Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CARBON MONOXIDE
CO 98.3 min
Hydrogen 1 ppm max
Methane 1 ppm max
Nitrogen 0.53 %
Ar 1.17 % max
Pressure 13.3 bar a
Temperature 46 C
ACTIVATED CARBON
Coconut shell based activated carbon produced by high
temperature steam activation of specially selected coconut shell char
feed stock.
Particle size 5 % max + 4.76 mm
90 % min 4.76 to 2.38 mm
5 % max 2.38 mm
Surface area 950 m2 / gm
Density 540 560 kg / m3
Ash 3 % max
Moisture content 1 % max
Antioxidant
Tri Phenyl Phosphate (TPP)
Colour max. 50 on APHA scale
Free phenol 0.5 % max
Hydrolyzable Chlorine 0.010 % max.
PRODUCT SPECIFICATION(PHOSGENE)
PHOSGENE
Chlorine 200 ppm max
CO 1 % by vol min
Molecular wt 98.916gm / gmole
Melting point -118 C
Boiling point 7.54 C
Apperance colourless gas
Density 1402.15 kg / m3
TLV 0.1 ppm
BY PRODUCT SPECIFICATION
HCl gas
The HCl gas produced equates to approx. 1030 kg/1000 kg of TDI
product.
Composition
HCl 90-97.5 % by wt
CO2 0.5 % by wt.
CO 1.5 % by wt.
N2 0.5 % by wt.
Discharge temperature 2 C
Discharge Pressure 2.3 bar abs
EFFLUENT SPECIFICATION
SALT CAKE
Quantity about 120 kg / 1000 kg product
Composition sodium oxides
Sodium sulphides
Sodium chlorides
Sodium sulphates
Sodium carbonates
MAIN STACK EXHAUST AIR
Quantity
Normal operation 3 m3 / kg product
Peak operation 11.5 m3/ kg product
Composition
ODCB 300 mg / m3 max
CCl4 65 mg / m3 max
HCl traces
Nox traces
TDA traces
TDI traces
Air balance
WASTE TREATING PLANT EXHAUST AIR
Quantity 8000 m3 / 1000 kg product
Composition
Nox as NO2 500 mg / m3
CO2 60 g / m3
CO traces
Water 300 g / m3
Air balance
UTILITY SPECIFICATION
PROCESS AIR
Pressure 3 bar a
Temperature ambient
Quality free from oil and dust
INSTRUMENT AIR
Pressure 4.5 bar abs
Temperature ambient
Dew point - 15 C
Quality oil and dust free
REFRIGERATION CARRIER
Delivery temperature - 17 C
Pressure 6.0 bar abs
Return temperature -8C
Pressure 3.0 bar abs
LP NITROGEN
Pressure 7 bar abs
Temperature ambient
Purity oxygen content 10 ppm
POWER
11 KV, 3 Phase, 3 wire, 50 Hz AC
3.3 KV, 3 Phase, 3 wire, 50 Hz AC
415 V, 3 Phase, 3 wire, 50 HZ AC
voltage variation within 10 %
frequency variation + 3 % to 6%
STEAM
Steam level pressure temperaure
HP superheated 25.5 bar a 340 C
HP saturated 25.5 bar a 225 C
MP saturated 14.7 bar a 197 C
LP saturated 4.0 bar a 143 C
PROCESS WATER
Delivery temperature 25 C
Pressure 5.0 bar a
Total alkalies 16.8
Total solids 938.2 mg/l
Total hardness 4.1 DH
DM WATER
PH 6.5 to 7.5
Conductivity 0.2 umhos/cm
Solica less than 0.02 ppm
Pressure 4 bar a min
Temperature ambient
COOLING WATER
Delivery temperature 33 C
Pressure 5.5 bar a
Return temperature 43 C
Pressure 3.5 bar a
PH 7.5
Conductivity 500 umhos/cm
Silica 20 60 ppm
CHILLED WATER
Delivery temperature 8 C
Pressure 5.5 bar a
Return temperature 13 C
Pressure 3.5 bar a
APPLICATIONS OF TOLUENE DI-
ISOCYNATE (TDI)
CASE
Coatings
Adhesives
Sealant
Elastomers
PROCESS
DESCRIPTION
PHOSGENE PLANT
Phosgene is the raw material for the production of the TDI. Chlorine is
reacted with carbon monoxide ( 3 mole percent excess over theory ) in
the presence of an activated coconut charcoal catalyst to form
phosgene. The feed gases are metered to the primary reactor, where the
bulk of the chlorine is reacted to form phosgene. The off gases from the
primary reactor passes through the secondary reactor and clean up
tower, where the chlorine content is reduced to less than 0.03 mole
percent. The product gas from the clean up towr is fed to the fresh
phosgene disperser in the phosgenation reaction loop.
The rate of phosgenation production is dictated by phosgene
consumption in the phosgenation step in the TDI plant. Since no
intermediate storage facilities provided, the phosgene equipment will be
operated only during the time the phosgenation facilities require
phosgene. Feed gas flows will be determined by phosgene usage in the
production of TDI
COMMENTS:
The reaction of water and carbon to carbon monoxide and
hydrogen results in catalyst loss.
The carbon tetrachloride produced from methane and chlorine is TDI
plant taken out as a slip stream, concentrated and incinerated in waste
treating department, to prevent accumulation in the phosgene loop.
The nitro chloride from the reaction of ammonia and chlorine explosive.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
FEED SYSTEM
Chlorine is obtained by a pipeline from chlorine bullet and fed to the
chlorine carbon mix tee.
Carbon monoxinde is obtained by pipeline from CO recovery plant. In
CO recovery unit. the feed gas comes from GNFC, Bharuch.
Before feeding the gas stream to the phosgene plant oil and moisture, if
any, are removed in the filters.
PRIMARY REACTION
The primary reaction consists of two identical reactors in parallel, each
reactor containing tubes packed with activated charcoal, arranged as a
shell and tube heat exchanger. Heat of reaction is removed by a closed
cooling water system comprising a recycle water cooler, a recycle water
heater, a recycle water expansion vessel and a recycle water pump.
The mixed gases consisting of chlorine and carbon monoxide (3 mole
percent over theory) are fed to the top of the reactors, react in passing
through the bed of the activated charcoal, and leave the reactor bottom.
Most of the chlorine is converted to phosgene in the primary reactor.
One of the two reactors is a stand by so that full capacity can be reached
using one reactor while the second is repacked with fresh catalyst.
SECONDARY REACTION
The secondary reactor consists of two identical reactors in parallel(one
stand by) packed with activated charcoal. The cooling system is the
same as used for the primary reaction
CLEAN-UP REACTION
The clean up tower consists of a single vessel packed with a bed of
activated charcoal. No cooing is provided. Gases pass downward
through the packed bed. No reaction should occur in the clean up tower
under normal conditions, it is provided to assure that the final phosgene
will have less than 0.03 mole percent chlorine. High temperature at the
exit of the clean up tower indicates that the unreacted chlorine is getting
past the secondary banks and reacting in the clean up tower.
Phosgene gas leaves the clean up tower and is fed to the fresh
phosgene disperser in the posgenation loop. Phosgene manufacturing
rate is set for desired TDI production rate thus avoiding any storage of
phosgene.
PROCESS
DESCRIPTION
TDI PLANT
The following are the main steps during the manufacture of TDI (Toluene
Di Iso-cyanates)
In Detail,
PHOSGENATION REACTION
TDI is produced by the reaction of MTD in ODCB solution with 100 %
excess phosgene in a continuous reaction. Phosgene/ODCB solution is
fed to the recirculation line. MTD/ODCB solution is fed to the MTD
dispersion nozzles in the pipeline reactor. Reaction takes place in the
pipeline reactor and the products of reaction are separated in a gas
liquid separator.
Gases from the reactor separator area cooled from about 150 C to
40C in the reactor condenser. ODCB condensed from the gas stream is
returned to the reactor separator and the cooled gasses are fed to the
phosgene absorber.
DEGASSING
The liquid product stream from the phosgenation reaction system
contains ODCB, phosgene, TDI, HCl, residue and solids (mostly amine
hydrochloride). The main function of the degassing system is to TDI and
HCl. In addition, about 60 % dissolved phosgene and HCl is removed.
The equipments are,
A degasser
A recycle pump
A heater
A condenser
A circulation pump
A degasser compressor
The product stream from the reactor is fed in to the recirculating loop
ahead of the degasser heater. Sufficient residence time is provided in the
degasser for converting the amine hydrochloride formed in the reactor to
TDI and HCl.
HCl STRIPPING
Liquidf from the degassing system contains ODCB dissolved phosgene.,
TDI and dissolved HCl. The function of HCl stripping column is to remove
the remaining HCl from the product stream. Most of the phosgene, some
ODCB and traces of TDI are also removed.
The feed stream is pumped through the filters and the feed separator
entering the top of the packed column. Liquid form the column bottom is
fed to the level tank and is then recirculated by the pump through the
stripper reboiler back to ht column.
The product from the HCl stripping column, containing ODCB, residue,
TDI a small amount of dissolved phosgene and traces of HCl, is fed to
the primary ODCB distillation. The vapors from the stripper are mixed
with the degasser vapors just before the degasser condenser.
Off-gas from phosgenation, degassing and HCl stripping are fed to the
bottom of the phosgene absorber. Phosgene/ODCB solution from the
absorber bottom is fed to the TDI reactor with the phosgene recycle
pump. HCl passes up through the absorber. From the top of the
absorber the gas, containing HCl and organic compounds, is sent to
the absorption columns. The organic content is reduced to a
minimum. From the absorption columns the HCl normally leaves as a
gas to BL. If there is no need for HCl gas,it is absorbed in the water to
produce 30% hydrochloric acid.
The TDI recovery unit consists of LIST reactor where TDI is stripped off
from the tar solution. The bottom stream is pumped to the tar burner .
Both of these tar concentrator and TDI recovery units are operated under
vacuum.
TDI PURIFICATION
Crude TDI from the secondary ODCB column containing trace amounts
of HCl, a small amount of residue and high boiling components is
distilled to improve product quality.
The equipment consists of,
A purification column
A reboiler
A pump
A condenser
A vent condenser
A reflux pump
A TDI surge tank
A TDI pump
A cooler
A condensate tank
A condensate pump
Crude TDI is pumped from the bottom of the secondary column to the
purification column. Boil up is supplied by circulating column bottoms
through the reboiler back to the column. Distilled TDI is removed as a
liquid side stream a number of trays from the top of the column and
collected in the surge tank. The TDI is cooled and sent to the TDI product
day receiver. Overhead vapors are condensed in the condenser and vent
condenser. Non condensables pass to the vacuum system maintaining
the column top pressure. Some of the condensate is returned to the top
of the column as reflux.
VACUUM SYSTEMS
All distillation columns are operating under vacuum. In all cases liquid
ring pumps instead of ejectors avoiding unnecessary contamination of
water, as well as suckbacks generate the vacuum. To rationalize the
operation and reduce the quantity of equipment, most of the columns are
connected in pairs to one common vacuum system.
DRYING VACUUM SYSTEM
The operating pressure of the drying column is 266-mbar abs. The
column is alone served by the drying column vacuum pumps. The
sealing liquid is recycled through the cooler. Make up liquid is
ODCB but as the gas contains moisture ODCB will be
contaminated with water. The overflow from the separator runs to
the start up tank to collect the contaminated ODCB.
PRIMARY VACUUIM SYSTEM
The operating pressure of the primary column is 200 mbar abs.
The column is alone served by a vacuum pump. The seal liquid
ODCB,is recycled and cooled in the heat exchanger. Gas and
liquid are separated in the separator. The ODCB overflows to the
vent condensate tank and is fed to forward by the condensate
pump to the reactor separator.
TDI RECOVERY VACUUM SYSTEM
The operating pressure is between 15 and 33 mbar abs. The
column alone served by the vacuum pump and its ejector. The seal
liquid is ODCB, which is recycled ad cooled in the heat exchanger.
The cooling medium is chilled water to get as low vapor pressure of
the ODCB as possible. The liquid is bled off from the separator by
overflow to the condensate surge tank and is fed forward to the
feed separator.
SECONDARY VACUUM SYSTEM
The operating pressure is between 20 and 33 mbar abs.the
vacuum of the secondary column and the vacuum pump and its
ejector maintain the TDI purification column. The seal liquid ODCB
is recycled and cooled in the same way as in the TDI recovery
vacuum system.
SCRUBBER SYSTEM
The main function of the ventilation and caustic scrubber system is to
remove poisonous substances such as phosgene, chlorine,carbon
monoxide and organics from the vent and process gases before
discharge into atmosphere.
Two caustic scrubbers serving the TDI plant and the phosgene plant.after
scrubbing the gas leaves the plant via main stack. A system for addition
of steam to the main stack during exceptional circumstances is included.
Detail description
The equipment consists of,
Two caustic tanks
A caustic pump
A dilute caustic tank
A dilute caustic pump
A caustic srcubber
Two caustic sumps
A caustic circulation pump
A cooler circulation pump
A caustic cooler
A vent scrubber
Two caustic vent sumps
Two caustic vent pumps
A vent sump cooler
A vent cooler pump
A stack
Three stack fans
There are three types of gases that must be sent to the scrubbers. The
first type is process gases, mainly from the vacuum pumps, which is sent
to the vent scrubber. The second type is gases from the rupture discs
and relief valves which load the caustic scrubber only during emergency
conditions. All of these gases come from the dry part of the TDI and
phosgene manufacturing areas. The third type of gases consists of
ventilation gases and also gases from the TDI storage and drumming,
which is sent to the vent scrubber. Ventilation ducts are connected to
several pieces of equipments which could release phosgene under
unusual conditions. They are connected to a main pipe running to the
vent scrubber.
Caustic soda is received in the caustic tank. Caustic from the caustic
tank and process water are charged to the dilute caustic tank over a mix
to in quantities to produce the desired caustic concentration. The dilute
caustic is circulated through the caustic cooler and back to the tank.
When the caustic concentration in the caustic scrubber sump has
dropped to 9 % or if the interlocking system is activated, the circulation
back to the dilute caustic tank stops and the caustic is fed to the
scrubber system.
Caustic solution, in both scrubber system, is circulated by a caustic
circulation pump from the sump, down through the scrubber and back to
the sump. If the caustic circulation pump stops, the stand by pump will
start/ If caustic circulation is not re-established within a certain time, the
phosgene manufacturing and TDI phosgenation are automatically
interlocked down.
The sodium hydroxide solution make-up for the caustic scrubber is 18 %
wt. When concentration has dropped to 9 % wt NaOH in the operating
caustic sump, there is a switch to the other caustic sump, where fresh
NaOH 18 % wt solution is stored for standby. With this system in
operation, the diluted caustic sump (with NaOH 9%wt) is emptied and
the solution is transferred to the caustic vent sump for further use as a
scrubbing liquid in the vent scrubber thus reducing NaOH consumption.
When the NAOH is used up in the caustic vent scrubber :the solution is
pumped to waste treating.
Exhaust points over sampling valves and elephant trunks are normally
closed in order to reduce the gas load on the vent scrubber and not to
reduce the efficiency of the ventilation system. To maintain good
continuous suction and healthy atmosphere in the plant only the exhaust
points that are used are opened. In case the exhaust fans or caustic
circulation pumps stop. the standby fan or pump will start automatically.
Emergency power must be available within 2 minutes for this equipments
and they shall start automatically when the emergency power is
available.
Normally there is only a small gas flow through the caustic scrubber. In
case of a rupture disc failure, relief valve release or on manual venting
from any equipment containing phosgene,HCL or chlorine the gases will
enter the bottom of the caustic scrubber. They will react with the
circulating caustic and form sodium chloride, Sodium carbonate and
sodium hypo chloride. Inert gas principally air, is discharged from the top
of the caustic scrubber column to the exhaust fan and then to the stack.
An inline analyzer continuously monitors the concentration of NaOH and
Na2CO3 in the scrubbing liquid for the caustic scrubber in order to ensure
that the concentration of the NaOH is kept above 9we%.
Occasionally, the combined sodium chloride and sodium carbonate
content rises to such a level that it could cause deposition of solids in the
fume scrubber. This requires draining of the partially spent solution and
replacing it with fresh caustic and process water.
WAER TREATING
Liquid waste water from the different plants are sent via separate storage
tanks to the waste water mixing tank. From that tank the water pumped
via preconcentrati9n step to an intermediate tan. The water mixture from
the intermediate tank is fed to the burner chamber where the organic
impurities burn on the walls and in the bottom.
Tar form the TDI plant, OTD from the TDA plant as well as fuel oil can be
used as fuels. The tar and the OTD are pumped from the plants to the
fuel storage tanks before being incineration
Inorganic salts in the waste waters, which melt in the bottom of the
incineration chamber will leave through an orifice and flow down to a
water chilled mould. The solid salt blocks are transported to deposit,.
The combustion gases are evacuated by a fan placed in the top of the
tower and pass through demister to remove particles before they exit to
the atmosphere.
Detailed description
INCINERATION
The system consists of,
Waster water mixing tank
Overflow tank
Wastewater pump
Spent caustic buffer tank
Spent caustic pump
Organic trap tank
] Intermediate tank
Different fuel tank
Washing tower with its feed pump
Incinerator chamber with its feed pump
Burner chamber with a burner.
The yellow and red wash waters from the DNT manufacture the amine
water form the catalyst wash and wt scrubbers together with the excess
hydrogenation water, all from the TDA plant are sent to the waster water
mixing tank. If required the pH is adjusted with fresh caustic solution.
The water is pumped to the intermediate tank, where it is mixed with the
predconcentrated liquid recycled from the washing tower. A stream from
the tank is pumped through the washing tower where the liquid is
preconcentrated by the heat form the combustion gases and from a
steam heater in the tower. The concentrated stream is returned to the
intermediate tank.
Liquid form the intermediate tank is fed to the incinerator chamber where
th organic impurities burn on the walls and the bottom of the chamber.
The heat is achieved by burning tar, OTD or oil in the burning chamber
with the provided burner.
COMBUSTION PRODUCTS
The inorganic salts which melt in the bottom of incinerator will leave the
chamber through an orifice and flow down to a water chilled mould .
when a mould is filled it will be replaced by an empty one and the full
one will be transported to a place near by to be further r cooled. The
mould is emptied and the solid ,hard salt block willl be transported to
deposit.
The combustion gases are evacuated by a fan placed in the top of the
washing tower. The gases preconcentrate the waste water and also pass
through demister to take care of small particles on their way through the
tower. They are finally release to the atmosphere.
EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
ODCB SPILLAGE /ODCB TANK
Property:
Colorless liquid with characteristic odour with TLV:50 ppm. Lower
explosive limit of same is 2.2% by volume and upper explosive limit is
9.2% by volume.
Health hazard:
Keep away from all sparks, flames, heat. Wear full protection. Use water
spray, CO2 DCP type foam.
First aid :
1. Weld/pinhole/ leakage.
2. Pump seal leakage. flange joints
3. Catastrophic failure of storage tanks.
Identification :
Spilled ODCB to be washed off with water to pit and resultant effluent to
be diverted to incinerator for incineration by operating personnel. In case
of pump seal leakage, pump to be changed over; if stand by is available,
if not then to be isolated with wearing personnel protective equipments
by operating personnel with consultant with shift engineer. After closely
draining pump, pump to be attended. In case of catastrophic failure of
tank, after isolating all inputs maximum material of failed tank to be
transferred to stand by one . As maximum inventory level in each tank is
only 50%. So stand by tank will take care of entire inventory of failed
tank.
Heat is evolved when the material is dissolved in water. Cold water must
be used for this purpose.
First aid :
Spilled caustic to be washed off with water to pit and resultant effluent to
be diverted to incinerator for incineration by operating personnel. In case
of pump seal leakage, pump to be changed over if stand by is available,
if not then to be isolated wearing personnel protective equipments by
operating personnel in consultation with shift engineer. After closely
draining pump, pump to be attended. In case of catastrophic failure of
tank, after isolating all inputs maximum material of failed tank to be
transferred to stand by one.
Fire hazard is moderate emits toxic fumes. Under fire condition thermal
decomposition may produce carbon monoxide. Water may be used to
overcome fire.
First aid :
Responsibility :
HCl is clear fuming liquid with pungent odour with density 1.639
Health hazard :
Cause severe and painful burns. Do not breath vapour. When there is
danger of breathing vapour, wear approved respirator. When there is
danger of contacting the liquid wear approved respirator and full
protective clothing. Area must be ventilated.
Fire and reactivity hazard :
As HCl(g) can be easily scrubbed with help of caustic solution, for this
purpose vent and emergency scrubber as well as ET network have been
provided in TDI plant, to over come any HCl(g) leakage.
Identification :
1. By characteristic odour
2. By observing white fumes.
3. Ammonia torch for exact leaky point.
Responsibility :
In the event of heavy HCl leakage, the area shall be evacuated. All the
persons shall be shifted towards upwind direction. Operating personnel
shall cordon the area having HCl(g) leakage for unauthorized entry. The
trapped persons shall be rescued and affected persons shall be given
medical attention
HCl is clear fuming liquid with punget odour with density 1.639
Health hazard :
Cause severe and painful burns. Do not breath vapour. When there is
danger of breathing vapour, wear approved respirator. When there is
danger of contacting the liquid wear approved respirator and full
protective clothings. Area must be ventilated.
Fire and reactivity hazard :
1. Lime powder.
2. Caustic solution.
3. Water.
Responsibility :
As phosgene can be easily scrubbed with help of caustic solution, for this
purpose vent and emergency scrubber as well as ET network have been
provided in TDI plant, to over come any phosgene leakage.
Responsibility :
In the event of heavy phosgene leakage, the area shall be evacuated. All
the persons shall be shifted towards upwind direction. Operating
personnel shall cordon the area having chlorine leakage for unauthorized
entry. The trapped persons shall be rescued and affected persons shall
be given medical attention.
Fire hazard is moderate emits toxic fumes. Under fire condition thermal
decomposition may produce carbon monoxide. Water may be used to
overcome fire.
First aid :
In the event of heavy TDI leakage, the area shall be evacuated. All the
persons shall be shifted towards upwind direction. Operating personnel
shall cordon the area having TDI leakage for unauthorized entry. The
trapped persons shall be rescued and affected persons shall be given
medical attention.
CO LEAKAGE-CO PLANT
Property :
Colourless, odourless gas with vapour density 0.97
TLV of same is 50 ppm. Lower explosive limit is 12.5% by volume and
upper explosive limit is 74.2% by volume.
Health hazard :
An anesthetic action. Symptoms are depression, restlessness,
unconsciousness, disturbance in vision, dizziness, vomiting and
headache. Skin sensation of heaviness and coldness. State of weakness
of limbs. Central nervous system gets demaged permanently.
Fire and reactivity hazard :
Highly dangerous when exposed to heat, spark or friction.
First aid :
Remove victim to fresh air. The area should be free from CO gas and
comfortably warm. Give artificial respiration if not breathing. In case of
skin or eye contact wash with plenty of water immediately. It is extremely
important to see patient warm. Blanket may be used to maintain body
temperature.
Source :
1. Any leakage from cold box or compressor.
Cause :
1. Weld/pinhole/flange joint leakage
2. Failure of bellow seals of control valves
3. Seal leakage from expander turbine.
4. Leakage from threaded joints of instruments and accessories.
Identification :
1. A total of eight sniffers are installed at different points in Plant. Based
on alarm indication on local panel in control room from any of the
sniffers, CO leakage shall be identified. Simultaneously, hooter will get
blown in the plant area, which shall warn the operating personnel present
in the field.
2. With help of portable CO dosimeter during plant round taken by
operating personnel.
Remedy :
Since CO is both toxic and explosive, and since it cant be scrubbed,
leakage has to be isolated and duly attended by wearing personnel
protective equipment.
Responsibility :
Area operating personnel shall act according to the magnitude of
leakage. The leakage shall be tried to arrest on line or isolating a part of
pipeline / equipment. Otherwise plant shall be shutdown in consultation
with shift engineer and then leakage shall be attended.
The hold up of CO inside the system shall be flared and purged with
nitrogen in order to make system CO free for attending the leakage.
Rescue :
In the event of CO leakage, the area shall be evacuated. All the persons
shall be shifted towards upwind direction. Operating personnel shall
cordon the area having CO leakage for unauthorized entry. The trapped
persons shall be rescued and affected persons shall be given medical
attention.
Remedy :
As chlorine can be easily scrubbed with help of caustic solution. For this
purpose chlorine scrubber system having one working and one stand by
scrubber, two caustic sumps, two caustic circulation pumps and two
exhaust blowers has been provided. To absorb heat of neutralization,
separate chilled water system has been provided to chill the circulating
caustic.
1 Chlorine leakage form chlorine tonner shed.
Possible leakages from chlorine tonner shed are as follows.
1. Passing of valve mounted on tonner.
2. Leakage from the shell of tonner.
3. Residual chlorine inside flexible copper tubing.
4. Passing of valves from chlorine transferring header.
5. Weld/pinhole/flange joints leakage of piping/equipment.
6. Failure of bellow seals of control valves or isolation valves.
Responsibility :
1. In case of passing of valves mounted on tonner, valves of such tonner
should be attended first with wearing personnel protective equipment
by mechanical personnel, otherwise such tonner should be unloaded
first with wearing personnel protective equipment by operating
personnel. Elephant trunk should be placed on leaky point till such
tonner placed for unloading on unloading platform gets fully unloaded.
If such tonner not getting unloaded because of jamming of isolation
valve which is passing too, isolation valve shall be clamped to isolate
the leakage. (Such clamps are lying in the emergency kit, kept in
chlorine tonner shed). External chlorine experts shall be contacted to
attend such valves.
2. In case of leakage from shell of chlorine tonner shed.
If leakage is minor, elephant trunk shall be placed on such leaky
point. If leakage is heavy, specially designed FRP hood shall be
placed on tonner to cover it completely. The vent of this hood should
be connected to the scrubber via elephant trunk by operating
personnel.
3. Residual chlorine inside flexible copper tubing
Elephant trunk shall be placed by operating personnel to suck residue
chlorine, if left after depressurising it in to the chlorine vent header.
4. In case of passing of valves from chlorine transferring header, the
leakage should be scrubbed in to the chlorine scrubber through
chlorine vent header or through elephant trunk. Valves should be
attended/blinded/replaced by wearing personnel protective
equipments by mechanical personnel.
5. In case of weld/pinhole/flange joint leakage of pipes/equipments
The leakage shall be tried to arrest on line by providing clamping
Or by isolating a part of pipe/ equipments . Isolating portion should be
depressurised in to the scrubber by elephant trunk in order to make the
system chlorine free, prior to attend the leakage.
6. In case of failure of bellow seals of control valves/isolation valves.
Such valves should be isolated and Elephant trunk should be placed
on such valves to suck leakage by operating personnel with wearing
personnel protective equipmetns. Valve should be attended /replaced
by mechanical personnel by wearing personnel protective
equipments.
2. Chlorine leakage form chlorine bullet area.
Possible leakages from chlorine bullet area are as follows.
1. Weld/pinhole/flange joint leakage on piping/equipments.
2. Failure of bellow seals of control valves or isolation valves.
3. Explosion of bullet
Responsibility:
1. In case of weld/pinhole/flange joint leakage of pipes/equipments
The leakage shall be tried to arrest on line by providing clamping
Or by isolating a part of pipe/ equipments. Isolating portion should be
depressurized in to the scrubber by elephant trunk in order to make
the system chlorine free, prior to attend the leakage. In case of pin
hole or immediate flange joint leakage on chlorine bullet, which could
not possible to isolate, all chlorine quantity inside the bullet shall be
transferred to stand by bullet and bullet should be depressurized in
chlorine scrubber to make bullet chlorine free for attending leakage
mean while elephant trunk should be placed on leakage point to
prevent chlorine exposure to the atmosphere.
2. In case of failure of bellow seals of control valves or isolation valve,
. such valves should be isolated and Elephant trunk should be placed
on such valves to suck leakage by operating personnel with wearing
personnel protective equipments. Valve should be attended
/replaced by mechanical personnel by wearing personnel protective
equipments.
3. In case of explosion of bullet.
Explosion of bullet may be due to overpressurising or corrosion or
catastrophic failure. Emergency shall be declared by shift enginner in
consultation with fire and safety dep. Shift engineer will look after
evacuation of area towards up wind direction and corderning of area
to prevent unauthorized entry & rescue of trapped person with help
of personnel protective equipments. Shift-engineer will infrom higher
authority for further action like informing near by community , local
authority etc.
Chlorine leakage form chlorine scrubber area.
Possible leakages from chlorine scrubber area are as follows
1. Weld/pinhole/flange joint leakage on piping/equipments
2. Failure of bellow seals of controlvalves or isolation valve
3. Unscrubbed chlorine form vent of chlorine scrubber.
Responsibility:
In case of failure of bellow seals of control valve/isolation valve
. Such valves should be isolated and Elephant trunk should be placed
on such valves to suck leakage by operating personnel with wearing
personnel protective equipments. Valve should be attended /replaced
by mechanical personnel by wearing personnel protective
equipments.
1. In case of weld/pinhole/flange joint leakage -piping/equipment
The leakage shall be tried to arrest on line by providing clamping
Or by isolating a part of pipe/ equipments. Isolating portion should be
depressurized in to the scrubber by elephant trunk in order to make
the system chlorine free, prior to attend the leakage.
2. Unscrubbed chlorine from vent of chlorine scrubber.
Release of unscrubbed chlorine from vent of scrubber results from
inefficient scrubbing eilther because of poor vacuums or because of
exhausted circulating caustic solution. In case of poor vacuums
exhaust blower shall be changed over and if still problem of poor
vacuums persists, then it may resulting from chocking of packing
inside the scrubber and in such event chlorine scrubber should be
changed over. In case of exhausted circulating caustic solution ,
fresh caustic sump to be taken in line by operating personnel.
PHOSGENE LEAKAGE IN TDI PLANT
Property :
Non flamable gas. Negligible fire hazard when exposed to heat or flame.
Do not use water for extinguishing purpose. Moist phosgene is very
corrosive. Thermal decomposition may release toxic/ hazardous gases.
First aid :
As phosgene can be easily scrubbed with help of caustic solution, for this
purpose vent and emergency scrubber as well as ET network have been
provided in TDI plant, to over come any phosgene leakage.
Responsibility :
In the event of heavy phosgene leakage, the area shall be evacuated. All
the persons shall be shifted towards upwind direction. Operating
personnel shall cordon the area having phosgene leakage for
unauthorized entry. The trapped persons shall be rescued and affected
persons shall be given medical attention.
Area operating personnel shall immediately isolate all inputs to the flash
vessel. Inform the shift engineer in control room for further
communication.
Rescue :
In the event of heavy explosion, the area shall be evacuated. All the
persons shall be shifted towards upwind direction. Operating personnel
shall cordon the area having explosion, for unauthorized entry. The
trapped persons shall be rescued and affected persons shall be given
medical attention.
TDI-TAR SPILLAGE /TDI PLANT
Source :
In the event of heavy TDI/TAR leakage, the area shall be evacuated. All
the persons shall be shifted towards upwind direction. Operating
personnel shall cordon the area having TDI/TAR leakage for
unauthorized entry. The trapped persons shall be rescued and affected
persons shall be given medical attention pertaining personnel.
TDI FIRE /TDI PLANT
Source :
Fire hazard is moderate emits toxic fumes. Under fire condition thermal
decomposition may produce carbon monoxide. Water may be used to
overcome fire.
Remedy :
In the event of heavy TDI fire, the area shall be evacuated. All the
persons shall be shifted towards upwind direction. Operating personnel
shall cordon the area having TDI fire for unauthorized entry. The trapped
persons shall be rescued and affected persons shall be given medical
attention
ORGANIC SPILLAGE-LEAKAGE/TDI PLANT.
Source :
In the event of heavy organic leakage, the area shall be evacuated. All
the persons shall be shifted towards upwind direction. Operating
personnel shall cordon the area having organic leakage for unauthorized
entry. The trapped persons shall be rescued and affected persons shall
be given medical attention.
CHEMISTRY OF THE PROCESS
(TDI PLANT)
PHOSGENATION
MAIN REACTIONS
- 2HCL
NH2 NHCOCL
MTD CARBAMYL
CHLORIDE
CH3 CH3
NHCOCL NCO
- 2 HCL
NHCOCL NCO
CARBAMYL
CHLORIDE TDI
NH2 NH2HCL
MTD DI AMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE
CH3 CH3
NH2HCL NCO
2COCL2
- 6 HCL
NH2HCL NCO
TDI
DI AMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE
YIELD LOSS REACTIONS
C7H6(NH2)2+C7H6(NHCOCl)2------- C7H6NH2-NHCONH-C7H6NCO
CAUSTIC SCRUBBING