Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. Capitol Medical Center vs NLRC 457 SCRA 235/ G.R. No.147080 April 26, 2005
FACTS
the petitioners refusal to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a
union-led strike on April 15, 1993. The Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-
Alliance of Filipino Workers, the Union, had to contend with another union, the Capitol Medical
Center Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE), which demanded for a certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Med-Arbiter Brigida Fadrigon
granted the petition, and the matter was appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SOLE). Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma rendered a Resolution granting the appeal.
He, likewise, denied the motion filed by the petitioner and the CMC-ACE. The latter thereafter
brought the matter to the Court which rendered judgment affirming the resolution of
Undersecretary Laguesma, thus: (1) Dismissing the petition for certification election filed by the
Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-United Filipino Services Workers for
lack of merit; and; (2) Directing the management of the Capitol Medical Center to negotiate a
CBA with the Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the
certified bargaining agent of the rank-andfile employees. The decision of the Court became final
and executory. Thereafter, in a Letter dated October 3, 1997 addressed to Dr. Thelma N.
Clemente, the President and Director of the petitioner, the Union requested for a meeting to
discuss matters pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA, conformably with the decision of the
Court. However, in a Letter to the Union dated October 10, 1997, Dr. Clemente rejected the
proposed meeting, on her claim that it was a violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and that the
Union was not a legitimate one. On October 15, 1997, the petitioner filed a Petition for the
Cancellation of the Unions Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) on the following grounds: (1) Respondent has failed for several years to
submit annually its annual financial statements and other documents as required by law. For this
reason, respondent has long lost its legal personality as a union; (2) Respondent also engaged in
a strike which has been declared illegal by the NLRC. The Union alleged as grounds for the
projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on
employees; and (c) interference/restraint to self-organization. A series of conferences was
conducted before the NCMB (National Capital Region), but no agreement was reached. On
November 6, 1997, the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that the notice of
strike be dismissed; the Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the
NCMB with a copy of a notice of the meeting where the strike vote was conducted. On
November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes9 of the alleged strike vote
purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioners premises, at
the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It appears that 178 out of
the 300 union members participated therein, and the results were as follows: 156 members voted
to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled. On November 28,
1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. The Labor Arbiter found and
declared in his decision that no secret voting ever took place in the parking lot fronting the
hospital on November 10, 1997 by and among the 300 members of the respondent Union. Erwin
Barbacena, the overseer of the only parking lot fronting the hospital, and security guards Simon
Ting-zon and Reggie Barawid, declared in their respective affidavits that no secret voting ever
took place on November 10, 1997; 17 employees of the petitioner also denied in their respective
statements that they were not members of the respondent Union, and were asked to merely sign
attendance papers and unnumbered votes. The NLRC and the CA declared in their respective
decisions that the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees had no probative weight because the
said employees merely executed their affidavits out of fear of losing their jobs. The NLRC and
the CA anchored their conclusion on their finding that the affidavits of the employees were
uniform and pro forma.
ISSUES
(1)Whether the respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino
Workers (the Union, for brevity) was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of the petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc.?
ISSUES:
(1) WON the strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is valid?
(2) WON union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be
treated differently from their leaders?
HELD
1) NO. Applying the law to the case at bar, the court ruled that strike conducted by the union on
October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within the seven (7) day waiting period
provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding
the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried
the approval of the majority of the union members;
2) YES. The Supreme Court, likewise, agreed with the public respondent that the union members
who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from
their leaders. Part of their benign consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file
workers who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated
workers shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services
skipped during the illegal strike.
3) San Miguel Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 403 SCRA 418/ G.R.
No. 119293. June 10, 2003
FACTS
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa
(IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of petitioners daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they agreed to submit all disputes to
grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also included a mutually enforceable no-strike
no-lockout agreement. On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo Colomeda,
filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike, docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-04-180-94, against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of
union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being
performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and
members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor
practice. The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its president
Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds: (1) illegal transfer, (2) labor-only contracting, (3)
violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and (5) other acts of unfair labor
practice. This was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-182-94. The Galvez group subsequently
requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike with that of the Colomeda group, to
which the latter opposed, alleging Galvezs lack of authority in filing the same. Petitioner
thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss, on the
grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four corporations
which are separate and distinct from each other. After several conciliation meetings, NCMB
Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the real issues involved are non-strikeable. Hence on May
2, 1994, he issued separate letter-orders to both union groups, converting their notices of strike
into preventive mediation. During the conciliation meetings, it was clearly established that the
real issues involved are illegal dismissal, labor only contracting and internal union disputes,
which affect not only the interest of the San Miguel Corporation but also the interests of the
MAGNOLIA-NESTL CORPORATION, the SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC., and the SAN
MIGUEL JUICES, INC. Considering that San Miguel Corporation is the only impleaded
employer-respondent, and considering further that the aforesaid companies are separate and
distinct corporate entities, we deemed it wise to reduce and treat your Notice of Strike as
Preventive Mediation case for the four (4) different companies in order to evolve voluntary
settlement of the disputes . . . . (Emphasis supplied) Two days after the declaration of strike, or
on June 6, 1994, petitioner filed with public respondent NLRC an amended Petition for
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress and Egress
Order and Deputization Order. After due hearing and ocular inspection, the NLRC on June 13,
1994 resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free ingress to and egress
from petitioners plants, without prejudice to the unions right to peaceful picketing and
continuous hearings on the injunction case.
ISSUE
WON the request by the petitioner for the issuance of injunction or restraining order may be
validly granted?
HELD
YES. Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction may also be used to restrain
an actual or threatened unlawful strike. In the case of San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, where
the same issue of NLRCs duty to enjoin an unlawful strike was raised, we ruled that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petition for injunction to restrain the
union from declaring a strike based on non- strikeable grounds. Further, in IBM v. NLRC we
held that it is the legal duty and obligation of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike staged in
violation of the law. Failure to issue promptly an injunction by the public respondent was
likewise held therein to be an abuse of discretion. Respondent however resorted to force without
exhausting all available means within its reach. Such infringement of the aforecited CBA
provisions constitutes further justification for the issuance of an injunction against the strike. As
we said long ago: Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining
agreement are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These
agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved. As to
petitioners allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA, jurisprudence has
enunciated that such clauses only bar strikes which are economic in nature, but not strikes
grounded on unfair labor practices. As a result a strike must be pursued within legal bounds.
4. Sarmiento vs Tujico
FACTS:
ISSUES:
W/N A RETURN TO WORK ORDER MAY BE VALIDLY ISSUED BY NLRC PENDING
DETERMINATION OF THE LEGALITY OF THE STRIKE;
HELD:
The authority for the order is found in Art 264(g) Labor Code, as amended by BP blg. 227, which
provides: When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or
lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public
utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and
export oriented industries, including those within export processing zones, MOLE shall assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption order. If one has already
taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking our locked out employees shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The minister may seek the assistance of lawenforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as such orders as he may issue to
enforce the same. There can be no question that MOLE acted correctly in certifying labor dispute
to NLRC, given the predictable prejudice the strike might cause not only to the parties but more
especially to the national interest. Thus, the return to work order was equally valid as a statutory
part and part of the certification order issued by MOLE on Nov 24, 1986. The challenged order
of NLRC was actually only an implementation of the above provision of the Labor Code and a
reiteration of the directive earlier issued by MOLE in its own assumption order of Sept 9, 1986.
It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return to work order is to protect the workers
who might otherwise be locked out by the employer for threatening or waging the strike, the
more important reason is to prevent impairment of the national interest in case the operations of
the company are disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work as directed. More
particularly, it is the national economy that will suffer because of the resultant reduction in our
export earnings and our dollar reserves, not to mention possible cancellation of contracts of the
company with foreign investors. It is also to emphasize that the return to work order not so much
confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged
as a duty even against the workers will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of
option but of obligation. The suspension of proceedings in the criminal complaints filed is
justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no question that the acts complained of are
connected with the compulsory arbitration proceedings still pending in NLRC. The 3 criminal
cases should be suspended until the completion of the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the
NLRC, conformably to the policy embodied in Circular no. 15, series of 1982 and Circular no. 9,
series of 1986, issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the implementation of BP
227. These circulars require fiscals and other
government prosecutors to first secure clearance of MOLE and/or Office of the President before
taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and filing in court of the
corresponding informations of cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute, including
allegations of violence, coercion, physical injuries, assault upon a person in authority and other
similar acts of intimidation, obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of
operation of the machines of such factory, or the employers premises. it does not appear from
the record that such clearance was obtained, conformably to the procedure laid down to attain the
industrial peace which is the primordial objects of this law.
5. ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE VS. TORRES 210 SCRA 565GR. NO 100158 JUNE 29,
1992
FACTS:
The Union and College initiated negotiations for a first ever CBA which resulted in a deadlock
and prompted the union to file a notice of strike with the DOLE. Union declared a strike which
paralyzed the operations of the College and public respondent Sec. of Labor immediately
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Instead of returning to work, the union filed a
motion for reconsideration of the return to work order. The college sent individual letters to the
striking employees requiring them to return to work. In response union presented demands, the
most important of which is the unconditional acceptance back to work of the striking employees.
But these were rejected. Sec. of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration for his return to
work order and sternly warned striking employees to comply with its terms. Conciliation
meetings were held but this proved futile as the college remained steadfast in its position that any
return to work order should be unconditional. The College manifested to respondent Sec. that the
union continued to defy his return to work order. The College sent termination letters to
individual strikers and filed a complaint for illegal strike against the union. The union moved for
the enforcement of the return to work order before the Sec.The Sec. issued an order directing
reinstatement of striking union members and holding union officers responsible for the violation
of the return to work order and were correspondingly terminated. Both parties moved for the
partial consideration of the return to work order.
ISSUE:
WON striking union members, terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply with
the return to work order of Sec. of labor, reinstated.
HELD:
The Labor Code provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, all
striking employees should immediately return to work. This means that a return to work order is
immediately effective and executory, notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its
validity. After all, the assumption and/or certification order issued in the exercise of the Sec.s
compulsive power of arbitration and until set aside, must therefore be complied with
immediately. The college correspondingly had every right to terminate the services of those who
chose to disregard the return to work order issued by the Sec. of Labor in order to protect the
interest of the students who form part of the youth of the land.