19.

SORIANO III VS LISTA

FACTSThis is a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments, made by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, of public respondents to different positions in
the Philippine Coast Guard and their subsequent assumption of office without confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments under the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the fact that despite the non-submission of their names to the Commission on
Appointments (CA) & for confirmation, all of the said respondent officers of the PCG had assumed their
duties and functions$ According to petitioner, their respective appointments are illegal and
unconstitutional for failure to undergo the confirmation process in the CA. Thus, they should be prohibited
from discharging their duties and functions as such officers of the PCG.

ISSUEWhether or not the appointment in PCGs falls upon the officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain Section 16 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which requires the confirmation by
the Commission of Appointments

RULINGNo. Due to the exercise of statutory authority of the President to reorganize the office of the
President, the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from
the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.

It is clear from the foregoing provision of the Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank of
colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation by the CA. The rule is that the plain, clear
and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a
construction that changes its meaning.

The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain refers to military officers alone. This is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission on the proposed text of said Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Since the promotions
and appointments of respondent officers are not covered by the above-cited provision of the Constitution,
the same need not be confirmed by the CA.

Accordingly, the Court declares that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction was committed by respondent officers of the PCG. Their assumption to office as well as the
disbursement of their respective salaries and other emoluments by the respondent Secretary of the DBM
are hereby declared valid and legal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

20. POBRE vs. MENDIETA

FACTS: These consolidated petitions under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court were filed by Her genes
Pobre to set aside the courts decision and writ of prohibitory injunction, issued by Judge Corona Ibay-
Somera, annulling the appointment extended by President Corazon C. Aquino to the petitioner,
Hermogenes Pobre, as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional Regulation Commission mo (PRC) and
enjoining him from discharging the duties and functions of that office.

The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as
PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate
Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC.

The Executive Secretary wanted to know whether the President may appoint as
Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than the Senior
Associate Commissioner.

In a Memorandum, Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III answered the queries as follows:
Based on the foregoing premises, it is our view that Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 does not limit or restrict the
appointing power of the President. It has been said that "those matters which the Constitution specifically
confides to the executive, the legislative cannot directly or indirectly take from his control"

Pobre opposed the issuance of a restraining order because President Aquino had already appointed
him PRC Chairman and he had, in fact, already taken his oath of office on February 17, 1992. Judge Somera
denied the prayer for a restraining order as well as the petition for declaratory relief for being moot and
academic.
Consequently, Mendieta filed a petition for quo warranto contesting Pobre's appointment as
chairman of the PRC because he (Mendieta) allegedly succeeded Francia as PRC Chairman by operation of
law. Pobre disputed Mendieta's claim on the ground that only the President of the Philippines, in whom the
appointing power is vested by law and the Constitution, may name the successor of retired PRC
Commissioner/Chairman Francia upon the expiration of the latter's term of office.
The petition raises an issue regarding the proper construction of the provision in Section 2 of P.D.
No. 223 that: ". . . any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most
Senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term,
resignation or removal," whereby the legality of Pobre's appointment as PRC Chairman may be determined.
In interpreting this section of P.D. No. 223, consideration should be accorded the provision of the
Constitution vesting the power of appointment in the President of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional Regulation
Commission by the President is lawful.

COURT RULING:

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. This provision empowers the President to appoint "those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint." The law that authorizes him to appoint the PRC
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners, is P.D. 223, Section 2, which provides that the Commissioner
and Associate Commissioners of the PRC are "all to be appointed by the President for a term of nine (9)
years, without reappointment, to start from the time they assume office . . . .

Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/Commissioner to succeed Julio B. Francia,
Jr. at the expiration of his term did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 223 and in fact conforms with the
Chief Executive's interpretation and implementation of the law, the legality of said appointment should be
upheld.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned decision dated August 5, 1992
and the writ of prohibitory injunction dated August 19, 1992 issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No.
92-60272 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The appointment of petitioner Hermogenes P.
Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional Regulation Commission is declared lawful
and in order.

21. Flores vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993]

FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was
appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is
challenged in a petition for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent
useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses
attached to the office . . . ." 2 Paragraph (d) reads:

(d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the
Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis supplied).

Said provision allegedly infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first
par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment
or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," because the City Mayor
of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the
Mayor to the subject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, for the reason that
the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3
April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.

ISSUE: Whether the provision in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

RULING: Yes. Said provision of law is unconstitutional.THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT INVOLVES THE
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION, AND ONCE CONFERRED, SUCH MAY NOT BE RESTRICTED BY THE CONGRESS TO
A POINT THAT THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY LOSES ANY DISCRETION ON WHO TO APPOINT.

As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the person or persons having
authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust," or "[t]he selection or designation of a
person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge
the duties of the same." In his treatise, Philippine Political Law, Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz
defines appointment as "the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office."

Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.
According to Woodbury, J., "the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the essence of his
appointment," and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds that an "appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act
involving the exercise of discretion." In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court
we held:

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he
may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who
have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power . . . ."

The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words,
the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power.

When Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the
same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is
conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on
the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest
the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when
the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively
eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the
power of appointment.

In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for
the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the provision nevertheless limits the
appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can
qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom
to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all
and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.

While it may be viewed that the provision merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year
of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly,
while the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the
provision limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.

As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman
of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act
that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and
his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer.
The provision in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227 is declared unconstitutional; consequently, the appointment
pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and
VOID. However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by respondent Gordon, if any, as
such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done
by him in the exercise of his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.

22. Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327

(Public Officer, Appointments, CSC)

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The
appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the final
action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested
position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner
whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor
Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the
respondents appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to
do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power
to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service .and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing
officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better
qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

23. Matibag vs Benipayo

FACTS:On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelecs EID by
then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent
Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman
issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested
Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.
She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of
government offices that transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular. Petitioner
appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed an
administrative and criminal complaint 16 with the Law Department 17 against Benipayo, alleging that her
reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil servicelaws,
rules and regulations. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, Petitioner filed
the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section
1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:We find petitioners argument without merit. An ad interim appointment is a permanent

appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once
the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. In the instant case, the President did in fact
appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity,
unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac 34 andSolicitor General Felix Bautista
in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. 35 The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to
make appointments that take effect immediately.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC shall be independent; 36 , this provision should be
harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence
of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad Interim appointees before
the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. This
is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It
will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.

24. Pimentel, Jr. vs Ermita, 472 SCRA 587

(Public Officer, Difference Between Ad-Interim and Acting Appointments)

Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their regular
session.

Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting
capacity.

Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that while Congress is in
session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.

Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in
session.

EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5,
Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:

SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as
provided for in the Constitution and laws.

SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in
the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly
appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or
(b) there exists a vacancy[.]
Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while
Congress is in session.

Held: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the
office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President
must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session.

Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but,
if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the undersecretary?

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The
scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to
prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty
to appoint any particular person to an office.

25. Calderon vs. Carale (April 22, 1992)

Petition for prohibition to review the constitutionality & legality of the appointment of respondents

FACTS: Sec.16, Art.VII: The President shall nominate &, w/ the consent of the Com on Appointments (CA),
appoint the heads of the exec departments., ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain & other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, & those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments., agencies, commissions, or boards.

Sarmiento III v. Mison: (On power of CA to confirm appointments) The position of the BOC Commissioner (a
bureau head) is not one of those w/n the 1st group of appointments where the consent of the CA is
required. While the 1935 Constitution includes heads of bureaus among those officers whose
appointments need the consent of the CA, the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of
heads of bureaus from appointments that need the consent of CA. The intent was to exclude presidential
appointments from confirmation by CA, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the 1st
sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII.

Bautista v. Salonga: The position of Chairman of the Com on Human Rights is not among those mentioned
in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of 1987 Consti, appointments to w/c are to be made w/ the
confirmation of the CA. The Pres appoints the CHR Chairman & members pursuant to the 2nd sentence in
Sec. 16, Art VII, that is, w/o confirmation of CA bec they are among the officers of govt whom the Pres may
be authorized by law to appoint. And Sec 2(c) of EO 163 authorizes the Pres to appoint the Chairman &
members of CHR.

Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Constl Commissions: Since the seats reserved for sectoral reps
in par.2, Sec. 5, Art VI may be filled by appointment by the Pres by express provision of Sec. 7, Art XVIII of
the Consti, it is indubitable that sectoral reps are among the other officers whose appointments are vested
in the Pres in this Consti referred to in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII whose appointments are subject
to CA confirmation.

DOCTRINES FROM THE 3 CASES:

1) Confirmation by CA is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec.
16, Art VII, including those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Consti in the Pres. 2)
Confirmation is not required when the Pres appoints other govt officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. Also,
in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides
in an unconstl manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose
appointments are not other wise provided by law.

In March 1989, RA 6715, amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved.

Sec. 13, RA 6715: The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners shall all be appointed by the
President, subject to confirmation by CA.Pursuant to RA 6715, Pres Aquino appointed the Chairman &
Commissioners of the NLRC. Drilon then issued AO No. 161, designating the places of assignment of the
newly appointed commissioners.The present petition questions the constitutionality & legality of the
permanent appointments mentioned above w/o submitting the same to CA for confirmation pursuant to
Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715.PETITIONER: insists on a mandatory compliance w/ RA
6715. Mison & Bautista are not decisive in this case for in the case at bar, the Pres issued permanent
appointments w/o submitting them to CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) w/c requires
the confirmation by the CA of such appointments.SOLGEN (RESPONDENTS): RA 6715 transgresses Sec. 16,
Art. VII by expanding the confirmation powers of CA w/o constl basis. Mison &Bautista laid the issue to
rest.SOLGEN: Three points as regards subsec. 3 of Sec. 10 of Art VII of the 1935 Consti & in the orig text
of Sec. 16, Art. VII of 1987 Consti as proposed in Resolution No. 517:
1) in both, the appointments of heads of bureaus were required to be confirmed by CA;
2) in both, the appointments of other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
to appoint are expressly made subject to confirmation by CA. However, in the final version of Resolution
No. 517, as embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of 1987 Consti, the appointment of heads of bureaus & other
officers whose appointments are not provided for by law & those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint areexcluded from the list of those officers whose appointments are to be confirmed by
CA;3) Under 1935 Consti, the word nominate qualifies the entire Subsec.3 of Sec. 10 of Art VII
thereof.SOLGEN: If confirmation is required, the 3 stage process of nomination, confirmation &
appointment operates. This is only true of the 1st grp enumerated in Sec. 16, Art. VII but the word
nominate does not appear in the 2nd & 3rd sentences. Therefore, the presidents appointment pursuant to
the 2nd & 3rd sentences need no confirmation.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by CA of appointments extended by
the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VII whose appointments require confirmation by the CA.

RULING: Mison: There are 4 groups of officers whom the Pres shall appoint
1) Heads of exec depts., ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, & other officers whose appointment are vested in him in this Consti.
2) All other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
3) Those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint
4) Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the Pres alone.
In the course of the debates on the text of Sec 16, Art VII, there were 2 major changes proposed &
approved by Constl Commission: 1) exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the
requirement of confirmation by CA; 2) exclusion of appointments made under the 2nd sentence of the
section from the same requirement.

The 2nd sentence refers to all other officers of the govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law & those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint.

The NLRC Chairman & Commissioners fall w/n the 2nd sentence of Sec 16, Art VII, more specifically, under
the third grp in Mison (I.e. those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint). Thus, they are not
among those mentioned in 1st sentence whose appointments require confirmation by CA.

To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by CA of the appointments of respondents Chairman &
Members of NLRC, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because:
1) It amends by legislation, the 1st sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by adding thereto appointments requiring
confirmation by CA
2) It amends by legislation the 2nd sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by imposing the confirmation of the CA on
appointments w/c are otherwise entrusted only w/ the Pres. Legislation cannot expand a constitutional
provision after the SC has interpreted it.

Sec 16, Art VII was deliberately intended by the framers to be a departure from the system embodied in
the 1935 Constitution where the CA exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidentiall
appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation.

Subsec. 3, Sec. 10, Art. VII, 1935 Constitution: The Pres shall nominate & w/ the consent of the CA,
shall appoint the heads of the exec departments. & bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel,
of the Navy & Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, & all other officers of the Govt whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, & those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint.

The solution to Congress displeasure/disapproval to the deliberate limitation on the CAs power of
confirmation is a future constitutional change w/c may consider either a return to the 1935 constitutional
provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between 1935 & 1987 Constitution.

RULING: Petition DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the
confirmation of CA of appointments of the Chairman & Members of the NLRC is UNCONSTITUTIONAL & of
no legal force & effect.

26. Tarrosa vs Singson

Congress Cant Expand the Appointing Power of the President

Gabriel Singson was appointed as the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by then president Fidel
Ramos. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a taxpayer, opposed the said appointment and he argued that Singson
cannot perform such position without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Tarrosa invoked
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7653 which provides that the Governor of the BSP if appointed is subject to
the confirmation of the COA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs confirmation.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the
confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An appointment to the said
position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA cited in Section 16 of
Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission
on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

27. BINAMIRA vs. GARRUCHO, JR. [G.R. No. 92008. July 30, 1990]
FACTS: A memorandum designating Ramon Binamira as General Manager of Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA) was addressed and signed by the then Minister of Tourism and the Ex-officio Chairman of PTA. The
Minister sought the approval of the delegation to the president and the same was granted. Concomitantly,
Binamira assumed office as general manager on the same date that the memorandum was sent.

Allegedly, Binamira discharged duties as the PTA general manager and ex-officio vice chairman.
Said discharged is even purported to have been acknowledge by the president.

However, after sometime, Peter Garrucho, as the newly appointed secretary of tourism demanded
for Binamira's resignation which was pursuant to a memorandum that then Pres. Aquino sent to the former
advising him of the invalidity of the delegation of the position to Binamira as he was not appointed by the
president which was what was required under PD 564. PD 564 is the law that created the Ministry of
Tourism. Under section 23-A of the decree, the General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause.

When Binamira was ousted, Garrucho took over his place as general manager, still in pursuance
with the memorandum sent by Pres. Aquino.

On account of the foregoing events, Binamira filed a petition for quo warranto question Garrucho's
post and prayed for reinstatement claiming unjust dismissal. Pending said case, he filed a supplemental
petition impleading Jose Capistrano who was the appointed general manager.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Binamira is proper and thus does not warrant his recall.

HELD: Petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the Minister
of Tourism.

It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only
designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation
that the petitioner has failed to consider.

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who
is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law
of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the
Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral
Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However,
where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office
only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the
designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of
tenure on the person named.

Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his
claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that the
appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of
the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of
its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the
exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the
petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate
even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he
was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and
unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to
another.
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of
judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent
to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been
given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.

Even on the assumption that the power conferred on the President could be validly exercised by the
Secretary, we still cannot accept that the act of the latter, as an extension or "projection" of the
personality of the President, made irreversible the petitioner's title to the position in question. The
petitioner's conclusion that Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the act of President Aquino is based only
on half the doctrine he vigorously invokes. Justice Laurel stated that doctrine clearly in the landmark case
of Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, where he described the relationship of the President of the Philippines
and the members of the Cabinet as follows:

. . . all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of
the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the Philippines
when "performed and promulgated in the regular course of business," which was true of the designation
made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered
valid only if not "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," as also happened in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

28. Sarmiento Vs Mison

FACTS:Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary
of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento
assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador
Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the
consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.