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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

FIRSTDIVISION

G.R.No.L32743February15,1974

PRIMITIVOESPIRITUandLEONORAA.DEESPIRITU,petitioners,
vs.
RICARDOCIPRIANOandTHECOURTOFFIRSTINSTANCE,RIZAL,BRANCHXV,respondents.

Concepcion,Victorino,SanchezandAssociatesforpetitioners.

JoseG.RicardoforrespondentRicardoCipriano.

ESGUERRA,J.:p

Inthispetitionforcertiorari,petitionersseekthereviewandnullificationoftwoordersoftheCourtofFirstInstance
of Rizal, Branch XV, the first, dated August 4, 1970 sustaining private respondent Ricardo Cipriano's motion to
dismiss"ontheauthorityofRepublicAct6126",andthesecond,datedOctober16,1970,denyingthemotionfor
reconsiderationofthefirstorder.ThequestionbeforeUsinvolvestheretroactiveapplicationoftheprovisionsof
RepublicAct6126,otherwiseknownastheRentalLaw.

ThecaseoriginatedasoneforunlawfuldetainerinstitutedonMay30,1969,byplaintiffs,nowpetitioners,inthe
MunicipalCourtofPasig,Rizal,againstprivaterespondentRicardoCiprianoforthelatter'sallegedfailuretopay
rentals.Anadversejudgmenthavingbeenrenderedagainstsaidrespondent,heappealedtotheCourtofFirst
Instance of Rizal where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 338M. In the said Court private respondent
soughttoamendhisAnswerfiledintheMunicipalCourtonthegroundsthat(1)forlackoftimehewasnotableto
disclosetohisformercounselallthematerialfactssurroundinghiscaseand,therefore,hewasnotabletofully
determinehisdefensesand(2)thatpriortothehearingofthecaseinthelowercourthewantedtocausethe
filingofanamendedanswerbutwasnotabletodosoforhisallegedfailuretocontacthiscounsel.Themotionto
fileamendedanswerwasdeniedbytheCourt.Thepartieseventuallysubmittedastipulationoffacts,thesalient
provisionsofwhichreadasfollows:

1.Theplaintiffsaretheownersofthepropertyinquestion,leasedtothedefendantsince1954

2. The house of the defendant was built on the property with the knowledge and consent of the
plaintiffpursuanttoanoralcontractoflease

3. Before 1969 the lease of the property was on yeartoyear arrangement, rentals being then
payableatorbeforetheendoftheyear

4.Thefollowingaretheratesofrentals:

(a)1954to1957P12.00ayear

(b)1968to1959P13.20ayear

(c)1960to1961P14.00ayear

(d)1962P16.00ayear

(e)1963to1965P24.70ayear

(f)1967to1968P48.00ayear
 5. Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a monthtomonth basis and rental was
increasedtoP30.00amonthbytheplaintiffs

6.Thedefendanthasremainedinpossessionofthepropertyuptothepresent

7.SinceJanuary1969thedefendanthasnotpaidrentalatthepresentmonthlyrate

8.Aformalnoticetovacate,datedMarch22,1969,wassentbyregisteredmailto,andreceivedby,
defendant.

On July 7, 1970, Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order giving private
respondent herein seven days within which to file his motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on July 13, 1970,
respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint, invoking the prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126,
entitled "An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's Dwelling Is Located For
OneYearAndPenalizingViolationsThereof.

PetitionersopposedthemotiontodismissbutrespondentJudgeissuedanorderonAugust4,1970,whichreads:

OntheAuthorityofRepublicAct6126,thisCourtherebysustainstheMotionforDismissalfiledbythe
defendantthroughcounsel,datedJuly13,1970.

AmotionforreconsiderationofsaidorderwaslikewisedeniedbyrespondentJudge.Hencethispetition.

ThrustuponUs,therefore,forresolutionistheproblemofwhetherRepublicAct6126maybeheldapplicablethe
caseatbar.ForconvenienceWereproducethepertinentprovisionsoflawinquestion:

Section1.Nolessorofadwellingunitoroflandonwhichanother'sdwellingislocatedshall,during
theperiodofoneyearfromMarch31,1970,increasethemonthlyrentalagreeduponbetweenthe
lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed three
hundredpesos(P300.00)amonth.

Section6.ThisActshalltakeeffectuponitsapproval.

ApprovedJune17,1970.

It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered by the
aforecitedlaw.Weruleotherwise.Establishedandundisputedisthefactthattheincreaseintherentalofthelot
involvedwaseffectedinJanuary,1969,1whilethelawinquestiontookeffectonJune17,1970,orafteraperiodofone
yearandahalfaftertheincreaseinrentalshadbeeneffected.Privaterespondent,however,putsforwardtheargumentthat
there was no perfected contract covering the increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly payments of
P30.00effectiveJanuary1969,ashedidnotgivehisconsentthereto.Inhisbriefhealleges:

Defendant(respondent)hereinalsobegstodisagreewiththecontentionofplaintiffs.Webelieveand
respectfullysubmitthattherewouldbenoimpairmentofobligationofcontractifRepublicAct6126
weretobeappliedtothepresentcase.Theallegednewcontractofleaseandsubsequentincrease
intheamountofrentalwerenoteffectedasofJanuary1969withrespecttothedefendant.Hedid
notacceptthenewrateofrental.Theeloquenttestimoniesonrecordtoshowthatdefendantnever
accepted the new rate of rental imposed upon him by the plaintiffs were the pretrials on the case
wherein defendant offered to accept the increase to the tone of 100%. Hence, the new contract of
lease increasing the rental had never been agreed upon by both the plaintiffs and the defendant
because the defendant never gave his consent to the new rate of rental. In effect, therefore, the
allegednewcontractofleasewasnotacontractatallsinceitdidnothavetheconsentoftheother
party,thedefendant.

Private respondent's contention is devoid of merit. There is nothing in the stipulation of facts to show that his
consenttotheincreaseinrentalsandchangeinthemannerofpaymentwasessentialtoitsvalidity.Therewasno
more subsisting yearly contract of lease at a fixed amount. It had already expired when the increase and
conversionintomonthlypaymentstookeffectinJanuary,1969.Thelessorwasfreetofixahigheramountthan
that previously paid by the lessee (private respondent herein) and if the latter did not agree to the increased
amount,hecouldhavevacatedthepremisesandthusrenderedhimselffreefromliability.RespondentCipriano,
therefore,cannotinvokelackofconsentonhispartasbasisfordeclaringthecontractofleaseineffective.

Likewisetheclaimofprivaterespondentthattheactisremedialandmay,therefore,begivenretroactiveeffectis
untenable.Aclosestudyoftheprovisionsdisclosesthatfarfrombeingremedial,thestatuteaffectssubstantive
rightsandhenceastrictandprospectiveconstructionthereofisinorder.Article4oftheNewCivilCodeordains
thatlawsshallhavenoretroactiveeffectunlessthecontraryisprovidedandthatwherethelawisclear,Ourduty
is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found.2 The law being a "temporary measure designed to meet a
temporarysituation",3ithadalimitedperiodofoperationasinfactitwassowordedinclearandunequivocallanguagethat
"Nolessorofadwellingunitorland...shall,duringtheperiodofoneyearfromMarch31,1970,increasethemonthlyrental
agreeduponbetweenthelessorandlesseepriortotheapprovalofthisAct."Hencetheprohibitionagainsttheincreasein
rentalswaseffectiveonMarch,1970,uptoMarch,1971.Outsideandbeyondthatperiod,thelawdidnot,bytheexpress
mandateoftheActitself,operate.Thesaidlaw,didnot,byitsexpressterms,purporttogivearetroactiveoperation.Itisa
wellestablished rule of statutory construction that "Expressium facit cessare tacitum" 4 and, therefore, no reasonable
implicationthattheLegislatureeverintendedtogivethelawinquestionaretroactiveeffectmaybeaccordedtothesame.
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on House Bill 953 which became Republic Act No. 6126, as recorded its
Congressional Records of March 5, 1970 reveals the sponsors of the Rental Law did not entertain for a moment that a
retroactiveoperationwouldbegiventothisenactment.Wequotepertinentportionsofthediscussion:

Remarksofsponsor,Mr.Roces:

Mr.RocesMr.Speaker,thePresidentisstillobservingtheeffectofthenewlyestablishedfloating
rate.Inthemeantimewefeelthat,inlinewiththepolicythatthosewhohavelessinlifeshouldhave
moreinlaw,apartmentdwellersareentitledtoprotection.Thereforethisbillproposesthattherentals
paidtodaywillnotbeincreasedinthenext18months.

andonpages66and72respectivelyofthesameCongressionalRecordWelikewisefindthefollowing:

Mr. Gonzales Will the gentleman from Manila interpret for us the phrase "during the period of 6
monthsprecedingtheapprovalofthisAct"inSection2?5

Mr. Roces. My interpretation is that the rent being paid during that period not before will be the one
considered.

Mr.Montano...ThetermmoratoriumasutilizedbythegentlemanfromManilaatthestartofhis
sponsorshipwasappliednotinitslegalacceptancebutgenerally.Forpurposesofthebill,thetermis
construed as suspension of increasing rents in the meantime that we have not yet determined the
realvalueofthecurrency....

Respondent'stenaciousinsistenceOntheretroactiveoperationofRepublicAct6126representsalastditcheffort
onhisparttoholdontothepremiseswhileatthesametimeescapingtheobligationtopaytheincreasedrate.
Wecannotcountenancesuchasituation,fortopermitthesametoobtainwouldbesanctioningasheerabsurdity
andcausinginjusticetothepetitionerherein.WellsettledistheprinciplethatwhiletheLegislaturehasthepower
to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is
equallytruethatstatutesarenottobeconstruedasintendedtohavearetroactiveeffectsoastoaffectpending
proceedings,unlesssuchintentinexpresslydeclaredorclearlyandnecessarilyimpliedfromthelanguageofthe
enactment,6Similarly,inthecaseofLaPrevisoraFilipina,MutualBuildingandLoanAssociationv.FelixLedda,66Phil.
573,577,thisCourtsaid:

It is a principle generally recognized that civil laws have no retroactive effect unless it is otherwise
provided therein (Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Santos, G.R. No. 43861). Act No. 4118 does not
state that its provisions shall have retroactive effect, wherefore, it follows, as it is hereby declared,
thatitisnotapplicabletothecontractsenteredintobytheparties,and,hencethetrialcourterredin
grantingpossessiontothepetitioner.

Thepetitionercontendsthatsaidlawisapplicablebecausewhenthepropertyinquestionwassoldat
public auction said law was already in force. This contention is in our opinion untenable. The date
whichshouldbetakenintoaccountinordertodeterminetheapplicabilityofthelawisthedatewhen
thecontractswereenteredintobythepartiesandnotthedateofthepublicsale,....

Underthecircumstancesofthiscase,We,therefore,rulethatRepublicAct6126isnotapplicabletothecaseat
bar.Asthelanguageofthelawisclearandunambiguous,itmustbeheldtomeanwhatitplainlysays.

WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby nullified and set aside. The
court a quo shall proceed with the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338M (12285) on the merits in
accordance with Republic Act 6031 if applicable, otherwise under the prevailing procedure prescribed by the
RulesofCourt.

Costsagainstrespondent.

Makalintal,C.J.,Castro,Teehankee,MakasiarandMuozPalma,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
 1StipulationofFacts,paragraph5,March3,1970,24ofRollo.

2Cf.Peoplev.Mapa,20SCRA1164PacificOxygen&AcetyleneCo.v.CB,22SCRA917Luzon
SuretyCo.,Inc.v.DeGracia,30SCRA111.

3ExplanatoryNote(RA6126)H.No.853CongressionalRecordoftheHouse,1970Vol.I,PartI,
March5,1970.

4"Thatwhichisexpressedputsanendtothatwhichisimplied."(SutherlandsStatutoryConstruction,
Vol.2.Section4945p.412.)

5"Section2.Itisunlawfulforanyowner,administrator,agentoranyperson,withinaperiodof18
monthsfromtheapprovalofthisAct,toincreasetherentalofanybuilding,partorunitthereoffor
residentialpurposes,ortocollectanyamountinexcessoftherentalpaidforsuchbuilding,partor
unitthereofduringtheperiodofsixmonthsprecedingtheapprovalofthisAct."....

6Jonesv.Summers,105Cal.App.51,286Pac.1093U.S.v.Whyel28F(2d)30.

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