[G.R. No. 182435. August 13, 2012.

LILIA B. ADA, et al., vs. FLORANTE BAYLON

Facts:
This case involves the estate of spouses Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon (who
died on November 7, 1961 and May 5, 1974, respectively. At the time of their death, Spouses
Baylon were survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita Baylon, Victoria Baylon,
Dolores Baylon, Panfila Gomez, Ramon Baylon and herein petitioner Lilia B. Ada.
Dolores died intestate and without issue on August 4, 1976. Victoria died on November 11, 1981
and was survived by her daughter, herein petitioner Luz B. Adanza. Ramon died intestate on July
8, 1989 and was survived by herein respondent Florante Baylon, his child from his first marriage,
as well as by petitioner Flora Baylon, his second wife, and their legitimate children, namely,
Ramon, Jr. and herein petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and Ma. Ruby, all surnamed
Baylon.
Petitioners filed with the RTC complaint for partition, accounting, and damages against
respondent Florante, Rita, and Panfila. They alleged that Spouses Baylon owned 43 parcels of
land. They claimed that Rita took possession of the land and appropriated the income derived
therefrom. Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted, in their answer, that the co-owned the properties
in question. On July 1997, Rita donated a parcel of land to Florante. In July 2000, Rita died.
Petitioners learned of the donation made by Rita in favor of Florante. They filed for a
Supplemental Pleading, asking the court to rescind the Deed of Donation.
The RTC rendered a decision, finding the existence of co-ownership but ordered the partition of
the estate of the Spouses Baylon. RTC also rescinded the donation made.
The case was appealed to the CA. The appellate court set aside the decision and remanded the
case to determine ownership of Lot Nos. 4706 and 4709.

The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves two separate, distinct and
independent actions partition and rescission. First, the petitioners raised the refusal of their
co-heirs, Florante, Rita and Panfila, to partition the properties which they inherited from Spouses
Baylon. Second, in their supplemental pleading, the petitioners assailed the donation inter
vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante pendente lite.

ISSUE/S: W/N there was co-ownership to make the partition proper.

RULING:
A joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is to unite two or more
demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a
declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made
the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may, under
certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one
declaration, complaint or petition.
While parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as they may have against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is
subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed
by special rules. .
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners
could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of
Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule
69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the
ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of
partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or
their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern
the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite
elements of each particular cause of action.
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts
have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the
severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there is
no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then
there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has
jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If
the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined
cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any
adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity.
Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the severance of the
petitioners' action for rescission from their action for partition. While this may be a patent
omission on the part of the RTC, this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and
correctness of its decision. The RTC validly adjudicated the issues raised in the actions for
partition and rescission filed by the petitioners.
Asserting a New Cause of Action in a Supplemental Pleading
Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads:
 Sec. 6.Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The
adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order
admitting the supplemental pleading.
The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts
which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled;
hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original right of action,
or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint
even though they themselves constitute a right of action. 37 (Citations omitted
and emphasis ours)
Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or events which
had transpired after the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented, even if the said
supplemental facts constitute another cause of action.
The petitioners' supplemental pleading merely amplified the original cause of action, because of
the gratuitous conveyance of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 after the filing of the
original complaint and prayed for additional reliefs, i.e., rescission. Indeed, the petitioners claim
that the said lots form part of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but cannot be partitioned unless the
gratuitous conveyance of the same is rescinded. Thus, the principal issue raised by the petitioners
in their original complaint remained the same.
Petition is partly granted. The case is remanded to the RTC.
G.R. No. L-33255 November 29, 1972

ARTURO BALBASTRO, JOSE PEREZ, EDGARDO DE LA CRUZ, LEONARDO

VILLANUEVA and CONSORCIA HALILI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IV, and FRANCISCO E.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Facts:

Chiu Keng Iong, Lim Bun Kong and Rajindar Singh, lessees of three doors of a
10-door apartment filed a complaint for interpleader and consignation with CFI of Rizal, Quezon
City, against private respondent Francisco E. Fernandez and Angela M. Butte, each claiming
ownership over the aforementioned 10-door apartment and of the right to collect the rents
therefrom. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they have no means of knowing definitely to
whom they should pay rentals whether to defendant Angela M. Butte or defendant Francisco
E. Fernandez.

In answer to plaintiffs' complaint defendant Francisco E. Fernandez alleged among others that
pending determination of the conflicting claims involved in the case he was granted an ad
interim authority to collect and deposit with the court the rentals due on the subject property
which authority was allegedly upheld by the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, defendant
Angela M. Butte claims that being the owner of the 10-door apartment in question, she has every
right to collect the rents of the property.

Fernandez filed a Third-Party Complaint against the third-party defendants (petitioners herein)
who are the lessees of the remaining doors of the 10-door apartment because of their refusal to
recognize the authority Fernandez to collect the rents on the doors leased by them.

The third-party defendants filed with the CA a Motion To Strike Out And/or to dismiss the Third-
Party complaint filed by Fernandez on the ground that the filing of said Third-Party Complaint is
in violation of Section 12, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court and not in accord with
established jurisprudence on the matter and on the further ground that said Third-Party
Complaint does not state any cause of action.

Fernandez filed his opposition to petitioners' Motion to Strike and/or to dismiss the Third-Party
Complaint but was denied by the Court a quo, and upon receipt of the order of denial, petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the same but was likewise denied.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

W/N the third-party complaint be dismissed.

Held:

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the admission of third-party complaint is discretionary

with the court. The exercise of this discretion should of course be guided by well-established
doctrines promulgated by our courts.

Section 12 of Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes a defendant to bring into a lawsuit
any person "not a party to the action, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief
in respect of his opponent's claim." From its explicit language it does not compel the defendant
to bring the third-parties into the litigation; rather it simply permits the inclusion of anyone who
meets the standard set forth in the rule. The secondary or derivative liability of the third-party is
central whether the basis is indemnity, subrogation, contribution, express or implied warranty or
some other theory. The impleader of new parties under this rule is proper only when a right to
relief exists under the applicable substantive law. This rule is merely a procedural mechanism,
and cannot be utilized unless there is some substantive basis under applicable law.

Apart from the requirement that the third-party complainant should assert a derivative or
secondary claim for relief from the third-party defendant, there are other limitations on said
party's ability to implead. The rule requires that the third-party defendant is "not a party to the
action" for otherwise the proper procedure for asserting a claim against one who is already a
party to the suit is by means of counterclaim or cross-claim under sections 6 and 7 of Rule 6. In
addition to the aforecited requirement, the claim against the third-party defendant must be based
upon plaintiff's claim against the original defendant (third-party claimant). The crucial
characteristic of a claim under section 12 of Rule 6, is that the original "defendant is attempting
to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.

A third-party complaint is, under the Rules, available only if the defendant has a right to demand
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief from the supposed third-party defendants
in respect to the plaintiff's claim."

Absent therefore in the case at bar the nexus between petitioners as third-party defendants and
Francisco E. Fernandez, the third-party plaintiff, showing the existence of a secondary or
derivative liability of the former in favor of the latter "in respect of his opponent's claim" the
third-party action would not be proper.
G.R. No. 173292 September 1, 2010

MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. OSWALDO Z.

CRUZ, Respondent.

Facts:

Sometime in October 1993, Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila a
Complaint against her son, defendant-appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for "Annulment of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages. Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law
husband (deceased) Architect Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of land located at Bo.
Obrero, Tondo Manila, that the said lot was registered in her name and was registered at the
Register of Deeds of Manila, that sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the title to the said
property was transferred by appellee and the latters wife in their names in August 1991 by virtue
of a Deed of Sale dated February 12, 1973, that the said deed was executed through fraud,
forgery, misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void, that she, with the help of her
husbands relatives, asked appellee to settle the problem, that despite repeated pleas and
demands, appellee refused to reconvey to her the said property and because of this she filed a
complaint against appellee before the office of the Barangay having jurisdiction over the subject
property and since the matter was unsettled, the barangay issued a certification to file action in
court, now the subject of controversy.

After Memoracion finished presenting her evidence in chief, she died on October 30, 1996.
Through a Manifestation, Memoracions counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court on
January 13, 1997 of the fact of such death, evidenced by a certificate thereof. 11 For his part,
appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs reconveyance action is a
personal action which does not survive a partys death which was then granted without prejudice
to the prosecution thereof in the proper estate proceedings.

Memoracions son-heir, Edgardo Z. Cruz, manifested to the trial court that he is retaining the
services of Atty. Neri for the plaintiff. Simultaneously, Atty. Neri filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order. However, the said motion was subsequently denied. And then he
appealed the said decision to the CA but likewise denied the appeal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not an action which affects primarily and principally property and property rights is a
transmissible right and survives the death of the original plaintiff?

Held:

The Court in is decision states that, the criterion for determining whether an action survives the
death of a petitioner as elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena, the question as to whether an action
survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive, the wrong complained of affects primarily and principally property and
property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action
which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental. If the case affects primarily and principally property and
property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or petitioner. In another case, the SC
held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to
property and property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the
instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the death of petitioner
Memoracion Z. Cruz.