Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Abad Santos, Camus, Delgado and Recto and Ohnick and McFie for
appellant.
Gibbs and McDonough for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
by Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership, for the purpose of recovering from
the Phoenix Insurance Co., of Hartford, Connecticut, the sum of
P117,800.60, with interest, by reason of a loss alleged to have been
sustained by the plaintiff, on August 21, 1924, from a fire, it being alleged
that said loss was covered by policy of insurance No. 600217, for the sum of
P200,000, issued by the defendant company to the plaintiff. For answer, the
defendant, Pheonix Insurance Co., admitted the insurance of the policy of
insurance but, by way of special defense, alleged, among other things, that
the fire in question had been set by the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and
that the plaintiff had submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent
claim of loss, in contravention of the express terms of the policy. Upon
hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint
with respect to the obligation created by the policy which was the subject of
the suit, but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P11,731.93, with interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account of
moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant, of
remnants of the insured stock. From this judgment the plaintiff appelaed.
So far as liability under the policy of insurance which is the subject of this
action is concerned, we are of the opinion that the defendant has sufficiently
established two defenses, either of which would be fatal to the right of
recovery, namely, first, that the fire was set by the procurance or connivance
of the plaintiff for the purpose of defrauding the insurer; and secondly, that
the plaintiff, after the fire, submitted to the defendant a fraudulent claim
supported by the false proof, in violation of the terms of the policy. Of these
defenses the trial judge sustained the second but passed the first without
express finding. We consider it important, however, briefly to exhibit the
salient facts on both points, not only because of the considerable sum of
money involved, but because the facts appearing in evidence supply a
typical illustration of the manner in which frauds of this character against the
insurance companies may be constructed with some hope of success, when
insurance agents are accessible who, under the incentive of writing large
amounts of insurance, can be induced to close their eyes to obvious
dangers.
On July 10, 1923, Francisco Prats, Elias Hanna and Isidro Bejar registered
two mercantile partnerships in the Bureau of Commerce and Industry for the
purpose of engaging in mercantile business. The articles of copartnership of
these two entities were the same except in the firm names. It was apparently
contemplated, in so far as any legitimate function may have been intended,
that Prats & Co. should be an importing firm, while Hanna, Bejar & Co.
should engage in retail businss. As eveents show, the existence of the
parallel entities, controlled by the same individuals, supplied, undeniably,
suitable engines for accomplishing an exploit of the kind that was here
attempted. Of the three individuals mentioned Elias Hanna and Isidro Bejar
were Turkish subjects of unsavory reputation in insurance circle of Manila,
while Francisco Prats was a Spanish subject who had had some success as
a merchant and, prior to his connection with the two associates above
mentioned, apparently enjoyed a fair reputation. Another individual, who
figures in the case as an instrument of the three partners, is one Domingo
Romero, who at that the time which we are here concerned, was an
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, with a salary of P150 per
month. Ramon Prats, a son of Francisco Prats, was united in marriage to a
daughter of Domingo Romero, with the result that social relations between
Francisco Prats and Domingo Romero were close. Francisco Prats appear to
have acted as manager for both Prats & Co. and Hanna, Bejar & Co.
On May 27, 1924, Prats, acting for Hanna, Bejar & Co., purchased a one-
story building at 95 Plaza Gardenia, Manila; and soon thereafter he begun to
assemble in this place the stock of merchandise which was the subject of
insurance in this case. The building referred to was purchasd outright for the
sum of P1,600. It was old and was scarcely more than a shed but had been
used in times past for human habitation. It was located in a part of the city
which was inconvenient of success to traders and out of the ordinary
channels of business activity. After purchasing the building, Prats knocked
out the partitions, removed the floor, and laid along the center. The main part
of the structure was thus converted into a single store, or bodega, though
certain adjuncts, consisting of kitchen and closets, remained unchanged in
the rear of the building. A sign was then set up over the entrance bearing the
firm name "Hanna, Bejar & Co." In effecting the purchase of this building
Prats availed himself of the service of Domingo Romero, who lived only two
doors away at 97 Plaza Gardenia.
By August 21, 1924, there had been assembled and stored by Prats in the
place above described a stock of goods which, according to the documents
exhibited by him, had a valuation of P211,329.72, on which he had taken out
insurance to the extent of P410,000. At midnight of the day mentioned a fire
occurred at 95 Plaza Gardenia, which destroyed the building and ruined its
contents, the amount realized from the salvage of the stock being
P11,731.93.
With respect to the insurance upon this stock at the time of the fire, the
following facts appear: In the month of June preceeding the fire, nine
policies aggregating P160,000 were taken out by Prats in the name of
Hanna, Bejar & Co. on merchandise stored at 95 Plaza Gardenia. At the time
these policies were taken out the valuation of the goods then in said store
could not have been more than P68,753. On June 28, 1924, Prats procured
from the agent of the defendant in this case policy of insurance No. 600217
in the amount of P200,000 on merchandise stored in the same place. The
nine policies already procured had been taken out, as we have seen, in the
name of Hanna, Bejar & Co.; but when Prats applied to the agent of the
defendant for the P200,000 policy last above mentioned, the agent told him
that if Hanna or Bejar had any interest in the stock to be insured the policy
could not be issued for the reason that, in such case, the defendant would
not be able to obtain reinsurance for any part of the policy, owing to the bad
reputation of Hanna and Bejar. Accordingly, at the request of Prats & Co.;
and Prats at the same time assured the agent that Hanna and Bejar were not
partners in Prats & Co. With the writing of this policy the amount of insurance
on the merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia was increased to P360,000, while
the value of the stock at that time was not probably much in excess of
P158,000. On August 11, 1924, or just ten days before the fire, Prats took out
an additional policy for P50,000 in the name of Prats & Co. on the same
stock. This made a total insurance of P410,000 on the contents of the store
at 95 Plaza Gardenia. At the time, according to Prats himself, the evaluation
of the merchandise then in the place was not in excess of P230,000.
Furthermore, Prats, about this time, caused the first nine policies which had
been taken out in the name of Hanna, Bejar & Co. to be indorsed to Prats &
Co., thereby making this firm the sole insured firm with respect to this stock
of merchandise.
With respect to the origin of the stock thus assembled, we find that part had
been purchased in Europe by Prats; and in connection with its importation
from abroad it is noteworthy that on June 18, 1924, Prats & Co. procured a
policy of marine insurance to be issued by Meerkamp & Co., Ltd., as agents
of the India Insurance Co., Ltd., Upon twenty-two cases of silk, of a
supposed value of P43,400. at the time this policy was procured Prats
informed the insurer that the goods were soon to arrive from France by the
steamer Suwa Maru. For this policy of insurance Prats paid out the sum of
P736.25. Nevertheless, it now appears that the twenty-two cases of silk
covered by this marine policy were fictitious, as no such purchase of silk had
been made by Prats & Co. in France or elsewhere. This fact was offered in
evidence by the defendant, as tending to reveal a scheme by which, if a
dstructive fire should occur, the plaintiff would be able to mislead the
defendant as to the quantity of goods stored in the bodega. This item of
proof, though circumstantial in its nature, was undoubtedly competent and
should have been admitted by the trial court.
Domingo Romero, who had been living at 97 Plaza Gardenia, had before the
fire taken his family temporarily to the home of Prats in Pasay. But after the
fire was over the family moved back to 97 Plaza Gardenia, although that
place had been considerably damaged by the flames.
Among those who suffered from the fire were the members of the Artigas
family, living at 93 Gardenia, on the side opposite Romero's house. Another
neighbor who likewise suffered from the fire was one Juan Atayde, occupant
of 67 Calle Gardenia, at the side of the house occupied by Osete. Soon after
the fire Domingo Romero quietly passed a 100-peso bill into the hand of
Maria Luisa Artigas, a daughter belonging to the Artigas family. Romero
likewise gave the same amount to Juan Atayde. It is self-evident that the gifts
thus made by Romero to Luisa Artigas and Juan Atayde had other motives
than pure charity and that the money probably came from some other source
than his own modest earnings. After the fire that a special investigation was
made by the police department with the result that Deputy Chief Lorenzo
came to the conclusion that the fire had originated from an intentional act.
Reflection upon the proof before the court engenders in us the same belief
and conducts us to the further conclusion that Prats & Co. was not alien to
the deed.
The finding of the trial court in the effect that the plaintiff had submitted false
proof in the support of his claim is also, in our opinion, well founded. That
conclusion appears to have been based upon three items of proof, and with
respect to at least two of these, we think that the conclusion of his Honor was
correctly drawn. These two facts are, first, that the plaintiff had submitted a
claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of P12,800 when th erule value
of said jewelry was about P600; and, secondly, that the plaintiff had sought
to recover from the insurance company the value of goods which had been
surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire. Neither of
these two facts are consistent with good faith on the part of the plaintiff, and
each constituted a breach of the stipulations of the policy against the use of
fraudulent devices and false proof with respect to the loss.
The other point relied upon by his Honor to sustain the conclusion that the
plaintiff had attempted to deceive the defendant with respect to the extent of
the loss was at least competent in its general bearing on the good faith of the
plaintiff, even if, as is probably true, not alone sufficient to constitute a
breach of the same stipulations. The point is this: After the fire the plaintiff
presented to the adjuster certain cost sheets and cpies of supposed
invoices in which the prices and expenses of importation of a quantity of
goods were stated at double the true amount. The adjuster soon discovered
the artificial nature of these documents, and, with his consent, they were
withdrawn by Prats and subsequently destroyed. At the hearing Prats stated
that these documents had been fabricated in order that they might be
exhibited to intending purchasers of the goods, thereby making it appear to
them that the cost of the mercahndise had been much greater than it in fact
was a ruse which is supposed to have been entirely innocent or at least
not directed against the insurer. But a question naturally arises as to the
purpose which these documents might have been made to serve if the fire,
as doubtless intended by its designers, had been so destructive as to
remove all vestiges of the stock actually involved. Upoon the whole we are
forced to state the conclusion, not only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be
set, or connived therein, but also that it submitted fraudulent proof as the trial
judge found.
Our examination of the case leads to the conclusion that the result reached
by the trial court was correct.
The appealed decision will therefore be affirmed, and it is also ordered, with
costs against the appellant.
x--x
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory injunction, to annul an order of Honorable Felino D. Abalos, as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Sulu, directing that the testimony of a
rebuttal witness for the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 3158 of said Court
be stricken from the records. Soon after the filing of the petition herein, We
issued a temporary restraining order directing that the continuation of the
trial of said case be suspended until further orders.
The prosecutor having announced that Madjid Andi would be its last witness
and that he (prosecutor) would appeal from the resolution of the court as
soon as copy thereof had been furnished him, respondent Judge
incorporated his aforementioned resolution in an order, dated May 2, 1968,
directing that the testimony of said witness, be "discarded from the records
on the ground that the testimony are answers to questions not proper in
rebuttal" and stating that "from the observation of the Court, the witness in
rebuttal should have been presented as a witness in the presentation of the
evidence in chief of the prosecutor", and declaring that the case would be
deemed submitted for decision on May 15, 1968, unless the parties sought
permission to file memoranda on or before said date.
Hence, this original action for certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary
mandatory injunction, filed by the prosecution against said respondent
Judge and Mohammad Ussam Dambong, for the purpose stated at the
beginning of this decision. In his answer to the petition herein, respondent
Judge reiterated the views expressed by him during the trial, as well as in
the resolution and the order complained of. Respondent Mohammad Ussam
Dambong filed an answer defending the position taken by respondent
Judge. Such position is utterly untenable.
Trial courts have ample discretion to determine whether or not the parties
should be allowed to introduce evidence in rebuttal. Moreover, its resolutions
on these matters are interlocutory in nature and will not generally be
reviewed, except on appeal taken from a decision rendered on the merits.
Judicial discretion, however, is not unlimited. It must be exercised
reasonably, with a view to promoting the ends of justice, one of which is to
ascertain the truth. Hence, whenever discretion is vested, it must be
understood to be a sound one, inasmuch as the interest of justice, equity
and fair play cannot be advanced otherwise. This is particularly with respect
to rules of procedure, especially those governing the admission or exclusion
of evidence. As a matter of general practice, it is deemed best to resolve
doubts in favor of the admission of the contested evidence, without prejudice
to such action as the court may deem fit to take in deciding the case on the
merits.1 This practice has added importance as regards the evidence for the
prosecution in criminal cases, for, once the accused has been acquitted,
there is no means to secure a review by appeal, no matter how erroneous
the action of the lower court may have been. Hence, We have been
constrained to suspend the proceedings in the criminal action involved in the
case at bar, to forestall a possible miscarriage of justice.
In issuing a writ of certiorari against a trial Judge who had rejected, inter alia,
certain rebuttal evidence for the prosecution in a criminal case, We had
occasion to point out, in People vs. Montejo,2 that:
Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that the lower court had,
not only erred, but, also, committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the resolutions complained of, in rejecting the aforementioned direct and
rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, and in not permitting the same to
propound the questions already adverted to. It is obvious to us that said
direct and rebuttal evidence, as well as the aforementioned questions, are
relevant to the issues involved in Criminal Case No. 672. Although it is not
possible to determine with precision, at this stage of the proceedings, how
far said exhibits may affect the outcome of that case, it is elemental that all
parties therein are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to establish their
respective pretense. In this connection it should be noted that, in the light of
the allegations of the amended information in said case and of the records
before us, the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused therein is bound
to hinge heavily upon the veracity of the opposing witnesses and the weight
attached to their respective testimony. Hence, the parties should be allowed
a certain latitude in the presentation of their evidence, lest they may be so
hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or appear to
be defeated. The danger of leading to such result must be avoided,
particularly in cases of the nature, importance and significance of the one
under consideration.
We, likewise, called attention to the following view, expressed in Prats & Co.
v. Phoenix Insurance Co.3 as far back as February 21, 1929:
x--x
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision dated November 24, 1992, of the
Regional Trial Court of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, Branch 12, finding accused-
appellant Roland Tacipit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape, as defined under paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, without the use of a deadly weapon, and hereby
imposes on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
penalties provided by law, and further sentences him to pay moral damages
to one Onelia Pamittan in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency and to pay the costs. . . . (Rollo, p. 32).
The records of the case disclose that the complainant, Onelia Pamittan, was
a 17-year old high school student at the Abulug School of Fisheries in
Abulug, Cagayan at the time of he commission of the offense. She had a
friend, Eden Molina, who studied at the same school and lived about two (2)
kilometers from the school.
After partaking of a snack of tinubong (native rice cakes), the group decided
to go home. At this point, the version given by the prosecution and the
defense differed. According to the complainant, as she was about to leave
the Molina house, the accused restrained her, held her left hand and her
notebooks and told her friends to go ahead. Despite her cries and pleas for
help, the owners of the house did nothing to help her. On the other hand,
defense witness Elmer Molina alleged that the complainant and the accused
were sweethearts. They left the house together, with their hands over each
other's shoulders. At any rate, it is undisputed that the complainant left the
Molina household with the accused.
The following day, the complainant accompanied by her mother, aunt and
cousin, reported the incident to the police at the municipal building. She
submitted her clothing for examination and after being investigated,
submitted herself for medical examination.
On the other hand, these contentions were firmly denied by the prosecution.
The complainant testified that she knew the accused to be a married man
and he never visited her house to court her. She also denied that Elmer
Molina courted her or that she told him that he was the accused's girlfriend.
As for the ring, the complainant denied ownership thereof. True enough,
when the ring was tried on her hand, it was loose and did not fit her finger
(Rollo, p. 23).
The trial court, after consideration of the evidence presented, rendered the
forequoted judgment against the accused. Hence, the present appeal
wherein the following assigned errors are raised:
II
The defense argues that the weight of the evidence presented by the
prosecution is grossly inadequate to overthrow the presumption of
innocence granted by law to the accused. It is the contention of the
accused-appellant that the testimony of complainant relied upon by the trial
court in convicting him is incredible and not worthy of belief. There are
inconsistencies in said testimony. It is also saddled with flaws which show
her tendency to exaggerate things (Rollo, p. 61-64).
Secondly, the accused argues that the physical evidence as well as the
actuations of the parties concerned are not consistent with the allegation of
rape but with carnal knowledge done with the consent of both the accused
and the complainant. As proof, the accused pointed out the lack of external
injuries on the body of the complainant. This fact negates the employment of
force by the accused on the complainant and rules out struggle or any other
form of resistance on the part of the complainant.
The accused likewise points to the absence of an out cry on the part of the
complainant which bolsters the position of the accused that the sexual
intercourse was consensual. The rationale given by the complainant that she
had a sore throat which prevented her from shouting was characterized by
the defense as incredible.
Finally, the accused argues that if rape had indeed been committed by him,
he would not have accompanied the complainant to a place near her house,
thereby exposing himself to the risk of being seen, but would have instead
fled for safety, which is more consistent with he commission of an offense.
In reviewing the evidence of this case, this Court was guided by the three(3)
settled principles in reviewing rape cases, namely, (1) an accusation for rape
can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; (3)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense (People vs. Lim, 206 SCRA 176 [1992]). On these bases, the
decision of the trial court must be affirmed.
There is present in this case clear, convincing and competent physical and
testimonial evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
against the accused. The testimony of complainant Onelia Pamittan, was
found by the trial court to be replete with details, negating the probability of
fabrication. Although the trial court did not accord credence to that part of
her testimony relating to how she ended up leaving the Molina household
with the accused, the same did not militate against the credibility of the
complainant as a prosecution witness.
Moreover, considering that the accused and the complainant are at most
acquaintances, there appears to be no motive on the part of the complainant
to testify against the accused which could render suspect her testimony in
court. It is clear that her only intent was to seek redress for the injustice
committed against her by appellant a married man. As held in People v.
Guibao, (217 SCRA 64 [1993]):
Anent the contention of the accused that the sexual act was committed with
the mutual consent of the parties, the evidence presented by the prosecution
sufficiently rebutted his point.
For one, although there was an absence of external injuries on the body of
the complainant, the clothes worn by her at the time of the offense speak
well of the use of force and the presence of a struggle. As the trial court
noted:
Her T-shirt was torn which corroborates her testimony that it was forcibly
removed. It also proves that she offered resistance to the criminal advances
of the accused. Her shorts, like her panty, had blood stains. Her panty was
detached from her shorts. Her bra was torn, also denoting that it was forcibly
removed. These physical evidence . . . are consistent only with the force and
compulsion applied on her; they prove she offered resistance and her
defloration was against her will. (Rollo, p. 27)
Thus, the accused's reliance on the defense that he and the complainant
were lovers is unfounded. But even if it were true, such relationship would
not give the accused the license to deflower the complainant against her will,
and will not exonerate him from the criminal charge for rape. Furthermore,
there is nothing in the testimonies of either the complainant or even the
accused himself which could indicate any sort of special relationship
between the two. The alleged proof of such relationship, the ring with
complainant's name engraved on it, does not even fit the fingers of the
complainant. Their actuations with respect to each other before, during and
even after the commission of the crime were consistent with the contention of
the complainant that they are nothing more than acquaintances. The
evidence of the prosecution, therefore, completely negates the existence of
any relationship between the accused and the complainant.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her
liberty.
The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending before the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are
charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for trial before
the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petitioner of
the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant
Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the
examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was
pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that
such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision
relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court
and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit
the medical examination required by the court.
The sole legal issue from the admitted facts is whether the compelling of a
woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she
is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that
portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the
Constitution of the United States and practically all state constitutions and in
the common law rules of evidence, providing that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. (President's
Instructions to the Philippine Commission; Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
section 5, paragraph 3; Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, section 3;
paragraph 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 [4]; United States
Constitution, fifth amendment.) Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily
exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the representative
of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional
provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it
is brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held on an
identical question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and
petitioner.
The authorities are abundant but conflicting. What may be termed the
conservative courts emphasize greatly the humanitarianism of the
constitutional provisions and are pleased to extend the privilege in order that
its mantle may cover any fact by which the accused is compelled to make
evidence against himself. (Compare State vs. Jacobs [1858], 50 N. C., 259
with State vs. Ah Chuey [1879], 14 Nev., 79. See further State vs. Ah
Nordstrom [1893], 7 Wash., 506; State vs. Height [1902]. 117 Iowa., 650;
Thornton vs. State [1903], 117 Wis., 338.) A case concordant with this view
and almost directly in point is People vs. McCoy ([1873], 45 How. Pr., 216). A
woman was charged with the crime of infanticide. The corner directed two
physicians to go to the jail and examine her private parts to determine
whether she had recently been delivered of a child. She objected to the
examination, but being threatened with force, yielded, and the examination
was had. The evidence of these physicians was offered at the trial and ruled
out. The court said that the proceeding was in violation of the spirit and
meaning of the Constitution, which declares that "no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Continuing,
the court said: "They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and compelled
her, by threats, to testify that she had been pregnant, and had been
delivered of a child, as to have compelled her, by threats, to allow them to
look into her person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she
had been pregnant and been delivered of a child. . . . Has this court the right
to compel the prisoner now to submit to an examination they are of the
opinion she is not a virgin, and has had a child? It is not possible that this
court has that right; and it is too clear to admit of argument that evidence
thus obtained would be inadmissible against the prisoner."
It may be revealing a judicial secret, but nevertheless we cannot refrain from
saying that, greatly impressed with the weight of these decisions, especially
the one written by Mr. Justice McClain, in State vs. Height, supra, the instant
case was reported by the writer with the tentative recommendation that the
court should lay down the general rule that a defendant can be compelled to
disclose only those parts of the body which are not usually covered. Buth
having disabused our minds of a too sensitive appreciation of the rights of
accused persons, and having been able, as we think, to penetrate through
the maze of law reports to the policy which lies behind the constitutional
guaranty and the common law principle, we have come finally to take our
stand with what we believe to be the reason of the case.
So much for the authorities. For the nonce we would prefer to forget them
entirely, and here in the Philippines, being in the agrreable state of breaking
new ground, would rather desire our decision to rest on a strong foundation
of reason and justice than on a weak one blind adherence to tradition and
precedent. Moreover, we believe that an unbiased consideration of the
history of the constitutional provisions will disclose that our conclusion is in
exact accord with the causes which led to its adoption.
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was
recognized in England in early days, but not in the other legal systems of the
world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was
raised against odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused
person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever present
temptation to commit the crime of perjury. The kernel of the privilege as
disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial compulsion. As forcing a man to
be a witness against himself was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of
republican government, the principle was taken into the American
Constitutions, and from the United States was brought to the Philippine
Islands, in exactly as wide but no wider a scope as it existed in old
English days. The provision should here be approached in no blindly
worshipful spirit, but with a judicious and a judicial appreciation of both its
benefits and its abuses. (Read the scholarly articles of Prof. Wigmore in 5
Harvard L. R. [1891], p. 71, and 15 Harvard L. R., 1902, p. 610 found in 4
Wigmore on Evidence, pp. 3069 et seq., and U. S. vs. Navarro [1904], Phil.,
143.)
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back
once more to elements and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a
criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purgue
the community of persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their
fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional
provisions, are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the
innocent. No rule is intemended to be so rigid as to embarrass the
administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused
person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to establish
the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make the
defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a
falsehood. But no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason
be held to be detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be
avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process
of law cause of the Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right
to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to
one's sense of decency and propriety to have the decide that such
inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by
exposure to another's gaze. As Mr. Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway Co.
vs. Botsford ([1891], 141 U. S., 250) said, "To compel any one, and
especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a
stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass."
Conceded, and yet, as well suggested by the same court, even superior to
the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the inherent which the
public has in the orderly administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too
frequently the modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer,
without any mental evasion, questions which are put to them; and such a
tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does not exempt him
from the duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth
to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for
refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which
on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless
enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the
policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences.
Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of
the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force
shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary
and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant
fiscal for an examination of the person of the defendant by physicians was
phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as subject
to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas
corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against the
petitioner. So ordered.
x--x
We are once again constrained to take a hard look into the sufficiency of
extra-judicial confessions as the sole basis for the imposition of the supreme
penalty of DEATH.
The three appellants were all sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. 2564
for robbery with homicide. In the companion case of parricide, one was
sentenced to another death penalty while the two other appellants received
sentenced ranging from 12 to 20 years of imprisonment.
Our task is made difficult by the fact that the crimes were specially ruthless
and barbarous in their commission. No less than the counsel for the
appellants states that the people of Puerto Princesa are no strangers to
crime and that the frequency of criminal acts in their city has somehow
benumbed the sensibilities of its citizens. Yet, the discovery on June 9, 1978
of the brutally and badly bashed corpses of two well-known and loved
women of their community was still shocking to their senses.
There is the added factor that the police officers who investigated the crime
and secured the confessions seemed so certain that indeed the three
appellants are the malefactors. The confessions are convincing in their
details. The trial court noted that "both victims were assaulted and killed with
the might and fury of one really who had harbored so long a grudge and
hate" and only Felicisimo Jara had that kind of ill-will against his estranged
wife and her female companion. Moreover, Jara, a recidivist for the crime of
homicide, was characterized as an experienced killer. There must be many
residents of Puerto Princesa who are thus convinced about the correct
solution of the crime. And perhaps, the appellants could have been the
killers.
The decision of the former Court of First Instance of Palawan, 7th Judicial
District, Branch 1 in the consolidated cases of People of the Philippines
versus Felicisimo Jara, et al. (Criminal Case No. 2564) for Robbery with
Homicide and People of the Philippines vs. Felicisimo Jara, et al. (Criminal
Case No. 2565) for Parricide is involved in this automatic review. All the three
accused in Criminal Case No. 2564 were sentenced to suffer the maximum
penalty of death, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased
Amparo Bantigue in the sum of Pl,000.00, the amount stolen, and the sum of
P12,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 2565, for the killing of Luisa Jara, accused
Felicisimo Jara was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide and meted out the maximum penalty of death while the two other
accused were found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. All the accused were
ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Luisa Jara in the sum of
P12,000.00.
The information for the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No.
2564 reads as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June, 1978, about 1:30 o'clock in the
morning, at Malvar St., Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to
kill, evident premeditation and treachery, after gaining entrance to the house
thru the window, an opening not intended for entrance or egress, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike with a hammer Amparo
Vda. de Bantigue hitting her on the vital parts of her body and stab with a
scissor while she was soundly sleeping in her bedroom with one Luisa Jara,
thereby causing her instantaneous death as a result thereof, and that after
killing Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, accused in conspiracy with each other,
with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, took, stole
and carried away a piggy bank and a buddha bank containing money in the
amount of not more than P200.00, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, in the total amount of TWELVE THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P12,200.00) Philippine Currency.
In Criminal Case No. 2565, the information charged the accused as follows:
All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. On motion by the
prosecution and the defense, the court a quo ordered a joint trial of the two
cases which arose from one incident and where the witnesses are the same.
At about 6:00 o'clock in the early morning of June 9, 1978, the waitresses at
Alvin's Canteen situated in Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, wondered
why their employer, the deceased Amparo Bantigue, did not answer when
they called at her door that morning (p. 7, TSN, March 21, 1979). They went
to the kitchen and peeped through a hole. They saw Amparo and Luisa Jara
seemingly asleep. They again went to the door and knocked but still no
answer came. The waitresses called one of Luisa Jara's waitresses at
Aileen's canteen next door. Becoming apprehensive, they went back to the
kitchen for a second look. They discovered the following- . Amparo and
Luisa were both lying in bed; Luisa was dressed only in her underwear and
there was dried blood in one of her hands; Amparo, seemingly asleep, lay
beside her (pp. 9-11, TSN, March 21, 1979). Finally, they decided to inform
Luisa's daughter, Minerva, about their apprehension. When they met Minerva
at the public market, she tearfully accompanied them back to Amparo's
room. When no one answered their knocking, Minerva kicked open the door.
(pp. 11-12, TSN, March 21, 1979). Inside, they found the two women dead
from wounds inflicted on their persons (p. 13, TSN, March 21, 1979).
The husband of Luisa, appellant Felicisimo Jara, then entered the room and
saw the condition of the victims (p. 15, TSN, March 21, 1979).
Inside the room, several ceramic piggy banks belonging to Amparo
containing coins estimated in the amount of P1,000.00 were missing (p. 43,
TSN, February 6, 1979). Scattered underneath the window of Amparo's
bedroom were coins and bits and pieces of what used to be ceramic piggy
banks (Exh. F; pp. 17-20, TSN' Feb. 6, 1979).
Later, two suspects in the killing, appellants Reymundo Vergara and Roberto
Bernadas. were apprehended (pp. 59-60, TSN, March 19, 1979). After
investigation, they confessed their guilt to the Provincial Commander of the
Philippine Constabulary in Palawan and other police investigators (pp.
26-31, TSN, May 28, 1979). They also positively Identified appellant
Felicisimo Jara as the mastermind who had plotted the killing and who
promised them a fee of P1,000.00 each for their participation (Exhibits O and
N). Before the City Fiscal and First Assistant Fiscal of Puerto Princesa City,
respectively, appellants Vergara and Bernadas subscribed and swore to
their extra-judicial statements wherein they narrated their role and that of
Felicisimo Jara in the killing (see Exhibits O and N).
Thereafter, the killing was reenacted before the military authorities and the
public, with appellants Vergara and Bernadas participating (p. 14, TSN, July
19, 1979).
The autopsy reports (Exhibits "A" and "C") submitted by Dr. Rufino Ynzon, the
City Health Officer of Puerto Princesa on the examination of the cadavers of
the deceased victims indicate that death in both cases resulted from
"hemorrhage, intra-cranial secondary to multiple comminuted-depressed
fracture of the cranial bones." Amparo Bantigue's wounds were described as
follows:
11. Wound, stabbed, about an inch in length at the right chest, between
the 3rd and 4th intercostal space, penetrating the thoracic cavity involving
the right lung.
12. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest, central
portion, penetrating the sternum, then thoracic cavity piercing the right
auricle, heart.
13. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the right upper
abdomen penetrating the abdominal cavity involving the liver and stomach.
(Exhibit "A").
13. Contusion with hematoma, circular in shape, located laterally from the
right eyebrow.
15. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest, central
portion penetrating inside the thoracic cavity involving heart and lung.
16. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the level of typhoid
process penetrating the thoracic cavity involving the right lung, lower lobe.
(Exhibit "C")
Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife,
Luisa, together with her friend, Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a
defense and testified that at the time the killings took place at Alvin's
Canteen at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, he was fast asleep with his
grandchildren at his step-daughter's house in Pineda Subdivision. The other
accused, Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas retracted their
respective extra-judicial confessions admitting their participation in the
crimes charged and Identifying their mastermind" as the accused Jara
during proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They contested the
admissibility of the extra-judicial confessions and the subsequent re-
enactment of the crime on the ground that their participations in these
occasions were not free and voluntary and were without the benefit of
counsel.
The court below ruled that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused
Bernadas and Vergara (Exhibits "N" and "O", respectively), together with the
proof of corpus delicti of the special crime of robbery with homicide
established the guilt of the accused beyond moral certainty.
In their brief, the accused-appellants contended that the court a quo erred:
II
III
IV
VI
IN ADMITTING THE PICTURES, EXHS. "T" TO "T- 23", WHICH WERE NEVER
PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
All these assigned errors boil down to the issue of whether or not there is
sufficient evidence as borne by the records to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no dispute that the confessions in these cases were obtained in the
absence of counsel. According to the records, there was a waiver by the
accused-appellants of their right to counsel.
SAGOT: Opo.
SAGOT: Opo.
DELA CRUZ
DELA CRUZ
The trial court in this case was not convinced that the extrajudicial
confessions of appellants were made involuntarily. Consider the following
reasons for the court's refusal to lend credence to appellants' claim:
The People v. Castaeda ruling applies to a crime committed before the Bill
of Rights was amended to include Section 20 on the right to remain silent
and to counsel and to be informed of such right. The presumption that "no
one would declare anything against himself unless such declarations were
true" assumes that such declarations are given freely and voluntarily. The
new Constitution, in expressly adopting the so-called Miranda v. Arizona
(384 U.S. 436) rule, has reversed the presumption. The prosecution must
now prove that an extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given, instead of
relying on a presumption and requiring the accused to offset it. There would
have been no need to amend the centuries old provisions of the Bill of Rights
and to expressly add the interdiction that "no force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him (the person being investigated)" if the framers intended us to
continue applying the pre-1973 or pre-amendment presumptions.
Miranda v. Arizona, in explaining the rule which the U.S. Supreme Court
adopted, states:
It is natural and to be expected that the police officers who secured the
confessions in these cases should testify that the statements were voluntarily
given. However, the records show that the interrogations were conducted
incommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere. When appellant
Bernadas gave his confession, his companions in the room were five police
officers. The only people with Vergara when he confessed were also police
investigators.
The officers are told by the manuals that the 'principal psychological factor
contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-being alone with the
person under interrogation.' The efficacy of this tactic has been explained as
follows:
The texts thus stress that the major qualities an interrogator should possess
are patience and perseverance. One writer describes the efficacy of these
characteristics in this manner:
The cited police manuals state that the above methods should be used only
when the guilt of the subject appears highly probable. As earlier stated, the
investigators in the cases now before us appear to have been convinced
that the accused-appellants were the culprits. Nonetheless, the evils of
incommunicado interrogations without adequate safeguards to insure
voluntariness could still result in the conviction of innocent persons. More
important, what the Constitution commands must be obeyed even at the risk
of letting even hardened criminals mix once more with the law-abiding world.
There were two sensational murder cases in Palawan which preceded the
killings now before us, The PC command and the Integrated National Police
were under pressure to "solve" these additional sensational killings.
The counsel for appellants mentions a factor not refuted by the appellee in
its brief, namely:
LT. COL. SABAS IMBONG, SGT. EUGENIO ENRIQUEZ, PFC HENRY PULGA
and CPL. ADOLFO JAGMIS all are connected with the Provincial
Constabulary Command which investigated the case, prematurely
publicized the solution of the case with the alleged 'extra-judicial
confessions' of two (2) accused, but who were rebuffed when the two (2)
accused, upon the first opportunity to do so in public, which was the
preliminary investigation, recanted and retracted their alleged 'extra-judicial
confessions' as they were taken with the use of force, violence, and
intimidation, was prepared by the investigators themselves, and without
benefit of counsel.
All are comrades in-arms of Pat. Mamerto Bantigue, who is the son of the
deceased Amparo Bantigue. Pat. Bantigue was implicated in several
coercion and physical injuries cases filed with the City Court by persons who
had been physically attacked and violated by him in connection with the
murder of his mother. Likewise, he evaded justice by escaping from the law
after murdering a companion of accused Jara and attempting to kill the
latter. He remains at large.
Evidence attesting to the fact that accused Jara and his wife had not been in
good terms for about three years before the killings was presented. They
used to quarrel with each other and they had not been sleeping together
since the deceased Luisa Jara slept at Alvin's Canteen together with the
other deceased Amparo Bantigue. Godofredo Anasis nephew of Luisa Jara,
testified that his aunt was a "tomboy" and that she and Amparo Bantigue
lived together as "husband and wife." The two went to the movies together.
The relationship of the two women angered Felicisimo Jara and was a cause
of their frequent quarrels. He resented not only his wife but also her woman
companion.
The testimony on the fact of Luisa Jara and Amparo Bantigue sleeping
together is corroborated by the fact that they were bludgeoned to death
while sleeping on one bed and their bodies discovered on that same bed. At
the Aileen's Canteen managed by the deceased Luisa, accused Felicisimo
Jara did the cooking and whenever he committed even the slightest
mistakes, his wife scolded and cursed him, treating him as though he were
only one of the servants of the restaurant. (TSN, May 31, 1979, pp.
1821-1830). The records are replete with testimony to show that Felicisimo
Jara had reason to hate his wife enough to kill her and her companion.
The lower court, in its decision, stated that the nature and the number of
wounds, reflected in the autopsy reports, convincingly show that only a
person who had harbored so much hate and resentment could have inflicted
such multiple fatal blows. It opined that accused Jara is the only person who
would have sufficient motive to wish the death of the deceased for he had
not been treated well as a husband by his wife.
During the investigation at the scene of the crime, blood stains were found
splattered in the trousers and shirt worn by accused Jara. His eyeglasses
were also smeared with blood. When asked to explain the presence of said
blood stains, accused Jara told the police that before he learned about the
killing, he was with his stepdaughter Minerva Jimenez in the public market
dressing chickens. (TSN, May 28, 1979, pp. 397398) He also said in his
testimony in open court that when he saw his wife lying dead on the bed, he
approached her and hugged her in his effort to wake her up. (TSN,
September 30, 1980, p. 1230) After a laboratory examination of the
eyeglasses (Exhibit "I"), trousers (Exhibit "J"), and shirt (Exhibit "K"), the NBI
biologist verified in her report that the blood stains were not chicken blood
but human blood (Exhibit "L"). The blood stains found in accused Jara's
trousers formed certain Identical circular patterns, a splattering of blood
which, according to the NBI biologist, could be caused by an instrument like
that of a hammner. Such circular patterns will only occur at the time of the
impact of the instrument, the very moment it hits the victim. He further
explained that there was no possibility of the splattering of blood if the victim
died hours before because blood starts to coagulate or clog 15 minutes after
the wound is caused. (TSN, March 19, 1979, pp. 227; 244; 248-250) The
blood of the deceased victims in the case at bar had already qqqcoagulated
in the morning of June 9, 1978 when accused Jara claimed that the blood
stains on his shirt were smudged when he hugged his wife.
The NBI biologist, whose findings were later signed by the Chief of the
Forensic Chemistry Division testified that human blood was found on the
eyeglasses of appellant Jara, on the front side lower portion of the left leg of
the trousers, at the left buttocks of the pants and the back portion near the
trousers, and smudged human blood stains on the appellant's T-shirt. The
human blood stains were Type B. A failure to get evidence on the blood
types of the two victims keeps this second circumstantial evidence, together
with the clear motive, from being well-nigh conclusive. However, it is still
strong evidence in the chain of circumstances pointing to Jara as the killer of
his wife.
The hammer used in the killing is an instrument with which appellant Jara is
familiar. It was proven during the trial of the case that the hammer with the
letter "A" on its handle which was one of the instruments used in the
perpetration of the crime belonged to Luisa Jara who had kept it at Aileen's
Canteen where her husband, appellant Jara helped as cook.
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
The defense of alibi given by the accused Jara is weak. Aside from himself,
the only person who vouched for his presence at some place away from the
scene of the crime was his stepdaughter from whom he had sought abode.
Hence, the alibi is made more dubious considering that no other credible
persons were presented who would, in the natural order of things be best
situated to support the tendered alibi (People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94,
citing People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336; People v. Bagasala, 39 SCRA 236;
People v. Carino, 55 SCRA 516). More importantly, the defense of alibi
cannot prosper because it is not enough to prove that defendant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must, likewise,
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at that time (People v. Alcantara, 33 SCRA 812). Such
proof is wanting in this case.
In Crim. Case No. 2564, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are
ACQUITTED of the crime of ROBBERY with HOMICIDE on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is CONVICTED of the crime of MURDER
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death
In Crim. Case No. 2565, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are likewise
ACQUITTED of the crime of HOMICIDE on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Accused Jara is CONVICTED of the crime of PARRICIDE and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of death.
Considering. however, that the accused Jara is now over 70 years of age,
the penalty of death is lowered to reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
DE CASTRO, J.:P
The gun used in the killing, an unlicensed revolver (Exhibit "F") was ordered
confiscated in favor of the Government.
As to how the crime was committed, and the events immediately preceding
and following the commission thereof, the prosecution's version is presented
in the People's Brief as follows:
At about 6:30 P.M. of May 30, 1968, while accused was downstairs. in the
mezzanine of the store situated at the first floor of his house along Mabini
Street, at Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, Raymundo Discipulo arrived thereat and
after quite sometime asked the accused whether it was true that the loading
of copra on the M/V Sweet Hope that day was given to Goring Gavero.
Expressing his surprise as he could not believe then that it could happen
because of his contract and good relation with the deceased, the accused
was only able to answer: "Ha?" to Raymundo Discipulo's query (pp. 8-10, tsn,
Aug. 26, 1969).
At about 7 o'clock that same evening, the accused left the said store, took a
tricycle and went to the office of the Oceanic Enterprises and inquired for the
deceased (pp. 287-288, tsn, April 15, 1969). Upon being informed by
Leoncio Njai Acido, a copra sample man of the said Oceanic Enterprises,
that the deceased was at the wharf, accused left and rode on the waiting
tricycle bound for the town (pp. 287, 289, tsn, Id.).
At about 8:30 o'clock that same evening of May 30, 1968, while Carmelito
Omboy was in his house fronting the plaza of the poblacion of Nasipit,
Agusan del Norte, Dodong Ratilla, a nephew of the accused, arrived and
told him (Carmelito Omboy) that the accused was requesting him to go to
the latter's house (pp. 81, 82, tsn, Feb. 24, 1969). Soon thereafter, Carmelito
Omboy went with Dodong Ratilla and proceeded to the accused's house
located at a distance of only about 20 meters away and upon arrival thereat,
accused who was then sitting by the door way beside a store (p. 82, tsn, Id.)
stood up and commanded him ( Carmelito Omboy) to go to the wharf and to
tell Joker (Atty. Jose Ong Oh, Jr., the deceased) to come to his (accused's)
house because the latter wanted to talk to the former (pp. 83, 84, 86, tsn,
Id.). Forthwith, Carmelito Omboy along with Dodong Ratilla took a tricycle
and went to the wharf, a kilometer away, to look and fetch for the deceased
(p. 87, tsn, Id.). Sometime after their arrival at the wharf, Carmelito Omboy
was able to contact and convey the accused's message to the deceased
who affirmatively said "Yes, I will be going there" and a little later rode in his
jeep bound for the town followed by Carmelito Omboy in a tricycle (pp.
87-89, tsn, Id.).
Meanwhile, and that was between 8:30 and 9:00 o'clock that same evening
of May 30, 1968, a wharf-bound cargo truck loaded with copra of the
deceased and driven by Jose Mendrez developed engine trouble at the
comer of Roxas and Mabini Streets in the poblacion of Nasipit, Agusan del
Norte (pp. 233, 234, tsn, April 14, 1969) and stopped along Roxas Street at a
point more or less seven (7) meters from the place where accused was
sitting (p. 242, tsn, Id.). A short while after the said cargo truck stopped, and
while its driver Jose Mendrez was still behind its wheel, the latter was
approached by one named Charlito Canon who said to him "Nong, you are
caged by Jesus Ruiz", referring to the accused. Jose Mendrez went down.
the cargo truck and proceeded to where accused was sitting outside his
store (p. 235, tsn, Id.). Accused gave Mendrez a glass containing Tanduay
wine, a little of which the latter drank (p. 236, tsn, Id.). Accused inquired from
Mendrez as to the whereabouts then of the deceased. Mendrez answered
that he does not know because when he left the bodega, the deceased was
not there (p. 237, tsn, Id.).
At this juncture then, and upon accused's instructions, Charlito Canon Nonoy
Palabrica and another person unloaded from the stalled cargo truck three (3)
sacks of copra which were then dropped along Roxas Street at the side of
the said truck (p. 238, tsn, Id.). Thereafter, Charlito Canon stood at a corner
fronting Roxas Street, while Nonoy Palabrica and the other person went
behind the house of the accused (p. 239, tsn, Id.). Mendrez excused himself
and went to the truck but upon reaching the same, Charlito Canon told him
that accused was calling for him again (p. 239, tsn, Id.). So, he (Mendrez)
went back to the accused who, while holding a glass of Tanduay on his left
hand and with something protruding from his waist, told him not to go away,
otherwise, he (accused) would shoot him (p. 240, tsn, Id.).
While Mendrez was thus being threatened by the accused, the deceased
arrived in the vicinity riding in his jeep, but before the latter could alight
therefrom, he was approached by Charlito Canon and soon thereafter, the
deceased got down from his jeep and went towards the parked cargo truck
and looked over at the sacks of copra lying on the street. Then he
proceeded to the place where accused was (p. 241, tsn, April 14, 1969; p.
94, tsn, Feb. 24, 1969). Taking advantage of this opportunity, Mendrez left
and went towards his parked cargo truck.
According to Carmelito Omboy who arrived at the vicinity almost at the same
time that the deceased reached the place as the latter was followed by the
former from the wharf, the devised greeted the accused "Jesse, Jesse"
extending his arms to the accused who, however, slapped them and kicked
the rattan stool and said, 'Sit down' to the deceased in a commanding
manner (pp. 94, 95, tsn, Feb. 24, 1969); that the deceased picked up the
rattan stool and placed it in front of the accused and sat on it (pp. 96, 97,
tsn, Id.); that accused demanded, "Why did you load without asking
permission?" (pp. 99, 100, tsn, Feb. 25, 1969); that the deceased answered
"Jesse, easy, easy" (Id.); that accused then splashed a glass of wine on the
face of the deceased and throw the glass to the concrete pavement (Id.);
that the deceased stood up, wiped his face, removed his eyeglasses and
wiped it with his T-shirt, wore his eyeglasses again and sat down anew, but
accused with his right hand slapped him on the left cheek (pp. 99, 100, tsn,
Feb. 25, 1969); that the deceased's face was turned to the right due to the
impact of the slapping, only to be met by the shot from accused's black
revolver (Exh. "F", p. 110, tsn, Id.) when the deceased turned his face to the
front; that the accused got the revolver from his right waist and that only one
shot was fired (pp. 101, 102, t.s.n., Id.); that the deceased jerked a little and
fell to his left side, meanwhile the accused stood up still holding his revolver,
raised it, turned its drum and tucked it on his right waist (p. 102, tsn, Id.); that
thereafter, the accused turned to his right, and went upstairs of his house (p.
110, tsn, Id.) and threw his firearm (p. 45, tsn, Aug. 27, 1969); that after a
while, accused came down from his house, passed by the body of the
deceased, walked along Roxas Street and proceeded to the Municipal
Building (pp. 111, 112, tsn, Feb. 25, 1969; p. 45, tsn, Aug. 27, 1969).
The body of the deceased was autopsied at the Raniel's Funeral Parlor at
Butuan City by Dra. Lydia San Pedro, Municipal Health Officer of Nasipit,
Agusan del Norte, at 2:00 o'clock in the morning of May 31, 1968 (pp. 140,
142-149, tsn, May 7, 1969), with the help of Dr. Teodoro Vesagas who did the
actual incision (pp. 102, 149, tsn, May 7, 1969) and removed the slug which
was lodged in the left medulla of the victim's brain (p. 116, tsn, Id.). The
autopsy findings are reflected in the medical report (Exh. "T" and "T-3")
submitted and testified to by Dra. Lydia San Pedro (p. 150, tsn, Id.) showing
the following:
Upper and lower incissor teeth left upper premolar detached from socket;
Hard and soft palate fractured on the left side with rugged edges.
Internal Findings: Linear fracture from occipital extending to the base of the
skull; lacerated left and right lobe of the medulla; bullet slug lodge in the left
medulla. Course of bullet wound of entrance-left hard palate-left maxilla-
base of the skull-left medulla.
In the early morning of May 31, 1968, the recovered slug (Exh. "C") was
handed by Dra. Lydia San Pedro to Chief of Police Luneta (pp- 36-39, tsn,
Aug. 27, 1968; p. 152, tsn, May 7, 1969) who in turn gave it to his deputy,
Police Lt. Amado Felias, with instructions to have it ballistically examined
(tsn, pp. 36, 37, Aug. 27, 1968; p. 237, May 9, 1969), and to escort the
accused to Camp Crame for the purpose of paraffin test, which mission he
undertook together with Lt. Jose C. Edera of the Agusan PC Command that
same morning of May 31, 1968 (tsn, pp. 30-34, May 5, 1969; pp- 239, 240,
May 9, 1969).
The result of the paraffin test conducted on the accused also on May 31,
1968 by Lt. Col. Minardo B. Piones, Chief of the Chemistry Branch, PC
Central Laboratory, Camp Crame (pp. 326, 327, tsn, April 1, 1969), showed
that the right hand of the accused was positive for the presence of nitrates,
while his left hand was negative (Exh. "K"; pp. 336, 337, 388, 389, tsn, Id.).
On the same date, May 31, 1968, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, the accused
executed an affidavit (Exh. "Z") stating therein that while he and the
deceased were grappling for the possession of the deceased's revolver,
somebody whom he did not see fired at the deceased. This affidavit,
however, was not believed by Lt. Col. Pelayo Perez, CIS Deputy Executive
Officer, when the said affidavit was presented to the latter on June 1, 1968
on account that it does not Identify who shot the deceased (pp. 174- 175,
tsn, May 8, 1969), so that Lt. Col. Perez was constrained to, and did,
interview, the accused (pp. 176, 179, tsn, Id.). After the interview, the
accused, in the presence of Lt. Col. Perez, executed a second affidavit (Exh.
"Z-1") giving a new version of the incident, in that it was the revolver of the
deceased which killed the latter, and because of this new version, Lt. Col.
Perez further interviewed the accused who finally admitted that he knew
where the firearm was, and promised to surrender the same in Agusan if he
(Perez) would go there. Forthwith, the accused was returned to Nasipit,
Agusan, accompanied by Police Lt. Amado Felias and PC Lt. Edera (p. 240,
tsn, May 9, 1969), while Lt. Col. Perez decided to follow them later together
with CIS Agent Sofronio Sison (p. 182, tsn, May 8, 1969).
On June 4, 1968, Lt. Col. Perez arrived in Agusan and at the residence of the
accused the latter surrendered to the former a Cal. .357 Magnum firearm
with five have ammunitions and one spent shell (pp. 182-191, tsn, may 8,
1969; pp. 37-43, May 5, 1969), which firearm (Exh. "F") was found ballistically
to be the firearm from which the recovered bullet or slug (Exh. "C") that killed
Atty. Jose Ong Oh, Jr. (deceased) was fired (Exh. "P"; pp. 162-167, tsn, April
18, 1969).
On June 5, 1968, the next day after the accused surrendered the aforesaid
firearm (Exh. "F"), he executed a third affidavit Exh. "Y") consisting of six (6)
pages, at the Headquarters of the Agusan PC Provincial Command at
Butuan City (pp. 193, 194, tsn, May 8, 1969), in which affidavit, accused,
among others, admitted that the surrendered firearm (Exh. "F") is his own
unlicensed revolver that killed the deceased, but that the killing was
accidental as the forefinger of the deceased's left hand was inserted into the
trigger guard of said revolver causing it to fire and hitting the deceased
himself.
On the same date, May 30, 1968, at 9:00 P.M. Ratilla who was sent to look for
the deceased, Atty. Jose Ong Oh, Jr., arrived with one Carmelito Omboy.
Ratilla told the herein accused-appellant that the deceased, Atty. Jose Ong
Oh, Jr., was at that time at the Helen's Bakery, then said Ratilla after telling
the herein accused-appellant the fact that Atty. Jose Ong Oh, Jr., was at the
Helen's Bakery went upstairs their house and said accused-appellant keep
on looking towards the direction of Helen's Bakery but could not see the
deceased, so he went to the middle of Mabini Street where he saw the jeep
of the deceased then parked. Then after seeing the parked jeep of the floor
of their house. Then he saw that the deceased, Atty. Jose Ong Oh, Jr., was
walking towards the cargo truck and look at its engine and upon seeing the
three sacks of copra being unloaded from the truck he (the deceased)
pulled his hair and saying. "This is a delay of the loading." Then he went
around the said truck and the herein accused-appellant could see from the
face of the deceased, Atty. Jose Ong Oh, Jr. that he was angry over the
unloading- of the three sacks of copra. That at the distance of about three to
four meters the herein accused-appellant told the deceased, Atty. Jose Ong
Oh, Jr.: "It is good that you are here," but the deceased did not answer, then
he offered him a seat while he (the accused-appellant) 'was sitting on a
rattan chair, telling the deceased to "sit down first" and pointing to a chair in
front where he was then sitting, but the deceased, Atty. Jose Ong Oh, Jr.,
answered: "No. I am in hurry" then the accused-appellant stood up, placed
his hands on the shoulder of the deceased and requested him again to sit
down; then the deceased, Atty. Jose Ong Oh, Jr., inquired and said: "What
shall we talk about, about the loading?", then the accused-appellant asked
the deceased whether it was true that he gave the loading of his copra on M/
V Sweet Hope to another labor union, Then the deceased, Atty. Jose Ong
Oh, Jr., answered in a harsh voice and said: "It is true; this is our copra; you
cannot tell me to whom I will give the loading of the copra." Then the herein
accused-appellant in turn raised his voice and said: "What do you mean? I
cannot interfere? Have you forgotten our contract? And that the last shipment
was not handled by us, so this shipment should be ours", then the deceased
replied and said: "It is none of your business. Litsi it is none of your business,
why do you interfere with our loading?" That because the herein accused-
appellant was hurt said to the deceased: "You are trampling on my right
already. You are a traitor, you big Chinese communist, you rascal "Then he
stood up to avoid the deceased, but the deceased said: "What do you mean
by rascal? communist? traitor? at the same time stepping forward towards
him (accused appellant) and pulling out his revolver from his (deceased)
right hip pocket. However, before the deceased could put his finger on the
trigger of his revolver, the accused-appellant splashed Tanduay wine
contained in the glass he was holding on Ms right hand on the face of the
deceased and with his left hand, he (the accused-appellant) gripped the
drum of the deceased's revolver which the deceased held with his right
hand. That the accused-appellant tightened his grip on the deceased's right
hand so that he could wrestle the former's revolver. But the deceased placed
his left hand over the accused-appellant's left hand trying to loosen his grip
so that he (the deceased could shoot him. The accused-appellant began to
feel afraid that he will be shot by the deceased if his left hand could be
wrestled from its hold on the drum of the deceased's revolver. Then he
(accused-appellant) threw the glass that he was then holding with his right
hand and with his right hand he pulled deceased's left hand which was on
top of his left hand, but he noticed the growing strength of deceased's left
hand, and he remembered that he had a firearm at his waist, so he pulled it
and struck deceased's face hitting lightly the deceased near his jaw with the
end of the barrel of the revolver because the deceased parried his blow.
Then the deceased struggled to point his gun at him, so he (accused-
appellant) pistol whipped the deceased again but he was surprised why he
could not, (sic) however, he found out that deceased's left forefinger was
then inserted into the trigger guard of his revolver and both of them were
then pulling his (accused appellant's) revolver, then he pushed forward with
his revolver the deceased, however, the deceased met his forward push and
his left finger still inserted into the trigger guard of his revolver, and after a
while he heard a sunburst and it was his gun that fired and his left hand still
holding the right hand of the deceased which was still holding his revolver.
Then a little later, deceased's left hand and his. forefinger inside the trigger
guard of accused-appellant's revolver loosened its grip then he saw the
deceased slump to the ground on his right side. That it was the left forefinger
of the deceased which pushed the trigger of the accused-appellant's
revolver that caused it to fire. That after the deceased slumped to the ground
he (the accused-appellant) released his grip on deceased's revolver and
deceased's revolver dropped to the ground by the side of the deceased.
Then the herein accused-appellant after taking a look at the deceased left
and proceeded upstairs of his house and throw his gun. Then he went down
again from his house and proceeded towards the Municipal Building of
Nasipit. That the accused-appellant had six more bullets in his revolver, and
that he did not fire them at the deceased because he had no intention to
shoot the deceased, he did not care to find out where the deceased was hit
and what occurred to his mind was to notify the police so that the police
could bring the deceased to the hospital and for him to surrender and report
the incident. Cf. decision Appendix "A", pp. 50 to 58.)
The refusal of the trial court to give credence to appellant's version of self-
defense is the basic and main assignment of error.
We agree with the court a quo in rejecting the plea of selfdefense. It has
found the prosecution witnesses more credible, and rightly so, because they
all appear to be disinterested witnesses, specially the public officials among
them, the Municipal Judge, the Chief of Police, and certain officers of the
Philippine Constabulary, whose testimonies, touching on how the crime was
committed, totally discredit the story of self-defense which fails to inspire
belief. The finding of the trial court on the relative credibility of the witnesses
in this case deserves full respect.
To begin with the initial unlawful aggression imputed to the deceased by the
defense, in order to erect the main prop of the defense invoked by appellant,
is belied by the more natural and credible testimony of the State witnesses.
Thus, the supposed aggression committed by the deceased according to
appellant and his witnesses was in whipping out his gun and pointing it at
appellant after a heated exchange of angry words. It is entirely belied by the
fact that no gun was found near the fallen body of the deceased or in the
immediate vicinity thereof, and that the slug (Exhibit "C") that caused the
death and extracted from the brain of the deceased was fired from
appellant's unlicensed gun (Exhibit "F"), as established by the ballistic
examination conducted by an expert, Capt. Constantino Y. Leyva, Chief of
the PC Central Laboratory, Camp Crame.
If the appellant fired his unlicensed gun with his right hand, as the presence
of nitrates thereon would prove, and there being no nitrate found on his left
hand, when he was subjected to paraffin test the day following the shooting
incident (Exhibit "K") also in Camp Crame, the defense theory that the
deceased pulled out a gun which appellant tried to wrest from the deceased
with his left hand, and that in the course of the struggle for the possession of
the gun, it went off with the deceased's finger also pressed against the
trigger, would be pure concoction. Under such theory, the left least, of the
deceased that supposedly fired the gun. But paraffin test conducted on
June 2, 1968 showed both hands of the deceased negative for nitrates (See
Exhibit "L"). It was the left cheek of the deceased that was found positive for
the presence of nitrates, which shows that the gun was close to the face
when it was fired.
If there was a struggle for the possession of the gun of the deceased as
claimed by appellant, there is the much greater likelihood of the gun being
held down on the level of the body during the struggle, not the level of the
head. That the gun was fired close to the face is more indicative of a
deliberate aim with complete freedom from any force that could distort its
accuracy, as would happen in a hand-to-hand struggle for the possession of
the gun. The entry of the slug through the mouth, likewise, renders
appellant's version of how the gun went off while he and the deceased who
allegedly pulled out his gun very improbable, as was his first version, as
given in his statement (Exhibit "Z-1"). An these improbabilities and plain
untrustworthiness in the testimony of the appellant, and the physical findings
of experts, would make the version of the prosecution that it was appellant
who drew his own gun from his right waist and fired at the deceased directly
on the face, at close range, easily the more natural and thus the more
credible of the diametrically conflicting versions of the defense and the
prosecution.
With the constant shifting of appellant's version from that of absolute denial
that he shot at the deceased, pointing to an unknown person as the
assailant, to that of accidental shooting, and finally to that of legitimate self-
defense, the utter incredibility of each of the changing theory he gave from
the time he first gave statement in custodial interrogation, to the time he
testified in court, becomes so manifest for him to be deserving of any bit of
credence as a witness in his own behalf. This is true with his witnesses who
merely tried to give corroboration to his principal testimony.
Finding, therefore, that appellant shot and killed the deceased not in lawful
self- defense, his liability for the killing, authorship of which he admitted, is
beyond doubt. The only question now is whether the shooting was attended
with treachery as to raise the slaying to the category of murder as charged,
and as found by the trial court, said court holding that there was treachery,
even if the attack was frontal, because it was sudden and unexpected.
In U.S. vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926, it was held that the circumstance that the
attack was sudden and unexpected to the person assaulted did not
constitute treachery, where it did not appear that the aggressor had
consciously and deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate
the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. As already shown,
appellant had not the time to reflect on the means or mode of attack for it to
be said that he deliberately and consciously pulled out his gun and fired at
the deceased to insure the commission of the crime without risk to himself.
He fired only once. One shot would not be so certain to disable the
deceased from making a defense. Before he was shot, the deceased was
splashed on the face by appellant with liquor from a glass the latter was
holding and then slapped on the left side of the face. The shooting was thus
preceded not only by a heated discussion, but acts on the part of appellant
that showed not mere hostility but such a heated temper that could break
into a violent attack, to put the deceased on, his guard. The circumstances
just mentioned negate the presence of treachery, as held in the case of
People vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473. For there to be treachery by reason of the
suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack, it has been generally held
that there must have been no warning of any sort to the deceased or
offended party. 2 His act of going to the Municipal Building right after he had
shot at the victim but once, can hardly suggest a strong and prior homicidal
intent, a circumstance also not quite compatible with a conscious and
deliberate choosing of the mode, form or means of assault to insure the
execution of the crime without risk to himself. Unconvinced nor persuaded
that treachery was present in the killing, We cannot find appellant guilty of
murder.
We neither could view the fact that both appellant and the deceased were
friends as giving rise to the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence when appellant killed the deceased, as held by the trial court.
We agree with the defense in invoking the ruling of People vs. Luchico, 49
Phil. 689, in that before the fatal shooting of the deceased, the latter, from the
time he had hired other laborers for the loading of his copra, not the
appellant's men, as he should have done under a supposed agreement with
appellant, and even more after being sought for by appellant for the alleged
breach of the agreement, and with the heated exchange of words between
them when they finally came face to face, whatever feeling of confidence,
deceased had of appellant had vanished. The sight of his truck parked near
the residence of appellant, with three sacks of his copra unloaded therefrom,
also helped to vanish whatever confidence he had in appellant, for that sight
reflected the hostility of appellant towards him. The deceased himself
naturally got mad at the appellant, a mood not quite compatible with the
charitable feeling of confidence. The deceased then knew, beyond mere
suspicion, that appellant was mad at him. It certainly cannot be said,
therefore, that the commission of the crime was facilitated by the confidence
deceased had in appellant, which alone would justify the appreciation of
abuse of confidence as an aggravating circumstance. 3
Upon the other hand, appellant had been drinking while celebrating his
son's birthday. He was told of the loading of the victim's copra by a rival
union laborers, by which act of the deceased, he felt cheated and
discriminated in alleged breach of a standing agreement. This fact aroused
his passion, and caused obfuscation. However, after seeing the appellant
fan from the single shot he fired, he went forthwith to the Municipal Building
and placed himself at the disposal of the law and the authorities. We note
from these facts the presence of the mitigating circumstances of (1)
drunkenness which was not shown to be intentional nor habitual; (2) passion
and obfuscation; and (3) voluntary surrender. With these three mitigating
circumstances, and with no aggravating circumstance to offset them, the
penalty to be imposed should be one degree lower than that for simple
homicide or reclusion temporal which is prision mayor, or from 6 years, 1 day
to 12 years (Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code. Applying the indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty should be from 6 years of prision correccional to
12 years of prision mayor.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The accused ADELINO Bardaje in this case, after trial, has been convicted
of Forcible Abduction with Rape, and sentenced to death. The case is before
us on automatic review.
That on or about the period from the 14th day to 17th day of December,
1965, in Bo. Lopig, Sta. Rita, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with lewd design, by means
of force and intimidation, and at nighttime, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drag one Marcelina Cuizon from the house of one
Norma Fernandez and brought her to a far away place and once there,
accused Adelino Bardaje, by means of force and intimidation forcibly had
sexual intercourse with her several times while his co-accused were on
guard.
The following day, December 21st, the Fiscal's office filed the following
Information with the Court:
That on or about the period from the 14th day to 17th day of December,
1965, in Bo. Crossing, Municipality of Sta. Rita, Province of Samar,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another, with Lucio Malate, Pedro Odal, Adriano Odal, Silvino Odal and Fidel
Ansuas, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, armed with
bolos and at nighttime, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drag one Marcelina Cuizon, a minor of 14 years old, from the house of one
Norma Fernandez and brought her to a far away place and once there,
accused Adelino Bardaje, by means of force and intimidation forcibly had
sexual intercourse with her for several times while his co-accused were on
guard.
That the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstances that it was
committed in an uninhabited place and with the aid of armed men, were
present. (Emphasis supplied).
It will be noted that the complaint filed directly by MARCELINA with the Court
was amended by the Fiscal in the Information. While MARCELINA charged
ADELINO only with Rape, the Fiscal charged him with "Rape with Illegal
Detention". MARCELINA merely alleged that she was dragged from the
house of Norma Fernandez by means of force and intimidation and at
nighttime. On the other hand, the Information added that the accused were
"armed with bolos". The name of the barrio was also changed from Lopig to
Crossing. Lastly, the Information included the allegation that the crime of
Rape with Illegal Detention was committed with the "aggravating
circumstances that it was committed in an uninhabited place and with the
aid of armed men".
Of the six (6) persons accused, the FIVE OTHERS were never arrested, and
only ADELINO stood trial. The period of the offense was from December 14th
to 17th, with the complaint having been filed on December 20th, or barely
three (3) days thereafter. With that time frame in mind, an analysis of the
Information will show the assumption that only ADELINO was the principal
culprit while the FIVE OTHERS were either principals by cooperation or
accomplices. Thus, the clause "with" Lucio Malate, Pedro Odal, Mariano
Odal, Silvino Odal and Fidel Ansuas" indicates that it was ADELINO who had
dragged MARCELINA "with" the help of the FIVE OTHERS. Both the
complaint and Information also indicated that ADELINO was the only one
who committed the rape, while the FIVE OTHERS were merely accomplices.
After the trial was concluded, ADELINO's lawyer submitted his Memorandum
on July 26, 1967, in which he specifically argued that "the prosecution did
not establish the elements of Rape and Illegal Detention as prescribed by
Articles 335 and 267 of the Revised Penal Code." It was only in the
Memorandum of the Fiscal, dated July 27, 1967, when the position was
taken that the crime which should be imputed to ADELINO is Rape with
Forcible Abduction. The prosecution's Memorandum stated:
Although the information is for Rape with Illegal Detention instead of Rape
with Forcible Abduction, yet from the body of the information it could be
clearly gleaned that the elements of abduction are sufficiently alleged therein
and hence the accused can be convicted thereunder (People vs. Emiliano
Javete, CA 01956-57-CR April 7, 1964 (82-1965).
The following day, July 28, 1967, the trial Court found ADELINO guilty of
Forcible Abduction with Rape with the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and aid of armed men, and sentenced him to death.
At about 8:00 o'clock the following morning, December 15, ADELINO and
the FIVE OTHERS brought her to another mountain, 6 kilometers farther,
arriving there past twelve o'clock noon at the house of one called Ceferino
(also called Cipriano) who lived there with his family. She was kept in one
room. Outside the room were Pedro Odal, Adriano Odal and Fidel Ansuas,
still armed with bolos, drinking and guarding her. In the evening, ADELINO
had another sexual intercourse with her even though she bit and kicked him
and shouted for help which was to no avail as all present were relatives of
ADELINO, with the latter Ceferino "Tatay" She curled the hair of Narita
(daughter of Ceferino) the next day, because ADELINO threatened to kill her
if she did not. Her curling paraphernalia was taken by Adriano Odal, upon
ADELINO's instructions, from Norma Fernandez (her cousin) who gave the
equipment as she (Norma) was also threatened. MARCELINA and her
"captors" stayed in Ceferino's house for two days. In the morning of
December 17, two soldiers with her father, Alejo Cuizon, arrived. The soldiers
apprehended ADELINO while the FIVE OTHERS jumped down the window
and fled. Upon her father, she embraced him and cried. They all returned to
Barrio Crossing. She and her mother, Maria Fernandez, then went to
Catbalogan, where she filed a complaint at the Fiscal's Office on December
20, 1965 and submitted to a medical examination at the Samar Provincial
Hospital.
Dr. Vitus Hobayan, Jr., Resident Physician at the Samar Provincial Hospital,
declared that he examined MARCELINA on December 20, 1965 and issued
a Medical Certificate with the following findings:
Explaining the "old healed laceration", the doctor stated that laceration may
have been caused by possible sexual intercourse or other factors, and if it
were intercourse, he estimated that it could have occured " say, two weeks or
one month" or possibly more. 8
For his part, ADELINO, aged 18, admitted having had carnal knowledge of
MARCELINA but denied having raped her. He claims that they eloped on
December 14 to 17, 1965 as previously planned, they having been
sweethearts since November 12, 1964. As such, they used to date in
Tacloban and "anything goes". MARCELINA's family used to have a house in
Barrio Crossing but now MARCELINA just stays in the house of her aunt,
Sofia, which is about five houses away from theirs. In the evening of
December 14, 1965, while Sofia, MARCELINA's mother and others were
eating, MARCELINA handed him a bag and beauty culture equipment
through the window, went downstairs, after which the two of them walked to
the mountains, to Ceferino Armada's house. Ceferino was a cousin of
ADELINO's mother. He and MARCELINA slept in the bedroom with 18-year
old Narita, Ceferino's daughter. While in that hut, food was brought to them
by his sister, Nenita. MARCELINA curled Narita's hair the next day.
Ceferino Armada, 60 years of age, the owner of the hut where MARCELINA
was allegedly forcibly brought the second time, corroborated that portion of
ADELINO's testimony regarding their stay in his house adding that
MARCELINA and ADELINO had told him that they had eloped; that
MARCELINA even offered to curl his daughter's hair (Narita's and
Concepcion's), and helped in house chores and in the threshing of palay,
while ADELINO helped in carrying palay because it was rainy.
The trial Court found the prosecutors version of the incident more worthy of
credence stating that Complainant had no improper motive to implicate
ADELINO in such a detestable crime as Rape.
On the basis of the evidence, testimonial and documentary, we find that the
guilt of ADELINO has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, we find MARCELINA's charge that she was forcibly
abducted and afterwards raped by ADELINO in conspiracy with FIVE
OTHERS highly dubious and inherently improbable.
Secondly, by Complainant's own admission, the first hut she was taken to
was a small one-room affair occupied by a woman and two small children.
Her charge, therefore, that she was ravished in that same room is highly
improbable and contrary to human experience.
Thirdly, from her own lips, Complainant testified that the second hut where
she was taken, that of Ceferino Armada, consisted of a small room
separated from the sala by a wall of split bamboos. Further, that Ceferino
with his wife and seven children all lived therein. It challenges human
credulity that she could have been sexually abused with so many within
hearing and distance. It is unbelievable, too, that under those circumstances
the FIVE OTHERS could have stood guard outside, armed with bolos and
drinking, while ADELINO allegedly took advantage of her. If rape were,
indeed, their malevolent intent, they would, in all probability, have taken turns
in abusing her. That they did not, indicates that there was, indeed, some
special relationship between MARCELINA and ADELINO. Furthermore, with
people around, and the hut constructed as it was, it would have been an
easy matter for MARCELINA to have shouted and cried for help. Surely, the
old man Ceferino, his wife and/or his children could not have been insensible
to her outcries notwithstanding their relationship to ADELINO. The aphorism
still rings true that evidence to be believed must not only come from the
mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself.
Additionally, Complainant admits that she even curled the hair of Narita, one
of Ceferino's daughters, a fact inconsistent with her allegation of "captivity".
That she was threatened with death if she did not accede to such an
inconsequential request defies credulity. The livelihood is that, as the
defense maintains, MARCELINA was not forcibly abducted but that she and
ADELINO had, in fact, eloped and that she had brought her beauty culture
paraphernalia with her, or, that she herself had sent for them from her cousin
Norma Fernandez voluntarily and not under threat from ADELINO.
The totality of the foregoing circumstances count with such great weight and
significance that they lend an aura of improbability and reasonable doubt to
the allegation that MARCELINA had been "kidnapped" or "illegally detained"
and that when she and ADELINO engaged in sexual intercourse, it was
because of force or intimidation exercised upon her. They are circumstances
that were overlooked by the trial Court and justify a reversal of its finding of
guilt as an exception to the established rule that the findings of fact of a trial
Judge based on the relative credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed by appellate Courts.
This case also constitutes an exception to the general belief that a young girl
would not expose herself to the ordeal of public trial if she were not
motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit who had ravished and
shamed her placed behind bars. As we view it, MARCELINA was confronted
with a paradoxical situation as a daughter of relative tender age who could
not shamefacedly admit to her parents that she had eloped and voluntarily
submitted to sexual intercourse, since that elopement must have met with
righteous indignation on the part of her parents. As a result, MARCELINA
was faced with no other choice but to charge ADELINO with rape or incur
the ire of her parents and social disrepute from a small community.
It should also be noted that throughout the hearings before the trial Court, it
was assumed that ADELINO was being held responsible for the complex
crime of Rape with Illegal Detention. While it is true that an accused can be
punished for a crime described by the facts alleged in tile Information
despite a wrong designation of the crime in the preamble of the Information,
13 yet, in capital cases, it should be desirable that, whenever a discrepancy
is noted between the designation of the crime made by the Fiscal and the
crime described by the facts pleaded in his Information. The lower Court
should call attention of the accused to the discrepancy, so that the accused
may be fully apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
This was not done in regards to ADELINO who all the time was under the
impression that he was being tried for Rape with Illegal Detention, and not
for Forcible Abduction with Rape. If ADELINO had known that he was being
tried for Forcible Abduction with Rape, he may have changed the strategy or
tactics of his defense. Not that it could be said he would have done so; but
he should have been advised he had the right, and given the opportunity, to
do so.
ADELINO wanted to have Narita testify on his behalf, and a subpoena had
been issued to her. But instead of taking effective steps to have Narita
brought to Court, the lower court gave responsibility for Narita's attendance
to the defense, expressly stating that, if the defense was not able to bring
her to the Court, her testimony will be dispensed with. The record shows:
ATTY. BOHOL
I appear as counsel for the accused. Up to now, Your Honor, the witnesses
we have been expecting have not yet arrived. This representation, with the
consent of the Clerk of Court have wired the Chief of Police of Sta. Rita,
Samar to bring Ceferino Armada and Narita Armada tomorrow for the
hearing, continuation of this case for those persons mentioned to testify, your
Honor, for the accused. We pray, Your Honor, that we be given time to hear
from the Chief of Police to bring those persons tomorrow, Your Honor.
COURT
COURT
ATTY. BOHOL
COURT
Suppose the two witnesses do not arrive tomorrow, for which this case is set
also?
ATTY. BOHOL
If we receive information and find that those witnesses could really not come
for this case, Your Honor, I will be constrained to submit the case for decision
based on the testimony of the accused. However, Your Honor, if it will be all
right with the Honorable Court and we find that there is hope that within this
week Ceferino Armada could come here, in view of the distance, I pray
before the Honorable Court that we be given time within this week to present
Ceferino Armada, and upon his failure, submit the case for decision
COURT
The Court will not allow that anymore, anyway this case is set for tomorrow.
The Court wail grant the postponement today on condition that any witness
not presented tomorrow will be considered waived Afterall as you have
manifest, 4 their testimonies will be corroborative.
COURT
What I mean is that you should have taken the necessary precaution for the
attendance of your witness today considering that there is a subpoena for
the witnesses.-
ORDER - for the reason that accused have no more witnesses to present
today, the trial of this case is hereby Postponed for tomorrow, July 26, 1967
at 8:30 A.M., with the warning that witnesses not presented during that day
shall be considered waived. 15
Considering that this case involved a prosecution for a capital offense, the
lower Court acted precipitously in not having Narita brought to Court, by
ordering her arrest if necessary ADELINO was deprived of his right "to have
compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses on his
behalf."
Crucial questions should also have been asked by the trial Court of
witnesses. MARCELINA testified before the lower Court on December 1,
1966. On December 12, 1966, P Gacelos, the PC Sgt. who investigated the
complaint against ADELINO, testified:
A. Yes, Sir. 16
It would have been advisable if the lower Court had right then and there
asked for the production of the written statement of MARCELINA.
The medical report, Exhibit "B", implied that MARCELINA could have had
sexual intercourse previous to December 14th. On the other hand, ADELINO
had testified that he and MARCELINA used to go together to Tacloban, and
while there several times, "we had sexual intercourse because she likes it."
17 Considering the possible infliction of the death penalty on ADELINO, the
lower Court could have asked MARCELINA if she had had sexual
intercourse prior to December 14th and, if so, if it was with ADELINO.
Further, there was possibility that ADELINO and MARCELINA had really
been sweethearts. The lower Court could have asked MARCELINA if she
realized that, charging ADELINO with Rape with Illegal Detention, the latter
could be sentenced to death. If that had been explained to her clearly by the
lower Court, she might then have admitted that she was neither raped nor
"kidnapped" nor illegally detained.
It may not be amiss to state then that just as in pleas of guilty where a grave
offense is charged trial Judges have been enjoined to refrain from accepting
them with alacrity but to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that an accused
fully understands the import of his plea, so also, in prosecutions for capital
offenses, it behooves the trial Courts to exercise greater care in
safeguarding the rights of an accused. The trial Judge should also take a
more active role by means of searching questions in the examination of
witnesses for the ascertaintment of the truth and credibility of their
testimonies so that any judgment of conviction imposing the supreme
penalty may rest on firm and unequivocal grounds. The life and liberty of an
individual demand no less.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
PUNO, J.:
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX, Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial
ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including
two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police
officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their
testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence
consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs
taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to
be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a
permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities.
Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led
by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited
prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then
Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the
leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres
thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for
thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group
and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega
added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and
used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered
away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the police.
Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later
stabilized. 1
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the
blood from his face. He sat on some cement steps 8 and then tried to flee
towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but
accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the
process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin.
Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?" 9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas
Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang
flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to
the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him
to the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various
contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in
the following post-mortem findings:
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal region, right
side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x
3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0
x 4.0 cm. left suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm., upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region; right
temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial fossa; right
anterior cranial fossa.
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials and fluid. 10
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the
mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito
Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by the
prosecution 12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon
City. 13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of
the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his
office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that time.
15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot
run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos admits he was
at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17 He
said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why his face
appeared in some of the photographs. 18 Unlike the other accused, Nilo
Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y
Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day.
According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los
Santos, merely viewed the incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because
he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified
that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The maulers
however ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer
opted not to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo
Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo
guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery and
sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was
likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, found that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted
Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin
Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal Case No.
86-47322, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the
two (2) Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and
hereby acquits them of said charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-49008, the Court
finds the said Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as accomplice to
the crime of Murder under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate penalty of NINE (9)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE
(12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan,
Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, to the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as
actual damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, and one-half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo Sison, Joel Tan,
Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo had been under detention during
the pendency of these cases shall be credited to them provided that they
agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to release the
Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando Fernandez from the City Jail
unless they are being detained for another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has become moot
and academic. The Petition for Bail of the Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison
and Joselito Tamayo is denied for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega
are hereby cancelled. 22
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court inasmuch as Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us for automatic review of
the decision of the Court of Appeals against the four accused-appellants
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
II
III
II
III
IV
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them
and his testimony incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify
more suspects who were apprehended during the investigation of Salcedo's
death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial
court on the witness stand for being argumentative and evasive. 32 This is
not enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did not exhibit this
undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his
testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his
evasiveness at some instances. Except for compelling reasons, we cannot
disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering
their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. As
trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions
of a witness' testimony.
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses'
testimonies corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of
the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe
with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the
medical and documentary evidence on record.
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched.
Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with
stones in their hands. 38
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was
being mauled at the Luneta starting from a grassy portion to the
pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, 41 as he
was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his
assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and
the mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the
Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 46 and
the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned
by appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons who
took the same.
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part
of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected
to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. 54 However, when the
accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for
accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to
prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not
have participated in the mauling of the victim. 55 The photographs were
adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the
defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the
other accused per understanding with their respective counsels, including
Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution
used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the
witness stand. 56 No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused,
not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a
continuing objection to their admissibility. 57
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of
conspiracy among the principal accused and in convicting them of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous affray.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several
persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these
several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence can be identified. 62
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one
distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of
the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually
after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after
said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one
defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting
punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the
incident. 64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much
as fifty in number 65 and were armed with stones with which they hit the
victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force
and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They
followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several
meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the
ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself
against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his attackers
continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor
could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his
assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process.
Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost
consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a
defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages,
P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of
the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three
years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi
Arabia. 69 The reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the
anguish wrought on his widow and three small children, 70 warrant an
increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity
of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim. 71
SO ORDERED.
x--x
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88,
Cavite City, sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and ordering
him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the rape-slaying of a 9-year
old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Cavite on July 10, 1999.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 26, 1999 and, with the assistance
of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, whereupon trial ensued.
Ten (10) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola, the
victims mother; Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, medico-legal officer of the NBI; Atty.
Lupo Leyva; Mayor Renato Abutan of Rosario, Cavite; Atty. Sikat Agbunag of
the Public Attorneys Office; Pet Byron Buan, NBI Forensic Biologist; Aida
Viloria-Magsipoc, NBI Forensic Chemist; SPO1 Arnel Cuevas of the Rosario,
Cavite police station; and Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes,
both neighbors of the victim.
The victims mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 oclock in
the afternoon of July 10, 1999, she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy
Diolola to their neighbors house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so that
Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with her
lessons. Aimees house, where accused-appellant was also staying, is about
four to five meters away from Daisys house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go
to the house of her tutor. She was wearing pink short pants and a white
sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant.
They were looking for a book which accused-appellant could copy to make a
drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the
book, Daisy and accused-appellant went back to the latters house. When
Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 oclock after an afternoon nap, she noticed
that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and
proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisys tutor. Aimees mother told Ma. Nida
that Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her
lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual
period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in her brothers and sisters houses, but she
was not there, either. At about 7:00 oclock that evening, Ma. Nida went back
to her neighbors house, and there saw accused-appellant, who told her that
Daisy had gone to her classmates house to borrow a book. But, when Ma.
Nida went there, she was told that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went
to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at about 3:30 oclock in
the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy was
playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television in
her house, but that Daisy later left with accused-appellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the whole evening of
June 10, 1999, a Saturday, until the early morning of the following day, June
11, 1999, a Sunday, but their search proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00
oclock in the morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead
body of her daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river
after the compuerta by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body was already in
the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her
pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. Barangay
Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported the incident to the
Rosario police. The other barangay officers fetched accused-appellant from
his house and took him to the barangay hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida
pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect since
he was with the victim when she was last seen alive.[3]
Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 oclock that afternoon, while she and
her daughter were in front of a store across the street from her house,
accused-appellant arrived to buy a stick of Marlboro cigarette. Accused-
appellant had only his basketball shorts on and was just holding his shirt.
They noticed both his shorts and his shirt were wet. After lighting his
cigarette, accused-appellant left.[4]
Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified. She said that at
about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, while she and her
husband and children were walking towards the compuerta near the
seashore of Ligtong, Rosario, Cavite, they met a fisherman named Herminio
who said that it was a good day for catching milkfish (bangus). For this
reason, according to this witness, they decided to get some fishing
implements. She said they met accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo near the
seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked troubled. Charito said
that accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was unusual. She
also testified that accused-appellants shorts and shirt (sando) were wet, but
his face and hair were not.[5]
SPO1 Arnel Cuevas testified that upon receipt of the report, Rosario Police
Chief Ricardo B. de la Cruz, Jr. responded to the call together with his men,
PO2 Garcia, SPO1 Araracap and PO2 Lariza. When they arrived, Daisys
body was already in the barangay hall. SPO1 Cuevas took photographs of
the body. At that time, Daisy was wearing pink short pants and a dirty white
panty with a dirty white sleeveless shirt wrapped around her neck. The body
was afterwards taken to the Samson Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite. The
inquiries conducted by the police showed that one Freddie Quinto was
fishing near the compuerta when he accidentally hit the body of Daisy, which
was in the mud and tied to the root of an aroma tree.
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that at about 9:00
oclock in the evening of July 11, 1999, he conducted a physical examination
of accused-appellant. His findings[7] showed the following:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
Abrasions: thigh, right, antero-lateral aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 0.1 cm., knee,
left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm. legs, right anterior aspect, 28.0 x 8.0 cms., left anterior
aspect, 24.0 x 10.0 cms., feet, plantar aspects; right, 9.0 x 3.0 cms. and left,
13.0 x 5.0 cms.
At about 10:00 oclock in the evening, Dr. Vertido went to the Samson Funeral
Parlor in Rosario, Cavite for an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim Daisy
Diolola. The autopsy revealed the following postmortem findings:[8]
Hematoma, periorbital right, 5.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 4.5 x 3.0 cms.
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999,
he took blood samples from accused-appellant in his office for laboratory
examination to determine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball shorts and
shirt worn by accused-appellant on the day the victim was missing and the
victims clothing were turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the
NBI by PO1 Amoranto of the Rosario, Cavite police for the purpose of
determining the presence of human blood and its groups.[11]
Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood samples, he had
a conversation with accused-appellant during which the latter admitted that
he had raped and later killed the victim by strangulation and stated that he
was willing to accept the punishment that would be meted out on him
because of the grievous offense he had committed. Mr. Buan observed that
accused-appellant was remorseful and was crying when he made the
confession in the presence of SPO1 Amoranto at the NBI laboratory.[13]
When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest Prosecutor Elpidia J.
Itoc at around noon of July 13, 1999 in Cavite City, accused-appellant had
with him a handwritten confession which he had executed inside his cell at
the Municipal Jail of Rosario. In his confession, accused-appellant admitted
not only that he killed the victim but that he had before that raped her.
Accused-appellant said he laid down the victim on a grassy area near the
dike. He claimed that she did not resist when he removed her
undergarments but that when he tried to insert his penis into the victims
vagina, she struggled and resisted. Accused-appellant said he panicked
and killed the child. He then dumped her body in the shallow river near the
compuerta and went home.[14]
Atty. Sikat Agbunag, a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office, testified that
at noon of July 13, 1999, while she was in their office in Cavite City,
Prosecutor Itoc came together with accused-appellant and some policemen.
Prosecutor Itoc asked Atty. Agbunag to assist accused-appellant about his
confession. Atty. Agbunag read the document, informed accused-appellant
of his constitutional rights, and warned him that the document could be used
against him and that he could be convicted of the case against him, but,
according to her, accused-appellant said that he had freely and voluntarily
executed the document because he was bothered by his conscience.
Accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Agbunag, then affixed his signature to
the document and swore to it before Prosecutor Itoc.[15]
At 9:00 oclock in the morning of July 11, 1999, barangay officials fetched
accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall, where
he was asked about the disappearance of Daisy. He claimed that he did not
know anything about it. Accused-appellant was allowed to go home, but, at
11:00 oclock that morning, policemen came and invited him to the police
headquarters for questioning. His mother went with him to the police station.
There, accused-appellant was asked whether he had something to do with
the rape and killing of Daisy. He denied knowledge of the crime.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
accused Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape with Homicide, as charged in the Information, accordingly
hereby sentences him to the supreme penalty of DEATH. The accused is
directed to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[20]
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
4. At about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and Charito
Yepes saw accused-appellant coming out of the compuerta, with his clothes,
basketball shorts, and t-shirt wet, although his face and hair were not.
According to these witnesses, he looked pale, uneasy, and troubled (balisa).
He kept looking around and did not even greet them as was his custom to
do so.
7. By 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for her
daughter, she was told by accused-appellant that Daisy had gone to her
classmate Rosarios house. The information proved to be false.
8. Daisys body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the river near
the compuerta.
10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were
bloodstained. The bloodstains on accused-appellants clothes and on Daisys
clothes were found positive of human blood type A.
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisys body contained her DNA profile as well
as that of accused-appellant.
ATTY. ESPIRITU
Q: But you will agree with me that more probably than not, if a crime is being
committed, and it results in a bloody death, it is very possible that the blood
of the victim and the blood of the assailant might mix in that particular item
like the t-shirt, shorts or pants?
A: It is possible when there is a huge amount of blood coming from the victim
and the suspect, Sir. It is possible. It will mix. Whichever is the dominant
blood in it, it will be the one which will register. For example, if there is more
blood coming from the victim, that blood will be the one to register, on
occasions when the two blood mix.
Q: But in these specimens number 1 to 5, it is very clear now that only type A
and no type O blood was found?
A: Yes, sir.
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime
or from the victims body for the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample.
The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from
the suspect and the victim.[30]
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists
between the evidence sample and the reference sample.[31] The samples
collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile.[32] The test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from
different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no
further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the
samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a
variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of some
aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated
with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source
(inclusion).[33] In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the
analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the Similarity.[34]
In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of
accused-appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands
of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human
DNA,[35] because, as Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc explained:
PROSECUTOR LU:
A: After this Honorable Court issued an Order for DNA analysis, serological
methods were already conducted on the said specimens. And upon inquiry
from Mr. Buan and as far as he also knew of this case, and we also
interviewed the mother who came over to the laboratory one time on how
was the state of the specimens when they were found out. We found that
these specimens were soaked in smirchy water before they were submitted
to the laboratory. The state of the specimens prior to the DNA analysis could
have hampered the preservation of any DNA that could have been there
before. So when serological methods were done on these specimens, Mr.
Byron could have taken such portion or stains that were only amenable for
serological method and were not enough for DNA analysis already. So
negative results were found on the clothings that were submitted which were
specimens no. 1 to 5 in my report, Sir.
Q: I also noticed that specimen no. 6-B consisting of the smears taken from
the victim also proved negative for human DNA, why is it so?
Q: How about specimen no. 7, the hair and nails taken from the victim, why
did they show negative results for DNA?
A: The hair samples were cut hair. This means that the hair did not contain
any root. So any hair that is above the skin or the epidermis of ones skin
would give negative results as the hair shaft is negative for DNA. And then
the nails did not contain any subcutaneous cells that would be amenable for
DNA analysis also, Sir.
Q: So its the inadequacy of the specimens that were the reason for this
negative result, not the inadequacy of the examination or the instruments
used?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So based on your findings, can we say conclusively that the DNA profile
of the accused in this case was found in the vaginal swabs taken from the
victim?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir."
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: Upon meeting this Gerrico Vallejo at the police station were you able to
confer with him?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did you ask him whether he really wants you to represent or assist him as
a lawyer during that investigation?
A: He said yes.
Q: After agreeing to retain you as his counsel, what else did you talk about?
A: I told him that in the investigation, whatever he will state may be used
against him, so its a sort of discouraging him from making any statement to
the police, Sir.
Q: You stated that you personally read this recital of the constitutional rights
of the accused?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: But it will appear in this recital of constitutional rights that you did not
inform the accused that the statement that he will be giving might be used
against him in a court of justice?
PROSECUTOR LU
ATTY ESPIRITU
The only thing that is stated here is that Maaaring gamitin pabor o laban sa
iyo.
COURT
A: I told him that, as a matter of fact, and I also told him to tell the truth and
nothing but the truth.
ATTY. ESPIRITU:
Q: Did Atty. Leyva explain to you the meaning and significance of that
document which you are supposed to have executed and signed?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And did he tell you that what you would be giving is an extra-judicial
confession?
A: Yes, Sir.
Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the
consequences of the statements he was to make as well as the written
confessions he was to execute. Neither can he question the qualifications of
Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an
effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being
propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an
accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was
adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead
the accused to admit something false. Indeed, counsel should not prevent
an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.[43]
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: And during the conversation you had with Accused Gerrico Vallejo, what
exactly did he tell you?
A: At first he said that he did not do that. That was the first thing he told me.
Then I told him that I will not be able to help him if he will not tell me the truth.
A: He had been silent for a minute. Then we talked about the incident, Sir.
A: I asked him, Were you under the influence of drugs at that time?
Q: Please tell us in tagalog, the exact words that the accused used in telling
you what happened.
A: He told me that he saw the child as if she was headless at that time. That
is why he strangled the child, Sir. (Ang sabi niya po sa kin, nakita niya raw
yung bata na parang walang ulo na naglalakad. Kaya po sinakal niya.)
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
Q: When you told the accused that you will help him, what kind of help were
you thinking at that time?
A: I told him that if he will tell the truth, I could help give him legal counsel.
Never was it raised during the trial that Mantungs admission during the press
conference was coerced or made under duress. As the records show,
accused-appellant voluntarily made the statements in response to Mayor
Marquez question as to whether he killed the pawnshop employees.
Mantung answered in the affirmative and even proceeded to explain that he
killed the victims because they made him eat pork. These circumstances
hardly indicate that Mantung felt compelled to own up to the crime. Besides,
he could have chosen to remain silent or to do deny altogether any
participation in the robbery and killings but he did not; thus accused-
appellant sealed his own fate. As held in People v. Montiero, a confession
constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.
For the same reason, the oral confession made by accused-appellant to NBI
Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant would
have this Court exclude this confession on the ground that it was
uncounselled and that Mr. Buan, who initiated the conversation with
accused-appellant, was part of the NBI. The issue concerning the
sufficiency of the assistance given by Atty. Leyva has already been
discussed. On the other hand, the questions put by Mr. Buan to accused-
appellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity and clearly not as part
of his tasks. As Buan testified:[52]
PROSECUTOR LU:
A: I asked him if he was the one who did the killing on this victim, Daisy
Diolola, Sir.
....
A: Yes, Sir.
A: It is not SOP. But for me alone, I want to know more about the case, Sir.
And any information either on the victim or from the suspect will help me
personally. Its not an SOP, Sir.
The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to an
ordinary individual and is, therefore, admissible as evidence.
ATTY. ESPIRITU:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What else?
A: Five, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Until what time did they keep you inside that room?
Q: Between 10:30 in the morning up to 11:00 oclock in the evening, what did
you do there?
Q: The 5 of them?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: The 5 of them remained inside that room with you throughout the
questioning?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: They burned my private part with a lighted cigarette butt and pierced me
with a needle, Sir.
A: Mercado, Sir.
A: No, Sir.
A: They were asking me to take off the pants which I was wearing at the time,
Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What?
Q: What did you feel when your private part was burned with a cigarette
butt?
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: What were your findings when you conducted the physical examination of
the suspect?
A: I found abrasions, your Honor, abrasions on the thigh, knees, legs and
feet of the suspect, and I also found hematoma on the left ring finger,
posterior aspect and at the same time, a laceration on the left ring finger.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: In your findings, it appears that the accused in this case suffered certain
physical injuries on his person like this abrasion on the thigh, right anterior
lateral aspect lower third of the knee, what could have caused this injury?
A: Abrasions are usually caused when the skin comes in contact with a
rough surface, Sir. Hematoma are usually caused by a blunt instrument or
object and laceration is the forcible contact of the skin from that blunt object.
A: My opinion to these hematoma and laceration found on the said left ring
finger was that it was caused by a bite, Sir.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that When by reason or on
the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
[59] Therefore, no other penalty can be imposed on accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
x--x
One of the cardinal rules of criminal law is that the guilt of the accused must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. If the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.[1] In the present case,
there being a doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant, the constitutional
presumption of innocence stands and he must be acquitted.
This is an appeal from the decision dated November 28, 1991 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 131, Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. 36930
finding accused-appellant Albino Bagas guilty of the complex crime of
robbery in band with double rape and sentencing him accordingly.
That on or about the 22nd day of February 1991, in Kalookan City, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, all armed
with guns, with intent of gain, and by means of violence, threats and
intimidation upon the person of Perlita delos Santos de Lacsamana, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the
following, to wit:
all belonging to said complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the latter,
in the aforesaid amount of P728,000.00; and on the occasion thereof, said
accused conspiring together and mutually helping one another likewise by
means of force and violence and with the use of their weapons, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Fe Catanyag y
Cabaero and Estrella Rolago y Madrid both residents of said house, against
their will and without their consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
The facts as found by the trial court and as presented in the Solicitor
Generals Brief are as follows:
The incident happened at the compound of Block 5, Road 32, Phase II of the
Sacred Heart Village in Kalookan City (pp. 6-7, TSN, July 2, 1991). In the
compound are the main house where Mrs. Perlita Lacsamana resides and
another house which serves as the office and quarters for Lacsamanas
employees. In between of these two houses is about three (3) meter-wide
area where the dirty kitchen and the garage are found. In the first floor of the
main house is the masters bedroom, and on the second floor is the
guestroom (pp. 6-8, TSN, July 2, 1991).
While at the masters bedroom on that particular evening at about 9:30 p.m.,
Lacsamana overheard her maid, cried aray, aray, aray. She immediately went
out but as soon as she opened the door of her room, two (2) men (one of
them is accused Amestuzo while the other one remains unarrested) poked
their guns on her. At gun point, Lacsamana, Lea, Edwin, and Belen were
forcibly brought to the second floor of the main house. Thereat, Lacsamana
saw four (4) other male persons ransacking her premises. The said male
persons, armed with guns and knives, tied her including all her employees
and members of her household with the use of torn electric fan wire and
television wire. After that they were told to lie down with face against the floor
but a minute later she was asked where the masters bedroom is and when
she answered that it is on the ground floor, she was again forcefully brought
down. On her way down, she saw, aside from the six (6) male persons who
were inside her house, two (2) other male persons (later identified as
accused Ampatin and Vias) outside the main house but within the compound
(pp. 8-10, TSN, July 2, 1991).
Once they were already inside the masters bedroom, the six (6 ) armed male
persons (two (2) of them were Amestuzo and Bagas) ransacked the same
and took all her monies, jewelries, shoes, jackets, colored television and
imported wine. Likewise, aforesaid accused ate the foods found by them in
their kitchen. (pp.10-11, 13, TSN, July 2, 1991).
After ransacking the room, two (2) of the accused, one (1) of them is
Amestuzo, brought Estrella Rolago inside her room and afterwhich she was
in turn brought to the guest room. Thereat she heard Rolago pleading
Maawa kayo, maawa kayo then after ten (10) minutes, Rolago, with
bloodstain on her shorts, was brought in back to the guest room (pp. 13-14,
TSN, July 2, 1991). Rolago was raped by Amestuzo (pp. 17-20, TSN, July 3,
1991).
Thereafter, Mrs, Lacsamana shouted for help. Sensing that the accused had
already left, they locked the door. With the help of her employer and co-
employees, more particularly Nanding, she and Rolago were brought the
nearby Neopolitan Clinic and from there they proceeded to the St. Lukes
Hospital where Dr. Brion treated Catanyag and Rolago (pp. 6-7, TSN, July 4,
1991; pp. 19-20, TSN, July 3, 1991).[3]
On November 28, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment convicting all the
accused. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads as follows:
SO ORDERED.[4]
From the judgment of conviction by the trial court, only herein accused-
appellant Bagas appealed to this Court. His appeal is based mainly on (1)
the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to be represented by
counsel during his identification, (2) the trial courts error in giving due weight
to the open court identification of him which was based on a suggestive and
irregular out-of-court identification, and (3) the trial courts improper rejection
of his defense of alibi.
Accused-appellant maintains that from the time he was arrested until he was
presented to the complainants for identification, he was deprived of the
benefit of counsel. He narrates the circumstances surrounding his arrest and
investigation as follows:
On February 26, 1991, four days after the alleged incident, a group of
policemen together with accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a
suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City where
accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking
for a certain Mario and searched the first and second floors of the building.
Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with
a gun and uttered, Niloloko lang yata tayo ng taong ito and Magturo ka ng
tao kahit sino. It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-
appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon.
Thereafter, he was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together
with accused Ampatin. While on board the jeep, accused Ampatin told him
that he (Ampatin) committed an error in pointing him out to the police,
namumukaan lang niya ako, napagkamalian lang niya ako. They were
brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed under
detention together with the other two accused, Amestuzo and Vias. When the
complainants arrived, accused-appellant was brought out, instructed to turn
to the left and then to the right and he was asked to talk. Complainant
Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and Vias. Accused-
appellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants
that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants
to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped when one
of the policemen intervened.[5]
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the
1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a
person while he is under custodial investigation.[6] Custodial investigation
starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into
custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions
to the person to elicit incriminating statements.[7] Police line-up is not part of
the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.[8] This was settled in the
case of People vs. Lamsing[9] and in the more recent case of People vs.
Salvatierra.[10] The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during
custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial
investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process
has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory[11] and it is
usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
statement in the course of the line-up.[12]
Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel
when he was presented for identification by the complainants because the
same was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no
showing that during his identification by the complainants, the police
investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from accused-
appellant. In fact, records show that the police did not at all talk to accused-
appellant when he was presented before the complainants. The alleged
infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extra-judicial
admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of
his conviction.[13] In the present case, there is no such confession or extra-
judicial admission.
Accused-appellant also makes much ado about the manner in which he was
presented to the complainants for identification. It is alleged that the
identification was irregular as he was not placed in a police line-up and
instead, made to stand before the complainants alone.
Again, the contention has no merit. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification.[14] The fact that he was brought out of the detention cell alone
and was made to stand before the accused by himself and unaccompanied
by any other suspects or persons does not detract from the validity of the
identification process.
xxx (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification process.
A: No, sir.
Q: How long a time from the time they arrived at the Urduja precinct to the
time that you were kicked by them?
A: Yes, sir.[16]
It is, thus, clear that the identification was practically suggested by the police
themselves when they announced to the complainants that accused-
appellant was the person pointed to by Ampatin. The fact that this
information came to the knowledge of the complainants prior to their
identification based on their own recall of the incident detracts from the
spontaneity of their subsequent identification and therefore, its objectivity.
The manner by which (witnesses) were made to identify the accused at the
police station was pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there
was none, activated visual imagination, and all told, subverted their reliability
as eyewitnesses.
In Tuason vs. Court of Appeals,[18] an NBI agent first pointed the accused
to the witnesses after which the latter identified the accused. The Court held
that such identification was doubtful as the same was not spontaneous and
independent as there was improper suggestion coming from the NBI agent.
We ruled that a show-up or the presentation of a single suspect to a witness
for purposes of identification is seriously flawed as it constitutes the most
grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the police.
The Court also finds that the trial court erroneously rejected accused-
appellants alibi.
Accused-appellant clearly and positively testified that at the time of the
crime, February 22, 1991, he was working as a shell cutter in a factory in
Pasay City where he was a stay-in employee. He rendered overtime work
until ten oclock in the evening that night because they had to rush work.
After ten p.m., he, together with his stay-in co-workers, went to sleep. Four
days later, he was arrested when accused Ampatin randomly pointed him
out to the police.[20]
The Court has held that where an accused sets up alibi as a defense, the
courts should not be too readily disposed to dismiss the same, for, taken in
the light of all the evidence on record, it may be sufficient to reverse the
outcome of the case as found by the trial court and thereby rightly set the
accused free.[27] Though inherently weak as a defense, alibi in the present
case has been sufficiently established by corroborative testimonies of
credible witnesses and by evidence of physical impossibility of accused-
appellants presence at the scene of the crime. Alibi, therefore, should have
been properly appreciated in accused-apellants favor.
Another significant evidence which the trial court failed to consider is the
voluntary confession of accused Federico Ampatin absolving accused-
appellant Bagas of the crime. Ampatins testimony was clear and categorical:
Q: When you reached that house where Bagas was working what
happened?
xxx
Q: And what did they do to you?
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened there?
A: I pointed to Albino Bagas, sir, because he was the only first person I saw
there at the ground floor while his companions were on the other side
because I dont want to get hurt anymore, Your Honor.
Court: When you see (sic) Bagas was lying face down at the tme you pointed
to him?
xxx
Court: You mean to say at the time you pointed to Albino Bagas you did not
know him?
Q: Now, do you know when was Albino Bagas arrested in connection with
this case?
A: Last February 25, that was Monday, sir.
xxx
Q: xxx what was the reaction of Albino Bagas when he was being pointed to
and arrested by the arresting officers?
A: The situation goes like this, sir, the policemen arrived there and they were
holding the persons of Ampatin and they were looking for a person named
Mario that was what I heard, sir, and then the policemen forced us to be
identified or to be seen by the guide. Ampatin at first at the ground floor but
since there was nobody there by the name of Mario they proceeded to the
second floor and upon looking one of the policemen shouted, Wala rito,
niloloko lang tayo ng taong ito.
Witness: And I noticed that the reaction of Federico Ampatin that he was
afraid, so, because of fear he was able to point on the person of Albino
Bagas but when asked he does not know the name of Albino Bagas, Your
Honor.
Atty. Pacis: Before going to the second floor, because according to you the
arresting officers and the guide went to the second floor, was Albino Bagas
at the ground floor seen by the guide and the policemen?
A: We were the first group of persons seen by the policemen and Albino and
I were beside each other, sir.
Q: And you want to impressed (sic) upon this Honorable Court that at first at
the ground floor, Albino Bagas was not identified by this Ampatin before
going to the second floor?
A: The guide was not able to identify the person of Albino Bagas and that
was the reason why they still made searches at the second floor, sir.
Q: How was Federico Ampatin able to identify Albino Bagas when he was
accompanied by the policemen went downstairs?
A: I noticed from the reaction of Federico Ampatin that he was afraid after
hearing the shout of the policemen, sir.
xxx[30]
SO ORDERED.
x--x
FERNANDO, J.:
Evidence both direct and circumstantial resulted in the conviction for the
crime of murder of Domiciano Berame, now appellant, for the killing of the
deceased Quirico Maningo, apparently arising from the intense partisanship
generated by local politics. 1 In the original information for murder filed, a
certain Anastacio Montinola was likewise included, but he died soon
thereafter. Appellant Berame was positively Identified by a son of the
deceased, who was just a meter away at the salary of their rented house at
the time of the fatal incident. In the judgment now on appeal, the trial court
likewise took into consideration the flight of the appellant, his surrender
coming only after a month, the statement at the hospital made by the
wounded co-accused Montinola that along with him, appellant participated
in the act of shooting, and the fact that a rubber shoe, found in a swampy
area where assailants hid for a while, did fit the right foot of appellant. As
against such proof considered conclusive of the trial court, the defense of
alibi was unavailing. A careful study of the record persuades us of the
correctness of such a conclusion. We affirm.
3. Then, too, there was a statement made by one of the original co-
accused, Anastacio Montinola, on his being captured after the gunplay
where he was wounded, it turned out, mortally. He admitted his participation
in the killing of Maningo and pointed to appellant as one of his companions.
While not amounting to a dying declaration, the lower court considered it as
part of the res gestae, and rightly so. That was assigned as error by
appellant's counsel in view of the nine hours that had elapsed from the time
of the killing before its utterance. That is not enough to take it out of the
operation of the principle. The teaching of a host of cases from United States
v. David, 23 a 1903 decision, is to the effect that it should be given
credence. As was stressed by the then Chief Justice Concepcion in People
v. Ner 24 All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part
of the res gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a startling event
witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he had time to
think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to
fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside
from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending
circumstances" 25 As far back as 1942, in People v. Nartea 26 the marked
trend of decisions, according to Justice Ozaeta, is to extend, rather than
narrow, the scope of the doctrine admitting declarations as part of the res
gestae. Whether specific statements are admissible as part of the res gestae
is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, the determination of
which is ordinarily conclusive upon appeal, in the absence of a clear abuse
of discretion. 27 Here, again, there cannot possibly be any abuse of
discretion. That much is clear.
4. The last error assigned is the alleged failure of the lower court to hold
that the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of appellant, and therefore he should be entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence. 28, It requires a certain degree of temerity to
make such an assertion in the face of the competent and credible evidence
of record. This is one of those cases where the culpability of appellant was
shown in a manner that should remove any misgivings. The stage of moral
certainty certainly was reached. The defense of alibi was indisputably devoid
of merit. There was positive Identification. Then there were the
circumstances that indicated conclusively his participation in the criminal
act. The alibi was therefore disproved by direct and circumstantial evidence.
29 It, is not inappropriate to conclude with this observation by Justice
Endencia in People v. Dagatan, 30 considering the distance involved
between Cebu and Danao City: "In this particular case, appellants loosely
told the court that at around eleven o'clock on the night of June 11, 1937,
they were not in Carmen when the crime was being committed because they
were in Cebu. They, however, failed to present credible and tangible
evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at Carmen at that
time. On the contrary, they themselves furnished evidence that Carmen is
only about 40 kilometers from Cebu City, with abundant means of
transportation such as buses, jeepneys and trucks plying between the two
places, which would at most take an hour to go from one place to the other,
and according to Saturnino himself, it would only take him 40 minutes if he
were to drive the car himself " 31 The trial court therefore correctly decided
that appellant is guilty of the crime of murder, the offense being qualified by
elevosia with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling being offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The appropriate penalty
then, as.imposed in the appealed decision, is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of March 8, 1967 finding the
accused Domiciano Berame alias Doming guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
affirmed, with the only modification that the indemnity due the heirs of the
deceased should be in the amount of P12,000.00 and not P6,000.00.
x--x
SANCHEZ, J.:
The charge is murder. Defendant Anastacio Bulawin was found guilty thereof
by the trial court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term ranging
from ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Ciriaco Jimenez, in the amount of
P6,000 and to pay the cost. 1
Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals. 2 The appellate court was of the
view that the crime committed by defendant was murder, qualified by
treachery without any circumstance, aggravating or mitigating which
would call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, the case
was certified to this Court upon the provisions Sections 17 and 31 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 and Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.
September 23, 1963 was the barrio fiesta of Barrio Mabatao, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. A political meeting was, on the night of September 22,
being held at the fair grounds of the barrio. About 12:30 o'clock in the early
morning of September 23, 1963, Ciriaco Jimenez was leisurely walking
towards the meeting place. Just as he was about twenty meters therefrom,
he was shot. The bullet, found its mark "at the back of his buttocks, two
inches below the waistline." About 6:00 o'clock p.m. on the same day,
September 23, Ciriaco Jimenez died at the Aurora Provincial Hospital.
The errors assigned in the brief of counsel de officio funnel down to one
single proposition: Has the People discharged its heavy burden of proving
the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt? To this question, we
addressed ourselves. For the purpose, we explored the entire record.
1. The People's case was built mainly on the testimony of three witnesses:
Candido Autor, Sergeant Roberto Laurie of the Philippine Constabulary and
Aniceto Dacalos.
Q. While you were there on this occassion, was there any unusual incident
that happened?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please tell the Court what was that all about?
Q. How do you know that the accused Anastacio Bulawin shot Jimenez?
Q. Where?
A. In the place.
Q. You said in answer to the question of the Court you saw Ciriaco Jimenez
shot by Anastacio Bulawin. What was the position of Ciriaco Jimenez and
Anastacio Bulawin when Ciriaco Jimenez was shot?
A. Ciriaco Jimenez was walking to the meeting place with his arms akimbo.
Q. What part of the body of Ciriaco Jimenez was hit by the shot?
COURT
A. At the back of his buttock, two inches below the waist line.
PROSECUTION
Q. When Ciriaco Jimenez was hit at the back, what happened with Ciriaco
Jimenez?
A. Ciriaco Jimenez was able to turn his face to the back and fell to the
ground. 5
Q. Did you not see him before You heard the shot?
A. I did not.
Q. What was Anastacio Bulawin doing when you first saw him for the first
time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you mean to say that you did not see him despite the fact that he was
only one fathom more or less from you before the report of the shot?
A. I did not.
A. No, sir. 6
Soon after the incident, people went to the place where Jimenez fell.
Amongst them were Governor Ali Dimaporo, Vice-Governor Arsenio
Quibranza, Mayor Apolonio Yap and many others. Witness Autor, however,
testified that he communicated to nobody, although "Mr. Quibranza,
Dimaporo and his leaders were still there," 7 and left for home without even
extending a helping hand to the victim. Autor said that he did not mention
the incident to the people in his own house. These circumstances suggest a
substantial amount of improbability.
Q. You stated you met Ciriaco Jimenez with these persons you have
mentioned. What else did you do when you met Ciriaco Jimenez?
A. When I get inside the truck I said, "What's happened?" he said, "I was
shot." I further asked him, "Who shot you?" he said, "Anastacio Bulawin." I
further asked him, "Why did you see Anastacio Bulawin when it was dark?"
he replied that "I clearly saw him." I inquired from him as to whether he will
live with the wound be sustained. He replied that "I will live. Just bring me to
the hospital." 8
Q. This affidavit of yours was duly sworn to before Justice of the Peace
Panfilo Rama of Salvador, Lanao del Norte?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am going to remind you sergeant about the statement you made in this
affidavit wherein the question was asked in this wise:
"Q. What question did you ask to the victim?" and your answer is this,
"A. I asked him who shot him and he answered me that it was Bulawin. Then
I asked another question. Why did you recognize him when in fact it is dark?
Then the victim did not answer. I further asked another question, do you think
you will not die of your wound you received? He did not answer any more. So
Lt. Mejia ordered the driver to leave immediately for Aurora so that the victim
will be given immediate treatment of his wound." Is that correct?
COURT
Q. Therefore what you testified now before this Court is not correct because
it did not tally with what you said in that affidavit?
A. I have not read that affidavit because it is three years already. I even
forget there is affidavit being executed.
Q. Which is now the truth that the victim told you that he recognized
Anastacio Bulawin as his assailant or he did not answer you at all?
Q. What is right?
The value of Laurie's testimony is, indeed, impaired. First, because he did
not hesitate in Court to overshoot his mark. One wonders whether he
did so to make a weak case look good. Then, it does not strike us as natural
that given that opportunity, Sgt. Laurie, or any other constabulary officer for
that matter, did not put that statement of the deceased Ciriaco Jimenez into
writing, the better to preserve its worth as evidence. Written words speak a
uniform language. Oral recollection, in turn, could suffer from the treachery
of memory or from coloring. The deceased's statement, it should be
remembered, at least forms part of the res gestae.
Aniceto Dacalos. Thus witness claims that he was in the dancing hall when a
child came running and reported to the people there that somebody was
shot. With Governor Dimaporo, Vice Governor Quibranza, Mayor Yap and
others, they went to the scene which was more or less twenty meters away.
There, they saw Ciriaco Jimenez. Upon arrival, so his version goes, he
inquired from Jimenez who shot him. The following from the transcript of
Dacalos' testimony is quite revealing as to why defendant was a suspect:
A. I further asked him, "Are you certain that it was really Anastacio Bulawin
who shot you?" and he replied that I clearly saw him because the light
reached the place where he was then. 13
This last statement would contradict the affidavit of Sgt. Laurie who asked
question along similar lines. "Why did you recognize him when in fact it is
dark?" And, according to the affidavit of Sgt. Laurie heretofore quoted, "the
victim did not answer." This witness, Aniceto Dacalos, a neighbor and an old
friend of Ciriaco Jimenez, like the alleged eyewitness Candido Autor, did not
figure in the list of witnesses for the prosecution, either in the criminal
complaint filed by PC Capt. Golez or in the Fiscal's indictment. His name
was not amongst those who gave affidavits to back up the criminal charge.
This gives the impression that Aniceto Dacalos, the neighbor of the
deceased, was but an eleventh-hour witness. To take his testimony on its
face value, we fear, is to rate truth so lightly.
The foregoing evidence of the People leaves much to be desired. It exhibits
a gap between doubtful evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt. That
gap is not bridged. The evidence does not produce in an unprejudiced mind
that moral certainty so necessary to bring about conviction in a criminal
case. It is in this context that we find ourselves unprepared to send appellant
to jail for life, or, for that matter, for a long term of imprisonment. Because, we
are not morally convinced.
2. But if more were needed, circumstances there are which cast a heavy pall
of doubt on the sufficiency of the People's evidence. At about 4:00 o'clock
that morning of September 23, appellant herein was placed under arrest in
his own home. He was brought to the PC barracks. And yet, at about 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon of that day, he was released by Capt. Golez who told
him: "We cannot detain you here because there was no complaint filed.
However, you should report to this headquarters every day." 14 If really this
man were pinpointed by the deceased at about 2:00 a.m. of September
23 as the author of the grave crime of murder it must be borne in mind
that the affidavits were executed not on the 23rd of September but on
October 3, 1963 it does not seem probable that the peace officers would
release him so soon. There is then probability that the reason why he was
arrested was because he was merely a suspect. But without evidence
against him. And this could have sprung from the fact that as barrio captain,
the deceased Ciriaco Jimenez lodged a complaint for theft of large cattle
against a son of appellant by the name of Bitoy, amongst others. 15
And then, two of the defense witnesses, namely, Lamberto Maghinay and
Paciencio Bacaling were, likewise, investigated by the Constabulary on that
same morning of September 23, 1963. Nothing in the record suggests that
the testimonies of these two witnesses were taken in writing. The record
below at least does not show any such written statements. And these two
witnesses with another by the name of Melecio Lomolho supported the alibi
offered as a defense by appellant.
The foregoing facts are significant because, as aforesaid, the affidavits of the
People's witnesses were only taken on October 3, 1963, even as the peace
officers had prompt knowledge of the crime and allegedly learned of facts
which linked appellant to the crime as early as about two hours after the
perpetration thereof. And, as aforesaid, the criminal complaint was lodged in
the municipal court only on that day, October 3.
And, Autor testified that he (Autor) who knew appellant very well saw
appellant at the scene of the crime, recognized him because the light was
bright and the distance between the two was only about one fathom, asked
him "What is that?", whereupon appellant "ran away." 16 If all these were true,
it does not seem probable that appellant would make himself a sitting duck,
go to and stay in his home in Barrio Salong, about one kilometer from the
scene of the crime. And there to be arrested at about 4:00 o'clock in the
morning by Sgt. Sarbida and a provincial policeman by the name of Madid.
What did he run for?
4. We are not unmindful of the fact that appellant left his barrio on the 29th of
September, 1963, that is, five days after Ciriaco Jimenez was shot, and went
to live with his parents and sisters in Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. 17
But he did so because he was warned daily by his neighbors that there were
Maranaos hired by the brothers of the deceased Ciriaco Jimenez to liquidate
him. If he really intended to hide from the authorities, he would have done so
at the first opportunity. It would seem to us that his flight was induced by his
instinct of self-preservation.
5. The defense is alibi. The version given is that at about 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of September 22 after the cock-fighting was over, appellant
conducted a game of "hantak" in the cockpit of Dalama, which was about
five kilometers from the scene of the crime. That game of "hantak" lasted till
about 3:00 o'clock the following morning of September 23. After which,
appellant went over to the house of Lamberto Maghinay where they took a
drink for a few minutes. Then, appellant went home where he was arrested
as aforesaid. His testimony in this respect was corroborated by Lamberto
Maghinay, Paciencio Bacaling and Melecio Lomolho. It is to be recalled at
this point that witnesses Maghinay and Bacaling were investigated at the
Constabulary headquarters on that morning of September 23, 1963.
In the end, we have but to bear in mind that, by Constitution and law, a
defendant in a criminal case is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is
shown beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 We cannot downgrade this precept
by accepting less than what it exacts. Else, the protection afforded may be
more in sound than in substance. The People's evidence does not measure
up to this standard in this, a grave crime of murder.
For the reason that guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt,
we vote to reverse the judgment under review, to acquit defendant-appellant
Anastacio Bulawin of the crime charged, and to set him at liberty. Costs de
officio. So ordered.
x - - -x
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a case where the accused, Luis Delmendo y Balot and Florentino
Delmendo y Bal-ot having volunteered to donate their blood to save the life
of one, Alfredo Buccat, who had been earlier shot in his house in the evening
of February 26, 1969 and in fact, the accused Luis Delmendo did donate
250 cc. of his blood, were later charged with the murder of said Alfredo
Buccat upon the affidavits of the widow, Magdalena Buccat, and her son,
Elpidio Buccat, who were both present at the commission of the crime, which
affidavits were given to the police authorities on March 14, 1969 or 16 days
after the shooting of Alfredo Buccat.
That on or about the 26th day of February, 1969, at about 7:30 in the
evening, in barrio Agtipal Municipality of Bacnotan, Province of La Union,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused namely, LUIS DELMENDO and FLORENTINO DELMENDO,
conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and
with treachery and evident premeditation and did then and there willfully
unlawfully and feloniously shoot one ALFREDO BUCCAT, inflicting upon said
offended party, Alfredo Buccat, the following wounds:
2. That the crime is committed in the dwelling place of the offended party.
The two accused appealed the decision of conviction but the records were
erroneously transmitted to the Court of Appeals. On June 17, 1970, the same
were forwarded to this Court.
1. The trial court erred in finding that "at a distance of about nine meters Luis
fired at the deceased. " (p. 20, Decision.)
2. The trial court erred in concluding that "the identity of Luis as the gun
wielder was corroborated by the findings of Col. Minardo Finones, Chief of
the P.C. Central Laboratory showing that Luis Delmendo was positive for
powder burns." (p. 21, Decision.)
3. The trial court erred in holding that "with the positive identification of
both accused, the defense of alibi interposed by the accused, inherently
weak as it is, ail the more becomes even weaker and is not worthy of
credit." (p. 22, Decision.)
4. The trial court erred in finding that "Florentino Delmendo conspired with
Luis Delmendo to commit the offense. " (p. 23, Decision.)
The crucial issue in the case at bar is the Identities of the assailants who shot
the victim, Alfredo Buccat, in his house in Barrio Agtipal Municipality of
Bacnotan, La Union in the evening of February 26, 1969. The wife of the
deceased and his son, Magdalena Buccat and Elpidio Buccat, respectively,
point to the two defendant-appellants as the malefactors. Both accused,
however, stoutly denied the accusation against them.
Upon seeing the two appellants, Alfredo, who was in the yard talking with
Cipriano Delarna and Eniong Oredena, told his son Elpidio not to bring out
basi anymore because the 'drunks are here again referring to the appellants
(pp. 83, 91, 92, 110, 148, 158, 169, 170, t.s.n.), whereupon Cipriano and
Eniong left while father and son ascended their house for supper (pp. 82, 83,
148, 149, t.s.n.). While Alfredo and his family were having supper, the
appellants went up to the house (pp. 83, 94, 152, t.s.n.). Luis sat on the
window sin east of the dining table where the Buccats were eating, his feet
dangling out of the window, while Florentino stood beside him (pp. 83, 93,
152, 166, t.s.n.). A while thereafter, Florentino vomitted, causing the spouses
to complain of the appellants' bad manners, especially at a time that they
were eating (pp. 84, 85, 152, 153, 157, t.s.n.). Luis stood up and whispered
something to Florentino (pp. 84, 85, 153, 168, t.s.n.). Afterwards they left
eastward following the pathway to their houses (pp. 85, 95, t.s.n.).
Later on the appellants returned as the Buccat family had just finished
supper and while in the yard at a distance of about nine meters, appellant
Luis fired several times at Alfredo from behind (pp. 75, 76, 78, 81, 95, 117,
118, 154, 155, 170, 173, 174, t.s.n.). Alfredo slumped and fell down to the
floor (pp. 97, 119, t.s.n.). Magdalena and her son Elpidio ran to the kitchen
and screamed for help as they saw the appellants fleeing northward (pp. 81,
96, 119, 156, 174, t.s.n.).
The stricken victim was rushed to the Lorma Hospital in San Fernando, La
Union (p. 86, t.s.n.), where he was attended to by Dr. Rufino Macagba Jr.,
director of the hospital (pp. 40, 41, t.s.n.), but expired at about 11:20 o'clock
in the evening due to severe loss of blood caused by the gunshot wound
sustained on the chest (pp. 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, t.s.n.; Exhs. "F" and "G "). "
The principal witnesses for the prosecution are Magdalena Buccat, the
widow, and Elpidio Buccat, son of the victim. The testimony of the widow,
lifted from the decision of the trial court, is as follows:
While thus lingering after supper at seven o'clock that evening she saw the
accused Luis Delmendo with Florentino Delmendo at their yard. Then she
saw Luis fire at her husband who, upon being hit, collapsed to the floor from
the chair where he was seated. Immediately she ran for help towards the
kitchen door where she again saw accused Luis and Florentino running
towards the north.
She did not know who finally brought her husband to the Lorma Hospital at
San Fernando, La Union, but when she followed to the hospital at 10 o'clock
that evening her husband was already dead.
The material testimony of the son Elpidio is likewise recited in the trial court's
decision, and We quote:
After the Buccat family had finished their supper, the victim rested for a while
on the same chair by the dining table but had changed his original sitting
position such that his back was turned against the dining table. Witness on
the other hand remained seated by the table facing west in his original
position now tinkering with the picture frame. He was reaching for the picture
frame when he saw both accused suddenly appear at the western window of
the dining room. He saw Luis Delmendo aim and fire at his father. At this
precise moment, Florentino was about one meter behind Luis Delmendo
After the gun fired, witness ran to the kitchen and out of the house to report
the shooting to a neighbor, Herminio Marquez.
Witness Elpidio Buccat did not reveal the Identities of the assailants of his
father that same night except to his mother who advised him not to reveal
their Identities yet to anybody for fear of reprisal.
Corporal Modesto Espejo of the Bacnotan Police Force was the first police
authority who, upon learning of the incident about 8:00 o'clock that evening,
proceeded immediately to the scene at Barrio Agtipal with Patrolman Partible
and two enlisted PC men assigned to Bacnotan. We also quote hereunder
Cpl. Espejo's testimony as cited in the decision:
Upon their arrival, the deceased was no longer there. He learned he was
brought to the Lorma Hospital at San Fernando by men from barrio Agtipal.
He interrogated the widow and their son and one Tinoy Delmendo (He was
not sure of the surname), but did not reduce them in writing because he
turned over the investigation to Sgt. Camilo Marquez. He gathered by his
routine police investigation that same evening that the deceased was shot in
his house at barrio Agtipal. He recovered six empty shells west of the house
on the ground under the window, and a slug inside the house embedded in
a window frame east of the house.
Later he made a verbal report to the chief of police to whom he also turned
over the six empty shells (Exh. D) and one slug (Exh. E). At the municipal
building a guard informed him that the suspects were also at the hospital. He
transmitted the information to Pat. Marquez who was then at the hospital.
The evidence for the prosecution further show that the accused Luis
Delmendo and Florentino Delmendo were subjected to paraffin tests at the
Provincial Constabulary Headquarters in San Fernando, La Union where they
were taken by Sgt. Camilo Marquez of the Police Force at the time said
accused Luis Delmendo and Florentino Delmendo were at the Lorma
Hospital in San Fernando, La Union where the two had gone to volunteer
with other barriomates to donate blood to the wounded Alfredo Buccat.
Paraffin casts of both hands of Luis Delmendo, Florentino Delmendo and
Fernando Ganiola were taken by staff Sgt. Godoy on 27 February 1969,
0830H. The chemistry report No. C-91-69 marked Exhibit "B"contained the
following findings: "1. Luis Delmendo Both hands gave POSITIVE result to
the test for the presence of gunpowder residue (Nitrates); and Fernando
Ganiola and Florentino Delmendo NEGATIVE to the test for the presence of
gunpowder residue (Nitrates)."
The trial court further summarized the testimony of Sgt. Camilo Marquez,
who took over the investigation of the case from Cpl. Modesto Espejo. Sgt.
Marquez admitted that the deceased Alfredo Buccat was his second cousin
and, therefore, a close relative of the aggrieved family. According to the
decision, p. 5; Records, p. 169.
He tried to talk to the widow and son but they could not give him some
enlightenment as they had not then recovered their composure and were
hysterical Others he interviewed refused to talk 'probably because they did
not have knowledge of the crime.' Thereafter, however, he tried to find clues,
and on March 17, 1969, he obtained a written statement of one Cipriano
Delarna
It is a fact that it was only on March 14, 1969 or after 16 days from the day of
the shooting incident that the widow, Magdalena and her son, Elpidio, both
went to the office of the Chief of Police of Bacnotan La Union and there and
then they gave their written statements about the shooting, Identifying the
accused, Luis Delmendo and Florentino Delmendo as the assailants who
shot Alfredo Buccat. Their affidavits were subscribed and sworn to before
Municipal Atty. and Special Counsel Eufemio R. Molina on March 19, 1969.
Testifying for the defense, Revelino Balen, the barrio captain of Agtipal
Bacnotan, La Union, declared that between the hours of 7:00 and 8:00 in the
evening of February 26, 1969 he was working in his flue-curing barn in
Agtipal when he heard gun reports from a northerly direction. He proceeded
northward to investigate the cause of the gunfire when he met children who
were running southward and reporting, "Tata Pidong was shot." He then
proceeded to the house of Alfredo Buccat the victim, and found his bleeding
body inside the kitchen. There were many people near the crime scene. He
called for a tricycle to bring the victim to the hospital. On the way to the
Lorma Hospital he asked the victim who shot him, but the latter answered " I
do not know." He saw both accused at the hospital but did not know their
purpose in going there.
Pedro Valmonte, barrio councilman of Agtipal also testified for the defense,
saying that between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. on the date of the incident, he heard
gun reports and when he heard the sound of a horn giving the alarm, he
proceeded to the house of the victim which was rumored to be the source of
the gun reports. He came upon the victim loaded into a tricycle for the
purpose of rushing him to a hospital. He also stated that he inquired from
Magdalena Buccat and her son Elpidio Buccat if they knew the assailants
and they replied in the negative. He asked Magdalena where the assailant
was at the time he fired at the victim and Magdalena pointed to the
southeastern part of her house saying, "That is the place where the flash of
light came from." Valmonte also declared that he searched for evidence
particularly empty shells to help authorities solve the crime but he could not
find any at the place pointed to by the widow. He, however, found six empty
shells about a meter below the window west of the house and he covered
them with a wash basin to avoid them being touched by anyone.
This witness further testified that he campaigned for blood donors willing to
give their blood for the victim, and two caretela loads of people responded to
the request for blood, he accompanying them up to the national road where
they were later on transported to the Lorma Hospital where the victim was
taken. He also said that both accused, Luis Delmendo and Florentino
Delmendo were among those who volunteered to donate their blood to the
victim.
As to the fact of the blood donation given by the accused Luis Delmendo the
records disclosed that in truth and in fact, said accused donated 250 cc. of
his blood type "B" to the victim Alfredo Buccat, on February 26, 1969 as
shown in the certificate issued by Nora Safra, medical technologist of the
Lorma Hospital. (Exh. " 1 ").
The trial court in convicting the two accused, reached such conclusion on
the following rationale:
That Luis Delmendo fired the gun that killed the deceased; that Florentino
Delmendo was near and in company with Luis; and that both of them were
positively Identified by the witnesses Magdalena Buccat and Elpidio Buccat
the court has no valid reason to doubt. At a distance of about nine meters at
night one can easily be Identified by the light of a kerosene lamp (such as
that used by the family of the deceased) especially if the party is well-known
to the Identifier. Both the accused and the witnesses are barriomates and are
well known to each other. Furthermore, the Identity of Luis as the gun wielder
was corroborated by the findings of Col. Minardo Finones chief of the P.C.
Central Laboratory showing that Luis Delmendo was positive for powder
burns.
The testimonies of Magdalena and Elpidio, even if they are the widow and
son, respectively, of the deceased corroborate each other in an respects.
They have been shown not to be perjured and no motive or reason was ever
faintly suggested why they will perjure their testimonies. Indeed, the accused
himself admitted that before the incident, they were in the best of terms with
the deceased. Aside from these, the testimony of Magdalena and Elpidio of
the shooting as well as the place where Luis fired from was further
substantiated by the testimony of police Corporal Modesto Espejo who
testified that he recovered six empty shells thereat plus a slug embedded on
the frame of the eastern window of the ground floor of the victim's house.
(Decision, pp. 21-22; Records, pp. 185-186).
Assailing the above decision, the main thrust of the defense is that the
testimonies of the widow, Magdalena, and her son, Elpidio, relative to the
Identity of the malefactors cannot be believed and relied upon because
there are compelling reasons why their declarations cannot be given full faith
and credence. And these are: (1) The three kerosene lamps were all inside
the house as testified to by Mrs. Buccat. It must have been dark outside
considering that it was already between 7:00 and 8:00 o'clock in the
evening, hence, it was quite difficult for her to recognize persons outside of
her house at the time of the incident; (2) While she testified that she saw one
of the malefactors aim his gun to her husband, she did not even warn her
husband of the danger to his life; she did not shout a warning at all. This is
an unnatural behavior of a wife witnessing the danger to her husband. Had
she really seen the accused Luis Delmendo aim his gun at the deceased
husband of Mrs. Buccat, the latter would have certainly shouted a warning to
him as a natural and instinctive reaction; (3) Her testimony on cross-
examination that despite the time of the night (between 7:00 to 8:00 o' clock)
she was even able to recognize the color of the shirts of the appellants, i.e.,
Luis was wearing light brown shirt while Florentino was wearing a reddish
shirt (p. 136, TSN, October 16, 1969), are exaggerations in an attempt to
appear credible, only to unmask her incredibility. It is unbelievable to
recognize with accuracy the color of a shirt at that time of the night
especially when the color of the shirt is dark. It is next to impossible since
any colored object on a dark night without the aid of artificial light would
appear to be black to the naked eye. And since the alleged assailants were
some nine meters away from the victim (p. 7, Decision) and therefore even
further away from Mrs. Buccat, an accurate Identification cannot be relied
upon; (4) When Mrs. Buccat was investigated by the police immediately after
the shooting, she did not mention the names of the assailants of her husband
to the police investigator, her reason being. "I did not then mention because I
was then crying." (p. 139, TSN, Oct. 16, 1969). The defense argues that her
reason for not divulging the assailants of her husband on the night she was
investigated is flimsy for even if she was crying, it was easy for her to
mention the names of the assailants, but she did not. It would have been
more natural for her to mention the names of the assailants in the course of
her investigation even if not asked or prodded to do so. It was only on March
14, 1969, or more than two weeks after the incident, that she divulged the
names of her husband's assailants allegedly because it was only then that
she "had composed" herself. Thus, she testified:
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTORNEY GUALBERTO:
Q The first time you ever gave your statement about who killed your
husband was March 14, 1969, which is found on your statement on page 34
of the record of the case?
Q That was the only time when you divulged the identities of the alleged
assailant of your husband to peace officers?
A Yes, sir.
Q That was also the only time when you mentioned about the incident
surrounding the circumstances surrounding the incident?
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY ATTORNEY CACANINDIN:
Q Why did it take you until March 14, to go to the police officers and give
your written statement?
A At the time of the week few days after the incident, I had not yet
composed myself. On March 14, when I had composed myself, I went to the
authorities to give my statement. (p. 142, TSN, October 16, 1969.)
BY ATTORNEY CARIASO
Q When you saw them (appellants), did you not go to the police authority
and tell the authorities to arrest them as they are the assailants of your
father?
Q Why?
A The following day, Sir, after the incident. (pp. 181-182, TSN, October 23,
1969.)
The defense considers the foregoing testimony as valueless for two reasons:
First, because on the night of the incident immediately after his father was
shot, the police investigators were already in their house conducting an on
the spot investigation. So he could have informed them of the identities of his
father's assailants right then and there, since there was yet no instructions
from his mother not to divulge the names of the malefactors, if it is true that it
was the following day of the incident that his mother advised Mm not to give
the authorities the identities of the assailants. Second, because his testimony
on this point is in direct contradiction with his mother's testimony to the effect
that immediately after the body of her husband was brought to the hospital,
she told Elpidio of the identity of the assailants at the same time telling him
"not to talk as yet about the matter, " to wit:
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. CARIASO
Q Aside from Espejo, did you ever tell any other person especially
members of your household about the Identity of the assailants of your
husband?
A None, sir.
COURT:
You did not tell anybody, or you do not remember having told anybody?
A It was to Elpidio, my son, whom I told, sir, that "You will not talk as yet
about the matter".
A When the body of my husband was already brought to the hospital (p.
99, TSN, October 15, 1969. )
The testimony of Elpidio that his mother told him not to reveal the Identity of
the assailants to the police authorities is a lie because the body of the
deceased was brought to the hospital on the same night of the incident. And
since the testimony is false, the defense argues that his whole testimony
should be disregarded under the principle of falsus in uno falsus omnibus,
false in one, false in all under "the cardinal rule which has served in all ages,
and has been applied to all conditions of men, that a witness wilfully
falsifying the truth in one particular, when upon oath, ought never to be
believed upon the strength of his own testimony, whatever he may
assert." (U.S. vs. Osgood 27 Fed. Case No. 15971-a, p. 364).
The defense maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that "the
Identity of Luis as the gun wielder was corroborated by the findings of Col.
Minardo Finones Chief of the P.C. Central Laboratory, showing that Luis
Delmendo was positive for powder burns." (p. 21, Decision). It is contended
that the findings of the laboratory that both hands of Luis Delmendo were
positive for powder bums is not conclusive that he fired the gun in the light of
the passion of Col. Finones that there is such a thing as "false negative," that
is if he did not fire a gun but found positive for nitrates (p. 10, TSN, Sept. 23,
1969); that it is possible that a person who did not fire a gun could be found
positive for powder burns; that "even a mere handling, for one occasion, of
fertilizer could produce nitrates on one's hand" (pp. 11-12, TSN, Sept. 23,
1969). In short, Col. Finones admitted that (1) one who works in a laboratory
and handles nitrates will have nitrates in his hands (p. 7, TSN, Sept. 23,
1969); (2) even smoking could produce nitrates (p. 11, Id.); (3) even
urinating also produces nitrates (p. 11, Id); and (4) handling of fertilizer also
produces nitrates. (p. 13, Id.).
The defense further contends that although Col. Finones testified that
nitrates from gun powder is fine and thin whereas other nitrates give fighter
color and bigger smell, he admitted that this is not conclusive (p. 12, TSN,
Sept. 23, 1969). This means that although thin and fine nitrates were found in
the hands of Luis Delmendo such fact is not conclusive that he fired a gun.
It is not disputed that accused Luis Delmendo was at the time of the incident
an employee of the Filipinos Magnetite Corporation, FILMAG for short,
working under Engineer Daniel P. Cafuir Chemical Engineer, in the Assay
Department of said firm (pp. 330-331, TSN, March 5, 1970). Luis was then a
laboratory technician in said firm, assisting the firm's chemist in "the analysis
of elements, iron concentrate and copper ores that he used to handle
chemicals and although he was equipped with gloves to prevent him from
contamination, he had been working without gloves, reason for which the
firm used to reprimand him. (p. 332, TSN, Id.). Engineer Cafuir likewise
declared that: "The chemicals most often used in the laboratory are acid
solvents like hydrocloric acid, sulphuric acid, nitrate acid, perphloric acid,
nitric acid, potassium dichromate, chemicals which pertain to other analysis
of different elements ammonium nitrate, potasium iodine, sodium
thiasulphate " (pp. 336-337, TSN, March 5, 1970).
In convicting the two accused for the murder of the victim in this case, the
conviction must be based on evidence that is clear, positive and strong
creating a moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused. The charge against
them must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since the two alleged
eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime are the widow and son of the
victim, their testimonies pointing to the accused as the perpetrators must be
subjected to a rigid test which should demonstrate beyond cavil their
truthfulness, honesty and rectitude as actual eyewitnesses to the
perpetration of the criminal act. There must never be any shadow of doubt,
any cloud of suspicion or deception to conceal the facts and disguise the
truth. The first, if not the basic foundation upon which the prosecution builds
its case against the accused is proof beyond reasonable doubt that it is the
said accused who committed the crime charged. In other words, the Identity
of the accused is the first duty of the prosecution.
As earlier indicated, the widow, Magdalena, and her son, Elpidio, both point
the accusing finger to the two accused as the assailants. Yet, the evidence
clearly show that it took them 16 days after the commission of the crime to
lay the blame upon both accused for the first time when on March 14, 1969,
these alleged eyewitnesses went to the police department in the townhall to
make their written statements and accuse the two defendants, although
police investigators (one of them the police sergeant who was their close
relative) had gone to the house of the victim and the witnesses to conduct an
on-the spot investigation that very night when the shooting occurred on
February 26, 1969. The credibility of their testimonies are, therefore, seriously
attacked.
In People vs. Baquiran 20 SCRA 451, 456-458, the Supreme Court said:
The widow's behavior after the incident was even more puzzling and leads
us to the conclusion that she did not at all recognize her husband's assassin
and that her subsequent Identification of the appellant was an afterthought
born of a prejudiced mind. She related that when she reported the murder to
the PC detachment at Tumauini around one o'clock in the morning of April
30, 1959, she told Sgt. Venturina that it was Fulgencio Baquiran who shot her
husband. But Sgt. Venturina denied this and testified that she refused and
would not talk about the matter. Mateo Forto who, she admitted, was present
when she made the report to Sgt. Venturina, confirmed the sergeant's
testimony and added that she said that she was not able to recognize any of
the killers. Forto also disclosed that on the way to Tumauini, he questioned
Juanita as to the identity of her husband's assailants and that the widow
replied that she was not able to recognize them because they had the brim
of their caps tilted downwards. Bernardo Gumatay, chief of police of
Tumauini, testified similarly. When he investigated the widow at the scene of
the crime, the latter revealed that she could not recognize the malefactors
because it was dark. Upon his return to Tumauini Gumatay entered the result
of the evening's investigation in the police blotter under date of April 30,
1959 (Exh. 3). Dr. Laman, who overheard the conversation between Gumatay
and the widow, corroborates the former's testimony. These witnesses have
not been shown by the prosecution to have any inordinate interest in the
acquittal of the accused. No one is a relative of barrio-mate of the appellant.
They are disinterested persons and the record does not indicate any reason
for us to disbelieve their testimonies or to suspect their motives.
The natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime and recognizes the
offender is to reveal it to the authorities at the earliest opportunity. Juanita
Marilao did report the crime to the Constabulary but she did not reveal the
identity of the assailant although it was inquired into three times or more. it
taxes credulity that Juanita made no effort to expose the appellant then. Her
silence casts serious doubt on her subsequent identification of the appellant,
Had she really recognized the appellant, as the prosecution contended, she
would have immediately and spontaneously revealed his Identity upon
reporting the crime as would be expected according to the natural course of
things. The argument that she was still in a state of shock after the incident
and that she was afraid of reprisal from the assailants who were still at large
is not supported by the evidence on record. The fact that she was able to
seek out Ocampo and Forto to help her go to Tumauini on the night of the
murder does not show a confused and disorganized mind. If she were afraid
of reprisal, wouldn't it be more in consonance with common experience for
her to have revealed the identity of the accused that he might safely be put
behind bars? As it were, the accused was not ordered arrested until May 3,
1959 after Sgt. Venturina filed a complaint the day before. This is in itself
significant for it lends support to the declarations of Celedonia and Fulgencio
that the identification of the latter as the alleged assailant took place on May
1, 1959 and not on April 30 as asserted by both Juanita and Venturina. As
previously mentioned, Juanita testified that she identified the accused as the
murderer of her husband during the first hours of the morning of April 30,
1959 when she reported her husband's death to the PC detachment at
Tumauini. This was denied and contradicted by Sgt. Venturina who asserted
that the identification was made during the confrontation between the widow
and the appellant in the morning of April 30 around nine or ten o'clock in the
morning. Celedonia, who was investigated together with her mother as
Venturina himself admitted, testified that the investigation took place on May
1, 1959 and that the accused was not present at all. This corroborates
Baquiran's statements to the same effect. For more than twenty-four hours
then no word was received from the widow as to the identity of her
husband's killers. This despite the fact that after her husband's burial on
April 30, she decided to spend the rest of the day and night in Tamauini. If
Sgt. Venturina filed the complaint only on May 2, 1959, it could have been
due to the fact that the widow made her Identification only the day before,
May 1, 1959. But then, she had had more than ample time for reflection and
what was merely a suspicion deepened into a conviction. She admitted on
cross-examination that she was not able to identify her husband's killer
although she suspected somebody. Thus:
Q You want to make this Honorable Court understand that the Chief of
Police, together with his two policemen, Domingo and Taguba, went to that
place where your husband was shot and killed without interrogating or
making investigation regarding the assailant?
A He asked me, sir.
Q And there you told him that you were not able to identify the person
who shot and killed your husband, although you suspected somebody?
She repeated her suspicions later to Chief of Police Gumatay after the burial
of her husband, mentioning the name of Baquiran as the suspect. Needless
to say, suspicion is no Identification. And the fact that she merely had
suspicions is an indication that at the time her husband was shot, she was
not able to make a positive Identification of the assailant.
In People vs. Bulawin 29 SCRA 710, 714-715, 719-720, where the witness
did not mention the incident to the people in his own house and where an
investigation was then being conducted by the Constabulary the Supreme
Court said
Soon after the incident, people went to the place where Jimenez felt
Amongst them were Governor Ali Dimaporo, Vice-Governor Arsenio
Quibranza, Mayor Apolonio Yap and many others. Witness Autor however,
testified that he communicated to nobody, although "Mr. Quibranza,
Dimaporo and his leaders were still there," and left for home without even
extending a helping hand to the victim Autor said that he did not mention the
incident to the people in his own house. These circumstances suggest a
substantial amount of improbability.
In People vs. Cunanan 19 SCRA 769, where the witness revealed the Identity
of the accused seven days after the shooting of the victim and his reason
was that every member of the family of the deceased was very angry and he
was afraid to reveal the Identity of the culprit sooner as "something also
untoward would even happen," and "(t)he situation might be aggravated," (p.
775) the Supreme Court, thru Justice Sanchez, held:
In People vs. Roxas, 73 SCRA 583, where the two witnesses gave their
statements after the wake, or a delay of five days from the shooting of the
deceased because their deceased uncle was a bachelor, without any family
to attend to his burial, the Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Antonio,
ruled:
In People vs. Aquino, 93 SCRA 772, where the witnesses reported 12 days
after the shooting, it was therein held with Justice Abad Santos as ponente
that:
If, indeed, these witnesses had recognized and Identified the assailants,
they would have reported the shooting and revealed the Identity of the
culprits, to the police authorities, at the earliest possible opportunity, as
could ordinarily be expected of witnesses to a fatal shooting. But, not one of
them did so.
On the main, all that the prosecution had proved was the fact of death of
Benigno Pascua, but it failed to prove by outright, convincing and conclusive
evidence that such death was caused by the accused. The evidence for the
prosecution does not even show that attempts were made to recover the
Garand rifle allegedly used in the shooting, or that any of the accused was in
possession of a rifle at the time of the shooting. It does not even appear that
formal and thorough investigation was made of the accused, more
particularly of Pedro Casimina who appears to have been hastily included in
the murder charge.
A None, sir.
Q When was the first time that you ever told anybody that you recognized
the assailants of your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you not say a while ago that you never told anyone the identity of
the assailants of your husband that night?
A I cannot remember if I told that to Itong Espejo, but maybe, I told it, sir,
because he talked to me that night.
Q But did you not state a while ago that you do not even remember
whether he investigated you that time?
Q Aside from Espejo, did you ever tell any other person especially
members of your household about the identity of the assailants of your
husband?
A None, sir.
THE COURT:
You did not tell anybody, or you do not remember having told anybody?
A It was to Elpidio, my son, whom I told, sir, that 'You will not talk as yet
about the matter.
A No, sir.
Q That is why you did not tell Itong who killed your husband?
A I did not then mention because I was then crying. (t.s.n., pp. 138-139,
October 16, 1969)
We have also the testimony of Sgt. Camilo Marquez, a second cousin of the
deceased Alfredo Buccat, who declared that "upon going to Agtipal from the
hospital he had occasion to talk to Magdalena Arellano, widow of the
deceased Alfredo Buccat, but he was not able to talk to her because she
was hysterical and was continuously crying." (t.s.n., p. 55, September 23,
1969). The sergeant was also asked this question: "Q - In other words, you
tried with desperate efforts from February 26, 1969 up to March 14, 1969, to
talk with the widow and the children and yet was unable to make them talk?"
and his answer was: "A- They were all hysterical." (t.s.n., p. 59, Sept. 23,
1969).
This testimony of Sgt. Marquez must be believed in full because he is a
close relative of the deceased and it is but a normal and natural reaction of
the widow, shocked by the shooting of her husband, rendering her
speechless or unable to talk. But when the police accompanied by P.C.
soldiers and later followed by Sgt. Marquez, an of whom would provide
protection and security to the aggrieved family, it became the duty of the
widow to reveal the identities of the assailants, even in confidence to the
sergeant as a close relative if she really knew said assailants. But the widow
did not, and from this omission or failure to reveal the identities of the
perpetrators, We can only conclude that in truth she was not able to identify
the killers of her husband. Her reason that she was crying and was
hysterical, that she was not composed and that she was afraid of their lives
can no longer be justified in the light of the long delay of 16 days when she
finally went to give her statement to the police. Her explanation is no longer
valid to excuse the lateness of her accusation against the accused after
more than two weeks had passed. Indeed, "this stultified silence casts grave
doubts as to their veracity. " (People vs. Bulawin 29 SCRA 710).
Second, the testimony of Elpidio, 19-year old son of the deceased, who
claims to have seen the two accused shoot his father, is likewise doubtful. It
is even contradictory for, according to Elpidio, the first time he told anyone
about the identity of the assailants of his father was when he told his mother
and that was when she asked him if he saw Florentino and Luis Delmendo
shoot his father. His mother allegedly asked the question that same evening
of the shooting which was February 26, 1969, after the father was already in
the hospital. (t.s.n., pp. 177-178, Hearing of Oct. 23, 1969). Yet, according to
Elpidio himself on cross- examination, it was on the following day after the
incident that he was advised by his mother not to make a report to the
authorities for fear of their lives. (t.s.n., pp. 181-182, Hearing on Oct. 23,
1969). Contrary-wise, Magdalena told her son Elpidio not to talk as yet about
the matter when the body of her husband was already brought to the
hospital (which was in the evening of February 26, 1969). (t. t.s.n., p. 99,
Hearing of Oct. 15, 1969).
Following the testimony of Elpidio, he declared that after the shooting of his
father, he ran out of the kitchen door and sought help in the neighboring
house of Herminio Marquez, ten meters away from their own house, telling
Herminio that his father had been shot. Herminio Marquez is the brother of
Sgt. Camilo Marquez, the second police investigator of the incident and
admittedly a second cousin of the victim, Alfredo Buccat. This Herminio,
being a close neighbor, is also a close relative of the aggrieved family. Now,
when Elpidio on the witness stand was asked: "Q Did Herminio Marquez
ask you the Identity of the persons who shot your father when you came to
him?" Elpidio's answer was: "A No, sir." Then followed this question: "Q
And you did not volunteer to tell him "A No, sir." (t.s.n., p. 177, October
23,1969).
This failure of Elpidio to inform even their neighbor Herminio Marquez, who is
also a second cousin of his father, being the brother of police investigator
Sgt. Camilo Marquez, which would have been a very logical and natural
particular to disclose in Elpidio's report or account of what had happened to
his father as stated by him to Herminio as the former sought for help, must
cast grave doubts as to the credibility of Elpidio's testimony that he saw and
identified the two accused as the assailants of his father.
Third, the lapse of 16 days during which time Magdalena and Elpidio did not
go to the police to give their statements or affidavits also engenders grave
doubts that the two alleged eyewitnesses actually saw the two accused in
the act of shooting the victim. Claiming that they volunteered to go to the
Presidencia to be investigated in connection with the incident and that they
were not summoned, Magdalena explained that after the incident she had
not yet composed herself and it was only on March 14, 1969 that she had
composed herself.
Such explanation or reason is weak, if not sham, considering that the usual
mourning period had already elapsed. She may be the aggrieved widow but
certainly, her grief cannot be so protracted as to be neglectful to seek
immediate justice with the help of the police. That the witnesses
procrastinated or delayed in going to the police authorities strongly indicates
the conclusion that they did not actually see the assailants or they were not
sure and positive as to their identities.
That Magdalena could identify the color of the assailants' shirts and that
Elpidio could identify the color of their pants which must have been hidden
by the lower portion of the window through which they were sighted, appears
to be an exaggeration, if not imagination to lend credence to their
identification. These and other details which the witnesses recalled and what
each did after the shooting to prove their memory do not, however, impress
Us in the face of the indisputable fact that the witnesses delayed
unreasonably in accusing the two assailants to the police.
And Sgt. Camilo Marquez, a second cousin of the victim who took over the
investigation from Cpl. Espejo, did not interview the widow allegedly
because she was crying. Yet, the police waited until March 14, 1969, 16
days after the shooting, to resume its investigation when the affidavits of the
witnesses were taken, only to be subscribed and sworn to 5 days thereafter,
on March 19, 1969. From this indecision and hesitancy, it can be reasonably
inferred that the evidence then at hand was insufficient and doubtful to
formally charge the accused.
A There is.
A When the two accused were approaching our house, they were seen
by my husband.
A My husband said, "Do not bring out basi anymore because the drunks
are here again".
A To my son, Elpidio.
Q And who were the drunks referred to by your husband who were
arriving?
Q For whom was that basi which Elpidio was trying to bring out?
THE COURT:
THE COURT:
But he did not tell anything to you that he was sore at you? I refer to
Florentino.
A He did not do anything, Sir, but I saw him very sore at me. (t. s. n pp.
107-108, Hearing October 15, 1969)
The last point is the defense of alibi set up by the accused. Alibi is a weak
defense that cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused by
eyewitnesses (People vs. Estrocada 75 SCRA 295; People vs. Roncal 79
SCRA 509). Alibi assumes importance where evidence for prosecution is
weak and betrays lack of concreteness on question of whether or not the
accused committed the crane charged. An accused cannot be convicted on
the basis of evidence which, independently of his alibi is weak,
uncorroborated, and inconclusive. The rule that alibi must be satisfactorily
proven was never intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases;
otherwise, there would be the absurdity of an accused being put in a more
difficult position where the prosecution's evidence is vague and weak than
where it is strong. (People vs. Lim, L-46890, Nov. 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 496).
The same rule is reiterated in People vs. Dilao, L- 43259, Oct. 23, 1980, 100
SCRA 358,394.
Re-stated otherwise, the weakness of the defense of alibi does not relieve
the prosecution of the required burden of proof. (People vs. Aquino, 93
SCRA 7'0 2; People vs. Salazar, 93 SCRA 796). And although alibi is the
weakest defense that an accused can avail of, it acquires commensurate
strength where no positive and proper identification has been made by the
witnesses of the offender. The prosecution has the onus probandi in
establishing the guilt of the accused and the weakness of the defense does
not relieve it of this responsibility. (People vs. Cruz, L-24424, March
30,1970,32 SCRA 181).
We have already ruled herein that the prosecution has not presented clear,
positive and convincing evidence identifying the two accused as the actual
assailants or perpetrators of the shooting of the victim, Alfredo Buccat. The
basis of Our ruling have been laid down and explained and the inevitable
end result is that We must acquit the two accused not because their defense
of alibi is weak, although such defense has acquired commensurate strength
due to failure of positive and proper identification of the offenders by the
witnesses, but on the ground that the prosecution has failed to discharge its
responsibility of proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For indeed, the
duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
peradventure of doubt is a primary one, and until and unless such duty has
been performed, the constitutional presumption of innocence to which the
accused is entitled must be upheld, whether his defense of alibi is weak or
strong.
While the prosecution is not required to submit such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty but only moral
certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind (Rule 133, Sec. 2, Rules of Court), in the case at bar, We
are confronted with inculpatory facts and circumstances which are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with their guilt. In such a situation, as
held by the Supreme Court in People vs. Abana, 76 Phil. 1; People vs.
Pacana 47 Phil. 48, 57; People vs. Bautista, 81 Phil. 78; People vs. Parayno,
L-24804, July 5, 1968, 25 SCRA 3, the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
We have analyzed and weighed the whole proof of the case at hand, the
totality of all the facts and circumstances presented before Us, and after
such careful analysis, review and appraisal We find inability to let the mind
rest easy upon the moral certainty of their guilt.
Thus, in People vs. Gallora L-21740, Oct. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 780, 786,
where the circumstances are in some respects similar to the present case,
the Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Makalintal said:
The corroborated alibi of appellant; the fact that he did not hesitate to go
with the municipal authorities to the scene of the crime; the failure of the two
material witnesses for the prosecution to identify him when identification
would have been most timely and in accord with natural human reaction the
absence of evidence concerning motivation; and the finding of the telltale
handkerchief in the possession of another person all these circumstances
cannot but cast a grave doubt as to the guilt of appellant.
Indeed, the impartial and unbiased mind is not laid to rest easy upon the
moral certainty of the accused being guilty in the light of the very singular
fact that both accused Luis and Florentino, immediately volunteered to be
blood donors to save the life of the victim. Alfredo. The very evidence of the
prosecution show that both accused joined and rode with other volunteers in
two caretelas to the town and then took a Thames transportation jitney to San
Fernando town at the Lorma Hospital and there, Luis was tested as to the
suitability of his blood type and accordingly, gave 250 cc. of his life blood,
type "B" to the victim which is attested by the certification of the Medical
Technician, Nora Zafra, in Exhibit "1". According to the accused Luis, he
donated blood because Alfredo Buccat was his uncle, the latter being a
second cousin of Luis' father, and he had no misunderstanding with his
uncle.
The trial court's holding that this sacrifice of blood donation made by the
accused Luis Delmendo was possibly a manifestation of remorse on the part
of the accused after their drunken state had subsided, is clearly a distortion
for a drunken person cannot be accepted for blood transfusion or donation.
Likewise, to hold that possibly the accused went with the crowd to the
hospital to hide their responsibility for the crime is purely conjectural and
speculative. The records do not disclose any reasonable basis, not an iota of
proof for such a conclusion arrived at by the court a quo.
As to the P.C. findings in Exhibit "C" that the dorsal portion of both hands of
the accused Luis Delmendo was found positive for gunpowder residue
(nitrates), the same is, to Our mind, satisfactorily explained by the testimony
of Luis who at the time was employed with Filipinos Magnetite Corporation
{FILMAG} and his work was assisting the chemists in assaying or analyzing
iron concentrates and copper ore from the black sands dogged out by
FILMAG, using his hands, sometimes with gloves and other times without
gloves, causing yellowish discoloration on the palm, fingers, fingertips and
dorsal portion of both hands. The work involved the handling and mixing of
chemicals such as ammonium nitrate, potassium nitrate, sodium nitrate and
other reagents The nature of Luis' work as a laboratory technician is
corroborated by his immediate superior, Chemical Engineer Daniel P.Cafuir
In resume, where the evidence clearly and convincingly show that (1) the
material witnesses of the prosecution, the widow and son of the deceased
failed to reveal and identify the assailants to the police and P.C. authorities at
the earliest opportunity when they arrived to investigate the shooting soon
thereafter, not even to the police sergeant, a close relative of the aggrieved
family, who followed up the investigation; (2) that the son, reporting to and
seeking help from an uncle living only 10 meters away from the scene of the
crime, did not also disclose the assailants' identities; (3) that both material
witnesses delayed unreasonably for 16 days after the shooting to go to the
police department and make their sworn statement naming the two accused
as the perpetrators; (4) that the circumstances of time (between 7:00 and
8:00 o'clock in the evening), of place (witnesses are under the house in the
ground floor and looking through a small window out to the yard of the house
located in the barrio), and of distance (9 meters away) render accurate
Identification of perpetrators in a sudden and startling occurrence, difficult
and unreliable; (5) the police made no effort to locate and search for the fatal
weapon nor place in the police blotter the names of the suspects; (6) that the
motive shown was flimsy, inoffensive and trivial, hence insufficient; and (7)
both accused volunteered to donate their blood to the victim and in fact, one
gave 250 cc. of his blood, type "B " to save him the guilt of the two accused
has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, thus they are entitled to
acquittal of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
x--x