RULE 130 SECTION 42 PART OF THE RES GESTAE

People vs. Tiozon 198 S 368 (supra; confession)

People vs. Naranja 108 P 781

The accused was charged with and convicted of murder under the following information filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan:
That on or about the 28th day of December, 1956, at night, in barrio Caraol-Malimpin, municipality of Dasol, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery and
evident premeditation, with intent to kill and armed with a blunt instrument, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack, and beat to death one MAMERTO SIGNEY, alias Berto, with the use of the said blunt instrument.

The accused has appealed, contending that the alleged crime has not been established, particularly because there is no
evidence (1) as to the kind of blunt instrument that killed the deceased; (2) as to the position of the assailant when he allegedly
killed the deceased; (3) as to the possession of a blunt instrument by the accused on the night of the crime, and (4) as to the
cause of the death of the victim. The accused considers the testimony of Maria Diaz, wife of the deceased mainly relied upon by
the trial court, as weak, uncorroborated, self-serving, unnatural and not direct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
According to Maria Diaz, it appears that in the afternoon of December 28, 1956, while she was pounding rice in her yard, the
accused arrived and was thereupon told by her to stop coming to her house because her husband (the deceased) knew that she
and the accused had been carrying on illicit relations; that the accused had asked her to leave her husband and, as she refused,
he indicated that he would seek means to separate her from her husband; that before leaving in that afternoon of December 28,
1956, the accused told her to wait for him in the evening; that, when she required about this purpose, the accused answered that
he would kill his compadre (the deceased) who was then harvesting palay in the farm; that in the evening of December 28, 1956,
as the dogs were barking, her husband went out of the house and proceeded to the place where there was stocks of palay; that,
becoming impatient for her husband's return, she went to the kitchen where she saw the accused at the stairs; that the accused
confessed to her that he had killed her husband whose dead body she ought to take and bury; that cautioning her not to tip
anyone, the accused informed that her husband lay dead at the creek east of the house; that she awakened her mother and
children and told them about the occurrence; that, upon advice of her mother, she requested her neighbors, Santiago Balderas
and one surname Baraan, to help her bring her husband's body to the house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Maria Diaz displayed courage in admitting having had illicit relations with the accused and thereby dishonoring and humiliating
herself, obviously to bring out the truth and let justice prevail. Her testimony is not self-serving because she has not gained any
beneficial interest. There is no point in the allegation that she was jealous as the accused had taken for himself another woman.
The accused already had a common-law wife before the crime was committed; and if Maria Diaz was in fact jealous, she would
have wanted to eliminate the other woman, not the accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As regards the contention that the elements of the crime have not been shown, suffice it to say that the confession of the
accused to Maria Diaz is strong evidence falling under the res gestae rule.
SEC. 33, Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance may be received as a part of
the res gestae. (Rule 123, Rules of Court.)

Quoting Professor Greenleaf, Chief Justice Moran, in his Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., Vol. III, pp. 348-349,
explains the res gestae rule as follows:
There are other declarations which are admitted as original evidence, being distinguished from hearsay by their connection with
the principal fact under investigation. The affairs of men consist of a complication of circumstances so intimately interwoven as to
be hardly separable from each other. Each owes its birth to some preceding circumstances, and in its turn becomes the prolific
parent of others, and each, during the existence, has its inseparable attributes and its kindred facts, materially affecting its
character, and essential to be known for a right understanding of its nature. These surrounding circumstances, constituting parts
of the res gestae, may always be shown to the jury along with the principal fact and their admissibility is determined by the judge
according to the degree of their relation to that fact, and in the exercise of his sound discretion: it being extremely difficult, if not
impossible to bring this class of cases within the limits of a more particular description.

Maria Diaz made reference to what the accused intended to do with the deceased; and the implementation of his evil design is
borne out by the actual and physical facts of the case. The testimony of Santiago Balderas to the effect that, when Maria Diaz
came to his house for help, she told him that her husband was dead and could be found at a certain place, amply proves the fact
of the crime as confessed by the accused. The presence of the bluish black spot at the nape of the deceased, Mamerto Signey,
and the opinion of Dr. Valera that a blow delivered right on the medulla oblongata could have caused instantaneous death,
confirm the admission of the accused to Maria Diaz.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defense of alibi is miserably weak. The testimony of defense witness Bisquera is incredible. While she could recall the
events of December 28, 1956, the date of the crime, she could remember nothing about other days, not even Christmas.
Moreover it is not impossible, much les improbable, that even if the accused was with his common-law wife and others harvesting
at the ricefield of Regino Naranja, he still could have gone in the afternoon to the house of Maria Diaz and killed the latter's
husband in the evening, considering that Maria's place was only about one kilometer away.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed with costs against the accused. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary c

People vs. Palomones 336 S 80

Facts: Brothers Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones were both charged with murder. That allegedly
accused-appellants shot SPO2 ASIM MAMANSAL, in a dark place, together with his paramour, while riding home in Kidapawan,
Sultan Kudaratthat last April 27, 1997. The inflicted gunshot wounds on the vital parts of MAMANSAL'S body caused of the death
of the victim.
The prosecution witnesses presented on trial were Sonny Boy Redovan, the nephew of the victim. He testified that in that
same evening in the emergency room of Kidapawan Doctors Hospital the victim declared that his perpetrators were Juany and
Tony Palmones which were the nicknames of the two accused-appellants. Another witness presented was Police Inspector
Alexander Tagum, who came in the emergency room about and hour later also testified that he was able to ask the victim, about
the identity of his perpetrator, and that were Juany and Tony Palmones.

The conviction of the two accused-appellants was based largely on the alleged dying declaration of the victim made to the two
witnesses of the prosecution.

Hence, this appeal by the accused-appellants to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. The court a quo erred in considering the alleged dying declaration of ASIM MAMANSAL as an exception to the hearsay rule.

2. The court a quo erred in considering the alleged dying declaration of ASIM AMAMNSAL as part of the Res Gestae Rule.

Ruling:

1. On the first issue:

Yes, it was error for the court to consider Mamansal's statement as dying declaration for failure to prove that the declaration
was made under a consciousness of impending death which means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is dying or
going to die from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a complete conviction that death is at hand, or there
must be a settled hopeless expectation.

Sec. 31. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be
received in a criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of
such death.

As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) it must concern the crime and the
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder,
murder or parricide win which the decedent was the victim.

In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the declarant concerning the cause and
surrounding circumstances of his death were made under the consciousness of impending death.

2. On the second issue:

Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to those
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and
to fabricate a false statement.
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. The following factors have
generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made
spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the
place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or
absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances
of the statement itself.

Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim, we rule that these statements fail
to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of
time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the
statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these statements not at the scene of
the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital
constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation.These circumstances, taken
together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to
be admitted as part of the res gestae.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment dated 8 May 1998 of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan,
Cotabato is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar
Palmones are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are being held for some other legal grounds.

People vs. Raquel 265 S 248

The court a quo found herein accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as well as accused Amado Ponce, guilty
of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Agapito
Gambalan, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, and the amount of P1,500.00 representing the value of the
stolen revolver.[1] The Raquel brothers now plead for their absolution in this appellate review.

In an information dated August 27, 1986, the aforementioned accused were indicted for robbery with homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 16,[2] allegedly committed on July 4, 1986 in Barangay Osias of the
Municipality of Kabacan.

Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however, and before he could give
his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail.[3]

The factual antecedents of the case for the People, as borne out by the evidence of record and with page references to the
transcripts of the court hearings, are summarized by the Solicitor General in the appellees brief:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor
in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men
emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. (pp. 4-6, TSN, )
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husbands lifeless (sic) while a man took her husbands gun and
left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away. (p. 9, ibid.)
George Jovillano responded to Juliets plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and found one of the
perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victims house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. (pp.
5-7, TSN, ; pp. 8-9, TSN, )
Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station. (p. 27, ibid.)
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the
crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to find them there since appellants fled
immediately after the shooting incident. (pp. 12-14, ibid.)
Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions. (pp. 5-6, TSN, ) [4]

Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense, on the bases of facts which are presented in their brief in this
wise: Accused Valeriano Raquel testified that on , with the permission of his parents he left Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and went
to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased brother. Together with
Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3 and 4. On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police authorities
accompanied by his father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan, Cotabato. He already heard the name
of accused Amado Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of land in Paatan.
On cross-examination, he admitted that their house and that of Gambalan are located in the same Barangay. Before July 4, he
entertained no grudge against victim Agapito Gambalan. (TSN, April 2, 1991, pp. 2-20)
Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on he was at home when his son Valeriano Raquel told him that he was going to
Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the) same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his
permission to leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place of assignment at Pagadian. On , several policemen came
over to his house, looking for his two (2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even accompanied them to Tunggol where
they arrested his son Valeriano. (TSN, April 3, 1991, pp. 3-26)
T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on , he was assigned in the 2nd Infantry Battalion,
First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, . Sabas Raquel was under his division then, and was on duty on . (TSN, Nov. 6, 1992, pp.
2-20).[5]
 On , the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and sentenced them accordingly.[6]

Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they manifested that they were appealing the
decision to the Court of Appeals.[7] The lower court ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
[8] In view of the penalty imposed, the Court of Appeals properly forwarded the same to us.[9]

Before us, the defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas Raquel
and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the
crime.

We find such submission to be meritorious. A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the participation of
herein appellants in, the crime charged.

The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. Even the corroborating witness,
George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who shot Agapito Gambalan.

A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as the culprits was
based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As
earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.

The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are
repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latters extrajudicial
statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. [14] That is exactly the situation, and the
disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.

Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which implicates his co-
accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other
accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-
examination and rebuttal.[15]

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule
is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against
him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man
should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.[16]

Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions,[17] those exceptions do not however apply to the
present case.

Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking appellants
to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the
clinic of Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente,[18] was negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he
treated no person by the name of Danny Clemente.[19]

Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato
who was the chief of the intelligence and investigation section of their police station.

Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be
considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the
assistance of counsel.[21] These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.

A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt. [22] Without the positive identification of
appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights to them.[23] While admittedly the alibi of appellants may be assailable, the evidence of the prosecution is probatively low
in substance and evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its case; it
must rely on the strength of its own evidence. In fact, alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecutions evidence is weak.[24]
 It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the
accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral
certainty was neither met nor were the standards therefor fulfilled.

WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and
Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

RULE 130 SECTION 44 ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS

People vs. Bernaldez 294 S 317

This is an appeal from the decision[1] of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao, Albay, convicting accused-
appellant Rodolfo Bernaldez of rape committed against his 10-year-old niece MARIA TERESA BERNALDEZ.[2]

The complaint[3] September 1990 by Pedro B. Bernaldez, the younger brother of the appellant and father of the
victim. RODOLFO was forthwith arrested and detained in jail.

After due proceedings in the MCTC, which found a probable cause against RODOLFO, [4] the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Albay filed with the RTC of Ligao, Albay, an information[5] charging him with the crime of rape committed as
follows:
That in the morning of August 29, 1990, at Sitio Mabatia, Barangay Sugcad, Municipality of Polangui, Province of Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her 10-year old niece MARIA THERESA BERNALDEZ, to her damage and
prejudice.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2763 and raffled to Branch 14 of said court.

RODOLFO entered a plea of innocence at his arraignment.[6]

At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented as its witnesses MARIA TERESA and her father Pedro Bernaldez. Dr.
Nancy de la Paz, who examined MARIA TERESA and issued the medical certificate, failed to testify.[7] For its part, the defense
had as its witnesses RODOLFO; Delfin Paular, the overseer of the rice mill where RODOLFO allegedly worked; and Melita
Sasota, the teacher of MARIA TERESA.

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in the Brief for the Appellee as
follows:
Through complainants testimony, the prosecution was able to establish that in the morning of August 29, 1990, complainant,
then [ten] years old, was raped by accused-appellant, her uncle, being the full-blooded brother of her father, at his house in Sitio
Mabatia, Barangay Sugcad, Polangui, Albay. She narrated that she was carried by her uncle upstairs who then removed her
clothes and let her lie down on the floor. While she was lying down, her uncle opened the zipper of his pants and laid on top of
her, inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull movement while on top of her. After a while, a sticky and
warm object came out from his penis. After the rape, accused-appellant gave her P5.00 and threatened her not to tell anybody
otherwise, he would kill her parents, brothers and sisters. (TSN, March 1, 1991, pp.6-7). Complainant further claimed that
accused-appellant had been abusing her since five (5) years ago and these repeated acts were done in the same place, with
accused-appellant always warning and threatening her not to tell anybody. (TSN, supra, pp.10-12).
On [August] 30, 1990, or the very next day after the last rape incident, complainant was sent by her father to go to accused-
appellants house in order to borrow P10.00 from him. However, complainant refused to go prompting her father to beat her. It
was only then that she revealed to her father the cause of her reluctance and narrated to him the repeated rape and assaults of
her uncle. Immediately after learning of the rape, her parents brought complainant to the Polangui Police Station to report the
incident and file the complaint (TSN, supra p. 7). Complainant then executed a Sworn Statement before the police investigator
(Exhs. A, A-1 and A-2). Afterwards, she was brought for treatment to Pio Duran Memorial District Hospital, a government hospital
where she was examined by Dr. Maria Nancy de la Paz who issued a Medical Certificate dated September 3, 1990 (Exh. B). She
likewise identified her Birth Certificate (Exh. C). Asked to identify her attacker, she readily identified accused-appellant in open
court (TSN, supra, pp. 8-9).
Pedro Bernaldez, father of the complainant, testified that he is the younger brother of accused-appellant who lives in a separate
house about two (2) medium hills away. He confirmed that he only discovered the rape on his daughter when she revealed to him
the reason for he reluctance or fear in going to her uncles (accused-appellants) place when he sent her to borrow P10.00 from
him on [August] 30, 1990. He likewise confirmed that the victim told him of the repeated rapes by her uncle since five (5) years
ago, the last time being that done on [August] 29, 1990. These, his daughter revealed after he hit her with his belt several times
for refusing to go as instructed. Fearing that something wrong would result if he directly confronted his brother, he decided to
report the matter to the police authorities instead, which he immediately did. He also executed a Sworn Statement before the
Polangui Police Station police investigator on September 2, 1990 (Exh. E). He further stressed that he had a good relationship
with his brother and had no quarrel with him. (TSN, supra, pp. 17-21.).[8]

RODOLFO had alibi for his defense. According to him he could not have committed the crime charged because from 6:00
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. of 29 August 1990, when the rape was allegedly committed, he was working as a mechanic/mill operator in the
rice mill of William Cu, located 2 to 3 kilometers from his house.[9] He was charged with rape because in the evening of 28
August 1990, he saw one Rodolfo wearing only briefs near the door of the house of his brother Pedro. Half a meter away from
that man was Pedros wife (MARIA TERESAs mother), who was then lying down on the floor wearing a sando and a skirt. The
next day, Pedro had a drinking spree with this Rodolfo; when he was already drunk, he filed the case against herein accused-
appellant RODOLFO.[10]

Delfin Paular, the overseer at the rice mill where RODOLFO was allegedly working, testified that RODOLFO arrived at the
rice mill at around 6:00 a.m. of 29 August 1990, and stayed there until 6:00 p.m. because nobody was available to relieve him.
[11]

Melita Sasota, MARIA TERESAs teacher at North Central School, Polangui, Albay, testified that MARIA TERESA was
present in her class on 29 August 1990 because her record of attendance was clean and not marked absent. MARIA
TERESA must have been already in school at around 6:30 a.m. and was inside the classroom when the bell rang at 7:15 a.m.
However, Melita could not remember what time MARIA TERESA left school after the morning session and to where the latter
went, although she saw the latter again at the start of the afternoon session until it ended at 4:20 p.m.[12]

In its decision of 19 January 1993, the trial court found RODOLFO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him to pay MARIA TERESA P50,000 representing
moral and exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

The trial court held that the testimony of MARIA TERESA, who positively identified RODOLFO as the malefactor, was
sufficient to prove RODOLFOs guilt. RODOLFO, as an uncle, had a great influence over MARIA TERESA, who, admittedly, was
less than 12 years of age when the offense was committed; besides, there was intimidation consisting of the threat to kill her
parents and brothers and sisters. Moreover, no reason or motive existed for MARIA TERESA or her father to fabricate the
charge. Both RODOLFO and Pedro Bernaldez admitted in open court that they had no quarrel with each other, as their families
were close-knit.[13]

As to Melita Sasotas testimony that MARIA TERESA attended her class on 29 August 1990, the trial court ruled that, as
buttressed by a long line of decisions, the specific date of commission of the offense was not so material for as long as evidence
could show that accused had actually committed the offense; and that the accused could be convicted even if there was a
mistake as to the date of the commission of the offense as long as the evidence showed with sufficient clarity that a crime was
committed and the accused was responsible therefor.

Finally, the trial court gave weight to the medical certificate (Exhibit B) issued on 3 September 1990 by Dr. De la Paz, who
was a government doctor at the time. In considering the medical certificate despite the failure of Dr. De la Paz to testify thereon,
the trial court reasoned that such document, being an act done by a public officer, was presumed to be done regularly unless
proved otherwise. It concluded that the finding of [o]ld lacerations at 3:00 and 9 oclock and newly-healed lacerations at 11 oclock
on the hymen of MARIA TERESA proved that someone had carnal knowledge of her. Nevertheless, a medical examination was
not an indispensable requisite in the prosecution for rape.

In view of the penalty imposed, appeal from the decision should have been to this Court.[14] But RODOLFOs appeal was to
the Court of Appeals;[15] hence, the record of the case was transmitted to that court.[16] On 23 April 1993, the record of the case
was forwarded to this Court.[17]

It was only on 27 March 1996 that RODOLFOs counsel, Atty. Mario Abella Encinareal, filed the Appellants Brief. He did so
only after he had been fined twice in the amounts of P500 and P1,000, and ordered arrested and confined in the cell of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

In his Appellants Brief, RODOLFO contends that the trial court committed serious and grave error in convicting him of the
crime of multiple rape, which was not charged in the information. He also attacks the ruling of the trial court that the specific date
of commission of the offense was not so material so long as evidence could show that the accused had actually committed the
offense. According to him, while the precise time of the commission of the crime need not be alleged in the complaint or
information, nevertheless, it must be sufficiently definite and certain to give the accused an opportunity to prepare for his defense;
for unless the accused is informed of the day, or about the day, he may be, to an extent, deprived of the opportunity to defend
himself.[18]
 RODOLFO likewise argues that he could not have sexually abused MARIA TERESA on 29 August 1990 because (a) he was
at his place of work from as early as 6:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.; and (b) MARIA TERESA attended her classes the whole day of 29
August 1990, from 7:15 a.m. until the dismissal of classes in the afternoon. Moreover, MARIA TERESA imputed the crime of rape
against him just to escape from more severe beatings from her father for her refusal to obey an errand.

On the other hand, the OSG maintains that RODOLFO was convicted of rape committed on 29 August 1990, and not of
multiple rape. His conviction was supported by the straightforward and candid testimony of MARIA TERESA on the details of the
rape. The motive imputed to MARIA TERESA is flimsy, illogical, and irrational; and so is the insinuation that the case was filed
against RODOLFO to cover up the alleged infidelity of his sister-in-law (MARIA TERESAs mother).

The appeal is without merit.

RODOLFO was not convicted of multiple rape, but of one rape committed on 29 August 1990, as alleged in the
information. This is very clear from the following finding of the trial court:
The prosecution, as can be observed, tried to convey to the court that the victim Maria Teresa Bernaldez ha[d] been repeatedly
abused by the accused, her uncle and brother of his father, repeatedly for the past five (5) years the latest of which was on the
faithful [sic] morning of August 29, 1990. No evidence, however, was presented by the prosecution on how and when Maria
Teresa was abused the past five (5) years except that of August 29, 1990.[19]

and the dispositive portion of the decision, which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused RODOLFO BERNALDEZ alias DOLFO, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua together with the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the aggrieved party P50,000.00 representing
moral and exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.[20]

As to RODOLFOs lament on the trial courts statement that the specific date of the commission of the offense charged in the
information is not material, it is enough to quote Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court; thus:
SEC. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. -- It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when the time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have
been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will
permit.

Indeed, we have ruled that the precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of rape.[21]

In this case, the allegation in the information of the time of the commission of the offense is specific, i.e., in the morning of 29
August 1990. RODOLFO admits its sufficiency when he states:
A careful reading of the information clearly show[s] that accused-appellant was charged of [sic] having committed the crime of
rape on August 29, 1990, a precise designation of the commission of the crime as determined by the Public Prosecutor. The plain
and clear meaning of August 29, 1990, only embraces a period of twenty four (24) hours when used with respect to time.

In fact, at no time before the trial court did the defense question the sufficiency of the information.

Even granting arguendo that the prosecution failed to prove the allegation in the information that the rape was committed in
the morning of August 29, 1990, any variance in the evidence as to the time the crime was committed is insignificant, if not,
irrelevant. Besides, the record fails to reveal that RODOLFO objected to the testimony of MARIA TERESA as to the time of the
commission of the crime. His counsel did not even object to the questions as to the number of times RODOLFO had been
abusing MARIA TERESA.[22]

It is settled that even a variance of a few months between the time set out in the indictment and that established by the
evidence during trial has been held not to constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score.
[23] The failure of the complainant to state the exact date and time of the commission of rape is a minor matter and can be
expected when the witness is recounting the details of a humiliating experience which are painful and difficult to recall in open
court and in the presence of other people.[24] Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the
crime.[25]

The ruling in U.S. v. Dichao[26] cited by RODOLFO is not applicable because the statement of the time of the commission of
the offense in the information (between October 1910 to August 1912) was indefinite and uncertain and was, therefore, held to be
fatally defective because it deprived the accused of the opportunity to adequately prepare for his defense.

We now proceed to the central issue of this case: whether RODOLFO is guilty of the crime charged.
 We reiterate these guiding principles in reviewing rape cases: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[27] What is decisive in a rape charge is the complainants positive identification of
the accused as the malefactor.[28] Bare denial and alibi are insufficient to overcome the positive identification made by the
prosecution witness.[29]

In this case, MARIA TERESA, a 10-year-old Grade III pupil,[30] positively identified RODOLFO as the person who raped her
on 29 August 1990,[31] and who had been sexually abusing her many times since she was 5 years old. She testified as follows:
[PROSECUTOR BIRATA]: COURT:
Q On August 29, 1990, do you remember if you were in the house of your Uncle, Q When your uncle inserted his penis to your vagina, what happened?
Rodolfo Bernaldez? WITNESS:
[WITNESS]: A Something came out from his organ.
A Yes, sir. Q What is that something?
Q The house of your uncle, Rodolfo Bernaldez, is in Barangay Sugcad, A Something which is sticky.
Polangui, Albay, is that correct? PROSECUTOR BIRATA:
A Yes, sir. Q How many times have your uncle done this to you?
Q While you were there in the house of your uncle on August 29, 1990, what WITNESS:
did Rodolfo Bernaldez, your uncle do to you? A Many times.[32]
ATTY. ENCINAREAL: No basis, Your Honor. She affirmed the sworn statements which she gave to the police:
PROSECUTOR BIRATA: PROSECUTOR BIRATA:
Q What happened? Q Now I am going to read to you the question and answer No. 8. Kung ikaw ba
Witness: inaabuso ng iyong tiyuhin na si Rodolfo Bernaldez ano naman ang ginagawa sa
A He was removing my clothes. iyo. Answer. Ako po ay kanyang binubuhat patungo sa itaas ng kanyang bahay
Q After he removed you clothes, what happened? at doon niya ako hinuhubaran ng panti at ako kanyang ipinapahihiga sa sahig ng
A He was inserting his penis to my vagina. kanyang bahay at habang ako ay nakahiga siya naman ay binababa ang
ATTY. ENCINAREAL: Objection, Your Honor. kanyang siper ng kanyang pantalon at inilalabas ang kanyang titi at dahandahan
COURT: Continue. ito pinapasok sa akong kiki at doon ay humihindayog na pababa at paitaas ang
PROSECUTOR BIRATA: kanyang poit hanggang sa doon mayroong lumalabas na mainit na galing sa
Q In what part of the house did he actually put his penis to your vagina? kanyang titi. Do you remember having [been] asked that question and having
A Upstairs. [given] the same answer to that question?
Q When your uncle was doing that to you, were there other people? WIITNESS:
A None. A Yes, sir.[33]

During the cross-examination, MARIA TERESA asserted that the answers in her sworn statement were given by her, not by
the police investigator.[34]

Against this story of MARIA TERESA, RODOLFO had nothing but alibi. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements
of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time the
crime was committed.[35]

Initially, there is some surface appeal on the proffered alibi because according to RODOLFO and his witness Delfin Paular,
he was out of his house the whole day of 29 August 1990, from 6:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Also, Melita Sasota testified that on the
basis of her school record, MARIA TERESA was in her class the whole day of 29 August 1990.However, their testimonies have
not convincingly proved that MARIA TERESA never went to RODOLFOs house on 29 August 1990 and that it was physically
impossible for RODOLFO to have been in his house when the rape was committed.

Sasota admitted that she did not know where MARIA TERESA went after the morning session, much less after the dismissal
of her class in the afternoon.[36] Moreover, we entertain serious doubt as to the reliability of Sasotas record (Exhibit 2) and her
testimony regarding MARIA TERESAs attendance and presence in school throughout the whole day of 29 August 1990. First,
Pedro Bernaldez declared that on that day MARIA TERESA did not go to school; she was in their house when he left for work
and when he came home.[37] Second, and more significantly, for 1 March 1991, Sasotas school record of attendance did not
show that MARIA TERESA was absent or tardy on that day. Yet, on that date, MARIA TERESA was in court and testified in the
rape case.

Delfin Paulars testimony does not inspire belief either. He admitted that he did not actually keep a record of the day-to-day
list of personnel working for Mr. Cu because somebody was assigned to do it, and that he was only an overseer.[38] He also
revealed that RODOLFO was not in the list of personnel because he was only a substitute for his brother Pedro Bernaldez, who
was the one listed as employee of the rice mill.[39] Obviously, his testimony was contrived for the alibi of RODOLFO.

Moreover, RODOLFOs house was only about 2 to 3 kilometers away from his place of work and could be reached in 30
minutes by walking.[40] Thus, even if indeed he went to work on 29 August 1990, it was not physically impossible for him to have
been at his house where the rape was committed.

RODOLFOs belated theory that MARIA TERESA fabricated the charge of rape to stop her father from further beating her for
her refusal to go to RODOLFOs house to borrowmoney is incredible. For one, it was never shown that MARIA TERESA had been
known to be a liar or a disobedient child. If she refused to go to the house of RODOLFO, it must have been for a compelling
reason. Her having been raped by him was, by any measure, an overwhelming compelling reason not to go to RODOLFOs
house. For another, it is unthinkable that MARIA TERESA, a girl of tender age, inexperienced in the ways of the world, would
concoct a tale of defloration by no less than an uncle just to avoid further beatings from her father.

MARIA TERESAs statements before the police and her testimony on the rape incident contained delicate details which could
be given by her alone and could only be based on real experience rather than on imagination. Surely, from the time she first
disclosed the rape, that is, in the morning of 30 August 1990, until she gave her statements to the police on 2 September 1990
and appeared before the municipal trial court judge, she had sufficient time to reflect on the seriousness of the charge. Several
months later, she affirmed in court the same allegations of rape. We cannot discern any plausible reason for her to falsely accuse
her uncle of so grave a wrong unless it was the truth.

The prevailing rule is that the testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserves full credence. [41] Indeed, no
woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter
pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended
and punished.[42]

Curiously, the alleged ill-motive on the part of MARIA TERESA was not the motive RODOLFO disclosed in his
testimony. What he told the court was that the case was filed to stop him from revealing to the public the alleged incident showing
that MARIA TERESAs mother had an illicit affair with her neighbor, a certain Rodolfo. RODOLFO, however, abandoned this
claim, for he must have realized that it was too incredible. Pedro Bernaldez would unlikely sacrifice the honor and reputation of
his family and the future of his young daughter, and implicate his brother to whom he usually ran for economic support just to
cover up the alleged incident involving his wife. Neither would he use her daughter as an engine of malice, especially if by doing
so her daughter would be subjected to embarrassment and even life-long stigma.[43] Then, too, it is hard to believe that a rape
victim, like MARIA TERESA, and her family would publicly disclose the rape incident and thus sully their honor and reputation in
the community unless it was true.[44]

The trial court erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by Dr. De la Paz despite the failure of the latter to
testify. The certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.[45] However, since it involved an opinion of one who
must first be established as an expert witness,[46] it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it be
presented in court to show his qualifications. Here, a distinction must be made between admissibility of evidence and probative
value thereof.Nevertheless, a medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. [47] The lone testimony of the
victim is sufficient if credible.

Finally, it was unnecessary for the trial court to consider the issue of force or intimidation. Since MARIA TERESA was
undisputedly below 12 years old on 29 August 1990, when the rape was committed, then any carnal knowledge of her, even if
consented, would be rape under the third paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Said article pertinently provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two preceding
paragraphs shall be present.

Per current case law, a rape victim is entitled to an indemnity of P50,000.[48] She can also recover moral damages pursuant
to Article 2219, and exemplary damages if the commission of the crime was attended by one or more aggravating circumstances
pursuant to Article 2230, both of the Civil Code. No aggravating circumstance was proved in this case; hence, the trial courts
award of exemplary damages is incorrect. Under the circumstances in this case, we deem fit to award the complainant an
indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.

WHEREFORE, the 19 January 1993 Decision of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, in Criminal Case No.
2763 finding RODOLFO BERNALDEZ, alias Dolfo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the modification ordering him to pay the victim civil indemnity
of P50,000 and moral damages of P50,000.

People vs. Divina 221 S 209

In G.R. Nos. 93808-09, accused BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" and MECRITO BAGA y HIYOG appealed from the judgment
** rendered by the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 35 of Dumaguete City convicting both accused for murder
and frustrated murder for the death of Concepcion Baillo and the gunshot wounds sustained by Jaime Baillo.
In G.R. Nos. 94073-74, accused BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" filed a petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction for disapproving his property bond because it
consists of unregistered or untitled land.
On July 30, 1990, this Court resolved to consolidate the two abovementioned cases.
In G.R. Nos. 93808-09, the accused BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" and MECRITO BAGA y HIYOG were charged with
murder and frustrated murder in the two informations as follows.
The Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 8342 dated August 30, 1988, alleged:
"That on or about the 17th day of June, 1988, at Barangay Malungcay Daku, Municipality of Dauin, Province of Negros Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Concepcion Baillo with the use of a firearm which said accused were then armed and
provided, thereby inflicting upon the body of Concepcion Baillo a gunshot wound at her back which directly caused her death
immediately thereafter.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code." 1
The information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 8362 dated September 9, 1988, alleged:
"That in the evening of June 17, 1988, at Barangay Malungcay Daku, municipality of Dauin, Province of Negros Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident premeditation and
treachery, and with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together and acting under the same accord and purpose, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a gun, shoot one JAIME BAILLO inflicting upon the latter the
following injuries, to wit:
1. Gunshot wound of entrance 0.5-1 cm. long posterior chest 3. Retro peritoneal hematoma.
wall lower left penetrating abdominal cavity with injury to the
4. Gunshot wound of entrance 0.5 cm. left buttock upper portion.
liver left lobe thru & thru.
5. Gunshot wound of exit left inguinal area.
2. Hemoperitoneum approximately 250 cc. with metallic foreign
body at submuscular area, epigastrium. 6. Pneumonia both lower lung fields.
thus the offenders performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of MURDER, as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is, by the timely
medical assistance rendered to the victim that prevented his death.
Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code." 2
On May 18, 1990, the court a quo rendered its decision convicting both accused for murder and frustrated murder, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, accused BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" and MECRITO BAGA Y HIYOG are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder, qualified by treachery, in Criminal Case No. 8342 for the killing of Concepcion Baillo;
and for Frustrated Murder, also qualified by treachery, in Criminal Case No. 8362, for the deadly wounds inflicted on Jaime Baillo,
and the Court hereby imposes the following penalties to wit:
1. For the Murder of Concepcion Baillo in Criminal Case No. 8342, accused Belarmino Divina and co-accused Mecrito Baga are
hereby sentenced to suffer the imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused shall also jointly and solidarily indemnify the
heirs of the deceased victim the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), and to pay the costs;
2. For the Frustrated Murder of Jaime Baillo in Criminal Case No. 8362, accused Belarmino Divina and co-accused Mecrito Baga
are hereby sentenced, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, to suffer an imprisonment ranging from
EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS AND FOUR (4) MONTHS of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to pay the costs.
Also considering the fact that the two (2) accused are charged with a capital offense and taking into account their conviction
today where it can no longer be said that the evidence against them is not strong, and considering that the possibility of their
jumping bail and evading arrest is not now remote, the two accused are likewise hereby ordered to be detained at the Negros
Oriental Detention and Rehabilitation Center without prejudice to their filing an appeal, if so, unless they could put up an
additional bail bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) each.
SO ORDERED." 3
On July 16, 1990, the accused-appellants Belarmino Divina and Mecrito Baga filed an appeal with this Court which was docketed
as G.R. Nos. 93808-09.
Pursuant to the trial court's decision, accused-appellant Belarmino Divina on June 29, 1990 filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Approval Of Bail Bond before the trial court offering untitled properties as property bond. On the same date, the trial court in its
Order dated June 29, 1990, directed the said accused-appellant to put up a titled property as property bond otherwise, he may
put up a surety bond or a cash bond. 4
Accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was denied. 5
Hence, accused-appellant Belarmino Divina filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for approval of bail
bond, docketed as G.R. Nos. 94073-74.
In G.R. Nos. 93808-09, accused-appellants contend that the court a quo erred in finding that their guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt and in convicting them of the crime charged. 6
The prosecution's version, as culled by the Solicitor General, is as follows:
"In the evening of June 17, 1988 at around 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. Ambrocio Baillo, his thirteen (13) year old son Jaime
Baillo and his wife Concepcion Baillo just came from the "tabuan" (flea market) at Barangay Anhawan, Dauin, Negros Oriental
and were heading for home at Barangay Daku, Dauin, Negros Oriental (TSN, January 3, 1984, pp. 4-5; TSN, April 10, 1989, pp.
4-5). Just after crossing the Maayong-tubig river and while walking one behind the other (Ambrocio, Jaime then Concepcion)
along the trail, suddenly and without any warning, they were shot from behind (Ibid.). Concepcion, being hit and mortally
wounded, fell down and cried "agi!" (Ibid.). Jaime also fell down because he was hit at the back and at the left hip. Ambrocio was
not hurt. Upon seeing his wife and son fall, he instructed his son Jaime to hide as he was going to get a vehicle (TSN, April 10,
1989, pp. 5-7). Immediately, Ambrocio ran away and proceeded directly to their house and told his other son Rogelio to go and
see his mother and younger brother Jaime who were shot at Malungcay Daku (Ibid., p. 7). Then Ambrocio reported the incident to
the police of Dauin and to the parish priest (Father Badoy) whose truck they used to return to the place of the incident (Ibid., p. 8).
Policemen Ikoy Tubil and Dadoy Elumir rode on the truck while Ambrocio rode with June Alta Marino on the latter's motorcycle
(Ibid., p. 9).
Meantime, at the scene of the incident, Jaime, upon being instructed by his father Ambrocio, was able to crawl and hide himself
behind a hagonoy plant despite the wounds he sustained (TSN, January 3, 1989, p. 5). While hiding, two (2) men whom he
recognized as their neighbors - Belarmino Divina and Mecrito Baga (accused-appellants) approached the lifeless body of his
mother (Ibid.)
Then Belarmino Divina, with a gun, said in the dialect: "PUSIL RAY TAMBAL SA MGA TESTIGOS SA CONTRA SA MGA DIVINA"
which means "ONLY THE GUN CAN SILENCE THOSE WITNESSES AGAINST THE DIVINAS". (Ibid., p. 6). (The records show
that victim Concepcion Baillo was a witness against the Divinas in another pending case.)
Meanwhile, Rogelio Baillo, after being told by his father of the incident, immediately proceeded to Malungcay-Daku, the place of
the incident (TSN, April 10, 1989, p. 33).
Upon arrival, he was told by his brother Jaime that Belarmino Divina and Mecrito Baga had approached the dead body of their
mother Concepcion Baillo with Belarmino holding a gun (Ibid., p. 35). Rogelio saw wounds at the arms and at the back of his
mother and he was not able to talk with her anymore (Ibid., pp. 36). He also observed that Jaime sustained wounds at his left hip
and at the back (Ibid.).
Thereafter, at about 10:00 o'clock that same evening, Ambrocio Baillo arrived with the truck of Fr. Badoy accompanied by
policemen Ikoy Tubil and Dadoy Elumir and, Jun Alta Marino, a teacher in Malungcay Daku. Ambrocio noticed that his wife
Concepcion was already dead while his son Jaime was alive (Ibid., pp. 9-10). Ambrocio further observed that his wife Concepcion
sustained six (6) wounds at the back and both her arms were lacerated (Ibid.). His son Jaime also sustained gunshot wounds at
the back and at the left hip (Ibid.). They then loaded the dead body of Concepcion on the truck and brought her to their house
while Jaime was brought to the provincial hospital for treatment (Ibid.). Jaime was operated twice. As testified to by the attending
physician, Dr. Nerissa Calumpang, Jaime could have died were it not for the timely medical attention (TSN, April 11, 1989, pp. 2-
18). Jaime was discharged only after two (2) weeks of confinement after which, he temporarily lived with their relatives at
Valencia (a nearby municipality) because of fear that he might be killed by the Divinas (TSN, March 29, 1989, p. 18)." 7
Accused-appellants, Belarmino Divina and Mecrito Baga interpose the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused Belarmino Divina's defense as contained in his Brief is as follows:
"Accused Belarmino Divina has been living in his parents-in-law's house at Anhawan, Dauin, Negros Oriental, since January,
1984. (TSN, January 13, 1990, p. 2). He was the OIC Barangay Captain of Anhawan since 1986 up to May, 1988 (ibid., p. 3).
On June 17, 1988, from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m., he was plowing in his farm, after which he ate his lunch. At about 3:00 p.m. of
the same day, he went to the "tabu-an", (a flea market) about 40 meters from his in-law's house where he met Sabino Sarense,
Dedio Tubil, Porferio Tubil, Alberto Deloria and Nicolas Sarense. At about 3:30 p.m., the group, including accused Divina, played
volley-ball. The group finished playing at about 4:00 p.m. after which they ate bread. At about 5:30 p.m. accused Divina invited
the group to his in-law's house where he also lives with his family, to drink tuba. The group was joined by Tony Regalado and
Lucero Regalado, accused Divina's brothers-in-law. They drank tuba until 7:00 p.m. that night after which accused Divina with his
family, Dedio Tubil and Porferio Tubil stayed around to view the TV.
Sabino Sarense, after the group stopped drinking at 7:00 p.m., left together with his son Nicolas Sarense and Alberto Deloria.
The rest of their group, Dedio Tubil, Porferio Tubil and accused Divina with his family were watching the TV. At about 8:00 p.m.,
Dedio and Porferio Tubil also left.
Accused Divina came to know of the killing of Concepcion Baillo the following day, June 18, 1988. Since that day accused Divina
never heard of the identity of the suspect until he was arrested on July 26, 1988, as the suspect himself at about 4:00 p.m., at the
Poblacion of Dauin while waiting for transportation going to Anhawan where he lives." 8
On the other hand, Mecrito Baga's defense is as follows:
"Mecrito Baga and Douglas Divina were plowing the latter's field on June 17, 1988, starting from 7:00 o'clock in the morning until
11:00 o'clock that morning and from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon that same day. They rested for a
while in the house of Douglas Divina and at about 6:00 o'clock p.m. Mecrito Baga with his mother Nicolasa Baga joined the
Divina family in praying the Holy Rosary which prayer had been going on for the last six months. After the prayer which ended at
about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, accused Mecrito Baga and his mother joined the Divina family for supper. After supper, Mecrito
Baga joined Guillermo Divina, Douglas Divina and Restituto Delvo in drinking tuba. At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Mecrito
Baga and his mother left the residence of Douglas Divina.
Mecrito Baga learned about the killing of Concepcion Baillo and the wounding of her son the following day, June 18, 1988, but he
never heard of any suspect, not until July 25, 1988, when he was arrested by four policemen in his house." 9
This appeal hinges on the credibility of the lone eyewitness and victim Jaime Baillo.
On the question of credibility, this Court will not as a general rule disturb the findings of the trial judge unless he has plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. The reason is the
opportunity available to the trial court but not to the appellate court to observe the witnesses on the stand and to assess
their credibility not only by the nature of their testimony but also by their demeanor under questioning. 10
Accused-appellants allege that the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Jaime Baillo, is far from credible for being conflicting,
uncorroborated, unreliable and inconclusive. In support of this contention, accused-appellants point out that Jaime Baillo upon
admission in the hospital on the night of the incident allegedly told Dr. Calumpang that he (Jaime) was shot by an unknown
assailant. 11
A reading of the above-quoted testimony shows that the response of the doctor to the question: "Did he tell you who shot him?"
was "No". The phrase "by an unknown assailant" was merely volunteered by the doctor which can be taken to mean that the
assailant was unknown to her but not necessarily unknown to the victim, Jaime Baillo. The succeeding question propounded by
the defense counsel, to wit "That is very clear to you that he was shot by an unknown assailant?" calls for a statement of an
opinion and not a statement of fact.
It is the duty of the defense counsel to propound questions that will not result in two or more interpretations as what happened in
this case. The resulting inconsistencies were the product of the kind of questions propounded by defense counsel.
As to the alleged testimony of one Feliciano Parao given in another criminal case that the victim Jaime Baillo allegedly told him
that it was Guillermo Divina and Douglas Divina, brothers of Belarmino Divina, who shot him and his mother, the said testimony
cannot but be considered as hearsay for Feliciano Parao was not presented as witness during the trial of this case. His testimony
has no probative value. The trial court was correct in rejecting said statements.
The defense makes a big issue of the fact that the prosecution witnesses Ambrocio Baillo, Jaime Baillo and Rogelio Baillo
reported the identities of the accused only after one month and nine days have elapsed despite the fact that the accused's
identities were already known to them on the very night of the incident. 13
The rule is well-established that the failure to reveal or disclose at once the identity of the accused does not necessarily affect
much less impair, the credibility of the witness. 14 The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal
case and their unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is common and has been judicially
declared not to affect credibility. 15
In the case at bar, it is a fact that one of the accused, Belarmino Divina, has been the OIC Barangay Captain of Anhawan since
1986 up to May, 1988. It cannot be gainsaid that although the incident happened after his term, having held said position, he has
a strong influence in said place. It was natural for the victim to fear for his life as explained by him.
In addition thereto, the incident also resulted in the death of Concepcion Baillo, wife of Ambrocio Baillo and mother of Jaime and
Rogelio Baillo. We have held that "(a)lthough there is a natural tendency to seek the ends of justice for the treacherous killing of a
dearly departed, mourning and rites for the dead take priority as dictated by our culture. 16
Moreover, the injuries sustained by the victim Jaime Baillo, both physical and emotional, and the necessary period of
recuperation after his discharge from the hospital are enough reasons to understand the delay in the filing of the complaint.
Both accused interposed the defense of alibi and denial. It is Our view that the trial court was correct in convicting accused
Belarmino Divina on the strength of the testimony of the lone eyewitness Jaime Baillo but in the case of the accused Mecrito
Baga, We find the evidence of the prosecution not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On the issue of conspiracy, We hold that it was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Nowhere in the trial court's decision
was there any mention of any act of the accused that may be construed as an overt act in the furtherance of conspiracy. Absent
such an evidentiary basis, We cannot accept the finding of implied conspiracy. 17
We have held that:
". . ., albeit no formal agreement is necessary to prove conspiracy and the same way be inferred from the circumstances
attending the commission of the crime, yet conspiracy must be established by the same quantum of evidence as any other
ingredient of the offense. Such evidence must show intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of
the common design or purpose. The same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to establish a finding of
criminal conspiracy, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. It cannot be established by conjectures but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Since conspiracy must be proved beyond peradventure of a doubt, it follows that it cannot be appreciated
where the facts can be consistent with the non-participation of the accused in the fancied cabal." 18
In the case at bar, no conspiracy may be deduced where there is no evidence to show the participation of accused Mecrito Baga
in the shooting incident. The lone eyewitness Jaime Baillo testified that while he was hiding behind the hagonoy plants, he saw
accused Belarmino Divina holding a gun and together with Mecrito Baga, approached the lifeless body of his mother. The mere
presence of accused Mecrito Baga does not prove his participation in the killing. The mere fact of being with Divina does not of
itself establish conspiracy. 19
Having found that no conspiracy attended the commission of the crime and that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of
accused Mecrito Baga beyond reasonable doubt, We are constrained to acquit him of the crime charged.
With regards to accused Belarmino Divina, his conviction must be sustained.
The well-settled rule is that alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable but also because of its easy fabrication. We have repeatedly held that the defense of alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused by witnesses for the prosecution and that to establish it, the accused must
show that he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the
crime was committed at the time of its commission. 20
Record shows that the victim Jaime Baillo while hiding behind the hagonoy plant saw accused Belarmino Divina approach the
dead body of his mother Concepcion Baillo and uttered "PUSIL RAY TAMBAL SA MGA TESTIGOS SA CONTRA SA MGA
DIVINA" which means "ONLY THE GUN CAN SILENCE THOSE WITNESSES AGAINST THE DIVINAS."
In addition thereto, accused Belarmino Divina in his cross examination admitted that the house of his father-in-law where he was
allegedly drinking tuba with his friends is only about two and a half (2 1/2) kilometers from where the victims Concepcion Baillo
and Jaime Baillo were shot at. 21 Hence, it was not physically impossible for accused Belarmino Divina to be at the place where
the crime was committed.
Moreover, although motive is unnecessary when the assailant has been positively identified, 22 in this case, accused Belarmino
Divina has the motive to commit the crime charged because the victim Concepcion Baillo was shown to be a witness against the
former's brothers in another criminal case.
Accused Belarmino Divina argues that as stated in the police blotter, the shooting incident happened at around 7:40 o'clock in the
evening of June 17, 1988 and not 6:30 o'clock as claimed by the prosecution witnesses. It was therefore, not possible for the
victim Jaime Baillo to have seen the accused without the aid of a lighted torch.
We do not agree. A police blotter is a book which records criminal incidents reported to the police. Entries in official records, as in
this case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. 23 It is undisputed
that the alleged time of the commission of the crime, i.e., 7:40 in the evening of June 17, 1988, was supplied only by the parish
priest Fr. Badoy who was neither present when the shooting incident happened nor presented as a witness during the trial. The
information supplied is therefore hearsay and does not have any probative value.
With regards to G.R. Nos. 94073-74, We are constrained to deny accused Belarmino Divina's petition for certiorari in line with this
Court's Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 "Re: Cancellation of Bail Bond of Accused Convicted of Capital
Offense in the Regional Trial Court," pertinent provisions of which are quoted hereunder:
"The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
"Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of
right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time
of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong."
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong." (Emphasis Supplied.)
Accused Belarmino Divina was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of the crime of murder which is an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to SC Administrative Circular No. 2-92, he is no longer entitled to bail even if he appeals to Us since
his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt is strong.
We therefore find no reason to dwell on the issue raised in said petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused MECRITO BAGA of the crime of
Murder in Criminal Case No. 8342 and of Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 8362 for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The convictions of accused BELARMINO DIVINA in Criminal Cases Nos. 8342 and 8362 are
AFFIRMED with the modification that he be ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Concepcion Baillo in the amount of
P50,000.00 in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.
The petition for certiorari filed by accused BELARMINO DIVINA is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

People vs. Leones 117 S 382

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, convicting the accused-appellant, Joseph
Leones y Ducusin, of the crime of rape charged in the following information, to wit:
 The undersigned offended party after having been duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law hereby accuses
JOSEPH LEONES y DUCUSIN alias Jessie of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1973, in the Municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused Joseph Leones y Ducusin alias
Jessie, by means of violence and use of force compelled the offended party to swallow tablets and consequently
thereafter while she fell into semi-consciousness the said accused wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the complainant Irene Dulay against her will in the house of the accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence.
San Fernando, La Union, May 8,1973.
(SGD.) IRENE DULAY Offended Party
WITH MY CONFORMITY:
(SGD.) GAUDENCIO DULAY
(Father of the Offended Party)
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the cost.
The facts are narrated in the People's brief as follows:
Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the store of Mr. & Mrs. Pepito Leones at San Fernando, La
Union where she resided.
On April 22, 1973, the complainant who had headache stayed in her room. Earlier that day, the members of the
Leones family, including the accused-appellant Joseph Leones and his sister Elizabeth, had gone to nearby
beach resort for a picnic.
At about past noon the appellant and Elizabeth returned to their house. While there, the appellant and Elizabeth
entered the room where complainant was lying down and forced her to take three tablets dissolved in a spoon
which according to them were aspirin. The complainant refused to take the tablets but was forced to do so when
the appellant held her mouth while his sister pushed the medicine. Then the appellant and Elizabeth left the room
and after a while the complainant felt dizzy.
Later, the appellant returned to the complainant's room and took of her panty. Then the appellant went on top of
her. The complainant tried to push him but as she was weak and dizzy, the appellant succeeded in abusing her
(pp. 2-8,15-16, tsn, June 27, 1975).
At about 4:30 P.M. of the same date, Natividad Leones, the stepmother of the appellant, found the complainant
unconscious near her room without any panty on. She was then taken to the La Union Provincial Hospital by the
driver of the Leones family (pp. 3-5, tsn, June 10, 1976).
When admitted to the hospital at about 6:00 P.M. of the same date (April 22, 1973), the complainant was
semiconscious, incoherent and hysterical. She refused to talk and to be examined by the doctors. She was
irritated when approached by a male figure (Exhibit "B", Records, pp. 280-281). The complainant was first
attended to by Dr. Antonino Estioco who found out that she had vaginal bleeding (Exhibit "2", Records, p. 786).
The complainant was then referred to Dr. Fe Cayao who was informed by Dr. Estioco that she might have been a
victim of rape (p. 28, tsn, May 15, 1974). In the presence of the complainant's father, Dr. Cayao examined her on
April 26, 1973 after which she issued a medical certificate with the following findings:
1. Presence of erythema of the vestibular 4. Unclotted blood at the vaginal cavity;
portion of external genitalia;
5. Smear exam for sperm cell-negative;
2. Healing lacerations of the hymen at 2 o'clock
6. D'plococci-negative
and 10 o'clock;
7. Florence test-reagent not available.
3. Easily admit one finger with pain;
Because of the lack of facilities in the hospital, Dr. Cayao was not able to make any examination to determine
whether drug was given to the complainant. (pp. 23- 24, tsn, May 15, 1974. 1
The accused-appellant denied the charge imputed to him, claiming that at the time of the alleged rape between 2:00 o'clock and
3:00 o'clock p.m. on April 22, 1973, he was at the beach resort with the other members of the family, namely his sister Elizabeth,
his stepmother Natividad Leones, his younger brothers and sisters named Marivic, Theresa, Carol, Pinky and Bongbong together
with other companions, for a picnic and had lunch thereat, swimming and picture-taking.
As indicated earlier, the trial court, holding that "viewed from all legal aspects of this case, in the light of the recorded evidence, ...
is fully convinced that the crime of rape charged in the criminal complaint was committed by the accused. The evidence
presented by the prosecution is not only clear and convincing but has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt."
From this sentence, the accused appeals to Us, strongly submitting that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the crime
charged since the evidence presented against him did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
At the outset, We note a number of significant facts from the recorded evidence of the prosecution which materially and
substantially debunks and derails the theory of the Government and correspondingly impresses considerable merit to the
defense.
1. The clinical case record of Irene Dulay's admission and confinement at the Provincial Hospital of La Union, marked Exhibit "2",
contain entries which totally and completely belle the claim of the complainant that she was raped by the accused in the
afternoon of April 22, 1973.
The entry written in the above clinical record when Irene Dulay was admitted under the item "Complaints" reads: Vaginal
Bleeding, and below this entry appears the Diagnosis-Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen. Assuming that
the victim was raped between 2 and 3 o'clock p.m., April 22, 1973 (the same day she was admitted in the hospital), then the
lacerations of the hymen at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock would not have been described and indicated to be Healing in the clinical
case record. It would be described as "laceration fresh" or by similar words like "bloody or new lacerations." There is no instant
formula, technique or process known to medical science or by human experience to hasten the healing of a lacerated hymen
within three (3) hours or so after defloration.
Citing from the book, Legal Medicine by Pedro P. Solis, M.D., Ll B Medico Legal Officer, National Bureau of Investigation,
Department (now Ministry) of Justice, We have the following comment on:
Healing time of laceration of the hymen:
Superficial laceration of the hymen may heal in two or three days.
More extensive tear may require longer time, usually seven to ten days.
Complicated types and those with intervening infection may cause delay in the healing depending upon the extent of the
involvement of the surrounding tissue and the degree of infection. Complicated laceration may even require surgical intervention."
(p. 302, Emphasis supplied.)
Since there was found laceration, wide, at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock of the hymen which was then already healing on April 22,
1973, it follows reasonably that the defloration occurred several days before, which may have happened when Irene Dulay took a
week-long vacation to her hometown in Pugo, La Union (tsn, p. 10, June 27, 1975) and there is evidence that she had a suitor
named Ferdinand Sarmiento who is from nearby Agoo, La Union. And when she returned to the house of her employer in San
Fernando, La Union, she had already chest and stomach pains and a headache.
The written entries in the clinical case record, Exh. "2", showing the date of her admission in the hospital on April 22, 1973, her
complaint of vaginal bleeding and the diagnosis of "Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated, the said entries having been made in official records by a public officer of the Philippines in
the performance of his duty especially enjoined by law, which is that of a physician in a government hospital. (Rule 130, See. 38,
Rules of Court). In the case at bar, Dr. Antonino Estioco was the admitting physician but unfortunately, he was not presented as a
witness for the government.
In connection with Exhibit "2", there is one piece of damaging evidence which not only derogates the theory of the prosecution
but also cannot be explained by the government, and that is the frank testimony of Dr. Fe Cayao herself, thus:
Q The question is: did you not discover through reading the clinical history of the patient that
the woman was not complaining of alleged rape?
A It was not indicated here that she was complaining of an alleged rape.
Q There was not a single word in the clinical record of the victim that she was the victim of an
alleged rape, is that correct?
A Yes. (tsn, pp. 27-28, May 15,1974)
2. From the same clinical case record, Exhibit "2", it appears clearly that the alleged victim, Irene Dulay, was having her
menstrual period when she was supposedly raped for the Complaint indicated that she had vaginal bleeding. She herself
admitted in her testimony that on April 22, 1973, she was having her menstruation. (tsn, p. 9, June 27, 1975).
It is quite abnormal and unnatural, almost unheard of in human experience and behavior that a man would have sexual
intercourse with a woman then having her menstrual period, as was the admitted condition of the complainant when she was
allegedly abused by the accused. And because of this universal abhorrence, taboo and distaste to have sexual contact with a
menstruating female and this is so however passionate and lustful the man way be unless he is depraved or demented. We
cannot believe that the accused-appellant, a young fourth year college student of civil engineering studying in Baguio City, would
break or violate such a taboo by drugging the complainant girl with the help of her sister and afterwards have sex relations with
her in her menstrual condition.
3. When the complainant was investigated by the police, she declared in her affidavit, Exhibit "5", the following answers to these
questions: [] Thus, it would appear from the above recorded evidence that the accused Joseph Leones and his sister Elizabeth,
helped and conspired with each other in the commission of the crime of rape against the offended party, an assumption that is
hardly believable for it would lead to the absurb conclusions that Elizabeth was a principal by cooperation and that both Joseph
and Elizabeth had planned the rape for they conveniently provided themselves beforehand with the necessary drug.
It further appears in the record that the Philippine Constabulary in La Union did not believe the existence of rape when Felicidad
Boado reported the incident (tsn, p. 25, June 18, 1974), which disbelief may reasonably be attributed to the unnatural and
unusual version of the complainant that another of her own sex had conspired and confabulated in the commission of the alleged
defilement.
4. The complainant, Irene Dulay, had declared in her affidavit, Exhibit " 5 ", in answer to question No. 9 that after she had taken
the tablets that were white in color similar to aspirin tablets, she felt dizzy, then unconscious. In her testimony at the trial,
however, she testified that after she had taken the tablets, she felt dizzy and felt the removal of her panty and that when he went
on top of her, he inserted his private parts into her private parts (tsn, pp. 6-7, June 27, 1975), but on cross-exmination, she said
that she became unconscious when Joseph Leones was already on top of her (tsn, p. 22, June 27, 1975). If she became
unconscious when Leones was on top of her and yet she felt pain when he placed his private parts into hers, then this is
incredible for how could she have known what was done to her and how she felt when she was already unconscious as admitted
by her.
5. The record is replete with testimonies of the very witnesses of the prosecution itself revealing the irrational, if not immoral
behavior and conduct of the complainant which cuts deep into the morality, character and credibility of the complaining witness.
To cite a few of her immoral acts, when the police came to visit her, Irene Dulay took hold of the penis, of the policeman
(Testimony of Felicidad Boado, tsn, p. 20, June 18, 1974). Whenever she sees a man, she goes after him and takes hold of his
hand and places it in her private part (Testimony of Leonida Dulay, p. 5, tsn, Sept. 20, 1974). Sometimes she is seated,
sometimes she is standing and there are moments that she goes around and whenever she sees a man, she calls for him and
says "darling Jessie" (Cross-examination of Leonida Dulay, tsn, p. 14, Sept. 20, 1974). She even said "have sexual intercourse
with me," making particular mention of the person who wanted to do that to her as Joseph Leones (Cross-examination of Leonida
Dulay, tsn, pp. 27-28, Sept. 20, 1974). There are times when she gets a pillow and imitates the sexual act (tsn, p. 29, Sept. 20,
1974). There are moments when she takes hold of a pillow, embraces it, and makes movements imitating the sexual act (tsn,
Testimony of Leonida Dulay, p. 5, Sept. 20, 1974).
6. The circumstances of persons, time and place attendant in the commission of the crime do not build up the case for the
People. On the contrary, We find facts and circumstances which contradict and contravene the theory of the prosecution,
rendering it highly improbable and questionable. Thus, the room of the complainant where the alleged rape was committed was
at the ground floor of the house where her employer lives with his family and maintains a canteen at the premises, the room
being very near the washing place and had a door with only wooden jalousies. There were several persons present in the house
at the time of the alleged rape and they were Evelyn Estigoy, the secretary of Natividad Leones, the cook Inocencia Gangad and
her daughter, Mantes. With the presence of these persons at the premises and the complainant's room was not secluded nor
completely closed, the opportunity to commit the rape is hardly present. More than that the alleged time being between 2:00
o'clock and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and with the supposed attendance of the perpetrator's elder sister, Elizabeth the element
of secrecy had been totally ignored or disregarded which is quite unbelievable and incredible in such a crime as rape.
Indeed, rape is a most detestable crime. It should be severely and impartially punished. But a rape charge is easy to make, hard
to prove and harder to defend by the party accused, though innocent. Experience has shown that unfounded charges of rape
have frequently been preferred by women actuated of rape have frequently been preferred by women actuated by some sinister,
ulterior or undisclosed motive. Convictions for such crime should not be sustained without clear and convincing proof of guilt. On
more than one occasion, it has been pointed out that in crimes against chastity, the testimony of the injured woman should not be
received with precipitate credulity. When the conviction depends on any vital point upon her uncorroborated testimony, it should
not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion. A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in
judging matters of this kind. (Cornelio Flores, 26 Phil. 262, 268; Ignacio Landicho, 8 ACR 580; Rafael Lacson, CA 53 O.G. 1823;
Francisco Salvador, CA 52 O.G. 7290; Lago, CA 45 O.G. 1356; Barbo, 56 SCRA 459; Bay, 27 Phil. 495; Pantaleon Ramos, 35
Phil. 671; Brocal, CA 36 O.G. 857; Topacio, CA 36 O.G. 1358; Fernando Fausto, 51 Phil. 852; cited in Aquino, The Revised Penal
Code, 1977 Ed., Vol. III, pp. 1679-1680).
After carefully analyzing and weighing the evidence presented by the prosecution in the light of the legal principles above outlined
and now well-established in Our jurisprudence and guided by a little insight into human nature, We are persuaded and convinced
that the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. That moral certainty or degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (Rule 133, Section 2, Rules of Court) has not been established by the prosecution.
The constitutional mandate that the accused is presumed innocent must prevail and, therefore, the accused-appellant, Joseph
Leones, is entitled to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of conviction is hereby REVERSED and the accused Joseph
Leones y Ducusin is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

People vs. Crisostomo 160 S 47

On Christmas day, December 25, 1967, between 6:00 and 7:00 o' clock in the evening at Sto. Rosario, Hagonoy, Bulacan, while
Eugenio Crisostomo was passing near the house of Romeo Geronimo, he met the latter and invited him to have a drink in the
place of a friend. Romeo declined the offer. Suddenly Eugenio rushed towards Romeo who was then standing near a store facing
the street with his back towards Eugenio and shot him with a .22 caliber revolver at a distance of one (1) meter. The bullet
entered about two (2) inches below the axilla (armpit) and came out on the right side of the chest about one (1) inch to the
sternum. Romeo fell to the ground mortally wounded while Eugenio ran away. By-standers who were near the place such as
Delfin Lopez, Ernesto Trillana Apolonio Santos and Manuel Tamayo and others who were all friends of both the victim and
assailant came to the aid of the fallen victim and brought him to the Reyes Hospital at the Poblacion of Hagonoy where the doctor
pronounced the victim dead upon arrival. Thus, they brought the victim's body to his home.
An information for murder was filed by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan against Eugenio
Crisostomo charging him of the crime of murder as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 1967, in the municipality of Hagonoy, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Eugenio Crisostomo, armed with
a firearm and with intent to kill one Romeo Felipe Geronimo, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and shoot the said Romeo Felipe Geronimo with the firearms
he was then provided, hitting the latter on the chest, causing serious physical injuries thereon, which directly
caused the death of the said Romeo Felipe Geronimo.
After the arraignment wherein accused entered a plea of not guilty and again during the trial, the accused signified his intention to
withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of murder and to substitute it with a plea of guilty to a lesser charge of homicide and
prayed that he be allowed to prove the mitigating circumstances. The same plea was made by the accused after the prosecution
had rested its case but the fiscal did not agree. Thus the court denied the petition.
A decision was rendered on March 28, 1969 convicting the accused of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds the accused EUGENIO CRISOSTOMO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, punished under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
without any modifying circumstance and hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories of
the law: to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00); and to
pay the costs.
Not satisfied therewith the accused now interposed this appeal alleging that the trial court committed the following assigned
errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT- APPELLANT HAS ADMITTED HAVING KILLED
ROMEO GERONIMO, INSTEAD OF LIMITING ITS FINDING TO THE TRUE EXTENT OF HIS ADMISSION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT KILLED ROMEO GERONIMO, INSTEAD OF FINDING THAT NO EVIDENCE
HAD BEEN PRESENTED AS TO THE ACTUAL CAUSE OF DEATH, THERE HAVING BEEN NO AUTOPSY
PERFORMED ON THE BODY OF ROMEO GERONIMO.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT- APPELLANT HAD ACTED WITH TREACHERY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT DEFENDANT- APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DRUNKENNESS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S OFFER TO PLEAD
GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF HOMICIDE (THE TRUE CRIME COMMITTED IF ONE HAD IN FACT BEEN
COMMITTED AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CREDITING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WITH THE PRIVILEGED
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PRESENCE OF TWO ORDINARY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
Under the first assigned error appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that he admitted having killed the victim.
Testifying in his defense the appellant claims that at the time of the incident when he saw the victim he played a joke on him by
drawing his gun from his waist and pointing the same to the victim but the gun suddenly went off, its bullet hitting the victim.
Taken by surprise he fled.
No doubt from the said version of the appellant he effectively admitted having shot the victim Romeo Geronimo. In fact he fled
from the scene of the crime upon realizing the gravity of what he had committed. It is clear that it was that single shot that felled
the victim which was the immediate cause of his death.
Indeed, during the trial and as late as after the prosecution had rested its case, the appellant offered to withdraw his plea of not
guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty of the lessor offense of homicide but the prosecution refused to agree with his
proposal.
Under the second assigned error the appellant claims that as no autopsy was performed on the body of the victim the
prosecution has not established the actual cause of death of the victim. He contends that the death certificate of the victim
(Exhibit A) to which he offered no objection is admissible only to establish the fact of death not the cause of the death of the
victim. He further avers that the testimony of Dr. Juan Santos who examined the body of the victim but did not perform an
autopsy shows that he did not qualify as an expert witness; and even if he were an expert witness there was no basis for him to
render an opinion as to the cause of death of the victim. Further, appellant alleges that Dr. Santos mentioned two (2) wounds of
different sizes but otherwise with exactly identical characteristics from which the possibility may be deduced that the victim may
have been shot twice, the second time by a person other than the appellant.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
Dr. Santos, who was then the municipal health officer of Hagonoy, Bulacan, categorically testified that the cause of death of the
deceased was a through and through gunshot wound which was caused by a bullet. 1 Although he may not be an expert witness,
as a physician and health officer he is certainly qualified to give an opinion as to the cause of death of the victim. He externally
examined the body of the deceased on the same night of the incident, and found no other sign of external violence except the
shot wound. 2 Under such circumstances, one need not be an expert to render an opinion that the said gunshot wound was the
cause of death of the victim.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Dr. Santos pointed out the difference between the two (2) wounds on the body of the
victim in that the left axilla wound was only 2.5 milimeters, while the right chest wound was 8 milimeters in diameter; that the
former was round while the latter was oval; and that the former was deep while the latter was shallower He denied that the
wounds were of identical appearance. 3 Dr. Santos emphasized that the left axilla wound is the point of entry of the bullet while
the right chest wound is its point of exit and that the said wounds were caused by one bullet. The trajectory of the bullet was from
the left axilla to the right chest. 4 The speculation of the appellant that the victim may have been shot twice is thus totally without
basis.
The death certificate and the notes issued by Dr. Santos after his external examination of the body of the victim establish the
cause of death of the deceased contrary to the contention of the appellant. 5 In this jurisdiction such death certificate and notes
issued by said municipal health officer in the regular performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the cause of death of
the victim. 6
Moreover, the said death certificate is not only confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Santos and by two (2) eyewitnesses Manuel
Tamayo and Delfin Lopez who stated that they saw the appellant rush at the victim and suddenly shoot him; that the victim fell
down after he was hit; and that they brought him to the hospital but the doctor pronounced him dead on arrival. These two
witnesses are mutual friends of both the deceased and the appellant so that their testimonies are free from any suspicion of bias
or prejudice.
The appellant assails the findings of the court a quo that he acted with treachery in the commission of the offense as a third
assigned error. He contends that while it may be true that he suddenly attacked the victim, it does not appear that he had
consciously adopted the mode of attack intended to facilitate the perpetuation of the offense without risk to himself. In fact
appellant claims that he was drunk and as such he could not have reflected on the special means of the execution of the act.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, method or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. 7
The suddenness of the attack does not, of itself, suffice to support the findings of alevosia. 8 There must be evidence that the
mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself
or retaliate. 9
In the present case, the appellant admitted that he had a previous altercation with the victim wherein he was hit by the deceased
with a bottle because of certain differences they had in a billiard hall although he claimed to have resumed friendly relations with
the victim thereafter. 10 Nevertheless, at the time of the incident, the appellant went through the motion of inviting the victim to
join him in a drinking spree which the victim declined and then suddenly, without any ceremony, he shot the victim while his (the
victim's) back was turned. The appellant used a gun, a lethal weapon to insure his design to kill the victim. He fired at him at a
short distance aiming at a vital spot of his body. The victim was unarmed. From the environmental circumstances of the
case, alevosia has been fully established. 11
Under the fourth assigned error appellant alleges that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness. He asserts
that he had been drinking from one o'clock in the afternoon on that Christmas day and that he had been drunk five (5) times in his
entire life so that it is not habitual.
Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstance when the offender committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan
to commit said felony. Otherwise when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The allegation of the appellant that he was drunk when he committed the offense is self-serving and uncorroborated. Besides,
appellant admitted that at that time he was only dizzy, 12 and that he was on the way to another drinking spree. Obviously he had
not drunk enough. He remembers the details of the shooting, the time it started and ended, how much wine he imbibed and the
persons who were with him. He realized the gravity of the offense he committed so he fled and hid from the authorities. He
sought sanctuary in the chapel of Sto. Rosario, boarded a tricycle going to the poblacion and took a La Mallorca bus to Manila. All
these are acts of a man whose mental capacity has not been impaired.
As the fifth assigned error appellant argues that he should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
stating that although he hid himself from the authorities for ten (10) days, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities thereafter
upon the advice of his parents.
The requisites of voluntary surrender are: (a) that the offender had not actually been arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary. 13
The testimony of the appellant is not disputed by the prosecution that while in hiding, upon the advise of his parents, he
voluntarily surrendered on January 4, 1968, so he was detained in the municipal jail of Hagonoy. 14 The Court agrees that the
appellant is entitled to this mitigating circumstance.
However, he cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense of the charge of homicide
as invoked under the sixth assigned error. The requisites of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) that the
offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the competent
court that is to try the case; and (3) that the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution. 15
In the present case the appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide only after some evidence of the
prosecution had been presented. He reiterated his offer after the prosecution rested its case. This is certainly not mitigating. 16
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the seventh assigned error where the appellant claims that he should be entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance is consequently without merit.
The offense committed is the crime of murder as the killing was qualified by treachery. 17 Considering that the commission of the
offense is attended by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
appellant is hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as
minimum to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months, and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The indemnity for the
death of the victim is increased to P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the penalty and indemnity, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in all other
respects, with costs against accused-appellant.

Feria vs. CA 325 S 525

Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the judgment, was lost or destroyed, petitioner filed
a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding
Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement
on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due
process.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or
commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the
case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas
corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.
In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for
petitioners continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court,
the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.

Issue: WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his criminal records.

Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of
his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under
lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has
been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Petitioners claim is
anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of
a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process.Based on the records and the hearing
conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as
the legal basis for his detention.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In
other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground
for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent
effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima
facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.
When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not
subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.

RULE 130 SECTION 47 TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER

PROCEEDING

De Leon vs. People 210 S 151

This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court of Appeals in A.C.-G.R. No.
23524 entitled Flavio de Leon, et al. v. People which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XIII
convicting the petitioners of the crime of homicide and sentencing them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.
The facts as established by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
From the testimony of Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr., Medico-legal Officer of the NBI, it was established that a post-
mortem examination of the body of Benjamin Aguinaldo was conducted and pictures of the cadaver were taken
(Exhibit A, A-1 to A-5). As a result of his examination, he found on the body of the deceased nine (9) separate
and distinct gunshot wounds, seven (7) of which constituted entrance and exit wounds; and two (2) entrances
wherein at the end were bullet tracks, two (2) slugs of which were recovered and these slugs were found to be
of .45 caliber bullets (Exhibits C and C-1). (pp. 9-18, tsn, Jan. 9, 1973). Two of the gunshot wounds had
entrances at the back of the deceased. There were two (2) fatal wounds, one (1) at the lower lip which fractured
the lower jaw and one at the back of the body just below the left shoulder blade which broke a rib, perforated the
left lung and heart. The approximate distance of the assailant to the deceased was beyond twenty-four (24)
inches since the entrance (sic) of the bullets were clean cut (pp. 20-30, tsn, Jan. 30, 1973)
Mariano Mata, Jr., an NBI Agent, substantially testified that he received a sworn complaint from one Teresa
Aguinaldo in connection with the death of her husband Benjamin Aguinaldo (Exhibit D). Their office conducted an
investigation and in the course thereof, they were able to secure the sworn testimony if three (3) witnesses,
namely, Ricardo Reyes y Ancheta; Marcelino Quinto, Jr. y Taylo; and Eduardo Flores y Garcia (pp. 2-48, tsn, Jan.
11, 1973). From these sworn statements, they extracted the following:
Ricardo Reyes pointed to Flavio de Leon, Gregorio de Leon and Apolonio Santos as three (3) of the five (5) men
who had forcibly taken Benjamin Aguinaldo in the evening of March 2, 1970 and that was the last time Aguinaldo
was seen alive (Exhibit E). Reyes Identified the three (3) accused and was corroborated by Marcelino Quinto, Jr.,
who saw the three (3) accused with Aguinaldo in a jeep which was then driven by Flavio de Leon (Exhibit G). On
the other hand, Eduardo Flores testified that in the evening of March 2, 1970, while inside his house, he heard
some commotion outside but was not able to go out to inquire about it as his wife prevented him. The following
morning, however, he learned from Isidro Ramos that Benjamin Aguinaldo was manhandled by Flavio de Leon
and Gregorio de Leon and others whom he could not identify (Exh. F). A rough sketch was prepared wherein
Reyes and Quinto indicated the position of Aguinaldo who was being forcibly taken by five (5) men and the
relative position of the jeep driven by Flavio de Leon while in the vicinity of San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal. The
corresponding report on the result of the investigation and a letter for the corresponding filing of criminal charges
were sent by the NBI to the provincial Fiscal of Rizal (Exhibits H and I).
Teresita Aguinaldo, wife of the victim, Benjamin Aguinaldo, testified that on March 2,1970 her husband, Benjamin,
left their residence at Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite, driving a PUJ jeepney owned by Isidro Ramos plying the Bacoor-
Cubao route. When Benjamin Aguinaldo failed to return that night, she made inquiries the following morning as to
the whereabouts of her husband. She went to the house of Ricardo Reyes at Pulang Lupa, Las Pias,
Paraaque. She was advised to ask Isidro Ramos to accompany her to Flavio de Leon to find out where
Benjamin was taken. Isidro Ramos, however, denied knowledge about the whereabouts of Benjamin Aguinaldo.
Ramos thereafter accompanied her to see Flavio de Leon who, however, could not give any information because
he (Flavio de Leon) was allegedly playing mahjong on March 2. 1970 (pp. 3-13, tsn, Feb. 26, 1973). On the way
home, a school boy from Sto. Nio informed her that a cadaver was found on the garbage dumping area at
Wawa, Sto. Nio. She immediately proceeded to the Municipal Hall of Paraaque to verify the information. but
she will informed that the body had been transferred to Funeraria Popular. She went to said funeral parlor where
she saw the body of the man burned beyond recognition. But she recognized the cadaver as that of her husband
who has small toes on both the right and left feet which are similar to Benjamin's mother (pp. 16-18, tsn, Feb. 26,
1973).
In connection with the investigation of both Reyes and Quinto before then Assistant Fiscal Luis Victor, she was
able to secure the stenographic transcript of said preliminary investigation and that both Reyes and Quinto are
now deceased.
Aquilina Quinto testified that the last time she saw her son Marcelino Quinto, Jr., was on April 14, 1971, when he
left for work. Two (2) days thereafter, several men, some of whom were in PC uniforms, told her that her son just
died. They could not tell the cause of her son's death (pp. 209, tsn, July 3, 1973).
Anita Reyes testified that Benjamin Aguinaldo is the compadre of her late husband Ricardo, Reyes. After the
burial of Benjamin Aguinaldo, the mother of Benjamin went to their house at San Dionisio, Paraaque, to request
her husband to testify about the death of Benjamin. Her husband agreed to do so. Later, a group of men, some of
whom were in PC uniforms, attempted to take her husband Ricardo from their house, but she vehemently refused
to let go of Ricardo. The following morning, she reported the incident to Mrs. Rosalinda Aguinaldo, who
thereafter, provided them a place at 57 Araneta Avenue, Quezon City to live in. Marcelino Quinto, Jr. never
stayed at their place, but he only went there whenever an investigation was to be conducted by Fiscal Victor.
There was also another occasion when a group of men claiming to be CIS agents had a talk with her husband
Ricardo who later recounted to her that the group of men had told him to desist from testifying in favor of Mrs.
Aguinaldo. It was sometime thereafter when she was informed by the Bacoor Police that her husband was shot
and killed at Bacoor. Her husband was identified thru his drivers license (pp. 4-17, tsn, May 9, 1973). Her
husband, Ricardo, was once confined at the Bulacan Provincial Jail at Malolos for involvement in a hold-up. Her
husband's real name was Reynaldo but he was later baptized as Ricardo. (pp. 20-30, tsn, May 9, 1973)
Angeles Vicencio testified that he is the stenographer who took down the stenographic notes of the preliminary
investigation conducted before Fiscal Luis Victor under IS No. 70-1193, entitled 'Rosalinda Panganiban vs. Flavio
de Leon, et. al.' In this preliminary investigation, Ricardo Reyes and Marcelino Quinto, Jr., testified under oath
regarding the circumstances under which they saw Benjamin Aguinaldo in the company of the three (3) accused
and with two (2) other unidentified persons. These two (2) prosecution witnesses were cross-examined by
counsel for all the accused. There were six (6) sessions in this preliminary investigation, namely, on May 7, 14,
20, and June 9, 24 and July 27, 1970, the transcripts of which were secured by both complainant and
respondents (Exhibit L, L-1 to L-6; pp. 18-28, tsn, Aug. 15, 1973).
Isidro Ramos testified that he is a jeepney operator and employer of the late Benjamin Aguinaldo. He had no
knowledge about the abduction and killing of Benjamin Aguinaldo. He saw Benjamin Aguinaldo in the evening of
March 2, 1970 when the latter came to remit the day's boundary and to return the radio and jeepney. After
Benjamin left, he (Isidro, Ramos) went to sleep. He described his house and garage. The walls of his house
fronting Daanan Street consist of eight (8) layers of hollow blocks, and the front has a steel gate. On the eastern
side, is a wall consisting of eight (8) layers of hollow blocks. The fence of the garage is lower than the jeepney,
but the roof of the jeepney could be seen outside. If one is outside, however, he will not see the people inside the
jeepney as only the roof could be seen.
Rosalinda Aguinaldo testified that she is the mother of the late Benjamin Aguinaldo who was found dead in the
garbage dumping area in Wawa, Sto. Nio, Paraaque. Ricardo Reyes and his family stayed at their residence at
Araneta Avenue, Quezon City. for several months because of the threats on Reyes' life as a result of his testifying
against the accused in this case. During this period when Reyes was staying with her, there were two (2)
occasions when a group of men came to her house to inquire about the whereabouts of Reyes (pp. 1-11, tsn,
June 25, 1973).
From the transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings at the preliminary investigation (Exhibits L, L-1 to
L-6), the following facts were testified to by Ricardo Reyes, now deceased:
At about 6:30 in the afternoon of March 2, 1970, he was with Benjamin Aguinaldo, a PUJ jeep driver plying the
route at Baclaran. He had known Aguinaldo at that time for approximately seven (7) months, On that date, they
made several trips, the first was at Baclaran-Cubao route and back; the second was in Quiapo (sic) and then
back to Baclaran; the third was to Sta. Cruz; and the fourth was to Divisoria. By the time they were back at
Baclaran, it was about quarter to 10:00 P.M. At that time, Aguinaldo decided to return the jeepney to its owner,
Isidro Ramos at Sto. Nio. When they were about thirty (30) meters from the house of Ramos, Aguinaldo gave
him P0.60 to buy one-half (1/2) pack of cigarettes. He got out of the jeep and went to two (2) stores, but they
were already closed, so he walked towards the garage. When he had about twenty (20) meters away, he saw five
(5) men in a jeep approach Aguinaldo who had parked his jeep. He moved closer and sought cover on the fence
of a house just across the house of Ramos about ten (10) meters away. Four (4) men surrounded the jeepney
where Aguinaldo was and Gregorio de Leon hit Aguinaldo with the butt of a .45 caliber pistol. When Aguinaldo
protested, Gregorio hit him again. Thereafter, Isidro Ramos and his wife came out of the house and decided to
interfere but were unable to do anything. Apolonio Santos, a Barrio Policeman, boarded the jeepney and helped
push Aguinaldo out of the vehicle. Aguinaldo was dragged by Gregorio de Leon and two (2) other men towards
the other jeep where Flavio de Leon was waiting. Apolonio Santos at that time was holding a revolver. Aguinaldo
was placed in between the two (2) men at the back seat with Apolonio Santos seated beside him. Gregorio sat
beside Santos. Flavio then started the engine and passed the portion of the road he was hidden (sic) proceeding
towards the dumping area. He witnessed the incident because the fence along the side of the house of Ramos is
 made of hollow blocks about two (2) and one-half (1/2) feet high on top of it. After a few minutes he left his hiding
place and walked along Daan Ilaya going towards the main road when he heard five (5) shots in succession
coming from the direction of the dumping area. He got apprehensive, and hid himself at the compound of a
school which was about eighty (80) meters away from the dumping area. After several minutes, he walked
towards the national road where he boarded a jeepney and went home. He did not report what he saw because
of fear. The following morning, that is March 3, 1970, Teresita Aguinaldo, wife of Benjamin Aguinaldo, went to his
house accompanied by a certain Eddie to inquire about her husband. He advised Teresita to inquire from Mang
Abio (Flavio de Leon) and in the afternoon of the same day, Teresita returned to him saying that Mang Abio
denied knowing where her husband was. It was only at that moment when Teresita was told of the incident he
witnessed the night before. Flavio de Leon is the father of Gregorio de Leon.
Likewise, on the basis of the transcript presented by the prosecution, the following facts appear to have been
testified to by Marcelino Quinto, Jr., at the preliminary investigation:
Sometime on March 2, 1970, he went to Wawa to look for Efren Zamora who just won in a race bet, but was not
able to see him. That evening, he saw Mang Abio, Apolonio, Goring and Benjamin Aguinaldo on board a jeep. He
was then at that time coming out of Wawa proceeding towards Quirino Avenue. He recognized Benjamin
Aguinaldo, so he shouted "Ben". "Ben ano ang nangyayari?" Since the jeep was moving slowly, it stopped and
Goring alighted from the jeep poking towards him a .45 caliber pistol with a warning not to interfere or he might
get involved. He was unable to move until the jeep left towards the direction of the fields (bukid). Although the
jeep had its dim lights on, there was a fluorescent lamp in the street and he recognized Benjamin inside the jeep
with the accused. He did not report the incident to the police because he thought Benjamin Aguinaldo had
committed something wrong since two (2) barrio policemen were on board the jeep with Aguinaldo. At first, he did
not know the first names of Flavio, Goring and Apolonio and Saro. But in the morning of March 3, 1970, he asked
a tricycle driver who knew those persons and they were identified respectively as Flavio de Leon, Gregorio de
Leon, Apolonio Santos, while the first name of Saro could not be given. He inquired about the first names of
those people because he received information that they will liquidate all witnesses. It was only on March 4, 1970
when he learned that Benjamin Aguinaldo died. On that date when he saw the wife of Benjamin with Eddie Flores
waiting for a ride, he approached them and told them of what he saw in the evening of March 2, 1970. The two
(2) then invited him to go to the parents of Benjamin Aguinaldo at Araneta Avenue. Subsequently, on March 16,
1970, he was informed that he, together with Toring, Fabian, Ricardo Reyes and Boy Bungi and another one
were being hunted by Goring and Mang Abio. He did not know anyone of these people except Ricardo Reyes.
According to his information, Goring planned to liquidate them all. At first, he did not believe the information. But
one day he saw Goring riding a blue owner jeep with two (2) companions. A stout man alighted with a carbine,
asking for Quinto. He became frightened, so he went no Sta. Rita to hide. When he was told that the people
looking for him were gone, he proceeded to Cubao to the parents of Aguinaldo, telling them that he will testify as
a witness in this case against the accused. He did not report the incident that happened to him because the
accused were officers in the company of policemen. (Rollo, p. 20-28)
The defense's version, on the other hand, as narrated by the accused and summarized by the lower court is as follows:
Flavio de Leon, one of the accused, testified that as far as he can recall, he was at their home in the evening of
March 2, 1970 suffering pain due to stomach ulcer which had afflicted him since the Japanese occupation. He
was certain that March 2 was a Monday because at that time he was watching a TV program called "Tawag ng
Tanghalan" and after the program he went to bed and woke up in the morning about 4:00 o'clock, The following
day, Teresita Aguinaldo sought his help informing him that her husband failed to come home the night before. He
did not know this Teresita Aguinaldo or her husband Benjamin. But he assured his visitor that he will assist her
the moment his stomach pain ceased. It was only after the third (3rd) day that he was able to leave his house
when he went to see Isidro Ramos whom Teresita claimed was the owner of the jeep which her husband
Benjamin was driving. It was then then Ramos informed him that the body of Benjamin Aguinaldo lay in state at a
funeral parlor in Pasay City. He came to know of the charge against him when he received a subpoena from the
Fiscal's Office and the accusation was against him together with Gregorio de Leon (sic). Apolonio Santos and tow
(2) other unknown persons, charging them for the killing of Benjamin Aguinaldo on March 2, 1970 at Barrio Sto.
Nio, Paraaque, Rizal (sic).
He further testified that he came to know of a person called Benjamin Aguinaldo only during the preliminary
investigation conducted by Assistant Fiscal Luis Victor. However, if Benjamin Aguinaldo was a former driver of his
son, Gregorio, he would personally know Benjamin Aguinaldo. He had never left his residence in Sto. Nio,
Paraaque, to belie the testimony of the prosecution witness that he could not be found there at. He did not know
of the incident between. Gregorio de Leon and Benjamin Aguinaldo. Ricardo Reyes implicated him in the
preliminary investigation because of a grudge which he harbored regarding the refusal of Flavio to pay the
balance of an account for the recovery of Flavio's jeep. Flavio's jeep was stolen and Eduardo Flores approached
him with the information that his jeep could be recovered for P3,000.00. He agreed to his proposal only if the jeep
would be returned without being cannibalized. The initial payment of P2,000.00 was paid and the jeep was
returned by Eduardo Flores, Ricardo Reyes and one Jessie Paraaque or Marcelino Quinto. Flavio refused to
pay the balance of P1,000.00 when he fund out that some parts of his stolen jeep were replaced by old and worn
out parts. His refusal to pay the balance made Reyes angry and even threatened him. Three (3) days thereafter,
Ricardo Reyes returned not to demand for the balance but to borrow (dilihensia) some money. Reyes informed
him that the money was necessary to settle a matter in order to avoid being suspected as having caused the
death of a friend, Benjamin Aguinaldo. Flavio learned that the Benjamin referred to by Ricardo Reyes and the
Benjamin subject of the case referred to one and the same person. Flavio contends that this Ricardo Reyes was
a bad man, a holdupper and also suspected as one of those who stole his jeep. He arrived at this conclusion on
the basis of the information given by Marcelino Quinto who told him about this after Ricardo Reyes was found
missing, he had no particular person yet in mind who had a hand in the theft (sic). When Aguinaldo was found
dead, his jeep was still missing. It was Marcelino Quinto who reported to him that Jessie Paraaque, a certain
Ricardo Reyes, Benjamin Aguinaldo, Toning Paraaque and many others who took this jeep (sic). Marcelino
Quinto further told him that this Ricardo Reyes had already killed several persons. Marcelino Quinto asked for
forgiveness for having testified falsely against him in the Fiscal's Office. Quinto promised to retract his testimony
given in the Fiscal's Office, Unfortunately, before Quinto could make any retraction, he was arrested by ANCAR
and detained at Camp Crame. Subsequently, he learned that Marcelino Quinto died.
Gregorio de Leon in his defense testified that in the evening of March 2, 1970, he was taking his supper at his
house at Sto. Nio, Paraaque. He did not go out of his house since the following day was a working day. The
following morning, he reported for work. He also reported for work in the succeeding working days as shown by
his daily time record (Exhibit 16). At the time, he was working as a market laborer. He admitted however, that the
person in charge of the daily time record is the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Felimon de Leon, a cousin of his. He
never knew a person by the name of Benjamin Aguinaldo until he received a subpoena to appear at the
preliminary investigation (Exhibit 14). Prior to his receipt of the subpoena, he was never investigated by any
police agency or the NBI in connection with the death of Benjamin Aguinaldo. At the preliminary investigation, he
learned for the first time that Benjamin Aguinaldo was a driver of a jeepney owned by Isidro Ramos who is his
uncle and ninong. The wife of Isidro Ramos and his mother are sisters. The house of Isidro is located at
Danganan Street about 200 meters from his house which is inside an alley. The jeepneys of Ramos are usually
parked at night at the side of Ramos' house. There is a fence made of hollow blocks along side the alley and a
person of average height cannot see beyond this fence. He contended that Ricardo Reyes testified against him in
the preliminary investigation, because he had previously terminated the services of Reyes in driving his PUJ
jeepney as he was reliably informed that his jeepney was being used by Reyes in committing hold-ups.
Furthermore, upon inquiry with the Pasay LTC agency, he found that Ricardo Reyes did not have any license.
With respect to Marcelino Quinto, he testified that he met said person only at the preliminary investigation
conducted by Fiscal Luis Victor. When Ricardo Reyes was reported dead, Marcelino Quinto approached him one
evening at the Baclaran market to inform him that since Ricardo Reyes is already dead, he did not fear anybody
anymore. Quinto informed him that Ricardo Reyes had forced him to testify against the de Leons and it was his
suspicion that Ricardo Reyes was responsible for the death of Benjamin Aguinaldo. Quinto promised to retract
what he testified to before the Fiscal, but before he could do so, Quinto met his death.
Apolonio Santos, the third accused testified that in the evening of March 2, 1970, at past 7:00 o'clock, he and the
Barrio Captain of Sto. Nio, Gerardo Basilio were patroling around the barrio when they chanced upon a
vehicular accident. A scooter driven by Eddie Cario and a tricycle driven by Sony Ompico, collided with each
other. As barrio policeman, he was instructed by their barrio captain to look for Ompico who had left the scene of
the incident. An hour thereafter, he was able to locate Ompico and the two (2) then proceeded to the scene of the
accident to settle the matter since the parties involved came from their barrio. When the parties could not settle,
they brought the parties to the Municipal Hall of Paraaque accompanied by Pat. Prudencio de Leon whom they
met on their way to the Police Station. At about 10:00 P.M. they reached the Police Station and the accident was
recorded in the Police Blotter. Thereafter, Pat. Balagtas brought Cario to the hospital for treatment of his injuries.
At about 11:00 that evening, he and Basilio left the Police Station to continue with their patrol. At about 11:30 that
same evening, Basilio left him at the Police Outpost where he stayed up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of March
3, 1970. During this time, he did not see nor hear anything unusual that occurred. As barrio policeman, he was
only armed with a nightstick, flashlight and whistle. He never owned a gun. It was only in the evening of March 3,
that he learned about the body of a man found at the garbage dumping area at Wawa. Nobody requested him to
identify the body. Their outpost where he was, is about one (1) and one-half (1/2)kilometers away from the
dumping area. He knew Flavio and Gregorio de Leon but not too closely. He knew Isidro Ramos who is the
brother-in-law of Flavio de Leon. The house of Isidro Ramos is about fifty (50) meters away from that of Flavio de
Leon. He knew Ricardo Reyes since he transferred residence to Sto. Nio for the reason that neighbors had
reported that Ricardo Reyes is engaged in nefarious activities. He contended that Ricardo Reyes testified against
him because he had accompanied the ANCAR agents to the residence of Ricardo's mother located at Francisco
Garcia compound on two (2) instances, the first was in the evening of February 15, 1970. On this occasion, he
was then at the outpost when a car with two (2) men, a woman and a child stopped in front of him requesting that
he accompany them to the Garcia compound. He boarded the car and it was then that he was informed that the
persons therein were agents of the ANCAR and they were looking for Ricardo Reyes who was reported to be
involved in carnapping and hold-ups. The woman was reported to be the wife of Ricardo Reyes. The other
incident was about the end of February, 1970, when he received news from his barrio mates that Flavio de Leon
lost his jeep. He was, however, unable to verify this from Flavio because they seldom meet each other. (Rollo, pp.
28-33)
The lower court, relying primarily on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ricardo Reyes and Marcelino Quinto, rejected the
alibi interposed by the defense and rendered a decision finding all of the accused guilty of the crime of homicide. On appeal, the
Intermediate Appellate Court, affirmed the lower courts decision and subsequently denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the accused. Hence, the present petition.
Meanwhile, on July 2, 1968, Flavio de Leon who is one of the petitioners herein, died. Flavio's death occurring during the
pendency of his appeal, his criminal as well as civil liability are extinguished (Article 89 Revised Penal Code; Tangan v. People,
155 SCRA 435 [1987]; People v. Jose, 71 SCRA 273 [1976]). The present petition, then, involves only Gregorio de Leon and
Apolonio Santos.
The petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE ADMISSION BY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE NBI
SWORN STATEMENTS AND PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TESTIMONIES OF RICARDO REYES AND
MARCELINO QUINTO, JR.
II
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSTAINING THE ADMISSION OF
THE NBI SWORN STATEMENTS AND PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TESTIMONIES OF RICARDO REYES
AND MARCELINO QUINTO, JR., IT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT SUCH
STATEMENTS AND TESTIMONIES DESERVE TO BE GIVEN CREDENCE AND WEIGHT.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES AND CONTRADICTIONS
IN THE DECLARATIONS OF RICARDO REYES AND MARCELINO QUINTO, JR. REFER ONLY TO MINOR
AND COLLATERAL MATTERS AND IN NOT FINDING THAT, APART FROM SAID INCONSISTENCIES AND
CONTRADICTIONS BEING INDICATIVE OF WILFUL FALSEHOODS ON THEIR PART, THEIR DECLARATIONS
ARE INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE AND UNWORTHY OF CREDENCE AS WELL AS PURELY SPECULATIVE
AND CONJECTURAL.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF RICARDO REYES AND
MARCELINO QUINTO, JR. STOOD UNREBUTTED AND UNCONTRADICTED.
V
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FACT THAT RICARDO REYES WAS A HOLD-
UPPER AND A PERSON OF BAD REPUTE AND THAT MARCELINO QUINTO, JR. HAD AN UNSAVORY
REPUTATION DID NOT DETRACT FROM THE TRUTH OF THEIR TESTIMONIES.
VI
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S REJECTION OF THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANT'S ALIBI.
VII
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE DEFENDANTS HAS NOT
BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONALBE DOUBT.
VIII
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN EVERY MANNER OR RESPECT THAT, UNDER SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE, JUSTIFIES REVIEW OF ITS FINDINGS ON ISSUES OF FACT AND CREDIBILITY. (Rollo,
p. 165-166)
It is worthy of note that except for the question as to the admissibility of the sworn statements taken during the NBI investigation
which comprised the direct testimony of Reyes and Quinto during the preliminary investigation, as well as the admissibility of the
rest of the testimonies taken during the said proceeding, the issues raised are factual.
It is a well-settled rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court (Fernan v.
Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 546 [1990]; De Ocsio v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 729 [1989]), save only in certain instances,
among them:
1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; 2) when the inference made is
manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; and 3) when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts (Dichoso v.
Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 169, [1990]).
After a very thorough review of the records, we find that no circumstance exists to warrant a deviation from the general rule
enunciated above as to the conclusiveness of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioners admit that the contradictory and inconsistent statements attributed to Reyes and Quinto have no direct bearing on
the commission of the crime. They argue, however, that the manner by and the occasion in which the contradictory statements
were uttered (Reyes' statements regarding his age, place of birth, educational attainment, relationship with the victim and
incarceration at the Bulacan provincial Jail; Quinto's statements regarding his previous criminal charges) are such that they
indicate the patent propensity on the part of these claimed eyewitnesses to wilfully falsify, prevaricate and perjure.
After' a perusal of the testimonies of Reyes and Quinto, this Court concludes otherwise. The narrations are straightforward and
consistent. Petitioners' insistence as to the improbability and incredibility of Reyes' and Quinto's testimonies in misplaced. There
is nothing incredible in Reyes' capacity to observe an incident at a distance of about ten (10) meters. There is no showing that
Reyes suffers from any infirmity that would impair his vision. Isidro Ramos' testimony as to the impossibility for any person in any
Reyes' location to witness the alleged incident due to the fence which obstructs the view could not be given much credence. In
the first place, Ramos cannot be altogether regarded as a disinterested witness inasmuch as he is the brother-in-law of Flavio de
Leon's wife. Secondly, as between the statement of Reyes on his actual experience and the answer of Ramos to a hypothetical
question, the former should definitely be given more weight inasmuch as it pertains to the specific incident in question while the
latter is a mere generalization expressed by someone who even denied his presence at the scene of the alleged incident.
The petitioners, then, question Reyes' testimony regarding the victim being whipped on the head with a pistol. They stress the
fact that in the certificate of post-mortem examination, there is no indication that the victim suffered from any wound or trauma on
the head and face area. Such discrepancy could be explained by the fact that the victims face and other parts of his body were
burned which Indicates a plan to make identification impossible. A complete examination, then, of the corpse of the victim is
extremely difficult.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that the inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations of Reyes and
Quinto refer only to minor and collateral matters that do not impair the credibility of the sworn statements and testimonies. This
Court has consistently held that minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness do not affect his credibility as they refer only
to collateral matters which do not touch upon the commission of the crime itself (People v. Arbolante, G.R. No. 96713, October
17, 1991; People v. Velasco, 175 SCRA 442 [1989]; People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483 [1986]).
The petitioner next challenge the fact that Reyes and Quinto failed to report immediately what they claimed to have witnessed.
According to the petitioners, Reyes should have called the aid of the barrio residents so that the victim could be rescued. Such
action would have been too much of a demand on the witnesses who stated that they were gripped with fear when they were
confronted with the incident. It is uncommon for a witness who is afraid for his life not to report to the police authorities what he
has witnessed. Such action should not detract from his credibility (People v. Bustarde, 182 SCRA 554 [1990]; People v.
Coronado, 145 SCRA 250 [1986]).Moreover, both witnesses explained that the group of men who accosted the victim included
barrio policemen such that they were uncertain if going to the police was advisable. Quinto even thought that Aguinaldo was
arrested so he did not find it proper to interfere. The foregoing reasons sufficiently explain Reyes' and Quinto's reaction to the
incident.
It is finally suggested by the petitioners that the testimonies of Reyes and Quinto should be totally rejected considering the
witnesses' questionable reputation and personal background as evidenced by the previous criminal charges against them. Reyes
even died in an encounter with the authorities while Quinto died in the custody of anti-carnapping (ANCAR) agents at Camp
Crame.
A witness cannot be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts; there must be a showing of previous conviction by final
judgment such that not even the existence of a pending information may be shown to impeach him (People v. Arceo, 187 SCRA
265 [1990]; citing Sec. 15 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court). In the present case, Reyes and Quinto are not shown to have been
previously convicted by final judgment. Therefore, the facts established as to their alleged illicit activities will not detract from their
competence as witnesses.
Moreover, as the Appellate Court has correctly observed:
xxx xxx xxx
In this particular case, while both Ricardo Reyes and Marcelino Quinto, Jr. may have been shown to be persons
of questionable repute and that they may have a hand in the loss of the jeep of Flavio de Leon which must have
culminated in the death of Benjamin Aguinaldo in the evening of March 2, 1970, this Court cannot close its eyes
to the principle that a person must not take the law in his hand. . . . (Rollo, p. 43)
The issue as to the admissibility of the sworn statements and testimonies of Reyes and Quinto deserves scant consideration at
this stage of the case because this Court had already put the issue to rest when it denied the petition for certiorari earlier filed by
herein petitioners questioning the decision of the Court of First Instance to admit the transcripts in question. By the express
provision of section 1 (f) Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, the testimonies given by witnesses during the preliminary investigation of
the case on trial should be admitted into evidence when such testimony was taken by question and answer in the presence of
defendant or his attorney, and there was an opportunity for the defendant to cross examine the witness "who is dead or
incapacitated to testify or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines" (People v. Villaluz, 125 SCRA 116 [l983]).
On the defense of alibi, we quote with approval the lower court's ruling adopted by the appellate court insofar as petitioners
Gregorio de Leon and Apolonio Santos are concerned, in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
 This Court finds that the evidence, for the prosecution has sufficiently established the participation of these three
(3) accused in the abduction of Benjamin Aguinaldo in the evening of March 2, 1970 and of having caused the
liquidation of said abducted person. Their claim of not knowing Benjamin Aguinaldo or of having heard of him
except during the preliminary investigation is for incredible to warrant belief. Benjamin Aguinaldo was the driver of
a PUJ jeepney owned and operated by Isidro Ramos. The De Leons are also in the transportation business while
Santos is Barrio Policeman. All these people must have known each other in the community especially those
engaged in the same business. The testamony of Ricardo Reyes and Marcelino Quinto. Jr., at the preliminary
investigation have established in ouch detail sufficient facts to link these three (3) accused, Flavio de Leon,
Gregorio de Leon and Apolonio Santos, to the death of Benjamin Aguinaldo. Although Marcelino Quinto, Jr. and
Ricardo Reyes may have been persons of unsavory reputation and had previously been implicated in robberies
and carnapping, nonetheless, there has been no showing that these two (2) witnesses had prevaricated when
they gave their version of the abduction of Benjamin Aguinaldo in the evening of March 2, 1970. These witnesses
were subjected to cross-examination by counsel for the accused in the preliminary investigation and their
testimonies linking the three (3) accused with the death of Benjamin Aguinaldo stood unrebutted and
uncontradicted. The narration given by these witnesses at the preliminary investigation was clear and devoid of
any contradictions. There is no showing that they were coached to give their separate testimonies before the
Provincial Fiscal or to give their sworn statement before the investigating officers at the NBI. Their detailed
narration of the circumstances that took place on the evening of March 2, 1970 could only come from an These
two (2) distinctly and unerringly pointed to accused Flavio de Leon, Gregorio de Lean and Apolonio Santos as
among this group of persons who were in a jeep and who took Benjamin Aguinaldo and brought him towards the
dumping area of Wawa, Paraaque, Rizal, where the body of said Benjamin Aguinaldo was finally recovered the
following morning. The alibis of these three (3) accused cannot stand in the light of this direct testimonial
evidence of the two (2) eyewitnesses. (Rollo, pp. 41-43)
Additionally, Gregorio de Leon relied solely on his uncorroborated testimony which in the light of the direct testimonies of Reyes
and Quinto can only be viewed as self-serving statements. Apolonio Santos' alibi, on the other hand, although corroborated by
the former barrio captain and a member of the traffic division of the Paraaque police force, should likewise fail. It must be noted
that the police blotter of the accident which Santos allegedly helped bring to the attention of the authorities does not bear any
indication of his participation therein. Moreover, it is not shown that it was physically impossible for him to have participated in the
crime considering that the alleged accident happened in the same small barrio. The foregoing circumstances strengthen the
conclusion that Santos' testimony cannot prevail over that of Reyes and Quinto.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that alibi is a considerably weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused (People v. Bugho, G.R. No. 91849, September 30, 1991; People v. Camarao, 188 SCRA 671 [1990];
People v. Repe, 175 SCRA 422 [1989]; People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988])
Although the positive identification made by the key witnesses is not on the actual killing of the deceased, all the circumstances
testified to are sufficient to convince this Court that the petitioners are the authors of the act charged. It is not only by direct
evidence upon which the guilt may be predicated (People v. Cagadas, 193 SCRA 216 [1991]). The accused may be convicted on
circumstantial evidence (People v. Torre, 184 SCRA 525 [1990]).
This case was assigned to the Third Division fairly recently.
At this point, this Court would like to stress that it is aware of the fact that the surviving petitioners have advanced in age, the act
complained of in the present case having been perpetrated about twenty years ago. At present, Apolonio Santos would be in his
late seventies while Gregorio de Leon would be in his late forties. Be that as it may, this Court's duty to apply the full force of the
law shall not be compromised. However, it is precisely the province of the indeterminate sentence law to give considerations to
the personal circumstances of each convict. And after are view of the sentence which the lower court has imposed, this Court is
of the considered opinion that the minimum and maximum periods imposed are still applicable. This Court expresses its
confidence that the authorities shall execute this Courts decision in a manner that shall consider the relative conditions of each
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing Premises considered, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hearby AFFIRMED with
respect to petitioners Gregorio de Leon and Apolonio Santos with the sole modification that the indemnity awarded to the
complainant should be increased to P50,000.00 consonant with recent case law.

RULE 130 SECTION 48 OPINION RULE

Lim vs. CA 214 S 273 (supra; privileged communication)

People vs. Galleno 291 S 762

Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita Obligar Garganera who had to leave the province to find work in
Manila after separating from her husband. Evelyn, together with her younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, was thus left under the
care and custody of their uncle, Emetario Obligar, and aunt, Penicola Obligar.
Less than kilometer away from their place of residence lived accused-appellant, 19-year old Joeral Galleno, known well Evelyn's
family due to his frequent visits at the Obligars' abode as he was paying court to Emetario's eldest child, Gina.
On August 16, 1994, Emetario and Penicola left their residence to work at sugarcane plantation owned by Magdalena Dasibar.
Their three children had all ealier left for school. The only persons left in the house were niece Evelyn and nephew Eleazar.
At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on his way to his Lola Esing to have his pants tailored. Since it was
drizzling, he passed by the Obligars' residence and found the two children left to themselves. The prosecution and the defense
presented conflicting versions on what occurred at said residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a
laceration in her vagina which result in profuse, and to our mind, life-threatening bleeding due to her tender age.
The prosecution's version of what took place at the Obligars' residence is based on the testimony of Evelyn herself, her uncle
Emetario, and the doctors who examined and treated her. The Solicitor General summarized the same in this wise:

2. Appellant took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting Evelyn. After lowering her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his
lap, facing him. As Evelyn was only five-years old while appellant was fully-grown man, the penetration caused the child's vagina
to bleed, making her cry in pain. (pp.10-11 and 18-25, tsn, Garganera, January 10, 1995).
3. Appellant tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the sap of "madre de cacao" leaves on her vagina.
Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left Evelyn grimacing and crying in pain. (pp. 14-15, tsn Garganera, January 10, 1995; pp. 6-7,
tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).
4. Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. The spouses were laborers in a sugarcane plantation about two
kilometers away from their house. They arrived to find Evelyn crying. Emetario noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress and
she was pressing a rug against her genital organ. (pp. 11-12, tsn, Obligar, January 10, 1995; pp. 8-9, tsn, Obligar, February 7,
1995).
5. Emeterio asked Evelyn what happened but she did not answer. Emetario spread the child's legs and saw that her vagina had
been lacerated and blood was oozing therefrom. He summoned a "quack" doctor who applied herbal medicine on Evelyns's
vagina but did not stop the bleeding. (pp.12-14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
6. The following day, August 17, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the clinic of Dr. Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician
of Maayon, Capiz. Dr. Orosco reported, upon examining Evelyn, that he found (1) clotted blood, about 1 centimeter in diameter, in
her vaginal opening, and (2) a vaginal laceration, measuring 1.0 centimeter x o.5 centimeter, between the 3:00 o'clock and 6:00
o'clock position. He also affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have been by blunt instrument inserted into the vigina,
that it was possible that a human penis in full erection had been forcibly inserted into her vagina, and that a human penis in full
errection is considered a blunt intrument (pp. 4-7, tsn, Orosco, November 28, 1994; p. 14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
7. While he was examining Evelyn, Dr. Orosco asked Evelyn what caused her injuries. The child told him that a penis was
inserted into her vagina and that its insertion caused her pain. (pp. 9-10, 14 and 18-19, tsn, Orosco, November 28, 1994).
8. Since his clinic lacked the proper medical facilities needed to treat Evelyn, Dr. Orosco, after dressing the victim's wound which
continued to bleed, advised Emeterio and Penicola to bring the child to the hospital for further medical treatment. (p.8, tsn,
Orosco, November 28, 1994; pp. 14-16, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995)
9. On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial General Hospital were she was examined by resident
physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes Laada. Dr. Laada, upon examining Evelyn found that "there was a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left
anterior one-third of the vagina" and "the pressence of about 10-15cc of blood" at the vaginal vault. Dr. Laada recommended
that evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital because the wound in her vagina, which was bleeding, had to be
repaired. Due to financial constraints, Evelyn was not admitted into the Hospital that day and went home with Emeterio to
Barangay Balighot. (pp.6-8,tsn Laada, January 4, 1995; pp. 15-16, ts, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
10. Upon her examination of the victim on August 18, 1994, Dr. Laada opined that "a lot of things will cause the lacerated wound
in the vagina." (p. 9, tsn, Laada, January 4, 1995). According to Dr. Laada, the vaginal laceration may be caused (1) by trauma
to the area, when a girl falls and hits her genital area on a blunt instrument; (2) by medical instrumentation, like the insertion of a
speculum into the vagina; or (3) by the insertion of blunt foreign object into the vagina, like a finger or a penis of a man in full
erection. (pp. 8-9, tsn, Laada, January 4, 1995).
11. On August 19, 1994, Emetario brought Evelyn back to the Roxas Memorial General Hospital where she was attended to by
Dr. Machael Toledo, the resident physician on duty, who found blood clots and minimal bleeding in the genital area. Dr. Toledo "
pack(ed) the area to prevent further bleeding and (he) admitted the patient for possible repair of the laceration and blood
transfusion because she has anaemia 2ndary to bleeding." Two hundred fifty five (255) cc of blood was transfused to Evelyn and
she was given antibiotics to prevent infection. However, she was no longer operated on because the laceration had healed. Five
days later, Evelyn was discharged and sent home with medication. (pp. 11-13, 17 and 26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994).
12. Upon his examination of Evelyn on August 19, 1994, Dr. Toledo disclosed that the child suffered severe compound laceration
which could have been caused by a normal and fully developed penis of a man in a state of erection that was forcibly inserted
into her vagina and that the insertion caused her vagina to hemorrhage which thus required the transfusion of 255 cc of blood
(pp. 14-16 and 26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994.
13. Prior to her confinement in the Roxas Memorial General Hospital on August 19, Emetario and Penicola Obligar brought
Evelyn to the Maayon Police Station on August 18, 1994, where they reported the crime to SPO1 Paulino Durana. That same
day, appellant was apprehended in a house near the Balighot Elementary School and brought to the police station (pp17-19, tsn,
Obligar, January 12, 1995; pp. 5-9, 16-17 and 21, tsn, Durana, January 16, 1995).

Issue:
The Trial Court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the medical doctors.

Ruling:
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw
conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are
received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or
expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, of for other reasons, the
testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave
their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony the victim herself. In other words, the trial
court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's
laceration does not mean the trial court's interference is wrong.
As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declaration, particularly as to what really caused the laceration, we are convinced
that the child, due to her tender age, was just confused.
As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's testimony is just a concocted story of what really happened, we
apply the rule that the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence (People vs. Cagto, 253
SCRA 455 [1996]). We likewise consider the fact that her uncle and aunt, virtually her foster parents, themselves support her
story of rape. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to
embarrassment and even stigma (People vs. Dones,supra.)

RULE 130 SECTION 49 OPINION OF EXPERT WITNESS

Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc. 306 S 762
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. repaired marine vessels while the Prudential is in the non-life insurance business.
William Lines, Inc., the owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel, which caught fire and sank. At the time of the
incident, subject vessel was insured with Prudential for P45M for hull and machinery. CSEW was insured for only Php 10 million
for the shiprepairers liability policy. They entered into a contract where negligence was the only factor that could make CSEW
liable for damages. Moreover, liability of CSEW was limited to only Php 1million for damages. The Hull Policy included an
Additional Perils (INCHMAREE) Clause covering loss of or damage to the vessel through the negligence of, among others, ship
repairmen.
William brought Manila City to the dry dock of CSEW for repairs. The officers and cabin crew stayed at the ship while it was being
repaired. After the vessel was transferred to the docking quay, it caught fire and sank, resulting to its total loss.
William brought suit against CSEW alleging that it was through the latters negligence that the ship caught fire and sank.
Prudential was impleaded as co-plaintiff after it had paid the value of insured items. It was subrogated to 45 million, or the value it
claimed to indemnify.
The trial court brought judgment against CSEW 45 million for the ship indemnity, 65 million for loss of income, and more than 13
million in other damages. The CA affirmed the TC decision.
CSEW contended that the cause of the fire was due to Williams hotworks on the said portion of the ship which they didnt ask
CSEW permission for.
Prudential, on the other hand, blamed the negligence of the CSEW workers in the instance when they didnt mind rubber
insulation wire coming out of the air-conditioning unit that was already burning.
Hence this MFR.

Issue:
1. WON CSEW had management and supervisory control of the ship at the time the fire broke out
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies against the crew
3. WON Prudential has the right of subrogation against its own insured
4. WON the provisions limiting CSEWs liability for negligence to a maximum of Php 1 million are valid

Held: Yes. Yes. Yes. No. Petition denied.

Ratio:
1. The that factual findings by the CA are conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. They are entitled to
great weight and respect when the CA affirmed the factual findings arrived at by the trial court.
The CA and the Cebu RTC are agreed that the fire which caused the total loss of subject M/V Manila City was due to the
negligence of the employees and workers of CSEW.
Furthermore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be
entertained.
2. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must concur: (1) the accident was of a
kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the
injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence.
The facts and evidence reveal the presence of these conditions. First, the fire would not have happened in the ordinary course of
things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised.
Second, the agency charged with negligence, as found by the trial court and the CA and as shown by the records, is CSEW,
which had control over subject vessel when it was docked for annual repairs.
What is more, in the present case the trial court found direct evidence to prove that the workers didnt exercise due diligence in
the care of subject vessel. The direct evidence substantiates the conclusion that CSEW was really negligent even without
applying such doctrine.
3. Petitioner contends that Prudential is not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of William Lines, Inc., theorizing that (1) the fire
which gutted M/V Manila City was an excluded risk and (2) it is a co-assured under the Marine Hull Insurance Policy. This was
wrong. The one who caused the fire has already been adjudicated by the courts as CSEW.
Upon proof of payment by Prudential to William Lines, Inc., the former was subrogated to the right of the latter to indemnification
from CSEW. As aptly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the law says:
Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or
loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the
insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does
not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or
injury.
When Prudential paid the latter the total amount covered by its insurance policy, it was subrogated to the right of the latter to
recover the insured loss from the liable party, CSEW.
Petitioner theorizes further that there can be no right of subrogation as it is deemed a co-assured under the subject insurance
policy with reliance on Clause 20 of the Work Order which states:
20. The insurance on the vessel should be maintained by the customer and/or owner of the vessel during the period the contract
is in effect.
Clause 20 of the Work Order in question is clear in the sense that it requires William Lines to maintain insurance on the vessel
during the period of dry-docking or repair. However, the fact that CSEW benefits from the said stipulation does not automatically
make it as a co-assured of William Lines. The intention of the parties to make each other a co-assured under an insurance policy
is to be read from the insurance contract or policy itself and not from any other contract or agreement because the insurance
policy denominates the beneficiaries of the insurance. The hull and machinery insurance procured by William Lines, Inc. from
Prudential named only William Lines, Inc. as the assured. There was no manifestation of any intention of William Lines, Inc. to
constitute CSEW as a co-assured under subject policy. The claim of CSEW that it is a co-assured is unfounded.
Then too, in the Additional Perils Clause of the same Marine Insurance Policy, it is provided that this insurance also covers loss of
or damage to vessel directly caused by the negligence of charterers and repairers who are not assured.
As correctly pointed out by respondent Prudential, if CSEW were deemed a co-assured under the policy, it would nullify any claim
of William Lines, Inc. from Prudential for any loss or damage caused by the negligence of CSEW. Certainly, no shipowner would
agree to make a shiprepairer a co-assured under such insurance policy; otherwise, any claim for loss or damage under the policy
would be invalidated.
4. Although in this jurisdiction, contracts of adhesion have been consistently upheld as valid per se; as binding as an ordinary
contract, the Court recognizes instances when reliance on such contracts cannot be favored especially where the facts and
circumstances warrant that subject stipulations be disregarded. Thus, in ruling on the validity and applicability of the stipulation
limiting the liability of CSEW for negligence to P1M only, the facts and circumstances vis-a-vis the nature of the provision sought
to be enforced should be considered, bearing in mind the principles of equity and fair play.
It is worthy to note that M/V Manila City was insured with Prudential for P45M. Upon thorough investigation by its hull surveyor,
M/V Manila City was found to be beyond economical salvage and repair. The evaluation of the average adjuster also reported a
constructive total loss. The said claim of William Lines, Inc., was then found to be valid and compensable such that Prudential
paid the latter the total value of its insurance claim. Furthermore, it was ascertained that the replacement cost of the vessel,
amounts to P55M.
Considering the circumstances, it would unfair to limit the liability of petitioner to One Million Pesos only. To allow CSEW to limit
its liability to P1M notwithstanding the fact that the total loss suffered by the assured and paid for by Prudential amounted to
P45M would sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence short of what is ordinarily required because, then, it would not be
difficult for petitioner to escape liability by the simple expedient of paying an amount very much lower than the actual damage
suffered by William.