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Strikes and lockouts

1. Capitol Medical Center vs NLRC 457 SCRA 235/ G.R. No.147080 April 26, 2005

FACTS
the petitioners refusal to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a
union-led strike on April 15, 1993. The Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-
Alliance of Filipino Workers, the Union, had to contend with another union, the Capitol Medical
Center Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE), which demanded for a certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Med-Arbiter Brigida Fadrigon
granted the petition, and the matter was appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SOLE). Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma rendered a Resolution granting the appeal.
He, likewise, denied the motion filed by the petitioner and the CMC-ACE. The latter thereafter
brought the matter to the Court which rendered judgment affirming the resolution of
Undersecretary Laguesma, thus: (1) Dismissing the petition for certification election filed by the
Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-United Filipino Services Workers for
lack of merit; and; (2) Directing the management of the Capitol Medical Center to negotiate a
CBA with the Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the
certified bargaining agent of the rank-andfile employees. The decision of the Court became final
and executory. Thereafter, in a Letter dated October 3, 1997 addressed to Dr. Thelma N.
Clemente, the President and Director of the petitioner, the Union requested for a meeting to
discuss matters pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA, conformably with the decision of the
Court. However, in a Letter to the Union dated October 10, 1997, Dr. Clemente rejected the
proposed meeting, on her claim that it was a violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and that the
Union was not a legitimate one. On October 15, 1997, the petitioner filed a Petition for the
Cancellation of the Unions Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) on the following grounds: (1) Respondent has failed for several years to
submit annually its annual financial statements and other documents as required by law. For this
reason, respondent has long lost its legal personality as a union; (2) Respondent also engaged in
a strike which has been declared illegal by the NLRC. The Union alleged as grounds for the
projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on
employees; and (c) interference/restraint to self-organization. A series of conferences was
conducted before the NCMB (National Capital Region), but no agreement was reached. On
November 6, 1997, the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that the notice of
strike be dismissed; the Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the
NCMB with a copy of a notice of the meeting where the strike vote was conducted. On
November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes9 of the alleged strike vote
purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioners premises, at
the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It appears that 178 out of
the 300 union members participated therein, and the results were as follows: 156 members voted
to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled. On November 28,
1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. The Labor Arbiter found and
declared in his decision that no secret voting ever took place in the parking lot fronting the
hospital on November 10, 1997 by and among the 300 members of the respondent Union. Erwin
Barbacena, the overseer of the only parking lot fronting the hospital, and security guards Simon
Ting-zon and Reggie Barawid, declared in their respective affidavits that no secret voting ever
took place on November 10, 1997; 17 employees of the petitioner also denied in their respective
statements that they were not members of the respondent Union, and were asked to merely sign
attendance papers and unnumbered votes. The NLRC and the CA declared in their respective
decisions that the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees had no probative weight because the
said employees merely executed their affidavits out of fear of losing their jobs. The NLRC and
the CA anchored their conclusion on their finding that the affidavits of the employees were
uniform and pro forma.
ISSUES
(1)Whether the respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino
Workers (the Union, for brevity) was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of the petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc.?

(2) WON the strike staged by the Union is legal?


HELD
NO. The Supreme Court agree with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that no secret balloting to
strike was conducted by the respondent Union on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front
of the hospital, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It was
agreed with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph
of Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads: Section 10. Strike or
lockout vote.A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda
called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the
Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the partners obtained by a
secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The regional branch of the Board may, at its
own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret
balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board
and notice of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours
before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the
intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period provided in this Rule. Although the
second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of the
Philippines, nevertheless, the same was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code and has the force and effect of law.
2.) Lapanday Workers Union & et. al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 248
SCRA 95/ G.R. Nos. 95494-97.September 7, 1995
FACTS
Petitioner Lapanday Agricultural Workers Union (Union for brevity) and petitioners-workers of
Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development
Philippines, Inc., seek to reverse the consolidated Decision, dated August 29, 1990, rendered by
public respondent NLRC, declaring their strike illegal and ordering the dismissal of their
leaders. Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their
agricultural establishments are located in Davao City. On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday
Workers Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of
private respondents. The Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and
Genuine Labor Organization). The other petitioners are all members of the Union. The records
show that petitioner Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private respondents,
covering the period from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few months before the
expiration of their CBA, private respondents initiated certain management policies which
disrupted the relationship of the parties. Private respondents contracted Philippine Eagle
Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide security services for their business premises.
Their contract also called for the protection of the lives and limbs of private respondents
officers, employees and guests within company premises. The Union branded the security guards
posted within the company premises as private respondents goons and special forces. It also
accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their members. The Union filed on August 25,
1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It
accused the company of unfair labor practices consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation
of union members and union-busting. These were the same issues raised by the Union during the
August 2, 1988 labor-management meeting. On August 29, 1988, the NCMB called a
conciliation conference. The conference yielded the following agreement: (1) Union officers,
including the officials of KMU-ANGLO, and the Executive Director of the NCMB would attend
the HDIR seminar on September 5, 1988; and; (2) A committee shall convene on September 10,
1988, to establish guidelines governing the guards. The Union officials did attend the September
5, 1988 seminar. While they no longer objected to the continuation of the seminar, they reiterated
their demand for the deletion of the discussion pertaining to the KMUANGLO. On September
14, 1988, private respondents filed separate charges against the Union and its members for illegal
strike, unfair labor practice and damages, with prayer for injunction. On October 3, 1988, a strike
vote was conducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of the strike won
overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then submitted to the
NCMB on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on October 12, 1988, the Union struck. On the
bases of the foregoing facts, Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the Union staged an
illegal strike. Petitioners now claim that public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion
in: a) declaring that their activities, from September 9, 1988 to October 12, 1988, were strike
activities; and b) declaring that the strike staged on October 12, 1988 was illegal. The critical
issue is the legality of the strike held on October 12, 1988. The applicable laws are Articles 263
and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24, 1986. Paragraphs
(c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is valid?

(2) WON union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be
treated differently from their leaders?
HELD
1) NO. Applying the law to the case at bar, the court ruled that strike conducted by the union on
October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within the seven (7) day waiting period
provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding
the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried
the approval of the majority of the union members;
2) YES. The Supreme Court, likewise, agreed with the public respondent that the union members
who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from
their leaders. Part of their benign consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file
workers who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated
workers shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services
skipped during the illegal strike.

3) San Miguel Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 403 SCRA 418/ G.R.
No. 119293. June 10, 2003
FACTS
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa
(IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of petitioners daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they agreed to submit all disputes to
grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also included a mutually enforceable no-strike
no-lockout agreement. On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo Colomeda,
filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike, docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-04-180-94, against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of
union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being
performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and
members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor
practice. The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its president
Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds: (1) illegal transfer, (2) labor-only contracting, (3)
violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and (5) other acts of unfair labor
practice. This was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-182-94. The Galvez group subsequently
requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike with that of the Colomeda group, to
which the latter opposed, alleging Galvezs lack of authority in filing the same. Petitioner
thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss, on the
grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four corporations
which are separate and distinct from each other. After several conciliation meetings, NCMB
Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the real issues involved are non-strikeable. Hence on May
2, 1994, he issued separate letter-orders to both union groups, converting their notices of strike
into preventive mediation. During the conciliation meetings, it was clearly established that the
real issues involved are illegal dismissal, labor only contracting and internal union disputes,

which affect not only the interest of the San Miguel Corporation but also the interests of the
MAGNOLIA-NESTL CORPORATION, the SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC., and the SAN
MIGUEL JUICES, INC. Considering that San Miguel Corporation is the only impleaded
employer-respondent, and considering further that the aforesaid companies are separate and
distinct corporate entities, we deemed it wise to reduce and treat your Notice of Strike as
Preventive Mediation case for the four (4) different companies in order to evolve voluntary
settlement of the disputes . . . . (Emphasis supplied) Two days after the declaration of strike, or
on June 6, 1994, petitioner filed with public respondent NLRC an amended Petition for
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress and Egress
Order and Deputization Order. After due hearing and ocular inspection, the NLRC on June 13,
1994 resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free ingress to and egress
from petitioners plants, without prejudice to the unions right to peaceful picketing and
continuous hearings on the injunction case.
ISSUE
WON the request by the petitioner for the issuance of injunction or restraining order may be
validly granted?
HELD
YES. Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction may also be used to restrain
an actual or threatened unlawful strike. In the case of San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, where
the same issue of NLRCs duty to enjoin an unlawful strike was raised, we ruled that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petition for injunction to restrain the
union from declaring a strike based on non- strikeable grounds. Further, in IBM v. NLRC we
held that it is the legal duty and obligation of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike staged in
violation of the law. Failure to issue promptly an injunction by the public respondent was
likewise held therein to be an abuse of discretion. Respondent however resorted to force without
exhausting all available means within its reach. Such infringement of the aforecited CBA
provisions constitutes further justification for the issuance of an injunction against the strike. As
we said long ago: Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining
agreement are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These
agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved. As to
petitioners allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA, jurisprudence has
enunciated that such clauses only bar strikes which are economic in nature, but not strikes
grounded on unfair labor practices. As a result a strike must be pursued within legal bounds.

4. Sarmiento vs Tujico

FACTS:

Asian Transmission Corp (ATC) terminated the services of Catalino Sarmiento, VP of


the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU), for allegedly carrying a deadly
weapon in the company premises. BATU filed a notice of strike, claiming that ATC
had committed an unfair labor practice. ATC, then, filed a petition asking the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the matter or
certify the same to NLRC for compulsory arbitration. MOLE issued an order certifying
the labor dispute to NLRC. At the same time, it enjoined the management from
locking out its employees and the union from declaring a strike or similar concerted
action. Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC, however, because of the
acceptance by Pres. Aquino of the resignations of 8 of its members, leaving only the
vice-chairman in office. MOLE set aside the previous orders and directly assumed
jurisdiction of the dispute, at the same time, enjoined the company to accept all
returning workers. This order was later set aside upon motion of both BATU and ATC
in view of the appointment of new commissioners in NLRC. MOLE then returned the
cases to NLRC and directed it to expedite the resolution of all issues relating to the
dispute. Conformably, NLRC issued on Jan 13, 1987 a resolution, which it affirmed in
its resolution of Feb 12, denying the motion of reconsideration. Three criminal
complaints were filed against the workers, two by the personnel administrative
officer of ATC and the third by Philippine Constabulary. The first two complaints were
for Violation of Art 265 par 1, in relation to Art 273 Labor Code. The third was for
coercion. In all 3 complaints, the defendants were charged with staging an illegal
strike, barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing the workers through
intimidation, harassment and force from reporting for work. Respondent Judge
Orlando Tuico issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and committed 72 of
them to jail although he later ordered the release of 61 of them to the custody of
the mayor of Calamba. The petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the
warrant of arrest and the referral of the coercion charge to NLRC and later, for the
dismissal of the criminal cases on the ground that they came under the primary
jurisdiction of the NLRC.

ISSUES:
W/N A RETURN TO WORK ORDER MAY BE VALIDLY ISSUED BY NLRC PENDING
DETERMINATION OF THE LEGALITY OF THE STRIKE;

W/N SUCH DETERMINATION, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF CERTAIN PERSONS


INVOLVED IN THE SAID STRIKE MAY BE VALIDLY RESTRAINED

HELD:

The authority for the order is found in Art 264(g) Labor Code, as amended by BP blg. 227, which
provides: When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or
lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public
utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and
export oriented industries, including those within export processing zones, MOLE shall assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption order. If one has already
taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking our locked out employees shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The minister may seek the assistance of lawenforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as such orders as he may issue to
enforce the same. There can be no question that MOLE acted correctly in certifying labor dispute
to NLRC, given the predictable prejudice the strike might cause not only to the parties but more
especially to the national interest. Thus, the return to work order was equally valid as a statutory
part and part of the certification order issued by MOLE on Nov 24, 1986. The challenged order
of NLRC was actually only an implementation of the above provision of the Labor Code and a
reiteration of the directive earlier issued by MOLE in its own assumption order of Sept 9, 1986.
It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return to work order is to protect the workers
who might otherwise be locked out by the employer for threatening or waging the strike, the
more important reason is to prevent impairment of the national interest in case the operations of
the company are disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work as directed. More
particularly, it is the national economy that will suffer because of the resultant reduction in our
export earnings and our dollar reserves, not to mention possible cancellation of contracts of the
company with foreign investors. It is also to emphasize that the return to work order not so much
confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged
as a duty even against the workers will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of
option but of obligation. The suspension of proceedings in the criminal complaints filed is
justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no question that the acts complained of are
connected with the compulsory arbitration proceedings still pending in NLRC. The 3 criminal
cases should be suspended until the completion of the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the
NLRC, conformably to the policy embodied in Circular no. 15, series of 1982 and Circular no. 9,
series of 1986, issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the implementation of BP
227. These circulars require fiscals and other
government prosecutors to first secure clearance of MOLE and/or Office of the President before
taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and filing in court of the
corresponding informations of cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute, including
allegations of violence, coercion, physical injuries, assault upon a person in authority and other
similar acts of intimidation, obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of
operation of the machines of such factory, or the employers premises. it does not appear from
the record that such clearance was obtained, conformably to the procedure laid down to attain the
industrial peace which is the primordial objects of this law.

5. ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE VS. TORRES 210 SCRA 565GR. NO 100158 JUNE 29,
1992
FACTS:
The Union and College initiated negotiations for a first ever CBA which resulted in a deadlock
and prompted the union to file a notice of strike with the DOLE. Union declared a strike which
paralyzed the operations of the College and public respondent Sec. of Labor immediately
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Instead of returning to work, the union filed a
motion for reconsideration of the return to work order. The college sent individual letters to the
striking employees requiring them to return to work. In response union presented demands, the
most important of which is the unconditional acceptance back to work of the striking employees.
But these were rejected. Sec. of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration for his return to
work order and sternly warned striking employees to comply with its terms. Conciliation
meetings were held but this proved futile as the college remained steadfast in its position that any
return to work order should be unconditional. The College manifested to respondent Sec. that the
union continued to defy his return to work order. The College sent termination letters to
individual strikers and filed a complaint for illegal strike against the union. The union moved for
the enforcement of the return to work order before the Sec.The Sec. issued an order directing
reinstatement of striking union members and holding union officers responsible for the violation
of the return to work order and were correspondingly terminated. Both parties moved for the
partial consideration of the return to work order.
ISSUE:
WON striking union members, terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply with
the return to work order of Sec. of labor, reinstated.
HELD:
The Labor Code provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, all
striking employees should immediately return to work. This means that a return to work order is
immediately effective and executory, notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its
validity. After all, the assumption and/or certification order issued in the exercise of the Sec.s
compulsive power of arbitration and until set aside, must therefore be complied with
immediately. The college correspondingly had every right to terminate the services of those who
chose to disregard the return to work order issued by the Sec. of Labor in order to protect the
interest of the students who form part of the youth of the land.

6. MSF TIRE & Rubber vs CA


FACTS
A labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread) and private
respondent, Philtread Tire Workers Union (Union). Union filed a notice of strike in the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board charging Philtread with unfair labor practices for
allegedly engaging in union-busting for violation of the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement. Thereafter, they picketed and assembled outside the gate of
Philtreads plant. Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lockout. The Secretary of
Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it for compulsory arbitration.
During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with Siam Tyre Public Company Limited (Siam Tyre) whereby its plant and
equipment would be sold to a new company, herein petitioner, 80% of which would be
owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located
would be sold to another company, 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by
Siam Tyre. Petitioner then asked respondent Union to desist from picketing outside its plant.
As the respondent Union refused petitioners request, petitioner filed a complaint for
injunction with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Respondent Union moved
to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. The trial
court denied petitioners application for injunction and dismissed the complaint. However, on
petitioners motion, the trial court reconsidered its order and granted an injunction. The
respondent Union filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. CA ruled in
favor of respondent Union, hence, petitioner filed this petition asserting that its status as an
innocent bystander entitled it to a writ of injunction.
ISSUE
WON petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of injunction under the
innocent bystander rule
HELD
No. In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, , stated the innocent
bystander rule as follows: The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a
labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If
peacefully carried out, it can not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee
relationship. The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is
entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not
without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the
demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related
interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection
or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute.Thus the right may
be regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if it
appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a
labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them
and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. Thus, an innocent
bystander, who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court that aside from the
grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is entirely different from, without any
connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally
foreign to the context thereof. In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have
such connection to the dispute. As correctly observed by the appellate court: we find
that the negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction between Philtread, as
vendor, and Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the
interest of petitioner, we cannot ignore. To be sure, the transaction between Philtread and
Siam Tyre, was not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights
over its sold assets. On the contrary, Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent
and 60% owner of Sucat Land Corporation which was likewise incorporated in accordance
with the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which now owns the
land were subject plant is located. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses
the same plant or factory; similar or substantially the same working conditions; same
machinery, tools, and equipment; and manufacture the same products as Philtread, lead us
to safely conclude that private respondents personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to
bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ.

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