Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Trump Politics DA
Trump is the only president to hold a net negative rating this early in
CNN reported that
a presidency. However, the vast majority of respondents, 78 percent, say Trump is handling the presidency as
they would have expected. The network compared Trump's ratings to past presidents, noting that Ronald Reagan's
first approval rating measured at 51 percent from Gallup in 1981 7 points above Trump's rating in the CNN poll
but Reagan's disapproval number was far lower than Trump's at just 13 percent, compared to Trump's 53 percent.
George W. Bush, the last president to be elected without winning the popular vote, also held a more positive
approval rating at 57 percent in February of his first year in office. Trump's first two weeks as president have been
punctuated by national protests over his executive order denying entry to nationals from seven predominantly
Muslims nations for 90 days while suspending the U.S. refugee program for 120 days. A majority of those polled by
CNN, 53 percent, oppose Trump's executive order, while 47 percent say they favor the action. Trump's executive
order to construct a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border also faces opposition, with 60 percent of Americans surveyed by
CNN opposed to the proposal. Trump said last week that construction on the wall could begin in "months." The CNN
poll of 1,002 adults was conducted Jan. 31 to Feb. 2 via landlines and cellphones with an overall margin of error of 3
percentage points.
A new Quinnipiac poll finds that Donald Trumps approval rating has soared all the way up to 36 percent, while 44
percent of American voters disapprove of his handling of the presidency so far. Now, youll be forgiven for thinking
that these numbers dont matter. After all, Trump won the presidency even though he was deeply unpopular and
heres why Trumps approval
majorities saw him as unfit for the presidency, right? Yes. But
numbers are still worth keeping an eye on: If theres anything that
can possibly get congressional Republicans to exercise meaningful
oversight on Trump or act as a check on him in other ways, its
horrifically awful poll numbers. Of course, not even that might be enough to get them to do
that, but theres at least a chance that they could. Along these lines, one thing that is notable about the new
Quinnipiac poll is that it shows Trump may be on very thin ethical ice with the public. For instance: Only 39
percent of Americans say Trump is honest, vs. 56 percent who say hes not. Seventy percent support a review of
Trumps finances to identify possible conflicts of interest that may interfere with his job as president. Fifty-four
percent say Trump has more conflicts of interest than most politicians. A total of 60 percent are either very (41)
or somewhat (19) concerned that Trump would veto a law that would be good for the country because it would hurt
his business interests. Only 33 percent are very satisfied with Trumps plan to allow his sons to run his
businesses to prevent conflicts of interest. Another 20 percent are only somewhat satisfied, while a total of 44
percent are either not so satisfied (12) or not satisfied at all (32) with that. In one sense, these last numbers are
good for Trump a total of 53 percent are either very or somewhat satisfied. On the other hand, those in the
somewhat camp might get a lot shakier and slide into the not-satisfied camp if new information about
conflicts emerges. Thin ice. And remember, the very fact that Trump has chosen to do nothing meaningful with his
business arrangement to prevent conflicts makes it more likely that such conflicts and possibly full-blown
corruption will indeed take place and will ultimately get uncovered by dogged investigative reporting. By the
way: Republicans seem to be just fine with Trumps conflicts. Fifty-three percent of Republicans oppose a review of
his finances. And 70 percent are satisfied with his arrangement for his businesses. Those numbers among
A whole lot is riding on getting
Republicans are reason for real pessimism.
congressional Republicans to stop relentlessly protecting Trump
not just on the ethics front, but also in other areas where he is
undermining our democracy.
Republicans are likely to continue to do nothing to prod Trump to show more transparency about his business
holdings, let alone exercise real oversight. They are likely to hew to Trumps general unwillingness to countenance a
full, independent probe into possible Russian meddling in the election, which makes it less likely that serious steps
will be done to prevent it from happening again. And they are likely to continue saying little to rebut Trumps lies
about voter fraud. This isnt just a problem because those lies undermine public faith in our
democracy. Its also disconcerting because Trump is vowing an investigation into that nonexistent fraud,
potentially laying the groundwork for a likely escalation in GOP efforts to restrict voting rights. It may be that
nothing, ever, will get congressional Republicans to exercise meaningful ethical oversight with regard to Trumps
conflicts; or to support a full, independent probe into Russian meddling; or to declare unequivocally and in a
concerted way that, no, millions of people did not vote illegally in our election; and no, voter fraud is not rampant,
as Trump says it is. As I keep shouting at you, there is no denying that the situation right now is really quite bleak.
But perhaps if enough new revelations come out about Trump conflicts or corruption, and if Democrats can find new
and innovative ways of bringing them to the attention of the public, creating real and sustained
blowback well, maybe this might change.
Jonah Engel Bromwich, Doomsday Clock Moves Closer to Midnight, Signaling Concern Among Scientists, The
New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/science/doomsday-clock-countdown-2017.html
It is getting closer to midnight. On Thursday, the group of scientists who orchestrate the
Doomsday Clock, a symbolic instrument informing the public when the
earth is facing imminent disaster, moved its minute hand from three to two
and a half minutes before the final hour. It was the closest the clock had
been to midnight since 1953, the year after the United States and the
Soviet Union conducted competing tests of the hydrogen bomb. Though
scientists decide on the clocks position, it is not a scientific instrument, or even a physical one. The movement
of its symbolic hands is decided upon by the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
The organization introduced the clock on the cover of its June 1947 edition, placing it at seven minutes to
midnight. Since then, it has moved closer to midnight and farther away, depending on the boards conclusions.
Thursdays announcement was made by Rachel Bronson, the executive director and
publisher of the bulletin. She was assisted by the theoretical physicist Lawrence Krauss, the climate
scientist and meteorologist David Titley, and the former United States ambassador Thomas Pickering. Ms.
explained why the board had included the
Bronson, in a post-announcement interview,
Pakistan, both of whom staged nuclear weapons tests three weeks apart,
had the clock at nine minutes to midnight in 1998. By 2007, fears about
Iranian and North Korean nuclear capacity had pushed it to 11:55. By 2015,
the scientists were back in a state of unmitigated concern, with the clock
at three minutes to midnight, the closest it had been since 1984.
Unchecked climate change, global nuclear weapons
modernizations, and outsized nuclear weapons arsenals pose
extraordinary and undeniable threats to the continued existence
of humanity, the bulletin said. World leaders have failed to act with the
speed or on the scale required to protect citizens from potential
catastrophe. These failures of political leadership endanger every person
on Earth, it added.
Keep trust in democracy alive is key to prevent many scenarios for
war and extinction
Diamond 95
Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting
Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the
coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of
Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful
international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have
utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on
Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of
these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or
aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy , with its
provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and
openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this
century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a
truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not
aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their
leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own
populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not
build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another.
Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading
partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for
investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they
must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor
international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their
openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret.
Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil
liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only
reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security
and prosperity can be built.
Next Off
Allied Proliferation DA
Withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea pushes both South
Korea and Japan to get nuclear weapons.
Brands, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and History at
Duke University, 15
(Hal, Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing,
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/fools-rush-out-flawed-logic-offshore-balancing)
The fundamental reason is that both U.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly
interwoven with a robust U.S. forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that
Washington has afforded its allies has equally afforded the United States great sway over those allies policies.43 During the Cold
War and after, for instance, the United States has used the influence provided by its security
posture to veto allies pursuit of nuclear weapons, to obtain more advantageous terms in
financial and trade agreements, and even to affect the composition of allied nations governments.44 More broadly, it has
used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas in
key regions and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear,
this influence has never been as pervasive as U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable
standard of comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. One can tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war
order. As even some leading offshore balancers have acknowledged, the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent decades is
not something that has occurred naturally. It has occurred because the American pacifier has suppressed precisely the dynamics
that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier has limited arms races and security competitions by providing the
It has soothed historical rivalries by
protection that allows other countries to under-build their militaries.
Washington backed away from this role? The most logical answer is that both U.S. influence
and global stability would suffer. With respect to influence, the United States would effectively
be surrendering the most powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded
in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing the position of leadership it has
used to shape bilateral and regional agendas for decades. The consequences would seem no less
damaging where stability is concerned. As offshore balancers have argued, it may be that U.S. retrenchment would force local
powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with countries that feel threatened or encircled
removing the American pacifier would
by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that
liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled. Long-
dormant security competitions might reawaken as countries armed themselves more vigorously;
historical antagonisms between old rivals might reemerge in the absence of a robust
U.S. presence and the reassurance it provides. Moreover, countries that seek to revise
existing regional orders in their favorthink Russia in Europe, or China in Asiamight indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but they
might just as plausibly feel empowered to more assertively press their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in
key regions, Mearsheimer acknowledges, then take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble.46 Scanning the
global horizon today, one can easily see where such trouble might arise. In Europe, a revisionist Russia is already destabilizing its
neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf and broader Middle East, the threat of Iranian
ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting in proxy wars and hints of an incipient arms race, even as that region also
In East Asia, a rising China is
contends with a severe threat to its stability in the form of the Islamic State.
challenging the regional status quo in numerous ways, sounding alarms among its
neighborsmany of whom also have historical grievances against each other. In these circumstances, removing the
American pacifier would likely yield not low-cost stability, but increased conflict
and upheaval. That conflict and upheaval, in turn, would be quite damaging to U.S.
interests even if it did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a key region. It is hard to
imagine, for instance, that increased instability and acrimony would produce the robust
multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with transnational
threats from pandemics to piracy. More problematic still might be the
economic consequences. As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have argued, the enormous progress
toward global prosperity and integration that has occurred since World War II (and now the Cold
War) has come in the climate of relative stability and security provided largely by the
United States.47 One simply cannot confidently predict that this progress would endure amid escalating geopolitical
competition in regions of enormous importance to the world economy. Perhaps the greatest risk that a strategy of
offshore balancing would run, of course, is that a key region might not be able to maintain its own
balance following U.S. retrenchment. That prospect might have seemed far-fetched in the early post-Cold War era, and it
remains unlikely in the immediate future. But in East Asia particularly, the rise and growing assertiveness of China has
highlighted the medium-to long-term danger that a hostile power could in fact gain regional
primacy. If Chinas economy continues to grow rapidly, and if Beijing continues to increase military spending by 10 percent or
more each year, then its neighbors will ultimately face grave challenges in containing Chinese
power even if they join forces in that endeavor. This possibility, ironically, is one to which leading advocates of retrenchment
have been attuned. The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, Mearshimer writes, because its Asian
neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.48 If this is true, however, then offshore balancing becomes a dangerous
it could lead countries like Japan and
and potentially self-defeating strategy. As mentioned above,
South Korea to seek nuclear weapons, thereby stoking arms races and
elevating regional tensions. Alternatively, and perhaps more worryingly, it might encourage the scenario that
offshore balancers seek to avoid, by easing Chinas ascent to regional hegemony. As Robert Gilpin has written, Retrenchment by its
very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on
In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to
relations with allies and rivals.49
navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely
because they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their
own. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to
acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for
successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.50 In the same vein, retrenchment would compromise alliance
relationships, basing agreements, and other assets that might help Washington check Chinese power in the first placeand that
would allow the United States to surge additional forces into theater in a crisis. In sum, if one expects that Asian
countries will be unable to counter China themselves , then reducing U.S.
influence and leverage in the region is a curious policy. Offshore balancing might
promise to preserve a stable and advantageous environment while reducing U.S. burdens. But upon closer analysis, the
the security relationship between the two, which guarantees peace and stability by extended
deterrence28,500 United States Forces Korea (USFK) troops on ground and the U.S. nuclear umbrella .
The combined threats of North Koreas nuclear weapons and conventional forces, as well as the specter of the collapse of the Kim Jong-Un family regime, compel the United States
pledged a continuing U.S. commitment to a strong alliance with South Korea . Obama
reminded South Korean President Park Geun-hye that recent developments in North Korea, such as significant increased activity at Punggye-ri nuclear test site coupled with multiple
long-range missile tests, beckoned for fiercer efforts toward denuclearization.
The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia , of course,
is the threat that nuclear weapons might be used. To be sure, the use of nuclear
weapons remains remote, but the probability is not zero and the consequences
could be catastrophic. The subject, therefore, deserves careful scrutiny. Nuclear use would
overturn a 70-year tradition of nonuse, could result in large-scale death and
destruction, and might set a precedent that shapes how nuclear weapons are
viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation may
be magnified in a multipolar nuclear order in which small skirmishes present
the potential to quickly draw in multiple powers, each with a finger on the
nuclear trigger. The following discussion will explore the logic of crisis escalation and strategic stability in a
multipolar nuclear order.14
the existence of multipolar nuclear powers means that crises may pit
First and foremost,
multiple nuclear-armed states against one another. This may be the result of formal
planning if a states strategy calls for fighting multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. A state may
choose such a strategy if it believes that a war with one of these states would inevitably mean war with both.
Alternatively, in a war between state A and state B, state A may decide to conduct a preventive strike on state C for
fear that it would otherwise seek to exploit the aftermath of the war between states A and B. Given U.S. nuclear
strategy in the early Cold War, for example, it is likely that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet
Union would have also resulted in U.S. nuclear attacks against China, even if China had not been a direct participant
conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may
in the precipitating dispute. In addition,
inadvertently impinge on the interests of other nuclear-armed states, drawing
them into conflict. There is always a danger that one nuclear power could take
action against a nuclear rival and that this action would unintentionally cross a
red line for a third nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis . Linton Brooks and
Mira Rapp-Hooper have dubbed this category of phenomena the security trilemma.15 For example, if the United
States were to engage in a show of force in an effort to signal resolve to Russia, such as the flushing of nuclear
There is also the issue of
submarines, this action could inadvertently trigger a crisis for China.
catalytic war. This may be the first mechanism by which Cold War strategists feared that multiple nuclear
players could increase the motivations for a nuclear exchange. They worried that a third nuclear power,
such as China, might conduct a nuclear strike on one of the superpowers, leading the
wounded superpower to conclude wrongly that the other superpower was responsible
and thereby retaliate against an innocent state presumed to be the aggressor . This
outcome was seen as potentially attractive to the third state as a way of destroying the superpowers and promoting
itself within the global power hierarchy. Fortunately, this scenario never came to pass during the Cold War. With
modern intelligence, reconnaissance, and early warning capabilities among the major powers, it is more difficult to
imagine such a scenario today, although this risk is still conceivable among less
technologically developed states. In addition to acting directly against one another, nuclear
powers could be drawn into smaller conflicts between their allies and brought
face to face in peak crises. International relations theorists discuss the concept of
chain ganging within alliance relationships, the dangers of which are more
severe when the possibility of nuclear escalation is present .16 Although this was a potential
problem even in a bipolar nuclear order, the more nuclear weapons states present, the
greater the likelihood of multiple nuclear powers entering a crisis. A similar logic
suggests that the more fingers on the nuclear trigger, the more likely it is that
nuclear weapons will be used. Multipolar nuclear crises are not without
historical precedent.17 Several Cold War crises featured the Soviet Union against the United States and
its European nuclear-armed allies, Britain and later France. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War involved the United States,
the Soviet Union, and a nuclear-armed Israel. The United States has been an interested party in regional nuclear
disputes, including the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 and several crises in the past two decades on the Indian
many of these crises stand out as among the most dangerous of
subcontinent. Indeed,
the nuclear era.
accelerating our own downfall.
Moving on to Case:
No chance of unification, China will intervene to ensure North Korea exists
Kim 2015 - professor of international finance and the coordinator of finance at the University of
Detroit Mercy
Suk Hi, The Survival of North Korea: A Case for Rethinking the U.S.-North Korea Nuclear
Standoff, North Korean Review11.1 (Spring 2015): 101-113
Since the war prediction and the collapse prediction are not realistic, the most concrete prediction is the continuation of a t wo-state
all, China and South Korea need to maintain North Korea as a buffer
peninsula with limited reforms.20 After
in order to protect their national interests. As a result, North Korea is dependent on China as its greatest
economic benefactor-negotiating economic aid, inward investment, foreign trade, and political support-especially with the Six-Party
Talks at a standstill since 2009 and with U.S. and UN economic sanctions in effect. Basically, Chinese
aid and support are
the economic component, among the cultural-historical and political-ideological factors, preventing a sudden
collapse of North Korea, and China will never allow the U.S. to unite the Korean peninsula on
American terms. As Chinese objectives toward North Korea protect Chinese interests, international efforts to
foment a North Korean crisis or foreign regime change will always face Chinese resistance . And should
circumstances run out of control, China will intervene to restore stability and political order .21
South Korea does not want the plan, purposefully ruins the
diplomatic efforts--causes an aggressive response from North
Korea, risking U.S.-Sino conflict.
Schake 14 (Kori Schake, fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 29, 2014. Pushing for Regime Change
aggressively trying to topple the Kim regime
in North Korea Is a Bad Idea - Why
could backfire -- badly. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/29/haass-of-cards-richard-north-korea-wall-
street-journal/)
In the pages of the Wall Street Journal, the Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haass makes an unusually reckless
recommendation for the doyen of establishment thinking: ending North Koreas existence as an independent
entity. I am sympathetic to the advocacy of regime change in North Korea there is no better case, either on
strategic or humanitarian grounds. Intervention in North Korea would liberate 200,000 Koreans trapped in
concentration camps, provide nutritional assistance to the 80 percent of Koreans suffering long-term deprivation,
reunite families separated for more than two generations, negate the nuclear weapons threat currently posed by
the Kim regime, alleviate the need for stationing American forces on the peninsula, remove the threat from 10,000
North Korean artillery pieces trained on Seoul, and end the proliferation pipeline that has assisted nuclear weapons
programs in Pakistan, Syria, and Iran. If it works, that is. And thats the problem with Haasss
recommendation: It assumes that we can turn the screws on Kim Jong Un
without catastrophic responses or the collapse of North Korea burgeoning into chaos.
Which is surprising from someone who wrote so ardently about the mistakes of such wars of choice. Implicit in
Haasss argument is that we are already at war of a tepid kind with North Korea, with the threat of much larger
conflagration looming. But those arguments were likewise made of Iraq, and Iraq had much less manifest means to
damage both the United States and our treaty allies. His argument is premised on confidence that he understands
if only we provided the right incentives, China would
both Chinese and Korean choices that
flip from bolstering Pyongyang. But the United States has been trying for
over a decade to turn that trick, with precious little sign of progress. Haass argues that
Chinas calculus is now changing, that North Korea is becoming a liability: Whereas Beijing previously supported
concern about refugees,
North Korea for reasons of ideology, restraining American influence, and
its overwhelming concern now is for years and more likely decades
of relative stability in the region so that it can continue to address
its many domestic challenges. Stability may be what China needs, but that doesnt appear to
be what China is choosing. Indeed, there appears to be little evidence that Beijing is
willing to back away from Pyongyang. It is similarly plausible that China still sees a scary
North Korea as useful in tying down Washingtons attention. It may well prefer that North Korea continues to
imprison its people rather than China having to police them. And Beijing might well be confident that Japan is
constrained domestically against nuclear weapons development. Moreover, the possibility may even exist for an
agreement with South Korea that worries about the credibility of an American security guarantee. After all, from
Seouls perspective President George W. Bush said the United States would not allow a nuclear North Korea but
he did. At the same time, Washington denuclearized half of the Korean peninsula, removing U.S. nuclear weapons
but two-thirds of South Koreans now favor developing nuclear weapons of their own. President Barack Obamas
record on enforcing red lines (hint: not good) will only have further aggravated South Koreas anxiety. Haass points
out that China appears more interested in relations with Seoul than with Pyongyang; perhaps China hopes to
achieve a peninsular condominium with the South Korean government to slowly shift dependence of North Korea
from China to South Korea. All of which is to say, as Haass himself has persuasively argued, that it is unsound to
premise a regime change strategy on the basis of speculative flights that are likely to be wrong in many respects.
The other major flaw in Haasss argument is lighting a fuse without putting adequate defense preparations in place.
His proposals for undermining it from within and denuding it of Chinese support corner the Kim regime.
These are deeply destabilizing moves against an erratic regime that boasts
of targeting its nuclear weapons at Los Angeles and Colorado Springs. Setting this train of events in motion would
make North Koreas a government with nothing to lose and thats the most
dangerous kind. It is also far beyond what South Korea, the ally most exposed
to North Korean retaliation, is likely to support. Another problem with Haasss Time to End the North
Korean Threat is that it is innocent of the scaffolding that international institutions and regional alliances provide
But getting the
and require. Haass recommends a trilateral U.S.-Chinese-South Korean understanding.
peace right will require much more: assuaging South Korean and Japanese anxiety
about reducing American troops; assuring the Philippines and others that an
agreement between China, the United States, and South Korea as Richard
advocates will not result in abandoning their concerns about Chinese military
provocations; ramping up U.N. involvement to manage the horrors internal to North Korea;
ensuring the Russians see no angle to exploit ; and verifying weapons dont flood out
to other rogue regimes. Haass is right that the United States government should be providing assurances to the
Chinese government that it would not take advantage of the Kim regimes collapse to move American military
forces north of the 38th parallel. Stability forces will surely be needed, but South Koreans would be much better at
the work anyway, as they speak the language and have ties of nationality and family to facilitate interaction. We
ought also to be seeking assurances from the Chinese they also would not move forces into a North Korean vacuum.
While persuading the Chinese to ratchet down their support for Kim Jong Un merits continuing effort, there is only
one lever that has shown any real success in dealing with the North Korean regime: cutting off their money. The
main sources of revenue for the North Korean leadership are evidently counterfeiting and proliferation. The former
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey created a team of Treasury experts and
masterminded the means of sleuthing the money trail; his offices pressure in 2007 on Banco Delta Asia in Macau
brought North Korea into cooperation. It is an elegant, quiet, and deadly serious means of applying smart power
that hurts the regime without imposing further suffering on its benighted citizens. And its far closer to the
proportionate response President Obama hinted at for North Koreas hacking of Sony Entertainment and threats
against movie theaters showingThe Interview. These sanctions on leading regime figures are still the most practical
means to try and affect the behavior of North Koreas evil government.