1

SALIT v MAGTOLIS upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other

FACTS means
petitioner has already been adequately apprised of
1. Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married, but
private respondents cause of action
their union turned sour. They separated and
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is
subsequently Erwin sued for annulment on ground of
PI evident that petitioner can already prepare her
2. Petition was filed in RTC QC alleged that petitioner responsive pleading or for trial
came to realize that wife was PI to comply w essential Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order
marital obligations which incapacity existed at the the immediate resumption of the annulment
time of marriage and became manifest after; Joselita proceeding which have already been delayed for more
moved for bill of part than two years now
3. Edwin said that at the time of marriage, Joselita was
unable to understand and accept the demand made by
his profession so she complained of lack of attention
4. Joselita said it was assert of legal conclusion not
averment of ulmate facts
5. TC upholding sufficiency and asked Joseliait to file
responsive pleading
6. Joselita filed for certiorari; was referred to CA; CA
denied the petition saying that the complaint
sufficiently alleged the ultimate facts constituting
cause of action; asking more on details and particular
conduct would be information on evidentiary matters
7. Hence, this petition
ISSUE: WON the Bill of Particulars was enough?
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which
the expected evidence will support."
[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence by which these
material elements are to be established." It refers to
"the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove,
and not the evidence which will be required to prove
the existence of those facts."
A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters
which should form part of the proof of the complaint

LORENZO v NPC
FACTS
1. Lorenzo Shipping owns commercial vessel; NPC owns
power barge
2. Vessel hit and rammed power barge
3. Captain Villarias as master of vessel was then being
piloted by Captain Yape
4. Captain Villarias testified that he was always at the
side of Yape and affirmed that he heard and knew of
Yapes orders
5. During the voyage, the engine failed to timely
respond; thus he ordered dropping the anchor but the
vessel still rammed into the power barge
6. The plant manager of power barge, filed a marine
protest while Yape file marine accident report.
7. NPC filed before RTC QC a complain for damages
against petitioner alleging that it cause total blackout
in GenSan and its underlying areas and cause leakage
of waste oil to sea as well as sued for generation
losses
8. Pet filed MD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter and failure to observe
edmidistrative remedies; MD denied
9. Petitioner in its answer said that it was the captains
fault, not the companys; that the power barge was
rammed due to its improper presence and that it was
barred by laches
10.RTC ruled in favor of petitioner saying that NPC failed
to establish pets negligence; or any of its liability is
only subsidiary; NPC appealed
11.CA reversed and set aside ordering pet to pay NPC
reasoning that vessel was under compulsory pilotage
and Villarias remained the overall commander;
12.Pet filed pet for rev saying no liability could be
attributed to them
13.NPC filed its own petrev
2
14. arguing how it had supposedly proven by competent
evidence that it was entitled to actual damages in the
amount of F876,826.00.
ISSUE: WON NPC is entitled to actual damages?
HELD: No
RATIO:
It recalls these pieces of evidence:
a. Testimony of Mr. Nelson Homena, manager of
Power Barge 104 [who] testified on the damages
[sic] sustained by said barge as a result of the
ramming incident caused by the negligence of
M/V Lorcon Luzon.
b. The "Total Incidental Cost for Drydock and
Repair" prepared by the Philippine Shipyard and
Engineering Corporation ("PHILSECO") dated 14
October 1993 was presented which clearly
enumerated and itemized the actual damages
[sic] sustained by Power Barge 104 and repaired
by PHILSECO.
c. NPC Disbursement Voucher No. 093-121304 in
the amount of P6,775,839.02 covering a period
up to 14 January 1994 as proof of payment
made by [National Power Corporation] to
PHILSECO for drydocking repairs of Power Barge
104
Regarding the "Total Incidental Cost for Drydock and
Repair," which was National Power Corporation's
Exhibit "F" before the Regional Trial Court, Lorenzo
Shipping underscored that when the Regional Trial
Court ruled on National Power Corporation's Formal
Offer of Evidence, it denied the admission of Exhibit
"F" for not having been identified nor authenticated. It
emphasized that no witness came forward to attest to
its authenticity and due execution, let alone allowed
himself or herself to be cross-examined on these
points.

Regarding Nelson Homena's testimony, Lorenzo
Shipping emphasized that all he indicated was how he
and a certain Mr. Neri estimated the cost of damage to
be at about P1,000,000.00
Regarding Disbursement Voucher No. 093-121304,
Lorenzo Shipping pointed out that while this attests to
expenses paid to PHILSECO, it was silent on the exact
cost paid for the repair of Power Barge 104
It is basic that any material presented as evidence will
not be considered unless duly admitted by the court
before which it is presented. Just as basic is that a
private document offered as authentic evidence shall
not be admitted unless its due execution and
authenticity are established in the manner specified by
Rule 132
Admissibility of evidence and weight accorded to
evidence are two distinct affairs. Rule 128, Section 3 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence governs admissibility
and provides that "[e]vidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of
these rules." When evidence has "such a relation to
the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence,"79 it is said to be relevant. When
evidence is not excluded by law or by the Rules, it is
said to be competent.
The weight accorded to evidence is properly
considered only after evidence has been admitted. To
this end, courts evaluate evidence in accordance with
the rules stipulated by Rule 133 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence,80 consistent with basic precepts of
rationality and guided by judicially established
standards. It is improper to even speak of evidentiary
weight when the piece of evidence in question has not
even been admitted.
Exhibit "F" was ruled to have been inadmissible for
failing to comply with Rule 132, Section 20 thus, it
failed the standard of competency. Consistent with
3
this, reliance on National Power Corporation's Exhibit
"F" and its contents, so as to establish the extent of
National Power Corporation's pecuniary loss, is
misplaced. Not having been admitted, Exhibit "F" does
not form part of the body of evidence worthy of judicial
consideration.
As National Power Corporation cannot rely on the
"Total Incidental Cost for Drydock and Repair," it is left
to rely on the testimony of Nelson Hpmena and on NPC
Disbursement Voucher No. 093-121304.
However, as pointed out by Lorenzo Shipping, these
pieces of evidence fall short of the standard required
for proving pecuniary loss, which shall be the basis for
awarding actual damages. As regards Nelson
Homena's testimony, all he did was give an estimate
of P1,000,000.00. Certainly, a mere estimate does not
suffice as proof of actual pecuniary loss. As regards
NPC Disbursement Voucher No. 093-121304, all it
attests to is a release of funds in favor of PHILSECO in
the total amount of P6,775,839.02, covering no
specific transaction but a period extending from
January 14, 1994.

PEOPLE v SALAK
FACTS
1. Based on prosecution: NBI STF received info
from their assets that Baida ais engaged in
selling shabu in QC. A surveillance operation
was conducted. A buy bust operation was held.
The asset told the accused he has a buyer.
2. They went to Mcdonalds where the transaction
happened wherein Kawada was the buyer and
agreed to pay 60k er 100gr of shabu or 180k for
300gr.
3. They went to Litex Market and there they
exchanged the shabu and the marked money
4. Then Kawada identified himself to be an NBI
operative and arrested the accused.)
5. Accused was brought to NBI office while the
plasic sachets (3) were submitted to NBI
forensic chemistry division for chemical analysis
and a cert was issued that it was positive for
shabu
6. The defense on the other hand denied the
charges saying that they wer busy in their stall
in Manggahan market QC; accused argues that
it he was involved in a buying of VCD and when
he found out that there involves shabu, he
complained that he was put in such precarious
situation; that Kawadas group forcibly took him
and was brough to NBI
7. defense filed a motion requesting for a
quantitative or purity analysis on
the shabu specimen allegedly confiscated from
the appellant.
8. RTC granted the said motion and directed NBI
Forensic Chemist to conduct the necessary tests
9. RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of crime charged
10.CA affirmed, hence this appeal; pet contends
that NBI did not comply with the requirement
4
that a physical inventory and photograph of the
confiscated drugs be taken
ISSUE: WON there was sufficient evidence to warrant
conviction?
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
The records do not show that the NBI-STF team
complied with the aforementioned procedure.
Nevertheless, such failure is insufficient ground to
acquit appellant.
While it appears that the buy-bust team failed to
comply strictly with the procedure outlined above, the
same does not overturn the presumption of regularity
in the performance of their duty. A violation of the
regulation is a matter strictly between the
Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting
officers and is totally irrelevant to the
prosecution of the criminal case since the
commission of the crime of illegal sale of a
prohibited drug is considered consummated
once the sale or transaction is established and
the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the
arresting officers' inability to conform to the
regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.
Further, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to
be preserved, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill
will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with
Moreover, non-compliance with the said regulation is
not fatal to the prosecution as it does not render
appellant's arrest illegal or the seized items
inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of herein appellant.
 5

A thorough review of the records of this case shows In crimes involving the sale of illegal drugs, two
that despite the NBI-STF's non-compliance with said essential elements must be satisfied: (1) identities of
regulation, the integrity and evidentiary value of the the buyer, the seller, the object and the consideration,
confiscated drugs was nonetheless preserved. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
Evidence shows that the three heat-sealed plastic for it.[57] These elements were satisfactorily proven by
sachets of shabu, after being confiscated from the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through
appellant on the night of May 23, 2001, were duly testimonial, documentary and object evidence
marked by poseur-buyer Kawada as "REM-1," "REM-2" presented during the trial.
and "REM-3" using his own codename
he following day, the confiscated drugs including the
disposition form Kawada prepared, were delivered and
submitted by Agent Raoul Manguerra to the NBI
Forensic Chemistry Division
When presented during the trial, these specimens
were also positively identified by Kawada as the very
same sachets which were handed to him by the
appellant.
It is also worthy to note that appellant never alleged
that the drugs presented during the trial have been
tampered with. Neither did appellant challenge the
admissibility of the seized items when these were
formally offered as evidence
It was only during her appeal that she raised the issue
of non-compliance with the said regulation. Settled is
the rule that objections to the admissibility of evidence
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a
party desires the court to reject the evidence offered,
he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the first
time on appeal
Failure to present the buy-bust money is not
indispensable in drug cases since it is merely
corroborative evidence, and the absence thereof does
not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution
provided the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately
proven and the drug subject of the transaction is
presented before the court. Neither law nor
jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money
used in the buy-bust operation.

BAYLOSIS v PEOPLE
FACTS
1. Petitioner was charged for estafa. The witness testified
that as a warehouse operaations manager, he was
tasked to monitor and see that all rules are
implemented by petitioner supervisor.
2. Petitioner was incharge of collecting remittances from
salesmen depositing them in a bank or converting
them into money orders; pet confessed that he had
taken out money from companys collections which
resulted in a cash shortage amounting to 90k and used
it for special project for following up for land title
3. Later on it turned out that 118k was the shortage from
cash count and physical inventory sheets which the
accused acknowledged and signed, and even added
the notation that the money was used to put to special
projects
4. Demand was made but he failed to return the amount
thus resulting to preventive suspension and admin
investigation
5. He was dismissed from service based on investigation
and documentary evidence
6. TC found him guilty; MR denied
7. Notice of appeal -> MNT since accused begged to
consider the affidavit of a certain Zenaida C. Aya-ay,
the Credit and Collection Manager of PCPPI. Said
affidavit stated that the accused had a r had remaining
balance of 21k and wanted to change his plea to
guilty; denied
8. MR denied hence this petition
ISSUE: WON the MNT shall be granted?
HELD: No
RATIO:
For a newly discovered evidence to be appreciated as
a ground for granting a motion for new trial, it must
fairly be shown that (1) the evidence was discovered
after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the
6
exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(4) the evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted.
Discovery is defined as the act, process, or an instance
of gaining knowledge of or ascertaining the existence
of something previously unknown or unrecognized.
The CA, in denying petitioners motion, observed the
fact that the lone affidavit dealt with statements made
by Aya-ay, PCPPIs Credit and Collection Manager,
regarding the payments made by petitioner of the
amounts that he borrowed after the trial court
promulgated its January 10, 1992 judgment. Such
testimony, however, does not qualify as newly
discovered evidence as explained above as a ground
for a motion for new trial.
The Court, in justifying the grant of the new trial,
stated that a new trial has been described as a new
invention to temper the severity of a judgment or
prevent the failure of justice.[26] In said case, the
circumstances brought up were exceptional enough to
warrant a new trial if only to afford him an opportunity
to establish his innocence of the crime charged.[27]
Petitioner, on the other hand, brings before us the
circumstance of his payment of the misappropriated
amount after a few years from his conviction by the
trial court. Said occasion, however, does not count as
extraordinary enough to warrant the grant of said
motion. In addition, plea bargaining as a ground
already comes too late at this stage.

AMBRE v PEOPLE
FACTS
1. Ambre and 2 co-accused were charged with illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia and illegal use of
drugs.
2. AS per prosecutions version, there was a buy bust
operation pursuant to a tip from police informant that
a certain sultan and his wife Aderp were engaged in
selling of drugs in Caloocan
3. It resulted to an arrest of Aderp and Tagoranao
4. Sulatn ran away and it led to his house where
policemen found Ambre and co-accused having pot
session and was caught sniffing shabu in an aluminum
foil
5. The items were confiscated were marked and
submitted for lab examiniation and the drug tests were
positive and the items seized were with traces of
shabu
6. Accdg to defense, Ambre denied saying that they were
inside the compound to buy malong but failed; then
the policemen barged inside and arrested her and
detained in Caloocan jail and that she was brough to
PNP crime lab
7. RTC found her guilty for illegal use of drugs but
absolved in crime of illegal possession of paraphernalia
for failure to prove with particularity the drug paraph
found in her possession
8. CA denied appeal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the evidence were fruits of poisonous tree?
HELD: No.
RATIO:
Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must
be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial
warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable
7
search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the
language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and
rigid proscription. One of the recognized exception
established by jurisprudence is search incident to a
lawful arrest.
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and
his belongings. As a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, but
there can be valid warrantless arrest such as
inflagrante delicto
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that
Ambre was caught by the police officers in the act of
using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested without
a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre
sniffing suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being
held by Castro.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or
prior lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in
flagrante delicto. Thus, even granting arguendo that
the apprehending officers had no legal right to be
present in the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render
unlawful the arrest of Ambre
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was
valid, the subsequent search and seizure done on her
person was likewise lawful.
In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been
 8

compromised. Hence, even though the prosecution

failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and
photograph of the drug paraphernalia with traces of
shabu, this will not render Ambre's arrest illegal or the
items seized from her inadmissible.
 9

RAMIREZ v CA to be a party other than or different from those

FACTS involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
1. Ramirez filed before RTC QC a civil case for damages such recording is underscored by the use of the
against Garcia because the latter allegedly vexed, qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity a communication who records his private conversation
and personality," contrary to morals, good customs with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
and public policy. qualify as a violator"
2. Petitioner produced the transcript of what happened
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban
based from tape recording of confrontation
on tape recorded conversations taken without the
3. Alleging that the recording was illegal, Garcia filed a
authorization of all the parties.
criminal case
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not
4. Petitioner filed MQ alleging that the facts do n
constitute an offense; MQ granted saying that RA 4200 contemplated by the bill. It is the communication
refers to taping a communication by a person other between one person and another person not
than a participant to communication between a speaker and a public.
5. Petrev; CAitute held it constitute an offense Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial
punishable under RA 4200 to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
6. Pet filed MR; CA denied same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
ISSUE: WON the complaint sufficiently established a case for secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
RA 4200? communications by means of the devices enumerated
HELD: Yes therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a
RATIO: secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought

15 NAVARRO v PEOPLE
FACTS
1. Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Ike Lingan (reporters of
the radio station DWTI in Lucena City) together with
Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following
reports that it was showing nude dancers.
2. They ordered beer; scantily dancer appeared on stage
and performed a strip act. She removed her brassieres,
Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.
3. Floor manager and security guard asked why he took a
picture; Jalbuena replied: Wala kang pakialam,
because this is my job.
4. Security guard threatened Jalbuena that he would kill
him.
5. Jalbuena and his companions ran and went to the
police station; Navarro (police) and other policemen on
duty were having drinks in front of police station and
they even asked Jalbuena and his companion to join
them; the latter declined.
6. Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the
wall, said to him: Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo
Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba
kilala? Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm
and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena,
said, Ano, uutasin na kita?
7. Lingan intervened Navarro asking the latter not to do
it. Navarro turned to Sgt. Aonuevo and told him to
make a record of Jalbuena and Lingan.
8. Lingan and Navarro had a heated argument. Navarro
hit Lingan w a handle of his pistol above the left
eyebrow; Lingan fell on the floor with blood and
Navarro gave him a fist blow.
9. Navarro reminded Jalbuena that it was Lingan who first
started the fight; so he asked Jalbuena to sign that fact
on the blotter and made Jalbuena sign to which
Jalbuena refused, but instead wrote his name in print.
10.Lingan died. Jalbuena was able to record the exchange
between Lingan and Navarro.
11.TC ruled against the accused Navarro. CA affirmed.
10
ISSUE: WON Navarro was guilty? (or WON the tape was
admissible? Yes)
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the
conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone,
unreliable. In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has
not shown that the trial court erred in according weight
to the testimony of Jalbuena. Indeed, Jalbuenas
testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had
made.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications. Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of
a witness (1) that he personally recorded the
conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the
one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape
are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In
the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally
made the voice recording; that the tape played in
court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers
on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the
authentication of the tape presented by the
prosecution.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1)
that there was a heated exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter
of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that
some form of violence occurred involving petitioner
Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of
it.
Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the
body of Lingan, issued a medical certificate that the
cause of death was cerebral concussion and shock as
well as blow on the head.
 11

Others: mitigating circumstance of no intention to

commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation on
part of Lingan were appreciated by Court. But the
aggravating circumstance of a crime in a place where
public authorities are engaged in discharge of duties
was appreciated.

HOMAR v PEOPLE
FACTS1
1. Petitioner was charges w violation of RA 9165
2. P01 Tan as lone witness testified that their chief
ordered him and civilian agent to go to south wing of
roxas. They saw the pet jaywalking and immediately
accosted him to cross the pedestrian crossing area
3. Petitioner picked up something from ground prompting
them resulting to recovery of knife. After thorough
search, they found a shabu
4. Homer said that he was going home after selling
sunglasses and after crossing the overpass, the
policeman and civilian stopped him and frisked him
despite refusal and they poked a gun and accused him
as holdupper and forced him to go with them. They
confiscated knofe and allegedl shabu
5. He was criminally charged before MTC Paranaque for
possession of kitchen knife but was acquitt4ed
6. RTC convicted pet and said that policemen were
presumed to have performed their duties regularly in
arrest and search
7. CA affirmed explaianing when a warrantless arrest is
legal, valid, and proper. One of these is when the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in
the presence of a peace officer or a private person. In
the present case, the petitioner committed jaywalking
in the presence of PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy; hence, his
warrantless arrest for jaywalking was lawful
8. MR by pet denied. Hence this petition
9. Petitioner argues that he was not committing any
crime and in fact there was no criminal charge for
jaywalking and assuming there was a valid arrest,
lawful search is only w respect to materials that are
related to the offense, thus, shabu has nothing to do w
jaywalking
10.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid search?
12
HELD: None, there was no valid warrantless arrest preceded
by search. It was an admissible evidence.
RATIO:
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in
evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or
not the search which yielded the alleged contraband
was lawful.21 There must be a valid warrantless search
and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest, which must precede the search. For this
purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made the process
cannot be reversed.
The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of
the warrantless arrest from which the corpus delicti of
the crime - shabu- was obtained. For, without a valid
warrantless arrest, the alleged confiscation of the
shabu resulting from a warrantless search on the
petitioners body is surely a violation of his
constitutional right against unlawful search and
seizure. As a consequence, the alleged shabu shall be
inadmissible as evidence against him.
he prosecution did not proffer any other proof to
establish that the requirements for a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest were complied with. Particularly, the
prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner was
committing a crime.
Aside from this conclusion, the respondent failed to
prove that the portion of Roxas Boulevard where the
petitioner crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area.
The petitioner was also not charged of jaywalking.
These are pieces of evidence that could have
supported the conclusion that indeed the petitioner
was committing a crime of jaywalking and therefore,
the subsequent arrest and search on his person was
valid.
petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment as required by the
Rules.1wphi1 In addition, he actively participated in
 13

the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is

deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only
affects the jurisdiction of the court over his person. It is
well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless
arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.32
Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its
inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction and
justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.


People v. Rolando delos Reyes G.R. No. 174774,
August 31, 2011
Facts: Botong (Ronaldo De Los Reyes) and Macmac
(Raymundo Reyes) and Cocoy (Emmanuel De Claro) were
arrested by the police for possession of shabu in violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act. According to the police, based on their
reliable information, a sale transaction of shabu will be
conducted in the parking area of Shangri-La Hotel
Mandaluyong. Because of the said information, the police
conducted an entrapment operation. The police claimed that
while they were on the place, they saw Cocoy handed over a
transparent bag with a box in it to Botong and Macmac.
Believing that a sale of shabu was consummated, the police
arrested them. They claimed that they arrested them even
without a warrant because according to the police, the
accused were committing a crime inflagrante delicto.
Because of this, the city prosecutor filed a case for illegal
possession and sale of shabu against them.
However, Botong and Cocoy raised the defense of alibi and
excuses. Botong claimed that he was just framed up and the
evidence presented against them was just planted. He
claimed that he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in
Cainta, Rizal, and not at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong
City. Cocoy on the other hand, claimed that the police just
arrested him without any explanation why he was being
arrested. He claimed that the police was forcing him to admit
about the shabu.
After arraignment, the trial ensued. After the trial, the RTC
convicted Botong, Cocoy and Macmac. However, Cocoy filed
a MR. The RTC granted the MR and acquitted Cocoy but
Botong and Macmac were still convicted. Because of this,
Botong and Macmac filed an appeal before the CA.
On appeal, the CA sustained the conviction of Boyong and
Macmac. The CA ruled that the police officers' testimonies
deserve credence than Botong and Macmacs defenses of
denial and alibi, there being no evidence to rebut the
presumption that the police officers regularly performed their
official duties.
14
Aggrieved, Botong and Macmac appeal before the SC. They
argued that the charge of illegal drug deal lodged against
them by the police is a complete fabrication and frame-up.
Accused-appellants called attention to the material
inconsistencies in the prosecution's evidence. PO3 Santiago
testified during direct examination that accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes handed the "plastic bag with box inside"
to Macmac, but he admitted during cross-examination that
he did not see such transfer.
They also argued that the prosecution was unable to present
any evidence to prove the source of the plastic bag
containing the box with sachets of shabu, and the money
paid as consideration for the illegal drugs. The prosecution
likewise failed to rebut accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes' straightforward, coherent, and truthful narration,
corroborated by Marlon David, that he was illegally arrested
at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, and not at Shangri-la Plaza
in Mandaluyong City.
The prosecution maintained that Botong and Macmac were
arrested inflagrante delicto.
Issue: WON the police validly arrested the accused.
Ruling: No. At the outset, The SC observe that the
prosecutors and the RTC both displayed uncertainty as to the
facts surrounding accused-appellants' arrest on the night of
February 17, 2000.The testimonies of prosecution witnesses
(arresting officers) were unreliable and suspiciously
fabricated. A close examination of the testimonies of the
arresting officers reveal that they simply relied on the
information provided by their confidential informant that an
illegal drug deal was to take place on the night of February
17, 2000 at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City.
Without any other independent information, and by simply
seeing the suspects pass from one to another a white plastic
bag with a box or carton inside, the police team was already
able to conclude that the box contained shabu and "sensed"
that an illegal drug deal took place.

Guided by the settled rule that "where the inculpatory facts
admit of several interpretations, one consistent with
accused's innocence and another with his guilt, the evidence
thus adduced fail[ed] to meet the test of moral certainty," we
find that the findings and conclusion of the RTC in its
subsequent Order dated January 12, 2004 (in which it
acquitted Emmanuel de Claro) is more in keeping with the
evidence on record in this case.
It bears to stress that the very same evidence were
presented against Emmanuel de Claro and accused-
appellants; if the evidence is insufficient to convict the
former, then it is also insufficient to convict the latter.
Even assuming that the prosecution's version of the events
that took place on the night of February 17, 2000 were true,
it still failed to establish probable cause to justify the in
flagrante delicto arrests of Botong and Macmac and search of
their' persons, incidental to their arrests, resulting in the
seizure of the shabu in their' possession.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementary to the above provision is the exclusionary
rule enshrined in Section 3, paragraph 2 of Article III of the
Constitution, which solidifies the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:
Section 3. (1)The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
15
of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. (Emphases supplied.)
The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without
exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a
warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop
and frisk situations.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative
of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view
of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest.
Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests
of Botong and Macmac, the search of their persons incidental
to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from
their possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the
seized shabu is excluded in evidence as fruit of a poisonous
tree.
Botong and Macmac were acquitted.