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EL

FARO ACCIDENT TIMELINE


Significant events aboard the ship
Taken from the voyage data recorder transcript (VDR)




Date Time (EDT) Event
Sept. 29 ~9:30 PM El Faro departed Jacksonville, Florida bound for San Juan, Puerto
Rico.
--- --- ---
Sept. 30 5:36 AM VDR recording of bridge audio began.
Sept. 30 6:41 AM Captain Michael Davidson said Oh look at that red sky over there.
Red in the morn sailors take warning. That is bright.
Sept. 30 7:01 AM Captain Davidson and Chief Mate Steve Shultz adjust course slightly
to keep their distance from Tropical Storm Joaquin.
Sept. 30 8:31 AM Captain Davidson said we'll be about sixty miles south of the eye. it
should be fine. we are gunna be fine not should be we are gunna
be fine.
Sept. 30 10:39 AM Third Mate Jeremie Riehm told unidentified Able Seaman 3 they are
nearly on a collision course with the storm.
Sept. 30 2:15 PM Captain Davidson and Second Mate Danielle Randolph heard radio
callouts being made by a Coast Guard aircraft broadcasting a
hurricane warning to mariners below over VHF radio.
Sept. 30 2:17 PM Captain Davidson told Second Mate Randolph that he will be up the
entire night for the most part.
Sept. 30 3:28 PM Nobody in their right mind would be drivin into it, unidentified

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Able Seaman 2 said of the storm. Second Mate responded with a
sarcastic laugh, We are. Yaaay."
Sept. 30 3:46 PM Chief Mate Shultz asked Second Mate Randolph if there was any
change with the storm. The Second Mate said it is still comin right
for us or were headed right for it.
Sept. 30 4:15 PM Unidentified Able Seaman 1 overheard the Captain and Chief Mate
discussing the storm and asked the Captain if there was a chance
they could turn around. The Captain replied Oh. No no no. Were
not gunna turn around were not gunna turn around, and added
the storm is very unpredictablevery unpredictable and this one
in particular is very erratic.
Sept. 30 6:55 PM Chief Mate Shultz suggested to Captain Davidson adjusting course
again, farther south. Captain Davidson agrees.
Sept. 30 ~8:00 PM Captain Davidson left the bridge and was not heard there again until
4:09 AM.
Sept. 30 8:24 PM Third Mate Riehm told unidentified Able Seaman 3 he was
concerned about how close they would be getting to the hurricane.
Maybe Im just being a chicken little, he said.
Sept. 30 9:19 PM Third Mate Riehm discussed needing an escape route, then said he
was not going to second-guess Captain Davidson.
Sept. 30 11:05 PM After receiving the latest hurricane forecast, Third Mate Riehm
called Captain Davidson and told him he might want to take a look
at the latest weather report. The Third Mate said the hurricane is
advancing toward their trackline, then offered to plot it out and call
the Captain back.
Sept. 30 11:13 PM Third Mate Riehm called Captain Davidson back and told him at 4:00
AM they will be 22 miles from the center of the hurricane with
gusts to 120 and strengthening. The Third Mate presented the
option of turning south at 2:00 AM to add more distance between
them and the center. The suggested course change was apparently
not authorized.
Sept. 30 11:26 PM Third Mate Riehm told unidentified Able Seaman 3 the Captain
seemed to think they will be south of the storm by then and the
winds wont be an issue. The Third Mate said, I trust what hes
saying its just, being twenty miles away from hundred knot winds
this doesnt even sound right.
--- --- ---
Oct. 1 1:15 AM SiriusXM satellite radio, playing on the bridge, broadcasts a news
update which indicated Hurricane Joaquin was upgraded to a
category 3 storm. Second Mate Randolph said, Oh my godNow
its a category three.
Oct. 1 1:20 AM Second Mate Randolph called Captain Davidson. In the 90-second
conversation, she told the Captain the storm had intensified and

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suggested altering course south. The suggested course change was
apparently not authorized.
Oct. 1 4:09 AM Captain Davidson arrived on the bridge. Referring to the swells, he
said, "Well, this is every day in Alaska. This is what it's like."
Oct. 1 4:37 AM Chief Engineer Richard Pusatere called the bridge to discuss the
impact a list was having on oil levels in the engine room.
Oct. 1 5:03 AM Captain Davidson said were getting conflicting reports as to where
the center of the storm is.
Oct. 1 5:43 AM Captain Davidson is first told of a problem, a flooding situation in
Hold 3. He ordered the Chief Mate Shultz to investigate.
Oct. 1 5:52 AM Captain Davidson was told a hate, called a scuttle was open. He
ordered unidentified Able Seaman 1 to turn the rudder left twenty
degrees to bring the list to the port side.
Oct. 1 6:01 AM Chief Mate Shultz told Captain Davidson over the radio that they
closed the scuttle.
Oct. 1 6:13 AM El Faro lost propulsion. Captain Davidson said, I think we just lost
the plant.
Oct. 1 6:17 AM Captain Davidson is told of water sloshing, coming in through the
ventilation in the engine room.
Oct. 1 6:32 AM Second Mate Randolph began formatting a distress message, as
directed by the Captain.
Oct.1 6:49 AM Second Mate Randolph offered coffee to Captain Davidson and
unidentified Able Seaman 1, who replied Give me the Splenda not
the regular sugar.
Oct. 1 6:59 AM Captain Davidson called TOTE Maritimes designated person ashore
(DPA) and left a voicemail explaining they had a navigational
incident.
Oct. 1 7:02 AM Captain Davidson called TOTEs contracted emergency call center for
assistance in reaching a DPA. He told the operator he had a marine
emergency and described the situation. At one point he said the
clock is ticking.
Oct. 1 7:06 AM TOTE Maritimes contracted emergency call center connected
Captain Davidson with a DPA. The Captain told him they had a 15-
degree list, the engineers were unable to get lube oil pressure on
the plant so they had no main engine. He said they were trying to
pump water from the hold but were not gaining ground. The Captain
provided their position and said he was going to activate the
emergency distress buttons. He said nobody was panicking and they
were going to stay with the ship.
Oct. 1 7:12 AM Captain Davidson ordered Second Mate Randolph to send the
distress message and push the SSAS button.
Oct. 1 7:14 AM Chief Mate Shultz arrived back on the bridge and told Captain
Davidson the water level was rising. The Captain asked where it was

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coming from. The Chief Mate told him the Chief Engineer said
something hit and ruptured the fire main hard.
Oct. 1 7:18 AM Chief Mate Shultz said he saw cars bobbing around in 3-Hold.
Captain Davidson called the engine room to ask if they could isolate
the fire main, cause that may be the root cause of the water
comin in.
Oct. 1 7:27 AM Captain Davidson gave the command to ring the ships general
alarm.
Oct. 1 7:29 AM Second Mate Randolph yelled about cargo containers in the water.
Oct. 1 7:29 AM Captain Davidson gave the command to ring the abandon ship alarm
and said Tell em were goin in.
Oct. 1 7:30 AM Captain Davidson said the bow is down.
Oct. 1 7:31 AM Captain Davidson told Chief Mate Shultz over the radio to put the
life rafts in the water. He said, EverybodyGet off the ship, stay
together.
Oct. 1 7:36 AM Unidentified Able Seaman 1, who is stuck on the bridge, yelled for
help. He told Captain Davidson his feet were slipping and asked for
a ladder or a rope.
Oct. 1 7:38 AM You gunna leave me, said unidentified Able Seaman 1. Im not
leavin you lets go, said Captain Davidson.
Oct. 1 7:39 AM Able Seaman 1 said, Im a goner. The Captain yelled, No youre
not Its time to come this way. There is a building rumble and the
recording ends.





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