Professional Documents
Culture Documents
v.
Tennessee
Copper
Co.,
206
U.S.
230
(1907)
The
caution
with
which
demands
of
this
sort
on
the
part
of
a
state
for
relief
from
injuries
U.S.
Supreme
Court
analogous
to
torts
must
be
examined
is
dwelt
upon
in
Missouri
v.
Illinois,
200
U.
S.
Argued
February
25,
26,
1907
|
Decided
May
13,
1907
496,
200
U.
S.
520-521.
But
it
is
plain
that
some
such
demands
must
be
recognized,
if
the
grounds
alleged
are
proved.
When
the
states
by
their
union
made
the
forcible
abatement
of
outside
nuisances
impossible
to
each,
they
did
not
thereby
agree
to
submit
to
BILL
IN
EQUITY
whatever
might
be
done.
They
did
not
renounce
the
possibility
of
making
reasonable
Syllabus
demands
on
the
ground
of
their
still
remaining
quasi-sovereign
interests,
and
the
When
the
states
by
their
union
made
the
forcible
abatement
of
outside
nuisances
alternative
to
force
is
a
suit
in
this
Court.
Missouri
v.
Illinois,
180
U.
S.
208,
180
U.
S.
241.
impossible
to
each,
they
did
not
thereby
agree
to
submit
to
whatever
might
be
done.
Some
peculiarities
necessarily
mark
a
suit
of
this
kind.
If
the
state
has
a
case
at
all,
it
is
They
retained
the
right
to
make
reasonable
demands
on
the
grounds
of
their
still
somewhat
more
certainly
entitled
to
specific
relief
than
a
private
party
might
be.
It
is
not
remaining
quasi-sovereign
interests,
and
the
alternative
to
force
a
suit
in
this
Court.
lightly
to
be
required
to
give
up
quasi-sovereign
rights
for
pay;
and,
apart
from
the
This
Court
has
jurisdiction
to,
and
at
the
suit
of
a
state
will,
enjoin
a
corporation,
citizen
difficulty
of
valuing
such
rights
in
money,
if
that
be
its
choice,
it
may
insist
that
an
of
another
state,
from
discharging
over
its
territory
noxious
fumes
from
works
in
infraction
of
them
shall
be
stopped.
The
states,
by
entering
the
Union,
did
not
sink
to
the
another
state
where
it
appears
that
those
fumes
cause
and
threaten
damage
on
a
position
of
private
owners,
subject
to
one
system
of
private
law.
This
Court
has
not
quite
considerable
scale
to
the
forests
and
vegetable
life,
if
not
to
health,
within
the
plaintiff's
the
same
freedom
to
balance
the
harm
that
will
be
done
by
an
injunction
against
that
of
state.
which
the
plaintiff
complains,
that
it
would
have
in
deciding
between
two
subjects
of
a
A
suit
brought
by
a
state
to
enjoin
a
corporation
having
its
work
in
another
state
from
single
political
power.
Without
excluding
the
considerations
that
equity
always
takes
discharging
noxious
gases
over
its
territory
is
not
the
same
as
one
between
private
into
account,
we
cannot
give
the
weight
that
was
given
them
in
argument
to
a
parties,
and
although
the
elements
which
would
form
the
basis
of
relief
between
private
comparison
between
the
damage
threatened
to
the
plaintiff
and
the
calamity
of
a
parties
are
wanting,
the
state
can
maintain
the
suit
for
injury
in
a
capacity
as
quasi-
possible
stop
to
the
defendants'
business,
the
question
of
health,
the
character
of
the
sovereign,
in
which
capacity
it
has
an
interest
independent
of
and
behind
its
citizens
in
forests
as
a
first
or
second
growth,
the
commercial
possibility
or
impossibility
of
all
the
earth
and
air
within
its
domain,
and
whether
insisting
upon
bringing
such
a
suit
reducing
the
fumes
to
sulphuric
acid,
the
special
adaptation
of
the
business
to
the
place.
results
in
more
harm
than
good
to
its
citizen,
many
of
whom
may
profit
through
the
It
is
a
fair
and
reasonable
demand
on
the
part
of
a
sovereign
that
the
air
over
its
territory
maintenance
of
the
works
causing
the
nuisance,
is
for
the
state
itself
to
determine.
should
not
be
polluted
on
a
great
scale
by
sulphurous
acid
gas,
that
the
forests
on
its
mountains,
be
they
better
or
worse,
and
whatever
domestic
destruction
they
have
The
facts
are
stated
in
the
opinion.
suffered,
should
not
be
further
destroyed
or
threatened
by
the
act
of
persons
beyond
its
MR.
JUSTICE
HOLMES
delivered
the
opinion
of
the
Court.
control,
that
the
crops
and
orchards
on
its
hills
should
not
be
endangered
from
the
same
This
is
a
bill
in
equity
filed
in
this
Court
by
the
State
of
Georgia,
in
pursuance
of
a
source.
If
any
such
demand
is
to
be
enforced
this
must
be
notwithstanding
the
hesitation
resolution
of
the
legislature
and
by
direction
of
the
governor
of
the
state,
to
enjoin
the
that
we
might
feel
if
the
suit
were
between
private
parties,
and
the
doubt
whether,
for
defendant
copper
companies
from
discharging
noxious
gas
from
their
works
in
the
injuries
which
they
might
be
suffering
to
their
property,
they
should
not
be
left
to
an
Tennessee
over
the
plaintiff's
territory.
It
alleges
that,
in
consequence
of
such
discharge,
action
at
law.
a
wholesale
destruction
of
forests,
orchards,
and
crops
is
going
on,
and
other
injuries
are
The
proof
requires
but
a
few
words.
It
is
not
denied
that
the
defendants
generate
in
their
done
and
threatened
in
five
counties
of
the
state.
It
alleges
also
a
vain
application
to
the
works
near
the
Georgia
line
large
quantities
of
sulphur
dioxide
which
becomes
State
of
Tennessee
for
relief.
A
preliminary
injunction
was
denied;
but,
as
there
was
sulphurous
acid
by
its
mixture
with
the
air.
It
hardly
is
denied,
and
cannot
be
denied
with
ground
to
fear
that
great
and
irreparable
damage
might
be
done,
an
early
day
was
fixed
success,
that
this
gas
often
is
carried
by
the
wind
great
distances
and
over
great
tracts
of
for
the
final
hearing,
and
the
parties
were
given
leave,
if
so
minded,
to
try
the
case
on
Georgia
land.
On
the
evidence,
the
pollution
of
the
air
and
the
magnitude
of
that
pollution
affidavits.
This
has
been
done
without
objection,
and,
although
the
method
would
be
are
not
open
to
dispute.
Without
any
attempt
to
go
into
details
immaterial
to
the
suit,
it
is
unsatisfactory
if
our
decision
turned
on
any
nice
question
of
fact,
in
the
view
that
we
take
proper
to
add
that
we
are
satisfied,
by
a
preponderance
of
evidence,
that
the
sulphurous
we
think
it
unlikely
that
either
party
has
suffered
harm.
fumes
cause
and
threaten
damage
on
so
considerable
a
scale
to
the
forests
and
vegetable
The
case
has
been
argued
largely
as
if
it
were
one
between
two
private
parties;
but
it
is
life,
if
not
to
health,
within
the
plaintiff
state,
as
to
make
out
a
case
within
the
not.
The
very
elements
that
would
be
relied
upon
in
a
suit
between
fellow-citizens
as
a
requirements
of
Missouri
v.
Illinois,
200
U.
S.
496.
Whether
Georgia,
by
insisting
upon
this
ground
for
equitable
relief
are
wanting
here.
The
state
owns
very
little
of
the
territory
claim,
is
doing
more
harm
than
good
to
her
own
citizens
is
for
her
to
determine.
The
alleged
to
be
affected,
and
the
damage
to
it
capable
of
estimate
in
money,
possibly
at
possible
disaster
to
those
outside
the
state
must
be
accepted
as
a
consequence
of
her
least,
is
small.
This
is
a
suit
by
a
state
for
an
injury
to
it
in
its
capacity
of
quasi-sovereign.
standing
upon
her
extreme
rights.
In
that
capacity,
the
state
has
an
interest
independent
of
and
behind
the
titles
of
its
It
is
argued
that
the
state
has
been
guilty
of
laches.
We
deem
it
unnecessary
to
consider
citizens,
in
all
the
earth
and
air
within
its
domain.
It
has
the
last
word
as
to
whether
its
how
far
such
a
defense
would
be
available
in
a
suit
of
this
sort,
since,
in
our
opinion,
due
mountains
shall
be
stripped
of
their
forests
and
its
inhabitants
shall
breathe
pure
air.
It
diligence
has
been
shown.
The
conditions
have
been
different
until
recent
years.
After
might
have
to
pay
individuals
before
it
could
utter
that
word,
but
with
it
remains
the
the
evil
had
grown
greater
in
1904,
the
state
brought
a
bill
in
this
Court.
The
defendants,
final
power.
The
alleged
damage
to
the
state
as
a
private
owner
is
merely
a
makeweight,
however,
already
were
abandoning
the
old
method
of
roasting
ore
in
open
heaps
and
it
and
we
may
lay
on
one
side
the
dispute
as
to
whether
the
destruction
of
forests
has
led
to
was
hoped
that
the
change
would
stop
the
trouble.
They
were
ready
to
agree
not
to
the
gullying
of
its
roads.
return
to
that
method,
and,
upon
such
an
agreement's
being
made,
the
bill
was
dismissed
without
prejudice.
But
the
plaintiff
now
finds,
or
thinks
that
it
finds,
that
the
tall
Joseph
A.
PAKOOTAS,
an
individual
and
enrolled
member
of
the
chimneys
in
present
use
cause
the
poisonous
gases
to
be
carried
to
greater
distances
Confederated
Tribes
of
the
Colville
Reservation;
than
ever
before,
and
that
the
evil
has
not
been
helped.
Donald
R.
Michel,
an
individual
and
enrolled
member
of
the
Confederated
If
the
State
of
Georgia
adheres
to
its
determination,
there
is
no
alternative
to
issuing
an
Tribes
of
the
Colville
Reservation;
injunction,
after
allowing
a
reasonable
time
to
the
defendants
to
complete
the
structures
State
of
Washington,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
that
they
now
are
building,
and
the
efforts
that
they
are
making
to
stop
the
fumes.
The
plaintiff
may
submit
a
form
of
decree
on
the
coming
in
of
this
Court
in
October
next.
v.
Injunction
to
issue.
TECK
COMINCO
METALS,
LTD.,
a
Canadian
corporation,
Defendant-
Appellant.
MR.
JUSTICE
HARLAN,
concurring:
United
States
Court
of
Appeals,Ninth
Circuit.
The
State
of
Georgia
is,
in
my
opinion,
entitled
to
the
general
relief
sought
by
its
bill,
and
No.
05-35153.
Decided:
July
03,
2006
therefore
I
concur
in
the
result.
With
some
things,
however,
contained
in
the
opinion,
or
to
be
implied
from
its
language,
I
do
not
concur.
When
the
Constitution
gave
this
Court
Syllabus:
original
jurisdiction
in
cases
"in
which
a
state
shall
be
a
party,"
it
was
not
intended,
I
Joseph
A.
Pakootas
and
Donald
R.
Michel
(collectively
Pakootas)
filed
suit
to
enforce
a
think,
to
authorize
the
court
to
apply
in
its
behalf
any
principle
or
rule
of
equity
that
Unilateral
Administrative
Order
(Order)
issued
by
the
United
States
Environmental
would
not
be
applied,
under
the
same
facts,
in
suits
wholly
between
private
parties.
If
Protection
Agency
(EPA)
against
Teck
Cominco
Metals,
Ltd.
(Teck),
a
Canadian
this
were
a
suit
between
private
parties,
and
if,
under
the
evidence,
a
court
of
equity
corporation.
The
Order
requires
Teck
to
conduct
a
remedial
investigation/feasibility
would
not
give
the
plaintiff
an
injunction,
then
it
ought
not
to
grant
relief,
under
like
study
(RI/FS)
in
a
portion
of
the
Columbia
River
entirely
within
the
United
States,
where
circumstances,
to
the
plaintiff,
because
it
happens
to
be
a
state,
possessing
some
powers
hazardous
substances
disposed
of
by
Teck
have
come
to
be
located.
We
decide
today
of
sovereignty.
Georgia
is
entitled
to
the
relief
sought
not
because
it
is
a
state,
but
whether
a
citizen
suit
based
on
Teck's
alleged
non-compliance
with
the
Order
is
a
because
it
is
a
party
which
has
established
its
right
to
such
relief
by
proof.
The
opinion,
if
domestic
or
an
extraterritorial
application
of
the
Comprehensive
Environmental
I
do
not
mistake
its
scope,
proceeds
largely
upon
the
ground
that
this
Court,
sitting
in
this
Response,
Compensation,
and
Liability
Act
(CERCLA),
42
U.S.C.
9601-9675.
case
as
a
court
of
equity,
owes
some
special
duty
to
Georgia
as
a
state,
although
it
is
a
Further,
we
address
Teck's
argument
that
it
is
not
liable
for
having
arranged
for
party,
while,
under
the
same
facts,
it
would
not
owe
any
such
duty
to
the
plaintiff
if
an
disposal
of
hazardous
substances
because
it
disposed
of
the
hazardous
substances
itself,
individual.
rather
than
arranging
for
disposal
by
any
other
party
or
entity.
We
hold
that
because
CERCLA
liability
is
triggered
by
an
actual
or
threatened
release
of
hazardous
substances,
and
because
a
release
of
hazardous
substances
took
place
within
the
United
States,
this
suit
involves
a
domestic
application
of
CERCLA.
Further,
we
reject
Teck's
contention
that
it
is
not
liable
under
9607(a)(3)
because
it
disposed
of
the
hazardous
substances
itself.
I.
We
consider
an
interlocutory
appeal
of
the
denial
of
Teck's
motion
to
dismiss.
In
August
of
1999,
the
Colville
Tribes
petitioned
the
EPA
under
9605
to
conduct
an
assessment
of
hazardous
substance
contamination
in
and
along
the
Columbia
River
in
northeastern
Washington
state.
The
EPA
began
the
site
assessment
in
October
1999,
and
found
contamination
that
included
heavy
metals
such
as
arsenic,
cadmium,
copper,
lead,
mercury
and
zinc.
The
EPA
also
observed
the
presence
of
slag,
a
by-product
of
the
smelting
furnaces,
containing
glassy
ferrous
granules
and
other
metals,
at
beaches
and
other
depositional
areas
at
the
Assessment
Area.
The
EPA
completed
its
site
assessment
in
March
of
2003,
and
concluded
that
the
Upper
Columbia
River
Site
(the
Site)
was
eligible
for
listing
on
the
National
Priorities
List
(NPL).
Teck
owns
and
operates
a
lead-zinc
smelter
(Trail
Smelter)
in
Trail,
British
Columbia.
Between
1906
and
1995,
Teck
generated
and
disposed
of
hazardous
materials,
in
both
liquid
and
solid
form,
into
the
Columbia
River.
These
wastes,
known
as
slag,
include
the
heavy
metals
arsenic,
cadmium,
copper,
mercury,
lead,
and
zinc,
as
well
as
other
unspecified
hazardous
materials.
Before
mid-1995,
the
Trail
Smelter
discharged
up
to
145,000
tons
of
slag
annually
into
the
Columbia
River.
Although
the
discharge
took
place
within
Canada,
the
EPA
concluded
that
Teck
has
arranged
for
the
disposal
of
its
hazardous
substances
from
the
Trail
Smelter
into
the
Upper
Columbia
River
by
directly
discharging
up
to
145,000
tonnes
of
slag
annually
prior
to
mid-1995.
Effluent,
such
as
slag,
was
discharged
into
the
Columbia
River
through
several
outfalls
at
the
Trail
Smelter.
The
slag
was
carried
downstream
in
that
legislation
of
Congress,
unless
a
contrary
intent
appears,
is
meant
to
apply
only
the
passing
river
current
and
settled
in
slower
flowing
quiescent
areas.
A
significant
within
the
territorial
jurisdiction
of
the
United
States.
amount
of
slag
has
accumulated
and
adversely
affects
the
surface
water,
ground
water,
However,
the
district
court
concluded
that
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality
sediments,
and
biological
resources
of
the
Upper
Columbia
River
and
Lake
Roosevelt.
was
overcome
here,
because
there
is
no
doubt
that
CERCLA
affirmatively
expresses
a
Technical
evidence
shows
that
the
Trail
Smelter
is
the
predominant
source
of
clear
intent
by
Congress
to
remedy
domestic
conditions'
within
the
territorial
contamination
at
the
Site.
The
physical
and
chemical
decay
of
slag
is
an
ongoing
process
jurisdiction
of
the
U.S.
That
clear
intent,
combined
with
the
well-established
principle
that
releases
arsenic,
cadmium,
copper,
zinc,
and
lead
into
the
environment,
causing
that
the
presumption
[against
extraterritoriality]
is
not
applied
where
failure
to
extend
harm
to
human
health
and
the
environment.
the
scope
of
the
statute
to
a
foreign
setting
will
result
in
adverse
effects
within
the
United
After
the
EPA
determined
that
the
Site
was
eligible
for
listing
on
the
NPL,
it
evaluated
States,
leads
this
court
to
conclude
that
extraterritorial
application
of
CERCLA
is
proposing
the
Site
for
placement
on
the
NPL
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
federal
funding
appropriate
in
this
case.
for
evaluation
and
future
cleanup.
At
that
time
Teck
Cominco
American,
Inc.
Further,
the
district
court
held
that
Teck
was
a
person
under
the
meaning
of
(TCAI)
approached
the
EPA
and
expressed
a
willingness
to
perform
an
independent,
9601(21),
and
held
that
Teck's
liability
as
a
generator
of
hazardous
waste
and/or
as
an
limited
human
health
study
if
the
EPA
would
delay
proposing
the
Site
for
NPL
listing.
arranger
of
the
disposal
of
hazardous
waste
could
not
be
ruled
out
under
The
EPA
and
TCAI
entered
into
negotiations,
which
reached
a
stalemate
when
the
parties
9607(a)(3).
could
not
agree
on
the
scope
and
extent
of
the
investigation
that
TCAI
would
perform.
The
district
court
sua
sponte
certified
its
order
for
immediate
appeal
to
us
pursuant
to
The
EPA
concluded
that
TCAI's
proposed
study
would
not
provide
the
information
28
U.S.C.
1292(b).
Thereafter,
Teck
petitioned
for
permission
to
appeal,
which
we
necessary
for
the
EPA
to
select
an
appropriate
remedy
for
the
contamination,
and
as
a
granted.
While
Teck's
petition
for
permission
to
appeal
was
pending
before
us,
the
result
the
EPA
issued
the
Order
on
December
11,
2003.
The
Order
directed
Teck
to
district
court
granted
Teck's
motion
to
stay
further
proceedings
in
the
district
court
conduct
a
RI/FSunder
CERCLA
for
the
Site.
To
date
Teck
has
not
complied
with
the
pending
the
outcome
of
this
interlocutory
appeal.
Order,
and
the
EPA
has
not
sought
to
enforce
the
Order.
On
this
appeal,
Teck
does
not
challenge
the
district
court's
determination
that
it
had
Pakootas
filed
this
action
in
federal
district
court
under
the
citizen
suit
provision
of
personal
jurisdiction
over
Teck.
And
although
Teck
disputes
the
conclusion
that
the
CERCLA.
9659(a)(1).
Pakootas
sought
a
declaration
that
Teck
has
violated
the
Order,
district
court
had
subject
matter
jurisdiction
to
hear
the
case,
it
does
not
argue
in
its
injunctive
relief
enforcing
the
Order
against
Teck,
as
well
as
penalties
for
non- briefing
that
the
district
court
was
without
subject
matter
jurisdiction.
Rather,
Teck
compliance
and
recovery
of
costs
and
fees.
argues
that
the
district
court
should
have
dismissed
Pakootas's
complaint
under
Federal
Teck
moved
to
dismiss
the
complaint
pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(6)
for
two
reasons.
First,
Teck
argues
that
to
apply
CERCLA
12(b)(1)
and
12(b)(6)
for
failure
to
state
a
cause
of
action
under
CERCLA
and
lack
of
to
Teck's
activities
in
Canada
would
be
an
impermissible
extraterritorial
application
of
subject
matter
jurisdiction,
on
the
ground
that
the
district
court
could
not
enforce
the
United
States
law.
Second,
Teck
argues
that
it
is
not
liable
as
a
person
who
arranged
for
Order
because
it
was
based
on
activities
carried
out
by
Teck
in
Canada.
Teck
also
moved
disposal
of
hazardous
substances
under
9607(a)(3).
to
dismiss
for
lack
of
personal
jurisdiction
over
Teck,
a
Canadian
corporation
with
no
presence
in
the
United
States.
After
Teck
filed
its
motion
to
dismiss,
the
State
of
II.
We
review
de
novo
a
district
court's
decision
on
a
motion
to
dismiss
for
failure
to
state
Washington
moved
to
intervene
as
of
right
as
a
plaintiff
in
the
action.
The
district
court
a
claim
pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(6).
We
review
questions
of
law
granted
the
motion
to
intervene,
and
considered
Teck's
pending
motion
to
dismiss
to
de
novo.
apply
to
both
Pakootas's
complaint
and
the
State
of
Washington's
complaint-in-
intervention.
III.
LITIGATION
PURSUANT
TO
CERCLA
STATUTORY
FRAMEWORK:
CERCLA
sets
forth
a
The
district
court
denied
Teck's
motion
to
dismiss.
It
held
that
because
the
case
arises
comprehensive
scheme
for
the
cleanup
of
hazardous
waste
sites,
and
imposes
liability
under
CERCLA
there
is
a
federal
question
which
confers
subject
matter
jurisdiction
on
for
cleanup
costs
on
the
parties
responsible
for
the
release
or
potential
release
of
this
court.
Because
there
was
a
federal
question,
and
because
Pakootas's
claims
were
hazardous
substances
into
the
environment.
Two
main
purposes
of
CERCLA
are
not
insubstantial
or
frivolous,
the
district
court
held
that
dismissal
under
Federal
Rule
of
prompt
cleanup
of
hazardous
waste
sites
and
imposition
of
all
cleanup
costs
on
the
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(1)
was
inappropriate.
The
district
court
also
held
that
[t]he
facts
responsible
party.
alleged
in
plaintiffs'
complaints
establish
this
court's
specific,
limited
personal
To
ensure
the
prompt
cleanup
of
hazardous
waste
sites,
CERCLA
gives
four
options
to
the
jurisdiction
over
the
defendant.
EPA:
(1)
the
EPA
can
investigate
and
remediate
hazardous
waste
sites
itself
under
Much
of
district
court's
order
was
devoted
to
analyzing
Teck's
argument
that
the
suit
9604,
and
later
seek
to
recover
response
costs
from
the
potentially
responsible
parties
involved
an
impermissible
extraterritorial
application
of
CERCLA,
and
thus
whether
(PRPs)
under
9607;(2)
the
EPA
can
initiate
settlement
negotiations
with
PRPs
under
dismissal
for
failure
to
state
a
claim
under
CERCLA
was
appropriate.
The
district
court
9622;
(3)
the
EPA
can
file
suit
in
federal
district
court
to
compel
the
PRPs
to
abate
the
first
acknowledged
that
there
is
some
question
whether
this
case
really
involves
an
threat
if
there
is
an
imminent
and
substantial
threat
to
public
health
or
welfare
under
extraterritorial
application
of
CERCLA.
However,
the
district
court
assumed
that
the
9606(a);
or
(4)
the
EPA
can
issue
orders
directing
the
PRPs
to
clean
up
the
site
under
case
involved
an
extraterritorial
application
of
CERCLA,
and
considered
whether
9606(a).
In
this
case,
the
EPA
chose
the
fourth
approach,
and
issued
the
Order
to
Teck
extraterritorial
application
was
permissible
here.
under
9606(a).
In
addressing
the
question
of
extraterritorial
application,
the
district
court
If
a
party
receives
an
order
and
refuses
to
comply,
enforcement
options
are
available.
acknowledged
that
Congress
has
the
authority
to
enforce
its
laws
beyond
the
territorial
See
generally
Solid
State
Circuits,
Inc.
v.
EPA,
812
F.2d
383,
387
(8th
Cir.1987).
boundaries
of
the
United
States,
but
that
it
is
a
longstanding
principle
of
American
law
First,
the
EPA
may
bring
an
action
in
federal
district
court
to
compel
compliance,
using
The
theory
of
Pakootas's
complaint,
seeking
to
enforce
the
terms
of
the
Order
to
a
the
contempt
powers
of
the
district
court
as
a
potential
sanction
for
non-compliance.
facility
within
the
United
States,
does
not
invoke
extraterritorial
application
of
United
9606(a).
States
law
precisely
because
this
case
involves
a
domestic
facility.
Second,
the
EPA
may
bring
an
action
in
federal
district
court
seeking
to
impose
fines
of
up
to
$25,000
for
each
day
that
the
party
fails
to
comply
with
the
order.
9606(b)(1).
The
second
element
of
liability
under
CERCLA
is
that
there
must
be
a
release
or
Third,
the
EPA
may
initiate
cleanup
of
the
facility
itself
under
9604,
and
the
party
threatened
release
of
a
hazardous
substance
from
the
facility
into
the
environment.
responsible
for
the
pollution
is
potentially
liable
for
the
response
and
cleanup
costs,
plus
See
9607(a)(4).
To
determine
if
there
is
an
actual
or
threatened
release
here,
we
treble
damages.
9607(c)(3).
consider
the
statutory
definition
of
release.
CERCLA
defines
a
release,
with
certain
exceptions
not
relevant
here,
as
any
spilling,
leaking,
pumping,
pouring,
emitting,
Here,
the
EPA
has
not
sought
to
enforce
the
Order
through
any
of
the
mechanisms
emptying,
discharging,
injecting,
escaping,
leaching,
dumping,
or
disposing
into
the
described
above.
Rather,
Pakootas
initiated
this
suit
in
federal
district
court
under
environment.
9601(22).
9659,
the
citizen
suit
provision
of
CERCLA.
Section
9659(a)(1)
provides
a
cause
of
action
for
any
person
to
commence
a
civil
action
against
any
person who
is
alleged
to
be
in
Here,
several
events
could
potentially
be
characterized
as
releases.
First,
there
is
the
violation
of
any
standard,
regulation,
condition,
requirement,
or
order
which
has
become
discharge
of
waste
from
the
Trail
Smelter
into
the
Columbia
River
in
Canada.
Second,
effective
pursuant
to
this
chapter.
Section
9659(c)
gives
the
district
court
the
power
to
there
is
the
discharge
or
escape
of
the
slag
from
Canada
when
the
Columbia
River
enters
order
such
action
as
may
be
necessary
to
correct
the
violation,
and
to
impose
any
civil
the
United
States.
And
third,
there
is
the
leaching
of
heavy
metals
and
other
hazardous
penalty
provided
for
the
violation.
Further,
9613(h)(2),
the
timing
of
review
substances
from
the
slag
into
the
environment
at
the
Site.
Although
each
of
these
events
provision
of
CERCLA,
grants
federal
courts
jurisdiction
to
review
an
order
issued
under
can
be
characterized
as
a
release,
CERCLA
liability
does
not
attach
unless
the
release
is
9606(a)
when
a
party
seeks
to
enforce
the
order.
from
a
CERCLA
facility.
IV.
MERITS
OF
THE
CASE:
Here,
as
noted,
the
Order
describes
the
facility
as
the
Site;
not
the
Trail
Smelter
in
Teck's
primary
argument
is
that,
in
absence
of
a
clear
statement
by
Congress
that
it
Canada
or
the
Columbia
River
in
Canada.
Pakootas
has
alleged
that
the
leaching
of
intended
CERCLA
to
apply
extraterritorially,
the
presumption
against
extraterritorial
hazardous
substances
from
the
slag
that
is
in
the
Site
is
a
CERCLA
release,
and
Teck
has
application
of
United
States
law
precludes
CERCLA
from
applying
to
Teck
in
Canada.
not
argued
that
the
slag's
interaction
with
the
water
and
sediment
of
the
Upper
Columbia
We
need
to
address
whether
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality
applies
only
if
River
is
not
a
release
within
the
intendment
of
CERCLA.
Our
precedents
establish
that
this
case
involves
an
extraterritorial
application
of
CERCLA.
So
a
threshold
question
is
the
passive
migration
of
hazardous
substances
into
the
environment
from
where
whether
this
case
involves
a
domestic
or
extraterritorial
application
of
CERCLA.
hazardous
substances
have
come
to
be
located
is
a
release
under
CERCLA.
In
A
&
W
Smelter
&
Refiners,
Inc.
v.
Clinton,
it
held
that
wind
blowing
particles
of
hazardous
Unlike
other
environmental
laws
such
as
the
Clean
Air
Act,
42
U.S.C.
7401-7671q,
substances
from
a
pile
of
waste
was
a
CERCLA
release.
Morever,
in
D.Idaho
2003,
the
Clean
Water
Act,
33
U.S.C.
1251-1387,
and
Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act
passive
movement
and
migration
of
hazardous
substances
by
mother
nature
(no
human
(RCRA),
42
U.S.C.
6901-6992k,
CERCLA
is
not
a
regulatory
statute.
Rather,
CERCLA
action
assisting
in
the
movement)
is
still
a
release
for
purposes
of
CERCLA.
We
hold
that
imposes
liability
for
the
cleanup
of
sites
where
there
is
a
release
or
threatened
release
of
the
leaching
of
hazardous
substances
from
the
slag
at
the
Site
is
a
CERCLA
release
into
hazardous
substances
into
the
environment.
(CERCLA
holds
a
PRP
liable
for
a
disposal
the
United
States
from
a
facility
in
the
United
States-is
entirely
domestic.
that
releases
or
threatens
to
release
hazardous
substances
into
the
environment.).
CERCLA
liability
attaches
when
three
conditions
are
satisfied:
(1)
the
site
at
which
there
The
third
element
of
liability
under
CERCLA
is
that
the
party
must
be
a
covered
person
is
an
actual
or
threatened
release
of
hazardous
substances
is
a
facility
under
under
9607(a).
Teck
argues
that
it
is
not
a
covered
person
under
9607(a)(3)
9601(9);
(2)
a
release
or
threatened
release
of
a
hazardous
substance
from
the
because
it
has
not
arranged
for
disposal
of
a
hazardous
substance
by
any
other
party
facility
has
occurred,
9607(a)(4);
and
(3)
the
party
is
within
one
of
the
four
classes
of
or
entity
as
required
by
9607(a)(3),
because
Teck
disposed
of
the
slag
itself,
and
persons
subject
to
liability
under
9607(a).
CERCLA
defines
the
term
facility
as,
in
without
the
aid
of
another.
Alternatively,
Teck
argues
that
if
it
is
an
arranger
under
relevant
part,
any
site
or
area
where
a
hazardous
substance
has
been
deposited,
stored,
9607(a)(3),
then
basing
CERCLA
liability
on
Teck
arranging
for
disposal
of
slag
in
Canada
disposed
of,
or
placed,
or
otherwise
come
to
be
located.
9601(9).
The
Order
defines
is
an
impermissible
extraterritorial
application
of
CERCLA.
the
facility
in
this
case
as
the
Site,
which
is
described
as
the
extent
of
contamination
in
Assuming
that
Teck
is
an
arranger
under
9607(a)(3),
we
consider
whether
the
fact
the
United
States
associated
with
the
Upper
Columbia
River.
The
term
facility
has
been
that
the
act
of
arranging
in
Canada
for
disposal
of
the
slag
makes
this
an
extraterritorial
broadly
construed
by
the
courts,
such
that
in
order
to
show
that
an
area
is
a
facility,
the
application
of
CERCLA.
Teck
argues
that
because
it
arranged
in
Canada
for
disposal,
that
plaintiff
need
only
show
that
a
hazardous
substance
under
CERCLA
is
placed
there
or
has
is,
the
act
of
arranging
took
place
in
Canada
even
though
the
hazardous
substances
came
otherwise
come
to
be
located
there.
The
Order
defines
the
facility
as
being
entirely
to
be
located
in
the
United
States,
it
cannot
be
held
liable
under
CERCLA
without
within
the
United
States,
and
Teck
does
not
argue
that
the
Site
is
not
a
CERCLA
facility.
applying
CERCLA
extraterritorially.
Because
the
CERCLA
facility
is
within
the
United
States,
this
case
does
not
involve
an
The
text
of
9607(a)(3)
applies
to
any
person
who
arranged
for
the
disposal
of
extraterritorial
application
of
CERCLA
to
a
facility
abroad.
hazardous
substances.
The
term
person
includes,
inter
alia,
an
individual,
firm,
corporation,
association,
partnership,
consortium,
joint
venture,
[or]
commercial
entity.
9601(21).
On
its
face,
this
definition
includes
corporations
such
as
Teck,
although
the
definition
does
not
indicate
whether
foreign
corporations
are
covered.
Teck
argues
that
United
States.
The
difference
between
a
domestic
application
of
United
States
law
and
a
because
the
Supreme
Court
recently
held
that
the
term
any
court
as
used
in
18
U.S.C.
presumptively
impermissible
extraterritorial
application
of
United
States
law
becomes
922(g)(1)
does
not
include
foreign
courts,
we
should
interpret
the
term
any
person
so
apparent
when
we
consider
the
conduct
that
the
law
prohibits.
In
the
case
of
Steele,
the
as
not
to
include
foreign
corporations.
prohibited
conduct,
the
unauthorized
use
and
reproduction
of
Bulova's
registered
In
Small
v.
United
States,
Chief
Justice
Marshall
held
for
the
Court
that
the
words
any
trademark,
took
place
in
Mexico
but
the
harm,
the
dilution
of
Bulova's
trademark,
took
person
or
persons,
as
used
in
a
statute
prohibiting
piracy
on
the
high
seas,
must
not
place
in
the
United
States.
The
Court
therefore
held
that
there
was
jurisdiction
in
that
only
be
limited
to
cases
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
state,
but
also
to
those
objects
to
case.
which
the
legislature
intended
to
apply
them.
The
Court
held
that
any
person
or
persons
did
not
include
crimes
committed
by
a
person
on
the
high
seas,
on
board
of
Here,
the
operative
event
creating
a
liability
under
CERCLA
is
the
release
or
threatened
any
ship
or
vessel
belonging
exclusively
to
subjects
of
a
foreign
state,
on
persons
within
a
release
of
a
hazardous
substance.
Arranging
for
disposal
of
such
substances,
in
and
of
vessel
belonging
exclusively
to
subjects
of
a
foreign
state.
However,
the
Court
held
that
itself,
does
not
trigger
CERCLA
liability,
nor
does
actual
disposal
of
hazardous
even
though
the
statute
did
not
specifically
enumerate
foreign
parties
as
persons,
the
substances.
A
release
must
occur
or
be
threatened
before
CERCLA
is
triggered.
A
party
statute
did
apply
to
punish
piracy
committed
by
foreign
parties
against
vessels
belonging
that
arranged
for
disposal
of
a
hazardous
substance
under
9607(a)(3)
does
not
to
subjects
of
the
United
States.
become
liable
under
CERCLA
until
there
is
an
actual
or
threatened
release
of
that
substance
into
the
environment.
Arranging
for
disposal
of
hazardous
substances,
in
itself,
Palmer
relied
upon
two
benchmarks
for
determining
whether
terms
such
as
any
is
neither
regulated
under
nor
prohibited
by
CERCLA.
Further,
disposal
activities
that
person
apply
to
foreign
persons:
(1)
the
state
must
have
jurisdiction
over
the
party,
and
were
legal
when
conducted
can
nevertheless
give
rise
to
liability
under
9607(a)(3)
if
(2)
the
legislature
must
intend
for
the
term
to
apply.
Regarding
jurisdiction,
Teck
argued
there
is
an
actual
or
threatened
release
of
such
hazardous
substances
into
the
in
the
district
court
that
there
was
no
personal
jurisdiction
over
it.
The
district
court
held
environment.
In
Cadillac
Fairview/California,
Inc.
v.
US,
it
held
that
a
party
that
sold
a
that
there
was
personal
jurisdiction,
and
Teck
has
not
appealed
that
determination.
product
to
another
party
arranged
for
disposal
of
a
hazardous
substance,
Because
a
party
can
waive
personal
jurisdiction,
we
are
not
required
to
consider
it
sua
characterizing
the
conduct
at
issue
in
Cadillac
Fairview/California
I
as
legal
at
the
time.
sponte.
In
Smith
v.
Idaho,
the
longstandng
rule
that
personal
jurisdiction,
in
the
traditional
sense,
can
be
waived
and
need
not
be
addressed
sua
sponte.
The
location
where
a
party
arranged
for
disposal
or
disposed
of
hazardous
substances
is
not
controlling
for
purposes
of
assessing
whether
CERCLA
is
being
applied
Nevertheless,
we
agree
with
the
district
court
that
there
is
specific
personal
jurisdiction
extraterritorially,
because
CERCLA
imposes
liability
for
releases
or
threatened
releases
over
Teck
here.
Because
there
is
specific
personal
jurisdiction
over
Teck
here
based
on
of
hazardous
substances,
and
not
merely
for
disposal
or
arranging
for
disposal
of
such
its
allegedly
tortious
act
aimed
at
the
state
of
Washington,
the
first
Palmer
benchmark
is
substances.
Because
the
actual
or
threatened
release
of
hazardous
substances
triggers
satisfied,
and
we
can
appropriately
construe
the
term
any
person
to
apply
to
Teck.
CERCLA
liability,
and
because
the
actual
or
threatened
release
here,
the
leaching
of
hazardous
substances
from
slag
that
settled
at
the
Site,
took
place
in
the
United
States,
The
second
Palmer
benchmark
is
that
the
legislature
must
intend
for
the
statute
to
apply
this
case
involves
a
domestic
application
of
CERCLA.
to
the
situation.
Except
for
the
statutory
definition
of
any
person,
CERCLA
is
silent
about
who
is
covered
by
the
Act.
But
CERCLA
is
clear
about
what
is
covered
by
the
Act.
Our
conclusion
is
reinforced
by
considering
CERCLA's
place
within
the
constellation
of
CERCLA
liability
attaches
upon
release
or
threatened
release
of
a
hazardous
substance
our
country's
environmental
laws,
and
contrasting
it
with
RCRA:
Unlike
[CERCLA],
RCRA
into
the
environment.
CERCLA
defines
environment
to
include
any
other
surface
is
not
principally
designed
to
effectuate
the
cleanup
of
toxic
waste
sites
or
to
compensate
water,
ground
water,
drinking
water
supply,
land
surface
or
subsurface
strata,
or
those
who
have
attended
to
the
remediation
of
environmental
hazards.
RCRA's
primary
ambient
air
within
the
United
States
or
under
the
jurisdiction
of
the
United
States.
purpose,
rather,
is
to
reduce
the
generation
of
hazardous
waste
and
to
ensure
the
proper
9601(8).
CERCLA's
purpose
is
to
promote
the
cleanup
of
hazardous
waste
sites
where
treatment,
storage,
and
disposal
of
that
waste
which
is
nonetheless
generated,
so
as
to
there
is
a
release
or
threatened
release
of
hazardous
substances
into
the
environment
minimize
the
present
and
future
threat
to
human
health
and
the
environment.
within
the
United
States.
In
ARC
Ecology,
US
Dept.
of
Air
Force,
Congress
intended
RCRA
regulates
the
generation
and
disposal
of
hazardous
waste,
whereas
CERCLA
CERCLA
to
apply
to
cleanup
hazardous
waste
sites
in
the
United
States.
Because
the
imposes
liability
to
clean
up
a
site
when
there
are
actual
or
threatened
releases
of
legislature
intended
to
hold
parties
responsible
for
hazardous
waste
sites
that
release
or
hazardous
substances
into
the
environment.
It
is
RCRA,
not
CERCLA,
that
governs
threaten
release
of
hazardous
substances
into
the
United
States
environment,
the
second
prospectively
how
generators
of
hazardous
substances
should
dispose
of
those
Palmer
benchmark
is
satisfied
here.
substances,
and
it
is
the
Canadian
equivalent
of
RCRA,
not
CERCLA,
that
regulates
how
Teck
disposes
of
its
waste
within
Canada.
Although
the
Palmer
analysis
supports
the
proposition
that
CERCLA
applies
to
Teck,
Palmer
of
course
does
not
address
the
distinction
between
domestic
or
extraterritorial
Here,
the
district
court
assumed,
but
did
not
decide,
that
this
suit
involved
application
of
CERCLA.
The
Palmer
analysis,
however,
in
what
we
have
termed
its
second
extraterritorial
application
of
CERCLA
because
to
find
there
is
not
an
extraterritorial
benchmark,
brings
to
mind
the
domestic
effects
exception
to
the
presumption
against
application
of
CERCLA
in
this
case
would
require
reliance
on
a
legal
fiction
that
the
extraterritorial
application
of
United
States
law.
In
Steele
v.
Bulova,
the
case
revolves
releases'
of
hazardous
substances
into
the
Upper
Columbia
River
Site
and
Lake
around
finding
jurisdiction
in
a
trademark
suit
against
a
person
in
Mexico
who
Roosevelt
are
wholly
separable
from
the
discharge
of
those
substances
into
the
Columbia
manufactured
counterfeit
Bulova
watches
that
then
entered
and
caused
harm
within
the
River
at
the
Trail
Smelter.
However,
what
the
district
court
dismissed
as
a
legal
fiction
is
the
foundation
of
the
disposal
or
treatment
of
hazardous
substances
owned
or
possessed
by
such
person
[or]
distinction
between
RCRA
and
CERCLA.
If
the
Trail
Smelter
were
in
the
United
States,
the
by
any
other
party
or
entity
discharge
of
slag
from
the
smelter
into
the
Columbia
River
would
potentially
be
regulated
by
RCRA
and
the
Clean
Water
Act.
And
that
prospective
regulation,
if
any,
We
followed
this
approach
in
Cadillac
Fairview/California
I,
where
we
said
with
forcible
would
be
legally
distinct
from
a
finding
of
CERCLA
liability
for
cleanup
of
actual
or
reasoning:
Liability
is
not
limited
to
those
who
own
the
hazardous
substances,
who
threatened
releases
of
the
hazardous
substances
into
the
environment
from
the
disposal
actually
dispose
of
or
treat
such
substances,
or
who
control
the
disposal
or
treatment
site,
here
the
Upper
Columbia
River
Site.
That
the
Trail
Smelter
is
located
in
Canada
does
process.
The
language
explicitly
extends
liability
to
persons
otherwise
arranging
for
not
change
this
analysis,
as
the
district
court
recognized.
disposal
or
treatment
of
hazardous
substances
whether
owned
by
the
arranger
or
by
any
other
party
or
entity,
at
any
facility
or
incineration
vessel
owned
or
operated
by
CERCLA
is
only
concerned
with
imposing
liability
for
cleanup
of
hazardous
waste
another
party
or
entity.
In
Kalamazoo
River
Study
Group
v.
Menasha
Corp.,
it
held
that
disposal
sites
where
there
has
been
an
actual
or
threatened
release
of
hazardous
defendant
was
potentially
liable
as
an
arranger
when
it
discharged
hazardous
substances
substances
into
the
environment.
CERCLA
does
not
obligate
parties
(either
foreign
or
into
a
river.
domestic)
liable
for
cleanup
costs
to
cease
the
disposal
activities
such
as
those
that
made
them
liable
for
cleanup
costs;
regulating
disposal
activities
is
in
the
domain
of
RCRA
or
The
text
of
9607(a)(3)
can
also
be
modified
to
support
a
different
meaning,
the
one
other
regulatory
statutes.
that
Teck
advances
on
this
appeal.
Teck
argues
that
the
phrase
by
any
other
party
or
entity
refers
to
or
otherwise
arranged
for
disposal
or
treatment,
and
so,
the
argument
We
hold
that
applying
CERCLA
here
to
the
release
of
hazardous
substances
at
the
Site
is
a
runs,
arranger
liability
does
not
attach
unless
one
party
arranged
with
another
party
to
domestic,
rather
than
an
extraterritorial
application
of
CERCLA,
even
though
the
original
dispose
of
hazardous
substances.
If
we
accept
this
position,
then
a
generator
of
source
of
the
hazardous
substances
is
located
in
a
foreign
country.
hazardous
substances
who
disposes
of
the
waste
alone
and
with
no
other
participant
may
defeat
CERCLA
liability,
because
the
generator
had
not
arranged
with
a
second
V.
LIABILITY:
party
for
disposal
of
the
waste.
But
this
interpretation
would
appear
to
require
the
Teck's
only
other
argument-that
it
is
not
covered
by
9607(a)(3)
because
it
has
not
removal
of
the
two
commas
that
offset
the
phrase
by
any
other
party
or
entity,
so
that
arranged
for
disposal
of
hazardous
substances
by
any
other
party
or
entity
because,
the
relevant
language
would
read
any
person
who
arranged
for
disposal
or
treatment
of
if
the
facts
in
the
complaint
are
taken
as
true,
Teck
disposed
of
the
slag
itself.
hazardous
substances
owned
or
possessed
by
such
person
by
any
other
party
or
entity.
Preliminarily,
we
note
that
neither
Pakootas,
nor
the
Order,
specifically
allege
that
Teck
is
an
arranger
under
9607(a)(3).
Rather,
the
Order
states
that
Teck
is
a
responsible
In
Kaiser
Aluminum
&
Chemical
Corp.
v.
Catellus
Development
Corp.,
we
perhaps
party
under
Sections
104,
107,
and
122
of
CERCLA,
42
U.S.C.
9604,
9607,
and
9622.
implicitly,
albeit
summarily,
suggested
that
this
reading
might
be
appropriate,
stating:
UAO
at
6.
The
parties
have,
however,
focused
in
their
arguments
solely
on
9607(a)(3).
Nor
has
[Plaintiff]
alleged
that
[Defendant]
Ferry
arranged
for
the
contaminated
soil
to
be
disposed
of
by
any
other
party
or
entity
under
9607(a)(3).
Ferry
disposed
of
the
soil
Section
9607(a)(3)
holds
liable
parties
that
arranged
for
the
disposal
of
hazardous
itself
by
spreading
it
over
the
uncontaminated
areas
of
the
property.
The
clause
by
any
substances.
It
states,
in
relevant
part,
the
following:
Any
person
who
by
contract,
other
party
or
entity
clarifies
that,
for
arranger
liability
to
attach,
the
disposal
or
agreement,
or
otherwise
arranged
for
disposal
or
treatment,
or
arranged
with
a
treatment
must
be
performed
by
another
party
or
entity,
as
was
the
case
here.
Thus
it
transporter
for
the
transport
for
disposal
or
treatment,
of
hazardous
substances
owned
can
be
argued
that
an
implication
from
Kaiser
Aluminum
supports
Teck's
view.
or
possessed
by
such
person,
by
any
other
party
or
entity,
at
any
facility
or
incineration
vessel
owned
or
operated
by
another
party
or
entity
and
containing
such
substances
Teck's
argument
relying
on
implication
from
Kaiser
Aluminum
would
create
a
gap
in
the
shall
be
liable
for certain
costs
of
cleanup.
9607(a)(3).
CERCLA
liability
regime
by
allowing
a
generator
of
hazardous
substances
potentially
to
avoid
liability
by
disposing
of
wastes
without
involving
a
transporter
as
an
intermediary.
CERCLA
or
particularly,
Section
9607(a)(3)
does
not
make
literal
or
grammatical
sense
If
the
generator
disposed
of
the
waste
on
the
property
of
another,
one
could
argue
that
as
written.
It
is
by
no
means
clear
to
what
the
phrase
by
any
other
party
or
entity
the
generator
would
not
be
liable
under
9607(a)(1)
or
(a)(2)
because
both
refers.
Pakootas
argues
that
it
refers
to
a
party
who
owns
the
waste;
and
Teck
argues
subsections
apply
to
the
owner
of
a
facility;
as
we
described
above
the
relevant
facility
is
that
it
refers
to
a
party
who
arranges
for
disposal
with
the
owner.
To
make
sense
of
the
the
site
at
which
hazardous
substances
are
released
into
the
environment,
not
sentence
we
might
read
the
word
or
into
the
section,
which
supports
Pakootas's
necessarily
where
the
waste
generation
and
dumping
took
place.
Liability
as
a
position,
or
we
might
delete
two
commas,
which
supports
Teck's
position.
Neither
transporter
under
9607(a)(4)
might
not
attach
because
transporter
liability
applies
to
construction
is
entirely
felicitous.
any
person
who
accepts
or
accepted
any
hazardous
substance
for
transport.
Although
we
do
not
here
decide
the
contours
of
transporter
liability,
one
could
argue
that
a
Section
9607(a)(3)'s
phrase
by
any
other
party
or
entity
can
be
read
to
refer
to
generator
who
owns
hazardous
substances
cannot
accept
such
hazardous
substances
hazardous
substances
owned
or
possessed
by
such
person,
such
that
parties
can
be
for
transport
because
they
are
already
held
by
the
generator.
We
hesitate
to
endorse
a
liable
if
they
arranged
for
disposal
of
their
own
waste
or
if
they
arranged
for
disposal
of
statutory
interpretation
that
would
leave
a
gaping
and
illogical
hole
in
the
statute's
wastes
owned
by
any
other
party
or
entity.
This
would
mean
that
a
party
need
not
own
coverage,
permitting
argument
that
generators
of
hazardous
waste
might
freely
dispose
the
waste
to
be
liable
as
an
arranger.
But
it
would
require
reading
the
word
or
into
the
of
it
themselves
and
stay
outside
the
statute's
cleanup
liability
provisions.
We
think
that
provision,
so
that
the
relevant
language
would
read
any
person
who
arranged
for
was
not
what
was
intended
by
Congress's
chosen
language
and
statutory
scheme.
The
ambiguous
phrase
by
any
other
party
or
entity
cannot
sensibly
be
read
to
refer
9607(a)(3)
because
it
did
not
arrange
for
disposal
of
hazardous
substances
by
any
other
both
to
the
language
urged
by
Pakootas
and
to
that
urged
by
Teck
in
their
differing
party
or
entity.
theories
of
statutory
interpretation.
In
interpreting
the
turbid
phrase
and
punctuation
on
which
the
parties
have
vigorously
pressed
contradictory
theories,
we
necessarily
navigate
a
quagmire.
Yet,
in
the
face
of
statutory
ambiguity,
9607(a)(3)
must
be
given
a
liberal
judicial
interpretation
consistent
with
CERCLA's
overwhelmingly
remedial
statutory
scheme.
Pakootas
and
the
State
of
Washington
suggest
that
we
can
resolve
the
inconsistent
and
mutually-exclusive
language
in
Cadillac
Fairview/California
I
and
Kaiser
Aluminum
by
dismissing
as
ambiguous
or
as
dicta
the
statement
in
Kaiser
Aluminum
that
[n]or
has
[Plaintiff]
alleged
that
Ferry
arranged
for
the
contaminated
soil
to
be
disposed
of
by
any
other
party
or
entity
under
9607(a)(3).
The
argument
is
that
it
is
unclear
whether
we
meant
in
Kaiser
Aluminum
that
we
did
not
need
to
reach
the
question
because
Plaintiff
had
not
alleged
that
Ferry
was
an
arranger,
or
instead
that
Plaintiff
had
alleged
that
Ferry
was
an
arranger
but
that
we
rejected
that
interpretation.
We
conclude
that
Pakootas
and
the
State
of
Washington
are
correct.
The
two
sentences
from
Kaiser
Aluminum
quoted
above
are
the
only
two
sentences
in
that
opinion
to
discuss
arranger
liability.
The
opinion
contains
no
analysis
of
the
text
of
9607(a)(3),
and
does
not
discuss
arguments
for
or
against
interpreting
9607(a)(3)
to
require
the
involvement
of
another
party
or
entity
for
arranger
liability
to
attach.
The
ambiguous
discussion
of
9607(a)(3)
liability
was
not
in
our
view
a
holding,
but
rather
a
prelude
to
discussing
why
the
defendant
in
Kaiser
Aluminum
was
potentially
liable
as
an
owner
of
a
facility
under
9607(a)(2)
or
as
a
transporter
under
9607(a)(4).
And
perhaps
most
importantly,
the
statement
in
question
may
be
simply
a
description
of
what
was
not
alleged
by
a
party,
rather
than
our
court's
choice
of
a
rule
of
law.
Further,
the
statement
in
Kaiser
Aluminum
bears
the
hallmarks
of
dicta.
In
United
States,
it
is
clear
that
a
statement
is
made
casually
and
without
analysis,
where
the
statement
is
uttered
in
passing
without
due
consideration
of
the
alternatives,
or
where
it
is
merely
a
prelude
to
another
legal
issue
that
commands
the
panel's
full
attention,
it
may
be
appropriate
to
re-visit
the
issue
in
a
later
case.
Because
we
view
the
statement
in
Kaiser
Aluminum
as
offhand,
unreasoned,
and
ambiguous,
rather
than
as
an
intended
choice
of
a
rule,
we
consider
the
Ninth
Circuit's
law
to
be
represented
by
Cadillac
Fairview/California
I.
And
under
Cadillac
Fairview/California
I,
the
phrase
by
any
other
party
or
entity
refers
to
ownership
of
the
waste,
such
that
one
may
be
liable
under
9607(a)(3)
if
they
arrange
for
disposal
of
their
own
waste
or
someone
else's
waste,
and
that
the
arranger
element
can
be
met
when
disposal
is
not
arranged
by
any
other
party
or
entity.
We
hold
instead
that
Teck
is
potentially
liable
under
9607(a)(3),
and
we
reject
Teck's
argument
that
it
is
not
liable
under
9607(a)(3)
because
it
did
not
arrange
for
disposal
of
its
slag
with
any
other
party
or
entity.
VI.
District
court
correctly
denied
Teck's
motion
to
dismiss
Pakootas's
complaint
for
failure
to
state
a
claim,
and
reject
Teck's
arguments
to
the
contrary.
Applying
CERCLA
to
the
Site,
as
defined
by
the
Order
issued
by
the
EPA,
is
a
domestic
application
of
CERCLA.
The
argument
that
this
case
presents
an
extraterritorial
application
of
CERCLA
fails
because
CERCLA
liability
does
not
attach
until
there
is
an
actual
or
threatened
release
of
hazardous
substances
into
the
environment;
the
suit
concerns
actual
or
threatened
releases
of
heavy
metals
and
other
hazardous
substances
into
the
Upper
Columbia
River
Site
within
the
United
States.
We
reject
Teck's
argument
that
it
is
not
liable
under
Olachukwu
NNADILI,
et
al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CHEVRON
U.S.A.
INC.
Defendant
medical
monitoring,
in
addition
to
the
instant
claims
for
property
and
emotional
distress
United
States
District
Court,
District
of
Columbia
|
June
1,
2006
damages.
On
October
4,
2004,
however,
after
air
sampling
conducted
by
Chevron
indicated that the air quality in selected Riggs Park homes did not exceed Environmental
Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases assert various claims against Chevron U.S.A. Inc. Protection Agency ("EPA") thresholds, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all claims
("Chevron") based upon the presence of petroleum hydrocarbons in the soil and predicated on evidence of actual exposure to gasoline constituents. (See Oct. 4, 2004
groundwater below certain properties in an area of Washington, D.C. known as Riggs Stipulated Order ("Stip.Order").) Specifically, plaintiffs stipulated as follows:
Park. They contend that the contamination resulted from the discharge or release of All plaintiffs agree that they do not now allege and' will not allege or attempt to prove in
gasoline from a retail service station formerly owned and operated by Chevron and seek these actions that any plaintiff was exposed to petroleum hydrocarbons or other
damages for diminution in the value of their properties and for emotional distress. They contaminants of a nature, intensity and duration that can be linked through valid
also seek injunctive relief under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. scientific evidence to personal injury or to a risk of injury or death. Nor will plaintiffs
6901 et seq. ("RCRA"). attempt to argue or prove that any emotional distress alleged to have been suffered by
Chevron has moved for partial summary judgment with respect to the following claims: any plaintiff is the result of any actual exposure to petroleum hydrocarbons or other
(1) emotional distress damages; (2) common law strict liability; (3) statutory claims contaminants. In addition, plaintiffs will not attempt to argue or prove that a valid
under the RCRA; and (4) claims by individuals whose properties are not situated over scientific basis exists for any potential for exposure.
subsurface contamination. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant summary In connection with this stipulation, plaintiffs also sought and were granted leave to
judgment as to the claims for strict liability and for violation of the RCRA, but will deny file their current amended complaints, which do not include claims for personal injury,
Chevron's motion in all other respects. wrongful death, or medical monitoring. As a result, plaintiffs are seeking based on
B A C K G R O U N D claims of trespass, nuisance, negligence, and common law strict liability damages only
Plaintiffs include approximately 500 current and former residents of, or property owners for diminution in the value of their properties and for emotional distress, as well as
within, the Riggs Park neighborhood of Washington, D.C. According to plaintiffs, from injunctive relief under the RCRA. On December 5, 2005, prior to the close of discovery,
approximately 1956 through June 21, 1993, Chevron, or its predecessor-in-interest, the Court entered a Revised Stipulated Scheduling Order pursuant to which Chevron filed
owned and operated a retail gasoline service station at 5801 Riggs Road in Chillum, the motion for partial summary judgment that is presently the Court.
Maryland, which is on the Maryland side of the border between Maryland and As agreed to and proposed by the parties, fact and expert discovery has been stayed
Washington, D.C. They allege that during the time that Chevron owned and operated the pending disposition of the instant motion. The Revised Stipulated Scheduling Order
service station, gasoline was discharged or released into the ground from the station's further provides that additional dispositive motions, as appropriate, shall be permitted
underground storage tanks ("USTs"). Plaintiffs further allege that the gasoline following the completion of discovery.
subsequently migrated into the Riggs Park neighborhood, contaminating the air, soil, and
I. Summary Judgment Standard: "balance the competing interests of the two jurisdictions, and apply the law of the
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for summary jurisdiction with the more `substantial interest' in the resolution of the issue." Lamphier
judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 524 A.2d 729, 731 (D.C.1987); see also Jaffe v. Pallotta
admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and TeamWorks, 374 F.3d 1223, 1227 (D.C.Cir.2004). To determine which jurisdiction
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty maintains a more substantial interest, District of Columbia courts consider the factors
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To be material, the listed in Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971).
fact must be capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation, and to be genuine, the These include: (1) the place of injury; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury
issue must be supported by admissible evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to occurred; (3) the domicile, residence, place of incorporation and place of business of the
find in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Laningham v. parties; and (4) the place where the relationship between the parties is centered.
To avoid summary judgment the nonmoving party's opposition must consist of more Applying these factors to the instant facts, the Court finds that between the District of
than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by affidavits or Columbia and Maryland, the District of Columbia has the greater interest in the outcome
other competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine of this litigation.3 While Chevron's conduct occurred mainly in Maryland, where its
issue for trial. The non-moving party must provide evidence that would permit a former service station and USTs are situated, and a handful of plaintiffs currently reside
reasonable jury to find in the non-moving party's favor. "If the evidence is merely in that state, all of the alleged contamination at issue in this litigation occurred in the
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." District of Columbia, all of the alleged injuries were sustained in the District of Columbia,
Nevertheless, "because summary judgment is a drastic measure, courts should grant it and the overwhelming majority of plaintiffs still reside in the District of Columbia.
with caution so that no person will be deprived of his or her day in court to prove a Accordingly, the Court concludes that all of the tort claims asserted in these consolidated
disputed material factual issue." This reason, in considering a motion for summary cases are governed by the laws of the District of Columbia.
judgment, the "evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
Chevron first contends that plaintiffs cannot recover damages for emotional distress as a
II. Choice of Law matter of law. Relying primarily on case law involving claims for intentional and
"When deciding state-law claims under diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, federal negligent infliction of emotional distress, Chevron argues that courts in the District of
courts apply the choice-of-law rules of the jurisdiction in which they sit." Ideal Elec. Sec. Columbia consistently have barred such claims absent proof of physical injury or
Co., Inc. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 143, 148 (D.C.Cir.1997). The District of Columbia has physical endangerment. To the extent that District of Columbia case law does not
adopted the "substantial interest" approach to choice of law questions. Greycoat Hanover expressly address claims for emotional distress damages based on property damage
F Street Ltd. P'ship v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 657 A.2d 764, 767-68 (D.C.1995). When faced alone, however, Chevron further asserts that the Court should look to the law of
Maryland
for
guidance.
According
to
Chevron,
plaintiffs'
claims
for
emotional
distress
damages
cannot
survive
under
established
Maryland
precedent.
In
support
of
it
position,
would
permit
recovery
of
emotional
distress
damages
for
intentional
torts
involving
Chevron principally relies on the Maryland Court of Appeals decision in Dobbins v. Wash. personal, but not real, property damage. Accordingly, the Court concludes that emotional
Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, the court held that "a plaintiff cannot ordinarily recover for distress damages are recoverable for trespass actions under District of Columbia law.
emotional injuries sustained solely as a result of negligently inflicted damage to the Furthermore, with respect to all of plaintiffs' tort claims, including those sounding in
plaintiff's property." The court reasoned that "emotional injuries are not the trespass, the Court concludes that District of Columbia law permits emotional distress as
`consequences that ensue in the ordinary and natural course of events' from negligently an element of damages because District of Columbia courts follow the Restatement
inflicted property damage," and that "such injuries should not be contemplated, in light (Second) of Torts. (See Pl.'s Mem. at 14-15 nn. 14-16 and cases cited therein.) Section 905
of all the circumstances, `as a natural and probable consequence' of a negligently inflicted of the Restatement, which applies to all torts, provides that: "Compensatory damages
injury to property." For additional support, Chevron points to instances where the that may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss include compensation (a) for bodily
Maryland Court of Appeals has refused to award emotional distress damages based on harm, and (b) for emotional distress, which pertains specifically to damages available in
property damage caused by trespass. actions sounding in trespass, provides in pertinent part: if one is entitled to a judgment
Finally, Chevron argues that the October 4, 2004 Stipulated Order independently bars for harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting to a total destruction
plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress damages because it eliminates any factual basis of value, the damages include compensation for discomfort and annoyance to him as an
for such claims. According to Chevron, not only have plaintiffs stipulated that they have occupant.
suffered no emotional distress from actual exposure to contamination, but they also have As Chevron accurately asserts, there is scant case law from the District of Columbia
stipulated that (1) no plaintiff has ever been exposed; and (2) no plaintiff will have the applying Sections 905 and 929. (See Def.'s Reply at 5.)5Nevertheless, the District of
potential for exposure. Chevron thus argues that the Stipulated Order, as a matter of Columbia's established rule that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress
undisputed fact, removes any reasonable basis for emotional distress. for intentional torts, which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
Stated simply, Chevron contends that property damage alone cannot serve as a basis for endorsed with respect to intentional torts involving personal property, see Parker, 557
recovering damages for emotional distress. The Court disagrees. A.2d at 1322-23, and the absence of any contrary suggestion with respect to real
Under District of Columbia law, it is firmly established that a plaintiff may recover property, lead the Court to conclude that the District of Columbia would follow Sections
damages for mental suffering unaccompanied by physical injury where the plaintiff sues 905 and 929 of the Restatement to permit emotional distress as an element of damages
for an intentional tort. It is also clear that trespass is an intentional tort. Although the for the tort claims plaintiffs have asserted. Moreover, courts in other jurisdictions have
parties have not cited and the Court has been unable to find a District of Columbia applied these sections of the Restatement to permit emotional distress damages in tort
decision addressing the availability of emotional distress damages in a trespass case, the cases similar to the instant claims. See, e.g., French v. Ralph E. Moore, Inc., 203 Mont.
decision in Parker is instructive. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the District of 327, 661 P.2d 844, 847-48 (1983) (holding damages for mental anguish recoverable for
Columbia, applying the established rule regarding intentional torts, concluded that claims trespass, nuisance, and negligence claims arising out of gasoline discharge from
emotional distress damages are available in an action for conversion of personal USTs).
property. Parker, 557 A.2d at 1322-23. Here, the Court can find no meaningful distinction Chevron's reliance on District of Columbia cases addressing causes of action for
between
personal
and
real
property
to
suggest
that
courts
in
the
District
of
Columbia
intentional
and
negligent
infliction
of
emotional
distress
is
misplaced.
Plaintiffs
are
not
seeking
damages
for
the
separate
torts
of
intentional
or
negligent
infliction
of
emotional
and
anxiety
over
future
exposure
to
toxic
chemicals;
(2)
fear
and
anxiety
over
any
distress.6 Rather, plaintiffs merely claim emotional distress as an element of damages for possible diminution in value of their homes; (3) fear, anxiety, and annoyance resulting
the traditional tort claims they have asserted e.g., trespass, nuisance, negligence. from the loss of the use and enjoyment of certain parts of their properties; and (4)
Chevron, in fact, acknowledges as much. (See Def.'s Mem. at 4, In their most recent humiliation over the contaminated state of their neighborhood.
amended complaints, plaintiffs dropped their claims for intentional and negligent Chevron does not argue that these assertions are directly contradicted by the Stipulated
infliction of emotional distress; whereas prior complaints asserted "claims for intentional Order but instead argues that plaintiffs' claims are "irrational and unreasonable" in light
and negligent infliction of emotional distress," current versions assert "emotional of the Order. (Def.'s Reply at 7.) Questions about the reasonableness of plaintiffs' alleged
distress damages as part of other claims". fear and anxiety, however, are for the jury.
The distinction between intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress as Accordingly, the Court will deny Chevron's motion for partial summary judgment with
independent causes of action and emotional distress as an element of damages for respect to plaintiffs' damage claims based on emotional distress.
traditional tort claims is illustrated by the decision in Adams, supra. In that case, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected plaintiff's claim for intentional IV. Common Law Strict Liability
infliction of emotional distress, because the plaintiff had failed to prove all the elements Plaintiffs allege that Chevron's storage of gasoline in USTs at the specific service station
for such a cause of action but permitted the plaintiff to claim, as an element of damages at issue constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity, thus giving rise to claims for
for the tort of wrongful termination, compensation for any emotional distress or mental common law strict liability. Chevron argues otherwise, and the Court agrees.
anguish resulted therefrom. In National Telephone Cooperative Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., which is similar to these cases, the
In other words, the court permitted emotional distress as an element of damages for a district court concluded that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia "would
tort claim, even though the plaintiff could not meet the requirements of an independent likely follow the majority of jurisdictions that have held that a defendant does not engage
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.; see also Williams v. in abnormally dangerous conduct by storing gasoline [in] USTs in commercial
Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C.1990) ("This jurisdiction's requirement that to be environments in which leaks are not likely to jeopardize human safety." Id. at 8; see also
compensable [in claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress] mental suffering id. ("Where USTs are buried beneath gasoline stations located in commercial settings, the
must flow from physical injury is consistent with the historic reluctance of the common overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that such conduct is not `abnormally
law to allow recovery for mental distress other than as an element of damages when an dangerous.
independent tort is established.") Applying the factors set forth in the Restatement for determining whether an activity is
Finally, Chevron's arguments regarding the Stipulated Order are without merit. As abnormally dangerous, the Court reasoned: Unlike archetypical abnormally dangerous
plaintiffs contend, the Stipulated Order has reduced their claims for emotional distress activities such as blasting, there is no evidence to suggest that the risk of seepage [from
damages to those arising from: USTs] cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care, or that the harm to be
(1) fear of the unknown, consisting of (a) fear and anxiety over whether plaintiffs or their anticipated from the underground seepage of gasoline is `grave.' Hudson, 566 P.2d at
families were exposed to toxic chemicals during the 15 year period from 1989, when the 178; see also Smith, 665 A.2d at 1220 (Gasoline and other petroleum products can be
release
was
discovered,
to
2004,
when
the
air
test
results
were
disclosed;
and
(b)
fear
stored
and
dispensed
safely
with
reasonable
care.
We
are
not
convinced
that
the
risk
cannot
be
eliminated
by
the
exercise
of
reasonable
care.
Absent
negligence
or
application
supply.
In
Yommer,
the
court
similarly
concluded
that
the
placement
of
USTs
next
to
a
of an outside force, use of a USTS does not create a high degree of risk of harm to the residential neighborhood and "virtually on top of a family's drinking-water well," Nat'l
person, land or chattels of another. Moreover those risks that do exist can be minimized Tel. Co-op. Ass'n, 38 F.Supp.2d at 9, constituted an abnormally dangerous
by the exercise of reasonable care by the owner or possessor of the tank. Perhaps activity, Yommer, 257 A.2d at 138. Again, by contrast, Chevron's USTs, While located
because reasonable care will typically guard against any harm that USTs may inflict, the nearby a residential neighborhood, are not situated near any sources of drinking water
storage of [gasoline] in tanks is a common use and is valuable to a modern society. Smith, and are in an area populated with commercial enterprises. As other courts have found,
665 A.2d at 1220; see also Walker Drug Co., 902 P.2d at 1233 ([T]he operation of a gas "USTs located beneath the ground of gasoline stations in commercial zones are
station is common, appropriate, and of significant value to the community.); Arlington commonplace and are of great utility to the community."
Forest, 774 F.Supp. at 391 (holding that gasoline stations fulfill essential transportation Accordingly, the Court will grant Chevron's motion for partial summary judgement with
needs in modern society). respect to plaintiffs' claims for common law strict liability and enter judgment in favor of
Here too, application of the Restatement factors demonstrates that Chevron's conduct Chevron on Count One of the Nnadili Complaint and Count v. of the Abney Complaint.
was not abnormally dangerous as a matter of law. Because plaintiffs derive their water
from the District of Columbia's water utility, rather than from the groundwater in the V. Statutory Claims Under the RCRA
area, there does not exist a high degree of risk that the utilization of USTs at the service Plaintiffs in the Abney case allege two claims under the RCRA. In Count VII of
station location will cause great harm to plaintiffs or others through exposure to the Abney Complaint, plaintiffs assert a citizen suit under 6972(a)(1)(A) to compel
contaminated water. Since the drinking water supply to the residential area is from a Chevron to comply with unspecified provisions of the RCRA and the regulations
public water supply, there is no known risk to the drinking water from contamination. promulgated thereunder. In Count VIII, they assert a citizen suit under 6972(a)(1)(B)
Indeed, plaintiffs have stipulated that there exists no possibility of harmful exposure to to compel Chevron to perform certain remedial measures. Plaintiffs have, however,
contaminants stemming from Chevron's operations. There is also no evidence in the "withdraw[n] their claim for injunctive relief under the RCRA" (Pl.'s Opp'n at 30),
record that gasoline cannot be stored in USTs safely with reasonable care. And finally, because the EPA, on November 26, 2002, issued an Administrative Order, pursuant to
although the service station is located in close proximity to a residential neighborhood, it 6973 of the RCRA, requiring Chevron to investigate and, if necessary, to develop a
is also situated among other commercial properties, including several other retail remedial approach to the conditions that are the subject of this litigation. (See Def.'s Ex. 3
gasoline service stations and a dry cleaner. at III.) Therefore, because plaintiffs have abandoned these claims, the Court will grant
Nothing in Brennan Construction Co. v. Cumberland, 29 App. D.C. 554 (1907), and Yommer Chevron's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Counts VII and VIII of
v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969), on which plaintiffs primarily rely, the Abney Complaint.
over the bed of the [Potomac River], two large tanks, and stored therein some 14,000 VI. Claims of Individuals Whose Properties Do Not Overlie Subsurface Contamination
gallons of petroleum residuum, and permitted a considerable quantity to escape to the According to Chevron, at least some plaintiffs own or reside in homes that are not
river, remain thereon for weeks, and injure innocent persons." Brennan Constr. Co., 29 situated over the subsurface contamination at issue in this litigation. For the purposes of
App.
D.C.
at
561.
Here,
Chevron
stored
gasoline
in
USTs
away
from
any
potable
water
its
motion,
Chevron
identifies
six
plaintiffs
who
it
contends
fall
into
this
category:
(1)
Mary
and
Eunice
Minor,
of
828
Jefferson
Street,
N.E.,
Washington,
DC;
(2)
Jacob
and
judgment.
The
maps
on
which
Chevron
relies
are
presented
without
any
affidavit
Gloria Carey, formerly of 5204 12th Street, N.E., Washington DC; and (3) Tometta and explaining who prepared them, how they were prepared, and whether they attempt to
Fred Dendy, of 618 Oglethorpe Street, N.E., Washington, DC. (Id.) In support of this delineate the current extent of contamination.11 Without anything to substantiate their
contention, Chevron relies on certain maps purportedly published by the U.S. Army authenticity, the maps would be inadmissible at trial to establish the plume boundaries
Corps of Engineers, which tend to show that the properties of these six plaintiffs "and and thus cannot be considered for that purpose on a motion for summary judgment. To
others" are not situated over the plume of contamination. be admissible at the summary judgment stage, documents must be authenticated by and
Chevron also notes that, instead of claiming that their properties directly overlie attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of Rule 56(e).
subsurface contamination, these six plaintiffs merely allege that their properties are While the Court recognizes that evidence "should not be excluded on summary judgment
"located adjacent to the underground Plume of contamination." on hypertechnical grounds," Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 F.2d 59, 67 (3d Cir.1989), strict
Chevron argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims asserted by adherence to the requirements of Rule 56(e) is particularly appropriate here because the
these six plaintiffs and others whose properties are not located over the subsurface delineation of the plume boundaries is arguably a matter of expert opinion rather than a
contamination. (See Def.'s Mem. at 29-33.) According to Chevron, a party cannot recover pure question of fact, see id. (unsworn expert report is not competent to be considered
damages for alleged diminution in value based upon mere proximity to environmental on a motion for summary judgment). To the extent that the maps were prepared by an
contamination. Relying primarily on case law from other jurisdictions, Chevron argues expert, plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to depose the expert or assess the facts
that a plaintiff either must prove actual physical impact upon the subject property, see, and methodology on which the expert relied to form an opinion about the scope of
e.g., Adams v. Star Enter., 51 F.3d 417, 422-25 (4th Cir.1995) (Virginia law); Berry v. contamination. Moreover, expert discovery on this issue and others has not yet been
Armstrong Rubber Co., 989 F.2d 822, 829 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1117, 114 completed in this litigation.
S.Ct. 1067, 127 L.Ed.2d 386 (1994) (Mississippi law), or substantial interference with the In short, because Chevron has failed to support its motion with admissible evidence, the
use and enjoyment of the property, see, e.g., Exxon v. Yarema, 69 Md.App. 124, 516 A.2d Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist, which preclude it from granting
990, 1004 (1986), in order to maintain a valid claim for tort damages. Chevron asserts summary judgment on these claims.
that
those
plaintiffs
whose
properties
are
not
situated
over
the
plume
cannot
prove
the
requisite
impact,
and
that
under
District
of
Columbia
law,
diminution
of
market
value
O R D E R
alone,
with
no
accompanying
personal
or
property
damage
does
not
constitute
an
Defendant's
Motion
for
Partial
Summary
Judgment
is
GRANTED
IN
PART
and
DENIED
IN
unreasonable
interference
with
the
use
and
enjoyment
of
land.
See
Nat'l
Tel.
Coop.
PART.
Parties
shall
meet
and
confer
on
all
outstanding
discovery
issues
and
submit
to
the
Ass'n,
38
F.Supp.2d
at
14
(so
holding
in
context
of
private
nuisance
claim).
Court
a
joint
proposal
for
the
scheduling
of
the
completion
of
discovery.
Any
plaintiff
Without
considering
the
merits
of
Chevron's
legal
arguments,
the
Court
must
deny
its
who
intends
to
proceed
pro
se
must
attend
the
status
conference.
motion
as
to
these
claims
because
Chevron
has
failed
to
submit
admissible
evidence
to
establish, as a factual matter, that one or more plaintiffs own or reside on property that is
not situated over subsurface contamination. It is well settled that only admissible
evidence may be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary