29.

Quintos-Deles vs Commission on Appointments

GR No. 83216 (September 4, 1989)

FACTS:
On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President
pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. In the May
12, 1988 meeting of the Committee on Appointments ruled against the position of petitioner Deles.
Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends that her appointment as Sectoral Representative for Women by
the President does not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to qualify her to take her
seat in the House of Representatives.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments

HELD:
The first group of people that may be appointed by the president, as previously stated in the Sarmiento v.
Mison case, are the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives
in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of
Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution, referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII (or the first group of people who
may be appointed) whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

30. Bautista vs Salonga (G.R. No. 86439 , April 13, 1989)

FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they
are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint."
Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of
the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as
Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Appointments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd
sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review
presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has
reserved to the President alone.

2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the
President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only
to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim
appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

31. Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez (G.R. 85439, January 13,1992)

31. KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG
MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM) vs. HON. CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ

Facts: The case, G.R. No. 85439 (hereinafter referred to as the Kilusang Bayan case), questions the validity of the order
of 28 October 1988 of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over by the
Department of Agriculture of the management of the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng
Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Department's regulatory and supervisory powers
under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a Management
Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3) the disbandment of the Board
of Directors, and (4) the turn over of all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM the Management Committee.

Issue: WON the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture on October 28, 1988 is valid being an alter ego of the
President.

Ruling: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where
the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the
latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts
when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts
could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions,
such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal,
arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.

A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPM's by-laws, reads:

Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. Any elected director or committee member
may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members in good standing present at the
annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after having been given the opportunity to be
heard at the assembly.

Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual general assembly and a special
general assembly.

Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise
manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even
without said provision, petitioners cannot be deprived of that right.

The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the
members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take
refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section
does not give him that right.

An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to necessary for their just and
reasonable execution.

32. Biraogo vs The Philippine Truth Commission (G.R. 192935 , December 7, 2010)

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to
cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Facts:
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under
the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No.
141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form
such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ,
because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant
or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong
as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is
governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public
right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He
has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds
reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of
the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance
of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate
funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source
of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing
auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
 3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement
of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally
to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration
is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which
the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority
to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered.
Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

33. Ang-Angco vs Castillo (G.R. L-17169. November 30, 1963)

FACTS: On October 8, 1956, the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry requesting for special permit to withdraw certain commodities from
the customs house which were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange.
On the same date, the company addressed an identical request to the Secretary of Finance who was also
the Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank. Senator Pedro Sabido, in behalf of the company,
likewise wrote said official urging that authority be given to withdraw the abovementioned concentrates.
Not content with this step, he also wrote to Dr. Andres Castillo, Acting Governor of the Central Bank,
urging, the same matter. Then Secretary Hernandez wrote another letter to Dr. Castillo stating, "Senator
Sabido is taking this to you personally. Unless we have legal objection, I would like to authorize the
withdrawal of the concentrates upon payment of all charges in pesos. Please expedite action. The
Monetary Board, however, failed to take up the matter in its meeting of October 12, 1956 for the reason
that the transaction did not involve any dollar allocation or foreign exchange, and of this decision Mr.
Licaros was informed. Collector Ang-Angco, while still in doubt as to the propriety of the action suggested,
finally authorized the release of the concentrates upon payment of the corresponding duties, customs
charges, fees and taxes.

On the strength of this complaint President Ramon Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee to
investigate , the committee submitted to President Magsaysay its report recommending that a suspension
of 15 days, without pay, be imposed upon Ang-Angco chargeable against the period of his suspension but
the decision on the administrative case against him remained pending until the death of President
Magsaysay. Upon learning said decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco wrote a letter to
President Carlos P. Garcia calling attention to the fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in
removing him from office had the effect of depriving him of his statutory right to have his case originally
decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service, as well as of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals, whose decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final, besides the fact that such decision is in
violation of the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers or employees in the civil service
against removal or suspension except for cause in the manner

ISSUE: whether the President has the power to take direct action on the case of petitioner even if he
belongs to the classified service in spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959

HELD: It is hereby ordered that petitioner be immediately reinstated to his office as Collector of Customs
for the Port of Manila, without prejudice of submitting his case to the Commissioner of Civil Service to be
dealt with in accordance with law. No costs.

the Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove officers
and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not
belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson V. Romero, supra), but not with regard to those officers or
employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised.
This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department"
(Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on
heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of
this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.

we may conclude that the action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the
President, in taking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the same to
the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and should be set aside.
34. Drilon vs Lim (G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994)
35. VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

G.R. No. L-46570 April 21 1939

FACTS:
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry
into the conduct of the Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter was found to have
committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority ad unauthorized practice of the law profession.
The respondent recommended the suspension of Villena to the President of the Philippines, in which it was
verbally granted. The Secretary then suspended Villena from office. Villena filed a petition for preliminary
injunction against the Sec. to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend and order investigation
over Villena.

RULING:
The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena. As to the
power to order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC that Department of Interior was
given the authority to supervise bureaus and offices under its jurisdiction. This was interpreted in relation
to Section 86 of the same Code which granted the said Department of executive supervision over
administration of provinces, municipalities and other political subdivisions.

This supervision covers the power to order investigation because supervision implies authority to inquire
into facts and conditions in order to render power real and effective.However, unlike this power to order
investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was not provided in any law. There was no express grant of
authority to the Secretary of Interior to suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the Administrative
Code granted the provincial governor the power of suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant
precluded the Secretary of Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that the acts of the department secretaries,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the President, presumptively the acts of the President. The power to suspend may be exercised by the
President. It follows that the heads of the Department under her may also exercise the same, unless the
law required the President to act personally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of the
departments are assistants and agents of the President.

36. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs Pano (G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967)
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.
JOSE PAO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G.
RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, defendants-
appellees.
May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of
Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources?

Facts:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land
situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao.
On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the above public land
to plaintiff LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC.
On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest
zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land.
On January 26, 1955, Jose Pao and 19 other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety hectares
of the released area.
On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire
released area. This was protested by Jose Pao and his companions before the Director of Lands
upon the averment that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales
application. The Director of Lands dismissed the claim of Jose Pao and his companions.
On July 5, 1957, Jose Pao and his companions filed an appeal with the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources who held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "by authority of the President" decided the
controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that
appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be
allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and
(2) directed that the controverted land "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and
allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the
cost of surveying this portion."
Plaintiff took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be rendered
declaring: (1) that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force
and effect; and (2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal
force and effect.
The CFI dismissed plaintiff's case.

ISSUES:
1. WON the President cannot undo an act of his department secretary.
Plaintiff's contention:
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141 provides that decisions of the Director of Lands "as to
questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Plaintiff claims that this statute is controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President.

Supreme Court Ruling:

Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is
his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is
the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and
directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by
his department secretaries.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's
power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
The decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
may be appealed to the Office of the President so that failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of
appeal is considered a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for non-exhaustion of all
administrative remedies.
This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of his department
secretary.

2. WON the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power.
Plaintiffs Contention: The Constitution does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of
control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the
President to act personally upon the matter.
Supreme Court ruling:
It is not correct to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the
Constitution does not command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in
person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is
an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our
constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President
has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

3. WON the Executive Secretary cannot intrude into the zone of action allocated to another
department secretary.
Supreme Court ruling:
The Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President," his decision is that of the President's. Such
decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary
is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized
to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," that
remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed. No such disapproval or
reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.

HELD: For the reasons given, the judgment of the CFI dismissing the plaintiffs case review is hereby
affirmed.

37. City of Iligan vs Director of Lands (G.R. No. L-30852, February 26, 1988)
1. President issued
Proclamation 335
:a. Withdrawing certain parcels of public land in Iligan from sale or settlement and
b. Reserving such for the use of NPC (Natl Power Corporation)
2. By virtue of said proclamation, NPC constructed a fertilizer plant named Maria Cristina
3. Later, NPC: a. Sold the fertilizer plant to Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corp with all the machineries, right
of occupancy, and use of land
b. Covenanted to collaborate with DANR in facilitating sale and right to lease for at least 25 years,
the lands where plant is erected
4. Proclamation 20 and 198 were issued:
a. Proc. 20 excluding from operation of Proc. 335 certain areas occupied by Ma. Cristina and
Employees Housing and declaring such lands for OPEN DISPOSITION
b.Proc. 198 - changing the technical description of said areas (6 lots)
5.Marcelo Steel and Ma. Cristina filed a Msc. Sales Applicationwith the Bureau of Lands.
a Marcelo Tire and Ma. Cristina are sister corporations.
b. Purchaser was Marcelo Tire but another sister corp. Marcelo Steel operated said plant
6. In the notice of sale issued in Manila, Director of Lands advised that Bureau will sell in an auction said
lands of Marcelo Steel
7. President then issued Proc. 469 excluding from the reservation made in favor to NPC certain lands in
Iligan (Lot 1, 1-a, 3, and 4) and DONATING said lands in favor of Iligan City.
8. Mayor of Iligan wrote to Director of Lands informing him that City is the owner of said lands and
foreshores in auction.
9. BUT no action was taken on said request for exclusion and so City filed a complaint for injunction in CFI
against Director. Injunctiontemporarily issued.
10. Pending case, President Marcos issued Proc. 94 excluding from the donation in Proc. 469 certain lands
(Lot 1-a, 2-a, and 3) anddeclaring same for open disposition.11. CFI dismissed the complaint of City and
dissolved injunction. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON President has the authority to grant a portion of public domain to any government like the
City of Iligan.

Held: YES
1. Section 60 of Public Land Act states that tracts of land can be disposed of by grant, donation or transfer
made to a province, municipality,branch, or subdivision of government for purposes conducive to public
interest.
a. Who has authority to donate? Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources through Director of
Lands (Sec 60)
2. Can President donate instead of Secretary and Director? YES
a. Director has direct executive control of lands (e.g. lease, sale, concession, disposition of land of
public domain)
b. Director SUBJECT to control of Secretary of Agriculture.
c. Secretarys control is SUBJECT to control of PRESIDENT
d. Under Art VII Sec 17: President shall control ALL executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
e. Hence, President has the same authority to dispose of portions of public domain as his
subordinates.
f. Such authority to dispose is also granted to the President under Section 69 of the Public Land Act.

3. Since, President has the authority to donate lands of public domain for residential, commercial, &
industrial purposes. QuestionedProclamation 469 is VALID and binding:
a. Ownership of lands now vested in City of Iligan.
b. Mayor of City upon proclamation immediately had the lots surveyed and entered into negotiation
with National Investment andDevelopment Corp. and those interested in developing the Coco-Chemical
Plant in order to accelerate economic expansion in theCity.

4. Proclamation 94 is NULL and VOID as said parcels had been segregated and had become property of
Iligan.
5. Decision of CFI REVERSED

38. Gascon vs. Arroyo (Section 17) G.R. 78389 ( October 16, 1989 )

Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, Faustino "Bong" L. Lapira, and Spouses Alberto and Karla Lim, petitioners, vs.
The Hon. Joker T. Arroyo, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary to the President, Hon. Teodoro
Benigno, as Press Secretary, Hon. Reneirio Reyes, as the Secretary of Transportation and Communication,
Hon. Jose Alcuaz, as Chairman of the National Telecommunications Commission, Hon. Conrado A.
Limcaoco, Jr., as the Officer-in-Charge of the People's Television, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, and
Messrs. Vicente Abad Santos, Pastor Del Rosario and Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in their respective capacities as
Chairman and Members of the "Arbitration Committee", respondents.
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Expropriation

Facts:
Lopez family is the owner of 2 television stations, namely: Channels 2 and 4, which they have
operated through the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
When martial law was declared on Sept 21, 1972, Ch. 4 was closed by the military and its facilities
were taken over by Kanlaon Broadcasting System (KBS) which operated it as a commercial TV
station
In 1978, KBS was taken over by the National Media Production Center (NMPC), which operated it
under Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-4)
After the February 1986 Edsa Revolution, the PCGG sequestered the TV stations and the Office of
Media Affairs took over the operation of Ch. 4
On. April 17, 1986, the Lopez family requested Pres. Aquino to order to return to them Chs. 2 and 4
On October 18 1986, Ch 2 was returned to the Lopez family
Upon the Lopez family's request, the respondent Executive Secretary, by the authority of the
President, entered into with

ABS-CBN, represented by its Pres. Eugenio Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to Arbitrate"

Arbitration Committee was created composed of Atty. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., for RP and Atty.
Pastor del Rosario for ABS-CBN, and retired Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman

Issue:
Note: There wasn't exactly an issue, as the court dismissed the case because the petitioners did
not have locus standi. If the need arises, I would say the issue is"Whether or not the Agreement to
 Arbitrate, as an alternative to a lawsuit against the State, is valid"; to which, the answer is
yes. Either way, I'll just enumerate below the court's statements regarding the expropriation topic.

1. The Executive Secretary, in entering into the "Agreement to Arbitrate," was acting for and in behalf
of the President when he signed it. Hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the
Republic of the Philippines.

2. Where the government takes property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent.

3. The government's immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.

4. Note: In a separate opinion, Justice Feliciano remarks that the above comments as obiter dicta.

Petition dismissed.

39. NAMARCO v. Arca G.R. L-25743 ( September 30,1969 )

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin respondent Judge Francisco Arca from enforcing his Order dated January 12, 1966, directing
petitioners to reinstate respondent Juan T. Arive to his former position in the National Marketing
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NAMARCO) and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued
pursuant thereto on January 14, 1966.

Respondent Juan T. Arive was the Manager of the Traffic-Storage Department of the NAMARCO receiving an
annual compensation of P7,200.00. Pursuant to the General Manager's Administrative Order No. 118 dated
February 24, 1960, he was investigated by a committee for violating Management Memorandum Order
dated February 1, 1960, directing "that the allocation and deliveries of merchandise imported under the
so-called Trade Assistance Program to its designated beneficiaries be stopped;" and causing the improper
release of shipments intended for delivery upon full payment thereof by the Federation of United
NAMARCO Distributors (FUND), which were covered by certain domestic letters of credit for the total sum
of P361,053.85. After due hearing, the investigating committee found Arive guilty of the charges but left
the imposition of the penalty to the discretion of the General Manager and the Board of Directors.
Subsequently, the General Manager issued Administrative Order No. 137, series of 1960, holding Arive
guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the service

On April 6, 1965, the NAMARCO, through its General Manager, in a letter addressed to the President, asked
for a reconsideration of the decision ordering Arive's reinstatement. In that letter it was contended that the
Office of the President had no jurisdiction to review any decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors
removing, suspending, or otherwise disciplining any of its subordinate employees, because Republic Act
No. 1345 (the NAMARCO Charter), which grants that power to the General Manager and to the Board of
Directors, does not provide for an appeal to any governmental body. In a letter to the NAMARCO dated June
8, 1965, then Executive Secretary Ramon A. Diaz, this time expressly acting "[b]y authority of the
President," refused to reconsider the decision, stating that the President had jurisdiction under his
constitutional power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, and directing that the
decision be implemented.

ISSUE
whether the President of the Philippines had authority to reverse the decision of the Board of Directors of
the NAMARCO and to order the reinstatement of Juan T. Arive

Held:
The President of the Philippines authority to review and reverse the decision of the NAMARCO
Board of Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position in the NAMARCO and to order his
reinstatement falls within the constitutional power of the President over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. Under our governmental set-up, corporations owned or controlled by the government,
such as the NAMARCO, partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices, which are administratively
supervised by the Administrator of the Office of Economic Coordination, whose compensation and rank
shall be that of a head of an Executive Department and who shall be responsible to the President of the
Philippines under whose control his functions ... shall be exercised. (Executive Order No. 386 of December
22, 1950, section 1, issued under the Reorganization Act of 1950).

The fact that section 13(d) of Republic Act No. 1345 (the NAMARCO Charter and likewise section
11(d) of the Uniform Charter for Government Owned or Controlled Corporations (Ex. Order No. 399 of
January 5, 1951) which authorize the general manager of such corporations, with the approval of the Board
of Directors, to remove for cause any subordinate employee of the Corporation do not provide for an
appeal from the general managers decision of removal to any superior officer, body or agency, does not
mean that no appeal lies from such decision to the President.

The right to appeal to the President reposes upon the Presidents power of control over the
executive departments. And control simply means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter.

40. Mondano vs Silvosa (97 Phil 143)

FACTS:
The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and concubinage against Mondano, duly
elected and qualified mayor of Mainit, Surigao,to Silvosa, provincial governor of Suriga, for immediate
investigation, appropriate action and report. Silvosa issued an Administrative Order suspending Mondano
from office. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal.

RULING:
Yes. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus
and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he
does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only
general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the RAC are to be
construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision
over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec
10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If general supervision over all local governments is to be
construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there would
no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision.

Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties.

Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the
import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of RAC.
Section 18
41. David vs Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3,2006)

Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle
I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to
suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such
PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies
and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-
Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write
ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day,
Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued
way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of
national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such
power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho
also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that
such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon
protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by
reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is
within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD:The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP.
It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP.
Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and
at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading
of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the
events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned
are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders.
There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing
the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events.
Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP
1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to
simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Over breadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases.
Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover,
the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which,
by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at
all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct,
not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents
calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has
validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion
for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has
been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6
of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress.
They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the
power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that
the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees.
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states
that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state
of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only
take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a
distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency
powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The
authority from Congress must be based on the following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise
of the calling out power of the president by the president.