Qualification Of Local Elective Officials

Torayno v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 137329 (August 9, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the
ground that he was not able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City
when he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3
consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently ran
for mayor.

HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a
mayoralty candidate. He bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually resided
there before he registered as a voter in that city in 1997.

Villarosa vs. HRET

G.R. No. 143351, September 14, 2000

FACTS:
Quintos contested the proclamation of Amelita Villarosa. Issue: whether JTV votes should be
counted in favor of Villarosa. JTV is the nickname of Villarosas husband, who is the incumbent
representative of Occidental Mindoro.

HELD:
Villarosas use of JTV as her nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the election
process. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the only issue for its
determination was whether "JTV" votes or variations thereof should be counted in favor of
VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray votes.

Maruhom v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139397 (May 5, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor. Because of several
irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as the
winner. Petitioner filed a case with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation, but later withdrew
it. He also filed an election protest with the RTC. Petitioner orally moved for dismissal of the
protest, but it was denied. The court ordered the Revision Committee to convene and start the
revision of the ballots. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the petition.

HELD: The SC held that the summary dismissal of petitioners Motion to Dismiss was not a
grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC. The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears
to be part of a perfidious plot to prevent the early termination of the proceedings as evidenced
by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by petitioner to avert the
revision ballots. Also, a motion to dismiss is not a prohibited pleading in an election contest filed
before the regular courts.
 Maruhom vs COMELEC

Maruhom challenges in her Petition the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in

declaring her registration in Marantao void. She asserts that Section 2, Article
IX(c) of the Constitution prohibits the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction or
deciding issues involving the right to vote. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8189,
or the Voters Registration Act of 1996 (VRA), confers upon the MTCs and
MeTCs original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and
exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities.

ISSUE:

Is the challenge on Maruhoms registration, an issue on the right to vote and

thus, beyond COMELEC jurisdiction?

HELD:

The present case is not about her being denied her right to register as a
voter, but is all about her making false material representations in her COC,
which would warrant the cancellation of the same. The resolutions of the
COMELEC en banc merely defeated Maruhoms intent to run for elective office,
but it did not deprive her of her right to vote. Although Maruhoms registration
in Marantao is void, her registration in Marawi still subsists. She may be
barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but she may still
exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter.
It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under
Section 78 of the OEC.[21] In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the
competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to
material facts was made in the COC.
Libanan vs Comelec Case Digest
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN vs. HRET

G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997

Facts: Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the
candidates for the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the
canvass of the returns was made on 13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern
Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly elected Representative of the District.

Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the
absence of the BEI Chairmans signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the
ballots were not those issued to the voters during the elections thus, indicating that they were
spurious and invalid. He averred that the law would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate
or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.

Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairmans signature are valid.

Held: A ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it
bears any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in
those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of
red and blue fibers in the ballots. What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid
down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of
these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or
thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are
blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is
only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and
subject to rejection.

Facts: GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President of the
Philippines. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed
an election protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. However, the protestant
died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. Now, the widow of
FPJ, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe submitted a manifestation with urgent petition/motion to
intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ.
Issue: Whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during
the pendency of the latters protest case.

Ruling: No. The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a public office is
personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal
and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would
oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution
and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is
the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is
entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any
claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we
can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election
protest.

SAQUILAYAN V. COMELEC 416 SCRA 658 (DINO)

FACTS:

1. SAQUILAYAN and JARO were candidates for the Office of Municipal Mayor of
Imus, Cavite.

2. SAQUILAYAN was proclaimed winner.

3. JARO instituted an Election Protest Case before the RTC, contesting the
results of all 453 election precincts. He alleges the ff:

a. Votes in favor of JARO were considered stray

b. Ballots and votes were misappreciated (considered null and void,

or counted in favor of SAQUILAYAN)

c. Votes that were void (containing stickers or markings) were

counted in favor of SAQUILAYAN, etc..

4. SAQUILAYAN filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by the RTC.

5. Questioning the denial of his Motion to Dismiss, the COMELEC (Division)

ruled in favor of SAQUILAYAN and ordered the dismissal of the election protest.
It ruled that JAROs allegations failed to state a cause of action, on the basis of
Pena v. HRET.

* Pena v. HRET held that the bare allegations of massive fraud, widespread
intimidation and terrorism, without specification and substantiation of where
and how these occurrences took place, render the protest fatally defective.

6. Upon reconsideration sought by JARO, the COMELEC En Banc,

SAQUILAYANs Motion to Dismiss was again dismissed, and the Election
Protest Case was ordered to proceed.

HELD:

1. The present case is similar to Miguel v. COMELEC, which the COMELEC En

Banc used as basis in ordering the Election Protest Case to proceed.

2. IN both cases, the protestants questioned all the precincts in their respective
municipalities.
3. As Miguel v. COMELEC is more recent than Pena v. HRET (as used by the
COMELEC Division), then the former should prevail in case of a conflict.

4. Furthermore, election contests involve public interest. Technicalities and

procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constituted an
obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate.

5. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
mere technical objections.

6. Allowing the election protest to proceed would be the best way of removing
any doubt as to who was the real candidate chosen by the electorate.

7. Decision of COMELEC En Banc affirmed.