Stonehill vs Diokno

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or corporations
for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of the
petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation
proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of
those seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with
respect to some documents and papers.

Held:

a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants.
There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the
requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.

b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee.
However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.

c. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the corporations
for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.

PEOPLE vs. ABE VALDEZ G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000

FACTS: Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without
authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from
which dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales,
SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force, who testified how the information was
received, the commencement of their operation and its details under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao.
Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant
had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters
away from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter
admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing beside the
cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
for analysis which produced a positive result. The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants were
found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but
no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his vegetable farm when he was
called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to see something. This
unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100
meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp
plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge
thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and
afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. At
the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than ample
time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove
appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other
possessions.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful and the seized
evidence admissible.

(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.

(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD: In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection against
illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without
warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any
form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As
to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said
plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of
the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and
relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the
prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the
author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must
likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence. Admissible evidence, in
turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at
trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted evidences against the accused and
to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly tainted.

In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved." To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of
evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its
evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the required degree of
proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

Katz v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Katz (the petitioner), was convicted of transmitting wagering information
over telephone lines in violation of federal law. The government had entered into evidence the petitioners end of
telephone conversations that the government had obtained by placing a listening device to the phone booth that the
petitioner used. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners contention that the evidence should be suppressed.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution), against unreasonable searches and seizures, follows the person and not the place.

Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and
Miami in violation of federal law. After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to the top of the
telephone booth and recorded the petitioners end of the telephone conversations which was then used as evidence
against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the evidence is
inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.

Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone conversations conducted in a phone
booth and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a person?

Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone booth was
a constitutionally protected area. However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from unreasonable
intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his person. Although the
petitioner did not seek to hide his self from public view when he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out
the uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to a place where he could be seen. A
person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as
he assumes that the words he utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged,
it is clear that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Governments activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioners telephone
conversations constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant predicated
upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.

Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black observed that eavesdropping
was an ancient practice that the Framers were certainly aware of when they drafted the United States Constitution
(Constitution). Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution they would
have added such language that would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it
plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and seized
may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations.

Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) filed a dissenting opinion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution
protects persons, not places. There is a twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to those people. First, that
a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. The critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a telephone booth shuts
the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted. On
the other hand, conversations out in the open public would not be protected against being overheard as the
expectation of privacy would not be reasonable.

United States v. Jones

Facts: Respondent Jones was an owner and operator of a nightclub and came under suspicion of narcotics trafficking.
Based on information gathered through various investigative techniques, police were granted a warrant authorizing
use of a GPS tracking device on the Jeep registered to Jones wife (of which Jones was the exclusive driver), but failed
to comply with the warrants deadline. Officials nevertheless installed the device on the undercarriage of the Jeep and
used it to track the vehicles movements. By satellite, the device established the vehicles location within 50 to 100
feet and communicated the location by cell phone to a government computer, relaying more than 2,000 pages of data
over a 28-day period. The government ultimately obtained an indictment against Jones which included charges of
conspiracy to distribute cocaine.

Procedural History
The district court granted Jones pre-trial motion to suppress in part, only suppressing the data obtained while the
vehicle was parked in the Joness home garage. A hung jury led to a second trial, which resulted in a guilty verdict.
The D.C. Circuit Court reversed the conviction, holding the admission of evidence obtained by warrantless use of the
GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment.

Issue: Does the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle and subsequent use of that device to monitor the
vehicles movements on public streets constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?

Rule / Holding (Scalia) Yes. Affirmed. The governments installation and use of a GPS device to track the vehicles
movements constituted a search.

Reasoning Scalia argued that the governments physical intrusion on Joness car (a personal effect) would
clearly be a search within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment, which for most of its history was particularly
concerned with government trespass on private property for the purpose of finding something or obtaining
information. The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard did not repudiate that understanding, but rather
added to it. The Knotts and Karo beeper cases are distinguishable because there, the electronic device was not placed
on property already possessed by the defendantthus, only the Katz test was applicable. Here, the police physically
encroached on a protected area to gather information.

Alito (joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) concurred in the judgment, disagreeing with the majority that any
technical trespass that results in the gathering of evidence amounts to search, and asserting that the case should
have been analyzed under the Katz standard. He stated that because GPS technology is relatively easy and cheap, it
overcomes traditional practical constraints on close surveillance and concluded that, in this case, its use violated
societys expectation that law enforcement would and could not monitor all of an individuals movements in his car for
a 4-week period. While relatively short-term monitoring of an individuals movements on public streets may be
reasonable, the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy.

Sotomayor concurred, agreeing with Scalia that Katz supplemented rather than substituted the trespassory test for
whether a search has occurred. She agreed with Alito that most long-term GPS monitoring would violate Katz, and
noted that even short-term monitoring may violate an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy because of the
unique nature of GPS surveillance.

People vs Marti

FACTS: August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that
he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect
the packages. She refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor),
following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the
box and that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the cellophane wrappers.

The accused appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegality of
search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD: Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RATIONALE: Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule Stonehill vs Diokno,
declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search warrant, abandoning in the process the
ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs Peoples Court.

The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered
and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of state
authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government without the latter transgressing
appellants rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the same should not
be admitted.

FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure
of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents made no search and seizure much less an illegal one,
contrary to the postulate of accused / appellant.

CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof

BILL OF RIGHTS

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy, protection against whom,
protection against the STATE.

People VS. Bongcarawan G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002

FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act). The antecedent facts of his conviction are as follows:
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed
from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City
when its security officer, Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy
suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel
security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The
suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and was
invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then
escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase
and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a
brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the
security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the
suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.

But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he
claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him.

ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid

HELD: YES

The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Evidence
acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed
by the government or its agent. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.

In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only
after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and
hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.

There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel
security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are
armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and
does not discharge any governmental function.

NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:

(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug;

(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and

(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To overcome this presumption, it is
necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican
Alex Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. No witnesses were
presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted
the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who
could testify and support the claim of the accused. Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case
at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more
than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no
knowledge or intent to possess the same.

ZULUETA VS. CA

Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's
clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it
is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from
a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty
of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Yao vs People

DOCTRINE: corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, directors or officers. However, when
the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law
will regard the corporation as an association of persons, or in the case of two corporations merge them into one.
Where the separate corporate entity is disregarded, the corporation will be treated merely as an association of persons
and the stockholders or members will be considered as the corporation, that is, liability will attach personally or
directly to the officers and stockholders.

FACTS: Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION (MASAGANA), an entity engaged
in the refilling, sale and distribution of LPG products. Private respondents Petron Corporation (Petron)
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in
the Philippines. Petron is the registered owner in the Philippines of the trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used
for its LPG products. It is the sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell,
and distribute GASUL LPG containers, products and its trademarks. Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand, is the authorized
user in the Philippines of the tradename, trademarks, symbols, or designs of its principal, Shell International Petroleum
Company Limited (Shell International), including the marks SHELLANE and SHELL device in connection with the
production, sale and distribution of SHELLANE LPGs. It is the only corporation in the Philippinesauthorized to
allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell and distribute SHELLANE LPG containers and products. On 3 April 2003,
(NBI) agent Ritche N. Oblanca (Oblanca) filed two applications for search warrant with the RTC, Cavite City, against
petitioners and other occupants of the MASAGANA compound for alleged violation of Section 155, in relation to Section
170 of The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. The two applications for search warrant uniformly alleged
that per information, belief, and personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually producing, selling,
offering for sale and/or distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the tradenames,
trademarks, and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation of the rights of the said
entities. MASAGANA, as third party claimant, filed with the RTC a Motion for the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG
Refilling Machine.[15] It claimed that it is the owner of the said motor compressor and LPG refilling machine; that these
items were used in the operation of its legitimate business; and that their seizure will jeopardize its business interests.
RTC resolved that MASAGANA cannot be considered a third party claimant whose rights were violated as a result of the
seizure since the evidence disclosed that petitioners are stockholders of MASAGANA and that they conduct their
business through the same juridical entity. CA affirmed RTCs decision

Issue: Whether or not CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT IS DIRECTED AGAINST MASAGANA GAS
CORPORATION, ACTING THROUGH ITS OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, HENCE MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION MAY NOT BE
CONSIDERED AS THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT WHOSE RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE SEIZURE

Held: No. It is an elementary and fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an entity separate
and distinct from its stockholders, directors or officers. However, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association
of persons, or in the case of two corporations merge them into one.[46] In other words, the law will not recognize the
separate corporate existence if the corporation is being used pursuant to the foregoing unlawful objectives. This non-
recognition is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity or disregarding the fiction of
corporate entity. Where the separate corporate entity is disregarded, the corporation will be treated merely as an
association of persons and the stockholders or members will be considered as the corporation, that is, liability will
attach personally or directly to the officers and stockholders. As we now find, the petitioners, as directors/officers of
MASAGANA, are utilizing the latter in violating the intellectual property rights ofPetron and Pilipinas Shell. Thus,
petitioners collectively and MASAGANA should be considered as one and the same person for liability purposes.
Consequently, MASAGANAs third party claim serves no refuge for petitioners. The law does not require that the
property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrants is directed. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized. Hence, even if, as petitioners claimed, the properties seized belong to
MASAGANA as a separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the search warrants is still valid.

Further, it is apparent that the motor compressor, LPG refilling machine and the GASUL and SHELL LPG cylinders
seized were the corpusdelicti, the body or substance of the crime, or the evidence of the commission of trademark
infringement. These were the very instruments used or intended to be used by the petitioners in trademark
infringement. It is possible that, if returned to MASAGANA, these items will be used again in violating the intellectual
property rights of Petron and Pilipinas Shell

** Villanueva vs Querubin (im so sorry wala ako makita anyway, attaching the full case na para u no
need to hanap love u)
In accordance with the policy to which this Court is committed, namely, that a colorable claim of a denial of a
constitutional right should not be ignored, petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding, succeeded in having
his alleged grievance against respondent Judge, the Honorable Jose R. Querubin, now retired, heard. He would have us
nullify the lower court order of June 1, 1966 requiring him "to return and deliver to the Provincial Commander, Bacolod
City, the amount of P10,350.00 and the wooden container stated in the receipt issued by the accused dated April 1,
1966, within forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt of this order." 1 The money in question formed part of the things seized
in accordance with a search warrant previously issued by respondent Judge himself. Petitioner therefore, to lend
plausibility to his plea, was under the necessity of alleging that less than full respect was accorded his constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 2 He would impress on us that full fealty was not shown to what
is ordained by such a guarantee. Assertion of such a disregard of a constitutional command is one thing; proof is
another. What is more, there is included in the petition itself 3 a written promise of petitioner to return such amount
when required. Accordingly, as will be explained, petitioner did fail to show that he is entitled to the writs of certiorari
and prohibition prayed for.

It was alleged in the petition that on April 23, 1966, in a motion filed with respondent Judge by an assistant city fiscal
of Bacolod City and a special prosecutor of the Department of Justice, it was set forth that on March 16, 1966, the
residence of petitioner was raided by a constabulary and police team on the strength of a search warrant issued by
such respondent Judge, in the course of which, there was a seizure of the amount of P10,350.00, which was not
however deposited in court, as thereafter its possession was restored to petitioner. It was further stated that an
information for the violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the City Court of Bacolod against
petitioner. 4 There was an opposition on the part of petitioner to such motion wherein after asserting that the lower
court was without jurisdiction and that the matter had become moot and academic, because the money was spent in
good faith by him for the payment of the wages of his laborers, it was contended that there was a violation of his
constitutional rights not to be deprived of property without due process of law and to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 5 Subsequently, after a reply to such opposition and a rejoinder were submitted, the respondent
Judge issued the challenged order dated June 1, 1966, the dispositive portion of which reads: "[In view thereof], the
accused Oscar Villanueva is hereby ordered to return and deliver to the Provincial Commander, Bacolod City, the
amount of P10,350.00 and the wooden container stated in the receipt issued by the accused dated April 1, 1966,
within forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt of this order." 6

There was a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 11, 1966. 7 Hence this petition. In view of the stress
laid therein as to the failure of respondent Judge considering the circumstances of the case to yield deference to the
command of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the assertion that unless there is a writ of
preliminary injunction issued, respondent Judge will cause the enforcement of the challenged order, thus exposing him
to contempt proceedings and other disciplinary actions if he could not comply with it, this Court adopted a resolution
on June 21, 1966 which reads as follows: "The respondents in L-26177 (Oscar Villanueva vs. Hon. Judge R. Querubin,
etc., et al.) are required to file, within 10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition
for prohibition and certiorari; upon petitioner's posting a bond of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), let preliminary
injunction Issue." 8

In the answer filed by the then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a member of this Court, the question of the
alleged violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure was squarely met, thus:
"Neither will the assailed orders result in unreasonable search and seizure for as already said earlier the money and
wooden box in question were confiscated during a gambling raid pursuant to a search warrant issued by the
respondent court after due and appropriate proceedings during which the petitioner and his witnesses were examined
under oath by the respondent court." 9 The point thus raised was sought to be refuted in petitioner's written
memorandum, but in a manner far from persuasive. For he did raise the specious argument that after the service of
the search warrant on March 16, 1966, the motion of April 23, 1966 for the return of the money came too late, ignoring
that the Rules of Court does require that the things seized be deposited in court. 10 Moreover, to counter the damaging
effect of a written promise, which commendably he did not omit from his petition, that the amount of P10,350.00 "will
be returned ... if the higher authorities will require the return of the same by legal orders,...," 11 he would rely on his
alleged rights as owner. Thus: "While he agreed to return the money by 'legal orders', this cannot be considered as a
limitation on his right of ownership, because when an agreement conflicts with the provision of law, the latter must
prevail. (Article 1306, Civil Code)." 12 There was no adequate appreciation of the controlling norms as to the effects of a
seizure under a valid search warrant or one not so challenged. It is on the basis of such contentions that petitioner
would have us issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition.

A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that there
was a denial of a constitutional right sufficient to oust the court of jurisdiction. On the contrary, what appears
undeniable is that the actuation of respondent Judge was in accordance with law. There can be no question then of a
violation of the safeguard against unreasonable search and seizure.

1. This constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. Since, moreover, it is invariably
through a search and seizure that such an invasion of one's physical freedom manifests itself, it is made clear that he
is not to be thus molested, unless its reasonableness could be shown. To be impressed with such a quality, it must be
accomplished through a warrant, which should not be issued unless probable cause is shown, to be determined by a
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, with a
particular description of the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of
a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. 13 What is sought to be
guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his
individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he
wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect
the privacies of his life. 14 In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work 15 could fitly characterize this
constitutional right as the embodiment of "a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person
and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity,
and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards." 16

2. Necessarily, then, if petitioner's alleged grievance, consisting of a disregard of the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure, were substantiated, he could validly raise a constitutional question of sufficient gravity to entitle
him to the remedies sought. For a failure to respect a constitutional command resulting in a deprivation of a
constitutional right is visited by loss of jurisdiction. 17 Such is not the case, however. He did not even put in issue the
validity of the search warrant, as a result of which there was a seizure of the money in question. For what were the
facts on which the challenged order was based, facts binding on this Court? As set forth therein: "As a result of the raid
conducted by a party of the Philippine Constabulary led by Lt. Alexander Aguirre at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
March 16, 1966, in virtue of a search warrant issued by the undersigned on March 14, 1966, the raiding party was able
to arrest eight (8) participants in the game of "Monte" held in one of the rooms of the house of Oscar Villanueva at 6th
Street, Bacolod City. Among the gambling paraphernalias seized during the raid is cash in the amount of P10,570.00,
which the raiding party submitted to this Court in endorsing the search warrant, thus subjecting the gambling
paraphernalia seized by the raiding party under the control of this Court. On March 24, 1966 the City Fiscal of Bacolod
City filed an information for Violation of Art. 195 of the Revised Penal Code against the eight (8) apprehended persons
named in the endorsement of the Philippine Constabulary. All the accused pleaded guilty and [were] convicted by the
City Court. Upon recommendation of the Fiscal, however, only the amount of P220.00 was ordered forfeited in favor of
the government and the amount of P10,350.00 was ordered to be returned to Oscar Villanueva, the owner of the
house, who issued the receipt for the amount with the condition that he will return the money if the higher authorities
will require the return of the said amount." 18 Then respondent Judge, after referring to Philips vs. Municipal Mayor, 19
stated further in the order now under scrutiny: "In the light of the aforequoted ruling of the appellate court, it is clear
that the Court of First Instance that issued the search warrant has jurisdiction over the amount of P10,350.00 and its
wooden container. With regard to the contention of the counsel for the accused that the return of the amount of
P10,350.00 is a moot question because the said amount is already spent by the accused, whatever defenses the
accused may invoke to resist the return of the amount of money in question is futile and untenable by estoppel. The
accused in issuing the corresponding receipt of the amount of P10,350.00 and the wooden box container, agreed to
return the said amount and the box if the higher authorities may so require. The return of the amount of P10,350.00
and its wooden container. With regard to the contention money in the box is a part and parcel of the gambling
paraphernalia seized by the raiding party of the Philippine Constabulary in the house of the accused Oscar Villanueva
who is at present facing the charge for violation of the gambling law." 20

Even if the recital of the antecedents of the challenged order were less compelling in thus lending support to what was
done by respondent Judge, still petitioner had failed to make out a case. For, had he entertained doubts as to the
validity of the issuance of the search warrant or the manner in which it was executed, he was called upon to establish
such a claim in court. He could rely on authoritative doctrines of this Court precisely to seek a judicial declaration of
any illegal taint that he could, with plausibility, assert. 21 That he failed to do. The Rules of Court made clear what is to
be done after the seizure of the property. Thus: "The officer must forthwith deliver the property to the municipal judge
or judge of the city court or of the Court of First Instance which issued the warrant, together with a true inventory
thereof duly verified by oath." 22 The legal custody was therefore appropriately with respondent Judge, who did
authorize the issuance of such search warrant. Even if the money could validly be returned to petitioner, had it
happened that in the meanwhile some other officer of the law had it in his possession, still, under the ruling of this
Court in Molo v. Yatco, 23 there should be a motion for its restoration to petitioner that must be affirmatively acted upon
by respondent Judge. Thus: "It appears from the present case that the documents and other papers belonging to the
petitioner Mariano Molo, which were seized by a special agent of the Anti-Usury Board by virtue of a warrant issued by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, came into the possession of said board, and while it does not appear how said
board came to have them in its possession, it is presumed that it was by virtue of an authority given by said court
(see. 334, No. 31, Act No. 190). By virtue of said authority the board became an agent of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in the custody of the documents in question, with the obligation to return them to said court upon the termination
of the investigation for which the board needed them. As the Anti-Usury Board had found no sufficient evidence to
warrant a criminal action against the petitioner for violation of the Usury Law, and as said board had dismissed the
case under investigation, it was duty bound to return said documents and papers to the Court of First Instance of Rizal
so that the latter might order the return thereof to their owner." 24

Much less could the seizure, the validity of the search warrant being admitted, be open to question. As was set forth by
Justice Malcolm in People v. Veloso: "The police officers were accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter
the premises of the building occupied by the so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to
arrest the persons presumably engaged in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the
crime. It has been held that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property
found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may
furnish the person arrested with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence
on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise." 25

3. There is an equally insurmountable obstacle to the grant of petitioner's prayer for the writs of certiorari and
prohibition. There is included, as one of the annexes to his petition, the following: "Received from Assistant City Fiscal
Jesus V. Ramos the sum of [Ten Thousand Three Hundred Fifty] (P10,350.00) Philippine Currency. This money will be
returned to him if the higher authorities will require the return of the same by legal orders, otherwise the same will not
be returned." 26 It was executed on April 1, 1966 and duly signed by him. As previously noted, he would dispute the
legality of the order requiring the return to enable him to avoid the effects of such a promise. Not only would he thus
ignore his plighted word, but what is worse, he would impress on this Court a rather unorthodox notion of what legality
connotes. His contention as to the failure of the challenged order to meet such a test is that he is the owner of such an
amount. What he would conveniently ignore was the seizure thereof under a valid search warrant. The very
constitutional guarantee relied upon does not preclude a search in one's home and the seizure of one's papers and
effects as long as the element of reasonableness is not lacking. It cannot be correctly maintained then that just
because the money seized did belong to petitioner, its return to the court that issued the search warrant could be
avoided when precisely what the law requires is that it be deposited therein. As a matter of fact, what lacks the
element of legality is the continued possession by petitioner. Resort to a higher tribunal then to nullify what was done
by respondent Judge is futile and unavailing.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition and certiorari is dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction under the
resolution of this Court of June 21, 1966, lifted and set aside. With costs against petitioner.

GUANZON VS. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990] (no check mark)

Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their
place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that
there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without
nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and
windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were
ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're
homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables
had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and
maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
informations.

The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to
government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The
aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were
the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the
actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.

Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.

Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which
"offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment
to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep
were arrested.

There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th
rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a
tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged.

In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.

In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged
violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

Kyllo v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. The police obtained evidence of a marijuana growing operation inside the defendant, Kyllos
(the defendant) home, by using a thermal imaging device from outside the home. The police used the device to
gather evidence to support issuance of a search warrant for the home.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The use of a device by the government, which is not generally used by the public, to
obtain evidence from inside a home is a presumptively unreasonable search without a warrant under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Facts. Upon suspicion that the defendant was growing marijuana in his home, police used a thermal-imaging device to
detect heat radiating from the defendants home. With this information, police obtained a search warrant for the home.

Issue. Does the use of a device by the government to obtain evidence from a constitutionally protected area without
physical intrusion constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution?

Held. Where police obtain information about the inside of a home without physical intrusion, using a device not
normally used by the public, the police action constitutes a Fourth Amendment search and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.

Discussion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and their property from unreasonable
searches by the government. The home is one place where society deems an expectation of privacy reasonable. In
order to preserve this degree of privacy, government searches under these circumstances must be supported by a
warrant.

The Fourth Amendment protections are not conditional upon the quality of information obtained by the government. So
long as there is a subjective expectation of privacy and society is willing to recognize this expectation as reasonable,
the government must obtain a warrant before conducting a search.

California v. Ciraolo

Facts: The Santa Clara Police received an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his back yard. Unable
to observe the yard from the ground due to a high fence which encircled it, the police secured a private plane and flew
over Ciraolo's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The fly-over confirmed the presence of marijuana. The police then
obtained a search warrant, seized 73 plants on the next day, and arrested Ciraolo who then pleaded guilty to the
cultivation of marijuana. The California Court of Appeals, however, found that the aerial observation was illegal and
reversed Ciraolo's conviction.
Question: Did the warrantless, aerial observation of Ciraolo's back yard from an altitude of 1,000 feet constitute an
illegal search and violate the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

The divided Court found that the observation did not violate the Constitution. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment protections regarding the home had never been absolute: for example, police officers are not
obligated to shield their eyes when passing homes on public streets or sidewalks. Since the observations of the Santa
Clara officers was "nonintrusive" and "took place within public navigable airspace," their actions were consistent with
the Fourth Amendment. "Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen
everything that these officers observed," concluded Burger. The dissenters, led by Justice Powell, argued that this
decision was a significant departure from the Court's holding in Katz v. United States (1967) which established a two-
part test to evaluate privacy claims.

Dow Chemical Company v. United States

Facts: Dow Chemical Company denied the Environmental Protection Agency a follow-up on-site inspection of its
facilities in Midland, Michigan. In response, EPA conducted an unannounced aerial inspection. When Dow became
aware EPA had taken aerial photographs of its facilities, it filed suit in District Court alleging that EPA conducted a
warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court ruled that the aerial inspection violated
Dow's "expectation of privacy" from searches. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
ruling on the ground that Dow only expected privacy with respect to its indoor property.

Question: Does the Fourth Amendment require government inspectors to obtain warrants before conducting aerial
searches of outdoor business facilities?

Conclusion: No. Justice Warren Burger delivered the opinion for a 5-4 court. The Court maintained that the EPA's
statutory jurisdiction "carries with it all the modes of inquiry and investigation traditionally employed or useful to
execute the authority granted." Fourth Amendment protection involves the invasion of areas where intimate activities
occur, whereas "the open areas of an industrial complex are more comparable to an 'open field' in which an individual
may not legitimately demand privacy." The fact that EPA could take aerial photographs of the facilities from public
airspace with the standard photographic equipment employed by mapmakers confirmed that the area was not subject
to strict protection from observation.

Illinois v. Caballes

Facts: During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An
Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the
conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and
articulable facts to support its use, "unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation."

Question: Does the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure clause require a reasonable articulable suspicion to
conduct a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop?

Conclusion: Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 7-2 opinion that Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated. The Constitution did not require police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drug-detection dog on
a car during a legal traffic stop. No legitimate privacy was at risk, the Court argued, because the dog only alerted to an
illegal drug.

Florida vs Jardines 11-564

Facts: On November 3, 2006, the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified "crime stoppers" tip that the
home of Joelis Jardines was being used to grow marijuana. On December 6, 2006, two detectives, along with a trained
drug detection dog, approached the residence. The dog handler accompanied the dog to the front door of the home.
The dog signaled that it detected the scent of narcotics. The detective also personally smelled marijuana.

The detective prepared an affidavit and applied for a search warrant, which was issued. A search confirmed that
marijuana was being grown inside the home. Jardines was arrested and charged with trafficking cannabis. Jardines
moved to suppress the evidence seized at his home on the theory that the drug dog's sniff was an impermissible
search under the Fourth Amendment and that all subsequent evidence was fruit of the poisonous tree.

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently ruled to suppress the evidence. The state appealed
the suppression ruling and the state appellate court reversed, concluding that no illegal search had occurred since the
officer had the right to go up to the defendant's front door and that a warrant was not necessary for the drug dog's
sniff. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and concluded that the dog's sniff was a
substantial government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constituted a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The state of Florida appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision.

Question: Is a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection dog a Fourth
Amendment search requiring probable cause?

Conclusion: Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered a 5-4 opinion affirming the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The
Court held that the front porch of a home is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Typically, ordinary
citizens are invited to enter onto the porch, either explicitly or implicitly, to communicate with the house's occupants.
Police officers, however, cannot go beyond the scope of that invitation. Entering a person's porch for the purposes of
conducting a search requires a broader license than the one commonly given to the general public. Without such a
license, the police officers were conducting an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Elena Kagan wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that the case dealt with privacy issues as well as
the property issues the majority opinion addressed. People have a heightened expectation of privacy in their homes
and the areas immediately surrounding their homes, and in this case, the police violated that expectation. Because the
police officers used a device (a drug-sniffing dog) not in public use to learn details about the home, Justice Kagan
argued that an illegal search had been conducted. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in
the concurrence.

Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented, arguing that the majority's interpretation of the public license to approach a person's
front door is too narrow and should extend even to police officers collecting evidence against an occupant. The dissent
argued that the common law of trespass does not limit the public license to a particular category of visitors
approaching the door for a specific purpose. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice
Stephen G. Breyer joined in the Dissent.

Florida vs Harris

Facts: The State of Florida charged Clayton Harris with possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture
methamphetamine. At trial, Harris moved to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his car. Police
searched the car during a traffic stop for expired registration when a drug detection dog alerted the officer. This dog
was trained to detect several types of illegal substances, but not pseudoephedrine. During the search, the officer
found over 200 loose pills and other supplies for making methamphetamine. Harris argued that the dog's alert was
false and did not provide probable cause for the search. The trial court denied Harris motion, holding that the totality
of the circumstances indicated that there was probable cause to conduct the search. The First District Court of Appeal
affirmed, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State did not prove the dog's reliability in drug
detection sufficiently to show probable cause.

Question: Does a drug-detection dog's alert to the exterior of a vehicle provide an officer with probable cause to
conduct a warrantless search of the interior of the vehicle?

Conclusion: Yes. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Florida Supreme Court. The U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the lower court's rigid requirement that police officers show evidence of a dog's reliability in
the field to prove probable cause. Probable cause is a flexible common sense test that takes the totality of the
circumstances into account. A probable cause hearing for a dog alert should proceed like any other, allowing each side
to make their best case with all evidence available. The record in this case supported the trial court's determination
that police had probable cause to search Harris' car.

Hoffa v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. A government informant was in a hotel room with a criminal defendant during a trial. The
defendant often conferred with his attorneys in the room. The informant was there in order to obtain information from
the defendant to be used during a second trial for witness tampering.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The conduct by the Government by means of deceptively placing a secret informer in the
quarters and councils of a defendant during one criminal trial [does not] violate the defendants Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights that suppression of such evidence is required in a subsequent trial of the same defendant on a
different charge.

Facts. James Hoffa (Hoffa) was charged with violating a provision of the Taft-Hartley Act. He was tried in the autumn
of 1962 (the Test Fleet trial). The Test Fleet trial ended with a hung jury. Hoffa and various others were convicted in
1964 of bribing members of the jury during the Test Fleet trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. One of
the governments witnesses, Edward Partin (Partin), testified to various statements made to him by Hoffa and
another convicted individual named King.

During the Test Fleet trial, Hoffa occupied a three-room suite in a hotel in Nashville. King was a constant companion of
Hoffa in the suite. Partin was also often in the hotel during the trial. Also, Hoffas attorneys were in the room. During
that time, Partin made various reports to a federal agents about conversations he said Hoffa and King had had with
him and with each other, disclosing endeavors to bribe members of the Test Fleet jury. Federal agents asked Partin to
look out for Hoffa attempting to tamper with the Test Fleet jury. After the Test Fleet trial, Partins wife received money
from the government and all charges against Partin were dropped.

Issue. Whether evidence obtained by the Government by means of deceptively placing a secret informer in the
quarters and councils of a defendant during one criminal trial so violates the defendants Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights that suppression of such evidence is required in a subsequent trial of the same defendant on a
different charge[?]

Held. The majority first observed that Partin was a government informant as soon as he arrived in Nashville and that
the government compensated him for his services as such.

The majority then observed that a hotel room can clearly be the object of Fourth Amendment protection as much as a
home or an office. Further that [i]n the present case, however, it is evident that no interest legitimately protected by
the Fourth Amendment is involved. It is obvious that the petitioner was not relying on the security of his hotel suite
when he made the incriminating statements to Partin or in Partins presence. Partin did not enter the suite by force or
by stealth. He was not a surreptitious eavesdropper. Partin was in the suite by invitation and every conversation which
he heard was either directed to him or knowingly carried on in his presence. The petitioner, in a word, was not relying
on the security of the hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his
wrongdoing. As such, no right protected by the Fourth Amendment was violated.

Hoffas Fifth Amendment claim that he was compelled to be a witness against himself was also without merit. There
was no type of compulsion or coercion.
Hoffa also made two Sixth Amendment arguments found to be without merit. First, Hoffa argued that his lawyers used
his suite as a place to confer with him and with each other, to interview witnesses, and to plan the following days trial
strategy. Accordingly, he argued that Partins presence in and around the suite violated the petitioners Sixth
Amendment right to counsel because an essential ingredient thereof is the right of a defendant and his counsel to
prepare for trial without intrusion upon their confidential relationship by an agent of the Government, the defendants
trial adversary. In discounting this argument, the majority observed it is far from clear to what extent Partin was
present at conversations or conferences of the petitioners counsel. Also, the majority distinguished two cases by
observing [Hoffa"s] statements related to the commission of a quite separate offense.

California v. Greenwood

Brief Fact Summary. The respondent, Greenwood (the respondent), was arrested for narcotics trafficking based
upon evidence obtained as a result of a police search of his trash. The California Supreme Court upheld the dismissal
of charges on the ground that the California Constitution declared such searches as unconstitutional. The State
petitioned for review.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment constitutional
protection unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable.

Facts. Police with the Laguna Beach Police Department received information that the respondent might be trafficking
narcotics. The police asked the regular trash collector to gather the respondents trash and keep it separate from the
other trash in the neighborhood, so that it might be examined for evidence of narcotics trafficking. Evidence was found
in the garbage, and a search warrant was issued to search the respondents house based upon that evidence. Police
searched the respondents house and arrested him after discovering narcotics. Respondent posted bail. The police
continued to receive reports of narcotics trafficking at the respondents house. A second search of the respondents
trash was conducted and again a search warrant was issued in which more narcotics were found in the house. The
respondent was again arrested. The Superior Court dismissed the charges stating that warrantless searches of trash
violated the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the California
Supreme Court denied the States petition for review. Certiorari was granted.

Issue. Whether a person has a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively
reasonable?

Held. Justice Byron White (J. White) held that no such subjective expectation of privacy existed. An expectation of
privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment constitutional protection unless society is prepared to accept that
expectation as objectively reasonable. The respondent exposed his garbage to the public to sufficiently defeat the
claim to Fourth Amendment constitutional protection. Garbage left at the side of the road is readily accessible to
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. Moreover, the garbage was placed at the
curb for the purpose of conveying it to a third party. Therefore, the respondent could have had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the items discarded. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment constitutional protection.

Dissent. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall (J.
Marshall). So long as a package is closed against inspection, the Fourth Amendment protects its contents, wherever
they may be, and the police must obtain a warrant to search it. The respondent deserves no less protection just
because he used the bags to discard rather than transport his personal effects. Their contents are not any less private,
and the respondents desire to discard them in the manner in which he did does not diminish his expectation of
privacy. Had the respondent flaunted his intimate activity by strewing his garbage over the curb for all to see, or had
some governmental intruder done the same, the resulting belief would be that this is unreasonable. However, the
mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open and rummage through the containers does not negate the
expectation of privacy.

Discussion. The expectation of privacy must be reasonable for Fourth Amendment constitutional protection to stand.

PEOPLE VS CANTON G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002

FACTS: Appellant Susan Canton was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation of Section
16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, under an Information whose
accusatory portion reads as follows:

That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her possession NINE HUNDRED
NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or license.

Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN imputing to the trial court the following errors: (1) in justifying
the warrantless search against her based on the alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was
caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the
frisker went beyond the limits of the Terry search doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial
investigation without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena,
which was not testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under
the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the medical report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in
applying the ruling in People v. Johnson.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of
Susan were violative of her constitutional rights.

RULING: No, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed
under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned
shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are
subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be
allowed to board the aircraft, which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier

Gaanan vs IAC, 1986 (no check mark)

Using an Extension Telephone to Eavesdrop is Not Punishable under the Anti-Wiretapping Law

Facts: Montebon filed a direct assault case against Leonardo Lanconico, which he later decided to withdraw. His
lawyer was Atty. Pintor, who called Lanconico initially to inform him about his clients proposal to withdraw the
complaint. Lanconico then requested Atty. Gaanan, another lawyer, to secretly listen to the conversation through a
telephone extension. When Atty. Pintor called again to discuss the terms, Atty. Gaanan heard the former enumerate
the conditions which later served as the basis of a robbery/extortion case against him. Atty. Pintor and Lanconico
agreed that the former himself will receive an amount of money at a certain place. Atty. Pintor was arrested by the
time he received the money.

Lanconico filed a case of robbery/extortion against Atty. Pintor, with an attached affidavit of Atty. Gaanan stating what
he heard. Atty. Pintor in turn charged the two with violation of the Anti -Wiretapping law for listening to the telephone
conversation without his consent.

Issue: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arrangement under RA 4200

Held: No. A rule in statutory construction states that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

The phrase device or arrangement in Section 1, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be
construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be
tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone.

Hence, an extension telephone is not in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in RA 4200 because its use cannot be deemed as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Second, penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt such as in this case,
the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone.

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA [288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998]

Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain Aling Rosa will be arriving from
Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal
they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who Aling Rosa was, the team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked aling Rosa about the contents of
her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked cash
katutak.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and
seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she
watched a movie Balweg. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag,
when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman
was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented.

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972

Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.

Held: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by
prevailing jurisprudence

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not acting
suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a
warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was
illegal and inadmissible evidence.

RULE 113, RULES OF COURT

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

RULE 126, RULES OF COURT

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed
with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed
if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending.

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house
or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein.

Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.

(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true
inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made,
and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was
made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with
and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has
been complied with.

(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who
shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

Manalili vs Court of Appeal (October 9, 1997)

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts: Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan City Cemetery dueto
reports of drug addicts roaming the area. They chanced upon a male (who turned out to be petitioner Alain Manalili y
Dizon) who seemed to be "high" on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be
walking in a swaying manner. When Manalili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and asked what
he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to resist, but the policemen were persistent until he yielded his wallet which
they examined and found to contain crushed marijuana residue. Further examination by the Forensic Chemistry
Section of the NBI confirmed the findings. Trial court convicted Manalili of violation of Section 8, Article II, of RA 6425.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.(In his defense, Manalili claimed that he was
not walking; that he was riding a tricycle until the three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because
the driver and passenger were allegedly under the influence of marijuana. He claimed that he was searched and his
pants were turned inside-out but nothing was found. To some extent he implied that the marijuana sample found in his
entity was framed up by the policemen.

Issue: WON the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk operation is admissible.

Held: Yes
Ratio: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant.
However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been contemplated by the law:

1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest

2. Search of moving vehicles
3. Seizure in plain view
4. Customs search
5. Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.

In the cited cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as essential requirement.

Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure): Existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item, article, or
object sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched. A stop-and-frisk operation is another exception to the general rule. In this case, probable cause was
established with Manalilis suspicious behaviour.

Laud vs. People, G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014

ISSUE: Having been divested as Vice Executive Judge pursuant to Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, was
the issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 by Judge Peralta an issuance by a de facto officer?

Petitioners contention:

Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that [t]he imposition upon an Executive
Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an administrative penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest
him of his position as such, Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge and
accordingly issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 in view of the Courts Resolution in Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge
Peralta wherein he was administratively penalized with fines of P15,000.00 and P5,000.00.

RULING: YES. Imposition of administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge Peraltas authority to act as Vice-
Executive Judge, it must be qualified that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the
invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the
issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain valid.

The treatment of a de facto officers acts is premised on the reality that third persons cannot always investigate the
right of one assuming to hold an important office and, as such, have a right to assume that officials apparently
qualified and in office are legally such. Public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an
office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public as distinguished from the officer in
question is concerned. Indeed, it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated,
not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who
get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers.

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The
search warrant wassought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions). Firearms, explosive materialsand subversive documents were seized and taken during the search.
Petitioners presented a Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of SearchWarrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally
Acquired Evidence. However, the court denied the quashal of the search warrant and the validityof which warrant was
upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines which provides that search warrants can be served
notonly within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court.

ISSUE: W/N a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense
committed outside its territorialboundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the
court's supposed territorial jurisdiction

HELD: A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.

A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before
the court.

A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. A judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant,
subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a
judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been
instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process, not a criminal action, no legal
provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of
enforceability. Moreover, in our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and
although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the
issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officiobut is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or
recalled. The following are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the criminal case is
pending in one court and the searchwarrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to
be used as evidence in said criminal case:

1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated
by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under
extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may
or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the
same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved
by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the
resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may
move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized
under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different
participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are
alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be
governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of
the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.

4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise
prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be
transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation
therefore.

5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or
complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the
issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary
jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED

PICOP v. Asuncion Case Digest 307 SCRA 253) (1999)

FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of
Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the
subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to
take possession and bring to the described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search
warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was
invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the trial court. Subsequently,
they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to SuppressEvidence. On March 23,
1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court
rendered its second contested Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid

HELD: The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined
personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the
judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present
case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the
other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant,
had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to
be searched was not described with particularity.

CORRO VS LISING

Facts: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in
committing the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters,
mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant
but his motion was denied.

HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of
probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general
warrant which is objectionable.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We
Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that
a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that
respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one
and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Bache vs Ruiz
PEOPLE V MAMARIL GR 147607 January 22, 2004
Facts:

SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana at the
family residence of appellant Mamaril. During the search operation, the searching team confiscated sachets of
suspected marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the
property seized and certified that the house was properly searched, which was signed by the appellant and the
barangay officials who witnessed the search.

The PNP Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the seized specimens positive for the presence of marijuana.
Moreover, the examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was positive for the same.

Appellant denied that he was residing at his parents house, and that he was at his parents house when the
search was conducted only because he visited his mother. He also said that he saw the Receipt of Property
Seized for the first time during the trial, although he admitted that the signature on the certification that the
house was properly search was his.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant

Ruling:Yes. The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause.

Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.

In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:

o The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally

o The examination must be under oath

o The examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers

The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put into writing his examination of the applicant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant.

When the Branch Clerk of Court was required to testify on the available records kept in their office, he was only able to
present before the court the application for search warrant and supporting affidavits. Neither transcript of the
proceedings of a searching question and answer nor the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses
showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing was presented. Mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient.

Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determine the existence and
non-existence of probable cause. Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the examination in writing and attaching to the record, rendering the
search warrant invalid.

No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid
warrant. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against
appellant.

Kho vs Makalintal

Facts: Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent NBI from using the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in
any case or cases filed or to be filed against them and to return immediately the said items, including the firearms,
ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets, transceivers, two units of vehicles and
motorcycle.

Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the absence of any probable cause
therefor. They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved,
prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).

Issue: Whether petitioners contention of the absence of probable cause in the given situation is tenable.

Held: Petitioners contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and
investigation testified unequivocably that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched,
and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. In fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he personally
attended the surveillance together with his witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witnesses personally
saw the weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises referred to. NBI Agent Ali Vargas
testified that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and brought to the
aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there inside the compound posing as an appliance
agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search
warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.

In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the question of whether or not a probable
cause exists is one which must be determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations. In Luna v. Plaza
(26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of
the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicants and the witnesses.

After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by the
respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to
assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a
probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked
searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine
whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they
conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his
duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for
doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.

Romer Sy Tan vs Sy Tiong Gue, et al. G.R. No. 174570 December 15, 2010 (no check)

Facts: Petitioner (Romer Sy Tan) filed a criminal case against respondents (Tiong Gue, et al.). The Respondents moved
for the withdrawal of the information which was subsequently granted by the RTC on the ground that the information
for robbery did not contain the essential elements of robbery as decided upon by the Court of Appeals on an prior
complaint. Hence the case was dismissed. Now the petitioner, seeking shelter from the Supreme Court contended that
he filed information for qualified theft based on the same subject matter of the dismissed robbery and would like to
use the item seized in the previously conducted search for the new information of qualified theft.

Issue: Whether or not the items seized in the previously conducted search warrant issued by the court for robbery be
included and used for the filing of for an information for qualified theft.

Ruling:No, petitioner cannot iclude the seized items as part of the evidence in the new information. Sec. 4 of Rule 126
of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Thus, as search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific offense
alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant's personal knowledge and his or her witnesses. Therefore,
petitioner cannot utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrant issued in connection with the case of
robbery in a separate case of qualified theft, even if both cases emanated form the same incident. Also, the withdrawal
of the information was justifiable, since there was no probable cause as to indict respondents of the crime of robbery
since unlawful taking which is an essential element for Robbery and likewise for Qualified Theft is not present.

Ogayon vs. People GR No. 188794

FACTS

1. Pursuant to the enforcement of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003, drug paraphernalia and plastic sachets
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu were found in the possession of Ogayon. Two Informations
were filed against him for violations of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).

2. Relying on the presumption of regularity, the RTC rejected Ogayons frame-up defense. The RTC rendered a
joint judgment convicting Ogayon of the two criminal charges against him.

3. Ogayon appealed to the CA. This time, he questioned the validity of the search warrant, claiming it was
improperly issued. He argued that the search warrant was defective for lack of transcript showing that the issuing
judge conducted an examination of the applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.

4. Although the CA found no evidence in the records showing compliance with this requirement, it nevertheless
upheld the search warrants validity due to Ogayons failure to make a timely objection against the warrant during the
trial.

ISSUE/S

1. W/N Ogayon had waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant. YES.
2. Granting that Ogayon had already waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant, the search
conducted was still highly irregular, thereby rendering the seized articles as inadmissible in evidence. YES.

RATIO

Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is central
to the right, and its existence largely depends on the finding of the judge conducting the examination. To substantiate
a finding of probable cause, the Rules of Court specifically require that

Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with the
affidavits submitted.

Ogayons appeal of his conviction essentially rests on his claim that the search warrant was defective because "there
was no transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the
required searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause." We find that the
failure to attach to the records the depositions of the complainant and his witnesses and/or the transcript of the
judges examination, though contrary to the Rules, does not by itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to attach is
merely a procedural rule and not a component of the right. Rules of procedure or statutory requirements, however
salutary they may be, cannot provide new constitutional requirements.

Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct an "examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce," after which he determines the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant.

Generally, a judges determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded great
deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was substantial basis for that determination. "Substantial basis means
that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the
offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched."

Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing in the records of this case indicating that the
issuing judge personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses. The absence of depositions and
transcripts of the examination was already admitted; the application for the search warrant and the affidavits,
although acknowledged by Ogayon himself, could not be found in the records. The testimonies given during Ogayons
trial made no reference to the application for the search warrant. SPO4 Caritos testified that he was among those who
conducted the surveillance before the application for a search warrant was made. However, he was not the one who
applied for the warrant; in fact, he testified that he did not know who applied for it.

The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the requisite examination was made, and from
which the factual basis for probable cause to issue the search warrant was derived.

The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from considering Ogayons belated objections thereto.

The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures due
to his failure to make a timely objection against the search warrants validity before the trial court. It based its ruling
on the procedural rule that any objections to the legality of the search warrant should be made during the trial of the
case. Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides the manner to quash a search warrant or to suppress
evidence obtained thereby:

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a search
warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the
action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the
court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.

We find the CAs casual treatment of a fundamental right distressing. It prioritized compliance with a procedural rule
over compliance with the safeguards for a constitutional right. Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify
substantial rights; their non-compliance should therefore not serve to validate a warrant that was issued in disregard
of the constitutional requirements. As mentioned, the existence of probable cause determined after examination by
the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is central to the guarantee of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
The ends of justice are better served if the supremacy of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is preserved over technical rules of procedure.

Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights; we should not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.

With the inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Ogayon' s home, there is no more evidence to support his
conviction.

RULING

WHEREFORE, under these premises, the Decision dated March 31, 2009, and the Resolution dated July 10, 2009, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction, as
stated in the joint judgment dated September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Lig ity, Albay, in Criminal
Case Nos. 4738 and 4739, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ is ACQUITTED of the
criminal charges against him for violation of Republic Act No. 9165.

People vs. Choi

Facts: In April 27, 1999, Mario P. Nieto, an Intelligence Operative of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau, applied for a search warrant which was issued by Judge Lourdes F. Gatbalite.

The search warrant was for Christopher Choi for violation of RA 8293, the Intellectual Property Code.

The search was conducted and respondent filed a motion to quash search warrant.

The respondent claimed that probable cause was not sufficiently established as the examination conducted was not
probing and exhaustive.

CA ruled that the judge should have at least required Sealey to present the alleged fake Marlboro cigarettes and the
genuine ones for comparison.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant and
whether adding a particular requirement to present the alleged fake Marlboro cigarettes and the genuine ones for
comparison is essential for a finding of probable cause.

Held: The Search Warrant was VALID.

There is no law or rule which requires that the existence of probable cause is or should be determined solely by a
specific kind of evidence.

To restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a particular requirement (20th Century Fox) not provided in
the law for a finding of probable cause is beyond the realm of judicial competence.

The testimonies and other evidence on record constituted adequate bases to establish probable cause that the alleged
offense had been committed.

Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)

FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioner's house
was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. However, the officers
conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they
confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.

Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search warrant on
May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida,
both of whom likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator.
As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents
thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the
same before him.

ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the proper procedure in issuing the Search Warrant.

HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering
that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the witnesses whose depositions
had already been taken by the undersigned.

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not
of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence.

People vs Tuan

TOPIC: Requisites for issuing search warrant

Facts: On January 2000, two informants namely, Tudlong and Lad-ing arrived at the office of CIDG (Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group) in Baguio City, and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain "Estela Tuan" had been selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio
City. SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. On the afternoon of the same day, he gave
Tudlong and Lad-ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and accompanied the two informants to the accused Tuans house.
Tudlong and Lad-ing entered the house, while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. Later, Tudlong and Lad-
ing came out and showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana they bought. Upon returning to the CIDG office, SPO2
Fernandez requested a laboratory examination on the specimen and yielded positive results for marijuana.

SPO2 Fernandez, together with the informants, filed the Application for a Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada
Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City on January 25, 2000. Two hours
later, at around three oclock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which,
she issued a Search Warrant, which stated Tuans residence as the house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela
Silang, Baguio City. Even though accused Tuan was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house by
Magno Baludda (Magno), accuseds father, after he was shown a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez guarded
the surroundings of the house, while SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched inside. They saw, in the presence of
Magno, a movable cabinet in Tuans room, below of which they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. Later Tuan
arrived and thereafter, the police officers asked Tuan to open a cabinet, in which they saw more bricks of marijuana.
The defense, on the other hand, disclaimed ownership of the bricks and alleged that a Search Warrant was issued for
her house because of a quarrel with her neighbor named Lourdes Estillore (Estillore). The RTC found accused guilty as
charged. On appeal, the CA modified by acquitting Tuan of the charge for illegal possession of firearm but affirming her
conviction for illegal possession of marijuana. Tuan raised the matter to the Supreme Court contending, among others,
that the warrant failed to particularly describe the place because the house was a two-storey building composed of
several rooms.

ISSUES:

1. WON there was probable cause for the judge to issue a Search Warrant and whether the search warrant particularly
described the place to be searched.

2. WON the search warrant particularly described the place to be searched. RULING: 1. YES. The validity of the
issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized.

The only issue is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular
description of the place to be searched and things to be seized. Probable cause generally signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by
substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and
that the items will be found in the place to be searched.

A magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a
reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to
be seized are in the place sought to be searched.Such substantial basis exists in this case. Judge Cortes found
probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for Tuans residence after said judges personal examination of
SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants. SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for
Search Warrant not only on the information relayed to him by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy and
conducted surveillance of Tuan.

2. YES. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community.

A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.

In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough.
There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellants residence, consisting of a
structure with two floors and composed of several rooms. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Naga Plant v. Gomez (G.R. No. 154491)

Facts: P applied for a SW against Pepsi for hoarding Coke empty bottles in Pepsis yard in Naga City, an act allegedly
penalized as UC under the IP Code. P claimed that the bottles must be confiscated to preclude their illegal use,
destruction or concealment by the R.

MTC Judge issued SW to seize the empty Coke bottles at Pepsis Naga yard for violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP
Code. The local police seized and brought to the MTCs custody empty Coke bottles and later filed with the OCP a
complaint against Rs, two Pepsi officers for violation of Section 168.3 (c) in relation to Section 170 of the IP
Code.

R filed motions for the return of their shells and to quash the SW. MTC denied the 2 motions and MR of R. R filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC.

RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable cause and non-commission of UC. Ps MR being denied, hence this petition
before the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the act charged hoarding of empty Coke bottles constitutes an offense under Section 168.3
(c) of the IP Code, Unfair Competition.

Ruling:We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit. We clarify at the outset that while we agree with the RTC
decision, our agreement is more in the result than in the reasons that supported it. The decision is correct in nullifying
the search warrant because it was issued on an invalid substantive basis the acts imputed on the respondents do not
violate Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. For this reason, we deny the present petition.

Articles 168.1 and 168.2, as quoted above, provide the concept and general rule on the definition of unfair
competition. The law does not thereby cover every unfair act committed in the course of business; it covers only acts
characterized by deception or any other means contrary to good faith in the passing off of goods and services as
those of another who has established goodwill in relation with these goods or services, or any other act calculated to
produce the same result.

What unfair competition is, is further particularized under Section 3 when it provides specifics of what unfair
competition is without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition. Part of these
particulars is provided under Section 168.3(c) which provides the general catch-all phrase that the petitioner cites.
Under this phrase, a person shall be guilty of unfair competition who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith
of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another.

From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off
upon the public the goods or business of one person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable
effect of deceiving the public. It formulated the true test of unfair competition: whether the acts of defendant are
such as are calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases under the ordinary conditions which
prevail in the particular trade to which the controversy One of the essential requisites in an action to
restrain unfair competition is proof of fraud; the intent to deceive must be shown before the right to recover can exist.
The advent of the IP Code has not significantly changed these rulings as they are fully in accord with what Section 168
of the Code in its entirety provides. Deception, passing off and fraud upon the public are still the key elements
that must be present for unfair competition to exist.

The act alleged to violate the petitioners rights under Section 168.3 (c) is hoarding which we gather to be the
collection of the petitioners empty bottles so that they can be withdrawn from circulation and thus impede the
circulation of the petitioners bottled products. This, according to the petitioner, is an act contrary to good faith a
conclusion that, if true, is indeed an unfair act on the part of the respondents. The critical question, however, is not the
intrinsic unfairness of the act of hoarding; what is critical for purposes of Section 168.3 (c) is to determine if the
hoarding, as charged, is of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of the petitioner.

We hold that it is not. Hoarding as defined by the petitioner is not even an act within the contemplation of the IP Code.

As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section 1 speaks of a person who has earned goodwill
with respect to his goods and services and who is entitled to protection under the Code, with or without a
registered mark. Section 168.2, as previously discussed, refers to the general definition of unfair competition. Section
168.3, on the other hand, refers to the specific instances of unfair competition, with Section 168.3a referring to the
sale of goods given the appearance of the goods of another; Section 168.3b, to the inducement of belief that his or her
goods or services are that of another who has earned goodwill; while the disputed Section 168.3c being a catch all
clause whose coverage the parties now dispute.

Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the hoarding as defined and charged by the petitioner does
not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168 in particular. It does not relate to any patent, trademark,
trade name or service mark that the respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from
the petitioner. Nor are the respondents alleged to be fraudulently passing off their products or services as
those of the The respondents are not also alleged to be undertaking any representation or misrepresentation that
would confuse or tend to confuse the goods of the petitioner with those of the respondents, or vice versa. What in fact
the petitioner alleges is an act foreign to the Code, to the concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates; as alleged,
hoarding inflicts unfairness by seeking to limit the oppositions sales by depriving it of the bottles it can use for these
sales.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Accordingly, we confirm that SW, issued by the MTC is
NULL and VOID.

People vs Estrada (296 SCRA 383)

FACTS: A petition for review was filed seeking the reversal of respondent Judge Estrada's order that granted private
respondent's motion to quash search warrant 958 as well as the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The
pertinent facts of the present case are as follows:

> Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of BFAD filed an application for the
issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza (private respondent) of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City for violation of Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines). However, the application
ended with a statement that the warrant is to search the premises of another person at a different address (Belen
Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu - who happened to be the subject on whom another search was applied
for by the same applicant)

>Respondent Judge issued search warrant 958 on June 27, 1995 which was served the next day. The present petition
stated that, during the search, the team discovered that said address (516 xx) was actually a 5,000-meter compound
containing at least 15 structures. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent Lanuza at
Lot 41 of said address. Failure to find any drug products prompted the policemen to proceed to search a nearby
warehouse at Lot 38 which yielded 52 cartons of assorted drug products.

> On August 22, 1995, private respondent Lanuza filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground that the
search warrant is illegal and null and void.

Respondent judge granted Lanyzas motion to quash the search warrant and denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:WON respondent judge erred in granting Lanuzas motion to quash Search Warrant 958.

HELD: There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant. Firstly, we cannot fault the
respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not convinced that there was probable cause for its
issuance due to the failure of the applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza had no license to sell drugs.

We hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the
applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.

The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under
the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence
or the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the
present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the
same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable
reason therefore during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards
before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his
home and personalities.

In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel
Cabiles could have easily procured such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed
persons or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as
to the non-existence of a license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search
warrant.

Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the questioned
search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516
San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot
No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different person.

This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things
to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. 28 In the present case, it must be noted that the application for
search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square.
Within the same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this
sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with
sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the
search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private
respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has
characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.

Microsoft Corporation vs Maxicorp, Inc.

In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance
against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares (Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and
packaged within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then
bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows. For their purchase,
they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz. Subsequently, Samiano
applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit
they bought as evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a computer
technician, who showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was
pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair
competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted the fact
that the receipt issued was not in Samianos or Sacriz name hence the proceeding in the trial court was infirm from
the onset.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented,
are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe
that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within
Maxicorps premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.

The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos name nor was it in Sacriz name does not render the issuance of
the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed
rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given
situation.Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings simply because the sales receipt
evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA [288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998]

Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain Aling Rosa will be arriving from
Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal
they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who Aling Rosa was, the team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked aling Rosa about the contents of
her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked cash
katutak.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and
seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she
watched a movie Balweg. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag,
when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman
was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented.

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972

Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.

Held: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by
prevailing jurisprudence

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted.

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not acting
suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a
warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was
illegal and inadmissible evidence.

RULE 113, RULES OF COURT

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

RULE 126, RULES OF COURT

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed
with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed
if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending.

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house
or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein.

Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true
inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made,
and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was
made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with
and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has
been complied with.

(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who
shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

SUSAN ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 182010. August 25, 2010

FACTS: Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts. On the time of the arrest, two
police officers came to Esquillo and another person while they were transacting. While the officers were coming, one of
the officers saw Esquillo hide a transparent plastic bag with white substance in it. When asked, she fled but was
eventually caught.

Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the officers planted evidence against her.

The lower cause said that the officers had probable cause to search Esquillo under the stop-and-frisk doctrine.

ISSUE: Whether the arrest was valid.

RULING: The SC denied the appeal.

Firstly, the issue whether the arrest was valid was waived by the petitioner when she did not quash it before
arraignment. The issue was only raised the first time during appeal on the appellate court.

On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the white substance from a distance, the plain view doctrine was imposed.
When searched the officers followed the definition and requirements of a valid stop-and-frisk as stated in People v.
Chua - that he should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons.

People v. Rufino Umanito 26 Oct 2007 / Tinga / Appeal from a CA decision

FACTS Around 9PM, private complainant AAA was accosted by a young male (whom she later knew as Umanito). He
waited for her by the creek, and he pointed as knife at her abdomen. He dragged her into the Home Economics
Building of Daramuangan Elementary School. He undressed her while still holding the knife. He set her down on a
bench, put down the knife, and had sex with her. He dressed up and threatened to kill her if she reported the incident.
Six months later, AAA s mother noticed the prominence on her stomach, and it was then that she divulged to her
mother the alleged rape. Her mother brought her to the police station. (Umanito s alibi: He was at home all day. Re:
AAA, he admitted that he courted her but she spurned him. He conjectured that she had a crush on him since she
frequently visited him.)

RTC rendered judgment against Umanito and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua. Umanito s appeal
was transferred to the CA for intermediate review (as per Mateo ruling), and CA affirmed RTC. Umanito seeks acquittal
on reasonable doubt, with the belated filing of the case and AAA s questionable credibility as grounds. He also said
that AAA filed the complaint only upon her mother s insistence; this supports his claim that AAA had sex with another
(a married man). Also, he claimed that there were several inconsistencies in her assertions.

CASE IS REMANDED TO THE RTC FOR RECEPTION OF DNA EVIDENCE

RATIO

The fact that AAA bore a child because of the purported rape may provide the definitive key to Umanito s absolution,
since it can now be determined with reasonable certainty WON he is the father of her child. AAA and her child are
directed to submit themselves to DNA testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (AM No. 06-11-5-SC)
which took effect on 15 Oct 2007 (a few days before promulgation of this case).

DNA print / identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a
crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available. The groundwork for
acknowledging the strong weight of DNA testing was first laid out in Tijing v. CA . Herrera v. Alba discussed DNA
analysis as evidence and traced the development of its admissibility in our jurisdiction. Tecson v. COMELEC said that in
case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to establish, DNA testing could be resorted to.

The determination of WON Umanito is the father (through DNA testing) is material to the fair and correct
adjudication of his appeal. Under Sec. 4 of AM No. 06-11-5-SC, the courts are authorized, after due hearing
and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, since SC is not a trier of facts, it would be more
appropriate that the case be remanded to RTC for reception of evidence.

The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set. RTC
should order the DNA testing if it finds it to be feasible in this case. RTC shall determine the institution to undertake the
testing, and the parties are free to manifest their comments on the choice. After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall
be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of
evidence, which shall be assessed by RTC in keeping with Sections 7 (Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence)
and 8 (Reliability of DNA testing methodology). RTC is also enjoined to observe confidentiality and preservation of DNA
evidence.

To facilitate the execution of this resolution, although the parties are primarily bound to bear the expenses for
DNA testing, such costs may be advanced by SC if needed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO UMANITO G.R. No. 172607 April 2009

FACTS: The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in
her pregnancy and the birth of a child hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, as well as the defense of
alibi raised by Umanito, the Courtdeemed uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB. With the advance in
genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether appellant
is the father of AAA's child. The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the parties in Court. The [NBI] is,
therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test results. The [NBI] is further enjoined to
observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing and is
hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the accused has been acquitted or served his sentence.
The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and Umanito, to
determine whether or not Umanito is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete Match in allof the
15 loci tested between the alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above findings, there is a99.9999%
probability of paternity that Umanito is the biological father of BBB. The defense admitted that if thevalue of the
Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.

ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB].

RULING: Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA
Evidence (DNA Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA, Umanito
had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she was raped by
Umanito. Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence (Rule 131, Section 3).The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not
contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the admission of the
results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same.
By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00.Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA
testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the
penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny Umanito's Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The instant case is
now CLOSED and TERMINATED

Maryland v. King

Facts: The Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) allows state and local law enforcement officers to collect DNA
samples from individuals who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence, burglary, or
attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first and second degree assault charges. While under arrest,
but prior to conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged in Maryland's DNA database. That database matched
King's DNA to a DNA sample from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the only evidence linking King to the rape.
The trial judge denied King's motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was convicted of first-degree rape and
sentenced to life in prison.

King appealed the conviction, arguing that the MDCA was an unconstitutional infringement of his Fourth Amendment
privilege against warrantless searches. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the MDCA was
unconstitutional. The court held that King's expectation of privacy was greater than Maryland's interest in using the
DNA for identification purposes.

Question: Does the Fourth Amendment allow states to collect and analyze DNA from people arrested, but not
convicted, of serious crimes?

Conclusion: Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that
conducting a DNA swab test as a part of the arrest procedure does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the test
serves a legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as to require a warrant. The routine administrative
procedures that occur during a booking for an arrest do not require the same justification and the search of a location.
The Court held that ascertaining an arrestee's identity and criminal history is a crucial part of the arrest procedure and
that a DNA test is just as valid and informative as fingerprinting. Determining an arrestee's criminal history also serves
the legitimate state interest of determining what level of risk the individual poses to the public and what conditions
should be set on his/her release from custody.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Fourth Amendment categorically prevents searching
a person for evidence of a crime without cause. Because the majority's opinion allows for DNA tests to be conducted in
the absence of evidence linking the arrestee to a specific DNA-related crime, these tests fall within the boundaries of
the British "general warrants" the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit. He also argued that the procedural
safeguards on the DNA evidence make it an ineffective and redundant identification tool. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the Dissent.

Missouri v. McNeely 11-1425 Apr 17, 2013

Facts: On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving above the speed limit.
When Winder followed McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three times. Upon making
contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his eyes were red and glassy, and that his breath smelled like alcohol.
McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested
McNeely for driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely
the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered the sample
taken anyway, and the blood test revealed McNeely's blood alcohol level was far above the legal limit.

The state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood
sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. The state appealed
and argued that the risk of McNeely's blood alcohol level decreasing over time represented an exigent circumstance
requiring a blood draw. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but that the case represented a
departure from current case law; it transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri
affirmed the trial court's decision.

Question: Does the Fourth Amendment prevent the taking of a warrantless blood sample under exigent
circumstances?

Conclusion: Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendments protection against warrantless searches applies to blood alcohol tests unless specific exigent
circumstances exist. Because each case must be considered based on its individual facts, there are cases in which the
natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood would be considered an exigent circumstance, but there is no reason to
create a categorical rule. The Court also held that the Fourth Amendments protection against bodily intrusions
outweighs the states interest in gaining evidence quickly.

In his partial concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the case in question does not provide the basis for
any categorical rule on the issue of conducting a blood alcohol test without a warrant. He also wrote that the Fourth
Amendment does not allow the warrant requirement to be entirely ignored in drunk driving arrests. Chief Justice John
G. Roberts, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that there must be a
categorical rule on this issue to provide appropriate guidance to law enforcement officials. He argued that exigent
circumstances exist and justify a warrantless blood test if the officer believes there is not sufficient time to obtain a
warrant before critical evidence is lost through natural metabolic processes. If there is time to secure a warrant, the
officer must do so. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the partial concurrence and
partial Dissent.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the bodys natural metabolization of
alcohol constitutes an the destruction of evidence and represents an exigent circumstance. The importance of
obtaining evidence allows the police to conduct a warrantless blood alcohol test without violating the Fourth
Amendment.

MUSTANG LUMBER vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Special Actions
and Investigation Division of the DENR were informed that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner. The SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to
conduct surveillance. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's
truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the
required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at
the DENR compound. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. The
team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's
lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and
approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. On 4 April
1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumber yard and placed under administrative seizure the
remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the
petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally
sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their
source and origin. Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical
possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his
representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders. On 10 April 1990,counsel for the
petitioner sent a letter to the Chief of SAID Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days to produce the required
documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were
allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the petition. Subsequently, the Sec. of DENR Factor an issued an
order confiscating the woods seized in the truck of the petitioner as well as those found in their lumberyard.

Issue: Whether or not that a lumber cannot be considered a timber and that petitioner should not be held forillegal
logging.

Held: The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's
conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession
thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, theSC rules that such possession is
penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no
definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of
Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and
other forestraw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wall bond, block board, paper board, pulp, paper or other
finished wood products. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly,
the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply
put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession
of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw or processed timber.

Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164815

FACTS: On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping for ransom was
released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition
was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the
petitioner but to another person.

The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a search warrant) in the
boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns on him and tied him and pulled him out of the room as the
raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the room exclaiming
that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a
Memorandum Receipt.

Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing a revolver
bearing serial number 52315 without securing the necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal
asked the court to be reconsidered.

ISSUE/S: Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit and valid

HELD/DECISION:

1.Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person who was arrested lawfully may be
searched so that the officer may remove any weapons that the accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect
the welfare of the officers and to make sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to find evidence that otherwise can
be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the
person or within the area of his immediate control. Based on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner did not
resist arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where the gun was found; therefore the room where the gun
was found could not be in his immediate control. Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are
permitted to seize any weapon that they can inadvertently found during the arrest under the plain view doctrine.
However, the firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and therefore not incidental. Clearly, the
search was illegal, a violation of Velorosos right against unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the evidence
obtained is inadmissible to court and cannot be used against him.

People vs. Racho 626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010

Facts: On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the
purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to
apprehend the appellant. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at
around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the
confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle,
the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled
out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the
confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the
contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or
delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs. During the arraignment,
appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting
appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11,
Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for
the first time he legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.

Held: The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from
this well-established doctrine.

Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers
have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about
to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a
tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police
officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the
information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been
made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.

Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite
warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the
"tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants physical
description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there
was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to
apply for a warrant.

People vs Molina

Overview: SPO1 Paguidopon received a tip about drug pushers. He previously caught a glimpse of one of them, Mula,
so he was able to point to him and his companion, Molina, to arresting officers when they were aboard a trisikad. Upon
accosting them, the police were able to find marijuana in a bag carried by Molina, leading to their arrest. The court
however held that they were illegally arrested because their case dont fall under the exception of an in flagrante
delicto arrest, there being no outward indication that could justify their arrest.
Statement of the Case: This is for review of the decision of the RTC finding Nasario Molina alias "Bobong" and
Gregorio Mula alias "Boboy" guilty of violation of Sec. 8 of RA 6245, or the Dangerous Drugs Act, by possessing
946.9 grants of dried marijuana.-Molina and Mula pleaded guilty upon arraignment.

Statement of Facts: On June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon received information about a marijuana pusher in
Davao. Paguidopon first saw the pusher in person on July of the same year, when his informer identified Mula as the
driver of a motorcycle who just passed by them. Molina, on the other hand, was never identified prior arrest. In the
morning of August 8, 1996, Paguidopon received information that the drug pushers will pass by at NHA, Ma-a, Davao
City that morning, so he called for assistance from the PNP. A team composed of SPO4 Cloribel, SPO2 Paguidopon
(brother of Marino), and SPO1 Pamplona were dispatched to proceed to Marino's house where they'll wait for the drug
pushers will pass by. Two hours later, a "trisikad" identified by Paguidopon as carrying Molina and Mula passed by. So,
the team boarded their vehicle, overtook the trisikad and accosted the two.-At that point, Mula was holding a black
bag. He handed the same to Molina. Pamplona, introducing himself as a police officer, asked Molina to open the bag,
to which Molina replied "Boss, if possible, we will settle this."-Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed
dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed. Mula and Molina filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, saying that the marijuna was illegally seized from them, therefore it is inadmissible. The trial court denied
this. The two waived presentation of evidence, and opted to file a joint memorandum. Later, the trial court still found
them guilty, and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. Pursuant to Art. 47 of the RPC and Rule 122, Sec. 10 of
the ROC, the case is elevated to the SC on automatic review. The SolGen moved for the acquittal of the two.

Issue and Held: Was the arrest of Mula and Molina fall under the exception of in flagrante delicto in warrantless
arrests?

NO. Applicable Laws: Article III, Sec. 2Article III, Sec. 3

Rationale: The law mandates that searches be carried out with a search warrant upon the existence of probable cause.
Likewise, the law protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and holds evidence taken from such incidents
as inadmissible as evidence. There are exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted incidental to a lawful arrest

For this, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. It doesn't work the other way around.
Likewise, as a rule, an arrest is legitimate if it's with a valid warrant of arrest. However, a police officer may conduct
warrantless arrests:

(a)In flagrante delicto - When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense

(b) Arrest effected in hot pursuit - - when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

(c) Arrest of escaped prisoners - when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In this case, the trial court found that the
warrantless arrest and seizure were valid apparently because they were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the
prohibited drugs. But the question is: does the present case aptly fall within the exceptions to the warrant
requirement?

In flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to constitute probable cause
that would justify in flagrante delicto arrests

O People vs Chua Ho San: The arresting officer must have personal knowledge that the person he is arresting has
committed, is committing or is about to commit the offense.

O People vs Aminudin: The accused was just disembarking the vessel. He only became suspect when the informer
pointed him to the officials.

United States v. Robinson

Facts: A police officer pulled over and arresting Robinson for operating an automobile without a valid permit. The
officer then frisked Robinson and discovered a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen vials of heroin in his
pocket.

Question: Did the officer's search violate the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion: The Court upheld the search. Distinguishing between searches done to discover concealed weapons
and those conducted coextensive with an arrest, Justice Rehnquist argued since the officer did not conduct the search
in an abusive or extreme manner, and because he acted consistent with the authority vested in a police officer when
making an arrest, his actions were legitimate.

People vs Padilla [269 SCRA 402 (1997)]

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.

Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian
witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession:

1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition

2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal
Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994,Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms
under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from
17years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court
of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bail bond.

RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.
Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and
filedManifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).

Issues:

1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course
thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule

No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was
issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually
committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable
lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence
are admissible. Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:

Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in
which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the
right to be there, (c)evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited bylaw inadvertedly found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant)

Search of moving vehicle

Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence where the test of incidental search(not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must
be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest. Petitioner would
nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at
the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success
when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled
jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea.

2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the
subject firearms

No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the
subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions were seized from petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence
during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners
purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the
prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were
mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent
courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required
by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform
personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated
in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.

3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the
1987 Constitution Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic
ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the
previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer
exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is
cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.

The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the
governing law at the time of appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal,
respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by
petitioner.

Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The
penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua contrary to appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same
cruel and excessive.

Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the
statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify
nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this
Court. Just recently, the Court declared that the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to
any provision of the Constitution

Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress
which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we
reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws

Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of
the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms &ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate
penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum.

PEOPLE vs. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999

FACTS: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca
Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay
Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by
fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1
Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed
that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the
speed boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon
seeing the police officers, the man changed direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They
then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what theyre saying. And by
resorting of sign language, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man acceded to the
request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline
substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his
constitutional rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a valid
exemption from the warrant requirement.

RULING: The Court held in the negative.

The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or
residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules.
However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the following cases, to wit:

(1) search of moving vehicles,

(2) seizure in plain view,
(3) customs searches,
(4) waiver or consent searches,
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest

It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such
facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause means
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar,
there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in ongoing criminal
enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a
drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to
the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. With these,
the Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented search. If
CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the police's "sign
language?" More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he
deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search.

Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence.
Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Cadua vs CA

This case stemmed from a charge for Illegal Possession of Firearms. Assistant City Prosecutor accuses EDWIN CADUA Y
QUINTAYO of (sic) violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions),

At said address, police officers found both complainants who stated that the alleged holduppers had just fled. PO3
Burdeos asked where the robbery took place. Complainants replied that they were held up by two (2) men at the
corner of Archer and Regalado Streets, near their house. The police officers also asked in what direction the alleged
holduppers fled and what they were wearing. Then, the police officers requested the complainants to board the patrol
unit in order to facilitate the search for the two (2) men.
 As they were patrolling around the area, complainants informed the police officers that one of the suspects was
dressed in jeans and a t-shirt while the other was dressed in a black top and black pants The police officers then
noticed two (2) men walking alongside the street and as the officers slowed down the mobile unit to get a closer look,
the complainants identified the men as the alleged holduppers, one of which is the petitioner in this case. The police
officers slowed down to a stop, alighted from the vehicle, and called out to the suspects.

As Burdeos was approaching the suspects, he noticed that petitioner Cadua was about to pull something which was
tucked at the right side of his waist. Burdeos promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and warned him not to move. He
then frisked Cadua and found in his possession a .38 caliber "paltik" revolver. PO3 Reynoso Bacnat the apprehended
Cadua's companion, who was later identified as Joselito Aguilar. In Aguilar's possession was found a fan knife. 9

Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

W/ N the warrantless arrest is VALID?

W/N THE "PALTIK" WAS RECOVERED IN AN INCIDENTAL SEARCH DURING A WARRANTLESS ARREST MADE BY
THE POLICE OFFICERS IS ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE?

RULING: YES.

The SC affirmed the ruling of CA that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was based on probable cause
and that the police officers had personal knowledge of the fact which led to his arrest. The subsequent
search was therefore an incident to the arrest, making the firearm found in his possession admissible in
evidence. Moreover, the CA stated that the positive declaration of prosecution witness Joselito Burdeos, that
the .38 "paltik" revolver was found in petitioner's possession, already proved one of the essential
elements of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms.15

Considering the circumstances in this case, we find that there was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest of
petitioner for illegal possession of firearms. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts", in arrests without warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. . . . Peace officers may
pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious
circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit, any
crime or breach of the peace.

Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused
to be guilty.

Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to affirm the finding below that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner is lawful. We also agree that the incidental search and subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm in
question is likewise lawful and valid pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

PEOPLE VS. BINAD SY CHUA [396 SCRA 657; G.R. No.136066-67; 4 Feb 2003]

Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended
by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to
deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of
operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel.
The other group acted as their back up. Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which
just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accusedappellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed
Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers.

As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from
his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .
22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he
saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the
Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2
Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col.
Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so
he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel
to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car.
When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his
car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman.

During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so
the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officers companions arrived
at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank,
while the others searched his car. Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for
about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters,
Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken. The
lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of
1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and

(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in
a lawful and valid manner.

Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs
that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more
time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a stop and frisk. The trial court confused the
concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly
effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be
madethe process cannot be reversed.

Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. We find the two aforementioned
elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes,
there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime. Reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify
an in flagrante delicto arrest.

With regard to the concept of stop-and frisk: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him.

Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. A
stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this
principle to apply.

The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before
the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to
make any initial inquiry into accused-appellants business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was
carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-
appellant. In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is applicable to justify
the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted

Office of the Court Administrator vs. (Judge) Florentino S. Barron (297 SCRA 376) Impropriety

Facts: Judge Barron was arrested during an entrapment operation when he tried to solicit bribes from an American
national in exchange for ruling in the latters favor in a pending case.

Held: Judge dismissed. A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner
that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. The conduct of respondent shows that he can be influenced by
monetary considerations. His act of demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant constitutes serious
misconduct in office. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct, no matter how nominal the amount involved,
which erodes the respect for the law and the courts.

Chimel v. California

Brief Fact Summary. The defendant, Chimel (the defendant), was arrested inside his home and police asked him
for consent to search the home. The defendant refused the request. The police proceeded nonetheless, incident to the
lawful arrest and searched in different rooms. The police also had the defendants wife open various dresser drawers
and remove their contents.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Incident to a lawful arrest, a search of any area beyond the arrestees immediate control, is
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution), unless there is a clear danger
that evidence may be destroyed or concealed or there is an imminent threat of harm to the arresting officers.

Facts. The police came to Defendants home with an arrest warrant for an alleged burglary. The police asked
permission to look around the house. The defendant refused the request and the police proceeded to search the
home anyways. The police also made the defendants wife remove contents of various dresser drawers. The police
seized coins and medals which were later used to convict the defendant of burglary.

Issue. Where a defendant is lawfully arrested inside his home, is a warrantless search of the area beyond the
defendants immediate control constitutional?

Held. Any search in an arrestees home beyond arrestees person and the area within his immediate control is
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.

Dissent. Where there is probable cause to search and there is a clear danger that the items which are the subject of
the search may be removed prior to police obtaining a search warrant, a warrantless search of the area beyond an
arrestees immediate control is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.

Concurrence. Given the variety of circumstances which police encounter, this decision will create additional burdens on
law enforcement. Whether or not the warrant requirement will protect individual rights in each and every local
situation is uncertain.

Discussion. Contemporaneous searches incident to a lawful arrest are reasonable to seize weapons as well as prevent
the destruction or concealment of evidence. Searches beyond the scope of these justifications are unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)

FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group
(CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6,
1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes
were seized.

Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roques leased residence allegedly
an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by
the CSG were filed by but the fiscals office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive
materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that
the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the
things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of
searching questions propounded to the applicants witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD: NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described
and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books
and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what
items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize
as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.

It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description
of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered
null and void for being too general.

POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS [188 SCRA 288; G.R. NO. 89139; 2 AUG 1990]

Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task
Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in
the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to
flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they
found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38
caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the
petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show
the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so.
He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to
M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under Section 12,
Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as
proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of
the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.

in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis of a
probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of
the police officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they
shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too
late.

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.

People v Cuizon 256 SCRA 320

FACTS: Cuizon and his wife arrived from Hong Kong, at the arrival area they allegedly handed four (4) bags to PaulLee
and Steve Pua who boarded a taxi immediately after the event. The NBI agents were observing the activities because
of the earlier tip given to them. Because of some uncontrolled event they were not able to apprehend Lee and Pua so
they decided to pursue them, based on the tips given to them the two (2) will be staying at Manila Peninsula Hotel.
They apprehended Lee and Pua inside their hotel room confiscating the four bags and was opened in the presence of
Col. Regino Arellano, Chief security of the hotel. Consequently, Cuizon was also apprehended in his house at Caloocan
that same day. They were brought to the NBI headquarters and subsequently referred to the prosecution division of the
DOJ for Inquest. An was charged in court violating Section 15 of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drug Act
of 1972. Appellant Cuiszon challenges the validity and legality of his warrantless arrest and the search and seizure
incidental thereto.

ISSUE: W/N the accused were caught in flagrante delicto, justifying the search without a warrant.

RULING: The SC did not agree that the accused were caught in flagrante delicto. The requirements stated in Section5
of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrest without warrant are not present in the case at bar, for at the time of
their arrest, appellants Pua and Lee were merely resting in the hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was inbed
resting with his wife and child. No offense had just been committed or being actually committed or being attempted by
any of the accused in the presenc eof the lawmen. It is well entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search
and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, guaranteed by section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constituiton. It is evident and clear that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug bust
operation and in the process violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and
seizures.

Malacat v Court of Appeals

Facts: On August 29, 1990 at about 6:30 in the evening, allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days
earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police
Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon
Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-
looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of stop and
frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose
object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information; and
that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty
of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was
appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR
15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.

Ruling:The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where
a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. Probable cause was
not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation,
hence to require probable cause would have been premature. The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were
confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of
evidence and the officers had to act in haste, as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously,
considering the time, place and reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran away in
different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus it is reasonable for an officer to conduct a
limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to
pursue his investigation without fear of violence. The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from
petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner later voluntarily admitted such fact to the police
investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to
establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is
SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10
February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y
MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is
justified for any other lawful cause.

CABALLES VS CA GR# 136292/JAN. 15, 2002

FACTS: On or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pangasinan, and/or elsewhere in the Province of
Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the above mentioned accused with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the National Power Corporation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630 kg of Aluminium cable conductors, valued at Php 27,
450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National Power Corporation, in the aforesaid
amount.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless search without consent is valid?

HELD: In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right, and (3) said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right.

In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable
searches.

WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is reversed and set aside, and accused Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.

Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, MeTC Manila

Facts: Atty. Morales, Branch Clerk of Court of MeTC, Branch 67, Manila was investigated on the basis of an
anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal cases, using office
supplies, equipment and utilities. The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The team was able to
access Atty. Morales personal computer and print two documents stored in its hard drive, which turned out to be two
pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the RTC of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales
computer was seized and taken in custody of the OCA but was later ordered released on his motion, but with order to
the MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein.

Atty. Morales, in defense, argues that since the pleadings were acquired from his personal computer which was
confiscated without any valid search and seizure order, such evidence should be considered as the fruits of a
poisonous tree as it violated his right to privacy.

The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating Judge that there was no evidence to support the charge against
Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement
affirming the charges against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also charged in the same case. The OCA
recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct.

Issues:

1. Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's personal computer admissible in the present administrative case against
him?

2. May the right against unreasonable searches and seizures be invoked in an administrative case?

3. Was there consented warrantless search in this case?

4. Is there a ground to hold Atty. Morales liable of the charge?

Held:

1. While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court employee, the Court
cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

2. As expounded in Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, any violation of the aforestated constitutional right renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

3. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given lies with the State.
Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed and courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right.

In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to relinquish his right. While he
may have agreed to the opening of his personal computer and the printing of files therefrom during the spot
investigation, it is also of record that Atty. Morales immediately filed an administrative case against said persons
questioning the validity of the investigation, specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure.
4. And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal
computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges
against him for insufficiency of evidence.

Polo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011

Facts: Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly
taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a memo directing the
team to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.

Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over
to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was
found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used
by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-
Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit
within five days from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of fishing expedition
when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.

He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing
the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC
Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioners answer to the charge. In view of the
absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived
his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter on the
ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration
which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

Issue WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search and was
a violation of his constitutional right to privacy

Ruling The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did not
violate his constitutional right.

Ratio Decidendi

In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.

Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically
recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and
constituted a search and seizure. Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the
enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area.
Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions
involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus recognized that employees may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.

OConnor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that [i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer. In OConnor the
Court recognized that special needs authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related
reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the
employees reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the
warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.

Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3, 2008, 570
SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that
there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.

The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.

As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC Chair, the
copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its inception and scope.

The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at
bar involves the computer from which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued
computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.

**US vs Wellman (heto lang summary na nakita ko. Click mo link below for full case kung kinulang)

Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of three offenses related to his possession of child pornography. On appeal,
defendant argued that the search warrant that led to his arrest was invalid; that a jury instruction involving the term
"obscene" was erroneous because it lacked a knowledge requirement; and that his sentence was imposed in violation
of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court held, pursuant to United
States v. Leon, that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress. The court also held that
the district court did not give the jury an erroneous instruction because the jury was not required to find that
defendant knew that the images at issue were obscene. The court further held that defendant's sentence was not
unconstitutional where the harshness of defendant's penalty reflected the gravity of his crimes and, as the district
court correctly noted, the severity of defendant's sentence was based on his recidivism. The ten-year sentence for
Count Two was also proportional to other sentences because this sentence was mandated by statute. Accordingly, the
judgment was affirmed.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/104689.P.pdf

**US vs Hill, 459 F.3d 966 January 12, 2006. (di ata to case digest eh pero di ko na binura. Try mo hanap
ng mas maikli)

Justin Hill conditionally pled guilty to possession of child pornography subject to his challenge to the admission of
evidence that he contends was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. His appeal involves the validity of a
warrant to search his computer and storage media for evidence that he possessed pornographic (i.e., lascivious)
images of children. We must also decide whether it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the police to take
all of Hill's computer storage media from his home (they did not find his computer) so they could conduct their search
offsite in a police laboratory, rather than carrying out the search onsite and taking only whatever evidence of child
pornography they might find. As we recently discussed in United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006),
because computers typically contain so much information beyond the scope of the criminal investigation, computer-
related searches can raise difficult Fourth Amendment issues different from those encountered when searching paper
files. Judge Kozinski, sitting as the district court in this case, thoughtfully addressed some of these issues in a
published opinion upholding the validity of the search warrant and its execution. United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d
1081, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2004). We affirm the district court's ruling in most but not all respects for the reasons Judge
Kozinski stated; to the extent we do agree with that reasoning, we adopt it verbatim in this opinion. In sum, we affirm
the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

As the district court explained:

A computer technician was repairing defendant's computer when she discovered what she believed to be child
pornography. She called Long Beach police, and the detective who took the call obtained a search warrant from a
judge of the Long Beach Superior Court. The warrant authorized a search of the computer repair store and seizure of
the computer, any work orders relating to the computer, "all storage media belonging to either the computer or the
individual identifying himself as defendant at the location," and "all sexually explicit images depicting minors
contained in the storage media." By the time the detective arrived at the store to execute the warrant, defendant had
picked up his computer. . . . [T]he detective [submitted an affidavit, which included the computer technician's sworn
statement describing the images. On the basis of this affidavit, the officer obtained] a second warrant, this one
directed at defendant's home, authorizing seizure of the same items.

The affidavit on which the warrants were based described "two images of child pornography":

Image 1

Is a color picture of a female, white, approximately 15 years old, with long dark brown hair. The female is in a room
standing between a couch and a coffee table. There is a framed picture on the wall above the couch. She is wearing
only a long blouse and pair of socks. The blouse is open and she is exposing her breast and pubic area to the camera,
which she is facing while leaning to her left.

Image 2

Is a color picture of a [sic in affidavit] two females, white, approximately 7-9 years of age, both with dirty blond hair.
These females are standing on a beach during the daytime. The shorter of the two females is standing to the right of
the picture while the other female is standing behind her. Both females are facing the camera askew and wearing only
a robe, which is open exposing the undeveloped breast and pubic area of both girls. They both are turning their faces
away from the camera preventing the viewer from seeing their faces.

Officers executed the search warrant but did not find the computer in defendant's apartment. 1 In what appeared to be
defendant's bedroom, they found and seized computer storage media [, specifically: 22 5.25-inch floppy disks, two CD-
ROMs, 124 3.5-inch floppy disks and six zip disks.] [Two of the zip disks] were eventually determined to contain images
of child pornography; [officers] also seized other evidence consistent with the warrant. Defendant was subsequently
charged with one count of possession of child pornography, 2 in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a) (5) (B).3

Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1083-84 (alterations in original).

In the district court, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the two zip disks on the grounds
that, (1) contrary to the magistrate's finding, the warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe the
defendant was guilty of criminal activity; and (2) the warrant was over-broad in allowing seizure of all discovered
computer storage media with no regard to whether such media contained child pornography, and in placing no
limitation on the police officers' search of the seized disks. Id. at 1084.4 The district court denied the motion to
suppress and the defendant conditionally pled guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the district court's
evidentiary ruling.5 This timely appeal followed.

We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence. United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705,
711 (9th Cir. 2004). We review for clear error a magistrate's finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant and
give "great deference" to such a finding. United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 634 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2000).

The defendant argues first that the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant was insufficient to establish
probable cause to believe the defendant was guilty of criminal activity. We do not agree.
" [N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Constitution is clear; a
magistrate may authorize a search of a location only if officers establish probable cause to believe evidence of a crime
may be found there. Probable cause means only a "fair probability," not certainty, and requires consideration of the
totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). Accordingly,
we must determine whether the officer's affidavit, which described the two images from the defendant's computer as
showing three different, minor girls with their breasts and pubic areas exposed, established a fair probability that there
was child pornography or evidence thereof to be found in computer hardware or software at the defendant's home. We
agree with the district court that the affidavit did establish probable cause, but reach that conclusion somewhat
differently.

Child pornography is a particularly repulsive crime, but not all images of nude children are pornographic. For example,
"a family snapshot of a nude child bathing presumably would not" be criminal. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1086. Moreover,
the law recognizes that some images of nudity may merit First Amendment protection because they serve artistic or
other purposes, and possessing those images cannot be criminal. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112-13, 110 S.
Ct. 1691, 109 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1990) (upholding Ohio's child pornography law because it had been interpreted to
criminalize possession of images depicting not just nudity, but "nudity constitut [ing] a lewd exhibition"); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 n. 18, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982) (" [N]udity, without more [,] is protected
expression."). Images depicting "minor [s] engag [ed] in sexually explicit conduct" are, however, prohibited. 18 U.S.C.
2256(8) (A). " [S]exually explicit conduct," in turn, is defined to include "graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of
the genitals or pubic area of any person." 18 U.S.C. 2256(2) (A) (v) (emphasis added). Thus the more precise
question we must answer is whether the officer's affidavit established probable cause that the images on the
defendant's computer were as described lascivious. 6 See Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1084. In answering that
question, it is important to remember that in issuing the search warrant, the magistrate had to make a practical,
commonsense decision, based on the totality of the circumstances presented to him in the affidavit, that there was a
"fair probability" that the images were lascivious. See United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).7

Various courts have attempted to articulate a test for determining lasciviousness. Many have relied upon a six-factor
test originated in United States v. Dost:

(1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area;

(2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with
sexual activity;

(3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child;

(4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude;

(5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity;

(6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.

636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987); see
also United States v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2001) (adopting and applying Dost factors); United States v.
Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).

The district court, analyzing each of these six factors, found Dost to be "not particularly helpful" in determining
whether a given image is lascivious generally or as applied to the images here. See Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
Instead, the court fashioned a new test that would create a presumption of lasciviousness, and therefore probable
cause, " [i]f an image of a minor displays the minor's naked genital area ... [,] unless there are strong indicators that
[the image] is not lascivious."8 Id. at 1086-87. Although we appreciate the district court's careful analysis and critique
of Dost, we do not think it necessary to adopt a new test or to deny the utility of Dost in the context of this case.

The Dost factors can be a starting point for judges to use in determining whether a particular image is likely "so
presented by the photographer as to arouse or satisfy the sexual cravings of a voyeur." Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1244. But
the factors are neither exclusive nor conclusive. Dost itself acknowledged that it did not seek to offer "a
comprehensive definition of ... lasciviousness," because a determination of lasciviousness "ha [s] to be made based on
the overall content of the visual depiction." 636 F. Supp. at 832. The factors are merely "general principles as guides
for analysis." Id. For instance, we have already recognized that, in some instances, the factors may be "over generous"
to defendants. Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1244; see also United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1999) ("We
believe that the Dost factors are generally relevant and provide some guidance in evaluating whether the display in
question is lascivious. We emphasize, however, that these factors are neither comprehensive nor necessarily
applicable in every situation. Although Dost provides some specific, workable criteria, there may be other factors that
are equally if not more important in determining whether a photograph contains a lascivious exhibition. The inquiry will
always be case-specific.").

Ultimately, probable cause is a fluid and nontechnical conception not readily susceptible to multifactor tests or
rebuttable presumptions. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003) ("
[T]he probable-cause standard is a ... nontechnical conception .... [and] a fluid concept turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules .... [It] is
incapable of precise definition or quantification ...." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).) The magistrate,
relying on Dost as a guidepost or on some other test for lasciviousness, need only make a "practical, common-sense
decision" that the description presented in the affidavit demonstrates a "fair probability" that the images are
lascivious. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317; see also Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1071; Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1244("The
definition of `lasciviousness' is a matter of law....").

Based on our independent review of the affidavit describing the two images, we are satisfied that the state judge's
finding of probable cause was well within his discretion. There was a fair probability that the images were "so
presented by the photographer as to arouse or satisfy the sexual cravings of a voyeur." Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1244;
see also id. ("Necessarily in deciding whether the district court erred as to the facts [in determining that the images
were lascivious], we must view the pictures ourselves and must interpret the statutory term."). The affidavit described
in some detail the images of three partially nude children, who were provocatively and unnaturally dressed in light of
the photographs' settings. The girls' clothing was opened so as to reveal their breasts and pubic areas, with the girls
appearing in sexually suggestive poses.9 Moreover the descriptions themselves did not raise doubts that the images
served some purpose other than that proscribed in Wiegand.10 Cf. Battershell, 457 F.3d at 1048(holding that an
affidavit describing "a young female (8-10 YOA) naked in a bathtub" is insufficient to establish probable cause to
believe the image is lascivious). The affidavit was sufficient to create "a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed" to believe that evidence of a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a) (5) (B) could be found on the defendant's
computer. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S. Ct. 2317(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

The defendant argues that the search warrant was overbroad because it authorized the officers to seize and remove
from his home his computer and storage media without first determining whether they actually contained child
pornography. Given the nature of computers and storage media, this argument sweeps too broadly, as the district
court explained in addressing the defendant's suggested limitations on the nature and scope of the search:

Search warrants must be specific. "Specificity has two aspects: particularity and breadth. Particularity is the
requirement that the warrant must clearly state what is sought. Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of
the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based." United States v. Towne, 997 F.2d 537,
544 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A warrant describing a category of items is not
invalid if a more specific description is impossible. United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986). The level
of specificity required "varies depending on the circumstances of the case and the type of items involved." Id. The
warrant here commanded the officers to search for and seize: "1) An IBM `clone' medium tower personal computer ...
3) All storage media belonging to either item # 1 or the individual identifying himself as defendant at the location. 4)
All sexually explicit images depicting minors contained in item # 3." Defendant argues the warrant was overbroad
because it authorized seizure of storage media whether or not they contained child pornography. He suggests it should
have authorized seizure only of media containing child pornography. But it is impossible to tell what a computer
storage medium contains just by looking at it. Rather, one has to examine it electronically, using a computer that is
running the appropriate operating system, hardware and software. The police had no assurance they would find such a
computer at the scene nor did they, for that matter or that, if they found one, they could bypass any security
measures and operate it.

Defendant suggests that the police could have brought their own laptop computer: Having probable cause to seize
only computer storage media that contained certain types of files, the police should have been required to bring with
them the equipment necessary to separate the sheep from the goats. Defendant's argument raises an important
question about how police must execute seizures pursuant to a warrant. Because seizable materials are seldom found
neatly separated from their non-seizable counterparts, how much separating must police do at the scene to avoid
taking items that are neither contraband nor evidence of criminal activity?

As always under the Fourth Amendment, the standard is reasonableness. To take an extreme example, if police have
probable cause to seize business records, the warrant could not authorize seizure of every piece of paper on the
premises on the theory that the police conducting the search might not know how to read....

[T]he court concludes that the police were not required to bring with them equipment capable of reading computer
storage media and an officer competent to operate it. Doing so would have posed significant technical problems and
made the search more intrusive. To ensure that they could access any electronic storage medium they might find at
the scene, police would have needed far more than an ordinary laptop computer. Because computers in common use
run a variety of operating systems various versions or flavors of Windows, Mac OS and Linux, to name only the most
common police would have had to bring with them a computer (or computers) equipped to read not only all of the
major media types, but also files encoded by all major operating systems. Because operating systems, media types,
file systems and file types are continually evolving, police departments would frequently have to modify their
computers to keep them up-to-date. This would not be an insuperable obstacle for larger police departments and
federal law enforcement agencies, but it would pose a significant burden on smaller agencies.

Even if the police were to bring with them a properly equipped computer, and someone competent to operate it, using
it would pose two significant problems. First, there is a serious risk that the police might damage the storage medium
or compromise the integrity of the evidence by attempting to access the data at the scene. As everyone who has
accidentally erased a computer file knows, it is fairly easy to make mistakes when operating computer equipment,
especially equipment one is not intimately familiar with. The risk that the officer trying to read the suspect's storage
medium on the police laptop will make a wrong move and erase what is on the disk is not trivial. Even if the officer
executes his task flawlessly, there might be a power failure or equipment malfunction that could affect the contents of
the medium being searched. For that reason, experts will make a back-up copy of the medium before they start
manipulating its contents. Various other technical problems might arise; without the necessary tools and expertise to
deal with them, any effort to read computer files at the scene is fraught with difficulty and risk.

Second, the process of searching the files at the scene can take a long time. To be certain that the medium in question
does not contain any seizable material, the officers would have to examine every one of what may be thousands of
files on a disk a process that could take many hours and perhaps days. Taking that much time to conduct the search
would not only impose a significant and unjustified burden on police resources, it would also make the search more
intrusive. Police would have to be present on the suspect's premises while the search was in progress, and this would
necessarily interfere with the suspect's access to his home or business. If the search took hours or days, the intrusion
would continue for that entire period, compromising the Fourth Amendment value of making police searches as brief
and non-intrusive as possible.

Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1087-89(alteration in original and internal citation omitted).

We agree with the district court that under the circumstances here, the warrant was not fatally defective in failing to
require an onsite search and isolation of child pornography before removing storage media wholesale. That does not
mean, however, that the government has an automatic blank check when seeking or executing warrants in computer-
related searches. Although computer technology may in theory justify blanket seizures for the reasons discussed
above, the government must still demonstrate to the magistrate factually why such a broad search and seizure
authority is reasonable in the case at hand. There may well be situations where the government has no basis for
believing that a computer search would involve the kind of technological problems that would make an immediate
onsite search and selective removal of relevant evidence impracticable. Thus, there must be some threshold showing
before the government may "seize the haystack to look for the needle."

Our cases illustrate this principle. In United States v. Hay, for example, we held permissible a "generic classification"
authorizing seizure of an "entire computer system and virtually every document in [the defendant's] possession
without referencing child pornography or any particular offense conduct" because, although officers "knew that [a
party] had sent 19 images [of child pornography] directly to [the defendant's] computer, [they] had no way of knowing
where the images were stored." 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000). Similarly United States v. Lacy allowed "blanket
seizure" of the defendant's "entire computer system." 119 F.3d 742, 746(9th Cir. 1997). We reasoned that "no more
specific description of the computer equipment sought was possible," because the agents "did not know whether the
images were stored on the hard drive or on one or more of [the defendant's] many computer disks." Id.; accord United
States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding, in a child pornography case, that "the seizure and
subsequent off-premises search of the computer and all available disks was about the narrowest definable search and
seizure reasonably likely to obtain the images"). Significantly, in both Hay and Lacy we carefully noted the critical role
played by the officers' affidavits supporting the warrants. See Hay, 231 F.3d at 637(" [T]he affidavit explained why it
was necessary to seize the entire computer system in order to examine the electronic data for contraband. It also
justified taking the entire system off site because of the time, expertise, and controlled environment required for a
proper analysis."); Lacy, 119 F.3d at 746-47 ("In the affidavit supporting the search warrant application, a Customs
agent explained there was no way to specify what hardware and software had to be seized to retrieve the images
accurately.").

By contrast, although the warrant in this case authorized a wholesale seizure, the supporting affidavit did not explain
why such a seizure was necessary. See United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d at 1149 n. 7 (noting favorably an affidavit's
computer search and seizure protocol explaining when a computer had to be searched offsite, because " [s]uch
specificity increases our confidence that the magistrate judge was well aware of what he was authorizing and that the
agents knew the bounds of their authority in executing the search"); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Searching and Seizing
Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations 43, 69 (July 2002) (recommending that "if
agents expect that they may need to seize a personal computer and search it off-site to recover the relevant evidence,
the affidavit should explain this expectation and its basis to the magistrate judge. The affidavit should inform the court
of the practical limitations of conducting an on-site search, and should articulate the plan to remove the entire
computer from the site if it becomes necessary."); cf. United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1982) ("If the
need for transporting the documents is known to the officers prior to the search, they may apply for specific
authorization for large-scale removal of material, which should be granted by the magistrate issuing the warrant only
where on site sorting is infeasible and no other practical alternative exists."). 11

We do not approve of issuing warrants authorizing blanket removal of all computer storage media for later examination
when there is no affidavit giving a reasonable explanation, such as that provided in Hay and Lacy, as to why a
wholesale seizure is necessary. 12 See Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595 (" [T]he wholesale seizure for later detailed examination
of records not described in a warrant is significantly more intrusive, and has been characterized as `the kind of
investigatory dragnet that the fourth amendment was designed to prevent'" (quoting United States v. Abrams, 615
F.2d 541, 543(1st Cir. 1980))). Without such individualized justification being presented to the magistrate, we cannot
be sure that the judge was aware of the officers' intent and the technological limitations meriting the indiscriminate
seizure and thus was intelligently able to exercise the court's oversight function. An explanatory statement in the
affidavit also assures us that the officers could not reasonably describe the objects of their search with more
specificity. See United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Generic classifications in a warrant are
acceptable only when a more precise description is not possible." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see
also Upham, 168 F.3d at 535 ("Of course, if the [seized] images themselves could have been easily obtained through
an on-site inspection, there might have been no justification for allowing the seizure of all computer equipment, a
category potentially including equipment that contained no images and had no connection to the crime."). Accordingly,
we hold that the warrant here was overbroad in authorizing a blanket seizure in the absence. of an explanatory
supporting affidavit, which would have documented the informed endorsement of the neutral magistrate. See Tamura,
694 F.2d at 596("The essential safeguard required is that wholesale removal must be monitored by the judgment of a
neutral, detached magistrate.").13

Nonetheless, as in Tamura, we conclude that suppression of the evidence of child pornography found on the
defendant's seized zip disks is not an appropriate remedy. Tamura involved an indiscriminate seizure of all files found
in an office even though the warrant authorized the officers to search for only three categories of records for evidence
of various alleged crimes. See id. at 594-95. Although we refused to sanction the "wholesale seizure for later detailed
examination of records not described in a warrant," id. at 595, we held that "the exclusionary rule does not require the
suppression of evidence within the scope of a warrant simply because other items outside the scope of the warrant
were unlawfully taken as well," id. at 597. See also id. ("Regardless of the illegality of the Government's seizure and
retention of documents not covered by the warrant, however, reversal is not compelled in this case.").

Similarly, the pornographic images from the defendant's zip disks that he sought to exclude as evidence at trial was
"seized and retained lawfully because described in and therefore taken pursuant to the valid search warrant." Id. As we
have discussed above, the officers' wholesale seizure was flawed here because they failed to justify it to the
magistrate, not because they acted unreasonably or improperly in executing the warrant. Because the officers were
"motivated by considerations of practicality rather than by a desire to engage in indiscriminate `fishing,' we cannot
say ... that the officers so abused the warrant's authority that the otherwise valid warrant was transformed into a
general one, thereby requiring all fruits to be suppressed." Id.See also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct.
2159, 2163, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006) ("Suppression of evidence ... has always been our last resort, not our first
impulse," and is appropriate "only `where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.'") (quoting
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974)).
Therefore, we hold that the district court properly admitted the evidence of child pornography found on the
defendant's computer storage media notwithstanding the lack of a sufficiently detailed supporting affidavit describing
the need for wholesale seizure of such media.

The defendant also argues that the search warrant was overbroad because it did not include a search protocol to limit
the officers' discretion as to what they could examine when searching the defendant's computer media, nor did the
affidavit explain why such a protocol was unnecessary. We, like the district court, find no error in the search warrant on
this ground and adopt the district court's analysis:

Defendant also argues that the warrant was overbroad because it did not define a "search methodology." He claims
that the search should have been limited to certain files that are more likely to be associated with child pornography,
such as those with a ".jpg" suffix (which usually identifies files containing images) or those containing the word "sex"
or other key words.

Defendant's proposed search methodology is unreasonable. "Computer records are extremely susceptible to
tampering, hiding, or destruction, whether deliberate or inadvertent." United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583
(D. Vt. 1998). Images can be hidden in all manner of files, even word processing documents and spreadsheets.
Criminals will do all they can to conceal contraband, including the simple expedient of changing the names and
extensions of files to disguise their content from the casual observer.

Forcing police to limit their searches to files that the suspect has labeled in a particular way would be much like saying
police may not seize a plastic bag containing a powdery white substance if it is labeled "flour" or "talcum powder."
There is no way to know what is in a file without examining its contents, just as there is no sure way of separating
talcum from cocaine except by testing it. The ease with which child pornography images can be disguised whether
by renaming sexyteenyboppersxxx.jpg as sundayschoollesson.doc, or something more sophisticated forecloses
defendant's proposed search methodology.

Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1090-1091; see also Adjani, 452 F.3d at 1149 (rejecting defendants' argument that officers
should have looked at only specified areas of certain email programs for enumerated keywords because " [t]o require
such a pinpointed computer search, restricting the search to an email program or to specific search terms, would likely
have failed to cast a sufficiently wide net to capture the evidence sought").

Moreover, in contrast to our discussion of the overbroad seizure claim above, there is no case law holding that an
officer must justify the lack of a search protocol in order to support issuance of the warrant. As we have noted, we look
favorably upon the inclusion of a search protocol; but its absence is not fatal. We have also held that even though a
warrant authorizing a computer search might not contain a search protocol restricting the search to certain programs
or file names, the officer is always "limited by the longstanding principle that a duly issued warrant, even one with a
thorough affidavit, may not be used to engage in a general, exploratory search." Id. The reasonableness of the officer's
acts both in executing the warrant and in performing a subsequent search of seized materials remains subject to
judicial review. See United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Where evidence is uncovered during a
search pursuant to a warrant, the threshold question must be whether the search was confined to the warrant's
terms.... [T]he search must be one directed in good faith toward the objects specified in the warrant or for other means
and instrumentalities by which the crime charged had been committed. It must not be a general exploratory
search ...." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 14

We realize that judicial decisions regarding the application of the Fourth Amendment to computer-related searches
may be of limited longevity. Technology is rapidly evolving and the concept of what is reasonable for Fourth
Amendment purposes will likewise have to evolve. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150
L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) ("It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology."); cf. id. at 41, 51, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (expressing concern with "the supposedly `bright-line rule' the Court has created in response to its
concerns about future technological developments" as it "is unnecessary, unwise, and inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment" and commenting that " [i]t would be far wiser to give legislators an unimpeded opportunity to grapple
with these emerging issues [of technology] rather than to shackle them with prematurely devised constitutional
constraints"). New technology may become readily accessible, for example, to enable more efficient or pinpointed
searches of computer data, or to facilitate onsite searches. If so, we may be called upon to reexamine the
technological rationales that underpin our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this technology-sensitive area of the
law.

That said, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, the search here was supported by probable cause and,
notwithstanding the shortcomings of the search warrant affidavit, the manner of its execution does not mandate
suppression of the fruits of that search. The district court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress is therefore
AFFIRMED

United States of America v. Jeffrey Brian Ziegler 474 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir., January 30, 2007)

Ninth Circuit holds that an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his private office, because it is locked
and not shared with others. This reasonable expectation of privacy extends to the contents of his office, including the
employees company computer, located therein.

As a result, the Court holds that the Fourth Amendment protects both the office and computer from warrantless
searches by the Government unless it obtains valid consent from either the defendant himself or one with common
authority over the items searched, or proceeds on the authorization of one with apparent authority to give such valid
consent.

Here, the Ninth Circuit holds that the Government obtained valid consent from one with common authority over the
items searched, when it received such consent from the employees employer. The employer had common authority
over the employees office computer because it had a policy of, and regularly did, monitor employees computer usage
of company machines, a policy of which its employees were made aware.
The Court accordingly denied defendants motion to suppress evidence found by the Government during its
warrantless search of defendants office computer. As a result, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant was
convicted of the receipt of obscene material based, in part, on evidence obtained during this search. The evidence
obtained during this search, and by the company earlier, showed that defendant had viewed and had possession of
child pornography.

Defendant Jeffrey Brian Ziegler (Ziegler) was employed by Frontline Processing as its Director of Operations. In this
capacity, he was given a private office, in which was located a company computer for his business use. The private
office had a lock. Access to the computer required a password.

Frontline monitored its employees computer usage and so advised its employees. Employees were further advised
employees not to use company computers for personal purposes.

As a result of its monitoring of defendants computer usage, Frontline discovered that Zieglers computer had been
used to access websites that contained child pornography.

Frontlines Internet Service Provider contacted the FBI, and advised that a Frontline employee had accessed websites
containing child pornography from a workplace computer.

The FBI contacted Frontline, who advised them of the information learned during their monitoring of Zieglers
computer. As a result, the FBI instructed Frontline to make a copy of the hard drive of Zieglers office computer.
Frontline contacted the companys CFO, who authorized this activity, and provided a key to Zieglers private office.
Frontline employees proceeded to enter his office, and make a copy of his computers hard drive, which was delivered
to the FBI. Inspection of the hard drive revealed that it contained many images of child pornography. The copy of this
hard drive was obtained without the issuance of a search warrant. Frontlines counsel had advised the FBI that
Frontline would fully cooperate with its investigation.

Ziegler subsequently moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his office computers hard drive.

In this decision, rendered on rehearing, the Court held that defendant Ziegler had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in his private office, because it contained a locked door. Because his office computer was located in his office, he was
held to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in it as well. This expectation was held to be both objectively and
subjectively reasonable.

The Court held that the presence of lock on his office door, and a password to access his computer, created a
subjective expectation of privacy in those locations.

The Court further held that Ziegler had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in those spaces as well. Said
the Court:

Zieglers expectation of privacy in his office was reasonable on the facts of this case. His office was not shared by co-
workers and kept locked. And while there was a master key, the existence of such will not necessarily defeat a
reasonable of privacy in an office given over for personal use. Because Ziegler had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office, any search of that space and the items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment.

Nonetheless, the Court denied defendants motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his hard
drive because the government was given valid consent to conduct that search by defendants employer, who had
common authority over it. The Court held that Frontline could give such valid consent to Zieglers computer because
its IT department had complete administrative access to his company computer, and because the company had a
practice of monitoring employee usage of its machines, of which its employee were advised. The fact that Ziegler
downloaded personal files onto his office computer did not destroy the employers common authority.

Because his employer via its CFO - gave its consent to this search, and provided the key to Zieglers office, the Court
held the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Riley v. California 13-132 June 2014

Facts: David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others
opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away.
On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration
tags. Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be impounded. Before a car is
impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at
the time of seizure, to protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband. During the
search, police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell
phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making
gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley
was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include
shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm.

Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his
cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the
rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on
all three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division
1, affirmed.

Question: Was the evidence admitted at trial from Riley's cell phone discovered through a search that violated
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches?

Conclusion Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that
the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving
 evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to
harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by
disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell
phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the
traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information
accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the
Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the
government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable.

Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed
doubt that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting
officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's
conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw reasonable
distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can be reasonably searched following an arrest.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND vs KAGUI

MALASUGUI, G.R. No. L-44335

Facts: On March 5, 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese merchant, a resident of Cotabato, a victim of robbery was found
lying on the ground, with several wounds in the head, on a path leading to the barrio of Carcar, Cotabato. Shortly
before the victims death he was able to mention the appellants first name, Kagui, when he was asked about
assailant.

Appellant was later searched by the investigating police, without opposition or protest on his part, and it was
discovered that he also had the victims pocketbook, containing P92 in bills, the victims identification card and a
memorandum of amounts with some Chinese characters. In one of the pockets of his pants was found some
change, making the total amount of money found in his possession P92.68. The said search was conducted after
the appellant had voluntarily produced the bracelets Exhibit A and placed them on Lieutenant Jacaria's table,
because, upon being asked if he had anything, he tremblingly answered in the negative.

The appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut had forcibly and through
intimidation taken from him the bracelets the pocketbook and all the money which he and that, but for the
printing thereon, the identification card found in the pocketbook then was blank and there was no memorandum
of the kind, in Tan Why's handwriting, inside the pocketbook, thereby, insinuating that it was Lieutenant Jacaria

Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted on the accused legal?

SC Ruling: Yes. The SC held that When the search of the person detained or arrested and the seizure of the
effects found in his possession are incidental to an arrest made in conformity with the law, they cannot be
considered unreasonable, much less unlawful. To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large
extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their
escape in many instances.

The record shows that before proceeding with the trial in the lower court, the appellant asked for
the return of said effects to him on the ground that they were unlawfully taken away from him. Leaving
aside the foregoing considerations, his testimony cannot prevail against nor is it sufficient to counteract
that of the government witnesses, Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut, who testified that when
Lieutenant Jacaria asked him what other things he carried, after having voluntarily placed the two pairs of
bracelets, Exhibit A, on the table, and Sergeant Urangut felt his body, he did not show the least opposition.
It follows, therefore, that the lower court committed no error in accepting as evidence the items taken from
the accused, not only because the appellant did not object to the taking thereof from him when searched,
but also because the effects found in his possession of a person detained or arrested are perfectly
admissible as evidence against him, if they constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent or relevant
thereto. It is certainly repgnant to maintain the opposite view because it would amount to authorizing the
return to the accused of the means of conviction seized from him, notwithstanding their being eloquent
Alvarez vs. CFI

Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain
Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious
rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt say that the information was based on his
personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant
ordering the search of Alvarez house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different
documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the
articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the
agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because
the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of
the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latters motion. Alvarez elevated the matter
to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to
retain custody be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose
oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance
of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered
reliable.

Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there
be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon
an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath
includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully
and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince
the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for
damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent
seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the
affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search
warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take
the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the
depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter.
The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing
magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient,
the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because
his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of
one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the
search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and
direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicants
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the
facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent
who had no personal knowledge of thefacts.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte

Brief Fact Summary. Police stopped a vehicle containing the respondent, Robert Bustamonte (the respondent), and
they asked to search the vehicle. Another passenger in the car gave permission, and the search produced stolen
checks that were entered into evidence against the Respondent.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. To determine whether a search was voluntary does not require that a person knew of his
rights, but whether the totality of circumstances indicated that the person was voluntarily allowing the search.

Facts. The police stopped the vehicle containing the respondent and five other passengers after they noticed a broken
headlight and license plate light. When the driver could not produce a license, the police asked for someone who could
produce identification. Another passenger responded, and when the police asked him if they could search the vehicle
he consented. Three stolen checks were found, and they were used as evidence to convict the respondent.

Issue. The issue is whether the respondent voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle.

Held. The consent to a vehicle search did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution (Constitution). The test to determine if a subject has voluntarily consented is to review the totality of the
circumstances. If the subject knows he or she has a right to refuse, it is a factor to be considered, but that fact is not
the sole consideration.

Dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) dissented, reasoning that unless the respondent knew he had a right
to refuse a search, there was no voluntary consent.

Discussion. The test to determine if consent was not the product of duress or coercion is to look at all the
circumstances rather than one sole factor.

Garcia vs Locsin

Facts: Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, a
search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the petitioner at Victoria,
Tarlac, for certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer. The
search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda.

On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the
office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the petitioners bookkeeper, Alfredo
Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution
thereof

The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter
were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed six separate criminal cases against the herein
petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.

The legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases and the
devolution of the documents demanded. The respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for the reason that
though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner.

HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant to be
valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All
that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not
appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the properties to be
seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the
law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law.

Instead, they were turned over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against petitioner.
Considering that at the time the warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment
that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis.

People vs Agbot (Alex,PPT to nung nakita kaya prang rough points lang ata nakalagay dito)

Facts: Antonio was charged murder by the Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental. Convicted of the crime
charged, sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Leona Agbot Subat, in sum of 12,000.

October 8, 1972 4:oopm

Antonio Agbot

House of his sister Leona Agbot ( Sitio Pangandan, Barrio Lamiawan, Carraga, Davao Oriental)

Return his 12 years old daughter Milagrosa

Leona Agbot refused

Antonio got angry (tighten your belt)

7:30 pm

Gun explosion was heard at the house of Leona Agbot

Leona Agbot found at the kitchen of the house wounded and bleeding on the right breast and died.

October 9, 1972, 5:00 am

Pacifico Sobia- Barrio Captain

Manuel Quiros- Patrolman

Joint investigation

Already dress up and ready for burial

Gunshot wounds on the right breast

No post mortem examination

While conducting the investigation:

Accused ( Antonio Agbot) arrived

Admit that he shot the victim using (paltik) shotgun

Luis Ligasan (Barrio Councilmen) and Adolfo Benaming (Barrio Councilmen ) went to the house of the accused and get
the firearm used for killing Leona Agbot

October 16,1972

Appellant executed on extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Caraga

Before Municipal Judge Manuel B. Castro

Antonio Agbot confessed to Judge guilty even though no post- mortem examination was made during
investigation

No ballistic examination was conducted

Issue: Whether or not Antonio Agbot uphold lack of Instruction as an excuse of killing

Held: Antonio Agbot was not excused on the ground of lack of instruction because the SC court upholds that:

Taking ones life was forbidden by natural law and therefore within the instinctive knowledge and feeling of any human
being not deprived by reason.
 Since, appeallant was a member of cultural minority, may considered in his favour, pursuant of Sec 106 of
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu

Regardless of the attending circumstances, Antonio Agbot was sentence life imprisonment instead of death

The judgment of conviction was affirmed

But the death sentence was hereby reduced to life imprisonment

Taking also into account the length of time he had already been in the death row

Cost de oficio

Analysis: (wow me ganito talaga)

Side of the accused:

No post mortem examination and no ballistic examination conducted on the case, Antonio Agbot would dispute the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction

Post-mortem examination or autopsy, systematic examination of a cadaver for study or for determining the
cause of death

Forensic ballistics entails the examination of bullets and firearms in an attempt to identify particular weapons
used in a crime.

Side of the court:

Lack of instruction cannot appreciate because the evidences were sufficient over the accused to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Natural law provides taking ones life was forbidden.

- Section 1, Article III of the Philippine Constitution: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Terry v. Ohio No. 67 196

Facts: Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing
a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was
convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail.

Question: Was the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion: In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to
focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and
that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a
threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches
undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.

Minnesota v. Dickerson

Facts: On November 9, 1989, while exiting an apartment building with a history of cocaine trafficking, Timothy
Dickerson spotted police officers and turned to walk in the opposite direction. In response, the officers commanded
Dickerson to stop and proceeded to frisk him. An officer discovered a lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket, and, upon
further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it was cocaine. The officer reached into Dickerson's pocket and
confirmed that the lump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Consequently, Dickerson was charged with possession of a
controlled substance. He requested that the cocaine be excluded from evidence, but the trial court denied his request

Article III, section 1(3), of the 1935 Constitution:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized," contains no prohibition of arrest, search, or seizure without a warrant, but
only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
and he was found guilty. Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court's decision.

Question: When a police officer detects contraband through his or her sense of touch during a protective
patdown search, does the Fourth Amendment permit its seizure and subsequent introduction into evidence? Was the
police officer who frisked Dickerson adhering to the Fourth Amendment when he formed the belief, through his sense
of touch, that the lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket was cocaine?

Conclusion

Yes and No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court recalled that a police officer may
seize contraband when it is in plain sight, and "its incriminating character is immediately apparent". It held that
instances in which an officer uses the sense of sight to discover illegal goods are analogous to those involving the
sense of touch. The Court also reasoned that the tactile detection of contraband during a lawful pat-down search does
not constitute any further invasion of privacy, therefore warrantless seizure was permissible. The Court also concluded
that the police officer frisking Dickerson stepped outside the boundaries outlined in Terry v. Ohio which requires a
protective pat-down search to involve only what is necessary for the detection of weapons. In fact the officer was
already aware that Dickerson's jacket pocket did not contain a weapon, when he detected the cocaine through further
tactile investigation.

Florida vs J.L

Facts: On October 13, 1995 Miami-Dade police received an anonymous tip that a black male wearing a plaid shirt was
standing near a bus stop carrying a gun. The two officers who responded found three black males, one of which, J.L., a
15 -year-old, was wearing a plaid shirt. After frisking him, the officers did find a firearm. J.L. was charged with carrying
a concealed weapon without a license. At trial, he moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing that the frisking
performed by the officers was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court granted the motion, but was
reversed by the immediate appellate court. The Florida Supreme Court overruled the appellate court and suppressed
the evidence.

Question: Did searching J.L. solely on the basis of the anonymous tip received by the Miami-Dade police violate
his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure?

Conclusion: Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court concluded that J.L. the
anonymous tip did not meet the minimum requirements to perform a warrantless search. Justice Ginsburg, drawing
from the Court's logic in Terry v. Ohio and Adams v. Williams, indicated that an anonymous tip must posses a moderate
level of reliability, including "predictive information" that offers police a "means to test the informant's knowledge or
credibility." An accurate description of a person without a reliable assertion of illegality or description of the crime in
question, as was the anonymous tip in this case, does not meet this standard. "All the police had to go on in this case
was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor
supplied any basis for believe he had inside information."

Delaware v. Prouse

Facts: A Delaware patrolman stopped William Prouse's car to make a routine check of his driver's license and vehicle
registration. The officer had not observed any traffic violation or suspicious conduct on the part of Prouse. After
stopping the car, the officer uncovered marijuana. The marijuana was later used to indict Prouse.

Question: Did the officer's search of Prouse's automobile constitute an unreasonable search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion: Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the privacy interests of travelers outweighed the state
interests in discretionary spot checks of automobiles. The Court found that random checks made only marginal
contributions to roadway safety and compliance with registration requirements; less intrusive means could have been
used to serve the same ends. Officers must be held to a "probable cause" standard for searches, otherwise individuals
would be subject to "unfettered governmental intrusion" each time they entered an automobile.

Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz

Facts: In 1986, the Michigan State Police Department created a sobriety checkpoint program aimed at reducing drunk
driving within the state. The program included guidelines governing the location of roadblocks and the amount of
publicity to be given to the operation. Before the first roadblock went into effect, Rick Sitz, a licensed Michigan driver,
challenged the checkpoints and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Sitz was victorious in the Michigan lower
courts.

Question: Did the drunk driving checkpoints violate motorists' privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment?

Conclusion : In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the roadblocks did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The
Court noted that "no one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in
eradicating it." The Court then found that "the weight bearing on the other scale--the measure of the intrusion on
motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints--is slight." The Court also found that empirical evidence supported
the effectiveness of the program.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond

Facts: In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs.
At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office
would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints.
They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being
stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the
Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint
program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question: Are highway checkpoint programs, whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal
narcotics, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion: No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because the
checkpoint program's primary purpose was indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the
checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment. "We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-
present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime,"
wrote Justice O'Connor. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented,
arguing that the reasonableness of the city's roadblocks depended on whether they served a "significant state interest
with minimal intrusion on motorists."

Alabama v. White
Facts: An anonymous caller told Montgomery, Alabama police that Vanessa Rose White had cocaine in an attach
case in her car. The caller gave certain specific details about the car and Whites future movements. Following that tip,
police followed Vanessa Rose White as she drove from an apartment complex to Dobys Motel Court, where they pulled
her over. When asked, White gave the officers permission to search her car and an attach case found in the car. Police
found marijuana in the case and arrested White. During processing at the police station, officers also found 3
milligrams of cocaine in Whites purse. After being charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine, White moved to
suppress evidence of the drugs. The trial court denied the motion and White plead guilty. On appeal, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Alabama reversed the motion, finding that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop
and search Whites car. This search violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

Question: Does an anonymous tip alone provide a reasonable suspicion sufficent to stop and search an
individuals car?

Conclusion: Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote for the majority, reversing the lower court. The
Court held that the totality of the circumstances provided a sufficiently reasonable suspicion that White possessed
illegal drugs. Even though police had no way to confirm the credibility of the caller, police verified many allegations
made by the caller about Whites car and movements. Because the police had a reasonable suspicion, the search did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, stating that the majoritys standard allows anyone with enough knowledge of a
persons routine to cause police to search that person. The standard also gives officers too much freedom to claim that
they received an anonymous tip to justify any search. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined
in the Dissent.

Caballes vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 136292, 373 SCRA 221 , January 15, 2002

FACTS: Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in a Barangay in Laguna, spotted a
passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods,
the two police officers flagged down the vehicle.

With appellant's alleged consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of galvanized
conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the
high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the
jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant
was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.

In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. Thus, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by virtue thereof was valid.

RULING: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties
against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III.

The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of such right.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain
exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10
(4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);12 and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances.

In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must
be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when
the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio. SO ORDERED.

People vs. Lacerna (1997)

Subject:

Exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest; Search of luggage inside a vehicle requires existence of
probable cause; Consented search valid if intelligently made; To be punishable, to give away a prohibited drug
should be with the intent to transfer ownership; Elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs; Criminal intent need not
be proved in prosecution of acts mala prohibita ; Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to commit the crime necessary
in prosecution of acts prohibited by special laws

Facts:

Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi when the group of Police Officer Carlito Valenzuela of the Western
Police District signaled the taxi driver to park by the side of the road in lieu of a police checkpoint. P03 Valenzuela
asked permission to search the vehicle. The officers went about searching the luggages in the vehicle. They found 18
blocks wrapped in newspaper with a distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. When the package was opened,
P03 Valenzuela saw dried marijuana leaves. According to Noriel and Marlon, the bag was a padala of their uncle.
Marlon admitted that he was the one who gave the 18 bundle blocks of marijuana to his cousin Noriel as the latter
seated at rear of the taxi with it. He however denied knowledge of the contents of the package.

Marlon was charged before the RTC for giving away marijuana to another. Noriel on the other hand was
acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The court noticed that Noriel manifested probinsyano traits and was, thus,
unlikely to have dealt in prohibited drugs.

Marlon objected on the RTCs decision, stating that the lower court erred in saying that the act of giving away
to another is not defined under R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. He also said that he was not aware of the
contents of the plastic bag given to him by his uncle. Marlon also raised that his right against warrantless arrest and
seizure was violated.

Held:

Exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest

1. Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest have been judicially formulated as follows:

(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest

(2) search of moving vehicles

(3) seizure in plain view,

(4) customs searches,

(5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.

2. Search and seizure relevant to moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a
warrant under said circumstances. In such cases, however, the search and seizure may be made only upon probable
cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or
other vehicle contains an item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. Military or police
checkpoints have also been declared to be not illegal per se as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely visual.

Search of luggage inside a vehicle requires existence of probable cause

3. In this case, the taxi was validly stopped at the police checkpoint. Such search however is limited to visual
inspections without occupants being subjected to a physical or body searches. A search of a luggage inside the vehicle
should require the existence of probable cause.

4. In several decisions, there was probable cause in the following instances:

(a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused

(b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to have been acting suspiciously

(c) where the accused fled when accosted by policemen

(d) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had
earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana

(e) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and
clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy one who participated in the drug smuggling
activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into
the country.

5. Probable cause in this case is not evident. The mere act of slouching in the seat when the taxi passed along P03
Valenzuelas checkpoint does not constitute probable cause to justify search and seizure.

Consented search valid if intelligently made

6. Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC outlawed a search based on an implied acquiescence, because such acquiescence was not
consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty, but was merely passive conformity to the search given
under intimidating and coercive circumstances.

7. In this case, Marlon was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" when he expressly said that he was consenting to
the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. This declaration is a confirmation of his
intelligent and voluntary acquiescence to the search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally through a
valid search and seizure, thus admissible.

To be punishable, to give away a prohibited drug should be with the intent to transfer ownership

8. As distinguished from "delivery," which is an incident of sale, "giving away" is a disposition other than a sale. It is,
therefore, an act short of a sale which involves no consideration. The prohibited drug becomes an item or merchandise
presented as a gift or premium (giveaway), where ownership is transferred.
9. By merely handing the plastic bag to Noriel, Marlon cannot be punished for giving away marijuana as a gift or
premium to another. Intent to transfer ownership should be proven.

Elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs

10. The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows

(a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug

(b) such possession is not authorized by law

(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.

11. Evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that Marlon was in possession of the plastic bag containing the
prohibited drugs without the requisite authority. He cannot deny knowledge of the package as its smell is pervasive.

Criminal intent need not be proved in prosecution of acts mala prohibita

12. Criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala prohibita. The prohibited act is so injurious to
the public welfare that, regardless of the person's intent, it is the crime itself.

Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to commit the crime necessary in prosecution of acts prohibited
by special laws

13. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have
consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of
things, the crime itself, then he can be held liable for the malum prohibitum.

14. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the
prohibited act was intentionally done. Thus in illegal possession of prohibited drugs, the prosecution is thus not
excused from proving that the act was done freely and consciously, which is an essential element of the crime.

15. In this case, Marlon failed to overcome the presumption of his knowledge of the contents of the package. He was
thus held liable for illegal possession of prohibited drugs.

People v. Solayao

Facts: At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of july 9,1992, with the CAFGU members Teofilo Liorad,Jr.and Cecilio
Cenining, he went to barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required
of them by their intelligence officer to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays
of Caibiran.From barangay Caulangon, the team of Police Officer Nino proceeded to barangay Onion where they met
the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became suspicious when they observed that
the latter were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Accused-
appellant not to run away and introduced himself as "PC" after which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a
49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as "latong". When he asked accused-appellant who issued him a license
to carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the same.Thereupon, SPO3 Nino confiscated the firearm and
turned him over to the custody of the policeman of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with
illegal possession of firearm.

Issue: Is Nilo Solayao guilty of illegal possession of firearm?

Held: Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and ordered immediately released
unless there are other legal grounds for his continued detention , with costs de oficio.

PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT

Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp
Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region.

The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.

In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and
announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.

During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a
gun, the officer asked for accuseds passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the
officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag
and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing
tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus
accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the
bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the
stuff toy contained also hashish.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in
the placed sought to be searched.

When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him
a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.

People vs. Roel Encinada G.R. No. 116720. October 2, 1997

FACTS:

Prosecutions version

At 4 p.m. of May 20, 1992, SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia was in his house when he received a tip that Encinada from Surigao
City to Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl bringing marijuana in the morning of May 21, 1992.

Bolonia notified the members of his team. They alleged that because the information came late, there was no more
time to secure a search warrant. At 8:15 a.m. of May 21, the ship finally docked. They saw Encinada walk briskly down
the gangplank, carrying two small colored plastic baby chairs in his hand.

Encinada immediately boarded a tricycle. Bolonia chased it and ordered the driver to stop. Bolinia identified himself,
ordered Encinada to alight, and asked the latter to hand over the plastic chairs. Between the stack of chairs, there was
a bulky package which appeared to be marijuana.

Encinada was brought to the police station. Bolonia, in the presence of one Nonoy Lerio who is a member of the local
media and a friend, opened the package. The package was brought to PNP Crime Laboratory and the forensic chemist,
Vicente Armada, tested the leaves and confirmed it to be marijuana (610 grams).

Defenses version:

Upon disembarking from the ship at around 8:00 am of May 21, he proceeded to the Surigao PPA Gate and boarded a
motorela bound for his residence at Little Tondo. The Motorela was fully loaded with passengers he was the 4th
passenger.

The motorela was soon forcibly stopped by persons who ordered the passengers to disembark, Thereafter, the
passengers and the driver were ordered to stand in a line for a body search. Encinada was singled ordered to board
the service vehicle of the police and was brought to the Police Station.

He underwent a custodial investigation for which a plastic bag was presented to him allegedly containing the subject
marijuana leaves. He denied that the plastic bag was his. Such was witnessed by Mr. Daniel Nonoy Lerio, Jr. a member
of the Surigao City Press.

On May 22, 1992, an information was filed by Prosecutor Virgilio M. Egay charging Roel Encinada of illegal
transportation of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by BP 179.

Upon his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. The defense then filed, with leave of court, a Demurrer to Evidence
questioning the admissibility of the evidence which allegedly was illegally seized. The court a quo denied the motion.

Encinada presented witnesses whose testimony allegedly established the following:

1. Ruben Concha the driver of the motorela testified that he was surprised when the motorela he was driving was
forcibly stopped by the police authorities; that after the search was made, Encinada was singled out, and despite
protest, was ordered to board the Police service vehicle; that the female passenger continued to board the motorela
who directed him to proceed to the residence of Baby Encinada to verify whether Encinada may be related to her.

2. Josephine Nodalo a beautician, and one of the four passengers; that she boarded back the motorela and directed the
driver to proceed to the residence of the Encinadas at Little Tondo to verify Encinadas identity; Mrs. Encinada, is
Nodalos regular customer.
3. Mr. Daniel Nonoy Lerio, Jr. testified that, being a member of the Press, he was requested by the police authorities to
witness the custodial investigation conducted upon the person of the accused, who, during the entire proceedings of
the investigation vehemently denied having any knowledge about the marijuana leaves placed inside the plastic bag;

4. Isabelita Encinada testified that she was informed by her manicurist Nodalo about the arrest of her son, and upon
being informed, she and her husband immediately went to the Surigao PNP Headquarters to verify.

The trial court rejected Encinadas claim that he was merely an innocent passenger and that his package contained
mango and otap samples, not marijuana. Encinada was convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt sentenced to the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

ISSUE:

(1) Was the evidence showing possession of marijuana by Encinada sufficient?

(2) Was the search conducted on the person and belongings of the Encinada valid?

HELD:

Appeal Granted; Encinada was ACQUITTED.

(1) Yes.

Encinada contends that the testimonies of Bolonia and Iligan conflicted as to the number of passengers riding the
motorela and to the place where he sat. But these are peripheral and irrelevant. Such claim was not also supported by
stenographic notes. Encinadas denial of possession of the plastic baby chairs was also easily rebutted by Bolonias
testimony.

Between these two contentions, the choice of the trial court prevails because this is a matter that involves credibility
of witnesses. The opinion of the trial court deserves great respect as it was in a better position to observe the
demeanor and deportment of the witnesses on the stand. Furthermore, proof of ownership of the marijuana is not
necessary in the prosecution of illegal drug cases; it is sufficient that such drug is found in Encinadas possession.

(2) No.

A search and seizure is normally unlawful unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Thus, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a fruit of the poisonous
tree. This principle is covered by this exclusionary rule:

SEC. 3. x x x (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.

This right has exceptions: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain
view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause as the essential requirement.
Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged

Encinada contended before the lower court that the warrantless search of his belongings was illegal. But the trial judge
rejected this and ruled that he was caught in flagrante delicto; thus a warrantless search conducted after his lawful
arrest was valid and that the marijuana was admissible in evidence.

Rule 113, Section 5, provides for warrantless arrest:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

Encinada was not committing a crime in the presence of the policemen. They did not have personal knowledge of
Facts. The search cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Raw intelligence information is not a
sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest. Furthermore, Bolonias testimony shows that the search preceded the arrest:

Q: And after that, what happened next?

A: I requested Roel Encinada to disembark from the motor tricycle because of that information given to us in his
possession.
Q: Possession of what?

A: Possession of marijuana, Sir.

Q: And Roel Encinada alighted from the motor vehicle?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?

A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

Also, evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the Encinada disembarked from the ship or while he rode
the motorela.

As to the justification of the warrantless search, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court. Even if the
information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992, there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of
arrest, as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock until 7:00 a.m. the following day. Administrative Circular No.
13 allows applications for search warrants even after court hours and as well as Circular No. 19, series of 1987, entitled
Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Applications for Search Warrants for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Other
Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple Salas.

As to the prosecutions contention that it was a consented search, the transcript did not voluntarily consent to
Bolonias search of his belongings.

Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two plastic chairs that he carried, what did you
do next?

A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.

Silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and
is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the Encinadas conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient
evidence remaining to convict him.

Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)

Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter
of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere
as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection
of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

Issue: Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and
seizures?

Ruling: [The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is
not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA sparrow units, not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted,
the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner
that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]

Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323,
Gun Ban, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly
weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police
organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued
Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and
transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun Ban,
Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two
firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the
firearms from petitioners house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by
Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and
detained. He then explained the order of petitioner.

Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer
or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and
Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified
from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues
that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the resolution are
not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is
unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when
he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to
him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car

Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a
warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar,
the guns were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and
placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the
car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.

Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could
not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of
setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation.
Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given
the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the
case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search
cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and
therefore, set aside.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO, et al. 420 SCRA 280 (2004)

On the night of April 10, 1995, as about fifteen police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant
to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC gun ban, a motorcycle with three men on board
namely appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped past of the police
officers. When they were ordered to return to the checkpoint, a police officer asked what the backpack contains which
the appellants answered that it was only a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a bomb and when appellant
opened the bag it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The three were then brought to the police station and
later to Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by police officials without the assistance of counsel, following
which they were made to sign some documents which they were not allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court rendered
them guilty for transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited drugs under Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged 1,700 grams of marijuana
violated there constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

HELD:

Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may
only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable
cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the
contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
accused has been declared by the Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee. In light then of Vinecario et al.s speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having
been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the
backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped
away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the
policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part
of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of
some offense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS BAGISTA GR # 86218, September 18, 1992

FACTS: On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office
located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City, received information from one of its regular informants that
a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 52" or 53", would be transporting
marijuana from up north. Acting upon this piece of information, they established a checkpoint and flagged down all
vehicles, both private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana
leaves on board.

After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and body number
428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas
announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were going to search their baggages. At
the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side (as one is facing the driver) of the last
seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and
discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were
confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was
booked and investigated.

ISSUE: 1. WON probable cause is present in the conduct of the warrantless search?

2. WON the warrantless search is valid?

HELD:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a
search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, 15 and the
seizure of evidence in plain view. This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause.

In the case at bar, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at
Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman
having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise
have probable cause to search accused-appellants belongings since she fits the description given by the NARCOM
informant.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

People vs Mariacos GR NO. 188611 June 16 2010

FACTS: October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence
Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that was about to
leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag
with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of
marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the owner of the bag, but no one know.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers. Unfortunately, he did
not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said
bag and 3 other bags were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and
introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but on the women got away.

DOCTRINES:

ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of the People to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)

1.This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

2.This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extension search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in
the vehicle to be searched.

MALUM PROHIBITUM

When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is
immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.

Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are
not exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum prohibitum

PEOPLE V. LAPITAJE 11 NOVEMBER 2003

FACTS: Accused-appellants were found guilty of Robbery with Homicide by the trial court for willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to gain by means of force, threat and intimidation, entering the store of Domingo Colonia and
killing one Nelson Saavedra. Witnesses were presented and and both parties gave their testimonies and alibis.
Accused-appellants were brought into custody without a warrant of arrest. Subsequently, firearms were seized by the
police without a search warrant. It was alleged that those were the weapons used in the perpetration of the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was deprived of due process safeguarded by the Bill of Rights in relation to the
admissbility of evidence.

HELD: The court held that the firearms seized by the police was inadmissble as evidence, being acquired without a
warrant. This mentioned, the trial court erred in convicting the defendants of Robbery with homicide. The
inadmissibility of the firearms as evidence would cause the failure of the prosecution to bind all the accused of the
crime charged. Only those proven beyond reasonable doubt by the testimonies and witnesses were held guilty of the
court.

People vs. Balingan [GR 105834, 13 February 1995]

Facts: On 31 August 1988, the Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio City Police Station received a telephone
call from an unnamed male informant. He passed the information that Jean Balingan y Bobbonan was going to Manila
with a bag filled with marijuana. Acting on the information, then P/Lt. Manuel Obrera formed a surveillance team to
monitor Balingan's movements. The team as deployed at different places in Baguio City, including Balingan's house on
Brookside and bus stations. Cpl. Garcia soon reported seeing Balingan move out from her residence at Brookside and
board a taxicab which proceeded to the direction of Bonifacio Street. Balingan was wearing a pink dress and carrying a
gray luggage with orange or yellow belts. She also reported the make and plate number of the taxicab which Balingan
boarded. Upon receiving the report, Lt. Obrera ordered Cpl. Garcia to proceed to the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in case
Balingan would go there. Pat. Kimay, who must have intercepted Cpl. Garcia's message, also reported that the taxicab
described by the latter passed along Bonifacio Rotunda. Lt. Obrera instructed him to move out and proceed to the
Police Checkpoint at Kennon Road going to the Philippine Military Academy. From his post at the Dangwa Bus Station,
Pat. Bueno informed Lt. Obrera that Balingan boarded a Dangwa Bus with plate number NTU- 153 bound for Manila. Lt.
Obrera promptly proceeded to the bus station to verify the report. There, he went up the bus described by Pat. Bueno,
and he saw Balingan on the third or fourth seat behind the driver's seat. In the luggage carrier above her head was the
gray luggage earlier described by Cpl. Garcia. He then left and positioned himself with Ong at the Lakandula burned
area to wait for the bus to depart. At about 11:00 a.m., the bus moved out (on its way) to Manila via Kennon Road. Lt.
Obrera instructed Pat. Kimay, who was at the Kennon Road Checkpoint, to stop the bus when it reaches the place.
Meanwhile, Lt. Obrera and Lt. Ong tailed the bus at about 15 to 20 meters behind. As instructed, Pat. Kimay stopped
the bus at the Kennon Road Checkpoint. That was already at 11:30 a.m. Lt. Obrera and Pat. Ong arrived at the
Checkpoint less than a minute after the bus did and immediately boarded it. Lt. Obrera announced a routinary check-
up. Pat. Ong identified himself as a policeman to Balingan and asked her permission to check her luggage, she did not
respond and just looked outside the window. He opened the luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and above
Balingan and found suspected marijuana in it. He pulled out the luggage and turned it over to Lt. Obrera. Thereupon,
Lt. Obrera tried to arrest Balingan but the latter resisted and tried to bite his hand and furthermore held tightly onto
the window pane. Lt. Obrera asked Pat. Ong to fetch Cpl. Garcia from the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in the City proper,
so that she would be the one to bring out Balingan from the bus. In the meantime, he remained inside the bus holding
the confiscated luggage while the other passengers alighted from the bus. After some 30 minutes, Garcia arrived and
pulled Balingan out of the bus and brought her to the Baguio City Police Station and there locked her up in jail. On 24
October 1988, Balingan was charged with Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as "The
Dangerous Drugs Act. On 4 April 1989, Balingan was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. After trial, Balingan was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment; to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
Balingan appealed.

Issue: Whether the search conducted in the Dangwa bus, subsequent to police surveillance pursuant to an
informants tip, is valid.

Held: The search and seizure herein happened in a moving, public vehicle. The rules governing search and seizure
have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible
in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought." Unquestionably, the warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable cause. The Baguio INP Narcotics
Intelligence Division received an information that Balingan was going to transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their
surveillance operations revealed that Balingan, whose movements had been previously monitored by the Narcotics
Division, boarded a Dangwa bus bound for Manila carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag. When the moving,
public bus was stopped, her bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana. Under those circumstances, the warrantless
search of Balingan's bag was not illegal.

Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals [GR 125959, 1 February 1999]

Facts: On 6 December 1993, in compliance with the order of the Malabon Municipal Mayor to intensify campaign
against illegal drugs particularly at Barangay Taong, the Chief of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit ordered his
men to conduct patrol on the area with specific instruction to look for a certain vehicle with a certain plate number and
watch out for a certain drug pusher named Vic Vargas. Pursuant thereto, SPO1 Advincula, PO3 Parcon, PO3 Pilapil and a
police aide were dispatched at around 11:45 p.m.. The team proceeded to Barangay Taong where they were joined by
their confidential informant and the latter informed them that a gray Nissan car is always parked therein for the
purpose of selling shabu. While patrolling along Leoo Street, the confidential informant pointed the gray Nissan car to
the policemen and told them that the occupant thereof has shabu in his possession. The policemen immediately
flagged down the said car along First Street and approached the driver, who turned out to be Jose Maria Asuncion y
Marfori, a movie actor using the screen name Vic Vargas and who is also known as Binggoy. Advincula then asked
Asuncion if they can inspect the vehicle. As Asuncion acceded thereto, Advincula conducted a search on the vehicle
and he found a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride beneath
the driver's seat. Asuncion told the policemen that he just borrowed the said car and he is not the owner thereof.
Asuncion was thereafter taken at the police headquarters for the purpose of taking his identification. However, when
he was frisked by Advincula at the headquarters, the latter groped something protruding from his underwear, which
when voluntarily taken out by the accused turned out to be a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to
be methamphetamine hydrochloride. A press conference was conducted the following day presided by Northern Police
District Director Pureza during which Asuncion admitted that the methamphetamine hydrochloride were for his
personal use in his shooting. On the other hand, Asuncion denied the charges against him. He claimed that on that
day, "between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., he was abducted at gun point in front of the house where his son lives by men who
turned out to be members of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; that he was told to board at the back seat by the
policemen who took over the wheels; that he acceded to be brought at the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon for drug
test but only his blood pressure was checked in the said hospital; that he was thereafter brought at the Office of the
Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; and that he is not aware of what happened at 11:45 p.m. as he was then sleeping
at the said office." On 14 June 1994, a decision was rendered by the trial court finding Asuncion guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, adn sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 1 year 8 months
and 20 days as minimum, to 3 years 6 months and 20 days, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,000.00. On 29 June
1994, a Notice of Appeal was filed and the records of the case were transmitted by the trial court to the Court of
Appeals. On 30 April 1996 a decision was rendered by the appellate court, modifying the penalty imposed (reducing
the sentence to 6 months of arresto mayor in its maximum period as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional in its medium period as maximum and deleting the fine of P3,000.00 imposed on Asuncion). On 6 August
1996, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Asuncion. Asuncion filed a petition for review
on certiorari Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the search upon Asuncions vehicle is valid.

Held: Well-entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by competent judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental law of the land
ordains it. However, the rule that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. The search
of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of
probable cause. The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the fact that the search in question
was made as regards a moving vehicle Asuncion's vehicle was "flagged down" by the apprehending officers upon
identification. Therefore, the police authorities were justified in searching Asuncion's automobile without a warrant
since the situation demanded immediate action. The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to
search the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless
search and Asuncion himself freely gave his consent to said search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were
admissible in evidence.

Roldan vs. Arca [GR L-25434, 25 July 1975]

Facts: On 3 April 1964, Morabe, De Guzman & Company filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a civil
case (56701) against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which
had been seized and impounded by the Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. On 10 April 1964, the
company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with the CFI, but said prayer was denied. On 28 April
1964, the CFI set aside its order of 10 April 1964 and granted the company's motion for reconsideration praying for
preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, the company took possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from the Philippine
Fisheries Commission adn the Philippine Navy by virtue of the said writ. On 10 December 1964, the CFI dismissed Civil
Case 56701 for failure of the company to prosecute as well as for failure of the Commission and the Navy to appear on
the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie however, remained in the possession of the
company.

On 20 July 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony
Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries
Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually
seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the
two vessels.

On 18 August 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges against
the crew members of the fishing vessels. On 30 September 1965, there were filed in the CFI of Palawan a couple of
informations, one against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the crew members of Tony Lex VI
both for violations of Act 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for illegal fishing with the
use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and
therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels. On October 2 and 4,
likewise, the CFI of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody. On 2 October 1965, the company
filed a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case 62799) with the CFI of Manila
against the Commission and the Navy.

Among others, it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in
legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated 13 September
1965 by the company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery
Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled. On 18 October 1965, Judge Francisco Arca issued an
order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the
filing by the company of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels.

On 19 October 1965, the Commission and the Navy filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the
preliminary writ on 18 October 1965 on the ground, among others, that on 18 October 1965 the Philippine Navy
received from the Palawan CFI two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 requiring the Philippine Navy to hold the fishing
boats in custody and directing that the said vessels should not be released until further orders from the Court, and that
the bond of P5,000.00 is grossly insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case the two vessels, which are worth
P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach of the Government, thus frustrating their forfeiture as instruments of the
crime. On 23 November 1965, Judge Arca denied the said motion for reconsideration. The Commission and the Navy
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain Judge Arca from enforcing his order
dated 18 October 1965, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction thereunder issued.

Issue: Whether the Fisheries Commissioner and the Navy can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the vessels of
the company for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses.

Held: Section 4 of Republic Act 3512 approved on 20 March 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to carry out
the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, to make
searches and seizures personally or through his duly authorized representatives in accordance with the Rules of Court,
of "explosives such as dynamites and the like; including fishery products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things
that are subject to seizure under existing fishery laws"; and "to effectively implement the enforcement of existing
fishery laws on illegal fishing." Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to and
vested in the Philippine Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and duties heretofore exercised by the Bureau
of Customs, Philippine Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters." Section 12 of the
Fisheries Act, otherwise known as Republic Act 4003, as amended, prohibits fishing with dynamites or other explosives
which is penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor more than P5,000.00, and by
imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, aside from the
confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats, tackles, apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in fishing in
violation of said Section 12 of this Act." Section 78 of the same Fisheries Law provides that "in case of a second
offense, the vessel, together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government." The
second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the possession and/or finding, of dynamite, blasting caps and other
explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption that the said dynamite and/or blasting caps and
explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section, and that the possession or discover in any
fishing boat or fish caught or killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives, under expert testimony, shall constitute
a presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing boat, or the fishing crew have been fishing with dynamite or
other explosives."

Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended, any person, association or corporation fishing in deep sea fishery
without the corresponding license prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other order or
regulation deriving force from its provisions, "shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not more than P5,000.00,
or imprisonment, for not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided, That in case of an
association or corporation, the President or manager shall be directly responsible for the acts of his employees or
laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with his knowledge; otherwise the responsibility shall extend only as far as
fine is concerned: Provided, further, That in the absence of a known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or person
in charge of such vessel shall be responsible for any violation of this Act: and Provided, further, That in case of a
second offense, the vessel together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government."
Under Section 13 of Executive Order 389 of 23 December 1950, reorganizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Philippine Navy has the function, among others, "to assist the proper governmental agencies in the enforcement of
laws and regulations pertaining to Fishing. Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD 34 of 27
October 1972, authorized any official or person exercising police authority under the provisions of the Code, to search
and seize any vessel or air craft as well as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to search any person on
board for any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws.

Herein, when the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965
the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these
vessels were found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and Customs Code and
therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code, and illegally fishing with explosives and without
fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law. Search and seizure without search warrant of
vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a
search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to
seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws: They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable
them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.

PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, 193 SCRA 122

FACTS: In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip from one of its informers about an
organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband items. To infiltrate the crime
syndicate, they recruited confidential men and deep penetration agents under OPLAN SHARON 887. One such agent
was Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). As an agent, he submitted regular reports of undercover activities of
suspected syndicates. CAPTAIN PALMERA, head of oplan sharon 887, in turned informed the Dangerous Drugs Board of
Tias activities.

Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another agent named George. Lim wanted a male travelling
companion for his business trips abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired by Lim. Later, Tia was introduced to
Peter Lo (alias of accused/appellant Lo Ho Wing), the later turning out to be Tias intended companion.

Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October 4, 1987. Tia telephoned Capt. Palmera that they would
return to the Philippines on October 6. From Hongkong, the two proceeded to Guangzhou in mainland China. There,
appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought six (6) cans of tea.Tia saw these 6 bags when they were opened for examination. That
evening, they went to Lo Ho Wings room and he saw two other men with him. One was fixing the tea bags, while the
other was burning a substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a lighter. Appellant Lo Ho Wing joined the second man
and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing what cargo they would bring to
Manila, the latter replied that they would be bringing Chinese drugs.
The next day en route to Manila, customs examiners inspected the bags containing the tin cans of tea. Since the bags
were not closely examined, appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In Manila, They were met by Lim Cheng Huat.
Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia boarded a taxi from the airport and loaded their luggage in the taxis compartment. Lim
Cheng Huat followed them in another taxi.

Meamwhile, a team composed by Capt. Palmera positioned themselves in strategic areas around the airport. The CIS
men who first saw Lo Ho and Tia followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the CIS car overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho
Wing and Tia , forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. The CIS team asked the taxi driver to open the baggage
compartment. The CIS team asked permission to search their luggage.

A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab of the CIS pried the lid open and pressed it in the
middle to pull out the contents. Crystalline white powder resmbling crushed alum came out. Suspecting the crystalline
powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three travelling bags opened for inspection. All the bags threshed out a
total of six tin cans. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS headquarters for questioning. Meanwhile, the second taxi
carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to escape. However, they were later captured.

Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The three suspects were indicted for violating Art. III,
sec.15 of the Dangerous Drug Act. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat were sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000 each. Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness. The trial court gave
full credence to the testimonies of government agents since the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties were in their favor.

ISSUES:

1. Was the warrantless search valid?

2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?

HELD:

1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the well-known exceptions to the valid warrantless
search and seizure. To stilol get a search warrant from a judge would allow the accused go scot-free.

2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained is admissible as evidence in any proceeding.

People vs. Cubcubin [GR 136267, 10 July 2001]

Facts: At about 3:30 a.m. of 26 August 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police station, received a
telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City.
For this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3
Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the
road.

Police photographer Fred Agana took pictures of the crime scene showing the victim slumped on the handle of the
tricycle. PO3 Rosal testified that a tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him that Fidel Abrenica
Cubcubin Jr. and the victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the gate
of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Forthwith, PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. went to the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano, a food server/waitress in Sting Cafe. Garcellano described
Cubcubin as a lean, dark-complexioned, and mustachioed man who had on a white t-shirt and brown short pants.
Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that Garcellano's description fitted a
person known as alias "Jun Dulce."

Armando Plata, who knew where Cubcubin lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to Cubucubin's
house in Garcia Extension, Cavite City. The policemen knocked on the door for about 3 minutes before it was opened
by a man who answered the description given by Danet Garcellano and who turned out to be Cubcubin. The police
operatives identified themselves and informed him that he was being sought in connection with the shooting near the
cemetery. Cubcubin denied involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked permission to
enter and look around the house. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt,
bearing the brand name "Hanes" and the name "Dhenvher" written in the inner portion of the shirt's hemline, placed
over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close examination, he said that he found it to be "bloodied." When he picked up
the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin while he conducted a search. They
then took the t-shirt and the two bullet shells. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked Cubcubin to go with them to Sting Cafe for
purposes of identification. There, Cubcubin was positively identified by Danet Garcellano as the victim's companion.
The police investigators asked Cubcubin where the fatal gun was. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said Cubcubin refused to tell him
where he hid the gun so he sought the latter's permission to go back to his house to conduct a further search.

Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., accompanied by Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and PO3 Rosal,
proceeded thereto. Inside the house, they saw Cubcubin's 11- year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on top of a
plastic water container (drum) outside the bathroom a homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver (six shooter),
without a serial number. He found the gun loaded with five live bullets. PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that he inscribed his initials
"RDE" (for Raymundo D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of a sharp object. While PO3 Estoy, Jr. was
conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin in the sala. The .38 caliber gun, the
white "Hanes" t-shirt, and the two spent .38 caliber shells were all photographed. Cubcubin was then taken to the
police station, where he was photographed along with the things seized from him. Cubcubin was charged for the crime
of murder.

On 5 October 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, found Cubcubin guilty of murder and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether there was "probable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that
Cubcubin committed the crime, to allow them to conduct the latter's warrantless arrest.

Held: Rule 113, 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that "A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another."

Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just committed an
offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that "personal knowledge of facts' in arrests without a
warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."

Herein, the arrest of Cubcubin was effected shortly after the victim was killed. There was no "probable cause, however,
for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that Cubcubin committed the crime. The two did
not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that Cubcubin had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the
circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that Cubcubin was probably guilty was based entirely on what they
had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 a.m.
of 26 August 1997 and reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an alleged
witness who saw Cubcubin and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting
Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a
white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical
description given by Garcellano fitted Cubcubin, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew where Cubcubin lived and
accompanied them to Cubcubin's house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to
them by others.

Be that as it may, Cubcubin cannot now question the validity of his arrest without a warrant. The records show that he
pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned on 11 November 1997. Cubcubin did not object to the arraignment,
and thus has waived the right to object to the legality of his arrest. On the other hand, the search of Cubcubin's house
was illegal and, consequently, the things obtained as a result of the illegal search, i.e., the white "Hanes" t-shirt, two
spent shells, and the .38 caliber gun, are inadmissible in evidence against him. It cannot be said that the .38 caliber
gun was discovered through inadvertence.

After bringing Cubcubin to the Sting Cafe where he was positively identified by a waitress named Danet Garcellano as
the victim's companion, the arresting officers allegedly asked Cubcubin where he hid the gun used in killing the victim.
According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr., when Cubcubin refused to answer, he sought Cubcubin's permission to go back to his
house and there found the .38 caliber revolver on top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom.

Thus, the gun was purposely sought by the police officers and they did not merely stumble upon it. Nor were the police
officers justified in seizing the white "Hanes" t-shirt placed on top of the divider "in plain view" as such is not
contraband nor is it incriminating in nature which would lead SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to conclude that it would constitute
evidence of a crime. Contrary to what SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said, the t-shirt was not "bloodied" which could have directed
his attention to take a closer look at it. From the photograph of the t-shirt, it is not visible that there were bloodstains.
The actual t-shirt merely had some small specks of blood at its lower portion. Furthermore, there is no evidence to link
Cubcubin directly to the crime.

Arizona v. Hicks

Facts: A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. To
investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking
mask. During the search, which was done without a warrant, an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment
which he suspected had been stolen. The officer moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and
seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct.

Question: Was the search of the stereo equipment (a search beyond the exigencies of the original entry)
reasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?

No. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view"
doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.
However, critical to this doctrine, argued Scalia, is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special
operational necessities" be done with probable cause. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a
"reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the equipment was stolen, the officer's actions were
not reconcilable with the Constitution.

PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]

Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville,
Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on
Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one
newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As
Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position,
Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted
more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two
newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to
the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the
living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego
went to the kitchen and found a cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked
Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa
was then placed under arrest.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible
as evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless
search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating
nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the object.

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. They arrested the accused in the living room
and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the
marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said object.

Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence
pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.

People vs. Doria [GR 125299, 22 January 1999]

Facts: In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics
Command (Narcom), received information from 2 civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug
activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As
arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on 5 December 1995 at
E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.

On 5 December 1995, at 6:00 a.m., the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare
for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader
and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated
PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security.
Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to
cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 a one thousand peso bill and six (6)
one hundred peso bills as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then
P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter. The
team rode in two cars and headed for the target area. At 7:20 a.m., "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3
Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana.

PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the
corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. An hour later, "Jun"
appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from
his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1
Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun"
revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth." "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's"
house nearby at Daang Bakal. The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and at woman inside. "Jun" identified
the woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over
"Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of
the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered
"Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills
from "Neneth."

The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked
bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is
Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The 1 brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered
from "Jun" plus the 10 bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. The bricks
were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. On 7 December 1995,
Doria and Gadda were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted Dorria and Gaddao. The trial court found the
existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each.
Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether the warrantless arrests of Doria and Gaddao are legally permissible.

Held: It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons
violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the
inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. Where
the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the
offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had. Where, however, the
criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person
acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense,
or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute
him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted. The law tolerates the use of decoys and other
artifices to catch a criminal.

The warrantless arrest of Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: "A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. xxx"
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."

Herein, Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as
a result of a buy- bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant. The warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of
marijuana and marked bills, however, are different matters. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a
judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant
Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest
under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was
no occasion at all for Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going
about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. Neither could the arrest of Gaddao be justified under the
second instance of Rule 113.

"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable
cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of
the alleged identification made by her co- accused, Doria. Save for Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable
grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the
warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a
criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows that
the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed
legal as an incident to her arrest.

People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Bolasa

Facts: An informer told the police that an illegal transaction of prohibited drugs were being conducted at a certain
house in Sta. Brigida St. Karuhatan Valenzuela Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando
Arenas immediately proceed to the said house. Upon reaching the house, they peeped through a small window and
saw a man and woman repacking suspected marijuana. They enter the house and introduce themselves as police
officers and confiscated the tea bag and other drug paraphernalia.Afterwhich, the police officers arrested the
two,Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los Reyes. Upon examination by the NBI, the tea bags were confirmed as
marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los Reyes were charged with violation of Sec.8 of Article II of Republic Act
6425 otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The RTC convicted them of the crime charged.

Accused Bolasa asserts that the search and her arrest was illegal. She insists that the trial court should not
regard the testimony of PO3 cCarizon credible because he does not have personal knowledge regarding the conduct of
the arrest and search making his testimony a hearsay.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest and seizure were valid

Ruling:No. The Supreme Court held that the arrest was invalid because the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-apellants had just committed, were committing or about to commit
a crime. The arresting officers also have no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor have a reasonable
ground to believe that the accused committed the crime. And accused appellants were not prisoners who have
escaped from a penal establishment.

With respect to the seizure of the tea bags,the court held that it is also invalid because the objects were not
seized in plain view. There was no valid intrusion and the evidence was not inadvertently discovered. The police
officers intentionally peeped through the window to ascertain the activities of appellants inside the room. In like
manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless arrest, a customs
search, or a stop and frisk situations.

The court stated that the arresting officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the
identities and addressed of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and
determining the existence of probable cause, they should have secured a warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and
seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was also illegal. Every evidence thus obtained
during the illegal search cannot be used against the accused-appellants.
 The Court held that the State cannot in a cavalier fashioni ntrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into
their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself
against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.

The Court held that the State cannot in a cavalier fashioni ntrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their
houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself
against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint

The Court enumerated the exceptions as follows:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in plain view.The elements of the plain view doctrine are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the policeare legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police who havethe right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable causethat the occupant committed a criminal activity

4. Consented warrantless search

5. Customs search

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

Citing the Rules of Criminal Procedure on lawful warrantless arrest, the Court stated that an arrest is lawful even in
theabsence of a warrant

:(a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his
presence;(

b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested
hascommitted it; and,

(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement toanother. (A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense

People v. Evaristo, G.R. No. 93828, 216 SCRA 431, December 11, 1992

"Heard gunshots therefore an offense is being committed"

Waiver of right is the consent given in entering the house, resulting to seizure of evidence in plain view.

Facts: The peace officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and they proceeded to investigate the matter. This
incident is considered an offense and "an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within
the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF."

While on routine patrol duty, the Philippine Constabulary officer patrolling heard gunfire within the vicinity. When they
came upon the source, Rosillo was firing a gun into the air.

Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon
approaching the house, the patrol saw appellants, Evaristo and Carillo, who were drunk. Inquiring as to the
whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol were told that he had already escaped.

Vallarta noticed a bulge on Carillos waist and subsequently frisked him revealing .38 caliber revolver. After
ascertaining that Carillo was neither a member of the military nor had a valid license to possess the said firearm, the
gun was confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.

Romeroso sought the consent of Evaristo for entry into the latters house to search for Rosillo and Evaristo consented.

Upon entry they found various firearms, paraphernalia, and other effects, which became the basis for the charge of
illegal possession of firearms.

For their part, the appellants alleged that they were forcibly taken into custody. They denied ownership or knowledge
of any of the firearms, contending that these were planted in their possession by the prosecution witnesses and other
police authorities.

Issue: Whether the firearms are considered illegally seized evidence? NO.

Held: The Court ruled that doctrine of seizure of evidence in plain view, objects inadvertently falling in the plain view
of an officer, who has a the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced
as evidence.

In this case, Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The officer's purpose was
to catch Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge inside. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not
Romerosa's purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his discovery of the firearms as accidental. The plain
view doctrine will apply to the seizure of the firearms and effects because their discovery was unintentional.

The Court sustains the validly of the firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized
warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Valid warrantless arrests

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

In this case, the second circumstance an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it is applicable. The peace officers, while on patrol,
heard bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate the matter. This incident is considered an offense and "an
offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES
CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF."

As for the existence of personal knowledge, the gunfire, the bulge in Carillos waist, and the peace officers
professional instinct are more than sufficient to grant him personal knowledge of the facts of the crime that has just
been committed. Consequently, the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to have been seized incidental to a lawful
and valid arrest.

People vs. Salanguit 356 SCRA 683

FACTS: A search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the police operatives started searching the house.
They found heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also
containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of
the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko
for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-
95-64358, respectively) were filed, and after hearing, the trial court convicted him in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and
Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively.

The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him was inadmissible because the warrant used in
obtaining it was invalid.

ISSUES: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the plain view doctrine.

HELD: Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence
was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that
there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by
the police.

The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void
only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to
the seizure of shabu from Salanguits residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded
on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the plain
view doctrine, the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguits person or in an
area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu
had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court
affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.

** State v. von Bulow (di ko rin to Makita kaya orig case na lang andito)

The defendant, Claus von Bulow (von Bulow), stands convicted by a Superior Court jury, which returned its verdict
after listening to evidence relating to a two-count indictment, each count of which charged von Bulow with assaulting
his wife with an intent to murder her. Later, on April 2, 1982, von Bulow's motion for a new trial on both counts was
denied. During this period he was allowed to remain free on the $50,000 surety bail posted for each count at the time
he was arraigned. When von Bulow returned to the Superior Court on May 7, 1982, he received a ten-year sentence on
the first count and a consecutive twenty-year sentence on the second count. At that time the trial justice rejected the
state's request that von Bulow be held without bail pending his appeal. The trial justice set bail at $1 million and
allowed von Bulow to execute a personal recognizance but conditioned the grant upon von Bulow's satisfying "the
Attorney General and/or the Superior Court that he is the owner and is presently in possession of $1,000,000.00 (One
Million Dollars) worth of assets" and agreeing "not to divest himself of any of these assets, without the express
approval of the Attorney General and the Superior Court."

Two weeks later, on May 21, 1982, von Bulow, his counsel, and counsel for the state were once again before the trial
justice. At that time the trial justice reiterated his willingness to place von Bulow on bail. He noted the receipt of von
Bulow's confidential statement of assets. The trial justice also observed that he had permitted von Bulow to post
$100,000 as part of the $1 million requirement but again stressed the need of documentation by von Bulow regarding
his ownership of an additional $900,000 in assets. In continuing the bail proceeding to June 7, the trial justice
remarked, "[I]f on the 7th the State is satisfied, then no further proceeding will be necessary."

When the hearing reconvened on June 7, the trial justice alluded to his previous reluctance *382 to accept $100,000
cash bail as sufficient surety. He also referred to certain inventories that had been submitted to the Attorney General's
department as having an alleged value in excess of $2 million. Some of the property listed was located in New York,
and other articles were situated in a Newport estate once occupied by von Bulow and his wife. Much of the Rhode
Island property, the trial justice said, was "brought to the marriage and * * * enjoyed by the victim and this defendant
throughout their married life." After expressing the belief that von Bulow and his attorneys had attempted in good faith
to comply with the terms of the recognizance, the trial justice found that the ownership issue was still unresolved. He
obviously thought that the point of no return had been reached; and since von Bulow's "right to remain on the street"
was keyed to proof of ownership, the trial justice ordered the sheriff to take von Bulow into his custody for his ultimate
delivery to the Adult Correctional Institutions. However, von Bulow's counsel was given until 2 p.m. to seek a stay in
this court.

The stay was granted, and on June 29, 1982, this court heard arguments relative to the trial justice's actions. The
review was sought pursuant to our Rule 9.

In faulting the trial justice's action, von Bulow's counsel argue that the trial justice, by accepting the $100,000,
representing 10 percent of the scheduled bail, was then foreclosed from insisting on proof of the ownership of another
$900,000 in assets. In taking this position, counsel rely upon G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) 12-13-10, which, in its
pertinent portion, allows any person who is "entitled to be released on bail" and who "is held in custody or committed
on a criminal charge" to be released on personal recognizance rather than on surety bail by depositing, in cash with
the court before which he or she is obligated to appear, 10 percent of the bail that he or she has been ordered to
furnish. The 10-percent factor came about as a result of action taken by the General Assembly at its January 1972
session. Public Laws 1972, ch. 267, 1. However, 12-13-10 has been part of the statutory framework concerning the
posting of bail since 1915. An examination of chapter 13 of title 12 and its statutory predecessors makes it quite clear
that the type of bail referred to in 12-13-10 is pretrial rather than postconviction bail.

We would also emphasize that von Bulow cannot be considered as a person who comes within the statutory
classification of one who is "entitled to be released on bail" because in Quattrocchi v. Langlois, 100 R.I. 741, 219 A.2d
570 (1966), this court pointed out that the constitutional guarantee of the right to bail found in art. I, sec. 9, of our
State Constitution is applicable only to pretrial bail and is of no assistance to a convicted felon who seeks to have bail
set pending appellate review of his conviction. Additionally, the Federal Constitution does not guarantee a right to bail,
but it does bar the imposition of excessive bail. Morris v. D'Amario, R.I. , 416 A.2d 137 (1980). Postconviction bail is not
a matter of entitlement but is an issue that is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

At oral argument the state, through its assistant attorney general, told us that von Bulow had never convinced the
Department of the Attorney General that he in fact was the owner of the property that he claimed was his. As noted
earlier, the trial justice was of the mind that if von Bulow convinced the department, the bail issue would be resolved.
However, the discretion that is involved in a postconviction-bail controversy is that of a Superior Court justice rather
than that of the prosecutor.

An adequate review of what occurred in the postconviction facet of this controversy is well nigh impossible because
much of what was relied on by the trial justice apparently came to him by way of "confidential information," in-
chambers meetings, or the prosecutor's protestations that he was not convinced of the validity of von Bulow's
ownership claims. There is nothing in this record that would indicate what happened when the representatives of the
Attorney General attempted to determine the legitimacy *383 of von Bulow's alleged ownership of assets that were set
forth on what still is an undisclosed list.

In light of the present state of the record, a remand is necessary. In remanding the bail controversy to the Superior
Court, it is vital that questions concerning ownership and assets be thrashed out in open court where a record can be
established. As will be seen, the remand hearing should be held by someone other than the trial justice.

At the June 7, 1982 hearing, the trial justice announced that earlier he had informed counsel that he had "little respect
for the defendant." This attitude apparently was motivated by information furnished to the trial justice after trial but
before imposition of sentence in a presentence report prepared by the Probation Department. In our opinion, such
negative sentiments are sufficient cause for us to direct the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court to designate a
different trial justice to preside at the remand hearing.

In conclusion, we would emphasize that the single issue on remand is whether von Bulow satisfies the factfinder that
he does indeed own $900,000 worth of either tangible or intangible assets and that proper steps can be taken so that
the assets will be preserved during the pendency of the appeal.

The case is remanded to the Superior Court for a further hearing that shall be held forthwith and in compliance with
the dictates of this opinion. Jurisdiction for appellate purposes is retained by this court.

People v. De Gracia (1994)

Doctrine:

Where the military operatives had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was being committed, and had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts, the same constituted an exception to the
prohibition against warrantless searches.
Facts:

1. Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged coup dtat in December 1989
against the Government.

2. Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team, conducted a surveillance of the
Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC on early morning of December 1, 1989, which surveillance actually started November
30, 1989 at around 10:00 PM. Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report that the said
establishment was being occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication command post.

3. Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo when a group
of 5 men disengaged themselves and walked towards their surveillance car. Maj. Soria ordered the driver to start the
car and leave the area. However, as they passed the area, then 5 men drew their guns and fired at them, which
resulted to the wounding of the driver. Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for they were afraid that civilians
might be caught in the crossfire.

4. Thereafter, on the morning of December 5, 1989, a search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6
cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and molotov.

5. Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia in the office of a certain Col. Matillano, holding a C-4
and suspiciously peeping though door.

6. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous
firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.

Issue: Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

Held: YES, there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

It is admitted that the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant at that time. It was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a
surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the
Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door
despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office.

The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence
of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained.

In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the
vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the
surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.

Under circumstances, SC considered that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a
warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient
probable cause to warrant their action.

Furthermore, in the prevailing situation, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant
from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court
was closed.

Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

Brigham City v. Stuart

Facts: Responding to a complaint about a loud party, police arrived at a house where they saw minors drinking
alcohol outside and heard shouting inside. As they approached the house, they saw a fight through the window
involving a juvenile and four adults, one of whom was punched hard enough to make him spit blood. The officers
announced their presence, but the people fighting did not hear them so they entered the home. They arrested the men
for contributing to the delinquency of a minor and other related offenses.

The trial court judge, however, refused to allow the evidence collected after the police entered the home because it
was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the government argued that the search
was covered by the "emergency aid doctrine" because the officers were responding to seeing the man be punched.
The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed, however, ruling that the doctrine only applies when there is an unconscious,
semiconscious, or missing person who is feared injured or dead. The Court also gave weight to the fact that the
officers acted exclusively in a law enforcement capacity, not to assist the injured man.

Question What objectively reasonable level of concern is necessary to trigger the emergency aid exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement?

Conclusion In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that police may enter a building without a warrant
when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an occupant is "seriously injured or threatened with
such injury." Quoting from Mincey v. Arizona, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that "[t]he need to protect or preserve
life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency."

Nardone v. United States (Fruit of the Poisonous Tree)

Facts:

1. In Nardone et al. v. United States (1937), Frank C. Nardone and others were tried, convicted & sentenced, in
separate counts, the smuggling of alcohol, possession and concealment of the smuggled alcohol, and
conspiracy to smuggle and conceal it. During the trial, despite PETs objections, federal agents testified to the
substance of petitioners' interstate communications overheard by the witnesses who had intercepted the
messages while tapping telephone wires. The trial court admitted the evidence. The US Supreme Court, in
reversing the trial court and remanding the case to the District Court (for further proceedings) construed
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act as including federal agents when it provided that no person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. Hence the
testimony of the federal agents on the intercepted messages of PETs were procured in violation of the said
provision/law.

2. In the present case, there was a new trial and in such trial, the trial judge refused to allow the accused to
examine the prosecution as to the uses to which it had put the information which Nardone v. United States
(1937) found to have vitiated the original conviction. The trial court ended up convicting PETs. Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction. Hence PETs appeal to the US Supreme Court.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not 605 merely interdicts the introduction into evidence in a federal trial of intercepted telephone
conversations, leaving the prosecution free to make every other use of the proscribed evidence? Phrased
differently, Whether or not, derivative use of (previously held) inadmissible evidence is allowed? -> NO.

Held+Rationale:

1. No. In a prosecution in a federal court, evidence procured by tapping wires in violation of the
Communications Act of 1934 is inadmissible. This applies not only to the intercepted
conversations themselves, but also, by implication, to evidence procured through the use of
knowledge gained from such conversations.

a. The result of the holding by the trial court is to reduce the scope of 605 to exclusion of the exact
words heard through forbidden interceptions, allowing these interceptions every derivative use that
they may serve. Such a reading of 605 would largely stultify the policy which compelled the
SCs decision in Nardone v. United States (1937).

b. To forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized, but to put no curb on their full indirect use,
would only invite the very methods deemed "inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of
personal liberty."

c. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States: The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court,
but that it shall not be used at all. AND the facts improperly obtained do not become sacred and
inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source, they may be proved like any
others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it simply
because it is used derivatively.

d. The US SC in this case cites a sensible way in which to deal with a situation in such a way that it would
be fair to the intent of the law and to the purposes of criminal law:

i. In the first instance, it is the burden of the accused to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that
wiretapping was unlawfully employed.

ii. Once that is established the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the
accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous
tree.

iii. The government then has the opportunity to convince the trial court that their proof has an
independent origin.

Dispositive: The judgment must be reversed and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity
with this opinion.

Note: This is the case where the US Supreme Court first used the term fruit of the poisonous tree.

Wong Sun v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. The constitutionality of various statements made by suspected drug dealers was at Issue.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. [V]erbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an
unauthorized arrest as the officers action in the present case is no less the fruit of official illegality than the more
common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.

Facts. Hom Way (Way) was found with heroin in his possession after being under surveillance by federal narcotics
officer for six weeks. Way told the officer that he bought heroin from someone named Blackie Toy. After obtaining this
information, six or seven federal agents went to the location where Way said he purchased the heroin. It was a
Laundromat operated by James Wah Toy (Toy). There is nothing in the record that says Toy and Blackie Toy are the
same person. One agent went to the front door and announced that he was a federal narcotics agent. When that
occurred, Toy slammed the door and began running toward his living quarters in the back of the Laundromat. The
agent who approached the door and other agents followed Toy into the bedroom. Toy reached into a nightstand drawer
and was arrested. There was nothing in the drawer and there were no narcotics found on the premises. The officers
informed Toy that Way said he purchased narcotics from him. Toy said that he never sold drugs, but knew someone
named Johnny who did. Toy described the house Johnny lived in to the officers.

The agents went the house Toy described and found Johnny Yee (Yee) in the bedroom. After speaking to the agents,
Yee gave them several tubes containing heroin. Within an hour, Yee and Toy were taken to the Office of the Bureau of
narcotics. While at the office, Yee said that Toy and another individual, Sea Dog brought the heroin to him a few days
before. Sea Dog was Wong Sun. The agents took Toy to Wong Suns avenue and Toy showed them where Wong Sun
lived. The agents arrested Wong Sun in his apartment. A search of the apartment did not turn up any narcotics.

Toy and Yee were arraigned and released. Wong Sun was arraigned the next day and also released. A few days later,
all three individuals were interrogated by another Narcotics agent. The agent advised the individuals of their right to
withhold information and right an attorney. The three individuals were interrogated individually. A statement was then
prepared for each individual. Toy refused to sign his statement and wanted to know if the others had signed. Wong Sun
also did not sign the statement, but admitted the accuracy of the statement.

The Governments evidence tending to prove the petitioners possession (the petitioners offered no exculpatory
testimony) consisted of four items which the trial court admitted over timely objections that they were inadmissible as
fruits of unlawful arrests or of attendant searches: (1) the statements made orally by petitioner Toy in his bedroom at
the time of his arrest; (2) the heroin surrendered to the agents by [ ] Yee; (3) petitioner Toys pretrial unsigned
statement; and (4) petitioner Wong Suns similar statement.

The Court of Appeals held that the arrests were illegal because they were not based on probable cause within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment or reasonable grounds within the meaning of the Narcotic Control Act of 1956.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the four items of proof were not the fruits of the illegal arrests and that
they were therefore properly admitted in evidence.

Issue. [W]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint[?]

Held. The majority began by pointing out the differences in Toy and Wong Suns cases and how they had to discuss
each individually.

The majority observed, [t]he exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained
either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion. It follows from our holding in [Silverman v. United States]
that the Fourth Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more
traditional seizure of papers and effects. Similarly, testimony as to matters observed during an unlawful invasion has
been excluded in order to enforce the basic constitutional policies. Thus, verbal evidence which derives so immediately
from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as the officers action in the present case is no less the fruit of
official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion. Nor do the policies underlying the
exclusionary rule invite any logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence. Either in terms of deterring
lawless conduct by federal officers, or of closing the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence
unconstitutionally obtained the danger in relaxing the exclusionary rules in the case of verbal evidence would seem
too great to warrant introducing such a distinction.

The majority concluded that it is clear that the narcotics were come at by the exploitation of that illegality and hence
that they may not be used against Toy.

Wong Suns unsigned confession was not the fruit of that arrest, and was therefore properly admitted at trial. On the
evidence that Wong Sun had been released on his own recognizance after a lawful arraignment, and had returned
voluntarily several days later to make the statement, [the majority held] that the connection between the arrest and
the statement had become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.

The courts holding as to Toy that this ounce of heroin was inadmissible against Toy does not compel a like result with
respect to Wong Sun. The exclusion of the narcotics as to Toy was required solely by their tainted relationship to
information unlawfully obtained from Toy, and not by any official impropriety connected with their surrender by Yee.
The seizure of this heroin invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which would entitle Wong Sun to object to
its use at his trial.

Nix v. Williams

Facts: Williams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who's body he disposed of along a gravel road. State
law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an
officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead
the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest.

Question: Should evidence resulting in an arrest be excluded from trial because it was improperly obtained?

Conclusion: No. The Court relied on the "inevitable discovery doctrine," as it held that the exclusionary rule did not
apply to the child's body as evidence since it was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered the
body even absent Williams's statements.

People vs Gesmundo

Facts: According to the prosecution, in the morning of Nov. 17, 1986, PO Jose Luciano gave money and instructed his
civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at the Cocoland Hotel. He actually saw the accused selling
marijuana to his civilian informer and that same day Luciano applied for a search warrant.
About 2pm that day, a police raiding team armed with a search warrant went to the Brgy captain for them to be
accompanied in serving the said warrant at the residence of the accused. The police was allowed to enter the house
upon the strength of the warrant shown to the accused. The accused begged the police not to search and to leave the
house. The police still searched the house and was led to the kitchen. She pointed a metal basin on top of a table as
the hiding place of died marijuana flowering tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. The police also recovered
from a native uway cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in 3 pieces of komiks paper.

According to the accused, when the police arrived at her house, she saw Sgt. Yte and PFC Jose Luciano. She invited
Sgt. Yte to enter her house while Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked near the house. While inside the house
Yte showed the accused something he claimed as a search warrant, when someone coming from the kitchen uttered
eto na They proceeded to the kitchen and saw Luciano holding a plastic bag with four other companions. They
confronted the accused and insisted that the bags belonged to her. Accused denied the accusation and told them that
she doesnt know anything about it. She was made to sign a prepared document. She was brought to the police station
and was detained.

The court renders judgment finding the accused guilty.

Issue: Whether or Not the evidence was properly obtained by the police.

Held: In the investigation report prepared by Luciano stated that during the search they discovered a hole at the
backyard of the house of the suspect, there was a big biscuit can inside the hole and on top of the cover a flower pot
was placed wherein the marijuana was kept. However, there was no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower
pot in any of their testimonies. There were inconsistencies insofar the prosecution is concerned, as to what was
recovered and where, the trial court concluded that these inconsistencies are trivial. There must sufficient evidence
that the marijuana was actually surrendered by the accused. As held in PP vs. Remorosa, Irreconcilable and
unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the guilt of appellant and his
culpability to the crime charged.

The claim that the marijuana was planted was strengthen as the police violated sec 7, rule 126 rules of the court
provides no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of
the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.

The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to the court as the accused was not informed of her right not to sign
the document neither was she informed that she has the right to the assistance of a counsel and the fact that it may
be used as evidence against her. It was not proved that the marijuana belonged to her. Not only does the law require
the presence of witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also imposes upon the person making the search the
duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the
judge who issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory thereof duly verified under oath. Again,
these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude substitution of the items seized by interested parties.

The guilt of the accused was has not been established. Judgment is reversed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HUANG ZHEN HUA G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004

Police operatives received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy
Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also learned that Lee was handling
the payments and accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao and Chan. Officer Anciro, Jr.
and other police operatives conducted surveillance operations and were able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee were
living together as husband and wife. They were able to secure search warrants, one for violation of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and explosives) and two for violation of R.A No. 6425, as amended
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drug Act.

The implementation of the first Search Warrant, no persons were found in the are, however the policemen found two
kilos shabu, paraphernalia for its production, and machines and tools apparently used for the production of fake credit
cards. Thereafter, the police operatives received information that Lao and Chan would be delivering shabu. The
policemen rushed to the area and saw Chan and Lao on board the latters car. Thereafter, the shoot-out resulted to
death of the two suspect during the encounter. The policemen found two plastic bags, each containing one kilo of
shabu, in Laos car.

The policemen then proceeded to the area where to enforce the other search warrant. The policemen coordinated with
Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of security in the building. The policemen, Pangan and two security guards
proceeded to the condominium unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked repeatedly on the front door, but no one responded. Pangan,
likewise, knocked on the door.9 until Lee peeped through the window beside the front door. The policemen allowed
Pangan to communicate with appellant Lee by sign language and pointed their uniforms to her to show that they were
policemen. The Lee then opened the door and allowed the team into the condominium unit.

The policemen conducted the search in all the rooms within the unit. The team proceeded with the search and found
other articles not described on the the search warrant. Huang Zhen Hua was found sleeping in one of the rooms during
the search and was surprised to see police officers. Anciro, Jr. found two transparent plastic bags each containing one
kilo of shabu, a feeding bottle, a plastic canister and assorted paraphernalia. Anciro, Jr. also found assorted documents,
pictures, bank passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation, credit cards, passports and identification cards of
Lao and Lee. Anciro, Jr. told Lee to bring some of her clothes because they were bringing her to the PARAC
headquarters. Lee did as she was told and took some clothes from the cabinet in the masters bedroom where Anciro,
Jr. had earlier found the shabu.

Issue: Whether or not the articles not specified in the search warrant, are inadmissible evidence.
Held: No, Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles belonging to the appellant and Lao which
were not described in the search warrants. However, the seizure of articles not listed in a search warrant does not
render the seizure of the articles described and listed therein illegal; nor does it render inadmissible in evidence. Such
articles were in plain view of Anciro, Jr. as he implemented the search warrants and was authorized to seize the said
articles because of their close connection to the crime charged. An example of the applicability of the plain view
doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the
course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character. An object that comes into view during
a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant.
Finally, the plain view doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other documents and papers seen by the policemen have
an intimate connection with the crime charged. The passport of the appellant would show when and how often she had
been in and out of the country. Her credit cards and bank book would indicate how much money she had amassed
while in the country and how she acquired or earned the same. The pictures and those of the other persons shown
therein are relevant to show her relationship to Lao and Chan. The Supreme Court ruled that Huang Zhen Hua should
be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, but that the conviction of Lee should be affirmed.

People V. Lacbanes Mar. 20, 1997. G.R. No. 88684

Facts: Cesar Lacbanes was convicted by the Palo, Leyte RTC for violating Art. II Sec. 4 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act). In this appeal he claims entrapment was never clearly established by the prosecution's evidence. The prosecution
relied on the testimony of PFC Rosales, member of the Tacloban Police Station Narcotics Section.

Events according to Rosales: his command received info that Lacbanes had been selling marijuana cigarettes in
Tacloban City. Surveillance was done, then a buy-bust operation was set up. 4:15 p.m.,Oct. 3, 1986 at the corner of
Burgos and Tarcela Streets, Tacloban City, their confidential agent told PFC Rosales and team members Patrolmen
Arpon and Buena, Sgt. Madriaga and Lt. Saranza, that he contacted Lacbanes. The team positioned themselves to see
the sale clearly. The agent talked to Lacbanes, handed him 2 marked P5.00 bills and received suspected marijuana
cigarettes. The team approached, said they were members of the Narcotics Section and arrested Lacbanes. They found
the bills and 3 sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes with him. He was brought to the station. Lacbanes was
informed of his rights prior to investigation, and he understood them. He admitted that the marijuana with him was for
sale and that his friend was the source. But they forgot to put the admission of guilt down in writing.

Events according to Lacbanes: he was sleeping at home from 2-4 p.m., and woken up by his dad, who told him that
Lt. Saranza, (with Arpon and Buena) wanted to take him to the station. He was asked if he knew the whereabouts of
Cresencio de la Cruzupon denial, he was forced to sign a paper which turned out to be a receipt for seized property
(the bills and marijuana). He denied knowing Rosales and said he was not there. Since the agent was not presented in
court, he also claims that Rosales testimony was equivalent to hearsay, and it amounted to a violation of his
constitutional right to know the witnesses against him and meet them in court. He also alleged that the marked bills
werent presented as proof before the trial court.

Issue: Is the conviction still valid?

Held: Yes. RTC AFFIRMED. The marked bills were presented as proof during Rosales direct examination, and the
agents testimony would only be used to corroborate Rosales testimony, since Rosales saw the entire exchange and
the bills and cigarettes are there as proof. The testimony of a lone prosecution witness, as long as it is
positive and clear and not arising from an improper motive to impute a serious offense to the accused,
deserves full credit. Lacbanes denial is not enoughif he wanted to use his alibi of being at home, he shouldve
presented his father to testify. The defense of frame up is not valid here either because theres no clear or
convincing evidence of it. However, the Court said that the receipt purportedly signed by Lacbanes was
inadmissible as evidence, because the prosecution failed to prove that he was assisted by counsel at the
timemaking it a violation of his right to remain silent.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)

This case was a criminal procedure case heard by the United States Supreme Court in which standing to invoke
unreasonable search is discussed.

Facts: An armed robbery was reported to police with a description of the getaway car. Officers on patrol recognized a
vehicle that matched the

earlier description and pulled the vehicle over. Upon searching the vehicle officers found a firearm and ammunition
inside. The passengers in this case (Rakas) filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search. The
court dismissed the motion for lack of standing.

Issue: Do the petitioners have standing to challenge the admissibility of the evidence seized?

Holding and Law

No. The passengers in the car were merely sitting in the car and had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
vehicle. As the vehicle did not belong to Rakas they had no standing to challenge the legitimacy of the search under
the Fourth Amendment.

Solid Triangle Sales v The Sheriff of RTC Quezon City

In Solid Triangle Sales Corp v The Sheriff of RTC Quezon City, Branch 93 , 370 SCRA 509, a criminal action for unfair
competition was brought by Solid Triangle, the exclusive distributor of Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan, against Sanly
Corporation, the importer of Mitsubishi photographic paper, under the law on trade marks. The court dismissed the
action because Sanly Corporation did not pass off the Mitsubishi photographic paper it was selling as the product of
another company. Solid Triangle in fact admitted that the goods Sanly Corporation sold were genuine Mitsubishi
photographic paper.

The trade mark law allows the parallel importation of drugs and medical goods, but the goods are subject to the
requirements of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Law before they can be sold to the public. Although imported drugs are
genuine, it is vital for them to comply with these requirements, particularly registration with the Bureau of Food and
Drugs. Otherwise they cannot be sold to consumers. The Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs, Republic Act 8203,
classifies as counterfeit an unregistered imported drug.

Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal

Facts: Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo an application for search warrant, stating in his application; "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Nio
St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain amount of opium." Upon that application
the said judge, on the same day, issued a search warrant.

Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S. Torralba, accompanied by some of his subordinates, on the same
day (April 30th) searched the house of the petitioner Uy Kheytin and found therein 60 small cans of opium. They
wanted to search also the bodega on the ground-floor of the house, but Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or
that he rented it. Lieutenant Torralba wanted to be sure, and for this reason he placed a guard in the premises to see
that nothing was removed therefrom, and then went away to find out who the owner of the bodega was. The next
morning he learned from the owner of the house, one Segovia, of the town of Molo, that the Chinaman Uy Kheytin was
the one who was renting the bodega. Thereupon Lieutenant Torralba and his subordinates resumed the search and
then and there found and seized other articles such as opium liquid, empty opium containers, opium pipe and the like.
Furthermore, officers seized books, papers, etc.

A criminal complaint was filed charging the petitioners with a violation of the Opium Law. They were duly arrested, and
a preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace, after which he found that there was probable
cause for believing that the crime complained of had been committed and that the defendants were the persons
responsible therefor.

Petitioners herein filed a petition in the Court of First Instance, asking for the return of "private papers, books and other
property" which the Constabulary officers had seized from said defendants, upon the ground that they had been so
seized illegally and in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendants. Petitioners contend that the search was
illegal and therefore asking for the return of the items seized.

Issue: WON the opium may be returned to the petitioner

WON the books,papers, etc may be returned

Held: In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that the judge
did not first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath. But the property sought to be searched for and
seized having been actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of
an improper arrest, we are of the opinion that irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium
found and seized under said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter.

That the officers of the law believed that the books, papers, etc., which they seized might be used as evidence against
the petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a violation of the Opium Law, is no reason or justification
under the law for the seizure: First, because they were not "particularly described" or even mentioned in the search
warrant; second, because, even if they had been mentioned in the search warrant, they could not be legally seized, for
a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining evidence; and third, because to compel a person to
produce his private papers to be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness
against himself.

From all of the foregoing our conclusions are:

1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements of
section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia
which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such
omission of the judge.

2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on the previous day, and, therefore, did
not require another search warrant.

3. That the seizure of the petitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent relation with
opium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the petitioners' constitutional
rights.

Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of the respondents herein, their assistants or successors,
be, and they hereby are, forbidden from examining or making any use of said books, letters, telegrams, etc., namely,
the articles described in items Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, and 15 of the sheriff's return (Exhibit 3, reproduced at the top of
page 3 of this decision 1) and they are hereby ordered to immediately return the said articles to the petitioners. So
ordered.

Magoncia vs Palacio

Facts: Zacarias Magoncia was arrested for the crime of robbery gang committed in the house of Hilario Enovejas
Ariston in the neighborhood of the town of Asingan, Pangasinan. Without search warrant, they made the seizure, the
wife of accused rebuked them "why search the house when my husband is away?"The cops found in the home a
paltik , shotgun clandestine manufacture a hand grenade, a box that contained 42 bullets and some pieces of cotton
cloth Hilario Property Enovejas, homeowner assaulted.

In this criminal case for illegal possession of firearms, the defendant filed a motion on January 8, 1947 asking the court
to order the return of illegally seized the effects of the four policemen of Asingan, Pangasinan and an order that the
Provincial Prosecutor desist from using such defects as evidence at the hearing.

Confident reports received, the Chief of Police instead of asking for a search warrant from a judge ordered four
policemen recording the defendant's home and found stolen pieces of fabric together with a paltik, ammunition and
hand grenade

Issue: WON the items seized may be returned

Held: No. The search of the house of Zachary Magoncia made by four police officers, on orders of the chief of police
of Asingan, over the objections of Magoncia's wife who protested that the search was being made in her husband's
absence, was absolutely illegal. The searching officers did not have any search warrant provided.

In the course of the illegal search, the searching officers found in Magoncia's house to paltik , a gun, a hand grenade,
and a container containing forty-two case ammunitions, the possession of all of Which is punishable by law and
prohibited. An information for illegal possession of firearms was filed against Magoncia. His motion, dated January 8,
1947, praying That the above effects be returned to him.

To order the return of the prohibited weapons to Magoncia is to justify an illegality or criminal offense. The illegality of
the search is independent from the illegal possession of prohibited arms. The illegality of the search did not make legal
an illegal possession of firearms.

Do not confuse the possession of a thing which is susceptible to legal appropriation and is the subject of free trade, like
watch, a box of firearms whose possession is prohibited. Possession of a firearm without a license is a flagrant
violation of law and is subject to an arrest the possessor and contraband can be seized

Collector vs. Villaluz

Facts: Petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo filed against Cesar T. Makapugay, a letter complaint with
respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court for violation of NIRC, Central Bank Circular 265 and RA 1937 claiming
that Cesar T. Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the government criminally, willfully and feloniously
brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed blue seal" Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny
Walker Scotch Whiskey, also "untaxed", without the necessary permit from the proper authorities. The respondent
submitted a Baggage Declaration Entry which did not declare the said articles.

Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary investigation, and on July 6, 1971,
issued the challenged order, dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering the return to private respondent the
amount of P2,280.00, his passport No. Ag-2456 FA - No. B103813, and one (1) box of air-conditioning evaporator only,
as well as the forfeiture of forty (40) cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five (5) bottles of Johnny
Walker Scotch Whiskey" (p. 13, rec.).

Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the articles so stated.
Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to the "prior institution of seizure proceedings thereon."
The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to file a complaint for "Open Disobedience" under Article 231 of the
Revised Penal Code, before the City Fiscal of Pasay City.

Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul and set aside the order dated July 6,
1971 on the ground that respondent Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal complaints
directly filed with him, cannot legally order the dismissal "with prejudice" of a criminal case after conducting a
preliminary investigation thereon, and is without authority to order the return of articles subject of seizure proceedings
before Customs authorities.

In these six cases, one common legal issue is whether a Circuit Criminal Court possesses the power to conduct
preliminary investigations which is significant to determine whether items may be returned or not.

Issue: WON the items seized may be returned

Held: The dismissal of a case, even with prejudice, during the stage of preliminary investigation does not bar
subsequent prosecution and conviction if the evidence warrants the re-filing of the same becomes next to impossible.
For the enforcement of such order would virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector of Customs of the evidence
indispensable to a successful prosecution of the case against the private respondent. Worse, the order nullified the
power of seizure of the customs official.

Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment imported goods are actually in the
possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had previously been issued by the
Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive
jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the Customs laws, subject to an appeal only to the
Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme Court.

Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of First Instance as well as the Circuit Criminal Court from assuming
cognizance of the subject matter and divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin properties subject to seizure
and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code because proceedings for the forfeiture of goods
illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of wrongdoer nor in the
imposition upon him of a penalty.

MATA VS BAYONA
Facts: Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets known as Masiao
Tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai and amusement Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned.

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said
case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he
had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts and to which inquiry respondent judge replied it is with the curt.
The judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached then to the records

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under the constitution no search warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge personally or such other responsible officer as may be authorized b law after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and any witnesses he may produce.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and witnesses that he may produce and to attach then to the records. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determined the existence and
nonexistence of the probable cause, to hole liable for perjury the person giving It if it will be found later that his
declaration are false.

Deposition any written statement certified under oath. written testimony of a witness given in the course of
a judicial proceeding in advance of the trail or haring upon oral examination

The search warrant is illegal, the return of the thing seized cannot be ordered. Illegality of search warrant does
not call for the return of the thing seize, the possession of which is prohibited.

MHP GARMENTS, INC vs. CA September 2, 1994 G.R. No. 86720

FACTS: In February 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the
exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their
Memorandum Agreement, MHP was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in
court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." Sometime in October 1983, MHP received
information that private respondents were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Larry de
Guzman (Larry), an employee of MHP, was then tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a
report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).

On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., Larry, Captain Renato M. Peafiel, and 2 other constabulary men of the
Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. WITHOUT any warrant, they
seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a
commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items and the items were then
turned over to MHP for safekeeping.

A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents but during its pendency, Larry
exacted from respondent Lugatiman P3,100.00 in order to be dropped from the complaint. However, after the
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents and
ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite demands. Private
respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods, and even then, not all the
seized items were returned and the other items returned were of inferior quality.

Private respondents filed a civil case for sums of money and damages against MHP and Larry (note: the PC officers
were not sued for damages). The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents which was later on affirmed by CA.

ISSUES:

1. Did CA err in imputing liability for damages to petitioners who did not effect the seizure?

NO. While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation
of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners. Despite the
sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they
took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents
against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was
no probable cause for the seizure.

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop
the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the
same extent as the officers themselves.

In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights and
liberties from public officer or private individual. The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or
criminal. It is NOT necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite
would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights.

In, Aberca vs. Ver, the court held that in Art. 32, the law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or
indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor
alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party it should nonetheless be
made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well
as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors .

2. Did CA err in finding that the seizure was done in a tortious manner but penalized the petitioners who
did not commit the act of confiscation?
NO. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in
transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure:

FIRST, They instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to
undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies.

SECOND, Under Letter of Instruction No. 1299, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling
of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant.

THIRD, If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint
against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery
of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.

Galvante vs. Casimiro

Facts: Private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one
short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions. The confiscated materials were covered by an expired
Memorandum Receipt dated September 2, 1999. Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against
petitioner an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on Elections
(Comelec) Resolution No. 3258 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Pending
resolution of Criminal Case, petitioner filed against private respondents an administrative case for Grave Misconduct,
before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, and a criminal case, for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and
Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman.

Petitioner alleged that the private respondents, thinking he was armed with a gun, pointed their firearms at him and
asked for his gun. SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near petitioners jeep and conducted a search without a search
warrant. After a while they saw the super .38 pistol under the floor mat of the petitioners jeep. He further alleged that
he was detained by Police Chief Rocacorba for two days having been released only after posing a bail.

Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance with both the IAS and Ombudsman absolving private
respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining the private respondent Conde alone be
prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases. The IAS then issued a Decision finding all private respondents
guilty of grave misconduct even if they were merely being enthusiastic in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty. The
RTC dismissed the case against the petitioner. On the other hand, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges
against private respondents for lack of probable cause.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman properly dismissed the criminal complaints filed against the private
respondents.

Held: The SC ruled that the complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of warrantless
search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any other special law. What the RPC
punishes are only two forms of searches:

A. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained.

B. Searching domicile without witnesses.

The petitioner did not allege any of the foregoing felonies in his complaint. The remedy of petitioner against the
warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, under Article 32 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code which
provides:

Art.32: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another shall be liable to the latter for
damages

xxx

(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

xxx

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by public respondents. To sustain a
criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown that (a)the offender is a public officer or employee, (b)the
offender detained the complainant, and (c)the detention is without legal grounds. The second element was not alleged
by petitioner. The petitioner himself identified that it it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his detention.

For the complaint of grave threats, the same is merely based on petitioners allegation. The public officers enjoy a
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official function.

Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.

Silahis International Hotel, Inc vs Panlilio G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006

FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the
basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she
failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In
the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what
she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in
barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed
Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the
office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found
containing marijuana flowering tops.

As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an
investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscals Office of Manila. RTC
acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.

RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages: x x x x

In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and
Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into
and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners violation of individual respondents
constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity
of the search and seizure.

Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved
party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal
search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in
accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil
Code which provides:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search
and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.