2/15/2017 G.R.No.

153567

TodayisWednesday,February15,2017

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT ClipHighli
Manila

THIRDDIVISION

G.R.No.153567February18,2008

LIBRADAM.AQUINO,petitioner,
vs.
ERNESTS.AURE1,respondent.

DECISION

CHICONAZARIO,J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Librada M. Aquino (Aquino), seeking the reversal and the setting aside of the Decision3 dated 17
October 2001 and the Resolution4 dated 8 May 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 63733. The
appellatecourt,initsassailedDecisionandResolution,reversedtheDecision5oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)
ofQuezonCity,Branch88,affirmingtheDecision6oftheMetropolitanTrialCourt(MeTC)ofQuezonCity,Branch
32,whichdismissedrespondentErnestoAures(Aure)complaintforejectmentontheground,interalia,offailure
tocomplywithbarangayconciliationproceedings.

ThesubjectofthepresentcontroversyisaparceloflandsituatedinRoxasDistrict,QuezonCity,withanareaof
449squaremetersandcoveredbyTransferCertificateofTitle(TCT)No.205447registeredwiththeRegistryof
DeedsofQuezonCity(subjectproperty).7

AureandE.S.AureLendingInvestors,Inc.(AureLending)filedaComplaintforejectmentagainstAquinobefore
the MeTC docketed as Civil Case No. 17450. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they
acquired the subject property from Aquino and her husband Manuel (spouses Aquino) by virtue of a Deed of
Sale8 executed on 4 June 1996. Aure claimed that after the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration
forthesaleofthesubjectproperty,theyrefusedtovacatethesame.9

InherAnswer,10AquinocounteredthattheComplaintinCivilCaseNo.17450lackscauseofactionforAureand
Aure Lending do not have any legal right over the subject property. Aquino admitted that there was a sale but
such was governed by the Memorandum of Agreement11 (MOA) signed by Aure. As stated in the MOA, Aure
shallsecurealoanfromabankorfinancialinstitutioninhisownnameusingthesubjectpropertyascollateraland
turnovertheproceedsthereoftothespousesAquino.However,evenafterAuresuccessfullysecuredaloan,the
spousesAquinodidnotreceivetheproceedsthereonorbenefitedtherefrom.

On20April1999,theMeTCrenderedaDecisioninCivilCaseNo.17450infavorofAquinoanddismissedthe
Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for noncompliance with the barangay conciliation process,
amongothergrounds.TheMeTCobservedthatAureandAquinoareresidentsofthesamebarangaybutthereis
noshowingthatanyattempthasbeenmadetosettlethecaseamicablyatthebarangaylevel.TheMeTCfurther
observedthatAureLendingwasimproperlyincludedasplaintiffinCivilCaseNo.17450foritdidnotstandtobe
injuredorbenefitedbythesuit.Finally,theMeTCruledthatsincethequestionofownershipwasputinissue,the
action was converted from a mere detainer suit to one "incapable of pecuniary estimation" which properly rests
withintheoriginalexclusivejurisdictionoftheRTC.ThedispositiveportionoftheMeTCDecisionreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, let this case be, as it is, hereby ordered DISMISSED. [Aquinos]
counterclaimislikewisedismissed.12

Onappeal,theRTCaffirmedthedismissaloftheComplaintonthesamegroundthatthedisputewasnotbrought
beforetheBarangayCouncilforconciliationbeforeitwasfiledincourt.InaDecisiondated14December2000,
theRTCstressedthatthebarangayconciliationprocessisaconditiosinequanonforthefilingofanejectment
complaint involving residents of the same barangay, and failure to comply therewith constitutes sufficient cause
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_153567_2008.html 1/8
2/15/2017 G.R.No.153567

forthedismissaloftheaction.TheRTClikewisevalidatedtherulingoftheMeTCthatthemainissueinvolvedin
CivilCaseNo.17450isincapableofpecuniaryestimationandcognizablebytheRTC.Hence,theRTCruled:

WHEREFORE,findingnoreversibleerrorintheappealedjudgment,itisherebyaffirmedinitsentirety.13

AuresMotionforReconsiderationwasdeniedbytheRTCinanOrder14dated27February2001.

Undaunted,AureappealedtheadverseRTCDecisionwiththeCourtofAppealsarguingthatthelowercourterred
indismissinghisComplaintforlackofcauseofaction.Aureassertedthatmisjoinderofpartieswasnotaproper
groundfordismissalofhisComplaintandthattheMeTCshouldhaveonlyorderedtheexclusionofAureLending
ClipHighli
as plaintiff without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 17450 until the final
determinationthereof.AurefurtherasseveratedthatmereallegationofownershipshouldnotdivesttheMeTCof
jurisdiction over the ejectment suit since jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and should not
depend on the defenses and objections raised by the parties. Finally, Aure contended that the MeTC erred in
dismissinghisComplaintwithprejudiceonthegroundofnoncompliancewithbarangayconciliationprocess.He
was not given the opportunity to rectify the procedural defect by going through the barangay mediation
proceedingsand,thereafter,refiletheComplaint.15

On 17 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, reversing the MeTC and RTC Decisions and
remandingthecasetotheMeTCforfurtherproceedingsandfinaldeterminationofthesubstantiverightsofthe
parties.TheappellatecourtdeclaredthatthefailureofAuretosubjectthemattertobarangayconciliationisnota
jurisdictionalflawanditwillnotaffectthesufficiencyofAuresComplaintsinceAquinofailedtoseasonablyraise
suchissueinherAnswer.TheCourtofAppealsfurtherruledthatmereallegationofownershipdoesnotdeprive
theMeTCofjurisdictionovertheejectmentcaseforjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterisconferredbylawandis
determinedbytheallegationsadvancedbytheplaintiffinhiscomplaint.Hence,mereassertionofownershipby
thedefendantinanejectmentcasewillnotousttheMeTCofitssummaryjurisdictionoverthesame.Thedecretal
partoftheCourtofAppealsDecisionreads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thepetitionisherebyGRANTEDandthedecisionsofthetrialcourtsbelow
REVERSEDandSETASIDE.Lettherecordsberemandedbacktothecourtaquoforfurtherproceedingsfor
aneventualdecisionofthesubstantiverightsofthedisputants.16

In a Resolution dated 8 May 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by
Aquino for it was merely a rehash of the arguments set forth in her previous pleadings which were already
consideredandpasseduponbytheappellatecourtinitsassailedDecision.

AquinoisnowbeforethisCourtviathePetitionatbarraisingthefollowingissues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IS A

JURISDICTIONALDEFECTTHATWARRANTSTHEDISMISSALOFTHECOMPLAINT.

II.

WHETHERORNOTALLEGATIONOFOWNERSHIPOUSTSTHEMeTCOFITSJURISDICTIONOVERAN
EJECTMENTCASE.

Thebarangayjusticesystemwasestablishedprimarilyasameansofeasingupthecongestionofcasesinthe
judicialcourts.Thiscouldbeaccomplishedthroughaproceedingbeforethebarangaycourtswhich,accordingto
theconceptorofthesystem,thelateChiefJusticeFredRuizCastro,isessentiallyarbitrationincharacter,andto
makeittrulyeffective,itshouldalsobecompulsory.Withthisprimaryobjectiveofthebarangayjusticesystemin
mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise
knownastheKatarungangPambarangayLaw,andthepolicybehinditwouldbebetterservedifanoutofcourt
settlementofthecaseisreachedvoluntarilybytheparties.17

TheprimordialobjectiveofPresidentialDecreeNo.1508istoreducethenumberofcourtlitigationsandprevent
the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the
courts.18Toensurethisobjective,Section6ofPresidentialDecreeNo.150819requiresthepartiestoundergoa
conciliationprocessbeforetheLuponChairmanorthePangkatngTagapagkasundoasapreconditiontofilinga
complaintincourtsubjecttocertainexceptions20whichareinapplicabletothiscase.Thesaidsectionhasbeen
declaredcompulsoryinnature.21

Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local
GovernmentCode,whichtookeffecton1January1992.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_153567_2008.html 2/8
2/15/2017 G.R.No.153567

ThepertinentprovisionsoftheLocalGovernmentCodemakingconciliationapreconditiontofilingofcomplaints
incourt,read:

SEC.412.Conciliation.(a)Preconditiontofilingofcomplaintincourt.Nocomplaint,petition,action,or
proceedinginvolvinganymatterwithintheauthorityoftheluponshallbefiledorinstituteddirectlyincourt
oranyothergovernmentofficeforadjudication,unlesstherehasbeenaconfrontationbetweentheparties
before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat
chairmanorunlessthesettlementhasbeenrepudiatedbythepartiesthereto.

(b)Wherepartiesmaygodirectlytocourt.Thepartiesmaygodirectlytocourtinthefollowinginstances: ClipHighli

(1)Wheretheaccusedisunderdetention

(2)Whereapersonhasotherwisebeendeprivedofpersonallibertycallingforhabeascorpusproceedings

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
deliveryofpersonalproperty,andsupportpendenteliteand

(4)Wheretheactionmayotherwisebebarredbythestatuteoflimitations.

(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. The customs and traditions of
indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural
communities.

SEC.408.SubjectMatterforAmicableSettlementExceptionTherein.Theluponofeachbarangayshall
have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlementofalldisputesexcept:

(a)Whereonepartyisthegovernmentoranysubdivisionorinstrumentalitythereof

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his
officialfunctions

(c)Offensespunishablebyimprisonmentexceedingone(1)yearorafineexceedingFivethousandpesos
(P5,000.00)

(d)Offenseswherethereisnoprivateoffendedparty

(e)Wherethedisputeinvolvesrealpropertieslocatedindifferentcitiesormunicipalitiesunlesstheparties
theretoagreetosubmittheirdifferencestoamicablesettlementbyanappropriatelupon

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicablesettlementbyanappropriatelupon

(g)SuchotherclassesofdisputeswhichthePresidentmaydetermineintheinterestofjusticeoruponthe
recommendationoftheSecretaryofJustice.

ThereisnodisputehereinthatthepresentcasewasneverreferredtotheBarangayLuponforconciliationbefore
Aure and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of such barangay conciliation
proceedingswasmadeinAureandAureLendingsComplaintbeforetheMeTC.Theonlyissuetoberesolvedis
whethernonrecoursetothebarangay conciliation process is a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of
theejectmentsuitfiledwiththeMeTC.

Aquinopositsthatfailuretoresorttobarangayconciliationmakestheactionforejectmentprematureand,hence,
dismissible.Shelikewiseaversthatthisobjectionwastimelyraisedduringthepretrialandevensubsequentlyin
herPositionPapersubmittedtotheMeTC.

Wedonotagree.

It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the Local
GovernmentCodeonbarangayconciliation(previouslycontainedinSection5ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1508)is
muchthesameeffectproducedbynonexhaustionofadministrativeremediesthecomplaintbecomesafflicted
withtheviceofprematurityandthecontroversythereallegedisnotripeforjudicialdetermination.Thecomplaint
becomesvulnerabletoamotiontodismiss.22Nevertheless,the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, so that noncompliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
otherwiseacquiredoverthesubjectmatteroroverthepersonofthedefendant.23
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_153567_2008.html 3/8
2/15/2017 G.R.No.153567

AsenunciatedinthelandmarkcaseofRoyalesv.IntermediateAppellateCourt24:

Ordinarily,noncompliancewiththeconditionprecedentprescribedbyP.D.1508couldaffectthesufficiency
oftheplaintiff'scauseofactionandmakehiscomplaintvulnerabletodismissalongroundoflackofcause
of action or prematurity but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercisingitspowerofadjudicationoverthecasebeforeit,wherethedefendants,asinthiscase,
failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire
proceedingsaquo.

While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by
seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer ClipHighli
and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross
examining respondent Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to
adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had
submittedthemselvesvoluntarily.xxx(Emphasissupplied.)

Inthecaseatbar,wesimilarlyfindthatAquinocannotbeallowedtoattackthejurisdictionoftheMeTCoverCivil
Case No. 17450 after having submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously examined Aquinos
Answer before the MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450 and there is utter lack of any objection on her part to any
deficiencyinthecomplaintwhichcouldousttheMeTCofitsjurisdcition.

WethusquotewithapprovalthedisquisitionoftheCourtofAppeals:

Moreover,theCourttakesnotethatthedefendant[Aquino]herselfdidnotraiseindefensetheaforesaid
lackofconciliationproceedingsinheranswer,whichraisestheexclusiveaffirmativedefenseofsimulation.
By this acquiescence, defendant [Aquino] is deemed to have waived such objection. As held in a case of
similarcircumstances,thefailureofadefendant[Aquino]inanejectmentsuittospecificallyallegethefact
thattherewasnocompliancewiththebarangayconciliationprocedureconstitutesawaiverofthatdefense.
xxx.25

By Aquinos failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to have already
acquiesced or waived any defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move for the
dismissaloftheejectmentsuitforAureandAureLendingsfailuretoresorttothebarangayconciliationprocess,
sincesheisalreadyprecludedfromdoingso.ThefactthatAquinoraisedsuchobjectionduringthepretrialand
inherPositionPaperisofnomoment,fortheissueofnonrecoursetobarangaymediationproceedingsshould
beimpleadedinherAnswer.

AsprovidedunderSection1,Rule9ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure:

Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motiontodismissorintheansweraredeemedwaived.However,whenitappearsfromthepleadings
or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgmentorbystatuteoflimitations,thecourtshalldismisstheclaim.(Emphasissupplied.)

Whiletheaforequotedprovisionappliestoapleading(specifically,anAnswer)oramotiontodismiss,asimilaror
identicalruleisprovidedforallothermotionsinSection8ofRule15ofthesameRulewhichstates:

Sec.8.OmnibusMotion.SubjecttotheprovisionsofSection1ofRule9,amotionattackingapleading,
order,judgment,orproceedingshallincludeallobjectionsthenavailable,andallobjectionsnotsoincluded
shallbedeemedwaived.

Thespiritthatsurroundstheforegoingstatutorynormistorequirethepartyfilingapleadingormotiontoraiseall
availableexceptionsforreliefduringthesingleopportunitysothatsingleormultipleobjectionsmaybeavoided.26
It is clear and categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court that failure to raise defenses and
objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed a waiver thereof and basic is the rule in statutory
constructionthatwhenthelawisclearandfreefromanydoubtorambiguity,thereisnoroomforconstructionor
interpretation.27Ashasbeenourconsistentruling,wherethelawspeaksinclearandcategoricallanguage,there
is no occasion for interpretation there is only room for application.28 Thus, although Aquinos defense of non
compliancewithPresidentialDecreeNo.1508ismeritorious,procedurally,suchdefenseisnolongeravailablefor
failuretopleadthesameintheAnswerasrequiredbytheomnibusmotionrule.

NeithercouldtheMeTCdismissCivilCaseNo.17450motuproprio.The1997RulesofCivilProcedureprovide
only three instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, and that is when the pleadings or
evidence on the record show that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter (2) there is another
cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause or (3) where the action is barred by a

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_153567_2008.html 4/8
2/15/2017 G.R.No.153567

priorjudgmentorbyastatuteoflimitations.Thus,itisclearthatacourtmaynotmotupropriodismissacaseon
thegroundoffailuretocomplywiththerequirementforbarangayconciliation,thisgroundnotbeingamongthose
mentionedforthedismissalbythetrialcourtofacaseonitsowninitiative.

AquinofurtherarguesthattheissueofpossessionintheinstantcasecannotberesolvedbytheMeTCwithout
first adjudicating the question of ownership, since the Deed of Sale vesting Aure with the legal right over the
subjectpropertyissimulated.

Again,wedonotagree.Jurisdictioninejectmentcasesisdeterminedbytheallegationspleadedinthecomplaint.
Aslongastheseallegationsdemonstrateacauseofactioneitherforforcibleentryorforunlawfuldetainer,the
courtacquiresjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter.Thisprincipleholds,evenifthefactsprovedduringthetrialdo ClipHighli
not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court after acquiring jurisdiction may
resolvetodismisstheactionforinsufficiencyofevidence.

ThenecessaryallegationsinaComplaintforejectmentaresetforthinSection1,Rule70oftheRulesofCourt,
whichreads:

SECTION1.Whomayinstituteproceedings,andwhen.Subjecttotheprovisionsofthenextsucceeding
section,apersondeprivedofthepossessionofanylandorbuildingbyforce,intimidation,threat,strategy,
or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
buildingisunlawfullywithheldaftertheexpirationorterminationoftherighttoholdpossession,byvirtueof
any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee,orotherpersonmayatanytimewithinone(1)yearaftersuchunlawfuldeprivationorwithholding
ofpossession,bringanactionintheproperMunicipalTrialCourtagainstthepersonorpersonsunlawfully
withholdingordeprivingofpossession,oranypersonorpersonsclaimingunderthem,fortherestitutionof
suchpossession,togetherwithdamagesandcosts.

Inthecaseatbar,theComplaintfiledbyAureandAureLendingon2April1997,allegedasfollows:

2.[AureandAureLending]becametheownersofahouseandlotlocatedatNo.37SalazarStreetcorner
Encarnacion Street, B.F. Homes, Quezon City by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed by [the
spousesAquino]infavorof[AureandAureLending]althoughregisteredinthenameofxxxErnestoS.
Aure title to the said property had already been issued in the name of [Aure] as shown by a transfer
CertificateofTitle,acopyofwhichisheretoattachedandmadeanintegralparthereofasAnnexA

3. However, despite the sale thus transferring ownership of the subject premises to [Aure and Aure
Lending] as abovestated and consequently terminating [Aquinos] right of possession over the subject
property,[Aquino]togetherwithherfamily,iscontinuouslyoccupyingthesubjectpremisesnotwithstanding
severaldemandsmadeby[AureandAureLending]against[Aquino]andallpersonsclaimingrightunder
hertovacatethesubjectpremisesandsurrenderpossessionthereofto[AureandAureLending]causing
damage and prejudice to [Aure and Aure Lending] and making [Aquinos] occupancy together with those
actuallyoccupyingthesubjectpremisesclaimingrightunderher,illegal.29

ItcanbeinferredfromtheforegoingthatAure,togetherwithAureLending,soughtthepossessionofthesubject
propertywhichwasneversurrenderedbyAquinoaftertheperfectionoftheDeedofSale,whichgivesrisetoa
cause of action for an ejectment suit cognizable by the MeTC. Aures assertion of possession over the subject
property is based on his ownership thereof as evidenced by TCT No. 156802 bearing his name. That Aquino
impugned the validity of Aures title over the subject property and claimed that the Deed of Sale was simulated
shouldnotdivesttheMeTCofjurisdictionovertheejectmentcase.30

AsextensivelydiscussedbytheeminentjuristFlorenzD.RegaladoinRefugiav.CourtofAppeals31:

Asthelawonforcibleentryandunlawfuldetainercasesnowstands,evenwherethedefendantraisesthe
questionofownershipinhispleadingsandthequestionofpossessioncannotberesolvedwithoutdeciding
the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue of ownership albeit only to
determinetheissueofpossession.

xxx.Thelaw,asrevised,nowprovidesinsteadthatwhenthequestionofpossessioncannotbe
resolvedwithoutdecidingtheissueofownership,theissueofownershipshallberesolvedonlyto
determinetheissueofpossession.Onitsface,thenewRuleonSummaryProcedurewasextendedto
include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the issue of
ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in
ejectmentsuitshasbeenthusconferredontheinferiorcourts.

Attheoutset,itmustherebestressedthattheresolutionofthisparticularissueconcernsandappliesonly
toforcibleentryandunlawfuldetainercaseswheretheissueofpossessionisintimatelyintertwinedwiththe
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_153567_2008.html 5/8
2/15/2017 G.R.No.153567

issue of ownership. It finds no proper application where it is otherwise, that is, where ownership is not in
issue,orwheretheprincipalandmainissueraisedintheallegationsofthecomplaintaswellastherelief
prayedformakeoutnotacaseforejectmentbutoneforrecoveryofownership.

Aproposthereto,thisCourtruledinHilariov.CourtofAppeals32:

Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely
provisionaland,therefore,wouldnotbarorprejudiceanactionbetweenthesamepartiesinvolvingtitleto
the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real
property,thatis,possessiondefactoandnotpossessiondejure." ClipHighli

In other words, inferior courts are now "conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or
ownershipraisedbythepartiesinanejectmentsuit."Thesecourtsshallresolvethequestionofownershipraised
as an incident in an ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete
adjudicationoftheissueofpossession.33

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17
October 2001 and its Resolution dated 8 May 2002 in CAG.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
againstthepetitioner.

SOORDERED.

MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

RUBENT.REYES
AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedto
thewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,ThirdDivision

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certifiedthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedto
thewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
1Substitutedbyhisheirs:AgnesJ.Aure,Ma.CeciliaAureQuinsay,Ma.ConcepcionCriseldaAureBarrion,
Ma.ErnaJ.Aure,ErnestMichaelJ.AureandMa.MelissaJ.Aurerollo,p.159.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_153567_2008.html 6/8
2/15/2017 G.R.No.153567
2Rollo,pp.821.

3PennedbyAssociateJusticeRamonMabutas,Jr.withAssociateJusticesRobertoA.Barriosand
EdgardoP.Cruz,concurring.Rollo,pp.2126.
4Id.at28.

5Records,514515.

6Id.at436439.
ClipHighli
7Id.at482483.

8Id.

9Id.at17.

10Id.at1115.

11Id.at1415.

12Id.at439.

13Id.at516.

14Id.at537.

15Id.at465480.

16Rollo,p.25.

17Peoplev.Caruncho,Jr.,212Phil.16,27(1984).

18Galubav.Laureta,G.R.No.71091,29January1988,157SCRA627,634.

19SECTION6.Conciliation,preconditiontofilingofcomplaint.Nocomplaint,petition,actionor
proceedinginvolvinganymatterwithintheauthorityoftheLuponasprovidedinSection2hereofshallbe
filedorinstitutedincourtoranyothergovernmentofficeforadjudicationunlesstherehasbeena
confrontationofthepartiesbeforetheLuponChairmanorthePangkatandnoconciliationorsettlement
hasbeenreachedascertifiedbytheLuponSecretaryorthePangkatSecretaryattestedbytheLuponor
PangkatChairman,orunlessthesettlementhasbeenrepudiated.However,thepartiesmaygodirectlyto
courtinthefollowingcases:

1]Wheretheaccusedisunderdetention

2]Whereapersonhasotherwisebeendeprivedofpersonallibertycallingforhabeascorpus
proceedings

3]Actionscoupledwithprovisionalremediessuchaspreliminaryinjunction,attachment,deliveryof
personalpropertyandsupportpendenteliteand

4]WheretheactionmayotherwisebebarredbytheStatuteofLimitations.
20Paragraph2,Section6,PDNo.1508.

However,thepartiesmaygodirectlytocourtinthefollowingcases:

1]Wheretheaccusedisunderdetention

2]Whereapersonhasotherwisebeendeprivedofpersonallibertycallingforhabeascorpus
proceedings

3]Actionscoupledwithprovisionalremediessuchaspreliminaryinjunction,attachment,deliveryof
personalpropertyandsupportpendenteliteand

4]WheretheactionmayotherwisebebarredbytheStatuteofLimitations.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_153567_2008.html 7/8
2/15/2017 G.R.No.153567

21Moratav.Go,210Phil.367,372(1983).

22Uyv.Contreras,G.R.No.11141617,26September1994,237SCRA167,170.

23Prescov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.82215,10December1990,192SCRA232,240241.

24212Phil.432,435436(1984).

25Rollo,p.24.
ClipHighli
26Manacopv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.104875,13November1992,215SCRA773,778.

27TwinAceHoldingsCorporationv.RufinaandCompany,G.R.No.160191,8June2006,490SCRA368,
376.

28Id.

29Records,pp.12.

30Tecsonv.Gutierez,G.R.No.152928,4March2005,452SCRA781,786.

31327Phil.982,10011002(1996).

32329Phil.202,208(1996),ascitedinOroncev.CourtofAppeals,358Phil.616(1998).

33Id.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_153567_2008.html 8/8