MARTIAL LAW HAS NEVER BEEN REPEALED.

Messages from Joyce Rosenwald.

Following the Civil War, President Andrew Johnson opposed passage of the
Reconstruction Act. He vetoed it, but his veto was overturned. In his "Veto Message of
the Reconstruction Act," he explained that martial law was being declared by the
provisions of the act and he, to his credit, was opposed to it.

Unfortunately, Johnson lost that battle, and the Reconstruction Act placed the nation
under martial law rule for the first time in our history. THAT MARTIAL LAW HAS
NEVER BEEN REPEALED.

Folks who run around worrying about when martial law is going to be declared to "take it
all away" don't know what they're talking about. We've been under technical and legal
martial law for over a century.

Here are Johnson's comments which explain in some detail exactly what the
Reconstruction Act was designed to do--and DID do. They are extensive quotes. TAKE
THE TIME TO READ THEM, and then I'll show you how this set the stage for
Executive Orders and the complete subversion of what we thought was the supreme law
of the land:

"I have examined the Bill to provide for more efficient government of the rebel
states with the care and anxiety which its transcended importance is calculated to
awaken. I am unable to give my assent for reasons so grave that I hope a
statement of them may have some influence on the minds of the patriotic and
enlightened men with whom the decision must ultimately rest.

"The Bill places all the people therein named under the absolute domination of
military rules, and the Preamble undertakes to give the reason upon which the
measure is based, and the ground upon which it is justified. It declares that there
exists in those states no legal governments and no adequate protection for life,
property, and assets; and asserts the necessity of enforcing peace and good order
within their limits.

"This is not true, as a matter of fact. The excuse given for the Bill in the
Preamble is admitted by the Bill itself not to be real. The military rule, which it
establishes, is plainly to be used not for any purpose of order, or the prevention of
crime, but solely as a means of coercing the people into the adoption of principles
and measures to which it is known that they are opposed, and upon which they
have an undeniable right to exercise their own judgment.

"I submit to Congress whether this measure is not in its whole character, scope,
and object, without precedent and without authority, in palpable conflict with the
plainest provisions of the Constitution, and utterly destructive to those great
 principles of liberty and humanity for which our ancestors on both sides of the
Atlantic have shed so much blood and expended so much treasure.

"The authority here amounts to absolute despotism. Such a power has not been
wielded by any monarch in England for more than 500 years. It reduces the
whole population, all persons of every color, sex, and condition, and every
stranger, to the most abject and degrading slavery. No master ever had a control
so absolute over the slaves as this Bill gives.

"This Proposition is perfectly clear that no branch of the federal government,

executive, legislative, or judicial, can have any just powers except those which it
derives through and exercises under the organic laws of the union. Outside of the
Constitution, we have no legal authority more than private citizens, and within it,
we have only so much as that instrument gives us.

"This broad principle limits all our functions and applies to all subjects. It
protects not only the citizens of the states which are within the union, but shields
every human being who comes or is brought under our jurisdiction. We have no
right to do in one place more than in another that which the Constitution says we
shall not do at all.

"When an absolute sovereign reduces his rebellious subjects, he may deal with
them according to his pleasure because he had that power before. But when a
limited monarch puts down an insurrection, he must still govern according to law.

"This is a Bill by Congress in time of peace. There is not in any one of the
states either war or insurrection. The laws of the states and of the federal
governments are all in undisturbed and harmonious operation.

Actual war, foreign invasion, domestic insurrection--none of these appear, and none of
these, in fact, exist. It is not even recited that any sort of war or insurrection is
threatened.

"We see that martial law comes in only when actual war closes the courts and
deposes civil authority. But this Bill in time of peace makes martial law operate
as though we were in actual war, and becomes the cause instead of the
consequence of the abrogation of civil authority.

"This is sufficiently explicit: peace exists in all the territory to which this Bill applies. It
asserts a power in Congress in time of peace to set aside laws of peace and to substitute
the laws of war. The purpose, an object of the Bill, the general intent which pervades it
from beginning to end, is to change the entire structure and character of the states'
governments and to compel them by force to the adoption of organic laws and regulations
which they are unwilling to accept if left to themselves." [end of quotes]
Now, despite President Johnson's Veto Message, the Reconstruction Act was passed, and
martial law fell upon the land. It remains in effect over the citizens of the sovereign
states today through the continued use of Executive Orders, under the pretense of national
emergencies -- in the same way that the War Powers Act of 1933 was hustled through to
approval...national emergency.

FURTHER PROOF:

Further proof that martial law remained in effect after the Civil War can be found in the
"Congressional Globe" (now called the "Congressional Record"). The following are
excerpts from the April 20th through 29th, 1870 "Congressional Globe" concerning H.R.
1328 which established the Department of Justice to CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT
MARTIAL LAW nearly five years after the end of the Civil War:

"The following bureaus shall be established in this department [the Department

of Justice]: a Bureau of International Law, a Bureau of Revenue Law, a Bureau of
Military and Naval Law, a Bureau of Postal Law, a Bureau of Land Management
Law."

Congressman Lawrence then said in the record:

"This Bill, however, does transfer to the Law Department, or the Department of
Justice as it is now called, the cognizance of all subjects of martial law, and the
cognizance of all subjects of military and naval law, except that portion of the
administration of military justice which relates to military court martial, their
proceedings, and the supervision of records.

"If a question of martial law is to be determined by the law officers of

government, it will now belong to the Attorney General, or to this Department of
Justice. It will not belong to the Judge Advocate General of the Army. He will
not be called upon for any opinion relating to martial law or military law except
as to that portion of the administration of military law which relates to military
justice.

"In other words, the Judge Advocate General, instead of giving legal opinions to
the Secretary of War relating to the status of the states of the union, their right to
call upon the government for military protection, or military aid, and other grave
Constitutional questions, will be limited. The Judge Advocate General will
perform duties administrative in their character and almost exclusively so.

"But I will state to the House why, in my judgment, no transfer of the Judge
Advocate General or of his duties to the Department of Justice has been proposed
in this Bill. If this had been done, the Bill would have encountered the opposition
of some of the officers of the Bureau of Military Justice and their friends, and so
great is the power of men in office, so difficult is it to abolish an office, that we
were compelled in the consideration of this subject to leave officers in this Bureau
 untouched in their official tenure in order that this Bill might get through
Congress.

"But so far as the Solicitor and Naval Judge Advocate General is concerned, he
is transferred with all his supervisory power over naval court martials and the
records and proceedings of such courts, so that to that extent, this Bill
accomplishes the great purpose which it has in view of bringing into one
department the whole legal service of the government. It is misfortunate that there
should be different constructions of the laws of the United States by different law
officers of the United States."

WHAT IS THIS ALL ABOUT:

These traitors knew they would have encountered opposition from the military with the
provisions of H.R. 1328, so they decided to leave the military officers untouched during
their tenure, and transfer them to supervisory positions over court martials. This
appeased the military leaders, who didn't have the foggiest idea as to what was really
going on.

Had the traitors fleeced the military of all their powers during their tenure in office, the
military would have realized and possibly taken some military action. But as nothing
was happening at the hen house, they slept through this entire situation which resulted in
an overthrow of the Constitution -- an overthrow under which government pretended to
operate in 1933, and under which it continues to pretend to operate today.

The traitors were now faced with a very serious problem, namely, what to do with the
powers of the Office of the Judge Advocate General when their tenure in office expired.
And they solved this dilemma by adding the following amendments, detailed in that same
"Congressional Globe":

Congressman Jenks: I move to amend Section 3 by inserting the word "naval"

before the words "Judge Advocate General".

The amendment was agreed to and later Congressman Finkelburg stated:

I would suggest the propriety of amending the third section of this Bill by
inserting after the words "the Naval Solicitor and Naval Judge Advocate

General" the words "who shall hereafter be known as Naval Solicitor".

Mr. Jenks: I have no objection to that amendment.

This amendment was also agreed to, and the Office of the Judge Advocate General
became known as the Naval Solicitor. Thus, when the existing tenure was over, the new
office would have a different set of rules and regulations so that the Bill accomplished the
great purpose which it had in view of bringing into one department the whole legal
service of the government without the power of the Office of the Judge Advocate General
getting in their way.

This was a necessary step to bring the President into the position of dictator over
America.

But they had one other problem facing them, namely, DIRECT ACCESS to the Treasury
for the Department of Justice without interference. They accomplished this by the
following three sections of the Bill:

1. "...The Eighth Section provides that the Attorney General is hereby empowered to
make all necessary rules and regulations for the government....
2. "...The Eleventh Section provides that all monies hereafter drawn out of the
Treasury upon requisition of the Attorney General shall be dispersed by such one
of the clerks herein provided for the Attorney General as he may designate, and so
much of the First Section of the Act, making appropriations, past March 3rd,
1859, as provides that money drawn out of the Treasury upon requisition of the
Attorney General shall be dispersed by such dispersing officer as the Secretary of
the Treasury is hereby repealed....

3. "...The Fifteenth Section provides that the supervisory powers now exercised by
the Secretary of the Interior over the accounts of the district attorneys, marshals,
clerks, and other officers of the courts of the United States, shall be exercised by
the Attorney General...."

It is important here to remember that under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the District
Courts of the United States are:

"...hereby given jurisdiction to make and enter all such rules as to notice and otherwise
and all such orders and decrees and to issue such process as may be necessary and proper
in the premises to enforce the provisions of this Act."

It is here that we find out that the district attorneys, marshals, clerks and other officers of
the courts are under the Department of Justice. That seems an obvious statement, given
the state of the nation today. But the REAL PROBLEM -- given the broad scope of
powers granted the District Courts under the Trading with the Enemy Act -- is that the
Department of Justice is *NOT* a part of the Judicial Branch of Government!

According to Section 101 of Title 5 of the United States Code, the Department of State,
the Department of Treasury, the Department of Defense, the DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Department
of Commerce, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Transportation, the Department of
Energy, the Department of
Education, and the Department of the Veteran Affairs are *ALL* under the Executive
Branch of Government.

All of the above departments are under the Executive Branch--which raises quite a few
questions about the balance of powers between the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative
branches of government.

How can this be? There is no balance of power under a declared state of emergency.
And we've been living under a declared state of emergency ever since the Civil War
began, and have been living under a declared state of martial law ever since the
Reconstruction Act.

This overthrow of the Constitution occurred long before the War Powers Act, and if we
are going back in history to find our roots of legality -- and if we stop our search when
we reach the War Powers Act -- we are NOT going to succeed in this venture.

Where is the separation of powers if the Department of Justice is under the Executive
branch? Shouldn't it be part of the Judiciary? The answer, of course, is yes; but it's not.
Again, just check Section 101 of Title 5 of the United States Code.

If only Congress has the power to regulate Commerce, under Article 1, Section 8, of the
Constitution, why are the Department of Commerce and the Department of
Transportation under the Executive branch and not under the Legislative branch?

And if only the Congress has the power to coin money, according to the Constitution,
why is the Department of Treasury under the Executive branch?

The Commerce Department (from Title 5):

"...part of the Executive branch of federal government, headed by a Cabinet member,

the Secretary of Commerce, which is concerned with promoting domestic and
international business and commerce."

To further illustrate the take-over by the Executive branch of government via martial law,
the following offices, bureaus, divisions, and organizations are under the Department of
Justice. And remember, the Department of Justice is under the Executive branch -- NOT
under the judicial branch.

The Office of Solicitor General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Drug Enforcement Agency

The Bureau of Prisons

 Immigration and Naturalization

United States Marshal Service

Office of Justice Program

United States Parole Commission

United States National Central Bureau

The Office of the Pardon Attorney

Executive Office of the United States Attorney

Criminal Division

Civil Division

Anti-Trust Division

Civil Rights Division

Tax Division

Environmental and Natural Resource Division

Community Relations Services

Foreign Claim Settlement Division

Executive Office of United States Trustees

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Justice Management Division

Office of Legal Counsel

Office of Policy Development

Office of Legislative Affairs

Office of Public Affairs

Office of Liaison Services

 Office of Intelligence and Policy Review

Office of International Affairs

Office of the Inspector General

Office of Professional Responsibility; and

Interpol -- (Note: Interpol is a private corporation, yet it comes under (in this
country) the Executive branch of government.)

In my opinion: if the matter of the repeal of the Reconstruction Act and the old H.R.
1328 are not addressed, we will remain in a state of declared

martial law. But few people do any research anymore, and even fewer read the results of
research done by others. It's easier to fear-monger and speculate.

Yes, we are already, and have been all our lives, living under declared martial law.

182 U.S. 1 45 L.Ed. 1041 DeLima v. Bidwell

Query: 2SPCASES:collective naturalization

"They were the 'immediate consequences,' says Foelix (Revue de Droit Francais et Etranger,
Tom. II, page 328, Naturalization Collective), 'of every union of territory, according to the existing
law of nations, and since it is no longer the custom, even after the conquest of a country, to
reduce its inhabitants to a condition inferior to that of the conquering country.'"

The dismemberment of populated territory from a State on the one hand, and its incorporation
into a new nationality on the other, operate as a collective naturalization ipso facto. "Annexation of
territory, either by peaceful cession or as a result of war, invariably carries with it a change of
nationality. This is what is called collective naturalization." Pradier Foedere, Droit International
Public, ed. 1885, vol. III, p. 721.

"A collective naturalization of all the inhabitants is effected when a country or province
becomes incorporated in another country by conquest, cession, or free gift." Phillimore,
vol. I, p. 499, ed. 1879.

MR. SOLICITOR GENERAL. Congress has entire authority over the matter of naturalization, and
it may naturalize not only by a law applying uniformly, but collectively, by special acts, and it has
done so. It has naturalized Indians who lived in the Indian Territory, although the Indian Territory
has not been regarded as a part of the United States in the imposition of our excise taxes. Many
instances of collective naturalization might be given. And so I say, that if we have conferred
citizenship, why, then, in disposing of territory that belongs to the United States, but has not
become an inseparable part of the Union, doubtless the treaty-making power or Congress would
provide for the safeguarding and protection of all personal and property rights flowing from
citizenship in such territory.

From the Informer:

ALL STATUTORY LAW IS UNDER PUBLIC TRUST. THE TRUST IS THE

CONSTITUTION AND YOU BECOME THE CESTU QUE TRUST.

Over the past several years I have been researching how to effectively get out of the
system. First I needed to understand exactly what the system was.

Then I needed to find out what our relationship to the system was. I couldn't understand
how the governors of the several states could have pledged the good faith and credit of
the citizens of their state to pay the international and domestic debt of this country. I
knew a contract couldn't be signed by one person making another person, who knew
nothing of the contract, responsible for payment. If the government believed they could
do it, there had to be some mechanism in the law was being concealed from us. My
research led me to the CESTUI QUE TRUST. Does anyone here have knowledge of this
trust as it is applied to us by government under the Doctrine of Parens Patrie?

I will be more than willing to share my info with you after I learn what you know. I
believe it is a BIG piece of the puzzle as to how and why government

believes they own us and have the right to control every aspect of our lives from the
cradle to the grave.....

From Joyce Rosenwald

SENATOR HARKINS - IRS KNOWLEDGE

Although the IR Code is used as the basis for the so called income tax, the
personal income tax does not derive its authority from the 16th Amendment,
Brushaber v. Union Pacific RR, or any other constitutional or federal provision,
as those authorities fell with the loss of our national money standard in 1933.
Since 1933, the people have formed new a new unincorporated United States in
trust by their silence in accepting the loss of their ability for paying their debts at
law. In other words, the suspension of our national money standard created a
void in the law. Consequently, a resulting or implied trust rushed in to fill the
void. In a resulting or implied trust, there are not terms of how and who is to
administer the terms of the trust, therefore you cannot put the blame on anyone
besides the people for letting the trust be established. "The United States
Government may be the trustee of a charitable trust," Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S.
163: 27 L.Ed. 397, and further; The United States or a state has capacity to take
and hold property upon a charitable trust, but in absence of a statute otherwise
providing, the charitable trust is unenforceable against the United States or a
state." In other words, the code does not define who is required to file and what
the terms are, but when you use the IR Code as you argument, you admit to
conveying your estate to the public trust, thus all your arguments have little or no
merit. It then is a constant battle finding niches in the code which the IRS
eventually overcomes and it comes down to how much you owe and when you are
going to pay. In the mean time, you cannot own anything because they put a lien
on it and it is hell getting rid of the lien.

You must also remember that you are also considered a beneficiary to the trust
and as such, unjust enrichment comes into play. Article IV, Section 3 of the
Constitution states: "New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
other State nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or
Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as
well as of the Congress." Article IV, Sec. 3 clearly states that in order to establish
new incorporated States under the Constitution, the legislatures and Congress
must follow the Constitutional rules. But, being there is no prohibition under
Article IV, Sec. 3 or any other provisions of the Constitution to prohibit the
people from forming an association of new unincorporated states, and just being
there is no charter of incorporation of the new states and just what its duties are,
i.e., its intents and purposes, a resulting implied charitable trust is formed by
operation of law.

As a result of the foregoing, when you go into court, the judge constructs a trust
whereby he takes judicial notice [of the presumption that you are a beneficiary of
the trust and the presumption is the fact until rebutted with evidence] and
invokes unjust enrichment on your part. Consequently there is no Constitutional
Law, only the conscience of the masses in the trust governed by courts of equity
whereby all property, real and personal, is held in common to everybody in the
trust, i.e., every person re-insures each others debts and responsibility, in limited
liability. In other words, by operation of law, the people have formed new
unincorporated states that operate outside the Constitution under their right to
contract and convey their property as a gift in trust, thereby creating relative
rights instead of absolute rights. As stated earlier, being there is no charter of
incorporation and just what its duties and jurisdiction consist of, this public trust
of unincorporated states reverts back to the Articles of Confederation because,
under the Articles, taxation and commerce were and are under the control of the
states and outside the control of the federal Government.
Thus, the IR Code is not under control of Congress' general powers, but rather its
authority lies under local law which is state law under the Erie RR doctrine. The
Articles were in force from March 1781 to March 1789. They were never
abolished, but discredited by 1786, thus not being incorporated into the
Constitution. Most authorities of that time agree that had it not been for the
Articles of Confederation, our Constitutional Republic would not have survived,
but taxation and commerce being under control of the states created major
problems as we are witnessing today under local law. Erie held that the law of the
state shall apply in the absence of the Constitution or Acts of Congress. First, Erie
does not say the incorporated State, but the unincorporated state. Secondly, Erie
does not differentiate between foreign or domestic commerce, nor does it
differentiate between local or general Acts of Congress. I go ballistic when I hear
folks say it's the incorporated States that are doing us in. Go to your state
constitution and check to see if the state boundary lines are there. OH! You say,
they are not there. Well then, how can the incorporated State or States be doing
us in when there is no boundary lines drawn between the various general powers
over the people and the U.S. Supreme Court has stated this many time over.

The purpose of the personal income tax is to tax those who want government
acting under local law (public policy) to take care of them. , which unfortunately
is what most of the people want and expect and therein lies the major problem.
Anyhow, silence is consent, therefore you are required to file tax returns and
share your wealth with the undesirables, that is, unless you use the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 USC 1602-1611, passed in 1976 in order to offer to
those who are dissatisfied with public policy, a statutory remedy to the
Constitution under Article III. Your access to the Constitution runs directly
through the FSIA in every area in dealing with government, federal, state, or
local.

In short, the FSIA codified the era of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters 1 (1842-1938)
whereby a jury trial can now be demanded, if desired, in State court on any
statutory issue covered by the FSIA against federal, state, or local government.
Congress specifically stated that the FSIA must be interpreted by statutory
remedy in an Article III court regardless of the citizenship of the plaintiff under
international law outside of the realm of equity, Erie, Title 42 and other public
policy. FSIA also, waives sovereign immunity for commercial activities of state
and federal governments which consists of about 90% of government activity. In
summation, arguing the Internal Revenue Code is an effort in futility.

Joyce rosenwald wrote:

Do you know what federal reserve notes are? They are military script.

Now, why do you need military script in a republic functioning under a

constitution which declares money should be silver and gold?
If our money was taken from us, is it so far a stretch to understand that our
common law was also taken from us?

Remember the court has said that they will not rule on the constitutionality of an
act for anyone who avails themselves of a federal benefit. What is a federal
benefit? There are many of them. Could one be that you are using military script
in place of constitutional money?

Why would those pretending to be government, under necessity, have given us

military script to use? Could it be because we are the declared enemy and are
being functioned under private international martial law rule codes?

Does the enemy have the right to self determination?

Think, People. You can't free yourself until you understand how you have been
conquered.

You don't own anything, including your labor. Slaves can't own anything. You are
a debtor/slave/ citizen and everything you think you own has been pledged as
surety. The 16th amendment was passed after the Republic fell.

For all you researchers out there, a good place to start looking for the system we are
living under, go to Title III, sec. 301 and then read the Reorganization Acts under
Roosevelt in Title V.

He claims to have organized our government just like any other corporation. He places
the legislative branch and the judicial branch under the Executive. He claims the right to
make law. Now, I ask you, does this sound like anything constitutional to you? Under
what authority was it done?
Is the Republic alive and is the Constitution alive and well and being used as the foundation
document for the government? Do we have a dejure government, federal or state?

Let me ask you a question. Where in the Constitution is authority given to reorganize
government? Where is law making authority assigned to the President? Where in the
Constitution is the authority given to congress to have our law written and given to us by
international organizations? Where in the Constitution is the authority to license every
activity of human life? The Constitution states the type of law this nation may use.
Where is the authority for administrative law? I'm trying to make you read, learn and
think. I'm trying to teach you to fish. I'm trying to teach you to think....Quo Warranto "by
what authority?" Do you know the difference between lawful and legal?

Quo Warranto.
A. Quo warranto is an extraordinary procedure used to prevent an official or
legal entity from exercising its authority in an unlawful manner and to try
title to a public office, corporate office or franchise.
1. The primary question in quo warranto cases is whether some
person or corporation has usurped or intruded into another's lawful
 office or authority, or whether that person is unlawfully holding or
executing an office or franchise.
2. If the person against whom a quo warranto action is brought is
found to not have a valid claim to the office or authority he is
holding or exercising, he can be ousted from office or prevented
from continuing to exercise that authority.
3. The theory is that the office or franchise has been forfeited by an
act of misconduct by the official or corporation and thus is usurping
power illegally.
B. Some examples of the use of quo warranto are:
1. To determine whether a public official is qualified to hold his office
and exercise the functions of the office. Grounds for quo warranto
might be corruption in office, willful failure to perform statutory
duties, or not having the qualifications prescribed by statute for an
office.

Title 12, Sec. 95 (a) & (b) has named us as enemies of the United States
government. We continually ignore this fact when preparing a defense. We have
been captured in war, and the state believes we belong to them. The denial of
defense in court only serves to prove my point.

According to Black's Law Dictionary and Universal Law:

*Bella part cedunt reipublicae. Things captured in war belong or go to the state.

1Kent, Comm. 101; 5 C.Rob.Adm. 173, 181; The Joseph, 1 Gall. 558,
Fed.Cas.No.7,533.

Belligerent. In international law. As an adjective, it means engaged in lawful war.

As a noun, it designates either of two nations which are actually in a state of war
with each other, as well as their allies actively co-operating, as distinguished from
a nation which takes no part in the war and maintains a strict indifference as
between the contending parties, called a "neutral."

U.S. v. The Ambrose Light, D.C.N.Y., 25 F. 412; Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill.

151, 92 Am.Dec.159.

Claimant. One who claims or asserts a right, demand or claim though sometimes
"claimant" has a more restrictive meaning.

Weisberger v. Workman's Compensation Bureau, 70 N.D. 165, 292 N.W.

627, 128 A.L.R. 1482.
Insurgent. One who participates in an insurrection; one who opposes the
execution of law by force of arms, or who rises in revolt against the constituted
authorities.

Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13, 20.

Belligerency. In International law. The status of de facto statehood attributed to a

body of insurgents, by which their hostilities are legalized. Before they
can be recognized as belligerents they must have some sort of political
organization and be carrying what in international law is regarded as legal war.
There must be an armed struggle between two political bodies, each of which
exercises de facto authority over persona within a determining territory, and
commands an army which is prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.

Moore, Int. Law Digest. I. 196;

Dana's Wheaton. note 15. page 35;

In re Jones, 71 W.Va. 567, 77 S.E. 1029, 45 L.R. A.N.S.. 1030, Ann. Cas.
1914C, 31.

Belligerents. A body of insurgents who by reason of their temporary organized

government are regarded as conducting lawful hostilities. Also, militia, corps of
volunteers,and others, who although not part of the regular army of the state, are
regarded as lawful combatants provided they observe the laws of war.

See Ex parte Toscano, D.C.Cal., 208 F. 938. Also see Belligerency.

De Facto. In fact, in deed, actually.

United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 30 S.Ct. 93, 54 L.Ed. 195 (1909)

"Of late years a new policy has found expression in the legislation of Congress --
a policy which looks to the breaking up of tribal relations, the establishing of the
separate Indians in individual homes, free from national guardianship and charged
with all the rights and obligations of citizens of the United States. Of the power of
the Government to carry out this policy there can be no doubt. It is under no
constitutional obligation to perpetually continue the relationship of guardian
and ward. It may at any time abandon its guardianship and leave the ward to
assume and be subject to all the privileges and burdens of one sui juris. And
it is for Congress to determine when and how that relationship of guardianship
shall be abandoned. It is not within the power of the courts to overrule the
judgment of Congress. It is true there may be a presumption that no radical
 departure is intended, and courts may wisely insist that the purpose of Congress
be made clear by its legislation, but when that purpose is made clear the question
is at an end."

Seems one must petition Congress to ask for emancipation from guardianship of the
federal government to end the parens patriae relationship. I believe in the full case U.S.
citizenship was referred to as "a gift."

HR 38 (Thompson-R) Relative to Treatment of United States Citizens in

Mexico

Requests that the Congress of the United States initiate an investigation into the
mistreatment of a U. S. citizen (Mr. Donald "Don" Kraft) who was in a car accident on
August 24, 1999 while vacationing in Mexico. Mr. Kraft suffered serious injury,
including a broken neck. According to family members involved in the accident, Mr.
Kraft was prevented from being sent to Scripps Mercy Medical Center in San Diego by
two armed Mexican police. Mr. Kraft was detained in a Mexican hospital for 18 hours
and released only after family members were able to raise and pay a $2,300 bond to
Mexican officials and $4,700 for medical care. Mr. Kraft succumbed to his injuries and
passed away on Monday, September 7, 1999. Strongly requests that the Congress of the
United States initiate an investigation of this tragedy and take whatever steps are
necessary to ensure that no other American citizen is treated in this manner.

Adopted by the Assembly

You have the right to challenge the constitutionality of the state statute through the back door
through "intervention" during the discovery process.

The constitutionality of state statutes can be challenged by way of its enacting clause. If the
statute is one the legislature enacted then the statute is constitutional. If it has none, then the
court can rule that the statute is unconstitutional. To learn more about enacting clauses you need
the book The Authority of Law by Charles Weisman.

Here is why California won't arrest illegal aliens and deport them. They are being
held to Federal Treaty Law adopted in 1963. And you don't think there is a plan to
destroy this Nation?

This Treaty is in effect in every state. If the local governments would allow the
police to do their job they would be violating the Federal Treaty.

SB 287 (Baca-D) Law enforcement officers: arrest of foreign nationals

Requires California law enforcement agencies to develop training materials based
on pertinent law enforcement obligations under the 1963 Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations Treaty, as specified.

Chapter 268, Statutes of 1999\

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

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The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) was completed in 1963 as a

multilateral treaty to codify consular practices that developed through customary
international law and numerous bilateral treaties.

The VCCR enumerates basic legal rights and duties of signatory States including

the establishment and conduct of consular relations, by mutual consent, and

the privileges and immunities of consular officers and offices from the laws of the
receiving State (the country where the foreign consular office has been established).

Article 36 of the VCCR requires that foreign nationals who are arrested or detained be
given notice "without delay" of their right to have their embassy or consulate notified of
that arrest. The notice can be as simple as a fax, giving the person's name, the place of
arrest, and, if possible, something about the reason for the arrest or detention. The police
must fax that notice to the embassy or consulate, which can then check up on the person.

The United States is a party to this treaty, but it has not had a good historical track record
of compliance (partly because under the U.S. federal system, implementation is up to the
individual states in the great majority of cases, and the national government does not
have direct authority to enforce state government compliance). Mexico sued the United
States before the International Court of Justice, and Mexico won. (The case is called
Avena, and you can find the text of it on the website for the International Court of
Justice.) In March of 2005, the United States pulled out of the Optional Protocol to the
convention, which allows the International Court of Justice to intervene when detained
foreign nationals are denied access to consular officials when imprisoned in a country
that is a signatory to the convention.

'But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a

government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a
government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1) that its
 existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against
the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while
it exists it must necessarily be [229 U.S. 416, 429] obeyed in civil matters by private
citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not
become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the
laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established
over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually
administered directly by military authority, but they may be
administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly
by military force.' Thornington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1, 9, 19 L. ed. 361, 363.

I spent all day yesterday researching the above case. I have come to the conclusion that
we are indeed under the jurisdiction of a military authority, administered by civil
authority, and the courts run America. It goes all the way back to before the Revolution.
International treaties, codified into law, are superior to domestic law, ( as stated by the
Supreme Court) starting at the time of the Revolution. (No transfer of American soil
from the Crown) The colonies were British (Crown) corporations. Washington D.C.
became the Mother Corp. and the colonies became her Inc's.

Peace was never declared after the civil war, and we are still functioning under the war
powers. This explains why we don't win in the courts. The national Constitution has been
suspended. The states', as Inc.'s , also had their Constitutions suspended. We lost our
law, which is supposed to be certified as constitutional before it can be implemented. NO
REMEDY. This explains the Rule of Necessity. You cannot claim to be a citizen of a
State or the U.S. because neither exist as de jure governments, they are governments de
facto.

However, since our de facto governments won't tell us this, and we are still functioning
under the belief that the constitutions are de jure, I still think we can challenge under the
"absence of law is the remedy" theory. Just exactly what is this theory? As I said before,
all law has to be certified as constitutional by the state supreme court before it can be
implemented. When charged with violating a law, one should subpoena the certification
of the act by the state supreme court. One should also subpoena the Attorney General of
the state to testify to the constitutionality of the act. Because the law will not be certified
as constitutional, and the state Attorney will not testify to the constitutionality of the act,
nothing remains but for the court to dismiss your case. I've used this technique is a
firearms violation case in which the defendant, if found guilty, would have been given 40
years in jail. Instead, on the day of his trial, he was called to the bench and told his case
has been dismissed.

I believe that all judges, once they reach the appellate level are aware of the above facts.
The more arrogant the judge, the more he knows about the government being de facto.
The law schools are private, so the lawyers are educated to work for the de facto system,
by making sure that the will of the state is imposed upon us. There was a deal struck
that, if any person who doesn't have a lawyer to bring a case before the courts, and if
this person proves the fraud, and speaks the truth about the fraud, the courts are
compelled to not allow the case to be cited or published anywhere. The courts cannot
afford to have the case freely available in the public archives. This would be evidence of
the fraud. That is why you can't hire an attorney. An attorney is compelled to uphold the
fraud.

How many times have we been told by a Judge that the Constitution does not exist in his
courtroom. He was telling us something very important but we weren't listening.....You have to
empty your mind at look at "no law = no remedy." If there is no remedy there can be no charges
of violating a law. It has always be understood that there MUST be a remedy for every violation of
law. WE CAN'T find one, because one doesn't exist. BUT...

How often have you challenged the law you are accused of violating as being certified as
constitutional by the supreme court of your state? I bet you have never done this. How
many times have you subpoened the Attorney General of your state to testify to the
constitutionality of the act you are charged with violating? NEVER?

It sounds too simple doesn't it? Perhaps remedy has been staring us in the face but we
thought it was too simple a defense. Perhaps it is the only defense we have left.
Joyce

I've spent the last 20 years connecting the dots. I now believe I have discovered how to get
REMEDY, but no one here seems to want to discuss it. They just want to bitch and moan. I guess
they like bitching and moaning...
Joyce

(d) This state includes the land and water and the air space above the
land and water over which this state has power to define offenses.

I don't know how many of you are familiar with the "Informer", but he was my mentor for many
years. He told me several things that seemed unbelievable at the time.

One of these things was that this country was set up to fail by our founding fathers. His
resaearch has proven this. Another was that President George Washington placed an overlay
shaped like the continental united states, raised it about 2 feet into the air and pronounced it to be
the united states. I didn't understand what he was talking about at the time, but now I do. After the
American Revolution was won, no land was transfered to the new nation. England still holds title
to the land. In order for us to have a new nation, it had to be above the land. Dessie's information
proves it. Impossible to comprehend? I always thought so. Not any more......

Joyce

Ralph has just sent us his latest research on INTERVENTION. In the government law is
the mention of it's role as PARENS PATRIAE.....This may be the most important
information in this post. Please read what I have inserted under Ralph's info.
 209. INTERVENTION IN PUBLIC INTEREST

While a public official may not intrude in a purely private controversy, permissive
intervention is available when sought because an aspect of the public interest with which
he is officially concerned is involved in the litigation. [FN1] The standing of the state
as parens patriae to intervene in a lawsuit of direct significance to the general welfare of the
populace has been recognized. [FN2] However, notwithstanding this public interest, the official may be
denied intervention in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion finding that intervention would unduly
expand the controversy or otherwise lead to improvident delay or expense. [FN3]

Either the state or one of its subdivisions may intervene in an action where it has
interests that would entitle a private person owning similar rights or subject to similar
liabilities to intervene, [FN4] or where the public interests warrant intervention. [FN5]

The United States may intervene in an appropriate action in which it has a proprietary
or governmental interest. [FN6]

Today the federal government "mandates, orders and compels" the states to
enforce federal jurisdiction upon it's citizens/subjects. This author believes the
federal government draws it's de facto jurisdiction for these actions from the
"Doctrine of Parens Patriae." Patens patriae means literally, "parent of the
country." It refers traditionally to the role of state as sovereign and guardian of
persons under legal disability.

Parens patriae originates from the English common law where the King had a
royal prerogative to act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as
infants.

With the birth registration established, the federal government, under the
doctrine of parens patriae, had the mechanism to take over all the assets of the
American people and put them into debt into perpetuity. Under this doctrine, if
one is born with a disability, the state, (the sovereign) has the responsibility to
take care of you. This author believes that the disability you are born with is, in
fact, the birth itself. I believe that when you are born, you are born free, a
"citizen of the soil," an American National. Parents, without full disclosure
under law, make application for a "birth certificate," thereby making the child a
citizen of the corporate government known as the United States. The
government then turns the new citizen into a corporation under the laws of the
state. The birth information is collected by the state and is then turned over to
the U.S. Department of Commerce. The corporation is then placed into a
"trust", known as a "Cestui Que Trust". A cestui que trust is defined as: He who
has a right to a beneficial interest in and out of an estate the legal title to which
is vested in another; The beneficiary of another. Cestui que use is : He for
whose use and benefit lands or tenements are held by another. The cestui que
use has the right to receive the profits and benefits of the estate, but the legal
title and possession, as well the duty of defending the same, reside in the other.

The government becomes the Trustee, while the child becomes the beneficiary
of his own trust. Legal title to everything the child will ever own is now vested
in the federal government. The government then places the Trust into the hands
of the parents, who are made the "guardians." The child may reside in the hands
of the guardians (parents) until such time as the state claims that the parents are
no longer capable to serve. The state then goes into the home and removes the
"trust" from the guardians. At majority, the parents lose their guardianship.

The subject of every birth certificate is a child. The child is a valuable asset,
which if properly trained, can contribute valuable assets provided by its labor
for many years. The child itself is the asset of the trust established by the birth
certificate. "Title" to your child is now owned by the state. The state now
directs the trust corpus and provides "benefits" for the beneficiary -- the corpus
and beneficiary being one and the same -- the citizen -- first as child, then as
adult.

The debt transfers from the death of one corpus to the birth of another through
the process know as "Novation." Novation is defined as "the substitution of a
new contract between same or different parties; The substitution of a new debt
or obligation for an existing one; The substitution of one debtor for another or
of one creditor for another, whereby the old debt is extinguished. This author
believes the debt of an individual is extinguished at his death, and the same
debt is then transfered to a new individual when he/she is born through the
registering of the birth, thereby creating a new corpus that will again reside in
the hands of the trust.

Each one of us, including our children, are considered assets of the bankrupt
United States which acts as the "Debtor in Possession.". We are now designated
by this government as "HUMAN RESOURCES," with new such resources
being added (born) continually. The bankruptcy is a receivership, rather than a
discharged bankruptcy. The bankruptcy debts are serviced, not paid or
discharged. The Human Resources service the debt, which continues to grow
with time.
The federal government, under Title 15, U.S.C., re-delegates federal parens
patriae authority to the state attorney generals. The attorney generals' can now
enforce all legislation involving your personal life , the lives of your children,
and your material assets.

New Hampshire Code

541 A:32 Intervention.

I. The presiding officer shall grant one or more petitions for intervention if:

(a) The petition is submitted in writing to the presiding officer; with copies mailed to all
parties named in the presiding officer's notice of the hearing, at least 3 days before the
hearing;

(b) The petition states facts demonstrating that the petitioner's rights, duties, privileges,
immunities or other substantial interests may be affected by the proceeding or that the
petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under any provision of law; and

(c) The presiding officer determines that the interests of justice and the orderly and
prompt conduct of the proceedings would not be impaired by allowing the intervention.

II. The presiding officer may grant one or more petitions for intervention at any time,
upon determining that such intervention would be in the interests of justice and would not
impair the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceedings.

III. If a petitioner qualifies for intervention, the presiding officer may impose conditions
upon the intervenor's participation in the proceedings, either at the time that intervention
is granted or at any subsequent time. Such conditions may include, but are not limited to:

(a) Limitation of the intervenor's participation to designated issues in which the

intervenor has a particular interest demonstrated by the petitioner.

(b) Limitation of the intervenor's use of cross examination and other procedures so as to
promote the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceedings.

(c) Requiring 2 or more intervenors to combine their

presentations of evidence and argument, cross examination, and other participation in

the proceedings.

IV. Limitations imposed in accordance with paragraph III shall not be so extensive as to
prevent the intervenor from protecting the interest which formed the basis of the
intervention.
V. The presiding officer shall render an order granting or denying each petition for
intervention, specifying any conditions and briefly stating the reasons for the order. The
presiding officer may modify the order at any time, stating the reasons for the
modification.
Source. 1994, 412:1, eff. Aug. 9, 1994.

RULE 24. INTERVENTION

(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2)
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when
an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.
When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive
order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation,
order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the
officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising
its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the parties
as provided in Rule 5. The motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a
pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought. The same procedure
shall be followed when a statute of the United States gives a right to intervene. When the
constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question in any
action in which the United States or an officer, agency, or employee thereof is not a party, the
court shall notify the Attorney General of the United States as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. ' 2403.
When the constitutionality of any statute of a State affecting the public interest is drawn in
question in any action in which that State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a
party, the court shall notify the attorney general of the State as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. ' 2403.
A party challenging the constitutionality of legislation should call the attention of the court to its
consequential duty, but failure to do so is not a waiver of any constitutional right otherwise timely
asserted.

[Amended December 27, 1946, effective March 19, 1948; December 29, 1948, effective October
20, 1949; January 21, 1963, effective July 1, 1963; February 28, 1966, effective July 1, 1966;
March 2, 1987, effective August 1, 1987; April 30, 1991, effective December 1, 1991.]
I have been looking through the u.S. Constitution and I can not find any authority for the feds to
have agreements or partnerships with the states to do that which the constitution prohibits. Yet, I
find that in every state partnerships exist between state governments and the feds to implement
federal laws in a state that violate both the federal and the state constitutions. These new
partnership relationships then trickle down into the counties of the states. The second
amendment is being trashed. The feds are taking over control of the water and land and
education and our children. There are 100's of new state "agencies" created exclusively to
implement these federal plans. It looks like huge federal grants are given to the states to form
these private bureaucracies for a year or two, and then the state has to develop some new form
of taxation to keep those bureaucracies funded. Have I overlooked something here?

Could someone out there please tell me where to look for the constitutional authority in either the
federal constitution or a state constitution to do these things?

Joyce

Compacts are "private" agreements between the states to do that which the constitution prohibits.
Challenges for any action against an individual for violating those private contracts should, in my
opinion be challenged by demanding to see certification of the law as constitutional. Those
"private " agreements lead to a codification process in the states. A judge will not allow a
constitutional challenge in the courtroom because he is usually serving and receiving funds as a
result of those private agreements. But, as far as I know, you still have the right to challenge the
constitutionality of the state statute through the back door through "intervention" during the
discovery process. You also have the right to demand production of documents which should
include copies of the state's consent to join and enforce the private agreements, signed MOU"s,
etc. etc.

OK Folks.....What do you think will be up for grabs next?

Title 3
Executive order 12803 of April 30, 1992
57 FR 19063 / May 4, 1992

TEXT: By the authority vested in me Sec. 3. Privatization initiative. To the

as president by the laws of the United extent permitted by law, the head of
States of America, end in order to each executive department and agency
ensure that the United States achieves shall undertake the following actions:
the most beneficial economic use of its (a) Review those procedures affecting
resources, it is hereby ordered as the management and disposition of
follows: federally financed infrastructure assets
owned by State and local governments
Section 1. Definitions. For purposes of and modify those procedures to
this order: (a) Privatization means encourage appropriate privatization of
the disposition or transfer of an such assets consistent: with this order;
infrastructure asset, such as by sale or (b) Assist State and Local
by long-term lease, from a State or governments in their efforts to
local government to a private party. advance the objectives of this order;
and
(b) infrastructure asset means any
asset financed in whole or in part by (c) Approve State and local
the Federal Government and needed governments requests to Privatize
for the functioning of the economy. infrastructure assets, consistent with
Examples of such assets include, but the criteria in section 4 of this order
are not limited to: roads, tunnels, and, where necessary, grant exceptions
bridges, electricity supply facilities. to the disposition requirements of the
mass transit, rail transportation, Uniform Administration
airports, ports. waterways, water Requirements for Grants and
supply facilities, recycling and Cooperative Agreements to State and
wastewater treatment facilities, solid Local Governments common rule, or
waste disposal facilities, housing, other relevant rules or regulations for
schools, prisons, and hospitals. infrastructure assets; provided that the
transfer price shall be distributed, as
(c) Originally authorized purposes paid, in the following manner: (i) State
means the general objectives of the and local governments shall first
original grant program; however, the recoup in full the unadjusted dollar
term is not intended to include every amount of their portion of total project
condition requires for a grantee to costs (including any transaction and
have obtained the original grant. fix-up costs they incur) associated
with the infrastructure assets involved;
(d) Transfer price means: (i) the (ii) if proceeds remain, then the
amount paid or to be paid by a private Federal Government shall recoup in
party for an infrastructure asset, if the full the amount of Federal grant
asset is transferred as a result of a awards, associated with the
competitive bidding; of (ii) the infrastructure assets, less the
appraised value of an infrastructure applicable share of accumulated
asset, as determined by the head of the depreciation on such asset (calculating
executive department or agency and using the Internal Revenue Service
the Director of the Office of accelerated depreciation schedule far
Management and Budget, if the asset the categories of assets in question);
is not transferred as a result of and (iii) finally, the State and local
competitive bidding. governments shall keep any remaining
proceeds,
(e) state and local governments
means the government of any state of Sec. 4. Criteria. To the extent
the United States, the District of permitted by law, the head of an
Columbia. any commonwealth. executive department or agency shall
territory, or possession of the United approve a request in accordance with
States, and any country, municipality, section 3(c) of this order only if the
city, town. township, local public grantee: (a) Agrees to use the proceeds
authority, school district, special described in section 3 (e)(iii) of this
district, intrastate district, regional or order only far investment in additional
interstate governmental entity, council infrastructure assets (after public
of governments, and any agency or notice of the proposed investment) or
instrumentality of a local government, for debt or tax reduction; and
and any federally recognized Indian
Tribe. (b) Demonstrates that a market
mechanism, legally enforceable
Sec. 2. Fundamental Principles. agreement, or regulatory mechanism
Executive departments and agencies will ensure that: (i) the infrastructure
shall be guided by the following asset or assets will continue to be used
objectives and principles: (a) Adequate for their originally authorized
and well-maintained infrastructure is purposes; and (ii) user charges will be
critical to economic growth. consistent with any current Federal
Consistent with the principles of conditions that protect users and the
federalism enumerated in Executive public by limiting the charges.
Order No. 12612, and in order to allow
the private sector to Provide for Sec. 5. Government-wide coordination
infrastructure modernization and and Review. In implementing
expansion, State and local Executive Order Nos. 12291 and
governments should have greater 12498 and OMB Circular No. A-19,
freedom to privatize infrastructure the Office of Management and Budget,
assets. to the extent permitted by law and
consistent with the provisions of those
(b) Private enterprise and authorities, shall take action to ensure
competitively driven improvements that the policies of the executive
are the foundation of our Nations department and agencies are consistent
economy and economic growth. with the principles, criteria. and
Federal financing of infrastructure requirements of this order. me Office
assets should not act as a barrier to the of Management and Budget shall
achievement of economic efficiencies review the results of implementing this
through additional private market order and report thereon to the
financing or competitive practices, or President one year after the date of this
both. order.

(c) State and local governments are in Sec. 6. Preservation of Existing m

the best position to assess and respond Authority. Nothing in this order is in
to local needs. States and local any way intended to limit any existing
governments should, subject to authority of the heads of executive
assuring continued compliance with departments and agencies to approve
Federal requirements that public use privatization proposals that are
be on reasonable and otherwise consistent with law.
nondiscriminatory terms, have
maximum possible freedom to make Sec. 7. Judicial Review. This order is
decisions concerning the maintenance intended only to improve the internal
 and disposition of their federally management of the executive branch,
financed infrastructure assets. and is not intended to create any right
or benefit, substantive or procedural,
(d) User fees are generally more enforceable by a party against the
efficient than general taxes as a means United States, its agencies or
to support infrastructure assets. instrumentalitys, its officers or
Privatization transactions should be employees, or any other person.
structured so as not to result in
unreasonable increases in charges to /a/ George Bush
users.
THE WHITE HOUSE

April 30, 1992.

The case cite below, Finn v. Brown.......states that when this nation was declared bankrupt in
1891, our private debt was hypothecated, but the debt held by bankers was not. Banks were
excluded from the law. I believe the same situation occurred when our bankruptcy was again
declared in 1933. The public lost their wealth by the reduction in the value of gold, while the
banks probably made a fortune buying it up. I don't know if you are aware that a double standard
for the value of our money was created at that time. Outside the country American money is
worth more than it is inside the country. Even though the nation was taken off the gold standard,
with gold declared unlawful to own privately, whereby monetized debt was declared by congress
to be the new currency in America, outside America the banks were still using gold for
international transactions. The government stated at the time that trade with foreign nations
could not be held to the same restrictions that were taking place in this country because the
national government had no authority to control the value of the currency of other nations. So,
the value of our gold was decreased to the point where it was almost worthless, allowing the
international bankers to bleed the wealth from this country while making millions in the
international markets.
All we have had as Americans since 1933 is circuses and cake.

Finn V. Brown...S.Ct. 1891..142 U.S. 56, 35 L.Ed. 936 pg 68

It is provided as follows, in regard to national banks, by Sec. 5146 of the Revised Statutes: "Every
director must, during his whole term of service, be a citizen of the United States, and at least
three-fourths of the directors must have resided in the State, Territory or district in which the
association is located, for at least one year immediately preceding their election, and must be
residents therein during their continuance in office. Every director must own, in his own right, at
least ten shares of the capital stock of the association of which he is a director. Any director who
ceases to be the owner of ten shares of the stock, or who becomes in any other manner
disqualified, shall thereby vacate his place." Section 5147 reads as follows: "Each director, when
appointed or elected, shall take an oath that he will, so far as the duty devolves on him, diligently
and honestly administer the affairs of such association, and will not knowingly violate, or
willingly permit to be violated, any of the provisions of this title, and that he is the owner in good
faith, and in his own right, of the number of shares of stock required by this title, subscribed by
him, or standing in his name on the books of the association, ****and that the same is not
hypothecated, or in any way pledged, as security for any loan or debt. ********* Such oath,
subscribed by the director making it, and certified by the officer before whom it is taken, shall be
immediately transmitted to the Comptroller of the Currency, and shall be filed and preserved in
his office."

U.S. Supreme Court

WILLIAMS v. VREELAND , 250 U.S. 295 (1919)
250 U.S. 295

WILLIAMS
v.
VREELAND.
No. 318.

Submitted April 23, 1919.

Decided June 2, 1919.

Mr. Stuart G. Gibboney, of New York City, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Pierre P. Garven, of Jersey City, N. J., for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Williams, as receiver, sued defendant in error in the United States District Court for New Jersey
to enforce [250 U.S. 295, 296] an assessment against her levied by the Comptroller of the
Currency ( section 5151, Rev. Stat.) because she apparently owned certain stock of the First
National Bank when it failed, December 6, 1913. She admits that the certificates were made out in
her name and at time of the failure were so entered on the bank books. But she claims that,
without her knowledge or consent, her husband caused them to be thus issued and entered, and,
further, that although she signed blank powers of attorney indorsed thereon and thereby made it
possible to transfer the stock from her name, she never really approved, ratified, or acquiesced in
the transfer to herself.

Each side asked for an instructed verdict without more. The trial judge directed one in favor of
Mrs. Vreeland, and in support of this action said:

'Although the burden was upon the defendant to show that she was not in fact the owner
of the stock (Finn v. Brown, 142 U.S. 56, 67 , 12 S. Sup. Ct. 136), I think that she has borne
the burden by proving that the placing of the stock in her name in the first instance was
unauthorized-without her knowledge and consent-and that she did not thereafter
acquiesce in this act or in any way ratify it . ... I am constrained to hold, therefore, that the
defendant is not liable and that a verdict should be directed in her favor.'

Final judgment entered upon the consequent verdict was approved by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. 244 Fed. 346, 156 C. C. A. 632.

In respect of the evidence and its conclusions therefrom the latter court said:
 'The plaintiff proved that the defendant was a shareholder of record and that she did
nothing to remove her name as such. This was sufficient to establish prima facie the
defendant's liability. Finn v. Brown, supra; Matteson v. Dent, 176 U.S. 521, 530 , 20 S.
Sup. Ct. 419. The burden then shifted to her (Finn v. Brown) to show that the act of
making her a shareholder was in the first in [250 U.S. 295, 297] stance unauthorized;
that it was without her knowledge or consent; and that she has not since acquiesced in or
ratified it. That she has sustained the burden upon the first two points is not disputed;
therefore the remaining question is as to evidence of her ratification. ... Considering this
testimony in connection with corroborating testimony, it appears to us that what Mary A.
Vreeland did, in legal effect, was to make a valid execution of a power of attorney for the
transfer of stock. That act, in so far as it authorized a transfer of stock, she cannot avoid
by pleading ignorance. As the question here does not involve the validity of the act to
effect a transfer, but concerns its evidential imputation of the knowledge with which it
was done, we are of opinion that the circumstances which attended the act were a part of
it, and affected the evidential inferences to be drawn from it. These circumstances show
that, before acting, the defendant requested to be informed as to what she was asked to
do; this information was denied her. It was denied her under representations and
influences which, when she acted, led her to believe she was doing something entirely
different from that which she was actually doing; that is, she was made to believe she was
correcting a mistake of her husband, a mistake affecting his affairs, not that she was
dealing with or assigning away her own property. Therefore we think the circumstances
were such as to negative the knowledge, which otherwise it is presumed her act would
have imparted. They contradicted the normal imputations of her act, and left her without
that knowledge which was a prerequisite to a valid ratification of her husband's
unauthorized act.'

It further held:

'Instead of submitting the case to the jury, however, each party asked the court for
binding instructions in his favor, which, under Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U.S. 154 , 15 Sup.
Ct. 566, is not a submission to the court without the intervention [250 U.S. 295, 298] of
a jury, within the intent of Rev. Stat. 649, 700 (Comp. St. 1587, 1668), but is equivalent to
a joint request for a finding of fact by the court, and when the court, acting upon such
request, directs the jury to find for one of the parties, both are concluded on its finding. In
this case the parties submitted to the court the question of the wife's ratification of her
husband's unauthorized act; that question was one of fact; upon it depended her liability.
The court's decision, as evidenced by its instruction to the jury that they render a verdict
for the defendant, was a finding of fact, which concluded both parties as effectually as if
the same fact had been found by the jury.'

The established rule is:

'Where both parties request a peremptory instruction and do nothing more they thereby
assume the facts to be undisputed and, in effect, submit to the trial judge the
determination of the inferences proper to be drawn therefrom.'

And upon review a finding of fact by the trial court under such circumstances must stand if the
record discloses substantial evidence to support it. Anderson v. Messenger, 158 Fed. 250, 253, 85
C. C. A. 468; Beuttell v. Magone, supra, 157 U.S. 154 , 15 Sup. Ct. 566; Empire State Cattle Co. v.
Atchison Ry. Co., 210 U.S. 1, 8 , 28 S. Sup. Ct. 607, 15 Ann. Cas. 70; Sena v. American Turquoise
Co., 220 U.S. 497, 501 , 31 S. Sup. Ct. 488; American National Bank v. Miller, 229 U.S. 517, 520 ,
33 S. Sup. Ct. 883; Mead v. Chesbrough Bldg. Co., 151 Fed. 998, 1002, 81 C. C. A. 184; American
National Bank v. Miller, 185 Fed. 338, 341, 107 C. C. A. 456.
Counsel for the receiver maintained that, when Mrs. Vreeland indorsed the certificates in blank at
the request of her husband, who declared this necessary to enable him to correct his mistake, she
thereby indisputably ratified his unauthorized transfer of the stock to her and assumed the duty
promptly to remove her name from the bank books or suffer the liability imposed upon duly
registered shareholders. But we think the courts below rightly held that facts and circumstances
concerning this indorsement could be shown in order to negative the inference which [250 U.S.
295, 299] would have followed if unexplained. Glenn v. Garth, 133 N. Y. 18, 36, 37, 30 N. E. 649,
31 N. E. 344. And as without doubt there is substantial evidence tending to show she had no
actual intention to ratify, affirm, or acquiesce in her husband's unauthorized act, we must accept
that as finally established.

In Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U.S. 138 , 10 Sup. Ct. 290, which involved the liability of a married woman
for an assessment levied against national bank stockholders, speaking through Mr. Justice
Harlan, this court approved a charge:

'If the stock in controversy was transferred upon the books of the German-American
Savings Bank to and in the name of the defendant without her knowledge and consent,
she was entitled to a verdict, unless she subsequently ratified and confirmed such
transfer.'

And it was further said:

'We must not be understood as saying that the mere transfer of the stocks on the books of
the bank to the name of the defendant imposed upon her the individual liability attached
by law to the position of shareholder in a national banking association. If the transfers
were, in fact, without her knowledge and consent, and she was not informed of what was
so done-nothing more appearing-she would not be held to have assumed or incurred
liability for the debts, contracts, and engagements of the bank. But if, after the transfers,
she joined in the application to convert the savings bank into a national bank, or in any
other mode approved, ratified or acquiesced in such transfers, or accepted any of the
benefits arising from the ownership of the stock thus put in her name on the books of the
bank, she was liable to be treated as a shareholder, with such responsibility as the law
imposes upon the shareholders of national banks.'

Approval, ratification, and acquiescence all presuppose the existence of some actual knowledge of
the prior action and what amounts to a purpose to abide by it. Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607, 629;
Western National Bank v. Armstrong, 152 U.S. 346, 352 , 14 S. Sup. Ct. 572; Glenn v. Garth,
supra. When [250 U.S. 295, 300] defendant in error signed blank powers of attorney she did not
know what her husband had done, and certainly entertained no purpose to approve transfer of the
certificates to herself. She thought she was merely doing something to enable him to correct his
avowed mistake and nothing else. Nobody was misled or put in a worse position as the result of
her act. 'As between the original parties that could not be deemed a ratification which was
accompanied by a refusal to ratify and a declared purpose to undo the unauthorized act. The form
adopted, by itself and unexplained, would tend to an inference of ratification, but it is not left
unexplained. The actual truth is established, and that truth must prevail over the form adopted as
between parties who have not been misled, to their harm, by the form of the transaction as
distinguished from its substance.' 'The presumption which might have flowed from the form of
the transaction disappears upon the explanation made, and in view of the substantial truth
proved by the evidence.' Glenn v. Garth, supra, 133 N. Y. 36, 37, 30 N. E. 651, 652.

The record reveals no material error, and the judgment below is

Affirmed.
-----------------------

Following is Bill Clinton's E.O. of March 4, 1997, on establishing a Commission to Study

Capital Budgeting; to define Capital; and to report on the federal government's
ownership of Capital & including HUMAN CAPITAL. The Commission is also ordered to
report on the depreciation of capital.

Question: How does one 'depreciate' human capital?

Emphasis, including bold and underline is ours

Executive Order No. 13037

COMMISSION TO STUDY CAPITAL BUDGETING

Ex. Ord. No. 13037, Mar. 3, 1997, 62 F.R. 10185, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 13066,
Oct. 29, 1997, 62 F.R. 59273; Ex. Ord. No. 13108, Dec. 11, 1998, 63 F.R. 69175,
provided:

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America, including the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C.
App.), it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. There is established the Commission to Study Capital

Budgeting (''Commission''). The Commission shall be bipartisan and shall be composed
of no more than 20 members appointed by the President. The members of the
Commission shall be

chosen from among individuals with expertise in public and private finance, government
officials, and leaders in the labor and business communities. The President shall
designate two co-chairs from among the members of the Commission.

Sec. 2. Functions. The Commission shall report on the following:

(a) Capital budgeting practices in other countries, in State and local governments in this country,
and in the private sector; the differences and similarities in their capital budgeting concepts and
processes; and the pertinence of their capital budgeting practices for budget decisionmaking and
accounting for actual budget outcomes by the Federal Government;

(b) The appropriate definition of capital for Federal budgeting, including: use of capital
for the Federal Government itself or the economy at large; ownership by the Federal
Government or some other entity; defense and nondefense capital; physical capital and
intangible or human capital; distinctions among investments in and for current, future,
and retired workers; distinctions between capital to increase productivity and capital to
enhance the quality of life; and existing definitions of capital for budgeting;
(c) The role of depreciation in capital budgeting, and the concept and measurement of
depreciation for purposes of a Federal capital budget; and

(d) The effect of a Federal capital budget on budgetary choices between capital and
noncapital means of achieving public objectives; implications for macroeconomic
stability; and potential mechanisms for budgetary discipline.

Sec. 3. Report. The Commission shall adopt its report through majority vote of its full
membership. The Commission shall report to the National Economic Council by
February 1, 1999.

Sec. 4. Administration.

(a) Members of the Commission shall serve without compensation for their work on the
Commission. While engaged in the work of the Commission, members appointed from among
private citizens of the United States may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of
subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the Government service (5
U.S.C. 5701-5707).

(b) The Department of the Treasury shall provide the Commission with funding and
administrative support. The Commission may have a paid staff, including detailees from
Federal agencies. The Secretary of the Treasury shall perform the functions of the
President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.),
except that of reporting to the Congress, in accordance with the guidelines and
procedures established by the Administrator of General Services.

Sec. 5. General Provisions. The Commission shall terminate on September 30, 1999.

William J. Clinton

-SECREF-