What Adorno Makes Possible for Music Analysis

Author(s): Kofi Agawu

Source: 19th-Century Music, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer, 2005), pp. 49-55
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What Adorno Makes Possible
for Music Analysis
KOFI AGAWU

It is well known that music as object, process,
desire, and, above all perhaps, metaphor played
a central role in Adorno's thought.' Yet his
vision of music analysis as praxis remained
diffuse, contradictory, and elusive. Periodic and
seemingly programmatic assertion of the ne-
cessity for music analysis alternates with a stra-
tegic reticence about modeling practice. Re-
sponding to the pedagogical challenge was sim-
ply not on Adorno's agenda. For empirically
minded Anglo-American analysts, such ideal-
'See Max Paddison, Adorno's Aesthetics of Music (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), and Adorno,
Modernism and Mass Culture (London:Kahn & Averill,
1996) for a comprehensive introduction. Most valuable are
the substantial commentaries that introduce a selection of
Adorno'swritings on music in Theodor W. Adorno, Essays
on Music, selected, with intro., commentary, and notes by
Richard Leppert;new trans. Susan H. Gillespie (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002).
Charles Rosen reviews some key ideas with appropriate
skepticism in "Should We Adore Adorno?"New YorkRe-
view of Books (24 October 2002), pp. 59-66.
ism cannot be accorded the status of the last
word on the subject. Yet one senses in Adorno's
critical responses to various composers a depth
of insight into musical style that presupposes
careful analysis, or at least careful listening.
Whether he speaks of compulsive repetition
figured as infantile in Stravinsky, or repetition
of timeless themes in Schubert, or concentrated
motivic working in Berg, or the subtle
reconfiguration of the idea of unison in Mahler,
Adorno's technical designations command our
attention, even if we are not in full agreement
with his aesthetic, or for that matter ethical
valuation of their compositional manifestation.
Evidence of analytical thinking thus exists
alongside a near absence of anything that might
be regardedas the application of standard ana-
lytical technique. How is it possible to achieve
analytical insight without, as it were, doing
analysis? What, in consequence, does Adorno
make possible for the music analyst? Is music
analysis indeed possible after Adorno?

19th-CenturyMusic,XXIX/1,pp. 49-55. ISSN:0148-2076,electronicISSN 1533-8606.? 2005 by the Regentsof the University 49

of California.All rightsreserved.Pleasedirectall requestsforpermissionto photocopyor reproducearticle content through
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 19TH This article-which originated as a response
CENTURY
MUSIC
to the four responses to Adorno's "Schubert"
by Esteban Buch, Jonathan Dunsby, Scott
Burnham, and Beate Perrey included in this
issue-proceeds from the belief that the aporias
produced in the course of the unfolding of
theory, metatheory, and practice in Adorno's
writing have not been sufficiently appreciated.
Analysts who seek to domesticate Adorno's
thought by aligning the more or less explicit
methodology of canonical analytical techniques
with the implied methodology of his peculiar
philosophical or poetical formulations are al-
ways rewarded with a deficit because, as the
outcome of acts of translation, such aligning
underestimates the degree to which technique
itself is alreadysocially embedded. On the other
hand, analysts who reject the Adornian chal-
lenge on principle often end up committing the
very errorsthat he sought to expose in the first
place. This double impossibility is instructive.
It suggests that Adorno's theory of music analy-
sis must be located in the interstitial, the hy-
brid, the in-between. And while the reported
outcome of analysis is normally designated in
and by language, the phenomena it subtends
often lie beyond it.2
The first thing to be said about Adorno's
"Schubert"essay is that it contains no analysis
of the conventional kind-no Schenkerian
graphs, paradigmatic charts, annotated scores,
interval counts, or circled sets. Although
Adorno has things to say about individual com-
positions, he never embarks on a blow-by-blow
account of any passage. Nor is he bound by the
ontological boundaries of musical works. He
subscribes instead to the idea of open works. (It
is possible, incidentally, that a rather rigid and
deterministic view of beginnings and endings
remains a significant obstacle to Anglo-Ameri-
can assimilation of Adorno's theory of music
analysis.)
Rejecting conventional analysis means re-
2For a stimulating explication of in-betweenness in
Adorno'sthought, see LydiaGoehr'sproposed "philosophi-
cal theory of Schweben (suspension),"designed to capture
the ontological intersections between music and philoso-
phy: "Adorno, Schoenberg, and the Totentanz der
Prinzipien-in Thirteen Steps," Journal of the American
Musicological Society 56 (2003), 595-636.
50
jecting its technical baggage. And this is neces-
sary in order to improve access to Schubertian
specifics. Forthe peculiarly Schubertian is what
Adorno is after. It is also, by implication, what
the analyst-as distinct from theorist-should
be after. Style, then, becomes a pertinent cat-
egory; matters of structure are relevant only to
the extent that they lead us back to style. Teas-
ing out the elements of Schubert's style is a
multifaceted process for Adorno. It includes
the deployment of organicist and nonorganicist
metaphors, alongside images that crystallize
into a landscape that, in turn, serves as a kind
of analytical backdrop. The analysis is neces-
sarily comparative, sometimes explicitly-as
seen in passing references to Beethoven and
Wagner--sometimes implicitly. Schubert's
idiolect is described with the aid of categories
like theme, harmony, form, and relationship
between text and music. With regardto theme,
for example, Adorno acknowledges Schubert's
great lyrical gift, notes asymmetrical construc-
tion, and then gets hooked on the idea of rep-
etition, including the very repeatability of
Schubert's themes. The harmonic principle,
exemplified by devices like modal mixture and
abrupt modulation, is of interest not only be-
cause of the kinds of coherence or incoherence
that Schubert's choice of pitch promotes, but
for its effects, the kinds of narratives that such
effects elicit from attentive listeners. Schubert's
forms are sometimes expressed as potpourri or
additive on a large level, contrasting with a
determined organic thrust at more local levels.
But here, too, repetition may override the sense
of outer form and forge its own path to under-
standing. This is why narrative metaphors are
hard to resist in analyzing Schubert. Finally,
the composer's choice of song texts provides
access to another realm of artistic expression.
Indifference to the relative qualities of his cho-
sen poems represents one extreme in the ongo-
ing negotiation of the boundaries that separate
the world of words from that of tone.
A simple content analysis such as the fore-
going cannot possibly do justice to the compos-
ing out of Adorno's thought. But as points of
departure for reflection, these themes serve a
purpose in reinforcing Adorno's enduring strat-
egy, that is, to name but never completely, to
explore possibilities as rigorously as possible
without being blinded by the given, to seek to
eliminate remainders knowing all along that
they are ultimately ineliminable. This strategy
is designed to produce a nuanced understand-
ing, one that generates only provisional an-
swers. When pursued authentically, it leads us
toward the truth content of a composition.
Esteban Buch writes that "Adorno's contri-
bution to music theory has still to be properly
acknowledged ... and used." But what exactly
should one acknowledge, and how should one
use it? The contexts set in motion by Adorno's
thought are invariably multilayered, so a basic
lesson for the analyst is to think beyond the
first level by maintaining a metatheoretical
awareness at all times. Such awareness may
also emerge from giving rein to the compara-
tive impulse, for with increasing accumulation
of individual analyses, today's analyst has no
choice but to engage-selectively rather than
comprehensively-with other analysts. Analy-
sis thus becomes a dialogue in which tech-
nique and ideology are exposed. Buch follows
Adorno's example in constructing a productive
dialogue out of different critical responses to
Schubert's Bb-Major Piano Sonata by Felix
Salzer, Otto Vrieslander, Tovey, Adorno, and
Schoenberg.3
The turn to metatheory and meta-analysis
may sometimes seem to mask a retreat from
confronting the thing itself-opportunistic,
parasitic, and unoriginal. For the analytical
majority who regardanalysis as a hands-on ac-
tivity, this turn is welcome chiefly as a supple-
ment. If, however, it devalues the phenomeno-
logical gain in doing, it will not be so welcome.
Commenting on Adorno's contribution to the
discourse around Schubert'ssonata, Buch draws
attention to the ways in which Adorno's poetic
or metaphorical mode captures the sense of
musical gestures-including their effects and
significance-without reducing their identity
to technique. Yet he admits that Adorno "does
not go into analytical details." This may well
be the crux of the analytical challenge: to keep
3The fragments gathered together for a projected book on
Beethoven provide a magnificent example of Adorno'sown
comparativist leanings. See his Beethoven: The Philoso-
phy of Music, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. EdmundJephcott
(Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press, 1998).
musical details at arms length lest their pro- KOFI
AGAWU
duction become routine or undifferentiated, and Music
to find imaginative ways of naming without Analysis
actually naming, thus ensuring that your reader
is on the same page but not in the same way.
Jonathan Dunsby, a practicing analyst, reads
Adorno sympathetically for ways in which his
thinking might be extended. According to him,
there are numerous "leads in Adorno's star-
tling essay that merit being followed up theo-
retically and in music-analytical exegesis."
(Modal interchange and the popular element
are examples.) The missing "analytical details"
that Buch mentions can therefore, Dunsby im-
plies, be supplied through close analysis. Does
that mean that Adorno's retreat is not strate-
gic, not essential to his project, but a matter of
lack of time, interest, or skill, perhaps?Dunsby's
demonstration in his article retains some of
Adorno's equivocality. His remarks about the
Wanderer Fantasy are of a critical-aesthetic na-
ture that may well remain unimproved by the
accumulation of analytical details. Similarly,
his claim that certain music-theoretical terms
of introversive provenance are unsuitable for
analyzing parts of the "Largo"requires no fur-
ther substantiation at this level. Adding "ana-
lytical details" may have pedagogic or feel-good
value, but the conceptual points remain unal-
tered. Dunsby reaches a potential impasse here
in seeking, on the one hand, to retain Adorno's
will to radical exegesis, while endorsing, on the
other, acts of professional musical exegesis.
Some might argue that Adorno's reticence says
it all, and that assimilating this aspect of his
thought would require us ultimately to give up
our shiny tools-Schenkerian, semiotic, set-
theoretic, transformational, neo-Riemannian-
and turn to poetry and philosophy.
Even further to the right from an analytical
point of view is Scott Burnham's response to
Adorno's "Schubert." Like Dunsby, he focuses
on a single work, this time the G-Major String
Quartet. But unlike Dunsby, who appears to
inhabit Adomrno's world, Burnham develops his
analysis in familiarly conventional terms. No
doubt Adomo would have approved of several
of Bumrnham's technical designations-cycles of
thirds, for example-while some of his images
would probably have elicited a knowing smile.
This meeting of minds is possible because, for
51
 19TH all intents and purposes, Burnham started with
CENTURY
MUSIC Schubert, not with Adorno. This put him in a
better position to appreciate what Adorno said
he heard. And he found some wonderfully cor-
roborative ideas-such as ex-centric construc-
tion of Schubert's landscape, or the repetition
and repeatability of themes. Following Burn-
ham's example literally would commit us to
scanning Adorno's thought for reinforcement
or support, going to him to see if he agrees with
US.
This way of appropriatingAdorno seems op-
portunistic; it also suggests ultimately a crisis
of authority within the community of writers
who, it might be argued, turn to the more self-
possessed Adorno for an occasional pat on the
back. Such opportunism is neither new nor
avoidable given the nature of practical analy-
sis, for unless a work is true for the individual
analyst-as, say, the Wanderer Fantasy is true
for Dunsby or the G-Major String Quartet for
Burnham-it has not been analyzed. Adorno's
mediation cannot but be temporally displaced--
sought after only in the wake of the analyst's
own initial engagement with the work.
AppropriatingAdorno opportunistically com-
mits Burnham to a selective strategy whereby
potentially conflicting aspects of his thought
are simply ignored. Yet, if one retains the full
Adornian context while reading Burnham, cer-
tain interesting tensions arise. For example,
commenting on the passage from the finale
where cycles of thirds find their culmination
(mm. 652-end), Burnham's language turns ag-
gressively organicist: "This passage sounds as a
dizzying review and culmination of all similar
passages in the finale, as well as of all the other
third-cycles throughout the quartet, both ma-
jor third and minor third." Adorno would not
have allowed himself to write this, for having
identified potpourri organization as basic to
Schubert's form, he is not (ethically) at liberty
to push such an orthodox organicist line with-
out massively qualifying it.
The case for reconciling the imperatives of
institutional music analysis to Adorno's
thought has been made by Buch, explored sym-
pathetically by Dunsby, and demonstrated in
earnest by Burnham. But there is another re-
sponse that pursues a different direction in
Adomo's "Schubert." Beate Perrey's poetic rhap-
52
sody on the essay, like Dunsby's, inhabits
Adorno's world, but where Dunsby broaches
analytical detail and meta-analytical concerns,
Perrey invokes overarching characterizations-
centered on the notion of repetition-as a prop
in pursuing the verbal-poetic side of Adorno. It
could be argued, in fact, that this direction is
indeed the pertinent one, for no reader is likely
to miss the self-consciousness of Adorno's lin-
guistic manner-images, metaphor, language-
in working through the essay. Thus Perreyreads
Adorno's epigraph (taken from Louis Aragon)
to reinforce the interpenetration of style and
content in Adorno, and to show what "seman-
tic shadows" it casts over the rest of the essay.
Taking writing seriously or indeed defining
analysis as a mode of writing is not unheard of
among Anglo-American music theorists, but
pursuing its implications through radical ex-
ploration of writing as such is an activity await-
ing fuller exploration. Perrey's reminder and
example are in this sense timely.
No matter how much they value insights
indigenous to natural language, music analysts
are not likely to be dissuaded from asking
whether any final truths about musical mate-
rial or process emerge from a particular under-
taking. One of Perrey's Adorno-inspired obser-
vations is that, formally speaking, Winterreise
is a set of variations. At first blush, this seems
an unpromising claim because the twenty-four
settings of affectively contrasting poetic texts,
expressed through contrasts in key, mood, and
temporal profile, seem more readily perceiv-
able as a collection upon which the listener is
invited to impose some kind of unity. But the
"theme" of Winterreise is, in Perrey's under-
standing, not a conventional phrase structure,
melody, or harmonic sequence, but rather a
condition: "the emotional arrest of the
wanderer's world," ultimately a death-inspired
idle fixe. It is this obsessive sameness, this
semantic standstill or affective constancy that
characterizes the entire Winterreise cycle. Al-
though Perrey recognizes an element of "over-
drive" in the last song of the cycle, she does
not recast her framework in terms of a teleo-
logical obligation. Schubert's winter journey is,
for her, a set of "frozen variations."
Perhaps the level of abstraction here will
have left a few skeptical analysts unmoved,
and this in turn may reflect impatience with,
or simply envy of, the poetical mode. The au-
thority for this arrangement of priorities is
Adorno himself. What Adorno makes possible
may be framed as a heightened and fully en-
gaged poetical response that does not rush into
divulging "analytical details" but maintains its
dependence on them. Perrey is at her most
Adornian when she stages this central contra-
diction.
These are only four of the many possible
responses to Adorno's "Schubert." There will
surely be others, for Adorno's message, what-
ever it is, does not seem to be one that we can
affordto ignore. And this is partly because there
is not a single fundamental aspect of Schubert's
music that is not mentioned or alluded to in
this remarkable essay. At the thematic level,
then, the essay serves a recapitulatory function
which should assure Schubert scholars that
what is new here is not the historical record as
such but the nature of the critical agenda. To
ignore this text would be to risk reinventing a
few wheels. So let me, in closing, take stock--
again-by passing through once more the land-
scape of Adorno's "Schubert."
It all begins in the realm of temporality, the
realm of time crafted, time inhabited. We are
reminded that time is domesticated differently
by different composers. And we know this by
comparison. According to Adorno, Schubert's
music "may not always have 'the power of
active will' that rises from the inmost nature of
Beethoven." Dahlhaus, too, was struck by this
stylistic or manneristic distinction, which al-
most hinges on a reversal of teleological en-
ergy: "in Schubert, unlike in Beethoven, the
most lasting impression is made by remem-
brance, which turns from later events back to
earlier ones, and not by goal-consciousness,
which presses on from earlier to later."4 In-
deed, some of the most provocative recent read-
ings of individual works by Schubert point to
alternative "constructions of subjectivity," in
Susan McClary's formulation, which in turn
4Carl Dahlhaus, "SonataFormin Schubert:The FirstMove-
ment of the G-Major String Quartet, Op. 161 (D. 887),"
trans. Thilo Reinhard, in Schubert: Critical and Analyti-
cal Studies, ed. Walter Frisch (Lincoln: University of Ne-
braskaPress, 1986), p. 8.
devolve upon ways of being in time.5 To say KOFI
AGAWU
with Stockhausen that time passes differently Music
in the course of a Schubert work is to adopt a Analysis
condition of possibility that may well stimu-
late a special analytical adventure.6
Time is shaped into form, and form, profiled
in a variety of ways, guides a certain kind of
listening. With the category of form we enter
into one of the mainstays of musicological criti-
cism. Yet, with Schubert, we are confronted at
every stage with exceptions and contrariness,
not normative enactments. Schubert's music is
"immune to idealized synopsis," Adorno says.
It is equally immune to "the phenomenologi-
cal exploration of 'coherence'." So much for
the Schenkerian Ursatz! Are we perhaps better
off with strategies that invest in the coherence
of fragments? Adorno implies that about the
only thing possible-critically speaking-is a
constructed or, more likely, a posited "tempo-
rary unity." Schubertian form thus becomes a
surprising potpourri, "putting bits of music to-
gether." Schubert as a composer of potpourris?
What happened to organicism?Adorno says that
potpourri construction "denies the music any-
thing to do with organicist theory," and-al-
most in defiance-he names Weber and Bizet
as Schubert's partners in crime. As often with
Adorno, it is not the overarchingverdict-about
form, in this case-that matters, for anyone
can cite counterexamples to undermine every
one of his attributions; rather, it is the material
contours of a particular characterization and
the way those contours inspire dissent or rap-
ture that matter.
Description is never neutral, innocent, or
objective. For Adorno, the site of description
becomes the site of provocation. And so we are
forced to dwell on why some themes are re-
SSusan McClary, "Constructions of Subjectivity in
Schubert's Music," in Queering the Pitch: The New Gay
and Lesbian Musicology, ed. Philip Brett, Elizabeth Wood,
and Gary C. Thomas (New York: Routledge, 1994).
6For three out of numerous English-language analytical
adventuresinspired directly by Adomo, see Rose Rosengard
Subotnik, Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in
Western Music (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1991); Daniel Chua, The "Galitzin" Quartets of
Beethoven, Opp. 127, 132, 130 (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1995); and James Buhler, "'Breakthrough'as
Critique of Form:The Finale of Mahler's First Symphony,"
this journal 20 (1996), 125-43.
53
 19TH peatable and others not. Again, there are nega-
CENTURY
tive examples in Schumann and Wagner,where
MUSIC
what might be called errors in aesthetic judg-
ment occur in the form of "the repetition of the
unrepeatable." Schubert, on the other hand,
has it just right, and in a way that many listen-
ers will attest, especially since they have learned
to live with and love the say-it-again gestures
that occur both locally and in global contexts
in many works. In Schubert, there may not be
development in the Beethovenian sense, only
"repeatability of unaltered truth-characters."
This insight should surely tempt us into mak-
ing a typology of Schubert's themes, imagining
them in different guises, swapping them where
possible, and asking why we never tire of them.
Thus Adomo suggests a new way in which
we might value repetition, a way that is not
merely structural but hermeneutic. By dispens-
ing with development and substituting repeti-
tion, Schubert achieves something more. His
forms, Adorno contends, "are forms of invoca-
tion of what has already appeared;they are not
transformations of something that had been
invented." Thus the associative dimension is
activated for the listener, challenging the taken-
for-granted linear mode of perception for
priority. Listening becomes an unavoidably
intertextual exercise; at our most engaged, we
revel in the material content of layers of asso-
ciation instead of charging forwardlike bulls to
the next cadence. Let the finale of the C-Major
Symphony be our witness. Let it offer the gray-
ness of counterassertion that criticism destroys
when it postulates its basic distinctions.
How do these observations facilitate analy-
sis as we know it? Adomo offers a tiny conces-
sion when he comments on Schubert's har-
mony. The alternation between major and mi-
nor is too salient a feature of Schubert's music
to be missed. Adorno locates this as a facet of
the harmonic dimension, "the true measure of
music's profound nature." There is no doubt-
ing Schubert's "command of the harmonic prin-
ciple," as, for example, in situations in which
certain modulations engender "a collapse of
perspective." And there are some "wonderfully
wayward paths" that we are all too glad to
embark upon with Schubert as tour guide. It is
against this background that we can appreciate
what Adomo does with a technical description.
54
When minor third is replaced by major third,
he notes, we come to understand the minor as
a "mere shadow" of the major. Therefore the
progression from minor to major dramatizes a
sameness in difference, a transformation of self,
a change of perspective, or even a collapse of
tenses. But it is not merely a matter of identity,
of boring and arcane nomenclatures; it is, above
all, a matter of effect: "Salvation happens in
the tiniest move, in the transformation of the
minor third to the major." Salvation? How far
our secular age has drifted from the putative
spiritual climate of Schubert's music!
We could extend this stocktaking exercise,
of course, by referring,for example, to the traces
of "simple joys," to the bourgeois element, to
techniques of variation, and so on. But the point
of such a list would only be to confirm both the
need for and the ultimate poverty of enumera-
tion. Concomitantly, the list would hint at the
contradictions and antinomies that undergird
the best music criticism. When, toward the
end of the essay, Adorno considers the prospect
that Schubert's music is "music we cannot de-
cipher," he is reflecting on something pro-
foundly constructive, namely, that by exempli-
fying acts of decipherment, in however oblique
a fashion, we begin to acquire a strong appre-
ciation of impossibility.
Adorno's truths, then, are truths for our con-
temporary times, truths that aim to restore a
measure of authenticity to music-making and
to writing about music. Although an increas-
ing number of scholars have drawn inspiration
from Adorno's way of proceeding, neither mu-
sic theory nor musicology as current institu-
tional practices are fundamentally invested in
the spirit of Adorno's critical practice. Music
theory's closed systems may be useful in dem-
onstrating a certain empirical and thoroughly
worldly coherence, while the monumental cer-
tainties of the neo-Riemannians provide a cer-
tain assurance of occupation, but these have a
tendency to squelch the spirit of idealization
that writers on Austro-Germanic music find
irresistible and that Schenker-rather than
Schenkerians-sought to give voice to. Recent
interpretative musicology's insistence on lay-
ing bare certain first-level narratives ostensibly
sedimented in Schubert's music-inscriptions
that typically match a biographical circum-
stance to a musical moment-may provide tem-
porary gratification for those who require it,
but this mode of correlating runs the risk of not
seeing beyond the literalness of iconic codes; it
risks exposing itself as a kind of semiotic infan-
tilism. Such narratives ultimately block access
to the evolving truths that Schubert's music
makes possible. In order to begin to make good
on Adorno's legacy, music analysis must be
willing to take nothing for granted, must not
delude itself into imagining definitive analyses
or final states, must glorify present engagement
instead of deferring to the supposed authority
of past criticism as transmitted by historians of
thought, and must be willing to stage ongoing
enactments and reenactments of the musical
work (or parts thereof) not only in actuality
but, more potently, in imagination and in a
manner consistent with music's performative
essence.7
It is the certainty of provisionality and the
provisionality of certainty, the conviction that
7Ina recent radical critique of hermeneutic and formalist
analytical discourses, Carolyn Abbate explores the conse-
quences of taking performance seriously. See her "Mu-
sic-Drastic or Gnostic?" Critical Inquiry 30 (2004), 505-
36.
what has been said may be false, incomplete, or KOFI
AGAWU
inadequate, and that there is always more to Music
say and especially to ask-this is what Adorno Analysis
makes possible for the dedicated music ana-
lyst. Whether this constellation of stances-
which has no corporate currency, and whose
peculiar shapes prove too unruly for domesti-
cation for mass teaching-can be generalized
and institutionalized as "theory" is debatable.
In any case, it presupposes an ethical stance
that is not framed by the cowardly dictates of
political correctness and critical opportunism,
but by an embrace-which we might as well
call "strategic"-of a simple yet powerful be-
lief that it is possible-indeed desirable-for
one musician-writer to write something A
that other musicians find edifying.
Abstract.
Conceivedas a commentaryon four responsesto
Adorno's1928 essay, "Schubert,"by EstebanBuch,
JonathanDunsby,Scott Burnham,andBeatePerrey,
this article explores some of the implications of
Adorno'sessay as they centeron notions of hybrid-
ity, the interstitialandespeciallythe provisional.It
urgesa criticalstrategythatis self-critical,thatseeks
to name without naming,and that drawson rigor-
ous formalanalysiswithoutpresentingits outcomes
as endsbut as meanstowardvariousnarrativeends.
55