I. 1st SET
29,
a. Saura Import and Export Co. vs DBP (April 27,
1972)
b. BPI Investment Corp. vs CA (Feb. 15, 2002)
c. Bonnevie vs CA (Oct. 24, 1983)
d. Central Bank of the Philippines vs CA (Oct. 3,
1985)
e. Republic vs Bagtas
f. Catholic Vicar Apostolic Inc. of the Mt. Province vs
CA (Sept. 21, 1988)
g. Quintos and Ansaldo vs Beck (69 Phil 108) (1939)
h. Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. vs CA (April 19,
2001)
i. Republic vs Grijaldo (G.R. No. 20240) (1965)
j. Casa Filipino Development Corp. vs Deputy
Executive Secretary (209 SCRA 379)
k. PNB vs CA (April 30, 1991)
l. Relucio vs Garfin (G.R. No. 76518) (1990)
m. Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. vs CA (July 12, 1994)
n. Phil. American Accident Inc. Co. vs Flores (97
SCRA 1980)
II. 2nd SET (DEPOSITS)
a. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs IAC and 2
Shornack (164 SCRA 630) (Aug. 19, 1988)
b. Triple V Ford Services Inc. vs Filipino Merchants
Insurance Co. Inc. (G.R. No. 160544) (Feb. 21, 2005)
c. CA Agro Industrial Devt. Corp. vs CA and Security
Bank and Trust Co. (G.R. No. 90027) (March 3, 1993)
(2195426)
d. Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro vs Dela Pena (26
Phil 144) (Nov. 21, 1913)
e. YHT Rently Corp. vs CA (451 SCRA 638) (Feb. 17,
2005)
III. 3rd SET
a. Navoa and Navoa vs CA (G.R. No. 59255) (Dec.
1995)
b. Constantino vs Cuisia (472 SCRA 505) (Oct. 13,
2005)
c. ACME Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. and Chia Pac
vs CA (260 SCRA 714) (Aug. 22, 1996)
d. Selegna Management and Development Corp. vs
UCPB (489 SCRA 125)
f. Transfield Philippines Inc. vs Luzon Hydro
Corporation Australia et.al. (443 SCRA 307) (Nov. 22, 2004)
g. Feati Bank and Trust Co. vs CA and Villaluz (196
SCRA 576)
h. Calinares and Velaso vs CA (339 SCRA 605) (Sept.
5, 2000)
i. Dino and Uy vs CA and Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co. (216 SCRA 9) (Nov. 26, 1992)
j. Escano and Silas vs RItagni (526 SCRA 26) (june
29, 2007)
k. Tupaz IV and Tupaz vs CA and BPI (475 SCRA 398)
(Nov. 18, 2005)
l. Prudential bank vs IAC (216 SCRA 257) (Dec. 8,
1992)

I. INTRODUCTION (9)
White Gold Marine Services vs Pioneer
Insurance (G.R. No. 154514)
FACTS: White Gold procured a protection and indemnity
coverage for its vessels from The Steamship Mutual
through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation. White
Gold was issued a Certificate of Entry and Acceptance.
Pioneer also issued receipts. When White Gold failed to
fully pay its accounts, Steamship Mutual refused to renew
the coverage. Steamship Mutual thereafter filed a case
against White Gold for collection of sum of money to
recover the unpaid balance. White Gold on the other
hand, filed a complaint before the Insurance Commission
claiming that Steamship Mutual and Pioneer violated
provisions of the Insurance Code. The Insurance
Commission dismissed the complaint. It said that there
was no need for Steamship Mutual to secure a license
because it was not engaged in the insurance business and
that it was a P & I club. Pioneer was not required to obtain
another license as insurance agent because Steamship
Mutual was not engaged in the insurance business.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Insurance Commissioner. In its decision, the appellate
court distinguished between P & I Clubs vis--vis
conventional insurance. The appellate court also held that
Pioneer merely acted as a collection agent of Steamship
Mutual. Hence this petition by White Gold.
ISSUE: W/N Steamship Mutual is engaged in the insurance
business in the Philippines?
HELD: Yes. Protection & Indemnity Club (P & I Club) is a
form of insurance against third party liability, where the
third party is anyone other than the P & I Club and the
members. By definition then, Steamship Mutual as a P & I
Club is a mutual insurance association engaged in the
marine insurance business. Relatedly, a mutual insurance
company is a cooperative enterprise where the members
are both the insurer and insured. In it, the members all
contribute, by a system of premiums or assessments, to
the creation of a fund from which all losses and liabilities
are paid, and where the profits are divided among
themselves, in proportion to their interest. The test to
determine if a contract is an insurance contract or not,
depends on the nature of the promise, the act required to
be performed, and the exact nature of the agreement in
the light of the occurrence, contingency, or circumstances
under which the performance becomes requisite. The
records reveal Steamship Mutual is doing business in the
country albeit without the requisite certificate of authority
mandated by Section 187 of the Insurance Code. It
maintains a resident agent in the Philippines to solicit
insurance and to collect payments in its behalf. Steamship
Mutual even renewed its P & I Club cover until it was
cancelled due to non-payment of the calls. Thus, to
continue doing business here, Steamship Mutual or
through its agent Pioneer, must secure a license from the
Insurance Commission.
Since a contract of insurance involves public interest,
regulation by the State is necessary. Thus, no insurer or
insurance company is allowed to engage in the insurance
business without a license or a certificate of authority from
the Insurance Commission.
People v Quibate G.R. No. L-54881 ; July 31, 1984
FACTS: Accused Rodolfo Quibate appeals the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Capiz finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Prima Baltar-Quibate. After the promulgation of this
case, the court moto proprio cancels the promulgation upon
noting that the regular counsel de oficio, Atty. Antonio Bisnar
was not around at the time and the accused refused to sign
receipt of a copy of the decision and upon noting that there was
a typographical error in the decision consisting of the wrong
penalty and the court noting further that the decision have not
been filed. Notifying accused and counsel of the new date of
promulgation which is hereby set for March 20, 1980. On March
20, 1980, the counsel de oficio was again absent so the court
appointed a well-known practitioner in the area, Atty. Jose
Alovera, to assist the accused in the promulgation and to
coordinate with the other counsel Atty. Antonio Bisnar.
Promulgation was re-set to April 1, 1980. On March 27, 1980,
Atty. Alovera filed a motion to advance the date of promulgation
to March 31, 1980 as counsel had to leave for Iloilo City on April
1, 1980. The motion to advance the date of promulgation was
considered on April 1, 1980. Promulgation was re-set to April 11,
1980. The appellant questions the cancellation and resetting of
promulgation stating that the counsel did not have to be
present during the promulgation of judgment and that there was
no need to nullify a promulgation already effected simply
because the accused refused to sign. According to the
appellant's brief, the appellant refused to sign because he did
not know how to write.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presence of counsel is essential
during the promulgation of judgment
HELD: No. It is not required that counsel for the accused must
be present when judgment is promulgated for it to be valid and
effective. However, considering the level of intelligence of the
accused and the serious nature of the offense, the Court had
reason to require counsel's presence during promulgation. The
court, however, followed a manifestly strange procedure when it
pronounced the sentence of conviction and then immediately
afterwards, reconsidered and cancelled the whole thing on the
ground, among others, that the lawyer was not present. On
noticing that there was no lawyer for the accused, the Court
should have deferred the promulgation of the decision if it
wanted counsel to be around.
Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 109242, January
26, 1999
Facts: On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the
Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan,
the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in
the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold
Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the
Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the
Makati Post Office. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the
National Bureau of Investigation in apprehending the group
responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office. On February
17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to
Legaspi Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of
mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents
composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private
car. At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai,
was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street.
Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Upon
reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons,
who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito
Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag to a
travelling bag. Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon
seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and
started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan
handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty.
Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two accused. The NBI agents
followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.
The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their
headquarters. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their
signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence
of the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and
the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to
Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify
the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them. A case for
qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the
accused were declared guilty.
Issue(s): Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were
inadmissible as evidence.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. It is
known that during custodial investigation, a person has the right to
remain silent and the right to an attorney. Any admission or confession
made in the absence of counsel is inadmissible as evidence.
Furthermore, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. In the instant case, even though the petitioner was asked to
sign the letters, the letters are still admissible as evidence because
the accused was convicted not only by means of these letters but also
by testimonies made by the NBI agents. Moreover, the Supreme Court
held that the letters were validly seized as an incident of a valid arrest
and therefore can stand on their own. The decision of the
Sandiganbayan is affirmed.
People v. Cayago G.R. No. 128827 ; August 18, 1999
FACTS: For killing his own wife through strangulation and with
evident premeditation, appellant was indicted for parricide. On
August 3, 1995, when Cayago was about to be brought to Camp
Crame for a polygraph test, he requested permission to go to
the nearby church. Cayago requested that he be accompanied
by SPO2 Delos Reyes, who agreed. Thereat, Cayago admitted to
SPO2 Delos Reyes that he killed his wife Myra Cayago and was
willing to give his statement relative to said killing. SPO2 Delos
Reyes and Cayago returned to the police station and upon such
information, Sr. Inspector Pajota instructed Zinampan to secure
a lawyer to assist Cayago. Zinampan then requested Atty.
Reynario Campanilla, who agreed to assist Cayago. Atty.
Campanilla conferred with Cayago at the Office of the
Investigation Division. After apprising Cayago of his
constitutional rights, Cayago admitted that he killed his wife.
Atty. Campanilla then advised Cayago to personally write down
his confession which Cayago did for about an hour in the
presence of Atty. Campanilla. Thereafter, with the aid of a tape
recorder, requested Cayago to read his admission. After
informing Cayago of his constitutional rights against self-
incrimination, SPO2 Delos Reyes started taking down Cayagos
extra-judicial confession again in the presence of Atty.
Campanilla and who signed said statement together with
Cayago.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement he gave to the police is
inadmissible in evidence because of the absence of counsel
HELD: No. Appellants contention that the statement he gave to
the police is inadmissible in evidence because it was given
without affording him the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution has no merit. It is undisputed that appellant was
not arrested because the authorities were not yet aware of the
crime. It was he himself who reported the incident to the police
after he went to the abandoned barangay hall two days later
and discovered that his wifes body was still there. The right to
counsel is afforded by Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution only to person(s) under investigation for the
commission of an offense. Custodial rights of a person are not
available whenever he volunteers statements without being
asked. He was not investigated by the authorities. In fact, after
appellant admitted to the police officer that he killed his wife,
the officer told him that he will be provided with a lawyer to
assist him. In any case, during the subsequent events the
investigation in the precinct - appellant was assisted by a
lawyer, namely, Atty. Campanilla. At the trial, the latter testified
that he talked to appellant, advised him of his constitutional
rights and was present when the latter wrote his extrajudicial
statement admitting that he killed his wife. Atty. Campanilla
even asked for appellants identification card to verify whether
the signature he will sign in his statement is his own.
People v. Bacor G.R. No. 122895. April 30, 1999
FACTS: Upon arraignment on September 4, 1991, accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial then ensued. After the
prosecution rested its case, the defense demurred to the
evidence on the ground that accuseds extrajudicial
confession which is the only piece of evidence connecting
him to the commission of the murder, is inadmissible for
any purpose. The Omnibus Motion To Demur and Objection
To The Admissibility Of Exhibit B For The Prosecution was
denied by the trial court in an order dated June 4, 1992
after which the defense offered the testimonies of the
accused himself and the latters father, Cesar Bacor. Their
main line of defense was that at the time the crime was
being perpetrated, accused Victor Bacor was at home
grating coconuts. It was however also established in the
course of their testimony that Barangay Seor was only
about one kilometer from Barangay SK Avancea where
accused Victor lived with his parents and was accessible
by means of transportation.
ISSUE: Whether accused-appellant validly waived his right
to remain silent and, therefore, whether his confession is
admissible in evidence against him.
HELD: All throughout the custodial investigation, Atty.
Miriam Angot of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) took
pains to explain meaningfully to the accused each and
every query posed by SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura. Accused
then stamped his approval to the extrajudicial confession
by affixing his signature on each and every page thereof in
the presence of counsel Miriam Angot. Each time, he was
asked whether he was willing to give a statement and he
said he was. This is sufficient. Contrary to accused-
appellants contention, there is no need for a separate and
express written waiver of his constitutional rights.
Accused- appellant was not arrested. He presented himself
to the authorities to confess to the crime because, he said,
he was being bothered by his conscience. By voluntarily
executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the
presence of and with the assistance of counsel and after
having been informed of his constitutional rights, accused-
appellant effectively waived his right to remain silent.
Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the evidentiary rule
that an extrajudicial confession corroborated by evidence
of the corpus delicti is sufficient to support a conviction.

People v. Mendoza G.R. No. 143702 : September 13,

2001

FACTS: Accused-appellant Zaldy Medoza, argues that the

confession he made to PO3 Daniel Tan at the St. Pauls
Hospital where the victim was confined, that he and Marco
Aguirre had robbed Abatay is inadmissible in evidence
because it was given without the assistance of counsel
while he (accused-appellant) was in custody.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confession made was
inadmissible
HELD: Indeed, the confession is inadmissible in evidence
under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution,
because it was given under custodial investigation and
was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the
defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial
with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived
objection to its admissibility. No error was, therefore,
incurred by the trial court in admitting evidence of the
confession.
People v. De Vera G.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999
Facts: Accused was charged with murder. Accused
executed a so-called salaysay ng pagbabawi ng
sinumpaang salaysay, which he swore to before Prosecutor
Tobia of Quezon City, for the purpose of recanting his
statements given at the precinct in the evening of June 8,
1992 and at the IBP office on June 9, 1992 on the ground
that they were given under coercion, intimidation, and in
violation of his constitutional rights.
Issue: WON the constitutional rights of the accused were
violated
Held: No. In the present case, the Court is satisfied that
Atty. Sansano sufficiently fulfilled the objective of this
constitutional mandate. Moreover, appellants allegations
of torture must be disregarded for being unsubstantiated.
To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of solemnly
made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without
any proof whatsoever. When an extrajudicial statement
satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it
constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless
prompted by truth and conscience. The defense has the
burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force,
duress or promise of reward. Appellant failed to overcome
the overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary.
People v. Mayorga G.R. No. 135405. November 29,
2000
Facts: Five-year old Leney was approached by the accused
Mayorga alias Puroy who asked her to buy for him a bottle
of gin commonly known as "bagets." He then brought the
child to a marshy area ("lalao") nearby where he boxed her
on the face and chest and wrung her neck until she fainted
and was raped. Accused contends that Leney, during the
trial, was coached by her grandmother and thus depriving
him of his right to cross examine.
Issue: WON there was violation of right to cross
examination
Held No. The victim, an innocent and guileless five-year
old when the crime was committed against her, cannot be
expected to recall every single detail and aspect of the
brutal experience that she went through in the hands of
the accused. Besides, at the time of her testimony she had
stopped schooling and did not have the gift of articulation.
It is but fair that she be guided through by her
grandmother in recounting her harrowing experience
which happened two (2) years before she testified.
People v. Rondero G.R. 125687, December 9, 1999
Facts: The accused was seen by the victims father with an
ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9
year old victim was later found dead and half naked with
lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was convicted
of homicide only. For his conviction, several circumstantial
pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his
hair for comparison with the strands of hair found in the
victims right hand at the scene of the crime as well as
blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his
house. The accused- appellant avers the acquisition of his
hair strands without his express written consent and
without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is
a violation of his Constitutional right against self-
incrimination
Both the offended party and the prosecuting fiscal,
however, failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite
due notice. The case was dismissed due to lack of interest
and a motion consideration filed by the fiscal was granted.
Issue: WON there was double jeopardy

Issue: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused- Held: No. The dismissal is with consent of the accused,
appellants hair strands can be admitted as evidence hence a waiver of his right against double jeopardy. In the
against him? present case, the accused was duly notified that the case
was set for hearing on January 19, 1983. On said date of
Held:Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is hearing neither the complainant nor the fiscal appeared
actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral despite due notice. This was the first date of hearing after
compulsion to extort communication from the accused- arraignment. The court a quo should not have dismissed
appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence the case and should have instead reset the case to
when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted another date to give the prosecution another day in court
from the body of the accused may be received as evidence
in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine
forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used
as evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-
appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from
him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the
hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for
what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or
any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress. On the other hand, the blood-
stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused
are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the
proper search warrant from the police officers.

People v. Declaro G.R. No. L-64362 February 9, 1989

Facts: As a result of a traffic accident, accused was charge People v. Bernas G.R. Nos. 133583-85. February 20,
with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. 2002
Facts: Accused was charged with 3 counts of Rape. When
arraigned on the charges, accused pleaded not guilty with
the assistance of counsel. Before the prosecution
presented its evidence, appellant -- through his counsel --
moved for the change of his former plea of not guilty to
that of guilty, a Motion which the RTC granted. Appellant
was thus re-arraigned, and he pleaded guilty to the
criminal charges. RTC convicted him of the charges.
Issue: WON the court erred accepting accused-appellants
improvident pleas of guilty to a capital offense and in
failing to conduct a searching inquiry as to whether the
accused- appellant fully understood the consequences of
his plea
Held: Yes. When the accused pleads guilty to the charge,
both the trial judge and the defense counsel must observe
the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and
applicable jurisprudence in order to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused. In the present case,
the defense counsel not only failed to protect the rights of
his client; worse, he even advised him to plead guilty to
the Information that had failed to allege the essential
elements of qualified rape. As a consequence, appellant
was wrongly sentenced to death.
Churchille v Mari vs Rolando Gonzales. GR No.
187728
Facts: Accused was charged with rape based on AAAs
sworn statement that she was raped by herein private
respondent PO1 Rudyard Paloma. AAA filed a motion to
cancellation of hearing due to the pendency of private
complainant's petition for transfer of venue before this
Court. Accused invoke his right to speedy trial.
Issue: WON there was a violation of his right to speedy trial
Held: Yes. Here, it must be emphasized that private
respondent had already been deprived of his liberty on two
occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before
the MCTC, a period of almost four months; then again,
when an Information had already been issued and since
rape is a non- bailable offense, he was imprisoned for a
period of over 6 months. Verily, there can be no cavil that
deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite
oppressive. Because of private respondent's continued
incarceration, any delay in trying the case would cause
him great prejudice. Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and
oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal case to
await the outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer of
venue, especially in this case where there is no temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by
a higher court against herein public respondent from
further proceeding in the case.
RULE 116

Borja vs Mendoza 79 SCRA 422

Facts: Petitioner Manuel Borja was found guilty of the
crime slight physical injury. He was ajudged by Judges
Senining of city court of Cebu (branch 1) and Judge
Mendoza, judge of court of first instance of Cebu (branch
6). Borja is contending that he was tried in absentia
despite the absence of an arraignment
People vs Abapo GR 133387
Facts: The accused pleaded guilty to the charge against
him for 86 counts of rape for raping his own daughter 86
times. The RTC sentenced him to supreme penalty of
death.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioners constitutional right was Issue: WON the conviction was valid
violated when he was not arraigned.
Held: No. While the trial court inquired as to the
Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the voluntariness of the accused-appellants plea, it failed to
accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to explain fully to the accused-appellant that once convicted,
why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to he could possibly be meted the death penalty. The fact
face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is that the court asked him whether he would accept the
shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to punishment that may be imposed upon him is not a
disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due sufficient explanation to the accused of the consequences
process that requires an arraignment. It is required in the of his plea. The importance of the courts obligation cannot
Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the be overemphasized for one cannot dispel the possibility
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. that the accused-appellant may have been led to believe
It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible that due to his voluntary plea of guilt, he may be imposed
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature with the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not
of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he death.
must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the
state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a
vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him.
Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner
notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the
violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself
and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the
Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence
imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The
absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in
view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair
and impartial trial.
People vs Cariaga Gr. No. L 145354
Facts: Accuse Deogracias Carrraga was sentenced for the
crime of theft to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor , to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1,120 with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Appellant argues that the trial court committed
errors by having found him guilty of the crime charged
without having been arraigned. Appellant argues that
having entered a plea of guilty, the records fails to show
when, where, or how he was arraigned.
Issue: was the accused validly arraigned
Held: Yes, accused has been validly arraigned. The court is
of the opinion that the statement in the judgment the
accused has been arraigned and the he pleaded guilty is
sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 16 and
25 of General Orders No. 58, in as much as it may be
presumed from said statement that the law has been
obeyed by causing the accused to appear before the court
and it is shown thereby that he really been arraigned, his
plea entered personally being that of guilty. The court is of
the opinion that generally a conclusion is the averment or
denial of a fact deduced from some evidence.
Kummer vs People Gr. 174461
Facts: Petitioner was charged with homicide and pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, the RTC convicted her.
The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the
amended information for which she was convicted. The
petitioners argument is founded on the flawed
understanding of the rules on amendment and
misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every
case.
Issue: WON there is a need for re-arraignment
Held: No. A mere change in the date of the commission of
the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more
formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not
prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed
amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
People vs De Luna GR L-77969
Facts: Patrick De Luna, assisted by counsel de officio Atty
David Ompos was charged with murder for assaulting one
Tricia by punching and kicking her on different parts of her
body which led to hear death. When arraigned he entered
a plea of guilty with the qualification that hindi ko
sinasadya:
Issue : Is the plea of guilt entered valid
Held: No, such plea of guilt is not valid. The essence of a
plea of guilt is that the accused admit his guilt, freely ,
voluntarily and with a full knowledge of the consequences
and meaning of his act and with a clear understanding of
the precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or
information. The plea must be an unconditional admission
of guilt. It must be of such nature as to foreclose the
defendants right to defend himself from said charges. Even
assuming that the plea was in fact to the lesser offense of
homicide still as provided in Rule 116, Sec 2 of the rules on
criminal procedure, the consent of both the fiscal and
offended party is needed. Plus upon enter of the plea of
guilt of a capital offense, the court under Sec 3 of the
above mentioned rule should have required the
prosecution its evidence to determine the proper penalty
to be imposed which the court in this case failed to do so.
People vs Dayot GR 88281
Facts: Rolando Dayot was being charged with the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide punished with
reclusion perpetua to death. He initially pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged but subsequently made a plea of
guilt. When the counsel de oficio of the accused Atty
Fernando Fernandez out him on the stand it appeared that
Dayot himself was unsure of the length of his punishment.
He was then convicted of the crime charged.
Issue: is the plea of guilt valid
Held: No, plea of guilt is not valid. Rule 116, Sec 3 of the
Rules of Court requires the judge to conduct a search
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of the accuseds plea for capital offense.
The transcript between Atty Fernandesz and Dayot fails to
satisfy this requirement, as Dayot was not aware how long
really is the penalty to be imposed to him, which turned
out to be for lifetime imprisonment. The judge failed to
satisfy himself in this case that the accused pleading guilty
is indeed truly guilty. The 5 questions asked to him hardly
amount to a searching inquiry considering that the
accused was only a 20 year old boy who was facing a
punishment of lifetime imprisonment.
People vs Nadera GR 131384-87
FACTS: The accused was charged for raping his two
daughters. He pleaded guilty. The lawyer of the accused
did not cross-examine the first daughter because he was
convinced that she was telling the truth. The cross
examination of the second daughter centered on what she
did when she saw her sister being raped. The lawyer did
not present any evidence, and expressed his conformity
for the admission of the evidence of the prosecution.
Issue: WON There is a searching inquiry conducted
Held: No. The warnings given by the trial court in this case
fall short of the requirement that it must make a searching
inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant
understood fully the import of his guilty plea. As has been
said, a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme
penalty of death is insufficient. For more often than not, an
accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because he
hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty. The trial
judge must erase such mistaken impressions. He must be
completely convinced that the guilty plea made by the
accused was not made under duress or promise of reward.
People vs Molina Gr. 14129-33 Dec 14, 2001
Facts: Accused Roland Molina was being charged of rape
for allegedly raping his own daughter, Brenda Molina.
Accused Molina initially pleaded not guilty but
subsequently withdrew his plea of not guilty when he was
informed that his penalty will be lowered should he plea
guilty to the accusations in which he did. After which the
prosecution did not anymore presented any evidence nor
did the accused cross-examined the witnesses presented
by the prosecution
Isse: Is the plea of guilty made by the accused valid
Held: Invalid. In cases where the punishment to be
imposed is a capital offense, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of the official functions does not apply.
In the present case it appeared that the only reason why
Roland made an improvident plea of guilt was simply
because of the promise made that his penalty will be
lowered. The court also failed to make the search inquiry
needed under Rule 116 Sec 3 of the rules of court. It also
appeared that the improvident plea of guilt made by
Roland was the only reason why the court convicted the
accused without adducing any other evidence to support
the conviction.
Acosta vs People of the Philippines Gr L-17427
Facts: Acosta et. al. were charged with robbery with
homicide. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not
guilty. But when the case came up for trial about a month
later, he withdrew his plea of not guilty and, upon the
information being read to him, entered, that of guilty. After
satisfying itself that the accused, who was then
represented by counsel, was aware of the consequences of
his plea, the court pronounced its judgment, declaring him
guilty as charged and sentenced him to death.
Issue: WON there was an explanation of the consequences
of such plea
Held: Yes. It appears that, before passing sentence, the
court first satisfied itself that the accused "was well aware
of the consequences of his plea of guilty, the full import of
which, in view of the aggravating circumstances alleged,
must have been brought home to him by his lawyer, who
was then with, him and must be supposed to have duly
performed his duty as such. Undoubtedly aware that there
were no mitigating circumstancesfor he made no offer to
prove anycounsel must have figured that defendant's
only chance to obtain leniency was for him to attenuate his
liability with a frank admission of guilt and throw himself
upon the mercy of the. court.
People vs De Mesa Gr 49121
Facts: Accused pleaded guilty to the charge simple murder.
But as the Solicitor General correctly observes, the crime
charged in the body of the information was not simple
murder but the complex crime of murder with assault upon
an agent of authority, for which the penalty provided by
law is deathan indivisible penalty which cannot be
affected by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
Issue: WON conviction was proper
Held: No. Inasmuch as the information charges a capital
offense and there is possibility that the accused
misunderstood its gravity on account of the misleading
introductory paragraph of the information wherein the
offense charged was qualified as simple murder, the trial
court should have explained to the accused the true
nature of the offense charged and the penalty involved in
order to avoid all reasonable possibility of the accused's
entering a plea of guilty improvidently or without a clear
and precise understanding of its meaning and effect, and
should have taken the prosecution's evidence in support of
the allegations of the information in order to be able to
judge correctly the extent of defendant's guilt.
People v. Arconado [G.R. No. L-16175. February 28,
1962]
Facts: Charged with the crime of homicide, the accused
Arconado, at first, pleaded not guilty but decided to
change it to that of guilty when the date of his trial arrived
with the request, however, that he be allowed to present
evidence showing the presence of several mitigating
circumstances which attended the killing. As he started
proving the mitigating circumstance of unlawful aggression
or in complete self-defense, the judge ordered him to stop.
Out of respect for the judge he desisted from continuing
and waited until the judge rendered its judgment.
Issue: WON the judge committed grave abuse of discretion
Held: Yes. Were we to make the discretion of the judge in
matters like the case at bar absolute, no accused would be
induced to enter a plea of guilty and thereby abbreviate in
a way the proceedings and especially the trial of the case.
When, as in the case at bar, the facts and circumstances,
as appearing in the record itself, justify the claim of the
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, we
believe it was error for the trial court to deny the privilege
to submit evidence thereof.
People v. Digoro [G.R. No. L-22032. March 4, 1966.]
Facts: Camolo Digoro and two others were charged with
counterfeiting of treasury and bank notes. Camolo pleaded
guilty and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
However, Camolo subsequently appealed his conviction on
the ground that the amended information to which he
pleaded guilty does not charge an offense.
Issue: Whether Camolo may be convicted for violation of
Article 168 under the amended information.
Held: No. A plea of guilty to such an information therefore
does not warrant conviction of the accused. It is well
recognized that a plea of guilty is an admission only of the
material allegations of the information but not that the
facts thus alleged constitute an offense. From the
allegations in the information to which the accused
pleaded guilty, intent to use cannot be clearly inferred. It is
true it was stated that the accused possessed the false
treasury and bank notes "unlawfully and feloniously ...
Contrary to and in violation of Article 168 of the Revised
Penal Code". Such statements, however, are not
allegations of facts but mere conclusions that the facts
alleged constitute the offense sought to be charged.
Furthermore, the information alleged "intent to possess"
instead of intent to use. Such allegation precludes clear
inference of intent to use, in the absence of express
allegation of the latter, since intent to use entails intent to
part with the possession. Thus, the judgment of conviction
must be set aside and the case should be remanded for
new prosecution under an appropriate and valid
information.
People v De Luna [G.R. No. 77969. June 22, 1989.]
Facts: Patrick de Luna was charged with Murder and he
entered a plea of guilty with the qualification that "hindi ko
sinasadya." The accused allegedly waived his right that
the prosecution present its evidence in order to determine
for the court the degree of culpability of the accused under
the present charge. The RTC convicted him of murder and
sentenced him to life imprisonment.
Issue: Whether the accused may waive the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution, when the accused pleaded
guilty during the arraignment.
Held: No. In order to be valid, the plea must be an
unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of such nature
as to foreclose the defendant's right to defend himself
from said charge, thus leaving the court no alternative but
to impose the penalty fixed by law. Under the
circumstances of the case, de Luna's qualified plea of
guilty is not a valid plea of guilty. Thus, after a plea of
guilty in capital offenses, it is imperative that the trial
court requires the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise
participation and the degree of culpability of the accused
in the perpetration of the capital offense charged.
People v. Serrano [G.R. No. L-2647. March 30,
1950.]
Facts: Accused was charged with Serious Physical Injuries.
The accused-appellant was arraigned and, waiving his
right to counsel, entered a plea of guilty. A few hours later,
on the same day, he filed a petition to substitute his plea
of guilty for one of not guilty upon the ground that his
former plea was entered without the benefit of counsel and
he then entertained the belief that the offended party
would pardon him and withdraw the charge. The court
denied his motion and convicted him of the charge.
Issue: WON there was a violation of his right to counsel
Held: Yes. As a general rule, where it is made to appear
that the accused has voluntarily entered a plea of guilty,
with a full realization of its meaning and consequences,
and after the same has been clearly explained to him, the
trial court's refusal to allow the withdrawal of the plea
should by no means be disturbed. However, where, as in
the instant case, notwithstanding the ordinary precautions
that have been taken, still a clear mistake appears to have
been committed in good faith not only by the accused who
was unaided by counsel, but also by the Fiscal, including
the court itself, with the result that a serious injustice has
been done against the accused who was convicted of an
offense that was graver than the offense which in truth he
had committed, it was certainly a clear abuse of discretion
on the part of the Court to persist in the mistake thus
committed once known and to deny a relief which under
the circumstances was a simple matter of fairness to grant
in order to save a person from the injustice of being
convicted of a crime that he had never committed.
People vs Serzo [G.R. No. 118435. June 20, 1997.]
Facts: Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by
the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo Casabal
after the latter rescued minors being held by the former.
Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the
merits. The accused alleged that he was denied the right
to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared without
counsel, so the court appointed a counsel de officio.
Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment be reset so he
can engage the services of his own counsel however,
during the arraignment, he still appeared without one. The
arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the
counsel de officio. During the trial, the same counsel
appeared and cross- examined for the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied of his right
to counsel
HELD: NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a
counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of the
proceedings. The option to hire ones counsel cannot be
used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle with
the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the
State and the offended party to speedy and adequate
justice. The right is however not absolute and is waivable;
a) the state must balance the private against the state's
and offended party's equally important right to speedy and
adequate justice, and b) the right is waivable as long as
the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.

People v. Lamsing [G.R. No. 105316. September 21,
1995.]
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted of the crime
robbery with homicide and trial court sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, hence this appeal. Accused-appellant
complains that he was made to join a police lineup where
he was identified by three persons, including Elizabeth De
los Santos, without the assistance of counsel.
Issue: WON there was a violation of his right to counsel
Held: No. The right to counsel guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1)
of the Constitution does not extend to police lineups
because they are not part of custodial investigations. The
reason for this is that at that point, the process has not yet
shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory. The
accused's right to counsel attaches only from the time that
adversary judicial proceedings are taken against him.
Sayson v. People [G.R. No. 51745. October 28,
1988.]
Facts: The petitioner, Ramon F. Sayson, was charged with
the crime of Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial
Document. The petitioner pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment and after several postponements, the
prosecution rested its case. On the day of presentation of
evidence by defense, the petitioners counsel was absent
and later sent a telegram requesting for the cancellation of
the hearing due to him being sick. The court denied
request for postponement and considered case submitted
for decision without evidence from petitioner. Petitioner
was rendered guilty by the court which was later affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, but imposed lower penalty.
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision finding him
guilty of attempted estafa; he alleges that such decision
was rendered depriving him of his right to due process and
it was the duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio
in his behalf in the absence of his own counsel.
Issue: Was the petitioner deprived of his right to present
evidence?
Held: No. The court did not deprive the petitioner of his
right to present evidence in denying the motion for
postponement of the hearing. The court held that there
was no denial of due process since no right can be
successfully invoked where it was validly waived. In this
case, the petitioner alleged that his counsel had another
case at a different court as the reason for his absence
before the court received the telegram alleging that the
such counsel was sick. Also, the petitioners motion was
not filed properly since the 3-day notice required in
accordance with procedure was not followed and there was
no medical certificate nor affidavit to support the alleged
illness of counsel. The petitioners plea that the court
should have appointed a counsel de oficio in his behalf is
without legal basis. The appointment of counsel de officio
is only mandatory at the time of arraignment in
accordance with Rule 116, Sec. 6 of the Revised Rules of
Court. It is no longer applicable during the hearing of the
trial such as the situation of the petitioner. The appeal is
denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed

People v. Rio [G.R. No. 90294. September 24, 1991.]

Facts: Convicted of Rape and sentenced to reclusion

perpetua, accused appealed his case. Thereafter, accused
wrote a letter to clerk of court and manifested his intention
to withdraw the appeal due to his poverty hence he
cannot, anymore retain his counsel de parte.
Issue: WON Court can appoint counsel de oficio on appeal?
Held: Yes. His right to a counsel de oficio does not cease
upon the conviction of an accused by a trial court. It
continues, even during appeal, such that the duty of the
court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an
accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case,
such as the one at bar, where the accused had signified his
intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to
inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds
the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this
case, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite
such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the
accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After
all, "those who have less in life must have more in law
People v. Bascuguin [G.R. No. 184704. June 30,
2009.]
Facts: Accused was charged with rape and at the
arraignment, he appeared without counsel. The court
appointed counsel de oficio for him. After the appointment
of a counsel de officio, the arraignment immediately
followed.
Issue: Whether or not there was a reasonable time given
by the court to the counsel
Held: No. A criminal case involves the personal liberty of
an accused and inadequate counseling does not satisfy the
constitutional requirement of due process. What is evident
in this case is that counsel de officio merely conferred with
accused-appellant and proceeded immediately with the
arraignment, indicative of his failure to effectively provide
accused-appellant with qualified and competent
representation in court. Courts must see to it that an
accused must be afforded a qualified and competent
representation. Where it appears that a counsel de officio
resorted to procedural shortcuts that amounted to
inadequate counseling, the Court will strike down the
proceedings had in order to promote a judicious
dispensation of justice.
People v Abad Santos [G.R. No. L-447. June 17,
1946.]
Facts: The accused was charged with treason. In the
information, it was alleged that the different kinds of
properties alleged to have been sold by him to the
Japanese imperial forces, in the City of Manila, during the
enemy occupation, was also added the phrase "and other
similar equipments". Hence the accused requested for bill
of particulars
Issue: WON the accused can request for bill of particulars
after arraignment
Held: Yes. It is thus evident that, in the absence of specific
provisions of law prohibiting the filing of specifications or
bills of particulars in criminal cases, their submission may
be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial
rights of the accused. On the contrary, they will serve to
apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against
them, and thus enable them to prepare intelligently
whatever defense or defenses they might have.
Rocaberte v. People [G.R. No. 72994. January 23,
1991.]
Facts: Rocaberte, the accused, moved to quash the
information, alleging that the statement of the time of
commission of the felony charged, "from 1977 to
December 1983, a period of 7 years," or "about 2,551
days," was fatally defective; there was "so great a gap as
to defy approximation in the commission of one and the
same offense"; "the variance is certainly unfair to the
accused for it violates their constitutional right to be
informed before the trial of the specific charge against
them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend
themselves.
Issue: Is a defect in the averment as to the time of the
commission of the crime charged a ground for a motion to
quash?
Held: No. The remedy against an indictment that fails to
allege the time of the commission of the offense with
sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars.
The information against Rocaberte is indeed seriously
defective. It places on him and his co-accused the unfair
and unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities
over a span of more than 2,500 days. It is a burden nobody
should be made to bear. The public prosecutor must make
more definite and particular the time of the commission of
the crime of theft attributed to Rocaberte and his co-
defendants. If he cannot, the prosecution cannot be
maintained, the case must be dismissed.
Samson v. Daway
Facts: The accused was charged with violation of
Intellectual Property Code for unfair competition. The
accused filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged
prejudicial question for unfair competition; and also in view
of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutors
resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with
unfair competition.
Issue: WON arraignment may be suspended
Held: No. There was no prejudicial question because the
other civil case was an independent civil action. As regards
the second issue, his pleadings and annexes submitted
before the Court do not show the date of filing of the
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. He thus
failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was
entitled to a suspension of his arraignment and that the
questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the
age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges must prove
his allegations.
Trinidad v. Victor Ang
Facts: Accused was charged with BP 22. He moved for the
suspension of the arraignment in view of the pendency of
their petition for review before the DOJ. One year and 10
months had already lapsed before the accused was
arraigned.
Issue: WON the suspension was valid
Held: No. While the pendency of a petition for review is a
ground for suspension of the arraignment, the provision
limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60
days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the
expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign
the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
RULE 117
People vs Givera 349 scra 513
Facts: That on or about the 2nd day of May, 1993, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused Cesar Givera,
conspiring together, confederating with EPEFANIO GAYON
GERALDE and ARTURO GAYON GERALDE, and mutually
helping one another who were charged with the same
offense at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The two
accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill, taking advantage of superior strength, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, and employ
personal violence upon the person of EUSEBIO GARDON y
ARRIVAS, by then and there stabbing him with a knife
hitting him on the different parts of his body, and striking
him with a piece of stone on the head, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of EUSEBIO GARDON y ARRIVAS.
Issue: W/N the claim of the accused valid?
Held: No, the court ruled that the accused-appellant must
be deemed to have waived his right to object thereto
because he failed to move for the quashal of the
information before the trial court, entered a plea of not
guilty and participated in the trial. As this Court has held,
any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in
the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person
of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
Suy sui vs People 92 PHIL 684
Facts: That on or about the 17th day of July, 1950, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and offer for
sale to the public at 312 Quezon Boulevard, in the said
city, one bag of refined sugar, 10 lbs. at P2, which price is
in excess of P0.20 than that authorized by law as the
maximum ceiling price of said commodity, to wit P1.80.
After trial the court found the petitioner guilty and
sentenced him to pay a fine of P5,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to be barred from
engaging in the wholesale and retail business in the
Philippines for a period of five years, with a
recommendation to the President for the immediate
deportation of the petitioner. From this judgment the
petitioner appealed, but the same was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The case is now before us on certiorari
from the Court of Appeals.
Issue: W/N the petitioner is liable?
Held: No. The court ruled that the petitioner failed to raise
the point not only in the Court of First Instance by a motion
to quash but also in the Court of Appeals, as a
consequence of which he must be deemed to have waived
the objection. In the first place, under section 10, Rule 113,
of the Rules of Court, failure to move to quash amounts to
a waiver of all objections which are grounds for a motion to
quash, except when the complaint or information does not
charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the
same. It is apparent that the point now raised by the
petitioner is in effect that the information does not charge
an offense. In the second place, as an appeal in a criminal
proceeding throws the whole case open for review, it
should have been the duty of the Court of Appeals to
correct such errors as might be found in the appealed
judgment, whether they are assigned or not.
Los Banos v Pedro G.R. No. 173588
Facts: Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded
firearm without authority from the COMELEC a day before
the election. After inquest, the Marinduque provincial
prosecutor filed the case against him. Pedro filed a motion
for preliminary investigation, which was granted, however,
did not materialize. Instead Pedro filed a motion to quash,
arguing that the information contains averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse and justification or
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He
attached a certification, which state that he was exempted
from the gun ban. The RTC quash the information. The
Peitioner, moved to reopen the case, as the certificate is
falsified, and the prosecution was deprived of due process
when the judge quash the information without hearing.
Pedro moved for reconsideration based on section 8 of rule
117, arguing that the dismissal had become final or
permanent.
Issue: WON the RTC is correct in the quashal of
information?
Held: No. We find from our examination of the records that
the Information duly charged a specific offense and
provides the details on how the offense was committed.
We do not see on the face or from the averments of the
Information any legal excuse or justification. This COMELEC
Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate
motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash
grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face
of the Information. Significantly, no hearing was ever
called to allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness
of the COMELEC certification.

People vs Asuncion 161 scra 330
Facts: On 30 July 1987, Rolando Abadina, a former colonel
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was charged before
the Relations Regional Trial Court, filing NCJR Quezon City,
with the offense of Violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866
illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition in an
Information. Upon motion of the accused, the respondent
judge, as aforestated, in a Resolution dated 1 September
1987, dismissed the Information on the ground that it did
not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense, since
the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not
illegal per se, in view of Executive Order No. 107 which
gives holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and
ammunition a period of six (6) months from its effectivity,
extended to 31 December 1987 by Executive Order No.
222, within which to surrender the same to the proper
authorities, without incurring any criminal liability therefor,
except if the unlicensed firearm or ammunition is carried
outside of one's residence, not for the purpose of
surrendering the same, or used in the commission of any
other offense, and there is no allegation in said information
that the firearms and ammunition enumerated therein
were carried outside the accused's residence or used in
the commission of some other crime
Issue: W/N petitioners contention is right?
Held: No. The petitioner claims that it was not necessary
for the prosecution to allege in the information that the
firearms and ammunition, subject matter of this case, were
brought out of the residence of the accused or were used
by him in the commission or another offense, since these
circumstances are not essential ingredients of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The
contention is without merit. In People vs. Lopez, 8 the
Court already ruled that, under Republic Act No. 4, the use
or the carrying of firearms and/or ammunition was an
ingredient, if not the sole ingredient, of the offense; i.e. the
very acts which were punished, subject to certain
conditions, and hence, should be alleged and proved.
Lacson vs Executive Secretary 301 scra 330
FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case
that started when eleven persons, believed to be members
of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) were killed by the
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)
where the petitioner was one of the heads. Then, in a
media expose, it was said that what happened was a rub-
out and not a shoot- out. Among other issues, petitioner
argues that Republic Act (R.A.) 8249, that was enacted
during his case was pending, has a retroactive effect and
is plan from the facts and was made to suit the petitioners
case, thus, making it an ex- post facto law that would
affect the right of the accused to procedural due process.
Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statute R.A. 8249 may be
considered as an ex post facto law that may affect the
petitioners right to due process?
HELD: NO. There is nothing ex-post facto in R.A. 8249 an
ex post facto law generally provides for a retroactive effect
on penal laws. However, the Court explains, R.A. 8249 is
not a penal law. As the Court defines, Penal laws are those
acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties thereof; or those that defines crimes,
treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
Republic Act 8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction
which is not penal in character, thus, may not be
considered an ex post facto law. Therefore, the argument
of the petitioner that the law in question has retroactive
effect and may affect his right to due process is wrong.
Llorente vs Sandiganbayan 322 scra 329
Facts: Atty. Llorente was employed in the PCA, a public corporation
(Sec. 1, PD 1468) from 1975 to August 31, 1986, when he
resigned. He occupied the positions of Assistant Corporate
Secretary for a year, then Corporate Legal Counsel until November
2, 1981, and, finally, Deputy Administrator for Administrative
Services, Finance Services, Legal Affairs Departments. As a result
of a massive reorganization in 1981, hundreds of PCA employees
resigned effective October 31, 1981. Among them were Mr. Curio,
Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena, and Mrs. Javier. They were all required to
apply for PCA clearances in support of their gratuity benefits.
Notwithstanding the Condition, the clearances of Mrs Perez and
Mr. Azucena both dated October 30, 1981, were favorably acted
upon by the CPA officers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto, acting
for the accounting division, even if the clearances showed they had
pending accountabilities to the GSIS and the UCPB, and
subsequently approved by Attys. Llorente and Rodriguez.
Thereafter, the vouchers for their gratuity benefits, also indicating
their outstanding obligations were approved, among others, by Atty
Llorente, and their gratuity benefits released to them after
deducting those accountabilities.
Issue: W/n the decision of the Sandiganbayan is erroneous?
Held: Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, amending
Rules 110 through 127 of the Rules of Court, the judgment of the
court shall include, in case of acquittal, and unless there is a clear
showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist, a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the
offended party. The rule is based on the provisions of substantive
law, that if acquittal proceeds from reasonable doubt, a civil action,
lies nonetheless. The challenged judgment found that the
petitioner, in refusing to issue a certificate of clearance in favor of
the private offended party, Herminigildo Curio, did not act with
evident bad faith, one of the elements of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3819.
People vs Lagon 185 scra 442
Facts: On 7 July 1976, an information for estafa was filed
against accused Lagon for allegedly issuing a check for
payment of goods without having sufficient funds. The city
court of Roxas, however, dismissed the information for the
very reason that the penalty prescribed for crime charged
had become beyond the latter courts authority to impose.
It appears that when the crime was committed (April
1975), the law vested the city court with jurisdiction.
However, by the time the information was filed (July 1976),
P.D. 818 increased the penalty for the same.
Issue: WON the City Court has jurisdiction.
Held: Well-settled is the doctrine that the subject matter
jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly
measured by the law in effect at the time of the
commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the
law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense
charged. In this regard, considering the passage of P.D.
818, jurisdiction of the case now pertained to the CFI of
Roxas and not with the city court

Cruz vs Sandiganbayan 194 scra 474
Facts: Following the May 1992 local elections and his
proclamation as mayor-elect of the Municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite, Victor Miranda sought an audit investigation of the
municipalities 1991-1992 financial transactions. Petitioner
Buencamino Cruz served as municipal mayor of the town
in 1991 until his term ended in the middle of 1992. Acting
on the request, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued COA
Order No. 19-1700 constituting a Special Audit Team. In
the course of the investigation, the Special Audit Team
discovered that certain anomalous and irregular
transactions transpired during the covered period, the
most serious being the purchase of construction materials
in the aggregate amount of P54,542.56, for which payment
out of municipal funds was effected twice. The double
payments were made in favor of Kelly Lumber and
Construction Supply and were accomplished through the
issuance of two (2) disbursement vouchers. Petitioner
signed the vouchers and encashed the two (2)
corresponding PNB checks, both of which were payable to
his order.
Issue: W/N the information filed against him is defective?
Held: Petitioners contention is flawed by the very premises
holding it together. For, it presupposes that Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 covers only public officers vested with the power
of granting licenses, permits or similar privileges.
Petitioner has obviously lost sight, if not altogether
unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan,
where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or
not the accused public officer is charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions. Petitioner
submits that a conviction could arise only for an
inculpatory act alleged in the information and duly
established in the trial, arguing in this regard that the
information alleged that Kelly Lumber was paid twice for
the same materials but what was found during the trial
was that the said payment was given to petitioner.
Pressing the point, petitioner states in fine that a variance
obtains between what was alleged in the Information filed
in this case and what was proven during trial.
Monsanto vs Factoran Jr. 170 scra 190
Facts: Monsanto was the Assistant Treasurer of Calbayug
City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and
was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by
Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance
for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was
still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays.
The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of
the President and Factoran denied Monsantos request
averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and
that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.
Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she
should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil
liabilities brought about by her acts.
Issue: W/N petitioners contention is right?
Held: A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for
the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction,
from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him
a new credit and capacity. But unless expressly grounded
on the persons innocence, it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Balite vs People 124 Phil 868
Facts: In December, 1958, the Democratic Labor
Association declared a strike against the Cebu Stevedoring
Company. Delfin Mercader, union president, was offered by
Richard Corominas & Co., a copra exporter affected by the
strike, P10,000.00 as aid to the union and presumably to
pave the way for the amicable settlement of the labor
dispute. Petitioner was with Mercader when that offer was
made. The disposition of this sum and the pleasure of the
union in the premises were referred to the union officers
and members, including the strikers. At a meeting called
for the purpose, it was decided that the amount be
accepted and spread amongst all the members. However,
at a subsequent meeting attended by Mercader and
petitioner, the latter proposed that the amount thus
offered be given solely to the officers of the union, leaving
out the members thereof. Petitioner's proposal met with
vigorous opposition. Passions seemed to have run so high
that petitioner walked out of the meeting, threatened to
destroy the union and to expose president Mercader.
Petitioner then pursued a smear campaign against
Mercader. Petitioner's activities caught the attention of the
union board of directors. A general meeting was called also
in December, 1958. It was then that a resolution was
unanimously adopted expelling petitioner from the union.
Issue: W/N the court has jurisdiction?
Held: The court ruled that the criminal proceeding herein
was properly commenced. the Cebu City Charter which
provides that the city prosecuting attorney "shall also have
charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors,
and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu and the Municipal Court of the city, and
shall discharge all the duties in respect to criminal
prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals.
Because, this citation is incomplete. Petitioner only quotes
the second part of the first paragraph of Section 37 of the
Cebu City Charter. He omits the first part of the second
paragraph thereof which reads: The fiscal of the city shall
cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of ordinances, and have the
necessary informations or complaints prepared or made
against the person accused.
Francisco vs CA G.R. No. L-45674 May 30, 1983
Facts: A case for intriguing against honor was filed by one Dr.
Angeles against accused Dr. Francisco and Bernardino with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal, which was later on changed to grave
oral defamation by latter in an information filed by same. Both
accused were convicted thereof. On appeal, the CA modified the
crime into simple slander. Eventually, Bernardino died and the case
against Dr. Francisco was elevated to the SC. Accused argues that
the CAs modification served as to acquit him of the charges for the
simple reason that the lesser offense of simple slander had already
prescribed.
Issue: W/N the petitioners contention is right?
Held: While the accused was correct insofar as the lesser offense
of simple slander includible in the offense charged can no longer
be applied to him by reason of prescription, Art. 91 of the RPC, as
well as jurisprudence, provides that the filing of a complaint,
regardless if it is with the Fiscals office or with the court, interrupts
the period of prescription. On this note, whether the court counts 2
months simple slander or 6 months grave oral defamation is
immaterial since the crime committed still falls within the period
(the offense was committed on 26 December 1965 and was filed
with the Office of the Fiscal on 3 February 1966). Still, the accused
cannot be convicted since the statements imputed were clearly not
libelous per se; at the most, such statements were merely criticism
of one doctor to another, to which is not necessarily libelous.
People vs Villalon 192 scra 521 G.R. No. 43659 December 21,
1990
Facts: De Guzman was charged with estafa thru falsification of
public document on March 29 1974. As the attorney in fact of
Mariano Carrera, in 1964, De Guzman forged his signature on the
special power of attorney to use it to mortgage carreras parcel of
land and obtain a loan from the mortgage bank. Both documents
and mortgage were later registered with the registry of deeds of
pangasinan. The mortgage foreclosed, the land was bought by
someone else, and Carrera only knew about it when an action for
ejectment was filed against him. De Guzman on the grounds that
the said crime, which was punishable by prision correctional,
already prescribed, pursuant to art 90. of the RPC.
Issue: W/N the crime has prescribed
Held: The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized
special power of attorney registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Dagupan City on February 13, 1964 authorizing private respondent
to mortgage a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 47682 in order to secure a loan of P8,500.00 from the People's
Bank and Trust Company. The information for estafa thru
falsification of a public document was filed only on March 29, 1974.
The court reject petitioner's claim that the ten-year period
commenced when complainant supposedly discovered the crime in
January, 1972 by reason of the ejectment suit against him.
PeoplevsMogulG.R. No. L-37837 August 24, 1984
Facts: An information for estafa was filed against petitioner Crespo.
When the case was set for arraignment, accused filed a motion to
defer on the ground of a pending petition with the Secretary of
Justice), but was denied. Upon petition to the CA, the lower court
was directed to refrain from therefrom. Eventually, the pending
petition for review with the Secretary was resolved, thereby
ordering the Provincial Fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
information. Such motion by the same, however, was denied by the
lower court. Petitioner Crespo files a petition for review with the
SC.
Issue: W/N the court can heed to the request and powers of the
fiscals office to dismiss the case
Held: While it is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal, the same it
not without any limitation or control. Among others, the powers of
the fiscal in relation to his/her power to determine whether a prima
facie case that warrants prosecution exists terminates upon the
filing of the information in the proper court. In other words, once
filed in court, any disposition of the case (dismissal, conviction or
acquittal) rests with the sound discretion of the court. Though
endowed with discretionary powers, the fiscal cannot impose his
opinion on the court for it is the latter which is the best and sole
judge of the case filed with it. A motion to dismiss, even if filed by
the fiscal, must still await the decision of the court.
PEOPLE vs. TAC-AN G.R. No. 148000 February 27,
2003
FACTS: An in formation was filed against Mario N. Austria,
who was the Officer-in-Charge Provincial Warden of the
Batangas Provincial Jail, falsified a Memorandum Receipt
for Equipment Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable
Property, a public/official document. When in truth and
fact, when in truth and in fact said statements are
absolutely false when he has the legal obligation to
disclose the truth, as said firearm is not a property of the
Provincial Government of Batangas; that it is not registered
with the Firearms and Explosives Units of Batangas PNP
Command, Batangas City and Camp Crame, Quezon City;
and that Alberto Tesoro is not an employee of the
Provincial Government of Batangas, to the damage and
prejudice of public interest. The trial court set the
arraignment of the accused and the initial pre-trial.
Apparently, out of the eleven witnesses listed in the
Information, only the first three witnesses were notified of
said arraignment and pre-trial. On motion of the accused
and over the objection of the public prosecutor, the trial
court issued an order dismissing the case for failure of said
witnesses to appear before it. The bail bond posted by the
accused for his provisional liberty was thereby cancelled.
The public prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration
and was denied. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition on the ground that the errors committed by the
trial court were mere errors of judgment, which are not
correctible by a writ of certiorari. Also the CA stated that a
reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10766 would place the
private respondent in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reinstatement of the case would
be in double jeopardy
HELD: NO. The Court ruled that legal jeopardy attaches
only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to
due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never
terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs. MODESTO-SAN
PEDRO G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004,
petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both
cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on
the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information for the second delict for placing him
in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence. The MTC refused quashal, finding no
identity of offenses in the two cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was double jeopardy
HELD: YES. The two charges against petitioner, arising
from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The
provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or
simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is
nothing new. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this
Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
LAVIDES vs. CA G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000
FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse
under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for stronger deterrence and
special protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination,
providing penalties for its violation, and other purposes). His arrest
was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted
by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of
complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their
daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an
assignation that night at petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel in
Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police
received reports of petitioners activities. When petitioner opened the
door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt
and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn
statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers,
which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of
Art.III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed against petitioner. Petitioner
filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully
Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of
Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed
to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on which he is charged. Nine
more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the
same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor
children. No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed
separate applications for bail in the nine cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should impose the condition that the
accused shall ensure his presence during the trial of these cases
before the bail can be granted.
HELD: YES. In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted
before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from
filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case
is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the
accused. Further, the trial court could ensure Lavides' presence at the
arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at
any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. To condition the
grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him
in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2)
foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly
undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial
except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure the
Lavides' presence at the arraignment violates the latter's
constitutional rights.
MARCOS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 124680-81.
February 28, 2000
FACTS: Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for
Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction done in 1984
while they were officers transacting business with the Light
Railway Transit. On August 12, 1994, petitioner filed with
the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash/dismiss the two
informations, raising the following grounds, namely: (a) the
informations are fatally defective for failure to adequately
inform the accused of the charge against her in violation of
due process guaranteed by the Constitution; (b) the
informations state no offense; and (c) the court has no
jurisdiction over the cases because the accused are
protected by immunity from suit. The Sandiganbayan
issued an order that virtually denied the motion to quash
even before the scheduled date of hearing thereof, ruling
that the informations actually state a valid accusation;
that immunity from suit was applicable only to acts upon
orders of the President which are legitimate, and that a
motion to quash at that stage was not proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to
quash the informations filed after she had pleaded
thereto.
HELD: YES. It is clear that a motion to quash is not
improper even after the accused had been arraigned if the
same is grounded on failure to charge an offense and lack
of jurisdiction of the offense charged, extinction of the
offense or penalty and jeopardy. In this case, petitioners
motion to quash is grounded on no offense charged and
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan erred in disregarding the plain provision of
the Rules of Court and in cavalier fashion denied the
motion. Nevertheless, the consistent doctrine of this Court
is that from a denial of a motion to quash, the appropriate
remedy is for petitioner to go to trial on the merits, and if
an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law.
MILO vs. SALANGA G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987
FACTS: An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against
herein private respondent (accused Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and
some other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by
hitting him with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately
thereafter, without legal grounds and with deliberate intent to
deprive the latter of his constitutional liberty, accused respondent
and two members of the police force of Mangsat conspired and
helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner inside the
municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the elements
of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are
not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst.
Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto. Consequently,
averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can
be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga
granted the motion to quash in an order. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio
Captain, can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
HELD: YES. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must
be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons
accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to be
chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public
officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their
functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and
function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those
of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial
jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace
and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or
order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private
respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural
police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner
Valdez.
CANIZA vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. L-53776 March 18,
1988
FACTS: On March 20, 1974, Assistant City Fiscal of Manila
filed an Information for falsification of public documents
allegedly committed on Nov. 5, 1968 by Caniza. On May
24, 1974, Caniza filed Motion to Quash saying that
allegations in the information did not constitute an offense,
and that the information contained averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification. The
Trial court granted Motion to Quash, dismissed case
against Caniza. Fiscals Motion for Reconsideration of this
Order was denied. On June 13, 1979, a second Information
was filed charging Caniza with substantially the same
offense as that charged under the previous information.
Caniza moved to quash this second information on the
grounds that 1) the offense charged had already
prescribed, 2) quashal of the first Information had been on
the merits, 3)the allegations of the second Information did
not constitute and offense. The judge issued an order
denying the motion to quash. He also denied Canizas
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not filing of the second Information has
placed the accused in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense a second time
HELD: NO. The application of the doctrine of waiver is
subject to two (2) sine qua non conditions: first, dismiss
must have been sought or induced by the defendant,
either personally or through counsel; and second, such
dismissal must not have been on the merits and must not
necessarily amount to an acquittal. Upon which the trial
court anchored its 27 November 1974 Order of dismissal,
are clearly directed at the sufficiency of said information to
sustain the conviction of petitioner Caniza and, hence,
indicate the absence of the first requisite in double
jeopardy. Consequently, petitioner Caizas plea of second
jeopardy cannot be sustained: he effectively waived his
right to assert that plea when he moved to quash the first
Information filed against him.
People v. Silay G.R. No. L-43790 December 9, 1976
Facts: Private respondents were charged with falsification
and use of falsified documents. In their comment, they
claim that there was no error committed by the respondent
court in dismissing the case against them for insufficiency
of evidence. On the other hand, the people asserts that
the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable in as much as
the case was dismissed upon motion of the accused.
Issue: Whether respondents can validity invoke the
defense of double jeopardy.
Held: No. the dismissal being one on the merits, the
doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double
jeopardy cannot be invoked.
People v. Ilagan G.R. No. L-38443 November
25, 1933
Facts: Believing the charge of complainant Benilda Lejano
that appellant Paulino Ilagan had forcibly abducted her and
afterwards raped her in conspiracy with 3 other appellants,
the lower court found them guilty of forcible abduction
with rape and sentenced each of them to reclusion
perpetua.
Issue: Whether the evidence proves the commission of the
offense.
Held: No. in crimes against chastity, conviction of acquittal
of the accused depends almost entirely on the credibility of
complainant testimony. Where complainant in abduction
with rape testified that she resisted accuseds advances
who boxed her but the attending physician testified that
she did not have any contusions or business in
complainants body, the former testimony is not credible.
Furthermore, if the complainant had really been raped in
the early morning of march 28, 1967, she would have
shown that same morning manifestations of the outrange
perpetrated against her.
ABAY vs GARCIA 162 SCRA 665, June 27, 1988
FACTS: Petitioners were accused of the crime of direct
assault. Trial commenced on July 26, 1976, with Ramiro
Garque testifying on direct examination and partly on
cross-examination. The trial was transferred to September
14, 1976. But again the cross-examination was not
terminated so the case was reset to July 1, 1977. At the
continuation of the trial on July 1, 1977, both accused
appeared without their counsel. The trial fiscal, Assistant
Fiscal Angel Lobaton, was present, but the complainant,
Garque who was still to be cross-examined, failed to
appear despite due notice. The private prosecutor, Atty.
Henry Trocino, also failed to appear. Whereupon, City Judge
Felino Garcia verbally ordered, motu proprio, the dismissal
of the case. Fiscal Lobaton did not object to the dismissal.
Both accused remained silent and later left the courtroom
after the judge dictated the order of dismissal. At about
10:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, Atty. Trocino,
together with Garque arrived in court and upon learning
that Criminal Case No. 29688 was ordered dismissed,
verbally moved to have the order of dismissal set aside.
Atty. Trocino was allowed to present evidence in support of
the verbal motion for reconsideration and to explain the
failure of Garque to appear on time. In his written order of
July 1, 1977, Judge Garcia granted the verbal motion for
reconsideration and set aside the verbal order of dismissal.
He further ordered the resetting of the case for hearing on
another date. Petitioners invoked double jeopardy,
claiming that the verbal order of dismissal, even if
provisional, was rendered without the express consent of
the accused.
ISSUE: WON the verbal order of dismissal acquitted the
petitioners?
HELD: No, the court held that the order was merely
dictated in open court by the trial judge. Showing that this
verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to writing and
duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of
a judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the
powers of the judge to set it aside and enter another order,
now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the
case.
PEOPLE v BAO 100 Phil 243, Jan. 15, 2004
FACTS: Jaime Bao and Virginia Bolesa were married. Barely two
months after their 4th wedding anniversary, Virginia was found
dead, floating in a basin of water along the river bank of Abra
River. Rumors immediately circulated that she drowned. [3] On 19
March 1997, after it was found upon autopsy that Virginia did
not die of drowning, Jaime was charged with parricide. Jaime
pleaded not guilty to the charge upon his arraignment. Trial
ensued and the Regional Trial Court of Abra convicted Jaime Bao
of parricide for killing his legitimate wife. In support of his lone
assigned error, Jaime avers that the prosecution failed to prove
the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient basis
for conviction. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) agrees with the trial court that the guilt of Jaime Bao was
established through circumstantial evidence. The circumstances
that lead to Virginias death constitute an unbroken chain of
events pointing to Jaime as the author of her death.
ISSUE: W/n the prosecution failed to prove the requisites for
circumstantial evidence
HELD: No. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld when the circumstances established
would lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as being the author of
the crime.[22] Stated in another way, the chain of events,
perhaps insignificant when taken separately and independently,
nevertheless, produces the effect of conviction beyond
reasonable doubt when considered cumulatively. Indeed, it is
the quality of the circumstances, rather than the quantity, that
draws the line on whether the circumstances presented consist
of an unbroken chain that fulfills the standard of moral certainty
to sustain a conviction.

PEOPLE v CITY COURT OF MANILA
121 SCRA 637, Apr. 27, 1983
FACTS: Diolito de la Cruz figured in an accident on October 17,
1971. The following day, October 18, an information for serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against
private respondent Francisco Gapay, the driver of the truck. On
the same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died. On October 20,
1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded
guilty, was sentenced to one (1) month and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence. Because of
de la Cruzs death, on October 24, 1972, an information for
homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against private
respondent. On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila,
upon motion of private respondent, issued an order dismissing
the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of
double jeopardy.
ISSUE: W/n there was double jeopardy
HELD: Yes. When the information for homicide thru reckless
imprudence was, filed on October 24, 1972, the accused-private
respondent was already in jeopardy. Well-settled is the rule that
one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charge
again with the same or Identical offense though the latter be
lesser or greater than the former. However, as held in the case
of Melo vs. People, supra, the rule of Identity does not apply
when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the
first prosecution, for the reason that in such case there is no
possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. "Thus, where
the accused was charged with physical injuries and after
conviction, the injured person dies, the charge for homicide
against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy."
Stated differently, where after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which
changes the character of the offense and, together with the
facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if
indicted for the new offense.
PEOPLE v RELOVA
148 SCRA 294, March 6, 1987
FACTS: Respondent herein is the judge who rendered the
decision dismissing the petition of the prosecutor to charge
Manuel Opulencia in violation of Municipal ordinance S1 of 1974
for illegal installation of electric wire to reduce electric
consumption for his factory Opulencia Ice Plant. An information
however was filed after almost 9 months. The responded herein
then moved to quash the charges for grounds of prescription,
that since the violation is classified as light felony, only two
months is given for prescription. The lower court granted the
motion to quash. The prosecutor then, after the motion was
granted, filed another charge against the respondent company
owner, on ground of theft. That according to the prosecutor,
illegal installation which is punishable under the municipal
ordinance and theft of electricity punishable under the RPC are
different.
ISSUE: W/n Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to
the second offense charged against him
HELD: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense
for the second offense because as tediously explained in the
case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or
kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that No person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense and the second sentence states that If an act is
punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal
shall bar to another prosecution for the same act. In the case
at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr.
Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double
jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge
constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge
was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the
two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of
double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on
the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him
coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense
charged against Mr.Opulencia.

CENTRAL BANK v CA
171 SCRA 49, Mar. 8, 1989
FACTS: An information for Estafa was filed against Felipe Plaza
Chua and Melchor Avila Chua President and Treasurer,
respectively, of the Surigao Development Bank. Both pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. Trial ensued and the trial court
convicted the respondents of the crime charged. On appeal, the
CA reversed the decision of the trial court and acquitted private
respondents.
ISSUE: W/n appeal by the People is proper
HELD: No. Ordinarily, errors of judgment may be corrected in a
timely appeal from the judgment on the merits. Such remedy,
however, is not available in the case at bar, the decision
involved being one of acquittal. An appeal therefrom by the
People would run counter to the accused's constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy.
LOS BAOS V PEDRO
GR No. 173588, Apr. 22, 2009
FACTS: Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded
firearm without authorization from the COMELEC a day before
the elections. Pedro, then filed a Motion to Quash after his
Motion for Preliminary Investigation did not materialize. The RTC
granted the quashal The RTC reopened the case for further
proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing Rule 117, Sec. 8
on provisional dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become
permanent. The public prosecutor manifested his express
conformity with the motion to reopen the case saying that the
provision used applies where both the prosecution and the
accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or
where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to
the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the
information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over
the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedros
arraignment date. Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
and prohibition to nullify the RTCs mandated reopening. The
CA, at first granted the reopening of the case but through
Pedro's Motion for Reconsideration, his argument that a year
has passed by from the receipt of the quashal order, the CA's
decision was reversed. Petitioner now argues using the same
argument of the public prosecutor.
Held: Yes. These prevent a review of the evidence by the
court. They frustrate the purposes of the law through open
violation. Such review is impossible in view of the abuse
committed in resorting to such unlawful agreements.

ISSUE: Whether the rule on provision dismissal is applicable.

RULING: The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to

the RTC. The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional
Dismissal. Primarily, they are two separate concepts. In Motion
to Quash, the Information itself has deficiency while in
Provisional Dismissal, the Information has no deficiencies. It
does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional
dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies. In the case, the
SC finds that the granting of the quashal of the RTC had no
merit on the ground that there is a legal excuse or justification
in Pedro's offense. Pedro misappreciated the natures of a motion
to quash and provisional dismissal. As a consequence, a valid
Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now
be arraigned and stand trial.

RULE 118
U.S v. Donato 9 Phil. 701
Fact: The representative of the government and the
attorney for the defendants made several agreements
where in facts of the case were stipulated. Later, the court
convicted the accused of the crime charged considering
that the crime of the accused was corroborated on its
substantial parts in view of the form and manner by which
the witnesses have testified.
Issue: Whether the agreements were unlawful.
ALVIOLA v AVELINO A.M. No. MTJ-P-08-1697, Feb 29,
2008
FACTS: In a Complaint[1] dated 5 October 2005, complainant
alleged that the complaint in the civil case was filed on 24
September 2002. After the defendants filed their answer on 10
October 2002, the case was set for pre-trial conference on 19
November 2002. Following several postponements, the pre-trial
conference was actually conducted and terminated on 26
August 2004. More than a year after the termination of the pre-
trial conference, respondent judge had not issued a pre-trial
order. Complainant had already filed before the sala of
respondent judge a manifestation regarding this matter but
respondent Judge still failed to issue the required pre-trial order.
Respondent judge maintained that pre-trial conferences were
set on 19 November 2002 and 2 January 2003 but both were
postponed at the instance of both parties for purposes of
settlement. Further settings were likewise postponed as
defendants counsel had moved for the suspension of the
proceedings of the civil case in deference to another civil case
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Capiz for
annulment/cancellation of title of the same property involved.
After respondent judge had resolved the motion, the
continuation of the pre-trial conference was scheduled and the
parties agreed to have it on 30 July 2004. Finally, the parties
had their exhibits marked on 26 August 2004. Thereafter, the
parties were given sufficient time to settle the case. Respondent
Judge admitted that the delay in the issuance of the pre-trial
order was due to the fact that he had opted to concentrate on
the disposal of other cases required to be terminated before 30
December 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. Respondent
judge, thus, argued that he cannot be held liable for gross
neglect of duty due to his efforts to unclog the courts docket of
pending cases as borne out by the record
ISSUE: W/n the respondent judge is liable for undue delay in
rendering a pre-trial order
HELD: Yes. Respondent judge violated the Paragraph 8, Title I (A)
of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC by issuing the pre-trial order only on 2
January 2005[16] or more than four (4) months after the
termination of the pre-trial conference. It should likewise be
underscored that since the civil case is an
unlawful detainer case falling within the ambit of the Rules on
Summary Procedure, respondent judge should have handled the
same with promptness and haste.[17] The reason for the adoption
of the Rules on Summary Procedure is precisely to prevent
undue delays in the disposition of cases. It is therefore not
encouraging when, as in the case at bar, it is the judge himself
who occasions the delay sought to be prevented by the rule. By
no means is the aim of speedy disposition of cases served by
respondent judges inaction.
NPC v ADIONG
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2060, July 27, 2011
FACTS: Ibrahim Abdo, et al., collectively sought to hold NPC
liable for damages for operating seven Hydroelectric Power
plants allegedly without due regard to the health and safety of
the plaintiffs and other residents of Marawi City and the
province of Lanao del Sur. Judge Adiong issued a Resolution
ordering NPC to refund the amount of P114,000,000,
representing the Fuel Compensating Cost, Foreign Exchange,
and Incremental Cost Charges; to refund the amount of
P176,000,000, representing the Fuel and Power Cost Adjustment
and PPA; and to pay the amount of P97,537,000 as attorneys
fees.[4] NPC sought reconsideration of the order alleging that no
pre-trial was conducted and yet respondent judge already
passed upon the merits of the case. NPCs motion, however, was
denied by Judge Adiong. Judge Adiong reasoned that before
issuing the questioned resolution, full-blown hearings were
conducted and NPC was afforded all the opportunities to present
its evidence and to participate actively in the hearings. Having
done so, NPC has submitted itself to the courts jurisdiction and
could no longer claim that no pre-trial was conducted. Later,
Judge Adiong also directed Sheriff Otto Gomampong to
implement the Resolution ratiocinating that the same has
already become final.[5]
ISSUE: W/n the issuance of Judge Adiongs Resolution is violative
of the Rules of Court
HELD: Yes. Respondent Judge failed to conduct a pre-trial
conference contrary to elementary rules of procedure which he
should have known all too well considering his long years of
service in the bench. Such ignorance of a basic rule in court
procedure, as failing to conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross
ignorance and warrants a corresponding penalty. As to the
allegations of poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal
principles in granting the motions for execution pending appeal
for flimsy and unsupported reasons, the particular reasons
relied upon by respondent judge for issuing the writ of execution
pending appeal are so unreliably weak and feeble that it
highlights the lack of knowledge of respondent judge with
regard to the proper appreciation of arguments. Dire financial
conditions of the plaintiffs supported by mere self-serving
statements as good reason for the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal does not stand on solid footing. It
does not even stand on its own.
FULE v CA 162 SCRA 447, June 22, 1988
Facts: Petitioner was convicted of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 on the basis of the stipulation of facts
agreed upon by the prosecution and the defense during
the pre-trial conference. The agreement was not signed by
petitioner nor his counsel. However, counsel of the
accused confirmed the stipulation of facts in his
memorandum.
Issue: Whether petitioner may be convicted solely on the
basis of the stipulation of facts.
Held: No. Rule 118 of the rules of court requires both the
accused and his counsel to sign the stipulation of facts.
This defect was not cured through the memorandum of
counsel. Evidence independent of the admission of guilt of
the accused was thus needed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
People v. Hernandez 260 SCRA 27
Fact: Accused appellant was charged with the crime of
illegal recruitment committed in large scale. For this crime,
accused- appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt by the trial court. Appellant contends that the
prosecution failed to prove one of the essential elements
of the crime of illegal recruitment that the offender is non-
licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in
the recruitment and placement of workers. That elements
was a subject of a stipulation proposed by the prosecution
and admitted by the defense during trial. Appellant assails
the erroneous reliance placed by the prosecution on the
stipulation of facts in dispensing with the presentation of
evidence to prove the said element.
Issue: Whether stipulation of facts in criminal cases are
prohibited.
Held: No. this is in light of recent changes in our rules on
criminal procedure, particularly the provisions found in rule
118. Sec. 2 there of states that the pre-trial conference
shall consider stipulation of facts. In further pursuit of the
objective of expending trial by dispensing with the
presentation of evidence on matters that the accused is
willing to admit, a stipulation of fact should be allowed not
only during pre-trial but also and with more reason, during
the trial proper itself.
RULE 119
People vs De Grano G.R. No. 167710
Facts: An Information for murder committed against
Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the RTC Branch 6,
Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano et. al. They People v. Bularan 325 SCRA 476
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged while the others Fact: Cielito Buluran and 3 John Does were charged with
remain at large. Respondents filed a motion for bail the crime of murder. The information was later amended
contending that the prosecutions evidence was not strong. when leonarda valenzeula was identified as one of the
Petitioner filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of assailants. Upon arraignment, both accused entered pleas
Court before the CA arguing that the private respondents, of not guilty. The trial court convicted appellants. In their
having deliberately evaded arrest after being denied bail consolidated brief, appellants contend that they were
and deliberately failing to attend the promulgation of the merely made the scapegoats for the killing. They argue
Decision despite due notice, lost the right to move for that their warrantless arrest and the lack of preliminary
reconsideration of their conviction; and the grounds relied investigation render the criminal proceedings against them
upon by respondent RTC in modifying its Decision are illegal for violation of their constitutional rights.
utterly erroneous.
Issue: Whether the proceeding against appellants are
Issue: WHETHER THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF invalid for violating the constitutional right of appellants.
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR Held: No, appellants are estopped from questioning the
CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. validity of their respective arrests since they never raised
this issue befo0re arraignment. There is also no violation of
Held: By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a the custodial rights of the accused during custodial
criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear confession or admission.
showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of
due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In
which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of
double jeopardy the revered constitutional safeguard
against exposing the accused to the risk of answering
twice for the same offense.

Abardo v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 139571-72 March
28, 2001
Facts: On May 21, 1991, the office of the ombudsman filed
before the Sandiganbayan 2 separate informations for
falsification of public documents against petitioner who
was then the provincial assessor of Camarines sur. At the
scheduled arraignment on July 8, 1991, petitioner filed a
motion to quash. In view of the pendency of the motions,
petitioners arraignment was postponed until further
notice. On September 3, 1991, the sandiganbayan denied
the motion of quash. Eventually. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the supreme court in
relation to the denial of his motion. The arraignment for
October 7, 1991 was thus reset to November 28, 1991,
upon motion of petitioners counsel. The arraignment was
reset for several times for the same reasons. The supreme
court dismissed the petition. On July 28, 1992, petitioner
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Adding to the delay
was the reorganization of the sandiganbayan and the
consolidation of the cases with 8 other criminal cases with
more than 20 accused where separate motion for
reinvestigation were filed.
Issue: Whether petitioner should be acquitted to
implement the provisions of the speedy trial act of 1998
and by reason of the IRRs promulgated by the supreme
court in its circular No. 38- 39.
Held: Petitioner should be acquitted. However, the time
limits provided by R.A 8493 could not be applied in this
case because petitioner was arraigned way back in 1992.
At that time, there was yet no statute which establishes
deadlines for arraignment and trial. Nevertheless,
petitioners right to a speedy trial under the constitution
has been violated. The inability of the ombudsman to
complete reinvestigation dragged this case for 11yrs.
G.R. No. L-26376 August 31, 1966 PEOPLE vs. BALISACAN,
Facts: To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a
plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de
oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present
evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the
accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-
defense because the latter was strangling him. And he further
stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to
the police authorities.
Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the above-
mentioned testimony of the accused, the court a quorendered a
decision acquitting the accused.
Issue: w/n THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE
LATTER'S PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN ARRAIGNED.
Held: Yes. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt
with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to
defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no
alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the
circumstances. In this case, the defendant was only allowed to
testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the
purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not
be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. In view of the assertion of self-defense
in the testimony of the accused, the proper course should have
been for the court a quo to take defendant's plea anew and then
proceed with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3
of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
PEOPLE vs. GUTIERREZ, JR. 302 SCRA 643
Facts: Accused, a Police Officer, was charged with murder of
ANTONIO MERCENE JR.Accused-appellant at first pleaded not
guilty, but later, through a new counsel, withdrew his plea and
moved for modification of the order of trial pursuant to Rule 119,
3(e) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure invoking his plea of self-
defense. The trial court ruled that accused-appellant was actually
entering a conditional plea of guilty and thus entered a plea of not
guilty for him. At the same time, it denied accused- appellants
motion for a modification of the order of trial
Issue: w/n trial court erred in not allowing the accused in presenting
his defense in an inverted order of trial upon his counsels motion
as he invoked self-defense
Held: The contention has no merit. The change found in the
present rule is based on the theory that by pleading self-defense,
the accused admits the killing and, therefore, the burden of
justification is now on him. Rule 119, 3(e), however, does not
require such a change in the order of trial but only allows it in the
discretion of the court. This can be seen in the use of the
permissive may. At any rate, in the case at bar, although accused-
appellant pleaded self-defense, he did not really admit the killing
because his claim was that it was the deceased who accidentally
shot himself. There is, therefore, no basis for reversing the order of
trial. The burden was on the prosecution to prove that it was
accused-appellant who really fired his gun at the deceased.
People vs De Vera, Sr. 308 SCRA 77
Facts: Accused is indicted in two separate informations for the
crime of murder for shooting Gerardo Valdez and homicide for
shooting Perlita Ferrer. After a joint trial that followed the
arraignment and the plea of not guilty entered by the accused with
the assistance of counsel, trial court found the accused guilty.
Issue: Whether the trial court committed an error in convicting the
appellant of murder with homicide?
Held: Yes. While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more
criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot
convict the accused of a complex crime consisting of the various
crime alleged in two information.
PEOPLE v. BACSA, 104 Phil 136
Facts: An information filed in May 1951 after the corresponding
investigation, charges Marcelino Bacsa, Evaristo de los Santo,
Pedro Gaspar, Ernesto Gaspar and Martin Granil with crimes of
robbery with homicide of the aged woman, plus multiple rape
committed on Celestina Torres, probably her relative. Martin Granil
and Marcelino Bacsa testified for the prosecution. After weighing
the evidence submitted on both sided, the district judge found
Gregorio Bacsa guilty. Gregorio Bacsa appealed in due time. The
appellant imputes irregularity to the trial judge in permitting the
release of two defendants; because Rule 115, sec. 9, according to
him, contemplates the discharge of only one.
Issue: Whether or not the trial judge erred in permitting the release
of the two defendants?
Held:No. Rule 115, Section 9, of the rules of Court does not
prohibit the discharge of more than one co-defendant to be utilized
as state witness. It all depends upon the needs of the fiscal and the
discretion of the Judge. Any error of the trial judge in this matter
cannot have the effect of invalidating the testimony of the
discharged co-defendant
PEOPLE vs. ANINON 158 SCRA 710
Facts: Benjamin Aninon and Policarpio Saycon were charged with
the murder of Cesar Agustin. Upon arraignment, Aninon and
Saycon pleaded not guilty. In the course of trial, Saycon was
discharged and utilized as a state witness. The trial court also gave
weight to the testimonies of Lauro Ibalig and Policarpio Saycon,
who witnessed the commission of the crime. Benjamin Aninon
appealed
Issue: w/n THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING
ACCUSED SAYCON AND ALLOWING HIM TO TESTIFY
AGAINST HIS CO-ACCUSED ANINON
Held: No.It has been ruled in this connection that the discharge of a
defendant to be utilized as a state witness for the prosecution,
should be availed of only if there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested or the
accused is the only one who has knowledge of the crime and not
when his testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise
strengthen the evidence in the hands of the prosecution. His
testimony merely served to corroborate and strengthen the earlier
testimony of Lauro Ibalig and furnish further details on antecedent
events. The irregular discharge of Policarpio Saycon however, will
not invalidate his acquittal. Under the then applicable provision of
Rule 119, his acquittal becomes ineffective only if he fails or
refuses to testify against his co- accused
PEOPLE vs ANABE G.R. No. 179033
Facts: In two separate Informations filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, both dated January 15, 1998,
Feliciano Anabe y Capillan (appellant) and one Felicita Generalao
y Irgulastion (Felicita), in conspiracy with another person, were
charged with robbery with homicide and destructive arson.When
arraigned, appellant and Felicita pleaded not guilty. FELICITA, who
turned state witness stating that appellant instructed Felicita and
Conrada to repair to their room while he sat beside Uy who was
watching television. After about an hour, Conrada went to the
dining room and saw appellant holding a knife. As Felicita followed,
she saw the dead body of Uy lying on the floor covered with a mat,
and as shenoticed a bloodstained knife on the table, she
exclaimed, you killed Kuya Tony!, which appellant admitted. Her
testimony was rebutted by other witnesses
Issue w/ court erred in GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED-TURNED-STATE-
WITNESS FELICITA GENERALAO.
Held: The claim of Felicita that appellant confessed to the killing of
Uy must be corroborated to be given credence. Like any other
testimony, Felicita's statements cannot be readily accepted hook,
line and sinker. More important, the testimony of a state witness
must be received with great caution and carefully scrutinized. The
rule is that the testimony of a self- confessed accomplice or co-
conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused
cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof of
a moral certainty that the latter committed the crime. It must be
substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable
testimony and strong circumstances, and must be to such an
extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. Felicitas
testimony on appellants confession being uncorroborated, the
question is whether it can stand alone and be given full credence
PEOPLE vs. DE GUZMAN 326 SCRA 131
Facts: Renato de Guzman, Marciano Ramos, Frederick Mosqueda
and Paquito Ancheta were charged with Robbery with Homicide
before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Only De Guzman,
Ramos and Mosqueda were apprehended. Ancheta remains at-
large. When they were arraigned, the three accused entered a plea
of "not guilty." At the trial and upon motion of the prosecution,
Mosqueda was discharged and was utilized as state witness.
Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding de Guzman and
Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
Accused-appellant Ramos claims that trial court erred in
discharging Mosquedo since Accused-appellant Ramos claims that
requirements (a), (b) and (d) of rule 119 section 9 were not properly
complied with
Issue: w/n THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MOTION TO DISCHARGE ACCUSED FREDERICK MOSQUEDA
TO BE UTILIZED AS STATE WITNESS
Held: No. The requirements under Section 9 of Rule 119 for the
discharge of Mosqueda to become state witness were not strictly
and properly met, nonetheless, this Court does not subscribe to the
suggestion of the defense that Mosquedas testimony should be
disregarded. This issue has long been settled. Although the trial
court may have erred in discharging the accused, such error would
not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the
defendant.[8] The discharge of an accused under these
circumstances is not reversible. Once his discharge is effected, the
legal consequence of acquittal follows unless the accused so
discharged fails or refuses to testify pursuant to his commitment.
The order for his discharge may only be recalled in one instance,
and that is when he subsequently fails to testify against his co-
accused
PEOPLE vs. DEANG 378 SCRA 657
Facts: On 31 January 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City, Branch 59, rendered a decision[1] in Criminal Case No. 95-
320, finding accused Rommel Deang, Melvin Espiritu, and Nicson
(or Nixon) Catli guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide, and sentencing each of them
to suffer the penalty of death. During the trial, a motion to
discharge Benito to become a state witness was filed,[19] which
was opposed by DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI.[ CATLI avers that
the trial court erred in: (a) proceeding with his arraignment without
a preliminary investigation; (b) admitting in evidence, giving weight
and credence to, and relying chiefly on the alleged extrajudicial
confession of accused DEANG in convicting them; (c) granting the
discharge of Benito Catli when he was the most guilty of the four
accused and by giving weight to his testimony; (d) ignoring his
defense of alibi; and (e) convicting him despite a clear lack of
motive
Issue: w/n court erred in the discharge of Benito
Held: Catlis issue is well within the discretion of the trial judge.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court did err, this Court has held
several times in the past that any witting or unwitting error of the
prosecution in asking for the discharge of an accused, and of the
trial court in granting the petition for discharge, would not deprive
the discharged accused of the acquittal specified in Section 10 of
Rule 119 and of the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy, as long as no question of jurisdiction is involved. It is also
relevant to note that the improper or mistaken discharge of an
accused would not affect his competence as a witness or render
inadmissible his testimony. CATLI'S argument that he had no
motive to kidnap anybody because his family was well-off is
irrelevant. In the fist place, the rich and the poor can and do
commit crimes.
G.R. No. L-21068 November 29, 1963 SALCEDO vs. LIWAG.
Facts: On October 10, 1961, petitioner, 2nd Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Sulu, investigated an incident involving Sgt. Andres A. Lopez of the
Philippine constabulary who was allegedly arrested while performing
guard duty and in the process was handcuffed and manhandled to
unconsciousness. petitioner, with the approval of his chief, Fiscal Martin
A. Paulete, filed on November 29, 1961 before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Jolo, province of Sulu, three informations against Lt. Recia, et
al., to wit: one for assault upon an agent or a person in authority, another
for less serious physical injuries, and the third for arbitrary detention.
On February 5, 1963, after the accused had secured numerous
postponements of the trial which petitioner considers unwarranted
because the prosecution was at all times prepared and ready to present
its evidence, petitioner was required by Fiscal Paulete to turn over the
cases once more to Fiscal Coscolluela in order that the latter may handle
the same, but considering such request as an undue interference with the
performance of his official duty since he is not disqualified by law to act
thereon, he declined the request and insisted on his right to prosecute
the cases.
This refusal of petitioner prompted Fiscal Paulete to appear at the trial of
the cases which was then in progress during which a discussion ensued
between the two prosecutors. It was on this occasion when the court
decided to postpone the trial once more in order that the incident may be
determined once and for all by the authorities concerned.
Issue: w/n the Secretary of Justice cannot disqualify a public Prosecutor
from prosecuting a case because this power belongs to the proper court
Held: the Secretary of Justice merely acted on the matter pursuant to the
authority conferred upon him by law over fiscals and public prosecutors
invoking in his favor the portion of the law which provides: "It (Department
of Justice) shall also have general supervision and control of the
provincial sheriffs and all law officers of the Government, the provincial
and city fiscals or attorneys and other prosecuting officers." (Section 83,
in relation to Section 79[C], Revised Administrative Code). But this power
of control and supervision can only extend to administrative matters and
not when it may conflict or encroach on the performance by the fiscal of
his duties in connection with the prosecution of a case investigated and
acted upon by him. To this extent he should be given wide latitude in
order that the best interest of justice may be accomplished.
ALARILLA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No. 136806.
August 22, 2000]
FACTS: Petitioner, a public officer, being then the Municipal
Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, committing the crime of
grave threats (Art.
282 RPC) in relation to and taking advantage of his official
functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously level and aim a .45 caliber pistol at and
threaten to kill one Simeon G. Legaspi,during a public
hearing about the pollution from the operations of the
Giant Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory and after the
said complainant rendered a privilege speech critical of the
abuses and excesses of the administration of said accused.
Petitioners motions for reconsideration and reinvestigation
and petition for certiorari were all denied. After the
prosecution had completed the presentation of its
evidence, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence on the
ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that he
had committed the crime charged in the information and
that the act complained of took place while he was
performing his official functions. This was also denied by
the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the first division of the
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners demurrer to evidence.
HELD: The resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to
the exercise of sound judicial discretion. A lower courts order of
denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will not
review the prosecutions evidence and precipitately decide whether
or not such evidence has established the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused has established that
such judicial discretion has been gravely abused, thereby
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction.[29] Mere allegations
of such abuse will not suffice. For the special civil action of
certiorari to lie, it is crucial that there must be a capricious, arbitrary
and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial
prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and
common law traditions. We are not prepared to rule that the
Sandiganbayan has gravely abused its discretion when it denied
petitioners demurrer to evidence. Public respondent found that the
prosecutions evidence satisfactorily established the elements of
the crime charged
People vs Atienza GR. 176671
Facts: An Information[2] filed on June 19, 2001,
respondents Aristeo E. Atienza (Mayor Atienza), then
Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, Engr.
Rodrigo D. Manongsong (Engr. Manongsong), then
Municipal Engineer of Puerto Galera and Crispin M.
Egarque (Egarque), a police officer stationed in Puerto
Galera, were charged before the Sandiganbayan violation
of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No.
26678. On January 9, 2006, Mayor Atienza and Engr.
Manongsong filed a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to
Acquit),[15] which was anchored on the credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution. Respondents maintain that
the evidence presented were not sufficient to hold them
guilty of the offense charged. In granting the Demurrer to
Evidence, the Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that not all the elements
of the crime charged were established by the prosecution,
particularly the element of manifest partiality on the part of
respondents. The Sandiganbayan held that the evidence adduced
did not show that the respondents favored other persons who were
similarly situated with the private complainant.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED IN DENYING THE PEOPLE DUE PROCESS WHEN IT
RESOLVED ISSUES NOT RAISED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, WITHOUT AFFORDING THE
PROSECUTION AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD THEREON.
Held: Verily, in criminal cases, the grant of demurrer is tantamount
to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed
because this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although
the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but
only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the
writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such
as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case or where the trial was a sham, thus, rendering the assailed
judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
In the present case, no such circumstances exist to warrant a
departure from the general rule and reverse the findings of the
Sandiganbayan.
Bangayan v Bangayan. GR 172777
Facts: On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig
City and they had two children.[4] Later, Sally Go learned that
Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine whom he
subsequently married on January 5, 2001 under the false name,
Benjamin Z. Sojayco. Benjamin, Jr. fathered two children with
Resally. Furthermore, Sally Go discovered that on September 10,
1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a certain Azucena Alegre
(Azucena) in Caloocan City. The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City
conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued a
Resolution dated June 5, 2002 recommending the filing of an
information for bigamy against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for having
contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still
legally married to Sally Go. After the arraignment, during which
petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge against them, the
prosecution presented and offered its evidence The RTC
dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for
insufficiency of evidence
Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari.
Issue:W/n the court can review an order grating the demurrer
Held: A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has
rested its case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether
the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to
warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If
the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the
demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the
merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-
established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order
granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place
the accused in double jeopardy.
Goodland v. Abraham GR 195658
Facts: Petitioner-appellant Goodland Company, Inc. (Goodland), a
corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with Philippine
laws, is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pasong Tamo,
Makati City Goodland allowed the use of its Makati property, by way of
accommodation, as security to the loan facility of Smartnet with Asia
United Bank (AUB). Mr. Guy, Goodlands Vice President, was allegedly
made to sign a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) document in blank. Upon
signing the REM, Mr. Guy delivered the same to AUB together with the
original owners copy of the TCT covering the the Makati property. Mr.
Rafael Galvez, the Executive Officer of Goodland, who had custody of
the title to the Makati property, handed over the original of the said title to
Mr. Guy, after being reassured that it would be turned over to AUB along
with a blank REM, and that it would serve as mere comfort document and
could be filled up only if and when AUB gets the conformity of both
Smartnet and Goodland. About two (2) years thereafter, Goodland found
out that the REM signed in blank by Mr. Guy has been allegedly filled up
or completed and annotated at the back of the title of the Makati property.
Makati Prosecutors Office filed an Information for Falsification of Public
Document defined and penalized under Article 172 in relation to Article
171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code against private respondents Co and
Chan and Atty. Pelicano After the prosecution formally offered its
evidence and rested its case, herein private respondents filed a Motion
for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with attached Demurrer
to Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to substantiate its claim
that they are guilty of the crime charged. The prosecution opposed the
Demurrer to Evidence contending that it was able to prove [that] Mr. Guy
did not participate in the execution of the REM because Goodland did not
consent to the use of its Makati property to secure a loan and it has no
outstanding credit for any peso loan.
Issue: w/n The CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 332313 against respondents on demurrer
to evidence in complete disregard of material prosecution evidence which
clearly establishes respondents criminal liability for falsification of public
documents
Held: It is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or
withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case,nor
can it be modified except to eliminate something which is civil or
administrative in nature. One exception to the rule is when the
prosecution is denied due process of law. Another exception is when the
trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case
by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence. If there is grave abuse
of discretion, granting Goodlands prayer is not tantamount to putting Co
and Chan in double jeopardy.
CABARLES vs. MACEDA GR NO. 161330, FEBRUARY 20, 2007
Facts: The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses RENE "NONOY"
CABARLES Y ADIZAS of the crime of Murder, committed on or
about the 25th day of April, 1999, in the City of Las Pias,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did assault, and stab with a deadly weapon
(fan knife) one Antonio Callosa, which directly caused his death.
With no witness for the August 1, 2001 hearing, the prosecution
rested its case and formally offered its evidence.Thereafter,
Cabarles, with leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence but it
was denied by Judge Maceda.16 Two witnesses were called for
the defense, accused Cabarles and Luisito Javier, a fisherman.
Issue: WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE ISSUED THE
QUESTIONED ORDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A FINAL
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
Held: Generally, after the parties have produced their respective
direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.
However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice,
may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will
not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion
appears. A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only
after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their
evidence, but before judgment is rendered,and even after
promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only controlling
guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of
justice.This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.
However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case
before judgment is rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing
must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003
Order without notice and hearing and without giving the
prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position
on the matter. This failure, to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion and goes against the due process clause of the
Constitution which requires notice and opportunity to be heard. The
issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is
contrary to the express language of Section 24, Rule 119.
Republic v SandiganBayan, GR 159275
Facts: On July 22, 1987, petitioner through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), instituted SB Civil Case No. 0011 for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages, entitled
Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Ricardo C. Silverio and Pablo P. Carlos, Jr. Petitioner seeks to recover ill-
gotten wealth acquired or accumulated by the said respondents either
singly or collectively, and includes charges of misappropriation and theft
of public funds; plunder of the nations wealth; extortion; blackmail;
bribery; embezzlement and other acts of corruption; betrayal of public
trust; and abuse of power, to the grave and irreparable damage of
petitioner. It held that the petitioner was unable to establish the loss or
destruction of the original documents and hence it cannot be permitted to
present secondary evidence as required under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. That the best evidence rule applies in this case is demonstrated by
petitioners own purpose in offering the rejected documentary exhibits for
how then can it intend to prove the defendants close business/personal
relationship with defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos without inquiring into the
contents thereof. On September 25, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to
Reopen Plaintiffs Presentation of Evidence Respondent Silverio filed his
Opposition asserting that the grounds cited by petitioner do not warrant a
reopening of the presentation of evidence.
Issue: w/n public respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in
denying petitioners motion
Held: The term grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. Public respondent gravely abused its discretion in disallowing
the presentation of additional evidence by the petitioner after the latter
made a formal offer of documentary evidence, at the time the
respondents had not even commenced the presentation of their
evidence. Such arbitrary denial of petitioners motion to reopen for
presentation of additional evidence would result in serious miscarriage of
justice as it deprives the Republic of the chance to fully prove its case
against the respondents and recover what could be illegally- gotten
wealth.
RULE 120
Talabon vs Warden 78 Phil 599
Facts: On November 2, before the attorney for the
petitioner was notified of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo dated October 31 denying the petitioner's
petition, another petition for habeas corpus was originally
filed with this Court by the same petitioner based on
substantially the same grounds. In view of the objection of
the attorney for the respondent to the jurisdiction of this
Court to entertain the original petition for habeas corpus,
based on the ground that the petitioner had also appealed
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
denying his petition, the attorney for the petitioner, in his
reply, moved that the petition and other pleadings filed
originally with this Court, together with the papers sent up
from the lower court, be considered as an appeal from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
Issue: whether or not the court that convicted the
petitioner had jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner
and of the offense, and to impose the particular penalty
above stated;
Held: The fact that the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo was made verbally without prejudice to
put it subsequently in writing, and that no written decision
with findings of facts has been rendered up to the filing of
the petition, did not make that judgment absolutely void,
because failure on the part of the court to comply with the
above quoted provisions of the Rules of Court and the
Constitution did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction
acquired over the offense and the petitioner.
The judgment that convicted the petitioner-defendant, not
absolutely void because the court that rendered it had
jurisdiction over him, the offense and the particular
penalty imposed therein, is defective because it does not
conform to the form required by the law and the
Constitution, and the proper remedy for the petitioner is to
appeal from said judgment, or petition for mandamus to
compel the Judge of the Court of First Instance to put in
writing the decision of the court in said case.
People vs Amondina 220 SCRA 6
Facts: According to Francisco Tangon, he saw the three
accused sitting on the side of the road. He recognized all
of them because he had known Amondina. When Floro
Gantalao arrived, the three men immediately and suddenly
attacked him. Tangon said that later that same night,
Amondina came to his house and warned him not to tell
anyone about the incident, otherwise he would be killed.
The defense of the three accused was denial and alibi.
The appellants' brief stresses the inconsistency of the trial
court in convicting the accused after casting much doubt
on the prosecution witnesses in its order. In that order, the
trial judge granted bail on the finding that the evidence of
their guilt was not strong.
Issue:W/n the contention of the court is correct
Held: Yes. As conspirators, they are all equally liable for the
victim's death, whoever of them actually dealt the lethal
blow.
The killing was qualified by treachery because of the
sudden and consecutive attacks made by the three
accused which were calculated to insure its execution
without risk to them arising from the defense the victim
might make. Treachery absorbs the circumstances of
superior strength and aid of armed men, 14 which should
not have been separately considered by the trial court.
We are satisfied that the guilt of the accused-appellants in
the murder of Floro Gantilao has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt and that they are justly punished with
reclusion perpetua and all its accessory penalties
Santos v Orda, GR 189402
Facts: An Information was filed in the RTC of Paraaque City,
charging Rolly Tonion alias Komang and Jhunrey Soriano
with murder for the killing of Francis Orda. The public
prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations in
the two cases in compliance with the joint resolution of the
Secretary of Justice. The appellate court ruled that the trial
court abused its discretion in granting the withdrawal of
the Informations without making an independent
evaluation on the merits of the case.
Issue: W/N tHE CA ERRED GRAVELY AND ACTED
ARBITRARILY IN NULLIFYING THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL
COURT GRANTING THE PROSECUTIONS MOTION TO
WITHDRAW THE INFORMATIONS
Held:Yes. In resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to
withdraw the Information filed by the public prosecutor on
his own initiative or pursuant to the directive of the
Secretary of Justice, either for insufficiency of evidence in
the possession of the prosecutor or for lack of probable
cause, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on
the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of
Justice that no crime was committed or that the evidence
in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to
support a judgment of conviction of the accused. In this
case, the trial court failed to make an independent
assessment of the merits of the cases and the evidence on
record or in the possession of the public prosecutor
People v Abellara 69 Phil 623
Facts: In a decision dated September 20, 1973, respondent
Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr. reversed the judgment of the City
Court of Quezon City and absolved Jose de Peralta from the
charge of illegal construction of his house. However, it
appearing from the records that the house was
constructed (in 1972) by the previous owner, Guillermo
Rezo, without a building permit, which is therefore an
illegal construction, that part of the decision requiring the
demolition of the subject house is modified. De Peralta
contends that the dispositive part of the decision, ordering
him to demolish his house, is inconsistent with the
judgment of acquittal and is not warranted. Judge Campos,
in his comment on the petition, justified the order of
demolition on the ground that it was intended to
implement the policy of clearing Quezon City of squatters.
Issue: w/n the judge was in excess of jurisdiction
Held: Yes. Demolition is a form of punishment. One cannot
be punished in a case where he has been acquitted
Whether the proper remedy to remove De Peralta's house
is through an ejectment suit, or under Letter of Instruction
No. 19, which orders city and district engineers "to remove
all illegal constructions, including buildings, ... and those
built without permits on public or private property, or
through any other appropriate civil or administrative
proceeding is a point which we do not decide in this case.
People v Silo, G.R. No. L-7916
Facts: The accused defraud the United States Tobacco
Corporation, received cigarettes valued at P3,172 to be
sold by him and under the express obligation to account
for and deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof, if sold, or
to return the said articles, if not sold; but the said accused,
far from complying With his aforesaid obligation and
despite repeated demands made upon him to do so,
accounted for the sum of P2,127.65 only, and with intent
to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the rest, to his
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the U. S. Tobacco Corporation in the amount of
P1,044.35, Philippine currency". The Judge found him
guilty of the crime of estafa as charged,
Issue: w/n the judges contention was correct
Held. Estafa is a well-known crime not only to lawyers but
also to the community in general, and especially to
businessmen and business agents. Then the court imposed
the penalty ranging from 2 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor to 1 year and 1 day of prision correctional. This
penalty would also indicate the kind of estafa committed.
It was not necessary, therefore, for the court to specify the
particular article and paragraph of the Revised Penal Code,
which have been violated by the appellant. There are
cases where the law or legal principle involved is not
obvious or clear. It is those cases that it would be
necessary for the court to specify the particular statute or
principle violated. On the other hand, where the statute or
principle concerned is so clear and obvious, as in the
present case, and is really understood from the facts, the
conclusion and the penalty imposed, an express
specification of the statute or an exposition of the law is
not necessary.
U.S. vs Avillar G.R. Nos. 9609, 9610 & 9611
Facts: Different cases were prosecuted in the CFI of Nueva
Ecija against the five defendants therein named. These
three actions were brought for three distinct crimes of
theft of carabaos, on three separate complaints, but it was
agreed among the parties that they should be heard
together and that the same evidence should serve for
each of the three prosecutions. This done, and there being
only one trial, but one judgment was rendered for all three
cases.
Although these actions were joined, three records were
made of them in this court and they were numbered
separately as in the lower court.
Issue: w/n the judgment was correct
Held: No. On appeal the convicted men stated that in the
judgment "the undersigned are sentenced to five years'
imprisonment in each cause" and Anastacio Avillar, in
withdrawing his appeal, says that "he was sentenced to
the penalty of five years in each one of the
aforementioned causes" The judgment, however, was one
and the same for all three causes; it was pronounced in a
single trial and its language does not warrant the
construction that it imposes five years imprisonment in
each cause, or a total of fifteen years.
This manner of pronouncing judgment is most defective; it
does not express the exact penalty that the law prescribes.
The Solicitor-General remarks in his brief in this court that
the Supreme Court has frequently enjoined the observance
of the mandates of the law in this respect.
U.S. vs Iguidez G.R. No. 12320
Facts: The accused, voluntarily, illegally and criminally,
without the consent of the mortgagee, sold to third
persons the three calesas and the six horses without
payments and cancellation of the mortgage. Basing his
argument on his contention that the evidence of record
discloses that only a part of the property was sold by the
accused, and that the property which remained in the
hands of the mortgagor was more than sufficient to secure
the unpaid balance of the mortgage indebtedness due at
the time when the sale was made, counsel further
contends that the interests of the mortgage creditor did
not suffer and were in nowise affected by the sale of a part
of the property, and that the accused should not be held
criminally responsible for a violation of the terms of the
Mortgage Law under such circumstances.
Issue: w/n accuseds contention is correct
Held: It is clear, however, that any unauthorized removal
or sale of mortgaged property, whether it be all or any part
of such property, so long as all or any part of the mortgage
indebtedness remains unpaid, is penalized under the
above cited provisions of the mortgage law.
The accused undertook to prove that he had the tacit, if
not the express consent of the agent of Bordman for the
sale of one of the horses. We do not deem it necessary,
however, to review at length the adverse finding of the
trial judge upon this contention of the accused because,
first, it is not claimed that the consent of the mortgagee or
his agent was given in writing in the manner and form
prescribed in section 10 of the Mortgage Law, and second,
whatever may have been the fact as to the alleged tacit
consent of the agent of the mortgagee to the sale of this
animal, we agree with the trial judge that the record
conclusively discloses that the accused wrongfully
disposed of some of the rest of the mortgaged property
without the consent, tacit or express, of the mortgagee or
his agent.
Abejuela vs People G.R. No. 80130
Facts: Benjamin Abejuela guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as accomplice of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document under Art. 315, par.
2(a) of the RPC. Petitioner claims that he had no
knowledge at all of the fraudulent machinations of Balo,
and that his act of lending his passbook was done in good
faith.
Issue: w/n accuseds contention is correct
Held: No. There is no evidence that appellant had
conspired with the malefactors, nor that he actually
participated in the commission of the crime. He cannot,
therefore, be considered as a principal. But in going with
them, knowing their criminal intention and in staying
outside of the house with them while the others went
inside the store to rob and kill, appellant effectively
supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making
him guilty as an accomplice. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary before a judgment of conviction can be
rendered. Not an iota of doubt must cloud the Court's
mind. A conviction of a criminal offense must be based on
clear and positive evidence and not on mere assumptions.
We believe that the guilt of petitioner Abejuela has not
been established beyond a reasonable doubt for which
reason he must be acquitted. The question that must be
resolved now is the effect of Abejuela's acquittal on his
civil liability.
Maximo vs Gerochi, Jr. G.R. Nos. L-47994-97
Facts: Four (4) informations for estafa against respondent
Conchita Panghilason was filed. The informations alleged
that Panghilason willfully issued four (4) checks drawn
against the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in
favor of the petitioner; that the checks were dishonored for
lack of funds or that her account with said bank had been
closed and that she refused to make the necessary deposit
within three (3) days from receipt of notice to redeem the
said checks. The respondent judge rendered judgment that
the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of accused
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issue: w/n accuseds contention is correct

Held: No. If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily
follow that no civil liability arising from the acts
complained of may be awarded in the same judgment.
Based on jurisprudence, the Court may acquit an accused
on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil
damages already proved in the same case without need
for a separate civil action. The private respondent never
denied her debts or obligations to the petitioner. Her
defense was directed only towards proving the fact that
the checks were issued in payment of a pre-existing
obligation, not that the obligation is non-existent or paid in
full. We further note that the private respondent failed to
submit her answer to this petition despite several notices
from this Court. She has waived her defenses to the
petition. In his answer, the trial judge justified his refusal
to award civil liability with a statement that the civil
liability did not arise from any criminal act but only from a
civil contract connected to the crime. He stated in his
denial of the motion for reconsideration that the action for
civil liability must be filed in a "civil court."
People vs Corral G.R. No. L-42300
Facts: Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the
general elections held on June 5, 1934. After due trial, he
was convicted on the ground that he had voted while
laboring under a legal disqualification. The judgment of
conviction was based on section 2642, in connection with
section 432. of the Revised Administrative Code. No
evidence was presented to show that prior to June 5, 1934,
he had been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise
undisputed that at the general elections held on June 5,
1934, the voted in election precinct No. 18 of the
municipality of Davao, Province of Davao.
Issue: w/n accused is guilty
Held: Yes. The modern conception of the suffrage is that
voting is a function of government. The right to vote is not
a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a
privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes
as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. The
right of the State to deprive persons to the right of
suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime,
is beyond question.
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the
latter voted in 1928 his offense had already prescribed,
and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at
the general election held on June 5, 1934. This contention
is clearly without merit. The disqualification for crime
imposed under section 432 of the Revised Administrative
Code having once attached on the appellant and not
having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon,
continued and rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote
at the general elections of 1934.
PEOPLE, vs. GALLARDE, G.R. No. 133025.
Facts: GALLARDE was charged with the special complex
crime of rape with homicide in an information. During the
arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of the
case immediately ensued as the defense waived the
holding of the pre-trial conference. GALLARDE alleges that
the trial court errerd in concluding that the prosecution has
proven beyond reasonable doubt that [he] was responsible
for the death of Editha Talan and not acquitting [him] on
the ground of notches of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond
resonable doubt.
Held: Yes. The place, time and date of the commission of
the offense are not essential elements of the crime of rape
with homicide. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal
knowledge of a woman and that on the occasion of or as a
reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed.
Conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the
crime provided it appears that the specific crime charged
was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the
complaint or information, within the period of the statute
of limitation, and within the jurisdiction of the court. The
allegation of the place of commission of the crime in the
complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood therefrom that the offense was committed or
some of the essential ingredients thereof occurred at some
place within the jurisdiction of the court. The rule merely
requires that the information shows that the crime was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
The Court may even take judicial notice that said place is
within its jurisdiction.
People v Arondain, GR 131864-65
Facts: : This is an automatic review is the Joint Decision of
the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 25, convicting and sentencing
accused Arondain to death in Criminal Case for Qualified
Illegal Possession of Firearm; and convicting accused
Sherjohn Arondain and Jose Precioso of Frustrated Robbery
with Homicide. The two accused, eighteen year-old
Sherjohn Arondain and twenty-seven year-old Jose
Precioso, interposed self-defense. Accused-appellant does
not deny authorship of the victims death. He contends,
however, that the killing of the victim was not on occasion
or by reason of robbery, hence, he should not have been
convicted for the complex crime of robbery with homicide,
but only for homicide. Appellant interposed that the the
court did not find them guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the accuse id found to be guilty of
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Held: No. In the case at bar, the trial courts conclusion that
the killing of the deceased was done on occasion or by
reason of robbery. Based on applicable jurisprudence, we
find that the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant
guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. The
confession made by the accused-appellant admitting the
crime of frustrated robbery cannot be admitted as part of
res gestae. It must be stressed that said statement, if it
was at all made by accused-appellant, was obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights. Said confession was
given after he was arrested and without the assistance of
counsel. He was not even informed of his right to remain
silent or right to counsel. From the time he was arrested
and deprived of his freedom, all the questions propounded
on him by the police authorities for the purpose of eliciting
admissions, confessions, or any information came within
the ambit of a custodial investigation. As such, he was
entitled to the rights enshrined under Article III, Section
12, of the Constitution. Failing to observe this
constitutional mandate, the alleged confession of accused-
appellant cannot be admitted as evidence against him.

U.S. vs Guzman G.R. No. L-3071.
Facts: The petitioner accuses Feliciano de Guzman and
Lorenzo Fajardo of the crime of lesiones menos graves.
After due trial had in this case, the accused Lorenzo
Fajardo was acquitted of the offense charged. Feliciano de
Guzman was found guilty and sentenced to one year and
eight months imprisonment (prision correccional) and to
pay to the offended party, Pedro Ignacio, an indemnity in
the sum of 250 pesos or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, together with the costs, from which
sentence the said accused, Guzman, appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the proper penalty was given to the
accused.
Held: No. This court accepts as proven the guilt of the
appellant as found by the trial judge in his sentence in this
case, such findings being in accordance with the facts and
merits. We can not say this, however, with respect to the
penalty imposed, such penalty not being in accordance
with the offense as alleged and charged.
This case or charge being one of lesiones menos graves
(personal injuries), treated successfully and cured within a
period of sixteen days after the infliction of the same, as is
expressly alleged and set forth in the complaint herein, the
penalty in this case should have been that of arresto
mayor, or banishment, together with a fine of from 325 to
3,250 pesetas, within the discretion of the court; this is in
accordance with and as prescribed in article 418 of the
Penal Code.
In the criminal procedure now in force and effect, it is not
proper or practicable to punish or impose upon the
accused a penalty for a graver offense than that with
which he has been accused and charged in the complaint.
PEOPLE VS. MAGPALAO G.R. NO. 92415
Facts: Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to
Baguio. After an hour of driving, the car stopped so that
one of the passengers could urinate. While the car was
stopped, Bara-akal, Edris, Ompa, Magpalao and
Magumnang pointed guns and knives at the other
passengers and divested them of their properties.
One of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car
towards the precipice (bangin). When the car was near the
precipice, Galvez then stepped to the brakes. The other
passengers jumped out of the car and went to different
directions to escape. Galvez however, was left in side the
car and was stabbed by one of the robbers. The robbers
then escaped. Quiambao, who owned the car helped
Galvez to get to a hospital. Galvez died in the hospital. The
robbers were then apprehended with the exception of Edris
who remain at large. Mangumnang however escaped while
being in detention and Bara-akal died inside the jail. Since
Mangumnang was not arrested, the trial in absentia
continued as to him. Ompa, Magpalao, and Magumnang
were all held guilty as principal by direct participation of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing to
apply the Constitutional mandate on the presumption of
innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt when it
allowed the trial in absentia to push through on the part of
defendant-appellant Magumnang.

Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
The reason is that the lower court has jurisdiction over
Magumnang the moment the latter was in custody.
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of
parties but until the case is terminated. Since all the
requisites of trial in absentia are complete, the court has
jurisdiction over Magumnang.
In addition, Magumnang was presumed innocent during his
trial in absentia. The prosecution had strong evidence
against him as proof beyond reasonable doubt that he is a
principal by direct participation in the crime of Robbery
with Homicide. Thus, the Constitutional mandate was not
violated.
ICDANG v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 185960
Facts: the Sandiganbayan (SB) convicted petitioner of the
crime of malversation of public funds. Petitioner was
likewise charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 (Criminal Case No. 26328).
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration requesting
that he be given another chance to present his evidence,
stating that his inability to attend the trial were due to
financial constraints such that even when some of the
scheduled hearings were sometimes held in Davao City
and Cebu City, he still failed to attend the same. However,
the SB denied the motion noting that the decision has
become final and executory on June 10, 2008 for failure of
petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration, or new trial,
or appeal before that date.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment is properly rendered
Held: Yes. There is nothing in the rules that requires the
presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment
of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on
both accused and his counsel, the latters absence during
the promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity
of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the
accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of
his counsel when the sentence was pronounced.
It is worth mentioning that petitioner never raised issue on
the fact that his counsel was not around during the
promulgation of the judgment in his motion for
reconsideration which merely prayed for reopening of the
case to enable him to present liquidation documents and
receipts, citing financial constraints as the reason for his
failure to attend the scheduled hearings. Before this Court
he now submits that the gross negligence of his counsel
deprived him of the opportunity to present defense
evidence.
Under the facts on record, SC finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the SB when it submitted the case
for decision and rendered the judgment of conviction on
the basis of the prosecution evidence after the defense
failed to present its evidence despite ample opportunity to
do so.
Villena and Doroja vs. People of the Philippines G.R.
No. 184091
FACTS: Petitioners were charged and found guilty of robbery-extortion
by the RTC. During promulgation of their judgment on, they failed to
appear despite proper notices. Warrants of arrest were issued against
them pursuant to Rule 120, Section 6, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Rules
of Court. It was only in October 11, 2007, that petitioners separately
filed their notices of appeal with the RTC, saying that they did not
receive the notices as they were transferred to another police station.
The RTC found their reason unmeritorious as they should have notified
their court of their new addresses
especially that they were the accused. On appeal, petitioners argue
that their notices of appeal have substantially complied with the
requirement of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and have
effectively placed them under the RTCs jurisdiction. They allege
further that their motion for reconsideration should have been
considered by the CA since they have offered the explanations that
their failure to appear during the promulgation of judgment was due to
the change of their respective addresses, and that their former
counsel of record did not inform them of the need to notify the RTC
thereof, much less properly advise them of the current status of the
proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have lost their standing in court,
thus, deemed to have waived their right to appeal.
RULING: Yes. Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides that If the
judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these
rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
fifteen (15) days from notice. Petitioners mere filing of notices of
appeal through their new counsel, therein only explaining their
absence during the promulgation of judgment, cannot be considered
an act of surrender, despite the fact that said notices were filed within
15 days from September 28, 2007, the purported date when their
new counsel personally secured a copy of the judgment of conviction
from the RTC. The term surrender under the above- mentioned
provision contemplates an act whereby a convicted accused physically
and voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer
the consequences of the verdict against him. The filing of notices of
appeal cannot suffice as a physical and voluntary submission of
petitioners to the RTCs jurisdiction. It is only upon petitioners valid
surrender, and only after proper motion, that they can avail of the
remedy of appeal. Absent compliance with these requirements, their
notices of appeal, the initiatory step to appeal from their conviction,
were properly denied due course. Petition denied.
Anselmo Cuyo vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No.
192164
FACTS: Petitioner Anselmo Cuyo and Alejo Cuyo are estranged
brothers. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal possession of
firearms against Alejo. Petitioner appeared before the RTC of La
Union with regard to the application for a search warrant by the
Criminal Investigation and Detective Group for the search of the
house of Alejo, and, in the course of the proceedings, made
untruthful statements under oath. Consequently, Alejo filed a
complaint for perjury against petitioner. The MTC in La Union,
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of perjury and sentenced him to imprisonment of four (4)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He was likewise ordered
to pay private complainant Alejo Cuyo the amount of P10,000
for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. However, petitioner
was not present during the promulgation of the judgment and
was represented by his counsel instead. Later, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision, but was denied by
the MTC. He then filed a petition before the RTC of La Union
alleging that the MTC had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his
Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied as well. On appeal,
petitioner contends among others, that the RTC erred in
dismissing the petition on procedural issues without determining
whether petitioner is entitled to avail himself of the remedies
after trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to avail himself of
the benefits of probation.
RULING: No. Sec. 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides
that the judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence
of the accused and any judge of the Court in which it was
rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the
province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk
of court. In the case at bar, petitioner was charged with and
found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is
considered as a correctional penalty. Under Article 9 of the
Revised Penal Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for
the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos (P200), or both are
imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light felony or offense
contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory
for petitioner to be present at the promulgation of the judgment.
In case the accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of
promulgation despite notice, and the failure to appear was
without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose all the remedies
available in the Rules against the judgment. One such remedy
was the Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of the
MTCC filed by petitioner on 28 August 2009. Petition denied.
Roallos vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No.
198389
FACTS: Roallos was charged in an Information for the crime
of sexual abuse. Upon arraignment, Roallos pleaded "not
guilty" to the offense charged. Trial on the merits ensued
thereafter, wherein the RTC rendered a Decision, finding
Roallos guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Roallos
sought a reconsideration but it was denied. Roallos claims
that the CA erred in affirming his conviction considering
that the Information filed against him was defective since
it charged two crimes and since none of the victims signed
the Information that was filed against him; and that he was
denied due process as he was not made to undergo a
preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in its judgment.
RULING No. Section 7, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
provides that a judgment of conviction may, upon motion
of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes
final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served,
or when the
accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation. In the case at bar, petitioner failed
to show that the proceedings were accompanied by
irregularities which would warrant a change in judgment.
Nevertheless, the Court modifies the amount of moral
damages and civil indemnity awarded by the CA. Petition
denied.
RULE 121
Evaristo, et.al. vs. Lastrilla 110 Phil 181 (G.R. No. L-
14682)
Facts: Petitioners, together with six others, were
charged with the crime of Murder. The Court of First
Instance of Samar found petitioners guilty as charged.
Upon being notified of the judgment, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal and served a copy upon the Provincial
Fiscal. Thereafter, petitioners moved for a new trial upon
the ground of newly discovered evidence. However, the
lower court entered an order declining to take "cognizance
of defendants (petitioners) motion for new trial for lack of
jurisdiction," because the petitioners already had perfected
their appeal from the judgment of conviction theretofore
rendered in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance can
resolve a motion for new trial after the perfection of
appeal.
Ruling: No. The filing of a notice of appeal with the
court in which the judgment or order was rendered, and
serving a copy thereof upon the Provincial Fiscal, perfected
the petitioners appeal. Upon perfection
of the appeal, the lower court lost jurisdiction of the case
to pass upon their motion for new trial in this Court where
the record of the case was transmitted and received. So
even in cases involving automatic
review by this Court, if the defendant perfects an appeal,
although he is not in duty bound to do so, the Court of First
Instance loses jurisdiction of the case and can no longer
pass upon or resolve a motion for new trial after the taking
of appeal by the defendant.
However, the motion for new trial filed by the petitioners
should not be denied even if the lower court declared that
the decision in the case at bar has become final and
therefore the motion for new trial
was filed out of time. This is so for there has been
substantial compliance of the law by the petitioners
regarding the perfection of appeal and consequently the
decision in this case has not yet become
final. Petition not yet denied.
People of the Philippines vs. Castelo
1 SCRA 461 (G.R. No. L-10774)
Facts: Defendant- appellant, who was sentenced to
death for murder filed a motion for Disposition of Petition
for New Trial and Bail, on the ground that the stenographic
notes containing the testimonies of some of the witnesses
are already definitely lost; that said testimonial evidence is
vital to the disposition of the case on the merits; that the
aforementioned loss of notes would delay the filing of the
appellees brief and consequently, the termination of the
appeal for an indefinite period of time.
Issue :Whether or not the case should be set for new
trial.
Ruling: No. Except for the missing transcript of the
stenographic notes containing the testimonies of the
witnesses, the records of this case are complete, with the
other evidence and the original decision of the trial court
intact. Defendant- appellant suggested, however, that
under the circumstances, the only remedy left to the Court
is to set aside the decision of the trial court and order a
new trial, on the alleged ground that the loss of the
stenographic notes in question constitutes an irregularity
that has been committed during the trial prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the defendant. The Court held that the
irregularity that justifies a new trial under the Rules on
Criminal Procedure is, as the rule itself prescribes, one that
has been committed during the trial. In the case at bar,
there is no pretense that an actual irregularity has been
committed during the trial. The proceedings have been all
in accordance with law and a decision on the merits has
been duly rendered and promulgated. This present
appellant has already filed his brief and no reference to
any
irregularity has been made therein. All that he assails is
the correctness of the decision on the merits. The property
remedy is the reconstitution of the missing evidence.
Ybiernas vs. Gabaldon G.R. No. 178925
Facts: Estrella Ybiernas owned a parcel of land located in Talisay,
Negros Occidental covered by a TCT. She executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property in favor of her heirs, one of
them is Dionisio Ybiernas. RTC issued an Order, directing the
registration and annotation of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the
title but neither the defendants nor anyone else has challenged
the validity of the mentioned judicial proceedings before the
RTC. Respondents Gabaldon and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc.
filed with the Pasig RTC a complaint for sum of money and
damages against Estrella and three other individuals. The sheriff
issued the corresponding writ of attachment and levied the
subject property. When Estrellas heirs learned about the levy,
Dionisio filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim, asserting the
transfer of ownership to them. Dionisio died and was succeeded
by his heirs. Petitioners filed with the Bacolod RTC a Complaint
for Quieting of Title and Damages, claiming that the levy was
invalid because the property is not owned by any of the
defendants in the Pasig RTC case. They averred that the
annotation of the RTC Order and the Deed of Absolute Sale on
the TCT serves as notice to the whole world that the property is
no longer
owned by Estrella. Respondents filed a notice of appeal, and it
was granted by the RTC. While the appeal was pending in the
CA, respondents filed a motion for new trial, claiming that they
have discovered that the Cadastral Case did not exist and the
Deed of Sale was simulated. The CA granted respondents
motion. Petitioners challenged the motion for new trial, but the
motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for new trial should be
granted.
RULING: Yes. A new trial is a remedy that seeks to temper the
severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. Thus, the
Rules allows the courts to grant a new trial when there are
errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights
of the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists
newly discovered evidence. Before a new trial may be granted
on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown
(1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching;
and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably
change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly
discovered evidence could have been very well presented
during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the
same cannot be considered newly discovered. In the case at
bar, respondents relied in good faith on the veracity of the
Order which petitioners presented in court. It was only practical
for them to do so, if only to expedite the proceedings. The court
holds that respondents exercised reasonable diligence in
obtaining the evidence. The certifications therefore qualify as
newly discovered evidence.
Payumo, et.al. vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 151911
FACTS: A composite team of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and
Integrated National Police (INP) units allegedly fired at a group of
civilians instantly killing one and wounding several others. The
accused were indicted for Murder with Multiple Frustrated and
Attempted Murder before the Sandiganbayan. After four years of trial,
the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision,
convicting the accused as co- principals of said charges. The accused
filed their Motion for New Trial, which was denied. They elevated the
case to the Supreme Court, which set aside the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan and remanding the case for a new trial. Thus, the case
was remanded to the Sandiganbayan and was raffled to the First
Division. Accordingly, the First Division received anew all the evidence
of the parties, both testimonial and documentary. Later, with the
creation of the Fourth and Fifth divisions, the case was transferred to
the Fifth Division, which promulgated judgment, convicting the
accused of the crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. The
accused filed their Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New
Trial. Since the Fifth Division could not reach unanimity in resolving the
aforesaid omnibus motion, a Special Fifth Division was constituted,
which granted a second new trial of the case. The Special Fifth Division
pronounced among others that a second new trial would enable it to
allow the accused to adduce pertinent evidence including the records
of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to shed light on the "serious allegations".
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it granted a new trial of the case.
RULING: Yes. Rule 121, Section 2(b) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that: new and material evidence has been
discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment, as one of the grounds
to grant a new trial. The records of the JAGO relative to the incident do
not meet the criteria for newly discovered evidence that would merit a
new trial. A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence
may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the
evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise
of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such
weight that if admitted, would probably change the judgment. In this
case, however, such records could have been easily obtained by the
accused and could have been presented during the trial with the
exercise of reasonable diligence. Hence, the JAGO records cannot be
considered as newly discovered evidence. There was nothing that
prevented the accused from using these records during the trial to
substantiate their position that the shooting incident was a result of a
military operation. Petition granted.
People vs. Antonio Dalisay G.R. No. 188106
FACTS: The accused, Antonio Dalisay, is the live-in partner
of the victim's mother. The 16-year old victim was raped
by the accused, but was also molested even prior to the
crime committed. An Information was filed against the
accused and in it, the victim was identified as the
accused's stepdaughter. The RTC convicted Dalisay of
qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA modified the RTC's
ruling, convicting the accused of simple rape instead.
ISSUE: Whether or not there should be a new trial.
RULING: No. Section 2 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
provides the court shall grant a new trial on any of the
following grounds: (a) The errors of law or irregularities
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial; (b) The new and material
evidence has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced
at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment. In the case at bar, the
Court affirmed the decision of the CA, convicting the
accused of simple rape. Three principles guide the courts
in resolving rape cases: (1) an accusation for rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult
for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only
two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The
Court cannot convict appellant of qualified rape because
the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the
information. With the foregoing, no irregularities prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial or new and material evidence
discovered. Substantial procedures of the law have been
followed; hence, a new trial cannot be warranted.
Mapagay vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No.
178984
FACTS: An Information was filed before the MeTC charging petitioner
with violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The MeTC provisionally
dismissed the instant case on the basis of an amicable settlement
between petitioner and private complainant Relindia dela Cruz.
However, private complainant moved for the revival of the present
case claiming that petitioner failed to comply with the terms of their
agreement. Said motion was granted by the MeTC and it subsequently
rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of violating BP 22.
Petitioner was sentenced to one-year imprisonment and was ordered
to pay a fine. Petitioner submitted her Appellants Brief with the RTC,
and the latter promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the MeTC
Decision. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was
denied by the RTC for being filed beyond the reglementary period. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal. It
sustained the RTCs ruling that petitioners motion for reconsideration
with the RTC was filed out of time. Hence, it held that the RTC Decision
had become final and unalterable. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision, but this was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not giving due
course to petitioners motion for reconsideration.
RULING No. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion
for reconsideration of the judgment of conviction may be filed within
15 days from the promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the
final order appealed from. Failure to file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period renders the subject decision final and
executory. Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by this Court. In the
case at bar, evidence on record shows that petitioners counsel of
record, Atty. Ballena, received on September 21, 2004 a copy of the
RTC Decision dated September 14, 2004, which affirms petitioners
conviction for violation of BP 22. Hence, petitioner may file a motion
for reconsideration within 15 days from such date of receipt, which
must be on or before October 6, 2004. However, petitioner filed her
motion for reconsideration only on November 3, 2004, or on the 43rd
day, which was beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
Consequently, the RTC Decision dated September 14, 2004 has
become final and executory. Petitioner alleges that she learned of the
RTC Decision only on October 20, 2004 when she asked a friend to
check on the status of the case and that Atty. Ballena did not inform
her of the RTC Decision. However, the rule is that when a party is
represented by counsel, notices of all kinds, including motions,
pleadings and orders, must be served on the counsel. Notice to
counsel of record is binding on the client, and the neglect or failure of
counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of
his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment, valid
and regular on its face. Petition denied.

De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan 326 Phil 182 (G.R. No.
103276)
FACTS: De Guzman was charged and convicted for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner then filed the
instant "Omnibus Motion For Leave to Vacate First Motion For
Reconsideration In The Light Of The Present Developments And
To Consider Evidence Presented Herein And To Set Aside
Conviction". This was filed on petitioner's behalf by a new
counsel, after petitioner's former lawyers withdrew their
appearance. Petitioner, for the first time, seeks to be relieved
from what he considers as the serious and costly mistake of his
former lawyers in demurring to the prosecution evidence after
court leave was denied, the effect of which deprived him of
presenting before the Sandiganbayan the pieces of
documentary evidence
that would have completely belied the accusation against him.
He now appeals to the Courts sense of justice and equity that
these documents be summoned and appreciated by the Court
itself or by the Sandiganbayan after remanding the case
thereto, if only to give him the final chance to prove his
innocence.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners motion for reconsideration
should be granted.
RULING: Yes. The Court held in Ronquillo v. Marasigan that the
fact that the decision has become final does not preclude a
modification or an alteration thereof because even with the
finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or
unjust, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same
with justice and the facts. In the case at bar, petitioner is just
about to lose his liberty simply because his former lawyers
pursued a carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting
on what has already become an imprudent remedy, which
forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the while
available for presentation before the Sandiganbayan. The rules
of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be avoided. In order to assure against any possible miscarriage
of justice resulting from petitioners failure to present his crucial
evidence through no fault of his, this case must be remanded to
the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioners
evidence. Petition granted.
Astorga vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 154130
FACTS: Five members of the DENR, together with SPO3 Andres
B. Cinco, Jr.
and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police
Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram,
Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible
illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team
found two being constructed at Barangay LocobLocob. There
they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who
turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation
ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called
for reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten
armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The
DENR team was then brought to petitioners house in Daram,
where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.
Petitioner was then charged with and convicted of Arbitrary
Detention
by the Sandiganbayan. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied with finality. He later filed an Urgent Motion
for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration
should be granted.
RULING: Yes. While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a
general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound
discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed
with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better
served thereby. The rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were
conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the
dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice,
courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our
power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its
operation. The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in
the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. After a careful
review of the evidence on record in the case at bar, we find no
proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private
offended parties. On the contrary, what appears is that
petitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely extended his
hospitality and entertained the DENR Team in his house. As
such, petitioner is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt. Petition granted; petitioner
acquitted.

JERRY VALEROSO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R.

No. 164815
FACTS: On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in
the boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes,
Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4)
heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at
him and pulled him out of the room. The raiding team tied his
hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then
went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments
later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy,
may nakuha akong baril sa loob!" SPO2 Antonio Disuanco
informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his
arrest. However, the raiding team was not armed with a search
warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid ground for consideration?
HELD: After considering anew Valerosos arguments through his
Letter-Appeal, together with the OSGs position recommending
his acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must
ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is
swayed to reconsider. The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature
of a second motion for reconsideration. While a second motion
for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it
is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same,
provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice
may be better served thereby.
Paredes vs Borja G.R. No. L-15559, November 29,
1961
FACTS: Upon arraignment, respondent, defendant therein,
assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of guilty for pulling
and destroying the corn plants of Josefa Lapora. Respondent
Justice of the Peace Court sentenced him to indemnify the
defended party in the sum of P10, to suffer the penal ten days
imprisonment and to pay the costs. Respondent filed an
amended motion for reconsideration alleging that in a civil case
between the respondent and his co-heirs on the one hand and
Exaltacion Jagonia de Amparado and her parents on the other
hand, involving ownership of four parcels of land (civil No. 1434)
the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis had ordered
the therein defendants to return possession to the herein
respondent and his co-heirs one-half of the parcels of land in
question described in certificate of title No. 397; that for that
reason he has a legitimate claim of ownership to the parcel of
land from where he uprooted the growing corn plants and his
liability, if any, was only civil and not criminal in nature. On 12
June 1958 the respondent Justice of the Peace Court entered an
ordering setting aside its judgment dated 6 June 1958, ordering
that a plea of not guilty be entered for the respondent and
setting the case for trial on 18 June 1958. On 25 June 1958 the
petitioner filed an "urgent motion for reconsideration of the
order dated June 12, 1958, setting aside the Judgment," on the
ground that the respondent's motion for reconsideration which
were in the nature of motions for rehearing were not verified
and not supported by affidavits of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration was in
proper form
HELD: The appellee contends that the respondent Justice of the
Peace Court should not have entertained the appellant's
motions for reconsideration because they were not verified and
not supported by affidavits. Such rule is no longer controlling.
The present rules on criminal procedure are as provided for in
the Rules of Court which took effect on 1 July 1940, and do not
require that a motion for new trial be verified. And while the
Rules of Court also require, as in the supplanted law, that an
affidavit of merit be attached to support a motion for new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, yet the defect of lack of it
in the appellant's motions for reconsideration or rehearsing had
been cured by the testimony under oath of the appellant at the
hearing of the motion for reconsideration on 25 June 1958.
People vs Ebias GR. No. 127130, October 12, 2000
FACTS: Ronaldo Narez and his cousin, Tirso Narez, went to get some jackfruit in
Barangay Dambo, Pangil, Laguna. On their way, they saw two men sitting by the
roadside. As they were nearing the place where the two men were, the latter
waved at them. Ronaldo and Tirso Narez ignored the summon and continued
walking. When they were about 15 meters from the men, they heard one of the
men, who was brandishing a bolo, say Boy, tirahin mo na. The other man then
drew his sulpak and shot them. Ronaldo and Tirso Narez ran towards
the kaingin. Ronaldo Narez realized that his right leg was bleeding. Nonetheless,
he managed to reach his house and told his father what had happened. Ronaldo
was taken to the Pakil Hospital for treatment. Tirso, who had also been taken to
the same hospital, suffered a gunshot wound on his stomach. He died from his
injuries the next day. Ronaldo Narez executed an affidavit identifying his
assailant as a certain Boy Marantal. About a month later, on August 16, 1994,
Ronaldo executed another affidavit (Exhibit F) in which he said that accused-
appellant Ernesto Ebias was the same Boy Marantal who shot him and his
cousin. The court rendered a decision, finding accused-appellant guilty of the
crime of murder with frustrated murder. Accused-appellant moved for new trial on
the ground of newly-discovered evidence. Accused-appellant averred that new
and material evidence had been discovered by the defense, consisting of a
confession made by Leonardo Eliseo, also a death row convict, that he
committed the crime for which accused-appellant was convicted and sentenced
to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eliseos confession constitutes newly discovered
evidence narrating a new trial in favor of the accused
HELD: For newly-discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted,
could probably change the judgment. There is thus a need for a new trial in order
to determine the veracity of Ronaldo Narezs positive identification vis--vis the
alleged confession made by Leonardo Eliseo since no less than a life is at
stake. We recognize that [c]ourt litigations are primarily for the search of truth,
and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest
opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. [32] Hence, a
liberal interpretation of the rule granting a motion for new trial is called for.[33] We
cannot in good conscience convict accused-appellant and impose upon him the
death penalty when evidence which would possibly exonerate him may be
presented by him in a new trial. Neither can we acquit him on the sole ground
that another person confessed to having committed the crime. For this reason,
this case should be reopened only for the purpose of allowing the defense to
present the testimony of Leonardo Eliseo and for the prosecution to present any
rebutting evidence which it may desire to present.
People vs De Grano GR. No. 167710, June 5, 2009
FACTS: On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against
Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6,
Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano
(Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused
Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo
Genil (Leonardo), who were at-large. Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and
Estanislao pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged; while their co-accused
Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. After the presentation of
the parties respective sets of evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated April
25, 2002, finding several accused guilty of the offense as charged. Respondents,
thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated May 8, 2002,
praying that the Decision dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and set aside and
a new one be entered acquitting them. Acting on respondents motion for
reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order dated April 15, 2004 modifying its
earlier decision by acquitting Joven and Armando. Petitioner, thru Assistant City
Prosecutor Cesar Glorioso of the Office of the Manila City Prosecutor, with the
assistance of private prosecutor Atty. Michael E. David, filed a Petition
for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. However, the
same was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petition for certiorari
HELD: Yes. A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the
remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly
and convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority
to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice. When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only
Estanislao Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering
and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo
joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of
the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who
were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion. The RTC clearly
exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration
with respect to the respondents who were at large.
RULE 122
People vs Paet G.R. No. L-9551
Facts: Alejandro Paet y Velasco was accused of a violation
of Circulars Nos. 20 and 42, as amended by Circular No.
55, of the Central Bank of the Philippines. The defendant,
with the assistance of counsel asked permission to
withdraw his former plea of not guilty and to substitute
therefor a plea of guilty, which permission was granted.
Upon rearraignment, he pleaded guilty to the amended
information, and upon recommendation of the prosecution,
the trial court found him guilty. The decision did not
provide for the confiscation or forfeiture of the
aforementioned amount in favor of the government. It
seems that this point was subsequently raised both by the
prosecution and the defense, the former contending that
the confiscation should have been included in the decision
as part of the penalty, and the latter naturally claiming
return to the accused. The lower court issued a resolution
dated July 30, 1955, expressing the opinion and holding
that the amount of $3,140 should not be confiscated, but
should be exchanged with pesos in the Philippine currency
at the Central Bank, and delivered to the accused. The
government, through the Solicitor General, is appealing
from the resolution directly to this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is put into double
jeopardy?
Ruling:Yes. The confiscation or forfeiture of the above
mentioned sum would be an additional penalty and would
amount to an increase of the penalty already imposed
upon the accused. To reopen the case for the purpose of
increasing the penalty, as is sought in the Governments
appeal, would be placing the accused in double jeopardy,
and under Rule 122, section 1 of the Rules of Court, the
Government cannot appeal in a criminal case if the
Defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. In
the present case, the Defendant-Appellee did not file any
brief, naturally, this point of the legality of the appeal of
the Government is not raised. The appeal of the
Government from the resolution is hereby dismissed.
Central Bank vs CA G.R. No. 41859
Fact: Private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor
Avila Chua, were elected President and Treasurer of the
Surigao Development Bank with a capital of Pl Million
which was deposited with the Pacific Banking Corporation
in Manila and private respondents were authorized to sign
checks and withdrawal slips to effect withdrawal from the
depository bank . An examination of the books of accounts
was conducted by the examiners of the Central Bank of
the Philippines and revealed a shortage. Acting
Superintendent of Banks Jose S. Martinez wrote private
respondents, asking them to authorize the Pacific Banking
Corporation to furnish the Central Bank with the records of
deposits of Surigao Development Bank but the private
respondents refused. An information was filed before the
Court of First Instance of Manila charging private
respondents with the crime of estafa and thus charging
them with the crime. CA reversed the decision and
acquitted the private respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion?
Ruling: No. Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal
if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy." The argument that the judgment is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion and therefore, null and void, is
flawed because whatever error may have been committed
by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and
not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of
the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be
rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how
obvious the error may be. The rule therefore, in this
jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is not
reviewable by a higher court, for an appeal by the
government from the judgment would put the accused in
second jeopardy for the same offense.
People vs Desalisa G.R. No. L-15516
Facts: Norberto Desalisa y Doca and Dominador Bartonico
y Japitana were charged with the crime of Serious
Physical Injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence. By reason of
the subsequent death of the victim, the information was
amended. Another information for Homicide Thru Reckless
Imprudence was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the same accused. The case for physical
injuries was dismissed by the Municipal Court upon motion
of the prosecutor. Defense counsel filed a motion to quash
the information, on the ground of double jeopardy, it being
alleged that the filing of separate cases, one in the
Municipal Court, and the other in the Court of First
Instance, for offenses arising out of a single act, placed
them in danger of being twice convicted and penalized for
the same act.
Issue: Whether or not the appeal of the prosecution from
the order of dismissal of the Municipal Court subjects them
to a second jeopardy before the Court of First Instance?
Ruling: No. An appeal by the prosecution from the order of
dismissal by the trial court will not constitute double
jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with
the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the
dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration
of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the
question to be passsed upon by the appellate court is
purely legal so that should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.
In the present case, considering that there was waiver of
the defense of double jeopardy by the failure of the
accused to object to the filing of the 2 cases in the court of
first instance and in the municipal court; that the dismissal
was not based on consideration of the merits of the case;
and the question raised in the appeal was purely legal, the
appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal in
the municipal court to the Court of First Instance did not
place them in second jeopardy. Neither does the present
appeal from the order of dismissal of the Court of First
Instance constitute a second jeopardy, because the motion
to quash was filed by the accused themselves before
arraignment and before they entered their plea to the
information.
Bernardo vs CA G.R. No. 82483
Facts: The private respondents, Jaime and Cynthia
Bernardo were accused in twenty-seven (27) criminal
cases for estafa. The information charged that the
Bernardo spouses, taking advantage of the confidential
position of Mrs. Bernardo in the company as Executive
Secretary of its Treasurer. Before the subject criminal cases
were filed, private respondent Jaime Bernardo filed a civil
case for the payment of sums of money due him from
transactions. After trial of the criminal cases, public
respondent Judge Marianito D. Militar rendered his
aforesaid decision acquitting the spouses Jaime and
Cynthia Bernardo of the criminal charges filed against
them.
Issue: Whether or not an appeal is a remedy after
acquittal?
Ruling: There is no dispute that a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory and that neither an
appeal nor certiorari is an available remedy. As to an
appeal by the complainant on the civil aspect of the case
this Court has ruled that, subject to the rules on double
jeopardy, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court
or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General
may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The
private offended party or complainant may not take such
appeal. Despite a judgment of acquittal, the offended
party may appeal, only insofar as the civil aspect of the
case is concerned. Such an appeal dispenses with the
authority and representation of both the fiscal and the
Solicitor General, considering that the subject matter of
the action involves solely the interests of the offended
party and hence, no longer concerns the State.
People vs Sison G.R. No. 119307
FACTS: That on or about midnight of May 21, 1993, at
Barangay Maticmatic, Municipality of Sta. Barbara,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, acting in conspiracy and taking advantage of
darkness, armed with a bladed weapon with intent to kill,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab
EDWIN A. ABRIGO, inflicting upon him stab wounds which
caused his instant death, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs. Both accused were arraigned on September 10,
1993. Renante pled not guilty. Jessie was not arraigned as
the trial judge found him mentally unfit. He was ordered to
be treated at the Baguio General Hospital. His trial was
suspended. In due time, he recovered. Hence, on May 11,
1994, the trial judge directed his return to jail to face trial.
On June 16, 1994 the prosecution moved to discharge him
as a state witness. The motion was granted despite the
opposition of the accused-appellant. Renante the appealed
from the decision of the RTC convicting him of the crime of
murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Renante Sisons appeal is
meritorious
HELD: No. it is difficult to sustain accused-appellants
submission that Jessie Sison is the most guilty of the crime
at bar.The discharge of Sison as a state witness because
he does not appear to be the most guilty is highly factual
in nature. The discretionary judgment of the trial court on
this factual issue is seldom interfered with by appellate
courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion. We do
not see any compelling reason to fault the discharge of
Sison as a state witness in light of the trial courts
assessment of the totality of the evidence adduced by the
parties. Examining the evidence, we find no competent
evidence establishing Sison as the most guilty party.
People vs Francisco Gr. Nos. 135201-02, March 15, 2001
FACTS: Ma. Coralyn lived with her parents Florencio Francisco and Isabelita Jucutan,
eight (8) siblings and an aunt in a one-room tenement at Area B, Talanay, Fairview,
Quezon City. Florencio was jobless. Isabelita, common-law wife of Florencio, provided for
the family by vending vegetables at the Balintawak market in the evening and returning
home in the morning. Coralyn's torments started in the evening of April 1997. The
Franciscos were all sleeping on the cement floor of the sala with Coralyn being situated
nearest the doorway. Her mother had already left the house that evening to sell
vegetables and was not expected home until early the following morning. While Coralyn
was asleep she was suddenly jolted when someone removed her shorts and panty. It was
her father Florencio. He fondled and caressed her and then licked her genital. She tried to
resist him but he pinned her down and angrily warned, "Huwag kang malikot, papaluin
kita." His lewd misconduct was interrupted when Coralyn's aunt, Maria Lourdes Ochavillo,
unexpectedly arrived and opened the door. Seizing the opportunity, Coralyn pretended to
be going to the toilet to urinate but went instead to her aunt and asked whether she could
sleep with her. Afterwards Coralyn confided to her aunt what her father did to her. But her
aunt advised her not to tell her mother as it would only cause trouble in the family. Thus
Coralyn decided to keep the incident to herself except her aunt. In the afternoon of 6 July
1997 Florencio went home after a drinking spree with friends. He was drunk. Fearing that
her inebriated father might sexually violate her again, Coralyn mustered enough courage
to relate her sad fate to her mother who immediately accompanied her to the Police
Station at Batasan Hills, Quezon City. As no one attended to them there, Isabelita and
Coralyn proceeded directly to the Department of Social Welfare and Development which
promptly referred them to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Coralyn and
Isabelita both executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the special investigators of the
NBI. Thereafter, two (2) separate Informations were filed against Florencio Francisco y
Alejo, one for rape and another for acts of lasciviousness. Thereafter the two (2) cases
were tried jointly. After trial, the court found the accused guilty of both crimes.
ISSUE: Whether or not he automatic review of accused-appellants conviction for rape, for
which the death penalty was imposed, include the automatic appeal of his conviction for
the less serious crime of acts of lasciviousness
HELD: No. According to jurisprudence, an automatic review of the death penalty imposed
by the trial court was deemed to include an appeal of the less serious crimes, not so
punished by death, "but arising out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused
on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense." In the instant case,
however, it cannot be said that the acts of lasciviousness case "arose out of the same
occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion" as that of the more
serious crime of rape. The two (2) cases involved distinct offenses committed at an
interval of two (2) months in point of time. The evidence reveals that the first crime was
committed sometime in April 1997 while the second was perpetrated on 27 June 1997. In
both cases, accused-appellant was animated by a separate criminal intent, although
incidentally, both crimes were directed against the same victim. Moreover, the evidence
presented by the prosecution in the rape case was not the same evidence they offered to
prove the acts of lasciviousness case.
People vs Cleopas G.R. No. 121998
Facts: On appeal is the decision dated January 5, 1995, of
the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 1, in
Criminal Case No. 8343 finding the accused Teodorico
Cleopas and Florencio Pirame guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt. Upon arraignment, Florencio Pirame and
Teodorico Cleopas entered a plea of not guilty. Epifanio
Cleopas was not arraigned, being at large. RTC rendered its
decision finding Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame
guilty of the crime of murder. Appellant alleges that the
declaration of Demetrio Cleopas, both in the course of
police investigation and in a sworn statement, to the effect
that his two sons were responsible for the killing did not
make any mention of him, hence, he should not have been
implicated. Appellant also asserts that while he invokes the weak
defense of alibi, the evidence against him is likewise weak, and did
not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Alsom that the trial
court erred in finding him to be a co-conspirator of the other two
accused.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision?
Ruling: Yes. The trial court in its decision did not make any
definitive finding on the circumstances which qualified the
crime to murder. While the information charging appellant
and the other accused alleged that the commission of the
crime was attended by treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength, the court did not expound
upon or point to the existence of these aggravating
circumstances in the case at bar. In other words, it did not
state its basis for qualifying the crime to murder. We are
thus required to determine if the crime at bar could be
qualified to murder, to resolve this appeal. It is axiomatic
that an appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the
entire case open to review, and that this Court has the
authority to review matters not specifically raised or
assigned as errors by the parties, if their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. The
attendance of evident premeditation in the commission of
the crime, though alleged in the information, is not
supported by the evidence, as there is no showing as to
when appellant and his co-accused determined to kill the
victim.
U.S. vs Sotavento G.R. No. 15450
Facts: The present case has been brought to this court on
an appeal presented by the two accused, Marcelino and
Primitivo Sotavento. This appeal which was made to
appear in the record at the request of the two appellants,
was taken against the judgment of the preceding
September 23, sentencing each one of them as authors, to
cadena perpetua together with the accessories. After
counsel de oficio had presented a written brief in defense
of the accused, the fiscal petitioned on the second of the
present month, that said appeal be declared null and void
inasmuch as said accused had failed to transmit a written
copy of the notice of appeal to the provincial fiscal of Leyte
Issue: Whether or not the appeal is null and void?
Ruling: HELD: NO. The appellants failure in not serving a
copy of his written notice of appeal to the provincial fiscal
or to the official government representative in the court
that had rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a
defect which can either nullify the appeal or prejudice the
unquestionable rights of the accused, inasmuch as what is
important is that the appellant should be able to exercise,
at the proper time, as one of the rights essentially
belonging to him, the right of appeal, against whatever
resolution or judgment he might consider prejudicial to his
rights or interests, and that the actual and physical
exercise of such right should be effected in writing within
the period of fifteen days; so that for the computation of
this period it is necessary for the clerk of court to cause to
appear in the case the date of the service upon the
accused of the notice, signed by the latter, of the rendition
of the judgment or resolution.
G.R. No. L-9043 July 30, 1955
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS vs. TEODORO
FACTS: On August 21, 1954, respondent Rafael Lacson was convicted
and sentenced to death by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, together with other 21 co-accused. On August 24, 1954,
respondent Lacson was confined in the Provincial Hospital of Negros
Occidental under guard by the Philippine Constabulary by order of the
court. Lacson instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the said
Court of First Instance against the Director of Prisons, the Provincial
Commander of the Philippine Constabulary at Bacolod City, and all
persons acting under them, the Provincial Governor and the Provincial
Warden, alleging that his transfer from the hospital to the new Bilibid
Prisons at Muntinlupa, Rizal for incarceration, would cause excitement
and shock and aggravate his already worsening condition, supporting
this allegation with certificates of two physicians, and petitioning that
he be retained under guard in the Provincial Hospital for 30 days more,
and that in the meantime a writ of preliminary injunction issue against
respondents. After the issues were joined, the Provincial Fiscal
presented an urgent motion to lift the preliminary injunction and for a
reconsideration of the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction
for the reason that more than 30 days have elapsed since the original
injunction had been granted and for the further reason that the court
has no jurisdiction to issue the said injunction. Opposition to this
motion was filed by the attorney of Lacson and, in view thereof, the
court ordered a committee of physicians to conduct a physical
examination of Lacson and to report their findings to the court.
On the basis of this report, the Honorable Jose Teodoro, Sr. denied the
motion to lift the preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: W/N the Court of First Instance has the power and authority to
issue the writ of preliminary injunction
HELD: NO. While no express provision similar to Section 9 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court is contained in the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
same general principal should obtain in criminal cases. As a matter of
principle, when an appeal has been perfected from a judgment in a
criminal case, the court from which the appeal is made loses
jurisdiction over the case, and this (case) means both the record and
the person of the accused-appellant. In the same manner that after
the judgment has become final, the trial court loses jurisdiction to
amend the same, so also upon the perfection of the appeal which
brings about the finality of the judgment or order of the court, the
sentencing court must also lose jurisdiction or power to do anything or
any matter in relation to the person of the accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011
Yu vs. Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad
FACTS: An information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with
the RTC. The RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. Petitioner filed a
motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new
and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which
she was convicted. The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction
to act on the prosecutions motions when she filed her notice of appeal
within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court,
applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes.
ISSUE: W/N the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to
appeals in criminal cases
HELD: YES. In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the
counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court
categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for
reconsideration within which to appeal. While Neypes involved the
period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh
period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in
criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons: First, BP 129, as
amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based,
makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and
in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he
period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from."
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the
same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions
insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops
running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and
starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for
new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes
addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal
cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal
period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review
from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court,
both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedur
G.R. No. 80481 June 27, 1990
People vs. Fernandez

FACTS: An appeal was interposed by accused-appellant Joven Pitogo

alone from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34 at
Calamba, Laguna, 2 finding both accused therein guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentencing each of them to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
Upon appeal, the decision was reversed and set aside and the accused
were acquitted.
During the trial, however, because accused Fernandez failed to appear
for six (6) times before the hearing on April 7, 1986, an order of arrest
was issued on said date and the case against him ordered flied
in absentia. The accused Fernandez has not been apprehended till
now.

ISSUE: W/N the judgement of the appellate court in this case should
affect those who did not appeal

HELD: YES. Note must be taken of the present rule that an appeal shall
not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of
the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. The court
held that, While, in effect, he committed an act of defiance of the law
by escaping, we are not without other prior incidents where such
undesirable conduct, which should not be condoned, has sometimes
been ascribed to a sense of desperation of those who believe they are
guiltless but fear that they cannot prove their innocence. While we
castigate and reprove his jumping bail and remaining at large up to
now, we have to concede, however, that our disquisition in this case is
applicable and favorable to him, hence he is affected by and shall [G.R. No. 129211. October 2, 2000]
benefit from the acquittal that we hand down in this appeal. People vs. Rodriguez

FACTS: On appeal is the decision dated November 13, 1995 of the

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29,[2] in Criminal Case No. 91-
99526, convicting appellant and his co-accused of the crime of
murder, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity,
and to pay the costs.

Appellant Larry Artellero was employed as a cement mixer and

helper of co-accused Wilfredo Rodriguez, a mason in the construction
of the upper floors of the Far East Bank and Trust Company,
Blumentritt Branch, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Both were charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide for the killing of the bank security
guard, Ramon Matias y Ibay. The trial court found both guilty of
murder. Both appealed. However, Rodriguez withdrew his appeal for
financial reasons.
Upon appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed and the
accused were acquitted.The OSG points out that the prosecution failed
to prove the existence of a conspiracy between appellant and
Rodriguez independent of the extrajudicial confession of the latter. The
OSG contends that the trial court erred in convicting appellant of
murder considering that the Information failed to allege the
circumstances qualifying the killing to murder.
Liquigan was able to post bail pending appeal and his release was
authorized by the Court of Appeals on November 26, 1973 On March
14, 1975, Martin Maguddayao filed a Motion For Withdrawal of Appeal.
The Motion was granted by the Court of Appeals on April 7, 1975.
ISSUE: W/N the accused may withdraw his appeal
HELD: YES. It should be stated that when Martin was allowed to
withdraw his appeal the briefs had not yet been filed. The brief for the
appellants was filed on July 31, 1975; that for the appellee was filed on
November 25, 1975.

ISSUE: W/N the judgement of the appellate court in this case should
affect those who did not appeal

HELD: YES. Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present
appeal, the well-established rule is that an appeal in a criminal
proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects,
including those not raised by the parties.[29] The records show that
Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However,
Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that [a]n
appeal taken by one or more [of] several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellant
court is favorable and applicable to the latter. As we have elucidated,
the evidence against and the conviction of both appellant and
Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellants acquittal, which is
favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.

People vs. Maguddayao

G.R. No. L-43923 September 12, 1984
FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 561-T of the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan, MARTIN MAGUDDAYAO, FAUSTINO LIQUIGAN and LAUREANO G.R. No. L-2073 October 19, 1953
MAGUDDAYAO were accused of the murder of Cipriano Baliwag, Sr. and
were subsequently found guilty. All three accused filed notice that they People vs Villanueva
were appealing to the Court of Appeals. The appellants were
committed to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, but Faustino
FACTS: By a decision dated November 19, 1947, the Fifth Division of
the defunct People's Court after trial of appellant Pedro T. Villanueva
on a charge of treason on several counts, found him guilty of treason
and murder.
Villanueva duly appealed to this court. The records were sent up to us
not only by virtue of the appeal but also under the provisions of Rule
118, Section 9, of the Rules of Court which provides for review and
judgment by this Tribunal of all cases in which the death penalty shall
have been imposed by a court of first instance, whether the defendant
shall have appealed or not.
Thereafter before the said court defendant-appellant Villanueva filed a
petition dated August 24, 1953, stating that about July 4, 1953, the
Chief Executive granted executive clemency to all prisoners convicted
of treason, including those whose cases were pending appeal, on
condition that such appeals be first withdrawn, supposedly to give
finality to the judgment of the lower court, and asking that he be
allowed to withdraw his appeal. Acting upon said petition the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo issued an order dated September 10, 1953,
directing the return of the case to the Court.
ISSUE: W/N the withdrawal of the appeal renders the decision of the
court final
HELD: NO. An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to
death may be allowed to withdraw his appeal like any other appellant
in an ordinary criminal case before the briefs are filed, but his
withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the case from the
jurisdiction of this court which under the law is authorized and called
upon to review the decision though unappealed. Consequently, the
withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve to render the
decision of the People's Court final. Moreover, "those prisoners whose
cases are still pending on appeal shall be released only after their
appeal has been withdrawn." The implication is that the withdrawal of
the appeal rendered the decision of the People's Court final, resulting
in conviction, this is to bring it into harmony with article VII, section 10
(6) of the Constitution which requires conviction as a condition
precedent to the exercise of Executive clemency. As we have already
stated, despite defendant's withdrawal of his appeal from the decision
imposing the death sentence, there is no definite conviction or
sentence until and after this court has reviewed the case and rendered
its own decision affirming, modifying or reversing that of the lower
court, unless of course in the new decision of the trial court based on
the new trial a sentence other than death is imposed, in which case
there would be no automatic review by the court.
G.R. No. L-31102 May 5, 1979
People vs. Dueno
FACTS: This is an appeal interposed on April 22, 1969 by the above
named three defendants from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Capiz, 11th Judicial District, Roxas City, Hon. Judge Jose A. Aligaen
presiding, in Criminal Case No. 3771 for murder, finding them guilty as
charged and imposing upon them the penalty of life imprisonment
or reclusion perpetua with all accesory penalties and to pay, jointly
and severally, the heirs of the victim the amount of Six Thousand
Pesos (P6,000.00).
The appeal was directed to the Court of Appeals, but, in view of the
penalty involved, the records were forwarded to this Court on October
4, 1969. 5 On January 2, 1977, and May 8, 1978 after the case had
been submitted for decision on February 1, 1972 - appellants Felipe
Dueno and Sofronio Dueno, respectively, withdrew their appeals.
These withdrawals were allowed in resolutions dated January 2, 1977
and June 28, 1978.
The evidence for the prosecution establish that in the afternoon of
January 21, 1963, the three accused-appellants fired upon Roque
Dellomos and Federico Dolfo but missed them; and theft in the
evening of the same day, the three again were Identified as the
assailants who fired upon and killed Bernardo Demontao who was
mistaken for Roque Dellomos and/or Federico Dolfo. It also appears
that their defense of alibi was not worthy of credence. The guilt of the
three accused-appellants, therefore, has been established and proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
The civil indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, however, was raised
from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00. The trial court's decision then
accordingly be modified.
ISSUE: W/N withdrawal of the appeal by the accused rendered the
decision final

HELD: YES. Accused-appellants Felipe Dueno and Sofronio Dueno had

withdrawn their appeals, and the decision of the trial court already
became final and executory as to them. The decision is binding as to
the third accused-appellant, Andresito Belonio, who pursued his
appeal.
G.R. Nos. L-16688-90 April 30, 1963
People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales
FACTS: This is an appeal interposed by the State against the decision
of Branch XVIII of the CFI of Manila, dismissing Criminal Cases Nos.
36894, 36899 & 36904, all entitled "The People of the Philippines vs.
Pacita Madrigal Gonzales, et al.", for falsification of official and public
documents. When the appeal was in the stage of preparation and
submission of briefs, the Solicitor General presented with this Court a
pleading captioned "MANIFESTATION AND PETITION FOR LEAVE TO
WITHDRAW APPEAL", instead of an appeal brief for the State, as
appellant. The above manifestation was opposed by the City Fiscal of
Manila, Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., who appeared in this Court, as
amicus curiae.
After the perfection of the instant appeal, however, and during the
pendency hereof, Branch X of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
presided by the Honorable Higinio Macadaeg, dismissed the
information in Criminal Case No. 36882 against the said accused-
appellees herein without their consent; while Branch XIII of the same
Court of First Instance, presided by the Hon. Bienvenido Tan, after
presentation by the prosecution of the available evidence against the
same accused-appellees herein in Criminal Case No. 36885 for
falsification, dismissed the said case by finding all said accused
innocent, with costs de officio, in its decision promulgated on March
24, 1960. ...."
The Solicitor General is of the belief that the dismissals of the cases by
the three branches of the Manila CFI constituted double jeopardy and,
therefore, they are a bar to the further prosecution of the remaining 24
informations for falsification. Upon the other hand, the amicus curiae
claims that the appeal of the State is meritorious, there is no double
jeopardy; and the Orders granting the motions to quash (Cases Nos.
36894, 36899 and 36904) were erroneous.
ISSUE: W/N the appeal should be granted
HELD: NO. It will be noted that although all the informations in the 27
falsification cases were uniformly worded, the numbers of the
vouchers alleged to have been falsified and the amounts thereof are
different. We have in the three (3) cases, subject of the proceeding at
bar, Voucher No. 4, dated September 3, 1955, for P2,275.00; Voucher
No. 6, dated September 6, 1955, for P3,590.00 and Voucher No. 13,
dated September 6, 1955, for P3,410.00. The other informations also
show different vouchers, dates and amounts. These undeniable facts,
alleged in the informations, evidently show that different acts of
falsification were committed on different vouchers and covering
distinct amounts. Each information did not refer to all said acts of
falsification. Neither is there merit in the argument that said acts of
falsification constituted a continuing offense, so as to have them all
prosecuted in only one information.
Moreover, under the facts and circumstances appearing in the record,
the grounds upon which the appellees anchor their defense of double
jeopardy in the motion to quash, are not clear and indubitable. One
cannot build up the defense of double jeopardy on mere hypothesis.
G.R. No. 90294 September 24, 1991
People vs Rio
FACTS: On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio, in
two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989, addressed to Division Clerk
of Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M.
Dris, manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his
poverty.
In the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, the action
recommended was for the Court to ascertain from the accused-
appellant, through the clerk of court of the trial court, whether he
desired the appointment of a counselde oficio on appeal, in view of the
reasons stated by him for the withdrawal of his appeal, and inasmuch
as poverty should not preclude anyone from pursuing a cause.
It was also recommended that the clerk of court of the trial court be
required by the Court to submit the response of the accused-appellant
along with a certificate of compliance with the duty imposed on him by
Section 13, of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
The branch clerk of the trial court submitted the reply of the accused-
appellant informing the Court that he was no longer interested in
pursuing his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn his appeal.
Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, however, the Court in a
resolution dated 1 October 1990, denied the appellant's motion
withdrawing the appeal and appointed a counsel de oficio for the
accused-appellant for, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General,
all the letters of the accused-appellant reveal that the only reason
offered by him for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain
the services of a counsel de parte on account of his poverty, a reason
which should not preclude anyone from seeking justice in any forum.
ISSUE: W/N accused has a right to a counsel de oficio during appeal
HELD: YES. This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the
conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues, even during
appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de
oficio persists where an accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even
in a case, such as the one at bar, where the accused had signified his
intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the
reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the
withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a
counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the
rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After
all, "those who have less in life must have more in law." 9 Justice
should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for
everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced
and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party
over another.
G.R. No. 92415 May 14, 1991
People vs Mapalao
Facts: An amended information was filed in the RTC of Baguio City
charging Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji Edris,
Gumanak Ompa and Omar Mapalao of the crime of Highway Robbery
with Homicide, defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No.
532, which was allegedly committed on September 20, 1987 at Km. 24
along Halsema Road, Caliking, Atok, Benguet. After the trial on the
merits, a decision was rendered by the trial court on January 12, 1990
convicting the accused of the offense charged. Not so satisfied
therewith the accused Omar Mapalao and Rex Magumnang appealed
the decision to the Court.
After arraignment and during the trial, Rex Magumnang escaped from
confinement and had not been apprehended since then. Accordingly,
as to him the trial in absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment
of conviction was promulgated.
ISSUE: W/N the appeal should be dismissed
HELD: the Court, may "upon motion of the appellee or on its own
motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." In this case, appellant Magumnang remained
at large even as his appeal was pending. Hence, by analogy his appeal
must be dismissed.
The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from
prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he
loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court.
Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement during the
trial on the merits and after his arraignment, and so the trial in
absentia proceeded and the judgment against him was promulgated in
accordance with Section 14(2) Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
nonetheless, as he remained at large, he should not be afforded the
right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15)
days from the notice of the judgment against him. While at large as
above stated he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is deemed to
have waived the same and he has no standing in court.

People vs Bugnay
Sycip v CA G.R. No. L-38711. January 31, 1985.
Facts: Petitioner Francisco Sycip was convicted by the CFI
of Manila of the crime of estafa. The CA affirmed the trial
courts decision. Petitioner now claims that respondent
appellate court erred in denying him of a hearing, as
provided under Sec. 9, Rule 124, RoC and in not upholding
due process of law, as provided under Sec. 1 and 17, Bill of
Rights. He argues that respondent CA erred in denying him
his day in court notwithstanding his motion praying that
the appealed case be heard.

Issue: WON petitioner can assert as a matter of right to be

present and to be heard on appeal.

Held: No. If the CA chooses not to hear the case, the

Justices may deliberate on the case, evaluate the evidence
on hand and then decide it. Petitioner need not be present
in court during its deliberation or
even during the hearing of the appeal before the appellate
court; it will not be heard in the manner or type of hearing
contemplated by the rules for inferior courts.
People v Cabiling
G.R. No. L-38091. December 17, 1976.
Facts: An Information for murder was filed against
appellants Rodolfo Cabiling, Roberto Lopez and one John
Doe. The court a quo found that the killing of Guido Fermin
was qualified by the circumstance of
treachery but appreciated in favor of Lopez the mitigating
circumstances of minority and voluntary surrender.
Benjamin Juliano testified against appellant Lopez. Lopez
denied having participated in the killing of Fermin.
Issue: WON the judgment of the trial court should be
reversed.
Held: No. The rule is well-settled that when the issue
involves credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not
generally disturb the findings of the trial court, as the
latter is in a better position to decide the question, having
seen and heard the witnesses themselves. The exception
is when it is shown that the trial court has overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that if considered,
might affect the result of the case.
People v Mamatik
G.R. No. L-11922. April 16, 1959.
Facts: Respondent Florentino Mamatik was accused of acts
of lasciviousness committed against the person of Maria
Langas. Mamatik was arraigned and he pleaded guilty. He
was sentenced and on the same day, the clerk of court
issued Judicial Form No. 34, committing the person of
Florentino Mamatik to the Director of Prisons. Appellant
contends, on appeal, that on the date he filed his motion
for reconsideration, the decision had not yet become final,
because he had not yet commenced to serve his sentence.
Issue: WON judgment against appellant has already
become final.
Held: Yes. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final
after the expiration of the period for appeal or when the
sentence has been partially or totally served, or the
defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to
appeal. It appearing that the appellant voluntarily
commenced to serve his prison sentence on the same day
that said sentence was meted out to him in open court,
the judgment has already become final.
FNCB Finance v Estavillo
G.R. No. 93394. December 20, 1990.
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Estavillo bought a Ford Fiera
from World Cars, Inc. The vehicle was seized by two
employees of petitioner and the deputy sheriff of the RTC
of Isabela. Respondent was told that he was in arrears for
two months and the vehicle was sold at public auction and
delivered to petitioner as highest bidder. The RTC held that
the seizure of the car was unwarranted because
respondent was not delinquent in his installment
payments. The decision was affirmed in toto by the
respondent court. Petitioner now alleges that the CA erred
in disregarding facts and evidence showing that
respondent was in fact in default.
Issue: WON the Supreme Court is a trier of facts.
Held: No. In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
RoC, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of
the factual issues is the function of the lower courts,
whose findings on these matters are
received with respect and are binding on the SC.
Joaquin v Navarro G.R. No. L-5426. May 29, 1953.
Facts: Three proceedings were instituted for the summary
settlement of the estates of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife
Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and Pilar Navarro. All of them
having been heard jointly, the judge handed down a single
decision which was appealed in the CA, whose decision,
modifying that of the CFI, in turn was elevated to the SC
for review. The modification of the lower courts findings is
now being contested by petitioner.
Issue: WON the evidence may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court.
Held: Yes. When the evidence is purely documentary, the
authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue
is the construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is
submitted upon agreement of facts,
of where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the
issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn
therefrom, the question of one of law which may be
reviewed by the SC.
De La Cruz v Sosing
G.R. No. L- 4875. November 27, 1953.
Facts: Petitioner sought to recover the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land. She alleged that
respondent, by means of force and violence, occupied the
land, thus depriving her of its possession. The
lower court held that petitioner is the owner of the land.
The CA reversed the decision, holding that respondent had
already acquired the land by prescription.
Issue: WON the Supreme Court can rectify the decision of
the CA.
Held: Yes. Where there is no question that the decision of
the CA is premised on a misapprehension of fact, not only
as pointed out in a motion for reconsideration, but as may
be seen from the record on
appeal submitted to the SC, fairness requires that proper
rectification be made to give justice where justice is due.
This rectification the court can do in the exercise of its
discretion because it is a matter that
can be gleaned from the record.
Sumbingco v CA
G.R. No. L-45114. October 26, 1987.
Facts: Jepte Demerin filed with the Court of Agrarian
Relations a complaint against Apolonio Sumbingco,
seeking reinstatement as tenant on the latters haciendas.
The Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, however, the CA reversed judgment of the
Court of Agrarian Relations. Both Sumbingco and Demerin
appealed by certiorari to the SC.
Issue: WON the findings of the CA are conclusive upon the
SC.
Held: Yes. Appeals from the CA are not entertained as a
matter of routine, they may be rejected out of hand in the
exercise of the SCs sound judicial discretion. The findings
of fact of the CA are conclusive on the SC, subject only to a
few well-defined exceptions. It is incumbent on the
appellant to make out a sufficiently strong demonstration
of serious errors on the part of the CA, failing which, the
SC will dismiss the appeal on the ground that it is without
merit.
RULE 126
Nolasco v Pano
G.R. No. L-69803. October 8, 1985.
Facts: Petitioners Nolasco, Aguilar-Rosque and Tolentino
were accused of rebellion. Petitioners principally assert
that the search warrant used in seizing 431 items
belonging to them is void because it is a general warrant
since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the
things subject of the search and seizure, and that probably
cause has not been properly established for lack of
searching questions propounded to the applicants
witness. The respondents contend otherwise, adding that
the questions raised cannot be entertained without first
moving for the quashal of the disputed search warrant.
Issue: WON the search warrant is in the nature of a general
warrant.
Held: Yes. It thus infringes on the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of things to be seized.
Hence, the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
Pano is annulled and set aside.
Burgos v Chief of Staf
G.R. No. 64261. December 26. 1984.
Facts: The validity of two search warrants issued by
respondent Judge Pano is assailed in this petition.
Metropolitan Mail and We Forum were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, books, papers and documents alleged to be
in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Sr.
were seized. Petitioners pray for the return of the seized
articles and that respondent be enjoined from using them
as evidence against petitioner Burgos. Petitioners assert
that although the warrants were directed against Burgos
alone, articles belonging to his co-petitioners were seized.
Issue: WON the search warrants are valid.
Held: No. Although Sec.2, Rule 126 of the RoC does not
require that the property to be seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrant is directed,
the search warrants in question are void for being too
general. In the determination of whether a search warrant
describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity, it has been held that the executing officers
prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is
relevant.
Corro v Lising
G.R. L-69894. July 15, 1985.
Facts: Respondent RTC Judge Lising, upon application filed
by Lt. Col. Castillo, issued a search warrant authorizing the
search and seizure of items owned by the Philippine Times
which have been used as means
of committing the crime of inciting to sedition. Petitioner
filed a motion to recall the warrant and to return the
personal properties alleging that the properties seized
were not in any way connected with the offense of inciting
to sedition.
Issue: WON the search warrant is valid.
Held: No. The affidavit of Col. Castillo contained
statements which are mere conclusions of law and will not
satisfy the requirement of probable cause. They cannot
serve as basis for the issuance of a warrant, absent of the
evidence of probable cause. The search warrant was in the
nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally
objectionable, as was held in Stonehill v Diokno.
Columbia Pictures, Inc. V. Flores G.R. No. 78631
Facts: The MPAA, through counsel lodged a complaint
before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against
certain video establishments for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 49 (Protection of Intellectual Property), in
connection with its anti-piracy campaign. Specifically
complaining of the "unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction
and/or disposition of copyrighted film", the MPAA sought
the NBI's "urgent assistance in the conduct of search and
seizure operations in Metro Manila and elsewhere".
On the basis of said letter, NBI and private agents
conducted discreet surveillance opera-tions on certain
video establishments, among them private respondent FGT
Video Network, Inc. (FGT).
Consequently, on May 14, 1987, NBI Agent III Lauro
C. Reyes, with Manalang and Rebec-ca Benitez-Cruz as
witnesses, applied for a search warrant with the Regional
Trial Court in Pasig. Upon the offer of these pieces of
evidence, Judge Alfredo C. Flores of the aforesaid court,
issued Search Warrant. On the same day, agents from the
NBI duly served Search Warrant on the opera-tors or
representatives of FGT.
The lower court resolved the doubt "against the
Government and in favor of a lawful busi-ness enterprise.
Hence, the present recourse.
Issue: W/N the search warrant is valid
Held: NO. The Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the
test of legality. The right to security against unreasonable
searches and seizures is guaranteed under Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Sections 3 and 4
of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites
in the issuance of search warrants.
In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply
with the constitutional and statu-tory requirements. He
must determine the existence of probable cause by
personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions. The search warrant must
contain a specific description of the place to be searched
and the articles sought to be seized must be described
with particularity.
KHO V. MAKALINTAL G.R. No. 94902-06.
Facts: NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search
warrants by the respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho, now
petitioner, in his residence at BF Homes, Paranaque. On the same day,
Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same court for
the issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner in his house
at Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search war-rants were applied for after
teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and inves-
tigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential
information they received that the said places were being used as
storage centers for unlicensed firearms and chop-chop vehicles.
On the following day, armed with Search Warrants, NBI agents
searched subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they
recovered various high-powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of
ammunition. Meanwhile, another search was conducted at the house
at Moonwalk, Pa-ranaque, by another team of NBI agents using the
other Search Warrants. The said second search yielded several high-
powered firearms with explosives and more than a thousand rounds of
am-munition. The simultaneous searches also resulted in the
confiscation of various radio and tele-communication equipment, two
units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace vans) and one motorcycle. Upon
verification, the NBI agents found out that no license has ever been
issued to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in question.
Likewise, the radio agents found out that no license has ever been
issued to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in question.
Likewise, the radio tranceivers recovered and motor vehicles seized
turned out to be unlicensed and unregistered per records of the
government agencies concerned.
Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants,
theorizing upon the absence of any probable cause therefor. They
contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI
agents within the premises involved, prior to the application for the
search warrants under con-troversy, were not sufficient to vest in the
applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or
indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is valid
Held:
YES. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the
surveillance and investigation testified unequivocably that they saw
guns being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and
motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. It is therefore
decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants
was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their
witnesses.
YEE SUE KOY V. ALMEDA G.R. No. 47021
Facts: In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief
agent of the Anti-Usury Board, the justice of the peace of Sagay,
Occidental Negros, after taking the testimony of applicant's witness,
Jose Estrada, issued on the same date a search warrant commanding
any peace officer to search during day time the store and premises
occupied by Sam Sing & Co., as well as the person of said Sam Sing &
Co., and to seize the documents in connection with their activities of
lending money at usurious rates of interest in violation of law. The
search was accordingly made by Almeda. Sam Sing & Co. filed a
motion with the CFI of Occidental Negros praying that the search
warrant and the seizure effected thereunder be declared illegal and set
aside and that the articles in question be ordered returned to Sam Sing
& Co. However, it was denied.
Issue: W/N the Search Warrant is valid
Held: YES. The criticism of the petitioners that the search warrant in
question was not issued in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by section 1, paragraph, 3, of Article III of the Constitution and of
section 97 of General Orders No. 58, is unfounded. On the contrary, we
are satisfied that strict observance of such formalities was followed. As
both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore that they had
personal knowledge, their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder,
they could be held liable for perjury if the facts would turn out to be
not as they were stated under oath. The existence of probable cause
has been determined by the justice of the peace of Sagay before
issuing the search warrant. The description of the articles seized, given
in the search warrant, is likewise sufficient. Where, by the nature of
the goods seized, their description must be rather gen-eral, it is not
required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that
no warrant could issue. Neither can there objection to the fact the
objects seized from the petitioners were retained by the agents of the
Anti-Usury Board, instead of being turned over to the justice of the
peace of Sagay, for the reason that the custody of said agents is the
custody of the issuing officer or court, the retention having been
approved by the latter.
UY V. BIR G.R. No. 129651.
Facts:
In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the
BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling
thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. This
is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct
1993, the BIR re-quested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant.
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second
warrant was issued which contains the same substance but has only
one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were
issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was
issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in
relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the
BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched
the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records
and documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by
Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants
which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via
certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the
proper remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the
return of the seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant.
The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not met some basic
requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the
requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions.
These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.
The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of
the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the
thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used
generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who
should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the
other was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the
inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as it
has revoked the two others.
PEOPLE V. CA G.R. No. 126005.
Facts: Rosalinda Dy was shot at pointblank range by private respondent
Jonathan Cerbo in the presence and at the office of his father, private
respondent Billy Cerbo. the 3rd MCTC of Nabunturan-Mawab, Davao,
after a preliminary investigation, found sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that the crime of murder has been committed by
private respondent Jonathan Cerbo and resolved to forward the entire
records of the case to the provincial prosecutor at Tagum, Davao The
prosecution filed an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the
murder case. A warrant for his arrest was later issued. Private respondent
Billy Cerbo then filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the
same was issued without probable cause. Respondent Judge issued the
first assailed order dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo and recalling
the warrant for his arrest. CA upheld the assailed order. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: W/N the assailed order is valid
Held: NO. The trial court erred in dismissing the Information filed against
the private respondent. Consequently, the Court of Appeals was likewise
in error when it upheld such ruling. The determination of probable cause
to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is judicial function.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before
issuing a warrant of arrest, must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.
At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet
tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in
determining probable cause.
Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if
he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so. Corollary
to this principle, the judge should not override the public prosecutors
determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial, on the
ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an
arrest warrant insufficient, as in the present case.
TAMBASEN V. PEOPLE G.R. No. 89103
Facts: P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search warrant
from the MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had
in his possession at his house "M-16 Armalite Rifles, Hand Grenades, .45
Cal. Pistols, Dynamite Sticks and Subversive Documents," which articles
were "used or intended to be used" for illegal purposes. On the same day,
the application was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 365, which allowed the seizure of the items specified in the
application. A police team searched the house of petitioner and seized
articles and cash.Petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that
the search and seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be
returned to him. The MTCC issued an order directing Lt. Col. Torres to
return the money seized to petitioner. The court opined that in the
implementation of the search warrant, any seizure should be limited to
the specific items covered thereby. It said that the money could not be
considered as "subversive documents"; it was neither stolen nor the
effects of gambling.Solicitor General filed before the RTC a petition for
certiorari seeking the annulment of the order of the MTCC. The petition
alleged that assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid,
petitioner was not entitled to its return. RTC issued an order granting the
petition for certiorari and directing the clerk of court to return to the MTCC
the money. Hence, this recourse.
Issue: W/N the money seized from petitioners house be retained and
kept in custody of court
Held: NO. The search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant
for more than one specific offense. The caption of Search Warrant
reflects the violation of two special laws. Search Warrant No was
therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void.
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search
warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under
the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires
that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
The same constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of
security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of
the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted.
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant,
had been illegally seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the
police team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is not a valid
excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity
in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the
constitutionally protected rights of an individual.
PEOPLE V. TUAN G.R. No. 176066
Facts: Two separate Informations were filed before the RTC against
accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana and illegal
possession of firearm. Two male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong and
Frank Lad-ing arrived at the office of CIDG (Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group) and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station
Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain Estela Tuan had been
selling marijuana.SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of
Tudlong and Lad-ing and filed the Application for a Search Warrant
before Judge Cortes. Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2
Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a Search
Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of probable cause. Upon
receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez and his team
implemented the warrant.
The gun and the nine bricks of marijuana were brought to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The RTC found accused-
appellant guilty as charged. CA reversed the decision of RTC.
Issue: W/N the search warrant is valid
Held: YES. Accused-appellant insists that the items allegedly seized
from her house are inadmissible as evidence because the Search
Warrant issued for her house was invalid for failing to comply with the
constitutional and statutory requirements.
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the
following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by
the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4)
the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized.
There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a
validly issued search warrant were complied with. What is left for the
Court to determine is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e.,
existence of probable cause; and particular description of the place to
be searched and things to be seized.
Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search
Warrant for accused-appellants residence after said judges personal
examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and
Tudlong, the informants.
Appellants assertion that the Search Warrant did not describe with
particularity the place to be searched. A description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of
all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at
bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the
Search Warrant was specific enough.
ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC V. HERRERA G.R.
No. L-25232
Facts: On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn
application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of
his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection
with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud,
and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the
Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic
Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of
the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president
and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the
search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents,
papers and receipts.
Issue: W/N the search warrant is valid
Held:
NO. In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate
and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and
(4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section
3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense.
What is plain and clear is the fact that the respondent Judge made no
attempt to determine whether the property he authorized to be searched
and seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes of
personal property that may be searched and seized under a search
warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules. The respondent Judge
simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus description of
the personal properties to be seized.
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner
transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a
detailed receipt of the things seized. In the seizure of two carloads of
documents and other papers, the possibility that the respondents took
away private papers of the petitioner, in violation of his constitutional
rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with the
broad and unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their
passport.
PEOPLE V. PEA G.R. No. 104947
Facts: At the time of the alleged rape, Erly Rose P. Marasigan was a nine
(9) year old third-grade student. On school days, she would take a
shortcut using an alley between her school and her home. As she passed
by, he grabbed her left arm with both of his hands, pulled her towards a
grassy area and threatened bodily harm if she would not keep quiet.
According to the testimonies of both the complainant and the accused-
appellant, he did not have an erection and was unable to insert his penis
into her vagina. Failing in this, the accused-appellant instead fondled his
victim's vagina and inserted his finger into the vaginal orifice.
Accompanied by her father and some neighbors, she thereafter narrated
the details of the attack to the Valenzuela Police on the same day. The
original information charged with him Attempted Rape but was later
changed to Statutory Rape. RTC found him guilty as charged.
Issue: W/N the accused should be charged with Statutory Rape and not
Attempted Rape
Held: NO. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman.
The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided for in Article
335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code is carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years old. In the case at bench, there was an attempt,
which the accused-appellant does not deny, but carnal knowledge did not
actually occur.

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION V. AQUINO G.R. No. L-35131
Facts: Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional
office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services. His
personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free entry
from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC)
suspected that the crates contain large quantities of highly dutiable
goods beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the
COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search
and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft. Secretary of Foreign
Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is
entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as
accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host
Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended. The
Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the
search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the
quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.
Issue: Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from
search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.
Held: Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized
that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions
of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of
the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as
principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said
petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the
search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a
political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination
by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch
of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to
accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other
officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the
executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal
of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic
immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION V. PEOPLE G.R. No. 161106
Facts: Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional
Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine
National Police filed applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon
City to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web
Corporation (WWC). The applications alleged that petitioners were
conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized
Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of
Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage
and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT). Trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search
warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund
Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT
testified as witnesses. RTC granted the application for search
warrants.The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO
operatives of the National Capital Region Police Office.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, and Planet Interne filed their
respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the
same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without probable
cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll
bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search
warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant
thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants
issued were in the nature of general warrants. CA reversed and set
aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants
valid and effective.
Issues: W/N there is probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrant
Held: YES. In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires
"such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects
sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched." There is no exact test for the determination of probable
cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly
dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising
their judicial function. They determine probable cause based on
"evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed" by the offender.
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing
courts:
It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed,
absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrates determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis
for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of
the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the
offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
People v. Nuez G.R. No. 177148
Facts: LBPS and IID Mobile Force conducted a search in the
house of Raul R. Nuez based on reports of drug possession.
Before proceeding to appellants residence the group summoned
Barangay Captain Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin
to assist them in serving the search warrant. While conducting the
search SPO1 Ilagan found 31 packets of shabu, lighters,
improvised burners, tooters and aluminum foil with shabu residue.
The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planner,
grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester and assorted carpentry tools on
suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu. Appellant
insists that the shabu found in his room was planted. He points out
variances in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which
cast doubt on his culpability. More importantly, appellant assails the
validity of the search warrant as it did not indicate his exact
address but only the barangay and street of his residence. He
maintains that none of the occupants witnessed the search as they
were all kept in the living room. Finally, appellant questions why the
prosecution did nit call the barangay officials as witnesses to shed
light on the details of the search.
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.
Held: In the case at bar, the search warrant specifically authorized
the taking of shabu and paraphernalia only. By the principle of
ejusdem generis where a statute describes things of a particular
class or king accompanied by words of a generic character, the
generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with
those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the
context of the statement which would repel such inference. Thus
we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search
conducted. Certainly, the ladys wallet, cash. grinder, camera,
component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws,
hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the word
paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of
drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised
their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in
appellants residence they believed were proceeds of the crime or
means of committing the offense
Harvey V Santiago G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988
Facts: Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles
who were apprehended after three months close surveillance by
the CID agents in Pagsanjan Laguna. Two days after apprehension
17 opted for self deportation, one released for lack of evidenced,
one was charged by another offense, working without a valid
working visa. Thus, three was left to face the deportation
proceedings. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of
photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitute shown
in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sexual
act. There were also posters and other literatures advertising the
child prostitution. Warrant of arrest was issued by respondent
against petitioners for violation of Sec 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration act and sec. 69 of the revised administrative code.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippines immigration act clothed the
commissioner with any authority to arrest and detained petitioner
pending determination of the existence of a probable cause.
Held: The Supreme court held that there can be no question that
the right against unreasonable search and seizure is available to all
persons, including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not. One
of the constitutional requirement of a valid search warrant or
warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. The
arrest of petitoners was based on probable cause determined after
close surveillance for three months during which period theire
activities were monitored. The existence probable cause justified
the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and
posters without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident
to a lawful arrest and, are therefore admissble in evidence. But
even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitoners was not valid
at its inception, the records show that formal deportation charges
have been filed against them as undesirable aliens. That
petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest
illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective
rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those
circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe
that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as
psychosexual perversion involving children"
Salazar v. Achacoso G.R. No. 81510
Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with
the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public
respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram
directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint
against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no
license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure
Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the
documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used
as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified
that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy
workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing
acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation
to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to
implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen
and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They
served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in.
The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with
POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties,
because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said
Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2
of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against
her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.
Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the
Labor Code
Held: Under the new Constitution, no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue
warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was
based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held,
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may
no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and
of no force and effect... The power of the President to order the
arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the
power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases,
like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of
the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the
nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null
and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be
seized.
Quintero v. NBI G.R. No. L-35149
Facts: Delegate Quintero disclosed that on different occasions.
certain persons had distributed money to some delegates of the
Con-Con, apparently in an effort to influence the delegates in the
discharge of their functions. He revealed the aggregate amount of
the "payola" which he himself had received, the amount of P11,150
in cash. However he did not reveal the names of the persons who
gave him the money, and he begged at that time not be made to
name names. He was later on hospitalized due to an indisposed
condition, he later on released a sworn statement addressed to the
Committee on Privileges mentioning the names of the persons who
gave him the "payola" Then First lady Mrs Imelda Marcos was
among others who was implicated in Quintero's sworn statement.
President Marcos later on went on air to denounce Mr. Quintero.
Mr. Marcos later on issued a statement to the NBI to raid the house
of Quintero and seized bundles of money amounting to P379, 000.
The NBI later on filed with the City Fiscal of Pasay a criminal
complaint for direct bribery against Delegate Quintero.
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is valid
Held: No. Under the aforequoted provisions, a search warrant may
issue only upon the finding of the judge of "probable cause," and
the latter has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
In the case at bar, the questioned search warrant was issued by
respondent Judge, upon application of NBI agent Samuel Castro.
Said application was accompanied by an affidavit of the
complainant, Congressman Artemio Mate, whose affidavit was
allegedly made also before the respondent judge. The
interrogations conducted by the respondent judge, upon the
applicant NBI agent Samuel Castro, showed that the latter knew
nothing, of his own personal knowledge, to show that Mr. Quintero
had committed any offense
Vlason Enterprise Corp. vs. Court of Appeals / G.R. No. 121662
Facts:
A civil action for for the recovery of possession of two
pieces of salvaged bronze propellers of a sunken vessel
was instituted by Sosuan, as buyer, against the seller, Lo
Bu and against all persons from which Lo Bu purchased the
propeller.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a criminal prosecution in
the court receiving or issuing a search warrant makes the
filing of a civil suit necessary.
Ruling:
Yes. It does not itself furnish basis for or warrant the
transfer of possession from one party to the other in the
civil action. The theory that the act of one branch of a
Court of First Instance may be deemed to be the act of
another branch of the same court is, upon its face, absurd.
It flies in the teeth of the all too familiar actuality that each
branch is a distinct and separate court, exercising
jurisdiction over the cases assigned to it to the exclusion of
all other branches.
PDEA vs. Richard Brodett / G.R. No. 196390
Facts: Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph were charged
with a violation of Sec. 5 in relation to Sec. 26 (b), of RA
9165. Brodett later filed a motion to return non-drug
evidence. He averred that during the arrest, the PDEA had
seized several personal non-drug effects from him
including a car. PDEA refused to return his personal effects.
The Office of the Prosecutor objected to the return of the
car because it appeared to be the instrument in the
commission of the violation due to its being the vehicle
used in the transaction and sale of dangerous drugs.
Issue: Whether or not the seizure of personal effects is
lawful
Ruling: Yes. Personal property may be seized in
connection with a criminal offense either by the authority
of a search warrant or as a product of a search incident to
a lawful arrest. The personal effects of Brodett are in
custodia legis. To release it before the judgment would be
to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as
evidence.
Padilla v. CA 269 SCRA 402
Facts: One night, Enrique Manarang noticed the accused appellants car
running fast. After a while, a screech of tires was heard and thus, made
the officer run out and investigate. Not so long, the car continued to run,
so a hot-pursuit took place. Manarang then radioed the incident to the
Police.When the car was put to a stop, the driver rolled down the
windows with his hands raised. The officers then noticed that it was the
famous actor, Robin Padilla. While apprehended, because of the hit-and-
run incident, the police saw the revolver tucked in the left waist of Robin.
So, the police insisted that the gun be shown in the office if it was legal.
The crowd had formed and Robin was shaking their hands and pointing
to the police while saying iyan kinuha ang baril ko, as if it was in the
movies. The gesture then revealed a magazine clip of a rifle which made
the police suspect that there is a rifle inside the vehicle. Then the rifle
was seen. The other firearms were voluntarily surrendered by
Robin.Now, Robins defense was that his arrest was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof
are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule.Robin Padilla
was arrested, tried, and convicted for illegal possession of firearms. He
was in possession of a .357 caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson with 6
live ammunitions, One M-16 baby Armalite Rifle with ammunitions, One .
380 Pietro Barreta with 8 live ammunitions, and six live double action
ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.
Issue: Whether or not the search was incident to a lawful arrest
Held: Yes. In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed
appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and
ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is
commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is
concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle
magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen
who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in
petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands
after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to
the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said
rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat.Thus it has been held
that:"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a
criminal offense, the . police officers should happen to discover a criminal
offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty
person and the taking of the corpus delicti.""Objects whose possession
are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to
seizure even without a warrant."
People v. De Guzman G.R. No. 92537
Facts: Jesus De Guzman, Danilo Castro, and Delfin Catap were
charged with Murder. Said incident happened on November 16,
1984 when appellants attacked and wounded a male Filipino
inflicting upon him several wounds. and as a resulting to his
death.Only De Guzman and Castro were arrested, while Catap
remains at large. Adelia Angeles, a witness for the prosecution,
testified that at arounf ten o' clock in the evening of November 16,
1984 she was awakened by moaning sounds outside her house.
Thinking that the person moaning was her brother-in- law, she went
down to investigate and it was then she an unknown person tied to
an ipil-ipil tree being slapped by accused Delfin. Angeles further
stated that the unknown person was pleading for mercy and that
upon seeing her the 3 accused untied the man and brought him
towards the direction of the Pasig River. At around 11 of the same
evening Delfin returned to their house and told her and her
husband that they killed the man by smashing his face with a stone
and warned them not to report to the authorities.
Issue; Whether the accused-appellants arrest was illegal as it was
effected without a warrant of arrest.
Held: No. The legality of the arrest need not be discussed,
considering that in People v. Rabang, this Court has held that any
irregularity attendant to an arrest is considered cured when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering his plea and participating in the trial. The alibi of the
accused-appellants deserves scant consideration since both of
them alleged being in their respective houses in the immediate
vicinity of the crime scene. As the Solicitor General correctly states,
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should not be
appreciated since both appellants were arrested. Likewise, it is
correctly pointed out that the qualifying circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery have not been proved thus the
crime committed is homicide and not murder.
People v. Musa 217 SCRA 609
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was
ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance
and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house
and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-
wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if
he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the
house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100
meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on.
Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he
wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa
went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers
containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his
right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved
in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living
room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped
away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a
cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.
They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they
opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then
placed under arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana
inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not
be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has
that view are subject to seizure and
the right to be in the position to have
may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is notsearching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating
nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the
object.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the
police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the
kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag.
Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the plain view of said object.
People v Rodriguez
Facts: Major Florencio Junio acting upon an information given by a
confidential informer that accused-appellant Dante Marcos was
selling marijuana at Holy Ghost Hill Baguio City, organized on
December 4, 1985 a "buy bust" operation. Serafin Artizona pose as
a buyer of the prohibited stuff together with the confidential
informant and the back up team. Dante Marcos denied the
accusation against him and claimed that the sack of marijuana
belonged to a certain Ronald Bayogan a student that he was only
at the scene because he was asked to entertain 3 visitors of him
while he go somewhere for a while. He was introduced to the 3
visitors and when one of the visitors saw the content of the sack he
said "Ok, I'll pay it" That when the NARCOM agents emerged and
arrested them.
Issue: Whether or not arrest of accused-appellant was incident to a
lawful arrest
Held: Artizona's testimony was corroborated by the "buy-bust"
operation team who confirmed that appellant was truly a marijuana
dealer. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana
requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction In the
case at bar, the appellant handed over the blue sack containing the
ten kilos of marijuana upon the agreement with Artizona to
exchange it for money. The circumstances show that there was an
agreement between the poseur-buyer and the appellant to
consummate the sale. The fact that the appellant returned with the
amount of marijuana corresponding to the aforesaid price suffices
to constitute if not sale, then delivery or giving away to another and
distribution of the prohibited drug. What is important is the fact that
the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the appellant and
that the contents were presented as evidence in court. Proof of the
transaction suffices.Neither can the appellant aver that no
consideration or payment was made. It is true that police officers
did not have the amount of P1,600 with them to buy marijuana from
the appellants during the incident. Be that as it may, it was not
indispensable for their operation. Sgt,. Raquidan went through the
motion as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the appellant who
produced and delivered the marijuana. There was no need to hand
the marked money to the appellants in the payment thereof. The
crime was consummated by the delivery of the goods.
People vs. Usana / G.R. No. 129756-58 (Justice Davide Jr.)
Facts: Some law enforcers of the Makati Police
manning a checkpoint at the South Luzon Expressway
(SLEX). They were checking the cars going to Pasay City,
stopping those they found suspicious. At about past
midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car and one of them
saw a long firearm at the passenger seat, who was later
identified as Virgilio Usana. The three passengers were thereafter
brought to the police station and since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious
of the vehicle, he requested Escao to open the trunk which he agreed
They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escao
to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape,
which, upon examination by National Bureau of
Investigation Forensic Chemist, was found positive for
hashish
Issue: Whether or not this was an illegal search or seizure
Ruling: No. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely
stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those
whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the
passengers thereof were carrying guns. Jurisprudence
recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to the
warrant requirement: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) evidence in plain view; (4)
customs searches; (5) consented warrantless search; and
(6) stop-and-frisk situations. Even though there was ample
opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we cannot
invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there are
indications that the search done on the car of Escao was
consented to by him. No fact was adduced to link Usana
and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car.
Their having been with Escao in the latters car before the
"finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an
appreciable time and without their presence left much to
be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling,
distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact,
there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the
presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw
the same before it was seized.
were
People. V. Che Chung Ting 328 SCRA 592
Facts:
Following a series of buy-bust operations, Mabel Cheung
Mei Po was apprehended as a suspected drug dealer. She
revealed the name of Che Chung Ting as the source of the
drugs. Thus, a team of agents was deployed for the latters
entrapment. Mabel went to Unit 122 at the place and the
agents saw the door open as a man went out to hand
Mabel transparent plastic bag containing a white
crystalline substance. The NARCOM agents immediately
alighted and arrested the man. Unit 122 was searched and
a bleck bag containing several plastic bags containing a
white crystalline substance was seized in an open cabinet
in the second floor. The contents were later tested and
found positive for shabu.
Issue:
Whether the search and seizure was lawful
Held:
No. Although the case falls within a search incidental to an
arrest, Che Chung Ting was admittedly outside of Unit 122.
The inner portion of the house can hardly be said to
constitute a permissible area within his reach or immediate
control, to justify a warrantless search therein. However,
this does not totally exonerate the accused. He was caught
in flagrante delicto. His arrest was lawful and the shabu,
being the fruit of the crime was admissible in evidence.

ValerosovCourtofAppealsG.R.No.164815
"area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him
to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used
against him. The arresting officers would have been justified in
searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in
front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the
former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no
comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and
cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. It is
worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search
as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from
being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence
within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond
what is needed to serve its purpose. In the case before us, search was
made in the locked cabinet, which cannot be said to have been within
Valerosos immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds
of what may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.

Facts: Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the desk officer to

serve a Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against
Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with ransom. The team conducted
the necessary surveillance on Valeroso the team members proceeded
to INP Central Police Station in Culiat Quezon City and arrested
Valeroso and conducted a bodily search they found a Charter Arms
revolver with five pieces of live ammunition. It was later found out that
the subject firearm was not issed to Valeroso but to a certain Raul
Palencia. Valeroso countered that Disuanco and his team suddenly
entered his house and pointed guns at him and searched and
ransacked the room Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a
standing warrant for his arrest. However, the raiding team was not
armed with a search warrant.
Issue: Whether not the search was valid
Held: No. Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest
allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was
sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. The arresting
officers who were heavily armed awakened him. They pulled him out
of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his
hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco. The other police
officers remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet
where they found the subject firearm and ammunition. With such
discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily
conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest
without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately
under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out
of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet, which,
according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an
People v. Collado, GR No. 185719, June 17, 2013
Facts:
PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that
Sps. Marcelino and Myra were engaged in selling shabu.
After recording the report in the police bloteter, PO2 Noble
relayed the informationto his superior, P/Insp. Castillo, who
in turn ordered the conduct of a surveillance operation.
PO2 Noble, et al., conducted surveillance on the couples
residence. A buy-bust operation team was thereafter
formed, and the team proceeded to Marcelinos and Myras
residence. Upon reading the target area, the asset
introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of
shabu. During the negotiation regarding the price,
Marcelino then took from his pocket a small metal
container from which he bought out a small plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance and gave the same
to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was inspecting its contents,
he noticed smoke coming from a table inside the house of
the couple around which were seven persons. When PO2
Noble gave the pre- arranged signal, the back-up team
rushed to the scene. The appellate court found the
warrantless arrest of the appellants to be lawful
considering that they were caught in the act of committing
a crime. Thus, the CA affirmed the conviction of Marcelino
and Myra for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, as well as
the conviction of Marcelino for violation of Section 11 of RA
9165.
Issue:
Whether the accused-appellants arrest was lawful
Held:
Yes. The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section
13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in
the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the
search was made after appellants were lawfully arrested.
Pursuant to the above- mentioned rule, the subsequent
search and seiqure must fail.
Sy v. People, GR No. 182178, August 15, 2011
Facts: Petitioner was found guilty by the lower courts for
the violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. PO3 Faelogo and
PO3 Paquera received an information from a caller,
informing them of an illegal drug trade. The two proceeded
to the reported place where they found petitioner, flicking
a plastic containing shabu. The police officers arrested
petitioner and seized the said plastic as well as the light
found in the petitioners possession. Petitioner denied
ownership. He further claime that he was not doing
anything illegal and so the arrest done was a violation of
his rights and that the article seized should be
inadmissible since it is the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Issue: Whether the petitioner was right in averring that the
evidence was inadmissible, it being the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
Held: No. Petitioner never objected to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Moreover, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is
deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest
and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court trying his case. The admissibility of the articles as
evidence relied on whether the search made was lawful.
Sufficient eveidence supports that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was effected under Section 5(a) of Rule 113, or
the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. The police
officers witnessed petitioner flicking a transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance in plain view.
Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu,
the arresting officers immediately approached petitioner,
introduced themselves as police officers and effected the
arrest. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline
substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug. Consequently, the results of the ensuing
search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove
petitioners guilt of the offense charged.
Miclat v. People, GR No. 176077, August 31, 2011
Facts: Petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was charged for
violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal
possession of shabu. P/Insp. Valencia received an INFOREP
Memo to illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being
undertaken along Caloocan. P/Insp. Valencia formed a
surveillance team headed by SPO4 Palting. Upon arrival of
the team at the are, they were at once led by their
informant to the house of one alias Abe. PO3 Antonio
then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house,
while the rest of the members of the group deployed
themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtain-
covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four (4)
distance of 112 meters, he saw ABE arranging several plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental
pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the
containing shabu. Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio plain view doctrine.
forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while Abe, Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the
on the other hand, after being informed of such authority, rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the
voluntarily handed over to the forment the four (4) pieces evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a
of small plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting out. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which
PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect under arrest incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the
and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sahcets results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible
containing white crystalline substance. in evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the offense
The defense, on the other hand, claims that petitioner was charged.
at their house watching television when they heard the
commotion downstairs. Men in civilian clothes introduced
themselves as raiding police officers who were set out to
arrest Abe, petitioner for drug pushing. There, petitioner
was immediately arrested. On their way to the Bagong
Silang Police Station, PO3 Pagsolingan showed to petitioner
a small piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substances allegedly recovered by the raiding police team
from their house. Afterwards, petitioner was trasnferred to
the Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally
detained.
The RTC convicted petitioner of violation of Sec. 11, Art. II
of RA 9165. The CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether petitioners arrest and the subsequent

seizure of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of
dangerous drugs was valid.
Held: At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no
objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation
in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictated that
petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
As to arrest, the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto
and the police authorities effectively made a valid
warrantless arrest. It is to be noted that petitioner was
caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic
sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he volutntarily Valdez v. People, GR No. 170180, November 23,
surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police 2007
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the Held: The court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the
lower courts for the violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 after lower courts. The accused was acquitted by reasonable
dried marijuana leaves were found in his possession by doubt. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides
three barangay tanods who made a search on him. for the only occassions permitting a warrantless arrest.
Bautista, one of the tanods, was conducting the routine The court held that none of the circumstances was
patrol along National Highway in Brgy. San Benito, La attendant at the time of the arrest. Furthermore, none of
Union, together with Aratas and Ordoo (the other two the petitioners actuations (i.e. his looking aroung and
tanods) when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight alleged fleeing upon approach of the tanods) is adequate
from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who to incite suspicion of criminal activity to validate the
appeared suspicious to them seemed to be looking for warrantless arrest.
something. They thus approached him but the latter The Court added that the petitioners lack of objection to
purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put the search and seiqure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the
of Brgy. Capt. Mercado, where petitioner was asked by the warrantless search and seizure.
latter to open the bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained
a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and
dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and
cellophane.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied ownership and
purported after alighting from the buse, petitioner claimed
that he went to the house of a friend to drink water and
then proceeded to walk to his brothers house, where the
prosecution witness Ordoo allegedly approached him and
asked where he was going. Ordoo then requested to see
the contects of his bag, at this point, Bautista and Aratas
joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag,
petitioner testified that he was restrained by the tanod and
taken to the house of Mercado. At Mercados house, his bag
was opened, where they took out an item wrapped in
newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves.
Petitioner claimed to have been threatened with
imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the
prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for
them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he
was brought to the police station and charged with the
instant offense.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted

for the lack of a warrant supporting the arrest and the
search.

Abelita III, v. Doria, GR No. 170672, Auguat 14, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Judge Felimon Abelita III filed a complaint
for Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code
against P/Supt. German B. Doria and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez.
Petitioner alleged that he and his wife was on their way
home when the respondents accompanied by 10
unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to
te PNP headquarters. Petitioner alleged that he would
proceed to the PNP HQ after ha had brought his wife home.
Petitioner alleged that when he parked his car in front of
their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him and took his car
keys, bared into the vehicle and conducted a search
without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a
licensed shotgun and an unlicensed .45 caliber pistol
allegedly found inside the vehicle.
However, the respondent has a different version of the
case. P/Supt. Doria alleged that they received a telephone
call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident.
He dispatched a team headed by SPO3 Ramirez to
investigate the incident. SPO3 Ramirez reported that a
certain William Sia s wounded while petitioner and his wife
just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for
the petitioner and when he found him, he informed him
about the incident, he requested petitioner to go with him
in the PNP HQ but the petitioner suddenly sped up his
vehicle and proceeded to his residence. They caught up
with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat and a
shotgun at the back. They confiscated the firearms and
charged petitioner for illegal possession of firearms,
frustrated murder and an administrative case.
Issue: Whether the arrest and seizure was valid
Held:
Yes. The seizure was valid. Under the plain view doctrine,
objects failling un the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence. Hence, the
police officers were justified in seizing the firearms
Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, 174570, December 15, 2010
Facts: Romer Sy Tan filed a criminal case against
respondents Tiong Gue, et al. The respondents moved for
the withdrawal of the information which was subsequently
granted by the RTC on the ground that the information for
robbery did not contain the essential elements of robbery
as decided upon by the CA on a prior complaint. Hence,
the case was dismissed. Now, the petitioner, seeking
shelter from the SC, conended that he filed an information
for qualified theft based on the same subject matter of the
dismissed robbery and would like to used the item seized
in the previously conducted search for the new information
of qualified theft.
Issue: Whether items seized in the previously conducted
search warrant issued by the court for robbery be included
and used for the filing of an information for qualified theft.
Held: No. Petitioner cannot include the seized items as part
of the evidence in the new information. Section 4 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court provides: A search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
partiularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is
probable cause in connection with only one specific
offense alleged in an application on the basis of the
applicants personla knowledge and his or her witnesses.
Therefore, petitioner cannot utilize the evidence seized by
virtue of the search warrant emanated from the same
incident. Also, the withdrawal of the information was
justfiable, since there was no probable cause as to indict
respondents of the crim of robbery since unlawful taking
which is an essential element for Robbery and likewise for
Qualified Theft is not present.
Babalo v Abano, 90 Phil 827
Facts: Consequent upon a dispute over a market stall, an
information for grave coercion was filed against petitioner
at the instance of herein respondent Canela. On the same
date, respondent Canela filed a civil action against
petitioner for damages based on the same facts alleged in
the information for grave coercion, in which respondednt
Canela prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. IN the civil case, petitioner insisted that the
criminal case should have precedence. The trial court,
however, issued an order providing that the trial of the civil
case upon the merits was suspended until after the
criminal case shall have been decided and terminated, but
that the hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction
might be proceeded with.
Issue: Whether the criminal case suspended the trial of the
civil case, including the matter of the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction
HELD: No. Although the civil action is suspended until final
judgment in the criminal case, the court is not thereby
deprived of its authority to issue preliminary and auxiliary
writs. If those ancillary processes cannot be resorted to
during the suspension, there is no sense in the rule
providing only for suspension, when its effect is to kill the
action.
Santos v. Hon. Flores, 5 SCRA 1136
Facts: These four cases are rooted on the issuance of
Secretary of Justice of Administrative Order No. 185, which
directed Sebastian, together with other respondents, to
assist the provincial fiscal of La Union and other provincial
and city fiscals and attorneys in the investigation and
prosecution of the alleged ACCFAs fraudulent tobacco
deals. Thereupon, the said prosecutors seized ACCFA and
CCEs records of tobacco purchases, sealed the
warehouses, and conducted ex parte investigation by
taking down the testimonies of witnesses and examining
the confiscated tobacco. A notice was sent by the
prosecutor to the defendants which informed them of the
preliminary investigation to be conducted. Thereafter, two
informations, one for malversation of public funds with
falsification of public and official documents and another
for malversation of public funds, were filed. Meanwhile, on
motion of respondents Sebastian and Marasigan, writs of
preliminary attachment of the properties of the defendants
in said criminal cases were issued.
Issue: Whether writs of preliminary attachment should be
dissolved.
Held: No. As official prosecutor in the criminal cases,
respondednt has the authority to apply for such remedies,
including writs of preliminary attachment, as may be
necessary to protect the interests of the offended party
since the corresponding civil liability of the culprits is to be
determined.
Mindanao Savings, etc v. CA, 172 scra 480
Facts:
Private respondents filed a complaint against defendants
DS Homes, Inc. and its directors for the rescission of
contract and damages with a prayer for issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment. Judge Dinopol then issued an
order granting the writ. Private respondents then amended
their complaint, impleading additional defendants, but
dropping Eugenio M. de los Santos. Judge Dinopol then
issued ex parte an amended order of attachment against
all defendants named in the second amended complaint.
DS Homes et al. and the DSLA and Villamor filed separate
motions to quash the preliminary attachment. When their
motions were denied, DS Homes, et al. offered a
counterbond issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines.
The lower court accepted the Land Bank Certificate of
Deposit as counterbond and lifted the writ of preliminary
attachment. MSLA and Villamor filed in the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorarito annul the order of
attachment & the denial of their motion to quash. The
appellate court dismissed the petition and remanded the
records to the RTC.
Issue: Whether the writ was properly invoked.
Held: Yes. The only requisites for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment are the affidavit and bond of the
applicant. No notice to the adverse party or hearing of the
application is required. A hearing would defeat the purpose
of this provisional remedy.