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A.

LAWYER
1. Duty to the Court/Negligence of a Lawyer
In Re: Vicente Y. Bayani
A.C. No. 5307. August 9, 2000
Facts: Atty. Vicente Bayani was the lawyer for the appellant in a criminal case.
He failed to submit his proof of service in his appellant's brief which subsequ
ently caused the inability of the appellee to file his own brief. The IBP was or
der to investigate on the matter and despite repeated notices, Bayani failed to
submit the proof of service and his answer to the IBP's query. Hence, this admin
istrative complaint.
Held: GUILTY. Atty. Bayani's failure to submit proof of service of appellant's b
rief and his failure to submit the required comment manifest willful disobedienc
e to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court, a clear violation of the canons of
professional ethics. It appears that Atty. Bayani has fallen short of the circum
spection required of a member of the Bar. A counsel must always remember that hi
s actions or omissions are binding on his clients. A lawyer owes his client the
exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation. Further, lawy
ers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure
and anyone who deals with them has the right to expect not just a good amount of
professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to his cli
ent's cause. Having been remiss in his duty to the Court and to the Bar, Atty. B
ayani was suspended from the practice of law for 3 months and until the time he
complies with the Order of the Supreme Court to submit the required proof of ser
vice.
2. Duty to Client/Accounting of Client s Money/Negligence
Teodulfo B. Basas vs. Atty. Miguel I. Icawat
A.C. No. 4282. August 24, 2000
Facts: Atty. Miguel Icawat was the lawyer for Teodulfo Basas and some other labo
rers in their complaint against their employer. The NLRC rendered an adverse dec
ision. Basas and his fellow workers, however, insisted that they appeal the deci
sion. Atty. Icawat, however, failed to file the required memorandum of appeal. B
asas filed an administrative complaint, also alleging that Atty. Icawat issued a
receipt for an amount less than that which they had paid him.
Held: GUILTY. Respondent's failure to file the memorandum of appeal required by
the NLRC Rules of Procedure reveals his poor grasp of labor law. Respondent prac
tically admitted that he did not file the memorandum. His failure to file the me
morandum clearly prejudiced the interests of his clients. Respondent manifestly
fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further provides that
a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable. For his failure to issue the pr
oper receipt for the money he received from his clients, respondent also violate
d Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawy
er shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client. The Court fined Atty. Icawat in the amount of PhP 500, with a warning
that a repetition of the same offense or a similar misconduct will be dealt with
more severely.
3. Duty of Lawyer to Client/Proper Conduct
Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty. Sergio Angeles
A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000
Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2 others
in a civil case. Rivera and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable decision.
Atty. Angeles received almost PhP 50,000 from one of the defendants in the case
as partial fulfillment of the judgement against the latter. Atty. Angeles, howev
er, never told his clients of the amount he had received and never remitted the
same to him, leaving them to discover such fact on their own. Rivera and his co-
plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angele
s.
Held: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act a
mounted to serious misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance
of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer s equipment in the pract
ice of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for
the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays th
eir trust and confidence. The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to
be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right sho
uld not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended
for his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor in litigati
on loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. For deceit in dealing
with his client, Atty. Angeles was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year
.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon
A.C. No. 4690. August 29, 2000
Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the
COMELEC and held the position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the
Pasig City Board of Candidates. The respondents helped conduct and oversee the
1995 elections. Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that th
e respondents tampered with the votes received by them by either adding more vot
es for particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV) or reducing the n
umber of votes of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an administ
rative complaint for their disbarment. Respondents argued that the discrepancies
were due to honest mistake, oversight and fatigue. Respondents also argued that
the IBP Board of Governors had already exonerated them from any offense and tha
t the motion for reconsideration filed by Pimentel was not filed in time.
Held: GUILTY. Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities at
tended the canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation
they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be due to honest
mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvass
ing committees who prepared the SoVs. There is a limit, we believe, to what can
be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the performanc
e of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error renders the defense of hon
est mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.
Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the ta
bulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subs
equent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs but a systematic scheme
to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of the petitio
ner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A lawyer wh
o holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if
the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsi
bility or the lawyer s oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification
as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disc
iplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. Here, by certifying as true
and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of
the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. By express provision of Canon 6, this is made appl
icable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violate
d their oath of office as lawyers to do no falsehood. The Court found the responde
nts guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a stern warni
ng that similar conduct in the future will be severely punished.
4. Misrepresentation and Non-payment of IBP Dues
Soliman M. Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000
Facts: Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues. I
t appears that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated th
e proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indic
ated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. On
the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is only engaged i
n a limited practice of law and under RA 7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted
from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption is the payment of m
embership dues.
Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay annual dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of m
embership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground
for removal of the delinquent s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matt
er whether or not respondent is only engaged in limited practice of law. Moreover,
the exemption invoked by respondent does not include exemption from payment of
membership or association dues.
In addition, by indicating IBP Rizal 259060 in his pleadings and thereby m
isprepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to th
e Rizal Chpater, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Resp
onsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dish
onest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 w
hich provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doin
g of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues, which
ever is later.
B. JUDGES
1. Gross Ignorance of the Law
* Improper Imposition of the Punishment of Contempt
Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Felina Bangalan
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1129. January 19, 2000
Facts: Complainant was one of the co-accused in an adultery case filed before th
e sala of respondent Judge Bangalan. In a letter-complaint, he moved for the vol
untary inhibition of respondent judge on the ground that the latter cannot be im
partial over the criminal case because complainant previously filed an oppositio
n to the appointment of respondent as RTC judge.
For this, respondent judge issued an order citing Complainant in direct
contempt of court, averring further that his pleading contained derogatory, offe
nsive or malicious statements "equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presen
ce of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the sam
e within the meaning of Rule 71. When complainant appealed said order in the sam
e court, after posting a notice of appeal, respondent judge ordered him to submi
t a record on appeal. Upon failure to do so, respondent judge issued a warrant o
f arrest against Complainant for which he was arrested and jailed for 1 day with
a fine of P10.00.
Thus, Complainant charges respondent judge with gross ignorance of the l
aw, oppressive conduct and abuse of authority when the latter held him in contem
pt of court on account of the statements he made in his letter-complaint which s
tatements, complainant insists, are absolutely privileged in nature. Complainant
further alleges that he filed a notice of appeal from the order of contempt but
respondent directed him to submit a record on appeal despite the fact that the
same is not required under the rules.
Held: GUILTY. Judge B was fined in the amount equivalent to 1-month salary with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more seriously
. The Court said that while it is true that the complainant attached the adminis
trative letter-complaint in his letter for respondent judge to inhibit in the cr
iminal case, it was used merely to support his contention in his motion for inhi
bition. A judge is bound never to consider lightly a motion for his inhibition t
hat questions or puts to doubt, however insignificant, his supposed predilection
to a case pending before him. Furthermore, the alleged offensive and contemptuo
us language contained in the letter-complaint was not directed to the respondent
court.
A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern
on his impartiality even if the judge may have been insulted therein. While the
power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in
judicial proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice, judges, h
owever, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with ut
most restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for
correction and preservation not for retaliation or vindication.
Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law in requiring complainant t
o submit a record on appeal, we find the respondent judge's order to be not it a
ccord with the established rule on the matter. Contempt proceedings is not one o
f those instances where a record on appeal is required to perfect an appeal. Thu
s, when the law is elementary, so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross i
gnorance of the law.
* Payment of Docket Fees in Election Cases
Alfredo B. Enojas v. Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1513. January 19, 2000
Facts: Judge Gacott is being administratively charged in this case with serious
misconduct, inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law. This complaint arose wh
en respondent Judge dismissed an election case on the ground of non-payment of d
ocket fees, although the case was had been previously admitted and was deemed pr
operly filed by the original Judge (inhibited himself due to relationship to one s
of the parties) whom Judge Gacott replaced. Jugde G issued the dismissal order
relying on a case (Manchester vs. CA) which states that - a case is deemed comm
enced only upon the payment of the proper docket fees. To his opinion, the requi
red fees in this case was not yet paid by the protestant. Hence, this complaint
charging him primarily with gross ignorance of the law.
Held: GUILTY. Based on the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, the el
ection protest was properly filed. In fact, the original Judge already made an
order that from the deposit given by the protestant for the expenses of reopenin
g the questioned ballots, an amount shall be allocated for the payment of the re
quired fees. More importantly, the Court held that the Manchester ruling relied
upon by respondent Judge does not apply to election cases. In a latter case ( Pa
hilan), the evil sought to be avoided in the Manchester case does not exist in e
lection cases. Truth is, the filing fee in an election case is fixed and the cla
im for damages, to which the docket fees shall be made to apply, is merely ancil
lary to main cause of action and is not even determinative of the court s jurisdic
tion.
While it is true that not every error or mistake of a judge renders him
administratively liable, in this case, it is clear that the respondent judge was
in utter disregard of established rules amounting to gross ignorance of the law
. The Pahilan case was decided long before the respondent made a ruling on the e
lection case. Thus, the respondent judge was duty bound to adhere to, and apply
the recent ruling, and he cannot feign ignorance thereof, because the Code of Ju
dicial Ethics requires him to be an embodiment of, among other things, judicial
competence. On e of the principal duties of a judge is to be abreast with law an
d jurisprudence since the administration of justice requires continuous study of
the law and jurisprudence. A perusal of the challenge order reveals that respon
dent judge failed to live up to what is expected of him as a dispenser of justic
e.
* Granting of Bail
Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Policarpio S. Camano, Jr.
A.M. RTJ-00-1522 January 20, 2000
Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion, grave abuse of authority, violation of Canons 1, 2, and 3 o
f the Canons of Judicial Ethics and incompetence in connection with granting bai
l to the accused in a criminal case for child abuse.
The complaint alleges that respondent Judge granted bail while pending t
he holding of a preliminary investigation. The defense moved to quash the inform
ation against the accused on the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation.
Consequently, respondent Judge ordered that a preliminary investigation be had
by the state prosecutor. During the pendency of this, he granted bail in favor o
f the defendant after several notices of hearing to the state prosecutor to whic
h the latter failed to appear. After such grant, complainant herein now accuses
respondent of denying the prosecution the chance to adduce evidence to show tha
t the guilt of the accused was strong and that bail should not have been granted
in his favor.
Held: NOT GUILTY. There was no denial of due process. It was not necessary to ho
ld hearing so that the prosecution could show that evidence of guilt of the accu
sed was strong since a preliminary investigation had been ordered by the court.
At that point, bail was still a matter of right. Respondent judge, knowing that
bail was indeed a matter of right at that stage, nevertheless set the hearing fo
r the petition for bail four times. However, complainant failed to appear and pr
esent evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was strong. It thus appears
that complainant is actually the one who was remiss in the performance of his d
uties. Considering that the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Pr
osecutor for preliminary investigation, the accused could be considered as entit
led to bail as a matter of right. Thus, respondent judge s decision granting bail
to the accused was proper and in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
* Issuance of an Order of Release
Jesusa Santiago vs. Judge Eduardo Jovellanos
Margarita Sanchez vs. Judge Eduardo Jovellanos
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1289. August 1, 2000
Facts: Jesusa Santiago and Margarita Sanchez were complainants in two different
criminal cases before the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and the RTC of Rosales,
Pampanga, respectively. The suspects in each of the criminal cases were caught b
y authorities and detained. However, both suspects were released by order of Jud
ge Eduardo Jovellanos, presiding judge of the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasina
n. The complainants questioned both Orders for Release issued by Judge Jovellano
s, alleging that the requirements for the bailbond had not been fulfilled and th
at the said judge had no jurisdiction to order the release.
Held: GUILTY. There are two defects in the Orders for Release signed by Judge Jo
vellanos. First, in both cases, the detainees had not registered the bailbond in
accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure. One may not be given provision
al liberty if the bailbond is not registered with the proper office. Secondly, J
udge Jovellanos did not have jurisdiction to order the release of the detainees.
The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that when a suspect is arrested outside
of the province, city or municipality where his case is pending, he may either
apply for bail with the court where his case is pending or with any RTC in the p
rovince, city or municipality where he was arrested. If a RTC judge is not avail
able, he may apply for bail with any MTC or MCTC in the place where he was arres
ted. In this case, Judge Jovellanos entertained motions for bail and ordered rel
ease for suspects whose cases were not pending in his court nor were they arrest
ed within his jurisdiction. As an advocate of justice and a visible representati
on of the law, a judge is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the
interpretation of our laws. A judge should be acquainted with legal norms and p
recepts as well as with statutes and procedural rules. Unfamiliarity with the Ru
les of Court is a sign of incompetence which goes against Canon 3, specifically
Rule 3.01, of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Having accepted the exalted position
of a judge, Judge Jovellanos owes the public and the court he sits in proficien
cy in the law. He must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is e
xpected to maintain professional competence at all times. Judge Jovellanos was s
uspended for 1 year without pay issued the warning that similar conduct in the f
uture shall be dealt with more severely.
* Grant of a Motion for Reconsideration
Gloria Lucas v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000
Facts : Complainant Lucas was the defendant in an ejectment case pending before
respondent judge. She alleges that Judge Fabros granted the plaintiff s motion fo
r reconsideration after the case had been dismissed the case for failure of plai
ntiff and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference. She averred that
it is elementary, under Section 19(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure, that a
motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of
the rule, granted the motion for reconsideration. She added that, notwithstandin
g the fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in open court that the ca
se is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the judge ordered the revival
of the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to cause an injury to comp
lainant. Thus, the instant complaint, charging respondent judge with Gross Ignor
ance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion
Held: NOT GUILTY. The SC held that respondent judge not guilty of gross ig
norance of the law and grave abuse of discretion.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under S
ection 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. This rule, however, applies
only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits
. Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a pa
rty to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on t
he merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of su
ch order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the
present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave ab
use of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due cour
se to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present
* Imposition of Proper Penalty
Felicidad Dadizon vs. Judge Aniceto Lirios
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1295. August 1, 2000
Facts: Felicidad Dadizon was the complainant in a prosecution for Falsification
of a Public Document (Art. 172, RPC) which was tried and decided by Judge Anicet
o Lirios of the MTC of Naval, Biliran. Judge Lirios convicted the accused, Pablo
Suzon, and sentenced him to a straight penalty of 7 months imprisonment and imp
osed a PhP 1,000 fine. Dadizon questioned the punishment meted by the said judge
, alleging that the straight penalty of 7 months is way below the penalty provid
ed by law. Judge Lirios defended his decision, stating that he had to appreciate
the mitigating circumstance that Suzon was already 70 years of age.
Held: GUILTY. As judge of thirty-three (33) years, respondent should have known
that the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides for the imposition of a prison sent
ence in the minimum and maximum term for offenses punishable by the Revised Pena
l Code or the special laws. The offense committed was Falsification by a Private
Individual and Use of Falsified Document punishable under Article 172 of the Re
vised Penal Code which provides for a penalty of imprisonment of prision correcc
ional in its medium and maximum periods (ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 da
ys to 6 years) and a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). Resp
ondent Judge appreciated one (1) mitigating circumstance (old age), which is mer
ely an ordinary mitigating circumstance. The imposition of a straight penalty of
seven (7) months by respondent Judge is clearly erroneous. While a judge may no
t always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decisi
on he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusiv
e and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It is true that a j
udge may err in fixing the minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate sentenc
e. However, the unawareness of or unfamiliarity with the application of the Inde
terminate Sentence Law and duration and graduation of penalties merit disciplina
ry action from reprimand to removal. Every judge should know that in applying th
e Indeterminate Sentence Law for offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code
, the indeterminate sentence should have a fixed minimum and maximum. And when t
he law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it con
stitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Aniceto Lirios was fined in the amoun
t of PhP 5,000 and issued stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely by the Court.
* Application of Rules of Procedure
Alfonso C. Ortiz vs. Judge Alex L. Quiroz
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1259 August 4, 2000
Facts: Alfonso Ortiz initiated a criminal complaint against Inocencia Hernandez
for malicious mischeif and grave threats. The case was assigned to Judge Alex Qu
iroz, presiding judge of Branch 69 of the MTC of Pasig City. Before trial, howev
er, Judge Quiroz ruled that the case would be governed by ordinary rules of proc
edure rather than the summary rules of criminal procedure because the case fell
within the exceptions in P.D. 1508. Ortiz filed an administrative complaint agai
nst Judge Quiroz, arguing that the summary rules not the ordinary rules should b
e followed for his case.
Held: GUILTY. Under the Revised Penal Code, grave threats is penalized with impr
isonment of 1 month and 1 day to 6 months (arresto mayor) and a fine not exceedi
ng PhP 500, if the threat is not subject to a condition (Article 282). Malicious
mischief, on the other hand, is penalized with imprisonment of 2 months and 1 d
ay to 6 months (arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods) if the value of
the damage caused exceeds PhP 1,000 (Article 329). In this case, the alleged da
mage to complainant was estimated to be PhP 50,000. Thus, the subject criminal c
ases should have been tried under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, conside
ring that such rule is applicable to criminal cases where the penalty prescribed
by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or a fine
not exceeding PhP 1,000 or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, acc
essory or otherwise or of the civil liability arising therefrom [Section 1 B(4),
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure]. Respondent judge, therefore, erred in apply
ing the ordinary rules of procedure instead of the rules of summary procedure. A
judge has a duty to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the stat
utes and procedural rules. In fact, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that j
udges must be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. He must
have the basic rules at the palm of his hand and be proficient in the interpreta
tion of laws and procedural rules. Judge Quiroz was reprimanded, with a stern wa
rning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more seve
rely.
* Issuance of a Writ of Execution
Teresita Jason vs. Judge Briccio Ygana
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1543. August 4, 2000
Facts: Teresita Jason was the defendant in an ejectment case before the MTC of P
asig City. Having received an adverse judgement, Jason appealed the decision to
Branch 153 of the RTC of Pasig City, presided by Judge Briccio Ygana. Respondent
judge affirmed the decision of the MTC and subsequently issued a Writ of Execut
ion for the judgement. The Sheriff of Branch 153 executed upon some personal pro
perties of Jason and gave a Notice to Vacate. Jason filed an administrative comp
laint against Judge Ygana, arguing that the Writ of Execution should have been i
ssued by the court of origin and not the appellate court.
Held: GUILTY. The case should have been remanded back to the MTC for execution.
The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed the
regional trial court and the decision of the latter is itself elevated to the C
ourt of Appeals, whose decision thereafter become final, the case should be rema
nded through the regional trial court to the metropolitan trial court for execut
ion. The only exception is the execution pending appeal which is not evident fro
m the records of this case. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a c
ursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he
be conversant with basic legal principles. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Et
hics requires that the judge should be studious of the principles of law. Canon
18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrit
y of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of ar
bitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Judge Ygana was fined PhP
10,000 for gross ignorance of the law.
* Conducting Hearings for Probation
Carlos B. Creer vs. Judge Concordio Fabillar
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1218. August 14, 2000
Facts: Respondent Judge Concordio Fabillar, acting presiding judge of the 9th MC
TC of Giporlos-Quinapundan, Eastern Samar, convicted Carlos Creer of grave coerc
ion. Creer appealed the conviction to the RTC where it was affirmed. Creer subse
quently filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Creer was then apprehended and jaile
d by order of Judge Fabillar. Creer alleged that respondent judge made him sign
an application for probation which the said judge denied. The RTC subsequently r
eversed the conviction of Creer and ordered his release. Creer filed an administ
rative complaint against Judge Fabillar, charging the latter with gross ignoranc
e of the law for conducting hearings for probation despite his pending appeal.
Held: GUILTY. The rule is that no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of convi
ction. At the time complainant applied for probation, an appeal had already been
perfected. Although respondent Judge eventually denied the application, the fac
t still remained that he had acted on it by asking the probation officer to cond
uct a post-sentence investigation instead of outrightly denying the same as so e
xplicitly mandated by the law. Observance of the law, which he is bound to know
and sworn to uphold, is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently ba
sic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it; anything less
than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Fabillar w
as suspended from service for 6 months without pay and ordered to pay a PhP 20,0
00 fine. He was further warned with the most severe penalty for another infracti
on by him.
* Order of Acquittal
Fredesminda Dayawon v. Judge Maximino A. Badilla
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1309. September 6, 2000
Facts: Ms. Fredesminda Dayawon charged Judge Maximino A. Badilla of the Municipa
l Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, with "Gross Ignorance of the Law and Incom
petence" relative to Criminal Case for estafa.
Complainant averred that respondent Judge acquitted the accused and decla
red her to only be liable civilly, despite Alamos admittance in open court that s
he had received the subject goods from complainant to be sold on commission basi
s with the obligation to remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the items,
if unsold, but had failed to comply seasonably therewith despite demand. Complai
nant stressed that these admissions, together with the finding that the accused
had acted in bad faith, were clearly sufficient to convict the accused of the cr
ime of estafa.
Held: GUILTY. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquain
tance with statutes and procedural rules; so long as he remains on the bench, it
is imperative that he continues to be conversant with the basic law and maintai
n the desired professional competence.
The Court finds it fit, however, to reduce the recommended fine of P5,000.00 to
P2,000.00 considering that no nefarious motive on the part of respondents judge
has been shown.
* Issuance of Hold Departure Order
Re: Hold-Departure Order Dated August 9, 1999 Issued by Judge Salvador B. Mendoz
a, MCTC, Poro-San Francisco-Tedela-Pilar, Poro, Cebu Office of the Court Adminis
trator v. Judge Salvador B. Mendoza
A.M. No. 00-1281-MTJ. September 14, 2000
Facts: MTC Judge Mendoza issued a Hold Departure Order in Criminal Case No. T-18
06, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Arnie Pena Osabel." pending before hi
m in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Poro-San Francisco-Tedela-Pilar, Poro, C
ebu. The Secretary urged the Court Administrator to look into the fact that the
order in question was issued in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 da
ted June 19, 1997.
Held: GUILTY. Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure or
ders to the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases within their exclusive juris
diction.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence." The Court has not be
en remised in reminding judges to exert diligent efforts in keeping abreast with
developments in law and jurisprudence. Needless to state, the process of learni
ng the law and the legal system is a never-ending endeavor, hence, judges should
always be vigilant in their quest for knowledge so they could discharge their d
uties and responsibilities with zeal and fervor.
2. Habitual Tardiness
Antonio Yu-Asensi vs. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245. January 19, 2000
Facts: Complainant charges Judge Villanueva for serious misconduct and/or ineffi
ciency particularly violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics on promptness and pu
nctuality. Judge V had been consistently late for 45 minutes to 1 1/2 hours duri
ng scheduled hearings, thus delaying the cause of complainant where he was the p
laintiff in a reckless imprudence case. Due to his tardiness, C's lawyer had als
o been compelled to extend trial even beyond the prescribed period provided for
by law.
Held: GUILTY. Habitual tardiness amounts to serious misconduct and inefficiency
in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Several SC Circulars have been is
sued which enjoin judges to be punctual in the performance of their judicial dut
ies, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys are of val
ue, and that if the judge is not punctual in his habits, he sets a bad example t
o the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction in the administration of justice.
Furthermore, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates: "A judge shall
dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required p
eriods."
3. Gross Inefficiency and Duty/Liability over Court Personnel
Atty. Martin Pantaleon v. Judge Teofilo Guadiz
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1525 January 25, 2000
Facts: In this case, respondent Judge is charged with Gross Inefficiency, Neglec
t and Delay in Elevating the Records of Civil Case No. 88-2187, to which the com
plainant was the plaintiff s counsel. After receiving an adverse decision, complai
nant filed a Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period and consequently, r
espondent Judge issued an order for the transmittal of the records of the case t
o the appellate court. However, despite constant follow-up by counsel, three yea
rs have passed and the records of the case have not been transmitted.
In his Answer, respondent judge contends that the court stenographer mis
placed the transcript of the testimony of one of the witnesses, hence the record
could not be transmitted to the Court of Appeals. He further averred that compl
ainant should have invited his attention by filing the proper motion or by writi
ng a personal letter informing him of the non-transmittal of the records within
three months from the date of his order of transmittal.
Held: GUILTY. A judge cannot hide behind the incompetence of his subordinates. H
e should be the master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistake
s of his subjects.
The non-transmission of the records by reason of inefficiency of the sta
ff cannot exonerate respondent judge from administrative liability. As administr
ative officer of the court, a judge is expected to keep a watchful eye on the le
vel of performance and conduct of the court personnel under his immediate superv
ision who are primarily employed to aid in the administration of justice as requ
ired by Canon 3, Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In the case of Re: Judge Fernando Agdamag, the Court stated: he (judge) s
its not only to judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his
responsibilities include being an effective manager of the court and its person
nel. He is presumed to be cognizant of his responsibilities as a worthy minister
of the law. At the very least, he is expected to keep abreast with his docket.
Certainly, a delay of three years in the transmission of court records t
o the appellate court, where only a period of 30 days is required, is inexcusabl
e.
Acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosilo v. Dante dela Cruz Rivera, Sheriff III, Branc
h 34, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City
A.M. No. P-00-1424. September 25, 2000
Dante dela Cruz Rivera, Sheriff III, Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon
City vs. Acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosilo, Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial Cour
t, Quezon City.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1316. September 25, 2000
Facts: Sheriff Dante Rivera allegedly falsified his Personal Data Sheet. For thi
s, respondent Judge accused him of dishonesty and subsequently prevented him fro
m reporting for work. Afterwhich, respodent Judge filed an administrative compla
int against the sheriff.
Held: GUILTY. A judge has no authority or power to prevent an employee from repo
rting for work. If indeed complainant Rivera committed falsification in the acco
mplishment of his personal data sheet, the most that Judge Bellosillo could have
done was to file an administrative charge against complainant Rivera, which he
later on did but after the complainant Rivera filed an administrative charge aga
inst him (Judge Bellosillo) for conduct unbecoming.
While a judge may have supervision over his employees, he should not however
exercise his authority over them in an oppressive or despotic manner. Judge Bell
osillo should have realized that it is the Supreme Court which has the authority
to discipline/dismiss his subordinate. The most that he can do is merely to fil
e an administrative complaint against the erring employee.
4. Impartiality and Impropriety of a Judge
* Issuance of Conflicting Orders
Daniel & Suprema Dumo v. Judge Romeo V. Perez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1242 January 20, 2000
Facts: Spouses Dumo filed this administrative complaint against respondent Judge
Perez for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and patent part
iality.
Respondent MTC Judge issued a Writ of Execution to enforce the decision
of a case involving quieting of title and recovery of ownership of real property
. However, said writ was returned unsatisfied because the herein complainants wa
s the actual owners and occupants of the questioned property without being imple
aded in the original case. Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order statin
g that complainants shall not be affected by said writ because they were not mad
e parties to the case. Despite such order, he moved on to issue a Writ of Posses
sion in favor of the original plaintiff (Espinas). As a consequence, Espinas use
d such Writ of Possession against the herein complainants in order to eject them
from their property and deprived them from the enjoyment of the same.
The crux of this controversy therefore is the issuance of respondent Jud
ge of conflicting orders, which according to complainants, showed patent partial
ity over Espinas, the original plaintiff in the case for quieting of title.
Held: GUILTY. First of all, respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law.
As a municipal trial court judge, he obviously had no jurisdiction over the acti
on for quieting of title and recovery of ownership filed by Espinas against the
original defendants. It must be stressed that the case was NOT for ejectment ove
r which MTC s have original jurisdiction, but for quieting of title and/or ownersh
ip falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts. The quest
ion of jurisdiction if so basic and elementary a matter that a judge s ignorance o
f it is simply inexcusable.
Secondly, the judge s act of issuing conflicting orders is likewise inexcu
sable. After declaring that the Writ of Execution cannot be made enforceable aga
inst herein complainants as they were not made parties to the case, he reversed
himself nevertheless by issuing the Writ of Possession. Under said writ of poss
ession, it was patent that he was contradicting his previous ruling by ordering
therein to eject all adverse occupants, which of course, was so broad to affect al
l persons including herein complainants. The issuance of said writ gave rise to
the suspicion of partiality or bias in favor of Espinas.
The presumptions of regularity and good faith in the performance of judi
cial functions on respondent s part are negated by the circumstances of record. Wh
ile a judge cannot be made liable for any criminal, civil, or administrative cha
rge for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith and in the absence of fraud
, it is imperative that he should have basic knowledge of the law. Judges must k
eep abreast of the laws and jurisprudence to be able to render justice and maint
ain public confidence in our legal system.
More importantly, judges should not only be impartial but should also ap
pear impartial. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that: a judge sh
ould also avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the int
egrity and impartiality of the judiciary. (Rule 2.01, Canon 2).
Leopoldo G. Dacera, Jr. vs. Judge Teodoro A. Dizon
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. August 2, 2000
Facts: Leopoldo Dacera, Jr. was the complainant in a prosecution for Qualified T
heft filed with Branch 37 of the RTC of General Santos City with Judge Teodoro D
izon presiding. The prosecutor later filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds th
at Dacera had executed and signed an Affidavit of Desistance from pursuing the p
rosecution. Dacera, however, opposed the Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Judge
Dizon had unduly influenced him to sign the Affidavit of Desistance and that he
had not been fully appraised of the consequences of his actions in doing so. The
Supreme Court assigned an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals to investig
ate into the matter.
Held: NOT GUILTY. The investigation did not find any conclusive evidence that Ju
dge Dizon was personally biased in favor of either party in the disposition of t
he case in question. It must be noted that respondent judge did not actually dis
miss the case upon motion of the prosecutor and even voluntarily inhibited himse
lf upon motion of Dacera to disqualify him. However, the investigation did revea
l that Judge Dizon had made telephone calls to Dacera and even had discussions w
ith him inside his chambers in order to verify the truth about the Affidavit of
Desistance. While there is no clear proof of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations, the acts of respondent in calling and meeting with the complain
ant still leave much to be desired and are deserving of reprimand. A judge is no
t only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. Fraternizi
ng with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Canon II of the Code of Judicial Co
nduct basically provides that judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all activities and should so behave at all times as to promot
e public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It is cl
ear that the acts of the respondent judge have been less than circumspect. He sh
ould have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and should have e
ndeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of ind
ecorum. The complaint filed by Dacera against Judge Dizon, Jr., was dismissed fo
r lack of merit. However, respondent Judge was admonished to refrain from making
calls to any parties-litigant and/or counsel with cases pending in his sala and
sternly warned that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.
William R. Adan vs. Judge Anita Abucejo-Luzano
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1298. August 3, 2000
Facts: William Adan was the complainant in 2 criminal cases for Grave Oral Defam
ation tried and decided by Judge Anita Abucejo-Luzano of the MCTC of Lopez Jaena
, Misamis Occidental. Respondent judge convicted the accused and sentenced them
accordingly. Upon Motion for Reconsideration, however, respondent judge reversed
her decision and rendered a judgement for acquittal. Adan questioned the revers
al of the conviction, alleging that Judge Abucejo-Luzano had modified her judgem
ent because having received new information from the accused, she conducted a pe
rsonal ocular inspection of the place where the crime was committed without the
presence of the parties involved.
Held: GUILTY. Respondent Judge should have known that an ex-parte ocular inspect
ion without notice to nor presence of the parties and after the case had already
been decided was highly improper. If respondent Judge had entertained doubts th
at she wished to clarify after the trial had already terminated, she should have
ordered motu proprio the reopening of the trial for the purpose, with due notic
e to the parties, whose participation therein is essential to due process. Thus,
it is error for the judge to go alone to the place where the crime was committe
d and make an inspection without previous knowledge or consent of the parties. T
he conduct of the ex-parte inspection, the result of which apparently influenced
her to reconsider her earlier decision, was highly improper as she, in effect,
admitted additional evidence without giving the prosecution a chance to object t
o its introduction or to controvert the same. Her actions show an ignorance of t
he law and proper procedure to be followed for a situation such as this. Further
more, respondent judge has opened herself to charges of partiality and bias by m
eeting with the accused privately. No matter how noble her intentions may have b
een, it was improper for respondent judge to meet the accused without the presen
ce of complainant. Respondent Judge has failed to live up to the norm that judge
s should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. She thus violat
ed Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that a judge should av
oid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Judge Abuce
jo-Luzano was fined PhP 10,000 and issued a stern warning that any similar act i
n the future will be dealt with more severely.
5. Gross Misconduct amounting to Violation of a Constitutional Right/ Serious/Gr
ave Misconduct
Atty. NapoleonS. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241 January 20, 2000
Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the constitutio
nal right of subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own choice, gross m
isconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not
being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It appears that
Judge granted bail without the assistance of the counsel of record, Atty. Valenz
uela and he even suggested that the latter should be replaced by another counsel
. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of Withdrawal, in conformity
with his client s decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, he filed the instant adm
inistrative complaint against respondent Judge. To support his position, he atta
ched an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client Colapo. However, during the h
earing of the case, he failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly
out of the country although she was willing to testify at that time.
Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of counse
l, the Court held that it was valid and sufficiently based on the Manifestation
filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With regard to the alleged act of respondent Judge su
ggesting to the accused that she should change her counsel (complainant Atty. V)
and recommending a different lawyer, the Court found that the evidence adduced
by the complainant was insufficient to substantiate the charges against him. The
only evidence offered by complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Col
apo, and it cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative
case. The complainant s failure to present his principal witness, in the absence o
f other evidence to prove his charges was fatal and said Affidavit cannot be giv
en credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant being placed on the wit
ness stand.
The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the
constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to Judges. Resp
ondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges against him with
out affording him a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwis
e, his right to due process would be infringed.
Erlinda Sy vs. Danilo Norberte
A.M. No. 00-1398-P. August 1, 2000
Facts: In her civil case versus Antoinetta Galvez, complainant Erlinda Sy obtain
ed a writ of preliminary attachment against all properties of the former. She al
leged, however, that respondent Danilo Norberte, Sheriff of Branch 125 of the RT
C of Kalookan City, tipped off Galvez about the said writ. She further alleged t
hat Norberte actively assisted Galvez in the removal of her personal property fr
om the latter's residence. Sy filed a complaint with Branch 125 of the RTC of Ka
lookan City which was submitted for investigation.
Held: GUILTY. The investigation revealed that Norberte was positively identified
and seen by the complainant Sy and 2 other witnesses in the act of helping Galv
ez remove her personal property from her residence. Norberte's alibi did not pro
ve to be credible. The offense of serious or grave misconduct refers to such mis
conduct that shows the element of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rules. In tipping off and assisting Galvez, N
orberte's actions are an attempt to circumvent a valid court order. Even if Norb
erte did not tip off Galvez, his mere presence at the scene is punishable. Being
an officer of the Court, respondent sheriff should have refrained from actuatio
ns though innocent and in good faith which may result in suspicion of impropriet
y and may consequently taint the good image of the judiciary. The nature and res
ponsibilities of officers of the judiciary are not mere idealistic sentiments bu
t true working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual
deeds. They are expected to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, in
tegrity, loyalty and efficiency and to conduct themselves with propriety and dec
orum at all times. Norberte was suspended for 1 month without pay and issued the
warning that similar conduct in the future will be punished more severely.
In Re: Procedure adopted by Judge Daniel Liangco
(A.M. No. 99-11-158-MTC. August 1, 2000)
Facts: RTC Judge Pedro Sunga of San Fernando, Pampanga received information abou
t irregularities in the disposition of jueteng cases before the MTC's of the sai
d region. Upon investigation, Judge Sunga discovered that of the 55 jueteng case
s filed in July 1999, 53 were assigned to Branch 1 of the MTC of San Fernando pr
esided by Judge Daniel Liangco. Noting that statistical improbability that 53 ou
t of 55 jueteng cases should be assigned to only 1 Branch, Judge Sunga demanded
a written explanation as to how such a situation had come about. In his letter,
Judge Liangco explained that it has been his practice to automatically take over
all jueteng cases without the need for raffling. The reason he cited is that th
e accused in such cases are deprived of their liberty and that by automatically
assigning these cases to his branch, the accused can file motions for bail and t
he same can be entertained immediately without waiting for the raffle. In short,
because of the need for provisional liberty, all jueteng cases are considered t
o be automatically raffled to his branch so that he may entertain motions for ba
il and the accused can be immediately released upon filing of the bond. The Supr
eme Court ordered further investigation of the case and placed Judge Liangco on
preventive suspension.
Held: GUILTY. Judge Liangco clearly violated Supreme Court Circular No. 7 which
provides: "All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there a
re two or more branches shall be assigned or distributed to the different branch
es by raffle. No case may be assigned to any branch without being raffled." Ther
e is no connection at all between respondent s alleged desire to facilitate the re
lease of such accused on bail and his questionable act of retaining the records
of the cases for direct assignment to his own sala. For after granting bail to
the accused, his alleged purpose of immediately extending provisional liberty to
the accused shall already have been served. There is thus no need or justificat
ion to retain the records of the cases and consider them raffled off to his own sa
la. The questioned acts of respondent Judge Liangco constitute a clear breach of
his duty as a judge. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that: A judge shoul
d so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and im
partiality of the judiciary. Respondent judge s manner of automatically assigning j
ueteng cases to its own branch without the benefit of raffle, casts doubt on his
integrity as a judge and erodes the confidence of the people in the judicial sy
stem. A judge s official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial d
uties should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond repro
ach. Judge Liangco was suspended from service for 6 months without pay and issue
d the warning that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more severe
ly.
6. Neglect of Duty/Abuse of Authority
Zenaida S. Beso v. Judge Juan Daguman
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000
Facts: In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged
Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdictio
n and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage con
tract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
In his comment, the respondent judge alleged that the marriage of the com
plainant had to be solemnized in Calbayog City though outside his territory as m
unicipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar because : 1) physically indisposed and u
nable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita; 2) complainant said she had to
fly abroad that same day; 3) that for the parties to go to another town for th
e marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a sol
emnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors; 4) if they failed t
o get married on August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a
long period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publi
cation of notice; 5) if the parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled mar
riage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment abroad.
Held: GUILTY. The authority of a judge to solemnize marriage is only limited to
those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longe
r within his area of jurisdiction. Additionally, there are only three instances,
as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemniz
ed by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, and the
circumstances of this case do not fall in any of these exceptions.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty whe
n he failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman. Such dut
y is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides
:
"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either o
f the
contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Arti
cle 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later th
an
fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where
the
marriage was solemnized. xxx"
Lastly, a judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that t
he records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There
is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The records show
that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge s part. This Cou
rt reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management and organize
their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.
It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing
system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the
proper discharge of his official functions.
7. Prompt Disposition of Cases/ Inefficiency/Abuse of Authority
State Prosecutor Romulo Tolentino vs. Judge Nilo Malanyaon
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1444. August 3, 2000
Facts: Judge Nilo Malanyaon, presiding judge of Branch 30 of the RTC of Camarine
s Sur, dismissed 5 separate criminal cases for lack of evidence and also refused
to issue warrants of arrest on the ground of lack of probable cause. Acting Sta
te Prosecutor for Camarines Sur Romulo Tolentino assailed the orders for dismiss
al and the refusal to issue the warrants for arrest alleging that Judge Malanyao
n had abused his authority and knowingly rendered unjust orders. Tolentino also
complained that several motions had been filed before respondent judge and have
yet to be resolved and decided upon.
Issues: (1) Did Judge Malanyaon exercise grave abuse of discretion and act in ex
cess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal cases?
(2) Was Judge Malanyaon guilty of unreasonable delay for failing to act
on the motions filed by State Prosecutor Tolentino?
Held: (1) NO. The allegations that respondent judge had violated Canons 1, 2 and
3 of the Canons of Judicial Conduct are without merit. Good faith and absence o
f malice, corrupt or improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a
judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjus
t decision from being held accountable for errors of judgment on the premise tha
t no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration
of justice can be infallible. There is no proof of grave abuse of discretion. T
hese charges were dismissed by the Court.
(2) YES. The motions/incidents were left unacted upon from 3 to 5
months and were still pending when the administrative complaint was filed agains
t respondent. Respondent should be aware of his duties as an arbiter of justice.
Under Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge shall dispose of the
court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. While t
he prosecutor in this case is not without fault, the respondent cannot escape re
sponsibility for his inaction of the pending motions before him. Even assuming
arguendo that the various motions filed by the prosecutor were considered to be
mere scraps of paper or without merit, the judge must nevertheless resolve on th
ose matters promptly by granting or denying them. It is the duty of the judge t
o rule upon the motions filed before him even if his actions are merely to deny
them. Respondent judge was found guilty for his failure to resolve pending motio
ns and/or incidents and, accordingly, a penalty of reprimand was imposed upon hi
m with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation will be de
alt with a more severe penalty by the Court.
Juan Luzarraga vs. Hon. Amaro M. Meteoro
A.M. No. 00-1572. August 3, 2000
Facts: Juan Luzarraga was the plaintiff in a civil case assigned to Branch 41 of
the RTC of Camarines Norte. After the said plaintiff had rested his case and pr
esented his evidence, the case was transferred to the newly-created Branch 64 of
the RTC of Camarines Norte, presided by Judge Amaro Meteoro. It was only 2 year
s later that Judge Meteoro proceeded with the presentation of the defendant's ev
idence. The case was finally submitted for decision a year later. After an elaps
e of more than 7 months without a decision on the case, Luzarraga filed an admin
istrative complaint against Judge Meteoro. Respondent judge pleaded for the unde
rstanding and compassion of the Court, citing that his branch had more than 300
cases pending before it, that he had trouble recruiting and training competent p
ersonnel and that he had suffered a stroke.
Held: GUILTY. More than one year had already elapsed since the submission of the
case and respondent Judge has not decided the same despite the Motion for Early
decision filed the complainant. The Court has consistently held that the failur
e of a judge to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and co
nstitutes gross inefficiency and non-observance of said rule is a ground for adm
inistrative sanction against the defaulting judge. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the C
ode of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of the court's business
promptly and to decide cases within the periods fixed by law. The failure to re
nder a decision within the 90-day period constitutes serious misconduct in derog
ation of the speedy administration of justice. When circumstances arise that wou
ld prevent the judge from disposing a case within the reglementary period, all t
hat he has to do is to file an application with the Court asking for a reasonabl
e extension of time within which to resolve the case. However, the record of thi
s administrative matter does not show that respondent made an attempt to make su
ch a request. Instead, he preferred to keep the case pending, thereby inviting s
uspicion that something sinister or corrupt is afoot. That he was burdened with
a heavy case load and is a stroke victim, serve only to mitigate the penalty, no
t to exonerate him. Judge Meteoro was fined P20,000 with the warning that a repe
tition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. He was further directed to
decide the subject case within a non-extendible period of 30 days from receipt
of resolution, and to submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a copy of
his decision within 10 days from promulgation thereof.
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 87 and 98, Quezon Ci
ty
A.M. No. 99-11-423-RTC. August 16, 2000
Facts: On September 15 to 17, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator conduc
ted an audit and physical inventory of pending cases in Branches 87 and 98 of th
e Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by Judge Elsie Ligot-Telan
and Judge Justo M. Sultan, respectively. The audit team reported that Judge Ligo
t-Telan had a well-managed docket. Judge Sultan, however, was a different story.
Of the 57 cases submitted for decision, 34 were already beyond the reglementary
period, some of which involve detention prisoners. It was observed that the sai
d branch gave the least preference to cases submitted for decision, and it has n
o effective docket system and recording of cases. In fact, the Branch Clerk of C
ourt had not submitted the required docket and inventory of cases for a number o
f years. Records did not show that Judge Sultan ever requested for an extension
of time within which to decide the cases submitted before him.
Held: GUILTY. The Court reiterates that failure to decide cases within the requi
red period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency which is a ground f
or administrative sanction against the defaulting judge, either by a fine or sus
pension from the service, depending on factors that tend to aggravate or mitigat
e his liability. This is in accordance with the mandate that the judge shall dis
pose of the business of the court promptly and decide cases within the prescribe
d periods. Conformably, the rules require the courts to decide cases ready for d
ecision within 3 months from date of submission. The Court is not unmindful of t
he Herculean task trial judges are faced with the perennial clogged dockets of t
he lower courts. However, this should not be an excuse for them to abdicate thei
r duty to dispense justice. Judges must adopt a system of record management and
organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business. Furthermore, if the caseload of the judge prevents the disposition of
cases within the reglementary periods, he should ask this Court for a reasonable
extension of time to dispose of the cases involved. This is to avoid or dispel
any suspicion that something sinister is going on. The Court fined Judge Sultan
PhP 20,000 to be taken from his retirement benefits.
Dominga D. Quillal-Lan vs. Judge Alicia L. Delos Santos
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1269. August 24, 2000
Facts: The daughter of complainant Dominga Quillal-Lan was the defendant in a Fo
rcible Entry case before Judge Alicia Delos Santos of the MTC of Digos, Davao de
l Sur. The complainant alleges that respondent judge failed to decide the case w
ithin the mandatory 30-day period as provided by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Judge Delos Santos avers that she was on sick leave and therefore could not be
expected to decide upon the case within the said period.
Held: GUILTY. There is no doubt that a case of Forcible Entry falls within the R
ules of Summary Procedure and as stated therein, must be decided within 30-days.
Respondent should have rendered judgment in the forcible entry case before she
went on leave. Delay in the disposition of cases covered by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure defeats the very purpose of said rule, which is the expeditiou
s and inexpensive determination of cases. Failure to decide such cases on time r
enders the rationale for the rule meaningless and inutile. Respondent appears to
be remiss in her duties as judge when she failed to render judgment in the case
as mandated by the rules. Under Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, she
is required to dispose of the court s business promptly and to decide cases within
the required time frame. We have time and again reminded judges to comply with
the rules regarding the period to decide cases, in pursuance of the Court s oft-re
peated policy of speedy disposition of quality justice for all. Judge Delos Sant
os was fined PhP 1,000 and issued a warning that similar conduct in the future w
ill be dealt with more severely.
Cob C. Dela Cruz v. Judge Rodolfo M. Serrano
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1582. September 4, 2000
Facts: Complainant contends, among others, that it took one (1) year and five (
5) months instead of three months to render a decision in civil case. The civil
case was submitted for decision on April 1996, but the decision thereon was onl
y promulgated on October 8, 1997.
Held: GUILTY. It is not disputed that it took respondent Judge one (1) year and
five (5) months, after Civil Case No. 908 was submitted for decision, to decide
it which is way beyond the three-month period mandated by the Constitution.
Section 15 (1) of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases fi
led before the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three (3) months
from date of submission. The Code of Judicial Conduct likewise provides that a
judge should administer justice impartially and without delay [Rule 1.02.] and dir
ects a judge to dispose of the court s business promptly and decide cases within th
e required periods. [Rule 3.05.]
It is an oft-repeated maxim that justice delayed is often justice denied. Th
us, any delay in the administration of justice may result in depriving the litig
ant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case and will ultimately affect
the image of the judiciary. A delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a de
nial of justice, brings the court into disrepute and ultimately erodes public fa
ith and confidence in the judiciary.
Rolando Sulla v. Hon. Rodolfo C. Ramos
A.M No. MTJ-00-1319. September 27, 2000
Facts: Dr. Rolando A. Sulla charging respondent Judge Rodolfo C. Ramos, presidin
g judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Jaro, Leyte, with unreasonable delay or
refusal to render a decision in criminal Case No. 8121. The case was submitted
for decision in April 1997. But as of May 21, 1999, date of complainant s letter,
and despite constant requests for its early resolution, respondent Judge Ramos
has not rendered any decision in the said case.
Held: GUILTY. This Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to deci
de cases promptly and expeditiously pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code o
f Judicial Conduct and Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution.
Judges are presumed to be aware of Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct whi
ch calls for a judge to be faithful to the law and maintain professional compete
nce. Rule 3.05 admonishes all judges to dispose of the court s business promptly a
nd decide cases within the period fixed by law.
8. Negligence/Incompetence of a Judge
Norma Esguerra vs. Judge Guillermo Loja
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1523. August 15, 2000
Facts: Norma Esguerra was the complainant in a criminal case for Falsification o
f a Public Document tried before Judge Guillermo Loja of Branch 26 of the RTC of
Manila. Complainant alleged that Judge Loja failed to decide the case within th
e 90-day reglementary period and further accused him of falsifying his certifica
te of service in order to make it appear that he had decided the case. Judge Loj
a countered by stating that he had indeed decided upon the case but rather, the
decision was just not dated.
Held: GUILTY. A careful study of the facts shows that Judge Loja is guilty only
of SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE and not of the administrative complaint filed against him.
There is no clear proof that the respondent judge falsified his certificate of s
ervice simply because his decision was dated. Even assuming that there was a sli
ght delay in deciding the case, it must be taken into consideration that Judge L
oja has a heavy case load (almost 800 cases pending) and that this is the first
offense by a judge who provided long and consistent service to the Judiciary. Th
e Court fined Judge Loja PhP 2,000 and issued a warning that similar conduct in
the future will be more severely punished.
9. Duty of Court Employees
Marta Bucatcat v. Edgar Bucatcat and Gene Jaro
A.M. No. P-93-985. January 28, 2000
Facts:Marta T.Bucatcat (complainant) charged her husband, Edgar Y. Bucatcat, and
Gene S. Jaro (respondents), Court Interpreter respectively, of the Third Munici
pal Circuit Trial Court of Gandara, Samar, with immorality. Complainant avers t
hat she is the legal wife of respondent Bucatcat. She claims that respondents ar
e having an illicit relationship with each other. Moreover, respondents allegedl
y have two (2) children together and that respondent Jaro, at the time of the fi
ling of the letter-complaint, was pregnant with their third child.
Held: GUILTY. There is sufficient evidence to hold respondents liable for immora
lity for
maintaining an illicit relationship with each other. Every employee of the judi
ciary should
be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, h
e must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the perfor
mance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with othe
r people, to preserve the court s good name and standing. It cannot be overstress
ed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and
otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of i
ts personnel. Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting stan
dards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order
to preserve the good name and integrity of courts of justice.
Respondents DISMISSED from service.
JUNE 1998-1999
A. JUDGES
1. Good Faith in Rendering Decisions
Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero v. Hon. Adriano Villamor (296 SCRA 88)
Facts: Carlos and his counsel, Guerrero, charged respondent with gross ignoranc
e of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment after they lost a civil
and a criminal case tried by respondent. They were also thwarted on appeal. Ho
wever, in the pleadings before the CA, they used abusive language in describing
the respondent s acts, hence, respondent judge cited them for direct contempt, whi
ch was later set aside by the SC.
Held: Case dismissed. The order of direct contempt may only be considered as a
n error of judgment. A judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors
of judgment, in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purp
ose. Moreover, judges cannot be held to account criminally, civilly, or adminis
tratively for an erroneous decision rendered by them in good faith.
* Impartiality
Re: Inhibition of Judge Eddie R. Rojas (292 SCRA 306)
Facts: Atty. Rojas was appointed a judge. One of the criminal cases he inheri
ted was one in which he acted as prosecutor. He explained that his delay in inh
ibiting himself from presiding on that case was because it was only after the be
lated transcription of the stenographic notes that he remembered that he handled
that case. He also says that the counsels did not object and he never held full
-blown hearings anyway.
Held: Judge is filed & reprimanded. The Rules of Court prevent judges from try
ing cases where they acted as counsel without the consent of the parties. This p
revents not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety o
n the part of the judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. He should administer justice impar
tially & without delay. The prohibition does not only cover hearings but all ju
dicial acts (e.g. orders, resolutions) some of which Judge Rojas did make.
Carlito D. Lazo v. Judge Antonio V. Tiong (300 SCRA 214)
Facts: Judge Tiong was accused of failing to inhibit himself in a criminal case
because he was related within the fourth degree of affinity to the accused. The
judge claims he did so in the hopes that his presence would allow the parties t
o settle amicably.
Held: Judge reprimanded. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his i
mpartiality might reasonably be questioned. Also, Rule 137, Rules of Court, pro
vides that no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, inter
alia, is related to either party within the sixth degree pf consanguinity or af
finity, or to counsel within the fourth degree computed according to the rules o
f the civil law. Under this provision, the Presiding Judge is mandated to disqua
lify himself from sitting in a case. He cannot exercise his discretion whether
to inhibit himself or not.
2. Speedy Administration of Justice
Baltazar D. Amion v. Judge Roberto S. Chiongson (301 SCRA 614)
Facts: A is a policeman charged with murder. During the trial, J ordered that
he be represented by counsel de officio because A s attorney was ill. A then charg
ed J with ignorance of the law & oppression because the fact that the counsel de
officio did not know the particulars of the case meant that A would be denied d
ue process.
Held: Complaint dismissed. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge
should administer justice impartially and without delay. A judge should always
be imbued with a high sense of duty & responsibility in the discharge of his obl
igation to promptly administer justice. In this case, the reason J appointed a
FLAG lawyer was because A s lawyer had postponed several hearings because he was i
ll or out of town. Also, A had various lawyers during the said case who always
postponed the hearings for various reasons such as illness, lack of knowledge of
the case or unavailability for trial. These are all legal but clearly dilatory
means used by the complainant to delay the case for 4 years. J should be comme
nded for his efforts to expedite the case.
Fe T. Bernardo v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros (307 SCRA 28)
Facts: B accused F of inaction in an unlawful detainer case for 7 months when th
e rules on summary procedure call for a decision in 30 days. F does not deny the
inaction but says B has no standing as she is only the attorney-in-fact of the
plaintiffs to the civil case.
Held: FINED. Judges must decide cases expeditiously, especially in summary proce
edings. She should either ask for additional time to decide or devise an efficie
nt filing system to expedite decision. Finally, standing or personal interest of
the complainant is immaterial in administrative cases which involves the public
good.
Dolores Gomez v. Judge Rodolfo A. Gatdula (293 SCRA 433)
Facts: Gomez is the complainant in 2 different criminal cases before Judge Gatd
ula. When she petitioned the SC to change the venue of 1 of the cases, Responde
nt suspended the scheduled hearings in both cases. When required by the SC to s
how cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him, he delayed hi
s comment thereto. He eventually explained that the suspension of hearing was m
ade because the request for change of venue was pending in the SC.
Held: Judge Gatdula acted vindictively & oppressively, apparently irked by the
request of petitioner. He need not have suspended both hearings as the change o
f venue only involved one case. His delay in commenting on the change of venue
also effectively delayed both cases by 5 months. His acts are not free from the
appearance of impropriety, let alone beyond reproach, as required by Canon 3 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge Narciso M. Bumanlag, Jr. (306 SCRA 50)
Facts: Upon retirement, B left 7 criminal and 3 civil cases undecided within the
90-day period required by section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution. He said
his failure was due to a serious illness.
Held: FINED. Members of the bench have a duty to administer justice without undu
e delay. Failure to do so within the reglementary period constitutes a neglect o
f duty warranting administrative penalties. If hindered by illness, a judge shou
ld inform the Office of Court Administrator and ask for additional time to decid
e in order to avoid the sanctions. However, if there is no malice or bad faith,
and the judge is prevented by factors beyond his control, the penalty will be mi
tigated.
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court Branch 24
, Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur; Branch 2, Isabela, Basilan; and Municipal Circuit Tri
al Court, Labason, Zamboanga del Norte (303 SCRA 208)
Facts: Judge Apostol had a backlog of 280 cases. Also, there had been no actions
on 268 other cases assigned to him. Judge says he has constant medical problems
and no legal researchers to help him. These and the peace and order problems in
his locality prevent him from expediting.
Held: Fined for gross neglect of duty. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides tha
t a judge should administer justice without delay and dispose of the court s busin
ess promptly and decide cases within the reglementary periods. If his health pro
blems were preventing him from doing his duty, he should have retired early so a
healthier successor could act on the case load.
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 68 of Camilang, Ta
rlac (305 SCRA 61)
Facts: Judge R was due for compulsory retirement. The OCA found that he had many
pending cases, some of which were undecided beyond the 90-day period.
Held: FINED but penalty mitigated. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 enjoins all judges to at
tend promptly to the business of the court and decide cases within the time fixe
d by law. A judge is mandated to render judgment not more than ninety (90) days
from the time the case is submitted for decision. Failure to render the decision
within the prescribed period of ninety (90) days from submission of a case for
decision constitutes serious misconduct and gross inefficiency. However, since a
fter being reminded of this, Judge R cleared most of his docket (even those not
overdue for decision) before retiring, the fine is mitigated.
Atty. Raula A. Sanchez v. Judge Augustine A. Vestil (298 SCRA 1)
Facts: Complainant charged RTC Judge Vestil with falsifying his monthly certific
ate of service submitted to the SC by stating that he has no pending case submit
ted for decision or resolution that has gone beyond the NINETY (90) day period a
llowed by law when in fact there were numerous civil & criminal cases which the
respondent failed to resolve within the said period. Respondents say most of th
e cases were either inherited & substantially heard by other judges, or that the
y require further study or whose stenographic notes were yet to be transcribed a
nd these are excepted from being included the certificate by a proviso contained
therein.
Held: Respondent Judge suspended and fined. Judges are mandated to decide case
s seasonably. Judges who cannot comply with such mandate should ask for additio
nal time, explaining in their request the reasons for the delay. Neither the pr
oviso nor the fact that notes are to be transcribed is a valid defense for not d
eciding within the required time. The SC has consistently held that the failure
of a judge to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and con
stitutes gross inefficiency & the non-observance of said rule is ground for admi
nistrative sanction against the defaulting judge.

B. LAWYERS
1. Assisting in the Speedy Administration of Justice
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (293 SCRA 622)
Facts: Judgment was rendered against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey the
cemetery to the rightful owners. Despite the final decision of the SC, petitio
ner was able to prevent the execution for 17 years, and thus render the judgment
ineffectual. They filed several petitions and motions for reconsideration with
the trial court and the CA despite the fact that it would never prosper as the
trial court s decision had long become final before the said petitions were filed.
Held: Petition denied. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest
of the client and zeal in the defense of their client s right, they are also offi
cers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and effic
ient administration of justice. They should not misuse the rules of procedure t
o defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a j
udgment or misuse court processes. The facts and the law should advise them tha
t a case such as this should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the
already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or the
ir clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve
the attention of the courts.
* Duty to Protect Client s Interest
Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset Privitization Trust v. Court of Ap
peals and Continental Cement Corporation (302 SCRA 362)
Facts: CCC filed an injunction suit to prevent the DBP and APT from foreclosing
on its mortgages. During trial, DBP & APT were unable to appear for cross-exam
ining CCC s witnesses because the respective counsels were unprepared, unavailable
or ill. The lower court decided this as a waiver, hence judgment was rendered
for CCC. DBP & APT filed this petition alleging denial of due process.
Held: Petition denied. There can be no denial of due process where a party had
the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but did not do so. Counsel for
APT was absent on several occasions because of withdrawal of previous counsel,
unreadiness to conduct the cross-examinations and serious illness. The withdrawa
l of APT s previous counsel in the thick of the proceedings would be a reasonable
ground to seek postponement of the hearing. However, such necessitates a duty on
the part of the new counsel to prepare himself for the next scheduled hearing.
The excuse that it was due to the former counsel s failure to turn over the record
s of the case to APT, shows the negligence of the new counsel to actively recove
r the records of the case. Counsel should have taken adequate steps to fully pro
tect the interest of his client, rather than pass the blame on the previous coun
sel. A motion to postpone trial on the ground that counsel is unprepared for tri
al demonstrates indifference and disregard of his client s interest. A new counsel
who appears in a case in midstream is presumed and obliged to acquaint himself
with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired prior to
his takeover. Also, even if counsel had been ill with dengue, he chose not to no
tify his co-counsels who could have conducted the cross-examination.
2. Falsehood/Forum-shopping/Dilatory Tactics
Ban Hua U. Flores v. Atty. Enrique S. Chua (306 SCRA 465)
Facts: Chua was charged with many offenses. The evidence was found to support th
e charges that he notarized a forged deed of sale, that he caused to be publishe
d an advertisement of a SEC decision in order to bring ridicule and shame upon a
corporation, that he filed a civil case knowing that the reliefs he prayed for
were probably granted in the SEC case thus belying his certification against for
um shopping. He has also been previously reprimanded for bribing a judge and for
consistently using dilatory tactics to prolong a litigation.
Held: DISBARRED. He has thus violated Rules 10.01, 12.02, 12.04 (foisting or com
mission of falsehood, forum-shopping and causing in court proceedings), Canon 19
(failing to resort to lawful means in representing his client), 27, 3.01 and 13
.02 (causing undue publication of a pending action). He had an active role in co
mmitting fraud since he falsely stated that the person making the deed of sale a
ppeared before him and stated that the same was his free act and deed- when evid
ence shows the signature was forged; also, he prolonged a family dispute by usin
g dilatory tactics and placing an advertisement in order to ridicule his opponen
ts in violation of Rule 1.04 that lawyers should encourage their clients to end
a controversy by a fair settlement. A lawyer must uphold the integrity of the pr
ofession. He brings honor to it by honesty and fair dealing and by performing hi
s duties to society, the bar, the courts and his clients.
3. Good Moral Character
Tomas Cabulisan v. Judge Adrian N. Pagalilauan (297 SCRA 593)
Facts: Cabulisan filed an administrative complaint against respondent for grave
misconduct committed as follows : (1) peeping into the bathroom where Marilyn C
. Dumayas, a public health nurse, and daughter of the owner of the house where h
e was boarding, was then taking a bath; (2) having a mistress in the neighboring
town; and (3) allowing local practitioners to write decisions for him.
Held: Respondent filed for voyeurism, other charges dismissed for lack of evide
nce. People who run the judiciary, particularly justices and judges, must not o
nly be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but
more importantly, they must possess the highest degree on integrity and probity
and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in their public and private lives.
By committing the acts in question, respondent violated the trust reposed in h
im and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and rigid standards of mora
lity required in the judicial profession.
Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson (300 SCRA 129)
Facts: respondent was accused of having appropriated for his own benefit the am
ount of P 2, 5000.00 representing the amount which was delivered by the Resurrec
cion to the respondent as compensation or settlement money of a case for homicid
e thru reckless imprudence. Sayson did not turn over the amount to his client,
the Complainant in the criminal case, forcing Resurreccion to pay the same amou
nt again. Sayson was later convicted for estafa.
Held: Sayson DISBARRED. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain extant in order t
o maintain one s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Acts of
moral turpitude (i.e. done contrary to justices, honesty & good morals) such as
estafa or falsification render one unfit to be a member of the legal proession.
Also, Sayson s acts of delaying the hearings before the OSG and the IBP reinforce
this view.
4. Abuse of Authority
Rosalia Villaruel, et al v. Grapilon, et al: In the Matter of the Petition to Re
move Atty. Jose A. Grapilon as President, IBP (302 SCRA 138)
Facts: G was accused of 16 IBP employees who sought his removal as IBP President
for: Immorality, questionable disbursements of funds, dishonesty, failure to tu
rn over IBP donations from private individuals, refusal to turn over records and
money pertaining to the Employees Loan Savings Association, Appropriation of Off
ice Property, Extending loans to IBP employees, oppression/harassment, appointme
nt of unworthy employees and relatives and organization of a secret society. The
issue regarding legal ethics is whether the SC can assume jurisdiction or shoul
d it be considered a labor dispute under the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
Held: Charges dropped. All the accusations of the petitioners were either unsubs
tantiated or refuted by controverting evidence. As to the issue of jurisdiction,
the SC has previously assumed administrative jurisdiction over the IBP presiden
t. If the petitioners allege that the IBP terminated them as an act of reprisal
and with malice or bias, this would constitute gross abuse of authority and seri
ous misconduct warranting the use of the SC s supervisory powers over the IBP. Las
tly, even if there was no wrongful act, G is ordered to transfer the funds of th
e savings and loan association to an account in their name to prevent the appear
ance and suspicion of impropriety.
5. Gross Ignorance of the Law
Jesus Conducto vs. Judge Iluminado C. Monzon (291 SCRA 619)
Facts: Respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law. He refuse
d to suspend the mayor due to criminal charges against the latter for the crime
of unlawful appointment. The judge opined that an official cannot be suspended
for something that has happened in a previous term. Settled jurisprudence says
this only applies to administrative, not criminal cases.
Held: Fined for P5000. While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency
on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, it is imperativ
e that they be conversant with basic legal principles. A judge is called upon t
o exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural r
ules; it is imperative that he be conversant with the basic legal principles an
d aware of well-settled and authoritative doctrines. Also, if he did the act de
liberately, he violated Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judg
e to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the
law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a j
udge under the sanction of law. An RTC judge cannot overturn a settled doctrine
laid down by the Supreme Court, otherwise, litigation would be endless.
6. Gross Immoral Conduct
Julieta B. Narag vs. Atty. Dominador M. Narag (291 SCRA 451)
Facts: Atty. Narag s spouse filed a petition for disbarment in the IBP alleging th
at her husband courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a mistress
and having children by her. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive,
jealous woman who abused him and filed the complaint out of spite. IBP disbarre
d him, hence, this petition.
Held: Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the testi
mony given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowled
ge and brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral cha
racter is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus,
when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supre
me Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7
.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the pra
ctice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a law
yer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.
Grossly immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must no
t behave in a way that scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is fl
outing those moral standards.
Remedios Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar (293 SCRA 331)
Facts: Respondent was previously dismissed as CFI judge for maintaining and coha
biting with his mistress. Despite this, he later married the same woman and had
children with her. He even made statements displaying contempt for the SC and
mocking the law and said court. Petitioner, his lawful wife, filed a letter-com
plaint for disbarment against her husband. IBP disbarred him.
Held: Disbarred (ratio is the same as the Narag case). A judge is a visible rep
resentation of the law and, more importantly of justice. Ordinary citizens cons
ider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law. A j
udge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all actuations, lest it
be a demoralizing example to others. Likewise, an attorney is also invested wit
h public trust. As officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and con
fidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A
high degree of moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where h
e resides. The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct whether in h
is professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral char
acter, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court. The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercis
ed with great caution and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously aff
ects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a m
ember of the bar. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a pr
ior one subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their
children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the l
aw and the lawyer s oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clear
ly shows a serious flaw in respondent s character, his moral indifference to scand
al in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms.
* Gross Misconduct
Erlinda Alonto-Frayna v. Judge Abdulmajid Astih (300 SCRA 199)
Facts: Judge Asith did not act on the case of the herein complainant for over 2
years despite the orders and directives of the Office of the Court Administrato
r to resolve it without delay. In addition, when asked to explain his actions b
efore the SC, respondent failed to reply.
Held: A Judge who deliberately and continuously refuses to comply with the resol
ution of the SC is guilty of gross misconduct & insubordination. It is gross mi
sconduct & even without outright disrespect for the SC for the respondent judge
to exhibit indifference to the resolutions requiring him to comment on the accus
ations contained in the complaint against him. Furthermore, failure to render a
decision beyond the 90 day period from its submission constitutes serious misco
nduct to the detriment of the honor & integrity of his office & in derogation of
a speedy administration of justice.
Romulo F. Manuel v. Judge Demetrio d. Calimag (307 SCRA 657)
Facts: M charged C with selling him a stolen car, for which he was arrested.
Held: CASE DISMISSED. No evidence to substantiate the charges. The SC also said
that to warrant dismissal for misconduct, it must be shown that the misconduct i
s serious and has a direct relation to his official duties amounting to misadmin
istration, or intentional neglect and failure to discharge said duties. The judi
cial acts complained of must be so corrupt or inspired by an intention to violat
e the law.
Felicidad L. Oronce, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. (298 SCRA 133)
Facts: During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally took possession of the
property in litigation using abusive methods. She was aided by her husband, a l
awyer. The illegal entry took place while the case was pending in the CA & whil
e a writ of preliminary injunction was in force.
Held: Atty. Flaminiano s acts of entering the property without the consent of its
occupants & in contravention of the existing writ or preliminary injunction & m
aking utterances showing disrespect for the law & this Court, are unbecoming of
a member of the Bar. Although he says that they peacefully took over the property
, such peaceful take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary injun
ction that he knew was still in force. Through his acts, he has flouted his dut
ies as a member of the legal profession. Under the Code of Professional Responsi
bility, he is prohibited from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Re: Leaves of Absence Without Approval of Judge Eric T Calderon, Municipal Trial
Court Judge of Calumpit, Bulacan (302 SCRA 92)
Facts: Administrative case against Judge C for incurring leaves of absence for a
n almost straight period of 3 years. His excuse is that he was suffering from a
lingering illness of malignant hypertension. However, despite the fact that medi
cal certificates were presented in his favor, most were made by his personal doc
tor (an orthopedic doctor). Also, the tests given by the Court physician contrad
ict the diagnosis given by his doctor.
Held: Guilty of gross misconduct and abandonment of office, judge dismissed. Jud
ge C should have been more conscious of his court duties, as well as more cautio
us of his actuations, than he has shown in the performance of his functions and
the discharge of his responsibilities to the Court and the citizenry. Further, h
e should have been aware that, in frequently leaving his station, he has caused
great disservice to many litigants and has denied them speedy justice. From the
record it could be fairly concluded that he had habitually abandoned his sala fo
r no justifiable excuse at all. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor , that the Cou
rt may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face,
would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law, or misconduct, is patently
applicable to the instant case.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (296 SCRA 171)
Facts: Petitioner filed a case for recission against the Quetulios and Abadillas
alleging that the former sold the land that had already been expropriated. The
Quetulios did not file an answer, but at the hearing on the motion for default,
co-defendant Hernando was permitted by the judge to appear as counsel for the de
fendants and file an answer.
Held: Case reinstated. Evidently, when respondent Hernando appeared before th
e trial court and filed the Answer/Motion to dismiss, he was still under suspens
ion from the practice of law. A suspended lawyer, during his suspension, is cer
tainly prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, and if he does so, he ma
y be disbarred. The reason is that, his continuing to practice the profession d
uring his suspension constitutes a gross misconduct and a willful disregard of
the suspension order, which should be obeyed though how erroneous it may be unti
l set aside.
* Impropriety
Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili (249 SCRA 423)
Facts: Respondent was charged with impropriety and gross ignorance of the law.
In a case for illegal logging, he dismissed the case and returned illegally cut
timber to the defendants because the search warrant was invalid. He was also se
en in eating and drinking in the company of said defendants, and this supposedly
influenced his decision.
Held: Judge Agcaoili is fined and suspended. Respondent erred in returning the s
eized articles even though the warrant was invalid, illegal articles (illegally
cut lumber) are not returned to the possessor. He also violated Canon 2, Rule 2.
01 of the Code of Judicial Ethics i.e. to avoid impropriety or even or even the
appearance of impropriety. Even though it was not proven that he was influenced
by the defendants (the dismissal was proper), he should not have fraternized wit
h litigants who had a pending case before him. To do so erodes public confidence
in the integrity and independence of the judiciary. A judge must avoid even th
e semblance of impropriety.
Carlos Dionisio v. Hon. Zosimo V. Escano (302 SCRA 411)
Facts: E posted an advertisement for waitresses and singers to work at his resta
urant at the RTC bulletin board. He also conducted interviews for this in his sa
la. He was later caught when a reporter from Hoy Gising! taped an interview which
revealed that he intended to operate a drinking pub with scantily clad waitresse
s.
Held: SUSPENDED. Rules 2.00, 5.02 and 5.03 provide that a judge should avoid imp
ropriety and even the appearance of impropriety. He should also refrain from fin
ancial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court s imparti
ality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase
involvement with lawyers and litigants. He should also manage financial interes
ts so as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification. Fi
nally, the halls of justice should not be used for unrelated purposes.
Benalfre J. Galang v. Judge Abelardo H. Santos (307 SCRA 582)
Facts: S was a judge and the publisher/columnist for a tabloid; he was also a wr
iter for another paper. G charges him with using his columns to ventilate his vi
ews. He has repeatedly used insulting and inflammatory language against the gov
ernor and the provincial prosecutor and legal adviser.
Held: JUDGE DISMISSED. While S has the right to free speech, his writing of vici
ous editorials compromise his duties as judge in the impartial administration of
justice. They reflect both on his office and on the officers he ridicules. The
personal behavior of a judge in his professional and everyday life should be fre
e from the appearance of impropriety. Improper conduct erodes the public confide
nce in the judiciary.
Benjamin Sia Lao vs. Hon. Felimon C. Abelila III (295 SCRA 267)
Facts: in a family dispute over a parcel of land, respondent judge committed ac
ts of forcible entry, attempted to deny complainant of possession despite a leas
e in the latter s favor. He also gave firearms to his men in order to assault com
plainant s workers. Respondent also fled from police when called in for questioni
ng.
Held: Respondent DISMISSED. A judge is the visible representation of the law an
d the embodiment of the people s sense of justice and that, accordingly, he should
constantly keep himself away from any act of impropriety, not only in the perfo
rmance of his official duties but also in his everyday actuations. No other pos
ition exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an indiv
idual than perhaps a seat in the judiciary. A judge must be the first to abide
by the law and to weave an example for the others to follow.
Spouses Benedicto & Rose Godinez v. Hon. Antonio Alano and Sheriff Alberto Ricar
do Alano (303 SCRA 259)
Facts: G charged A with committing irregularities in a civil case for sum of mon
ey. In said case, a writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the effects se
ized were kept in Judge A s house. The court investigator found that the writ was
improperly issued because the allegations of fraud and attempts to abscond in th
e affidavit were bare assertions and not substantiated by the facts.
Held: FINED. The writ was issued in error. But in order to merit a disciplinary
sanction, the error or mistake committed by a judge should be patent, gross, mal
icious, deliberate, or done in bad faith. Absent a clear showing that the judge
has acted arrantly, the issue becomes judicial in character and would not proper
ly warrant the imposition of administrative punishment. Judge A is fined for sto
ring the effects in his house and their intent to charge storage fees. Judges sh
ould avoid impropriety of the appearance of impropriety.
Gregorio & Teresita Lorena v. Judge Adolfo Encomienda (302 SCRA 632)
Facts: Spouses Lorena were evicted from the property of Judge E s brother. They re
fused to vacate. The mayor invited the parties to a conciliation meeting but the
y still refused. The owners allowed them to stay on the condition that they sign
a written promise to leave after the grace period. When L refused, E phoned him
and tried to convince him to sign. L still refused, E then said: mga tarantado,
mabulok kayo sa kalabos! and slammed the phone down. L accuses E and his conspira
tors of abuse of authority for later throwing them in jail.
Held: REPRIMANDED. Although the charges against E were refuted by evidence, the
serious nature of the tasks of judges requires them to be circumspect in both th
eir public and their private dealings. As they are expected to rise above human f
railties they must, in all their activities, avoid not only impropriety but even
the appearance of impropriety. Hence, E should not have called L by [hone which
gave the impression of undue pressure and influence. He should not have cursed L
over the phone as a judge s behavior must be beyond reproach.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. (Judge) Florentino S. Barron (297 SCRA 376
)
Facts: Judge Barron was arrested during an entrapment operation when he tried t
o solicit bribes from an American national in exchange for ruling in the latter s
favor in a pending case.
Held: Judge dismissed. A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and prop
riety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about
his honesty. The conduct of respondent shows that he can be influenced by monet
ary considerations. His act of demanding and receiving money from a party-litig
ant constitutes serious misconduct in office. It is this kind of gross and flau
nting misconduct, no matter how nominal the amount involved, which erodes the re
spect for the law and the courts.
Sarah B. Vedana vs. Judge Eudarlo B. Valencia (295 SCRA 1)
Facts: Complainant is the court interpreter and a relative of respondent judge.
She claims that he kissed and fondled her when she went to his sala to inform
him that the cases for the day were ready for trial.
Held: Respondent guilty of violating Canons 2, 3 and 22 of the Code of Judicial
Ethics. The Code mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties,
but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. A public
official is also judged by his private morals. A judge, in order to promote pu
blic confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave
with propriety at all times. A judge s official life can not simply be detached o
r separated from his personal existence.
* Negligence
Corazon T. Reontoy v. Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit (302 SCRA 604)
Facts: On January 28, 1998 the SC found Ibadlit administratively liable and susp
ended him from the practice of law for 1 year for failing to appeal within the r
eglementary period the decision rendered against his client. His reason was, an
appeal would only be futile. SC declared that it was highly improper for him to
have adopted such opinion. SC said that a lawyer was without authority to waive
his client s right to appeal and that his failure to appeal within the reglementar
y period constituted negligence and malpractice, proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides (a) lawyer shall n
ot neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection ther
ewith shall render him liable. This is a motion for reconsideration.
Held: Suspension lowered to 2 months his arguments are partly persuasive, he bel
ieved in good faith that his client s case was weak and that she accepted his expl
anation that the adverse decision was not worth appealing anymore. Besides, it w
as only several years later that she complained when no more relief was availabl
e to her. Also, complainant had reasonable opportunity to hire another counsel f
or a second opinion whether to appeal from the judgment or file a petition for r
elief, that he did not commit to handle his client s case on appeal and that the t
estimonies of complainant and her brother were unpersuasive. This is also his fi
rst offense.
People of the Philippines v. Sevilleno ( 304 SCRA 519)
Facts: In a criminal case for rape with homicide, the accused pleaded guilty. Ho
wever, the 3 PAO lawyers assigned as counsel de officio did not perform their du
ty. The first did not advise his client of the consequences of pleading guilty,
the second left the courtroom during trial and thus did not cross-examine the pr
osecution witnesses. The third postponed the presentation of evidence for the de
fense, and when he did appear, he said he would rely solely on the plea in the m
istaken belief that it would lower the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Held: Case remanded. Canon 18 required every lawyer to serve his client with utm
ost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter ent
rusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively li
able. In this case, the defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the
fundamental rights of the accused.
N.B. Case remanded because of error by the judge in not using searching question
s to find if the plea was made knowingly.
Rodolfo P. Velasquez v. CA & PCIB (GR No. 124049, June 30, 1999)
Facts: As an incident in the main case, V appointed his counsel as attorney-in-f
act to represent him at the pre-trial. Counsel failed to appear, hence V was dec
lared in default. The order of default was received by counsel but no steps were
taken to have it lifted or set aside.
Held: Binding on V. V was also guilty of negli8gence because after making the sp
ecial power of attorney, he went abroad and paid no further attention to the cas
e until he received the decision. Thus, no FAME which will warrant a lifting of
the order.
* Property Under Litigation
Regalado Daroy vs. Esteban Abecia
Facts: Daroy was plaintiff in a forcible entry case. He hired Abecia as his la
wyer and won. To satisfy the award for damages, a parcel of land of the defenda
nt was sold to Daroy at an execution sale. The land was then sold to Daroy s rela
tive, who then sold it to Abecia s wife. He now claims that these sales are void
because Abecia forged his signature on the deeds of sale. IBP disbarred Abecia.
Held: Reversed. The evidence shows that Daroy was a party to the sale at the t
ime ot was made and did not discover it 9 years later as he claimed. He was not d
efrauded <real issue--> the parties thought that because the land had been acqui
red at a public sale to satisfy a judgment in a case in which respondent was com
plainant s counsel, the latter could not acquire the land. The parties made this
arrangement to circumvent Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which prevents lawyers fr
om acquiring property and rights that may be the object of any litigation in whi
ch they may take by virtue of their profession. The prohibition in Art. 1491 do
es not apply to the sale of a parcel of land acquired by a client to satisfy a j
udgment in his favor, to his attorney was not the subject of the litigation. Wh
ile judges, prosecuting attorneys, and others connected with the administration
of justice are prohibited from acquiring property or rights in litigation or levi
ed upon in execution the prohibition with respect to attorneys in the case extend
s only to property and rights that may be the object of any litigation in which t
hey may take part by virtue of their profession.
* Qualifications
Ruferto Gutierrez and Maritess Passion vs. Judge Estanislao S. Belan
(294 SCRA 1)
Facts: Concerned citizens of Binan Laguna charged respondent MTC judge with con
duct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. They claim he committed p
erjury for failure to disclose a previous charge for two criminal offenses in hi
s written application to the JBC.
Held: Judge is dismissed. Every prospective appointee to the judiciary must ap
prise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judici
al office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and pro
bity. These are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the judic
iary by Article VIII, Sec. 7(3) of the Constitution. The act of concealing the
two criminal cases against him is a clear proof of his lack of the said qualific
ation and renders him unworthy to sit as a judge- even if he was ultimately acqu
itted. He is not being chastened for having had a pending criminal case at the t
ime of his application for a judicial position but for his dishonesty and misrep
resentation in the process of seeking that office.
* Unlawful Conduct
Cleto Docena vs. Atty. Dominador Q. Limon (295 SCRA 262)
Facts: Respondent was petitioner s lawyer in a civil case. During that case, he a
sked the petitioners to post a supersedeas bond to stay execution of the appeale
d decision. Petitioners forwarded the money to Limon. Later, the case was deci
ded in their favor. They were unable to recover the money because the clerk of
court said no such bond had ever been filed. IBP suspended him for one year. H
ence this petition.
Held: Disbarred (see Canon 1.01 and 16.01). Respondent s allegation that the mon
ey was payment of his fees was overcome by other evidence. The law is not a tra
de nor craft but a profession. Its basic ideal is to render public service and
to secure justice for those who seek its aid. If it has to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideal, lawyers should not only master its tenets
and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to t
hem. By extorting money from his client through deceit, Limon has sullied the i
ntegrity of his brethren in the law and has indirectly eroded the people s confide
nce in the judicial system. He is disbarred for immoral, deceitful and unlawful
conduct.
Victor Nunga v. Atty. Verancio Viray (306 SCRA 487)
Facts: N accused V of notarizing documents without a commission. It appears that
in 1987 and 1991 he notarized deeds of sale of property between the bank he wor
ks for and his minor son. At those times, he was not commissioned as a notary pu
blic.
Held: SUSPENDED. Notarization is invested with public interest because3 it conve
rts a private document into a public one. Notarizing without commission is a vio
lation of the lawyer s oath to obey the laws (the Notarial Law) and by making it a
ppear that he is so authorized is a deliberate falsehood which violates the lawy
er s oath and Rule 1.01 (CPR) that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishones
t, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Atty. Prudencio Penticostes v. Prosecutor Diosdado Ibaez (304 SCRA 281)
Facts: Pascual was sued for non-remittance of SSS benefits. She gave the contest
ed amount to respondent, who was supposed to forward the same to the SSS and dro
p the charges. Respondent did not forward the amount. He only remitted the amoun
t after his complaint for misconduct was filed with the IBP.
Held: REPRIMANDED. A high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expecte
d and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 provides that a lawyer shall no
t engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. While Pascual may
not strictly be considered a client of respondent, the rules relating to a lawy
er s handling of funds of a client is still applicable, thus, lawyers are bound to
promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clie
nts and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. Also, even if he w
as acting as a prosecutor, Canon 6 provides that these canons shall apply to law
yers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
* Attorney s Fees
Renato S. Ong & Francia N. Ong v. Court of Appeals, Inland Trailways, Inc. & Phi
ltranco Service Enterprise, Inc. (301 SCRA 387)
Facts: Renato Ong was injured during a vehicular collision. He was awarded dama
ges by the trial court. On appeal, the CA, the awards for actual damages, moral
damages & attorney s fees were reduced because (1) the cost & feasibility of corr
ective surgery had not been adduced in evidence, (2) the document relied upon to
prove actual damages was not formally offered in evidence and (3) no evidence b
ut the bare assertion of counsel was put forward to prove damages for unearned i
ncome.
Held: Attorney s fees is an indemnity for damages ordered by a court to be paid b
y the losing party to the prevailing party, based on any of the cases authorized
by law. It is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless the 2 have a
greed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or a
s part thereof. The Court has established a set of standards in fixing the amou
nt of attorney s fees. Counsel s performance, however, does not justify the award of
25 percent attorney s fees. The nature of the case was not exceptionally difficu
lt, and his handling of the case was sorely inadequate, as shown by his failure
to follow elementary norms of civil procedure & evidence. It is well-settled th
at such award is addressed to sound judicial discretion and subject to judicial
control.
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