Administrative Law; Public Officers; Damages; The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages

which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks; However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts
done in bad faith which being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity
for official actions. The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer
arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who
acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that
may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to
judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Same; Same; Same; A public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be
validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad
faith; Instances Where a Public Officer May Be Validly Sued in His/Her Private Capacity for Acts Done in the Course
of the Performance of the Functions of the Office.In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
309 SCRA 602 (1999), that a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another,
may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice
or bad faith. Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity
for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted
with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Same; Same; Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of
superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties; while said provisions deal
in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e., acts done in the
performance of official duties, without specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the
official concerned. On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule
on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For
both superior and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements
that will make them liable for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of
government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e.,acts done in the performance of official duties, without
specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.

Same; Same; Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public
officers. Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an
act that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights
and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights
by public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the
Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32
of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a
particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article
32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek
damages for violation of constitutional rights.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.

FACTS:

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are
currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax
shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying
Champion, Hope, and More (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already
covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of
the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her
because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her
acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under
Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the
discharge of the functions of his/her office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer
arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who
acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that
may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to
judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may
arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA,
a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done
in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a
general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as
the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which
the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act
was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that
defendant acted without evil intent.

VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION

GR No. 141309, JUNE 19 2007
Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune
Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior
to its effectivity, cigarette brands Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner
issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion"
cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are
currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum
tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."
Fortune filed an MfR on 20 Jul, requesting the RMC's recall but it was denied on 30 Jul, and payment of the AV tax
deficiency (9M~) was demanded within 10 days. Fortune filed a petition for review with the CTaxApp (CTA) which
issued an injunction enjoining RMC's implementation (defective, invalid, unenforceable). This was affirmed by the
CA, and SC in Comm, BIR v. CA, since the RMC fell short of the requirements for a valid admin issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private
capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without
due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that:

(1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her
official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the
Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts;
(2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith;

On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of
petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was
dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act
with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the
general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs
the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the
performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which
should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice,
or gross negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of
damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38,
Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers liability, such that, if the
complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for
failure to state a cause of action

Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers "acts" from which civil
liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers violation of
constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whether the complaint states a cause of action
or not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,14 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said public
officer should have acted with malice or in bad faith

ISSUE/S:

(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of
the functions of his/her office?

(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern
in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer
arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who
acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that
may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to
judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may
arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA,
a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done
in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the
decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.

The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows:

"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so
amended as to make a public official liable for violation of another persons constitutional rights only if the public
official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:

"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there
should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an
end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.

Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as
the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property, or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which
the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act
was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that
defendant acted without evil intent.

Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of superior and
subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and subordinate
public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for
damages. Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject
thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or omission
that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.

Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that
may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and
liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by
public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative
Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same
Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular
class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article
32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek
damages for violation of constitutional rights.

Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on Human Rights; Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to
have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory powers over certain specific type of cases like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has
the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it
has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations in volving civil or political rights. The Court declares the
Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights.The most that may be conceded to the Commission. in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in a controversy must be accompanied by
the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations invoking civil and political rights.As should at once be observed,
only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations
of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted
by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request
the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice or even quasi-judicial bodies do.But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the
popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Human Rights having merely the power to investigate
cannot and should not try and resolve on the merits the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90
775.Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power to investigate, cannot and
should not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90
775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights,
or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The matters are undoubtedly and clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and also within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Isidro Cario vs The Commission on Human Rights

Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public
authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes,
converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served
them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order,
eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90
days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed
to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout
signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from
service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was
filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was
eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding
the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held
that the striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced without a
chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the
Commission is empowered to investigate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of
any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also
request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies
do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have
well understood and quite distinct meanings.

Investigate vs. Adjudicate

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or
inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve,
rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court
case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in
a case of controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not
"try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it
has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits"
the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions,
and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this
effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where
the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said
acts or omissions.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary
cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves
are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of
Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which
may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education
himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually
the Supreme Court.

204 SCRA 483 Political Law Constitutional Law The Constitutional Commissions Commission on Human Rights
Adjudicatory Power of the CHR

On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage
rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The
issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario ordered the dismissal from
the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on
Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and
prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to
Secretary Cario.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the
alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of
human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits
and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.

Same; Same; Administrative Law; Department Secretaries are authorized to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under their jurisdiction.The Administrative Code of 1987
vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for
officers and employees under the formers jurisdiction. Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over
respondents. Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the
President, in line with the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. While the Chief
Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health secretarys disciplinary
authority over respondents when he remanded the PCAGCs findings against them for the secretarys appropriate
action.

Same; Same; Same; As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to
investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based; Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad
Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly
their authority was limited to conducting investigations and preparing their findings and recommendations.As a
matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report the
facts from which a decision may be based. In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to
investigate to the PCAGC. Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under
AO 298 had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting
investigations and preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the
disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.

Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Cardinal Principles in Administrative Due Process.Due process in administrative
proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing,
which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be
substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have
acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the
views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the
reasons for it and the various issues involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the department secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what
action should be taken against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and investigated,
the actual exercise of the disciplining authoritys prerogative requires a prior independent consideration of the law
and the facts, and failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid decision.The health secretary has
the competence and the authority to decide what action should be taken against officials and employees who have
been administratively charged and investigated. However, the actual exercise of the disciplining authoritys
prerogative requires a prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this
requirement results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an
investigators recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There can be no
shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the livelihood of the person administratively
charged. In the present case, the health secretarys two-page Order dismissing respondents pales in comparison
with the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the issuance of his seven-page decision, President
Fidel V. Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctors case. He even noted a violation that had not been considered by
the PCAGC. On the other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive
portion of the Commissions Resolution. She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with
regard to Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Like that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should have contained a
factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for their
dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.The Presidents endorsement of the
records of the case for the appropriate action of the health secretary did not constitute a directive for the
immediate dismissal of respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should have
contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for
their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The end does not justify the meansguilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed,
unless due process is first observed, this is the essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.In
representation of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges
and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the
guilt of respondents, but solely due process. In closing, the Court reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism that the end
does not justify the means. Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed.
This is the essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.

DOH vs Camposano

Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining authority must
make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing administrative
sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and
conducted by another body or group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence
gathered and indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for the
sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair
play in a democracy.

Facts:
Respondents are former employees of the DOH-NCR. Some concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint
before the DOH Resident Ombudsman against respondents arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-
NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00
from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory.

Issue: WON there has been a failure to comply with administrative due process

Held:
The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the former's jurisdiction.[16] Thus, the health
secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents.

The Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of
a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against respondents and their co-respondents.
The Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the them for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of
RA 3019.Then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 creating an ad-hoc
committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed
to the PCAGC. The PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution
disposing respondents (guilty as charged) and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that the
penalty of dismissal from the government service be imposed thereon. President Ramos issued AO 390 that
DISMISSED them from the service. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision on the ground that the PCAGC's
jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no
power to investigate the charges against respondents. Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the PCAGC's
findings, the secretary of health failed to comply with administrative due process.

Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the President, in line
with the principle that the 'power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.[17] While the Chief Executive
directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health secretary's disciplinary authority over
respondents when he remanded the PCAGC's findings against them for the secretary's 'appropriate action.

As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report
the facts from which a decision may be based.[19] In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the
power to investigate to the PCAGC.
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the power to
impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting investigations and preparing
their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who
had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the
respondents' right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit supporting evidence,
must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to
support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision,
the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not
have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that
respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.

The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present factual milieu.
Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident from the health secretary's Order dismissing the
respondents thus guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed. This is the
essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.

Smart Communications, Inc. Et Al. vs. National Telecommunications Commission (Ntc) G.R. 151908, August 12,
2003

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS; RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DOCTRINE

OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION;WHEN APPLICABLE

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)

G.R. 151908, August 12, 2003

Facts: The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to declare the circular as unconstitutional. A
motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC
denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC.

Held: 1. Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and (b) quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegability and separability of powers. To be valid, such rules and regulations must conform to, and be
consistent with, the provisions of enabling statute.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial.
2. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative body contravenes the law
or the constitution is within the judicial power as defined by the Constitution which is the duty of the Courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there haw been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The NTC circular was issued pursuant to its quasi-
legislative or rule-making power. Hence, the action must be filed directly with the regular courts without requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
3. Where the act of administrative agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, exhaustion of
administrative remedy is required, before going to court.
4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the same must be referred to an administrative
agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within
the special competence of an administrative body. In such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral
of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

Facts:

The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services.

The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and three certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper,
The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000. Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale
and use of prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the
effectivity of the Memorandum Circular.

On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators
which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This
was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities.

Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications
Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner
Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing
Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order.

Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call
cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the
Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against
deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of
the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and
that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable.
Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Complaint-in-Intervention and this was granted by the trial court.

Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No.
152063, assigning the following errors. Thus, two petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17,
2003.

Issues:

1. Whether NTC has a jurisdiction and not the regular courts over the case; and
2. Whether Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional and contrary to law and public policy.

Held:

Jurisdiction: NTC vs. RTC

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative

adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegability and separability of powers.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to
the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises
of the regulatory statute administered.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals
erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.

Constitutionality of the Circular

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed
act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated
October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power.

Ruling:

Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical
matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of
the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards and this is judicially known to be within the
knowledge of a good percentage of our population and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the
Constitution.

Hence, the consolidated petitions are granted but the decision of the Court of Appeals on the civil cases are
reversed and set aside. Thus, it is remanded to the court a quo for continuation of the proceedings.