SearchandSeizure

CRUZVS.GATAN
FACTS: SerafinCruzwasarrestedalongKennonRoadatapolicecheckpointinBaguioCityfor
being a member of a subversive organization as ordered by Pres. Ferdinand Marcosinlinewith
the Martial Law. He was brought to Pampanga where he was heldforcustodialinvestigationby
Gen. Romeo Gatan. A Petition for Habeas Corpus was made on his behalf claimingthathewas
being held incommunicado, he was being held in custody without court order and he is not a
member of a subversive organization. Cruz, however, opted to stay undertheprotectivecustody
ofthePhilippineConstabulary.
ISSUE:Wasthearrestjustifiable?
DECISION: The arrestandcontinueddetentionwasjustifiableunderGeneralOrderNo.2A,as
amended, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081,datedSeptember
21, 1972, ordered the Secretary of National Defense "to arrest or cause the arrest and take into
custody and to hold them until otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly designated
representative: 1. Such persons as may have committed crimesandoffensesinfurtheranceoron
theoccasionoforincidenttoorinconnectionwiththecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellion.

OLAESVS.PEOPLE
FACTS: Adolfo Olaes questioned the admission by Judge Alicia Santos of evidence allegedly
acquired through an invalid search warrant and an extrajudicial confession obtained withoutthe
assistance of a counsel. The petitioners claim that the search warrant issued by the respondent
judge is unconstitutional because it does not indicate the specific offense they are supposed to
have committed butwasgenerallystatedasaviolationofRA6425ortheDangerousDrugsAct
of 1972 because the respondents has in their possession and control and custody of marijuana
dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics
preparations.
ISSUE:Cantheevidenceagainstthepetitionersbeadmitted?
DECISION: Yes for those obtained through the search warrant and no for the extrajudicial
confession. The search warrant was regular in all material respects that it is not necessary to
specify which section of the Dangerous Drugs Act was violated because the act charged was
described,whichisenoughforthejudgetopersonallydetermineprobablecause.
For the extrajudicial confession, it isnecessaryforthearrestingofficerstoinformtheaccusedof
his right to counsel and the effects of waiving such right. In waiving such right, it must be in
writing, which happened in thiscase,andtheaccusedmustbeassistedbycounsel,whichdidnot
happeninthiscase.

GeronimovRamos

FACTS: Meliton Geronimo and Bayani Ferrera were candidates in the mayoralty elections in
1980. GeronimowaselectedasmayorofBaras,Rizalwith2,695votesasagainstFerreras2,370
votes(325margin).
He was subsequently disqualified based on the petition filed by Julian Pendre to disqualify him
in January 19, 1980 on the ground that he was a political turncoat which the COMELEC
affirmed.OnJanuary

28, 1980 (2 days before election), Geronimo filed a petition for certiorari to restrain the
COMELEC and was granted. On September 26, 1981, the SC ruled that Geronimo was
disqualified for being a political turncoat. And he COMELEC then proclaimed Ferrera as the
mayor.

On May 3, 1982, the Geronimo together with some of his political followers of more than fifty
persons entered enmassetheMunicipalHallofBaras,occupieditspremisesandcontinuedtodo
so until May13,1982,causingaparalyzationofofficialbusinessinthemunicipality.Duringthis
period, Ferreraheldofficeinhisownhouse.Parenthetically,Geronimodidnotentertheofficeof
themayorbutstayedinanotherroominthemunicipalbuilding.

On May 4, 1982, Pendre filed with the COMELEC a motion to cite and declare Geronimo in
contempt. On May 12, 1982, the COMELEC after hearing, issued Resolution No. 82605,
finding Geronimo guilty of contempt and sentencing him to suffer an imprisonment of five (5)
months and to pay a fine of P1,000.00. In said resolution, the COMELEC simply "noted"
Geronimo'surgentmotionbecauseofitspreviousdenialofhismotionforreconsideration

At about 2:00 o'clockintheearlymorningofMay14,1982,Geronimoandhisfollowers,mostly

women were forcibly taken out of the municipalhallofBaras,Rizalbythemilitarywithtileuse
of teargas grenades. Gun shots were also fired by the Philippine Constabulary. Some of
Geronimo's followers retaliated with empty bottles when they heard the breaking of the glass
windows of the room where Geronimo was staying. The petitioner was seized, handcuffed, and
broughttotheNationalPenitentiaryinMuntinglupa,Rizal.

A series of criminal charges were filed against Geronimo and his 75 followers: :Usurpationof
Authority [Art. 177, Revised Penal Code (RPC)] Violation of Usurpation of Authority of
Official(sic)[Art.177,RevisedPenalCode(RPC)]TumultousAffray[Art.153,RPC]:Sedition
(Art. 139, RPC) Illegal Possession of Firearms Disobedience to a Person in Authority or the
AgentofsuchPerson(Art.151,RPC)andAlarmandScandal(Art.155,RPC).

Geronimo filed a petition for habeas corpus with the allegation that his arrestanddetentionwas
donewithgraveabuseofdiscretionandwithoutjurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON charges against Geronimo and his followers were issued with grave abuse and
discretion

HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC when it
held the petitioner guilty of contempt. However, we find the penalty of five (5) months
imprisonment to be harsh. Time and again, this Court has held that the power to punish for
contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, on the
corrective and not on the retaliatoryIdeaofpunishment.Thethirteen(13)daysduringwhichthe
petitioner was confined in the National Penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal more thansufficefor
thepurposeofservinghissentenceforcontempt.

The charges were filed almost successively: one onMarch20oneonApril12oneonApril14

two on May 4,twoonMay14,andoneonMay19,andwiththesamecourtandpresidedover
by the same judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Teresa, Rizal . In one of the criminal
complaints wherein about 75 people were charged, the warrants of arrest were issued on the
same day that the preliminary examination was conducted. Such a hasty and manifestly
haphazard manner of conducting the preliminary examination to determine probable cause for
the issuance of the warrants of arrest and eventually for the filing of the necessary information
cannot be sanctioned by this Court.Ajudgemustfirstsatisfyhimselfoftheexistenceofprobable
cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. The requirements are strict. (See Placer v.
Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463). Theexaminationmustbelegitimateandnotafeignedoneintended
tojustifyacourseofactionalreadypredetermined.

The SC ruled that it was highlyimprobableforthejudgetobeabletodeterminetheexistenceof

reasonable grounds to believe that theoffenseshavebeencommittedandthateachandeveryone
of the seventysix (76) persons are probably guilty thereof in a matter of a few hours and to
proceed with the issuance of the warrants of arrest also on the sameday.Therewasgraveabuse
onthepartofthejudgeontheissuanceofthewarrantsofarrests.

ENRILEvSALAZAR

G.R.No.92163June5,1990

FACTS:

In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
CourtofQuezonCityBranch103,inCriminalCaseNo.9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of SeniorStateProsecutorAurelioC.Trampe,StateProsecutorFerdinand
R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging SenatorEnrile,the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failedcoup
attemptagainstthenPresidentCorazonAquinofromNovember29toDecember10,1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight attheNBIheadquartersonTaftAvenue,Manila,

without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February28,1990,hewasbroughttoCampTomasKaringalin
Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern
PoliceDistrict,Brig.Gen.EdgardoDulaTorres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights. He questioned the regularity of the
issuance ofthewarrantofarrestagainsthim.HeclaimedthatitonlytookJudgeSalazaronehour
and twenty minutes from the raffling of the case to him to issuethewarrant.Enrileclaimedthat
such period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the
voluminousrecordofthecasefromtheprosecutionsoffice.

Enrile also claimed that the crime charged was nonexistent. He insists that there is no such
crime as rebellionwithmurderandmultiplefrustratedmurdercitingthelandmarkcaseofPeople
vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimessuch
as murder as such, the proper crime that should have been charged against him is simple
rebellionwhichisbailable.

For the prosecution, the SolicitorGeneralarguedthattheHernandezrulingshouldbeabandoned

andthatitshouldberuledthatrebellioncannotabsorbmoreseriouscrimeslikemurder.

ISSUE:WONnotJudgeSalazarpersonallydeterminedprobablecauseinthecaseatbar

HELD: ThisCourthasalreadyruled,however,thatitisnottheunavoidabledutyofthejudgeto
make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by
personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.
Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the
case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to
personally go over the voluminous recordsofthepreliminaryinvestigation.Merelybecausesaid
respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief periodwithinwhichtocomply
with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied nor
does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has
beenregularlyperformed.

PITAVS.CA

FACTS:

On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing anAntiSmutCampaigninitiatedbytheMayorof

the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special AntiNarcotics Group,
Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of
Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along
Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt
along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and severalofficersand
members of various student organizations. Among thepublicationsseized,andlaterburned,was
"PinoyPlayboy"magazinespublishedandcoeditedbyplaintiffLeoPita.

He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him from confiscating
more copies of his magazine and claimed that this was a violation of freedom of speech. The
court ordered him to show cause. He then filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary
restrainingorderagainstindiscriminateseizure.

Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence reading
materials but admitted that these were surrendered by the stall owners and the establishments
werenotraided.
Theotherdefendant,WPDSuperintendent,NarciscoCabrera,filednoanswer.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on
January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether thepublication
'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are
obscenceperseornot".
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the
motionforawritofpreliminaryinjunction,anddismissingthecaseforlackofmerit
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of the press is not
withoutrestraint.
IntheSC,thepetitionerclaimedthat:
1. The CA erredinholdingthatthepoliceofficerscouldwithoutanycourtwarrantororderseize
and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are
obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding
that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what
was submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of
preliminaryinjunction.
ISSUE:Whetherthesearchandseizurewasillegal.
HELD:YES

Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of thematterchargedasobscene,istodeprave

or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publicationorotherarticlechargedasbeingobscenemayfall
Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of
the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate
senseofthecommunityreachedbyit."(Kottinger)
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor
divided.
Katigbak "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant
themeofthematerialtakenasawholeappealstoprurientinterest."
KalawKatigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense that it
measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme"ofthework,ratherthanisolatedpassages,
which were central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that"contemporarycommunity
standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). KalawKatigbak undertook moreover to
make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence, to
temperthewidediscretionKottingerhadgivenuntolawenforcers.
The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which expressly
abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," to wit: "(a) whether 'the average
person, applying contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appealstothe
prurient interest . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law and (c) whether the work,taken
asawhole,lacksseriousliterary,artistic,political,orscientificvalue.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity"has
been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the constitutional dimension of the
problem.
Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of
free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions among
magistratespredicateduponarbitrary,ifvaguetheoriesofwhatisacceptabletosociety.
In the case at bar, thereisnochallengeontherightoftheState,inthelegitimateexercise
of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut
simply because one insistsitissmut.Soisitequallyevidentthatindividualtastesdevelop,adapt
to wideranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What
shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present
generation.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare(nopunintended)matterofopinion.
As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably
compoundedtheproblemratherthanresolvedit.
 Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression,
although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court hasconsistentlybeenontheside
of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State
interferenceandaction.Buttheburdentoshowthislieswiththeauthorities.
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the
existenceofsuchclearandpresentdanger."
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political
speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to
demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2)
present,tojustifyStateactiontostopthespeech.
The Court is not convinced thattheprivaterespondentshaveshowntherequiredproofto
justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had
been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the
said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search andseizure,by
wayofasearchwarrant.
HaspetitionerbeenfoundguiltyforpublishingobsceneworksunderPresidentialDecrees
Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can conclude thatthefactthattheformerrespondent
Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license toseizepropertyindisregardofdue
process.ThePDsdontgivetheauthoritiesthepermissiontoexecutehighhandedacts.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise,theybecomeunreasonableandsubjecttochallenge.
There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules ofCourtbutasthe
provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a lawfularrestanditmustbe
onaccountfoacrimecommitted.
The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision
which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been no warrant,
andthereisno"accused"heretospeakof,whooughttobe"punished".

PEOPLEVS.MENDOZA

FACTS: On November 11, 1988, accusedappellant, his wife Cecilia Mendoza, and their then
10yearold daughter attended the birthday party of a relative of accusedappellant held at
McDonald's in Harrison Plaza. While the party was going on, accusedappellant letf and
proceeded to Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant where hehadsomebeer.Whenitwastimefor
Cecilia and Charmainetogohome,theycouldnotfindaccusedappellant,hence,theydecidedto
justleave.
 Cecilia and Charmaine arrived home at around 7 o'clock in the evening but
accusedappellant was not yet there. After a while, mother and daughter left for the house of
Cecilia'sparentsinBacoor,CavitetobringsomeperfumeforCecilia'sbrother,Francisco.

At about 9 o'clock in the evening, Cecilia and Charmaine left Bacoor. They rode a
jeepney and at the gate of the subdivision where they live, they saw the car of Rowena
Hernandez, Cecilia's goddaughter, and they hitched a ride home. Finally home, they saw their
car already parked in the garage of their neighbor. All the lights in their house were on but the
screen door was locked. They knocked at the window but accusedappellant did not respond. A
moment later, however, accusedappellant opened the back door and mother and daughter went
straighttothemaster'sbedroom

While inside the master's bedroom, accusedappellant who was drunk instructed
Charmaine to get coldwaterandtodousehim.Shewillinglyobliged,afterwhichshewastoldto
go to her room. She changed her clothes and readied herself for bed. While in her room,
Charmaine heard her parents quarrelling over the issue of Cecilia and Charmaine having left
accusedappellant at the party. Thereafter, Charmaine suddenly heard three gunshots. Running
out of her room, Charmaine saw her mother Cecilia down on the floor of their living room,
bleeding profusely. Charmaine saw accusedappellant hiding a gun under the bedinherparents'
room.

Accusedappellant subsequently called his brotherinlaw, Sgt. Antonio Gabac, and told
him that Cecilia had been shot and is already dead. Gabac, on the other line, told
accusedappellant not to touch anything and that he would be arriving shortly. When Gabac
finally arrived, he and accusedappellant carried the lifeless body of Cecilia into
accusedappellant'scarandbroughthertothePerpetualHelpHospital.

Cecilia's father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughter's death, and
that valuables were being taken out of his daughter's house, decided to remove, together
with his sons, the remaining pieces of property therein, including accusedappellant's
personaleffects

From the aforestated personal effects of accusedappellant, Alipio found Mission

Order No. 86580893 dated November 7, 1986 issued to accusedappellant by Col. Eladio
Gonzales, PAF (GSC), Acting Wing Commander, 580th Aircraft Central Warning Wing,
VillamorAirbase,PasayCity,whichauthorizedaccusedappellanttocarryaColtRevolver,
38 CaliberwithSerialNo.41001fromNovember15,1986toDecember15,1986.Therewas
also a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, dated November 10, 1986, approved by
Captain Luis L. Salanguit of the Philippine Air Force and Lt. Col. Ramon Bandong and
issued to one Octavio L. Mendoza, Captain, PAF, Assistant Director for Personnel which
describedthefirearmas"OneColtRevolverSN41001"
ISSUE: Wether the trial court erred in substantially and almost totally relying on illegally
procured and/or inadmissible, unauthenticated, questionable documents, in grave violation of
accused's constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against
unreasonablesearchandseizure.

HELD:NO

Charmaine testified thal the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on
the night her mother was not shot. And weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she
saw with his father. Defense witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Pias police
investigators to surrender the gun, claimed that the same was surrendered to him by
accusedappellant shortly after the shooting incident. The possession of the fatal gun by
accusedappellant is further established by the memorandum receipt signed by
accusedappellant himself and a mission order authorizing him to carry the said weapon.
But accusedappellant claims that these documents were illegally procured ingraveviolationof
his constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against
unreasonablesearchandseizure.

The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such rights applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies. The case in piont is People vs. Marti
(193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the occasion to rule that the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's
person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by
privateindividualssoastobringitwithintheambitofallegedunlawfulintrusion.

In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by
accusedappellant's fatherinlaw Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, asearchwarrantis
dispensable.

Finally, contrary toaccusedappellant'sclaimthathewaslicensedandauthorizedtocarry

a .45 caliber pistol, the certification of Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief, Records, Legal and
Research Branch of the Firearm and Explosive Unit, dated December 29, 1989, shows that
accusedappellantisnotalicensedfireamholderofanykind.

SILAHISINTERNATIONALHOTELandJOSEPANLILIO
vs.
ROGELIOSOLUTAETAL

FACTS:
 Coronel Floro Maniego, General Manager of the Rapier Enforcement Professional
Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (REPISA) which Silahis International Hotel contracted
to provide its security force to the hotel had been receiving reports that sale and/or use of
marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution were going on in the union office at the hotel and
that there existed a theft syndicate in the hotel. Acting onthistip,JoseMarcelPanlilio,theVice
President for Finance of his copetitioner Silahis International Hotel allowed Maniego to place
thesuspectedmembersandofficersoftheunionundersurveillance.

At dawn of January 11, 1988, Loida Somacera, a laundry woman at the hotel, saw five
unidentified men forcibly trying to open the doors of the union door. Somecera narrated to
Rogelio Soluta (one of the respondents herein) the incident to which Soluta responded
immediately. Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he
fetched a locksmith, Efren Guevarra, who tried to assist him, Edna, Arnold Ilustrisimo and Ed
Bautista open the door. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and
started hitting Soluta and hiscompanions,drawingthemtoruntothefemalelockerroom,andto
thereafterproceedtotheEngineeringOfficewheretheycalledforpoliceassistance.

While awaiting the arrival of the police, Henry Babay, a union officer, and Panlilio, on
the latters request, met. At the meeting, Panlilio toldBabaythattheyproceedtotheunionoffice
where they would settle the mauling incident, to which Babay replied that thedooroftheoffice
could not be opened. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the
latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the
objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag wasfound
containingmarijuanafloweringtops.

Since marijuana was found in the room, a complaint was filed againt Soluta, Babay and
otherunionofficerswasfiledbeforetheFiscalsOfficeofManila,forviolationofTheDangerous
DrugsAct.

The RTC of Manila acquitted the petitioners due to the fact that the specimenand/orthe
marijuana flowering tops allegedly found inside the Union Office occupied by the accused are
notadmissibleinevidenceandwereconfiscatedundersuspiciouscircumstance.

Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union, thereafter filed before the
Manila RTC a Complaint against Silahis and Palilio including prosecuting Fiscal Jose Bautista
and Atty. Eduardo Tutaan whoassistedintheprosecutionofthecaseagainstthem,formalicious
prosecutionandviolationoftheirconstitutionalrightagainstillegalsearch.

 The RTC of Manila ruled in favor of Soluta et al and ordered Silahis et al. to pay
damages to Soluta and company. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed thedecisionofthe
RTCbutloweredtheamounttobeawardedtotheSolutaetal.

ISSUES:

1. WON PETITIONERS SEARCH OF THE UNION OFFICE IN THE INSTANT CASE WAS
ENTIRELYREASONABLEUNDERTHECIRCUMSTANCES
2. WON THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT
PETITIONERSARELIABLEFORDAMAGESUNDERARTICLE32OFTHECIVILCODE

HELD:
1. NO. Petitioners argue that being private persons, they are not covered by the standards set
forth in People vs. Aruta as the constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures is
not meant to be invoked against private individuals. Petitioners further argue that the search of
the union office was reasonable under the circumstances, given that the hotel owns the room
where the union holds office the search was not without probable cause as it was conducted
precisely due to reports received by petitioners that the union office was being used as a venue
for illegal activities, particularly the sale and/or use of prohibited drugs and the search was
conductedwiththeconsentandinthepresenceofunionofficerBabay.Thepetitionfails.

Petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal
activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the
union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11,1988,petitionersandtheircompanionsbarged
into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to
obtainone,andnotwithstandingtheobjectionofBabay.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under
any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless search is allowed by law. Petitioners
violation of individual respondents constitutional right against unreasonable search thus
furnishesthebasisfortheawardofdamagesunderArticle32oftheCivilCode.

2. NO. Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides that any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs the right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be liable to the latter for damages. It necessaryto
hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights
enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the
defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would
defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that
thereisaviolationoftheconstitutionalrightoftheplaintiff.

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINESvs.ANDREMARTI
FACTS:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his commonlaw wife,ShirleyReyes,wenttothe
booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them four (4)giftwrappedpackages.AnitaReyes(theproprietressandno
relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was
sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes then askedtheappellantif
she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In
viewofappellant'srepresentation,AnitaReyesnolongerinsistedoninspectingthepackages.

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or BureauofPosts,Mr.

Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves
and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an openingononeofthecellophane
wrappersandtookseveralgramsofthecontentsthereof

Job Reyes then prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples heextractedfromthecellophanewrapper.Hebroughtthe
letter and a sample of the shipment to the Narcotics Section of the NBI. He wasinterviewedby
theChiefofNarcoticsSection.JobReyesinformedtheNBIthattherestoftheshipmentwasstill
in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the
Reyes'officeatErmita,Manila.

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styrofoam and took out the
cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers. The package which allegedly contained books was
likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cakelike
dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also
opened.Itturnedoutthatdriedmarijuanaleaveswereneatlystockedunderneaththecigars.
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and ofthecontentsthereof,after
signinga"Receipt"acknowledgingc ustodyofthesaideffects

 A complaint for violation of The Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against Marti. Marti
contended that he was not the owner of the packages but rather a certain Michael, a German
national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their
30minute conversation, MichaelrequestedhimtoshipthepackagesandgavehimP2,000.00for
thecostoftheshipmentsincetheGermannationalwasabouttoleavethecountrythenextday.

ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE

ILLEGALLYSEARCHEDANDSEIZEDOBJECTSCONTAINEDINTHEFOURPARCELS

HELD: NO. The Court sees no cogent reason whythesameshouldnotbeadmittedagainsthim

in the prosecution of the offense charged. The contraband in the case at bar having come into
possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonablesearchandseizure.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that
NBIagentsconductedanillegalsearchandseizureoftheprohibitedmerchandise.Recordsofthe
case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
made search/inspection ofthepackages.Saidinspectionwasreasonableandastandardoperating
procedure onthepartofMr.Reyesasaprecautionarymeasurebeforedeliveryofpackagestothe
BureauofCustomsortheBureauofPosts.

It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took
samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business.
Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and
custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much
lessanillegalone,contrarytothepostulateofaccused/appellant.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by ReyesintoawarrantlesssearchandseizureproscribedbytheConstitution.Merelyto
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is
open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.Wherethecontraband
articles are identified withoutatrespassonthepartofthearrestingofficer,thereisnotthesearch
thatisprohibitedbytheconstitution.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable

doubtofthecrimechargedisherebyAFFIRMED.

ThePeopleofthePhilippinesvRogelioMengoteyTejas
Facts:
The Western PoliceDistrictofManilareceivedatipthatthereweresuspiciouspersonslurkingat
North Bay Boulevard in Tondo. As stated by Patrolmen Mercado and Juan inthetrial,theysaw
two men looking from side to side, one of whom was holding his abdomen. The two tried to
run away, when the officers introduced themselves as policemen. Mengote and his companion
failed to escape because the other police were just around. They were then searched. Mengote
was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Weeson revolver with 6 live bullets. His companion,
NicanorMorellos,hadafanknife
Aside from the police officers, the prosecution presented a withness, Rigoberto Danganan. The
witness identified the weapon confiscated from Mengote as one of those robbed in his house in
Malabon. The accused contended that the weapon had been planted. Mengote was convicted of
violating PD 1866 for illegally possessing a firearm and was sentenced with the penalty of
reclusionperpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal
seizure.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
However, the Solicitor General stated that the said provision is not applicable in the caseatbar.
ThelawfularrestofMengotewasbasedonRule113,Section5oftheRulesofCourt.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officerorprivatepersonmay,withouta
warrant,arrestaperson
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,isactuallycommitting,oris
attemptingtocommitanoffense
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicatingthatthepersontobearrestedhascommitteditand
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penalestablishmentor
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
hasescapedwhilebeingtransferredfromoneconfinementtoanother.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordancewithRule112,Section7.
Paragraph C is inapplicable to Mengote as he did not escape from any penal institution.
Requirements for Paragraph A is 1)afterhehascommittedorwhileheisactuallycommittingor
is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in thepresenceofthearrestingofficer.Looking
from side to side and holding his abdomen at 11:30 in the morning is definitely not an
offense. TheseactsdidnotestablishtherequirementsofparagraphA.Par.Bisnolessapplicable
because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution hasnot
shown that atthetimeofMengote'sarrestanoffensehadinfactjustbeencommittedandthatthe
arresting officers had personal knowledge of factsindicatingthatMengotehadcommittedit.All
they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller,andaboutacrimethathadyettobe
committed.
WHEREFORE, the appealeddecisionisREVERSEDandSETASIDE.Theaccusedappellantis
ACQUITTEDandorderedreleasedimmediatelyunlessheisvalidlydetainedforotheroffenses.

VALIDWARRANTLESSSEARCHANDSEIZURE
3.Searchmadeincidentaltoavalidarrest
Search incident to a lawful arrest, commonly known as search incident to arrest
(SITA) or the Chimel rule, is a legal principle that allows police to perform a warrantless
search of an arrested person, and the area within the arrestees immediate control, in the
interestofofficersafety,thepreventionofescape,andthedestructionofevidence.

3. PEOPLE OFTHEPHILIPPINESvsSPO3SANGKIAR,MIKETALIB,andJORDAN
MUSA
Facts:
On December 20, 2002, a confidential informant (CI) came to the Heinous Crime
Investigation Section (HCIS) of the Davao CityPoliceDepartmentandreportedthatthree(3)
suspected drug pushershadcontactedhimforadealinvolvingsix(6)plasticsachetsofshabu.
He was instructed to go thatsamemorningtoSt.PetersCollegeatToril,DavaoCityandlook
foranorangeNissanSentracar.
Police Chief Inspector Fulgencio Pavo, Sr. immediately formed a buybust team who
wouldactasposeurbuyer.
The team proceeded to the school where PO1 Ayao and the CI waited by the gate. At
around 8:45 a.m., an orange Nissan SentrabearingplatenumberUGR510stoppedinfrontof
them. The two men approached the vehicle and the CI talked briefly with SPO3 Ara, THe
poseurbuyer said hehadthemoneyandAratookoutseveralsachetswithcrystallinegranules
from his pocket and handed them to PO1 Ayao (poseurbuyer), who thereupon gave the
prearrangedsignaltoarresttheaccused.
Recovered from the group were plastic sachets of whitecrystallinesubstance:six(6)big
sachets, from Ara by PO1 Ayao five (5) bigsachets,fromMusabySPO1Furogandasmall
sachet,fromTalibbyPO2Lao.
The three suspects were brought to the HCIS and the seized items indorsed to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic Chemist
Austero, who conducted theexamination,foundthattheconfiscatedsachetsalltestedpositive
forshabu.
 Ara insisted that he was not holding anything and that the shabu taken from him was
planted.Heassertedthattheonlytimehesawshabuwasontelevision.
RTCpronouncedaccusedappellantsguiltyofthecrimescharged.
ISSUES:
1. Whetherthebuybustconductedwasvalid
2. Whetherthechainofcustodyovertheshabuwasunbroken.
HELD:
WarrantlessArrestandSeizureValid
Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buybustoperationhas
long been held as a legitimate method of catching offenders. It is a form of entrapment
employed as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of commission of an
offense. We have ruled that a buybust operation can be carried out after a long period of
planning. The period of planning for such operation cannot be dictated to the police
authorities who are to undertake such operation.It is unavailing then to argue that the
operatives had to first secure a warrant of arrest given that the objective oftheoperationwas
to apprehend the accusedappellants in flagrante delicto. In fact,oneofthesituationscovered
by a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a
person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the
presenceofapeaceofficerorprivateperson.
It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to arrest
accusedappellants. Probablecause,inwarrantlesssearches,mustonlybebasedonreasonable
ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
Probable cause was provided by information gathered from the CI and from
accusedappellantsthemselveswhentheyinstructedPO1Ayaotoentertheirvehicleandbegin
the transaction. The illegal sale of shabu inside accuseds vehicle was afterwards clearly
established. Thus, as we have previously held, the arresting officers were justified in making
the arrests asaccusedhadjustcommittedacrimewhenArasoldshabutoPO1Ayao.Taliband
Musa were also frisked for contraband as it may be logicallyinferredthattheywerealsopart
of Aras drug activities inside the vehicle. This inference was further strengthened by Musas
attempttodrivethevehicleawayandeludearrest.
Since the buybust operation was shown to be a legitimate form of entrapment. The
pieces of evidence thus seized therein were admissible. It was within legal bounds and no
anomalywasfoundintheconductofthebuybustoperation.

ValidityofBuyBustOperation
There are requirements that must be complied with in proving the legitimacy of drug
buybust operations. Nevertheless, this Courthasruledthatpresentationofthemarkedmoney
used is not such arequirement.Intheprosecutionforthesaleofdangerousdrugs,theabsence
of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution, as long as the
sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proved and the drug subject of the transaction is
presented before the court. In the instant case, the police officers testimonies adequately
established the illegal sale of shabu. The shabu was then presented before thetrialcourt.The
nonpresentationofthemarkedmoneymay,thus,beoverlookedasaperipheralmatter.

RequirementsofRA9165onProperInventory
Musa contends that since the markings on the seized items were only made atthepolice
station, there is a great possibility that these were replaced. The result, he argues,wouldbea
lack of guarantee that what were inventoried and photographed at the crime laboratory were
thesamespecimensconfiscatedfromtheaccused.
The Implementing Rules andRegulations(IRR)donotrequirestrictcomplianceastothe
chain of custody rule. The arrest of an accused will not be invalidated and the items seized
from him rendered inadmissibleonthesolegroundofnoncompliancewithSec.21,ArticleII
of RA 9165. Wehaveemphasizedthatwhatisessentialisthepreservationoftheintegrityand
the evidentiaryvalueoftheseizeditems,asthesamewouldbeutilizedinthedeterminationof
theguiltorinnocenceoftheaccused.

ACCUSEDAREGUILTY.

3.PEOPLEVSPENAFLORIDA
April10,2008

FACTS:
The chief of investigation and operation of the PNP station in Tiagon, Camarines sur,
SPO3 Vicente Competente received a tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana is being
transported from one barangay in TiagnontoHuyonhuyon.ThenmayorDomingoAgravente
organized a group of police who, upon his orders, proceeded to Huyonhuyon in order to
arrest Penaflorida. On their way to Huyonhuyon, the police over took Penafloridas bycle,
flagged him down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and a newspaper together
with some grocery items. Police officers confiscated themarijuanaandbroungthPenaflorida
to their headquartersandwaschargedofviolationofsection4articleIIofRA6425otherwise
knownasDangerousDrugsactof1972.
In assailing his conviction, Penaflorida said that the package containing marijuanawas
only given to him by Boyet Obias who requested him to bring the same to Jimmy Gonzales.
Penaflorida further assails that there is no evidence to prove that he freely and consciously
possessed the marijuanaandthatthepolicethepoliceshouldhavefirstinvestigatedthematter
andtriedtoobtainthewarrant,inteadofarbitrarilydetaininghim.
ISSUE:
WONPenafloridasarrestwasillegal.
HELD:
No. The police received the tip around 1:00 pm that Penaflorida was transporting
marijuana to Huyonhuyon. Certainly theyhadnotimetosecureawarrantasPenafloridawas
already in transit and was already committing a crime. Penaflorida was seen riding a bicycle
carrying with him the package of marijuana which demonstrates that he was already
committing a crime. Under said circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that
Penaflorida was committing a crime. Thus the warrantless arrest was justified. As to the
defense of Penaflorida of not knowingthecontentsofthepackage,thetrialcourtheldthathis
defense was impossible because marijuana has a distinct, sweet and unmistakable aroma
which could have alarmed him. Lastly, violation of RA 6425 constitutes a crime mala
prohibita , wherein the mere possession of a prohibited drug without legal authority is
punishable.Intent,motiveorknowledgethereofisnotnecessary.

3.MORENOVSAGOCHI
12Phil439

FACTS:
In May 1904, a complaint was presented against the Ago Chi charging him with
the crime of assassination. He was arrested and tried for said crime in the Court of First
Instance in the city of Manila. The Roberto Moreno was appointed bythecourttodefendthe
Ago Chi during the progress of the trial. Ago Chi was found guilty of the crime chargedand
was sentenced with the penalty of death. Ago Chi appealed to the Supreme Court. On April
1906. The court modified the finding of the lower court and sentenced the Ago Chi to be
imprisonedforaperiodoftwentyyearsofreclusiontemporal.
When Ago Chi was arrested, the police found P700 in his possession which was
then surrendered totheclerkofcourt.Morenothenpetitionedthecourttoturnovertohimthe
amount of P600 from the money which had been taken from the defendant as reasonable
compensation for his services. In December 1906, Moreno was awarded with P550
compensation.Hethenfiledapetitiontotheclerkofcourttorecoversaidamount.
Ago Chi was brought into court on the day fixed for the hearing and then and
there stated to the court that he was willing that a portion ofthemoneyoriginallytakenfrom
him by the officer making the arrest might be applied upon the execution, but thathewished
someofitreservedforhisownuse.
After hearing the respective parties, the judge of the lower court ordered thattheclerkpayto
Moreno, out of said money, the sum of P50 and further ordered that the balance should be
retainedbytheclerkforthebenefitoftheAgoChi.
Moreno Appealed said decision, assailing that court erredinarbitrarilyfixingthevalueofthe
services rendered by him in the trial of said cause at the sum of P50, and in not ordering the
clerktopaytohimthesumofP550.
ISSUE:
May third persons, creditors for example of the defendant, obtain a lien or claim
uponsuchpropertytakenfromthedefendantuponarrest?
HELD:
No. third persons, creditors, etc. cannot acquire any claim or lien upon such
property while thus in the hands of the officer, whichtheymightnotacquirehadtheproperty
remained in the custody of the defendant himself. To hold otherwise would lead to unlawful
and forcible searches of the person under cover of criminal of debts. Furthermore, todeprive
the defendantofhismoneyorpropertyunderothercircumstancesthanthosementionedabove
is to deprive him, perhaps, of the lawful means of defense.When it is fully shown that the
property so taken was in no way connected with the crime charged, the court should not
permit any advantage to be taken of the defendant, by reason of the fact that he had been
deprivedofhispropertybytheofficerandagainsthiswill.
3.NOLASCOVS.PANO,139SCRA541

Facts:
Milagros AguilarRoque wasarrestedtogetherwithCynthiaNolascobytheConstabulary
Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The
arrest took place at 11:30 a.m.ofAugust6,1984.Atnoonofthesameday,herpremiseswere
searchedand428documents,aportabletypewriterand2boxeswereseized.

Earlier that day,JudgeCruzPaoissuedasearchwarranttobeservedatAguilarRoques
leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the
documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the
fiscalsofficemerelychargedherandNolascowithillegalpossessionofsubversivematerials.

AguilarRoque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally
obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not
sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that
probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded
totheapplicantswitness.

Issue:
Whetherthesearchwarrantwasvalid?

Held:
NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonablesearchesandseizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses hemayproduce,andparticularlydescribingtheplaceto
besearchedandthethingstobeseized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizureofpersonal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
NationalDemocraticFront.Itdoesnotspecifywhatthesubversivebooksandinstructionsare
what the manuals not otherwise available to the public containtomakethemsubversiveorto
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriterand2woodenboxes.

It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court,
searchwarrantsofsimilardescriptionwereconsiderednullandvoidforbeingtoogeneral.

CarrollvsUS267U.S.132(1925)

FACTS: This was during the time of the Prohibition Act,whenliquorwasbannedintheUnited

States. Federal undercover agents arranged an undercover purchase to buy liquorfromKiroand
Carroll. They said they had to go to Grand Rapids, Michigan to get the liquor. The undercover
purchase never came to fruition because the two never returned. Later,whiletheagentswereon
their rounds, they saw both onahighway.Theagentsgavechase,stoppedthemandsearchedthe
car. They found 68 bottles of liquor. Carroll and Kiro say that this violates the Fourth
Amendment(searchandseizure)becausetherewasnosearchwarrant.

ISSUE:Wasthewarrantlesssearchontheautomobilevalid?

HELD: Yes, it was valid. This is now known as the Carroll doctrine: Search without a warrant
of an automobile, and seizure therein of liquor subject to seizure and destruction under the
Prohibition Act, do not violate the Amendment, ifmadeuponprobablecause,i.e.,uponabelief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the officer, that the vehicle contains such
contrabandliquor.

3.G.R.No.109232December29,1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs.ANG CHUN KIT also known as
"ROMYANG,"accusedappellant.

FACTS:

ANGCHUNKIT:
A Chinese national and a member of a HKbased drug syndicate operating in Metro
Manila
was collared by NARCOM operatives in a buybust operation after he sold to an
undercover agent for P400,000.00 a kilo of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as
shabu
hiscar:containeddrugsneatlytuckedinaKleenexbox.
8 November 1991(3pm): Confidential Informant (CI) reported to Chief Investigator Avelino I.
Razon that he (CI) had arranged a transaction with a drug dealer interested in selling a kilo of
shabu for P400,000.00 and agreed to do the sale at 7pm at the lobby of the Cardinal Santos
MedicalCenter.
ChiefInvestigatorRazon
organized a buybust team composed of Chief Inspector Rolando Magno as teamleader,
SPO3 Lolita Bugarin, SPO2 Cesar Jacobo as poseurbuyer, SPO2 Albert San Jose, and
SPO2DomingoRubi.
40) bundles of genuine and counterfeit P100bills were prepared with each bundle
supposedtocontainP10,000.00.
To camouflage thecounterfeitbillsgenuineP100billswereplacedonthetopandbottom
often(10)bundles.
The CI and SPO2Jacobo(carryingthemoney):wenttothelobbyofCSMCwhileothersmoved
aroundtoavoiddetection.
7:15pm:A ngChunKitarrivedinaToyotaCorolla.
Meeting:
He was met at the lobby by the CI who introduced SPO2 Jacobo to him as the person
interestedtobuyshabu.
 After quick look at the money, SPO2 Jacobo and the CI followed him to the parking lot
where the latter took out from the trunk of his car a blue SM Shoemart plastic bag and
handedittoSPO2Jacobo.
After ascertaining that the bag contained approximately one (1) kilo of shabu, SPO2
Jacobohandedtheboodlemoneytotheaccused.
Signal(arrest):

SPO2 Jacobo casually lit a cigarette to signal to the otherNARCOMoperativestomove

inandeffectthearrest.
The other members of the team closed in, placed the accused underarrestandseizedthe
money from him. They also searched his vehicle and found on the dashboard of his car
three(3)packetsmoreofcrystallinesubstanceinaKleenexbox.

Substance found in SM Shoemart bag and in the Kleenex box tobeshabuandweighing983.27

gramsand293.70grams

ContentionoftheAccused:
He denied the charges. He contended that a friend named Johnny Sy called him asking
him if he could ride with him to Greenhills to visit a sick friend at the CSMC and that the car
was owned by his cousin, Roman Ong. When he went to the parking lot, (20) to (30) minutes
later, plainclothesmen with guns drawn, Johnny and Anthony in tow, suddenly appeared from
nowhere and arrestedhimandUywithoutinformingthemthereasonfortheirarrest.Hetogether
with Uy, Sy and Co was then brought to Camp Crame where he was mauled, detained and
interrogated without the assistance of counsel. His repeated requests to make atelephonecallto
hisrelativesandcounselweredenied.
He alleges that the buy bust operation was a frame up and the evidence was merely
planted.

SearchandSeizure:
The defense argues : shabu found inside the car is inadmissible in evidence as it was
obtained through an illegal search and seizure,thesamehavingbeenfoundinsidethecarand
notinthepersonoftheaccusedwhowasoutsidethecar.

But the search inside the car was an incident of a lawful arrest. It must be remembered that the
accused was with a driver who was inside the car. Upon the arrest of the accused, the arresting
agents also had to neutralize the driver inside the car who could be presumed atthatinstanceto
be acting together and in conspiracy with the accused. For a weapon could have easily been
concealed in the dashboard of the vehicle, which was very well within the reachofthedriverat
that time. Corollarily, in People v. Figueroa we reiterated that "[t]he warrantless search and
seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control."21Thuswhether
the accused gave his consent to the search of the car which the arresting agents say he did, but
whichhedenies,isimmaterial.

HELD: wefinditdifficulttobelievetheversionoftheaccused.HedidnotevenpresentJohnny
Sy or Anthony Co to substantiate his story, much less did he reveal thenameofthepatientthey
were to visit in the hospital. Besides it appears that there was no reason for the accused to wait
for Johnny Sy and Anthony Co in the parking lot as they did not have any prior agreement to
meet there. On the contrary the accused still had to attend a dinner somewhere and should not
havewaitedanylonger.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding accused appellant Ang Chun Kit also
known as "Romy Ang" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling methamphetamine
hydrochloride in violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425, as amended, sentencing him to life
imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
accusedappellant.

3.G.R.No.34917September7,1931

THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINEISLANDS,plaintiffappellee,vs.

LUACHUandUYSETIENG,defendantsappellants.

The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of First
InstanceofCebuconvictingthemoftheillegalimportationofopium

FACTS:

November 1929: accusedUySeTiengwrotetohiscorrespondentinHKtosendhimashipment

ofopium.

November 4, 1929: Juan Samson (chief of the customs secret service of Cebu) called Joaquin
Natividad(collector of customs for the Port of Cebu) at his office, took 300 pesos from his
drawer and handed it, saying: "This is for you, and a shipment will arrive shortly, and you will
soon be able to recoup your travelling expenses. It was later found out that the shipment
consistedofopium.

Uy Se Tieng : that same night went to Samson's house and told him he had come by order of
Natividad to talk to him about the opium. He informed Samson that the opium shipment
consisted of 3,000 tins, and that will pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 atin,andthattheopiumhad
beeninHongkongsincethebeginningofOctoberawaitingashipthatwouldgodirecttoCebu.

December 14, 1929: The Kolambugan steamship arrived at Cebu. Samson detailed one of his
men to watch the ship. While Natividad, instructed him to do everything possible to have the
cargounloaded,andtorequireUySeTiengtopayovertheP6,000.

Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that night and was told that he must pay over the P6,000
beforetakingtheopiumoutofthecustomhouse.

The following day SamsoninformedColonelFranciscooftheConstabulary,ofallthathadtaken

place, andthesaidcolonelinstructedtheprovincialcommander,CaptainBuenconsejo,todiscuss
thecaptureoftheopiumownerswithSamson.

BuenconsejoandSamsonagreedtomeetatthelatter'shousethatsamenight.

Samson went to provincial fiscal and asked for a stenographer to takedowntheconversationhe

wouldhavewithUySeTienginthepresenceofCaptainBuenconsejo.

December 17, 1929: Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando and the stenographer went to
Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which hung
fromthewindowoverlookingtheentrancetothehouseonthegroundfloor.

Uy Se Tieng: arrived and asked Samsonifhehadbroughtthemoney.Herepliedthathehadnot,

saying that the owner of the opium, who wasLuaChu,wasafraidofhim.Samsonthentoldhim
totellLuaChunottobeafraid,andthathemightcometoSamson'shouse.

After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a back door entrance intothegarden,heaskedhimwherethe

opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that itwasinthecasesnumbered11to18,andthatthere
were3,252tins.
Uy Se Tieng returned accompanied by his codefendant Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole
owner of the opium, but that a man from Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy were also
owners.

Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the opium, and the latter answered that
Uy Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if he had brought the P6,000, Lua Chu
answered,no,butpromisedtodeliveritwhentheopiumwasinUySeTieng'swarehouse.

Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson'shouse,andasUySeTiengwashandingcertain

papers, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two
Chinamen, taking the aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills of lading and in invoice
writteninChinesecharacters,andrelatingtothearticles.

After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the
fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him.
Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took LuaChutotheConstabularyheadquarters,andthen
went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11to
18,theyfound3,252opiumtinshiddenawayinaquantitytodryfish.

ThevalueoftheopiumconfiscatedamountedtoP50,000.

ContentionoftheAccused:

The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson hadobtainedaloanofP200from

Uy Se Tieng,heinducedhimtoordertheopiumfromHongkongsayingthatitonlycostfromP2
to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20, and that he could make a good dealof
money by bringinginashipmentofthatdrugthatSamsontoldUySeTieng,thattherewouldbe
nodanger,becauseheandthecollectorofcustomswouldprotecthim

But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the
opium in question. Juan Samson denies this, andhisconductinconnectionwiththeintroduction
oftheprohibiteddrugintotheportofCebu,bearshimout.

A public official who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes ofgain,doesnot
take the steps necessary to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before
having obtained the profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothedthewayforthe
introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the accused had already planned its
importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its introduction into the country through the
Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a
successful issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the
smugglers.

The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime, as laid
down by the courts of theUnitedStates,aresummarizedin16CorpusJuris,page88,section57,
asfollows:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. While it has been said that the practice of
entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be
deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been
condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable,
the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy
solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in
the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that
class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation
merely furnishesevidenceofacourseofconduct.Meredeceptionbythedetectivewillnotshield
defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigationofthe
detective. Thefactthatanagentofanowneractsassupposedconfederateofathiefisnodefense
to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the originaldesignwasformedindependently
of such agent and where a person approached by the thief as his confederatenotifiestheowner
or the public authorities, and, being authorized by them to doso,assiststhethiefincarryingout
the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a
prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or
hiredinformerbuttherearecasesholdingthecontrary.

Held:

Juan Samson neitherinducednorinstigatedthehereindefendantsappellantstoimporttheopium

in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of
customs, Joaquin Natividad who had promised them thathewouldremoveallthedifficulties
in the way of their enterprise so farasthecustomhousewasconcernednottogaintheP2,000
intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the
prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral
in this or against the public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and
punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a
crimemerelytoprosecutehim,butitsimplyatrapsettocatchacriminal.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere factthatthechiefofthecustomssecret

service pretended to agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the
customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its
importers,isnobartotheprosecutionandconvictionofthelatter.

3.PEOPLEVSFIGUEROA248SCRA679
FACTS:
RobertFigueroawasconvictedoftheRTCofParanaqueCityforviolationofSection14A[2]of
RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. His coaccused Beatrice Valerio was acquitted.
Accordingly, the two willfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture, produce, prepare or
process methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug amounting to a 2.4 liters,
directlybymeansofchemicalsynthesis.
Before the arrest of Figueroa and Valerio, Palencia, an NBI Special Investigator received a call
from their informant who reported that a certain OBET or Figueroa was allegedly engagedin
large scale drug trafficking in Makati City. Palencia and Soriano, an NBI Intellegence Agent,
then instructed the informant for a buy bust operation. Palencia and Soriano, through the buy
bust operation, succeeded in apprehending Obet. (Although before he was apprehended, he
managed to take his mistress and her two children as hostages after firing two shots at Palencia
andSoriano.HesurrenderedtooneMajorRobertoReyes,thereafter.)
During his interrogationattheNBIheadquarters,hevolunteeredthatthesourceofhisshabuwas
a certain Betty (Valerio) of 263 El Grande Street, B.F. Homes, Paranaque City. Palencia and
Soriano took him to the said address for a followup operation. Betty insistently denied the
existence of the shabu, PALENCIA told OBET to confer with Betty. After a while, OBET
proceeded to the kitchen of the guesthouse located outside the main house, followed by Betty.
OBET then promptly pointed to what he termed as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with
otherdrugparaphernalia,suchasabeakerspray.PALENCIAandSORIANOseizedtheitems.
During the trial and on cross examination, PALENCIA admitted that he and SORIANO
conducted the search without a search warrant, but with the consent of Betty. He also admitted
thathedidnotactuallyseeOBETorBettyintheactofmanufacturingshabu
NBI Intelligence Agent II SORIANO corroborated PALENCIA's testimony. He likewise
admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET, during whichhedivulgedBettyasthesource
of shabu, was conducted in theabsenceofanycounsel.SORIANOalsoconfirmedPALENCIA's
testimony that they were not armed with a searchwarrant,butthattheyconductedthefollowup
operationatBetty'shouseunderthehotpursuittheory.
The trial court agreed with the prosecution's theory that the warrantless arrests of OBET and
Betty were conducted within the purview of valid warrantless arrests enumerated in Section
5,[24] Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. It then ruled as valid the consented warrantless search
conducted at the house of Betty. Consequently, it found that the very items seized by the NBI
agents at the kitchen of Betty's guesthouse were admissible as the corpusdelictioftheviolation
of Section 14A of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Thus, the trial court "believed" that the
paraphernalia seized were indispensable to the processing or manufacturing of shabu into
crystallized form. Although it conceded that the prosecution witnesses did not actually see the
crystallization processes, the trial court observed that the Dangerous Drug Act does not require
thattherebeactualmanufacturingactivitiesatthetimeoftheseizure.
The trial court, however, acquitted Betty for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence that
she,inconspiracywithOBET,manufacturedshabuwithouttherequisiteauthority.
Unsatisfied with the verdict, OBET appealed the decision to the SC onthegroundthattheState
failed to show by convincing evidence that shortly prior to or during custodial investigation, he
was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to have a competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice, and to be informed of such rights. He asserts that he did
notwaivethoserights.
HELD:
Needless to state, OBET cannot be investigated for anything in relation to shabu while under
custody without informing him of his rights to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Any waiver of such rights should be in
writing and made in the presence of a counsel pursuant to Section 12 (1)[26], Article III of the
Constitution. It has been held that these rights attach from the moment the investigation starts,
i.e. when theinvestigatingofficersbegintoaskquestionstoelicitinformationandconfessionsor
admissionsfromthesuspect.
It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to incustody
questioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of
regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with these constitutional
safeguards, extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial
investigation are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of a case. In other
words, confessions and admissions in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution
are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant and more so against third persons. This is so
evenifsuchstatementsaregospeltruthandvoluntarilygiven.Suchstatementsareuselessexcept
asevidenceagainsttheverypoliceauthoritieswhoviolatedthesuspect'srights.
SORIANO admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET was conducted without the
presence of a lawyer, and there is no proof that OBET waived said right andtherighttoremain
silent. No waiver in writing and in the presence of a counsel was presented. Thus, pursuant to
paragraph 3 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution any admission obtainedfromOBET
in the course of his custodial investigation wasinadmissibleagainsthimandcannotbeusedasa
justificationforthesearchwithoutawarrant.
The search conducted on Betty's house was allegedlyconsentedtobyBetty.Indeed,aconsented
search is one of the exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant. In case of consented
searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental
that to constitute, a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existenceofsuchrightand(3)the
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The third condition does not exist in
theinstantcase.Thefactis,Bettyaskedforasearchwarrant.
Neither can the search be appreciated asasearchincidentaltoavalidwarrantlessarrestofeither
Betty or OBET as intimated by the trial court. First, Betty's arrest did not precede the search.
Second,pertheprosecution'sevidenceOBETwasnotarrestedforpossessionorsaleofregulated
or prohibited drugs as a consequence of the buybust operation. He surrendered after taking
hostage Estrella and her two children, although he was thereafter held in custody for further
questioningonillegaldrugs.
There is no showing that the house occupied by Betty and the articles confiscated therefrom
belong to OBET. That OBET pointed to PALENCIA and SORIANO the places where the
articles were found provides no sufficient basisforaconclusionthattheybelongedtohim.Even
if the articles thus seized actually belonged to him, they cannot be constitutionally and legally
used against him to establish his criminal liability therefor, since the seizure was the fruit of an
invalidcustodialinvestigation.Wherefore,Obetisacquittedofthecrimecharged.

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINESvsBELENMARIACOS

GRNO.188611June162010

FACTS:

October27,2005inBrgyBalbalayang,PO2PallayocmetwithsecretagentoftheBarangay
IntelligenceNetworkwhoinformedhimthatabaggageofmarijuanahadbeenloadedina
passengerjeepneythatwasabouttoleaveforthepoblacion.Theagentmentioned3bagsand1
plasticbag.Further,theagentdescribedabackpackbagwithO.K.marking.PO2Pallayoc
boardedthesaidjeepneyandpositionedhimselfontopthereof.Hefoundbricksofmarijuana
wrappedinnewspapers.Hethemaskedtheotherpassengersabouttheownerofthebag,butno
oneknow.Whenthejeepneyreachedthepoblacion,PO2Pallayocalightedtogetherwithother
passengers.Unfortunately,hedidnotnoticedwhotooktheblackbackpackfromatopthe
jeepney.Heonlyrealizedafewmomentslaterthatthesaidbagand3otherbagswerealready
beingcarriedawaybytwo(2)women.Hecaughtupwiththewomenandintroducedhimselfasa
policeman.Hetoldthemthattheywereunderarrest,butthewomengotaway.

RULING:

UNDERARTICLEIII,SECTION2OFTHEPHILIPPINECONSTITUTIONPROVIDES:The
rightofthePeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papers,andeffectsagainstunreasonable
searchesandseizuresofwhatevernatureandforanypurposeshallbeinviolable,andnosearch
warrantorwarrantofarrestshallissueexceptuponprobablecausetobedeterminedpersonally
bytheJudgeafterexaminationunderoathoraffirmationofthecomplainantandthewitnesseshe
mayproduce,andparticularlydescribingtheplacetobesearchedandthepersonsorthingstobe
seized.

ButInthiscasetheWARRANTLESSSEARCHisjustified.

Reason:MOVINGVEHICLE(WARRANTLESSSEARCH)Thishasbeenjustifiedonthe
groundthatthemobilityofmotorvehiclesmakesitpossibleforthevehicletobesearchedto
moveoutofthelocalityorjurisdictioninwhichthewarrantmustbesought.

Thisisnoway,however,givesthepoliceofficersunlimiteddiscretiontoconductwarrantless
searchesofautomobilesintheabsenceofprobablecausewhenavehicleisstoppedand
subjectedtoanextensionsearch,suchawarrantlesssearchhasbeenheldtobevalidonlyaslong
asofficersconductingthesearchhavereasonableorprobablecausetobelievebeforethesearch
thattheywillfindtheinstrumentalityorevidencepertainingtoacrime,inthevehicletobe
searched.Whenanaccusedischargedwithillegalpossessionortransportationofprohibited
drugs,theownershipthereofisimmaterial.Consequently,proofofownershipoftheconfiscated
marijuanaisnotnecessary.Appellantsallegedlackofknowledgedoesnotconstituteavalid
defence.Lackofcriminalintentandgoodfaitharenotexemptingcircumstanceswherethecrime
chargeismalumprohibitumBasedonthetestimonyofPO2Pallayoc,afterappellantsarrest,she
wasimmediatelybroughttothepolicestationwhereshestayedwhilewaitingfortheMayor.It
wastheMayorwhoopenedthepackages,revealingtheillegaldrugs,whichwerethereafter
markedandsenttothepolicecrimelaboratorythefollowingday.Contrarytoappellantsclaim,
theprosecutionsevidenceestablishesthechainofcustodyfromthetimeofappellantsarrestuntil
theprohibiteddrugsweretestedatthepolicecrimelaboratory.

Whileitistruethatthearrestingofficerfailedtostateexplicitlythejustifiablegroundfor
noncompliancewithSection21,thisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatappellantsarrestwasillegal
orthattheitemsseizedareinadmissible.Thejustifiablegroundwillremainunknownbecause
appellantdidnotquestionthecustodyanddispositionoftheitemstakenfromherduringthe
trial.[38]EvenassumingthatthepoliceofficersfailedtoabidebySection21,appellantshould
haveraisedthisissuebeforethetrialcourt.Shecouldhavemovedforthequashalofthe
informationatthefirstinstance.Butshedidnot.Hence,sheisdeemedtohavewaivedany
objectiononthematter.
 Further,theactionsofthepoliceofficers,inrelationtotheproceduralrulesonthechainof
custody,enjoyedthepresumptionofregularityintheperformanceofofficialfunctions.Courts
accordcredenceandfullfaithtothetestimoniesofpoliceauthorities,astheyarepresumedtobe
performingtheirdutiesregularly,absentanyconvincingprooftothecontrary.[39]

Insum,theprosecutionsuccessfullyestablishedappellantsguilt.Thus,herconvictionmustbe
affirmed.

WHEREFORE,theforegoingpremisesconsidered,theappealisDISMISSED.TheDecisionof
theCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CRHCNo.02718isAFFIRMED(GUILTYaschargedand
sentenceshere(sic)tosufferthepenaltyoflifeimprisonmentandtopayafineofP500,000.00.
The7,030.3gramsofmarijuanaareorderedconfiscatedandturnedovertothePhilippineDrug
EnforcementAgencyfordestructioninthepresenceoftheCourtpersonnelandmedia.)

SOORDERED.

ESPANOVSCA

RODOLFOESPANOvs.COURTOFAPPEALSandPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES

G.R.No.120431April1,1998

Facts:

Pat.PagilagantogetherwithotherpoliceofficerswenttoZamoraandPandacanStreets,Manila
toconfirmreportsofdrugpushinginthearea.Theysawpetitionersellingsomethingtoanother
person.Aftertheallegedbuyerleft,theyapproachedpetitioner,identifiedthemselvesas
policemen,andfriskedhim.Thesearchyieldedtwoplasticcellophaneteabagsofmarijuana.
Whenaskedifhehadmoremarijuana,herepliedthattherewasmoreinhishouse.The
policemenwenttohisresidencewheretheyfoundtenmorecellophaneteabagsofmarijuana.
Petitionerwasbroughttothepoliceheadquarterswherehewaschargedofpossessionof
prohibiteddrugs.

Issue:
 Whetherornotthepiecesofevidencewereinadmissible

Ruling:

TheSupremeCourtheldthatSection5Rule113oftheRulesofCourtprovides:

Arrestwithoutwarrantwhenlawfulapeaceofficeroraprivatepersonmay,withouta
warrant,arrestaperson:

When,inthepresence,thepersontobearrestedhascommitted,isactuallycommitting,oris
attemptingtocommitanoffense...

Petitionersarrestfallssquarelyundertheaforecitedrule.Hewascaughtinflagranteasaresult
ofabuybustoperationconductedbypoliceofficersonthebasisofinformationreceived
regardingtheillegaltradeofdrugswithinthearea.Thepoliceofficersawpetitionerhandling
oversomethingtoanallegedbuyer.Afterthebuyerleft,theysearchedhimanddiscoveredtwo
cellophaneofmarijuana.Hisarrestwas,therefore,lawfulandthetwocellophanebagof
marijuanaseizedwereadmissibleinevidence,beingfruitsofthecrime.

3.Searchofmovingvehicles

PEOPLEVS.MALMSTEDT

FACTS: Accusedappellant Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for
the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. On May 7, 1989, the accused went to Sagada and
stayedtherefor2days.OnMay11,1989,fromSagada,hetookabusridegoingtoBaguio.

On the same date (may 11), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer oftheFirstRegional
Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, received reports that vehicles comingfrom
Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs and that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. He then ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of
checkingallvehiclescomingfromtheCordilleraRegion.

The bus where accused was riding reached the said checkpoint. 2 NARCOM officers inspected
the bus. One of themnoticedabulgeonaccused'swaist.Suspectingthebulgeonaccused'swaist
to be a gun, the officer asked for accused'spassportandotheridentificationpapers.Theaccused
failure to comply, he was ordered to show what was bulging on his waist. The bulge contained
hashish,aderivativeofmarijuanawhichisaprohibiteddrug.Hewasbroughttotheheadquarters
forinvestigation.Onhisluggagewereteddybearswhereotherhashishwasfound.

The accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made
without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the
illegalsearcharenotadmissibleasevidenceagainsthim.

ISSUE:Whetherthesearchandseizuremadewasillegal.

HELD: No. The search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search
warrant. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A
crime was actually beingcommittedbytheaccusedandhewascaughtinflagrantedelicto.Thus,
the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisionsoflaw,whichallowawarrantlesssearchincidenttoalawfularrest.

Warrantless search of the personaleffectsofanaccusedhasbeendeclaredbythisCourtasvalid,

because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic
bagownedbytheaccused,orwheretheaccusedwasactingsuspiciously,andattemptedtoflee.

MustangLumberInc.vCA

FACTS:On1April1990,aninformationthatahugestockpileofnarraflitches,shorts,andslabs
wereseeninsidethelumberyardofthepetitioner.TheSpecialActionsandInvestigationDivision
(SAID) ofDENRorganizedateamofforestersandpolicemenandsentittoconductsurveillance
at the said lumberyard. They sawcomingoutfromthelumberyardatruckloadedwithlumberof
assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and
transport documents,theteamseizedthetrucktogetherwithitscargoandimpoundedthematthe
DENRcompound.

On 3 April 1990, the team wasabletosecureasearchwarrantfromExecutiveJudgeAdrianoR.

Osorio of the Regional Trial Court in Valenzuela. The team seized on that date from the
petitioners lumberyard four truckloadsofnarrashorts,trimmings,andslabsanegligiblenumber
ofnarralumberandapproximately200,000boardfeetoflumbers.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises ofthepetitioner'slumberyardinValenzuela

and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of lumbers because the
petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin,
auxiliary invoices, tallysheets,anddeliveryreceiptsfromthesourceoftheinvoicescoveringthe
lumbertoprovethelegitimacyoftheirsourceandorigin.

The accused questioned the seizure on1April1990,withoutanysearchandseizureorderissued

byajudge.

The trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's
truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
loaded with large volumes of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its
source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be
supportedbyavalidwarrant.

ThepetitionerappealedfromthedecisiontotheCourtofAppealshoweveritwasdismissed.

ISSUE: whether the seizure madeonApril1andthecontinuationofsearchandseizureonApril

4wasillegal.

HELD: The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power . The search
was conducted on a movingvehicle.Suchasearchcouldbelawfullyconductedwithoutasearch
warrant

Searchofamovingvehicleisoneofthefivedoctrinallyacceptedexceptionstotheconstitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issuedbyajudge
after personally determining the existence ofprobablecause.Theotherexceptionsare(1)search
as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence inplainview,(3)customssearches,and
(4)consentedwarrantlesssearch.

The search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of thesearchon3April1990doneunderandby

virtueofthesearchwarrantissuedon3April1990.

Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days.
Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot
be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until
completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be
continuedunderthesamewarrantthefollowingday,provideditisstillwithinthetendayperiod.

PacisvsPamaran

FACTS: Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile,model1957.Itwas

brought into this country without the payment of customs duty and taxes, its owner Donald
James Hatch being taxexempt. It was from him that respondent Santos acquired said car. 3 On
June25,1964,hepaid311.00forcustomsdutyandtaxes.

On July 22, 1964 received from Pedro Pacis a letter to the effect that the Land
Transportation Commission reported that such automobile was a "hot car." Pacis is the
Administrator of the General Affairs Administration of the DepartmentofNationalDefense.He
looked in the records and found that the customs taxes that should have been was2,500,more
or less. Based on such discrepancy, on July 22, 1964, he instituted seizure proceedings and
issued a warrant of seizure and detention. On the strength thereof, the automobile was taken
while it wasparkedonEconomiaStreet,Manila,byDepartmentofNationalDefenseagentswho
wereauthorizedtodosobyvirtueofthesaidwarrant.

ISSUE: WON Pedro Pacis committed usurpation of authority when he issued a search warrant
andawarrantofarrest,consideringthatsuchpowerswerejudicialfunctions.

HELD: There is no usurpation of authority. The search warrants issued and the search and
seizure performed in pursuance thereof is a valid exercise of police power. The Tariff and
Customs Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or searchanyland,inclosure,warehouse,storeorbuilding,
not being adwellinghouseandalsotoinspect,searchandexamineanyvesseloraircraftandany
trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveing any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning theneedofasearchwarrant
in said cases. But in the search of adwellinghouse,theCodeprovidesthatsaid"dwellinghouse
may be entered andsearchedonlyuponwarrantissuedbyajudgeorjusticeofthepeace...."Itis
our considered view, therefore, that except in thecaseofthesearchofadwellinghouse,persons
exercising police authority underthecustomslawmayeffectsearchandseizurewithoutasearch
warrantintheenforcementofcustomslaws.

From the foregoing, there was nosuchinfringement.Whatwasdonebypetitionerwasstrictlyin

accordance with settled principles of law. No doubtneedbeentertainedthenastothevalidityof
the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention. His liability for any alleged usurpation of
judicial function is nonexistent.Suchimputationwasdefinitelyunfounded.Evenifhoweverthe
matter were less clear, the claim that the search and seizure clause was in effect nullified is
hardlyimpressedwithmerit.

PAPAvsMAGO

FACTS: Reliable information wasreceivedbytheManilaPoliceDepartment,totheeffectthata

certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released
the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and
upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila andadulydeputizedagentof
the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the
trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the
counterintelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle,
Ermita, Manila. The load of the twotrucksconsistingofninebalesofgoods,andthetwotrucks,
were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed
ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties
Collected in Informal Entry No. 1475501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a
certainBienvenidoNaguit.

ISSUE:WONtheseizureofthegoodsarevalid,takingintoaccountthefollowingirregularities:

a. thegoodswereseizedwithoutavalidwarrantissuedbyacompetentcourt

b. that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to
examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the
CommissionerofCustomsand

c. that the goods were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs
Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that
theywereimportedillegally.

HELD:T
heseizurewasvalid,notwithstandingtheaforementionedirregularities.

Petitioner Martin Alagaoandhiscompanionpolicemenhadauthoritytoeffecttheseizure

without any search warrant issued by a componentcourt.TheTariffandCustomsCodedoesnot
require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority
under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,
inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house and also to inspect, search
and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on
board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or
conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling
house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace ...." It is our considered view, therefore, that
except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under
the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customslaws.

4.SeizeofEvidenceinPlainView

4.1Peoplev.AbeValdez

FACTS:

SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde,NuevaVizcaya,receivedatip

from an unnamed informer about the presence ofamarijuanaplantation.Itwasallegedlyowned
by Abe Valdez, and it was situated close to his hut. Police Inspector Alejandro Parungao, Chief
of Police of Villaverde, NuevaVizcayathenformedareactionteamfromhisoperativestoverify
the report. The team was composed of five members, namely, SPO3MarceloTipay,SPO2Noel
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro Morales, SPO1 Romulo Tobias, and PO2 Alfermer Balut. The specific
instructionsofInspectorParungaowere,touprootsaidmarijuanaplantsandarrestthecultivator
ofthesame.

Version of the Prosecution: At approximately 5:00 AM the following day, the police team,
together with the informant, went to the site where the marijuana was allegedly being grown.
After a threehour, uphill trek, they arrived at the site and found Valdez alone in his nipa hut.
They looked for the marijuana plants around the area and spotted seven (7) fivefoot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately twentyfive (25) meters from Valdezs
hut. PO2 Balut asked Valdez who owned the prohibited plants, and Valdez admitted that they
were his. Subsequently, the police team uprooted the seven (7) marijuana plants whichweighed
2.194 kilograms. They even took photos of Valdez standing beside the cannabis plants. Valdez
wasthenarrested.

One of the plants weighing 1.090 kilograms was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis affirmed that it was marijuana upon
finding calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana. The prosecution alsopresenteda
certification from the DENR that acknowledged Valdez as the occupant of the lot where the
marijuanawasfound.

Version of the Defense: At around 10:00 AM, Valdez was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio
Bulan when he was called by apersonwhohedidnotknow.ThisunknownpersonaskedValdez
to go with him to see something. The unknown person led Valdez to the place where the
marijuana plants were planted, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his nipa hut.Five
armed policemen were there, and asked Valdez if he had anyknowledgeofthemarijuanaplants
which Valdez denied. Upon Valdezs denial, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to
admit ownership of the plants. Valdez was so nervous and afraid that he admitted ownership of
the marijuana. The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana
plants. They also made him uproot five (5) of the marijuana plants and bring them to his hut,
whereanotherphotoofhimstandingnexttothepileofcannabisplantswastaken.

The police team brought Valdez to the police station. On the way,theywerewithacertainKiko
Pascua, a barangay peace officer. PascuathreatenedValdeztoadmitownershipofthemarijuana,
otherwise he would be put in a bad situation. It turns out that Pascua bore a grudge against
Valdez because Valdez refused to participate in Pascuas illegal logging activities. At the police
headquarters, Valdez reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the
police.

Contention of the Accused: There were ten other houses around the site where the marijuana
plants were planted, the nearest one being one hundred (100) meters away. The site is located
between the house of Valdez and the house of Carlito Pascua (Kiko Pascuas uncle). The
cannabis plants were not plantedinthelotwhichValdezcultivated.Thus,itcannotbeconcluded
thatValdezownedthemarijuanaplantation.

The Prosecutions Rebuttal: According to Tipay, the marijuana plantation was forty (40) meters
away from Valdezs hut, and two hundred fifty (250) meters away from Carlito Pascuas hut.
Tipay also admitted that no surveyor accompanied him when he made the measurements. He
further stated thathisbasisforclaimingthatValdezwastheownerofthecannabisplantswasthe
information given him by the police informer and theproximityofValdezshuttothesiteofthe
cannabisplants.

***The Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya found Abe Valdez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of theDangerousDrugsActof1972.Hewassentenced
tosufferthepenaltyofdeathbylethalinjection.

AutomaticReviewoftheSupremeCourt

Contention of the Accused: There was an unlawful search because (1) the law enforcers had
ample time to secure a search warrant and (2) although the marijuana plants were found in an
unfenced lot, that does not remove appellant from the mantle ofprotectionagainstunreasonable
searchesandseizures.

Contention of the State:TheOSGarguesthattherewasnosearchmadebythepoliceteaminthe

first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plantsinquestionweregrowninanunfenced
lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact,
immediately spotted by the police officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana
plants were, thus, in plain viewofthepoliceofficers.Theinstantcasemust,therefore,betreated
asawarrantlesslawfulsearchunderthe"plainview"doctrine.

ISSUES:

1.Whetherthesearchandseizureofthemarijuanaplantsislawfuland

2.Whethertheseizedplantsareadmissibleinevidenceagainsttheaccused.

HELD:

1. No, the search andseizureofthemarijuanaplantsisunlawful. Intheinstantcase,therewas

no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of
probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear thatthey
had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had
revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was
pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge
that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant.Buttheydidnot.Instead,
they uprooted the plants andapprehendedtheaccusedontheexcusethatthetripwasagood
six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against
illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and onlyunderspecificinstancesare
searches allowed without warrant. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights
covers both innocent and guiltyalikeagainstanyformofhighhandednessoflawenforcers,
regardlessofthepraiseworthinessoftheirintentions.

We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain
view"doctrine.Forthedoctrinetoapply,thefollowingelementsmustbepresent:
 (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
arelegallypresentinthepursuitoftheirofficialduties

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered bythepolicewhohavetherighttobe

wheretheyareand

(c)theevidencemustbeimmediatelyapparentand

(d)plainviewjustifiedmereseizureofevidencewithoutfurthersearch.

In the instant case, recall that PO2 Baluttestifiedthattheyfirstlocatedthemarijuanaplants

beforeappellantwasarrestedwithoutawarrant.Hence,therewasnovalidwarrantlessarrest
which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was
dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to searchforanduproottheprohibitedflora.The
seizure of evidence in "plain view"appliesonlywherethepoliceofficerisnotsearchingfor
evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the
testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the
area" before they could spot theillegalplants.Patently,theseizedmarijuanaplantswerenot
"immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in
question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine,
thus,cannotbemadetoapply.

Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were
found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by theCharter
against unreasonable searches by agents of the State. The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. The guarantee refers to"therightofpersonalsecurity"ofthe
individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the
State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. To conclude otherwise would not only
mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for aperson
to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he mustbeinhishomeoroffice,
within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill ofRightsbelongsasmuchtothepersonin
thestreetastotheindividualinthesanctuaryofhisbedroom.
2. No, the seized plants are not admissible in evidence against the accused. We find that said
plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against
appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error
on the part of the court a quo to have admitted andreliedupontheseizedmarijuanaplantsas
evidencetoconvictappellant.

***AbeValdezhasbeenacquittedforinsufficiencyofevidence.

4.2AbrahamMiclat,Jr.v.People

FACTS:

Abraham Miclat, Jr. (Abe) was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City of
violatingtheComprehensiveDangerousDrugsActof2002.

At around 1:00 PM, Police Inspector Jose Valencia received an INFOREP Memo from Camp
Crame relative to the illicit and downright drugtrading activities happening along Palmera
Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat and two others. Valencia formed a
surveillance team headed by SPO4 Ernesto Palting and is composed of5moreoperatives.After
ashortbriefingattheirstation,andrentedapassengerjeepney,andproceededtothetargetarea.

When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at thetargetareaataround3:50PMthesameday,they

were at once led by their informant to the houseofoneAliasAbe.PO3Antoniothenpositioned
himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of the group deployed
themselves nearby. Through a small opening in the curtaincovered window, PO3 Antonio
peeped inside and there at a distance of 1 meter, he saw Abe arranging several pieces of small
plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched hisway
in by gently pushing the door as well astheplywoodcoveringthesame.Upongainingentrance,
PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as apoliceofficerwhileAbe,ontheotherhand,after
being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed over to the former the four (4) pieces of
small plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio immediately placed the
suspect under arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containingwhite
crystalline substance to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Fernando Moran for
proper disposition. The suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat, 19 years old, single, and
jobless.

ISSUE: Whether peeping through a curtaincovered window is within the meaning of the plain
viewdoctrineforawarrantlessseizuretobelawful.

HELD:

Yes,peepingthroughacurtaincoveredwindowiswithinthepurviewoftheplainviewdoctrine.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that
view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justificationforanintrusionoris
in a position from which he can view a particular area (b) the discovery of evidence in
plain view is inadvertent (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to
eyeandhandanditsdiscoveryinadvertent

4.3ELENITAFAJARDOVSPEOPLE

FACTS:
Elenita Fajardo,andoneZaldyValeriowerechargedwithviolationofP.D.No.1866before
the RTC,Branch5,Kalibo,Aklan.IntheeveningofAugust27,2002,membersoftheProvincial
Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG) were instructed by P/Supt. Mendozatorespond
to the complaint of residents of Barangay Andagao that armed men drinking liquor at the
residence of Fajardo were indiscriminately firingguns.TherespondingteamsawValerioholding
two.45caliberpistols.Fajardowasseentuckinga.45caliberhandgunbetweenherwaistandthe
waistbandofhershorts,afterwhich,sheenteredthehouseandlockedthemaindoor.

SPO2 Nava saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw something. The discarded
objects landed near the wall of petitioners house and inside the compound of a neighboring
residence. SPO2 Nava recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two receivers of
.45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number 763025, and model no.
M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number. The recovered items were then surrendered to
SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and
obtainingasearchwarrant.

The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a barangay captain, barangay
kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses, the police team proceeded to search
petitionershouse.Theteamfoundandwasabletoconfiscatethefollowing:

1.Two(2)piecesofShortMagazineofM16ArmaliteRifle
2.Thirtyfive(35)piecesofliveM16ammos5.56Caliberand
3.Fourteen(14)piecesofliveammosofCaliber45pistol.

Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to possess
the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal informationforviolationof
P.D.No.1866,asamendedbyRepublicAct(R.A.)No.8294,wasfiledagainstthem.

Fajardo and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant was defective because the
allegation contained in the application filed and signed by SPO1 Tan was not based on his
personalknowledge.
They further asserted that the execution of the searchwarrantwasinfirmsinceFajardowhowas
inside the house at the time of the search, was not asked to accompany the policemen as they
exploredtheplace,butwasinsteadorderedtoremaininthelivingroom.

ISSUE:
W/not the discoveryofthetwo(2)receiversdoesnotcomewithinthepurviewoftheplainview
doctrine.

HELD:
Weholdthatthereceiverswereseizedinplainview,hence,admissible.

No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, andeffectsagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.Thisrightisencapsulated
inArticleIII,Section2,oftheConstitution,whichstates:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searchedandthepersonsorthingstobeseized.

Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same
article

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissiblefor
anypurposeinanyproceeding.

There are, however, several wellrecognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence
obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may beadmissibleunderanyofthefollowing
circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest (2) search of a moving motor vehicle (3)
search in violation of custom laws (4) seizure of evidence in plain view and (5) when the
accusedhimselfwaiveshisrightagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.[18]
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a right to
be in the position to have thatview,aresubjecttoseizureandmaybepresentedasevidence.[19]
It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search ofthe
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent and (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officermustlawfullymakean
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularlyviewthearea.Inthe
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
theaccused.Theobjectmustbeopentoeyeandhand,anditsdiscoveryinadvertent.

HARRISv.UNITEDSTATES,(1968)
Argued:January18,1968Decided:March5,1968

CRIME:Robbery(27yearsimprisonment)

FACTS:

Petitioner's automobile had been seen leaving the site of the robbery. The car was traced and
petitioner was arrested as he was entering it, near his home. The police decided to impound the
carasevidence,andacranewascalledtotowittotheprecinct.
A regulation oftheMetropolitanPoliceDepartmentrequirestheofficerwhotakesanimpounded
vehicle in charge to search the vehicle thoroughly, to remove all valuables fromit,andtoattach
to the vehicle a property tag listing certain information about the circumstances of the
impounding. Pursuant tothisregulation,andwithoutawarrant,thearrestingofficerproceededto
thelottowhichpetitioner'scarhadbeentowed,inordertosearchthevehicle,toplaceaproperty
tagonit,torollupthewindows,andtolockthedoors.

Proceeding to the front door on thepassengerside,theofficeropenedthedoorinordertosecure

the window and door. He thensawtheregistrationcard,whichlayfaceuponthemetalstripping
over which the doorcloses.Theofficerreturnedtotheprecinct,broughtpetitionertothecar,and
confronted petitioner with the registration card. Petitioner disclaimed all knowledge ofthecard.
Theofficerthenseizedthecardandbroughtitintotheprecinct.

At his trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, petitioner moved to
suppress an automobile registration cardbelongingtotherobberyvictim,whichtheGovernment
sought to introduce in evidence. The trial court, after a hearing, ruled that the card was
admissible.

Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals over his contention that the card
hadbeenillegallyseizedfollowingawarrantlesssearch.

ISSUE:Whethertheofficerdiscoveredtheregistrationcardbymeansofanillegalsearch.

HELD:

Itdoesnotconstituteillegalsearch.

The admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search under the police regulation is not
presented by this case. The precise and detailed findings of the District Court, accepted by the
Court of Appeals, were to the effect that the discovery of the card was nottheresultofasearch
of the car, but of ameasuretakentoprotectthecarwhileitwasinpolicecustody.Nothinginthe
FourthAmendmentrequiresthepolicetoobtainawarrantinthesenarrowcircumstances.

Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with the name of the robbery
victim on it, was plainly visible. It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain viewof
an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subjecttoseizureandmay
beintroducedinevidence.

Though Preston v. United States, is notmentionedintheCourt'sopinion,Iassumeithassurvive

because in the present case (1) the car was lawfully in police custody, and the police were
responsible for protecting the car (2) while engaged in the performance of their duty to protect
the car, and not engaged in an inventory or other search of the car, they came across
incriminatingevidence.

Peoplevs.BASILIODAMASO@Bernardo/BERNIEMENDOZA@KADADO,
accusedappellant.

CRIME: Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (unlawful possession of firearm) in

furtheranceof,orincidentto,orinconnectionwiththecrimeofsubversion

FACTS:

Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer and his group proceeded to
Bonuan, Dagupan City, to verify the presenceofCPP/NPAandputundersurveillancetherented
apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They
interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked
with Bernie Mendoza (Damaso), herein appellant. She guided the group to the house rented by
appellantbutfoundthatithadalreadybeenvacatedbytheoccupants.

Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Bernie Mendoza (Damaso), the
grouplookedfortheBarangayCaptainoftheplaceandrequestedhimtopointoutthenewhouse
rented by appellant. The group again required Morados to go withthem.Whentheyreachedthe
house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside.Theytoldherthattheyalreadyknewthatshewas
a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she
requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the
Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a
computermachine.

They also found persons who were companions of LuzTanciangco.Thegrouprequested

the persons in the house to allow them to look around.WhenLuzTanciangcoopenedoneofthe
rooms, they saw books used forsubversiveorientation,oneM14rifle,bulletsandammunitions,
Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and
otheritems.

They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory.
They likewise brought the persons found in the house totheheadquartersforinvestigation.Said
persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated
therefrom.

Basedonthis,Damasowaschargedwithillegalpossessionoffirearms.
ISSUE:Whethertheevidenceisadmissible

HELD:NO

The records of this case show that the accusedappellant was singled out as the sole
violator of P.D. No. 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the
appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M14rifleandother
subversiveitemswerefoundortheownerofthesaiditems.

The witnesses testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on
their own personal knowledge. TheSolicitorGeneral,however,arguesthatwhilethetestimonies
may be hearsay, the same are admissible because ofthefailureofcounselforappellanttoobject
thereto.

It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results initsbeingadmittedas

evidence. But, oneshouldnotbemisledintothinkingthatsincethesetestimoniesareadmittedas
evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot
begivencredence.

It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed topresentaswitnessesthepersonswhoknew

the appellant as the lessee and owner of the M14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could have
exercised his constitutional right to confront the witnesses and to crossexamine them for their
truthfulness. Likewise, the records do not show any other evidence which could have identified
the appellant as the lessee of the house and theownerofthesubversiveitems.Togiveprobative
value tothesehearsaystatementsandconvicttheappellantonthisbasisalonewouldbetorender
hisconstitutionalrightsuselessandwithoutmeaning.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case
against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with
therequirementsofavalidsearchandseizureproceedings.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution
(Article III, Section 2). The purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in
person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpations when
attempted. However, such right is not absolute. There are instances when a warrantless search
and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest (2) search of a moving
vehicle and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. None of these exceptions is present in this
case.
 The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal
one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expresslyauthorizedtodosoinhisorherbehalf.

In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz
Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. We find no
evidence that would establish the fact that LuzMoradoswasindeedtheappellant'shelperorifit
was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his house in
his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority.
Without this evidence, the authorities'intrusionintotheappellant'sdwellingcannotbegivenany
coloroflegality.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is
ACQUITTEDwithcostsdeoficio.

LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, petitioner, vs. DIEGO LOCSIN, Judge of First
Instance of Tarlac, FELIX IMPERIAL, Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac,andtheANTIUSURY
BOARD,respondents

Facts:
Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the AntiUsuary Board, obtained from the justice of the peace
of Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or
store of the petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for certain books, lists,chits,receipts,documentsand
other papers relating to her activitiesasusurer.Thesearchwarrantwasissueduponanaffidavit
givenbythesaidAlmeda.
On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine
Constabulary, went totheofficeofthepetitionerinVictoria,Tarlacand,aftershowingthesearch
warrant to the petitioners bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and,withoutthepresenceofthepetitioner
whowasillandconfinedatthetime,proceededwiththeexecutionthereof
The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerablelengthoftimebytheAntiUsury
Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed six
separatecriminalcasesagainstthehereinpetitionerforviolationoftheAntiUsuryLaw.
The legality ofthesearchwarrantwaschallengedbycounselforthepetitionerinthesixcriminal
cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. The respondent Judge denied the
petitioners motion for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, therewasawaiver
onthepartofthepetitioner.

The important question presented is whether upon the facts and under the circumstances of the
present case, there has been a waiver by the petitioner of her constitutional immunity against
unreasonablesearchesandseizures.

While the SolicitorGeneral admits that, in the lightofdecisionsofthiscourt,thesearchwarrant

wasillegallyissued,hemaintains:
(1) that the petitioner had waived her constitutional right by her acquiescence after the search
andseizure,and
(2) that the application for the return of the documents illegally seized was made after an
unreasonablelengthoftimeafterthedateofseizure.

HELD:
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search
warranttobevalid:
(1)itmustbeissueduponprobablecause
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by theapplicantorany
otherperson
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
thecomplainantandsuchwitnessesasthelattermayproduceand
(4) thewarrantissuedmustparticularlydescribetheplacetobesearchedandpersonsorthingsto
beseized.

In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but
by the applicant. All thatthejudgedidwastoacceptastruetheaffidavitmadebyagentAlmeda.
Hedidnotdecideforhimself.

It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the
description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt
issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not
deliveredtothecourtwhichissuedthewarrant,asrequiredbylaw.

Instead, they were turned over to the respondent provincial fiscal & used by him in buildingup
cases against petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued, there was no case
pending against the petitioner,theavermentthatthewarrantwasissuedprimarilyforexploration
purposesisnotwithoutbasis.

WAIVEROFRIGHTORGIVESHISCONSENT

The constitutional immunityagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresisapersonalrightwhich

may be waived. The waiver may be either expressorimplied.Noexpresswaiverhasbeenmade
inthecase.

Itiswellsettledthattoconstituteawaiverofaconstitutionalright,itmustappear
first,thattherightexists
secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existenceofsuchrightand,
lastly,thatsaidpersonhadanactualintentiontorelinquishtheright.

It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. She
could not have objected because she was sick and was not present whenthewarrantwasserved
upon Alfredo Salas. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are
invadedoronewhoisexpresslyauthorizedtodosoinhisorherbehalf.

..Searchwarrant,isherebydeclaredvoidandofnoeffect..

JOSE G. LOPEZ and TOMAS VELASCO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSIONER OF

CUSTOM

Facts:
M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict surveillance by the combined team of agents of the NBI,
PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao prior to its apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak,
Sasa, Davao City. M/V [Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by Capt. Aquilino Pantinople and
chartered by Mr. Tomas Velasco. During the period from the latter part of August to September
18, 1966, the said vessel was in Indonesian waters where it loaded copra andcoffeebeansfrom
Taruna, Pitta, and Mangenito, all of Indonesia. In its trip to Indonesia it brought various
merchandise from the Philippines which were exchanged and/or bartered for copra and coffee
beansandsubsequentlytakentoDavaoCity.

Said vessel passed Marore, Indonesia on 18 September 1966 on its a way to Tahuna, Indonesia
before proceeding to Davao City where it was apprehended on 19 September 1966. At about
3:00 p.m. of the said day, when the vessel was searched and after Captain Pantinople informed
the team that Velasco, the charterer ofthevessel,hadotherdocumentsshowingthatvesselcame
from Indonesia carrying smuggled copra and coffee, a combined team of Constabulary and
Regional AntiSmuggling Center operatives headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent of
Davao, proceeded to the Velasco's room at the Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said
document.Velascowasnotinsidethehotelroomwhentheyenteredtheroom.

There are conficting claims whether the manicurist Teofila Ibaez or whether Velasco's wife,
who was allegedly inside the room at that time, voluntarily allowed the police officers to enter
and whether the police officers "forcibly opened luggages and boxes from which only several
documents and papers werefound,thenseized,confiscatedandtookawaythesame,"orwhether
Mrs. Velasco volunteered to open the suitcases and baggages of Velasco and delivered the
documents and things contained therein to Reynolds. The CollectorofCustomsofDavaoseized
1,480sacksofcopraand86sacksofcoffeefromtheM/VmotorvesselJoloLema.

The seizure was declared lawful by the Court of Tax Appeals, and its decision was affirmed by
the Supreme Court on 29 November 1974 in Nasiad vs. Court of Tax Appeals (GR L29318,
November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 238). In the present specialcivilactionforcertiorari,prohibition
and mandamus the only question left theniswhetherthesearchconductedbyapartyheadedby
Reynolds without the search warrant for the hotel room of Velasco, who entered into a contract
with Jose G. Lopez, the awardee of such Philippine Reparations Commission vessel, for its
operationanduseostensiblyforfishing,isviolativeofsuchconstitutionalprovision.

Issue: Whether there was consent on the part of the person who was the occupant of the hotel
roomthenrentedbyVelasco.

Held:
There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and Velasco to counteract the force of the recital of
the written statement of Teofila Ibaez (allegedly wife of Tomas Velasco) by anaffidavitofone
Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of Velasco, and another by Velasco
himself reiterating that the person who was presentathishotelroomwasoneTeofilaIbaez,"a
manicuristbyoccupation."

If such indeedwerethecase,thenitismuchmoreeasilyunderstandablewhythatperson,Teofila
Ibaez, who could be aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong
time,wouldhavesignifiedherconsentreadilyandimmediately.

Under the circumstances, that was the most prudentcourseofaction.Itwouldsaveherandeven

Velasco himself fromanygossiporinnuendo.Norcouldtheofficersofthelawbeblamedifthey
would act on the appearances. There was a person inside who from all indications was readyto
accede to their request.Evencommoncourtesyalonewouldhaveprecludedthemfrominquiring
too closely as to why she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be
concludedthattherewasconsentsufficientinlawtodispensewiththeneedforasearchwarrant.

Thepetitioncannot,therefore,prevail.


6.StopandFrisk

G.R.No.89139August2,1990
ROMEOPOSADASyZAMORA,petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Facts:
1. Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police
(INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a
surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the
Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner Posadas (below 18 y.o) carrying a "buri" bag
andtheynoticedhimtobeactingsuspiciously.
2. They then checked the "buri" bag of thepetitionerwheretheyfoundone(1)caliber.38Smith
& Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two(2)roundsofliveammunitionfora.38caliber
gun2 asmoke(teargas)grenade,3andtwo(2)liveammunitionsfora.22calibergun.
3.HewasthenchargedwithillegalpossessionoffirearmsandammunitionsintheRegionalTrial
CourtofDavaoCitybecauseofhisfailuretosecurethenecessarydocuments.

Held:
The assailed search andseizuremaystillbejustifiedasakintoa"stopandfrisk"situationwhose
object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the statusquo
momentarilywhilethepoliceofficerseekstoobtainmoreinformation
Clearly, the search in the case at bar, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
andseizureshasnotbeenviolated.

[G.R.No.113447.October9,1997]
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.

Facts:
1. Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R.
Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, wherein crushed
marijuanaresiduewasfoundinhispossession.
2. At about 2:10 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, as the policemen ( Pat. Romeo
Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas) from the AntiNarcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police
Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the
Kalookan City Cemetery. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who
appearedhighondrugs.Themalepersonwasobservedtohavereddisheyesandtobewalkingin
a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached
him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person
what he was holding in his hands. The malepersontriedtoresist.Pat.RomeoEspirituaskedthe
male person if he could see what said male person hadinhishands.Thelattershowedthewallet
and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and
examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its
marijuanacontents.
Issue:OntheAdmissibilityoftheEvidenceSeizedDuringaStopandFrisk
Held:
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance
that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery,
which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his
experience as a member of the AntiNarcotics Unit oftheCaloocanCityPolice,suchsuspicious
behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had
sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs .During such
investigation,theyfoundmarijuanainpetitionerspossession
The search was valid, being akin to a stopandfrisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio a
stopandfrisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a policeofficertostopa
citizenonthestreet,interrogatehim,andpathimforweapon(s):
x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that thepersonswith
whom he is dealing may be armed and presentlydangerous,whereinthecourseofinvestigating
this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt todiscoverweapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidenceagainsttheperson
fromwhomtheyweretaken
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and
subjecttochallenge
In the case of People vs. Lacerna five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless
searchandseizureareenumerated
(1)searchincidentaltoalawfularrest,
(2)searchofmovingvehicles,
(3)seizureinplainview,
(4)customssearch,and
(5)waiverbytheaccusedthemselvesoftheirrightagains

DR.NEMESIOE.PRUDENTE,petitioner.

vs. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33
andPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,r espondents.

Facts:

P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the
Western Police District (WPD) filed withtheRTCofManila,Branch33,presidedoverbyJudge
Abelardo Dayrit (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) anapplicationfortheissuance
ofasearchwarrantforVIOLATIONOFPDNO.1866(IllegalPossessionofFirearms,etc.).

In support of the application for issuance of search warrant,P/Lt.FlorenioC.Angeles,executed

a "Deposition of Witness." (Questions asked were: Do you know P/MajorAlladinDimagmaliw,
the applicant for a Search Warrant? Do you know the premises of Polytechnic Universityofthe
Philippines at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila? Do you have personal knowledge that
in the said premises iskeptthefollowingpropertiessubjectoftheoffenseofviolationofPDNo.
1866 or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense? Do you knowwhoisorwho
arethepersonorpersonswhohasorhavecontroloftheabovedescribedpremises?)

After this, the Judge issued the Search Warrant. On a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search
warrantwasenforcedbysome200WPDoperatives.

In Dr. Prudente's office was found a bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation
handgrenadesseparatelywrappedwitholdnewspapers.

Dr.Prudentemovedtoquashthesearchwarrant.Heclaimedthat

(1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the
factswhichformedthebasisfortheissuanceofthesearchwarrant
(2) the examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and
answers
(3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe
theplacetobesearchedandthatitfailedtochargeonespecificoffenseand
(4) the searchwarrantwasissuedinviolationofCircularNo.19oftheSupremeCourtinthatthe
complainant failed to allege underoaththattheissuanceofthesearchwarrantonaSaturdaywas
urgent.

Issue: Whether the examination conducted by the judge before issuing the warrant was in the
formofsearchingquestionsandanswers?

Held:No.Thesearchwarrantsareannulled.
(12) Foravalidsearchwarranttoissue,theremustbeprobablecause,whichistobedetermined
personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and
thejudgemust,beforeissuingthewarrant,personallyexamineintheformofsearchingquestions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on
facts personally known to them andattachtotherecordtheirswornstatementstogetherwithany
affidavitssubmitted.

While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated
that he verified the information he had earlier received that petitioner had in hispossessionand
custody there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified
the earlier information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such
information to be a fact. This point might have been clarified if there had been searching
questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and
answers,whethersearchingornot,visavisthesaidapplicant.

Whattherecordsshowisthedepositionofwitness,P/Lt.Angeles,astheonlysupporttoP/Major
Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. For, it avers that they
(presumably, the police authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several days of
the suspected premises and, as a result, they "gathered information from verified sources" that
theholdersofthesubjectfirearmsandexplosivesarenotlicensedtopossessthem.

An examination of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that itwastoobriefand

short. The Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers."
On the contrary,thequestionsaskedwereleadingastheycalledforasimple"yes"or"no"
answer.

In the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence ofprobablecausetojustifythe
issuanceofthesearchwarrant.

The requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the
individualagainstunreasonablesearchandseizureshallremainbothmeaningfulandeffective.

(3) The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended. Inthecaseatbar,
the application forsearchwarrantandthesearchwarrantitselfdescribedtheplacetobesearched
as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta.
Mesa, Sampaloc,Manilamoreparticularly,theofficesoftheDepartmentofMilitaryScienceand
Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP,
Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched
sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly
describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and
secondfloorofthePUP.
(4)Astotheurgencyfortheissuanceofthesearchwarrant:CircularNo.19reads:

Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall likewise be
taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of thecourthavingjurisdictionoftheplaceto
be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the
satisfactionofthejudge,thattheissuanceisurgent.

The circular merely provides for a guideline and departure from it would not necessarily affect
thevalidityofanotherwisevalidsearchwarrant.

AlvarezvCFI

Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the AntiUsury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information,
Narciso AlvarezkeptinhishouseinInfanta,Tayabas,books,documents,receipts,lists,chitsand
other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a moneylender, charging usurious
ratesofinterestinviolationofthelaw.
In his oath at the end of the affidavit, thechiefofthesecretservicestatedthathisanswerstothe
questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of
his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him
fromareliableperson.
Upon the affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is thesubjectmatterofthe
petition, ordering the search of theAlvarezshouseatanytimeofthedayornight,theseizureof
the books and documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in
accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the AntiUsury Board entered
Alvarezs store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June1936,andseizedandtookpossessionofthe
following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2
cashbooks, 9 order books, 4 notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2
contracts, 4 stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles of bills of lading, 1
bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundleofstubsofpurchasesofcopra,2packagesofcorrespondence,
1 receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14 bundles of invoices and other papers, many
documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes
and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The
search for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of Alvarez who stated his
protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the
documents. As the articles had not been brought immediatelytothejudgewhoissuedthesearch
warrant, Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a motion on 8 June 1936, praying that the agent
Emilio L.Siongco,oranyotheragent,beorderedimmediatelytodepositalltheseizedarticlesin
the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having
disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the court issued an order directing Siongco to
deposit all the articles seized within 24 hoursfromthereceiptofnoticethereofandgivinghima
period of 5 days within which to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of
court. On 10 June, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the AntiUsury Board, filed a
motion praying thattheorderofthe8thofsaidmonthbesetasideandthattheAntiUsuryBoard
be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of30daysforthenecessaryinvestigation.
On June25,thecourtissuedanorderrequiringagentSiongcoforthwithtofilethesearchwarrant
and the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings taken by him, and to present an
inventorydulyverifiedbyoathofallthearticlesseized.
On July 2, the attorney for the petitioner filed a petition alleging that the search warrantissued
was illegal and that it had not yet been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in
connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued
directing the return of all the articles seized to Alvarez, that the agent who seized them be
declaredguiltyofcontemptofcourt,andthatchargesbefiledagainsthimforabuseofauthority.
On September 10, the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and
issued in accordance with the law,thatithadbeendulycompliedwithand,consequently,should
not be cancelled, and that agent Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must,
therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the AntiUsury Board in Manila to show
cause, if any, within the unextendible period of 2daysfromthedateofnoticeofsaidorder,why
allthearticlesseizedappearingintheinventoryshouldnotbereturnedtoAlvarez.
The assistant chief of the AntiUsury Board of theDepartmentofJusticefiledamotionpraying,
for the reasons stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of
conducting an investigation of the violation of the AntiUsury Law committed by Alvarez. On
October 10, said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed 60 days to examine
the documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1to4oftheinventorybyNos.
5, 10, 16, 23, 2527, 3031 , 34, 3643 and 45, and praying that he be granted said periodof60
days. In an order of October 16, the court granted him the period of 60 days to investigate said
19 documents. Alvarez, herein, asks that the search warrant as well as the order authorizing the
agents of the AntiUsury Board toretainthearticlesseized,bedeclaredillegalandsetaside,and
praysthatallthearticlesinquestionbereturnedtohim.

Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon
the affidavit of agent Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of
the facts whichweretoserveasabasisfortheissuanceofthewarrantbutthathehadknowledge
thereof through mere informationsecuredfromapersonwhomheconsideredreliable,andthatit
isillegalasitwasnotsupportedbyotheraffidavitsasidefromthatmadebytheapplicant.

Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, ofArticleIIIoftheConstitutionandSection97ofGeneralOrders

58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a searchwarrantbutthat
the search warrant must be based upon an application supportedbyoathoftheapplicantandthe
witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by
which a party signifies that he is bound in consciencetoperformanactfaithfullyandtruthfully
and it issometimesdefinedasanoutwardpledgegivenbythepersontakingitthathisattestation
orpromiseismadeunderanimmediatesenseofhisresponsibilitytoGod.
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or hiswitnesses,becausethepurposethereofistoconvincethecommittingmagistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, oftheexistence
ofprobablecause.
The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it
has been drawn in such amannerthatperjurycouldbechargedthereonandaffiantbeheldliable
for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and
therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other
papersareillegal.Further,itisthepracticeinthisjurisdictiontoattachtheaffidavitofatleastthe
applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search
warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made byagentAlmedaandthathedid
not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General
Orders 58 provides that itisofimperativenecessitytotakethedepositionsofthewitnessestobe
presentedbytheapplicantorcomplainantinadditiontotheaffidavitofthelatter.
The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing morethantosatisfy
the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses.
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was
not personal but merely hearsay, it isthedutyofthejudgetorequiretheaffidavitofoneormore
witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence ofprobablecausetowarranttheissuance
of the searchwarrant.Whentheaffidavitoftheapplicantorcomplainantcontainssufficientfacts
within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judgeissatisfiedthatthereexists
probable cause when the applicants knowledge ofthefactsismerehearsay,theaffidavitofone
or more witnesseshavingapersonalknowledgeofthefactsisnecessary.Thusthewarrantissued
is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledgeofthefacts.

LunavsPlaza

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur,
dated April 20, 1967, dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by herein
petitionerappellant Simon Luna who was charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 655New
ofthesamecourt.

The criminal action was commenced by TSgt. Candido Patosa, PC investigator of

Tandag, Surigao del Sur, by filing with respondent Municipal Judge Lorenzo M. Plaza, of the
Municipal Court of Tandag, criminal case No.1138chargingtheaccused,hereinpetitioner,with
thecrimeofmurder.

The respondent Judge examined theprosecutionwitnessesbyreadingtothem"alloveragainthe

questions and answers" in their statements in writing, and the witnessesaffiantsdeclaredbefore
said Judge that the questions were propounded by TSgt. Candido Patosa, and that the answers
were made by them. The affiants further declared before respondent Judge that their answers
were true, and were freely and voluntarily made that they fully understood the questions and
answers, and that they were willing to sign their respective affidavits. The affiants signed their
respective affidavits in the presence of the respondent Judge, who also signed after the usual
procedureofadministeringtheoath.

The respondent Judge opined that there was reasonable ground to believe that the crime of
murder had been committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof. Respondent Judge
issued the order and warrant of arrest, specifying therein that no bail should be acceptedforthe
provisionalreleaseoftheaccused.

On February 20, 1967,uponmotionofpetitionerthathebeadmittedtobailuponthegroundthat

the evidence of guilt was not strong, respondent Judge issued an order granting bail, fixing itat
P30,000.00 which order, however, respondent Judge later revoked, and petitioner was denied
bail.

Contentionoftheaccused:

On April 5, 1967, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of First
Instance of Surigao delSur,thereindocketedasSpecialProceedingsNo.105New,claimingthat
he was being deprived of liberty without the due process of law, on the ground that the
imprisonment and detention was the result of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge in
violation of Republic Act No. 3828,andprayingfortheannulmentoftheorderforhisarrestand
hisdischargefromconfinement.

Contentionoftherespondents:

Respondents filed their answer, alleging that Republic Act No. 3828 had been substantially
complied with that a motion to quash, and not a petition for habeas corpus was the proper
remedy and that petitioner's application for bail constituted a waiver oftherighttoquestionthe
validityofthearrest.

Issue:

Petitioner,inhisassignmentoferrors,claimsthatthetrialcourterred,asfollows:
1. In giving absolute credence to the oral testimony of the respondent Judgetotheeffectthathe
adopted and made his own the questions and answers taken by TSgt. Patosa, PC Investigator,
oneoftheprosecutionwitnesses,becausetherecordsshowthecontrary

2.Indenyingthewritofh abeascorpusandindismissingthepetition.

Before a municipal judge may issue a warrant of arrest, the following conditions must first be
fulfilled:

(1) he must examine the witnesses personally (2) the examination must be under oath (3) the
examinationmustbereducedtowritingintheformofsearchingquestionsandanswers.

Weretheseconditionsfulfilledintheinstantcase?

Held:

The first condition was fulfilled. The trial court found as a fact that "the respondent judge
personally examined the witnesses for the prosecution ..." that respondent judge adopted as his
own personal examination the questions asked by TSgt. Patosa as appearing in the written
statements, which he read over again to the witnesses together with the answers given therein,
asking the witnesses whether said answers were theirs,andwhetherthesameanswersweretrue,
to which the witness answered in the affirmative. Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit the
municipalJudgefromadoptingthequestionsaskedbyapreviousinvestigator.

It appears that the sworn statements5 of the witnesses state at the beginning that the sworn
statement was "taken by TSgt. Candido L. Patosa", and does not state that it was taken by the
respondent municipal Judge himself. This circumstance is explained bythefactthatsaidwritten
statements already taken by TSgt. Patosa were delivered to respondent Municipal Judge who
adopted the questions therein in his examination, because he considered them searching
questions. RespondentJudgepresumablydidnotconsideritnecessarytochangetheintroductory
remarks ineachofthewrittenstatements.Butthathemadetheexaminationpersonallycannotbe
doubteditissostatedintheorderdatedFebruary18,1967,whichrecites:

After examining the witness personally and underoaththereisreasonablegroundtobelievethat

an offense for murder has been committed and that the accused, Simon Luna,isprobablyguilty
thereof.(Exh.H)

The second condition required by Republic Act No. 3828 for the issuance of a warrantofarrest
was also fulfilled. The trial court found that the complaint was "supported by statements of the
witnesses under oath." The record also shows the documentstohavebeensubscribedandsworn
tobeforerespondentJudge.

The third condition required by Republic Act No. 3828 was likewise fulfilled. The examination
ofthewitnesseswaswrittendown,intheformofsearchingquestionsandanswers.
The term"searchingquestionsandanswers"meansonly,takingintoconsiderationthepurposeof
the preliminary examination which is to determine "whether there is a reasonable ground to
believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a
warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial", suchquestionsashavetendency
toshowthecommissionofacrimeandtheperpetratorthereof.

What would be searching questions woulddependonwhatissoughttobeinquiredinto,suchas:

the nature of the offense, the date, time,andplaceofitscommission,thepossiblemotivesforits
commission the subject, his age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, his
attitudetowardtheinvestigation,socialattitudes,opportunitiestocommittheoffensethevictim,
hisage,status,familyresponsibilities,financialandsocialcircumstances,characteristics,etc.

The points that are the subject of inquiry may differ from casetocase.Thequestions,therefore,
must to a great degree depend upon the Judge making the investigation. At any rate,thecourta
quo found that respondent judge was "satisfied that the questions and answers contained in the
sworn statements taken by TSgt. Patosa partake of the nature of his searching questions and
answersasrequiredbylaw,"sotherespondentJudgeadoptedthem.

Petitioner's further contention that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was a violation of the
constitution and of procedural due process is likewise untenable. The Constitution, in Section
1(3), Article III, provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge after examinationunderoathoraffirmationofthecomplainantandthewitnesseshe
may produce. The constitutional requirement of examination of witnesses under oath was, as
shown above, fulfilled. The existence of probable cause depended to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. Respondent judge found that there
wasprobablecause,asstatedinhisorderofarrest,that"afterexaminingthewitnessespersonally
and under oath there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense of murder has been
committedandthattheaccused,SimonLuna,isprobablyguiltythereof."

Petitioner's last contention that the warrant of arrest issued was a violation of procedural due
process because of the alleged defective preliminary examinationhasnolegtostandon,inview
of what we have hereinbeforestated.Moreover,thisCourthasheldthatpreliminaryexamination
is not an essential part of due process of law. Preliminary examinationmaybeconductedbythe
municipal judge, prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, either in the presence, or in the
absence, of the accused. The record shows that herein petitioner waived the preliminary
investigation before respondent Municipal Judge, and instead, he filed a petition for bail. The
petition for bail was at first granted by respondent Judge, but later the order granting bail was
revoked. Thisconductofpetitionerindicatesthathehadwaivedhisobjectiontowhateverdefect,
if any, in thepreliminaryexaminationconductedbyrespondentJudgepriortotheissuanceofthe
warrant of arrest. Indeed, petitioner has no substantialmuchlesslegalgroundtocomplain
thathewasdeniedthedueprocessoflaw.

SoledadAvillardeMulatavsJudgeEliasC.Irizari
Facts:

Soledad Avillar filed anadministrativecaseagainstJudgeIrizariwithgraveabuseofdiscretion,

favoritismandbiasforhavingconductedhepreliminaryexaminationinsaidpetitionerscriminal
case without giving the accused therein an opportunity to be heard because they were granted
the occasion to crossexamine the complainant and her witness before issuing the warrant
for their arrest. The accusedwasarrestedanddetainedinjailfor15dayswithoutknowingwhy
theywerearrestedasneitherofthemwereshownanywarrantofarrest.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is entitled to be present during the preliminary examination or to
crossexaminethewitnessespresentedagainsthimbeforehisarrest.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that under Section 5, Rule 112, of the Revised Rules of Court, the
accused is not entitled as a matterofrighttobepresentduringthepreliminaryexaminationorto
crossexamine the witnesses presented against him before his arrest. The purpose of the
preliminary examination is to determine whether or not there is sufficient reason to issue a
warrant of arrest. Section 6 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court requires the warrant of
arrest shall be issued only when the judge conducting the preliminary examination is satisfied
that the offense has in fact been committed and that there is a reasonable ground to believethat
the accused committed the same. We are not satisfied that in the circumstances attendant to the
case,respondent,indismissingthecomplaintforgravecoercion,hasactedarbitrarily.

WHEREFORE,respondentisexoneratedfromthecharges.

AntonioMarinasvsJudgeAndresSiochi

Facts:

PetitionerwastheSheriffinchargedtoexecutetherentedhouseofVictoriaLasindeAtienzaand
Rosario L. Atiena. That upon the enforcement of said writ of execution, Lasins jewelry worth
590 pesos was taken by petitioner without issuing any receipt therefor. On January 1966, when
Lasin reentered the house after securingaCourtOrder,shediscoveredthatseveralpiecesofher
jewelry and other personal items worth 1,018 pesos were missing. On February 1966, she
entered the house to get her remaining unlevied properties. She claimed that on the same day,
Marinas forcibly compelledthemtodelivertheunleviedpersonalproperties(amountingto2,645
pesos) found therein, hauled said articles into a truckandleft.Twoseparatechargesoftheftwas
the filed against the petitioner. Respondent Judge Siochi issued warrants for the arrest of
petitioners. The preliminary examination conducted by him was done with the aidofLt.JoseS.
Lotoc.

Issue:

Whether or not an arrest is valid without the presence of the accused during the preliminary
examination.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that under Section 5, Rule 112, of the Revised Rules of Court, the
accused is not entitled as a matterofrighttobepresentduringthepreliminaryexaminationorto
crossexamine the witnesses presented against him before his arrest. The purpose of the
preliminary examination is to determine whether or not there is sufficient reason to issue a
warrant of arrest. Section 6 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court requires the warrant of
arrest shall be issued only when the judge conducting the preliminary examination is satisfied
that the offense has in fact been committed and that there is a reasonable ground to believethat
theaccusedcommittedthesame.

Section 87, paragraph 3 of the Judiciary Act providesthatbeforeaMunicipalJudgemayissuea

warrant of arrest, the following conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the
witness orwitnessespersonally(2)theexaminationmustbeunderoathand(3)theexamination
must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. These requirements
have been met in thethreecriminalcasesinvolvedherein.By"searchingquestionsandanswers"
ismeant:

the term "searching questions and answers" meansonly,takingintoconsiderationthepurposeof

the preliminary examination which is to determine 'whether there is a reasonable ground to
believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a
warrantofarrestmaybeissuedandtheaccusedheldfortrial',suchquestionsashavetendencyto
showthecommissionofacrimeandtheperpetratorthereof.

In a nutshell, the proceedings in these three criminal cases conformed to lawandjurisprudence.

But evenconcedingthatpetitionerswereentitledtoapreliminaryinvestigation,theproperforum
beforewhichabsencethereofshouldhavebeenraisedandventilatedwasinthetrialCourt,notin
an appellate Court because the absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the
jurisdiction of the Court butmerelytotheregularityoftheproceedings,andbearinginmindthat
preliminaryinvestigationcanbewaived,asinfact,itisfrequentlywaived.

WHEREFORE,thePetitionisherebydenied

NolascovsPano,139SCRA541GRNo.L69803
Facts:
AT around 11:30 am on August 6, 1984, AguilarRoque and Nolaso were arrested by a
Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margall St., Q.C.
(Prior to August 6, 1984, AguilarRoque was one of the accusedofrebellioninCriminalCase#
MC25113ofMilitaryComm.No25whereinshewasstillatlarge.)
At 12NN of Aug 6, 1984. Elements of the CSG searched thepremisesat239BMayonSt,Q.C.
wherein 428 documents and written materials and additionally a portable typewriter and 2
woodenboxes,making431itemsinall,wereseizedbyCSGelements.
Prior the arrest done and the search done, at around 9am that same day, Lt. Col. Virgilio
Saldajeno of the CSJ applied for a search warrant from Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, theExecJudge
of the RTC in Q.C. to be served at 239B Mayon St, QC because it was determined to be the
leased residence of AguilarRoque, after almost a month of round the clock surveillance of the
premises as a suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA. AguilarRoque has long been
wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the CPP, particularly connected with
theMVKaragatan/DonaAndreacases.
On Aug 10, 1984, Nolasco et al. were charged beforetheQCFiscalOfficeuponcomplaintfiled
by the CSG group for Subversion, Rebellion, and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion. On Aug 13, 1984, an information for Violation of PD 33(Illegal
Possession of Subversive Documents) were filed against Nolasco et al. before the MTC of QC
whichwaspresidedbyJudgeAntonioP.Santos.
ON Dec 12, 1984, Nolasco et al.askedforthesuppressionoftheevidence(431itemsseized)on
the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant was void because it was a
general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the thingssubjectofthe
search and seizure and that probable cause has not been established for lack of searching
questions.
Issue:W/Nthesearchwarrantwasvalid?
Held: NO. Sec 3, Art IV of the Constitution of the Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It alsospecificallyprovidesthatnoSearch
Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searchedandthethingstobeseized.
ThedisputedSearchWarrant(No.8084)describesthepersonalitiestobeseizedasfollows:

Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples
Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of
these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals
nototherwiseavailabletothepublic,andsupportmoneyfromforeignorlocalsources.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are
what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of ageneralwarrantandinfringesonthe
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent
rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for
beingtoogeneral.
However, considering that AguilarRoque has been charged with the crime of Rebellion,
notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the search warrant and although ordinarily the articles
seized under an invalid search should be returned, they cannotbeorderedreturnedinthecaseat
bar to AguilarRoque. The SC heldthatsomesearchesmaybemadewithoutwarrantpursuantto
Sec 12 of the Rules of Court. It provides that a person charged with an offensemaybesearched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense. The SC opines that with respect to Aguilar Roque, the searchatNo239BMayon,St.,
QCdidnotneedasearchwarrantthisforpossibleeffectiveresultsintheinterestofpublicorder.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained by the CSG for possible
introduction of evidence in the rebellion case leaving it to AguilarRoque to object to their
relevance.

7.Corrovs.Lising,137SCRA541

Facts:
Respondent RTC Judge Esteban Lising, uponapplicationfiledbyLt.Col.BerlinCastillo
of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued a search warrant
authorizing the search and seizure of articles allegedly used by Rommel Corro (Publisher and
editorofthePhilippineTimes)incommittingthecrimeofincitingtosedition.

1.PrintedcopiesofPhilippineTimes
2.Manuscripts/draftsofarticlesforpublicationinthePhilippineTimes
3.NewspaperdummiesofthePhilippineTimes
4.Subversivedocuments,articles,printedmatters,handbills,leaflets,banners
5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video
machinesandtapes

Corro filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return documents/personal
properties alleging among others that (1) the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating
machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes whichare
not in any way, inanimate or mutethingsastheyare,connectedwiththeoffenseofincitingto
sedition, and that (2) the documents/papers seized has been rendered moot andacademicdue
to the findings of the Agrava Board having exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts and
circumstances behind the killing of Ninoy Aquino that a militaryconspiracy was responsible
forNinoyAquinosslaying.

 Respondent Judge Lising denied the motion. Hence, this petition praying that the search
warrantissuedbyrespondentJudgeEstebanM.Lisingbedeclarednullandvoidabinitiothat
thepadlockedofficepremisesofthePhilippineTimesbereopened.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition stating that probable cause exists
justifying theissuanceofasearchwarrant,thearticlesseizedwereadequatelydescribedinthe
search warrant, a search was conducted I n an orderly manner and the padlocking of the
searchedpremiseswaswiththeconsentofpetitioner'swife.

Held:
Section3,ArticleIVofthe1973Constitutionprovides:
SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainantandthewitnesseshemay
produce, and particularly describing the place to besearchedandthepersonsorthingsto
beseized.
and,Section3,Rule126oftheNewRulesofCourt,statesthat:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the
judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
besearchedandthepersonsorthingstobeseized.

Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and

circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the
means takeninprosecutingit,arelegallyjustandproper(Burtonvs.St.Paul,M&M.Ry.
Co.,33Minn.189,citedinU.S.vs.Addison,28Phil.566)."

An application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive
materials published or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the
Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. As We have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. ChiefofStaffofthe
ArmedForcesofthePhilippines,133SCRA800,"m eregeneralizationwillnotsuffice."

A search warrant shouldparticularlydescribetheplacetobesearchedandthethings
to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the
officers of the law with no discretionregardingwhatarticlestheyshouldseize,totheendthat
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed, that abuses may not be
committed.

TheaffidavitofCol.CastillostatesthatinseveralissuesofthePhilippineTimes:
... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the
government of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities, definedandpenalized
by Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree No.1835
(p.22,Rollo)
and,theaffidavitofLt.Ignacioreads,amongothers
... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles tending to incite
distrust and hatred for the Government of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted
authorities.(p.23,Rollo)

The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. They cannot serve as basis for the issuance of search
warrant,absentoftheexistenceofprobablecause.

In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of
printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication,
newspaper dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating
machines,mimeographingandtaperecordingmachines.

Thus, the language used is soallembracingastoincludeallconceivablerecordsand
equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is
constitutionallyobjectionable.

PEOPLEVSVELOSO
FACTS:
In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by
anorganization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso wasatthattimeamember
of theHouse of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the
club.The police of Manila hadreliableinformationthatthesocalledParliamentaryClubwas
nothingmore than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of
the gamblingsquad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, onMay25,1923,
Detective AndresGeronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and
obtained a search warrantfrom Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the
police attempted to raid theParliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date
above mentioned. They foundthe doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one
band of police including policemanRosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a
windowofthehouse.Otherpolicemen,headedbyTownsend,brokeintheouterdoor.
Once inside the ParliamentaryClub,nearlyfiftypersonswereapprehendedbythepolice.One
of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter
showedhim the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative
Veloso andnot John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend
answered thatVeloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it
contained gamblingutensils,TownsendrequiredVelosotoshowhimtheevidenceofthegame.
About five minuteswas consumed in conversation betweenthepolicemenandtheaccusedthe
policemen insistingon searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the
search.
At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of
Velosoonly tomeetwithhisresistance.VelosobitRosackerintherightforearm,andgavehim
a blow inanother part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the
combinedefforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and
long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his
pockets.
All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons.
Velosoaguain refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against thepolicedepartment.It
wasnecessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted
sotenaciouslythatthreepolicemenwereneededtoplacehiminthepatrolwagon.

ISSUE
WONthesearchwarrantandthearrestofVelosowasvalid.

RULINGYes.
It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on Criminal Procedure that a
searchwarrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by
oathparticularly describing the place to be searchedandthepersonofthingtobeseized.The
name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant andwhere
the name isunknowntheremustbesuchadescriptionofthepersonaccusedaswillenablethe
officertoidentifyhimwhenfound.
A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of
"John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or truenameinunknown,"isvoid,withoutother
and furtherdescriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrantwillnotjustifythe
officer inacting underit.Suchawarrantmust,inaddition,containthebestdescriptiopersonae
possibleto be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must
besufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to
beserved and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation
andplace of residence, and any othercircumstancesbymeansofwhichhecanbeidentified.In
the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described
thebuilding to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
PhilippineIslands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be
searched.As the search warrant statedthatJohnDoehadgamblingapparatusinhispossession
in thebuilding occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and asthisJohn
Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, themanageroftheclub,thepolicecouldidentifyJohnDoeasJose
Ma.Velosowithoutdifficulty.

5.Whenthereiswaiverofarightorgiveshisconsent.

8.PEOPLEVS.BAULA,344SCRA663
FACTS:
Jupiter Caburao, allegedly decided to follow his mother, Patrocinia Caburao, who had
earlier left their house to settle her due obligations at a store owned by Brigida Tumamang.
Jupiter noticed a commotion and he focused his flashlight towards the direction where he
heard the commotion and saw Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of hacking a
person who was lying on the ground, whileRobertBaulaandRubenBaulastoodaslookouts.
The assault allegedly lasted for about 4minutes. Jupiter went near the lifeless body of the
victim who turned out to be his own mother. Her head and face sustained four hacking
wounds,twoofwhichdamagedherbraintissues.
Police authorities, led by SPO4 Fermin Mirande, went to the locus criminis, and repaired to
the respective houses of accusedappellants. The policemen asked Ruben Baula and Crisanto
Baula for the clothing they wore on the night of the murder. Ruben Baula gave his
bloodstained pair of short pants, and Crisanto Baula turned over his bloodstained polo shirt.
The policemen next went to the hut of Danilo Dacucos. Inside the hut, the group found
hanging on the wall a bloodstained bolo. The bloodstained pair of short pants, polo shirt and
bolo, together with the victim's dried blood samples, were sent on the same day to the
National Bureau of Investigation, Dagupan CityBranchOffice,forforensicexamination.The
results of the examination disclosed that the bloodstains found in thebolo,thebloodstainson
the polo shirt and the bloodstains on the pair of short pants had the same type "O" blood as
thatofthevictim.
Appeal for review on the decision of the lower court in the ground that the articles sought
(bloodstained bolo, shirt and shortpants) cannot be admitted as evidence against the accused
sinceitwasseizedwithoutavalidsearchandseizurewarrant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search conducted was valid under a consented
search

HELD:
 No. The articlesareunlawfullysearchedandseized.Asearchincidentaltoavalid
arrest is one of the statutory exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search and
seizure shall be effected without a valid warrant. In this instance, the arrest should be lawful
before search and seizure by the arresting officer would be conducted. A warrantless arrest
may be effected by the arresting officer when in his presence the person arrested have
committed, committing or attempting to commit the crime. In the case at bar,
Accusedappellants were not being arrested at thetimethatthesubjectarticleswereallegedly
taken from them but were just being questioned by the police officers conducting the
investigation about the death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating thattheaccusedhadcommittedthecrime.Beinginno
position to effect a warrantless arrest, the police officers were thus likewise barred from
effectingawarrantlesssearchandseizure.
The Court finds it less than credible the stance of theprosecutionthatthepoloshirtandshort
pants have been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure
cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This
presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an
individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods
thattheConstitutionitselfabhors.

8.VEROYVS.LAYAGUE,210SCRA97
FACTS:
Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP raided Veroys
house in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a safehouseof
rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not
enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant.
Permission was requested by phone to Ma. Luisa Veroy who consented on the condition that
the search be conducted in the presence of Major Macasaet. The followingday,Capt.Obrero
and Maj. Macasaet met at the Veroys house to conduct the search pursuant to the authority
granted by Ma. Luisa. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal.handgunwithamagazinecontaining
7 live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer in the childrens room. 3
halffull jutesackscontainingprintedmaterialsofRAMSFPwerealsofoundinthechildren's
room. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag
containing assorted clothing,asmallblackbagcontainingabookentitled"IslamicRevolution
Future Path oftheNation",aroadmapofthePhilippines,atelescope,aplasticbagcontaining
assortedmedicinesandreligiouspamphletswasfoundinthemaster'sbedroom.

ISSUE:
 Whether the permission granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy for ascertaining thereat the
presence of alleged rebel soldiers include the authority to conduct a room to room search
onceinsidethehouse.

HELD:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papersandeffectsagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures(ArticleIII,Section2of
the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a
valid warrant is not anabsoluteone.ThenecessityofthepermissionobtainedfromMa.Luisa
underlines the recognition of Capt. Obrero of the need of a searchwarranttoenterthehouse.
The permission granted by was for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the
alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to
room search once inside the house. The police officers had ample time to procure a search
warrant but did not. Warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials
conducting thesearchhadeveryopportunitytosecureasearchwarrant.Theitemstakenwere,
therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they
areinadmissibleinevidenceinthecriminalactionsinstitutedagainstthem.

8.PEOPLEVDAMASO,212SCRA457

Facts:
The Philippine Constabulary apprehended alleged members of the NPA in Bani, Dagupan.
When interrogated, they revealed that there is an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in
Urdaneta,Pangasinan.Fromthatsafehouse,theyfoundsubversivematerials.

The group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City and put under surveillance the rented
apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, the sister of one who they earlier arrested. They
interviewed a visitor of Aritumba, Luzviminda Morados, and she stated thatsheworkedwith
accused Damaso alias Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA/Ka Dado.Moradosguidedthemtothe
house rented by Damaso and whentheyfoundthattheplacewasalreadyvacated,theysought
thehelpofthebarangaycaptain.

They saw Luz Tanciangco outside the new house rented by Damaso and uponinformingthat
the authorities already knew thattheyweremembersofNPA,Tanciangcorequestedthegroup
to enter the house.Uponentering,theysawsubversivematerialssuchasradiosets,pamphlets
entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. The group requested the
persons in the house to allow them to further look around. One room was opened by
Tanciangco and they saw more materials including maps and one M14 rifle, bullets and
ammunitions.They seized the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final
inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house and said persons revealed
that appellant wasthelesseeofthehouseandownedtheitemsconfiscatedtherefrom.Damaso
waschargedofviolationofPDNo.1866andwasfoundguiltybythelowercourt.

Issue:
Whether Damaso waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure when his alleged
helpers Tanciangco and Morados requested PC to get inside the houseandtolookaroundthe
appellantshouse

Held:
No. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal
one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. No evidence that would establish the fact
that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper,
that the appellant had given her authority to open his house in his absence. Without this
evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of
legality.

6.StopandFrisk

5.ESQUILLOVPEOPLE,GRNo.182010

Facts:
PO1 Alvin Cruzin,togetherwithPO2AngelAguasconductedsurveillanceontheactivitiesof
an alleged notorious snatcher named Ryan operating Bayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City.
Accused Esquillo was standing threemetersawayfromthepositionofthepolicemenandshe
was seen placing be a small heatsealed transparent plastic sachet containingwhitesubstance
insideayellowcigarettecase.

Suspicious on the actions of Esquillo, PO1 Cruz approached her, introduced himself as a
police officer and inquired about the plastic sachet. Instead of replying, however, petitioner
attemptedtofleetoherhousenearbybutwastimelyrestrainedbyPO1Cruzin

After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic
sachet. With the seized item, petitioner was brought for investigation to a Pasay City Police
Station. After laboratory examination of the substance, it was found tobeshabuandEsquillo
aftertheconductofdrugtestappearedtobepositive.

Esquillo contends that she was framed up by the policeofficerstoextortmoneyfromherand

her family and that she was illegally arrested. She was found guilty of violation of par. 3 of
Section11,ArticleIIofR.A.9165ortheComprehensiveDangerousDrugsActof2002.

Issues:
Whetherstopandfriskconceptavalidexceptionforlawenforcerstosearchwithoutwarrant

Whethertherewasprobablecausetosearchpetitionerunderthestopandfriskconcept

Held:
Yes. A search may be conducted by law enforcers on the strength of a valid search warrant
except on: (a) consented searches (b) as an incident toalawfularrest(c)searchesofvessels
and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws (d) searches of moving
vehicles (e) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders (f) where the
prohibited articles are in plain view (g) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire,
sanitary,andbuildingregulationsand(h)stopandfriskoperations.[20]

Yes. Stop and frisk operation entails the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officershouldproperly
introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in
accordance with the police officers experience and the surrounding conditions,towarrantthe
belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed on him. It should
therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle
toapply.

In the case at bar, when PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a
law enforcement officer, itwasinstinctiveonhisparttobedrawntocuriosityandtoapproach
her. That petitionerreactedbyattemptingtofleeafterheintroducedhimselfasapoliceofficer
andinquiredaboutthecontentsoftheplasticsachetallthemoreprickedhiscuriosity.

RoanvGonzales
145SCRA687

Facts: thepetitionerclaimshewasthevictimofanillegalsearchandseizureconductedbythe
military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as evidence in his
prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be temporarily
restrained
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984.The
petitioner'shousewassearchedtwodayslaterbutnoneofthearticleslistedinthewarrantwas
discovered. However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt
Magnum revolver and eighteen livebulletswhichtheyconfiscated.Theyarenowthebasesof
thechargeagainstthepetitioner.
The applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrantonthebasisofmerehearsay
and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence. In any
case, Judge Gonzales did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the
contents of the affidavit when he issued the search warrant. He did not take the applicant's
deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented to
him
Issue:WONthesearchwarrantwasvalid
Held: VOID. The respondent judge almostunquestioninglyreceivedthewitnesses'statement
that they saw eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May2,1984.Thiswas
supposedly done overtly, and one witness said he saw everythingthroughanopenwindowof
the house while he was near the gate. He could even positively say that six of the weapons
were.45 caliberpistolsandtwowere.38caliberrevolvers.Onemaywellwonderwhyitdidnot
occur to the respondent judgetoaskhowthewitnesscouldbesocertainevenastothecaliber
of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a
second floor, or why his presence wasnotnoticedatall,oriftheactsrelatedwerereallydone
openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law.
These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the
declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant soughtwasissued
forthwith.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's
deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had
alreadybeentakenbytheundersigned."
In other words, the applicant was asking fortheissuanceofthesearchwarrantonthebasisof
mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence." The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a
prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. His
application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It
was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to
establishtheapplicant'sclaims.

MatavBayona
FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD
1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took andarrangedbets
on the Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any
authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned. Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that
nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other
pertinent papers connected to the issuance ofthesame,sothathehadtoinquirefromtheCity
Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of
the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is with the court. The Judge then handedtherecordsto
the Fiscal who attached themtotherecords.ThisledMatatofileamotiontoquashandannul
the search warrant and for the return ofthearticlesseized,citingandinvoking,amongothers,
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules ofCourt.ThemotionwasdeniedbytheJudgeon
1 March 1979, statingthatthecourthasmadeathoroughinvestigationandexaminationunder
oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of
352nd PC Co./Police District II INP that in fact the court made a certification to that effect
and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrantwerenotattachedimmediately
to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule doesnotspecify
when these documents are to be attached to the records. Matasmotionforreconsiderationof
the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for
certiorari, praying, amongothers,thattheCourtdeclarethesearchwarranttobeinvalidforits
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and
that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidenceinthecase,or
inanyproceedingsonthematter.
Issue:WhetherornotSearchWarrantisvalid
Held: NOT VALID. The search warrantistaintedwithillegalitybythefailureoftheJudgeto
conformwiththeessentialrequisitesoftakingthedepositionsinwritingandattachingthemto
therecord,renderingthesearchwarrantinvalid.
Deposition, sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by
oath but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to
written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the
trialorhearinguponoralexamination.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writingofthecomplainantandthewitnesseshemayproduce
and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that theJudge
may be able to property determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to
holdliableforperjurythepersongivingifitwillbefoundlaterhisdeclarationsarefalse.