point out that respondents Madeja and Florendo, indeed,
connived with respondent Delgado in removing the three (3) pages from a copy of the 30 May
2011 Agenda. The denial of respondents Madeja and Florendo, in a complete turnaround from an
earlier admission, is unavailing as against the positive, straightforward and consistent statements
of respondent Delgado.
First. Respondent Delgados statements, not only in the initial investigation but also in the formal
investigation, were unwavering in their implication of respondents Madeja and Florendo.
Respondent Delgado categorically identified respondents Madeja and Florendo as the persons
who induced him to remove several pages from a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda and
thereafter obtained them.64 Thus, as respondent Delgado relates during the formal
investigation:65
Q: Itong nangyaring insidente noong June 2, 2011, ano ang naging partisipasyon mo dito?
A: Ganito po ang pangyayari, kasi po lumapit sa akin ang kasama ko.
Q: Sinong kasama mo?
A: Si Florendo at si Madeja.
Q: Willie Florendo at si..?
A: Joseph Madeja.
Q: Okay.
A: Nung time pong yun wala naman pong .. kasi po pinatahi lang sa akin yun.
Q: Ang alin?
A: Yung agenda po.
Q: Pinatahi sa yo yung agenda?
A: Opo.
Q: Pagkatapos?
A: Wala po sa loob ko. Tinanong nila ako kung nandyan pa ang agenda, sabi ko, "Ganun,
ganun." Yung May 30, "Tingnan mo nga kung andyan yung item ganun. Wala naman sa akin,"
sabi ko, "Andito," sabi ko. "Bigyan mo nga ako," sabing ganun.
xxx
Q: Paano mong ginawa yung pagbibigay ng copy ng agenda kina Madeja?
A: Tiningnan ko lang po yun kung anong item tapos inabot ko lang sa kanila.
xxx
Q: Yung items na yun ay nakapaloob dito sa pages 58, 59 and 70 atyun ang binigay mo sa
kanila?
A: Opo.
xxx
Q: Kung ang nawawalang pages ay tatlo, ibig mong sabihin, tatlo din ang tinanggal?
A: Usually, Maam, yung hiningi po ni Joseph Madeja, mali ang item na naibigay ko sa kanya.
Hindi niya na po naibalik sa akin inilagay lang niya dun sa mga scratch ko. Nagkamali po ng ano
Q: Kumbaga ang intended page ay nasa page 5 & 7, ang naibigay mo page 3?
A: Parang ganito po, may item po yan kasi. Kunwari, number 1,2,3,4,5,6 may number pa ng
item ang naibigay ko sa kanya ay yung number hindi yung item. Kunwari, sabi ninyo page 70,
ang naibigay ko sa kanya hindi yung mismong item number kaya ang sabi niya, "Mali ito."
xxx
Q: Noong mali ang page na ibinigay mo, ibinalik ba sa yo o hindi?
A: Inilagay na lang po sa side ko, sabi niya, "Mali ang ibinigay mo." Kasi binigyan na ako ni
[Ms. Puno] ng kopya. nung kulang kaya hindi ko na inano yun.
Q: Hindi ka ba man lang nag-take ng initiative na kahit papano ay xerox lang ang ibigay mo sa
kanila?
A: Hindi po kasi pwedeng pag ibinigay mo sa nag-se-xerox..
Q: Kasi makikita niya?
A: Opo.
Q: So, makikita niya at hinayaan mong ma-discover na may nawawalang pahina, tama ba ako?
A: Tama po.
Q: In, effect, ang ini-establish ko ngayon ay magkaka-kuntyaba kayo?
A: Yun na din po ang magiging ano nun eh.
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Second. It was never shown that respondent Delgado was motivated by any ill will in implicating
respondents Madeja and Florendo. As a witness, the credibility of respondent Delgado remained
unsullied. We find his statements worthy of belief.66
Third. The unsubstantiated denial of respondents, therefore, falters in light of the direct and
positive statements of respondent Delgado. The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless
supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of
truthful witnesses.67
Respondents Administrative Liability
Having established the involvement of each respondent in the removal of the pages of the subject
Agenda, We next determine their administrative culpability.
We lay first the premises:
1. As stated beforehand, the 30 May 2011 Agenda contain an itemized list of cases taken
up by the Courts Second Division during the sessions held on the concerned date and the
handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio noting the specific actions adopted by the
division on each case.68 Under Rule 11, Section 5 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court,69 such a document is considered confidential.
2. Owing to the confidential nature of the contents of an Agenda, the OCC-SD follows a
very strict procedure in handling them.70 Thus, as can be gathered from the factual
narration, only a few specified personnel within the OCC-SD are authorized to have
access to an Agenda e.g., only Ms. Puno is authorized to receive and open; only four
(4) persons are authorized to photocopy.71
3. None of the respondents is entitled to a copy of an Agenda.72 None of them has any
authority to be informed of the contents of an Agenda, much less to obtain a page
therefrom.73
a. Respondent Delgado holds a casual appointment74 as a Utility Worker II in the

OCC-SD. His primary work in the said office is to stitch pleadings, records and
other court documents.75
b. Respondent Madeja holds a permanent appointment as Clerk IV in the OCC-

SD. His primary task in the said office is the inventory of case rollos.76
c. Respondent Florendo holds a permanent appointment as Utility II in the OCC-
SD. As such, he performs various duties in the office like receiving and delivering
case rollos, releasing of agenda reports and stitching court records.77
Given the foregoing, We find that there are adequate grounds to hold respondents
administratively liable.
First. The act of the respondents in causing the removal of several pages in a copy of the 30 May
2011 Agenda is a malevolent transgression of their duties as court personnelparticularly, as
employees detailed at the OCC-SD. The act is unauthorized and a blatant disregard of the
standard operating procedures observed by the office in handling confidential documents, such
as the Agenda. It compromised the ability of the OCC-SD to efficiently perform its functions and
also imperiled the environment of confidentiality the office is supposed to be clothed with.
As court employees, respondents clearly committed a willful breach of the trust reposed upon
them by this Court. They thereby violated Sections 1 and 3, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel,78 to wit:
CANON IV
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with
diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their
office during working hours.
xxx.
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not alter, falsify, destroy or mutilate any record within their
control.
This provision does not prohibit amendment, correction or expungement of records or documents
pursuant to a court order. (Emphasis supplied)
Second. The acts of the respondents fall squarely under the offense Grave Misconduct. In Valera
v. Ombudsman,79 We defined the offense as follows:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves
any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or disregard of
established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence.80 (Emphasis supplied)
Rule IV, Section 52(A) (3) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases81 in the Civil
Service, on the other hand, classifies Grave Misconduct as a grave offense punishable with
Dismissal even in its first commission.
Third. The fact that respondents Madeja and Florendo merely induced the removal of, but did not
actually remove, the missing pages from the subject Agenda, do not make their liability any less
than that of respondent Delgado. After all, the evidence in this case adequately shows the
existence of connivance among the respondents.
The evidence in this case establishes that respondent Delgado came to remove the missing pages
from the subject Agenda because he acceded to the request of respondents Madeja and
Florendo.82 The removal of the Agenda pages was undoubtedly done for the benefit of
respondents Madeja and Florendo.
Verily, the cajoling employed by respondents Madeja and Florendo is as much a part of the
Grave Misconduct as the act of removing the Agenda pages itself. The proposal is intricately
linked and inseparable with the submission. As to their liability, therefore, Respondents Madeja
and Floredo must stand in equal footing with respondent Delgado.1avvphi1
Fourth. This Court had already held that the conduct and behavior of all officials and employees
of an office involved in the administration of justice, from the highest judicial official to the
lowest personnel, requires them to live up to the strictest standard of honesty, integrity and
uprightness in order to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.83 Court employees, as the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel puts it, "serve as sentinels of justice" and "any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
peoples confidence in it."84
In the case at bench, the respondents palpably failed to meet the high standard expected from
them as court employees. Their conduct is neither excusable nor tolerable. The respondents,
through their acts, have proven themselves to be unfit for continued employment in the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the respondents Eddie V. Delgado, Utility
Worker II, Joseph Lawrence M. Madeja, Clerk IV and Wilfredo A. Florendo, Utility Worker II,
all of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Second Division are hereby DISMISSED from the
service, with FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS, except accrued leave benefits, and WITH
PREJUDICE to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Govt of Hong kong Special Administrative Region vs Olalia Jr.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,

represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case
No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz,
private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to
vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner.
The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution
granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of
Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took
effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention
of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request
for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19
an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of
habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest
void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became
final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo
Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which
was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition
for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No.
99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying
his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20,
2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The
petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of
the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if
they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further
desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees
from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the
corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that
there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a
right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh
process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired,
thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the
first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective
extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge,

RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court,
speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person
has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v.
Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption
of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec.
18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail
merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this
Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international
sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine
that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards
the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II
resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under
the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the
individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states
gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the
right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While
not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v.
Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under
the Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In
1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined
therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention
and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this
Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in
light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in
order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty
is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right
to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not
involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to
persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold
human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for
failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal.
After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To
refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to
law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the
machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation
proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled
that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released
on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff
relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed
in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is
not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at
the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction,
and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a
criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is
not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may
follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to
secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it
entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This
is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the
"immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of
urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and
extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a

criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint
of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
"Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of
time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In
other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of
any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted
the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there
is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under
the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of
extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption
that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee
thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights
to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or
denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard
of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the
standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a
flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate
detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
People vs Fontanilla
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012

vs.
ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful
aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke
self-defense as a justifying circumstance.
The accused prays for the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006,1
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for murder handed down by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.
Antecedents
At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in
Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head
with a piece of wood called bellang.2 Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him
again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only
because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him
to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais
was pronounced dead on arrival.3
On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for
murder against Fontanilla in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 29th day of October 1996, along the Provincial Road at Barangay Butubut
Oeste, Municipality of Balaoan, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and strike with a long coconut night stick and thereafter hit with a stone the head of Jose
Olais, thereby inflicting on the latter head wounds which caused the death of the latter, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The accused pleaded not guilty.
The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed that they were only
several meters away from Olais when Fontanilla struck him; that they shouted at Fontanilla, who
fled because of them; and that they were able to see and to identify Fontanilla as the attacker of
their father-in-law because the area was then well-lighted.5
Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais, attested
that her post-mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture on the left temporal
area of the skull, causing his death. She opined that a hard object or a severe force had hit the
skull of the victim more than once, considering that the skull had been already fragmented and
the fractures on the skull had been radiating.6
SPO1 Abraham Valdez, who investigated the slaying and apprehended Fontanilla, declared that
he had gone looking for Fontanilla in his house along with other policemen; that Fontanillas
father had denied that he was around; that their search of the house had led to the arrest of
Fontanilla inside; and that they had then brought him to the police station.7 Valdez further
declared that Fontanilla asserted that he would only speak in court.8
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been
standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk,
had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had
continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert,
had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking
up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victims head, causing the latter to fall face
down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was
no longer moving.9
Fontanillas daughter Marilou corroborated her fathers version.10
On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged, and disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring he
accused ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO @ Carlos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 6, and thereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount
of Fifty Thousand Pesos ( P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.11
The RTC rejected Fontanillas plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to
employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death"12 due to the
victim attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury
despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment,
and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered, having been
immediately released from the hospital;13 that Fontanillas failure to give any statement at the
time he surrendered to the police was inconsistent with his plea of self-defense;14 and that the
manner of attack against Olais established the attendance of treachery.15
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable
element of unlawful aggression; that his failure to report the incident to the police at the earliest
opportunity, or even after he was taken into custody, negated the plea of self-defense; and that
the nature of the victims injury was a significant physical proof to show a determined effort on
the part of Fontanilla to kill him, and not just to defend himself.16
The CA ruled that treachery was attendant, because Olais had no inkling that a fatal blow was
looming upon him, and because Fontanilla was inconspicuously hidden from view when he
struck Olais from behind, rendering Olais unable to retaliate.17
Nonetheless, the CA rectified the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death to only reclusion
perpetua upon noting the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and disposed as
follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Balaoan, La Union, Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 2561 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that appellant Fontanilla is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. No cost.
SO ORDERED.18
The accused is now appealing, insisting that the CA erred because:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE.
II.
EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE

TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WHEN THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
III.
FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

APPRECIATING THE SPECIAL PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by

clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.19 Unlawful aggression is the
indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is
established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.20 The character of the
element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in
defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the
accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a)
there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or,
at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending
or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be
merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another
with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand
to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming
to throw a pot.21
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused
the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide
admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his
criminal liability.22 Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla
came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court,23
and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and
satisfactory proof.24 He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own
evidence, because the Prosecutions evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of
his admission of the killing.25 Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not
commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanillas act of hitting the victims
head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an
unreasonable response to the victims fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from the
aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of
Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician of the
hospital did not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to him.26 In
contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the
head more than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by
Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill,
not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be significant that
the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not
just to defend himself.27
The CA and the RTC found that treachery was attendant. We concur. Fontanilla had appeared
out of nowhere to strike Olais on the head, first with the wooden stick, and then with a big stone,
causing Olais to fall to the ground facedown. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack
effectively denied to Olais the ability to defend himself or to retaliate against Fontanilla.
The imposition of reclusion perpetua by the CA was warranted under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code,28 which prescribes reclusion perpetua to death as the penalty for murder. Under the
rules on the
application of indivisible penalties in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,29 the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua is imposed if there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances.
Yet, the Court points out that the RTC erroneously imposed "RECLUSION PERPETUA TO
DEATH" as the penalty. Such imposition was bereft of legal justification, for reclusion perpetua
and death, being indivisible, should not be imposed as a compound, alternative or successive
penalty for a single felony. In short, the imposition of one precluded the imposition of the other.
The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death
indemnity of P50,000.00. When death occurs due to a crime, the damages to be awarded may
include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (b) actual or compensatory
damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.30
Accordingly, the CA and the RTC should also have granted moral damages in addition to the
death indemnity, which were of different kinds.31 The death indemnity compensated the loss of
life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental
anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of Olais.32 Although mental anguish
and emotional sufferings of the surviving family were not quantifiable with mathematical
precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of the
deceased to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, P50,000.00 should be
reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,33 we are bound to
award despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional
suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human nature and experience having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the
part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when
a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing
not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his
love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has
been done to them.341wphi1
Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of
the victim to temperate damages. The victims wife testified about her familys incurring funeral
expenses of P36,000.00, but only P18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is already settled that
when actual damages substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than P25,000.00, temperate
damages of at least P25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser amount
actually proved by receipts. It would obviously be unfair to the heirs of the victim to deny them
compensation by way of actual damages despite their honest attempt to prove their actual
expenses by receipts (but succeeding only in showing expenses lower than P25,000.00 in
amount).35 Indeed, the heirs should not be left in a worse situation than the heirs of another
victim who might be nonetheless allowed temperate damages of P25,000.00 despite not having
presented any receipts at all. With the victims wife having proved P18,000.00 worth of
expenses, granting his heirs temperate damages of P25,000.00, not only P18,000.00, is just and
proper. Not to do so would foster a travesty of basic fairness.
The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of
the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances."36 The Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages."37 In light of such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the
entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages on account of the attendance of
treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as
such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. As well explained in People v. Catubig:38
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of
the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages
within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For the purpose, P30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages,39 for a lesser
amount would not serve result in genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court of
Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, by ordering accused Alfonso
Fontanilla y Obaldo to pay to the heirs of Jose Olais P25,000.00 as temperate damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the P50,000.00 as death indemnity and the
P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on such amounts from the finality
of the judgment.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
iv. Preponderance of Evidence
PCIB vs Balmaceda
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 158143 September 21, 2011
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N. RAMOS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by the Philippine Commercial International
Bank2 (Bank or PCIB), to reverse and set aside the decision3 dated April 29, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69955. The CA overturned the September 22, 2000 decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 148, in Civil Case No. 93-3181, which
held respondent Rolando Ramos liable to PCIB for the amount of P895,000.00.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On September 10, 1993, PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before
the RTC against Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. In its
complaint, PCIB alleged that between 1991 and 1993, Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his
position as branch manager, fraudulently obtained and encashed 31 Managers checks in the total
amount of Ten Million Seven Hundred Eighty Two Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P10,782,150.00).
On February 28, 1994, PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint to implead
Rolando Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmacedas alleged
fraud. PCIB also increased the number of fraudulently obtained and encashed Managers checks
to 34, in the total amount of Eleven Million Nine Hundred Thirty Seven Thousand One Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P11,937,150.00). The RTC granted this motion.
Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other hand, Ramos
filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmacedas scheme. According to Ramos, he is a
reputable businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and
Balmaceda was one of his clients. Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment
for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the
source of Balmacedas money.
THE RTC DECISION
On September 22, 2000, the RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB, with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants as follows:
1. Ordering defendant Antonio Balmaceda to pay the amount of P11,042,150.00 with

interest thereon at the legal rate from [the] date of his misappropriation of the said
amount until full restitution shall have been made[.]
2. Ordering defendant Rolando Ramos to pay the amount of P895,000.00 with interest at
the legal rate from the date of misappropriation of the said amount until full restitution
shall have been made[.]
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff moral damages in the sum of P500,000.00 and
attorneys fees in the amount of ten (10%) percent of the total misappropriated amounts
sought to be recovered.
4. Plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
From the evidence presented, the RTC found that Balmaceda, by taking undue advantage of his
position and authority as branch manager of the Sta. Cruz, Manila branch of PCIB, successfully
obtained and misappropriated the banks funds by falsifying several commercial documents. He
accomplished this by claiming that he had been instructed by one of the Banks corporate clients
to purchase Managers checks on its behalf, with the value of the checks to be debited from the
clients corporate bank account. First, he would instruct the Bank staff to prepare the application
forms for the purchase of Managers checks, payable to several persons. Then, he would forge
the signature of the clients authorized representative on these forms and sign the forms as
PCIBs approving officer. Finally, he would have an authorized officer of PCIB issue the
Managers checks. Balmaceda would subsequently ask his subordinates to release the Managers
checks to him, claiming that the client had requested that he deliver the checks.5 After receiving
the Managers checks, he encashed them by forging the signatures of the payees on the checks.
In ruling that Ramos acted in collusion with Balmaceda, the RTC noted that although the
Managers checks payable to Ramos were crossed checks, Balmaceda was still able to encash the
checks.6 After Balmaceda encashed three of these Managers checks, he deposited most of the
money into Ramos account.7 The RTC concluded that from the P11,937,150.00 that Balmaceda
misappropriated from PCIB, P895,000.00 actually went to Ramos. Since the RTC disbelieved
Ramos allegation that the sum of money deposited into his Savings Account (PCIB, Pasig
branch) were proceeds from the sale of fighting cocks, it held Ramos liable to pay PCIB the
amount of P895,000.00.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence
existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latters fraudulent manipulations.8
According to the CA, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee in some of the
Managers checks does not suffice to prove that Ramos was complicit in Balmacedas fraudulent
scheme. It observed that other persons were also named as payees in the checks that Balmaceda
acquired and encashed, and PCIB only chose to go after Ramos. With PCIBs failure to prove
Ramos actual participation in Balmacedas fraud, no legal and factual basis exists to hold him
liable.
The CA also found that PCIB acted illegally in freezing and debiting P251,910.96 from Ramos
bank account. The CA thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is granted. The Decision of the trial court rendered on September 22,
2000[,] insofar as appellant Ramos is concerned, is SET ASIDE, and the complaint below
against him is DISMISSED.
Appellee is hereby ordered to release the amount of P251,910.96 to appellant Ramos plus
interest at [the] legal rate computed from September 30, 1993 until appellee shall have fully
complied therewith.
Appellee is likewise ordered to pay appellant Ramos the following:
a) P50,000.00 as moral damages
b) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
c) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.9
THE PETITION
In the present petition, PCIB avers that:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE

TO HOLD THAT RESPONDENT RAMOS ACTED IN COMPLICITY WITH
RESPONDENT BALMACEDA
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO

RELEASE THE AMOUNT OF P251,910.96 TO RESPONDENT RAMOS AND TO
PAY THE LATTER MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS
FEES10
PCIB contends that the circumstantial evidence shows that Ramos had knowledge of, and acted
in complicity with Balmaceda in, the perpetuation of the fraud. Ramos explanation that he is a
businessman and that he received the Managers checks as payment for the fighting cocks he
sold to Balmaceda is unconvincing, given the large sum of money involved. While Ramos
presented evidence that he is a reputable businessman, this evidence does not explain why the
Managers checks were made payable to him in the first place.
PCIB maintains that it had the right to freeze and debit the amount of P251,910.96 from Ramos
bank account, even without his consent, since legal compensation had taken place between them
by operation of law. PCIB debited Ramos bank account, believing in good faith that Ramos was
not entitled to the proceeds of the Managers checks and was actually privy to the fraud
perpetrated by Balmaceda. PCIB cannot thus be held liable for moral and exemplary damages.
OUR RULING
We partly grant the petition.
At the outset, we observe that the petition raises mainly questions of fact whose resolution
requires the re-examination of the evidence on record. As a general rule, petitions for review on
certiorari only involve questions of law.11 By way of exception, however, we can delve into
evidence and the factual circumstance of the case when the findings of fact in the tribunals below
(in this case between those of the CA and of the RTC) are conflicting. When the exception
applies, we are given latitude to review the evidence on record to decide the case with finality.12
Ramos participation in Balmacedas scheme not proven
From the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, we find it beyond question that
Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager of PCIBs Sta. Cruz, Manila
branch, was able to apply for and obtain Managers checks drawn against the bank account of
one of PCIBs clients. The unsettled question is whether Ramos, who received a portion of the
money that Balmaceda took from PCIB, should also be held liable for the return of this money to
the Bank.
PCIB insists that it presented sufficient evidence to establish that Ramos colluded with
Balmaceda in the scheme to fraudulently secure Managers checks and to misappropriate their
proceeds. Since Ramos defense anchored on mere denial of any participation in Balmacedas
wrongdoing is an intrinsically weak defense, it was error for the CA to exonerate Ramos from
any liability.
In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered
in opposition.13 This Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.,14 defined "preponderance of
evidence" in the following manner:
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence"
or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the
last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the
onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment, subject to the overriding rule
that the burden to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff. For the defendant, an
affirmative defense is one that is not merely a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's
cause of action, but one which, if established, will constitute an "avoidance" of the claim.15
Thus, PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive assertion that
Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latters scheme to defraud the Bank. In
PCIBs estimation, it successfully accomplished this through the submission of the following
evidence:
[1] Exhibits "A," "D," "PPPP," "QQQQ," and "RRRR" and their submarkings, the
application forms for MCs, show that [these MCs were applied for in favor of Ramos;]
[2] Exhibits "K," "N," "SSSS," "TTTT," and "UUUU" and their submarkings prove that
the MCs were issued in favor of x x x Ramos[; and]
[3] [T]estimonies of the witness for [PCIB].16
We cannot accept these submitted pieces of evidence as sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof
that PCIB carries as plaintiff.
On its face, all that PCIBs evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos name as a payee
when he filled up the application forms for the Managers checks. But, as the CA correctly
observed, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee on some of the Managers checks
is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos was complicit in Balmacedas fraud; a number of
other people were made payees on the other Managers checks yet PCIB never alleged them to
be liable, nor did the Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos participation that
would justify his separate treatment from the others. Also, while Ramos is Balmacedas brother-
in-law, their relationship is not sufficient, by itself, to render Ramos liable, absent concrete proof
of his actual participation in the fraudulent scheme.
Moreover, the evidence on record clearly shows that Balmaceda acted on his own when he
applied for the Managers checks against the bank account of one of PCIBs clients, as well as
when he encashed the fraudulently acquired Managers checks.
Mrs. Elizabeth Costes, the Area Manager of PCIB at the time of the relevant events, testified that
Balmaceda committed all the acts necessary to obtain the unauthorized Managers checks from
filling up the application form by forging the signature of the clients representative, to forging
the signatures of the payees in order to encash the checks. As Mrs. Costes stated in her
testimony:
Q: I am going into [these] particular instances where you said that Mr. Balmaceda [has] been
making unauthorized withdrawals from particular account of a client or a client of yours at Sta.
Cruz branch. Would you tell us how he effected his unauthorized withdrawals?
A: He prevailed upon the domestic remittance clerk to prepare the application of a Managers
check which [has] been debited to a clients account. This particular Managers check will be
payable to a certain individual thru his account as the instruction of the client.
Q: What was your findings in so far as the particular alleged instruction of a client is concerned?
A: We found out that he forged the signature of the client.
Q: On that particular application?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Showing to you several applications for Managers Check previously attached as Annexes
"A, B, C, D and E["] of the complaint. Could you please tell us where is that particular alleged
signature of a client applying for the Managers check which you claimed to have been forged by
Mr. Balmaceda?
A: Here sir.
xxxx
Q: After the accomplishment of this application form as you stated Mrs. witness, do you know
what happened to the application form?
A: Before that application form is processed it goes to several stages. Here for example this was
signed supposed to be by the client and his signature representing that, he certified the signature
based on their records to be authentic.
Q: When you said he to whom are you referring to?
A: Mr. Balmaceda. And at the same time he approved the transaction.
xxxx
Q: Do you know if the corresponding checks applied for in the application forms were issued?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Could you please show us where these checks are now, the one applied for in Exhibit "A"
which is in the amount of P150,000.00, where is the corresponding check?
A: Rolando Ramos dated December 26, 1991 and one of the signatories with higher authority,
this is Mr. Balmacedas signature.
Q: In other words he is likewise approving signatory to the Managers check?
A: Yes sir. This is an authority that the check [has] been encashed.
Q: In other words this check issued to Rolando Ramos dated December 26, 1991 is a cross check
but nonetheless he allowed to encash by granting it.
Could you please show us?
ATTY. PACES: Witness pointing to an initial of the defendant Antonio Balmaceda, the notation
cross check.
A: And this is his signature.
xxxx
Q: How about the check corresponding to Exhibit E-2 which is an application for P125,000.00
for a certain Rolando Ramos. Do you have the check?
A: Yes sir.
ATTY. PACES: Witness producing a check dated December 19, 1991 the amount of
P125,000.00 payable to certain Rolando Ramos.
Q: Can you tell us whether the same modus operandi was ad[o]pted by Mr. Balmaceda in so far
as he is concerned?
A: Yes sir he is also the right signer and he authorized the cancellation of the cross check.17
(emphasis ours)
xxxx
Q: These particular checks [Mrs.] witness in your findings, do you know if Mr. Balmaceda [has]
again any participation in these checks?
A: He is also the right signer and approved officer and he was authorized to debit on file.
xxxx
Q: And do you know if these particular checks marked as Exhibit G-2 to triple FFF were
subsequently encashed?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Were you able to find out who encashed?
A: Mr. Balmaceda himself and besides he approved the encashment because of the signature that
he allowed the encashment of the check.
xxxx
Q: Do you know if this particular person having in fact withdraw of received the proceeds of
[these] particular checks, the payee?
A: No sir.
Q: It was all Mr. Balmaceda dealing with you?
A: Yes sir.
Q: In other words it would be possible that Mr. Balmaceda himself gotten the proceeds of the
checks by forging the payees signature?
A: Yes sir.18 (emphases ours)
Mrs. Nilda Laforteza, the Commercial Account Officer of PCIBs Sta. Cruz, Manila branch at
the time the events of this case occurred, confirmed Mrs. Costes testimony by stating that it was
Balmaceda who forged Ramos signature on the Managers checks where Ramos was the payee,
so as to encash the amounts indicated on the checks.19 Mrs. Laforteza also testified that Ramos
never went to the PCIB, Sta. Cruz, Manila branch to encash the checks since Balmaceda was the
one who deposited the checks into Ramos bank account. As revealed during Mrs. Lafortezas
cross-examination:
Q: Mrs. Laforteza, these checks that were applied for by Mr. Balmaceda, did you ever see my
client go to the bank to encash these checks?
A: No it is Balmaceda who is depositing in his behalf.
Q: Did my client ever call up the bank concerning this amount?
A: Yes he is not going to call PCIBank Sta. Cruz branch because his account is maintained at
Pasig.
Q: So Mr. Balmaceda was the one who just remitted or transmitted the amount that you claimed
[was sent] to the account of my client?
A: Yes.20 (emphases ours)
Even Mrs. Rodelia Nario, presented by PCIB as its rebuttal witness to prove that Ramos
encashed a Managers check for P480,000.00, could only testify that the money was deposited
into Ramos PCIB bank account. She could not attest that Ramos himself presented the
Managers check for deposit in his bank account.21 These testimonies clearly dispute PCIBs
theory that Ramos was instrumental in the encashment of the Managers checks.
We also find no reason to doubt Ramos claim that Balmaceda deposited these large sums of
money into his bank account as payment for the fighting cocks that Balmaceda purchased from
him. Ramos presented two witnesses Vicente Cosculluela and Crispin Gadapan who testified
that Ramos previously engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and that
Balmaceda was one of Ramos biggest clients.
Quoting from the RTC decision, PCIB stresses that Ramos own witness and business partner,
Cosculluela, testified that the biggest net profit he and Ramos earned from a single transaction
with Balmaceda amounted to no more than P100,000.00, for the sale of approximately 45
fighting cocks.22 In PCIBs view, this testimony directly contradicts Ramos assertion that he
received approximately P400,000.00 from his biggest transaction with Balmaceda. To PCIB, the
testimony also renders questionable Ramos assertion that Balmaceda deposited large amounts of
money into his bank account as payment for the fighting cocks.
On this point, we find that PCIB misunderstood Cosculluelas testimony. A review of the
testimony shows that Cosculluela specifically referred to the net profit that they earned from the
sale of the fighting cocks;23 PCIB apparently did not take into account the capital, transportation
and other expenses that are components of these transactions. Obviously, in sales transactions,
the buyer has to pay not only for the value of the thing sold, but also for the shipping costs and
other incidental costs that accompany the acquisition of the thing sold. Thus, while the biggest
net profit that Ramos and Cosculluela earned in a single transaction amounted to no more than
P100,000.00,24 the inclusion of the actual acquisition costs of the fighting cocks, the
transportation expenses (i.e., airplane tickets from Bacolod or Zamboanga to Manila) and other
attendant expenses could account for the P400,000.00 that Balmaceda deposited into Ramos
bank account.
Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos participation in Balmacedas scheme, it was not even
necessary for Ramos to provide an explanation for the money he received from Balmaceda. Even
if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant, a
judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiffs favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain
his cause of action;25 to reiterate, a preponderance of evidence as defined must be established to
achieve this result.
PCIB itself at fault as employer
In considering this case, one point that cannot be disregarded is the significant role that PCIB
played which contributed to the perpetration of the fraud. We cannot ignore that Balmaceda
managed to carry out his fraudulent scheme primarily because other PCIB employees failed to
carry out their assigned tasks flaws imputable to PCIB itself as the employer.
Ms. Analiza Vega, an accounting clerk, teller and domestic remittance clerk working at the
PCIB, Sta. Cruz, Manila branch at the time of the incident, testified that Balmaceda broke the
Banks protocol when he ordered the Banks employees to fill up the application forms for the
Managers checks, to be debited from the bank account of one of the banks clients, without
providing the necessary Authority to Debit from the client.26 PCIB also admitted that these
Managers checks were subsequently released to Balmaceda, and not to the clients
representative, based solely on Balmacedas word that the client had tasked him to deliver these
checks.27
Despite Balmacedas gross violations of bank procedures mainly in the processing of the
applications for Managers checks and in the releasing of the Managers checks Balmacedas
co-employees not only turned a blind eye to his actions, but actually complied with his
instructions. In this way, PCIBs own employees were unwitting accomplices in Balmacedas
fraud.
Another telling indicator of PCIBs negligence is the fact that it allowed Balmaceda to encash
the Managers checks that were plainly crossed checks. A crossed check is one where two
parallel lines are drawn across its face or across its corner.28 Based on jurisprudence, the crossing
of a check has the following effects: (a) the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the
bank; (b) the check may be negotiated only once to the one who has an account with the bank;
and (c) the act of crossing the check serves as a warning to the holder that the check has been
issued for a definite purpose and he must inquire if he received the check pursuant to this
purpose; otherwise, he is not a holder in due course.29 In other words, the crossing of a check is a
warning that the check should be deposited only in the account of the payee. When a check is
crossed, it is the duty of the collecting bank to ascertain that the check is only deposited to the
payees account.30 In complete disregard of this duty, PCIBs systems allowed Balmaceda to
encash 26 Managers checks which were all crossed checks, or checks payable to the "payees
account only."
The General Banking Law of 200031 requires of banks the highest standards of integrity and
performance. The banking business is impressed with public interest. Of paramount importance
is the trust and confidence of the public in general in the banking industry. Consequently, the
diligence required of banks is more than that of a Roman pater familias or a good father of a
family.32 The highest degree of diligence is expected.33
While we appreciate that Balmaceda took advantage of his authority and position as the branch
manager to commit these acts, this circumstance cannot be used to excuse the manner the Bank
through its employees handled its clients bank accounts and thereby ignored established bank
procedures at the branch managers mere order. This lapse is made all the more glaring by
Balmacedas repetition of his modus operandi 33 more times in a period of over one year by the
Banks own estimation. With this kind of record, blame must be imputed on the Bank itself and
its systems, not solely on the weakness or lapses of individual employees.
Principle of unjust enrichment not applicable
PCIB maintains that even if Ramos did not collude with Balmaceda, it still has the right to
recover the amounts unjustly received by Ramos pursuant to the principle of unjust enrichment.
This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
To have a cause of action based on unjust enrichment, we explained in University of the

Philippines v. Philab Industries, Inc.34 that:
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or
obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense
that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally
prove that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not
entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep
the benefit. Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make
remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or
equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit
by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey.
Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.35 (emphasis ours)
Ramos cannot be held liable to PCIB on account of unjust enrichment simply because he
received payments out of money secured by fraud from PCIB. To hold Ramos accountable, it is
necessary to prove that he received the money from Balmaceda, knowing that he (Ramos) was
not entitled to it. PCIB must also prove that Ramos, at the time that he received the money from
Balmaceda, knew that the money was acquired through fraud. Knowledge of the fraud is the link
between Ramos and PCIB that would obligate Ramos to return the money based on the principle
of unjust enrichment.
However, as the evidence on record indicates, Ramos accepted the deposits that Balmaceda
made directly into his bank account, believing that these deposits were payments for the fighting
cocks that Balmaceda had purchased. Significantly, PCIB has not presented any evidence
proving that Ramos participated in, or that he even knew of, the fraudulent sources of
Balmacedas funds.
PCIB illegally froze and debited Ramos assets
We also find that PCIB acted illegally in freezing and debiting Ramos bank account. In BPI
Family Bank v. Franco,36 we cautioned against the unilateral freezing of bank accounts by banks,
noting that:
More importantly, [BPI Family Bank] does not have a unilateral right to freeze the accounts of
Franco based on its mere suspicion that the funds therein were proceeds of the multi-million peso
scam Franco was allegedly involved in. To grant [BPI Family Bank], or any bank for that matter,
the right to take whatever action it pleases on deposits which it supposes are derived from shady
transactions, would open the floodgates of public distrust in the banking industry.37
We see no legal merit in PCIBs claim that legal compensation took place between it and Ramos,
thereby warranting the automatic deduction from Ramos bank account. For legal compensation
to take place, two persons, in their own right, must first be creditors and debtors of each other.38
While PCIB, as the depositary bank, is Ramos debtor in the amount of his deposits, Ramos is
not PCIBs debtor under the evidence the PCIB adduced. PCIB thus had no basis, in fact or in
law, to automatically debit from Ramos bank account.
On the award of damages
Although PCIBs act of freezing and debiting Ramos account is unlawful, we cannot hold PCIB
liable for moral and exemplary damages. Since a contractual relationship existed between Ramos
and PCIB as the depositor and the depositary bank, respectively, the award of moral damages
depends on the applicability of Article 2220 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. [emphasis
ours]
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious commission of a wrong; it partakes of the nature of fraud.39
As the facts of this case bear out, PCIB did not act out of malice or bad faith when it froze
Ramos bank account and subsequently debited the amount of P251,910.96 therefrom. While
PCIB may have acted hastily and without regard to its primary duty to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care and utmost fidelity,40 we find that its actions were propelled
more by the need to protect itself, and not out of malevolence or ill will. One may err, but error
alone is not a ground for granting moral damages.41
We also disallow the award of exemplary damages. Article 2234 of the Civil Code requires a
party to first prove that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before he can
be awarded exemplary damages.1wphi1 Since no reason exists to award moral damages, so too
can there be no reason to award exemplary damages.
We deem it just and equitable, however, to uphold the award of attorneys fees in Ramos favor.
Taking into consideration the time and efforts involved that went into this case, we increase the
award of attorneys fees from P20,000.00 to P75,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. We AFFIRM the decision of the

Court of Appeals dated April 29, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 69955 with the MODIFICATION
that the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of Rolando N. Ramos is DELETED,
while the award of attorneys fees is INCREASED to P75,000.00. Costs against the Philippine
Commercial International Bank.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Dela Llana vs Biong

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182356 December 4, 2013
DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO, Petitioner,

vs.
REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading,
Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Very case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions of fact and questions of law.
Questions of fact are the parties and their counsel to respond to, based on what supporting facts
the legal questions require; the court can only draw conclusion from the facts or evidence
adduced. When the facts are lacking because of the deficiency of presented evidence, then the
court can only draw one conclusion: that the cause must fail for lack of evidentiary support.
The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A dela Llanas(petitioner) petition for review on
certorari1 challenging the February 11, 2008 Decision2 and the March 31, 2008 resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89163.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla
car along North Avenue, Quezon City.4
His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at
the backseat.5
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A
few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the
cars rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the cars rear end collapsed
and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart
from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible
physical injuries.6
The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero.
It stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.7
Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the
name and style of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.8
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left
side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury
became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left
arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine
specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury,
an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla
required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llanas condition
did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy.9
She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric
Flores, in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a
cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores
operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.10
The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the
practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.11
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries,
but Rebecca refused to pay.12
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the
vehicular accident and claimed P150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the
complaint) and an average monthly income of P30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed
for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.13
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no
reasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llanas injury. She
pointed out that Dra. dela Llanas illness became manifest one month and one week from the
date of the vehicular accident. As a counterclaim, she demanded the payment of attorneys fees
and costs of the suit.14
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness15 and Joel as a hostile
witness.16
Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident.
To prove her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20,
2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a
whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations.17
Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the trucks brakes got stuck.18
In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met
several days after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed out that she required
Joel to submit a certification of good moral character as well as barangay, police, and NBI
clearances prior to his employment. She also stressed that she only hired Primero after he
successfully passed the driving skills test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a licensed driver-
mechanic.19
Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he checked the truck in the morning of
March 30, 2000. He affirmed that the truck was in good condition prior to the vehicular accident.
He opined that the cause of the vehicular accident was a damaged compressor. According to him,
the absence of air inside the tank damaged the compressor.20
RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas
whiplash injury to be Joels reckless driving.21
It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the neck
area. It pointed out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was over-
speeding. It maintained that Joel should have driven at a slower pace because road visibility
diminishes at night. He should have blown his horn and warned the car that his brake was stuck
and could have prevented the collision by swerving the truck off the road. It also concluded that
Joel was probably sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been driving for fifteen hours
on that fateful day. The RTC further declared that Joels negligence gave rise to the presumption
that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in Joel's selection and
supervision of Joel. Rebecca was vicariously liable because she was the employer and she
personally chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the collision, she ordered him to deliver
gravel and sand to Muoz Market, Quezon City. The Court concluded that the three elements
necessary to establish Rebeccas liability were present: (1) that the employee was chosen by the
employer, personally or through another; (2) that the services were to be rendered in accordance
with orders which the employer had the authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of
the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. The RTC thus
awarded Dra. dela Llana the amounts of P570,000.00 as actual damages, P250,000.00 as moral
damages, and the cost of the suit.22
CA Ruling
In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela
Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her
whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. Citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of
Appeals,23 it declared that courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there is no
evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact in issue. It
noted that the interval between the date of the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana began
to suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised doubts on
whether Joels reckless driving and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela Llanas injury.
It also declared that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash
injuries. It observed that Dra. dela Llana did not immediately visit a hospital to check if she
sustained internal injuries after the accident. Moreover, her failure to present expert witnesses
was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to the medical certificate. The medical certificate
did not explain how and why the vehicular accident caused the injury.24
The Petition
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court that Nutrimix is inapplicable in the
present case. She stresses that Nutrimix involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the
Civil Code, provisions governing hidden defects. Furthermore, there was absolutely no evidence
in Nutrimix that showed that poisonous animal feeds were sold to the respondents in that case.
As opposed to the respondents in Nutrimix, Dra. dela Llana asserts that she has established by
preponderance of evidence that Joels egligent act was the proximate cause of her whiplash
injury. First, pictures of her damaged car show that the collision was strong. She posits that it
can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the massive impact resulted in her whiplash
injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana
suffered from whiplash injury. Third, her testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury
is credible because she was a surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has probative value. Citing several
cases, she posits that an uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if uncontroverted.25
She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely relates to matters of
common knowledge. She maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine the
causation between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Trial judges are aware of the
fact that whiplash injuries are common in vehicular collisions.
The Respondents Position
In her Comment,26 Rebecca points out that Dra. dela Llana raises a factual issue which is
beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She
maintains that the CAs findings of fact are final and conclusive. Moreover, she stresses that Dra.
dela Llanas arguments are not substantial to merit this Courts consideration.
The Issue
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether Joels reckless driving is the
proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury.
Our Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious.
The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari when the
findings of fact by the lower courts are conflicting
The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court is not a trier of facts. As a general
rule, the CAs findings of fact are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on
appeal. It is not the function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We can only review the
presented evidence, by way of exception, when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the
CA.27
We see this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly examine the relevant evidence
presented before the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict."
Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the
defendant must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.28
These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or omission
of mutual duties that civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from non-
contractual relations of certain members of society to others.29
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the
three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebeccas liability as Joels employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.30
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then
proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.31
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an
action predicated on an employees act or omission may be instituted against the employer who
is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee."32
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual
obligations.33
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater
weight of credible evidence.34
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent
to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joels negligence and
Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance
of evidence that Joels negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury
would not have occurred.36
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation
between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words,
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which
the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below.37
A.
The pictures of the damaged

car only demonstrate the
impact of the collision
Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show that the massive impact of
the collision caused her whiplash injury. We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence
that these pictures show the causation grossly belies common logic. These pictures indeed
demonstrate the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that the whiplash
injury can also be inferred from these pictures.
B.
The medical certificate cannot be

considered because it was
not admitted in evidence
Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit "H" during trial, should not be
considered in resolving this case for the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC
in an order dated September 23, 2004.38
Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution of the case. It
is a basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the
courts in arriving at their judgments.
However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical
certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral
or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.39
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence40 except in very unusual
circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance
and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but
its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules
of Court.41
During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified:
"Q: Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was the reason why you were feeling that
pain in your left arm?
A: Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate, she stated that my condition was due
to a compression of the nerve, which supplied my left arm and my left hand.
Court: By the way, what is the name of this physician, Dra.?
Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist. Atty.
Yusingco: You mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued a medical certificate.
What relation does this medical certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to do with that certificate,
you said was made by Dra. Milla?
Witness: This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made out for me.
Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit H.
Atty. Yusingco: What other medical services were done on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a result of
that feeling, that pain that you felt in your left arm?
Witness: Well, aside from the medications and physical therapy, a re-evaluation of my condition
after three months indicated that I needed surgery.
Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this surgery?
Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck, on my spine.

Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result of that surgical operation?
Witness: Well, the operation was to relieve the compression on my nerve, which did not resolve
by the extensive and prolonged physical therapy that I underwent for more than three
months."42(emphasis ours)
Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical
certificate. However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify
and affirm the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings. We also
point out in this respect that the medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of
causation in fact between Joels reckless driving and Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury. It did not
categorically state that the whiplash injury was a result of the vehicular accident. A perusal of the
medical certificate shows that it only attested to her medical condition, i.e., that she was
suffering from whiplash injury. However, the medical certificate failed to substantially relate the
vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury. Rather, the medical certificate only
chronicled
her medical history and physical examinations.
C.
Dra. dela Llanas opinion that

Joels negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as the plaintiff in this
quasi-delict case, was the lone physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified
as an ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in her testimony
that Joels reckless driving caused her whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a
physician and even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to her
opinion that Joels reckless driving caused her whiplash injury without violating the rules on
evidence. Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness
and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence
regarding:
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the
witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of
a person.43
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.44
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony,
much less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that
the probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert's
opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by
demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic
of his conclusions is founded.45
In the present case, Dra. dela Llanas medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the
reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not
competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we
emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation
on the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.
The Supreme Court cannot take

judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries.
Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial court shows
that Dra. Dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly
shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela Llanas injury. Her
claim that Joels negligence causes her whiplash injury was not established because of the
deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot
take judicial notice that vehicular ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public
knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.46 We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and
judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties pieces of
evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of evidence.
While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the
merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llanas favor. Her claim, unsupported by
prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Candao vs People
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 186659-710 October 19, 2011
ZACARIA A. CANDAO, ABAS A. CANDAO AND ISRAEL B. HARON, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated October 29,
2008 and Resolution2 dated February 20, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) finding the
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The Facts
On August 5, 1993, Chairman Pascasio S. Banaria of the Commission on Audit (COA)

constituted a team of auditors from the central office to conduct an Expanded Special Audit of
the Office of the Regional Governor, Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ORG-
ARMM). State Auditors Heidi L. Mendoza (Team Leader) and Jaime Roxas (Member) were
directed to conduct the said audit under the supervision of Jaime P. Naranjo (State Auditor V).
From August 24 to September 1, 1993, the expanded audit was thus conducted on the financial
transactions and operations of ORG-ARMM for the period July 1992 to March 1993.
As stated in Special Audit Office (SAO) Report No. 93-25 submitted by the audit team, it was
found that illegal withdrawals were made from the depository accounts of the agency through the
issuance of checks payable to the order of petitioner Israel B. Haron (Disbursing Officer II)
without the required disbursement vouchers. The following are the details of the government
accounts and the fifty-two (52) checks3 issued and encashed without proper supporting
documents:
PNB Account No. 370-3208
DATE CHECK NO. SIGNATORIES AMOUNT
ISSUED
December 29, 1992 414431 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00
January 26, 1993 414487 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00
February 2, 1993 414493 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00
February 18, 1993 461803 Israel Haron & Zacaria Candao 500,000.00
March 18, 1993 461932 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00
TOTAL P11,118,570.64
Account No. 844061 (Treasurer of the Philippines)
DATE CHECK NO. SIGNATORIES AMOUNT

ISSUED
January 11, 1993
January 13, 1993 968751 Pandical Santiago & Abas Candao 120,000.00
March 2, 1993 974192 Israel Haron & Zacaria Candao 250,000.00
TOTAL P9,927,000.00
GRAND TOTAL = P21,045,570.64
In a letter dated September 10, 1993, Chairman Banaria demanded from petitioner Haron to
produce and restitute to the ARMM-Regional Treasurer immediately the full amount of
P21,045,570.64 and submit his explanation within seventy-two (72) hours together with the
official receipt issued by the ARMM Regional Treasurer in acknowledgment of such restitution.
On April 17, 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,
filed in the Sandiganbayan criminal cases for malversation of public funds against the following
ORG-ARMM officials/employees: Zacaria A. Candao (Regional Governor), Israel B. Haron
(Disbursing Officer II), Abas A. Candao (Executive Secretary) and Pandical M. Santiago
(Cashier). They were charged with violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, under the following informations with identical allegations except for the varying date,
number and amount of the check involved in each case:
Criminal Case Nos. 24569-24574, 24576-24584, 24593, 24595-246204

(42 counts involving checks in the total amount of P17,190,585.00)
That on or about 29 December 1992, in Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Israel B. Haron, a low-ranking public officer being the Disbursing
Officer of the Office of the Regional Governor, and as such is responsible and accountable for
the funds of the said office in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, in connivance and
in conspiracy with [Abas] Candao, Executive Secretary of the same office, who is a high ranking
officer, while in the performance of their respective official functions, taking advantage of their
official positions, and committing the offense in relation to their respective functions, with gross
abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously withdraw the
amount of P500,000.00 from the depository account of the Office of the Regional Governor thru
the issuance of Check No. 414431 dated 29 December 1992, payable to the order of accused
Israel B. Haron, without the required disbursement voucher and once in possession of the said
amount withdrawn, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, misappropriate, embezzle and
convert to their own personal use and benefit the amount of P500,000.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the aforesaid sum as abovestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case Nos. 24585- 24592 and 245945
(9 counts involving checks in the total amount of P3,854,985.64)
That on or about 18 February 1993, in Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
in conspiracy with Zacaria Candao, Regional Governor of the same office, who is a high ranking
officer, while in the performance of their respective official functions, taking advantage of their
official positions, and committing the offense in relation to their respective functions, with gross
abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously withdraw the
amount of P500,000.00 from the depository account of the Office of the Regional Governor thru
the issuance of Check No. 461803 dated 18 February 1993, payable to the order of accused Israel
B. Haron, without the required disbursement voucher and once in possession of the said amount
withdrawn, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to
their own personal use and benefit the amount of P500,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of
the government in the aforesaid sum as abovestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 245756
That on or about 13 January 1993, in Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
in conspiracy with Pandical Santiago and [Abas] Candao, Cashier and Executive Secretary,
respectively, of the same office, while in the performance of their respective official functions,
taking advantage of their official positions, and committing the offense in relation to their
respective functions, with gross abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously withdraw the amount of P120,000.00 from the depository account of the Office of
the Regional Governor thru the issuance of Check No. 968751 dated 13 January 1993, payable to
the order of accused Israel B. Haron, without the required disbursement voucher and once in
possession of the said amount withdrawn, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
misappropriate, embezzle and convert to their own personal use and benefit the amount of
P120,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid sum as
abovestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At their arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of malversation. In the
meantime, accused Santiago died and consequently the case against him in Criminal Case No.
24575 was dismissed.
The prosecutions lone witness was Heidi L. Mendoza,7 COA State Auditor IV. She testified that
their expanded audit, conducted from August 24 to September 1, 1993, disclosed the illegal
withdrawals of funds from the PNB and Treasury accounts of ORG-ARMM involving 52 checks
issued without the required disbursement vouchers. Specifically, their attention was caught by
the fact that the Report of Checks Issued by the Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDDO)
showed that the subject 52 checks have no assigned voucher numbers. The audit team demanded
for the original of said RCIDDO for the months of December 1992, February and March 1993,
which were supposed to be prepared and submitted by the disbursing officer, but the ORG-
ARMM did not submit the same. In a letter dated August 24, 1993, the COA likewise made a
demand from the Regional Governor through the resident auditor for the production of the
original disbursement vouchers and complete supporting documents of the subject checks.8
In response, the Finance and Budget Management Services of ORG-ARMM informed the audit
team that the vouchers were already submitted to COA Resident Auditor, Supervising State
Auditor IV Rosalinda Gagwis, purportedly under transmittal letters dated March 4 and March 30,
1993. Mendoza then personally verified from Gagwis who denied having received the subject
vouchers and issued a certification to that effect. In a letter dated September 10, 1993, Chairman
Banaria finally demanded for the restitution of the funds illegally withdrawn through the issued
52 checks and to comply with such demand within 72 hours from receipt of said letter. As to the
absence of her signature in the audit report, she explained that she was already on maternity
leave when the interim report (SAO Report No. 93-25) was submitted. However, she, together
with audit team member Jaime B. Roxas executed a Joint Affidavit dated May 17, 1996
regarding their conduct of the expanded audit and their findings and recommendation. Although
Haron submitted copies of disbursement vouchers to the COA receiving clerk, this was made
beyond the 72-hour deadline given to them.9
On cross-examination, witness Mendoza was asked if the audit team had informed the office or
parties concerned that they are going to be audited (entry conference). She replied that this was a
sensitive assignment, recalling that they were threatened after their identities were established
during the earlier audit of the same office such that she had to be brought back to Manila. At that
time, the Regional Governor was accused Candao. Hence, during the expanded audit, the team
was unable to proceed as in ordinary situations. While they did an entry conference during the
previous main audit, they were unable to do so at the time of the expanded audit. Again for
security reasons, the team also did not conduct an exit conference after field work; they would be
risking their lives if they discuss there and then their findings. Due to threat to her life, it was her
team supervisor (Naranjo) and member (Roxas) who personally retrieved the documents in
Cotabato City. She admitted the belated submission of original vouchers (October 29, 1993) to
the COA central office but these are without supporting documents.10
For the accused, the first witness was Nick Luz Aduana who was the Director of Finance of
ORG-ARMM from July 1991 until his resignation in March 1993. He testified that his functions
then include the supervision and overseeing of the three divisions: Budget, Accounting and
Management. When report of the audit team came out, he was surprised because they were not
informed of the audit. He was familiar with the 52 checks because the disbursement vouchers
passed through his office. He explained the procedure with respect to the processing of cash
advances as follows: generally, there were cash advances made in ARMM which cover travels,
salaries, etc. but particularly for "peace and order campaign," it emanates from the ORG when
the Regional Governor issues an authority for cash advance, and then they process the voucher
(Finance and Budget Management Services); once their division have performed their
accounting functions relative to the vouchers, the same are forwarded to the Regional Governor
for approval or in his absence to his Executive Secretary; after the approval of the voucher, it
will be forwarded to the Cash Division for the issuance of check; the person who will liquidate
the cash advance is usually the employee mentioned in the voucher; and after they have prepared
all the liquidation papers, these are submitted to the Budget and Management Division before
forwarding them to the COA Auditor. He maintained that the original disbursement vouchers
have already been submitted to the COA Special Audit Office. Since 1991, they have never
received any notice of disallowance of their disbursements, including those intended for "peace
and order campaign." Being the first ARMM set of officials, they had sought the advice of their
Auditor as to proper accounting procedures; they followed the advice of Auditor Gagwis who
said that there should be authority to cash advance coming from the Regional Governor which
should be given to the Disbursing Officer. He identified the vouchers presented by the defense as
the ones processed by their division with the corresponding amounts reflected therein. Insofar as
the expanded audit is concerned, they were not given the opportunity to defend the case as they
were not given the so-called exit conference.11
On cross-examination, witness Aduana hinted on political reasons why an expanded audit was
conducted when Regional Governor Pagdanganan assumed office despite the fact that an earlier
audit was already made during the administration of Governor Candao. He claimed that he did
not receive any copy of the demand letter dated August 24, 1993; he was no longer connected
with ARMM at the time. He also maintained that the disbursement vouchers were processed by
their office and entered into their books of account. However, when asked what happened to
these books of account, Aduana said these are with the Office of the Regional Governor. He
admitted that the only supporting document for the checks and vouchers were the authority to
cash advance; the "peace and order campaign" disbursement is peculiar to ARMM and hence
they did not know what supporting documents to attach. When queried about the particular
activities covered by this "peace and order campaign" disbursement, Aduana admitted that he
really does not know the breakdown of expenses or for what items in particular were the
disbursed amounts spent. Their division merely processed the disbursement vouchers that were
prepared by the ORG, and while his signature appears in said vouchers his role was limited to
certifying the availability of funds.12
The next witness, Rosalinda G. Gagwis, former COA Resident Auditor of ORG-ARMM,
testified that in 1991 she was the Chief of the Operation and Review Division (ORD), COA
Region XII which at the time has jurisdiction over ORG-ARMM; she was Auditor-in-Charge of
ORG-ARMM only up to March 8, 1993 when the separation of COA Region XII personnel and
COA-ARMM was implemented. Among her duties as such Auditor-in-Charge was to conduct a
post-audit of the financial transactions of ORG-ARMM. In the course of the expanded audit of
ORG-ARMM, she was requested to issue the Certification dated August 27, 1993 stating that she
has not received the January to March 1993 vouchers as stated in the letter of Haron.
Subsequently, on July 22, 1998 she executed a two-page Affidavit because she has been hearing
that her previous Certification was misinterpreted to mean that the subject vouchers were "not
existing." She then clarified that actually, ORG-ARMM tried to submit bundles of vouchers to
her office but she refused to accept them because she was no longer Auditor-in-Charge of that
office as there was already an order separating COA-Regional Office XII from the COA-
ARMM. She confirmed that when ARMM was a newly created agency, its officers (Aduana,
Brigida Fontanilla and Bartolome Corpus) sought her advice regarding accounting procedures.
Prior to submission to her office for post-audit, the accountable officers like the Cashier and
Disbursement Officer prepares and submits a Monthly Report of Disbursements to the
Accounting Division which, within ten days from receipt and recording in the Books of
Accounts, shall submit the same to the auditor for post-audit custody. Based on her experience,
however, this deadline was not strictly observed as 25% to 50% of the national agencies are
delayed in the submission of such reports. The usual reasons given were the geographical
locations of the offices in Region XII and ARMM, lack of manpower due to budgetary
constraints and lack of know-how of personnel regarding accounting and auditing procedures,
especially if there is a change in administration. As far as she can recall, their office had not
issued a notice of disallowance to ORG-ARMM although notices of suspension have been issued
for minor deficiencies noted during post-audit; these notices of suspension were usually
complied with by the agency.13
On cross-examination, witness Gagwis said that upon seeing the bundles of vouchers being
submitted to her office, she immediately refused to accept, and sort of "washed her hands" by
telling her staff that they were no longer incharge of ORG-ARMM. She did not actually scan
those documents and examine their contents. She also did not receive the Monthly Report of
Disbursements from said office. As to the execution of the July 22, 1998 Affidavit, she insisted
that she did it voluntarily five years later in order to clarify herself after hearing about the case
filed in the Sandiganbayan and her name was being dragged because of the Certification she
made in August 1993. As to the earlier Certification, she maintained that she did not receive the
subject vouchers and she does not know where these documents are at present.14
Another witness, Brigida C. Fontanilla, Chief Accountant, ORG-ARMM, testified that her duties
and responsibilities include the processing, updating and recording of transactions of ORG-
ARMM in the books of accounts while vouchers are recorded in the Journal of Analysis and
Obligations (JAO). They also prepared financial reports. As to cash advances, she explained that
the procedure starts with the preparation of the voucher at ORG which also issues the authority
to withdraw cash advance which is attached to the disbursement voucher and supporting
documents, afterwhich it is forwarded to the Finance and Budget Management Services for
processing: there, it is first submitted to the Budget Division for the request for allotment of
obligation, and next forwarded to the Accounting Division for the journal entry of obligation and
recording in the books of account, and then the documents are forwarded to the Office of the
Finance Director for his approval, and thereafter returned back to the ORG for final approval for
the issuance of the check. Presently, their office is more systematic and organized than it was
during the administration of Governor Candao. Sometime in 1994 during the investigation by the
Office of the Ombudsman relative to the subject illegal withdrawals, she was summoned to
produce the Cash Receipts Book and Cash Disbursement Book of the 1991 ARMM seed money
for regional, provincial and district Impact Infrastructure Projects. However, she was not able to
comply with the said directive because such books are not among those required by the COA for
their office; what the COA directed them to maintain was the JAO, a book of original entry for
allotments received and disbursements for the transactions of ORG-ARMM. She wrote a letter-
reply to the Ombudsman Investigator and transmitted the original 1992 JAO which was never
returned to their office.15
Explaining the contents of the JAO, witness Fontanilla said that the entries in the voucher are
recorded therein: an obligation number is placed in the request of allotment (ROA) which also
appears in the voucher. Before such recording in the JAO, the disbursement vouchers are
presented to their office. Actually, she does not know whether the 1992 JAO still exists or with
the Ombudsman Investigator because at the time, they were holding office temporarily at the
office of ORG Auditor which unfortunately got burned sometime in 1996.16
As for witness Bartolome M. Corpus, his deposition upon oral examination was taken on August
27, 2004 before Atty. Edipolo Sarabia, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Davao City. He
testified that in 1991 he was appointed Chief of the Management Division of the Finance and
Budget Management Services (FBMS), ORG-ARMM. He was placed on floating status for three
years by the new Chief of Staff of ORG-ARMM (Nasser Pangandaman) upon the election of a
new Regional Governor, Lininding Pangandaman who defeated Governor Candao. As Finance
Director, it was his responsibility to review all transactions of the ORG-ARMM and see to it that
COA regulations are in place and supporting documents are complete. After reviewing
documents, which include disbursement vouchers, his office submits the same to the COA
Regional Officer or to the COA Resident Auditor. Being the internal control unit of ORG-
ARMM, all transactions and supporting documents must pass through his office. As to the
transactions covered by the subject 52 checks, he confirmed that these passed through his office,
including the disbursement vouchers, afterwhich these were forwarded to the Accounting Office
and then to the Cash Division for issuance of checks. He claimed that his subordinates tried to
submit the disbursement vouchers to the Resident Auditor, as shown by the transmittal letters
dated March 4 and March 30, 1993. However, Ms. Gagwis refused to accept the vouchers
because she was no longer the Resident Auditor at the time. During the time of Governor
Candao, he does not recall having received any notice of disallowance from the COA although
there were times they received a notice of suspension which had been settled. During the time he
was on floating status, he discovered that some vouchers including those original vouchers
covered by the subject 52 checks were still in his filing cabinet. He then handed them over to
Haron. In 1996, he was reinstated by Governor Nur Misuari.17
On cross-examination, witness Corpus said that they tried to submit the vouchers to Gagwis
sometime in late March or early April 1993. He was not aware of the August 27, 1993
Certification issued by Gagwis. When asked about the stated purpose "peace and order
campaign" in the cash advance vouchers, he confirmed that this was the practice at that time and
it was only during liquidation that ORG will have the list of expenses; the supporting documents
will come only after the issuance of the check.18 On re-direct examination, he maintained that
there were previous similar vouchers for "peace and order campaign" which have not been
disallowed but only suspended by the COA.19
Sandiganbayan Ruling
By Decision dated October 29, 2008, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner Haron guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, committed in conspiracy with petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao
who were likewise sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to the amount
of the check in each case, as follows:
Criminal Case Nos. 24569-24584,

24593, 24595-24620
Israel B. Haron and Abas A. Candao - convicted of 43 counts of Malversation of Public Funds
and each was sentenced to indeterminate prison term in each case of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay a fine in each case equivalent to the
particular check involved, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification to hold public office and other accessory penalties provided
by law. In the service of their respective sentences, they shall be entitled to the benefit of the
three-fold rule as provided in Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Criminal Case Nos. 24585-24592 & 24594
Israel B. Haron and Zacaria A. Candao convicted of 9 counts of Malversation of Public Funds
and each was sentenced to indeterminate prison term in each case of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay a fine in each case equivalent to the
particular check involved, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification to hold public office and other accessory penalties provided
by law. In the service of their respective sentences, they shall be entitled to the benefit of the
three-fold rule as provided in Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.20
The Sandiganbayan found no merit in petitioners claim that the subject checks were covered by
existing disbursement vouchers which were belatedly submitted and received by the COA
Central Office on October 29, 1993. It said that had those vouchers really existed at the time of
the 52 withdrawals petitioners made from December 29, 1992 to March 30, 1993, petitioner
Haron could have readily produced them when required to do so by the special audit team on
August 24, 1993. Said court likewise did not give credence to the testimony of Corpus in view of
the August 27, 1993 Certification issued by then COA Auditor Gagwis that she has not received
the vouchers mentioned in the transmittal letters. Gagwis explanation, on the other hand,
contradicted the testimony of Corpus that when he returned to his office sometime in May 1993,
he found the original vouchers together with the transmittal letters still there in his filing cabinet
and have not been submitted to the COA Resident Auditor.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioners presented no proof that the cash advances intended for
"peace and order campaign" were spent for public purposes, as in fact the alleged disbursement
vouchers did not indicate any detail as to the nature of the expense/s such as purchase of
equipment, services, meals, travel, etc. and there were no supporting documents such as the
Request for Issuance of Voucher, Purchase Request and Inspection Report of the items
supposedly purchased. More importantly, the vouchers were not accomplished in accordance
with existing COA circulars because they are unnumbered and undated. Hence, the belatedly
submitted vouchers are of doubtful veracity or origin, nay, a fabricated evidence or, as pointed
out by the prosecution, "self-serving or an afterthought, belatedly prepared to give the illegal
disbursements amounting to the aggregate amount of more than P21M, a semblance of
regularity."21 As to the JAO and Certification dated August 18, 1998 issued by Chief Accountant
Fontanilla, the Sandiganbayan found there is nothing therein to indicate the particular
disbursement voucher that corresponds to each of the subject 52 checks which were neither
reflected in the JAO.
With respect to petitioners assertion that the audit conducted by the COA special audit team was
incomplete and tainted as it did not follow procedures because the person audited were not
notified thereof, the Sandiganbayan found these allegations unsubstantiated as in fact at the start
of the audit on August 24, 1993, the audit team thru their team leader State Auditor Naranjo,
informed the management of ORG-ARMM thru the COA Resident Auditor of the expanded
special audit to be conducted as they even requested for the original copies of the disbursement
vouchers together with their complete supporting documents covering the 52 checks. But despite
said letter, the ORG-ARMM failed to heed the audit teams request. For the failure of petitioner
Haron to account for the funds involved in the illegal withdrawals when asked to do so, the
presumption arose that he misappropriated the same, which presumption was not overcome by
defense evidence.
On the respective liabilities of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao, the
Sandiganbayan held that by their act of co-signing the subject checks, petitioner Haron was able
to consummate the illegal withdrawals without the required disbursement vouchers of the
amounts covered by the 43 checks (for Abas) and 9 checks (for Zacaria). Thus, by their
collective acts, said court concluded that petitioners conspired to effect the illegal withdrawals of
public funds which, when required by the COA to be properly accounted for, petitioners failed to
do so.
In its Resolution dated February 20, 2009, the Sandiganbayan denied the prosecutions motion to
cancel bail bonds and petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Petition
Petitioners raised the following grounds for their acquittal:
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN...COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

CONVICTING THE ACCUSED PETITIONERS FOR THE CRIME OF
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS DESPITE PROOF POSITIVE THAT,
CONTRARY TO WHAT THE INFORMATIONS CHARGED, THERE WERE
DISBURSEMENT VOUCHERS EXCEPT THAT THE COA REFUSED TO ACCEPT
MUCH LESS EXAMINE THE SAME. PETITIONERS WERE THUS DENIED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THEY WERE CONVICTED FOR OFFENSES NOT
COVERED BY THE INFORMATIONS AGAINST THEM.
2. .THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

APPLYING THE "EQUIPOISE RULE" WHICH IF APPLIED WOULD HAVE
RESULTED IN THE ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONERS.
3. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

CONVICTING ACCUSED PETITIONERS ZACARIA A. CANDAO AND ABAS A.
CANDAO DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY WHICH IS
THEIR ONLY LINK TO THE OFFENSES HEREIN HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.22
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property Presumption of malversation. - Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property,
wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred
pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than
twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos.
If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value
of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property with which
he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. (Emphasis supplied.)
The following elements are essential for conviction in malversation cases:
1. That the offender is a public officer;
2. That he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office;
3. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable; and
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or

negligence, permitted another person to take them.23
All the foregoing elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution in this case.
Petitioners have not rebutted the legal presumption that with the Disbursing Officers (Haron)
failure to account for the illegally withdrawn amounts covered by the subject checks when
demanded by the COA, they misappropriated and used the said funds for their personal benefit.
Petitioners however assert that their convictions were based solely on the Sandiganbayans
conclusion that the vouchers submitted by the defense were illegal or irregular, whereas the
informations simply alleged their absence or non-existence. They contend that said court could
not have validly assessed the disbursement vouchers as to their legality because that duty
pertains to the COA which refused and failed to examine the same. Had the court allowed the
COA to evaluate and make a ruling on the validity of the vouchers, the result would have been
different and most probably they would have been acquitted of the crime charged.
We are not persuaded by petitioners asseveration.

The Sandiganbayan categorically ruled that the disbursement vouchers were inexistent at the
time of the issuance of the subject checks and expanded special audit based on its findings that:
(1) petitioner Haron could not produce the vouchers upon demand by the COA in August 1993;
(2) Resident Auditor Gagwis certified at about the same time that to date she has not received the
vouchers mentioned in the supposed transmittal letters of March 4 and March 30, 1993; (3) the
entries in the duly certified Report of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDDO)
of the late Pandical M. Santiago, Cashier of ORG-ARMM, showed that for the months of
January, February and March 1993, there were indeed entries of checks issued with Haron as
payee but no disbursement voucher numbers as these were either lacking, detached or missing,
and which were verified by the audit team as corresponding to the subject 52 checks issued and
signed by petitioners and encashed by petitioner Haron who received the money withdrawn from
the government depositary accounts; (4) FBMS Chief Corpus testified that he discovered the
supposed vouchers still there at his office filing cabinet in May 1993 when these supposedly
have already been submitted to the COA Resident Auditor as reflected in the March 4 and March
30, 1993 transmittal letters; and (5) the supposed original disbursement vouchers belatedly
submitted to the COA central office last week of October 1993, were undated and unnumbered
with no supporting documents as required by COA Circular No. 78-79 (April 5, 1978).
Contrary to petitioners claim, the special audit team could not have examined the vouchers
presented by the defense (Exhibits "1" to "1-A-43") because the only indication of its actual
receipt by the COA as admitted by the prosecution, was on October 23, 1993 long after the
expanded audit was completed and beyond the 72-hour deadline specified in the September 10,
1993 demand letter addressed to Haron for the restitution of the total amount of illegal
withdrawals. In addition, such disbursement vouchers have no supporting documents as required
by COA Circular No. 92-389 dated November 3, 1992. On the other hand, the Certification dated
August 18, 1998 issued by ARMM Chief Accountant Fontanilla stating that the vouchers were
regular because these were properly recorded in the JAO, was not given credence by the
Sandiganbayan. Upon scrutiny of the JAO covering the period January to March 1993, said court
found that it failed to indicate the particular disbursement voucher that corresponds to each of the
52 checks, aside from the fact that it was prepared by the ARMM Chief Accountant who is under
the control and supervision of the ORG. Notably, the JAO is used to summarize obligations
incurred and to monitor the balance of unobligated allotments, which is prepared by function,
and project for each fund and allotment class.24 The JAO is thus separate and distinct from the
Report of Checks Issued (RCI) which is prepared by the Disbursing Officer to report checks
issued for payment of expenditures and/or prior accounts payable. What is clear is that the
disbursement of funds covered by the 52 checks issued by the petitioners are subject to the rule
that disbursement voucher "shall be used by all government entities for all money claims" and
that the "voucher number shall be indicated on the voucher and on every supporting
document."25 Inasmuch as the JAO for the months of January, February and March 1993 do not
at all reflect or indicate the number of each of the disbursement vouchers supposedly attached to
the 52 checks, it cannot serve as evidence of the recording of the original vouchers, much less
the existence of those disbursement vouchers at the time of the issuance of the 52 checks and the
conduct of the expanded audit.
Petitioners further raise issue on the regularity, completeness and objectivity of the expanded
audit conducted by the COA. However, records showed that the ORG-ARMM were duly
notified of the expanded audit at its commencement and was even requested thru the COA
Resident Auditor to submit the needed disbursement vouchers. It must be noted that at an earlier
date, a main audit had already been conducted for the financial transactions of ORG-ARMM
during which State Auditor Mendoza experienced threats against her own security that she had to
be immediately recalled from her assignment. Thus, by the time the expanded audit was
conducted in August 1993 upon the directive of the COA Chairman, petitioners, especially
Haron, should have seen to it that the records of disbursements and financial transactions
including the period January to March 1993, were in order and available for further audit
examination. In any case, even if there was no so-called entry conference held, there is
absolutely no showing that petitioners were denied due process in the conduct of the expanded
audit as they simply refused or failed to heed COAs request for the production of disbursement
vouchers and likewise ignored the formal demand made by COA Chairman Banaria for the
restitution of the illegally withdrawn public funds, submitting their compliance only after the
special audit team had submitted their report.
In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in holding that the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the petitioners failed to overcome the prima facie evidence
of misappropriation arising from Harons failure to give a satisfactory explanation for the illegal
withdrawals from the ARMM funds under his custody and control. Petitioners likewise did not
accomplish the proper liquidation of the entire amount withdrawn, during the expanded audit or
any time thereafter. There is therefore no merit in petitioners argument that the Sandiganbayan
erred in not applying the equipoise rule.
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt
on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The
equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and
does not suffice to produce a conviction.26 Such is not the situation in this case because the
prosecution was able to prove by adequate evidence that Disbursing Officer Haron failed to
account for funds under his custody and control upon demand, specifically for the
P21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from the said funds. In the crime of malversation, all that is
necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public
funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he
could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation
by the accused is hardly necessary in malversation cases.27
As to the liability of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao, the Sandiganbayan
correctly ruled that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron to effect the illegal
withdrawals and misappropriation of ORG-ARMM funds.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence and may
be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime,
which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. In
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the
criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime
committed. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated.28
In this case, petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao were co-signatories in the
subject checks issued without the required disbursement vouchers. Their signatures in the
checks, as authorized officials for the purpose, made possible the illegal withdrawals and
embezzlement of public funds in the staggering aggregate amount of P21,045,570.64.1avvphil
Petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao assail their conviction as co-conspirators in
the crime of malversation contending that their only participation was in the ministerial act of
signing the checks. The checks having passed through processing by finance and accounting
personnel of ORG-ARMM, petitioners said they had to rely on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their subordinates acts. Furthermore, they assert that since conspiracy
requires knowledge of the purpose for which the crime was committed, they could not have been
conspirators in the design to defraud the government.
We disagree with such postulation.
As the Regional Governor of ARMM, petitioner Zacaria A. Candao cannot exonerate himself
from liability for the illegally withdrawn funds of ORG-ARMM. Under Section 102 (1) of the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, he is responsible for all government funds
pertaining to the agency he heads:
Section 102. Primary and secondary responsibility. (1) The head of any agency of the
government is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and
property pertaining to his agency.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and his Executive Secretary Abas A. Candao are both accountable
public officers within the meaning of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. No
checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a
disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, any disbursement and
release of public funds require their approval,29 as in fact checks issued and signed by petitioner
Haron had to be countersigned by them. Their indispensable participation in the issuance of the
subject checks to effect illegal withdrawals of ARMM funds was therefore duly established by
the prosecution and the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that they acted in conspiracy with
petitioner Haron in embezzling and misappropriating such funds.
Moreover, as such accountable officers, petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao were
charged with the duty of diligently supervising their subordinates to prevent loss of government
funds or property, and are thus liable for any unlawful application of government funds resulting
from negligence, as provided in Sections 104 and 105 of the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines, which read:
Sec. 104. Records and reports required by primarily responsible officers. The head of any
agency or instrumentality of the national government or any government-owned or controlled
corporation and any other self-governing board or commission of the government shall exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising accountable officers under his control to
prevent the incurrence of loss of government funds or property, otherwise he shall be jointly and
solidarily liable with the person primarily accountable therefor. x x x x
Sec. 105. Measure of liability of accountable officers. x x x
(2) Every officer accountable for government funds shall be liable for all losses resulting from
the unlawful deposit, use, or application thereof and for all losses attributable to negligence in
the keeping of the funds.
The fact that ARMM was still a recently established autonomous government unit at the time
does not mitigate or exempt petitioners from criminal liability for any misuse or embezzlement
of public funds allocated for their operations and projects. The Organic Act for ARMM (R.A.
No. 6734) mandates that the financial accounts of the expenditures and revenues of the ARMM
are subject to audit by the COA.30 Presently, under the Amended Organic Act (R.A. No. 9054),
the ARMM remained subject to national laws and policies relating to, among others, fiscal
matters and general auditing.31 Here, the prosecution successfully demonstrated that the illegal
withdrawals were deliberately effected through the issuance of checks without the required
disbursement vouchers and supporting documents. And even if petitioners Zacaria A. Candao
and Abas A. Candao invoke lack of knowledge in the criminal design of their subordinate,
Disbursing Officer Haron, they are still liable as co-principals in the crime of malversation
assuming such misappropriation of public funds was not intentional, as alleged in the
informations, but due to their negligence in the performance of their duties. As this Court
ratiocinated in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan32 :
Besides, even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of
malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be
in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa
present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode
charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and
conviction thereof is proper. A possible exception would be when the mode of commission
alleged in the particulars of the indictment is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of
the crime that it may be said due process was denied by deluding the accused into an erroneous
comprehension of the charge against him. That no such prejudice was occasioned on petitioner
nor was he beleaguered in his defense is apparent from the records of this case.33 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00, in addition to fine equal to the funds malversed. Considering that neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the crime charged, the maximum imposable
penalty shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal maximum to
reclusion perpetua, or eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is one degree lower
from the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of prision mayor maximum to
reclusion temporal medium, or ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months.34 The penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan on petitioners needs therefore to be
modified insofar as the maximum penalty is concerned and is hereby reduced to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, for each count.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated October 29, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 24569 to 24574, 24575, 24576 to 24584, 24585 to
24592, 24593, 24594, 24595 to 24620 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and the Resolution dated February 20, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division), denying petitioners motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that petitioners are instead accordingly sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, in each of the above-numbered criminal cases.
In addition to the payment of the fine ordered by the Sandiganbayan, and by way of restitution,
the petitioners are likewise ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the Republic of the Philippines
through the ARMM-Regional Treasurer, the total amount of P21,045,570.64 malversed funds as
finally determined by the COA.
In the service of their respective sentences, the petitioners shall be entitled to the benefit of the
three-fold rule as provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
v. Substantial evidence
Office of the ombudsman vs Reyes
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170512 October 5, 2011

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO T. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of
the Decision2 dated July 4, 2005 and the Resolution3 dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70571. The judgment of the appellate court reversed and set aside
the Decision4 dated September 24, 2001 and the Joint Order5 dated February 15, 2002 of the
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170; while the appellate courts
resolution denied the motion for reconsideration6 assailing its decision.
On January 11, 2001, Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit against herein respondent Antonio
Reyes and Angelito Pealoza, who were the Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting Officer-
in-Charge and Clerk III, respectively, of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) District Office in
Mambajao, Camiguin. Acero narrated thus:
That, on January 10, 2001, at about 2:00 oclock P.M. I went to the Land Transportation Office,
at Mambajao, Camiguin to apply for a drivers license;
That, I was made to take an examination for drivers license applicants by a certain Tata
Pealoza whose real name is Angelito, a clerk in said office;
That, after the examination, [Pealoza] informed me that I failed in the examination; however if I
am willing to pay additional assessment then they will reconsider my application and I am
referring to [Pealoza] and [Reyes];
That, I asked how much will that be and [Pealoza] in the presence of [Reyes] answered
P680.00, so I agreed;
That, I then handed P1,000.00 to [Pealoza] and [Pealoza] handed it to the cashier;
That, [Pealoza] in turn handed to me the change of P320.00 only and a little later I was given
the LTO Official Receipt No. 62927785 (January 10, 2001) but only for P180.00 which O.R.
serves as my temporary license for 60 days; and the balance of P500.00 was without O.R. and
retained by Pealoza;
That, I feel that the actuation of Antonio Reyes and Angelito Pealoza are fraudulent in that they
failed to issue receipt for the extra P500.00 paid to them; and [Reyes] know that I am with [the
Commission on Audit];
That, I execute this affidavit to file charges against the guilty parties.7
Attached to Aceros affidavit was the LTO Official Receipt No. 62927785, showing his payment
of P180.00.8
The above affidavit was apparently filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in
Camiguin, but the same was later referred9 to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The
latter office thereafter ordered10 Reyes and Pealoza to submit their counter-affidavits within ten
days from notice.
On June 19, 2001, Pealoza filed his Counter-Affidavit.11 He denied telling Acero that if the
latter were willing to pay additional costs, Reyes and Pealoza would reconsider his application.
Pealoza stated that he did administer the examination to Acero but since he was very busy, he
requested their security guard, Dominador Daypuyat, to check the answers of Acero using their
answer guide. After Daypuyat checked Aceros paper, Pealoza noted the score of 22/40.
Pealoza informed Acero of the failing grade and told him that it was up to Reyes to decide on
the matter. Acero then went to the office of Reyes and after a few minutes, he came back and
returned his application documents to Pealoza. After examining the application form, Pealoza
saw that the same did not contain Reyes signature but a plus sign (+) and the number 27 beside
the score of 22/40. Pealoza knew that it was Reyes who wrote the "+ 27" and the same
indicated that Acero had to pay additional costs in order to pass the examination, as was done in
the past.
Thereafter, when Pealoza allegedly informed Reyes that Acero was an auditor, the latter was
summoned into Reyes office. Reyes asked if Acero wanted to retake the examination or just pay
the additional costs. Acero eventually said "yes" and Pealoza inferred that the former agreed to
pay Reyes the extra costs. Pealoza recounted that Reyes instructed him to prepare the drivers
license of Acero. Pealoza gave Aceros application documents to Lourdes Cimacio, the senior
statistician, who processed the drivers license. When the cashier asked for Aceros payment, the
latter gave Pealoza a one-thousand-peso bill. The cashier, in turn, handed to Pealoza a change
of P820.00. From the said amount, Pealoza gave to Acero P320.00, while P500.00 was given to
Reyes. Acero soon left the office. Pealoza said that Acero called their office not long after,
asking for a receipt for the P500.00. Pealoza then asked if Acero had not come to an
understanding with Reyes that a receipt would not be issued for the additional cost. Acero
insisted on a receipt then hanged up. Pealoza told Reyes of Aceros demand and Reyes told him
to cancel the drivers license. When told that the same could not be done anymore, Reyes
allegedly gave Pealoza P500.00, instructing the latter to return the money to Acero under
circumstances where nobody could see them. Pealoza stated that he waited for Acero to come
back to their office but the latter did not do so anymore.
Pealoza also submitted in evidence the affidavit12 of Rey P. Amper. Amper narrated that he
started working at the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin in September 1988 as a driver-examiner. In
February 1994, Reyes became the acting Head of Office, and eventually the Head of Office, of
the LTO in Mambajao. About four months thereafter, Reyes verbally instructed Amper to send to
him (Reyes) all the applicants for drivers licenses who failed the examinations. In case Reyes
was absent, the applicants were to wait for him. Subsequently, Reyes gave Amper a piece of
paper containing the rates to be charged to the "applicant-flunkers" in addition to the legal fees.
Amper was also told to deliver the additional payments to Reyes. Amper stated that his office
table and that of Reyes were located in one room. Reyes would allegedly tell the applicant-
flunkers to either re-take the examinations or pay additional costs. In most cases, Amper said that
the applicant-flunkers would only be too willing to pay the extra costs. Reyes would then instruct
Amper to add more points to applicant-flunkers scores, which meant that Reyes and the
applicants concerned had come to an agreement for the payment of additional costs. Amper
added that the said practice of Reyes was a "goad to his conscience" and he talked about it to
Pealoza. They allegedly reported the matter to their District Representative Pedro Romualdo,
but the latter could only express his regrets for having recommended Reyes to his position. The
practice of Reyes of claiming additional costs continued up to the time Amper left the LTO.
Amper declared that he knew that it was Reyes alone who took and benefitted from his illegal
exactions. The employees of the LTO in Mambajao were purportedly aware of the practice of
Reyes but they were afraid to come out against their Head of Office.
The affidavit13 of Margie B. Abdala was also presented by Pealoza. Abdala stated that she
accompanied Pealoza and the latters wife, Ebony, to the house of Acero on January 13, 2001.
Ebony urged Acero not to include Pealoza anymore in the complaint. Acero assured them that
his complaint was principally directed against Reyes for requiring him (Acero) to pay additional
costs for which he was not issued any official receipt. Pealoza brought with him Aceros
application form for a drivers license, which had already been approved by Reyes, and he asked
the latter to complete the same. Pealoza also tried to return the P500.00 from Reyes that was not
covered by a receipt. Acero, however, refused to fill up the application form and to accept the
money. When Ebony asked why Acero agreed to pay the additional cost required by Reyes, the
latter answered that he did not understand what was meant by additional cost.
On June 19, 2001, Reyes manifested14 that, for purposes of the instant case, he was adopting the
counter-affidavit he filed in another Ombudsman case, docketed as OMB-MIN-01-0090,15 as
both cases involved the same parties and the same incident.
In his counter-affidavit,16 Reyes claimed that Aceros complaint was a "blatant distortion of the
truth and a mere fabrication of the complainant."17 Reyes asserted that a perusal of the affidavit-
complaint revealed that the only imputation against him was that Pealoza allegedly told Acero
to pay P680.00 in his (Reyes) presence. The affidavit revealed that it was Pealoza who
processed the application of Acero; the money was allegedly given to Pealoza and it was he
who handed the change back to Acero; and he had no participation and was not present when the
money changed hands. Reyes stated that when he conducted an informal investigation on the
complaint, Pealoza admitted to having pocketed the extra P500.00. Reyes allegedly
reprimanded Pealoza and ordered the latter to return the money to Acero. Based on the receipt
submitted by Acero, the same proved that as far as the LTO and Reyes were concerned, what
was received by the office was only P180.00. Reyes contended that he did not ask or receive
money from Acero and it was Pealoza who pocketed the P500.00.
In an Order18 dated June 20, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao directed the parties
to appear before its office on July 11, 2001 for a preliminary conference. The parties were to
consider, among others, the need for a formal investigation or whether the parties were willing to
submit their case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record and such other evidence as
they will present at the conference.
On July 6, 2001, Acero sent the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a telegram,19 stating that he
was waiving his right to avail of the preliminary conference.
On July 11, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order,20 stating that none
of the parties appeared in the preliminary conference scheduled for that day. In view of the non-
appearance of the respondents therein, they were considered to have waived their right to a
preliminary conference. The case was then deemed submitted for decision.
On July 23, 2001, the counsel for Pealoza informed the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
that his client was waiving his right to a formal investigation and was willing to submit the case
for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record. Pealoza also submitted the additional
affidavit of one of their witnesses, Rickie Valdehueza.
In his affidavit,21 Valdehueza stated that on January 5, 2001, he applied for a drivers license
with the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin. He took an examination on that day, which was
conducted by an employee he later came to know as Dominador Daypuyat. After the latter
checked his test paper, Valdehueza was told that he got a failing score. His application was then
turned over to Pealoza, who told him to see Reyes. Valdehueza said that Reyes advised him not
to retake the examination anymore and just pay P1,500.00. Valdehueza bargained for P1,200.00
since he had no money and Reyes agreed. Reyes then wrote the sign "+ 20" next to Valduezas
score of 30, such that what appeared on the test paper was "30 + 20." Reyes returned the test
paper and instructed Valdehueza to tell Pealoza to add "20" to his score. Valdehueza went back
to the LTO on January 10, 2001 bringing P1,200.00. Before he could go to Reyes office, he was
accosted by Daypuyat in the lobby who informed him that his license was already completed.
Daypuyat also took P700.00 to give to Reyes. Valdehueza gave P500.00 to the cashier as
payment for the P240.00 license fee. He told the cashier to just give his change to Reyes.
On September 24, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a Decision in OMB-
MIN-ADM-01-170, adjudging Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and finding Pealoza guilty of
simple misconduct. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
Here, as borne out of the record, there is no denying the fact that [Acero] failed in the
examination given for a drivers license, yet ultimately, herein complainant was granted a
temporary drivers license. It is therefore very logical to presume that something in between was
agreed upon between the applicant and the person charged with the grant of license.
Based on the testimony of [Pealoza] and corroborated by the testimonies of Rey P. Amper
(Record, pp. 31-32) and Rickie Valdehueza (Record, pp. 44-45), [Reyes] would give the flunker
the option of retaking the examination or to simply pay an additional cost to have a passing grade
without actually re-taking the same. As testified to by Rey P. Amper, "xxx in almost all cases,
the applicant-flunker would only be too willing to pay the additional costs, in which case, Mr.
Reyes would instruct him to go back to my table. Then Mr. Reyes would call me, saying: Ray,
just add more to his score., which to me meant that he and the applicant-flunker had come to an
agreement to pay the additional costs." Mr. Amper testifies further that this matter of extending
a passing grade to a flunker for a monetary consideration has been a system within this LTO
agency perpetrated by [Reyes] since he assumed as Head of Office thereat.
Verily, [Reyes] took advantage of his position and office in exacting the so-called additional cost
from those who flunked the examination. There is nowhere in the record authorizing the Head of
Office of the LTO to adjust a failing grade into a passing grade. In addition, there is nowhere in
the record that supports the legality of collecting additional costs over and above the legal fees.
This is a pure and simple case of extortion and certainly, such act is a breach of his oath of office
as well as a deliberate disregard of existing rules and regulations. Based on the foregoing, this
Office finds respondent [Reyes] guilty of grave misconduct.
As regards [Pealoza], while he may have helped or facilitated in the collection of that additional
costs, he could not be as guilty as [Reyes].
Understandably, it is normal for a subordinate to keep mum while an anomaly is going on

specially when the perpetrator is the Head of Office. There is fear in him and normally, such
subordinate would just "ride along", so to speak. But nonetheless, [Pealoza] has to be
sanctioned. While the infraction he had helped accomplished may not have been voluntary on his
part but as a public official, he should have registered his objection regardless of the
consequence that may occur. Based on the foregoing, this Office finds respondent [Pealoza]
guilty of simple misconduct.
WHEREFORE, there being substantial evidence, this Office finds respondent Antonio T. Reyes
guilty of grave misconduct and he is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service
pursuant to Section 23(c) [Grave Offenses], Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292. Likewise, this Office finds respondent Angelito G. Pealoza guilty of
Simple Misconduct and he is hereby meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from office without
pay for a period of Six (6) months based on Section 23(b) [Less Grave Offenses] Rule XIV of
the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. In both instances, the execution of
the penalties imposed shall be made immediately after the same shall have been final and
executory.22
In their bid to challenge the above ruling, Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration cum Motion
to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference,23 while Pealoza filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.24 On February 15, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a Joint
Order,25 denying the aforesaid motions of Reyes and Pealoza.
Reyes elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review26 under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, which petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70571.
In the assailed Decision dated July 4, 2005, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes
and reversed the judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The appellate court
reasoned thus:
It must be pointed out that in the complaint-affidavit filed by Acero, it was only Pealoza who
received the money and the balance of P 500.00 which was without O.R. was retained by
Pealoza. Nowhere in the complaint-affidavit could one find the name of Reyes, herein
petitioner, nor is it alleged there that Reyes was around when Acero handed to Pealoza the P
1000.00. From the evidence on record, it was, clearly, only Pealoza all along. Nowhere in the
record is Reyes complicity suggested or even slightly hinted.
xxxx
It does not appear on record that [Reyes] was the one who ordered and received the "additional
assessment". Rather, it was Pealoza alone who approached the complainant, discussed about the
"additional assessment", and retained the balance of P 500 basing on the complaint-affidavit filed
by Acero.
We note with sadness that the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, of itself, was considered enough
evidence by the investigation officer in finding [Reyes] guilty of grave misconduct, and
dismissing him from government service. The testimony of Pealoza is, however, a self-serving
declaration considering that he is the co-respondent in the Ombudsman case filed by Acero. Such
a declaration which was obviously made principally to save his own neck should have been
received with caution. This vital objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay
character and to permit its unqualified introduction in evidence would open the door to frauds
and perjuries.
It may be true that Reyes failed to attend the scheduled preliminary conference where he could
have refuted all the hearsay evidence submitted against him. The introduction of such as
evidence does not, however, give them the probative value which they did not bear in the first
place. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence.
The self-serving evidence presented in the form of a counter-affidavit by Pealoza should not
have been taken hook, line and sinker, so to speak, for there was no way of ascertaining the truth
of their contents. Moreover, in the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 13, 2001
[Reyes] claimed that he was not furnished any copy of Pealozas counter-affidavit. Thus,
admissions made by Pealoza in his sworn statement are binding only on him. Res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or
omission of another.
The charge of misconduct is a serious charge, a "capital offense" in a manner of speaking, which
may cause the forfeiture of ones right to hold a public office. Therefore, said charge must be
proven and substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegation will not suffice. It
should be supported by competent evidence, by substantial evidence. We find the case against
[Reyes] wanting in this regard.
FOR THESE REASONS, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated 24 September
2001 and the Joint Order dated 15 February 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. [Reyes] is
hereby exonerated from the administrative charge for insufficiency of evidence.27
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration28 of the Court of Appeals decision. The same was, however, denied in the
assailed Resolution dated October 27, 2005.
Hence, the Office of the Ombudsman (petitioner) filed the instant petition, raising the following
issues:
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN NULLIFYING

THE D E C I S I O N OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN THAT:
(i) It re-examined and weighed the evidence submitted in the administrative

proceedings and worse, substituted its judgment for that of the Ombudsman; and,
(ii) It made a conclusion that substantial evidence does not exist to warrant a finding
of administrative culpability on the part of respondent Reyes.29
In essence, the fundamental issue in the instant case is whether the charge of grave misconduct
against Reyes was sufficiently proven by substantial evidence. Petitioner settled this issue in the
affirmative, while the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise.
In Salazar v. Barriga,30 the Court characterized the administrative offenses of misconduct and
grave misconduct as follows:
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of

behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected
with the performance of official functions and duties of a public officer.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. Corruption as
an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully
uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to the rights of others.31
Here, petitioner adjudged Reyes guilty of grave misconduct after finding that Reyes, being then
the Head of Office of the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin, illegally exacted money from Acero in
exchange for the issuance of a drivers license to the latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not
pass the requisite written examination therefor.
In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, petitioner avers that the findings of fact of the
Office of the Ombudsman are entitled to great weight and must be accorded full respect and
credit as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner argues that it is not the
task of the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before an administrative
body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the
sufficiency of evidence.
Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of
the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.32 In administrative and
quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or
against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount
of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.33
Dadulo v. Court of Appeals34 reiterates that in reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond

the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect
to the sufficiency of evidence. However, while it is not the function of the Court to analyze and
weigh the parties' evidence all over again, an exception thereto lies as when there is serious
ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result.
After carefully perusing the records of this case, we find that the above-cited exception, rather
than the general rule, applies herein. Otherwise stated, the Court deems it proper that a review of
the case should be made in order to arrive at a just resolution.
In the main, the evidence submitted by the parties in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 consisted of their
sworn statements, as well as that of their witnesses. In the affidavit of Acero, he categorically
identified both Reyes and Pealoza as the persons who had the prerogative to reconsider his
failed examination, provided that he paid an additional amount on top of the legal fees. For his
part, Pealoza ostensibly admitted the charge of Acero in his counter-affidavit but he
incriminated Reyes therein as the mastermind of the illicit activity complained of. To corroborate
this allegation, Pealoza submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Amper was a former
LTO employee who allegedly had first-hand knowledge of the practice of Reyes of imposing and
pocketing additional fees; while Valdehueza declared that he was an applicant for a drivers
license who was likewise made to pay the said additional fees to Reyes. Upon the other hand,
Reyes counter-affidavit repudiated the allegations of Acero, insisting that it was Pealoza who
illegally took the amount of P500.00 from Acero.
Reyes faults petitioner for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, as well
as the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Reyes claims that he was not furnished a copy of the
said documents before petitioner rendered its Decision dated September 24, 2001. Reyes, thus,
argues that his right to due process was violated. Petitioner, on the other hand, counters that
Reyes was afforded due process since he was given all the opportunities to be heard, as well as
the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of petitioners adverse decision.
On this point, the Court finds merit in Reyes contention.
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals35 elaborates on the well established doctrine of due process in
administrative proceedings as follows:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is
simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.36
Moreover, Department of Health v. Camposano37 restates the guidelines laid down in Ang Tibay
v. Court of Industrial Relations38 that due process in administrative proceedings requires
compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which
includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2)
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to
support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the
law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a
subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know
the reasons for it and the various issues involved.39
In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with.1avvphi1 Reyes
was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the
bases of petitioners decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct.
To recall, after the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,
the respondents therein, i.e., Reyes and Pealoza, were ordered to submit their counter-affidavits
in order to discuss the charges lodged against them. While Pealoza acknowledged in his
counter-affidavit his participation in the illicit transaction complained of, he pointed to Reyes as
the main culprit. Pealoza thereafter submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza as
witnesses who would substantiate his accusations. However, the records reveal that only the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished copies of the said affidavits.40
Thus, Reyes was able to respond only to the affidavit of Acero. It would appear that Reyes had
no idea that Pealoza, a co-respondent in the administrative case, would point an accusing finger
at him and even supply the inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. The said affidavits were made
known to Reyes only after the rendition of the petitioners Decision dated September 24, 2001.
The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a Motion for
Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the
violation of his right to due process in this case. Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the
issue of the violation of his right to due process. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes
was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and
Valdehueza, whether before or after the Decision dated September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it
cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the
accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.
It is true that, in the past, this Court has held that the right to due process of a respondent in an
administrative case was not violated if he was able to file a motion for reconsideration to refute
the evidence against him. However, the instant case should be differentiated from Ruivivar v.
Office of the Ombudsman,41 which likewise involved the issue of administrative due process. In
the said case, Ruivivar was found administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her
official functions and was meted the penalty of reprimand. In her motion for reconsideration,
Ruivivar argued that she was deprived of due process because she was not furnished copies of
the affidavits of complainants witnesses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman ordered that Ruivivar be
furnished with copies of the affidavits of the witnesses, with the directive for her to file any
pleading that she may deem appropriate. As Ruivivar still opted not to controvert the affidavits
that were belatedly provided to her, the Ombudsman ruled that her right to due process was not
violated and her administrative liability was upheld. The Court affirmed the ruling of the
Ombudsman, declaring that "the law can no longer help one who had been who had been given
ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance."42
In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded Reyes protestations without giving him a
similar opportunity, as in Ruivivar, to be belatedly furnished copies of the affidavits of Pealoza,
Amper and Valdehueza to enable him to refute the same. As it were, petitioner rendered its
Decision dated September 24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes.
This the Court cannot sanction. A judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme
penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered with due
regard to the rights of the parties to due process.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 4, 2005 and the Resolution dated October 27, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70571, as well as the Decision dated September 24,
2001 and the Joint Order dated February 15, 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-
MIN-ADM-01-170, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The records of OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 are REMANDED to the Office of the Ombudsman,

which is hereby ordered (a) to furnish respondent Antonio T. Reyes copies of the affidavits of
Angelito G. Pealoza, Rey P. Amper and Rickie Valdehueza, and (b) to conduct further
proceedings in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 as may be appropriate.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Ramos vs BPI Family Savings Bank
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 203186 December 4, 2013
XAVIER C. RAMOS, Petitioner,

vs.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. and/or ALFONSO L. SALCEDO, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[[1] are the Decision2 dated November 12, 2010
and Resolutio3 dated August 6, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 104161
which modified the Decision4 dated March 31, 2008 and Resolution5 dated May 30, 2008 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR 00-09-07510-06 finding
petitioner Xavier C. Ramos (Ramos) concurrently negligent with respondent BPI Family Savings
Bank, Inc. (BPI Family) and thus ordering the equitable reduction of his retirement benefits from
P546,000.00 to 200,000.00.
The Facts
Ramos was employed by BPI Family in 1995 and eventually became its Vice-President for
Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division,6 the duties and responsibilities of which were
to:
(a) receive applications for auto loans from auto dealers and salesmen;7
(b) analyze market demands8 and formulate marketing strategies; and
(c) enhance dealer and manufacturer relations.9
During his tenure, a client named Trezita10 B. Acosta (Acosta) entered into and obtained several
auto and real estate loans from BPI Family which were duly approved and promptly paid.11
On December 15, 2004, Acosta purportedly secured another auto loan from BPI Family in the
amount of P3,097,392.00 for the purchase of a Toyota Prado vehicle (subject loan) which had
remained unpaid. As it turned out, Acosta did not authorize nor personally apply for the subject
loan, rendering the transaction fraudulent.12
After investigation, BPI Family discovered that:
(a) a person misrepresented herself as Acosta and succeeded in obtaining the delivery of a
Toyota Prado from the Toyota-Pasong Tamo Branch, pursuant to the Purchase Order (PO) and
Authority to Deliver (ATD) issued by Ramos;
(b) Ramos released these documents without the prior approval of BPI Familys credit
committee; and
(c) Ramos was grossly remiss in his duties since his subordinates did not follow the banks safety
protocols, particularly those regarding the establishment of the loan applicants identity, and that
the promissory note was not even signed by the applicant in the presence of any of the marketing
officers.13
As a consequence, BPI Family lost P2,294,080.00, which amount was divided between Ramos
and his three (3) other subordinates, with Ramos shouldering the proportionate amount of
P546,000.00.14
The foregoing amount was subsequently deducted from Ramos s benefits which accrued upon
his retirement on May 1, 2006.15
In relation thereto, he executed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim16 dated June 21, 2006,
agreeing to release the bank from any claim or liability with respect to, inter alia, his separation
pay or retirement benefits.17
Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were illegal, Ramos filed a complaint for
underpayment of retirement benefits and nonpayment of overtime and holiday pay and
premium pay against BPI Family and/or its President at that time, Alfonso L. Salcedo, Jr., before
the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC,18 docketed as NLRC NCR 00-09-07510-06.
The LA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated June 27, 2007, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Ramoss complaint,
ruling that the deduction made on his retirement benefits was "legal and even reasonable"20
since Ramos was negligent in running his department. In particular, the LA found that Ramos
failed to ensure that his subordinates complied with the banks Know Your Customer (KYC)
safety protocols, and that he issued the PO and ATD without the prior approval of the credit
committee.21
The LA further noted that the quitclaim executed by Ramos must be given the force and effect of
law, effectively barring any future claim by him against BPI Family.22
The NLRC Ruling
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA in a Decision23 dated March 31, 2008, holding that the
deduction complained of was "illegal and unreasonable"24 in that:
(a) the alleged negligence committed by Ramos was not substantially proven as he was not
expected to personally examine all loan documents that pass through his hands or to require the
client to personally appear before him because he has subordinates to do those details for him;25
(b) the issuance of the PO and ATD prior to the loans approval is not an irregular procedure, but
an ordinary occurrence in BPI Family;26 and
(c) the deduction does not fall under the exceptions prescribed under Article 11327 of the Labor
Code on allowable deductions.28
Further, it found Ramoss consequent signing of the quitclaim to be without effect.29
Accordingly, it ordered BPI Family to return/refund to Ramos the amount of 546,000.00, with
additional payment of 10% thereof as attorneys fees.30
BPI Family moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the NLRC on May 30,
2008;31 hence, it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Pending resolution thereof, Ramos
submitted a manifestation that he had caused the execution of the NLRC decision and the sum
amounting to P600,000.00 was released in satisfaction of his claim.32
The CA Ruling
In a Decision33 dated November 12, 2010, the CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part
of Ramos, holding that Ramos was remiss in his duty as head of Dealer Network Marketing/Auto
Loans Division in failing to determine the true identity of the person who availed of the auto loan
under the name "Trezita Acosta".34
It observed that Ramos should have forwarded the documents for approval to the Loans Review
Section and/or the Credit Evaluation Section of the bank and should not have authorized the
release of the car loan without clearance from the credit committee.35
However, it also attributed negligence on the part of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice
of issuing the PO and ATD prior to the approval of the credit committee.36
Such relaxed supervision over its divisions contributed to a large extent to its defraudation.37
Thus, finding BPI Familys negligence to be concurrent with Ramos, the CA found it improper
to deduct the entire P546,000.00 from Ramos s retirement benefits and, instead, equitably
reduced the same to the amount of P200,000.00.38
Ramos moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution39 dated August
6, 2012. Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC when it found the deduction made from Ramoss retirement
benefits to be illegal and unreasonable.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious. To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the
petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the
discretion conferred upon them. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a
capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.40
To be considered "grave," the discretionary authority must be exercised in a despotic manner by

reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in
contemplation of law.41
In labor disputes, the NLRCs findings are said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when
its conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence. As held in the case of Mercado v.
AMA Computer College-Paraaque City, Inc.,42 citing Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya & Co.:43
The CA only examines the factual findings of the NLRC to determine whether or not the
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence whose absence points to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the recent case of Protacio v. Laya
Mananghaya & Co., we emphasized that:
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate
court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of
whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine
and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial
evidence.
The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate courts reversals of the decisions of labor
tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence .44 (Emphases supplied; citations
omitted)
The requirement that the NLRCs findings should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly
expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[i]n cases filed
before administrative or quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramoss
retirement benefits was improper. Two (2) reasons impel the foregoing conclusion:
First, as correctly observed by the NLRC, BPI Family was not able to substantially prove its
imputation of negligence against Ramos. Well-settled is the rule that the burden of proof rests
upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.45
In this case, BPI Family failed to establish that the duty to confirm and validate information in
credit applications and determine credit worthiness of prospective loan applicants rests with the
Dealer Network Marketing Department, which is the department under the supervision of
Ramos. Quite the contrary, records show that these responsibilities lie with the banks Credit
Services Department, namel y its Credit Evaluation Section and Loans Review and
Documentation Section,46 of which Ramos was not part of.
Second, as similarly observed by the NLRC, Ramos merely followed standing company practice
when he issued the PO and ATD without prior approval from the banks
Credit Services Department. In fact, as the CA itself notes, BPI Family adopted the practice of
processing loans with extraordinary haste in order to overcome arduous competition with other
banks and lending institutions, despite compromising procedural safeguards, viz.:47
In a separate audit report (herein appended as Annex "E"), it was noted that marketing officers
regularly issue or release purchase orders and authorities to deliver to car dealers (in case of
dealer generated auto loan wherein a loan originates from the automobile dealer who submits the
financing transactions, down payment and mortgage fee by the debtor-car purchaser to the bank)
before the approval of the documents.
The report further noted that the practice has been adopted due in part to the stiff competition
with other banks and lending institutions. Resultantly, in 2005 alone, approximately 111 car loan
applications were released ahead of the approval of the credit evaluation section.
Such findings of the auditing division have not been rebutted or countered as erroneous.
In fact, in all 111 instances, the bank did not attempt to rectify the flaw by calling the
respondents attention to the manner by which he disregarded important bank procedure or
protocol in accommodating car loan applications.
It would seem unthinkable that respondent bank has had no knowledge thereof when its credit
evaluation committee could have easily relayed the variations to the management for expedient
solution. Any conscientious, well-meaning banking institution (such as respondent bank, We
imagine) would have raised the red flag the moment the violation is first discovered. However, in
the case before Us, respondent bank did not sound alarm until the discovery of the first
defraudation. Without doubt, its uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over its divisions
contributed to a large extent to the unfortunate attainment of fraud. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is readily apparent that Ramoss action of issuing the PO and ATD
ahead of the approval of the credit committee was actually conformant to regular company
practice which BPI Family itself sanctioned. As such, Ramos cannot be said to have been
negligent ion his duties. To this end, it is well to note that in loan transactions, banks are
mandated to ensure that their client wholly comply with all the documentary requirements in
relation to the approval and release of loan applications.48 As BPI Family "uncharacteristically
relaxed supervision over its divisions," yielding as it did to the demands of industry competition,
it is but reasonable that solely bears the loss of its own shortcomings.
All told, absent any showing that the NLRCs decision was tainted with capriciousness or any
semblance of whimsicality, the Court is wont to grant the present petition and accordingly
reverse the CA decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 12, 2010 and
Resolution dated August 6, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 014161 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The National Labor Relations Commissions Decision dated
March 31, 2008 ad Resolution dated May 30, 2008 in NLRC NCR 00-09-07510-06 are hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
vi. Prima facie evidence
Lucas vs lucas
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011
JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner,

vs.
JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition
for review on certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with
a relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009.
The antecedents of the case are, as follows:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation
(with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)2 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie
Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who
worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work.
On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens workplace,
and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on
March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioners father was
not stated in petitioners certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his
father is respondent. On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft
Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for
a period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused
to accept respondents offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While
petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but
all attempts were in vain.
Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioners certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing that he graduated
from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers
about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the
petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and
obtained a copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on
September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued
the Order3 setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to
file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and that the
Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may
appear and represent the State in the case.
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed
a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the
summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was
required, he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice
by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the
subject matter.4
On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners
Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Respondent reiterated that the petition for
recognition is adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with summons.
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.5
Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could
not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing
cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father.
Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondents motion for reconsideration, issued an Order6
dismissing the case. The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba,7 there are
four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first establish
these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which
may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results.
The court observed that the petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present.
Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally
declare that she had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioners statement as to what his
mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not
signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no
allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court
opined that, having failed to establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present
any affirmative defenses. The dispositive portion of the said Order therefore reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action in his petition, his motion for the submission of parties to
DNA testing to establish paternity and filiation is hereby denied. This case is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008, which
the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the Order9 setting aside the
courts previous order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered
and set aside.
Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for hearing
on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.10
This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court
stressed that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a
certification against forum shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court. The court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the petition were
not of petitioners personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed
respondents arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence
is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA
Evidence11 allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the courts instance or upon
application of any person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and for
Dismissal of Petition,12 reiterating that (a) the petition was not in due form and substance as no
defendant was named in the title, and all the basic allegations were hearsay; and (b) there was no
prima facie case, which made the petition susceptible to dismissal.
The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the hearing.13
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the Orders dated
October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.
On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious.
The assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-
V-07 is DISMISSED.14
The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no
summons had been served on him. Respondents special appearance could not be considered as
voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of
the court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the courts jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically
seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show
that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met. The CA
further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish
a prima facie case, thus:
While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could not
really have been intended to trample on the substantive rights of the parties. It could have not
meant to be an instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not been
intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the situation in this
particular case if a court may at any time order the taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in
compulsory recognition cases is immediately available to the petitioner/complainant without
requiring first the presentation of corroborative proof, then a dire and absurd rule would result.
Such will encourage and promote harassment and extortion.
xxxx
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the danger of allowing
an absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to
establish prima facie proof. x x x If at anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the
court can indeed order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the
prominent and well-to-do members of our society will be easy prey for opportunists and
extortionists. For no cause at all, or even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their younger
years could be used as a means to harass them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of
their children may just be taking the chances-just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long
past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute and unconditional taking of DNA test for
compulsory recognition case opens wide the opportunities for extortionist to prey on victims who
have no stomach for scandal.15
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack
of merit.16
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED

THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.
I.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED

THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE
RESPONDENT.
I.B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED

TO REALIZE THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED
VOLUNTARILY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO.
I.C
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT

ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER
THAN ITS BODY, IS CONTROLLING.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE

DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE MOTION (FILED BY THE
PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA
TESTING.
II.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY

RULED THAT DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE
PETITIONER ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED
RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF HERRERA VS. ALBA,
ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

OF A TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.17
Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the courts
lack of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same,
because issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had already
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several motions asking
for affirmative relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 3,
2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November
6, 2007; and (c) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for
Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points out that respondent even expressly admitted that he has
waived his right to summons in his Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent
Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and academic.
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of the petition
does not state respondents name, the body of the petition clearly indicates his name and his
known address. He maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and not the caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the
dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA
entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the
motion.18 Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require that
there must be a prior proof of filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that the CA
erroneously relied on the four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated in
Herrera v. Alba.19 Petitioner avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of
the proceedings because they are matters of evidence that should be taken up during the trial.20
In his Comment, respondent supports the CAs ruling on most issues raised in the petition for
certiorari and merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, respondent counters that, contrary to petitioners assertion, he raised the issue before
the CA in relation to his claim that the petition was not in due form and substance. Respondent
denies that he waived his right to the service of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and
voluntary appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed
required. He avers that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over such person.
The petition is meritorious.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying
respondents motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion
to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As
such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special
civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless
and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has
been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.21 In the
present case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the
motion to dismiss.
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the courts lack of jurisdiction over
his person due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in the form and substance of the
petition to establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause of action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the CA,
whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent, or whether respondent
waived his right to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually
whether it was necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of summons jurisdictional?
The answer to this question depends on the nature of petitioners action, that is, whether it is an
action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is
directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a
person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which
concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction
of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.22
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court
to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the
latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
made effective. 23
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of
the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole
world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established.24 Through publication, all interested
parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.25 This
is but proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he
so chooses.26 Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try
and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined
that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find
that the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that
he has participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his
opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
To address respondents contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form, we
further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed
adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to
implead respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A
proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.27 In this petitionclassified as an action
in remthe notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the
publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the
trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of
the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be
stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.28 A complaint states
a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right.29
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation
to respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as
they were not of petitioners personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that
cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence.
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the
court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.30
The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.31 The test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint.32
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and
correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and require
the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the
parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.33
The statement in Herrera v. Alba34 that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that
cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish
filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie
casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case
is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis
the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More
essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is
warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter
has just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without
corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Courts attention. In light of this observation,
we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in
resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We,
thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue
a DNA testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and
use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on the
requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary
laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of
DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to
ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively
and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to
ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public."35
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are
aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a
showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of
any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these
states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions
(as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently
explained
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the
kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that
a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood
testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may
issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.371avvphi1
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute
necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish
paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion,
disallow a DNA testing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
vii. Probable Cause
PNB vs Tria
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193250 April 25, 2012
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
AMELIO TRIA and JOHN DOE, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the January 18, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 108571 entitled Philippine National Bank v. Department of Justice, Amelio C. Tria and John
Doe which affirmed the Resolution dated December 26, 2007 issued by the Department of
Justice.
The Facts
Respondent Amelio C. Tria (Tria) was a former Branch Manager of petitioner Philippine
National Bank (PNB), assigned at PNBs Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
Branch (PNB-MWSS) located within the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) Compound, Katipunan Road, Balara, Quezon City.
On September 21, 2001, MWSS opened Current Account (C/A) No. 244-850099-6 with PNB-
MWSS and made an initial deposit of PhP 6,714,621.13 on October 10, 2001. The account was
intended as a depository for a loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to fund Contract
No. MS-O1C.
To withdraw from the account, PNB checks must be issued and three signatures securedone
signatory each from MWSS, Maynilad Water Services, Inc. (MWSI), and the contractor, China-
Geo Engineering Corporation (China-Geo).2
On April 16, 2003, C/A 244-850099-6 became dormant with a balance of PhP 5,397,154.07.3
In the meantime, Tria requested a listing of the dormant accounts of PNB-MWSS and borrowed
the folders of MWSS and C/A 244-850099-6.4 On one occasion, Tria also inquired about the
irregularities involving managers checks committed by the banks former branch accountant.5
On April 22, 2004, PNB-MWSS received a letter-request from MWSS instructing the deduction
of PhP 5,200,000 (plus charges) from C/A 244-850099-6 and the issuance of the corresponding
managers check in the same amount payable to a certain "Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes." The letter-
request was purportedly signed and approved by the duly authorized signatories of MWSS.
Hence, C/A 244-850099-6 was re-activated in light of the letter-request.6
The letter-request, supporting documents, and Managers Check Application Form were then
evaluated by the banks Sales and Service Officer (SSO), Agnes F. Bagasani, who found the
same to be in order.7
Edsel B. Francisco (Francisco), who was also designated to perform the tasks of a Fund Transfer
Processor (FTP), likewise verified the letter-request and the documents from the MWSS Current
Account folder of the bank. He then effected the transaction requested by debiting C/A No. 244-
850099-6 for the purchase of a Managers Check payable to "Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes" and
prepared a Batch Input Sheet listing the supporting documents for the transaction together with
the other transactions for that day.8
Managers Check No. 1165848 was, thus, prepared and issued in the name of Atty. Rodrigo A.
Reyes (Atty. Reyes) for the amount of PhP 5,200,000 (five million two hundred thousand
pesos).9
On April 26, 2004, PNB-MWSS received cash delivery from PNBs Cash Center in the amount
of PhP 8,660,000.10 Nonetheless, at around 11:00 a.m. of the same day, respondent Tria
accompanied Atty. Reyes in presenting Managers Check No. 1165848 to PNBs Quezon City
Circle Branch (PNB-Circle) for encashment and told PNB-Circles SSO, George T. Flandez
(Flandez), that PNB-MWSS had no available cash to pay the amount indicated in the Managers
Check. He also informed Flandez that Atty. Reyes was a valued client of his branch and was in a
hurry to leave for a scheduled appointment.11
To confirm the issuance of Managers Check No. 1165848, Flandez called PNB-MWSS and
talked to its Sales and Service Head, Geraldine C. Veniegas (Veniegas).12 Veniegas confirmed
that PNB-MWSS issued a managers check in favor of Atty. Reyes and sent a letter-confirmation
through e-mail to PNB-Circle.13
While waiting for the confirmation, Flandez interviewed Atty. Reyes. Atty. Reyes told Flandez
that he was an MWSS contractor and the amount covered by Managers Check No. 1165848
represented the proceeds of his recent contract with MWSS. Atty. Reyes then showed his
drivers license and Integrated Bar of the Philippines identification card to Flandez and wrote the
numbers of these cards on the back of the managers check.14
Upon receiving confirmation from PNB-MWSS regarding the managers check, Flandez went to
the Cash Center of PNB-Circle to pick up the cash requisition. Tria and Atty. Reyes, however,
followed him with Tria telling Flandez: "Pirmahan ko na lang tong check, George. Identify ko
na lang siya kasi nagmamadali siya. Dito na lang i-receive. For security kasi nag-iisa lang
siya."15 Tria then placed his signature on the check above the handwritten note "PAYEE
IDENTIFIED AMELIO C. TRIA."16
In August 2004, Veniegas, the Sales and Service Head of PNB-MWSS, observed that Tria
showed sudden concern with the Minutes of the Meeting dated August 6, 2004 even if he was no
longer involved in the operations of the bank. Tria reminded her to prepare the Minutes of the
Meeting. Tria then made revisions therein.17 After the revised Minutes of the Meeting had been
signed by all the attendees, Tria sought to further amend the Minutes, as follows:
9. For your information, BM Tria, per delineation of functions has no approving authority except
in the opening of current and savings account. The BM is purely on marketing clients and giving
services to existing and new clients. Sometimes, we are requesting his assistance like:
- represent/follow up our operational needs in the Head Office;
- handles client complaints;
- assists in emergency cash requisitions;
- assists in accompanying valued client/clients to QC Circle Branch for encashment of

MCs merely to identify the bearer/payee and confirmation of the MC whenever we are
short in cash;
- we usually seek some advice and strategies on handling clients complaints and on other
operational matters.18
On November 1, 2004, Tria retired as PNB-MWSS Manager under PNBs regular retirement
plan.19
On February 2, 2005, Zaida Pulida (Pulida), the MWSS employee in charge of C/A No. 244-
850099-6,20 inquired about the accounts outstanding balance. While she was trying to reconcile
the records of MWSS and PNB, she inquired about a debit entry dated April 22, 2004 to C/A No.
244-850099-6 in the amount of PhP 5,200,000.
Veniegas verified that PhP 5,200,000 was indeed debited and was encashed using Managers
Check No. 1165848 in favor of Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes. Veniegas also attempted to retrieve the
files for the transaction on April 22, 2004 but discovered that the duplicate copy of Managers
Check No. 1165848, the managers check application form and the letter of authority were all
missing.21
Pulida notified Veniegas that MWSS did not apply for the issuance of the managers check
payable to Atty. Reyes. Upon verification with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, it was
discovered that there was no Rodrigo A. Reyes included in its membership roster. Further, upon
inspection of the PNB-MWSS microfilm copy of Managers Check No. 1165848, it was shown
that the check was negotiated and encashed at the PNB-Circle on April 26, 2004 and was
annotated with "ok for payment per confirmation and approval of PNB MWSS" by Tria on the
dorsal portion of the check.22
On February 14, 2005, MWSS wrote the new Branch Manager of PNB-MWSS, Ofelia Daway,
about the unauthorized withdrawal from their PNB C/A No. 244-850099-6.23 MWSS expressed
surprise at the withdrawal of PhP 5,200,030 from its account when it had not issued any PNB
checks. The MWSS letter also stated that:
Our contractor has already submitted their final billing and we expect to withdraw the full
amount deposited to the said account within a months time. We therefore demand the refund or
restoration within five (5) days after receipt of this letter of the amount of P5,200,030.00 to PNB
Account No. 244-850099-6 representing the amount withdrawn without MWSS
authorization/instructions. Otherwise, we will use all the legal means available to MWSS to
recover the amount.
PNB conducted its own investigation and, at its conclusion, sought to hold Tria liable for
qualified theft.24
Employees of PNB-MWSS, Veniegas, Bagasani, and Francisco, and PNB-Circles SSO,

Flandez, executed separate complaint-affidavits to recount the circumstances of the issuance and
encashment of Managers Check No. 1165848, and accused Tria guilty of qualified theft.
Tria, via his Counter-Affidavit, contended that (1) there was no taking of personal property; (2)
there was no intent to gain on his part; (3) the personal property does not belong to PNB even if
it is the depositary bank; (4) there was no grave abuse of confidence on his part; and (5) his
alleged identification of the payee is not the operative act that triggered the payment of the
managers check by the PNB-MWSS Branch.25 Instead, Tria argued that it was Flandez who
approved and paid the managers check even beyond his authority. He added that it was the other
bank employees who should be held liable for the loss.
In his Reply-Affidavit dated February 20, 2006, Flandez contradicted Trias claim that Tria left
PNB-Circle immediately after signing Managers Check No. 1165848. According to Flandez,
Tria helped Atty. Reyes count the PhP 5,200,000 by the bundle and even asked the banks
security guard for a plastic bag for the cash.26
Following a preliminary investigation, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution27 on

August 15, 2006 stating that Trias identification of the payee did not consummate the payment
of the Managers Check. Rather, it was held, the consummation of the payment occurred during
Flandez approval of the encashment. The Resolutions dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Undersigned respectfully recommends the approval of

the above and the dismissal of the charge for Qualified Theft against respondent Amelio C. Tria
due to lack of evidence and probable cause.
PNB moved for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution28 dated April 13, 2007.
Undaunted, PNB filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and prayed for
the reversal of the August 15, 2006 and April 13, 2007 Resolutions issued by the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP).
On December 26, 2007, then Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales issued a Resolution dismissing
PNBs petition for review. PNBs motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
February 27, 2009.
PNB sought recourse before the Court of Appeals (CA). It alleged that both the OCP and the
DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to consider that Tria and Atty. Reyes/John
Doe conspired in committing the crime of qualified theft; and the DOJ committed grave abuse of
discretion in failing to consider the existence of probable cause in the instant case and affirming
the OCPs findings that there is no probable cause to hold Tria and Atty. Reyes/John Doe for
trial in the crime of qualified theft.
The Ruling of the CA
On January 18, 2010, the CA decided in favor of Tria. In affirming the DOJ Resolution issued by
Secretary Gonzales, the CA took notice of how Managers Check No. 1165848 was issued and
paid by PNB after the verification made by PNBs own employees.
The CA ruled that probable cause against Tria and Atty. Reyes was not established since the
employees of PNB made the encashment after their own independent verification of C/A No.
244-850099-6. Further, the CA deferred to the DOJs determination of probable cause for the
filing of an information in court as it is an executive function and ruled that the resolutions were
not reversible as PNB was unable to show that these resolutions of the DOJ were tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The CA, thus, affirmed the OCPs finding that Trias identification of
the payee did not by itself bring about the payment of the subject managers check and
concluded that the element of taking of personal property belonging to another without the
owners consent is lacking since PNB consented to the taking by Atty. Reyes.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions dated December 26, 2007
and February 29, 2009, issued by Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales in I.S. No. 05-10093. are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PNB, thus, questions the Decision of the CA by the instant appeal.
The Ruling of this Court
We find petitioners appeal meritorious.

According to the CA, it was the approval of the request for the issuance and for the encashment
of the managers check by the employees of PNB that resulted in the withdrawal of the amount
encashed by Atty. Reyes/John Doe. Hence, according to the appellate court, the OCP was correct
in not pursuing the criminal case against Tria.
Clearly, the CA in the instant case erroneously overlooked vital factual circumstances that call
for a reversal of its ruling.
While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to

ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of an information rests with the executive branch,29 such
authority is far from absolute. It may be subject to review when it has been clearly used with
grave abuse of discretion.30 And indeed, grave abuse of discretion attended the decision to drop
the charges against Tria as there was more than probable cause to proceed against him for
qualified theft.
It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the filing of a criminal information
is not proof beyond reasonable doubt that the person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on
him, but only that there is probable cause to believe that he is guilty of the crime charged.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.31 It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. 32 A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed
and that it was committed by the accused.33
The acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the encashment of the check provide
more than sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause to file an information against him and
John Doe/Atty. Reyes for qualified theft. In fact, it is easy to infer from the factual milieu of the
instant case the existence of all the elements necessary for the prosecution of the crime of
qualified theft.
As defined, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence
against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of
another without the latters consent.34 If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of
theft becomes qualified.35 In prcis, qualified theft punishable under Article 310 in relation to
Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is committed when the following
elements are present:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,

nor of force upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
In the instant case, the first and second elements are unquestionably present. The money
involved is the personal property of Trias employer, PNB. Trias argument that the amount does
not belong to PNB even if it is the depositary bank is erroneous since it is well established that a
bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients.36
The third element, intent to gain or animus lucrandi, is an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation.37 This element is immediately
discernable from the circumstances narrated in the affidavits submitted by PNBs employees. In
particular, it is plain from Trias misrepresentation that the person he called Atty. Reyes was a
valued client of PNB-MWSS who was authorized to encash the managers check and his act of
revising his functions as stated in the Minutes of the Meeting referred to by Veniegas to make it
appear that he had been tasked with "accompanying valued client/clients to QC Circle Branch for
encashment of MCs merely to identify the bearer/payee and confirmation of the MC whenever
we are short in cash."
The fifth element is undisputed, while the last element, that the taking be done with grave abuse
of confidence, is sufficiently shown by the affidavits of PNB and Trias own admission of the
position he held at the Bank. A banks employees are entrusted with the possession of money of
the bank due to the confidence reposed in them and as such they occupy positions of
confidence.38
It is the existence of the fourth elementthe taking be done without the owners consentthat is
the crux of contention. While the appellate court, together with the DOJ and OCP, maintains the
negative and equates the cumulative acts of the other PNB employees as the consent of PNB in
the issuance and encashment of the managers check, this Court cannot find itself to sustain such
opinion.
On the contrary, the facts portray the stark absence of consent on the part of PNB for the
issuance of managers check payable to "Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes" and its felonious encashment
by John Doe/Atty. Reyes in complicity with Tria.
Tria, it must be reiterated, was PNBs bank manager for its MWSS branch. The check in
question was a managers check. A managers check is one drawn by a banks manager, Tria in
this case, upon the bank itself. We have held that it stands on the same footing as a certified
check, which is deemed to have been accepted by the bank that certified it, as it is an order of the
bank to pay, drawn upon itself, committing in effect its total resources, integrity and honor
behind its issuance. By its peculiar character and general use in commerce, a managers check is
regarded substantially to be as good as the money it represents.39 In fact, it is obvious from the
PNB affidavits that the MWSS C/A was deducted upon the issuance of the managers check and
not upon its encashment. Indeed, as the banks own check, a managers check becomes the
primary obligation of the bank and is accepted in advance by the act of its issuance.40
Taking this fact into consideration, it cannot be denied that the wheels of the felony started
turning days before the misrepresentations made by Tria at PNB-Circle. And the encashment was
a mere culmination of the crime that was commenced in PNB-MWSS.
The felony of qualified theft started with the use of the now missing falsified letter-request and
supporting documents for the issuance of the managers check and the re-activation of the
MWSS C/A. It was the pretense of an authority from MWSS that deprived PNB the liberty to
either withhold or freely give its consent for the valid reactivation of the account and issuance of
the check. Quoting from Black v. State,41 this Court held in Gaviola v. People42 that such
pretense does not validate a taking:
In all cases where one in good faith takes anothers property under claim of title in himself, he is
exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And
the same is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. Still, if
the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, it will not protect the taker.
In more conventional words, this Court sustained the finding of qualified theft in People v.
Salonga,43 where the taking was done through the issuance of a check by the very person
responsible for, and in custody of, the said check, viz:
The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. The
information alleged that the accused took P36,480.30 with grave abuse of confidence by forging
the signature of officers authorized to sign the subject check and had the check deposited in the
account of Firebrake Sales and Services, a fictitious payee without any legitimate transaction
with Metrobank. Theft is qualified if it is committed with grave abuse of confidence. The fact
that accused-appellant as assistant cashier of Metrobank had custody of the aforesaid checks and
had access not only in the preparation but also in the release of Metrobank cashiers checks
suffices to designate the crime as qualified theft as he gravely abused the confidence reposed in
him by the bank as assistant cashier. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Similar to the bank involved in Salonga, PNB was deprived of the discretion to withhold its
consent since, as the circumstances establish, the very person responsible for the custody and the
issuance of the check is the one guilty for its felonious issuance and encashment, its former
branch manager Tria.
Indeed, the pretense made in PNB-MWSS that led to the issuance of the Managers Check
cannot be imputed on anyone other than Tria. His role as the branch manager of PNB-MWSS
who had the responsibility over the functions of the employees of PNB-MWSS cannot be
overlooked. As branch manager, Tria signs managers checks. He serves as the last safeguard
against any pretense resorted to for an illicit claim over the banks money. The acts of the other
bank officials in the MWSS branch in processing the managers checks pass through the
supervision and approval of Tria. Thus, the processing and approval of the check are the
responsibility of Tria.
As such, Tria is duty-bound to verify from the banks client any supposed authority given for the
issuance of a managers check. He was, therefore, duty-bound to confirm with MWSS whether
the letter-authorization for the deduction of P5.2 million from the MWSS C/A is genuine, legal
and binding. Tria is required to exercise the highest degree of care since the degree of diligence
required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of
their relationship with their depositors is concerned.44 This degree of diligence was wanting in
Trias failure to determine the veracity of said letter-authority considering that the amount to be
deducted is large, with the withdrawal of almost the entire amount of the deposit leaving only
less than PhP 200, more so when the account has been dormant since April 16, 2003.
As standard banking practice intended precisely to prevent unauthorized and fraudulent

withdrawals, a bank manager verifies with the client-depositor to authenticate and confirm that
he/she has validly authorized such withdrawal. Such failure of Tria as bank manager to verify the
legitimacy of the requested withdrawal lends credence to the accusation that he colluded with
Atty. Reyes to feloniously take money from PNB, and his complicity includes depriving the bank
of its opportunity to deny and withhold the consent for the necessary issuance of Managers
Check No. 1165848. It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that PNB did not consent to the issuance of
the check and its eventual encashmentwhich both constitute the taking of personal property
as respondents had made sure that the bank was rendered inutile and incapable to give its
consent. The fourth element of the crime clearly exists.
Furthermore, a branch manager normally stays at his branch to perform his functions and duties
in such position in said branch except on official business as prescribed by the bank. Certainly, it
is not one of the duties of a branch manager to leave his office and personally accompany a
payee of a managers check it issued to another branch to encash said check. It is, therefore,
unusual and highly suspicious for Tria to leave his office located in Balara, Diliman, Quezon
City and travel to Quezon Avenue where the PNB-Circle is located to identify a fictitious payee
and ensure the encashment of the check.
Tria could just have waited for a call from the branch manager of the PNB Quezon City Circle
Branch to verify the authenticity of said check. Such extra effort and unexplained gesture on the
part of Tria to provide assistance to Atty. Reyes, a fake lawyer, to ensure the encashment of the
check leaves one to believe that he is in cahoots with the impostor.1wphi1
What is more, it is curious that Tria accompanied John Doe/Atty. Reyes to encash the managers
check in another branch under the pretext that his own branch is short of cash when in fact more
than PhP 8 million has just been delivered to PNB-MWSS. Such misrepresentation can only be
considered as an attempt to cover the crime and pass the blame to other PNB employees, as in
fact the CA ruled that Flandez is to blame. This attempt is further reinforced by the curious case
of the missing fictitious letter-request and its supporting documents, which were last seen in the
vault of PNB-MWSS which can be accessed by Tria. Furthermore, the allegation of Veniegas
that Tria unilaterally and secretly revised the banks Minutes of the Meeting to reflect that he had
"no approval authority" beyond opening accounts but was specifically requested by the bank to
"assist valued clients" in encashing checks at the Quezon City Circle Branch shows an ingenious
ploy by Tria to cover his tracks upon the eventual discovery of the theft and is in contravention
of the General Banking Law of 2000.45
Nonetheless, nothing is more damning than the fact that Tria vouched for the identity of John
Doe/Atty. Reyes, even claimed that Atty. Reyes is a valued client of PNB-MWSS, affixed his
signature at the back portion of the check to guarantee that Atty. Reyes is the true and legal
payee, and ultimately guaranteed that the Managers check is legally effective and valid and
everything is aboveboard. PNB-Circle could have verified from MWSS if the deduction is
authorized especially considering that the money will be deducted from an account of a
government corporation. The identification by Tria of Atty. Reyes as payee precluded and
preempted the bank officials from verifying the transaction from MWSS. Thus, the identification
made by Tria impliedly warranted to the PNB-Circle that said Managers check was validly
issued with the consent of PNB, and that the encashment is legal and warranted.
It must also be noted that Tria likewise made representations to the PNB-Circle that the
Managers check is legal and valid as evidenced by the annotation at the dorsal portion of the
check "ok for payment per confirmation and approval of PNB MWSS." The act of Tria in
confirming and approving the encashment of the check by Reyes is the pretense of the consent
given to him by PNB to authorize the issuance of the managers check that resulted in the taking
of PhP 5.2 million from PNB. Tria must, therefore, be prosecuted and tried before the courts of
justice.
While it is truly imperative to relieve a person from the pain of going through the rigors of trial,
it is more imperative to proceed with the prosecution of a criminal case to ensure that the truth is
revealed and justice served when there is a prima facie case against him.46
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 108571 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
is ORDERED to file an Information charging Amelio C. Tria and Atty. Reyes/John Doe for
Qualified Theft.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Del Castillo vs People
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012

(Formerly UDK No. 13980)
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben
del Castillo assailing the Decision2 dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution3 dated December 13,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision4
dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case
No. CBU-46291, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock
in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from
the jeep they were riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of
the petitioner's residence is a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor.
When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her that they will implement
the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw
petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him
but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the
place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the
subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few
minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner
named Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the
petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found
nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles
that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of
the four (4) heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the
result of which proved positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The Information5 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent, did then and there have in his possession and control four (4) packs of white crystalline
powder, having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as "shabu," all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or prescription from any
competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty.7
Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit
Salinas.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo,
Dalisay del Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was installing the electrical
wirings and airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky
Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he
was engaged by the owner of the establishment in a conversation. He was able to go home
around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his wife that police
operatives searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small structure, 20
meters away from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned by his older
brother and was used as a storage place by his father.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben del Castillo "alyas Boy
Castillo," GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances proven before this Court, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6) Months and One
(1) Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months as Maximum of Prision
Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.31
gram, positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated and
shall be destroyed in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the
RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED,
with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.9
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this
Court the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the following
arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS

OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-
24;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4) PACKS
OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF
THE NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST
THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY
PRESUMED THAT IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER OR THAT THE
PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED
AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT OR
STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY THE PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4)
PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE
SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ARE FRUITS
OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT

OF "POSSESSION" AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN VIOLATION
OF THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD THE SAID
COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE
BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE SAME HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN.10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10, 2009, enumerated
the following counter-arguments:
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of

Branch 24, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible in evidence
against him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs.11
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that
SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of
the alleged illegal sale of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of
the same search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner, aside from failing to
file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing evidence to show
that Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away
from his house is no longer within the "permissible area" that may be searched by the police
officers due to the distance and that the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one
of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against government authorities and
not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper containing
packs of shabu inside the nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to
be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the
OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and regulated drugs
are found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a particular person, the
presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the
fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in
writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.12 According to
petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.13 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction.14 The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality
of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula,15 and must
employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard.16 The existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court,
therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of
the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for
that determination.17 Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought
out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched.18 A review of the records shows that in the present
case, a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered that the warrant issued
must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for
it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.19 In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-
2420 specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be
searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away
from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other
than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless
search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the
items seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items
should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay
tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they
asked the assistance of the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:
Fiscal Centino:
Q For how long did the chase take place?
A Just a very few moments.
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him?
A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay tanod.
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?
A Nelson Gonzalado.
Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver get?
A Two.
Q What happened after that?

A We searched the house, but we found negative.
Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?
A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing.
Q What about you, where were you?
A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.
Q What about the barangay tanod?
A Together with Milo and Pogoso.
Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative what did you do?
A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop because he ran from his shop,
so we searched his shop.
Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?
A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo named Dolly
del Castillo.
Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, Barangay Tanod Nilo
Gonzalado and the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo were together in the shop?
A Yes.
Q What happened at the shop?
A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded paper.
Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?
A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.
Q Was that the only item?
A There are others like the foil, scissor.
Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others inside the electric shop?
A Yes.21
The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the items that were
actually seized were found in another structure by a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2
Arriola, thus:
FISCAL:
Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you still recall what took
place?
A We cordoned the area.
Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen?
A We waited for the barangay tanod.
Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?
A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's wife.
Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?
A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face.
Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted the search?
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate Bienvenido Masnayon saw
that Ruben ran away from his adjacent electronic shop near his house, in front of his house.
Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was clean.
Q What did you do afterwards, if any?
A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop.
Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop?
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben run from that store
and furthermore the door was open.
Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.
xxxx
Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop?
A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that there were other persons
or other person that followed after Masnayon?
A Then we followed suit.
Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit?
A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.
Q What about you?
A I also followed suit.
Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo?
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw him open the folded
paper which contained four shabu deck.
Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open the folded paper?
A We were side by side because the shop was very small.22
SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?
A At his residence, the two-storey house.
Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the search at the residence of
the accused?
A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A Negative, no shabu.
Q And what happened afterwards, if any?
A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.

Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you
proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.
Q And who among the team went inside?
A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.23
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as
agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in
authority and agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of

some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent

authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security
of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader,
and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a
person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a
barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code
reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay,
sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay
shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials
and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the
maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the
maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting
as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted
was unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is considered a private
individual, thus, making the same items admissible in evidence, petitioner's third argument that
the prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the regulated drugs seized, would
still be meritorious.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter
has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying,24 unless attended with
arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are
accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal25 as in the present case.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A.
6425. In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements
must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is
not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that
the said drug is a regulated drug.26
In People v. Tira,27 this Court explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However,
the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the
drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under
the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The
accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place
where the contraband is located, is shared with another.28
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the
property is under appellants control or possession.29 The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession
exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to
exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.30 The records are void of any
evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used
the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used
the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:
x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation. As such,
conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical equipments is
actually used by the respondent. Being the case, he has control of the things found in said
structure.31
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof as to
the ownership of the structure where the seized articles were found. During their direct
testimonies, they just said, without stating their basis, that the same structure was the shop of
petitioner.32 During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the
electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you
proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.33
However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was an electrical shop
but denied what he said in his earlier testimony that it was owned by petitioner, thus:
ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:
Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that correct?
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the shop.
Q Now, this shop is within a structure?
A Yes.
Q How big is the structure?

A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den and at the other side is a
structure rented by a couple.34
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of
the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs.35 With the
prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there
casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with
the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is
presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.36
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty
that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.371wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No.
27819, which affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Ruben del Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
viii. Iota of Evidence (circumstantial)
People of the Philippines vs Anticamara
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178771 June 8, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO and FERNANDO CALAGUAS FERNANDEZ
a.k.a. LANDO CALAGUAS,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00556, affirming the trial court's judgment finding appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez
(Lando) and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara (Al) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder in Criminal Case No. 4498-R and of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention in Criminal Case No. 4481-R.
Lando, Al, Dick Taedo (Dick), Roberto Taedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), Necitas Ordeiza-
Taedo (Cita), and Fred Doe are charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious
Illegal Detention in two separate Informations, which read:
For Murder (Criminal Case No. 4498-R)
That on or about the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome,
Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with a hand gun, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and
superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take Sulpacio Abad,
driver of the Estrellas, hog tied (sic) him, brought (sic) to a secluded place, shoot and bury in a
shallow grave, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.
For Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention (Criminal Case No. 4481-R)
That on or about the 7th day of May 2002, more or less 3:00 o'clock in the early morning, at the
Estrella Compound, Brgy. Carmen East, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who are private
persons, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with firearms, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Sulpacio Abad and AAA,2 both
employees of the Estrellas, thereby depriving them of their liberty, all against their will for a
period of twenty-seven (27) days.
That in the course of the kidnapping, Sulpacio Abad was killed and buried in Brgy. Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan and AAA was raped for several times by her abductors.
Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to RA 7659.
When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all pleaded not guilty, while
Dick, Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe remained at-large. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
As summarized in the People's brief, the facts as established by the evidence of the prosecution
are as follows:
About 3 o'clock in the early morning of May 7, 2002, househelper AAA and driver Abad
Sulpacio were sleeping in their employers' house located in Barangay Carmen East, Rosales,
Pangasinan. Their employers, Conrado Estrella and his wife, were out of the house at that time
(TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 4-7). Momentarily, AAA was jolted from sleep when she heard
voices saying, "We will kill her, kill her now" and another voice saying, "Not yet!" Hiding under
her blanket, AAA later heard someone saying, "We only need money, we only need money."
Thereafter, she heard someone talking in Ilocano which she could not understand. Then she
heard somebody say, "Cebuana yan, Cebuana yan, kararating lang galing Cebu." AAA heard the
persons conversing which she estimated about four to five meters away (TSN, ibid., pp. 11-12).
Thereafter, AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who she later identified as
accused Dick Taedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Taedo, a certain Fred and appellants Alberto
Anticamara alias "Al Camara," and Fernando Fernandez alias "Lando Calaguas." One of the
intruders approached her and told her not to move (TSN, ibid., p. 8).
Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she attempted to run but to her
surprise, someone wearing a bonnet was watching her. Someone, whom she later recognized as
Dick Taedo, tapped her shoulder. AAA asked Taedo, "Why Kuya?" Taedo replied,
"Somebody will die." After a brief commotion, appellant alias "Lando Calaguas" asked the group
saying, "What shall we do now?" They then decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led
her outside the house. Outside, AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and blindfolded, seated inside
a vehicle (TSN, April 26, 2004, pp. 6-10).
The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their employers. AAA saw
Cita Taedo there. The group brought Abad outside the vehicle and led him away (TSN,
December 2, 2002, pp. 13-18; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 5-8).
Later, alias "Fred" returned telling the group, "Make the decision now, Abad has already four
bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl." When Cita Taedo made a motion of cutting
her neck, appellant alias "Lando Calaguas" and "Fred" boarded the vehicle taking along with
them AAA. They later proceeded towards San Miguel Tarlac, where Lando Calaguas resided.
They stayed in Lando's house where they kept AAA from May 7 to May 9, 2002 (TSN,
December 4, 2002, pp. 18-22; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 7-9).
On May 9, 2002, appellant Lando Calaguas told AAA that Fred and Bert Taedo would kill her.
Lando then brought AAA to a hotel in Tarlac, telling AAA that he would leave her there as soon
as Fred and Bert Taedo leave the place. However, once inside the hotel room, appellant Lando
Calaguas sexually molested AAA. Lando told AAA to follow what he wanted, threatening her
that he would turn her over to Fred and Bert Taedo. After Lando raped AAA, he brought her
back to his house. Later, Fred, Bert Taedo and Lando Calaguas transferred AAA to Riles,
Tarlac (TSN, ibid., pp. 9-13).
AAA was brought to the residence of Fred's niece, a certain Minda, where Fred kept AAA as his
wife. At nighttime, Fred would repeatedly ravish AAA, threatening her that he would give her
back to appellant Lando Calaguas who, AAA knew, killed Abad Sulpacio. She was afraid Lando
might also kill her (TSN, ibid., pp. 14-16).
On May 22, 2002, Fred brought AAA to Carnaga (should be Kananga), Leyte, together with his
wife Marsha and their children. AAA stayed in the house of Marsha's brother Sito, where she
was made as a house helper (TSN, ibid., p. 17).
On June 4, 2002, AAA escaped from the house of Sito. She proceeded to Isabel, Leyte and
sought the help of her friend Susana Ilagan. After hearing AAA's plight, Susana called AAA's
brother in Cebu, who later fetched AAA in Isabel, Leyte and brought her to Mandaue City.
When they arrived in Mandaue City, they immediately reported the incident to the police
authorities. On June 23, 2002, AAA executed a Sworn Statement (Exh. "D," TSN, ibid., pp. 18-
20).
Meanwhile, Dr. Ronald Bandonil, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Sulpacio Abad. Dr. Bandonil prepared Autopsy
Report No. N-T2-23-P (Exh. "A") which contains the following findings, to wit:
x Remains placed in a sealed metal coffin, wrapped in two (2) layers of black, plastic garbage
bags, and covered in (sic) a red-stripped cotton blanker. A thick layer of lime embeds the whole
torso.
x Remains in a far advanced state of decomposition, with the head completely devoid of soft
tissue. A cloth is wrapped around the eyesockets and tied to the back of the skull. The skull does
not show any signs of dents, chips nor fractures. The other recognizable body part is the chest
area which retained a few soft tissues and skin, but generally far advanced in decomposition. The
whole gamut of internal organs have undergone liquefaction necrosis and have been turned into
grayish-black pultaceous masses. Worn on top of the remaining chest is a sando shirt with
observable holes at the left side, both front and back. A large hole is seen at the area of the left
nipple, with traces of burning at its edges and inward in direction. A tied cloth is also observable
at the remnants of the left wrist.
x At the upper chest, which is the most recognizable, remaining and intact part of the torso, a
hole, 1.0 cm. x 2.0 cms., with signs of burning, edges inverted, is seen at the left anterior axillary
line just below the left nipple. Another hole is seen 1.5 cms. x 2.5 cms. in diameter, edged
averted (sic) at the right chest, along the right anterior axillary line, 5.0 cms. below the right
nipple. A 3rd hole, almost unrecognizable is seen at the left groin area.
x The other parts of the cadaver are too far advanced in decomposition to have remarkable
findings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUNSHOT WOUNDS, TRUNK3
In his defense, Lando denied having committed the crimes charged and interposed alibi as a
defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on May 7, 2002, he was in Barangay
Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac, with his family. He denied ever going to the Estrella farm in Sitio
Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his companions if any person or
vehicle would approach the house of the Estrellas. He said that he was forced to follow what was
ordered of him and did not report the matter to the police because he was threatened to be killed,
including the members of his family who were in Cebu.
On August 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53,
rendered its Decision,4 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
A. Accused Nicetas "Cita" Taedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for
insufficiency of evidence;
B. Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto

Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the presence of aggravating
circumstance of pre-meditation, with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the
penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two (2) accused Fernando Calaguas
Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). They are also ordered
jointly and severally [to] pay the heirs of the victim Abad Sulpacio the following:
1) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as indemnity for the death of the

victim;
3) Fifty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Two Pesos and Thirty Centavos

(P57,122.30) as actual damages; and
4) The cost of suit.
II. Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention:
A) Accused Nicetas "Cita" Taedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for
insufficiency of evidence;
B) Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto

Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention of the victim AAA as
charged, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. 7659. Considering that the victim AAA was raped during her detention, the
maximum penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two accused, Fernando
Calaguas Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). The two
accused are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the victim AAA the amount of:
1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages;
2) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
3) Cost of suit.
As to the rest of the accused who are still at-large, let this case be set to the archives until they
are apprehended.
SO ORDERED.5
In light of the Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,6 the records of the cases were forwarded by the
RTC to the CA for its review. The CA rendered a Decision dated December 15, 2006, affirming
the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 4498-R and 4481-R. However, in view of the
abolition of the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, which was approved on
June 24, 2006, the appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
On January 9, 2007, Lando, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), appealed the Decision
of the CA to this Court. Lando had assigned the following errors in his appeal initially passed
upon by the CA, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED

BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT

GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF MURDER INSTEAD OF
HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH FOR THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, AGGRAVATED BY RAPE, IN SPITE OF
THE FACT THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS NOT DULY PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION TO THE

EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE
THAN THAT OF THE PROSECUTION
V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION

DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On January 9, 2007, Al, through the PAO, appealed the Decision of the CA to this Court. Al had
assigned the following errors, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE

CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE
CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH FOR THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT
THAT HE HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF [TWO] SEXUAL
ABUSES AGAINST THE VICTIM.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE CONSPIRED
WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE SAME.8
In capsule, the main issue is whether the appellants are guilty of the crimes charged.
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
Circumstantial Evidence
The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the
early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan,
the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the
identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience .9
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.10 A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved
form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.11
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken
together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of
Sulpacio. The Court quotes with approval the lower court's enumeration of those circumstantial
evidence:
The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:
1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad
Sulpacio were sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to rob the place;
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick
Taedo, and heard the latter uttering "somebody will die";
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside
Abad Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Taedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin
Lim, Roberto Taedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred;
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia,
Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;
6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the
vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick
Taedo stayed with her in the vehicle;
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): "Make a
decision now. Abad has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this
girl."12
In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter
"Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan." (Our agreement is that whoever
comes our way should be eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on
June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and naming his companions
Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of
the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a
shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the
remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico
Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on various parts of the body of
the victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the gunshot
wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye
sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also found tied at the remnants of
the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution
was able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the
Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly
shot and buried.
Conspiracy
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of
the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together,
would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is
frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.13 To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not
even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one
another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal
objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals.14
In the present case, prior to the commission of the crime, the group met at the landing field in
Carmen, Pangasinan and discussed their plan to rob the house of the Estrellas with the agreement
that whoever comes their way will be eliminated.15 Appellant Al served as a lookout by posting
himself across the house of the Estrellas with the task of reporting any movements outside. Fred
then climbed the old unserviceable gate of the Estrella compound and then opened the small door
and the rest of the group entered the house of the Estrellas through that opening.16 After almost
an hour inside the house, they left on board a vehicle with AAA and Sulpacio. AAA and
Sulpacio were brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. In that place,
Sulpacio was killed and AAA was brought to another place and deprived of her liberty. These
circumstances establish a community of criminal design between the malefactors in committing
the crime. Clearly, the group conspired to rob the house of the Estrellas and kill any person who
comes their way. The killing of Sulpacio was part of their conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of
arming himself with a gun constitutes direct evidence of a deliberate plan to kill should the need
arise.
Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was only forced to
participate in the commission of the crime because he and his family were threatened to be
killed. Al's defense fails to impress us. Under Article 1217 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is
exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act
with freedom.18 To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the
existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear
of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed.19 For such defense to prosper, the
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature
as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough.20
There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that he was under duress
from his co-accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to exempt him from
incurring criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and
directed to station himself across the house of the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00
a.m.21 of the following day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the landing field. Thus,
while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to a real,
imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay across the house of the Estrellas for
almost six (6) hours,22 and thereafter returned to the landing field where the group was waiting
for his report. Subsequently, the group proceeded to the Estrellas house. When the group
entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his companions. Later,
when the group left the house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them in going to Sitio Rosalia,
Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and AAA.23 Clearly,
appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he wished to, but he never did. Neither did he
request for assistance from the authorities or any person passing by the house of the Estrellas
during the period he was stationed there. Clearly, Al did not make any effort to perform an overt
act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the
commission thereof that would exempt himself from criminal liability.24 Therefore, it is obvious
that he willingly agreed to be a part of the conspiracy.
Alibi and Denial
Appellant Lando denied having committed the crime charged and interposed alibi as a defense.
He claims that at the time of the incident he was in his house at Tarlac, together with his family.
On the other hand, the appellants were positively identified by AAA, as two (2) of the six (6)
malefactors who forcibly took her and Sulpacio from the Estrella house in the early morning of
May 7, 2002. Both the trial court and the CA found the testimony of AAA credible. The Court
gives great weight to the trial courts evaluation of the testimony of a witness because it had the
opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while
testifying; thus, making it in a better position to determine whether a witness is lying or telling
the truth.251avvphi1
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare denial
of the appellant, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far
stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible
witness. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and
always received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also
because they are easily fabricated and concocted.26 Denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against
the appellants.27
As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at
the time of the incident, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible for
Lando to be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must
prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.Physical impossibility refers to the
distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place
where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.28 Where there is
the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.29
During the trial of the case, Lando testified that the distance between his house in Brgy.
Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac to the town of Rosales, Pangasinan is only around forty (40)
kilometers. Such distance can be traversed in less than 30 minutes using a private car and when
the travel is continuous.30 Thus, it was not physically impossible for the appellant Lando to be at
the locus criminis at the time of the incident. In addition, positive identification destroys the
defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and
categorical.31
Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances
In convicting the appellants, the courts a quo appreciated treachery in qualifying the killing to
murder and evident premeditation in imposing the penalty of death. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make.32 Two conditions must concur for
treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted.33
In the case at bar, it was proven that when AAA boarded the vehicle, she saw Sulpacio tied and
blindfolded. Later, when they reached the fishpond, Sulpacio, still tied and blindfolded, was led
out of the vehicle by the group. When the remains of Sulpacio was thereafter found by the
authorities, the autopsy report indicated that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye
sockets and tied at the back of the skull and another cloth was also found tied at the left wrist of
the victim. There is no question therefore, that the victim's body, when found, still had his hands
tied and blindfolded. This situation of the victim when found shows without doubt that he was
killed while tied and blindfolded; hence, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery
was present in the commission of the crime. In People v. Osianas,34 the Court held that:
x x x In the case at bar, the means used by the accused-appellants to insure the execution of the
killing of the victims, so as to afford the victims no opportunity to defend themselves, was the
act of tying the hands of the victims. Teresita saw the accused-appellants hog-tie the victims and
take them away with them. Later that night, Dionisio Palmero saw the victims, still hog-tied,
walking with the accused-appellants. The following day, the victims were found dead, still hog-
tied. Thus, no matter how the stab and hack wounds had been inflicted on the victims in the case
at bar, we are sure beyond a reasonable doubt that Jose, Ronilo and Reymundo Cuizon had no
opportunity to defend themselves because the accused-appellants had earlier tied their hands.
The fact that there were twelve persons who took and killed the Cuizons further assured the
attainment of accused-appellants' plans without risk to themselves.35
The aggravating circumstance of superior strength cannot be separately appreciated because it is

absorbed by treachery.36
The circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof showing: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has
clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.37 The essence of
premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.38 From the time the group met at the landing field at around 6:30 p.m. of May 6, 2002,
and discussed the possibility of killing anyone who stands on their way, up to the time they took
Sulpacio away from the Estrellas house and eventually killed him thereafter at around past 3:00
a.m., more than eight hours had elapsed sufficient for the appellants to reflect on the
consequences of their actions and desist from carrying out their evil scheme, if they wished to.
Instead, appellants evidently clung to their determination and went ahead with their nefarious
plan.
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape, defined in and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code39 are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in
any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be
illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating
public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.40
The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Appellants
Lando and Al, both private individuals, forcibly took AAA, a female, away from the house of the
Estrellas and held her captive against her will. Thereafter, appellant Lando brought AAA to his
house in San Miguel Tarlac, whereby she was deprived of her liberty for almost one month. It is
settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an
enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty.41 For there to
be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.42 Its essence is the
actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the
accused to effect such deprivation.43 Although AAA was not confined in an enclosure, she was
restrained and deprived of her liberty, because every time appellant Lando and his wife went out
of the house, they brought AAA with them. The foregoing only shows that AAA was constantly
guarded by appellant Lando and his family.
The crime of rape was also established by the prosecution. Appellant Lando succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of threat and intimidation. AAA testified that on May
9, 2002, appellant Lando brought her to a hotel to hide her from Fred and Bert, who intended to
kill her. Appellant Lando told her to follow his orders, otherwise, he will give her to Fred and
Bert. While in the hotel, appellant Lando raped her.44 Clearly, for fear of being delivered to Fred
and Bert and of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to appellant Lando's lustful
assault. In rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost always the single most
important factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the
accused's conviction.45 This is so because owing to the nature of the offense, in many cases, the
only evidence that can be given regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended party.46
The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed
or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People v. Larraaga,47 this provision gives rise
to a special complex crime. Thus, We hold that appellant Lando is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in
Criminal Case No. 4481-R.
However, the Court does not agree with the CA and trial court's judgment finding appellant Al
liable for Rape in Criminal Case No. 4481-R. In People v. Suyu,48 We ruled that once conspiracy
is established between several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all
be equally culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery,
unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape.49
Also, in People v. Canturia,50 the Court held that:
x x x For while the evidence does convincingly show a conspiracy among the accused, it also as
convincingly suggests that the agreement was to commit robbery only; and there is no evidence
that the other members of the band of robbers were aware of Canturia's lustful intent and his
consummation thereof so that they could have attempted to prevent the same. x x x
The foregoing principle is applicable in the present case because the crime of robbery with rape
is a special complex crime defined in and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the crime of kidnapping with rape in this case is likewise a special
complex crime as held in the case of People v. Larraaga.51 There is no evidence to prove that
appellant Al was aware of the subsequent events that transpired after the killing of Sulpacio and
the kidnapping of AAA. Appellant Al could not have prevented appellant Lando from raping
AAA, because at the time of rape, he was no longer associated with appellant Lando. AAA even
testified that only Fred and appellant Lando brought her to Tarlac,52 and she never saw appellant
Al again after May 7, 2002, the day she was held captive. She only saw appellant Al once more
during the trial of the case.53 Thus, appellant Al cannot be held liable for the subsequent rape of
AAA.
The Penalties
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to
murder. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged and
proven, the imposable penalty upon the appellants is death, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 1,
of the Revised Penal Code.54 In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346,55 prohibiting
the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua,56
without eligibility for parole.57
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with rape is death. In view of R.A. No. 9346, the penalty of death is
reduced to reclusion perpetua,58 without eligibility for parole.59 Accordingly, the imposable
penalty for appellant Lando is reclusion perpetua.
As to appellant Al, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance in the commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 6360 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Damages
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs
of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.61 In People v.
Quiachon,62 even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A.
9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As explained in People
v. Salome,63 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains
that the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still
heinous. Accordingly, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is proper.
Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation
and proof other than the death of the victim.64 However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on
heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant
to R.A. No. 9346, the award of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00.65
The award of exemplary damages is in order, because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation in the commission of the crime.66 The
Court awards the amount of P30,000.00, as exemplary damages, in line with current
jurisprudence on the matter.67
Actual damages is also warranted. Modesta Abad, the spouse of victim Sulpacio, incurred
expenses in the amount of P57,122.30, which was duly supported by receipts.68lawphil
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing
jurisprudence that civil indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of rape.69 Applying
prevailing jurisprudence, AAA is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.70
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code,71
without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape.72 Moral
damages is granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious
crime of rape.73 Such award is separate and distinct from the civil indemnity.74 However, the
amount of P100,000.00 awarded as moral damages is reduced to P75,000.00, in line with current
jurisprudence.75
The award of exemplary damages to AAA in the amount of P50,000 is hereby reduced to
P30,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence.76
As to appellant Al. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the accused is individual and not
collective.77 Since appellant Al is liable only for the crime of serious illegal detention, he is
jointly and severally liable only to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. For serious
illegal detention, the award of civil indemnity is in the amount of P50,000.00, in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.78
Along that line, appellant Al's liability for moral damages is limited only to the amount of
P50,000.00.79 Pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in
cases of illegal detention. This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety and fright
when she was detained for almost one (1) month.80
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando"
and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara alias "Al" are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
without eligibility of parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Sulpacio Abad
the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00
as exemplary damages, and P57,122.30 as actual damages.
(b) In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, appellant Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando"
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Appellant Alberto Cabillo Anticamara alias "Al" is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is also directed to pay, jointly
and severally, with appellant Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando," the victim
AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
People vs De Ocampo
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185212 February 15, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
MARITESS ALOLOD, EFREN DEOCAMPO, ELMER DEOCAMPO and EDWIN
DEOCAMPO, Accused,
EFREN DEOCAMPO, Appellant.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about when circumstantial evidence may be considered sufficient to support a
finding of guilt in a murder case.
The Facts and the Case
The Provincial Prosecutor of Sultan Kudarat charged the accused Maritess Alolod, Efren
Deocampo, Edwin Deocampo, and Elmer Deocampo with double murder before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Cases 2531 and 2532.
The prosecution evidence shows that Melanio and Lucena Alolod adopted accused Maritess and
took her into their home in Barangay Poblacion, Lebak, Sultan Kudarat. Maritess had two
children with her lover, Efren Deocampo, who was never allowed to set foot on her parents
house since they loathed him. In May 1998, the old couple, Melanio and Lucena, suddenly went
missing.
Neighbors and relatives testified last seeing the old couple on May 27, 1998. A neighbor,
Magdalena Ato, recalled that the two were in good health. In fact, Melanio even went to market
early in the day. At around 8:30 that evening, as he was making his rounds, a security guard at
Salaman Institute, Demetrio Nebit, saw two men standing near the fence that separated the
school from the Alolod house. On seeing Nebit, the two hurried into a nearby toilet but the
security guard followed and told them to come out. Nebit identified one of the two to be Efren
Deocampo, a former classmate, and his brother Edwin.
At about 2:00 a.m. on the following day, May 28, Victor Ato, Magdalenas husband, awakened
to strange sounds coming from the Alolod house just five to six meters away. Victor heard a
woman sobbing and what sounded like a pig being butchered. He looked out through the window
but, seeing no one, he just went back to bed. When Victor woke up at 5:30 a.m., he saw Efren at
the kitchen of the Alolod house.
Later that day, Magdalena had the chance to ask Maritess about the sounds coming from their
house during the night. Maritess explained that Melanio was ill and she was having a difficult
time giving him medicine. Maritess added that her parents had left for Cotabato City early that
morning. Meantime, on inspection that morning, the school security guard noticed that the
cyclone wire of the fence where he saw Efren and Edwin standing the night before had been cut.
He reported the incident to the school principal.
Annaliza Relles, the grandniece of the Alolods, noticed the absence of the old couple when she
came over that morning to cook for them. Only Maritess and her two children were there.
Maritess told Annaliza that her parents had left for a vacation. Annaliza tried to use one of the
toilets in the house but it was padlocked. Maritess told her to just use the other toilet.
On May 29 Generita Caspillo, Maritess relative and close friend, stayed at the Alolod residence
to keep them company because according to Maritess, her father suffered a stroke and had to be
brought to Cotabato for medical treatment. While Generita was there, she noticed a pile of red
soil near the well at the garden.
On May 30 Annaliza and Generita saw Efrens younger brothers Edwin and Elmer at the Alolod
residence. The next day, during their town fiesta, friends and relatives came by to visit the old
couple but Maritess told them that they had gone to Davao City and would not return until
August 16 or 17. By June the couples grandchildren who would stay at their house for school
began arriving. They observed the frequent presence of the Deocampo brothers in the house.
Sometime in August, Generita and her mother, Lucenas sister, came to pay a visit. They saw
Efren wearing Melanios wristwatch. Maritess insisted that her parents were still in Davao for
medical check-up.
In August, Maritess and her children, together with the Deocampo brothers, left the Alolod house
to live at Sitio Gila-gila, Barangay Kuya, South Upi, Maguindanao. When the Alolod spouses
did not return to their home, their relatives started looking for them. They found out that the
missing couple did not go to either Davao or Cotabato or to their relatives in Iloilo. Their clothes
and other personal effects were still in the house. The last entry on the recovered diary of
Melanio was on May 27. Suspecting that something was amiss, the couples relatives, Francisco
Estaris and Joel Relles, searched the house for clues. They even dug up elevated and depressed
soil formation around the place but for naught.
Finally, on October 9, 1998 Francisco noticed a portion of the land planted with camote.
Francisco found the place unlikely for camote since it was shaded from the sun. Those who
boarded at the house said that it was Maritess and Efren who planted them. With the help of
others, Francisco dug up the suspected spot. There they found the decomposing bodies of
Melanio and Lucena. Based on the post-mortem report, Melanio was strangled with a wire;
Lucena was stabbed.
On May 10, 2001 the RTC found the four accused guilty of murder of Lucena, with Efren and
Edwin as principals and Maritess and Elmer as accessories, in Criminal Case 2531 and of the
murder of Melanio in Criminal Case 2532. In each case, the RTC sentenced Efren and Edwin to
suffer the penalty of death, while Maritess and Elmer were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum to 10 years of
prision mayor, as maximum. The RTC also ordered the accused to pay P50,000.00 to the heirs of
Lucena and another P50,000.00 to the heirs of Melanio, and to pay the costs.
While the case was on appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the request of Maritess and
Elmer to withdraw their appeals, leaving only those of Efren and Edwin for its consideration. On
August 30, 2007 the CA rendered judgment in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00419, affirming with
modification the RTC decision. The CA reduced the penalty imposed on Efren to reclusion
perpetua and on Edwin who was a minor to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum to
15 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition to the P50,000.00 granted by
the RTC as civil indemnity in each of the cases, the CA further ordered the additional payment of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and another P25,000.00 as temperate damages for a total of
P100,000.00 in each case, with the principals severally liable for P60,000.00 and the accessories
for P40,000.00 of this amount. Efren and Edwin appealed to this Court. Edwin, however, on a
letter to the Office of the Solicitor General dated December 7, 2008, manifested his intention to
withdraw his appeal. On August 26, 2009 the Court granted Edwins withdrawal, leaving Efren
as the sole accused-appellant in this case.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs
finding that accused Efren was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based on
circumstantial evidence.
The Ruling of the Court
The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of the crime1 provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair
conclusion: the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others.2
Here, those circumstances abound.

1. Efren had always been banned from the old couples house because they strongly
disapproved his relationship with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no business
being around that house.
2. The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of May 27, 1998.
3. On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house, meaning that they were killed on
the night of May 27 or early morning of May 28.
4. On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman Institute saw Efren and Edwin
standing on the school side of the fence next to the old couples house. They even tried to
conceal themselves in the school toilet. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence
wire had been cut.
5. At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a woman sobbing and
what seemed like the butchering of a pig.
6. At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod kitchen.
7. From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couples house, with Efren
wearing the old mans watch.
8. Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City and
subsequently to Davao City for medical treatment when people started looking for them.
They were of course buried in the garden.
9. A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant more camote on a pile of red soil
beside the house.
10. The bodies of the old couple were found underneath those plants.
The alibi of Efren that he was in Maguindanao at about the time the old couple was killed does
not encourage belief.1wphi1 The security guard saw him with his brother at 8:30 p.m. of May
27 near the couples house where they had no business being there. A neighbor saw Efren at the
kitchen of that house on the morning following the slaying of the couple. And it was not
physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene when it happened.3 Sitio Gila-gila,
South Upi, Maguindao was merely 15 kilometers from Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.
The CA, however, correctly reduced the imposable penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, not
only because the information failed to allege the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and the
victims age but likewise, because of Republic Act 93464 that now prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty.
Consistent with recent jurisprudence the Court is awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,5
P25,000.00 as temperate damages,6 another P75,000.00 as moral damages,7 and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages,8 for a total of P205,000.00 in each case. But these amounts should only
apply to Efren and not to the rest of the accused who withdrew their appeals.9 Here, the RTC
ordered Maritess, Edwin and Elmer to pay only P50,000.00 as civil indemnity in each case or a
total of P100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
00419 dated August 30, 2007 with MODIFICATION ordering accused Efren Deocampo to
indemnify the heirs of Melanio and Lucena Alolod in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, another P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a total of P205,000.00 in each case, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

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i.

G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005

MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner,

Esperanza testified as follows:

Swear in the witness.

ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)

You may proceed.

A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

In Ordoo vs. Daquigan,13 this Court held:

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

People of the Philippines vs Castaneda

G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Moises Sevilla Ocampo for private petitioner.

Cicero J. Punzalan for respondent.

SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship The following persons

xxx xxx xxx

Razon vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992

ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,

G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992

VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The relevant Antecedent facts are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner's contention is not correct.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The rights of stockholders are generally enumerated as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Sunga Chan Chua

G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners,

LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.

The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:

NO special pronouncements as to COSTS.

SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties or

We are not persuaded.

2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Bordalba vs Court of Appeals

[G.R. No. 112443. January 25, 2002]

TERESITA P. BORDALBA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR

and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows:

3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.

N - Fruelana Jayme & Road

W - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana

North: Froilan Jayme and Road

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the

(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;

7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order the reconveyance of one-third of

North: Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme

G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner,

The Facts and the Case