Commemoration of 1 October Hari Kesaktia PDF

Asian Studies Review.
ISSN 1035-7823
Volume 26 Number 1 March 2002
COMMEMORATION OF 1 OCTOBER,
HARI KESAKTIAN PANCASILA:
A POST MORTEM ANALYSIS?1
Katharine E. McGregor
University of Melbourne
On the morning of 1 October 1997 Jakarta officials, including the highest ranks
of the military and the civil service, gathered to commemorate the last Hari Kesak-
tian Pancasila [Sacred Pancasila Day] of Suhartos regime. The site at which they
gathered was Monumen Pancasila Sakti [Sacred Pancasila Monument], an elabo-
rate monument and museum complex built around the disused well into which
the bodies of the six army generals and one lieutenant, victims of the 1965 coup
attempt, had been dumped. By 1997 commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila
was a well-established state ritual. A commemorative ceremony had been held at
the monument for thirty consecutive years of the New Order period.
While official representation of the events of 1 October 1965 has previously
received considerable attention in scholarship on Indonesia, the annual com-
memorative day upon which Indonesians were reminded of the coup attempt has
escaped detailed analysis.2 The significance of commemoration is that . . . it
involves the co-ordination of individual and group memories, whose result may
appear consensual when they are in fact a product of the processes of intense
contest, struggle and, in some cases annihilation (Gillis 1994, 5). Hari Kesaktian
Pancasila celebrated a very selective memory of both the coup attempt and the
transition years from Sukarno to Suharto. It focused solely on the violence
directed at the seven army victims of the coup attempt of 1 October. After the
crushing of the Thirtieth of September movement up to one million people were
killed, and many others imprisoned, for membership of or affiliation with the
PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) (Cribb 1990, 13). In reality, multiple mem-
ories of the transition years exist, yet the purpose of commemoration of 1
October is to telescope these memories into a singular memory of the transition
that of the violence against the military heroes.
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila is most commonly perceived to be the day on which
Indonesians were reminded of the official version of the coup attempt, in which
the communist party was the culprit. While this was certainly the main focus of the
Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002. Published by Blackwell Publishing Limited.

40 Katharine E. McGregor
commemorative day it also served other purposes. Commemoration of Hari Kesakt-

ian Pancasila was an important means by which the government claimed ownership
of and alignment with Indonesias national philosophy, the Pancasila. This is dem-
onstrated by the fact that at the same time as the New Order government emphasised
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila it also made attempts to quash commemoration of 1 June,
Hari Lahir Pancasila (the anniversary of Sukarnos first articulation of the Pancasila),
a date that the government perceived to compete with Hari Kesaktian Pancasila. The
meaning of the day also underwent subtle changes during the course of the New
Order. Hari Kesaktian Pancasila became an occasion on which new enemies of the
regime were defined in response to changing political circumstances.
This article examines the basis for and changing context of commemoration
of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila in both the New Order and post New Order periods.
While in the early years of the New Order the day was primarily a celebration of
the suppression of the communist coup attempt, in the early 1980s officials
emphasised the day as a celebration of the defence of the Pancasila not only from
communism but also from Islam. In the early 1990s the survival of commemora-
tion of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila faced a major challenge because of the end of the
cold war and the subsequent questioning of the need for annual warnings of an
on-going communist threat. In this context, the communist threat evolved into
a more complex spectre. In the late New Order period, in response to increased
religiosity of Indonesian Moslems, the regime stressed the theme of Hari Kesak-
tian Pancasila as a celebration of Moslem piety and anti-atheism.
Dramatic political change within a country can lead to re-negotiation over
which events should still be celebrated, which abandoned and which added to
the national calendar. The fall of Suharto in May 1998, which marked the end of
the New Order regime, led to a rejection of the New Order regime and many
things associated with it. Yet despite this sentiment Hari Kesaktian Pancasila, the
commemorative day most closely associated with the New Order regime, did not
come under specific attack. Although some have made calls to open the version
of the past celebrated on this day to wider investigation there have not been vocif-
erous demands to abandon commemoration of 1 October. The reasons for this
are complex and have to do with the changing meanings assigned to Hari Kesak-
tian Pancasila during the course of the New Order period, a continuing com-
mitment to Pancasila and the slow process of adjustment involved in confronting
other memories of the last transition period.
THE MEANING OF KESAKTIAN PANCASILA
Indonesias national philosophy consists of five principles: belief in one God,

humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy and social justice. Sukarno formulated
Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Hari Kesaktian Pancasila: A Post Mortem Analysis? 41
the Pancasila on 1 June 1945 as a compromise alternative to a state based on

Islam. During the course of the New Order, the Pancasila was transformed from
a set of philosophical principles to a more penetrative set of guiding principles
for everything from personal behaviour and family relations to media publica-
tions and industrial relations (see Bourchier 1996, 22257). Although some
aspects of these developments in Pancasila discourse are addressed in this article,
attention is focused on the use of the Pancasila as a means of legitimising a politi-
cal order and discrediting opposition to the regime.
The word kesaktian has a number of meanings. Generally it implies sacred,
supernatural, divine or magical qualities (Echols and Shadily 1994, 474). By
using the term kesaktian Pancasila, the New Order regime implied that the
national philosophy was endowed with a tangible power, with inner strength
or concentrated energy. This message is reinforced in annual commemora-
tion of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila. Participants in the ceremony at Monumen
Pancasila Sakti are, for example, required to declare in front of God the
almighty their commitment to perfect and defend the Pancasila as the source of
strength in the fight to maintain truth and justice in the mandate of the peoples
suffering.
The official version of the coup attempt, the Monument and the day
The events of the coup attempt are still shrouded in mystery. Uncontested is that
in the early hours of 1 October 1965 an armed group wearing uniforms of the
Presidential guard and calling itself the 30th September Movement kidnapped
and killed six of the most senior army generals and one lieutenant. Their bodies
were dumped in the area of Lubang Buaya [Crocodile Hole]. Much is still unclear
about what happened on that day, but in the confusion Major General Suharto,
the commander of the army strategic reserve, quickly and decisively suppressed
the movement.
There are numerous interpretations of the events of 1 October 1965. Some
theories suggest the movement was an internal military affair in which commu-
nist leaders were coopted (Anderson and McVey 1971) or the result of a split in
the communist party between Njoto and Aidit (ISAI 1995). Others attribute
agency to either Sukarno (Dake 1973) or Suharto (Wertheim 1970) as key plot-
ters in the events.
In the wake of the Thirtieth of September movement, the army officially
declared the movement a coup attempt by the PKI against the government and
took immediate steps to control the version of the coup attempt that reached the
public (Paget 1967, 21115). To add to the hysteria, the army-backed press cir-
culated stories about the alleged torture and genital mutilation of the army

Figure 1: The preserved well at Monumen Pancasila Sakti. The message recorded on the plaque
translates as it is not possible that the ideals of our struggle to uphold the essence of the Pancasila
will be destroyed merely by burying us in this well.
heroes by members of the communist aligned womens group Gerwani at the

site of Lubang Buaya.3
In addition to these initial steps taken to circulate the official version of the coup
General Suharto, in his capacity as Minister of Defence and Commander of the
Army, recommended preservation and memorialisation of the well from which
the bodies were originally hauled in the months following the coup attempt. The
Pancasila Sakti monument complex consists of the central feature of the well (now
preserved with clay moulding) covered by a four-pillared pavilion structure,
known as a cungkup (see Figures 1 and 2) and a monument that features more than
life-size portraits of the army heroes, the Garuda Pancasila emblem (see Figure 3)
and an historical relief detailing the history of communist betrayal. The monu-
ment complex was repeatedly added to during the course of the New Order. In
1983, a museum detailing the official version of the coup was opened at the site.
One of the most important means by which the official version of the coup attempt
was circulated to the public was by annual screening of the epic propaganda film
Pengkhianatan Gerakan 30 September [The Betrayal of the 30 September Move-
ment], on national television on the night of 30 September.

Figure 2: The cungkup above the preserved well at Monumen Pancasila Sakti
Suharto also made the decision in 1967, his first year as Acting President, to
commemorate 1 October, the day on which the six generals were kidnapped and
murdered and on which he, together with the army, suppressed the coup attempt.
He was clearly determined to ensure that the official version of the coup attempt,
in which the army victims were martyrs and Suharto the triumphant hero, would
not be forgotten. For every year of the New Order Hari Kesaktian Pancasila was
celebrated in a ceremony at Monumen Pancasila Sakti. The themes taken up in
the ceremony replicate themes of the initial propaganda surrounding the coup
including an emphasis on the coup attempt as a communist plot; the horror of
the deaths of the army heroes; the religious and moral deviance of the commun-
ists; warnings about the return of communism; and 1 October as a day on which
the Pancasila was resurrected. These messages were variously encapsulated in the
reading of the Pancasila text, the Pancasila ikrar [pledge]4 and a prayer during
the course of the ceremony. Suharto was inspector of the ceremony for every year
of the New Order. As principal actor in the events of 1 October Suhartos pres-
ence added authenticity to the commemoration. The two main roles he per-
formed in the ceremony were to lead a silent reflection and to inspect the
monument at the conclusion of the ceremony.

Figure 3: Monumen Pancasila Sakti featuring life-sized portraits of the seven army victims of the
coup attempt
HARI KESAKTIAN PANCASILA IN THE NEW ORDER PERIOD
Claiming the Pancasila
The name Suharto chose for the commemorative day of 1 October had consid-
erable political significance. In his 1967 presidential decision, regarding this new
commemorative date, Suharto declared that commemoration of Hari Kesaktian
Pancasila was premised on
the special character and features of 1 October as a day on which peoples

certainty in the truth and kesaktian of the Pancasila, as the only life view which
can unite the entire state, nation and Indonesian people, was strengthened and
instilled (Soedjono 1975, xiii [emphasis added]).
Suharto implied that from 1 October 1965 onwards the people, presumably
under the direction of Suharto and the army, embraced the Pancasila and
rejected all other life views, notably communism (which Suharto banned at the

first opportunity). His suggestion that this was the day on which people affirmed
their faith in Pancasila was also based on the allegation, prevalent in the late
New Order period, that if the communists took power they would abandon the
Pancasila (Mortimer 1974, 94).
The regime also sought to phase out commemoration of another day associ-
ated with the Pancasila, Hari Lahir Pancasila (the birth date of the Pancasila), the
day in 1945 on which Sukarno first articulated the principles of the Pancasila.
They did so to ensure that the Pancasila would be more closely associated with
its saviour, the New Order, than with its creator, Sukarno. Commemoration of
Hari Lahir Pancasila was at once a celebration of the Pancasila and of Sukarnos
role in unearthing [menggali] the Pancasila on 1 June 1945. For the duration of
the New Order the government remained wary of the potency of Sukarnos ghost
(see van de Kok, Cribb and Heins 1991; Brooks 1995).
On 1 June 1967, the first year in which he was in power, Suharto took the oppor-
tunity to contrast the significance of the two days. He stated that
we are proud of the exaltation [mengagungkan] of the Pancasila, not

because it was rediscovered [ditemukan kembali] and formulated by
someone [read Sukarno] from the womb, identity and ideals of the
Indonesian nation which were hidden away for centuries, but rather
because the Pancasila has already proven its truth, after having stood the
test of the history of the nations struggle (Soeharto 1994, 17).
By shifting emphasis from Sukarnos discovery of the Pancasila to the armys

defence of the Pancasila, including his own role, Suharto ensured that the Pan-
casila was an historically clean doctrine that could be turned to the New Orders
purposes without conjuring up embarrassing memories of a former president
locked away under house arrest in Bogor.
In the 1970s, the government took further steps towards destroying the asso-
ciation between Pancasila and Sukarno. Nugroho Notosusanto, the most promi-
nent official New Order historian, a man with close ties to the military (he was
head of the Armed Forces History Centre for many years), began to circulate
a theory that Bung Karno was only one of three of the penggali [excavators] of
Pancasila and that the real birth date of the Pancasila was 18 August 1945, the
date on which the Pancasila was legally confirmed together with the 1945 Con-
stitution (see Brooks 1995, 72). The publication of Nugrohos version of the birth
of the Pancasila (Notosusanto 1978) sparked a major polemic (see Oey 1982),
yet despite the controversy Nugrohos thesis on the Pancasila was incorporated
into government Pancasila courses. As result of this move Sukarno supporters
organised public commemoration of Hari Lahir Pancasila in 1980 (Merdeka 2 June
1980) and again in 1985 and 1986.

The early years of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila: criticism and adjustments
For the first two years of commemoration Suharto delivered a speech for Hari
Kesaktian Pancasila. In these speeches he focused on the need to guard against a
recurrence of a tragedy like G-30-S/PKI (the official acronym used to describe
the coup movement) and on the valour of the army heroes (Kompas 30 Sep-
tember 1967; Kompas 1 October 1968). A key part of the official version of the
coup attempt of 1965 that was celebrated on Hari Kesaktian Pancasila was the
alleged treachery or betrayal [pengkhianatan] by the Indonesian Communist
Party. Every year in commemorations of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila the Indonesian
public was reminded of this treachery and, more importantly, of the on-going
threat of communism in Indonesia.
The invocations of the property of kesaktian did not go unnoticed by critics
of the new government. In 1970, on the anniversary of the coup attempt,
Jakob Oetama published an article in Kompas challenging the governments
description of the Pancasila as sakti. Reflecting on the various meanings of
sakti he went on to suggest that the term Pancasila sakti implied that the present
government took the view that the Pancasila was in fact a pusaka [an heirloom],
something that is respected and valued but put away (Kompas 30 September
1970). Oetamas response reflected a growing sense of frustration with the New
Order regime and more specifically disappointment on his part at the reappear-
ance of authoritarian measures characteristic of the Guided Democracy era,
including press censorship, particularly on issues of human rights that might
compromise the governments claim to be upholding the Pancasila principle of
humanitarianism.5
A similar criticism to Oetamas appeared in an article in 1972 in which the
writer noted that until now we have only made Pancasila a weapon to challenge
or reject things we consider opposed to Pancasila or political ideologies consid-
ered in opposition to Pancasila (Kompas 3 October 1972). By 1972, public cyni-
cism towards the New Order regime had intensified due to increased moves
towards depoliticisation, the exposure of corruption and the coercive methods
used by the military in the 1971 election (Bourchier 1984, 16).
In 1975, the government felt compelled to adjust commemoration of Hari
Kesaktian Pancasila to counteract the impression that the military had a vested
interest in this ceremony (Suara Karya 1 October 1975). The most likely reason
for this criticism was a swell of public, and particularly student, disillusionment
with the military. Students who had assisted the military to take power, through
their role in the 196566 protests against Sukarno and communism, watched with
alarm as military officers took up increasing privileges and continued to expand
their political role (Hansen 1975, 149). In response to this criticism the govern-

ment transferred responsibility for commemoration from the Department of

Defence to the directorate of culture in the Department of Education and invited
students to join the main ceremony (Suara Karya 1 October 1975). In the imme-
diate term this move did not, however, have a significant impact on commemo-
ration, especially given that the Education Minister at the time, Syarief Thayeb,
was himself a military man and the fact that, until the 1980s at least, the military
and the bureaucracy (if distinguishable) were in close partnership (see Mackie
and McIntyre 1994, 79). The government also tried to maximise the profile of
the Education Department by instigating an annual speech by the Minister of
Education. These speeches, which were broadcast on national television and
radio on the night before the anniversary of the coup attempt, provide the clear-
est indication of the shifting meaning of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila in subsequent
years.
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila and the primacy of Pancasila
From the mid to late 1970s, the New Order government placed increasing empha-
sis on the Pancasila as an ideology and a way of life. In this way the New Order
moved from depoliticisation to creating a state-controlled political framework
that was directed at excluding not just communism but also other political forces,
including western liberalism and political Islam. Pancasila was used as a pillar in
a corporatist system of state control (see Ford 1999). On Hari Kesaktian Pancasila
in 1978, the government introduced Pancasila upgrading courses (Penataran
Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan PancasilaUpgrading Course on the Direc-
tives for the Realisation of Pancasila) commonly known by the acronym P4
(Kompas 2 October 1978). The courses included instruction on New Order inter-
pretations of each of the principles of Pancasila, emphasis on the duties of
Pancasila citizens and justifications of how the policies and form of the New
Order government complied with the Pancasila (Bourchier 1996, 22936; Morfit
1981, 845). Initially the two-week courses were only compulsory for civil servants
(Morfit 1981). During the 1980s, however, the P4 course was extended to cover
religious leaders and all students (Weatherbee 1985, 188). In line with the
increased emphasis on Pancasila, and under the influence of armed forces
commander Benny Murdani who had a strong intelligence background, military
ideology also began to reinforce kewasapadaan [vigilance] thinking, according to
which all threats to national stability were defined in relation to the Pancasila
(Honna 1999, 79). In 1985 the government also introduced the contentious asas
tunggal [sole foundation] legislation, which required all political and social
organisations to make Pancasila the sole basis of their organisations. Pancasila

thus became the prescribed set of guiding principles for the press, the law, the
economy, industrial relations and morality.
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila and the threat of Islam
In the early years of the New Order a partnership existed between Moslems and
the military-dominated regime but, from the late 1970s to the mid 1980s, Islams
political role changed from being the hammer of the left into the major per-
ceived threat to military rule (McVey 1983, 199). In response to this change
some officials attempted to broaden the meaning of kesaktian Pancasila to include
threats to the state from the extreme right or groups allegedly wishing to replace
the Pancasila with Islam as the basis of the state. This threat had its historical
roots in the debate over the place of Islam in the Indonesian political order
and in the Darul Islam [house of Islam] rebellions of the 1950s and 1960s (see
Boland 1982). In the late 1970s, the regime perceived the threat of Islam to have
resurfaced due to the success of the government-created Moslem party PPP
(Partai Persatuan PembangunanUnited Development Party) in the 1977
election (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 91) and the partys increasing assertive-
ness. In 1978, members of the PPP walked out of parliament in protest at
plans to introduce the P4 courses. Suharto responded to this bold move by
attacking certain groups who displayed an anti-Pancasila attitude in his famous
Pekanbaru speech of 1980. In this speech Suharto reminded his audience of the
troubles different ideological leanings had brought Indonesia in the past, men-
tioning the Darul Islam rebellions as well as the G-30-S/PKI. He stressed the fact
that the New Order had sought to correct these deviations ( Jenkins 1984, 154,
158, 16263).
As a consequence of growing government apprehension about Islam as a
source of opposition, between 1980 and 1984 some government officials began
to use commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila as an opportunity to remind
Indonesians of the history of Islamic opposition to the Pancasila. In 1980 this
message was relatively muted (Sinar Harapan 1 October 1980), but by October
1981 the message about the threat of Islam to the Pancasila was far clearer. In his
television address on the night of 30 September, Education Minister Daoed
Joesoef suggested that commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila, besides
being a reminder of the latent threat of the extreme left, was also a reminder
of the latent threat of the extreme right. In this context he noted that the
Indonesian nation had also experienced a betrayal of the Pancasila by the Darul
Islam movements because of their attempts to change the basis of the state to
Islam (Berita Buana 1 October 1981). This introduction of Islam as an enemy of
the Pancasila represented a major shift in the meaning of this day, as it now not

only served as a reminder of the betrayal of the communists whom Moslem

groups had indeed helped to crush (see below), but also as a reminder and
warning of prior Moslem betrayals of the Pancasila. Although Daoed Joesoef
had a reputation for offending Indonesian Moslems (Far Eastern Economic Review
22 August 1980, 2627), he was not the only one issuing warnings in 1981. A
likely reason for the more direct inclusion of Islam as a potential threat to the
Pancasila in 1981 was the April hijacking of a Garuda plane en route to Medan,
which the government blamed on Moslem extremists.6 Another motive for the
demonisation of Islam was the forthcoming parliamentary election in 1982 in
which the government hoped to secure a firm victory. Similar warnings against
Moslem extremists were issued in 1982 (Kompas 1 October 1982), but in 1983,
perhaps due to the end of the immediate election threat and a change in the
Minister for Education, official warnings about the communist threat took
priority (Kompas 1 October 1983).
Commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila in 1984 took place just after the
Tanjung Priok affair of 18 September in which over 400 people are believed to
have died as a result of a clash between security forces and demonstrators.7
The government later alleged that the Tanjung Priok affair was the result of the
failure of certain groups, particularly Moslem preachers, to accept the asas
tunggal legislation (Ramage 1995, 3538).8 Unyielding government officials felt
compelled to link the Tanjung Priok incident with threats to the Pancasila on
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila in 1984. Amir Machmud, the head of the DPR/MPR,
stated that the Tanjung Priok episode was an old disease that had re-established
itself in response to the feelings of a group in society with a different ideology
outside of the Pancasila (Sinar Harapan 29 September 1984). Nugroho Noto-
susantos speech as Minister for Education by contrast was considerably more
moderate, perhaps reflecting a hesitation shared by other government officials
about the events of Tanjung Priok and the continued espousal of the threat of
Islam.9
In 1985, the asas tunggal [sole foundation] legislation was passed. The accep-
tance of asas tunggal by most Moslem organisations marked the end of a short
era in which the meaning of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila was altered in order to warn
not only of the danger of communism but also against Islamic extremism. In his
1985 address for Hari Kesaktian Pancasila, the new Minister of Education Fuad
Hassan claimed that the purpose of commemorating Hari Kesaktian Pancasila was
to make Indonesians aware that with a national commitment to Pancasila,
Indonesians would share the same aspirations. In this sentence he encapsulated
the governments aim to homogenise Indonesian society by means of continual
Pancasila propagation. He suggested that further disturbances related to the
national ideology were not expected, given the acceptance of Pancasila as the
basis of life in Indonesia (Kompas 1 October 1985).

HARI KESAKTIAN PANCASILA IN THE LATE

NEW ORDER PERIOD
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila and the threat of communism in the

post cold war environment
No sooner had the Pancasila state been put into place than the political role of
Pancasila began to change. This change came about partly because the disinte-
gration of global communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s cast doubt on the
continued seriousness of the supposed communist threat to Indonesia, and partly
because the New Order itself began to move towards a slightly more open politi-
cal format. The government responded to the first change by constructing new
images of communist perfidy and to the second by shifting the Hari Kesaktian
Pancasila commemoration in an Islamic direction.
A part of the reinvigoration of anti-communism involved new emphasis on the
so-called Madiun Affair of 1948, in which conflict between left-wing and right-
wing military units in East and Central Java had led to an abortive attempt by the
PKI to seize power in the Indonesian Republic. The PKI argued that its action
was needed to prevent the then national leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, from
signing away full independence in their negotiations with the Dutch. Conserva-
tives, on the other hand, saw the revolt as a stab in the back by the communists
at a time when the Republic was facing defeat at the hands of the Dutch, and it
contributed to the strong anti-communist feelings in sections of the military (see
Sastrosoewignyo 1965). The first panel of bas-reliefs that adorns the Pancasila
Sakti monument at Lubang Buaya shows scenes from the Madiun Affair, intended
as proof that G-30-S was not a unique occurrence but part of a consistent pattern
of power-seeking and betrayal by the PKI. The term latent danger [bahaya laten]
was frequently used to imply the cyclical nature of the communist threat and the
fact that it could resurface at any time.
Although throughout the New Order regime the label communist served
as a convenient means of discrediting regime opposition (see Honna 1999;
Goodfellow 1995; Heryanto 1999), during the late 1980s and early 1990s the gov-
ernment placed increasing emphasis on the supposedly insidious character of
communist activity. The authorities screened all government employees for com-
munist links in their past, in what was called the bersih diri bersih lingkungan [clean
self, clean environment] campaign, and placed tight controls on the activities of
former political prisoners detained after 1965.10
The military also reasserted the communist threat by recycling propaganda
about the gruesome deaths of the army heroes in 1965. To set the scene, a colos-
sal diorama torture scene (Figure 4) and an exhibition of the original gory photos

Figure 4: The Colossal Diorama at Monumen Pancasila Sakti located just beside the preserved
well in an original bamboo hut
of the retrieval of the heroes bodies from the well were opened at the monu-
ment on 1 October 1990 (Suara Pembaruan 3 October 1990). Armed forces com-
mander Try Soetrisno presented awards to members of the local population who
had helped locate the bodies and to staff of the Gatot Subroto hospital who had
bathed the corpses of the heroes (Angkatan Bersendjata 29 September 1990). He
also delivered a speech in which he stated that those who found the bodies had
lifted the veil of deceit and exposed the inhumanity of the G-30-S/PKI group.
Consistent with initial propaganda released immediately after the coup attempt,
Soetrisno sought to emphasise the brutality of the PKI by drawing attention
to the appalling condition of the bodies of the army heroes after exhumation
(see van Langenberg 1990, 48). In a further demonstration of their commitment
to this theme in 1993 the military opened a new museum dedicated to the his-
torical theme of the leftist betrayal, Museum Pengkhianatan Kommunis, at the
monument complex at Lubang Buaya.
In the mid-1990s, regime figures increasingly warned of the danger of organ-
isasi tanpa bentuk [organisations without any form], and groups that used PKI

methods, as primary threats (Kompas 1 October 1995). On the one hand, the
organisasi tanpa bentuk concept represented an attempt to discredit as com-
munist almost any kind of opposition, from those who appealed for human rights,
environmental protection or democratisation to those who criticised the gov-
ernment (Honna 1999, 96100). On the other hand, the accusations attributed
infinite cunning to the communists, so that they were able to be present every-
where in society without leaving any trace and could dupe otherwise sincere and
loyal Indonesians into doing their nefarious work.
These warnings against new forms of communism and organisations without
form coincided with the growing popularity of the secular PDI party [Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia], originally formed in 1973 out of Protestant and Catholic
parties and remnants of the nationalist PNI. By 1 October 1996 the government
had already dealt with the election threat of Megawati by removing her from lead-
ership of the PDI and violently attacking her party headquarters on 27 July 1996
in response to the daily free speech forums held there. Over 200 people were
arrested in the riots that followed the attack, and many of these are still missing.
The military blamed the riots on members of the illegal party PRD (Partai Rakyat
DemokratDemocratic Peoples Party), which had been active in the free speech
forums (Liddle and Mallarangeng 1997, 168, 170), and branded the PRD a com-
munist organisation because of its so-called communist methods.
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila as a celebration of Moslem piety

and anti-atheism
The New Order never ceased to be authoritarian, but during the mid-1990s it did
preside over a greater degree of political openness than had been the case at the
height of the 1980s Pancasila campaigns. The reasons for this openness were
complex, and relate to the mounting pressure for change within Indonesia from
increasingly restless intellectuals, student groups and members of the press
(Budiman 1992, 135) as well as a veiled power struggle between Suharto and
armed forces commander Benny Murdani (Vatikiotis 1993, 88). During the short
period of liberalisation known as keterbukaanor opennessthere was a dramatic
expansion in public discussion on political and economic issues and a general
relaxation of controls. During the period of liberalisation, while the military and
Suharto made competing assertions of their commitment to openness both con-
tinued to summon the communist ghost as a means of controlling the permissi-
ble limits of reform (Aspinall 1995, 28).
In this more open political environment, the New Orders political format
shifted somewhat from constricting choice and controlling thought to winning
the support of various groups in Indonesian society. In these circumstances, Hari

Kesaktian Pancasila was recruited to contribute to the regimes appeal to the large
Moslem constituency. The importance of this constituency had grown under the
New Order because of a dramatic rise in orthodox Islamic observance. Paradoxi-
cally this change appears to have arisen out of the New Orders success in ex-
cluding Islam from open politics: in exchange for abjuring politics, Moslem
proselytisers were rewarded with state funds for mosque-building and organisa-
tion and were given considerable freedom to work quietly for more orthodox
observance. By the mid-1990s, this effort had borne fruit in a noticeable increase
in the number of mosques, prayer halls and Islamic schools, increased official
usage of Islamic expressions and permission for schoolgirls to wear the jilbab
[Islamic head covering] (Hefner 1993, 10, 3). The Pancasila carries a religious
element because of its first principle, belief in one God. As we have seen, early
in the New Order the regime used the supposed inability of communists to accept
this principle to isolate them from the mainstream of Indonesian society. There
was nothing specifically Islamic, however, about the principle of belief in one
God; this was portrayed in New Order theology as a characteristic of all recog-
nised religions, and many orthodox Moslems regarded the Pancasila as unac-
ceptably non-committal towards Islam.
Although the Minister of Religion read a prayer each year during the main
ceremony at Lubang Buaya, the religious implications of the Pancasila were
downplayed as it was turned into a weapon against political Islam as well as com-
munism. After 1995, however, the commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila was
given an increasingly Islamic cast. Although Hari Kesaktian Pancasila continued
to be a day on which Indonesians were reminded of the possible return of a com-
munist threat, this threat was couched more specifically in terms of a threat to
the Pancasila principle of belief in one God. Rather than emphasising that Hari
Kesaktian Pancasila was the day on which the Pancasila itself was saved, the author-
ities portrayed it as the day on which the people were saved from atheism. As in
other cases when the communist ghost was conventionally summoned there was
no basis for suggesting that communism or atheism was on the increase in
Indonesia. It was simply a means of playing on the fears of some Moslems of the
rise of secular forces that could potentially mean repression of Islam.
In 1995, as part of its projection of a more Moslem image, the ruling party
Golkar organised an additional commemorative activity for Hari Kesaktian
Pancasila, an acara tahlilan (recitation of the confession of faith: there is no God
but God). This event was attended by around 2,300 Islamic teachers and religious
authorities (Suara Karya 2 October 1995). In arranging an acara tahlilan, the gov-
ernment not only reinforced the older message that Hari Kesaktian Pancasila was
the day on which Indonesians were saved from atheism, but added the implica-
tion that the day should be commemorated as a form of affirmation of the reli-
gion of Islam.

For Hari Kesaktian Pancasila 1996, the Indonesian military followed the lead of
Golkar the year before in sponsoring its own acara tahlilan at Monumen Pancasila
Sakti on the night of 30 September (Angkatan Bersenjata 2 October 1996). The
armed forces commander, Feisal Tanjung, took this opportunity to warn Indone-
sians that they should beware of their forgiving nature, for the PKI had taken
advantage of this in the past (the reference was to both the events of Madiun
1948 and the coup attempt of 1965). More specifically he suggested that this
attitude of forgiveness had recently been taken advantage of by certain groups
such as the youths and students involved in the July 27 Affair in 1996 (Angkatan
Bersenjata 2 October 1996). He was of course referring to members of the PRD.
This military-sponsored commemoration was an attempt to consolidate Moslem-
based opposition to Megawati and the PRD by presenting this as a case of com-
munists versus Moslems.
In 1996, the government-sponsored organisation MUI (Majelis Ulama Indone-
siaCouncil of Indonesian Ulama)11 also organised a commemoration for
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila. For the first time ever the general meeting to crush the
G-30-S/PKI, originally held on 4 October 1965, was commemorated. Six thou-
sand people from Islamic organisations took part in a long march from the
Sunda Kelapa Mosque to the Istiqlal Mosque. The purpose of the march was to
remind and caution people of the possibility of the return of a communist
movement (Kompas 30 September 1996). In addition, thousands of Moslems
attended a Malam tasyakur (a ceremony involving the reading of prayers and
poetry) at the Istiqlal Mosque. The head of MUI, Hasnan Basri, stated that the
purpose of the malam tasyakur was to give thanks to God for his help and to
reinforce MUIs rejection of the communist-like methods used by those respon-
sible for the July 27 riots (Kompas 2 October 1996). Commemoration of Hari
Kesaktian Pancasila in 1996 served as a means of reminding the public, less than
a year before the next election, of Megawatis fateful alliance with the allegedly
communist PRD.
Efforts by Golkar and the Feisal Tanjung faction of the military to rally Moslems
to commemorate Hari Kesaktian Pancasila in 1995 and 1996 seem to have been
strongly motivated by the forthcoming election in May 1997. This is evidenced
by the fact that in the commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila in 1997, which
happened to be the day on which new members of parliament were sworn in,
there were no commemorative activities directed specifically at winning Moslem
support.
Over the period of the New Order the meaning of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila went
through three distinct phases, as the regime redefined its principal enemies and
courted new allies. Until the mid-1970s, Hari Kesaktian Pancasila was a celebra-
tion of national unity and purpose, excluding the communist party. Commemo-
rations marked the leadership and supreme sacrifice of the military in defending

the Pancasila but explicitly sought to maintain the spirit of the so-called New
Order coalition that had brought Sukarno down and helped Suharto to power.
From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, by contrast, the commemoration became
more exclusive. Islam and other forms of thinking not sanctioned by the regime
were marginalised and Hari Kesaktian Pancasila became a central state ritual. From
the late 1980s, however, the commemoration became both a tool in the renewed
demonisation of communism and a weapon in the regimes political struggle to
win Moslem support. This latter struggle led the authorities to give Hari Kesak-
tian Pancasila a much more Islamic character than ever before. For the duration
of the New Order regime the official version of the coup attempt celebrated on
this day remained largely unchallenged in the mainstream media, and mention
of the post-coup killings was scarce. This was in part due to tight press censor-
ship, but also to the strong climate of anti-communism.
HARI KESAKTIAN PANCASILA IN THE POST-SUHARTO

REFORMASI ERA
The resignation of President Suharto and his replacement by the Vice President,
B. J. Habibie, led to unprecedented openness in Indonesian politics and the ques-
tioning of a vast range of policies and practices associated with the former regime.
Although public attention focused on current issues of policy, the writing and
commemoration of history also came under scrutiny. First of all Indonesians
began to revisit the history of the 196566 transition. The first topic to receive
attention was the official version of the coup attempt, slowly followed by the topic
of the 196566 killings. These changes were significant to commemoration of
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila because they provided the grounds for questioning the
future relevance of the day and the injustices that it disguised. The end of the
authoritarian New Order also sparked a re-examination of the Pancasila as
national orthodoxy. This re-examination also had significance for the fate of Hari
Kesaktian Pancasila.
The Habibie period
Holding on to the Pancasila

In the first year after the fall of Suharto both Hari Lahir Pancasila and Hari Kesak-
tian Pancasila were celebrated at the instigation of different but similarly moti-
vated political players. The anniversary of Hari Lahir Pancasila fell less than two
weeks after Suhartos resignation. On this occasion Megawati, who had remained

an important symbol of the struggle against Suharto in the last years of his regime,
chose to use this historic day with which her father was so closely associated. In
a speech at the Pancasila building addressed primarily to supporters of her
PDI-Perjuangan [PDI Struggle] party, she said that there was no need for further
debate about the actual birth date of the Pancasila and reasserted that it was
her father who had unearthed the Pancasila. She also stated that previously
Pancasila had only been paid lip service to and that Indonesians must rise up
and realise that [they] really did have a basis for [their] nation which is so
beautiful and must be implemented consistently and purely (Suara Pembaruan 2
June 1998). New Order officials had also frequently claimed to be implementing
the Pancasila consistently and purely, but Megawatis reference to lip service
was clearly intended to discredit the political use made of the Pancasila by the
New Order. Megawatis statement signalled that she intended to continue to
support the Pancasila as a basis for the nation. In addition, she suggested that
Indonesians needed to think of the future and of how they could return to the
values of the Pancasila (Suara Merdeka 2 June 1998). This message implied that
Pancasila had been temporarily abandoned, thereby suggesting that once,
perhaps under her father, it had indeed been implemented. The commemora-
tion of Hari Lahir Pancasila in 1998 took place on a large scale. Confirming the
sense that Hari Lahir Pancasila was a form of counter commemoration to Hari
Kesaktian Pancasila, a journalist noted that throughout the New Order it was only
Suhartos sacred [keramat] day that had been commemorated (Suara Merdeka 2
June 1998).
Commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila went ahead in 1998. The replace-
ment of Suharto as master of ceremony by Habibie altered the tone of the cere-
mony because Habibie, unlike Suharto, was neither of military background nor
an historical actor in the events of 1965. Following the lead of Megawati, who had
seized the opportunity of Hari Lahir Pancasila to make a statement about her
commitment to Pancasila, President Habibie chose to deliver a televised speech
for Hari Kesaktian Pancasila in 1998. In his speech he reminded Indonesians that
the reformasi now being carried out must consistently refer to the values of the
Pancasila, as reformasi was a reaction to, and a correction of, the inconsistent
application of these principles (Kompas 1 October 1998). This speech reflected
the broad thrust of Habibies political program, which was to remove or reform
what were seen as the excesses and mistakes of the New Order era without bring-
ing about fundamental changes in society. The holding of free elections, the lift-
ing of censorship, the release of political prisoners and the decision to allow a
ballot on independence in East Timor all addressed serious criticisms of the New
Order, and were arguably closer to the Pancasila value of humanitarianism than
any steps taken by the New Order regime on human rights issues (see Amnesty
International 1994).

By October 1999, Habibie was still President but Megawatis PDI-Perjuangan

had won the most seats in the 1999 national election and Megawati was a strong
contender for President. As in previous years, new members of parliament were
sworn into office on 1 October. Yet, in an unprecedented move, many of them
refused to attend the commemoration at Monumen Pancasila Sakti (Suara Pem-
baruan 1 October 1999). This move, by the first democratically elected members
of parliament for many years, was most likely an attempt to disassociate them-
selves from Habibie, who was to be inspector of ceremony, rather than a repudia-
tion of the ceremony itself. The Habibie-appointed Education Minister, Juwono
Sudarsono, raised strong objections to the decision to snub commemoration of
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila. He claimed that it was inappropriate to abolish Hari
Kesaktian Pancasila in the name of reform, because the Pancasila had indeed
proved its sakti quality. He suggested that the values in Pancasila were still rele-
vant, and could be an asset to assist in creating a new Indonesian person (Suara
Pembaruan 1 October 1999). In some quarters at least there was concern that
abandoning this commemorative day would send out a message about the future
relevance of Pancasila.
Despite indications from the Habibie government of its commitment to Pan-
casila, although in a possibly diminished capacityHabibie had conceded to calls
to abandon the P4 courses (Kompas 5 June 1998)there were some in this climate
of greater press freedom who challenged the term kesaktian Pancasila. One
opinion piece in Suara Merdeka, replicating the sentiment of Jakob Oetama some
thirty years earlier, pointed to the last regimes use of Pancasila as a political com-
modity to defend its own power, in cases as wide-ranging as compulsory reloca-
tion of villagers for development projects, oppression, corruption, collusion and
nepotism. Its author recommended that Hari Kesaktian Pancasila should invite
reflection on the meaning, position and truth of the Pancasila (Suara Merdeka 1
October 1999). It seemed that for this commentator the most central issue to be
contemplated on this day was the Pancasila and its future use.
Responding to challenges to the official version of the coup attempt

One reason for the continued emphasis on the Pancasila in commemoration of
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila may have been an awareness of the challenges to the
version of events commemorated on this day. When Suharto resigned, both he
and the myths he had helped to create, including the myth of origin of the New
Order regime, became subject to open questioning. Days after the fall of Suharto,
Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul Latief, a political prisoner convicted of involvement in
the coup attempt of 1965, revealed in a press interview that the night before the
coup attempt he had warned Suharto that the generals would be kidnapped. He
also reported that Suharto had chosen not to act until the coup was completed

(The Australian 25 May 1998). This public testimony from a man who had by then
served over thirty years in prison exposed Suhartos role in the coup to wider
comment. By the time of the 1998 anniversary of the coup attempt, a flood of
special feature articles questioning the official version of this episode appeared.12
Most articles considered the question of Suhartos culpability, focusing in par-
ticular on Latiefs version of the coup attempt (Tajuk 17 September 1998), rather
than on that of the military as an institution, but other versions of the coup
attempt were also outlined in the press. Some reports also featured rebuttals of
the official version that the heroes were tortured prior to their deaths, making
reference to the autopsy reports from 1965 (Tajuk 17 September 1998). The sig-
nificance of these reports was that they cast suspicion on the endlessly repeated
propaganda about the coup attempt.
In an attempt to display its reformasi credentials, the Habibie government
made some responses to the appearance of alternative versions of the coup
attempt. First of all, it cancelled the nation-wide television screening of the
propaganda film Pengkhianatan Gerakan 30 September for the first time since its
release in 1983; then, on 1 October it was announced that the national history
curriculum, including the events of the coup attempt, would be revised by the
year 2000 (The Australian 3 October 1998). These two announcements were
tentative acknowledgments of the need for adjustment to official New Order
historiography. Despite these changes, though, there was no reflection from
either the public or the government on what these challenges to the official
version of the coup attempt meant for the future of commemoration of Hari
Keeping the communist threat alive

On the 1998 anniversary of the coup attempt Habibie supporters resorted to
tactics prevalent in the late New Order period, using anti-communism to rally
opposition against regime critics. Leading up to commemoration of 1 October,
members of the Islamic group KISDI, which had developed a reputation in the
late New Order period for mobilising to support Suharto,13 appeared on the
streets. They carried banners with alarmist messages such as The country is on
the threshold of danger. The PKIs third revolt will be September 1998. Some
mosques throughout Jakarta carried similar warnings (Tajuk 1 October 1998).
On 30 September 1998, between 5,000 and 15,000 Moslems from BKPRMI,14
MUI and Furkon15 gathered at the Istiqlal mosque in Jakarta to commemorate
the anniversary of the coup attempt. The organisers of this rally cautioned
the audience to be alert for indications of the return of communism, suggesting
that recent protests, which had largely been directed at Habibies government,

had anarchic and violent tendencies reminiscent of the PKI (Pikiran Rakyat 30
September 1998; Gatra 10 October 1998). The theme of anti-atheism was again
highlighted by the proliferation of bandannas, worn by commemorators,
adorned with Arabic script for the profession of faith: there is no God but God.
The timing of these rallies was significant because they closely preceded the
November Special Session of the MPR that would decide upon the next steps in
the political transition. It was expected that this session would attract large-scale
protest, particularly as many members of the MPR were Suharto appointees.
In anticipation, Habibie supportersespecially from ICMI and modernist
Islamic organisationsdecided to mobilise themselves into voluntary security
forces or Pam Swakarsa [Civil Security Forces], to block opposition to Habibie
(Crouch 1999, 132). The participation of some Moslem groups in the Hari Kesak-
tian Pancasila rallies can therefore be explained by their hopes that Habibie, who
was founding Chairman of ICMI, would look after their interests better than
a more secular leader, who might once again implement policies repressive to
Islam (Falaakh 1999, 203). It should however be noted that there were Moslem
organisations that did not join or support these rallies and that were cautious
about the extent of reform the Habibie government would deliver (see Madrid
1999, 29).
In the lead-up to Hari Kesaktian Pancasila 1998, armed forces commander
Wiranto also rallied anti-communist sentiment among Moslem organisations in
an effort to discredit the opposition to Habibie. Although there were prior ten-
sions in relations between Habibie and the military (Lowry 1996, 1819, 37),
Wiranto moved quickly to offer his support to Habibie in exchange for retaining
his position as Commander. Despite his reputation as a middle-of-the-road officer,
he proved himself willing to rally Moslem organisations to safeguard the com-
bined position of Habibie and the military (Crouch 1999, 128, 13031). On 20
September, General Wiranto announced at a conference of Nahdlatul Ulama
youth that there were indications that communists had masterminded many of
the recent demonstrations (Suara Merdeka 20 September 1998). The target of
Wirantos warnings was the same group that had been targeted by the above-
mentioned Moslem protesters, Forkot,16 a group mostly of students who were the
most persistent critics of Habibie (Suara Merdeka 25 September 1998; Gatra 10
October 1998).
In 1999, however, the military leadership, consumed by the crisis in East Timor
triggered by the independence ballot, issued no warnings about the revival of
communism on Hari Kesaktian Pancasila. Nor were there specifically Moslem
forms of commemoration. On the whole, media commentary on Hari Kesaktian
Pancasila was also more subdued in 1999. This was probably due to preoccupation
with the impending presidential election, scheduled for nine days later.

Preempting memories of the killings
Although the main purpose of the 30 September 1998 gathering at the Istiqlal
mosque was almost certainly to rally Moslem solidarity behind Habibie, older
members of the audience also used the occasion to make statements about some
previously suppressed aspects of the 196566 transition. As if to provide public
justification for the mass killing of communists, an historical actor [pelaku sejarah],
A Husni Thamrin,17 testified that he had suffered the cruelty of the PKI at first
hand (Suara Merdeka 1 October 1998). The deputy head of PP Muhammadiyah,
Lukman Harun,18 announced that if communism had not been stamped out,
Indonesia would be have been hancur [destroyed]. These two statements, made
to younger audiences, were possibly prompted by awareness that the history of
the last transition period was slowly being opened up and that the history of the
post-coup killings, including the involvement of Moslem groups in the killings,
might soon also be revisited. Lukman Harun also reminded Indonesians that
the Moslems in close partnership with the army had suppressed the communists
(Suara Merdeka 1 October 1998). Haruns comment was possibly designed to influ-
ence the framework within which young Moslems would view the past role in the
killings played by many of the organisations of which they were now members,
if that role were subsequently exposed. It also reflected a reluctance to admit
that in the case of the post-coup killings some Moslem organisations might
have become tools of the state. This was particularly true for older Moslems who
participated in the post-coup killings as members of Moslem vigilantes under
army direction, such as members of the Islamic youth organisation Ansor
(Anonymous 1990, 17075). These statements were designed to reinforce com-
memoration of this day as both a justification for, and celebration of, the sup-
pression of communism. At the same time, they indicated a sense of nervousness
about how the role of some Moslems in the 196566 killings would be interpreted.
This was the first time that public mention of the killing of communists after
1 October was so directly addressed in commemoration surrounding Hari
The prediction that it was only matter of time before the issue of the post-coup
killings was also opened up was accurate. On 7 April 1999, the Yayasan Penelit-
ian Korban Pembunuhan 196566 (YPKPInstitute for the Investigation into the
196566 Killings) was set up by former political prisoners, including former
Gerwani leader Ibu Sulami, to collect data on the 196566 killings. The activities
of this organisation included investigating mass graves from this period. Although
the YPKPs activities suggested that a genuine change in the political environ-
ment had taken place, it was not free from intimidation. As Stanley argues, the
appearance of YPKP stimulated anxiety among some people over the possibility
of exposure of their own abuses of human rights (Stanley 2000, 6). In June 1999,

Ibu Sulami also released an autobiographical account of her twenty years of

imprisonment as a political detainee, providing one of the first public accounts
of the suffering of political prisoners both within and outside gaol (Sulami 1999).
In September 1999 an historical seminar, entitled Taking an Honest Look at
the National Tragedy of 1965 was also held in Jakarta under the auspices of
Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia (MSIthe Society of Indonesian Historians).19
Although discussion of the official version of the coup attempt was relatively
open, discussion of the killings was still guarded. A key participant in the seminar,
Taufik Abdullah, felt it necessary to state publicly that the motivation for dis-
cussing issues that had been forgotten was not to open the nations wounds or
to encourage revenge (Suara Pembaruan 9 September 1999). Nor were the pre-
sentations necessarily sympathetic to the victims. Iwan Sujatmiko of the Univer-
sity of Indonesia dismissed the possibility of describing the 196566 killings as a
holocaust or genocide because, he said, those killed (the communists) were not
innocent. He also asserted that the attack on the PKI was a preemptive strike and
that there was consequently no need for those involved in the killing to ask for
forgiveness (Sujatmiko 1999, 1719). Nonetheless, the founding of the YPKP,
Sulamis book, and the content of this seminar indicated that the history of the
SukarnoSuharto transition was slowly being confronted. These moves to open
up the past did not, however, have immediate consequences for Hari Kesaktian
Pancasila.
The Gus Dur-Megawati period
In October 1999, Abdurrachman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, was elected
President of Indonesia, with Megawati Sukarnoputri as Vice President. His elec-
tion brought with it expectations that Indonesia was finally moving closer to a
more democratic society and that troubles that had plagued Indonesia, includ-
ing a weak rupiah, sporadic violence and escalating separatist movements, would
be solved. There were also hopes in some circles that many of the injustices
of the past, including the 196566 killings, the Tanjung Priok incident and the
1996 raid on the PDI office, would be investigated and the appropriate persons
punished.
Lifting the ban on communism and Marxist Leninist teachings

Early in 2000, Gus Dur made the controversial recommendation to lift the 1966
Consultative Assembly Decree (MPRS TAP 25) that had banned communism and
Marxist-Leninist teachings in Indonesia. He claimed that this proposal was based
on humanitarian and constitutional considerations, especially the preamble to

the 1945 constitution (Suara Pembaruan 22 May 2000). Along with proposing to
end the ban, he made a personal apology to former members of the PKI and
proposed lifting longstanding restrictions on the activities of former political
prisoners. Coming from the President and former head of Indonesias largest
Islamic organisation, the Nahdlatul Ulama, these were very significant moves and
suggested the possibility of public acknowledgment of the suffering of others
during and after the 196566 transition. They also posed a potential challenge
to those who wanted to continue to celebrate 1 October as the day on which the
communists were crushed. However, Wahids proposal met with considerable
resistance.
Throughout March and April, street protests were held against this proposal.
The Indonesian Islamic Front (FUII) protested on the grounds of the association
between communism and atheism ( Jakarta Post 8 April 2000). Meanwhile, Front
Pembela Islam Surakarta (FPIS) requested clarification of Abdurrachmans
request for forgiveness from the PKI, suggesting that he took the matter of
communism too lightly (Duta 29 March 2000). Members of the Moslem-based
PPP (United Development Party) and the military also spoke out against this
idea (Duta 29 March 2000). The Moslem Crescent and Star Party (PBB) was the
most critical. It went so far as to call an emergency session of the Peoples
Consultative Assembly to demand the accountability and possible impeachment
of the President based on the alleged contravention his suggestion posed to his
oath to uphold the 1945 constitution ( Jakarta Post 15 April 2000). Although some
of the groups that opposed this idea, most noticeably the PBB, may have been
looking for a means to discredit Gus Dur and prompt a change in leadership,
these protests also reflected a commitment to anti-communism and to the belief
that the killing of the communists in 196566 was justified. Ahmad Sahal, editor
of Kalam magazine, questioned why Islamic groups of all derivations opposed
the lifting of the ban on communism so strongly, asking whether this reflected
the success of the New Order regime in spreading communist-phobia (Tempo 16
April 2000, 23). In a climate of increased religiosity, it appeared that consistent
calls to rally anti-communism by emphasising the communistatheist association
had been successful. Due to exacerbated political tensions the proposal was not
mooted at the August MPR session as Gus Dur had originally planned.
Commemoration of 1 October continues

In 2000 the Wahid government made a decision to continue to commemorate 1
October. This decision may have been a response to the resistance his proposal
to lift the ban on communism had raised. Possibly Wahid felt the political climate
to be too volatile to propose another major break with the anti-communist tra-
ditions of the New Order. There were, however, other reasons that might explain

why commemoration of this day was continued. After 33 years of commemora-

tion, the association between this day and the governments commitment to Pan-
casila, whatever the forms that commitment took, had been cemented. This day,
more than any other, including Hari Lahir Pancasila, was Pancasila day. Although
considerable criticism had been raised at the forcefulness with which the Pan-
casila had been imposed in the New Order, both Wahid and Megawati remained
committed to the Pancasila as the basis of the Indonesian state. Both had made
repeated pronouncements of this commitment in the post-Suharto era.20 In a
press statement the deputy chair of the DPR, Harry Sabarno, said that if 1
October were not commemorated it would be difficult to understand why the
Pancasila must be defended (Suara Pembaruan 1 October 2000). Continuing to
celebrate the day therefore sent a signal about the governments commitment to
the Pancasila.
Gus Dur and Megawati did, however, change the name of the day. The new
name under which 1 October was commemorated in 2000 was Peringatan
Hari Pengkhianatan (terhadap) Pancasila, the Commemorative Day for the Betrayal
of the Pancasila. The official reason behind the name change was to change
the misrepresentation that Pancasila, the national ideology, was sacred ( Jakarta
Post 2 October 2000). This change managed the neat manoeuvre of repudiat-
ing the New Orders attribution of sacredness to the Pancasila, which both pious
Muslims and political liberals found offensive, while still affirming the impor-
tance of the Pancasila. It was a very shrewd move that also forestalled the possi-
ble hijacking of this day for other interests. This potential for hijacking became
apparent on 1 October, when members of Pelajar Islam Indonesia [Indonesian
Moslem Students], seemingly unaware of the name change, demonstrated in
front of the state palace in Jakarta against the former name of this day. They
held banners reading Jas merah [an Old Order acronym for the message never
leave history21], dont forget the history of betrayal of 18 September 1948
[Madiun] and Get rid of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila (Suara Pembaruan 30 Sep-
tember 2000). The last message in this banner seemed incongruous with the
transparent anti-communism of the demonstrator. What the students meant
by the demand to get rid of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila was not to end com-
memoration of this day, but rather to change its name by omitting the Pancasila
altogether. The alternative name they proposed was Hari Syukur Nasional
[National Thanks-be-to-God Day] (Forum Keadilan no. 27, 8 October 2000). In
this way, they were attempting to reframe the meaning of the day as a warning
against communism, but not an affirmation of the Pancasila. The implication was
that they wanted this day to be a celebration of religious belief and anti-atheism,
rather than an endorsement of the Pancasila. The tone of this protest was indica-
tive not only of a rising backlash against the Pancasila,22 but also of the emerging
pattern of sectarian politics that Suharto had set in train. Gus Dur in particular

had spoken out against the danger of this trend both during and after the New
Order period.23
The official theme for the 1 October commemoration in 2000 was let us be
firm in our national unity and oneness (Suara Pembaruan 2 October 2000). This
theme focused on the specific Pancasila principle of nationalism and national
unity. With widespread violence and continuing troubles in the disputed
provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya and Ambon this was a logical theme, but public
enthusiasm was lacking. The government did not instruct Indonesians to fly their
flags at half-mast in memory of the military heroes, and many Indonesians did
not voluntarily do so. The head of the East Java Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia,
Dr Aminudin Kasdi, suggested that the reason for this was that society was cur-
rently criticising and attacking all remnants of the New Order (Suara Pembaruan
30 September 2000).
Most telling is the fact that most criticisms of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila in the
reformasi era focused on the name of the day. The claim that the Pancasila was
sakti seemed to evoke much more protest than the version of events being com-
memorated. Indeed, the new name of this commemorative day continues to send
a message that 1 October should be commemorated as a national tragedy and a
betrayal [pengkhianatan] of the Pancasila. Unlike the name of the unpopular film
Pengkhianatan Gerakan 30 September, the name of this day does not mention any
agency of betrayal. The identification of the traitors in fact is tantalisingly ambigu-
ous. For 1 October was not only the date when the army heroes were kidnapped
and killed but also the date on which Suharto took the first steps towards seizing
power. It is also perhaps noteworthy that Megawati, who served as inspector of
ceremony in 2000 (due to Gus Durs absence), did not conduct a tour of the
colossal torture diorama, the preserved well or the monument ( Jakarta Post 2
October 2000). In this way, the ceremony was somewhat distanced from the story
represented in the monument complex.
HARI KESAKTIAN PANCASILA AND ALTERNATIVE MEMORIES

OF THE 196566 TRANSITION YEARS
Although small steps were made in the reformasi era towards opening up the
history of the last transition, it is surprising that commemoration of Hari Kesak-
tian Pancasila has rarely been challenged on the basis of the highly political
memory of the transition that this day celebrates. As noted throughout this
article, commemoration of 1 October demands a focus on the events of this day
in 1965, particularly on the deaths of the army martyrs. The commemoration
obscures the far greater violence that took place in the wake of the coup attempt
against communist supporters. This obfuscation is evidenced by the fact that fre-

Figure 5: Retrieving the bodies from Lubang Buaya. Diorama image from Museum Sejarah
Monumen Nasional, Jakarta
quent comment was made in annual commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila

that 1 October 1965 was the most traumatic day in modern Indonesian history
( Jakarta Post 1 October 1985), and also by the consistent visual representation
of the transition by one popular imagethat of Suharto in his khakis and
sunglasses standing in a commanding pose over the disused well at Lubang
Buaya while the corpses of the victims of the coup attempt are being retrieved
(see Figure 5).24
In 2000, however, there was one of the most direct attacks on this day on the
basis of the hypocrisy of the term kesaktian Pancasila given the post-coup killings.
Historian Taufik Abdullah claimed that
although the historical episode of the coup was undeniably a national

tragedy, at the same time everyone [perhaps privately] remembered that
this tragedy was followed by an equally horrible tragedy. But the govern-
ment went ahead and labelled 1 October Hari Kesaktian Pancasila (Kompas
3 October 2000).

He suggested that the New Orders strategy of controlling collective memory,

by emphasising events in a certain way in order to justify revenge, should be
discarded.
Throughout the New Order, the commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila
reinforced a highly politicised and exclusive memory of the transition from
Sukarno to Suharto. Hari Kesaktian Pancasila initially served simply as a means
of reaffirming the armys claim to have led the nation in a just victory over
communism. In the early 1980s, the meaning of this day was expanded to include
threats to the Pancasila from Islam as well as communism. As time passed, the
commemoration became a means of renewing the potency of the label com-
munist, so that it could be applied to any opposition. Finally, in the 1990s,
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila took on an increasingly religious character, becoming
more a celebration of opposition to atheism than an affirmation of the Pancasila
itself.
In the early reformasi years, commemoration of 1 October continued primarily
because of the desire of both the Habibie and Gus Dur-Megawati governments
not to abandon the Pancasila. Nonetheless, during the years 19982000 the offi-
cial version of events commemorated by this day became noticeably less impor-
tant in the proceedings. At the same time, the government resisted Islamic
pressure to shed the days specific political identity and to make it a general day
of religious thankfulness. Evidence from the years 19982000 suggests, however,
that phasing out commemoration of 1 October will involve a significant psycho-
logical leap. Until the myth of 1 October as the day on which Pancasila was saved
is examined more closely, especially in light of the post-coup killings in which the
Pancasila values of humanitarianism and social justice were completely aban-
doned, commemoration of 1 October will continue to dismiss alternative mem-
ories of the transition. A key ingredient necessary for the public deconstruction
of this myth is, as Abdullah suggests, widespread public recognition of the
196566 killings as a tragedy rather than a justifiable act of revenge. The
responses to Gus Durs attempts to apologise to victims of the 196566 violence
indicated that such recognition would take considerable time.
One significant step in the direction of increased recognition of the killings as
a tragedy was made in November 2000 when members of the Yogyakarta Ansor
Youth Movement, a youth group affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama and specifically
associated with the post-coup killings, particularly in East Java and Bali (see Cribb
1990, 32), announced the formation of their own investigative team to examine
the role of Ansor Youths (Banser) in the killings. These investigations were to
look most particularly at the extent to which Ansor had become a tool of the mil-
itary. In addition, members of this committee asked forgiveness from the fami-
lies of the victims of this tragedy (Bernas 21 November 2000). Coming from a
key organisation involved in the killings and an organisation that represented

Moslem voices, which have so often been coopted to oppose communism on the
basis of anti-atheism, this apology suggested that in the near future Indonesians
might re-examine the usefulness of continued commemoration of Hari Kesaktian
Pancasila in light of the wounds that it denies. The efforts by Forum Ukuwah
Islamiya Kaloran [Kaloran Islamic Fraternity Forum] to obstruct the reburial of
26 victims of the 1965 mass killings, discovered in a mass grave in Kaloran, Central
Java, in March 2001 were, however, a reminder that others were a long way away
from making the necessary psychological leap (Tapol 2001).
NOTES
1
An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 1998 ASAA Conference held at UNSW in
Sydney. Many thanks to Charles Coppel, Antonia Finnane, Tim Lindsey, Helen Pausacker,
Michele Ford and the anonymous referees from Asian Studies Review for their valuable com-
ments on earlier drafts of this paper, and to Robert Cribb and Anne Platt for their assistance
with editing.
2
For analysis of the official representation of the events of 1 October 1965 see van Langenberg
(1990), Brooks (1995), LeClerc (1997) and Wieringa (1998). In addition to Siegel (1986,
27781), Bourchier has referred in passing to Hari Kesaktian Pancasila, noting that school teach-
ers were instructed to treat Hari Kesaktian Pancasila as the most important day in the calendar
(Bourchier 1994, 56). The most detailed discussion of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila is, however, to
be found in Purdy (1984, 13038, 33949).
3
Evidence from an autopsy report suggests that these allegations were entirely fabricated
(Anderson 1987).
4
The pledge states that the participants in the commemoration are aware that on 1 October a
coup was carried out by the Indonesian Communist Party against the legitimate government
of Indonesia, resulting in the national tragedy marked by the brutal and inhumane deaths of the
heroes of the revolution. It is acknowledged that the tragedy became possible because of
the neglect, the lack of caution and the activities of the leaders of the communist party who
deliberately tricked some of the Indonesian people in their efforts to pull down the Pancasila
(Soedjono 1975, xi, emphasis added). This and all other translations in this article are my own.
5
As chief editor of Kompas, Oetama was aware of the gradual tightening of press censorship.
In 1969, Oetama decided against publishing a report on the controversial mass killings of com-
munist political prisoners at Purwodadi after being pressured by senior military officers
(Maxwell 1997, 275).
6
Although there are alternative theories about who instigated this episode, some of which
suggest that this was a Murdani-backed intelligence scheme, blame was officially placed on
Moslem extremists. For more on this incident see van Dijk (1981). For a theory on Woyla as
an infiltration see Panji Masyarakat, 17 June 1998.
7
The original cause of trouble was the entrance of local military officers to the As Saadah
mosque without removing their shoes and their use of dirty water to remove a poster adver-
tising an Islamic youth seminar from the mosque wall. In response to the arrest of four persons
connected to the prayer house, Amir Biki, a local religious figure and a known critic of the
regime, led a procession to the local police headquarters. On arrival, the crowd was met by

the fire of automatic weapons. The details of this episode, particularly the number of persons
killed and the circumstances in which they were killed, were covered up by the government
with strict warnings to the press not to report alternative accounts (Indonesia Reports 15 Novem-
ber 1984, 67 [of main report], 56 [of politics supplement]).
8
Some Moslems protested the asas tunggal legislation on the grounds that it constituted an
attempt to replace Islam with the Pancasila (see Amnesty International 1986, 57).
9
Again without direct mention of Islam as a threat to the Pancasila, Nugroho focused on the
P4 as a means of preventing challenges to the Pancasila and of preventing any further victims
(Antara 1 October 1984). At his trial in relation to the Tanjung Priok incident Dharsono
claimed that there were divisions within the government, including the armed forces, about
the Tanjung Priok incident (Kompas 2 October 1985).
10
Once released, former political prisoners faced restrictions on employment, freedom of
speech and movement, political activities and social contacts. They also frequently became the
targets of government security crackdowns (Fealy 1995, 43; Amnesty International 1994, 94).
11
Raillon describes MUI as a quasi-official body established in 1975 to manage the relation-
ship between the government and ulama in an attempt to improve the governments rela-
tionship with the Moslem community (Raillon 1994, 206).
12
Two examples of magazines that made the coup attempt a special feature were Adil (Tabloid
Berita Mingguan), 30 September6 October 1998 with the headline Suharto Dalam Konspirasi
PKI; and Tajuk (Berita investigasi dan Entertainmen), 17 September30 September 1998 with the
headline Kol. Latief: Suharto Tahu Rencana G-30-S/PKI.
13
KISDIKomite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Islam [Indonesian Committee in Solidarity with
the Islamic World] is a radical Islamic organisation with which Prabowo had developed ties in
the last years of Suhartos rule. In the late New Order period it had frequently been mobilised
for street demonstrations by Prabowo (Crouch 1999, 129). In late May 1998, KISDI also clashed
with anti-Habibie protesters occupying the DPR/MPR (Suara Pembaruan 23 May 1998).
14
Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Remaja Masjid IndonesiaOrganisation for the Communication
of Youth and Teenagers of the Indonesian Mosque.
15
Forum Umat Islam Penegak Keadilan dan Konstitusi NegaraIslamic Forum for the Defence
of Justice and the State Constitution. This group was established specifically to deal with the
possible return of communism in Indonesia (Gatra 10 October 1998).
16
Forum Komunitas Mahasiswa JabotabekCommunity Forum for Students of Jakarta, Bogor,
Tangerang and Bekasi.
17
Husni Thamrin was the former head of Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia (KAPPI
Indonesian Student Youth and Youth Action Front), a student organisation involved in the
overthrow of Sukarno. He was also the general secretary of Pelajar Islam Indonesia, a Masyumi-
oriented Islamic organisation for high school students (Crouch 1988, 185).
18
Lukman Harun is a well-known figure from Muhammadiyah and the former head of Kesa-
tuan Aksi Pengganyangan Gerakan G30S 1965 (KAP Gestapu)Unified Action Group for the
Crushing of the Thirtieth of September Movement (Gatra 10 October 1998).
19
Papers in the seminar covered topics such as a re-examination of the events of the coup
attempt, historical representation of the role of Gerwani in the torture of the heroes,
censorship of history during the Suharto government, and comments on the post-coup
killings.
20
Both in her Hari Lahir Pancasila speech in 1998 (see above) and at the October 1998 PDI-P
congress, in which she stated her political positions, Megawati reaffirmed her commitment to

the Pancasila (Suara Pembaruan 14 October 1998). In 1998 Gus Dur, in his capacity as head
of NU, continued to assert the position that Pancasila should be retained as the basis of the
state (Suara Pembaruan 12 May 1998). He also reaffirmed his commitment to defending the
Pancasila just prior to the 1999 election (Suara Pembaruan 8 June 1999).
21
Jas merah was the acronym given to Sukarnos last independence day address in 1966 entitled
Jangan Sekali-kali Tinggalkan Sejarah (Dont ever leave history).
22
In July 2000 Muhammadiyah, Indonesias second largest Moslem organisation, proposed to
drop Pancasila as its philosophical principle.
23
During the New Order, Gus Dur expressed concern at the appearance of ICMI and in
response continued a program of endorsement of the Pancasila (see Ramage 1995, 4550,
5558). In the post-Suharto era he vowed as leader of NU to defend Islamic values while also
upholding the Pancasila and guarding against what he labelled the distortion of Islamic values
(Suara Pembaruan 12 May 1998). In 1999, he was particularly critical of the Islamic ruling
[fatwa] made by the MUI just prior to the 1999 election in which the MUI called upon all
Moslems to vote only for Moslem parties (Jakarta Post 3, 4, 30 June 1999). Gus Durs commit-
ment to anti-sectarianism was, however, tested in 2001 when leaders of NU began discussing
whether or not the Islamic concept of bughot, or rebellion against a legitimate government,
could be invoked to justify the use of armed force to oppose efforts to overthrow Gus Dur
( Jakarta Post 3, 28 April 2001; Tempo 28 April 2001).
24
This image, usually labelled Hari Kesaktian Pancasila, appeared in the museum at Lubang Buaya
(Museum Monumen Pancasila Sakti), the National Monument History Museum (beneath
Monas), in Museum Pusat ABRI Satriamandala (the first New Order military museum) and on
giant historical billboards posted in central locations in major cities on commemorative dates.
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Asian Studies Review.

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002. Published by Blackwell Publishing Limited.

commemorative day it also served other purposes. Commemoration of Hari Kesakt-

THE MEANING OF KESAKTIAN PANCASILA

Indonesias national philosophy consists of five principles: belief in one God,

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

the Pancasila on 1 June 1945 as a compromise alternative to a state based on

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

heroes by members of the communist aligned womens group Gerwani at the

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

HARI KESAKTIAN PANCASILA IN THE NEW ORDER PERIOD

Claiming the Pancasila

the special character and features of 1 October as a day on which peoples

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

we are proud of the exaltation [mengagungkan] of the Pancasila, not

By shifting emphasis from Sukarnos discovery of the Pancasila to the armys

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

The early years of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila: criticism and adjustments

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

ment transferred responsibility for commemoration from the Department of

Hari Kesaktian Pancasila and the primacy of Pancasila

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Hari Kesaktian Pancasila and the threat of Islam

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

only served as a reminder of the betrayal of the communists whom Moslem

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

HARI KESAKTIAN PANCASILA IN THE LATE

Hari Kesaktian Pancasila and the threat of communism in the

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Hari Kesaktian Pancasila as a celebration of Moslem piety

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

HARI KESAKTIAN PANCASILA IN THE POST-SUHARTO

The Habibie period

Holding on to the Pancasila

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

By October 1999, Habibie was still President but Megawatis PDI-Perjuangan

Responding to challenges to the official version of the coup attempt

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Keeping the communist threat alive

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Preempting memories of the killings

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Ibu Sulami also released an autobiographical account of her twenty years of

The Gus Dur-Megawati period

Lifting the ban on communism and Marxist Leninist teachings

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

Commemoration of 1 October continues

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

why commemoration of this day was continued. After 33 years of commemora-

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

HARI KESAKTIAN PANCASILA AND ALTERNATIVE MEMORIES

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

quent comment was made in annual commemoration of Hari Kesaktian Pancasila

although the historical episode of the coup was undeniably a national

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.

He suggested that the New Orders strategy of controlling collective memory,

Asian Studies Association of Australia 2002.