Manila Prince Hotel v.

GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard
as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince
Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28
September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which
GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender
of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.

RULING:

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and
the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

A constitutional provision may be selfexecuting in one part and non-self-executing in another.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not
selfexecuting. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be selfexecuting as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another.
Imbong vs. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates
for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.

Issue : Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the
Right to health

NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the
regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law).
They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that
the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of
RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
The requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine
that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.

Reproductive Health Law; The Reproductive Health (RH) Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional
rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have
already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Supreme Court entertains no doubt
that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication.In
view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and
bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the
constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive
health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no
doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication.
More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at
issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action. The Court cannot, and
should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being
imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.

While the Supreme Court has opted not to make any determination when life begins, it finds that the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of
fertilization.The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life
of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion.
It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in
the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. x x x A reading of the RH Law would
show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to
make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is
replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should
be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a
crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the
fertilized ovum.
Villavicencio vs. Lukban

Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without
their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly
hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that
the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the
presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law
chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute
and practically admitted by the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men.

RULING:

We are clearly a government of laws. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the
prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the
contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who
compels any person to change his residence.

Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated
in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should not be a cause for
discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to
compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been
deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their
belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban et al
must be severely punished.

When one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid
excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must
order him either imprisoned or fined.

An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ -of habeas corpus, when he has
power to do so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS.The Government of

the Philippine Islands is a. government of laws. The court will assist in retaining it as a government of laws
and not of men.

No official, however high, is above the law.

Belgica vs Ochoa

Facts:

Pork Barrel refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representatives district. And has been commonly referred to as lump
sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature. Its usage would evolve in reference to certain
funds of the executive.

September 3, 2013 (Belgica et al) filed an Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the
immediate issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of preliminary injunction dated Aug 27
2013 under rule 65 of rules of court. Seeking that the annual pork barrel system and the executives lump
sum, discretionary funds such as the malampaya funds and the presidential social fund be declared
unconstitutional and null and void. And pray that the court issue a TRO against respondents to immediately
cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. They also pray that the court order the respondents to
release to the CoA and to the public the complete schedule/list of of legislators who have availed of their
PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013. The use of executives lump sum, discretionary funds,
including the proceeds from the malampaya funds and remittances from the PAGCOR.

Substantive Issue on the Presidential Pork Barrel:

WoN the 2013 PDAF article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of constitutional provisions on (non-delagability
of legislative power) (checks and balances)

Courts Ruling:

Non-delagability of Legislative Power

The court observes that the 2013 PDAF article violates the principle of non-delagability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation. That the power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1) Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Undoubtedly said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the constitution
does not allow. Keeping with the principle of non-delagability of legislative power, the court herby declares
the 2013 PDAF article as well as other forms of congressional pork barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification as unconstitutional.

Checks and Balances

Insofar as its post enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14 Article VI of the
Constitution, thus impairing public accountability the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.

Angara vs Electoral Commission

Petitioner- Jose Angara

Repondent- Electoral Commission

Facts:
1. Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua- both candidates for member of the National Assembly of Tayabas.
2. Angara- proclaimed as the new member of national assembly with Resolution No. 8 of National
Assembly that (Dec 3, 1935) was the last day of filing protest.
3. December 9, 1935- Resolution was issued by Electoral Commission that the said day (Dec 9) was the
last day of protest thus the protest of Ynsua dated December 8 complied with the last day of protest.
4. Angaras Contention- Resolution No. 8 issued by the National Assembly is valid and Dec. 3 was the
last day of filing protest, thus, the Electoral Commission cannot entertain the protest of Ynsua dated
Dec. 8.
5. Electoral Commissions Contention- EC is the SOLE instrumentality of legislative dept. for deciding
election, returns and qualifications of members of National Assembly.

Issue: (Constitutional Supremacy) WoN the SC has the authority to determine who between the said
departments (EC and NA) shall prevail between the case

Ruling:
1 In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which may determine the
proper allocation of powers.
6. SC determines the scope, nature, and extent the powers of government and when the SC mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does NOT assert any superiority over the legislative and executive
branch BUT asserts the SOLEMN and SACRED obligation assigned to it by the Consti. to determine
conflicting claims of authority between and among branches the govt.
3. EC shall prevail because of Fact No. 5.
Decision: the EC can entertain the protest of Ynsua.
ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima

Petitioner: ABAKADA Guro Partylist

Respondent: Cesar V. Purisima

FACTS:

1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335.
2. RA 9335- was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
3. The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).
4. It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status2.
5. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.

ISSUE: (SEPARATION OF POWERS) WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional

HELD:
1. No. It is unconstitutional. It constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws
nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.

2. The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the Implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,
oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation
of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest.

3. The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government.

4. CATEGORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS

1. Scrutiny
based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in con
nection withit, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either
of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation
2. Congressional Investigation- investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step
beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
3. Legislative Supervision- exercises its oversight power . Supervision connotes a continuing
and informed awareness on the part of the congressional committee regarding executive
operations in a given administrative area.
Legislative veto - statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-
turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation)
to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the
design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Co vs. HRET

FACTS:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural
born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among
the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1)
Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

Issue:

WoN Jose Ong Jr. is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

On Jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)

The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.

The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to
review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not
they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency
has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter
which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the
HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

On Citizenship
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the
case ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have
a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality
or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)

To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412
[1965])

The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents father of his citizenship after his
death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore,
to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents father as null and void would
run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest.

Petitioner: Bengzon

Respondent: Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Facts:

1. Defendants (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in
unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage
of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices,
schemes and strategems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.

2. Petitioner Bengzon and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenad by the Committee to appear before it and testify
on what they know regarding the 36 corporations belonging to Romualdez and properties acquired by the
latter.

3. Bengzon and Lopa refused, averred that their testimony would unduly prejudice the defendants and
against the Constitutional right to due process.

4. SC was in favor of the Petitioners

Issue: Justiceable or Political Question?

Ruling: Justiceable Question. ( A justiciable question is one that can be decided by courts like issues
arising out of obligations and contracts, and violations of laws, etc. The courts have jurisdiction over these
things, meaning they can hold a trial and issue judgments. )

1. The allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.

2. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.

3. Lastly, the Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation.

Taada vs. Angara, GR 118295, May 2, 1997

FACTS:

On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent
authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14,
1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II,
providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12,
Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a
bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection
of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-
reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community.
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part
of the law of the land. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in government. It
presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive
agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the
absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

Petitioner: Miriam Defensor Santiago

Respondent: Teofisto Guingona

Facts:

1. Sen. Miriam Santiago and Sen. Francisco Tatad instituted a petition for quo warranto seeking the ouster
of Sen. Teofisto Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Sen. Tatad as the Rightful
minority leader.

2. After due course, Sen. Guingona was proclaimed as the Senate minority leader.

Issue: Justiceable Question or Political Question

Ruling:

1. Justiceable Question. . ( A justiciable question is one that can be decided by courts like issues arising
out of obligations and contracts, and violations of laws, etc. The courts have jurisdiction over these things,
meaning they can hold a trial and issue judgments. )

2. Courts have no power to inquire into the internal organization and business of a house of Congress
except as the question affects the rights of third parties or a specific constitutional limitation is involved.

3. Indeed, these matters pertain to the internal government of Congress and are within its exclusive
jurisdiction.

People v Dacuycuy

Facts:
Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than
P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel
and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled
that the said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative
power.

Issue:
W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.

Held:
NOT VALID. The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if
the judicial department was a legislative dept. The exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use
legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of
existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and
non-delegability of legislative powers

Chiongbian vs Orbos

Facts
In 1968, R.A. 5435 authorized the President of the Philippines, with the help of Commission on
Reorganization, to recognize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or
controlled by it. Purpose was to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government.

The Congress passed the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (RA 6743)
pursuant to Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution. A plebiscite was called in some provinces which
resulted to 4 provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi Tawi) in favor of creating an
autonomous region and therefore became the ARMM. The RA says that those provinces and cities who did
not vote in favor of it shall remain in their existing administrative regions provided, however, that the
President may merge the existing regions through administrative determination. President Cory then issued
the EO containing the provinces/cities that will be merged, transferring provinces from their existing region
to another. The petitioners who are members of the Congress representing legislative districts protested
the Executive Order, saying that there is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces
and cities within existing regions and restructure them to new administrative regions. The transfer of one
province under its current region to another (ex: Misamis Occidental from Region X to IX) is a form of
reorganization, an alteration of the existing structures of the government. The RA 6743 only holds
authority of the president to merge existing regions and cannot be construed as reorganizing them.

Issue
W/N the power to merge administrative regions is legislative (petitioners stand) in character or
executive as the respondents contend
Petitioners: It unduly delegates power to the President to merge regions through
administrative determination or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power
delegated
Respondents: No undue delegation but only a grant of power to fill up or provide the
details of legislation because the Congress did not have the facility to provide for them

Ruling: Petition is DISMISSED.

The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant
to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power to merge the existing regions
following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the
pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972.
(RA5453)

This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of
power. Standard can be gathered or implied. Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant of
power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department:to promote
simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue its programs consisted with the
national goals for accelerated social and economic development.
GEROCHI vs DOE (Sufficiency Standard Test)
Petitioners: ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST
CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN),

Respondents: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC),

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and
PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO),

Facts:

Petitoner Gerochi questioned the constitutionality of the implementation of Universal charge in electric bill
and alleged that SEC 34 of EPIRA law or Universal charge tax which is to be collected from all end-users
and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function thus, delegation of said power
to any admin agency like ERC in unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to tax on the part of ERC?

HELD: NO.

1. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is
a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not
make the imposition a tax. In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the
EPIRA, the State's police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be
deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is
imposed and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character. The EPIRA resonates such
regulatory purposes on Sec.2.
2. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements
are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.

3. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is
complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. Although
Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a
Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all
electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal
Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law
itself.
4. As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following:
"interest of law and order;" "adequate and efficient instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and
equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy and efficiency;" "standardization
and regulation of medical education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices." Provisions of
the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality,
reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power and watershed rehabilitation and
 management meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the
ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.

Villena vs Secretary of Interior (Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency)

Petitioner: JOSE D. VILLENA

Respondent: SECRETARY OF INTERIOR

Facts:

Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an
inquiry into the conduct of the Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter was found to
have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority ad unauthorized practice of the law
profession. The respondent recommended the suspension of Villena to the President of the Philippines, in
which it was verbally granted. The Secretary then suspended Villena from office. Villena filed a petition for
preliminary injunction against the Sec. to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the
investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation.

HELD: Yes.

sThe Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena. As to
the power to order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC that Department of Interior was
given the authority to supervise bureaus and offices under its jurisdiction. This was interpreted in relation to
Section 86 of the same Code which granted the said Department of executive supervision over
administration of provinces, municipalities and other political subdivisions. This supervision covers the
power to order investigation because supervision implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in
order to render power real and effective.However, unlike this power to order investigation, the power to
suspend a mayor was not provided in any law. There was no express grant of authority to the Secretary of
Interior to suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the Administrative Code granted the provincial
governor the power of suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant precluded the Secretary of Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that the acts of the department secretaries,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the President, presumptively the acts of the President. The power to suspend may be exercised by the
President. It follows that the heads of the Department under her may also exercise the same, unless the
law required the President to act personally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of the
departments are assistants and agents of the President.