Princess Morado
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael Case Digest
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana
became the registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del
Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-
in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver
of rights, in which the latter waived her share of the
property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his
name. Having no children to take care of him after his
retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latters
cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care
of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the
relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that
the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same
room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila
was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was
mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Franciscos death, he executed an
instrument denominated Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in
which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to
Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument.
The deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of the faithful services she had rendered over
the past ten years. Thereafter, Francisco died and the
respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of
nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of
possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces,
nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco,
alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco
and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the
Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos
executed by the late Francisco Comille be declared void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of
evidence that two persons lived together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is
that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of
evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is
considered null and void.
Carlos vs. Abelardo
GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002
FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his
G.R. No. L-68873, March 31, 1989
son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to
Lucilda Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, ET. Al.
purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in
October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as
FACTS:
such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life
Cesario Cabutihan was married to Beinvenida
independently. The seller of the property acknowledged
Durana, whom he had five children, upon the death of the
receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the petitioner
wife; Cesario contracted a second marriage with his former
inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from
wifes sister Victorina.
him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position
Private respondents filed settlement over the property of
to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent
their deceased parents. Trial Court rendered a decision
expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various
holding that Victorina Durana had no paraphernal properties
death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a
brought to her marriage with Cesario. That the copra
formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the
business was formed during the first marriage and Victorina
obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more
used the same facilities, credit and capital in managing the
than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses
business, and the main source of the income not only of
filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the
Cesario and also of Victorina during their respective lifetimes
amount was never intended as a loan but his share of
was the copra business. Hence, the extent of the Estate of
income on contracts obtained by him in the construction
Victorina shall consist only of her share in the inheritance of
firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the
the Estate of Cesario Cabutihan. Intermediate Appellate
debt from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial
courts decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently,
ISSUE:
there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner
Is the marital community of proprietary interest
of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal
continued to exist in the second marriage, even after the
dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument
Cesario-Beinvenida conjugal partnership has been dissolved
acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.
by the death of Bienvenida?
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal
HOLDING:
dwelling can be charged against the conjugal partnership.
The first conjugal partnership was automatically
dissolved because of death of Bienvenida and it was
HELD:
converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership. There
should be liquidation of properties before contracting
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They
another marriage. Since there was none, the total mass of
did not deny that the same served as their conjugal home
the partnership property shall be divided between the
thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly
different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each
and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos
and to the property belonging to the respective spouses.
contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the
One-half (1/2) of the properties that pertain to the first
construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that
conjugal partnership belong to Cesario as his conjugal share
he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the
therein, while the other half shall be considered as inherited
profits and income of the company.
by him and his five children as the heirs of Bienvenida.
The properties pertaining to the second partnership shall
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to
also be equally divided, one-half (1/2) to belong to Cesario
pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal
and the other to Victorina as their respective shares in their
interest including moral and exemplary damages and
conjugal partnership properties. The share of Cesario should
attorneys fees.
then be divided among his heirs, namely, Victorina and his
five (5) children.
To recapitulate, the estate of Victorina for distribution to her
In Vda. de Ramones v. Agbayani, citing Villaranda v. heirs shall consist of her one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal
Villaranda, we held that without the wife's consent, the properties of the aforesaid second marriage and her one-
husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property sixth (1/6) share in the estate of Cesario as an heir.
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
is not void, but merely voidable.
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Princess Morado
Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356, February 23, 2004
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI)
obtained two loans from the Allied Banking Corporation
(ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching
executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC for the
payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the
payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of
money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the
sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to
answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching,
wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on
attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares of
stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her
husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds.
Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the
acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the
controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the
conjugal nature of stocks under Art. !21 and that such
presumption subsists even if the property is registered only
in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner
Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners, the suretyship
obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the
petitioner-husbands profession or business.44
ISSUE: WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by
the sheriff to answer for the loans guaranteed by petitioner
Alfredo Ching
HELD: No.
RATIO: The CA erred in holding that by executing a
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the
private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the
petitioner-husband was in the exercise of his profession,
pursuing a legitimate business.
The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal
partnership property of the petitioners. The private
respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-
husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.
The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal
partnership is liable for the said account of PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a
showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the
conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the
petitioner-husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty
and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for
and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between
the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit
of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact
that when the petitioner-husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the
conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The
private respondent was burdened to establish that such
benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
In Josefa Ferrer v. Sps. Manuel & Virginia Ferrer, et
al., G.R. No. 166496, November 29, 2006, prior to his
marriage with Josefa, Alfredo owned a real property. He
obtained a loan from the SSS to build improvements on the
land, but the loan was paid during their marriage. Alfredo
sold the property to his brother. After his death, Josefa
demanded that she be reimbursed one half (1/2) of the
value of the improvements and demanded for such
reimbursement from the brothers of Alfredo who are now
the registered owners.
Is her contention correct? Why?
Held: No. While there is an obligation to reimburse the cost
of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on
the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is
vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser
of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-
spouse.
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements that are
made on the separate property of the spouses at the
expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of
either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in value are more
than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall
belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-
spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said
property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-
spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement. (Ferrer v. Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. 166496,
November 29, 2006).
In Metrobank, et al. v. Jose Tan, et al., G.R. No.
163712, November 30, 2006, a property was registered
under the names Jose Tan married to Eliza Go Tan. The
husband contracted an obligation secured by a mortgage
over the property. Since the husband failed to pay, there
was foreclosure of the mortgage which was objected to by
the wife on the ground that the property was mortgaged
without her consent, hence, it is void contending that a
conjugal property cannot be mortgaged without the consent
of the spouse.
In brushing aside the contention, the SC
Held: The lack of consent to the mortgage covering the
title in question would not render the encumbrance void
under the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family
Code. For proof is wanting that the property covered by the
title is conjugal that it was acquired during respondents
marriage which is what would give rise to the presumption
that it is conjugal property. (Article 116, F.C.). The
statement in the title that the property is registered in
accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of the
Property Registration Decree in the name of JOSE B. TAN,
of legal age, married to Eliza Go Tan does not prove or
indicate that the property is conjugal. In Ruiz v. CA, G.R.
No. 146942, April 22, 2003, 401 SCRA 410, it was ruled that
the phrase married to ismerely descriptive of the civil
status of a person and should not be construed to mean
that the spouse is also a registered owner. Furthermore,
registration of the property is not proof that such
property was acquired during the marriage, and thus,
is presumed to be conjugal. The property could have been
acquired by a spouse while he was still single, and
registered only after the marriage. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. The presumption
under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties
acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal
cannot apply in the instant case. Before such presumption
can apply, it must first be established that the property was
in fact acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof
of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership. No such proof was offered nor presented in the
case at bar. (Metrobank, et al. v. Jose Tan, et al., G.R. No.
163712, November 30, 2006).
PHILIP MATTHEWS vs. BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and
JOSELYN C. TAYLOR
G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009
Facts:
1. On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin, a British
subject, married Joselyn, a 17-year old Filipina.
2. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting,
Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a lot (Boracay
property).
3. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
4. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds,
constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted
the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the
Admiral Ben Bow Inn.
5. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the
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Princess Morado
resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino,
Joselyns sister.
6. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and
Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen.
7. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SPA in favor of
Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and
sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third
parties with respect to their Boracay property.
8. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip
Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease
involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with
an annual rental of P12,000.00.
9. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and
renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.
10. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it
was entered into by Joselyn without Benjamins consent,
Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the
petitioner.
11. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the
acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and
coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any
transaction involving said property required his consent.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Agreement of Lease of a parcel of
land entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of
her British husband is valid
2. Whether or not Benjamin is the actual owner of the
property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the
same
Ruling:
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision,
they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The
primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony. Our fundamental law
cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the
public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or
corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is
owned by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not
allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines,
save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is
no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as
more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision
by trying to own lands through another.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease
between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is
absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands
in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be
the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said
property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true
even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the
funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract
knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in
his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject
property was part of the conjugal/community property of
the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal,
this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest
and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive
vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, Petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely:
MILAGROS DE GUZMAN, VICTOR DE GUZMAN,
REYNALDO DE GUZMAN, CYNTHIA G. RAGASA and
QUIRINO DE GUZMAN, JR., Respondents. G.R. No.
160347; November 29, 2006
TOPIC: RULE ON COMPULSORY JOINDER OF
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES (CO-OWNERS OF PERSONAL
PROPERTIES)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This case reached the Supreme
Court as an appeal to the decision of the CA ruling against
the spouses Carandang and denying their motion for
reconsideration. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision that
Milagros de Guzman, the decedents wife, is not an
indispensable party in the complaint, hence, her non-
inclusion in the case does not warrant a dismissal of the
complaint.
FACTS: Spouses Carandang and the decedent Quirino de
Guzman were stockholders and corporate officers of
Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS). The Carandangs have
equities at 54 % while Quirino has 46%.
When the capital stock of MBS was increased on
November 26, 1983, the Carandangs subscribed P345,000
from it, P293,250 from the said amount was loaned by
Quirino to the Carandangs. In the subsequent increase in
MBS capital stock on March 3, 1989, the Carandangs
subscribed again to the increase in the amount of P93,750.
But, P43,125 out of the mentioned amount was again
loaned by Quirino.
When Quirino sent a demand letter to the
Carandangs for the payment of the loan, the Carandangs
refused to pay. They contend that a pre-incorporation
agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang and
Quirino, whereby Quirino promised to pay for the stock
subscriptions of the Arcadio without cost, in consideration
for Arcadios technical expertise, his newly purchased
equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading
radio/communication equipment therefore, there is no
indebtedness on the part of the Carandangs.
Thereafter, Quirino filed a complaint seeking to recover the
P336,375 total amount of the loan together with damages.
The RTC ruled in favor of Quirino and ordered the
Carandangs to pay the loan plus interest, attorneys fees,
and costs of suit. The Carandangs appealed the trial courts
decision to the CA, but the CA affirmed the same. The
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Carandangs were also denied. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
SPOUSES CARANDANG: Three of the four checks used to
pay their stock subscriptions were issued in the name of
Milagros de Guzman, the decedents wife. Thus, Milagros
should be considered as an indispensable party in the
complaint. Being such, the failure to join Milagros as a party
in the case should cause the dismissal of the action by
reason of a jurisprudence stating that: (i)f a suit is not
brought in the name of or against the real party in interest,
a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action."
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the
case for failure to state a cause of action, considering that
Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was
not included as a party-plaintiff.
HELD: No. Although the spouses Carandang were correct in
invoking the aforementioned doctrine, the ground set forth
entails an examination of whether the parties presently
pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation,
and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are
actually pleaded. The first query seeks to answer the
question of whether Milagros is a real party in interest, while
the latter query is asking if she is an indispensable party.
Since the issue of this case calls for the definition of an
indispensable party, invoking the abovementioned doctrine
is irrelevant to the case because the doctrine talks about a
real party in interest and not an indispensable party.
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Princess Morado

Although it is important to take note that an indispensable the action should be dismissed. The absence of an SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. MAR
party is also a real party in interest. indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the TIERRA CORP, WILFRIDO MARTINEZ, MIGUEL
court void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the LACSON, and RICARDO LOPA
absent parties but even as to those present. For necessary November 29, 2006 (508 SCRA 419)
parties, the non-inclusion of a necessary party does not FACTS:
*Definitions:
prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president,
> Real party in interest the party who stands to be
judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the
rights of such necessary party. Non-compliance with the accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust
party entitled to the avails of the suit.
order for the inclusion of a necessary party would not Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered
> Indispensable party a party in interest without whom no
warrant the dismissal of the complaint. Lastly, for pro-forma into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It
final determination can be had of an action
parties, the general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by
> Necessary party one who is not indispensable but who
followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson
ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be
Hence, in a case concerning an action to recover a sum of and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and
accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
case was not a jurisdictional defect. The non-joinder of a loan.
action
spouse does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt
> Pro-forma parties those who are required to be joined
requirement which may be cured by amendment. balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing
as co-parties in suits by or against another party as may be
operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent
provided by the applicable substantive law or procedural
Conversely, in the instances that the pro-forma parties are corp and individual respondents.
rule.
also indispensable or necessary parties, the rules concerning RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal
An example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of
indispensable or necessary parties, as the case may be, properties of respondent corporation and individual
Court:
should be applied. Thus, dismissal is warranted only if the respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or
pro-forma party not joined in the complaint is an the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the
be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
indispensable party. benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the
Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable, necessary or
attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses
neither indispensable nor necessary. The third case occurs if,
Under Art. 147 of the Civil Code which was superceded by Martinez.
for example, a husband files an action to recover a property
Art. 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership shall Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC decision.
which he claims to be part of his exclusive property. The
be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership. Petitioned to SC.
wife may have no legal interest in such property, but the
Thus, Milagros is a co-owner of the subject personal
rules nevertheless require that she be joined as a party.
property in this case the credit incurred by spouses ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for
Carandang. Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to
Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the
and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for accommodate a third party
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988. As they did
the recovery thereof. HELD:
not execute any marriage settlement, the regime of
No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil
conjugal partnership of gains govern their property
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for all debts and
relations.
real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them conjugal partnership.
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the
may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that,
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as
to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Credits are
the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.
personal properties, acquired during the time the loan or
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court
other credit transaction was executed. Therefore, credits
not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be of Appeals, we ruled that, if the husband himself is the
loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be
accorded in the suit even without their participation, since principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of
conjugal property.
the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all the money and services to be used in or for his own
co-owners. business or profession, the transaction falls within the term
Assuming that the four checks are credits, they are assumed
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In
to be conjugal properties of Quirino and Milagros. There
Thus, Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on
being no evidence to the contrary, such presumption
the action for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption
subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of
the spouses Carandang. As such, she need not have been that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal
specific partnership property, is certainly a real party in
impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the suit is not partnership.
interest.
warranted by her not being a party thereto. (The Civ Pro On the other hand, if the money or services are given to
issue was not the main issue in the case.) another person or entity and the husband acted only as a
Now, with regard to the discussion on the effect of non-
surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be
inclusion of parties in the complaint filed: in indispensable
deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
parties, when an indispensable party is not before the court,

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Princess Morado
partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and
not for the surety or his family.
In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line
agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation,
was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory
contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual
respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for
respondent corporation was similarly for the latters benefit.
Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the
transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.
ABALOS VS MACATANGAY, JR. G.R. No. 155043
September 30 2004
FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners
of a parcel of land with improvements. Arturo made a
Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of
Macatangay, binding himself to sell to latter the subject
property and not to offer the same to any other party within
30 days from date. Full payment would also be effected as
soon as possession of the property shall have been turned
over to Macatangay. Macatangay gave an earnest money
amounting to P5,000.00 to be deducted from the purchase
price of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the spouses.
Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital squabble
brewing at that time and Macatangay, to protect his
interest, made an annotation in the title of the property. He
then sent a letter informing them of his readiness to pay the
full amount of the purchase price. Esther, through her SPA,
executed in favor of Macatangay, a Contract to sell the
property to the extent of her conjugal interest for the sum
of P650,000 less the sum already received by her and
Arturo. She agreed to surrender the property to Macatangay
within 20 days along with the deed of absolute sale upon full
payment, while he promised to pay the balance of the
purchase price for P1, 290,000.00 after being placed in
possession of the property. Macatangay informed them that
he was ready to pay the amount in full. The couple failed to
deliver the property so he sued the spouses.
RTC dismissed the complaint, because the SPA could not
have authorized Arturo to sell the property to Macatangay
as it was falsified. CA reversed the decision, ruling the SPA
in favor of Arturo, assuming it was void, cannot affect the
transaction between Esther and Macatangay. On the other
hand, the CA considered the RMOA executed by Arturo valid
to effect the sale of his conjugal share in the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of property is valid.
RULING: conjugal partnership property without which, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void.
No. Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before
the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no indication Inescapably, herein Arturos action for specific performance
that they have adopted a different property regime, their must fail. Even on the supposition that the parties only
property relations would automatically be governed by the disposed of their respective shares in the property, the sale,
regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The subject land assuming that it exists, is still void for as previously stated,
which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the
the spouses forms part of their conjugal partnership. conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet. No one can
Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of give what he has not.
the conjugal partnership. This right is clearly granted to him
by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The
wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration.
Uy vs CA GR No 109557 November 29, 2000
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as
FACTS: This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza
administrator of the conjugal partnership, cannot validly
(herein respondent) on the one hand, against his mother
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the
partnership without the wifes consent. Similarly, the wife
spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners)
cannot dispose of any property belonging to the conjugal
on the other hand. The controversy came about as a result
partnership without the conformity of the husband. The law
of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s suffering of a stroke which left
is explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental
without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by
faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein
law.
respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private
respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
More significantly, it has been held that prior to the
Respondent wife filed a petition for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each
declaration of incapacity of his husband and assumption of
spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
authorization to sell one piece of real properties.
equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears
RTC granted said petition. Respondent opposed
that there are assets in the community as a result of the
and filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that such
liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is
petition is essentially a petition for guardianship of the
limited to the net remainder or remanente liquido (haber
person and properties of Jardeleza Sr and that a summary
ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the
proceedings was irregularly applied.
partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the
RTC denied the motion. CA reversed RTCs
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not
decision for lack of due process on the part of the
vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause
partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is
why the petition should not be granted.
finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal
obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided
ISSUE: WON petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of
between the spouses or their respective heirs.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a
cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without
The Family Code has introduced some changes particularly
motor and mental faculties, and could not manage their
on the aspect of the administration of the conjugal
conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of
partnership. The new law provides that the administration of
administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of
the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the
the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its
husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse is
improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
the approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her
administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse
co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the
may assume sole powers of administration. However, the
amount of eight million pesos.
power of administration does not include the power to
dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal
RULING: NO. ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment
partnership. In all instances, the present law specifically
of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
requires the written consent of the other spouse, or
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
5
Princess Morado
the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors..
Art 124 does not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give
consent. The situation contemplated in Art 124 is that one
where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has
abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be
obtained. . Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give
consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject
spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-
comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular
accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper
remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93
of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real
property as such administrator of the conjugal property
must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate
required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised
Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under
the Family Code.
Court affirmed in toto CAs decision.
In Bautista v. Silva, the Court erected a standard to
determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller
who had title to and possession of the land but whose
capacity to sell was restricted, in that the consent of the
other spouse was required before the conveyance, declaring
that in order to prove good faith in such a situation, the
buyers must show that they inquired not only into the title
of the seller but also into the sellers capacity to sell. Thus,
the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of
requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the
validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the
diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting
spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other
spouse.
G.R. No. 165803 September 1, 2010
SPOUSES REX AND CONCEPCION AGGABAO, Petitioners,
vs.
DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN,
Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Subject of this case are 2 parcels of land located, BF Homes,
Paraaque City and registered under TCT No. 633763 and
TCT No. 633774 in the name of respondents Spouses Maria
Elena A. Parulan (Ma. Elena) and Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr.
(Dionisio), who have been estranged from one another.
Real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio (Atanacio) offered the
property to the petitioners, who initially did not show
interest due to the rundown condition of the improvements,
but Atanacios persistence prevailed. On February 2, 1991,
they and Atanacio met with Ma. Elena at the site of the
property thelatter showed to them the following documents:
(a) the owners original copy of TCT No. 63376; (b) a
certified true copy of TCT No. 63377; (c) three tax
declarations; and (d) a copy of the SPA dated January 7,
1991 executed by Dionisio authorizing Ma. Elena to sell the
property.On the same day, they paid P20,000.00 as earnest
money, Ma. Elena then executed a handwritten Receipt of
Earnest Money, and stipulated that: (a) they would pay an
additional payment of P130,000.00 on February 4, 1991; (b)
they would pay the balance of the bank loan of the
respondents amounting to P650,000.00 on or before
February 15, 1991; and (c) they would make the final
payment of P700,000.00 once Ma. Elena turned over the
property on March 31, 1991.
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners went to the Office of
the Register of Deeds and the Assessors Office to verify the
TCTs in the company of Atanacio and her husband (also a
licensed broker). There, they discovered that the lot under
TCT No. 63376 had been encumbered to Banco Filipino in
1983 or 1984, but that the encumbrance had already been
cancelled due to the full payment of the obligation. They
noticed that the Banco Filipino loan had been effected
through an SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena.
They found on TCT No. 63377 the annotation of an existing
mortgage in favor of the Los Baos Rural Bank, also effected
through an SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena,
coupled with a copy of a court order authorizing Ma. Elena
to mortgage the lot to secure a loan of P500,000.00.
The petitioners and Atanacio next inquired about the
mortgage and the court order annotated on TCT No. 63377
at the Los Baos Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty.
Noel Zarate, the banks legal counsel, who related that the
bank had asked for the court order because the lot involved
was conjugal property.
Following their verification, the petitioners delivered
P130,000.00 as additional down payment on February 4,
1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baos Rural Bank on
February 12, 1991, which then released the owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 63377 to them.
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final
amount of P700,000.00 to Ma. Elena, who executed a deed
of absolute sale in their favor.However, Ma. Elena did not
turn over the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376,
claiming that said copy was in the possession of a relative
who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376 would be turned
over after a week. On March 19, 1991, TCT No. 63377 was
cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the
petitioners.
Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owners copy of
TCT No. 63376 as promised. In due time, the petitioners
learned that the duplicate owners copy of TCT No. 63376
had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan,
who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother
Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots.
At Atanacios instance, the petitioners met on March 25,
1991 with Atty. Parulan, they were also accompanied by one
Atty. Olandesca. They recalled that Atty. Parulan smugly
demanded P800,000.00 in exchange for the duplicate
owners copy of TCT No. 63376, because Atty. Parulan
represented the current value of the property to be P1.5
million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered
P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined, giving them only
until April 5, 1991 to decide.
Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan
decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him
that they had already fully paid to Ma. Elena. Thus, on April
15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an
action praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed
of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation
of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof.In turn,
the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for
specific performance with damages against the
respondents.Both cases were consolidated for trial and
judgment in the RTC.
RTC ruled in favour of Plaintiff Parulan and declared the sale
covered by TCT 63376 and 63377 as null and void. RTC
declared that the SPA in the hands of Ma. Elena was a
forgery, based on its finding that Dionisio had been out of
the country at the time of the execution of the SPA; that
NBI Sr. Document Examiner Rhoda B. Flores had certified
that the signature appearing on the SPA purporting to be
that of Dionisio and the set of standard sample signatures of
Dionisio had not been written by one and the same
person;22 and that Record Officer III Eliseo O. Terenco and
Clerk of Court Jesus P. Maningas of the Manila RTC had
issued a certification to the effect that Atty. Alfred
Datingaling, the Notary Public who had notarized the SPA,
had not been included in the list of Notaries Public in Manila
for the year 1990-1991. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.Hence, the instant petition.
6
Princess Morado
Issues
1) Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and
Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the
sale of the conjugal property executed without the
consent of Dionisio?
Held:
The petition has no merit. We sustain the CA.
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal
properties made after the effectivity of the Family
Code
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3,
1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to
apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is
settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is
governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The power of administration does not include acts of
disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict
ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed
from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two
powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the
provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to
Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty.
Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of
the property in question, and did not include or extend to
the power to administer the property.
The petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans making of a
counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the
sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family
Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of
Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence,
ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be
ratified. The void sale was a continuing offer from the
petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of
accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by
either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last
sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the 2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights
Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of overof the properties in the conjugal partnership NO.
the other spouses consent, the transaction should be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting 3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a partnership of gains the same with the computation of net
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or profits earned in the absolute community? NO.
upon authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. RATIO:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the
promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is
QUIAO V. QUIAO
that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]
same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
FACTS:
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern
the property relations between husband and wife.
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses
decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the
marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all
same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so
remaining properties shall be divided equally between the
far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in
and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal
children because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal
Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the
within the period 270 days later or after more than nine
Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal
months from the promulgation of the Decision, the
partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,
and wife.
asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.
While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes
lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is
the remainder of the properties of the parties after
founded in law and jurisprudence.
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse
and the debts. It further held that after determining the
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent
the common children because the offending spouse does not
prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be
have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the
that the trial court divide the community assets between the
Family Code.
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and
evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it
the community properties of the parties. Second, when the
applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article
decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner
102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because
never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the
there is no other provision under the Family Code which
trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7)
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of
of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
legal separation.
deprived of his right to due process.
ISSUES:
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute
community, the husband and the wife become joint owners
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or
of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property
Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is
each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired
applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern.
7
Princess Morado
during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92
of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couples
properties. And when the couples marriage or community is
dissolved, that common mass is divided between the
spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the
value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable,
since it has been established that the spouses have no
separate properties, what will be divided equally between
them is simply the net profits. And since the legal
separationshare decision of Brigido states that the in the
net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still
be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of
conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil
Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the
fruits of their separate property and income from their work
or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple
has his and her own property and debts. The law does not
intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or
properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the
trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,
there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed
properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-
listed properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the
trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share
from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited
in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of
the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the
absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because
there is no separate property which may be accounted for in
the guilty partys favor.
ALAIN M. DIO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO
October 25, 2012 Leave a comment
FACTS:
January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On
May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological
incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and
support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, that the property relations of parties in a void marriage
and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
court declared their marriage void ab initio. Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should
MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be [p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties
issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., petitioner, vs. EDEN
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
VILLENA AGUILA, respondent. [G.R. No. 202370.
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
September 23, 2013.]
HELD:
Facts
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC,
Juan Salas and Eden Aguila were married in September
Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless
1985. Five months after, Aguila gave birth to their daughter,
of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
Josan Jiselle. Salas left their conjugal dwelling and since
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
then no longer communicated with Aguila or their daughter.
Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family
In 2003, Aguila filed a petition for nullity of marriage,
Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
stating that they have no conjugal properties whatsoever.
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
In 2007, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the nullity of
whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
marriage. After this declaration, Aguila filed a manifestation
respondent in the case before the Court.
stating that she discovered two properties belonging to
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
Salas. The registered owner of the Discovered properties is
elements must be present:
Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas. Rubina is Salas
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry
common-law wife. The RTC granted the petition of the said
each other;
discovered properties that are among the conjugal
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and
properties to be partitioned and distributed between Salas
wife; and
and Aguila. However, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
Intervention, claiming that the Discovered Properties are her
marriage is void
paraphernal properties. She claims that she authorized her
All these elements are present in this case and there is no
brother to purchase the same, but because he was not well-
question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
versed with legal documentation, he registered the
property relations between petitioner and respondent.
properties in the name of Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section
C. Salas.
19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are
The RTC found that Salas failed to prove his allegation that
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Aguila transferred the Waived Properties to third persons.
Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of
The RTC emphasized that it cannot go beyond the TCTs,
the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
which state that Salas is the registered owner of the
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
Discovered Properties. The RTC further held that Salas and
which should be declared void without waiting for the
Rubina were at fault for failing to correct the TCTs, if they
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
were not married as they claimed. The CA affirmed.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45
Issue: Whether Rubina owns the Discovered Properties
are governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
Held/Ratio: No
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition
On both Salas and Rubina's contention that Rubina owns the
and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
Discovered Properties, we likewise find the contention
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
to Rubina C. Salas" is the registered owner of the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally a
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was
conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to,
declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not
because there is a strong presumption that it is valid and
8
Princess Morado
regularly issued. The phrase "married to" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.
Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of
the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the
manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that
Salas supported Rubina's statement that she owns the
Discovered Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal
interest in the Discovered Properties, she has no right to
intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only
"a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody
of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court,
be allowed to intervene in the action."
In Dio v. Dio, we held that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Article 147 of the
Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of
his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation
and owned in common, without the consent of the other,
until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
of the cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this property regime, property acquired during the
marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through the couple's joint efforts and governed by the rules
on co-ownership. 29 In the present case, Salas did not rebut
this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for
nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we
held that the properties acquired during the union of the
parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be
governed by co-ownership. 30 Accordingly, the partition of
the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA
should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and
not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision
dated 16 March 2012 and the Resolution dated 28 June
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322.
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286 April
14, 2004
FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a
the properties must first be proven to have been acquired
complaint before the trial court against her husband Nicolas
Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas son with Pacita,
Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the reconveyance from
Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject properties),
claiming that such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas.
Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas,
having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful
wedlock, they begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya
resided at Mandaue City. During their marriage, they
acquired real properties and all improvements situated in
Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-
owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he
inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon
as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of
approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.
Some of the properties earn income from coconuts leased to
corporations
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family
and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein
Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then,
was the only person who received the income of the
properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in
concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no
properties of her own from which she could derive income.
From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his
illegitimate son is already the one who has been receiving
the income of his properties
Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial
court in favor of Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners appealed.
Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA
upheld trial courts decision
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired
during the marriage between Eusebia and Procopio are
conjugal
HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of
CA affirmed
RATIO: The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships
govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia
even if they were married before the effectivity of Family
Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the
Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established
before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus,
under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during
the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The
burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not
conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that
during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926.
Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died
on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on
16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot
No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of
acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were
acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all
these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat v. Wenifreda Balcom-
Tambuyat
G.R. No. 202805, 23 March 2015
Facts:
Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda
Balcom Tambuyat were married on September
16, 1965.
During their marriage, Adriano acquired several
real properties, including a 700 sq. m. parcel of
land located at Brgy. Muzon, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, which was bought on November 17,
1991. The Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano
alone as vendee.
One of the signing witnesses was petitioner
Rosario Banguis Tambuyat, who signed therein
as Rosario Tambuyat. All this time petitioner
Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco.
When TCT covering the subject property was
issued, it was made under the name of Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.
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Princess Morado
When Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998,
Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the
subject TCT. She alleged that she was the
surviving spouse of Adriano. That the TCT was
erroneously registered and made in the name of
Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E.
Banguis. That per annexed marriage contract,
Banguis was still married to Nolasco. Wenifreda
prayed that the TCT be cancelled. That a new
certificate of title be made out in Adrianos name,
with her as the spouse indicated, and that Banguis
be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT.
On her defense, Banguis claimed that she and
Adriano were married on Sept. 2, 1988, and
thereafter lived together as married couple; that
their union produced a son; and that the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the petition for
cancellation, which is merely a summary
proceeding considering that a thorough
determination will have to be made as to whether
the property is conjugal or exclusive property, and
since she and Adriano have a child whose rights
will be adversely affected by any judgment in the
case.
The RTC decided in favor of Wenifreda and directed
the RD of Meycauayan to cancel the TCT of
Banguis and in lieu thereof to issue a new
certificate of title in the name of Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Wenifreda Winnie Balcom
Tambuyat. RTC justified its decision by using Sec.
108 of PD 1529 which states: court authorization
is required for any alteration or amendment of a
certificate of title when any error, omission or
mistake was made in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate
certificate, or when there is reasonable ground for
the amendment or alteration of the title.
The CA sustained the trial courts decision, noting
that Banguis name was included in the TCT by
error or mistake. It held that the evidence
adduced proved that Wenifreda and not Banguis
is the lawful wife of Adriano; that there is a valid
and subsisting marriage between Nolasco and
Banguis, and the latter admitted to such fact
during the course of the proceedings in the trial
court; and that Banguiss opposition to Wenifredas
petition for cancellation of TCT is not real and
genuine as to place the latters title to the subject
property in doubt.
Issue: Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed by
Wenifreda be granted by the court.
Held: YES
Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for
the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title may be resorted to in seven
instances, included are (1) when any error,
omission or mistake was made in entering a
certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any
duplicate certificate and (2) when there is
reasonable ground for the amendment or
alteration of title. The present case falls under the
two instances because the RD of Bulacan
committed and error in issuing the disputed TCT, in
the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to
Rosario E. Banguis when, in truth and in fact,
respondent Wenifreda and not Banguis is
Adrianos lawful spouse. As correctly ruled by the
appellate court, the preponderance of evidence
points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate
spouse of Adriano. Thus, it cannot be said that
Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to
each other; it cannot even be said that they have a
common law relationship at all.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law
marriages. A man and woman not legally married
who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally married in common
law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it
is true that our laws do not just brush aside the
fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such
form of co ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly
providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when
referring to a spouse contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse.
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