ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. A.C. No.

5859
ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. (Formerly CBD Case No. 421)
MERCADO, SEVERINO P.
MERCADO AND SPOUSES Present:
JESUS AND ROSARIO
MERCADO, CORONA, C.J.,
Complainants, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, Promulgated:

Respondent.
November 23, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

For our review is the Resolution[1]of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional malpractice
and gross misconduct and recommending his disbarment.

The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner,[2]are undisputed.

The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a
civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative case filed
before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office.[3]

Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of
Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the
defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn
over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the
money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorneys fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to
file an administrative case for disbarment against the respondent.[4]
 On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the
respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of clients funds and recommending to the
Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law.[5]

Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits
against the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also instituted cases against the
family corporation, the corporations accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the
case where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the
respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors who
voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year. Complainants allege that
the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family problems, and use of
intemperate language when he filed several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against the
complainants and their family members, their lawyers, and the family corporation. [6] They maintain
that the primary purpose of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension
from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against the respondent. Thus, they pray that the
respondent be disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27, [7]Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.

In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.

He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to file lawsuits
against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George filed against the complainants
were not harassment suits but were in fact filed in good faith and were based on strong facts.[8]

Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he was
merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained to seek relief
elsewhere by reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case so he could justify his
attorneys fees.

Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his clients family. He argues that the
case that he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from their perception of
unlawful transgressions committed by the latter for which they must be held accountable for the
public interest.

Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional language. On the
contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to intemperate and vulgar language in
accusing him of extorting from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorneys fees.[9]

After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties submissions, we find
ourselves in agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege.[10] Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can
only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or
right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him,
based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to
remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and
those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney.[11]In Maligsa v.
Cabanting,[12]we explained that the bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well
as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal
profession should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and
trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. An attorney
may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and
counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.

In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross misconduct
particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution suspending
him from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the respondent filed against his former client,
her family members, the family corporation of his former client, the Chairman and members of the
Board of Governors of the IBP who issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the
case where his former client received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former
client, a total of twelve (12) different cases in various fora which included the Securities and
Exchange Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City
Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and
the Supreme Court.[13]

In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had
previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the Mercado
family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and 97-140. With
the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing of previously dismissed
cases.[14]

Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora,
as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive or
purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we find that the
barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to her was meant to
overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law.

The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being dismissed,
the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy with a renegade
member of the complainants family, the defendants named in the cases and the foul language used in
the pleadings and motions[15]all indicate that the respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice
and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by
anger and frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary complaint against him for
infidelity in the custody of a clients funds.

In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16]the Court pronounced that it is professionally irresponsible

for a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto,
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Although no person
should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right must be exercised in
good faith.[17]

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice.
They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an
instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of
cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these
objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or
prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.[18]Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated on 21
June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties
as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against a
former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility[19]provides:
CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-
client relation is terminated.

Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course
of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the
client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information
acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios counsel. Information as to the
structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and
figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious
motives were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act
is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the

practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 5108. May 26, 2005]

ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo,
seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent
maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former
client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship.

Let us first hearken to the facts.

Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development

Division, Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV
of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). [1]

Complainants husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C.
Francisco, for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and
executory on July 15, 1992. [2]

In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7,

1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for
complainant. [3]

On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, informing the
[4]

RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of
Atty. de Leon.

It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et
al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado, and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of
Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal Code.
Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her
[5]

children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said
Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their
marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G.
Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
 Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any other
name than Rosa F. Mercado. She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April
11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.

In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending
before or decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Pasig City; (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the
[6]

best interest of the service, pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the
permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;
(3) complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
[7]

the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and
meted out the penalty of one month suspension without pay; and, (4) the Information for
[8]

violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the
Sandiganbayan. [9]

Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public
document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the
civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted
complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the
criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential
lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.

Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged

that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the
allegations leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent
claimed that the pending cases against him are not grounds for disbarment, and that he is
presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise. He also states that the decision of the
[10]

Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of
suspension for one month without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he
was found guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith. [11]

In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of
live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken
during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant
confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing
was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two
daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible
to anyone. [12]
 In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [13]

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to
appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondents
motion to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted for resolution based on the
pleadings submitted by the parties. [14]

On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating
commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.

On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and
recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that
after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those who have
wronged her.

At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal and
administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases
are pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent.

We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or
desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting
forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.

We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication

between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document
against his former client.

A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the rule
on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.

In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust
and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The
relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and
public interest. Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to
[15]

repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. Thus, the
[16]

preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems
to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of justice. One rule
[17]

adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his
clients secrets or confidence and not to abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve
[18]
his clients secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,
and continues even after the clients death. It is the glory of the legal profession that its
[19] [20]

fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and
converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance
that the lawyers tongue is tied from ever disclosing it. With full disclosure of the facts of the
[21]

case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment
and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the clients cause.

Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors
essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz:

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. [22]

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship,

and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
[23]

whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client. [24]

On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some
purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged.
Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca, where the client and his wife leased to their
[25]

attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties
agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the client-
lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors.
The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had confidentially supplied counsel for the
purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by
counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to
those of the client. As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the
aforesaid lease contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the confidential list of
his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel
not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the
lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery
of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing
from a lawyer to his client.
 (2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.
[26]
The client must intend the communication to be confidential. [27]

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure

between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. [28]

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise

agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the
opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to
[29] [30]

his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of
[31]

confidentiality not being present. [32]

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.[33]

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the
purpose of seeking legal advice. [34]

If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not
[35] [36]

legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to
substantiate complainants allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in
general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of
public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for
annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will
determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to
the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.

Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the
complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without
her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on
privileged communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a
breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to
merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is
[37]

placed upon the party asserting the privilege. [38]

 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 927 September 28, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY POTENCIANO A. PALANCA. WILLIAM C.
PFLEIDER, complainant,
vs.
POTENCIANO A. PALANCA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

The respondent Atty. Potenciano A. Palanca was for sometime the legal counsel of the complainant William C. Pfleider.
According to the complainant, he retained the legal services of Palanca from January 1966, whereas the latter insists that the
attorney-client relationship between them began as early as in 1960.

At all events, the relations between the two must have attained such a high level of mutual trust that on October 10, 1969,
Pfleider and his wife leased to Palanca a 1,328 hectare agricultural land in Hinobaan, Negros Occidental, known as the
Hacienda Asia, for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease
rentals would be paid to Pfleider, and the remainder would be delivered by Palanca to Pfleider's listed creditors.

The arrangement worked smoothly until October 14, 1969 when the rupture came with the filing by Pfleider of a civil suit (civil
case 9187 of the CFI of Negros Occidental) against Palanca for rescission of the contract of lease on the ground of alleged
default in the payment of rentals. In his answer to the complaint, Palanca averred full satisfaction of his rental liabilities, and
therefore contended that the lease should continue. He also charged that he had already been dispossessed of the hacienda by
Pfleider and the latter's goons at gunpoint and consequently had suffered tremendous financial losses.

With this history in, perspective, we shall now consider the administrative charges of gross misconduct in office brought by
Pfleider against Palanca. The indictment consists of four counts.

First count. In regard to a criminal case for estafa filed in December 1965 by one Gregorio Uy Matiao against Pfleider, the latter
instructed Palanca to offer in settlement the sum of P10,000, payable in installments, to Uy Matiao for the dismissal of the case.
After sometime, Palanca reported to Pfleider that the offer has been rejected. Finally in October 1969, Palanca supposedly
informed Pfleider that he had succeeded in negotiating the dismissal of the estafa case by leaving the sum of P5,000 with the
Dumaguete City Court where the action was then pending. Sometime in December 1969, however, Pfleider was the object of a
warrant of arrest in connection with the same estafa case. It turned out, charged the complainant Pfleider, that Palanca had not
deposited the sum of P5,000 with the Dumaguete City Court, let alone communicated to Uy Matiao his earlier offer of settlement.

We have closely examined all the pleadings filed by the parties in this case and the annexes thereto, and it is our view that the
first charge is devoid of merit. In support of his claim of alleged assurance made by Palanca that the estafa case had already
been terminated, Pfleinder relies on certain letters written to him by Palanca. Our own reading of these letters, however, belies
his claim. They contain nothing which might reasonably induce the complainant to believe that the criminal action against him
had been finally settled by his attorney. On the contrary, the letters merely report a continuing attempt on the part of Palanca to
secure a fair bargain for Pfleider. The letter-report of October 10, 1969, invoke by the complainant, states in no uncertain terms
that "I am bargaining this (referring to the estafa case) even for P8,000.00 and I think they will agree. I'll finalize this and pay
Tingyan on Tuesday. I have already left in Dumaguete P5,000.00 to show them the color of our money and I will bring the
balance when I go there Tuesday."
Nothing in the above letter indicates that Palanca had deposited the sum of P5,000 with the Dumaguete City Court. What he did
state is that he had left that sum in that City to enable their adversaries to see "the color of our money." In this connection, the
veracity of the certification by Felicisimo T. Hilay, Dumaguete branch manager of RCPI, that he (Hilay) had been holding the sum
of P5,000 during the early part of October in trust for Pfleider and his lawyer, has not been assailed by Pfleider.

If Pfleider was the object of a warrant of arrest in December 1969, no substantial blame can be laid at the door of the respondent
Palanca inasmuch as the latter's services were implicitly terminated by Pfleider when the latter sued his lawyer in October of the
same year. While the object of the suit is the rescission of the contract of lease between the parties, the conflict of interest which
pits one against the other became incompatible with that mutual confidence and trust essential to every lawyer-client relation.
Moreover, Pfleider fails to dispute Palanca's claim that on October 26, 1968, Pfleider refused to acknowledge receipt of a certain
letter and several motions for withdrawal, including Palanca's withdrawal as counsel in the estafa case.

Second count. Palanca had fraudulently charged the sum of P5,000 (which he supposedly had left with the City Court in
Dumaguete) to his rental account with Pfleider as part payment of the lease rentals of the Hacienda Asia. Third count. In the
same statement of account, Palanca falsely represented having paid, for the account of Pfleider, one Samuel Guintos the sum of
P866.50 when the latter would swear that he had received only the sum of P86.50.

These two charges are anchored upon the same "Statement of Disbursements" submitted by Palanca to Pfleider. It is our view
that this statement is but a memorandum or report of the expenses which Palanca considered as chargeable to the account of
Pfleider. By its very tentative nature, it is subject to the examination and subsequent approval or disapproval of Pfleider, and any
and every error which it contains may be brought to the attention of Palanca for rectification or adjustment. Viewed in relation to
the contract of lease between Pfleinder and Palanca, this "statement" is but one aspect of the prestation required of Palanca by
the contract. Whatever breach he might have committed in regard to this prestation would be but a civil or contractual wrong
which does not affect his office as a member of the Bar.

Final count. It is charged that the list of creditors which Pfleider had "confidentially" supplied Palanca for the purpose of carrying
out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by Palanca, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to
parties whose interests are adverse to those of Pfleider.

As Pfleider himself, however, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the parties, complainant
furnished respondent with a confidential list of his creditors." This should indicate that Pfleider delivered the list of his creditors to
Palanca not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. A violation
therefore of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a
breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client. Moreover, Pfleider fails to controvert Palanca's claim that there is no such
thing as a "confidential" list of creditors and that the list of creditors referred to by Pfleider is the same list which forms part of the
pleadings in civil case 9187 (the action for rescission of the lease contract) now, pending between the complainant and the
respondent lawyer, and therefore is embraced within the category of public records open to the perusal of persons properly
interested therein.

In sum, we are satisfied, and we so hold, that nothing in written complaint for disbarment against Palanca and in his reply to
Palanca's answer supports a prima facie finding of such misconduct in office by Palanca as would warrant further proceedings in
this case.

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint is hereby dismissed.