SPOUSES MARIA LUISA and JULIUS MORATA, vs. SPOUSES VICTOR and FLORA GO and HON. VALERIANO P.

TOMOL, JR., Judge, CFI of Cebu, Branch XI

FACTS:

1. Respondents and petitioners are all residents of Cebu City.

2. Sometime in August 1982, respondents Victor Go and Flora Go filed a complaint in the CFI of Cebu against petitioners
Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages, amounting to 49,400.00

3. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds

a Failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the respondents of the BARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCESS,
as required by P.D. No. 1508
b Absence of a CERTIFICATION by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been
reached by the parties.
4. Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss.

5. Petitioners then filed an MR, but this was also denied considering that Sections 11, 12, and 14 of P.D. No. 1508 specifically
referred to City and Municipal Courts (not CFI/RTC) as the courts to which the settlement or arbitration made by the
Lupon shall be elevated and transmitted.

6. Thus, this petition by the Spouses Morata.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cases cognizable by the CFI/RTC are required to first undergo barangay conciliation process before the
courts can receive the said cases.

RULING: YES.

Cases falling within the jurisdiction of CFIs/RTCs must also be coursed first to the barangay court in the cases mentioned by
law cognizable by the Lupon

RATIO:

Under Sections 2 and 6 of P.D. No. 1508:

Section 2. x x x The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in
the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

1. Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;

3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;

4. Offenses where there is no private offended party;

5. Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.
 Section 6. x x x No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon
as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication
unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation
or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary , attested by the Lupon
or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to the
court in the following cases:

1. Where the accused is under detention;

2. Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;

3. Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property and support pendente lite; and

4. Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Except in the instances enumerated in Sections 2 and 6 of P.D. No. 1508, the Lupon has the authority to settle
amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city of municipality. The law makes no
distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level. In fact,
in defining the Lupons authority, Section 2 of P.D. No. 1508 employed the comprehensive term ALL, to which usage the
court should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept that where the law does not distinguish,
the court should not distinguish.

The conciliation process at the barangay level is designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order
to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the
authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the City and Municipal courts is to lose sight of this
objective. There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon the authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, its obvious intendment was to grant
to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the
aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupons authority is exercised only in
cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of City or Municipal courts.

Furthermore, any doubt on the issue before us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando. The circular embodied the directive to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions and
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons, which was addressed not only to judges of city and municipal
courts, but also to all the judges of the CFIs/RTCs, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian
relations. This clearly shows that conciliation process at the barangay level, as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court,
is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the city and municipal courts, but for actions
cognizable by the CFIs/RTCs as well.
UY vs. CONTRERAS

237 SCRA 167, September 26, 1994

FACTS

Uy subleased from Atayde, the other half of the second floor of a building in Makati where she operated a parlor. On
April 15, 1993 the sublease expired however Uy failed to remove all her movable properties. 2 days later when Uy sought to
withdraw the aforementioned properties, an argument that resulted in a scuffle, ensued between her, Atayde and Ataydes
employees (respondents). After getting medically examined, respondents filed a complaint with the Barangay Captain of
Valenzuela, Makati; nevertheless on the scheduled confrontation on April 28, 1993 only Uy appeared. As a result the said
confrontation was then reset on May 26, 1993 but on May 11, 1993, the prosecutor of Rizal filed 2 information for slight
physical injuries in the MTC of Makati. Consequently Uy alleged the prematurity of the case in her counter affidavit then later
on filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the
Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

The judge denied the motion due to lack of merit. The pertinent portion of the denials reads:

The court finds the motion to be without sufficient merit. In the first place, the offense subject of these cases
occurred in Makati, Metro Manila on April 17, 1993; that Barangay Valenzuela of the Municipality of Makati had
started the conciliation proceedings between the parties but as of May 18, 1993 nothing has been achieved by the
barangay (Annex 2 of the Counter-Affidavit of the accused); that the above-entitled cases were filed directly with
this court by the public prosecutor on May 11, 1993; and the accused and her witnesses had already filed their
counter-affidavits and documents. At this stage of the proceedings, the court believes that the accused had already
waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati considering that accused
and complainant are residents of different barangays; that the offense charged occurred in the Municipality of
Makati; and finally, this offense is about to prescribe.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the court believes, and so holds, that the complainants may go directly to the
court where their complaint is about to prescribe or barred by statute of limitations Uy vs. Contretras, 237 SCRA
167, G.R. Nos. 111416-17 September 26, 1994

As a consequence, Uy filed a special civil action for certiorari alleging that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss considering that the private
respondents failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and further required under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The respondents raised
the defense of non-applicability of PD 1508 because they leave in different barangays as well as substantial compliance.

ISSUE

W/N the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is proper.

RULING

NO. While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon
regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its
provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.

In the proceedings before the court a quo, the petitioner and the respondents had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The
petitioner further invoked the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the decree by the Local Government Code
of 1991. Even in her instant petition, the petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. However, the private respondents, realizing the weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer
their grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the decree, changed tack. In their Comment, they assert that on 20
April 1993 Atayde filed a complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela, Makati, in
compliance with the requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code.20 Yet, in a
deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the
said law is not applicable to their cases before the court a quo because (a) the petitioner and respondent Atayde are not
residents of barangays in the same city or municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the action, as in the said cases, may
otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) even assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned,
she has substantially complied with it.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted enough diligence to inquire from the private
respondents if prior referral to the lupon was necessary before filing the informations.

Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the Local Government Code of 1991, more
specifically on the provisions on the katarungang pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken judicial notice thereof,
ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of
the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines. We have ruled that a judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.21 He should have applied the
revised katarungang pambarangay law under the Local Government Code of 1991. Had he done so, this petition would not
have reached us and taken valuable attention and time which could have been devoted to more important cases.

In view of the private respondents failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the
mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at
any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was
premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should
have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go
directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section
410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993
when the private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati.

Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are
estopped from disavowing the authority of the body, which they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority
of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away
with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.
JOHAN L.H. WINGARTS AND OFELIA A. WINGARTS v. JUDGE SERVILLANO M. MEJIA

A.M. No. MTJ-94-1012 March 20, 1995

FACTS:

The resolution originated form three letter-complaints (administrative) filed by Johan L. H. Wingarts and Ophelia A. Wingarts
against Judge Servillano M. Mejia of the Municipal Trial Court of Santa Maria, Pangasinan. These administrative complaints
were an offshoot of three criminal cases decided by Judge Mejia involving the Wingarts and Col. Rodulfo Munar.

Johan L.H. Wingarts was the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 2663 and 2664 filed in the aforesaid municipal trial court for
malicious mischief and grave threats which was initiated by Col. Munar. Thereafter, the Wingarts made a counter-charge
against Col. Munar resulting in the third criminal case for usurpation of authority under Criminal Case No. 2696 with Col.
Munar as the accused.

In their second complaint, the Wingarts imputed unto Judge Mejia with incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of
authority for taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2664 for grave threats and for issuing a warrant of arrest against him
despite lack of prior barangay conciliation. The said case was later dismissed and indorsed to the barangay official concerned.
In his comment, Judge Mejia explained that he took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2664 in the belief that there had been
substantial compliance with the requirements of theKatarungang Pambarangay Law since a certification of the barangay
captain regarding a confrontation of the parties, the fact that no amicable settlement was reached by them, and that he was
endorsing the filing of the case in court, had been duly submitted to respondent judge.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in a memorandum, found that second complaint meritorious. Had respondent Judge
exercised greater prudence, he could have known at the outset that under Art. 408 (c), Chapter 7, Title One, Book III, R.A.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law), offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one (1) year or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) require
prior barangay conciliation. The crime of grave threats punishable under Art. 282 of the Revised Penal Code falls within the
purview of that section. Furthermore, Sec. 412 (a) of the same law likewise provides:

Sec. 412. CONCILIATION (a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filled (SIC) or instituted directly in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties
before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified
by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the
settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
Had respondent Judge observed the mandate of the aforequoted provision of law he could have remanded the case to the
lupon instead of taking cognizance thereof and prematurely issuing the warrant of arrest against the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Mejia should be held liable for administrative sanction for taking cognizance the aforementioned case
without the required barangay conciliation?

RULING:

Judge Mejia is indeed liable for incompetence and ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2664
despite the legal obstacles thereto. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence and should
administer justice impartially and without delay. He should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence,
dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. He is called upon to exhibit more than
just cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.

Although there is no clear proof of malice, bad faith, bias or partiality on his part, respondent judge should have exercised the
requisite prudence, especially under the environmental circumstances of the aforesaid criminal case where personal liberty
was involved. He should have carefully examined all relevant facts and issues and avoided the improvident issuance of the
warrant of arrest without a circumspect review of the case which, after all, did not exhibit abstruse factual matters or
complicated legal questions.

Moreover, judges are directed to desist from improvidently receiving and desultorily acting on complaints, petitions, actions or
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the Lupon Tagapamayapa. We have repeatedly ruled that the proceedings
before the lupon are a precondition to the filing of any action or proceeding in court or other government office. Such an
initiatory pleading, if filed without compliance with the precondition, may be dismissed on motion of any interested party on
the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.

CORPUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Gr no. 117005 June 19, 1997

FACTS:

Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain Lorenzo Barredo who decided to sell his property to the tenants.
Alvarado and the other lessees executed an Affidavit of Waiver granting Barredo the right to sell his house. Barredo sold his
house to Corpuz for P37,500.00. As a result of the sale, a tenancy relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado.
In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that he vacate the room which he was occupying
because the children of Corpuz needed it for their own use. Alvarado refused to vacate the room despite demand which
prompted Corpuz to file a case for ejectment.

Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (1) the alleged Affidavit of Waiver executed between him and Barredo was a
forgery; and (2) the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa, therefore the lower court has no jurisdiction over
the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ejectment suit not being referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa affects the jurisdiction of the lower court.

RULING: NO.

The SC ruled that the failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay
conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense.We have held in Dui v. Court of Appeals that failure of a party to
specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that
defense. A perusal of Alvarados answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his allegation, which is
deemed a mere general averment.

The proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement.In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508
is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had
already acquired over the subject matter and the parties therein.

BONIFACIO LAW OFFICE Represented by Atty. RICARDO M. SALOMON JR. vs. Judge REYNALDO B. BELLOSILLO
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1308. December 16, 2002

FACTS

Petitioner Law Office assailed the Order referring the ejectment case represented by the Petitioner back to the barangay for
conciliation proceedings despite the fact that the matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the
Certification to File Motion was attached to the verified complaint.
Bewildered with such Order, he inquired from the respondents branch clerk of court the reason behind such order and he was
advised to submit the minutes of the hearings held in the barangay. Following said advice, he filed a compliance with
respondents court attaching a copy of his complaint filed before the barangay and the minutes of the proceedings held.

After the filing of said compliance, no action was taken by the court despite the fact that the case falls under the Rule on
Summary Procedure. He then inquired personally with the court about the status of the case and he was told that no action
could be taken unless the Order had been complied with. Due to the Courts insistence of referring the case to the barangay
though it had already gone through all the requisite proceedings, he decided not to pursue the case and filed a notice to
withdraw complaint but said withdrawal was denied by respondent on the basis of the action already taken thereon as
contained in the questioned Order. He then filed a Notice of Dismissal but the same was still unacted upon by respondent.

After a year from the filing of the complaint, respondent ordered that summons be served on defendants. When defendants
failed to file an Answer, petitioner filed a Motion to Render Judgment in accordance with the provisions of Sec.5 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure. However, instead of rendering judgment, respondent merely required defendants to comment on the
motion to render judgment. After defendants filed their comment, respondent still did not act on the said motion.

Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon Jr. of the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo of the MeTC QC,
Branch 34, with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and obvious partiality.

ISSUE

Whether or not Petitioner Law Office have complied with the mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings.

RULING - NO

The Certification to File Action attached to the Complaint was improperly and prematurely issued. In what appears to be a
pre-printed standard form, it shows that no personal confrontation before a duly constituted Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo took place. Therefore, the complainant failed to complete the barangay conciliation proceedings.

Further, the Complaint before the barangay was dated February 16, 1996. Records show that the hearing was scheduled for
February 26, 1996 and was reset for February 29, 1996. And yet, the Certification to File Actionwas issued on March 1, 1996,
less than fifteen days after the first scheduled hearing before the barangay chairman.

Section 410 (b) of the Local Government Code is quoted hereunder:

Mediation by lupon chairman. Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman shall within the next working day
summon the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to appear before him for
a mediation of their conflicting interests. If he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first
meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance
with the provisions of this Chapter.

Furthermore, Administrative Circular No. 14-93 provides:

xxxxxxxxx

In order that the laudable purpose of the law may not be subverted and its effectiveness undermined by
indiscriminate, improper and/or premature issuance of certifications to file actions in court by
the Lupon or Pangkat Secretaries, attested by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairmen, respectively, the following guidelines
are hereby issued for the information of trial court judges in cases brought before them coming from
the Barangays:

xxxxxxxxx

[II] 4. If mediation or conciliation efforts before the Punong Barangay proved unsuccessful, there having been no
agreement to arbitrate (Sec. 410-{b}, Revised Rule Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 1,c,[1], Rule
III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation proceeding before
the Punong Barangay (3rd par. Sec. 8,a, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), the Punong Barangay shall not
cause the issuance of this stage of a certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for him to constitute
the Pangkat before whom mediation, conciliation, or arbitration proceedings shall be held.

III. All complaints and/or informations filed or raffled to your sala/branch of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court shall be carefully read and scrutinized to determine if there has been compliance
 with prior Barangay conciliation procedure under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, as a pre-condition to judicial action, particularly whether the certification to file action
attached to the records of the case comply with the requirements hereinabove enumerated in part II;
(Emphasis and italics supplied)

IV. A case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation which is a pre-condition for formal
adjudication x x x may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant/s x x x or the court may suspend proceedings
upon petition of any party x x x and refer the case motu proprio to the appropriate Barangay authority. x x x.

Evidently, the barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to conciliate between the parties and to settle the case
before it. Hence, respondent judge was not incorrect in remanding the case to it for completion of the mandated
proceedings. His referral of the case back to the barangay cannot be equated with gross ignorance of the law. Neither does it
constitute grave abuse of discretion or obvious partiality.

However, as regards the Complainants Motion to Render Judgment, in refusing to heed the Motion, respondent instead called
a preliminary conference and directed the defendants to submit their Comment. The SC finds the Judges resolution to the
Motion to be incorrect. The law states that when an Answer has not been filed within the reglementary period, the
judge, motu proprio, or on motion, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.

Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo is hereby found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision.

ABRAHAM L. MENDOVA, vs. CRISANTO B. AFABLE, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Julian Sulat,
Eastern Samar

Administrative Case No. MTJ-02-1402 | December 4, 2002

FACTS:

1 Allegedly, the crime of slight physical injuries was committed by one Robert Palada against complainant Mendova on
February 15, 1998.
2 Then, on February 18, 1998, he filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman a complaint for slight physical injuries
against Palada.
 3 However, despite the hearings conducted thereon, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
4 Therefore, on May 4, 1998, Mendova filed a complaint for slight physical injuries before the MTC. However, on
November 3, 1998, the same was dismissed by Judge Afable on the ground of prescription.
Since slight physical injuries is a light offense, it prescribes in two (2) months, the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended parties.
Since the alleged crime was committed on February 15, 1998, from the date of the commission of the crime, 2
months have already elapsed.

5 Thus, Mendova filed an administrative case against Judge Afable for ignorance of the law relative to his criminal case
against Palada (People vs. Palada)
6 Mendova alleged that in dismissing the above criminal case, Judge Afable showed his ignorance when he did not
apply the provisions of Section 410(c) of the Local Government Code, which suspends the prescriptive period of
offenses upon the filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay.

Section 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses While the dispute is under mediation,
conciliation or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under existing laws
shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. The prescriptive periods
shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation
or of the certification to file action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary: Provided,
however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the
complaint with the punong barangay.

7 In his Answer, Judge Afable merely admitted his error and claimed a mere mental lapse on his part.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is liable administratively for dismissing Criminal Case People v. Palada on the
ground of prescription.

HELD: No.

It is axiomatic, as this Court has repeatedly stressed, that an administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy
is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, or an appeal. For, obviously, if subsequent developments
prove the judges challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all. Besides,
to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has
erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is only where the error is so gross,
deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed
against the erring judge.

In the present case, complainant Mendova did not bother at all to file a motion for reconsideration of respondent judges
decision dismissing the criminal case. No reason was advanced by Mendova why he failed to do so. Thus, his instant
administrative complaint is PREMATURE.

In addition, records fail to show when complainant received the Barangay Certification to file action. The undated certification
he submitted merely states that the case was set for hearing before the barangay on March 16, 22, and 29, 1998, but the
parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. When he filed the criminal case for slight physical injuries on May 4, 1998 in
the MTC, until its dismissal on November 3, 1998, he still failed to present proof of his receipt of the Barangay Certification to
file action. Clearly, he cannot now fault Judge Afable for dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.

While respondent judge admitted his mistake, the same may not be considered ignorance of the law. If at all, it can only be
considered as an error of judgment. Finally, the complainant did not allege any malice or bad faith on the part of the
respondent judge in his administrative complaint.
MONTECLAROS vs. COMELEC

GR. No. 152295, July 9, 2002

FACTS:
On February 18, 2002, petitioner Montesclaros sent a letter to the Comelec, demanding that the SK elections be held as
scheduled on May 6, 2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the
letter; otherwise, she will seek judicial relief.

On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the Comelec Chairman
intimated that it was operationally very difficult to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the Comelec
Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002
and postpone the SK elections to November 2002.

Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of
Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 476311 dated February 5, 2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK
elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled.

On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On
March 11, 2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee of the Senate and the House came out with a Report recommending
approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 205014 and House Bill No. 4456. The Bicameral Committees
consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least
15 but not more than 18 years of age.

As a consequence, on March 11, 2002, Monteclaros together with other 20-year-old youths (petitioners) filed the present case
contending that SK membership is a property right within the meaning of the constitution. Subsequently, the proposed bill
was signed into law on March 19, 2002 (RA 9164).

ISSUE:

1. W/N the congress has the power to lower the age of requirement of SK membership embodied in Section 424 of the LGC

2. W/N the petitioners have legal standing to maintain the suit.

3. W/N the provision in RA 9164, lowering the age of membership of the SK from not more than 21 to not more than 18,
unconstitutional.
4. W/N SK membership is a property right within the meaning of the constitution.

RULING:

1. YES. Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK,
which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a
vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Every
law passed by Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal by Congress. The Court cannot restrain Congress from
amending or repealing laws, for the power to make laws includes the power to change the laws.

2. NO. Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or
is about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled.25 A party must also show that he
has a real interest in the suit. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.

In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not
more than 21 years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on the date of the SK
elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age
group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified
to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in
the SK elections.

3. NO. This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which
reset the SK elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted into law. After the
passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant
petitioners prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the
constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down a law unless its
constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and adequately argued.

4. NO. Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified
because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only
those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK
membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution
because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even
withdraw the statutory right.
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a [P]ublic office is a public trust. No one has a
vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,
decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to
consider an office a property. It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is not property within
the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The
basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere
agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual
right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the
office as a trust for the people he represents. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right
to public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council, the law does
not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The
constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy
directing equal access to opportunities for public service cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership
or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.

Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths involvement in public affairs, this policy refers to those who
belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the
SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth
cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service, once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he
cannot invoke any property right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since petitioners are now past the maximum age
for membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership.
APOLINARIO MUEZ v. JUDGE CIRIACO ARIO, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur

A.M. No. MTJ-94-985 February 21, 1995

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint against Judge Ciriaco C. Ario of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment as defined and penalized under Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code. It appears that on December 26, 1989, Mayor Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur summoned to his office
Apolinario S. Muez for conference respecting a land dispute between Muez and one Tirso Amado. As Muez failed to attend
the conference, Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him. The warrant was served on him although no investigation
was later conducted.

Muez then filed a complaint against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function with the Office of
the Ombudsman as well as administrative complaint for violation of the Constitution, misconduct in office and abuse of
authority with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. After preliminary investigation, the investigating officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman filed a case for usurpation of judicial function against Mayor Asuero Irisari in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Loreto, Agusan del Sur which was raffled and assigned to Judge Ciriaco Ario.

Mayor Irisari moved to quash the information on the ground that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime under the
law. He further contended that under 143(3) of the former Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337), mayors
were authorized to issue warrants of arrest. Judge Ario however denied the motion to quash on the ground that the power
of mayors to issue warrants of arrest had ceased to exist as of February 2, 1987 when the Constitution took effect.

For its part the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative complaint against the mayor, found him guilty of
misconduct in office and abuse of authority and accordingly ordered him suspended for eight (8) months without pay. On
appeal, however, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) reversed on the ground that what the mayor had
issued, although denominated "Warrant of Arrest," was actually just an invitation or a summons.

Mayor Irisari filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial of Judge Ario, invoking the resolution of the DILG.
Judge Ario reconsidered his previous order and dismissed the case holding that while Courts are not bound by findings of
administrative agencies like the DILG as in this case if such findings are tainted with unfairness and there is arbitrary action or
palpable serious error. Since the DILG decision was not so tainted, "therefore, it must be respected." Upon receipt of this
order, Muez sent two letters to the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission charging Judge Ciriaco C. Ario with knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment for dismissing the case against Mayor Irisari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Ario can be held liable for dismissing the case?

RULING: Yes.

While respondent judge may have acted in good faith, he should nevertheless be administratively held liable. The acts alleged
in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority
involves the following elements: (1) that the offender is an officer of the executive branch of the government; and (2) that he
assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
These elements were alleged in the information. Mayor Irisari was an officer of the executive branch and the order issued by
the former in plain terms stated that it is a warrant.

Mayor Irisari justified his order on the basis of 143(3) of the former Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337)
which expressly provided that in cases where the mayor may conduct preliminary investigation, the mayor shall, upon
probable cause after examination of witnesses, have the authority to order the arrest of the accused." This provision had,
however, been repealed by Art. III, 2 of the 1987 Constitution, as this Court held in Ponsica v. Ignalaga, in which it was
explained:

The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining
probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly
exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase,
"such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973
Constitution who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigation and issue warrants of arrest or
search warrants.

Indeed, Judge Ario had previously denied the motion to dismiss which the accused Mayor Irisari had filed on the ground that
the authority (B.P. Blg. 337, 143[3]) invoked by him as basis for his warrant of arrest had been abrogated by the
Constitution. He subsequently reversed himself on the ground that the decision of the DILG, finding Mayor Irisari not guilty,
"must be respected. Judge Ciriaco Ario should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari was not before him on review from
the decision of an administrative agency and, therefore, there was no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of evidence.
What was before him was a criminal case and he should have considered solely the facts alleged in the information in
resolving the motion to dismiss of the accused. At the very least, he showed poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal
principles, for which he should be reminded of what this Court said in Libarios v. Dabalos:

In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be
disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly
imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles.

GREATER BALANGA DEVELOPMENT vs. MUNICIPALITY OF BALANGA, BATAAN

Gr no. 83987 December 27, 1994

FACTS:

On January 1988, the petitioner applied with the office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business permit to engage in the
business in the said area. The mayor granted the petitioner the privilege of a real estate dealer/privately-owned public
market operator under the trade name of Balanga Central Market. In February 1988, the Sangguniang Bayan passed a
resolution annulling the mayors permit issued to petitioner and advising the mayor to revoke the permit to operate a public
market in which the mayor did by passing an executive order. Because of which, the petitioner filed a petition for the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction which the court denied. Petitioner argues that it had not violated any law or
ordinance; hence, there was no reason for the respondents to revoke the Mayors permit issued to it. Respondents claims that
the petitioner has violated a municipal ordinance when it failed to disclose the true status of the area involved when it did not
secure separate permits for its two businesses, one as real estate dealer and another as a privately-owned public market
operator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the revocation of the Mayors permit is proper. NO.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the application for Mayors permit in the case at bench requires the applicant to state what type
of business is being applied for. Petitioner left this entry blank in its application form. It is only in the Mayors permit itself that
petitioners lines of business appear, which in this case are two separate types, one as real estate dealer and another as public
market operator.

The permit should not have been issued without the required information given in the application form itself. Revoking the
permit, however, because of a false statement in the application form cannot be justified under the aforementioned provision.
There must be proof of willful misrepresentation and deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good faith is always
presumed, and as it happened, petitioner did not make any false statement in the pertinent entry.

Neither was petitioners applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for revocation. The second paragraph of Section
3A-06(b) does not expressly require two permits for the conduct of two or more businesses in one place, but only that
separate fees be paid for each business. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi juris and any
doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality (City of Ozamiz v. Lumapas, 65 SCRA 33 [1975]).

HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO REYES and
BISTRO PIGALLE, INC.
G.R. No. 111397. August 12, 2002

FACTS

On December 7, 1992, Bistro filed with the RTC a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction, against Lim.

Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lims instructions inspected and investigated Bistros license as well as the work
permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistros night club and restaurant
operations. Lim also refused to accept Bistros application for a business license, as well as the work permit applications of
Bistros staff, for the year 1993.

RTC granted Bistros application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. However, despite the RTCs order, Lim still
issued a closure order on Bistros operations even sending policemen to carry out his closure order.

On January 25, 1993, Bistro filed a Motion for Contempt against Lim and the policemen who stopped Bistros operations. At
the hearing, Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would respect the courts injunction. However, the same parties
again disrupted Bistros business operations.

Meanwhile, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor
to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to
issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses. This statutory power is expressly provided for in Section 11 (l),
Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local Government Code of
1991.

RTC denied Lims motions. CA affirmed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the injunctive relief was validly issued.

RULING - YES

The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question. The law expressly provides for such
authority. Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, reads:

Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor. The general duties and powers of the mayor shall be:

x x x.

(l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation
of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinances are being
committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have
been granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general interest. (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation: xxx.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the City and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the City Mayor shall:

(3) x x x.

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the condition upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend,
revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly
premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the violation of the
condition(s) on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits
is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe
due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and
opportunity to be heard.

True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in
the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his authority when he directed
policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No. 7716
which expressly prohibits police raids and inspections, to wit:

Section 1. No member of the Western Police District shall conduct inspection of food and other business
establishments for the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules and regulations, inspecting licenses and permits,
and/or enforcing internal revenue and customs laws and regulations. This responsibility should be properly
exercised by Local Government Authorities and other concerned agencies.

Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business establishment in Manila without due process of law.
There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial
establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the
Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions
of its licenses and permits.

The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we find that Lims exercise of this power violated Bistros property
rights that are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution.

ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG vs. SECRETARY OF DPWH, SIMEON A. DATUMANONG and
SECRETARY OF DBM, EMILIA T. BONCODIN

FACTS:

1 Pursuant to Article X, Sec. 15, of the 1987 Constitution, R.A. No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao was enacted.
2 In a plebiscite, the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi voted to become part of the ARMM.
3 To implement R.A. No. 6734, the then president Cory Aquino issued E.O. 426, placing the control and supervision of
the offices of the DPWH within the ARMM under the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG).

4 9 years later, the DPWH Secretary issued D.O. 119 creating a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office, which
shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and over all facilities under the DPWH within Marawi
City and Lanao Del Sur.

5 R.A. No. 9054 was later passed, detailing and expanding the specific powers of the ARG.

6 In 2001 however, R.A. 8999 was enacted, establishing an Engineering District in the 1st District of Lanao Del Sur in
effect re-establishing the National Governments jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in the area.
7 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119, saying that the 2 issuances run counter to the
constitutional autonomy of the ARMM
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are constitutional.

HELD: No.

R.A. No. 8999 is antagonistic and cannot be reconciled with the ARMM Organic Acts 6734 and 9054. The idea behind the
Constitutional provisions for the autonomous regions is to allow separate development of peoples with distinct cultures and
traditions. It strives to free Philippine society of the strain caused by the assimilationist approach. Decentralization is a
prerequisite to autonomy. It comes in 2 forms:

1 Deconcentration - decentralization of administration

2 Devolution decentralization of power

The framers of the Constitution intended for the autonomy of the ARMM to be in the nature of the latter a meaningful
authentic regional autonomy. Ratified through a plebiscite, the ARMM Organic Act cannot be amended without a plebiscite,
which R.A. No. 8999 clearly lacked. It is the intention of the ARMM Organic Acts to cede some, if not most of the powers of
the national government to the autonomous government. The enforcement of R.A. No. 8999 runs afoul of these organic acts.
It bears stressing that national laws are subject to the Constitution, one of the policies of which is to ensure the autonomy of
the autonomous regions, subject only to general supervision by the President.

Meanwhile, the office created under D.O. 119 is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM 1 st Engineering District in Lanao Del Sur
formed under the auspices of E.O. 426. The said department order, in effect, takes back powers, which had already been
devolved to the ARG. The DPWH Order cannot rise higher than its source the Executive.

It is also worthy to note that E.O. 124 on which D.O. 119 is based is merely a general law organizing the DPWH, while E.O. 42
is a special law transferring control and supervision of DPWH offices within the ARMM to the ARG. The latter should prevail
over the former. Even without applying the principle of lex specialis derogat generali (specific law prevails over general law),
the enactment of R.A. 9054 in 2001 which repealed laws, orders, and issuances inconsistent with it rendered D.O. 119 functus
officio.

ABBAS vs. COMELEC

179 SCRA 287, November 10, 1989

FACTS:

The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,1
scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the
plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2)
declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional.

1. ISSUE:

W/N R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao contrary to the provisions of the Constitution
on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.

Argument:
 Petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that [t]here is hereby created the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for
the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above
provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of
autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were
obtained.

RULING: NO.

The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the
autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in
the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in
the Constitution and fills in the details.

SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval
of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in
the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, That the President
may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved
by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority
vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority
is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all
of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included
therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1)
whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those
enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall comprise it.

2. ISSUE:

W/N including areas, which do not strictly share the same characteristics as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has
expanded the scope of the autonomous region, which the Constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.

Argument:

He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao
del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant
characteristics.

RULING: NO.

The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous
region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is
within the exclusive realm of the legislatures discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom
of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers.

3. ISSUE:

W/N Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734, which gives the president, powers to merge regions unconstitutional.

ARGUMENT:

According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not
conferred by the Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the
Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, which provides:
 No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

RULING:

NO. It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e.
Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres. Dec. No. 1, Pres.
Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it is power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power
of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power
of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local
government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.

DR. LAMPA I. PANDI and DR. JARMILLA B, MACACUA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND DR. SABER,
G.R. No. 116850. April 11, 2002

FACTS:

On August 9, 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the Department of Health of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, issued a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant
Regional Secretary, as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. In the same Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr.
Mamasao Sani, then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in
Cotabato City. On September 15, 1993, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office Order No. 07
designating Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

Sani filed a complaint with the RTC of Lanao del Sur challenging the Memorandum transferring him to the DOH-ARMM
Regional Office in Cotabato City, alleging that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as provincial health officer of the
IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. On the other hand, Saber filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto with prayer
for preliminary injunction, claiming that he is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

On October 29, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 133 transferring the powers and functions of
the Department of Health in the region to the Regional Government of the ARMM. Macacua, again in her capacity as DOH-
ARMM Secretary-Designate, issued a Memorandum reiterating Pandis designation as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH,
Lanao del Sur, as well as Sanis detail to the Regional Office of the DOH-ARMM in Cotabato City. On November 19, 1993, the
Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Pandi from further discharging the functions and duties.
Pandi and Macacua filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion seeking the dismissal of Sabers petition, on the ground
that the issues therein had become moot and academic. They cited as reason the enactment by the ARMM Regional Assembly
of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 25, otherwise known as the ARMM Local Government Code (ARMM Local Code for
brevity), as well as the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 14, 1994 between the DOH of the National
Government and the ARMM Regional Government.

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court held that Saber is the lawfully
designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur ruling that Lanao del Sur Governor Mahid Mutilan has the
power and authority to appoint the provincial health officer under Section 478 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Pertinently, Sec. 478 of RA No. 7160 makes mandatory for provincial governments the appointment of a health officer and
under Article 115 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, it is specifically provided that the Provincial Health Officer is one
of the mandatory appointive provincial officials. There is thus, no doubt in the mind of the Court that the authority and power
to appoint the Provincial Health Officer is vested by law in the Provincial Governor . The Court further stated that Sections 2,
3, 4, 5 and 7 of Executive Order 133 which provide for the transfer of certain powers and functions of the DOH to the ARMM,
speak of administrative supervision and control and other functions which do not in any manner relate to the power of
appointment and designation of the Provincial Health Officer, which under the law is clearly vested in the provincial chief
executive. Thus, the aforementioned E.O. does not render the issue moot and academic.

The Court of Appeals maintained that the Organic Act of 1989 and the ARMM Local Code could not prevail over the 1991 LGU
Code. The Court of Appeals declared that the provisions of the Organic Act for ARMM should not be construed to authorize and
empower the Regional Government and the Regional Governor to diminish, much less, render nugatory the powers and
functions already enjoyed by the local government units. Inasmuch as the local chief executive of the province already enjoys
the mandatory power to appoint the Provincial Health Officer under Republic Act 7160, it is believed that Section 457 (b) and
(d) of MMA Act 25 was not intended to diminish the power of the Provincial Governor to appoint/designate the Provincial
Health Officer for his province. Accordingly, Section 457 (b) merely grants to the Regional Governor recommendatory
prerogative over appointments for the position of Provincial Health Officer.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether an incumbent provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur can be assigned to another province?

(2) Who can designate the Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur - the Provincial Governor or
the ARMM Secretary of Health?

(3) Who is empowered to appoint the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur - the Provincial Governor, the Regional
Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health?

RULING:

The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial government official only after the effectivity of the ARMM
Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994 and approved by the Regional Governor on
March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code but after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the Regional Governor
appointed the provincial health officer while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the provincial health officer to any
province within the ARMM. The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or even designate the Officer-in-Charge of the
provincial health office.

The Court of Appeals reliance on Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code as Provincial Governor Mutilans authority to appoint
Saber is misplaced. Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code, which provides that [T]he appointment of a health officer shall be
mandatory for provincial, city and municipal governments, is not a grant of power to governors and mayors to appoint local
health officers. It is simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. In short,
the appointment of local health officers, being essential for public services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those
vested by law with the power to appoint them. Moreover, as explained earlier, the 1991 LGU Code did not amend the Organic
Act of 1989.

Application of the law to the appointment and transfer of Sani

The Secretary of Health, upon recommendation of the Regional Director, could assign provincial health officers to any province
within the region. In Miclat vs. Ganaden, the Court held that while the transfers of officers against their will amount to a
removal, the same is predicated upon the theory that said officers are appointed to particular stations and as such cannot be
transferred without their consent. The present case however does not involve any appointment to any particular station. It
merely concerns an assignment to a station made in the interest of the service. Consequently, Sani cannot claim any security
of tenure as provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur because he was never appointed to that office.

Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and ARMM Secretary of Health, detailed Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office
in Cotabato City on August 9, 1993. As of that date, the powers and functions of the Department of Health were not yet
transferred to the Regional Government, and the Secretary of Health of the National Government still exercised the power to
assign the provincial health officers in the ARMM. Consequently, the August 9, 1993 directive of Macacua detailing or
assigning Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato City is void.

However, on November 6, 1993, Macacua issued another Memorandum reiterating Sanis detail or assignment to the Regional
Office in Cotabato City. This second Memorandum was issued after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133 which expressly
transferred supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Regional Department of Health to the Head of the
Regional Department of Health. In Gen. Renato de Villa vs. City of Bacolod,[24] this Court ruled that the power of
administrative control encompasses the power to transfer personnel who under the law may be reassigned to other
stations. The second detail or assignment of Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato, issued on November 6, 1993, is within
the authority of Macacua as Regional Secretary of Health. Thus, the second detail of Sani is valid.

Application of the law to the designation of Pandi

The designation dated August 9, 1993 is void since the Regional Secretary at that time did not yet exercise supervision and
control over the provincial health offices of the ARMM. However, the designation of Pandi on November 6, 1993 is valid since
at that time Executive Order No. 133 had already been issued vesting in the Regional Secretary of Health supervision and
control over all functions and activities of the Department of Health in the ARMM. As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua
was, as of November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in
the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of Executive Order No. 133, assumed the administrative powers and functions of
the Secretary of Health of the National Government with respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM. The official
exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative authority to designate, in the interest of public
service, an Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had the authority on November 6, 1993 to
designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent
provincial health officer. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to
make such a designation.

The ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to exercise general supervision and control over all
programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government. Upon the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the
power of supervision and control over the provincial health officer passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial
Governor. From then on the Provincial Governor began to exercise the administrative authority to designate an Officer-in-
Charge in the provincial health office pending the appointment of a permanent provincial health officer.

ORDILLO vs. COMELEC

Gr no. 93054 December 4, 1990

FACTS:

The people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region."

The results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the
Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.

On February 14, 1990, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been
approved and the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the COMELEC resolution and
provided:

"x x x [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting
favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted
favorablythen, alone, legally and validly constitutes the CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the province of Ifugao can legally and validly constitute a region alone

RULING:

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in Article X,
Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:

"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines." (Italics Supplied)

The keywordsprovinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than
one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact
that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742)
Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.

Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position
that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province. Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the
Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and
local government units. It further provides that:

"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance
and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region x x x."

From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous
region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G. R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990

FACTS:

Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) and the
Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and
violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations. A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by
the two parties.

Such agreement states that they are to:

Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could perform policy-making
and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the
Cordilleras.

Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive
Order.

Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the
representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the
primary ground that by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-
empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

ISSUE:

Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional

RULING:

The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners are unfounded. E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an
organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not
necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions. The Constitution outlines a complex
procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the
President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the
organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. At this time, the President was still exercising
legislative powers as the First Congress had not yet convened.

Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of government in the autonomous region), the
Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies created by E. O.
No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure; nor are they autonomous government agencies. They
merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the
National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur
development in the Cordilleras.

The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in
the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a
legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions
[Art. X, sec. 18].

The Cordillera Administrative Region is not a territorial or political subdivision, it is a mere sophisticated version of a regional
consultative council.After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial
and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. 1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a
territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
x x x Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created under
E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the
CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the
regional development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. x x x In this wise, the
CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development council.

In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region signed into law on October 23,
1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act which completed the autonomous region-creating process outlined in the
Constitution. Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.

FACTS:
1 MMDA attempted to demolish the wall separating Kalayaan Avenue from the subdivision owned by the respondent. Thus,
respondents filed a case for injunction against the MMDA.
2 CA ruled for the respondent and issued a permanent writ of injunction. Hence, this petition by the MMDA.
3 MMDAs arguments:
a MMDA has the authority to open the Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila (in this case, traffic management).
b From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an
ordinance opening Neptune Street to the public.
c It is further alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang
v. IAC

ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
1 Whether or not MMDA has police power. NO.
2 Whether or not there is a need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the public.
YES.

MMDA has no police power and an ordinance enacted by the City of Makati is necessary for the opening of Neptune Street to
the public.
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system, and administration. There is nothing in R.A. 7924 which
grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power.

Unlike the legislative bodies of LGUs, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to enact
ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general welfare of Metro Manila inhabitants. The MMDA, as
termed in its charter, is a development authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, NGOs, and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature
and these are actually summed up in the charter itself.

Having no legislative power, the MMDA cannot enact ordinances. Thus, it becomes necessary for the City of Makati to enact an
ordinance declaring the Neptune Street open to the public before the MMDA can implement such activity.

3 Whether or not the ruling in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. IAC, where SC upheld MMDAs alleged police
power, is applicable in this case. NO.

Firstly, the Sangalang cases involved zoning ordinances passed by the Municipal Council of Makati and the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC). In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is a mere notice sent by MMDA
to the respondent, the former relying on its authority under its charter to rationalize the use of roads, thoroughfares, for the
safe and convenient movement of persons.

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the Metro Manila Commission. Although the MMC is the forerunner of MMDA, an
examination of P.D. 824 (charter of MMC) shows that MMC possessed greater powers which were not bestowed upon MMDA.
MMC was specifically vested with legislative and police powers. It was the central government of Metro Manila, and whatever
legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.

In 1990, President Cory Aquino issued E.O. 392 and constituted Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). MMA had lesser powers
and functions that MMC. Its jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended
local boundaries. MMA did not have legislative power. It only provided LGUs with technical assistance in the preparation of
local development plans.

When R.A. No. 7294 took effect Metro Manila became a special development and administrative region, and the MMA became
MMDA whose functions were without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected LGUs. MMDA is not a political unit of
government, it is also not a special metropolitan political subdivision, as contemplated in Article X, Section 11, of the 1987
Constitution. The creation of a special metropolitan political subdivision required the approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. It should be noted that R.A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the
inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. Furthermore, the MMDA chairman is not an official elected by the people, but one
appointed by the president with the rank and privilege of that of a Cabinet member.

Clearly, MMDA, unlike MMC, has no power to enact ordinance for the welfare of the community. It is the LGU, acting through
their respective councils, that possess legislative and police power. In the case at bar, the City Council of Makati did not pass
any such ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street. Hence, its proposed opening by MMDA is illegal, and
the CA did not err in granting the injunction against MMDA.

MMDA vs GARIN
GR. No. 130230, April 15, 2005

FACTS:

Dante O. Garin was involved in an illegal parking incident along Gandara St. in Binondo. As a consequence MMDA issued him
a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated. The aforementioned TVR contains an instruction for
Garin to go to MMDA office in Port Area within 48 hours for appropriate action/disposition. Shortly before the expiration of the
TVRs validity, the Garin addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his drivers
license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction at the RTC of
Paraaque contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants
the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity
of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that the
provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA
to fix and impose unspecifiedand therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that he suffered and continues to suffer great
and irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his license and that, absent any implementing rules from the Metro
Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his license have no legal basis.

RTC ruled in favor of Garin, asserting that the summary confiscation of a drivers license without first giving the driver an
opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property right (drivers license) without DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court
the complaint of supposed traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional.

MMDA on appeal argued that that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a
privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The
petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due process as
long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.

ISSUE:

W/N the MMDA may validly confiscate drivers license in the interest of public safety and welfare

RULING:

NO. R.A. No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are
administrative in nature. Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that
all its functions are administrative in nature.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the
subjects of the same.

Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative
boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. A local government is a political
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. government units are
the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in
1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a special development and administrative region and the administration of
metro-wide basic services affecting the region placed under a development authority referred to as the MMDA. Thus:

. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the
legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development
authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private
sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself.

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro
Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no
grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.17
(footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied)

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the
MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such
is an unauthorized exercise of police power.