ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA

(their father) who represents the minors, petitioners, vs.

LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA,
AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the
Court of First Instance of Abra, respondents.
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976

FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and
Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First
Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. The herein
defendants then filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of
the said motion, the plaintiffs counsel moved to amend the complaint which was granted.
The defendants again filed another motion to dismiss the complaint. The said motion to
dismiss was then heard. On August 19, 1975, plaintiffs counsel received a copy of the order
dismissing the complaint and on the 23rd of the same month; he moved to set aside the
said order. The court denied the MR filed by the plaintiffs counsel which the counsel later
on filed a written manifestation allowing the minor petitioners to be allowed to substitute
their deceased mother. From the order, the plaintiffs counsel filed a second MR of the order
dismissing the complaint but the same was denied. Hence, this present petition for review.

ISSUE: WON THE ACTION SURVIVES EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF A PARTY DURING THE
PENDENCY OF THE CASE.

HELD: Yes. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be
substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. Under Section 16, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies, it shall be the duty of his
attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, and to give the name and residence of
his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." Moreover, Article 777 of
the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to
the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but
was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the
properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. In addition, Under Section
17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear
and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted." The question as
to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage
sued for. The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels
of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and
therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the
respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and
to be substituted for her. Thus, the action in the instant case survives.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch II, respondents.

G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, in Paranaque,
Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of
Cebu.

On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the probate
of a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased, devising all his
properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and
designating Junquera as executor thereof.

After due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was a
forgery.

The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings.

After determining the intestate heirs of the decedent, the court ordered that the assets of the intestate
estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable
shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs.

On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the forged
will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased
Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs
made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to
receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was
entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child.

Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the court dated April
12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the
court dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.

Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted to support
his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He
asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by Pilar
N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio
Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales,
Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato
their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as
a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato
Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was
executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been executed before the
distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and
inexistent for lack of subject matter.

On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirs who
signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same
rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.

It is argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights" executed on July
31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo,
Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because there can be no
effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the
heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of
inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of
his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the
inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore, uncertain. This view, according
to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and
legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an order
for the distribution of the estate.

Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code
there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an
inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the death of the person from whom he is
to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of
the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were
certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in the
waiver document itself.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an acceptance or renunciation of inheritance, in order to be valid, must be preceded by

a court declaration that the person making the acceptance or renunciation is indeed an heir.

RULING:

No.

The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an existing
inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction
of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future
property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the
deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to

which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the
moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property,
but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of
the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding
hereditary portion." The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to
partition the estate was issued only in 1969.

In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective.
For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the
existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. The intention to waive a right or
advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a
party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily
relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is
possible.

The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear
and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and
Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the
amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the eight (8)
intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including all cash and sums of money
in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in
any action then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and
concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes
that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never
meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would
not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle
the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and
30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they inherited
shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3)
On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment"
purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her
(Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the
deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the
same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the
aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-
assignors named in the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A
Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and
Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24,
1969.

RIOFERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004]

Facts:

Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. Private
respondents discovered that petitioner Teodora Rioferio (the paramour) and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, real estate mortgages and
transfers involving the properties of the estate of the decedent. To recover their rights, Alfonso Clyde P.
Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of Administration praying that letters of administration
encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.

Issue: Whether the heirs (respondents) may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case?

Ruling:

Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to
bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the
New Civil Code that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations
to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others
by his will or by operation of law. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the
heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. The heirs cannot be expected
to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed
would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime
do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.

POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First
Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America and a permanent
resident of Philadelphia. She executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat, and that while in temporary sojourn in the
Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila, leaving property both in the Philippines and
in the United States of America. The Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was
admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the
probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of
administration were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Nenita C. Paguia, daughter or the testator, was
appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.
This was opposed by Adoracions father, Hermogenes Campos, who earlier filed an Affidavit of Self-
adjudication not being aware that Adoracion had left a will. He later died and was substituted by Polly
Cayetano as petitioner in the instant case.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos
merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and
forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.

Cayetano alleged that the trial court erred in ruling that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be
divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in
complete disregard of Law of Succession.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a forced heir is entitled to his legitime in case the testator was a citizen of another
country.

RULING:

No.

Applying Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is
the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit
that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by
the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it
would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
must apply.

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO,
respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979

FACTS:

AQUINO, J.:

Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on
October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5,
1935. In addition to the devices contained therein, the will had a provision to the effect that the testator
intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest. It was stated
therein that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: one,
during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood
and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a device in favour of a person whose identity at the time of the testators death cannot
be ascertained, may be efficacious.

RULING:

No.

The Supreme Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the
heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).

The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as
referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions
difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his
intention.

The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his
death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the
seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew
entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be
entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the
trusteeship would be terminated.

Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in
1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow
the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's
petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male
relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood."

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration
of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.

It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the
testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered
the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did
not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any
intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now
article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged
into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists."

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that
legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There
being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the
testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.

Manuel Reyes v. Court of Appeals and Julio Vivares

G.R. No. 12099; October 30, 1997
Facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato Reyes executed his last will and testament. He
bequeathed all his prop to his wife Asuncion (Oning) and his brother Jose. The
will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence
of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan.
Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his
default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. PR filed a petition for probate
of the will. The recognized natural children of Torcuato with Estebana Galolo
and Celsa Agape filed an opposition. The court declared that the will was exec
according w/ the forma prescribed by law. However, it ruled that Asuncion was
never married to the deceased (Hence, dispo made in will is invalid). Julio
Vivares filed an appeals before the CA with the allegation that the oppositos
failed to present ay comp. evidence taht Asuncion was legally married to
another person. The CA affirmed the trial court's decision but with the
modification that dispo in favor of Oning was valid.
Ruling:
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon
the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely
inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities
prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will's
provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof
usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are,
however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first
determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the
probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid.
The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because "practical
considerations" demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the
testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality. Parenthetically, the rule on
probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the will. The lower court was not asked to rule
upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the
declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not
have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the
institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved
inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the
probate court.

FACTS:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decent Margarita S. Mayores
(Margarita) while respondent was the decedents lifelong companion since 1929.

On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her
parents, grandparents, and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins
which included petitioner.

Before her death, Margarita executed a will where she bequeathed portions of her undivided
shares in real properties to respondent. Margarita also left all her personal properties to
respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will.

RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and
respondent as executor of the will. CA affirmed.

ISSUES:
(1) W/N the CA erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the formalities
required by law. NO
(2) W/N it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita,
and in not issuing letters of administration to petitioner. NO

HELD:
We rule in favor of respondent.

(1) A review of the findings of the RTC reveal that petitioners arguments lack basis. The RTC
correctly held:
About the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its
attestation clause states that the will is composed of 3 pages while the will, in truth, only
consists of 2 pages only because the attestation is not part of the notarial will, the same is not
accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court is of the
considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation
clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is
consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is sufficient safeguard from the possibility of
an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief
that the will is the whole instrument consisting of 3 pages inclusive of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal
interpretation enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code.
The Court also rejects the contention that the signatures of the testator were affixed on
different occasions as the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture, and
appearance as compared to the signatures on the succeeding pages. The picture shows that
the testator was affixing her signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and the
notary. There is no evidence to show that the first signature was procured earlier than February
2, 1987.

We find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC.

(2) Since, petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887
of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed
and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedents estate.

The petition is DENIED. The assailed CA decision is AFFIRMED.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." He had eight
(8) legitimate children from two wives and three (3) illegitimate children.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he bequeathed, among
others, an amount of P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,
Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each.

On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The executor of the will paid all the bequests therein including to the three (3) illegitimate children,
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each
in satisfaction of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by
his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to
the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. Their oppositions were overruled by the lower court.
Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is
Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the illegitimate children of a person, who is citizen and a domiciliary of a foreign
country, and whose estate in the Philippines had been settled in accordance with a will validly probated
here, are entitled to their respective legitimes.

RULING:

No.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed. They provide that

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature
of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate
and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine
will, it would not alter the law, for a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall
be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

ENRIQUEZ v ABADIA 95 Phil 927 MONTEMAYOR; August 9, 1954

FACTS - September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. He died on January 14, 1943 . Andres
Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a petition for its probate which was opposed by some
cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will. - One of
the attesting witnesses testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence
of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand said will in Spanish which the testator
spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of
each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same
with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all
this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and
that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in
his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence. -
The trial court found said will to be a holographic will. Although at the time it was executed and
at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law , the trial court
still admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The TC did so
because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code
was already in force, which permitted the execution of holographic wills. According to the trial
court, to carry out the intention of the testator is the controlling factor and may override any
defect in form.

ISSUE WON The New Civil Code may be applied to the probate of Father Abadias will
HELD

No. Article 795 of the new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The validity of a will is
to be judged not by the law in force at the time of the testator's death or at the time the
supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but
at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the
will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the
disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at
the time the will is executed, and in reality, the. legacy or bequest then becomes a completed
act. From the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and
devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the
constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of
execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes
a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its
execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate,
and his heirs will then inherit by intestate sucession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to
validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by
intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills

G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.

A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS: Fleumer, the special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appealed from a
decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by the
last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think,
however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was
a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so
should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42 Phil., 780).

It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on
November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West
Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., and as certified to by the Director of the National
Library, should govern.

ISSUE: Whether or not the laws of West Virginia should govern.

RULING: The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of the
Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.(In
re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There
was no was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in
section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West Virginia, as
provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the
extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.

Note: In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this
point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate
that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that
these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of
West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the
Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)

It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West
Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of
the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings originally in the Philippine Islands, the
petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine
Islands.

While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented
an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to
the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the was
presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in
vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the
subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by another
document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia,
appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward
Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of
the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia
appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to
make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration.
However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on
the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has
been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the
Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.

Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded
Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific
pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce.

For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.

PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL. v. MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS

G.R. No. L-20234, 23 December 1964

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS:

On May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and
testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that two parcels of land owned and acquired by them
during their marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to a niece, Manuela
Rebaca. Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to probate
by said Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, by Order of October 31,
1939, admitted it for probate.

Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate of the same
will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952. For failure of the Manuela R.
Potot and her attorney to appear, the case was dismissed on March 30, 1954.

The Court of First Instance declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the
prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code, but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals
reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction
and conclusive on the due execution of the testament.

ISSUE:

Whether or not

RULING:
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of
First Instance of Cebu has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even
then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators,
reciprocally, or in favor of a third party. The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of
law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate
court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a
petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world, and public policy and sound practice
demand that at the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts should become final at some definite
date fixed by law.

But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that
the probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It
could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and
over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely
because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will
could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.

It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on
her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each
testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one
prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties
in question.