Delinquency of Atty Marcial Edilion (IBP
memebership dues)
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly
licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues assailing the provisions of the
Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2,
Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to
the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee
and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute
an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be
a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of
the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty.
Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar
which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in
which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements.
The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his
annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not the meeting of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which
he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court in order to further the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require thet the cost
of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State. The right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary.
Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement
of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities thus
the court may compel all members of the Integrated
Bar to pay their annual dues.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR.,
REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT
OF IBP DUES.
This is a request for exemption from payment of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by
petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner
sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the
amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability
for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part
of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until
1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in
December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003.
He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for
the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil
Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the
practice of ones profession while in government
service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the
IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its
comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership in the
IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a
lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys
as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP;
that one of the obligations of a member is the
payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP
Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme
Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A
of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues
on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to
defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that
the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no
exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Courts directives for all
members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of
integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no
rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues
as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is
voluntary termination and reinstatement of
membership. It asserted that what petitioner could
have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his
intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the
IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to
pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that
the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive
status for its members, which if approved by the Board
of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive
IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
[4]
In his reply dated 22 February 2005, petitioner
contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board
of Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment
of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of
whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive
practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues
suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal
protection clause and the due process clause. He also
posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual
membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to
him considering that he has been in an inactive status
and is without income derived from his law practice.
He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual
membership dues would constitute deprivation of
property right without due process of law. Lastly, he
claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in
inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor
to the community where the inactive lawyers-members
reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner
is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues
during the time that he was inactive in the practice of
law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from
1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-
2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to
which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from
bar association organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to
do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar
as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of
the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body
of which all lawyers are required to be members. They
are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar, including the requirement
of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to
a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the entire lawyer population. This
requires membership and financial support of every
attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
order to foster the States legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. [7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law and in the integration of the
Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of
integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been
explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,
[9]
thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the
members does not mean that the Court is attempting
to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction
for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue.
If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar,
it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may
impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would
not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program
without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of
implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to
impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate
the privilege of law is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs
the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from
his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary
consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no
one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature
of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack
of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is
engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows
exemption from payment of membership dues. At
most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have
informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his
intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case,
his membership in the IBP could have been terminated
and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated
that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing the situation of members under inactive
status and the nonpayment of their dues during such
inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to
comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to
the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of
the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation
of property without due process and hence infringes on
one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re
Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in
the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause
to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondents right to practice law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is
not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public
responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption
from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to
pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as
membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of
this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will
merit his suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.

Santos Jr. v. Llamas
FACTS:
Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying
his IBP dues.He was also cited in the complaint as not
paying his professional tax or PTR as it was
intermittently indicated in his pleadings filed in court.
It was also an alleged falsity when he included his
IBP-Rizal 259060 where in fact he was not in good
standing. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was
dismissed as Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that
the decision was reversed and he was subsequently
promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also had criminal
case involving estafabut was appealed pending in the
Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he expressed
willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues.
RATIO:
Even if he had limited practice of law, it does not
relieve him of the duties such as payment of IBP dues.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to
the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead
or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March
1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became
a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that
day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and
now intends to resume his law practice.
Issue:
Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship
Ruling:
The Constitution provides that the practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar,
loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine
bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a
privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country
but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This
is because all Philippine citizens who become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]. Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have
lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed
never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law
practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the
legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he)
shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice.
ROLLY PENTECOSTES v ATTY HERMENEGILDO
MARASIGAN
Facts: The administrative case against respondent
stemmed from a sworn affidavit-complaint filed by
Rolly Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki
motorcycle, which was recovered by members of the
PNP of Mlang, North Cotabato from suspected
carnappers against whom a criminal case for
carnapping, was lodged at RTC.
On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of
Mlang, North Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to
respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof.
After the conduct of hearings to determine the true
owner of the motorcycle, the trial court issued an
Order for its release to Pentecostes.
Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release
the motorcycle to him. Respondent, however, told him
to wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the
filing of the complaint.
Issue: On the topic of good moral character
Ruling: ,Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court,
provides:
SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. The clerk shall safely
keep all record, papers, files, exhibits and public
property committed to his charge, including the library
of the court, and the seals and furniture belonging to
his office.
From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of
court of the RTC, Kabacan, respondent was charged
with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes
motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination of the
case, barring circumstances that would justify its
safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of
the trial court.
No explanation was offered by respondent, however,
for turning over the motorcycle. But whatever the
reason was, respondent was mandated to secure prior
consultations with and approval of the trial court.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of
court are essential and ranking officers of our judicial
system who perform delicate functions vital to the
prompt and proper administration of justice. Their
duties include the efficient recording, filing and
management of court records and, as previously
pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public
property committed to their charge.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established or
definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an
unlawful behavior by the public officer. The misconduct
is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be proved by
substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is
only simple, as in this case.
Fr. Ranhilio Aquino v. Atty Pascua
Father Ranhilio Aquino vs Atty. Edwin ascua Facts:
Father Aquino as the Academic head of Philippine
Judicial Academy, filed a complaint against Atty. Edwin
Pascua, a Notary Public for violation of the Notarial
Practice Law. He alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two
documents wherein both documents had Doc. No.
1213, Page No. 243. Book III, Series of 1998 and
both are dated on December 10, 1998. It was shown
by the Clerk of Court of RTC-Tuguegarao that none of
these entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty.
Pascua. In his comment, Atty. Pascua admitted having
notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998,
but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due
to the oversight of his legal secretary. Complainant
maintains that Atty. Pascuas omission was not due
to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pascua violated the Notarial
Practice Rule.
Ruling: Yes. Under the notarial law, the notary
public shall enter in such register, in chronological
order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing,
swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument. Failure
of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his a repetition of the same act will be dealt with more
notarial register touching his notarial acts in the severely. His notarial commission is revoked.
manner required by law is a ground for revocation of
his commission. Atty. Pascua claims that the
omission was not intentional but due to oversight of
his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot
escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial
register the documents that he admittedly notarized is
a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and
he is bound by the acts of his staff. Furthermore, the
claim of Atty. Pascua of simple inadvertence is
untenable. The photocopy of his notarial register
shows that the last entry which he notarized on
December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page In Re JBC vs. Judge QuitanJBC No. 013 | Aug
240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints 22, 2007Facts:
allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are
Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 10,
Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other
Davao City on May 17, 2003.
complainants are correct in maintaining that Atty. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the
Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the Court Administrator (OCA) received
questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on confidentialinformation that administrative and
his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in
member of the Bar. A member of the Bar may be hiscapacity as then Assistant Regional Director,
disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM),Regional
Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which he was
professional or private capacity. The Court has
dismissed from the service per Administrative Order
invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.
were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the In Personal Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the JBC
performance of their duties. Atty Pascua is declared judge quitan declared that there were 5criminal cases
guilty of misconduct and is suspended from the filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, all were
practice of law for 3 months with a stern warning that dismissed.
NoAdministrative Case was disclosed by Quitan
in his PDS
 Deputy Court administrator Christopher Lock
requested certifie true copies of the criminalcases
relative to the administrative complaints filed against
Quitan, particularly AdminisrativeOrder 180 which
dismissed Quitan from service.
In a letter dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM
furnished the Office of the CourtAdministrator (OCA) a
copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent Judge
was indeeddismissed from the service for Grave
Misconduct for falsifying or altering the
amountsreflected in disbursement vouchers in support
of his claim for reimbursement of expenses.
The Administrative order stated that Quitan was
dismissed from service with forfeiture of payand
benefits, this was signed by President Ramos himself.
In a letter dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA
Lock, Judge Quitain denied havingcommitted any
misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged
that during his interview, themembers thereof only
inquired about the status of the criminal cases filed by
the NAPOLCOM before the
Sandiganbayan, and not about the administrative
casesimultaneously filed against him. He also alleged
that he never received from the Office of the President
an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from
the service.
The DCA Lock directed Quitan to explain within 10
days from notce why he did not includein his Personal
Data Sheet (PDS), which was sworn before a notary
public , the administrativecases filed against him and
the fact that he was dismissed from service.
The respondent said that during the administrative
case by the NAPOLCOM one of itsmembers suggested
to him that he will no longer be persecuted if
he tendered his resignationfrom the NAPOLCOM.
The Secretary of the DILG accepted the resignation.
Quitan said that he did not disclose the administrative
charge because he was of the honest belief that he
had no more pending administrative case by reason of
his resignation. This did not persuade Administrator
Presbitero Velasco and DCA Lock that he should not
beheld administratively liable. They submitted a
Memorandum , to then Chief Justice Davide which
read:
An examination of the PDS submitted by Quitan with
the JBC he concealed materialfacts and even
committed perjury in having answered yes to
question 24, but withoutdisclosing the fact that he was
dismissed from government service.
Question 24: Have you ever been charged with or
convicted of or otherwise imposeda sanction for the
violation of any law, decree, ordinance or regulation by
any court,tribunal or any other government office,
agency or instrumentality in the Philippinesor in any
foreign country or found guilty of an administrative
offense or imposed anyadministrative sanction?
In the Mindanao Times quitan said: I was dismissed
from the NAPOLCOM office withoutdue process
In the Mindanao Daily Inquirer: Quitan vowed to clear
his name.
The OCA recommended that: (1) the instant
administrative case against respondent be
docketed as an administrative matter;; and (2) that
he be dismissed from the service with
prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accruedleave credits.
Quitan contended that before he filed his application
for RTC Judge with the JBC, he had noknowledge that
he was administratively dismissed from the
NAPOLCOM service as the case
was secretly heard and decided.
OCA submitted its Memorandum dated stating therein
that it was adopting its earlier findingscontained in its
Memorandum. Based on the documents presented, it
can not be denied that atthe time Judge Quitain
applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of A.O.
No. 183dismissing him from government service.
Issue:
W/N Judge Quitan concealed his Administrative
Charges and Dismissal in the PDS and filedhis
application with knowledge of those preceedingly
mentioned.
Held:
Judge Quitan did not comply with the requirements
that were set by Article VII Section 7(3)of the
constitution.
Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was
administratively charged and dismissed from
theservice for grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183,
1995 by no less than the former President of the
Philippines
No amount of explanation or justification can
erase the fact that Judge Quitan was dismissedfrom
public service and that he deliberately withheld this
information.
Resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against himwhile he was
still in service.
Netither does his resignation render the
administrative caseMoot and Academic.
Judge Quitain was removed from office after
investigation and was found guilty of
gravemisconduct. His dismissal from the service is a
clear proof of his lack of the requiredqualifications to
be a member of the Bench.
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME
V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would
have warranted his dismissal from the service had he
not resigned during the pendencyof this case, he is
hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It
appearing that he has yet toapply for his retirement
benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise
ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except
earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be
entitled to,and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
reinstatement and appointment to any
branch,instrumentality or agency of the government,
including government-owned and/or
controlled corporations.This Decision is immediately
executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Jaime
V. Quitains 201 File. SO ORDERED.
 1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.
BERNARDO v MEJIA These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
The Facts:
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
On December 27, 2004, Atty. Edmundo Macarubbo was
disbarred by the Court in Adm. Case No. 6148 for gross judges or judges associations and prominent members
immorality for having contracted a bigamous marriage of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
with complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case
with Josephine Constantino while his first marriage to for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
Helen Esparza was still subsisting.. He filed a Motion strong presumption of non-reformation.
for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy
which the Court denied on June 4, 2012. On June 4,
2012, he again filed a Petition for Extraordinary Mercy
to ask for judicial clemency and be reinstated in the
Roll of Attorneys; the Court denied this, but the Office
of the Vice-President endorsed the same petition,
prompting the Court to look into the merits of the
petition.

The Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Edmundo Macarubbo should be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

The Ruling:In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,

Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Clemency,1 the Court laid down the
following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency, to wit:
 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must
show that he still has productive years ahead of him
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as

intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development
of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and

circumstances that may justify clemency.2 (Citations
omitted)
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the
applicant must, like any other candidate for admission
to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good
moral character.3
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the
Court finds the instant petition meritorious.

Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and

acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession
and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from
his children by complainant Teves and maintained a
cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein
attached pictures.4 Records also show that after his
disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in
Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an
orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her
death in 2008.
5 In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to
the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed
the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/
Office-In-Charge in the Assessors Office, which office
he continues to serve to date.6
Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University
of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the
School Year 2011-2012.7 Respondent likewise took an
active part in socio-civic activities by helping his
neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
The following documents attest to respondents
reformed ways:
(1) Affidavit of Candida P. Mabborang;8
(2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez;9
(3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud;10
(4) Certification from the Municipal Local Government
Office;
(5) Certification by the Office of the Municipal
Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare
Development Officer;11
(6) Certification from the Election Officer of Enrile,
Cagayan;12
(7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T.
Tuddao;13
(8) Certifications from nine (9) Barangay
Chairpersons;14
(9) Certification from the Office of the Provincial
Assessor;15
(10) Certification from the Office of the Manager,
Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose Cooperative;16 and
(11) Certification of the Office of the Federation of
Senior Citizens, Enrile Chapter.
17 The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified
that respondent has no monetary accountabilities in
relation to his office18 while the Office of the Human
Resource Management Officer attested that he has no
pending administrative case.19 He is not known to be
involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime.
Even the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
attested that he has no record on file as of May 31,
2011.20
Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is
duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cagayan Chapter21 and by his former and
present colleagues.22 His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo
Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts to
actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic
Church.23 He is also observed to be a regular
churchgoer.24 Records further reveal that respondent
has already settled his previous marital squabbles25
as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was
tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular
support26 to his children in compliance with the
Courts directive in the Decision dated February 27,
2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had
elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and
recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product
of Lemu National High School,27 and his fourteen (14)
years of dedicated government service from 1986 to
July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil
Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission;
Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice.
28 From the attestations and certifications presented,
the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned
for his transgressions. At 5829 years of age, he still
has productive years ahead of him that could
significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law
profession and the betterment of society. While the
Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even
remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty
to show compassion to those who have reformed their
ways30 as in this case.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered reinstated
to the practice of law. He is, however, reminded that
such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby
adherence. to the rigid standards of intellect, moral
uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and
the law are continuing requirements.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is
hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

Velez v. De Vera:
* Succession to the IBP Presidency The Facts In AC No.
6697, Complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez sought the
suspension or disbarment of Respondent Atty. Leonard
de Vera (1) for misrepresentation through his
concealment of the suspension order rendered against
him by the State Bar of California; and (2) for violation
of the rotation rule enunciated in Administrative
Matter No. 491. The first ground concerned an
administrative case filed against Atty. de Vera before
the State Bar of California. The action arose from an
insurance case he had handled involving Julius Wills III,
who had figured in an automobile accident in 1986. To
settle the case amicably, Atty. de Vera received -- on
his clients behalf -- a $12,000 check, which he then
deposited in his personal account. Because of his
irregular deposit of his client's funds, respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for three years,
upon the recommendation of the hearing referee. The
case was not decided on the merits, because Atty. de
Vera resigned from the California Bar.
Later, his resignation was accepted by the Supreme
Court of California. On the second ground, complainant
averred that respondents transfer of membership
from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and Muntinlupa
(PPLM) IBP Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter
was a circumvention of the rotation rule. Allegedly,
Atty. de Vera made the transfer for the sole purpose of
becoming IBP national president. Complainant stressed
that respondent neither resided in Agusan del Sur nor
held office there.
A companion case, Bar Matter No. 1227, referred to
the letter-request of respondent, asking the Supreme
Court to schedule his oath-taking as IBP national
president. On the other hand, AM No. 05-5-15-SC
referred to the letter-report of IBP National President
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, furnishing the Court with the
May 13, 2005, IBP Resolution removing Atty. de Vera
from the latters positions as IBP board member and
executive vice-president, for committing acts inimical
to the board and the IBP in general. The controversy in
these two consolidated cases started when the IBP
board[1] approved the withdrawal of a Petition[2]
docketed at the Supreme Court as Integrated Bar of
the Philippines et al v. Senate of the Philippines et al. -
SC-R165108. Subsequently, during the plenary session
held at the 10th National IBP Convention,[3]
respondent allegedly made some untruthful
statements, innuendos, and blatant lies in connection
with the IBP board's Resolution to withdraw the
Petition On May 12, 2005, IBP Governor Romulo A.
Rivera wrote to IBP National President Cadiz, praying
for the removal of the IBP board membership of Atty.
de Vera, who had allegedly committed acts inimical to
the board and the IBP in general.
The following day,[4] during its 20th regular meeting,
the IBP board resolved by a twothirds vote to remove
respondent from his positions as a member of the
board of governors and as the executive vice-president
(EVP) of the IBP. On June 13, 2005, the IBP board took
note of the vacancy in the EVP position, brought about
by the removal of Atty. de Vera. In his stead, IBP
Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally
elected and declared as EVP.
On June 20, 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily
relinquished that position. Thus, on June 25, 2005,
during its last regular meeting, the IBP board elected a
new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B.
Salazar. On June 28, 2005, IBP National President Cadiz
requested the Supreme Court's approval of Atty.
Salazar's election and assumption of office as national
president, in the event that Atty. de Vera would be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law; or
should his removal from his positions as member of
the 2003-2005 board of governors and as EVP of the
IBP be approved by the Court. Protesting the election
of both Atty. Santiago and Atty. Salazar, respondent
also denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP
and its board. He maintained that his removal from his
two positions had been done without due notice and
due process.
The Issues The issues were as follows:
1. Whether the judgment in AC No. 6052 constituted a
bar to the filing of AC 6697
2. Whether, in the course of his practice of law,
Respondent Atty. de Vera committed malpractice
amounting to moral turpitude in the State Bar of
California and in the Philippines
3. Whether on May 13, 2005, the board of governors
validly removed respondent from his positions as
governor and EVP of the IBP
4. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as
EVP on June 25, 2005, and whether he could
consequently assume the presidency of the IBP for the
term 2005-2007 The Court's
Ruling First Issue: Res Judicata Res Judicata The Court
unanimously held in a per curiam Decision that AC No.
6052 did not constitute a bar to the filing of AC No.
6697. The two administrative cases involved different
subject matters and causes of action. In AC No. 6052,
the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de
Vera to run for the position of IBP governor for Eastern
Mindanao. In the present Administrative Complaint,
the subject matter was his privilege to practice law.
The two aforementioned cases did not seek the same
relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to
prevent respondent from assuming his post as IBP
governor for Eastern Mindanao; the cause of action
referred to his alleged violation of IBP bylaws. In the
second case, what was principally sought was his
suspension or disbarment; the primary cause of action
was his alleged violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Second Issue: Moral Turpitude Moral Turpitude In
resolving the second issue, the Court cited Maquera,
[5] according to which a judgment of suspension
against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the
Philippines, only if the basis of the foreign courts
action included any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in our jurisdiction. The Court opined that by
insisting that he was authorized by his clients father
and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera was
impliedly admitting his use of the Willis funds for his
own personal use. Undoubtedly, his unauthorized use
of his clients funds was highly unethical. Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic
about this matter. The conduct of Atty. de Vera --
holding on to the money of his client without the
latters acquiescence -- was indicative of lack of
integrity and propriety. It was clear that by depositing
the $12,000 check in his own bank account and using
it for his own benefit, respondent was guilty of
malpractice, gross misconduct, and unethical behavior.
He violated his oath to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his client. Nevertheless, the Court decreed
that, where any lesser penalty could accomplish the
end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
Considering the amount involved in this case, the
Court considered the penalty of suspension for two
years appropriate. The Court found that the transfer by
Atty. de Vera of his membership to the Agusan del Sur
IBP Chapter was within his rights. He could not be
deemed to be guilty of unethical conduct or behavior.
Neither the Code of Professional Responsibility nor the
Lawyers Oath punished lawyers for aspiring to be the
IBP national president or prohibited them from doing
perfectly legal acts in accomplishing that goal.
Third Issue: Validity of the Removal Validity of the
Removal The Court ruled that the constitutional
provision on due process safeguarded life, liberty and
property. The position of EVP of the IBP, however, was
not a property within the constitutional sense. Further,
there was no right to security of tenure over that
position, as all that was required to remove any
member of the board of governors for cause was a
resolution adopted by two thirds of the remaining
board members. Furthermore, in administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process was simply
the opportunity to explain ones side. The cross-
examination of witnesses was not indispensable to due
process. Neither was an actual hearing always
essential, especially under the factual milieu of this
case. Atty. de Veras actuations during the IBP National
Convention in question had been witnessed by all the
members of the board, upon whose shoulders the
determination of the cause for removal of an IBP
governor was placed, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court. Atty. de Vera received a copy of the
Complaint against him; indeed, he was present in the
meeting when the matter was taken up. From the
transcript of stenographic notes of the meeting on May
13, 2005, in which he was removed, it was patent that
he had been given a fair opportunity to defend himself
against the accusations of Atty. Rivera. Under the IBP
rules, the expulsion of an IBP governor was done via a
Resolution adopted by two thirds of the remaining
members. The phrase remaining members excluded
the complainant and the respondent. Of the 7
remaining members qualified to vote, 5 voted for
expulsion, while 2 voted against it. The five votes still
added up to the two thirds vote required for expulsion.
Removal for Cause Removal for Cause Conflicts and
disagreements of varying degrees of intensity are
inherent in the internal life of an organization. Like that
of any other organization, however, the effectiveness
of the IBP would be diluted if the conflicts are brought
outside its governing body. The impression would be
that the IBP, which speaks through its board of
governors, does not and cannot authoritatively speak
for its members. Its prestige and reputation with
lawyers, as well as with the general public, would
diminish accordingly. Because of the importance of
retaining group cohesiveness and unity, no fault was
attributed to the expulsion from the board of Atty. de
Vera, who had insisted on bringing to the public his
disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the
majority after due discussion. The cause for expulsion
was legal, because the effectiveness of the board as a
governing body was being lessened.
Fourth Issue: Validity of Governor Salazar's Validity of
Governor Salazar's Election as EVP Election as EVP The
removal of Atty. de Vera from his membership in the
board of governors ipso facto meant also his removal
as EVP. The IBP board had shown no grave abuse of
discretion; thus, the Court found no reason to interfere
in the resolution to remove him. The board had specific
and sufficient guidelines in its rules and bylaws on how
to fill the vacancies left by the removal of Atty. de
Vera. The 2003-2005 IBP board of governors election
of a new EVP, who would assume the presidency for
the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and
prerogative granted to the board by the IBP bylaws.
According to Article VII, specifically Section 47, [t]he
EVP shall automatically become president for the next
succeeding term.
The phrase for the next succeeding term necessarily
implied that the EVP who should succeed Atty. Cadiz as
IBP president for the next succeeding term (2005-
2007) should come from the members of the 2003-
2005 IBP board of governors. Accordingly, the election
of Governor Santiago, and later of Governor Salazar
upon the formers relinquishment of her EVP position,
was valid. In Bar Matter 491, the Court said that it was
the position of EVP that was actually rotated among
the nine regional governors. The rotation with respect
to the presidency was merely the result of the
automatic succession rule of the IBP.
Thus, the rotation rule pertained in particular to the
position of EVP; the automatic succession rule, to the
presidency. Intrinsic to the IBP bylaws was the principle
that one who was to assume the highest position in its
hierarchy must have been exposed to the demands
and responsibilities of national leadership. By electing
the replacement EVP from among the members of the
2003-2005 board of governors, the IBP stood to benefit
from the experience of the 2003-2005 EVP, who would
have served in a national capacity prior to the latters
assumption of the highest position. Therefore, in
electing Atty. Salazar as EVP and thus ensuring a
ADVINCULA v MACABABAD
Facts:
The case is a disbarment case against
respondent on the ground of gross immorality. It was
alleged that sometime in December 2004, complainant
seek for legal advice from peitioner regarding her
collectibles from a travel company. Respondent sent
Demand Letter and sometime in February 2005, they
met at Zensho Restaurant to discuss the possibility of
filing complaint against the travel company because
the latter failed to settle the accounts. That after that
said meeting, the respondent "held her arm and kissed
her on the cheek while embracing her very tightly."
The two met again to finalize the draft for
the complaint and while on their way home after the
said meeting, the respondent suddenly stopped the
car and things went out of hand. Thus she decided to
refer the case to another lawyer.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent committed acts
are grossly immoral which would warrant the
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Held: The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I x x x
succession in the leadership of the IBP, its board of
governors acted in accordance with its bylaws.
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The SC held that lawyers are expected to
abide the tenets of morality, not only upon admission
to the Bar but all throughtout their legal career as
lawyers belong to an exclusive and honored fraternity.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of
the legal profession and should adhere to the
unwaveringly to the highest standard of morality. The
respondent admitted to the act of kissing the
complainant on the lips as evidenced as well of his
asking for apology from complainant in his text
message. Regardless of the fact that the respondent
admitted that he kissed the complainant but the Court
held that this was not accompanied by malice because
the respondent immediately asked for forgiveness
after sensing the annoyance of the respondent after
texting him. Thus the Court held that this is not grossly
immoral nor highly reprehensible which will warrant
CRUZ v MINA
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry
of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law
student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor
on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in
Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may
appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend
of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers
that his appearance was with the prior conformity of
the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the
prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the
MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19
governing limited law student practice in conjunction
with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student
Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling
of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the
case for continuation of trial.
disbarment or suspension. But the Court reprimanded
respondent to be more prudent and cautious.
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear
before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student
appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law
student may appear in his personal capacity without
the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138
provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the
court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.

Gatchalian Promotions Talent Pool, Inc. vs.
Naldoza
Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for disbarment against
Atty. Primo L. Naldoza for appealing a decision which is
final and executory, deceitfully obtaining $2,555 from
the client allegedly for cash bond in the appealed
case, and issuing a spurious receipt to conceal the
illegal act. Respondent denies that he persuaded
complainant to file an appeal and asserted that it was
the latter who initiated the action to delay the
execution of POEA decision. He also denied the two
other charges. Trial procedures were instituted before
the IBP.
Meanwhile, a criminal case based on the same facts
was filed before RTC Makati, Branch 141. Although
acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly
liable in the amount of $2,555. Having been acquitted
in the criminal case, he manifested a Motion for
Dismissal of the IBP case.
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent's
contention on the ground that the criminal case for
estafa is completely different from the proceedings
before him. Acquittal in the former did not exonerate
respondent in the latter. He further noted that the RTC
Decision itself hinted at the administrative liability of
respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein
complainant for $2,555. He was suspended by the IBP
for one (1) year. Thus, he appealed before the
Supreme Court.
Issues: (1) Whether or not respondent should be freed
of the administrative proceeding since he was
acquitted of the criminal charge.
(2) Whether or not respondent is negligent when he
appealed the decision of the POEA knowing it to be
final and executory.
Held:
(1) Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and
circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the
criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of
liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate
him administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts
finding of civil liability against the respondent will not
inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative action before this Court.
(2) Complainant has failed to present proof regarding
the status of the appeal. Neither has there been any
showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground
that the POEA Decision had become final and
executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that
respondent knew that the case was unappealable.
Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the
Petition for Review was dismissed for petitioner's
failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible
duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has
no leg to stand on. WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is
hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is
directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision.
DE BARRERA vs. CASIANO U. LAPUT
CONCEPCION, C. J.:
Complainant Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera seeks the
disbarment of respondent Casiano U. Laput, upon the
ground that, being her counsel, as administratrix of
the estate of her late husband, Macario Barrera, in
Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, he (Laput) had misappropriated
several sums of money held by him in trust for said
estate and tried to appropriate two (2) parcels of land
belonging to the same, as well as threatened her, in a
fit of anger, with a gun, into signing several papers,
despite the fact that she is 72 years of age.
In his answer, respondent admitted his former
relationship with Mrs. Barrera as attorney and client
and, apart from denying the main allegations of her
complaint, averred that the filing thereof was "part of a
scheme to beat off" his claim for attorney's fees in said
Special Proceedings No. 2-J.
The matter was, pursuant to the Rules of
Court,1 referred for investigation, report and
recommendation, to the Solicitor General, who after
appropriate proceedings, recommended the dismissal
of all the charges preferred against the respondent, for
insufficiency of the evidence except as regards the
alleged act of coercion on his part, for which said
Officer filed the corresponding complaint alleging, inter
alia:
3. That while being such counsel for the administratrix
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera, and of the estate, the
respondent Casiano U. Laput on January 10, 1955
presented to the complainant Nieves Rillas Vda. de
Barrera at her residence at 854-D D. Jakosalem St.,
Cebu City, certain pleadings for the latter's signature
in the aforementioned administration proceedings;
4. That the complainant administratrix Nieves Rillas
Vda. de Barrera declined to sign said pleadings but
requested respondent to leave the papers in order that
she may first ask somebody to translate the same for
her;
5. That the respondent Casiano U. Laput instead of
acceding to her (his) client's request became angry
and told complainant to sign the papers, at the same
time drawing his revolver from its holster and placing
it on his lap with the evident purpose of intimidating
the complainant, an old woman of 72 years old, into
signing the papers or pleadings presented for
signature;
6. That complainant administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda.
de Barrera intimidated by the threat aforementioned
was compelled to sign as in fact she did sign, said
pleadings against her will;
and praying that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
In his answer, respondent denied having committed
the acts imputed to him in this complaint of the
Solicitor General and alleged, in substance that the
papers he caused Mrs. Barrera to sign, on the occasion
referred to in said pleading, was a "Notice for Rendition
of Final Accounting and Partition of Estate"; that this
"notice" was legally unnecessary and useless; that he,
however, caused it to be prepared in order to impress
upon Mrs. Barrera the necessity of filing her final
accounts in the aforementioned proceedings and,
closing the same, because she was reluctant to do so;
that Mrs. Barrera had, also, filed against him a criminal
complaint for coercion with the office of the City Fiscal
of Cebu, based upon the same allegations made in her
administrative complaint herein; and that, after due
investigation, said criminal complaint was dismissed
by the City Fiscal.
From the evidence on record, we gather that, prior to
January 10, 1955, Mrs. Barrera was not inclined to
cause the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of Macario Barrera to be closed; that, upon the other
hand, respondent wanted to put an end to said
proceedings since there was nothing else to be done
therein so that he could collect his fees for services
rendered to Mrs. Barrera as administratrix of said
estate; that he, therefore, prepared a petition for the
declaration of Mrs. Barrera as the universal heir of her
deceased husband, for the delivery to her of the
residue of his estate and the termination of the
proceedings; that he, moreover, caused to be prepared
a notice "for the rendition of the final, accounting and
partition" of said estate; that his purpose in preparing
said petition was to induce her to virtually agree and
promise to submit her final accounts by signing this
notice; that respondent presented said petition and
notice to Mrs. Barrera, on January 10, 1955, for her
signature; that she, however, refused to do so and
suggested that the papers be left with her so that she
could have them read by somebody else; that,
annoyed or angered by this open manifestation of
distrust, respondent sought to offset her adamance by
putting his revolver on his lap; and that, although he
did not point the firearm at her, its display attained the
intended effect of intimidating Mrs. Barrera, who,
accordingly affixed her signature on the petition and
the notice aforementioned.
Improper and censurable as these acts inherently are,
they become more so when we consider that they
were performed by a man dealing with a woman 72
years of age. The offense in this case is compounded
by the circumstance that, being a member of the Bar
and an officer of the Court, the offender should have
set the example as man of peace and a champion of
the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the offended
party is the very person whom the offender was
pledged to defend and protect his own client.
There are, of course, two (2) extenuating circumstance
in favor of respondent herein, namely: (1) he evidently
considered himself insulted by Mrs. Barrera and was
obfuscated because she clearly indicated her lack of
confidence in him, by stating bluntly that she wanted
somebody else to read the papers to her; and (2) he
required her to do something really harmless. Still, it
cannot be denied that his intent in placing the gun on
his lap was to intimidate his client.
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Solicitor
General, respondent herein is hereby found guilty of
gross misconduct in office and accordingly suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
beginning from the date of entry of judgment in this
case. It is so ordered.
Victoria Barrientos v. Transfiguracion
Daarol Adm. Case 1512 29 January 1993
FACTS: Complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a
college student, and was about 20 years and 7 months
old during the time(July-October 1975) of her
relationship with respondent,
whilerespondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married, Ge
neralManager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative, and 41years old at the time of the said
relationship. Respondent is married to Romualda A.
Sumaylo with whom he has a son; that the marriage
ceremony was solemnized on September 24, 1955
at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a Catholic
priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, and that said
respondent had been separated from his wife for about
16years at the time of his relationship with
complainant. Respondent had been known by the
Barrientos family for quite sometime, having been
a former student of complainant's father in 1952 and,
a former classmate of complainant's mother at the
Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that
he became acquainted with complainant's sister,
Norma in 1963and eventually with her other sisters,
Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he used to
visit Norma at her residence; that he also
befriended complainant and who became a close
friend when he invited her, with her parents' consent,
to be one of the usherettes during the Masonic
Convention in Sicayab, DipologCity from June 28 to 30,
1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence in the
morning and took her home from the convention site
after each day's
activities;Respondent courted complainant, and after a
week of courtship, complainant accepted respondent's
love on July 7,1973; that in the evening of August 20,
1973, complainant with her parents' permission was
respondent's partner during the Chamber of
Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog
City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left
the place but before going home, they went to the
airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at
the beach, where there were no houses around; that
after the usual preliminaries, hey consummated the
sexual act and at about midnight they went home; that
after the first sexual act, respondent used to have joy
ride with complainant which usually ended at the
airport where they used to make love twice or three
times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations,
complainant became pregnant; That after a conference
among respondent, complainant and complainant's
parents, it was agreed that complainant would deliver
her child in Manila, where she went with her mother on
October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the
25th and, stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto
Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that respondent visited
her there on the 26th, 27th and28th of October 1973,
and again in February and March 1974;that later on
complainant decided to deliver the child in Cebu City
in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went
there in April 1974 and her sister took her to the Good
Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on
June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl at the
Perpetual Succor Hospital in CebuCity and, named her
"Dureza Barrientos"; that about the last week of June
1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that duringher
stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the
respondent defrayed some of her expenses; that she
filed an administrative case against respondent with
the National Electrification Administration; which
complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she
instituted the present disbarment proceedings
againstrespondent.In view of the foregoing, the unders
igned respectfullyrecommend that after hearing, respo
ndent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daarol is grossly im
moral.

HELD: Here, respondent, already a married man and

about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage to
complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing
that he did not have the required legal capacity.
Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations
with complainant by deception, made her pregnant,
suggested abortion, breached
his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and
the child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct. By his acts of deceit
and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires,
respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral
delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct is in order. Good
moral conduct is a condition which precedes admission
to the Bar and is not dispensed with upon admission
there. It is a continuing qualification to which all
lawyers must possess. Otherwise, a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred.
Tabas vs. California Manufacturing Co., Inc.
Facts: Petitioners filed a petition in the NLRC for
reinstatement and payment of various benefits against
California Manufacturing Company. The respondent
company then denied the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between the company and the
petitioners.
Pursuant to a manpower supply agreement, it appears
that the petitioners prior their involvement with
California Manufacturing Company were employees of
Livi Manpower service, an independent contractor,
which assigned them to work as promotional
merchandisers. The agreement provides that:
California has no control or supervisions whatsoever
over [Livis] workers with respect to how they
accomplish their work or perform [Californias]
obligation It was further expressly stipulated that the
assignment of workers to California shall be on a
seasonal and contractual basis; that [c]ost of living
allowance and the 10 legal holidays will be charged
directly to [California] at cost ; and that [p]ayroll for
the preceding [sic] week [shall] be delivered by [Livi]
at [Californias] premises.
There is no doubt that in the case at bar, Livi performs
manpower services, meaning to say, it contracts out
labor in favor of clients. We hold that it is one
notwithstanding its vehement claims to the contrary,
and notwithstanding the provision of the contract that
it is an independent contractor. The nature of ones
business is not determined by self-serving appellations
one attaches thereto but by the tests provided by
statute and prevailing case law. The bare fact that Livi
maintains a separate line of business does not
extinguish the equal fact that it has provided California
with workers to pursue the latters own business. In
this connection, we do not agree that the petitioners
had been made to perform activities which are not
directly related to the general business of
manufacturing, Californias purported principal
operation activity. Livi, as a placement agency, had
simply supplied California with the manpower
necessary to carry out its (Californias) merchandising
activities, using its (Californias) premises and
equipment.

Issue: WON principal employer is liable.

Held: Yes. The existence of an employer-employee
relation cannot be made the subject of an agreement.
Based on Article 106, labor-only contractor is
considered merely as an agent of the employer, and
the liability must be shouldered by either one or
shared by both.