What Makes An Experience Aesthetic

What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?
Author(s): Michael H. Mitias

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Winter, 1982), pp.
157-169
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/430266
Accessed: 12-02-2017 13:08 UTC
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MICHAEL H. MITIAS
IN A RECENT ESSAY, "What Makes an Ex- aesthetically. Again, let us grant that one
perience Aesthetic?"1 Kingsley Price argues approaches an aesthetic object, an object
that what makes an experience aesthetic, recognized
or by most critics as aesthetic, still it
put differently, what makes an aestheticis both reasonable and important to ask:
experience unique, is not the sort of aware- what makes his experience aesthetic? It is
ness, attention, or contemplation in which naive
a to think that the aesthetic character of
person apprehends, or experiences, a given an experience would be illuminated or ex-
object as a work of art but mainly whether plicated once and for all when we elucidate
the object, or content, of the experiencethe is question of the aesthetic character of
itself an aesthetic object. This is based onthe object of experience, for suppose it
the assumption that "experience" is not turnsa out that what is aesthetic is not given
homogeneous but a heterogeneous concept: to perception as a ready-made quality or set
pure experience, or experience as such, of qualities and that in order for this charac-
does not exist. Experience is always the ex- ter to become a reality it must be creatively
perience of some thing. Accordingly whatmade in the process of aesthetic perception,
the experience is-viz., its kind or can we neglect or ignore anymore the ques-
essence-is determined by the sort of object
tion of what makes an experience aesthetic?
which is the content of the experience. Again,Theare we to assume, as Price seems to
identity of an experience-for example, a aesthetic awareness is passive and
do, that
religious or a moral experience-is then separate, i.e., independent, from the im-
determined by the identity of its content or agination of which it is a power or a func-
object. Price does not theorize on what tion? If the aesthetic character of an object
makes the object of an aesthetic experience is not given as a ready made quality or set of
an aesthetic object. His main concern is onlyqualities, and Price is ready to grant this
to show that an answer to the question, premise, should we not ask: how does this
"What makes an experience aesthetic?" character come into being? And, can it be
cannot be found in a study of the awarenessknown, or acknowledged for what it is, un-
or contemplation in terms of which we ex- less it is experienced as such? And if it is
perience and enjoy the art work but of theexperienced as such, would it not be rea-
features or conditions under which a givensonable to characterize this experience as
object is, or may be, viewed as an aesthetic aesthetic? What does it mean to charac-
object. terize an object as aesthetic if this character
Though attractive and seemingly plausi- does not qualify, or infect, the experience
ble, this view is one-sided. It is certainly which is the basis of this characterization?
logical to hold that in order for an experi- I do not wish to belabor the point, but
ence to be aesthetic the object of the experi- only hope I have said enough to suggest
ence must in some way and to some extent that a critical examination of Price's view is
be aesthetic. All, if not most, aestheticians worth our effort. In what follows, I shall
would, so far as I know, agree on this prem- analyze and evaluate the main arguments
ise. But it is equally logical to state that an which he advances in support of his view. I
artwork, an object with aesthetic qualities, shall, in the course of my discussion, defend
may be perceived, i.e., experienced, un- two main propositions: (1) it is reasonable to
ask: what makes an experience aesthetic?
MICHAEL H. MITIAS is professor of philosophy at Millsaps (2) contrary to Price's contention, the ques-
College. tion "What makes an experience aesthetic?"
158 MITIAS
does not ask "What makes not beanunderstood

object as a in
causal
an concept, be-
aesthetic experience an aesthetic
cause object?"
"aesthetic-ness" cannot replace,
but rather "Under what conditions can one hence cause, the experience to acquire a
new quality which it did not possess before.
perceive an object as an aesthetic object?"
This argument is inadequate for the follow-
The perception of an object as an aesthetic
object is what makes an experience ing reasons.
aesthetic. We should aver at the outset that "ex-
perience" and "pumpkin" signify two dif-
I. ferent types of reality, the one substantial
and the other mental, temporal: accordingly,
The first argument which Price advances the two concepts, being-an-experience and
in support of his view is that "experiences being-a-thing, are logically different from
are of such a kind that they cannot undergo each other. But this difference is only for-
a change of properties."2 And they cannot mal, logical, not material, because an ex-
undergo such a change primarily because perience is as real and enduring as a thing
they are not substances. Thus since an ex- like a pumpkin is real and enduring. An
perience is not an entity like a pumpkin, or experience is a temporal event, but, though
an apple, it would be wrong to think that we an event, it can endure in time; a pumpkin
qualify an experience by an adjective like is an entity which endures in time, but it also
"aesthetic" the way we qualify a pumpkin by changes in time.3 Apart from its qualities,
an adjective like "yellow." "What makes a the pumpkin does not exist. I agree with
pumpkin yellow?" and "What mades an ex- Price that being a pumpkin is logically in-
perience aesthetic?" share a similar syntac- dependent of being a yellow, or a green,
tical form; moreover, the object phrase in pumpkin; I can conceive a pumpkin which
each question contains an adjective (aes- is not yellow, but I cannot conceive a color-
thetic, yellow) which modifies a noun less pumpkin, just as I cannot conceive a
(experience, pumpkin). This similarity, how-pure experience, or an experience which is
ever, is only formal, not material. The two not of a certain kind. And just as "yellow' is
questions differ in one basic respect: in the
only one quality by which a given pumpkin
pumpkin question the adjective yellow presents itself as such to perception,
qualifies a noun, pumpkin; but it attributes"aesthetic" is also one quality by which a
change of quality to the pumpkin. In thegiven experience presents itself as such to
object phrase of the experience question (intuitive, imaginative) perception.4 Like a
"aesthetic" qualifies a noun, experience; thing, e.g., pumpkin, an event, e.g., experi-
but it does not attribute a change of quality ence, has a complex structure of qualities in
to the experience, for "experience" is not a terms of which it "exists" and can be iden-
substance, like "pumpkin," which endures tified in the world.
in time. For example, a pumpkin may But, I may be reminded, it is senseless to
undergo a change in color and remain a characterize experience as something that
pumpkin; its being a pumpkin does not de- endures; we usually have distinct experi-
pend on its being yellow, green, or brown. ences of a certain novel, a certain painting, a
But it is not the case with "experience," for certain encounter with God, etc. Once an
an experience does not endure in time; experience is over it ceases to exist. You
consequently it cannot undergo a change in may refer to it as a past event. For example,
quality-e.g., aesthetic or moral. All we can you can say, "Experience X was a pleasant
contend with is specific experiences, where aesthetic, or romantic experience." But it
an experience of a certain kind replaces would be absurd to say that experience X
another; these experiences are distinct: a becomes or acquires an aesthetic, or roman-
moral experience is not, for example, the tic quality primarily because it, the experi-
same as an aesthetic experience. Accord- ence, did not exist before it took place. This
ingly, since an experience is not a substance
objection rests on a mistaken assumption:
which endures in time, and since it cannotviz., experiences happen, or exist, dis-
undergo a change of quality, "make" can- cretely. But experiences do not exist, or
159
happen the way pumpkins, or apples, exist. me, "What makes your experience of this
An experience is always an experience of a painting aesthetic?"
human being at a certain time, in a certain Let us grant, Price would argue, that it is
place, and in relation to a certain object you who experiences Guernica, and let us
(mental or spatiotemporal.) An "I" per- grant that you have had an experience, as
ceives Guernica, prays to God, loves its you say, of this painting, what does it mean
neighbor, or demonstrates against the gov- to say that your experience-or perhaps
ernment. This I is not a fleeting event but you-becomes, in the sense of "undergo a
an enduring reality. It is the author of its change of property," aesthetic? But, first,
experience; it is the unity of its experiences.what do we mean when we say, "The
It is also the agent which structures the ex- pumpkin is yellow" and "What makes the
perience. During the experience I remain pumpkin yellow?" When we say, "The
the subject which authors the experience pumpkin is yellow," we mean: this pumpkin
and also the medium within which the ob- possesses the property, or color, we normally
ject becomes a living, meaningful reality in designate as "yellow." Any object which
the experience.5 possesses this property is characterized as
If I am to rely roughly, and with some yellow; put differently, the statement, "The
modification, on Price's analogy, I can rea- pumpkin is yellow," is based on the fact that
son in the following way: the pumpkin is an object possesses a certain property gen-
distinct, but cannot exist as separate, from erally designated as yellow: the presence of
itS qualities or the qualities into which it can this property is the ground of the state-
change. As a thing (or as a substratum?), ment. Now, when we ask, "What makes a
the pumpkin endures, but this endurance pumpkin yellow?" do we really have in
does not necessarily apply to its properties. mind a causal kind of question? Are we in
A pumpkin can, in other words, undergo a other words, asking: what causes the
change of properties. Similarly, a person, pumpkin to be yellow? What can the answer
i.e., a human being, is distinct, but cannot to this question be? Ordinarily, we mean, I
exist as separate, from his experiences; on should say: what makes the pumpkin yellow
the contrary, he is the unity of his experi- is simply the fact that it possesses the prop-
ences the way the pumpkin is the unity of its erty, color, yellow. We do not have in mind
properties. As a thing (or substratum?), the either a divine, a chemical, or a metaphysi-
person endures, but this endurance does cal sort of question. What we have in mind
not necessarily apply to his experiences. is: in virtue of what quality, or aspect, is the
Experiences happen, take place, but a per- pumpkin referred to as yellow?
son endures. Thus if the experiences which But let us now suppose that "make" in the
take place are always of a certain kind, as pumpkin question is a causal concept-.
Price contends, then it should follow that a what kind of cause does Price have in mind?
person can undergo, or perform, different He does not provide an answer to this ques-
types of experience. I am here assuming tion. The concept of cause is a relational
that the relationship which holds between concept; it involves an object, or some
the pumpkin and its properties is similar to thing, which produces an effect of some
the one which holds between an I and its kind in another object, some thing else.
experiences. If this line of reasoning is Thus if "make" in the pumpkin question is
valid, then we can say that "make" in "What causal then we should think of something,
makes an experience aesthetic?" is a causal X, making i.e., causing, the pumpkin which
concept, for if an experience does not hap- at one moment was not yellow to become or
pen discretely, randomly, but is always per- undergo a change in which it becomes yel-
formed by some person, and if a person is a low. We should here insist that the
causal agent, it follows that it makes sense to pumpkin is always color-ful, never color-
ask, "What makes an experience aesthetic?" less; when it changes its color it either
Suppose I am this person we are talking abruptly or gradually abandons a color and
about, and suppose, next, I now perceive acquires a new one.
Guernica, is it not reasonable for you to ask Now, when you ask me, what makes your
160 MITIAS
experience of Guernica aesthetic? I may, may, or may not, be interrupted. In a s

first, mean: essential to my experience of of waking, or consciousness, this flow r
the painting is a property, or set of proper- veals a mosaic of experiences depending on
ties, which we normally designate as aes- the conditions under which they take place,
thetic; in other words, I characterize my or put differently, depending on the condi-
experience as aesthetic, mainly because it tions under which the I, the individual, en-
possesses a property, which I, and aesthet- counters his environment or plans what to
ically inclined people, would call "aesthetic:" do next. The individual endures, relatively
the presence of such a property is the ground speaking, but his experiences vary. Simi-
of my statement. I may, second, mean: in larly, a pumpkin endures, relatively speak-
the course of perceiving Guernica certaining, but its color changes.6 For example,
"things" happen, to use Price's term, some- suppose I am listening to a Mozart concert,
thing "befalls" the experience, in virtue of and suppose I am in this case having an
which my experience acquires an aesthetic aesthetic experience. During this event I
character. This second meaning of "make" am one with my experience; I am my ex-
is certainly causal, for if something does not perience during that stretch of time. Now,
befall the experience then it will not, indeed let us imagine that in the midst of my ex-
cannot, be characterized as aesthetic. perience a violent, unusual disturbance
When you say, Price would interject, that takes place which detracts my attention
something befalls your experience, that from the music. My aesthetic experience is,
your experience becomes aesthetic you consequently, discontinued. But although
seem to assume that the experience is an the experience discontinues, ceases to exist,
entity like a pumpkin which undergoes a I continue to exist and, without interrup-
change of color, but what was your aesthetic tion, pass into another kind of experience,
experience like before it has become aes- for as I turn my attention away from the
thetic? First, my experience of Guernica is as music and direct it towards the source of the
real and "objective" as the pumpkin is real distraction which happens, let us say, to be a
and "objective." While the first is a broil between two enemies in which one
"spatiotemporal" kind of reality, the second dies, I continue experiencing; but the sort
is a psychological, mental kind of reality. of experience which I now have is not any-
The basic tissue, or structure, of my experi- more aesthetic but moral, because I may
ence is fundamentally feeling. This feeling feel compassion for the dying and perhaps
is a complex of four main types of mental wronged man. Again, when the concert is
ingredienets: emotion, idea, image, sensa- over I walk towards my car; if I have a
tion. That is, when I perceive Guernica my friend with me my experience of walking
experience may, or may not, be aesthetic; with him may have a twofold character,
certain conditions should be fulfilled in practical and social, for on the one hand I
order for it to be, or become, aesthetic. I perform the activity of walking which is
here assume that my experience of the controlled by practical interest, and on the
painting lasts, or endures, as long as my other hand I socialize with my friend on
perception of the painting lasts, or endures. some matter of mutual concern. The life of
What makes the experience real is the fact an individual is a series of experiences in
that it is of the painting; it is an active im- which one type of experience replaces
aginative response to it. Its structure and another, just like the "life" of the pumpkin.
unity are to a large extent determined by A pumpkin becomes, changes into, yellow
the structure and unity of the painting and only if it were green, and it changes into
by what it has to offer. Second, before it brown only if it were yellow, and so on.
becomes aesthetic, my experience has a dif- What merits emphasis at this point of our
ferent type of character-practical, reli- discussion is that it is reasonable to say that
gious, moral, etc. As I emphasized earlier, an experience becomes aesthetic, and it is
we cannot view experiences discretely; we reasonable to make this assertion primarily,
do not bump into them in nature. An I is a for before it has become aesthetic it was of a
stream, flow, of experiences. This flow kind, and if it was of a different kind our
What Makes an Experience Aesthetic? 161
question "What makes an experience ing my cognitive attention on something

aesthetic?" is, then, warranted. yellow in contradistinction to something
which is not yellow. Now can I know what
II. "aesthetic" means the way I know what "yel
low" means? If I follow the same procedure
The second argument which Price ad- of knowing I commit a serious mistake. I
vances in support of his view is that experi-should in the first place examine what
ence in general, and aesthetic experience in makes my experience of Guernica, for
particular, cannot be understood apart example, aesthetic, then I should compare
from its objects. Unlike color, e.g., yellow,what makes my experience in this and simi-
the aesthetic character of an experience lar experiences aesthetic in contrast to what
cannot be abstracted from a certain ex- makes other experiences of mine moral,
perience. Thus any attempt to isolate religious, or practical. But if I undertake
aesthetic-ness the way we isolate yellow this task I discover it impossible, mainly be-
from the object to which this property because "the nature of any experience and its
longs is doomed to failure. How? Considerdifference from experiences of other kinds
the following questions: "What makes an is not intrinsic to the realm of experience,
experience aesthetic?" and "What makes a itself, but crammed full with all its objects;
color yellow?" We may tend at first look to that, consequently, an experience cannot be
treat them alike, for they have a similar understood in isolation from its objects."7
syntactical form. In the object phrase of Accordingly, if I attempt to know what
each question we have a noun qualified by makes an experience aesthetic by seeking to
an adjective; also, the noun in each case isolate aesthetic-ness from given experi-
denotes a class of "objects." But here the ences the way we isolate "yellow" from a
similarity ends; the differences are deeper yellow pumpkin I am bound to meet a dead
than what meets the eye. First, in the color end. This whole argument is both mislead-
question "yellow" does not qualify "color"; ing and misapplied-why?
the terms are two nouns in apposition; in First, let us grant, with Price, that experi-
the experience question, however, "aesthetic" ence as such, or experience apart from its
does not qualify "experience." Second, al- objects, does not exist; let us also grant that
though "color" and "experience are general what we call experience is always "crammed
terms and denote classes, the classes they full with all its objects." When we make an
denote are quite different from each other: assertion like this we in effect state that an
the member of the class "color"-red, yel- experience is always an experience of some-
low, etc.-are abstract properties, but the thing. I do not know of any aesthetician,
members of the class "experience" are con- philosopher, or psychologist at the present
crete events -moral experience, aesthetic who would deny the validity of this asser-
experience, etc.-where each of these is it- tion. Pure experience is a logical impossibil-
self a class of concrete events-an experi- ity, for the very concept of experience is
ence of Aida, an encounter with God, etc. relational in character; it entails an object of
Yet, Price contends, the two questions re- which it is an experience. But from this
semble each other in one respect; they are premise I do not see why we cannot study a
requests to explain a concept-"aesthetic certain kind of experience, analyze its con-
experience" and "yellow color." But if we tent, and then make an assertion on the
explain them similarly we make a items which constitute this content.
mistake-why? Because we know what "yel- When a philosopher, or a psychologist,
low" means by looking at and isolating, i.e., studies experience he does not claim, or
abstracting, the property yellow from a yel- pretend, to have an experience-in-general
low thing: being yellow and being a or "the realm of experience, itself," before
pumpkin are, as we saw, logically indepen- his cognitive faculty but specific experi-
dent of each other; the existence of the one ences and types of experiences; he has in
does necessarily require the existence of the mind the structure, procedure, and the
other. I know what "yellow" means by fix- conditions under which an experience is at
162 MITIAS
all possible. What an experience is, i.e., its tinguish an aesthetic experience from a
kind, is determined by the sort of object nonaesthetic experience? First, since an
which actuates it; that is, the content of the aesthetic experience is not a thing like a
experience-the sort of ideas, images, sen- pumpkin it cannot possess aesthetic-ness
sations, emotions, feelings, etc., and the the way a pumpkin possesses the color yel-
depth, richness, and vividness of these low: aesthetic-ness is not a simple property
items which constitute the being of the dwelling on the "surface" of an experience!
experience-is in the final analysis deter- Second, to determine what makes an ex-
mined by the sort of object which makes the perience aesthetic we should first under-
given experience possible. For example, stand what an experience is, i.e., its struc-
what happens to and in me, i.e., what I ture. Unlike a pumpkin, or an object of
experience, when I worship God in the ordinary sense-perception, an experience is
church is different from what I experience a complex event; it is a dynamic, temporal
reality. It does not present itself to mental
when I listen toEroica. It is, I think, logically
permissible to analyze my experience of the intuition as an appearance and as an in-
Eroica, or Anna Karenina, and compare itself; it does not, in other words, present
these experiences; it is equally permissibleitself as a substratum possessing sensuous
to compare the outcome of this comparison properties, but simply itself. Its essence, or
with my experience of God in the church, the in-itself, is at the same time its appear-
for in each case the content of the expe-ance. The most prominent aspect of this
rience, is distinguishable, from the other experience is the fact that it is apprehended
experiences. But from the fact that every as a complex feeling: a richness of images,
experience of mine is "crammed full of its emotions, ideas, sensation. This feeling is
objects," hence essentially distinguishable the content, fabric, of an experience in a
from other experiences, it does not neces- process of aesthetic perception. In this
sarily follow that I cannot study these ex- process the art work qua aesthetic object
periences, compare them, and then see comes to life. This is not an activity of pas-
whether or not there is something common sive sense-perception but of a reflective im-
to some or all of them. Let us, for example, agination: it is also conscious, purposeful,
ask someone to experience Eroica, Guernica, meaningful, creatively-made, and enjoy-
and Anna Karenina and let us suppose these able. What is aesthetic about this sort of
three works have something in common experience should be discovered within its
and that this common feature is necessarily elements. But we cannot achieve this end
experienced by him who experiences unless we first know what it means for
them-would it be logically offensive for something to be aesthetic; it would simply
this person to point out the presence of this be futile for someone to search for some-
feature in his experience of the three thing if he is ignorant of the identity of the
works? object he is searching for. And when I say
Second, Price assumes in his argument "aesthetic" in this context I do not have in
that "aesthetic-ness" is a simple property mind the etymological or lexical meaning of
which belongs (or is claimed to belong) the term but rather the aspect, aspects, or
the way "yellow" belongs to a pumpkin. But relation, or whatever it is which enables one
this assumption is both simplistic and to say that a given experience is aesthetic in
one-sided. An experience is not a thing; contrast to what we normally call moral,
consequently it does not, cannot, possess religious, practical, etc. Certainly, and this
qualities the way things possess them. Ac- is a purely logical statement, we cannot un-
cordingly, when we characterize an experi- derstand how or why an experience is aes-
ence as aesthetic we should have a special thetic unless we also know what makes an
relation between them in mind. But what object aesthetic, for, after all, it is the object
special relation, Price would object, should which occasions the experience and also
we have in mind? Again, what do aestheti- gives its structure. But from the fact that an
cians mean when they ask "What makes an aesthetic object is a necessary condition for
experience aesthetic?" How are we to dis- the being of an aesthetic experience it does
not necessarily follow that (1) simply be- application "requires an element within
cause one perceives an aesthetic object he which there need be no diversity of kind8;
will automatically have an aesthetic experi- e.g., "yellow." A concept is heterogeneous
ence; (2) we cannot, as we saw earlier, en- when its application requires "the presence
quire into the aspect, aspects, or relation of an element whose components are dif-
which distinguishes the experience as aes- ferent in kind"; e.g., "salesman." Now "ex-
thetic. During a process of aesthetic perience," like its offspring "aesthetic ex-
perception the art work does not exist as perience," is a heterogeneous concept; it is
external to the perceiving or the aesthetic composed of two main elements: awareness
process but as an integral element of that and an object of awareness. Accordingly if
process. It is not my task here to explore something is an experience it is always an
questions like the following: what makes a awareness of some object-of a game, a
feeling aesthetic? In what way, and under painting, or an idea. We cannot mean by
what conditions, does a complex experi- "experience" only awareness: "an aware-
ence become aesthetic? My main concern inness of nothing whatever is inconceivable."9
the preceding discussion has been only to Thus whenever we think of "experience"
show that it is reasonable to focus attention we should think of an awareness and also of
an object without which the awareness is
on an experience, to investigate its content,
and to see whether this content possesses inconceivable.
an
aspect which we usually call "aesthetic." Let us now ask: what makes an experi-
ence aesthetic? Or, put differently, in what
element are we to locate the aesthetic
III. character of the experience? Can we
abstract this character from the experi-
The third argument launched by ence? PriceNo,
toPrice contends; why? We cannot
defend his view is that "what makes an ex- abstract "aesthetic experience" from its ob-
perience aesthetic is that it is an experience jects the way we abstract "yellow" from a
of an aesthetic object." The concept "ex- given yellow object, because "aesthetic ex-
perience," and its offspring "aesthetic perience" is a heterogeneous concept. What
experience," is composed of two main ele- actually exists is a concerete awareness of
ments: awareness and an object of aware- Eroica, Anna Karenina, or Guernica. Aware-
ness. "Awareness" is the same-i.e., ness of each of these objects is what we call
homogeneous-in all types of experience; "aesthetic experience." But we are also
thus since this element is simple and cannotaware of a soccer game or of an aromatic
undergo any change of character, and sincedish at the table. We should accordingly
its object is variable as well as changeable, itask: what makes our experience of Guer-
follows that "aesthetic-ness" cannot be at- nica, Anna Karenina, orEroica, in contrast to
tributed to the element of awareness but to other types of experience, aesthetic? We
its object. Let me elucidate this argument. cannot discover "aesthetic-ness" in the ele-
"Aesthetic" does not, and should not, ment of awareness primarily because this
properly apply to the experience as such element is transparent and cannot, as such,
but to the object of the experience; that is, be an object of introspection. An awareness
in raising the question "What makes an ex-does not have any traits peculiar to it, "al-
perience aesthetic?" our attention should most no traits that it possesses in independ-
not focus on an experience as something
ence of other things."10 Awareness is that by
which possesses an aesthetic quality the way means of which we perceive, recognize, or
a pumpkin possesses the quality yellow, but identify things. Thus all qualities we ordi-
on the object of the experience-namely, narily attribute to experience actually apply
what makes a given object in a given experi- to the thing experienced. It follows then
ence aesthetic? Why? We should make, to that we cannot characterize an experience
begin with, a distinction between two types as moral, religious, or aesthetic, etc., in
of concepts, homogeneous and heteroge- virtue of a special kind of awareness.
neous. A concept is homogeneous when its Accordingly what makes an experience
164 M I T IA S
aesthetic is the fact that it is the experi- perception I am not aware of my awareness
ence of an aesthetic object. of the painting, I am only aware of the
I emphasize "aesthetic object" on behalf painting. Now what does it mean to say "I
of Price mainly because the mere awareness am aware of the painting?" I raise this ques-
of a painting, or a statue, does not make an tion for two reasons: (1) I am anxious to
experience aesthetic. The aesthetic charac- identify the locus of the aesthetic experience;
ter of an object does not belong to its simple (2) I cannot, on Price's view, attribute any
nature; it rather befalls the object: quality to the awareness but to the object or
"aesthetic-ness" happens to the object.the Price
person who is aware of the object: "the
is not here interested in explaining how the and the fragrance of the rose, un-
redness
object acquires the property of aesthetic- like its time and place of ownership, charac-
ness but only in showing that the question terize the rose alone. But what property can
"What makes an experience aesthetic?" we assign to awareness in itself in isolation
should be replaced by "What makes the ob- from all other things? We say it is attentive
ject of an experience an aesthetic object?"and rapt; but while, at first, these predicates
The preceding argument is inadequate seem to qualify the awareness in independ-
for three main reasons: (1) "aesthetic-ness" ence of all other things, they soon appear in
does not belong to an experience the way their true colors as properties of the person
"yellow" belongs to an object; (2) "aware- who is aware. It is he who attends with care
ness" is not a passive element in experienceand concentration, not his awareness."11'
through which we look at things but a con- But if the concept of aesthetic experience is
stitutive, creative, agent of the experience a relation, a unity of an object and its
itself; (3) Price's use of "awareness" is quite awareness, the owner of the awareness
different, indeed indifferent, to the use should logically be irrelevant to our consid-
adopted by most, if not all, of the aestheti- eration of the concept. If, however, the per-
cians, at least by those to whom he refers. ceiver, the person, is the one who feels ex-
Let us now consider these reasons in detail. pectant, excited, attentive, etc., then we
First, Price's analysis of "experience" in should allow that it is he who has the experi-
general, and "aesthetic experience" in par- ence in a process of aesthetic perception.
ticular, is tantamount to a denial of the pos- Accordingly, the aesthetic experience is not,
sibility and being of experience as such, for contrary to Price's contention, the unity of
suppose we ask: what should I conceive an awareness and its object but what one
when I think of a specific experience, e.g., feels when one aesthetically perceives a
an aesthetic perception of Guernica? Let us work of art; it is the unity of his feeling with
imagine that I now stand before the paint- the art work in the event of aesthetic per-
ing and undertake the ritual of aesthetic ception. This feeling is what aestheticians
perception; let us also imagine that. my have in mind when they ask: what makes an
perception is a genuine aesthetic experience aesthetic? "Awareness" is only
experience-what should I conceive, or ask an element in the realization of this experi-
you to conceive with me, when I talk about ence; it is, in Harold Osborne's words, what
this experience? If we follow Price's rec- energizes "our grasp of things."12 It is,
ommendations, I should conceive of the ob- moreover, a form of attention, and as such
ject, viz., the painting, and an awareness by it is a power, a vital power, which directs the
means of which I am said to perceive the "mind upon an object."13 Price's under-
painting. But since my awareness in this standing of "awareness" is unfortunately
event is transparent, since it is trait-less and limited and unrealistic. He views it as an
cannot be found in introspection, since it element independent of the person, the
cannot, in short, be characterized, I can mind, which perceives the art work. A per-
only conceive of the painting. What is left of son is, beside other things, his awareness;
the experience then? The so-called aes- the latter is not merely a "glass pane"
thetic experience is necessarily reduced to a through which we perceive objects in the
verbal statement about the painting; for, world. "We look at them," Price writes,
once more, during the event, or process, of "through awareness, quite unnoticing; as
through a perfect window, we see the gar- time; it is also, as I indicated earlier, a com-
den not the glass."14 This conception of plex event: it is a bundle of emotions, im-
awareness is, moreover, both atomistic and ages, ideas, moods, sensations, and feelings.
passive. But, as I shall stress later on, And since it is temporal, i.e., has a begin-
awareness is an activity of imagination; it is
ning and end in time, and since its structure
a creative power which assists in focusing is determined by the structure, sensuous or
our attention on an object, on the one imaginative,
hand, of the art work, we can say it
and in grasping the structure of the object, can be a unity, that is, coherent and com-
on the other hand. plete. Let us grant, Price would here inter-
It is, I think, logically difficult to sayject,
thatthat this is what we mean by "aesthetic
awareness (in Price's sense of the term) in experience," let us also grant for the sake of
an experience is, or can be, aesthetic, for argument, that an aesthetic experience can
two reasons: first, the experience is, as ex-be a unity according to your sense of
perience, a mental event; consequently the"unity"-17 what makes, or could make, such
object of the awareness is a mental object, a experience aesthetic? What does it mean to
percept; but since the art work is complex, say of a mental event that it is aesthetic? Let
and since its perception endures in time, me state at the onset that "aesthetic" should
the percept should likewise endure in time. not be understood as a simple quality, like
But it would not endure and it would not yellow, which can be abstracted from the
maintain an identity during this endurance expereince qua mental event the way we
unless it is to some extent coherent, for abstract "yellow" from a yellow object,
coherence is essential, indeed a necessary primarily because, as I argued earlier, an
condition, to its apprehension as something experience is generically different from a
intelligible, hence meaningful. Now when physical object like a pumpkin; the former is
the percept endures through a period of an event, the latter is a substance. Thus
time as a meaningful, intelligible, reality it is when aestheticians ask "What makes an
usually calledfeeling. Second, the elements experience aesthetic?" they do not try to
of an experience, an awareness and its ob- discover the nature of aesthetic-ness by
ject, may be distinguished post facto for the isolating a simple property from an experi-
sake of analysis but cannot in fact be viewed ence they usually call an aesthetic experience.
as separate; for during the process of per- They simply seek to enquire into those fea-
ception one is not aware of his awareness of tures or relations-mental features or rela-
the object, he is only aware of the object and tions, I should say-which are peculiar to
its qualities. During this event the experi- an aesthetic experience and which distin-
ence takes place as a unity of awareness and guish this sort of experience from other
object: the two blend into a living unity. The sorts: e.g., moral or religious experience.
perceiver becomes, to use Whitehead's For certainly what I feel when I perceive a
famous description, "a drop of experi- work of art is different from what I feel
ence." It would accordingly be meaningless when I pray to God or watch a football
in this event to say that what makes an ex- game.'8 If these and other experiences are
perience aesthetic is the fact that the aware- different in kind, the question "What
ness which belongs to it is aesthetic.15 makes an experience aesthetic?" is war-
An aesthetic experience, then, is not a ranted. I am purposely refraining from any
relation between two discrete elements, an reference to what makes an experience
awareness and an art work; it is rather the aesthetic simply because my main concern
feeling which one enjoys in aesthetic per- in this argument is only to show that, re-
ception; this feeling is actuated, made real, gardless of how an experience becomes
when one attends to certain qualities of an aesthetic, it is logically plausible to ask what
art work and when one consciously re- makes such an experience aesthetic. But
sponds to and recreates the aesthetic qual- from the fact that an experience is not a
ities pregnant in the work qua form imagina- thing like a pumpkin from which certain
tively.16 An aesthetic experience is a mental properties can be abstracted it does not
event which endures through a period of necessarily follow that we cannot account
M I T I A S
166
for the uniqueness of an aesthetic experi- aesthetic-ness is a function of awareness,

ence. If an experience is aesthetic, and if we not of the object of awareness. But Stolnitz,
know what "aesthetic" means, then we Price argues, commits the mistake dis-
should be able to ask what makes it so. This cussed in part II of this paper; he supposes
is what Beardsley has in mind when he that "What makes an experience aesthetic?"
writes: "we can distinguish an aesthetic ex- is like "What makes a colour yellow?" Con-
perience from a non-aesthetic one in terms sequently, he supposes that "experience is
of its own internal properties, and thus de- "a concept like 'colour', and 'aesthetic' like
cide whether or not an experience is aes- 'yellow."' He will, next, "suppose that the
thetic without having first to know whetherobject of an aesthetic experience can be
abstracted from it as things can from their
or not the object of (and in) the experience
has the properties that permit aesthetic colours, and that consequently, aesthetic
experience."19 experience, may claim its character and dis-
tinction from experiences of other kinds
IV. wholly within the abstract realm of aware-
ness as colours do in theirs. But as we have
Second, implicit in Price's treatment of seen, aesthetic experience cannot, even in
aesthetic experience is the belief that thought, be dissociated from its objects.'"24
aesthetic perception is a passive process in This evaluation of Stolnitz's view suffers
which if an experience is accompanied, in from a number defects.
an aesthetic process, by a certain kind of Let me, first, explain what I mean when I
awareness, or contemplation, the experi- say that Price's conception of aesthetic per-
ence would then be characterized as aes- ception is passive. If, as he holds, aesthetic
thetic. This belief underlies his critique of experience is composed of two elements,
philosophers like Schopenhauer, Stolnitz, awareness and an object of which it is an
and Beardsley. I shall select Jerome Stol- awareness, if, next, what is aesthetic is not
nitz's view for critical evaluation as an determined by the awareness but by the fact
example; my aim in this evaluation is simply that its object is an aesthetic object, it should
to expose Price's mistaken assumption follow that one becomes aware of the
about the role of awareness in aesthetic aesthetic identity of an object in "aesthetic
perception. perception"; that is, aesthetic-ness acciden-
For Stolnitz, Price contends, what makes tally befalls an object when it comes into
an experience aesthetic is "its being an "awareness that belongs to persons of cer-
awareness of one kind, contemplation, as tain sort."25 "Awareness" is treated in this
opposed to others."20 He makes the follow- context as a transparent reality which does
ing quotations from Aesthetics and the not possess any properties apart from its
Philosophy of Criticism: "we are defining the objects; and any property which we ordi-
realm of the aesthetic in terms of a distinc- narily attribute to it actually applies, as we
tive kind of 'looking'. This says nothing saw earlier, either to the person who pos-
about the objects which are apprehended in sesses the awareness or to its object. In an
this way."21 Again, this kind of "looking," aesthetic experience one is not, cannot be,
Price observes, consists for Stolnitz in a cer- aware of his awareness which is an element
tain attitude, one of "disinterested and of the experience but only of the object of
sympathetic attention to and contemplation the experience. We see the object the way
of any object of awareness whatever, for its we see the garden through a glass window.
own sake alone."22 Finally, aesthetic experi- If I am to express this point succinctly,
ence "is the total experience had while this awareness is not, for Price, a formative, or-
attitude is being taken."23 On this view, ganizative agent of the aesthetic character
Price insists, if we assume an aesthetic at- of an experience; it is in fact indifferent to
titude, and if this attitude is accompanied this character. But, when we turn our atten-
by contemplation as a species of a special tion to Stolnitz's view, we find in his work a
sort of awareness the experience would radically different view of awareness, dif-
then be considered aesthetic. Accordingly, ferent, that is, from the one which Price
attributes to him. Price complains that what may distinguish two types of attitude, prac-
makes an experience aesthetic for Stolnitz is tical and aesthetic. One assumes a practical
"its being an awareness of one kind, con- attitude when he perceives an object in
templation, as opposed to others."26 But terms of its utility. For example, I may kneel
what do we mean by "contemplation?" Con- before an icon and look at it as I pray. My
templation is a species of awareness. The perception, or awareness, of this picture is
latter is a primitive, generic term; it desig- in this case motivated by a religious senti-
nates an active mental state which can be
ment or interest. The icon may be a great
characterized only in and through anyone,
artistic masterpiece, and it may be signifi-
or a combination, of various species: cant
per-in other ways, but in the present per-
ception it exists to me as an object of reli-
ception, sensation, contemplation, or intellec-
tual cognition. Anyone of these processesgious veneration: I perceive it solely as a
is, for Stolnitz, an activity of awareness.
means to a religious end; I perceive, in
Thus to be aware means, broadly speak- other words, what is religious, not what is
ing, to respond, attend, knowinglyaesthetic
to an or cognitive in it. One assumes an
object mentally or sensuously. But aesthetic
pure attitude when he perceives an ob-
awareness, or awareness in general, does ject disinterestedly, sympathetically, atten-
not exist, primarily because an abstract, tively, or put differently, contemplatively. In
pure, or general object as an object of this sort of attitude I direct my attention to
awareness is inconceivable. what the object has to offer, i.e., as a repre-
Whenever we discover ourselves in a state sentation, as a world in itself, and respond
of awareness we attend, respond, to an to ob-its qualities objectively; I perceive and
ject in one of its modes: sensation, intellec-
apprehend them for what they are. I do not
tual cognition, or perception. The point allow my own emotional, intelleuctual, or
which merits emphasis here is that for Stol- cultural idiosyncracies to interfere in
nitz what makes an experience aesthetic is seeing, i.e., apprehending, the values preg-
not merely an awareness of a special kind, nant in it; on the contrary, I control, direct
viz., contemplation. In other words, though my power of awareness, i.e., attention, to
a species of awareness, "contemplation" is respond to all or as much as the object has to
not a passive state, given as such, so that offer. For example, if the icon before which
when one assumes a certain attitude to- I usually pray hangs now in my living room
wards an object he acquires an aesthetic it is possible for me to assume an aesthetic
character. On the contrary, "contempla- attitude towards it; when this happens I do
tion" is a complex concept; it defines the not perceive it as a religious object but as a
whole notion of Aesthetic Attitude. In representation, i.e., form. I respond to it as
order for an experience to be, or become,
a complex of lines, colors, and representa-
aesthetic two conditions should be fulfilled: tion, and I try to apprehend what the unity
(1) one should assume an aesthetic attitude; of these express.
(2) one should apprehend the art work as I discussed, though briefly, the concept
an aesthetic object in what Stolnitz calls of aesthetic attitude mainly to focus atten-
Aesthetic Experience. Both of these condition on one point: aesthetic awareness, as
tions are included in the definition which perception, is, for Stolnitz, a dynamic con-
Price quotes in full from Aesthetics and the cept; it is an activity in which the mind, or
Philosophy of Criticism but whose full importbetter imagination, recognizes and ap-
he does not seem to consider seriously. Letprehends an object as something aesthetic.
me elucidate this point. We are clearly told by him that "an attitude
What do we mean by an "attitude" in organizes and directs our awareness of the
general, and "aesthetic attitude" in particu- world."28 The attitude he speaks of here
lar? An attitude, for Stolnitz, "is a way of should not be viewed as a force working
directing and controlling our percep- behind awareness qua activity but rather as
tion."27 It is, accordingly, a power, a readi-
the attitude of the aware-ness itself; it is the
ness to focus one's attention on an object attitude of the perceiver in an activity of
and respond to it actively, interestedly. We attending to an object and apprehending it
M I T I A S
168
in a certain way. Awareness in the experience

mode of aesthetic is that it is the experi-
aesthetic perception is not an opaque ence of an aesthetic object." The mere
real-
ity, a window through which one awareness recognizes of a musical compoPition, Price
the identity of an object but the very states, is not necessarily an awareness of an
activity
which apprehends, constructs, the aesthetic
object object:
in "the impresario is aware of
the process of aesthetic perception. This the music as something to be sold, the
process, Stolnitz reminds us, should not be communicant as something through which
thought of as "'blank, cow-stare.' It is easy the Deity may be approached, and the citi-
to fall into this mistake when we find aes- zen as something that impedes or forwards
thetic perception described as just looking,' the well-being of society. The same object
without any activity or practical interest."29may appear in experiences of different
On the contrary, it is a creative activity, species,
in and it is not in the simple nature of
which we "want to make the value of the a thing that we can find that trait that makes
object come fully alive in our experience. awareness of it an aesthetic experience as
Therefore we focus our attention upon opposed
the to an experience of some other
object and 'key up' our capacities of imagi- kind."'31 The aesthetic quality befalls ob-
nation and emotion to respond to it. As a jects, "an accident when, in certain cir-
psychologist says of the aesthetic experi- cumstances, they come into awareness that
ence, 'Appreciation . . . is awareness alert- belongs to persons of a certain sort."32 But
ness, animation.'"30 In it we empathize, feel if that property is not part of its simple
into the object; we respond to it actively, nature, if it does not belong to it the way the
creatively, not only by our imagination but way "yellow" belongs to a pumpkin, then
also by our body. Accordingly, contemplative who, or what, makes it happen? In itself the
activity, or as it is here called aesthetic per- object cannot undergo such a transforma-
ception, is discriminative in character; its tion, i.e., from being natural to being
goal is to capture those qualities in the ob- aesthetic. It must be the perceiver who does
ject which merit aesthetic attention. But this as creative imagination, not as passive,
what makes the experience, or perception, opaque awareness. It is, I think, Price's im-
aesthetic is not, contrary to Price's claim, poverished conception of awareness, and
merely the fact that it is an awareness of a his persistence to see it discretely and not as
distinctive kind; what makes this aware- a function of imagination, which led him to
ness distinctive is exactly the fact that it can misunderstand the views of Stolnitz,
capture, create, bring to life the aesthetic (Schopenhauer, and Beardsley.)
aspect of the object, and not vice versa. Ac- Thus the question "What makes an ex-
cordingly, assuming the aesthetic attitude is perience aesthetic?" should not mean to ask
a necessary condition for the possibility of "What makes an awareness aesthetic?"
the aesthetic experience; it assists the percip- primarily because no aesthetician so far as I
ient to apprehend the aesthetic qualities of know has asked such a question; it should
the object. In order for the experience to instead ask: under what conditions can one
be, or become, aesthetic the object, regard- perceive an object as an aesthetic object?
less of its identity, must be contemplated, Or, under what conditions can one ac-
i.e., apprehended, brought to life in the tualize the aesthetic qualities potential in
aesthetic experience of an aesthetic object. the object in a process of aesthetic percep-
Consequently, "aesthetic-ness" is not, con- tion? For the realization of these qualities
trary to Price's charge, a simple quality and their enjoyment is what makes the ex-
which can be abstracted from "experience" perience aesthetic. Accordingly the aes-
the way "yellow" can be astracted from a thetic object is a task to be achieved crea-
pumpkin, or which can be injected or im- tively in aesthetic experience. The latter is
ported into the experience, but a creatively its womb and the limit of its destiny.
formed reality achieved in the process of How does an aesthetic quality, or the
aesthetic perception. aesthetic object, exist in, or present itself to
This last point leads me to my final re- the imagination? This question is the sub-
mark. Price tells us that "What makes an ject matter of another study.
1 Kingsley Price, "What Makes an Experience kraus,Philosophy ofArt, (Beverly Hills, 1974) Chapter I;
Aesthetic?" The British Journal of Aesthetics, vol.B.
19Bosanquet, Three Lectures on Aesthetics (New York,
(1979), 131-43. 1963),-Lecture I; S. Alexander, Beauty and Other Forms
2 Ibid, p. 133. of Value, pp. 7 ff.; M. Beardsley, Aesthetics (New York,
3 We can seriously argue, the way Whitehead did, 1958); H. Osborne, "The Elucidation of the Aesthetic
that what we call a substance, like pumpkin, which Experience, 'Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.
endures in time is an occasion, a temporal event, and XXIII
as (1964); R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art
such it is as substantial as an experience is, which is
(Indiana University Press, 1964); J. Dewey, Art as Ex-
likewise an event. I make this point only to stress that
perience (New York, 1958).
Price's characterization of a pumpkin as something 171 am aware that some philosophers deny the
enduring and an experience as something that simply meaningfulness of speaking of "aesthetic experience"
happens and does not endure rests on a questionable as a unified mental event which we can characterize or
metaphysical conception of matter, event, and thing. analyze. This issue has been treated often in debates,
4 I am aware that we should here distinguish be- such as the one between G. Dickie and M. Beardsely. It
tween sensuous and mental types of perception. Butis in not necessary for me here to enter this controversy;
both cases we may characterize perception as an activ-one remark, however, is in order: any discourse in
ity in which the mind attends to an object regardlessaesthetics
of is unintelligent if the discourse is not based,
its kind. in some way or another, on what we usually call
5 We need not here explain, or justify, how this aesthetic experience. This point was made explicitly
happens; such an explanation, or justification, is the clear by Clive Bell when he wrote: "The starting-point
task of the metaphysician. We should only stress that of all systems of aesthetics must be the personal ex-
an aesthetic, moral, or religious experience does not perience of a peculiar emotion. The objects that pro-
exist, or happen, discretely, atomistically, in the world;voke this emotion we call works of art."Art, pp. 16-17.
it is always the experience of an enduring reality, the I.See, moreover, M. Beardsley, "Aesthetic Experience
6 We need not concern ourselves here with the na- Regained," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 28
ture of the I or with how it endures. We should accept, (1969). DeWitt Parker, The Principles of Aesthetics (New
at least on phenomenological basis, that human beings York, 1946); H. Osborne, "The Elucidation of Aes-
have identities and that these identitites endure in thetic Experience," see G. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic:
time. An Institutional Analysis (Cornell University Press,
7"What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?", 135. 1974).
8 Ibid, 136. 18 In the Philosophy of Art, W. E. Steinkraus discusses
9 Ibid. in some detail the essential features which distinguish
10Ibid, 137. the aesthetic experience from other types of experi-
" Ibid. ence. See especially chapter I.
12 H. Osborne, "Aesthetic Perception," The British 19 "Aesthetic Experience Regained," in Art and
Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 18 (1978), 307. Philosophy, ed. by W. Kennick, (New York, 1979), pp.
13 S. Alexander, Beauty and Other Forms of Value.458-9.
(New York, 1968), p. 13. 20 "What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?", 139.
14 "What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?" 138. 21 J. Stolnitz, Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism
15 One can even argue that awareness, conscious-
(Boston, 1970), p. 29.
ness, is the medium within which the aesthetic object 22 Ibid, p. 35.
comes to life in the aesthetic experience; it is accord- 23 "What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?", 140.
ingly the principle of unity of the experience. Cf. 24 Ibid.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Psychology of Imagination 25 Ibid., 139.
(Washington Square Press, 1966); M. Dufrenne, 26 Ibid.
Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (Northwestern 27Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism, p. 32.
University Press, 1973); Roman Ingarden, The Literary 28 Ibid., p. 33.
Work of Art, tr. G. G. Grabowicz (Northwestern Univer- 29 Ibid., p. 37.
sity Press, 1973). Edward S. Casey, Imagining: A 30 Ibid. Cf. Richard Lind, "Attention and the
Phenomenological Study (Indiana University Press, Aesthetic Object," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
1979). Criticism, vol. XXXIX. (1980), 131-42; Harrison Hall,
16 Although aestheticians do not in general agree on "Painting and Perceiving," The Journal of Aesthetics and
the exact meaning and nature of "aesthetic experience" Art Criticism, vol. XXXIX (1981), 291-96.
they would, I think, agree that the texture of the ex- 31 "What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?", 138.
perience is feeling. See, for example, Warren E. Stein- 32 Ibid., 139.

What Makes An Experience Aesthetic

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What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?

Author(s): Michael H. Mitias

What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?

does not ask "What makes not beanunderstood

experience of Guernica aesthetic? I may, may, or may not, be interrupted. In a s

question "What makes an experience ing my cognitive attention on something

for the uniqueness of an aesthetic experi- aesthetic-ness is a function of awareness,

in a certain way. Awareness in the experience

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