[G.R. No. 8634. October 22, 1913.
No other question was
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
JOSEPH N. HEERY, Defendant-Appellant.
OBrien & DeWitt for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Harvey for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE;
ALLOWANCE OF CIVIL DAMAGES. Case
reviewed and Held: It is well settled that the
civil liability of the accused is determined in the
criminal action unless the injured party
expressly waives such liability or reserves his
right to have the civil damages determined in a
separate action. It is therefore error for the
court to refuse a request of the injured party
during the course of the criminal prosecution to
submit evidence of his damages.
2. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY. The elements
of civil liability of a criminal as defined in article
119 of the Penal Code compared with the civil
liability of criminals in the United States, and
held to be the same in all essential aspects.
Consequently, the assessment of damages in
favor of the injured person cannot be
considered as punishment for the crime, even
though determined in the criminal action.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMANDING THE CAUSE FOR
DETERMINATION OF CIVIL DAMAGES. The
trial court erroneously refused to permit the
injured party to submit evidence during the
course of the criminal proceedings of the
damages he had sustained as a consequence
of the crime. For the reasons stated the
accused was not subject to double jeopardy by
the action of this court in affirming the
judgment of guilt and remanding the cause for
the sole purpose of determining his civil
liability.
] judgment therefor.
Per MORELAND, J., concurring and
dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
4. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH MANDATE OF THE
SUPREME COURT. The trial court in the
proceeding before us did nothing but carry out
the mandate of this court issued in connection
with the first judgment in this case, which
ordered that court to determine the amount of
damages sustained by the complaining
witness. Therefore, no question settled by the
former judgment of this court is reviewable on
this appeal or can be questioned or discussed.
5. ID. An appeal will not be entertained by
this court from a judgment entered in an
inferior court in exact accordance with a
mandate issued on judgment of this court.
Such a judgment, when entered in the court
below, is, in effect, a judgment of the Supreme
Court, and the appeal would be from this court
to this court. If such an appeal is taken,
however, we will, upon the application of the
appellee, examine the decree entered and, if it
conforms to the mandate, dismiss the case
with costs. If it does not, the case will be
remanded, with proper directions for the
correction of the order.
6. ID. If the progress of the execution of the
decree of this court, after its entry in the court
below, either party is aggrieved, he may
appeal from the final act of the trial court
executing that decree, but such an appeal will
bring up for reexamination only the
proceedings subsequent to the mandate of this
court. The rights of the parties in the subject
matter of the suit were finally determined upon
the original appeal in this case and all that
remained for the trial court to do was to
ascertain the amount of civil damages in
accordance with our instructions and to enter
open.
7. ID. On this appeal no question can
properly be raised or discussed which was
settled by the original decree of this court
made on the first appeal. That decree settled
conclusively and finally the civil liability of the
accused. It settled also the question of former
conviction and former jeopardy. It settled also
that the civil liability is not a part of the
criminal punishment. It settled also that the
civil incident could be separated from the
criminal action and be carried on
independently thereof. Therefore, the only
questions open for discussion or decision in the
court below, or which can be open for
discussion or decision on this appeal, are the
amount of damages and exceptions taken in
connection therewith in the trial court.
8. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE;
DOUBLE JEOPARDY. The question of double
jeopardy; the question of whether the civil
liability is a part of the criminal punishment;
the question of what is the nature of the civil
liability; and kindred questions, were not before
the court below, are not before this court, and
are improperly discussed and decided.
9. COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; JURISDICTION.
Every act of the trial court in carrying out a
mandate of this court, which act fairly tends to
the end in view, whether absolutely necessary
or not for that purpose, is not void and without
jurisdiction but is a lawful act performed within
the power of the trial court and within the
mandate of the Supreme Court.
DECISION
TRENT, J. :
This was a case of assault attended with
lesiones graves. Upon the first appeal the
sentence of the lower court condemning the
appellant-defendant to one year and three
months of prision correccional was affirmed. (U.
S. v. Heery, 10 Off. Gaz., 2102.) At the same
time the appeal of the injured party against the
ruling of the court refusing to allow him to
submit evidence as to the damages suffered by
him was sustained and the case was returned
with the following instructions:
"It is therefore ordered that the record be
returned to the court whence it came for the
execution of the criminal judgment herein
affirmed, and for the further purpose of
completing the civil branch of the case."
The lower court duly proceeded to take
evidence as to the civil damages sustained by
the injured person and then entered the
following judgment:
"I therefore restate the judgment heretofore
entered herein and affirmed by the Supreme
Court, by finding the defendant, Joseph N.
Heery, not guilty of frustrated murder as
alleged in the complaint, but find him guilty of
a lesser offense included within the charge
made in the complaint, that of maliciously
inflicting serious injury upon Alex Sternberg,
causing him an illness and disability from the
performance of any kind of manual labor for
more than thirty days, and sentence him to one
year and three months of prision correccional
at Bilibid Prison, and, having found the amount
of the indemnity which the defendant should
pay, in accordance with the instructions
contained in the judgment of the Supreme
Court made herein, sentence the defendant to
indemnify the complainant, Alex Sternberg, in
the sum of P50,500 and in case of insolvency
to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay
the costs of the action."
The defendant appealed from this judgment,
and his first, third, and fourth assignments of
error, raises the question of double jeopardy.
It will noted that the trial court, in its judgment
for civil damages says that it restates the
judgment by finding the defendant guilty. The
judicial procedure involved in finding a
defendant guilty by restating a final judgment
is not well understood. No exercise of judicial
discretion is involved in the mere repetition of
a final judgment, whether it be restated once
or a dozen times. From the ambiguity of the
language used, it cannot be determined
whether the lower court merely intended to
restate the penalty imposed for the sake of
convenience or clearness, or whether it
actually reconsidered the guilt of the appellant
and found that its previous decision was
correct. Both were unnecessary and beyond
the instructions contained in the judgment of
this court, and as the only addition to the
judgment was the civil damages which the
accused should pay, no attempt being made to
change in any manner the punishment
imposed upon the defendant, the question
does not arise as to the effect such action
would have upon the defendants constitutional
rights. In passing, however, it may be
remarked that such action would be entirely
beyond the jurisdiction of the lower court and
absolutely void.
The basis for the plea of double jeopardy must
be the same, therefore, as though the lower
court had strictly confined its judgment to the
limits set by the instructions of this court,
above quoted. The question is reduced to the
determination of whether remanding the case
for determination of civil damages and their
assessment against the defendant are to be
considered as a modification of the
punishment, by increasing the penalty or
otherwise, meted out to the defendant for the
commission of the crime.
In this jurisdiction it is well settled that the civil
liability of the accused must be determined in
the criminal action, unless the injured party
expressly waives such liability or reserves his
right to have the civil damages determined in a
separate action. Section 107 of General Orders
No. 58 reads:
"The privileges now secured by law to the
person claiming to be injured by the
commission of an offense to take part in the
prosecution of the offense and to recover
damages for the injury sustained by reason of
the same shall not be held to be abridged by
the provisions of this order; but such person
may appear and shall be heard either
individually or by attorney at all stages of the
case, and the court upon conviction of the
accused may enter judgment against him for
the damages occasioned by his wrongful act. It
shall, however, be the duty of the promotor
fiscal to direct the prosecution, subject to the
right of the person injured to appeal from any
decision of the court denying him a legal right."
The procedure under the Spanish Code of
Criminal Procedure for determining the civil
liability of persons accused of crime, referred to
in above quoted section, has been discussed
by this court a number of times.
In Springer v. Odlin (3 Phil. Rep., 344), it was
said: "By General Orders, No. 58, section 107,
the privileges secured by the Spanish law to
persons claiming to be injured by the
commission of an offense to take part in the
prosecution of the offense and to recover
damages for the injury sustained by reason of
the same, are preserved and remain in force,
and it is therein expressly provided that the
court, upon conviction of the accused, may
enter judgment in favor of the injured person,
against the defendant in the criminal case for
the damage occasioned by the wrongful act."
In Finnick v. Peterson (6 Phil. Rep., 172), it was
said: "This provision (art. 120, Penal Code)
makes it the duty of the court, when the right
to personal property is in question in a criminal
cause, to order its return to the proper person,
after giving all persons interested a hearing,
and the Code of Criminal Procedure provided a
method for an examination into the question of
the right of the property."
In Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. (7 Phil.
Rep., 359, 364), it was said: "According to
article 112 (of the Spanish Code of Criminal
Procedure) the penal action once started, the
civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless
it had been waived by the party injured or been
expressly reserve by him for civil proceedings
for the future. If the civil action alone was
prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be
enforced only on private complaint, the penal
action thereunder should be extinguished."
Almeida v. Abaroa (8 Phil. Rep., 178), was a
civil action for damages brought the plaintiff
against a person who had been previously
acquitted on a criminal charge. It was held that
his acquittal in the criminal action was a
complete bar to a civil action for damages
based upon the alleged criminal act of which
the defendant had been accused. In the course
of this decision it was said:
"Instituting a criminal action only, it will be
understood, brings the civil action as well,
unless the damaged or prejudiced person
waives the same or expressly reserves the
right to institute the civil action after the
termination of the criminal case, if there be any
reason therefor. (Art. 112 of the said Law of
Criminal Procedure.)
"The right to bring the civil action, as reserved
by the person damaged or prejudiced, after the
termination of the criminal case, is only
permitted, if there be any reason therefore,
and so says the law, in the event that the
judgment rendered in the criminal cause is a
finding of guilt against the accused; but if the
accused be acquitted, then the compliant in
the civil action must be based on some fact
and or cause distinct and separate from the
criminal act itself."
The court then quotes from article 114 of the
Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure which
provides:
"When a criminal proceeding is instituted for
the judicial investigation of a crime or
misdemeanor, no civil action arising from the
same act can be prosecuted; but the same
shall be suspended, if there be one, in
whatever stage or state it may be found, until
final sentence in the criminal proceeding is
pronounced.
"To prosecute a penal action it shall not be
necessary that a civil action arising from the
same crime or misdemeanor be previously
instituted."
In United States v. Guy-Sayco (13 Phil. Rep.,
292), it was said: "As to the penalty of
indemnity contained in the judgment appealed
from and impugned by the defense, article 17
of the Code reads: . . .; and according to the
established rules of the courts, in order that an
accused person may be declared to have
incurred civil liability, it is sufficient that said
liability shall proceed from, or be the
consequence of the criminal liability, and in
addition thereto, article 122 of the said Code
provides that the courts shall regulate the
amount of indemnity for damages under said
civil liability, upon the same terms as
prescribed for the reparation of damage in
article 121 of the Code, and a finding on the
matter should be contained in the judgment."
As a further illustration of the procedure under
the Spanish law of determining the civil liability
of the accused person, it may not be out of
place to revert to the decision of the supreme
court of Spain of November 14, 1889. In this
case the defendant was indicated for robbery.
During the trial, his civil liability was raised by
the states prosecution attorney, but in
rendering judgment of conviction the trial court
made no finding on this issue. the state
appealed, and the supreme court of Spain held
that the courts failure to resolve the civil
liability of the defendant was reversible error,
and remanded the case with instructions to
determine this issue. It will be noted that this
was precisely the procedure outlined by this
court in the case at bar.
Under the Spanish criminal law, an injured
person had the right to intervene in the
prosecution of the accused for the purpose of
having his damages ascertained. The trial court
was required to include the amount of these
damages in the judgment of conviction. The
plain provisions of section 107 of our criminal
procedure, quoted supra, expressly preserves
this right to the injured person. The refusal of
the trial court to allow the injured person to
introduce evidence as to his damages is,
therefore, clearly prejudicial error.
We will first determine the soundness of the
plea of double jeopardy had the lower court not
erred in the criminal proceedings by refusing to
consider the civil liability of the of the
defendant. Had a finding of civil liability been
made upon relevant evidence duly taken, and
stated in the judgment of conviction, would
there have been double jeopardy?
It is true that the connotation of the "twice in
jeopardy" clause in the Philippine Bill must be
found in American jurisprudence. (Kepner v. U.
S., 195 U. S., 100; 11 Phil. Rep., 669.) It is also
true that this clause refers exclusively to
punishment by the state and rendered to the
state; that civil liability, as that term is used in
the United States, attaches to most crimes and
misdemeanors; that, as a general rule, the civil
liability of a criminal can not be made an issue
in the criminal proceedings, but must be
adjudicated and determined in a separate, civil
action; that civil liability is due to the person
injured and criminal liability to the sovereign;
that the criminal proceeding is not a bar to the
civil action, or vice versa; and that the twice in
jeopardy clause refers only to criminal
prosecutions. We take these statements to be
axiomatic, and therefore unnecessary of
annotation. But we quote from one well
considered case which practically covers all of
these propositions:
"The cases generally hold that the rule in
criminal cases, that one shall not twice be put
in jeopardy, implies more than the bar of a
judgment to an action for the same cause. But
no case is known where a conviction upon an
indictment has been held a bar to a civil action
for damages growing out of the same act; a
fortiori, none in which a recovery in a civil
action has been held a bar to an indictment for
the same act. And the whole purview of section
8 plainly shows that the putting in jeopardy
prohibited is confined to criminal prosecutions.
Indeed, this is manifest in the clause itself,
which is confined to the same offense, used in
the same sense as criminal offense in the first
clause of the section. Of course the same act
may be an offense (in the sense of crime)
against the State, and an offense (in the sense
of tort) against a private person. It is manifest
that judgment for the one is not a bar to the
other. And it might be difficult, in principle, to
hold a criminal conviction as a bar to the
recovery of punitory damages; in a civil action,
and not a bar to the recovery of compensatory
damages; not a bar to any civil action. See
Jacks v. Bell, 3 C. & P., 316." (Brown v.
Swineford, 44 Wis., 282; 28 Am. Rep., 582, per
Ryan, C.J. )
What is the nature of the civil liability imposed
upon criminals by the provisions of the Penal
Code? If it be the same as the civil liability
known to American authorities, then it has
nothing to do with criminal liability, and a
fortiori, can the defense of "twice in jeopardy"
ever be utilized to prevent its imposition?
By article 17 of the Penal Code it is provided
that "Every person criminally liable for a felony
or misdemeanor is also civilly liable."
If it be urged that this is not true under
American law, it may be said with equal
accuracy that it is not literally true under the
Penal Code. As stated by both Groizard (vol. 1,
p. 697) and Viada (vol. 1, p. 391), there are a
number of crimes, such as contempt of court,
attempts against the authorities, some of the
offenses against religious cults, etc., which are
not usually attended with damages to third
persons. As stated by the first named
commentator, this article must be understood
to mean that there is civil liability in those
cases where private persons have suffered
damages. And this will be found to be
substantially true in the United States.
Under the early common law, damages to a
person injured by a crime were merged in the
punishment thereof. Later, it was held that
there was no merger except in cases of
homicide, but that the remedy for the private
wrong and injury must be suspended until
public justice had been vindicated by the
confession or acquittal of the wrongdoer in a
criminal prosecution. (1 Cyc., 681.) But by
statutory enactments are never merged. (See
for instance, N. Y. Ann. Code, sec. 1899, and
Mairs v. B. & O. R. Co., 175 N. Y., 409; La. Stat.,
1904, sec. 985.) For specific crimes where civil
liability attaches, see 33 Cyc., 1520, rape; 19
Cyc., 980, arson; 30 Cyc., 1578, abortion; 24
Cyc., 802, kidnapping; 3 Cyc., 1066, assault
and battery; 19 Cyc., 319, false imprisonment;
26 Cyc., 6, malicious prosecution. Although at
common law there was no civil liability for
seduction, it has been created by statute in
most jurisdictions: 35 Cyc., 1294. Wrongful
death, by statute, now carries with it civil
liability: 13 Cyc., 310. Larcency and robbery: 25
Cyc., 55. Generally, in the United States, the
owner of stolen property is entitled to have it
back irrespective of the conviction of the thief.
Identified stolen goods may be recovered even
from a bona fide purchaser. Civil actions for
debt, replevin, trover and conversion, etc., lie
in this class of cases. Malicious prosecution,
under the common law only a civil liability, is
now by statute, a criminal offense also: 26
Cyc., 120. But aside from these specific
references, it would be sufficient to refer to the
subject of torts, which occupies a large field in
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. In this branch of
law, pecuniary damages to the individual for
injuries suffered by him are the controlling
question, and one of its cardinal principles is
that there is no wrong without a remedy. We
may safely say, therefore, that civil liability
coexist with criminal liability in the United
States, the same as it does here.
Now, are the elements of civil liability the same
in the two countries? Article 119 of the Penal
Code reads: "The civil liability established in
Chapter II, Title II, of this book comprises:
"1. Restitution;
"2. Reparation of the damage caused;
"3. Indemnification for consequential
damages."cralaw virtua1aw library
What are restitution, reparation, and
indemnification under this article? Of
restitution, there can be no doubt that it exists
also in American law. Where property is taken
from its rightful owner, it must be restored if
found, even though in possession of a bona
fide purchaser. Reparation is not so easily
recognized. It is treated by both Groizard and
Viada as referring to damage caused to
property in the commission of crimes such as
robbery, as opposed to damages suffered by
injuries to the person, as in assaults and
homicide. It would appear that Groizards
comment upon this provisions is justified when
he says that these two elements of civil liability
could well have been expressed in a single
term. (Vol. 2, 621.) Taken together they are
both allowable under the American law of civil
liability, and are usually designated without
distinction as damages.
Does the fact that in this country civil liability
is, as a rule, determined in the criminal action
transform it into criminal liability and thus
make it a part of the punishment for the crime?
Certainly the mere form of a remedy should no
affect its substance. And there are many
indications in the Penal Code that the civil
liability therein imposed for the commission of
crimes was not intended to be merged into the
punishment for the crime. Article 71, 119-126,
which provide for civil liability of offenders, are
confined strictly to that subject. Article 23
sharply defines one distinction between the
criminal and civil liability, in that the former
can not be waived by a pardon of the party
injured, while the latter may be waived. The
chapters of the Penal Code dealing with the
classification and duration of penalties (articles
25 to 62 inclusive), nowhere list the civil
liability attached to a crime. And article 133
provides that "Civil liability arising out of
crimes or misdemeanors shall be extinguished
in the same manner as other obligations, in
accordance with the rules of civil law."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In commenting upon this article, Groizard (vol.
2, p. 717), says: "From crimes arise, as we
know, two liabilities: criminal and civil. The first
is extinguished by the methods to which we
have just adverted. The method of terminating
the second is not a subject of criminal law, but
of civil law. . . .
"The character of this work does not permit us
to tarry for further explanations. We would not
be commenting upon subjects included within
the Penal Code but laws of a purely civil
character."
And, as a complement of this article, article
1813 of the Civil Code provides that civil
liability attached to crimes may be
compromised but that the criminal liability is
not thereby extinguished. Other distinctions
might be noticed which show that there is no
merger of the two kinds of liability from the
mere fact that they are tried together. But
these are, we think, sufficient to sustain the
point.
There is, therefore, no new or foreign element
in civil liability under the Penal Code of this
country as compared with civil liability under
the American law. We do not consider the
practice in the United States of allowing
punitive or exemplary damages as affecting
the question we are discussing. Here as there,
civil damages are no part of the punishment for
the crime; here as there, they are rendered to
the citizen and not to the State.
As the civil liability is no part of the punishment
for the crime, there would have been no
question of double jeopardy, and counsel for
the defendant in effect so admits, had the
lower court not erred in refusing to consider
the question of civil damages during the course
of the criminal proceedings. What was the
effect of the action of this court in affirming
that judgment as to the guilt and punishment
of the accused and of reversing it as to the
question of civil damage, with instructions to
execute the punishment imposed and to try the
civil branch of the case? Bearing in mind the
broad line of demarkation between the civil
liability of the accused and his criminal liability,
the bare fact that his civil liability was
determined and fixed had nothing whatever to
do with the punishment imposed. The latter
was not thereby affected. This being true, by
what reasoning could it be held that its
determination prior or subsequent to the
finding of guilt was merged into and became a
part of the punishment? If two lines are
parallel, they can not converge. This time
intervening between the judgment of guilt and
the judgment of civil damages could in no way
give to the latter the character of the former.
It is urged that in such a case as the present,
the defendant might serve the term of
imprisonment fixed by the court as the
punishment for his crime, and after the
sentence for civil damages and in case of his
insolvency, he would have to return to prison
to serve the subsidiary imprisonment by reason
of his insolvency, being argued that this would
constitute double jeopardy. Even so it is well
settled that execution against the person will
issue in civil actions in case of personal
injuries, and that this is not imprisonment for
debt or punishment for crime. It is in lieu of the
payment of the indemnity and is considered as
a discharge thereof. If the payment of the
indemnity is not punishment for the crime, the
imprisonment in lieu thereof is not punishment
for the crime.
The practice, in civil cases, of partially
affirming and partially reversing judgment
appealed from, is well settled.
"Where a judgment appealed from consists of
distinct and independent matters, so that an
erroneous portion thereof can be segregated
from the parts that are correct, the court will
not set aside the entire judgment, but only so
much as is erroneous, leaving the residue
undisturbed." (3 Cyc., 447.)

This rule is often applied to cases of tortious

wrongs, where the culpability of the tort feasor
is established but there has been error in the
assessment of damages. (Smith v. Whittlesey,
79 Conn., 189; George v. Railroad, 214 Mo.,
551; Austin & McCargar v. Langlois, 83 Vt.,
104.) In the present case, the civil liability of
the defendant was established, and the sole
question determined upon the second trial was
the amount of civil damages. The plea of
double jeopardy can not be allowed.

By their second assignment of error, counsel

for the defendant urge that the amount of
damages, P50,500 awarded is excessive, and
not supported by the evidence. There can be
no objection to allowing the physicians fees of
P500 and P1,300 for the three months salary,
being the time the injured party was
incapacitated from performing the work in
which he was then engaged. The remainder,
P48,700, appears to have been allowed on
account of the permanent diminution of
Sternbergs ability to earn money. The
evidence of record does not establish such
disability with that degree of certainly which
will justify an award for that purpose. We have
reached this conclusion after a most careful
examination of all the testimony upon this
point. The award of damages is therefore
reduced to P1,800, the defendant to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment, which in no event
can exceed one-third of the principal penalty,
in case of insolvency. Costs in the instance de
oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990
YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY
SALVADO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M.
POLO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Br. 19 of the RTC of Manila, and ROY
CAMASO, respondents.
Tomas R. Leonidas for petitioners.
David B. Agoncillo for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Can a civil action instituted after the criminal
action was filed prosper even if there was no
reservation to file a separate civil action? This
is the issue in this petition.
On December 24, 1982, a five-year old boy,
Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of
M. de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was
sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by
Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee,
Larry Salvado.
Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries
in an information that was filed on January 6,
1983 with the then City Court of Manila,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 027184. On
October 19, 1984 a complaint for damages was
filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father,
David Camaso, against Yakult Philippines and
Larry Salvado in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27317.
In due course a decision was rendered in the
civil case on May 26, 1989 ordering defendants
to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the
sum of P13,006.30 for actual expenses for
medical services and hospital bills; P3,000.00
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
Although said defendants appealed the
judgment, they nevertheless filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court
over said civil case.
Petitioners' thesis is that the civil action for
damages for injuries arising from alleged
criminal negligence of Salvado, being without
malice, cannot be filed independently of the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. Further, it is contended that under
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure such a separate civil action
may not be filed unless reservation thereof is
expressly made.
In a decision dated November 3, 1989, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. 1 A
motion for reconsideration thereof filed by
petitioners was denied on January 30, 1990.
Hence this petition.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes
the others. The institution of, or the reservation
of the right to file, any of said civil actions
separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the
separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages,
the filing fees for such civil action as provided
in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual
damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages,
other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall
be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial. (1a)
Although the incident in question and the
actions arising therefrom were instituted before
the promulgation of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, its provisions which are procedural
may apply retrospectively to the present
case. 2
Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.
It is also provided that the reservation of the is even far better than a compliance with the
right to institute the separate civil action shall requirement of an express reservation that
be made before the prosecution starts to should be made by the offended party before
present its evidence and under circumstances the prosecution presents its evidence.
affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation. The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is
to prevent the offended party from recovering
In this case, the offended party has not waived damages twice for the same act or omission.
the civil action, nor reserved the right to
institute it separately. Neither has the offended Thus, the Court finds and so holds that the trial
party instituted the civil action prior to the court had jurisdiction over the separate civil
criminal action. However, the civil action in this action brought before it.
case was filed in court before the presentation
of the evidence for the prosecution in the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
criminal action of which the judge presiding on questioned decision of the Court of Appeals
the criminal case was duly informed, so that in dated November 3, 1989 and its resolution
the disposition of the criminal action no dated January 30, 1990 are hereby AFFIRMED.
damages was awarded.
SO ORDERED.
The civil liability sought arising from the act or
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
omission of the accused in this case is a quasi
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
Code as follows:
concur.
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.

The aforecited revised rule requiring such

previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as
defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.

Although the separate civil action filed in this

case was without previous reservation in the
criminal case, nevertheless since it was
instituted before the prosecution presented
evidence in the criminal action, and the judge
handling the criminal case was informed
thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action
[G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000]
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for
herself and on behalf of the minors Maria
Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and
Francis Rafael, all surnamed
Dy), respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the
amended decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals affirming
[2]
the decision and
supplemental decision of the trial court, [3] as
follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered dismissing the appeals
interposed by both accused and Reyes Trucking
Corporation and affirming the Decision and
Supplemental Decision dated June 6, 1992 and
October 26, 1992 respectively.
"SO ORDERED." [4]
The facts are as follows:
On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor
Patricio T. Durian of Isabela filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19,
Cauayan an amended information charging
Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with reckless
imprudence resulting in double homicide and
damage to property, reading as follows:
"That on or about the 20th day of June, 1989,
in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused being
the driver and person-in-charge of a Trailer
Truck Tractor bearing Plate No. N2A-867
registered in the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, with a load of 2,000 cases of
empty bottles of beer grande, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drove and operated
the same while along the National Highway of
Barangay Tagaran, in said Municipality, in a
negligent, careless and imprudent manner,
without due regard to traffic laws, rules and
ordinances and without taking the necessary
precautions to prevent injuries to persons and
damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence the
said trailer truck to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-
up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 driven by
Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., @
Pacquing, due to irreversible shock, internal
and external hemorrhage and multiple injuries,
open wounds, abrasions, and further causing
damages to the heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the
amount of P100,000.00 and to the death of
Francisco Dy, Jr.; @ Pacquing and damages to
his Nissan Pick-Up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in
the total amount of P2,000,000.00.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
"Cauayan, Isabela, October 10, 1989.
"(Sgd.) FAUSTO C. CABANTAC
"Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor"
Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the
accused entered a plea of not guilty. On the
same occasion, the offended parties (Rosario P.
Dy and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita
and minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file
a separate civil action against the accused
arising from the offense charged. [5] On
November 29, 1989, the offended parties
actually filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan a complaint
against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo
Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi delict. The
petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of
Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle
involved in the accident). The private
respondents opted to pursue the criminal
action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi
ex delicto they filed against petitioner. On
December 15, 1989, private respondents
withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil
action against the accused and manifested that
they would prosecute the civil aspect ex
delicto in the criminal action.[6] However, they
did not withdraw the separate civil action
based on quasi delictagainst petitioner as
employer arising from the same act or
omission of the accused driver.[7]
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court
consolidated both criminal and civil cases and
conducted a joint trial of the same.
The facts, as found by the trial court, which
appear to be undisputed, are as follows:
"The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of transporting beer products
for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC for short)
from the latters San Fernando, Pampanga plant
to its various sales outlets in Luzon. Among its
fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck
trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca
y Tumol, a duly licensed driver. Aside from the
Corporations memorandum to all its drivers
and helpers to physically inspect their vehicles
before each trip (Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5), the
SMCs Traffic Investigator-Inspector certified the
roadworthiness of this White Truck trailer prior
to June 20, 1989 (Exh. 17). In addition to a
professional drivers license, it also conducts a
rigid examination of all driver applicants before
they are hired.
"In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the
White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao,
Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga
loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer
"Grande" bottles. Seated at the front right seat
beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck
helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino). At around 4:00
oclock that same morning while the truck was
descending at a slight downgrade along the
national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it
approached a damaged portion of the road
covering the full width of the trucks right lane
going south and about six meters in length.
These made the surface of the road uneven
because the potholes were about five to six
inches deep. The left lane parallel to this
damaged portion is smooth. As narrated by
Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the
potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its
headlights on coming from the opposite
direction. They used to evade this damaged
road by taking the left lance but at that
particular moment, because of the incoming
vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused
the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of
the wheels and the truck swerved to the left
invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result,
Duncas vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan
dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and
climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it
finally stopped. (see Exh. A-5, p. 8, record). The
Nissan was severely damaged (Exhs. A-7, A-8,
A-9 and A-14, pp. 9-11, record), and its two
passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and
Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly (Exh. A-19) from
external and internal hemorrhage and multiple
fractures (pp. 15 and 16, record).
"For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr.
her widow spent P651,360.00 (Exh. I-3). At the
time of his death he was 45 years old. He was
the President and Chairman of the Board of the
Dynamic Wood Products and Development
Corporation (DWPC), a wood processing
establishment, from which he was receiving an
income of P10,000.00 a month (Exh. D). In the
Articles of Incorporation of the DWPC, the
spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy
appear to be stockholders of 10,000 shares
each with par value of P100.00 per share out of
its outstanding and subscribed capital stock of
60,000 shares valued at P6,000,000.00 (Exhs.
K-1 & 10-B). Under its 1988 Income Tax Returns
(Exh. J) the DWPC had a taxable net income of
P78,499.30 (Exh. J). Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La
Salle University graduate in Business
Administration, past president of the Pasay
Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the
Philippine Jaycees in 1971 and 1976,
respectively, and World Vice-President of
Jaycees International in 1979. He was also the
recipient of numerous awards as a civic leader
(Exh. C). His children were all studying in
prestigious schools and spent about
P180,000.00 for their education in 1988 alone
(Exh. H-4).
"As stated earlier, the plaintiffs procurement of
a writ of attachment of the properties of the
Corporation was declared illegal by the Court of
Appeals. It was shown that on December 26,
1989, Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of the RTC
at San Fernando, Pampanga, attached six units
of Truck Tractors and trailers of the Corporation
at its garage at San Fernando, Pampanga.
These vehicles were kept under PC guard by
the plaintiffs in said garage thus preventing the
Corporation to operate them. However, on
December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals
dissolved the writ (p. 30, record) and on
December 29, 1989, said Sheriff reported to
this Court that the attached vehicles were
taken by the defendants representative, Melita
Manapil (Exh. O, p. 31, record). The defendants
general Manager declared that it lost
P21,000.00 per day for the non-operation of
the six units during their attachment (p. 31,
t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran, proceedings on
December 10, 1990)."[8]
On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations judgment is hereby rendered:
"1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de
Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Double Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle
Law (Rep. Act No. 4136), and appreciating in
his favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer two (2)
indeterminate penalties of four months and
one day of arresto mayor as minimum to three
years, six months and twenty days as
maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco
Dy. Jr. in the amount of P3,000,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as
moral damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral
expenses;
"2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br.
19-424 to pay the defendant therein actual
damages in the amount of P84,000.00; and
"3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in
Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED.
"Cauayan, Isabela, June 6, 1992.
"(Sgd.) ARTEMIO R. ALIVIA
"Regional Trial Judge"[9]
On September 3, 1992, petitioner and the
accused filed a notice of appeal from the joint
decision.[10]
On the other hand, private respondents moved
for amendment of the dispositive portion of the
joint decision so as to hold petitioner
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to
the private respondents in the event
insolvency of the accused.[11]
On October 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a
supplemental decision amending the
dispositive portion by inserting an additional
paragraph reading as follows:
"2:A Ordering the defendant Reyes Trucking
Corporation subsidiarily liable for all the
damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy,
Jr., in the event of insolvency of the accused
but deducting therefrom the damages of
P84,000.00 awarded to said defendant in the
next preceding paragraph; and x x x"[12]
On November 12, 1992, petitioner filed with
the trial court a supplemental notice of appeal
from the supplemental decision.[13]
During the pendency of the appeal, the
accused jumped bail and fled to a foreign
country. By resolution dated December 29,
1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal of the accused in the criminal case.[14]
On January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals
rendered an amended decision affirming that
of the trial court, as set out in the opening
paragraph of this decision.[15]
On January 31, 1997, petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of the amended decision.[16]
On April 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.[17]
Hence, this petition for review.[18]
On July 21, 1997, the Court required
respondents to comment on the petition within
ten (10) days from notice.[19]
On January 27, 1998, the Solicitor General filed
his comment.[20] On April 13, 1998, the Court
of granted leave to petitioner to file a reply and
noted the reply it filed on March 11, 1998.[21]
We now resolve to give due course to the
petition and decide the case.
Petitioner raises three (3) grounds for
allowance of the petition, which, however, boil
down to two (2) basic issues, namely:
1.....May petitioner as owner of the truck
involved in the accident be held subsidiarily
liable for the damages awarded to the offended
parties in the criminal action against the truck
driver despite the filing of a separate civil
action by the offended parties against the
employer of the truck driver?
2.....May the Court award damages to the
offended parties in the criminal case despite
the filing of a civil action against the employer
of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding
that alleged in the information for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage
to property?[22]
We grant the petition, resolving under
circumstances pro hac vice to remand
cases to the trial court for determination of
civil liability of petitioner as employer of
accused driver in the civil action quasi
delicto re-opened for the purpose.
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has
the choice between (1) an action to enforce
civil liability arising from crime under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a
separate action for quasi delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once
the choice is made, the injured party can not
avail himself of any other remedy because he
may not recover damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission of the accused.
[23]
This is the rule against double recovery.
In other words, "the same act or omission can
create two kinds of liability on the part of the
offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and
civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may
be enforced against the culprit, subject to the
caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that
the offended party can not recover damages
under both types of liability."[24]
In the instant case, the offended parties
elected to file a separate civil action for
damages against petitioner as employer of the
accused, based on quasi delict, under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael
Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of
the accused, to be vicariously liable for the
fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law,
this vicarious liability of the employer is
founded on at least two specific provisions of
law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation
to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would
allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be
instituted by the injured party against the
the
employer for an act or omission of the
the
employee and would necessitate only a
the
preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here,
the
the liability of the employer for the negligent
ex
conduct of the subordinate is direct and
primary, subject to the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee. The enforcement of the
judgment against the employer in an action
based on Article 2176 does not require the
employee to be insolvent since the nature of
the liability of the employer with that of the
employee, the two being statutorily considered
joint tortfeasors, is solidary. [25] The second,
predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, provides that an employer may be held
subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed
by his employee in the discharge of his duty.
This liability attaches when the employee is
convicted of a crime done in the performance
of his work and is found to be insolvent that
renders him unable to properly respond to the
civil liability adjudged.[26]
As regards the first issue, the answer is in the
negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as
employer of the accused who has been
adjudged guilty in the criminal case for
reckless imprudence, can not be held
subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the
separate civil action based on quasi
delict against it. In view of the reservation to
file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action
for recovery of civil liability, the same was not
instituted with the criminal action. Such
separate civil action was for recovery of
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.[27]
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section
1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, when private respondents, as
complainants in the criminal action, reserved
the right to file the separate civil action, they
waived other available civil actions predicated
on the same act or omission of the accused-
driver. Such civil action includes the recovery
of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission of the accused. [28]
The intention of private respondents to proceed
primarily and directly against petitioner as
employer of accused truck driver became
clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal
of the civil action against the latter based
on quasi delict.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the
trial court erred in holding the accused civilly
liable, and petitioner-employer of the accused
subsidiarily liable for damages arising from
crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the
offended parties in fact filed a separate civil
action against the employer based on quasi
delict resulting in the waiver of the civil
action ex delicto.
It might be argued that private respondents as
complainants in the criminal case withdrew the
reservation to file a civil action against the
driver (accused) and manifested that they
would pursue the civil liability of the driver in
the criminal action. However, the withdrawal is
ineffective to reverse the effect of the
reservation earlier made because private
respondents did not withdraw the civil action
against petitioner based on quasi delict. In
such a case, the provision of Rule 111, Section
1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure is clear that the reservation to file or
the filing of a separate civil action results in a
waiver of other available civil actions arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2 enumerated
what are the civil actions deemed waived upon
such reservation or filing, and one of which is
the civil indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically
provides:
"A waiver of any of the civil actions
extinguishes the others. The institution of, or
the reservation of the right to file, any of said
civil actions separately waives the others."
The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance
of multiple suits between the same litigants
arising out of the same act or omission of the
offender. The restrictive phraseology of the
section under consideration is meant to cover
all kinds of civil actions, regardless of their
source in law, provided that the action has for
its basis the same act or omission of the
offender.[29]
However, petitioner as defendant in the
separate civil action for damages filed against
it, based on quasi delict, may be held liable
thereon. Thus, the trial court grievously erred
in dismissing plaintiffs civil complaint. And the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
courts decision. Unfortunately private
respondents did not appeal from such dismissal
and could not be granted affirmative relief.[30]
The Court, however, in exceptional cases has
relaxed the rules "in order to promote their
objectives and assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding"[31] or exempted "a
particular case from the operation of the
rules."[32]
Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial
court erred in awarding civil damages in the
criminal case and in dismissing the civil action.
Apparently satisfied with such award, private
respondent did not appeal from the dismissal
of the civil case. However, petitioner did
appeal. Hence, this case should be remanded
to the trial court so that it may render decision
in the civil case awarding damages as may be
warranted by the evidence.[33]
With regard to the second issue, the award of
damages in the criminal case was improper
because the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability was waived in the criminal action by
the filing of a separate civil action against the
employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong,
[34]
"civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for
the crime committed." The only issue brought
before the trial court in the criminal action is
whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property. The action
for recovery of civil liability is not included
therein, but is covered by the separate civil
action filed against the petitioner as employer
of the accused truck-driver.
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail
pending his appeal from his conviction. Thus,
the judgment convicting the accused became
final and executory, but only insofar as the
penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The
damages awarded in the criminal action was
invalid because of its effective waiver. The
pronouncement was void because the action
for recovery of the civil liability arising from the
crime has been waived in said criminal action.
With respect to the issue that the award of
damages in the criminal action exceeded the
amount of damages alleged in the amended
information, the issue is de minimis. At any
rate, the trial court erred in awarding damages
in the criminal case because by virtue of the
reservation of the right to bring a separate civil
action or the filing thereof, "there would be no
possibility that the employer would be held
liable because in such a case there would be
no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the
accused.[35]
As a final note, we reiterate that "the policy
against double recovery requires that only one
action be maintained for the same act or
omission whether the action is brought against
the employee or against his employer. [36] The
injured party must choose which of the
available causes of action for damages he will
bring.[37]
Parenthetically, the trial court found the
accused "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Double Homicide Through
Reckless Imprudence with violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136)." There
is no such nomenclature of an offense under
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court
was misled to sentence the accused "to suffer
two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months
and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as
maximum." This is erroneous because in (1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311, the Court
reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty declares the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol
for criminal negligence bears no relation to the guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
individual willful crime or crimes committed, imprudence resulting in homicide and damage
but is set in relation to a whole class, or series to property, defined and penalized under
of crimes.[38] Article 365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, with violation of the automobile law (R.
Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this A. No. 4136, as amended), and sentences him
judgment even if erroneous, as it is, because it to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four
has become final and executory. (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as
criminal negligence "is treated as a maximum,[40] without indemnity, and to pay the
mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately costs, and
from willful offenses. It is not a question of
classification or terminology. In intentional (2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, the Court
crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence orders the case re-opened to determine the
or imprudence, what is principally penalized is liability of the defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking
the mental attitude or condition behind the act, Corporation to plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or defendants counterclaim.
foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the
confusion has arisen from the common use of No costs in this instance.
such descriptive phrase as homicide through
reckless imprudence, and the like; when the SO ORDERED.
strict technical sense is, more accurately,
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide; or
simple imprudence causing damages to
property."[39]
There is need, therefore, to rectify the
designation of the offense without disturbing
the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench
and bar in strict adherence to precedent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition
and SETS ASIDE the amended decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R.
CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6,
1997, and the joint decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, in
Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No.
Br. 19-424, dated June 6, 1992.
IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court renders judgment
as follows:
G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005
MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER, VS.
HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 104; PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES; AND GLADYS NOCOM,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing
a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct
criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). The Rules of
Court allow the offended party to intervene via
a private prosecutor in each of these two penal
proceedings. However, the recovery of the
single civil liability arising from the single act of
issuing a bouncing check in either criminal
case bars the recovery of the same civil liability
in the other criminal action. While the law
allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the
offended party, it authorizes recovery in only
one. In short, while two crimes arise from a
single set of facts, only one civil liability
attaches to it.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse the July 27, 2002 Order [2] of the
Regional Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch
104) in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-106256 to Q-
01-106259. Also assailed is the August 16,
2002 Order[3] of the RTC denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration. The first assailed
Order is quoted in full as follows:
"For consideration is the opposition of the
accused, through counsel, to the formal entry
of appearance of private prosecutor.
"Accused, through counsel, contends that the
private prosecutor is barred from appearing
before this Court as his appearance is limited
to the civil aspect which must be presented
and asserted in B.P. 22 cases pending before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
"The private prosecutor submitted comment
stating that the offended party did not
manifest within fifteen (15) days following the
filing of the information that the civil liability
arising from the crime has been or would be
separately prosecuted and that she should
therefore be required to pay the legal fees
pursuant to Section 20 of Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court, as amended.
"Considering that the prosecution under B.P. 22
is without prejudice to any liability for violation
of any provision of the Revised Penal Code (BP
22, Sec. 5), the civil action for the recovery of
the civil liability arising from the estafa cases
pending before this Court is deemed instituted
with the criminal action (Rule 111, Sec. 1 [a]).
The offended party may thus intervene by
counsel in the prosecution of the offense (Rule
110. Sec. 16).
"WHEREFORE, the appearance of a private
prosecutor shall be allowed upon payment of
the legal fees for these estafa cases pending
before this Court pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended."[4]
The Facts
The undisputed facts are narrated by petitioner
as follows:
"On 10 December 2001, the Honorable
Assistant City Prosecutor Rossana S. Morales-
Montojo of Quezon City Prosecutor's Office
issued her Resolution in I.S. No. 01-15902, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"Premises considered, there being PROBABLE
CAUSE to charge respondent for ESTAFA under
Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as amended by PD
818 and for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, it is respectfully recommended that the
attached Information be approved and filed in
Court."
"As a consequence thereof, separate
informations were separately filed against
herein [p]etitioner before proper [c]ourts, for
Estafa and [v]iolation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22.
"Upon payment of the assessed and required
docket fees by the [p]rivate [c]omplainant, the
informations for [v]iolation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 against herein [p]etitioner were filed
and raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 42, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 0108033 to 36.
"On the other hand, the informations for
[e]stafa cases against herein [p]etitioner were
likewise filed and raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-106256 to 59.
"On 17 June 2002, petitioner through counsel
filed in open court before the [p]ublic
[r]espondent an 'Opposition to the Formal
Entry of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor'
dated 14 June 2002.
"The [p]ublic [r]espondent court during the
said hearing noted the Formal Entry of
Appearance of Atty. Felix R. Solomon as
[p]rivate [p]rosecutor as well as the Opposition
filed thereto by herein [p]etitioner. x x x.

"As ordered by the Court, [p]rivate
[c]omplainant through counsel filed her
Comment to the Opposition of herein
[p]etitioner.
"On 27 June 2002, the [p]ublic [r]espondent
court issued the first assailed Order allowing
the appearance of the [p]rivate [p]rosecutor in
the above-entitled criminal cases upon
payment of the legal fees pursuant to Section 1
of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
"On 31 July 2002, [a]ccused through counsel
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 July
2002.
"On 16 August 2002, the [p]ublic [r]espondent
court issued the second assailed Order denying
the Motion for Reconsideration of herein
[p]etitioner."[5]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Noting petitioner's opposition to the private
prosecutor's entry of appearance, the RTC held
that the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is
deemed instituted, unless the offended party
(1) waives the civil action, (2) reserves the
right to institute it separately, or (3) institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Considering that the offended party had paid
the corresponding filing fee for the estafa cases
prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the RTC
allowed the private prosecutor to appear and
intervene in the proceedings.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
Issues
Petitioner raises this sole issue for the Court's
consideration:
"Whether or not a [p]rivate [p]rosecutor can be
allowed to intervene and participate in the
proceedings of the above-entitled [e]stafa
cases for the purpose of prosecuting the
attached civil liability arising from the issuance
of the checks involved which is also subject
mater of the pending B.P. 22 cases."[7]
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Civil Action in BP 22 Case Not a Bar
to Civil Action in Estafa Case
Petitioner theorizes that the civil action
necessarily arising from the criminal case
pending before the MTC for violation of BP 22
precludes the institution of the corresponding
civil action in the criminal case for estafa now
pending before the RTC. She hinges her theory
on the following provisions of Rules 110 and
111 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 16. Intervention of the offended
party in criminal action. -- Where the civil
action for recovery of civil liability is instituted
in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense."
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. -- (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
"The reservation of the right to institute
separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence
and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
"When the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages
without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees
therefor shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment awarding such damages.
xxx xxx xxx
"(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation
to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
"Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and
civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as
the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay the filing fees based on the amounts
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing
fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
"Where the civil action has been filed
separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed
in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions."
Based on the foregoing rules, an offended
party may intervene in the prosecution of a
crime, except in the following instances: (1)
when, from the nature of the crime and the law
defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises
in favor of a private offended party; and (2)
when, from the nature of the offense, the
offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity,
but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil
action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so
or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In
any of these instances, the private
complainant's interest in the case disappears
and criminal prosecution becomes the sole
function of the public prosecutor. [8] None of
these exceptions apply to the instant case.
Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred
from intervening in the estafa suit.
True, each of the overt acts in these instances
may give rise to two criminal liabilities -- one
for estafa and another for violation of BP 22.
But every such act of issuing a bouncing check
involves only one civil liability for the offended
party, who has sustained only a single injury. [9]
This is the import of Banal v. Tadeo,[10] which
we quote in part as follows:
"Generally, the basis of civil liability arising
from crime is the fundamental postulate of our
law that 'Every man criminally liable is also
civilly liable' (Art. 100, The Revised Penal
Code). Underlying this legal principle is the
traditional theory that when a person commits
a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the
society in which he lives in or the political
entity called the State whose law he had
violated; and (2) the individual member of that
society whose person, right, honor, chastity or
property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or
omission. However, this rather broad and
general provision is among the most complex
and controversial topics in criminal procedure.
It can be misleading in its implications
especially where the same act or omission may
be treated as a crime in one instance and as a
tort in another or where the law allows a
separate civil action to proceed independently
of the course of the criminal prosecution with
which it is intimately intertwined. Many legal
scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the
generally accepted notion that the civil liability
actually arises from the crime when, in the
ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or
omission is felonious because it is punishable
by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime but because it caused
damage to another. Viewing things
pragmatically, we can readily see that what
gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and the moral duty of everyone to
repair or make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his own act or omission,
done intentionally or negligently, whether or
not the same be punishable by law. In other
words, criminal liability will give rise to civil
liability only if the same felonious act or
omission results in damage or injury to another
and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.
Damage or injury to another is evidently the
foundation of the civil action. Such is not the
case in criminal actions for, to be criminally
liable, it is enough that the act or omission
complained of is punishable, regardless of
whether or not it also causes material damage
to another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on
Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp.
246-247)."
Thus, the possible single civil liability arising
from the act of issuing a bouncing check can
be the subject of both civil actions deemed
instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22
violation prosecution. In the crimes of both
estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court expressly allows, even
automatically in the present case, the
institution of a civil action without need of
election by the offended party. As both
remedies are simultaneously available to this
party, there can be no forum shopping.[11]
Hence, this Court cannot agree with what
petitioner ultimately espouses. At the present
stage, no judgment on the civil liability has
been rendered in either criminal case. There is
as yet no call for the offended party to elect
remedies and, after choosing one of them, be
considered barred from others available to her.
Election of Remedies
Petitioner is actually raising the doctrine of
election of remedies. "In its broad sense,
election of remedies refers to the choice by a
party to an action of one of two or more
coexisting remedial rights, where several such
rights arise out of the same facts, but the term
has been generally limited to a choice by a
party between inconsistent remedial rights, the
assertion of one being necessarily repugnant
to, or a repudiation of, the other."[12] In its
more restricted and technical sense, the
election of remedies is the adoption of one of
two or more coexisting ones, with the effect of
precluding a resort to the others.[13]
The Court further elucidates in Mellon Bank v.
Magsino[14] as follows:
"As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose
of the doctrine of election of remedies is not to
prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent
double redress for a single wrong.[15] It is
regarded as an application of the law of
estoppel, upon the theory that a party cannot,
in the assertion of his right occupy inconsistent
positions which form the basis of his respective
remedies. However, when a certain state of
facts under the law entitles a party to
alternative remedies, both founded upon the
identical state of facts, these remedies are not
considered inconsistent remedies. In such
case, the invocation of one remedy is not an
election which will bar the other, unless the
suit upon the remedy first invoked shall reach
the stage of final adjudication or unless by the
invocation of the remedy first sought to be
enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an
advantage thereby or caused detriment or
change of situation to the other. [16] It must be
pointed out that ordinarily, election of remedies
is not made until the judicial proceedings has
gone to judgment on the merits. [17]
"Consonant with these rulings, this Court,
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, opined that while
some American authorities hold that the mere
initiation of proceedings constitutes a binding
choice of remedies that precludes pursuit of
alternative courses, the better rule is that no
binding election occurs before a decision on
the merits is had or a detriment to the other
party supervenes.[18] This is because the
principle of election of remedies is discordant
with the modern procedural concepts
embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure which
permits a party to seek inconsistent remedies
in his claim for relief without being required to
elect between them at the pleading stage of
the litigation."[19]
In the present cases before us, the institution
of the civil actions with the estafa cases and
the inclusion of another set of civil actions with
the BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant or
inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the
Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a
civil action in a criminal case for violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law[20] precludes the
institution in an estafa case of the
corresponding civil action, even if both offenses
relate to the issuance of the same check.
The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is
explained by Justice Florenz D. Regalado (ret.),
former chairman of the committee tasked with
the revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
He clarified that the special rule on BP 22 cases
was added, because the dockets of the courts
were clogged with such litigations; creditors
were using the courts as collectors. While
ordinarily no filing fees were charged for actual
damages in criminal cases, the rule on the
necessary inclusion of a civil action with the
payment of filing fees based on the face value
of the check involved was laid down to
prevent the practice of creditors of using the
threat of a criminal prosecution to collect on
their credit free of charge.[21]
Clearly, it was not the intent of the special rule
to preclude the prosecution of the civil action
that corresponds to the estafa case, should the
latter also be filed. The crimes of estafa and
violation of BP 22 are different and distinct
from each other. There is no identity of
offenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in
one case may be invoked in the other. The
offenses charged in the informations are
perfectly distinct from each other in point of
law, however nearly they may be connected in
point of fact.[22]
What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court
prohibits is the reservation to file the
corresponding civil action. The criminal action
shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. "[U]nless a separate civil action
has been filed before the institution of the
criminal action, no such civil action can be
instituted after the criminal action has been
filed as the same has been included
therein."[23] In the instant case, the criminal
action for estafa was admittedly filed prior to
the criminal case for violation of BP 22, with
the corresponding filing fees for the inclusion of
the corresponding civil action paid accordingly.
[24]
Furthermore, the fact that the Rules do not
allow the reservation of civil actions in BP 22
cases cannot deprive private complainant of
the right to protect her interests in the criminal
action for estafa. Nothing in the current law or
rules on BP 22 vests the jurisdiction of the
corresponding civil case exclusively in the court
trying the BP 22 criminal case. [25]
In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not
intend to leave the offended parties without
any remedy to protect their interests in estafa
cases. Its power to promulgate the Rules of
Court is limited in the sense that rules "shall
not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights."[26] Private complainant's intervention in
the prosecution of estafa is justified not only
for the prosecution of her interests, but also for
the speedy and inexpensive administration of
justice as mandated by the Constitution. [27]
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding
that the private prosecutor may intervene
before the RTC in the proceedings for estafa,
despite the necessary inclusion of the
corresponding civil action in the proceedings
for violation of BP 22 pending before the MTC.
A recovery by the offended party under one
remedy, however, necessarily bars that under
the other. Obviously stemming from the
fundamental rule against unjust enrichment,[28]
this is in essence the rationale for the
proscription in our law against double recovery
for the same act or omission.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and
the assailed Order AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.
G.R. NO. L-22237, May 31, 1974 1920, to Bautista vs. Navarro, [3] promulgated in have to abide by what is commanded by the
1972, betray its weakness. What is more, an procedural rules. First, he set the date for
EUFRACIO D. ROJAS, PETITIONER, VS. applicable Civil Code provision, as will be arraignment.[8] After the plea of not guilty, he
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND shown, fails to lend support. [4] The petition fixed the date of trial.[9] Then came this petition
HONORABLE FEDERICO ALIKPALA, IN HIS must fail. for certiorari and prohibition, the former to
CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF annul and set aside the aforesaid orders and
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH It is clear from the undisputed facts that the the latter to enjoin and restrain both the People
XXII, RESPONDENTS. filing by the offended party, the CMS Estate, of the Philippines and respondent Judge from
Inc., with the City Fiscal of Manila of five estafa proceeding in the instant case until after the
DECISION charges against petitioner, resulted in the filing determination of the aforesaid civil case.
of the information made mention of at the Respondents were required to answer, and
FERNANDO, J.: outset. While at first assigned to the then upon petitioner posting a bond, a preliminary
Judge Jesus Perez, it was subsequently injunction was issued. In their answer it was
In this certiorari and prohibition proceeding,
transferred to respondent Judge upon the alleged: "(g) That the resolution of the liability
petitioner would have this Court nullify two
former's elevation to the Court of Appeals. of the defendant in the civil case on the
orders of respondent Judge, one for his
Thereafter, the challenged orders first for eleventh cause of action based on the
arraignment and the other for his trial. He is
arraignment and then for the date for trial were fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel
the accused in a pending criminal case for
issued, notwithstanding an opposition by mortgage the defendant executed in favor of
violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal
petitioner.[5] The basis for such opposition, as the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957,
Code,[1] for executing a new chattel mortgage
noted, was that there was likewise, at the that his D-6 'Caterpillar' Tractor with Serial No.
on personal property in favor of another party
insistence of the offended party, a civil case 9-U-6565 was 'free from all liens and
without the consent of the previous mortgagee
against petitioner in the court of first instance encumbrances' will not determine the criminal
and duly noted in the record of the Register of
of Manila for the revocation of a management liability of the accused in the said Criminal
Deeds. He would plead, however, before
contract.[6] Included in such complaint was an Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of
respondent Judge, and now with us, that no
eleventh cause of action, namely the execution Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. * * * (i)
arraignment could be set, as thereafter the
by petitioner of a chattel mortgage on a That, even granting for the sake of argument, a
offended party filed a civil case for the
Caterpillar tractor, with his explicit affirmance prejudicial question is involved in this case, the
termination of a management contract, one of
that it was free from all liens and fact remains that both the crime charged in the
the causes of action of which consisted of
encumbrances, when such was not the case at information in the criminal case and the
petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage
all, as the very same tractor was the subject of eleventh cause of action in the civil case are
when a prior chattel mortgage was still valid
a chattel mortgage in favor of the Davao based upon fraud, hence both the civil and
and subsisting, thus giving lie to his express
Lumber Company, of Davao City, to secure criminal cases could proceed independently of
manifestation that the property was free from
petitioner's obligation, still valid and subsisting the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil
all liens and encumbrances. It was his
as of the date of his entering into the second Code which provides: 'In cases of defamation,
contention that the civil case was a prejudicial
mortgage.[7] Petitioner, as the accused in the fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for
question, a decision of which was necessary
criminal case under the Revised Penal Code damages, entirely separate and distinct from
before the criminal case could proceed. Both
arising from the same act imputed to him was the criminal action, may be brought by the
the petition as well as the memorandum
thus encouraged to assert that thereby, he injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
thereafter submitted would characterize the
could no longer be tried pending the independently of the criminal prosecution, and
challenged orders as amounting to a grave
termination of the civil suit, as a prejudicial shall require only a preponderance of
abuse of discretion, referring to what was
question was involved. evidence.' (j) That, therefore, the act of
termed as "well-settled principles and
respondent judge in issuing the orders referred
guideposts" on the subject. Petitioner's stand
Respondent Judge was of a different mind. He to in the instant petition was not made with
lacks solidity. The decisions of this Tribunal
saw to it that petitioner as the accused would 'grave abuse of discretion.'"[10]
from Berbari vs. Concepcion,[2] announced in

The plea of respondent for the dismissal of this
petition, as intimated at the outset, finds
support in the applicable decisions of this
Tribunal. The petition, to repeat, must fail.
1. In a fairly recent decision, Zapanta vs.
Montesa,[11] Justice Dizon, speaking for the
Court, stated: "We have heretofore defined a
prejudicial question as that which arises in a
case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal.* * * The prejudicial question we
further said must be determinative of the
case before the court, and jurisdiction to try
the same must be lodged in another court. [12] It
is indispensable then for this petition to
succeed that the alleged prejudicial question
must be determinative of the criminal case
before respondent Judge. It is not so in this
case. A more careful scrutiny of the applicable
decisions would explain why. Thus in Pisalbon
vs. Tesoro,[13] this Court, through Justice Jugo,
stated: "The Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan erred in holding that the criminal
case should be suspended. In the present
proceedings, the civil case does not involve a
question prejudicial to the criminal case, for to
whomsoever the land may be awarded after all
the evidence has been presented in the civil
case, may not affect the alleged crime
committed by the notary public, which is the
subject of the criminal case. But, even
supposing that both the civil and the criminal
case involve the same question and one must
precede the other, it should be the civil case
which should be suspended rather than the
criminal, to await the result of the latter." [14] De
la Cruz vs. City Fiscal,[15] decided six years
later, reiterated such a view: "Now, with
respect to the annulment of the affidavit of
adjudication sought by Carmelita, the
execution by Apolinario of said affidavit with its
narration of facts, is intimately related to his
guilt or innocence of the charge of falsification
being investigated by the Fiscal, it is true;
however, resolution of the petition for
annulment of the affidavit of adjudication,
affirmative or otherwise, does not and will not
determine criminal responsibility in the
falsification case. Regardless of the outcome
of the pending civil case for annulment of the
affidavit of adjudication, determination of the
charge of falsification would be based on the
truth or falsity of the narration of facts in the
affidavit of adjudication, * * * Therefore, the
civil case aforementioned does not involve a
prejudicial question."[16] Then came Benitez vs.
Concepcion, Jr.,[17] with facts even more
analogous. There it was shown that there was
a civil case for annulment of a deed of
mortgage where the issue was whether or not
certain signatures were forged. There was also
a criminal case for falsification, the issue being
similar springing from the same facts.
Precisely, according to this Court, with Justice
Paredes as ponente, the fact "that the principal
issues in both cases are the same" and did
"arise from the same facts" would not show
any necessity "that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal
case."[18]
If there still be any doubts on the matter, what
was said by Justice Barredo in Isip vs.
Gonzales[19] would dispel them. As he pointed
out: "In other words, there is a prejudicial
question only when the matter that has to be
priorly decided by another authority is one the
cognizance of which pertains to that authority
and should not, under the circumstances, be
passed upon by the court trying the criminal
case."[20] That is not so in the litigation before
us. It becomes manifest therefore that there
was no error committed by respondent Judge in
ordering the arraignment and setting the case
for trial. There was no abuse of discretion
whatsoever. The allegation then of a grave
abuse thereof is utterly devoid of merit.
2. Moreover, there is, as pointed out in the
answer of respondents, another ground that
militates in a well-nigh conclusive fashion
against the pretension of petitioner. Article 33
of the Civil Code, already referred to, explicitly
provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence."[21] Here, fraud is
the basis for both the civil and the criminal
actions. They are, according to law, to proceed
independently. In the same way that the civil
suit can be tried, the criminal prosecution has
to run its course. This is an instance, as noted
by the respondents, whereby a codal provision
of undoubted applicability should prevail. The
invocation of the doctrine on prejudicial
question is thus attended with futility. It is
easily understandable why. It would be a
disservice to public interest if, under the
circumstances disclosed, with the culpability of
petitioner as the accused being dependent not
on what is shown in one of the causes of action
in a civil suit for revocation of the management
contract, but on whether or not he did commit
an act punishable by law, the hand of criminal
prosecution would be stayed. What was done
by respondent Judge then instead of being
contrary to any juridical concept is to be
commended if the basic policy underlying
penal statutes is not to be frustrated.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is dismissed. The preliminary
injunction issued by this Court is set aside.
Costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar, (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio,
Fernandez, and Aquino, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-22759, March 29, 1968
MANUEL R. JIMENEZ, PETITIONER, VS.
HON. ALBERTO V. AVERIA, JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE
AND OFELIA V. TANG AND ESTEFANIA DE
LA CRUZ OLANDAY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DIZON, J.:
In Criminal Case No. TM-235 of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite respondents Ofelia V.
Tang and Estefania de la Cruz Olanday were
charged with estafa, the information filed alleg-
ing that, having received from Manuel Jimenez
the sum of P20,000.00 with which to purchase
for him a fishing boat known as "Basnig", with
the obligation on their part to return the money
on January 30, 1963 in case they should fail to
buy the fishing boat, they misappropriated the
amount aforesaid, to the damage and prejudice
of Jimenez.
Before arraignment, the accused filed Civil
Case No. 6636 against Jimenez in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon contesting the validity
of a certain receipt signed by them on October
25, 1962 (Annex "A" of the present petition)
wherein they acknowledged having received
from him the sum of P20,000.00 with which to
purchase for him a fishing boat and its acces-
sories, and the further sum of P240.00 as
agent's commission, with the obligation, on
their part, to return the aforesaid amounts on
January 30, 1963 in case they were unable to
buy the fishing boat. Their complaint alleged
that they had never received any amount from
Jimenez and that their signatures on the
questioned receipt were secured by means of
fraud, deceit and intimidation employed by
him. Several days later, they filed a motion in
the aforementioned criminal action to suspend
proceedings therein on the ground that the
determination of the issue involved in Civil
Case No. 6636 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon was a prejudicial question. The
respondent judge granted the motion in an
order dated October 18, 1963.
The petition now before Us is one for certiorari
predicated upon the preposition that in issuing
the order just mentioned, the respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Properly,
however, the action is for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus, the relief prayed being for this
Court "to order the Hon. Court of Cavite
Province to proceed with the case and to order
the Hon. Court at Quezon Province to dismiss
the civil case".
The issue to be decided is whether the
determination of the issue raised in the civil
case mentioned heretofore is a prejudicial
question, in the sense that it must be first
resolved before the proceedings in the criminal
case for estafa may proceed.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be
one which arises in a case, the resolution of
which (question) is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved in said case, and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal (Ency-
clopedia Juridical Espaola, p. 228). In People
vs. Aragon, G. R. No. L-5930, February 17,
1954, We held in connection with this subject
that the question claimed to be prejudicial in
nature must be determinative of the case
before the court, and that jurisdiction to try
and resolved said question must be lodged in
another tribunal.
Applying the above considerations to the
instant case, it will be readily seen that the
alleged prejudicial question is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
parties charged with estafa, because even on
the assumption that the execution of the
receipt whose annulment they sought in the
civil case was vitiated by fraud, duress or
intimidation, their guilt could still be
established by other evidence showing, to the
degree required by law, that they had actually
received from the complainant the sum of
P20,000.00 with which to buy for him a fishing
boat, and that, instead of doing so, they
misappropriated the money and refused or
otherwise failed to return it to him upon
demand. The contention of the private
respondents herein would be tenable had they
been charged with falsification of the same
receipt involved in the civil action.
Were We to sanction the theory advanced by
the respondents Tang and De la Cruz Olanday
and adopted by the respondent judge, there
would hardly be a case for estafa that could be
prosecuted speedily, it being the easiest thing
for the accused to block the proceedings by the
simple expedient of filing an independent civil
action against the complainant, raising therein
the issue that he had not received from the
latter the amount alleged to have been mis-
appropriated. A claim to this effect is properly
a matter of defense to be interposed by the
party charged in the criminal proceeding.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the respondent Court of First Instance
of Cavite to proceed without undue delay with
the trial of Criminal Case No. TM-235, with the
result that the order complained of suspending
the proceedings therein until after Civil Case
No. 6636 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon has been resolved is hereby set aside.
With costs against the respondents except the
respondent judge.
Reyes, Acting C.J., Makalintal, Bengzon,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Castro, J., no part.
G.R. Nos. L-50441-42 September 18, 1980
ALENJANDRO RAS, petitioner, vs. HON.
JAINAL D. RASUL, District Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Basilan, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
This is a petition brought by the petitioner to
review and set aside the order of respondent
Judge dated December 12, 1978 in Criminal
Case No. 240 of the Court of First Instance of
Basilan denying petitioner's motion as accused
therein to suspend proceedings due to the
existence of a prejudicial question in Civil Case
No. 73 of the same court. Finding the petition
and the Solicitor General's concurrence
therewith to be meritorious, this Court hereby
grants the petition and accordingly sets aside
the questioned order and hereby enjoins the
respondent Judge from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 73 until Civil Case No. 240 is
finally decided and terminated.
A chronological statement of the antecedent
facts follows:
On or about April 27, 1978, Luis Pichel filed a
complaint against petitioner Alejandro Ras and
a certain Bienvenido Martin before the Court of
First Instance of Basilan, docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 73 praying for the nullification of
the deed of sale executed by Alejandro Ras in
favor of his codefendant Bienvenido Martin and
for the declaration of the prior deed of sale
allegedly executed in his favor by the
defendant Alejandro Ras as valid.
In their answer, the defendants (the Ras
spouses) alleged that they never sold the
property to Pichel and that the signatures
appearing in the deed of sale in favor of
plaintiff Pichel (in Civil Case No. 73) were
forgeries and that therefore the alleged deed of
sale in Pichel's favor sought to be declared
valid was fictitious and inexistent.
While Civil Case No. 73 was being tried before
the Court of First Instance of Basilan, the
Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed on or about
September 5, 1978 an Information for Estafa in
the same court against Alejandro Ras arising
from the same alleged double sale subject
matter of the civil complaint filed by Luis
Pichel. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 240 of the Court of First Instance of
Basilan. On November 6, 1978, petitioner,
through counsel, filed a "Motion for Suspension
of Action" in said Criminal Case No. 240
claiming that the same facts and issues were
involved in both the civil and criminal case and
that the resolution of the issues in the civil
case would necessarily be determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. The
Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed his opposition
on December 4, 1978.
In his Order of December 12, 1978, the
respondent judge saw no prejudicial question
and accordingly denied the motion. Hence, the
present petition.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which
arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the
court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the
question must be lodged in another court or
tribunal 1 It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused. 2
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the criminal action pending the determination
of the civil, it must appear not only that the
civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal pro. prosecution is based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in said
civil action would be necessary determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 3
On the basis of the issues raised in both the
criminal and civil cases against petitioner and
in the light of the foregoing concepts of a
prejudicial question, there indeed appears to
be a prejudicial question in the case at bar,
considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras'
defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of
the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed
of sale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the
civil case and complaining witness in the
criminal case) is based on the very same facts
which would be necessarily determinative of
petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in
the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in
favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there
would be no double sale and petitioner would
be innocent of the offense charged. A
conviction in the criminal case (if it were
allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross
injustice and would have to be set aside if it
were finally decided in the civil action that
indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a
forgery and spurious.
The Solicitor General in his comment expressed
his concurrence with the petition thus: "The
petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to
the complaint in Civil Case No. 73 that he had
never sold the property in litigation to the
plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in
the alleged deed of and that of his wife were
forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore,
necessary that the truth or falsity of such claim
be first determined because if his claim is true,
then he did not sell his property twice and no
estafa was committed. The question of nullity
of the sale is distinct and from the crime of
estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of herein petitioner in the c action."

Wherefore, the Order of respondent judge in

Criminal Case No. 240 dated December 12,
1978 is hereby set aside. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on May
16, 1979 is hereby made permanent and
respondent judge is enjoined from proceeding
with the arraignment and trial of Criminal Case
No. 240 until and unless Civil Case No. 73 shall
have been finally decided and terminated
adversely against petitioner. No costs.

Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-

Herrera, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003 verbal demands, respondent and his mother restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
refused to return the amount of injunction with the Court of Appeals seeking to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially enjoin the arraignment and trial of the estafa
VS. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., paid by PBI. through falsification case.[11] The Court of
RESPONDENT. Appeals granted respondents prayer for the
On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a
DECISION Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, an resolution dated March 19, 2001.[12]
action for Injunctive Relief docketed as Civil
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc, On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered
Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires, Mariano setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45
D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other trial court and permanently enjoining it from
of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
John Does.[5] Respondent sought a declaration proceeding with the arraignment and trial of
May 31, 2001 decision[1] of the Court of
that he was merely an agent of his mother, the criminal case until the civil cases for
Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, which
Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under Injunctive Relief and for Damages and
reversed and set aside the January 23, 2001
any obligation to PBI and to the other Attachment shall have been finally decided.
order[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
defendants on the various transactions
Cavite, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 7668-
involving TCT No. 687599. Hence, the People of the Philippines,
00 denying respondents motion for deferment
represented by the Solicitor General, filed the
of arraignment.
On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against instant petition seeking the reversal of the May
respondent and his mother a complaint for 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals.
Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael
Damages and Attachment, docketed as Civil
Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de la
Case No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the The issue to be resolved in this petition is
Cruz,[4] represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI)
Regional Trial Court of Manila.[6] Respondent whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos.
that they are the true and lawful owners of a
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief
42,443 square meter lot situated in Imus,
forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case No. and for Damages and Attachment, is a
Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of
SCA 1759.[7] prejudicial question justifying the suspension of
Title No. 687599 in the name of Cecilia de la
the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa
Cruz. They further represented that they
On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document, filed
acquired said lot, which was previously covered
through falsification of public document was against the respondent.
by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito Tan Teng and
filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr.
Po Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of
and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.[8] A prejudicial question is defined as that which
respondent and his mother, PBI purchased the
arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
questioned lot.
On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to logical antecedent of the issue involved
defer arraignment on the ground of prejudicial therein, and the cognizance of which pertains
In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent
question, i.e., the pendency of Civil Case Nos. to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
and his mother did not have a valid title over
SCA 1759 and 99-95381.[9] On January 27, must be determinative of the case before the
the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito
2000, the trial court denied respondents court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the
Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to
motion. question must be lodged in another court or
respondent and his mother and that TCT No.
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct
191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based
A motion for reconsideration thereof was and separate from the crime but so intimately
is not on file with the Register of Deeds.
likewise denied on February 27, 2001.[10] connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. For a civil action to
In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as
possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan
prayer for the issuance of a temporary to cause the suspension of the criminal
Teng and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil
action, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined; and
(3) jurisdiction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal.[13]
If both civil and criminal cases have similar
issues or the issue in one is intimately related
to the issues raised in the other, then a
prejudicial question would likely exist, provided
the other element or characteristic is satisfied.
It must appear not only that the civil case
involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in the
civil action would be necessarily determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the
resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the
same facts, or there is no necessity that the
civil case be determined first before taking up
the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does
not involve a prejudicial question.[14]
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial
question that would justify the suspension of
the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue
in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief
is whether or not respondent merely acted as
an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz;
while in Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages
and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay
damages and to return the amount paid by PBI
for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if
respondent is declared merely an agent of his
mother in the transaction involving the sale of
the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free
from criminal liability. An agent or any person
may be held liable for conspiring to falsify
public documents. Hence, the determination of
the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759
for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or
innocence of the respondent in the criminal
case for estafa through falsification of public
document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid
damages and the purchase price of the lot in
question will not be determinative of the
culpability of the respondent in the criminal
case for even if PBI is held entitled to the
return of the purchase price plus damages, it
does not ipso facto follow that respondent
should be held guilty of estafa through
falsification of public document. Stated
differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case
that PBI should not be paid the purchase price
plus damages will not necessarily absolve
respondent of liability in the criminal case
where his guilt may still be established under
penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial
question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of
each other.[15] Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People,[16] the petitioner was
accused in a criminal case for violation of
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for
executing a new chattel mortgage on personal
property in favor of another party without
consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter,
the offended party filed a civil case for
termination of management contract, one of
the causes of action of which consisted of
petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage
while the previous chattel mortgage was still
valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the
arraignment and trial of the criminal case be
held in abeyance on the ground that the civil
case was a prejudicial question, the resolution
of which was necessary before the criminal
proceedings could proceed. The trial court
denied the suspension of the criminal case on
the ground that no prejudicial question exist.
We affirmed the order of the trial court and
ruled that:
the resolution of the liability of the
defendant in the civil case on the eleventh
cause of action based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage
the defendant executed in favor of the said
CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his
D-6 Caterpillar Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-
6565 was free from all liens and
encumbrances will not determine the criminal
liability of the accused in the said Criminal
Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i)
That, even granting for the sake of argument, a
prejudicial question is involved in this case, the
fact remains that both the crime charged in the
information in the criminal case and the
eleventh cause of action in the civil case are
based upon fraud, hence both the civil and
criminal cases could proceed independently of
the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil
Code which provides: In cases of defamation,
fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. (j) That,
therefore, the act of respondent judge in
issuing the orders referred to in the instant
petition was not made with grave abuse of
discretion.

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for

Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his
mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case at bar.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the

instant petition is GRANTED. The May 31,
2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The permanent injunction issued by the
Court of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 is
ORDERED to proceed with the arraignment
and trial in Criminal Case No. 7668-00.
SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 137010. August 29, 2003]
ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS, INC., petitioner,
vs. The Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150, HON.
ZEUS ABROGAR, VIOLETA BAGUIO and
LORELEI IRA, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
Order dated October 2, 1998 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City
(Branch 150) in Civil Case No. 98-2125[1] which
considered Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and
200895 pending before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Makati (Branch 67) as
withdrawn; and, the Order dated November 23,
1998 which denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of the case:
Herein petitioner Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark
Travel for brevity) filed with the City Prosecutor
of Makati a criminal complaint for False
Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of
the Revised Penal Code against herein private
respondents Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira. In a
resolution dated November 20, 1996, the City
Prosecutor found probable cause to indict
private respondents for violation of said law
and accordingly filed the respective
Informations against each of them before the
MTC, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 200894
and 200895, which, except for the names of
the accused, uniformly read as follows:
The undersigned 2 Assistant Prosecutor
nd
accuses VIOLETA S. BAGUIO of the crime of
Violation of Article 182 of the Revised Penal
Code (False Testimony), committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February,
1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give false
testimony upon a material fact in Civil Case No.
95-1542, relative to a complaint for Collection
of sum of money, torts and damages filed by
Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Inc. for short)
against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc.
(NFMA, Inc. for short) in the following manner,
to wit: during the trial of the aforesaid civil
case on aforestated date before Branch 137 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Metro
Manila, in which one of the principal issues was
whether or not payment of the claim of ARK,
Inc. has been made by NFMA, Inc., the said
accused while testifying for NFMA, Inc., with
malicious intent, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly
testified on direct testimony, by way of a sworn
statement, and while under oath on the
witness stand, that the claims of ARK, Inc.
supported by a statements of accounts (Exhibit
E to GG) sent to and received by defendant-
corporation NFMA, Inc. is baseless and/or been
paid, which testimony as accused very well
knew and ought to know, by reason of
accuseds position as cashier, was false
inasmuch as the claim based on the statement
of accounts of ARK, Inc. (Exhibits E to GG are,
in truth and in fact, valid, legal and unpaid
accounts of NFMA, Inc. with ARK Travel Inc.,
herein represented by private complainant MA.
PAZ ALBERTO, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Private respondents filed a petition for review
of the City Prosecutors resolution dated
November 20, 1996 with the Department of
Justice (DOJ). In a resolution dated March 9,
1998,[3]Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito P. Zuo
reversed the City Prosecutors resolution dated
November 20, 1996. The prosecution office of
Makati then filed with the MTC a Motion to
Withdraw Information.[4]
However, on May 15, 1998, Ark Travel filed an
Urgent Petition for Automatic Review with the
DOJ. In a letter dated May 27, 1998, Secretary
Silvestre H. Bello III resolved to treat the urgent
petition as a motion for reconsideration,
reversed its resolution dated March 9, 1998
and directed the City Prosecutor to proceed
with the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos.
200894 and 200895.[5] For this reason, the MTC
issued an Order dated June 10, 1998, denying
the aforesaid Motion to Withdraw Information
filed by the prosecution, to wit:
It appearing that the Department of Justice had
reconsidered its previous ruling directing the
City Prosecutor of Makati City to withdraw the
information filed against the accused in the
above-entitled cases, the Motion to Withdraw
Information filed by the prosecution is hereby
DENIED.
Set these cases therefore for arraignment on
July 30, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In the meanwhile, private respondents Baguio
and Ira filed a Motion for Reconsideration [7] of
the May 27, 1998 resolution of then Secretary
Bello III, alleging that: (1) the March 9, 1998
resolution of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo finding
no probable cause to indict them has become
final and executory because the Urgent Petition
for Automatic Review was filed way beyond the
10-day reglementary period; and (2) the said
resolution of May 27, 1998 did not reverse the
finding of the March 9, 1998 resolution that
respondents did not really act with
malice/criminal intent because the resolution of
the Secretary merely stated that there was
false testimony.
DOJ Undersecretary Jesus A. Zozobrado, Jr.,
signing For the Secretary, granted the Motion
for Reconsideration in a resolution dated June
26, 1998, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, our resolution dated May 27,
1998 is reconsidered and set aside; and
consequently, our resolution dated March 9,
1998 is reinstated. You are accordingly,
directed to immediately cause, with leave of
court, the withdrawal of the informations for
false testimony in a civil case filed against
Violeta S. Baguio and Lorelei Ira. Report to us
the action taken within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.
Consequently, private respondents filed with
the MTC a Motion for Reconsideration of its
June 10, 1998 Order alleging that there is no
longer any obstacle, legal or otherwise, to the
granting of the Motion to Withdraw Information
previously filed by the prosecution. The MTC
denied the motion in an Order, dated July 21,
1998, which we quote verbatim, as follows:
Submitted for resolution is a Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the accused through
counsel which seeks a reversal of the courts
order denying the Motion to Withdraw filed by
the prosecution.
In the Crespo Mogul case, it was held by the
Supreme Court that once an information is filed
in court, such filing sets in motion the criminal
action against the accused before the court,
and any motion to dismiss or withdraw
information is always addressed to the
discretion of the court. The denial or grant of
any motion is done by the court not out of
subservience to the secretary of justice but in
faithful exercise of its judicial prerogative. This
is the ruling in the case of Robert Jr. et al. vs.
CH et al. vs. CA G.R. No. 113930 promulgated
on March 5, 1996.
A reading of the information sufficiently alleges
the facts which make out the offense charged
and in keeping with the above ruling of the
Supreme Court, this court hereby denies the
Motion for Reconsideration.
Set this case for arraignment of both accused
on July 30, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Private respondents questioned the MTC Orders
dated June 10, 1998 and July 21, 1998 via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
respondent RTC of Makati.
The RTC issued herein assailed Order dated
October 2, 1998, portions of which read:
...
As aptly stated in Ledesma vs. CA (Supra) and
Marcelo vs. CA (Aug. 4, 1994) the trial Court
nonetheless should make its own study and
evaluation of the said motion and not reply
merely on the awaited action of the secretary.
No such evaluation was ever conducted by the
respondent Court before it issued the two (2)
questioned orders.
In view hereof, it is this Courts opinion and
stand that the respondent Court may have
indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it denied the Motion to Withdraw and the
motion for reconsideration based solely on its
bare and ambiguous reliance on the Crespo
Doctrine, since an independent evaluation and
assessment of the existence of a probable
cause is necessary before such orders denying
the said motions could be issued.
Foregoing Premises Considered, the petition for
Certiorari is hereby granted. The questioned
orders dated June 10 and July 21, 1998 are
hereby set aside and the Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895
are hereby considered withdrawn.
[9]
(Emphasis ours)
SO ORDERED.
The RTC denied Ark Travels motion for
reconsideration in its Order dated November
23, 1998,[10] to wit:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration
filed by private respondent which was
temporarily held in abeyance on account of the
manifestation of movants counsel that they
intend to file a motion to inhibit; however,
despite the lapse of the 10-day period given to
them to do so, the intended motion has not
been filed.
After an extensive study of the motion as well
as the opposition thereto, and with careful
consideration and assessment of the
circumstances which led to its earlier order, the
Court finds no compelling reason to alter,
amend and/or reconsider its order dated
October 2, 1998.
Wherefore, the above-mentioned motion is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari which
raises the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, WHEN IT NULLIFIED THE
ORDERS OF THE COURT A QUO, ENJOINED THE
SAID COURT A QUO FROM HEARING CRIMINAL
CASES NOS. 200894 AND 200895, AND
THEREAFTER, ORDERED THE OUTRIGHT
DISMISSAL OF SAID CRIMINAL CASES.[11]
Ark Travel argues that the ruling of the RTC
contravenes the doctrine laid down by this
Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul[12] which
enunciated that once a complaint or
information is filed in court any disposition of
the case such as its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the court. Ark Travel likewise
insists that criminal prosecutions cannot be
enjoined.
In their Comment, private respondents
counter: (1) Appeal and not certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate
remedy. But even if the petition at bar is
treated as an appeal, the filing thereof way
beyond the 15-day reglementary period within
which to appeal, renders the instant petition
outrightly dismissable; (2) Assuming arguendo
that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the
correct remedy, the petition should still be
denied and/or dismissed outright for having
been filed beyond the 60-day reglementary
period provided by Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; (3) The RTCs Orders have become final
and executory, and consequently may no
longer be disturbed; (4) The filing of the
petition with this Court is grossly violative of
the principle of hierarchy of courts; (5) There is
no ground to reverse public respondent RTCs
Orders which considered the criminal cases as
withdrawn because the petition does not rebut
the validity of the ruling of the DOJ that there is
no probable cause to charge herein private
respondents with the crime of false testimony.
In its Reply, Ark Travel argues that herein
petition for certiorari is the proper remedy and
not appeal because what is being questioned is
not the correctness of the subject Orders but
the jurisdiction of the RTC in considering the
criminal cases as withdrawn when said cases
are not pending with it but the MTC; that
appeal is not a speedy and/or adequate
remedy; and that herein petition does not
violate the principle of hierarchy of court
because it presents a question of law.
We shall first address the procedural aspect.
The issue raised in the present petition
concerns the jurisdiction of the RTC in ordering
the dismissal of the criminal cases pending
before the MTC and therefore, the proper
remedy is certiorari. As such, the present
petition for certiorari ought to have been
dismissed for late filing. The assailed Order
dated October 2, 1998 was received by Ark
Travel on October 16, 1998.Ark Travel filed the
Motion for Reconsideration fourteen days later
or on October 30, 1998. On November 27,
1998, Ark Travel received the Order of the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration.
Pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, then prevailing, the petition should
have been filed on the forty-sixth day (60 days
minus 14 days) from November 27, 1998 or on
January 12, 1999, the last day of the 60-day
reglementary period; instead, the petition was
filed on January 26, 1999.
However, during the pendency of herein
petition, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-2-
03, amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure, effective September
1, 2000, to wit:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration
or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of
said motion.
in which case, the filing of the petition on
January 26, 1999 was filed on the 60 th day from
November 27, 1998, Ark Travels date of receipt
of notice of the order denying Ark Travels
motion for reconsideration.
We have consistently held that statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage
procedural laws are retroactive in that sense
and to that extent.[13] In view of such
retroactive application of procedural laws, the
instant petition should be considered as timely
filed.[14]
Further, herein case is a clear exception to the
principle of hierarchy of courts. The Court has
full discretionary power to take cognizance of
the petition filed directly to it for compelling
reasons or if warranted by the nature of the
issues raised.[15] This case commenced in the
MTC way back 1996 and still pends. We
therefore set aside such principle for this
particular case, in the interest of speedy
justice.[16]
Anent the substantive aspect.
The general rule is that the denial of a motion
to withdraw information, just like a motion to
dismiss a complaint, is an interlocutory order
and therefore it cannot be the proper subject of
an appeal or certiorari until a final judgment on
the merits of the case is rendered.[17] However,
there are certain situations where recourse
to certiorari or mandamus is considered
appropriate, to wit:
a) when the trial court issued the order without
or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is
patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial
court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a
speedy and adequate remedy
as when an appeal would not promptly relieve
a defendant from the injurious effects of the
patently mistaken order maintaining the
plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the
defendant needlessly to go through a
protracted trial and clogging the court dockets
by another futile case.[18]
All three situations are present in this
case. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed with
this Court is the proper remedy.
In the petition for certiorari filed with the RTC,
Ark Travel claims that the MTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion
to Withdraw Informations on the ground that
the MTC disregarded the DOJs finding of lack of
probable cause without making an independent
evaluation of the same.
Indeed, the MTC Order dated June 10, 1998
shows that the Motion to Withdraw
Informations was denied by the MTC solely on
the basis of the ruling of the DOJ that there
exists a probable cause; while the MTC Order
dated July 21, 1998 denied the motion for
reconsideration of the June 10, 1998 order on
the basis of the
principle laid down in the Crespo vs. Mogulcase
that once an Information was filed in court, its
disposition rests in the discretion of the court
and that the allegations of facts in the
Information make out the offense charged.
It is settled that when confronted with a
motion to withdraw an Information on the
ground of lack of probable cause based
on a resolution of the Secretary of the
Department of Justice, the bounden duty
of the trial court is to make an
independent assessment of the merits of
such motion.[19] Having acquired
jurisdiction over the case, the trial court
is not bound by such resolution but is
required to evaluate it before proceeding
further with the trial[20] and should
embody such assessment in the order
disposing the motion.[21]
The subject MTC Orders do not show that the
MTC made an independent assessment of the
merits of the Motion to Withdraw
Informations. The MTC merely based its first
order on the ruling of the DOJ that probable
cause existed. In the second order, the MTC
merely stated that from its reading of the
Informations, and in keeping with
the Crespo ruling, it is denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The MTC should have made an independent
evaluation and embodied its assessment in at
least one of its assailed orders, especially
considering that the DOJ had issued
contradicting rulings on the existence of
probable cause. Hence, on this point, we agree
with the RTC that the MTC committed grave
abuse of discretion.
But the RTC, acting on the petition for certiorari
before it, not only committed grave abuse of
discretion but acted in excess of or beyond its
jurisdiction in
considering the criminal casespending in the
MTC as withdrawn, which in effect, causes the
dismissal of the two criminal cases. First, the
subject cases are not within the jurisdiction of
the RTC to dismiss. The only issue brought to it
is whether or not the MTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
withdraw without making any independent
evaluation as to whether or not there is a
probable cause. Second, while ruling that the
MTC should have made an independent
assessment on the merits of the Motion to
Withdraw Informations, the RTC itself omitted
to do the very thing that it prescribed the MTC
to do. It unceremoniously considered the
criminal cases as withdrawn, without
evaluation or determination of the existence of
the probable cause.
The RTC should have only nullified the subject
MTC Order and remanded the case to the MTC
for its determination of the existence of
probable cause pursuant to the
aforementioned Crespo and Ledesma cases.
However, inasmuch as we have taken
cognizance of this case in the interest of
speedy justice and considering that the entire
records have been forwarded to us, it is
befitting that we determine the existence of
probable cause to put an end to this issue
which had been unresolved since 1998, not to
mention the fact that the subject Informations
were initially filed in 1996.A remand of the case
to the MTC for an independent evaluation of
the existence of probable cause will only delay
the disposition of the case and contribute in
the clogging of the dockets.
To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a
Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised
Penal Code, the following requisites must
concur:
1. the testimony must be given in a civil case;
2. the testimony must relate to the issues
presented in the case;
3. the testimony is false;
4. the false testimony must be given by the
defendant knowing the same to be false; and
5. such testimony must be malicious and given
with and intent to affect the issues presented
in the case.[22]
There is no doubt that the first two requisites
are extant in this case. The records show that
Ark Travel filed a complaint for collection of
sum of money, torts and damages against New
Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMAI) and
Angelina T. Rivera with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati (Branch 137), docketed as Civil Case
No. 95-1542. In said civil case, private
respondents were presented by NFMAI as
witnesses. They executed their respective
sworn statements and testified before the trial
court that NFMAI has no outstanding obligation
with Ark Travel as the same had been paid in
full.
The existence of the last three requisites is
quite dubious. The falsity of the subject
testimonies of private respondents is yet to be
established. It is noted that at the time of the
filing of the criminal complaints, the civil case
filed by Ark Travel is still pending decision.
[23]
Ark Travel has yet to prove the validity of its
monetary claims and damages against
NFMAI. It is only after trial that the RTC can
assess the veracity or falsity of the testimony
and correspondingly render a decision. Thus,
the civil case is so intimately connected with
the subject crime that it is determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the respondents in the
criminal cases. In other words, whether or not
the testimonies of private respondents in the
civil cases are false is a prejudicial question. It
is clear that the elements of a prejudicial
question are present as provided in Section 7,
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 7 Elements of Prejudicial question. The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedures provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question. A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, pending determination of the falsity of
the subject testimonies of private respondents
in the civil case, the criminal action for false
testimony must perforce be suspended. As
such, under the attendant circumstances,
although there is no motion to suspend
proceedings on the part of the private
respondents, orderly administration of justice
dictates that the criminal cases should be
suspended.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders dated
October 2, 1998 and November 23, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court are NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE insofar only as said court, acting as an
appellate court, considered Criminal Cases
Nos. 200894 and 200895 as withdrawn.
The Orders dated June 10, 1998 and July 21,
1998 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
(Branch 67) in Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and
200895 are likewise NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE
for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. In lieu thereof, the said Metropolitan
Trial Court is directed to SUSPEND the criminal
proceedings until after the final decision in Civil
Case No. 95-1542 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Branch 137).
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141624, August 17, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
VS. HERNANDO B. DELIZO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 50995 granting the petition for
certiorari of respondent Dr. Hernando B. Delizo
and nullifying the December 18, 1998 and
February 1, 1999 Orders[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No.
167-MD for estafa.
The Antecedents
Arsenio T. Ng filed a criminal complaint for
estafa against the respondent with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City,
docketed as Inv. Slip No. 97-10288. After the
requisite preliminary investigation, First
Assistant City Prosecutor Esteban A. Tacla, Jr.
signed an Information dated October 10, 1997,
charging the respondent with estafa. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of October,
1996, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then
President and Chairman of Mediserv, Inc., by
means of deceit, false pretenses and
fraudulent representation, executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, succeeded in inducing herein
complainant, Arsenio T. Ng to give the amount
of P12 Million, to the accused on his pretext
that said amount will be converted by him into
shares of stock (120,000 shares of stocks) and
in order to complement such false pretenses or
fraudulent acts, he (respondent) even showed
a Board Resolution defining his authority to
contract loan from the complainant and the
conversion of such loan into shares of stock,
which, on the strength by said manifestations
and representations, the complainant gave said
amount and duly received by the accused, he
knowing fully well that the same were false and
fraudulent and were only made to entice
complainant into believing that he, indeed, is
empowered and in a position to issue the
equivalent number of shares of stocks
(120,000) in order to obtain, as in fact, he
(accused) obtained the total amount of P12
Million from the complainant and the accused,
once in possession of the money, far from
complying with his obligation to release the
120,000 shares of stocks into complainants
name, despite demands made on him and, with
intent to defraud, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert said amount, to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of Arsenio T. Ng, in the
aforementioned amount of P12 Million.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Before the Information was filed, the
Ambulatory Health Care Institute, Inc. (AHCII),
also known as Clinica Manila (CM), and the
Health Check, Inc. (HCI) filed a Complaint on
October 22, 1997 with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) against the
respondent and a certain John Doe for
injunction and damages. The case was
docketed as SEC Case No. 10-97-5794. The
petitioners therein alleged, inter alia, that a
special meeting of the stockholders of CM was
held on October 9, 1997 after due notice to the
respondent two weeks before the said date.
During the said meeting, the stockholders
elected a new board of directors, replacing the
respondent as CM president. Thereafter, at
3:00 p.m. of October 13, 1997, the respondent
and an unidentified companion arrived at the
CM office at SM Megamall, announced that he
was still the president, and rallied the officers
and employees against the new board of
directors. Despite the security guards request
for him to leave the premises, the respondent
refused to do so. He, thereafter, wrote the
China Banking Corporation, the depository
bank of CM, requesting it not to honor any
change in the authorized signatories for CM,
and appended thereto a falsified General
Information Sheet (GIS) to show that he was
still a member of the board of directors and
president of CM. It was prayed that, after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Commission to adjudge that
respondent be ordered:
1. Not to do any act or deed that will
disturb or interfere with the operations
and business of the petitioners, and not
to cause any alarm, scandal,
disturbance, intrigue, disloyalty,
disorder, or defiance on the part of any
(sic) employees, officers, contractors,
workers of CLINICA MANILA and
HEALTH CHECK, INC.;
2. Not to do any act that will interfere
with or disturb the management and
operation of the funds, bank accounts,
receivables, and all other property
transactions of the petitioners, and to
stop representing themselves as
having any kind of power and authority
over any asset of the two companies
and their management;
3. Not to do any act or deed, directly or
indirectly, that will dishonor the name
and reputation of the petitioners;
4. To pay actual damages of P1,000,000;
moral damages of P2,000,000; and
 exemplary damages of P500,000; and
to pay the costs of suit.[4]
On October 23, 1997, AHCII, Mediserv, Inc. (MI)
and the respondent, filed a Complaint with the
SEC against Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly S. Salvador,
Antonio Roberto M. Abaya, Bartolome C. Felipe,
Jr., Joel Abanilla and Nonette C. Mina. The
complainants alleged, inter alia, that they had
been stockholders of AHCII since August 1995,
and represented a majority of the outstanding
capital stock, owning 52.37% and 6.08%,
respectively, as shown by the GIS dated
October 15, 1997 filed with the SEC; the
respondent was the incumbent chairman of the
board of directors and president of AHCII; and
there was no quorum during the stockholders
meeting of October 9, 1997; as such, the said
meeting where a new set of board of directors
and officers were, elected was in violation of
the by-laws of the complainant AHCII and,
consequently, illegal. The complainants prayed
that the following reliefs be granted after due
proceedings:
a) Declaring the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
earlier issued as permanent;
b) Adjudging the Special Stockholders Meeting
purportedly held on October 9, 1997 as null
and void ab initio;
c) Adjudging any action, proceeding, resolution,
and/or election made in the alleged
stockholders meeting purportedly held on
October 9, 1997 as null and void ab initio;
d) Adjudging respondents Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly
S. Salvador, Antonio Roberto M. Abaya,
Bartolome C. Felipe, Jr., Joel Abanilla and
Nonette C. Mina, jointly and severally, liable to
pay to complainant Delizo moral damages of
not less than P1,000,000.00;
e) Adjudging respondents Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly
S. Salvador, Antonio Roberto M. Abaya, WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of
Bartolome C. Felipe, Jr., Joel Abanilla and this Honorable Court that:
Nonette C. Mina, jointly and severally, liable to
pay to the complainants, as follows: 1. Immediately upon filing of this
Complaint, this Honorable Court issues
i. Exemplary damages of not less than a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, or at
P500,000.00; least a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining and restraining defendant
ii. Actual damages not less than Register of Deeds from
P250,000.00; effecting/allowing the registration or
annotation of the purported auction
iii. Attorneys fee of P200,000.00; sale of plaintiffs property covered by
TCT No. 205824 of the Register of
iv. Costs of litigation.
Deeds for the City of Manila in favor of
Other equitable reliefs are prayed for.[5] defendant Landheights, or any
transaction, dealing or incident arising
The case was docketed as SEC Case No. 10-97- from the purported auction sale
5796. allegedly conducted by defendant
Ignacio until further orders from this
In the meantime, Mediserv, Inc., represented Honorable Court.
by its president, the respondent, and its
treasurer, Marissa D. Delizo, filed a complaint 2. After hearing, to render Judgment, as
with the RTC of Manila, Branch 29, against the follows:
China Banking Corporation, the Landheights
a. Declaring the Writ of
(Iloilo) Development Corporation, Notary Public
Preliminary Injunction earlier
Romeo A. Ignacio, Jr. and the Registrar of
issued as permanent;
Deeds for the City of Manila. An amended
complaint was later filed, where it was alleged, b. Declaring the alleged public
inter alia, that MI received a loan from the bank
auction sale conducted by
in the amount of P9,820,000, later increased to defendant Ignacio over the
P11,200,000. To secure the payment of the said subject plaintiffs property, as
loan, MI executed a real estate mortgage and null and void;
amendment to real estate mortgage over its
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title c. Ordering and commanding
(TCT) No. 205824 of the Register of Deeds of Defendant China Bank to
Manila. MI also executed a promissory note on comply and to reduce into
October 5, 2000 in favor of the bank in the writing and/or to document its
amount of P11,200,000. The bank, thereafter, agreement with plaintiff to
foreclosed the mortgage and sold the property consolidate the first P5 million
at public auction in favor of the bank for loan of plaintiff with it with the
P15,649,023.29, through defendant Notary plaintiffs second loan of
Public Romeo A. Ignacio, Jr. It was prayed that, P1,800,000.00;
after due proceedings, it be granted the
following reliefs:
 d. Adjudging defendants China
Banking Corporation,
Landheights (Iloilo)
Development Corporation and
Romeo A. Ignacio, Jr., jointly
and severally, liable to pay to
plaintiff the following:
1. Attorneys Fees in the
amount of
P200,000.00; and
2. Costs of suit.
Other equitable reliefs are prayed for.[6]
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-
86152.
On December 3, 1997, the Information for
estafa against the respondent was filed with
the RTC of Mandaluyong City and raffled to
Branch 214. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 167-MD. The private prosecutor filed
an ex parte motion for preliminary attachment,
which was opposed by the respondent. On
December 18, 1998, the trial court issued an
Order[7] directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment on a bond of
P8,000,000. The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order with a prayer for
the suspension of the proceedings on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question on December 23, 1998.
As early as January 13, 1998, the trial court in
Branch 213 issued an Order denying the
motion to suspend proceedings on the ground
that the private complainant, Arsenio T. Ng,
was not a stockholder of MI; hence, the
pendency of the two (2) SEC cases was not a
ground for the suspension of the case. On
February 1, 1999, the trial court issued the
assailed Order denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On February 19, 1999, the respondent filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 50995, for the
nullification of the Orders of the trial court,
contending as follows:
6.A.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT GROSSLY IGNORING
THE ESTABLISHED RULE THAT APPLICATIONS
FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE
APPLICANT AND LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE
PARTY AGAINST WHOM IT IS DIRECTED.
6.B.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT DESPITE THE
CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE CIVIL ASPECT OF
THE CRIMINAL CASE IS ALREADY COVERED BY
CASES BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA; HENCE, THERE IS NO
CIVIL ASPECT ATTACHED AND/OR DEEMED
INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL CASE.
6.C.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT ON A P12 MILLION
CLAIM PER THE INFORMATION WITH ONLY P8
MILLION BOND; HENCE, GROSSLY
INSUFFICIENT, IMPROPER AND
UNREASONABLE.
6.D.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
MERELY RELYING ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE
EX PARTE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT WHICH ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVIT/S AS REQUIRED
UNDER THE RULES.
6.E.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
NOT SUSPENDING THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE IN VIEW OF THE
PRESENCE OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS IN THE
SEC CASES AND THE RTC CASE WHICH ARE
DETERMINATIVE OF THE INNOCENCE OR GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED, THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
6.F.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
DENYING THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR BEFORE THE SAID MOTION CAN
BE HEARD; HENCE, A CLEAR AND PALPABLE
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.
6.G.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
NOT DISQUALIFYING THE PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING
THAT THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE SUBJECT
CRIMINAL CASE IS PRESENTLY LITIGATED
AND/OR THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE ACTIONS
BEFORE THE SEC AND THE RTC.[8]
On January 18, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision granting the petition and nullifying the
assailed Orders of the trial court, as well as the
writ of preliminary attachment it issued. The
fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course.
The assailed Orders of December 18, 1998 and
February 1, 1999, as well as the writ of
attachment are hereby set aside. The
respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, is hereby
directed to suspend proceedings of Criminal
Case No. 167-MD considering the existence of
a prejudicial question in SEC Cases Nos. 10-97-
5794 and 10-97-5796 and Civil Case No. 97-
86152.
SO ORDERED. [9]
The Present Petition
The People of the Philippines, now the
petitioner, filed its petition for review on
certiorari with this Court, on the following
grounds:
Public interest requires that all criminal acts be
immediately investigated and prosecuted for
the protection of society (Gorospe vs. Pana
Florida, 101 SCRA 445). Thus, the suspension
of criminal proceedings must be avoided unless
the basis and grounds thereof are clear and
unmistakable.
The finding of the trial court that the criminal
case, the civil case filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) at Manila and the cases filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
are based on the same transaction is grounded
entirely on speculation. The complaints filed
with the RTC and SEC cases do not support
such finding.
Moreover, in ruling that a prejudicial question
exists, the court based its finding solely on its
conclusion that the criminal, civil and SEC
cases arose out of the same transaction. This is
contrary to Sec. 5, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court and the ruling of the Supreme Court that
for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal action, it must appear not only that
the civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution is based, but
also that the resolution of the issues raised in
said civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused (Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125).[10]
The petitioner, thus, raises the following issues
for resolution:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIMINAL,
CIVIL AND SEC CASES ARE BASED
ON THE SAME TRANSACTION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES
FILED WITH THE SEC AND THE
CIVIL CASE FILED WITH THE RTC
RAISE PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS
WHICH WOULD NECESSITATE THE
SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL
ACTION FOR ESTAFA.
Central to the issues in the case at bar are
Sections 5 and 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court,[11] which read:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The
two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question. A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the fiscal or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in
the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.[12]
The petitioner asserts that the issues involved
in Criminal Case No. 167-MD for estafa are
entirely different from and unrelated to the
issues in the SEC cases and in Civil Case No.
97-86152 pending before the RTC of Manila. It
asserts that, contrary to the rulings of the
appellate court, the said cases are based on
facts and transactions different from those in
the criminal case. According to the petitioner,
the resolution of the issues in the SEC and the
civil cases are not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the respondent in the criminal
case; hence, the suspension of the proceedings
in the criminal case was barren of factual and
legal bases.
On the other hand, the CA held that the
P12,000,000 subject of the transaction in the
criminal case was the same amount involved in
the SEC cases and the civil case. The CA then
concluded that the issues raised or involved in
such cases were determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the respondent in the criminal
case, warranting the suspension of the latter
case.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
In case the civil action is instituted ahead of
the criminal action, under Section 2, Rule 111
of the Rules of Court, the civil action shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found
before judgment on the merits upon the
commencement of the criminal action. Such
criminal action has precedence over the civil
action to enforce the civil liability of the
accused arising from the delict. An exception is
where the prejudicial question exists, under
Sections 5 and 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
If the issues raised in a civil action are so
similar or intimately related to those in the
criminal case such that the resolution of the
said issues in the civil case are determinative
of the juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case, the
proceedings in the latter case shall be
suspended and the civil action shall proceed
until judgment on its merits. [13] A prejudicial
question is one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime because if both
actions arose from the same fact or
transaction, the civil case does not constitute a
prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal action.[14] Neither is there a prejudicial
question if the civil and the criminal actions
can, according to the law and rules, proceed
independently of each other.[15] The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. [16]
In this case, the transaction subject of the
criminal case for estafa against the
respondent is the receipt of the amount of
P12,000,000 from the private complainant, Ng,
which was intended for the purchase of
120,000 shares of stocks of MI. According to
the Information in Criminal Case No. 167-MD,
the respondent used the money for his
personal benefit instead of purchasing the said
shares in behalf of Ng. The event or occurrence
subject of SEC Case No. 97-5794 filed by the
AHCII and the HCI against the respondent was
the latters refusal to vacate the office of the
president, and his insistence on performing and
exercising the duties and powers of the said
office, as well as the chairmanship of the board
of directors of the said corporation despite his
alleged ouster from the said positions. The
plaintiff corporations sought a writ of injunction
and relief for damages against the respondent.
Neither Ng nor the MI were parties in the said
case. On the other hand, SEC Case No. 97-
5796 was filed by the respondent and several
others, for and in representation of the AHCII
and the MI, as the plaintiffs, to nullify the
October 9, 1997 stockholders meeting and the
election of the board of directors and officers
held thereon, anchored on their claim that they
owned majority of the outstanding capital of
the AHCII, and that the said meeting and
election subsequently held were null and void.
As in SEC Case No. 97-5794, Ngs projected
investment of P12,000,000 in the MI which, as
alleged in the Information, the respondent had
misused for his personal benefit, was not the
subject of SEC Case No. 97-5796. There is even
no showing in the SEC cases that Ng claimed to
be a stockholder of the MI on account of the
respondents receipt of the P12,000,000 for the
intended purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks
therein.
These issues are not, in any way, determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the respondent in
the criminal case for estafa. Whether the said
meeting and elections will be declared null and
void by the SEC will not result in the conviction
or acquittal of the respondent for estafa, for
swindling Ng of P12,000,000. Furthermore, the
SEC cases involve intra-corporate disputes
between the respondent, on the one hand, and
Ng and the other stockholders of the AHCII, on
the other, for the control of the said
corporations management. It must be stressed
that the petitions before the SEC are bare of
allegations relating to the alleged P12,000,000
received by the respondent from Ng, and
intended for the latters purchase of 120,000
shares of stocks in the MI.
In his petition with the CA, the respondent
alleged that in the SEC cases, the MI insisted
that the P12,000,000 received by him was a
mere loan; that he would not be liable of estafa
if he could prove the same. [17] According to the
respondent, Ng alleged in the said SEC cases
that he and the members of his group became
the major and controlling stockholders in AHCII
because of the infusion of P12,000,000 by Ng.
On the other hand, the respondent averred in
his comment on the instant petition that the
P12,000,000 he received from Ng referred to
AHCII shares of stocks owned by MI.[18] A
cursory reading of the Information will show
that the P12,000,000 was intended for the
purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks of the MI,
and not of the AHCII. Even the CA in its
decision declared that the P12,000,000 was
intended for Ngs purchase of shares of stocks
in the MI:
As regard the motion to suspend the
proceedings in [the] questioned criminal case
in view of the presence of a prejudicial
question in the SEC cases, petitioner insists in
that the nature of the subject transaction
involving the alleged P12 million of Mr.
Cusencio (sic) T. Ng which is the subject of the
case at bar, is, likewise, the subject of the
consolidated SEC cases. A perusal of the
complaints (p. 79, Rollo) filed with the SEC
(SEC Cases Nos. 10-97-5794 and 10-97-5796)
and the Regional Trial Court of Manila shows
that there really exists a prejudicial question. It
appears, as claimed by private respondent,
that the amount of P12 million subject of the
instant Criminal Case for Estafa was given to
petitioner to be diverted into shares of stocks
from Mediserv, Inc., while the petitioner
averred that the amount was given as a loan.
Thus, it is clear that the nature of the
transaction involving the P12 million of private
respondent in the criminal case is the same as
the cases before the SEC and the Civil Case Q-
97-88152 (sic) in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.[19]
Moreover, the respondent failed to submit to
the CA the answer and other pleadings filed by
Ng as well as the pleadings of the stockholders
of the AHCII in the SEC cases, containing
allegations that they became the majority and
controlling stockholders of the AHCII because
of the infusion of P12,000,000. Such pleadings
would have bolstered the respondents stance
in this case, and debilitated that of the
petitioner herein.
We agree with the petitioners contention that
the issue of whether or not the P12,000,000
was merely a loan by Ng in favor of the MI is a
matter of defense by the respondent in the
criminal case.
The transaction subject of the civil case is the
loan procured by the MI in the amount of
P9,820,000, later increased to P11,200,000,
from the China Banking Corporation, the
payment of which was secured by a real estate
mortgage and amended real estate mortgage
over its property in Sampaloc, Manila. The MI
sought to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the said mortgage and the sale of its property
at public auction, on its allegation that it did innocence of the respondent in the criminal
not breach its contract with the bank. The case. The CA thus erred in granting the petition
respondents agreement with Ng for the of the respondent and nullifying the assailed
purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks in the MI, orders of the trial court.
as well as the alleged misappropriation of the
amount of P12,000,000 by the respondent, is IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
not the subject matter of the civil case. Ng is petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
not even a party thereto; neither was he privy the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The Orders
to the said transaction between the respondent of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City
and the MI, and the China Banking Corporation dated December 18, 1998 and February 1,
involving the said loan. 1999 are REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In sum, the outcome of the civil case is not, in
any way, determinative of the guilt or Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.