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A. REMEDIES The Issues

G.R. No. 129282 November 29, 2001 The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiff's failure to attach a certification against
forum shopping in the complaint is a ground to dismiss the case; 9 and, (2) whether the
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-ECCI), petitioner, civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without having
vs. reserved the filing of the civil action.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Misamis
Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, respondents. The Court's Ruling

PARDO, J.: On the first issue, Circular No. 28-9110 of the Supreme Court requires a certificate of
non-forum shopping to be attached to petitions filed before the Supreme Court and the
The Case Court of Appeals. This circular was revised on February 8, 1994 11 by extending the
requirement to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other
than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative,
Inc. (DMPI-ECCI) seeks the annulment of the order1 of the Regional Trial Court,
Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent Respondent Villegas' failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping in her
Eriberta Villegas, and thus reversing the previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94- complaint did not violate Circular No. 28-91, because at the time of filing, the
214. requirement applied only to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals.12 Likewise, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is inapplicable for the reason
that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994, three days before April 1, 1994, the date
The Facts
of effectivity of the circular.13

On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court,
On the second issue, as a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The
Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an information for estafa 2 against Carmen Mandawe for
first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru
alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46.
the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused
Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of
to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity
petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner.
which is civil in nature.14

Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." 15 This is the law
Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint3 against Carmen Mandawe and
governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil
petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment
liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of
arising out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil
consequential damages.16
case on the following grounds: (1) that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch
37, arising from the same facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a
certification against forum shopping as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. 4 The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the
commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed
instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an order5 dismissing Civil Case No. CV-
94-214. On January 21, 1997, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 6 of the
order. Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective
on December 1, 2000, provides that:
On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order7 granting respondent's motion for
reconsideration, thereby recalling the dismissal of the case. "(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
Hence, this petition.8
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action." [Emphasis supplied]
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Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the order dated
February 21, 1997.20
"After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in No costs.
the criminal action." [Emphasis supplied]
SO ORDERED.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has
been changed.

Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.17

There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation
and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation." 18

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

"Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided
in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil
actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. 19
[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on account of
the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may
proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing. AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO
LLAVORE LAROYA,respondent.
The Fallo
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
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The Case The Issue

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution [1] dated The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution [2] dated
August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and
Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99). believe that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party,
believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless
The Facts imprudence against the second party. On the other hand, the second party, together with
his operator, believing themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity) civil case for quasi-delict against the first party who is the very private complainant in
and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by the criminal case.[4]
petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an accident. As a
result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless
of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action
imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089. The Courts Ruling

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal
civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a
case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate
civil case. civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different
from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident.
case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can
MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999.Casupanan proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was
and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also
(Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, [3] assailing the MCTCs Order of Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.
dismissal.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not
The Trial Courts Ruling state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited
their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the
for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a
by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy lapsed appeal.
should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal
on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the
error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion. independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.

Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC Nature of the Order of Dismissal
denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-
Hence, this petition. shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not
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state in its order of dismissal[5] that the dismissal was with prejudice.Under the civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice. [6] Absent a
declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his
prejudice. counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil
action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim
Forum-Shopping
in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such
separate civil action.
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a
Filing of a separate civil action
favorable judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought. [9] However, there
is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for
the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently
action. of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil
action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution, allcivil actions arising from the same act or omission were
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the
property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil
recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions
recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human
arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal
Relations.
case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil
case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read: Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985
Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such
action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate

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A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action deemed
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others. instituted in the criminal action.[10]

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is
deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately
of the accused. but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the
criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil
actions arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
the Civil Code.[11]

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
provides as follows:
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the commencement of
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule
action prior to the criminal action.
applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did
not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this
procedure, to wit:
xxx
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been
(b) x x x commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced,
it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
accordance with section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
actions. (Emphasis supplied) action.Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the
same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex- adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal
delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and decided jointly.
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive
period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even
with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of

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During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of consequences and implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim
suspended shall be tolled. for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case
against the offended party after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with
x x x. (Emphasis supplied) the new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-claim,
counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily
complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate
civil action, filed to recover damagesex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules
commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex- precisely to address the lacunamentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused
delicto. is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal
case. However, the same provision states that any cause of action which could have been
the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated
When civil action may proceed independently
in a separate civil action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the criminal
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended
party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
Conclusion

SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if
such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules,
expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent civil action under Articles
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111,
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating
a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action
will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In
independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he
Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may bring such an action but the cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some
offended party may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against
the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the his employer or guardians.
criminal action, not to the accused.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6,
Cantos[12] where the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute a separate Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may
civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused
case. InCabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed
for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his
governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil
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action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No.
17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177
of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy SO ORDERED.
which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and
Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the
ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.

We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in
the criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil
action. This possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced
in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the
independent civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:

x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the
civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution
whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of
a civil action separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from
the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting
and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other
the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may
be more apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of
Court to deal with such remote possibilities.

One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on G.R. No. 141538 March 23, 2004
December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999
or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be HERMANA R. CEREZO, petitioner,
given retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that - vs.
DAVID TUAZON, respondent.
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. [14] DECISION
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CARPIO, J.: The records show that the Cerezo spouses participated in the proceedings before the trial
court. The Cerezo spouses filed a comment with motion for bill of particulars dated 29
The Case April 1994 and a reply to opposition to comment with motion dated 13 June 1994. 6 On 1
August 1994, the trial court issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file a
comment to the opposition to the bill of particulars. Atty. Elpidio B. Valera ("Atty.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to annul the Resolution2 dated 21 October
Valera") of Valera and Valera Law Offices appeared on behalf of the Cerezo spouses. On
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its Resolution dated
29 August 1994, Atty. Valera filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying for the resolution
20 January 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied
of Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of new summons on the
the petition for annulment of the Decision3 dated 30 May 1995 rendered by the Regional
Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper service in accordance with the Rules of Court. 7
Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 ("trial court"), in Civil Case No. 7415. The trial
court ordered petitioner Hermana R. Cerezo ("Mrs. Cerezo") to pay respondent David
Tuazon ("Tuazon") actual damages, loss of earnings, moral damages, and costs of suit. On 30 August 1994, the trial court issued an order resolving Tuazons motion to litigate
as a pauper and the Cerezo spouses urgent ex-parte motion. The order reads:
Antecedent Facts
At the hearing on August 30, 1994, the plaintiff [Tuazon] testified that he is
presently jobless; that at the time of the filing of this case, his son who is
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate
working in Malaysia helps him and sends him once in a while P300.00 a
number NYA 241 collided with a tricycle bearing plate number TC RV 126 along
month, and that he does not have any real property. Attached to the Motion to
Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat, Pampanga. On 1 October 1993, tricycle
Litigate as Pauper are his Affidavit that he is unemployed; a Certification by
driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus
the Barangay Captain of his poblacion that his income is not enough for his
line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo ("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver Danilo A.
familys subsistence; and a Certification by the Office of the Municipal
Foronda ("Foronda"). The complaint alleged that:
Assessor that he has no landholding in the Municipality of Mabalacat,
Province of Pampanga.
7. At the time of the incident, plaintiff [Tuazon] was in his proper lane when
the second-named defendant [Foronda], being then the driver and person in
The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted testimony of the plaintiff that he is
charge of the Country Bus with plate number NYA 241, did then and there
entitled to prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper under existing rules.
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a
negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules
and regulations, there being a "Slow Down" sign near the scene of the incident, On the other hand, the Court denies the prayer in the Appearance and Urgent
and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent loss of lives or injuries, Ex-Parte Motion requiring new summons to be served to the defendants. The
his negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe damage to the Court is of the opinion that any infirmity in the service of the summons to the
tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to defendant before plaintiff was allowed to prosecute his complaint in this case
walk and becoming disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand as a pauper has been cured by this Order.
being cut[.]4
If within 15 days from receipt of this Order, the defendants do not question on
On 1 October 1993, Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. Subsequently, the trial appeal this Order of this Court, the Court shall proceed to resolve the Motion
court issued summons against Atty. Cerezo and Mrs. Cerezo ("the Cerezo spouses") at for Bill of Particulars.8
the Makati address stated in the complaint. However, the summons was returned
unserved on 10 November 1993 as the Cerezo spouses no longer held office nor resided On 27 September 1994, the Cerezo spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
in Makati. On 18 April 1994, the trial court issued alias summons against the Cerezo reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
spouses at their address in Barangay Sta. Maria, Camiling, Tarlac. The alias summons
and a copy of the complaint were finally served on 20 April 1994 at the office of Atty. On 14 November 1994, the trial court issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to
Cerezo, who was then working as Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor. Atty. Cerezo reacted file their answer within fifteen days from receipt of the order. The Cerezo spouses did
angrily on learning of the service of summons upon his person. Atty. Cerezo allegedly not file an answer. On 27 January 1995, Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo
told Sheriff William Canlas: "Punyeta, ano ang gusto mong mangyari? Gusto mong spouses in default. On 6 February 1995, the trial court issued an order declaring the
hindi ka makalabas ng buhay dito? Teritoryo ko ito. Wala ka sa teritoryo mo."5 Cerezo spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to present his evidence. 9

8
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
On 30 May 1995, after considering Tuazons testimonial and documentary evidence, the Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied receipt of notices of hearings and of orders of the court.
trial court ruled in Tuazons favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Forondas Atty. Valera added that he received no notice before or during the 8 May 1995 elections,
liability because there was no service of summons on him. The trial court did not hold "when he was a senatorial candidate for the KBL Party, and very busy, using his office
Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezos business benefited the and residence as Party National Headquarters." Atty. Valera claimed that he was able to
family, pursuant to Article 121(3) of the Family Code. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo read the decision of the trial court only after Mrs. Cerezo sent him a copy.11
solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs.
Cerezos employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The dispositive portion Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to prove the participation of
of the trial courts decision reads: the Cerezo spouses in the case. Tuazon presented the following exhibits:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Hermana


Cerezo to pay the plaintiff:

a) For Actual Damages

1) Expenses for operation and medical Treatment

2) Cost of repair of the tricycle

b) For loss of earnings

c) For moral damages

d) And to pay the cost of the suit.

The docket fees and other expenses in the filing of this suit shall be lien on
whatever judgment may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.10

Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision on 25 June 1995. On 10 July 1995, Mrs.
Cerezo filed before the trial court a petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of
"fraud, mistake or excusable negligence." Testifying before the trial court, both Mrs.

9
Exhibit 1 - Sheriffs return and summons;
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
On 4 March 1998, the trial
court issued an order13 denying
Exhibit 1-A - Alias summons dated April 20, 1994;
the petition for relief from
judgment. The trial court
stated that having received the
decision on 25 June 1995, the
Exhibit 2 - Comment with Motion;
Cerezo spouses should have
filed a notice of appeal instead
of resorting to a petition for
Exhibit 3 - Minutes of the hearing held on August 1, 1994; relief from judgment. The trial
court refused to grant relief
from judgment because the
Cerezo spouses could have
Exhibit 3-A - Signature of defendants counsel; availed of the remedy of
appeal. Moreover, the Cerezo
spouses not only failed to
prove fraud, accident, mistake
Exhibit 4 - Minutes of the hearing held on August 30, 1994; or excusable negligence by
conclusive evidence, they also
failed to prove that they had a
good and substantial defense.
Exhibit 4-A - Signature of the defendants counsel; The trial court noted that the
Cerezo spouses failed to
appeal because they relied on
an expected settlement of the
Exhibit 5 - Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion; case.

The Cerezo spouses


subsequently filed before the
Exhibit 6 - Order dated November 14, 1994; Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari under Section 1
of Rule 65. The petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
Exhibit 6-A - Postal certification dated January 13, 1995; 48132.14 The petition
questioned whether the trial
court acquired jurisdiction
over the case considering there
Exhibit 7 - Order dated February [illegible]; was no service of summons on
Foronda, whom the Cerezo
spouses claimed was an
indispensable party. In a
Exhibit 7-A - Courts return slip addressed to Atty. Elpidio Valera;
resolution15 dated 21 January
1999, the Court of Appeals
denied the petition
for certiorari and affirmed the
Exhibit 7-B - Courts return slip addressed to Spouses Juan and Hermana Cerezo;
trial courts order denying the
petition for relief from
10
Exhibit 8 - Decision dated May [30], 1995
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
judgment. The Court of Appeals declared that the Cerezo spouses failure to file an On 20 January 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the Cerezo spouses motion for
answer was due to their own negligence, considering that they continued to participate in reconsideration.19 The Court of Appeals stated:
the proceedings without filing an answer. There was also nothing in the records to show
that the Cerezo spouses actually offered a reasonable settlement to Tuazon. The Court of A distinction should be made between a courts jurisdiction over a person and
Appeals also denied Cerezo spouses motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. its jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case. The former is acquired by the
proper service of summons or by the parties voluntary appearance; while the
The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule latter is conferred by law.
45. Atty. Cerezo himself signed the petition, docketed as G.R. No. 137593. On 13 April
1999, this Court rendered a resolution denying the petition for review on certiorari for Resolving the matter of jurisdiction over the subject matter, Section 19(1) of
failure to attach an affidavit of service of copies of the petition to the Court of Appeals B[atas] P[ambansa] 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
and to the adverse parties. Even if the petition complied with this requirement, the Court exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the
would still have denied the petition as the Cerezo spouses failed to show that the Court litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus it was proper for the lower
of Appeals committed a reversible error. The Courts resolution was entered in the Book court to decide the instant case for damages.
of Entries and Judgments when it became final and executory on 28 June 1999.16
Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case which is absolute and
Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of Appeals on 6 July 1999 a conferred by law; any defects [sic] in the acquisition of jurisdiction over a
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 with prayer for restraining order. Atty. person (i.e., improper filing of civil complaint or improper service of
Valera and Atty. Dionisio S. Daga ("Atty. Daga") represented Mrs. Cerezo in the summons) may be waived by the voluntary appearance of parties.
petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53572.17 The petition prayed for the annulment of
the 30 May 1995 decision of the trial court and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
The lower court admits the fact that no summons was served on defendant
injunction enjoining execution of the trial courts decision pending resolution of the
Foronda. Thus, jurisdiction over the person of defendant Foronda was not
petition.
acquired, for which reason he was not held liable in this case. However, it has
been proven that jurisdiction over the other defendants was validly acquired by
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment in a resolution the court a quo.
dated 21 October 1999. The resolution reads in part:
The defendant spouses admit to having appeared in the initial hearings and in
In this case, records show that the petitioner previously filed with the lower the hearing for plaintiffs motion to litigate as a pauper. They even mentioned
court a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground that they were conferences where attempts were made to reach an amicable settlement with
wrongfully declared in default while waiting for an amicable settlement of the plaintiff. However, the possibility of amicable settlement is not a good and
complaint for damages. The court a quo correctly ruled that such petition is substantial defense which will warrant the granting of said petition.
without merit. The defendant spouses admit that during the initial hearing they
appeared before the court and even mentioned the need for an amicable
xxx
settlement. Thus, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
spouses.
Assuming arguendo that private respondent failed to reserve his right to
institute a separate action for damages in the criminal action, the petitioner
Therefore, petitioner having availed of a petition for relief, the remedy of an
cannot now raise such issue and question the lower courts jurisdiction because
annulment of judgment is no longer available. The proper action for the
petitioner and her husband have waived such right by voluntarily appearing in
petitioner is to appeal the order of the lower court denying the petition for
the civil case for damages. Therefore, the findings and the decision of the
relief.
lower court may bind them.
Wherefore, the instant petition could not be given due course and should
Records show that the petitioner previously filed with the lower court a
accordingly be dismissed.
Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground that they were wrongfully
declared in default while waiting for an amicable settlement of the complaint
SO ORDERED.18 for damages. The court a quo correctly ruled that such petition is without merit,

11
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
jurisdiction having been acquired by the voluntary appearance of defendant Remedies Available to a Party Declared in Default
spouses.
An examination of the records of the entire proceedings shows that three lawyers filed
Once again, it bears stressing that having availed of a petition for relief, the and signed pleadings on behalf of Mrs. Cerezo, namely, Atty. Daga, Atty. Valera, and
remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available. Atty. Cerezo. Despite their number, Mrs. Cerezos counsels failed to avail of the proper
remedies. It is either by sheer ignorance or by malicious manipulation of legal
Based on the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration could not be given due technicalities that they have managed to delay the disposition of the present case, to the
course and is hereby DENIED. detriment of pauper litigant Tuazon.

SO ORDERED.20 Mrs. Cerezo claims she did not receive any copy of the order declaring the Cerezo
spouses in default. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that she only came to know of the default order
on 25 June 1995, when she received a copy of the decision. On 10 July 1995, Mrs.
The Issues
Cerezo filed before the trial court a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38,
alleging "fraud, mistake, or excusable negligence" as grounds. On 4 March 1998, the
On 7 February 2000, Mrs. Cerezo, this time with Atty. Daga alone representing her, filed trial court denied Mrs. Cerezos petition for relief from judgment. The trial court stated
the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court. Mrs. Cerezo claims that: that Mrs. Cerezo could have availed of appeal as a remedy and that she failed to prove
that the judgment was entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
1. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment, the Court of Appeals Mrs. Cerezo then filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under
assumes that the issues raised in the petition for annulment is based on Section 1 of Rule 65 assailing the denial of the petition for relief from judgment. On 21
extrinsic fraud related to the denied petition for relief notwithstanding that the January 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed Mrs. Cerezos petition. On 24 February
grounds relied upon involves questions of lack of jurisdiction. 1999, the appellate court denied Mrs. Cerezos motion for reconsideration. On 11 March
1999, Mrs. Cerezo filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
2. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court of Appeals disregarded 45, questioning the denial of the petition for relief from judgment. We denied the
the allegation that the lower court[s] findings of negligence against defendant- petition and our resolution became final and executory on 28 June 1999.
driver Danilo Foronda [whom] the lower court did not summon is null and
void for want of due process and consequently, such findings of negligence On 6 July 1999, a mere eight days after our resolution became final and executory, Mrs.
which is [sic] null and void cannot become the basis of the lower court to Cerezo filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the
adjudge petitioner-employer liable for civil damages. trial court under Rule 47. Meanwhile, on 25 August 1999, the trial court issued over the
objection of Mrs. Cerezo an order of execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 7415.
3. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court of Appeals ignored the On 21 October 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for annulment of
allegation that defendant-driver Danilo A. Foronda whose negligence is the judgment. On 20 January 2000, the Court of Appeals denied Mrs. Cerezos motion for
main issue is an indispensable party whose presence is compulsory but [whom] reconsideration. On 7 February 2000, Mrs. Cerezo filed the present petition for review
the lower court did not summon. on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the dismissal of her petition for annulment of
judgment.
4. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court of Appeals ruled that
assuming arguendo that private respondent failed to reserve his right to Lina v. Court of Appeals22 enumerates the remedies available to a party declared in
institute a separate action for damages in the criminal action, the petitioner default:
cannot now raise such issue and question the lower courts jurisdiction because
petitioner [has] waived such right by voluntarily appearing in the civil case for a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before
damages notwithstanding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived. 21 judgment, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
The Courts Ruling excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18
[now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);
The petition has no merit. As the issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.

12
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.30 Tuason v. Court of Appeals31 explained the
the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file nature of a petition for relief from judgment:
a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
When a party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and
and executory, he may file apetition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1] he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from
of Rule 38; and filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this
petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his
the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right
has been presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41). (Emphasis added) to appeal which has been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is also Evidently, there was no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented
available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court Mrs. Cerezo from filing an appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for certiorari. It
properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such was error for her to avail of a petition for relief from judgment.
declaration.23
After our resolution denying Mrs. Cerezos petition for relief became final and
Mrs. Cerezo admitted that she received a copy of the trial courts decision on 25 June executory, Mrs. Cerezo, in her last ditch attempt to evade liability, filed before the Court
1995. Based on this admission, Mrs. Cerezo had at least three remedies at her disposal: of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the trial court. Annulment is
an appeal, a motion for new trial, or a petition for certiorari. available only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on
extrinsic fraud, a party must file the petition within four years from its discovery, and if
based on lack of jurisdiction, before laches or estoppel bars the petition. Extrinsic fraud
Mrs. Cerezo could have appealed under Rule 4124 from the default judgment within 15
is not a valid ground if such fraud was used as a ground, or could have been used as a
days from notice of the judgment. She could have availed of the power of the Court of
ground, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment. 32
Appeals to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence, and perform all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its appellate
jurisdiction.25 Mrs. Cerezo insists that lack of jurisdiction, not extrinsic fraud, was her ground for filing
the petition for annulment of judgment. However, a party may avail of the remedy of
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
Mrs. Cerezo also had the option to file under Rule 3726 a motion for new trial within the
petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
period for taking an appeal. If the trial court grants a new trial, the original judgment is
through no fault of the party.33 Mrs. Cerezo could have availed of a new trial or appeal
vacated, and the action will stand for trial de novo. The recorded evidence taken in the
but through her own fault she erroneously availed of the remedy of a petition for relief,
former trial, as far as the same is material and competent to establish the issues, shall be
which was denied with finality. Thus, Mrs. Cerezo may no longer avail of the remedy of
used at the new trial without retaking the same.27
annulment.

Mrs. Cerezo also had the alternative of filing under Rule 65 28 a petition
In any event, the trial court clearly acquired jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezos person. Mrs.
for certiorari assailing the order of default within 60 days from notice of the judgment.
Cerezo actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court, submitting herself
An order of default is interlocutory, and an aggrieved party may file an appropriate
to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The defense of lack of jurisdiction fails in light of
special civil action under Rule 65.29 In a petition for certiorari, the appellate court may
her active participation in the trial court proceedings. Estoppel or laches may also bar
declare void both the order of default and the judgment of default.
lack of jurisdiction as a ground for nullity especially if raised for the first time on appeal
by a party who participated in the proceedings before the trial court, as what happened in
Clearly, Mrs. Cerezo had every opportunity to avail of these remedies within the this case.34
reglementary periods provided under the Rules of Court. However, Mrs. Cerezo opted to
file a petition for relief from judgment, which is availableonly in exceptional cases. A
For these reasons, the present petition should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. The
petition for relief from judgment should be filed within the reglementary period of 60
extraordinary action to annul a final judgment is restricted to the grounds specified in the
days from knowledge of judgment and six months from entry of judgment, pursuant to
rules. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from being

13
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of
long become final and executory. There would be no end to litigation if parties who have Tuazons action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
unsuccessfully availed of any of the appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault
could still bring an action for annulment of judgment.35 Nevertheless, we shall discuss The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
the issues raised in the present petition to clear any doubt about the correctness of the solidary.40 Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case,
decision of the trial court. each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the
entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual
Mrs. Cerezos Liability and the Trial Courts Acquisition of Jurisdiction representation.41 Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is
Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition for annulment is lack of available from either.42 Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as
jurisdiction. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render judgment Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs. Cerezo points out that there was
no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to Moreover, an employers liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the
institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action. Such contention employers liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary.43 The words "primary and
betrays a faulty foundation. Mrs. Cerezos contention proceeds from the point of view of direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refer to the remedy provided by law for
criminal law and not of civil law, while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the
quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code. obligation.44 Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of
the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of
103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the two condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the
remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the employees criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and
criminal action.36There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting
delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue and supervising his employee. The idea that the employers liability is solely subsidiary
for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the is wrong.45
action.37
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another),
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. In his complaint, without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is
Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, "without exercising due care and diligence in the accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act
supervision and management of her employees and buses," hired Foronda as her driver. committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not
Tuazon became disabled because of Forondas "recklessness, gross negligence and be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that
imprudence," aggravated by Mrs. Cerezos "lack of due care and diligence in the it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the
selection and supervision of her employees, particularly Foronda." 38 employer) is in itself a principal action.46

The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda.
Article 2180 states in part: The trial courts acquisition of jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of
the present case on the merits.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the
the former are not engaged in any business or industry. employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict,
the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employees delict and
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case.
corresponding primary liability are established.47 If the present action proceeds from a
An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the courts action in the
delict, then the trial courts jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the present
litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. 39 However, Mrs.
action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
Cerezos liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is

14
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
The Cerezo spouses contention that summons be served anew on them is untenable in
light of their participation in the trial court proceedings. To uphold the Cerezo spouses
contention would make a fetish of a technicality.48Moreover, any irregularity in the
service of summons that might have vitiated the trial courts jurisdiction over the
persons of the Cerezo spouses was deemed waived when the Cerezo spouses filed a
petition for relief from judgment.49

We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction and was competent to decide the case in
favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in the absence of Foronda. Contrary to
Mrs. Cerezos contention, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the present case. It is
not even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action because he
opted to file a civil action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly THIRD DIVISION
liable for her own civil negligence. The words of Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v.
Garcia still hold true today as much as it did in 1942:

x x x [T]o hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latters) property
first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ, G.R. Nos. 155531-34
cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our
Petitioner,
laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary
and direct responsibility of the defendant under article [2180] of the Civil Present:
Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs,
because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of
delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis
and other similar public conveyances do not have sufficient means with which - versus - Panganiban, J.,
to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In Chairman,
construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the
pathways of right and justice.50 Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is due on the amount of damages adjudged by the Hon. THELMAA. PONFERRADA, Corona,*
trial court.51 The 6% per annum interest shall commence from 30 May 1995, the date of
the decision of the trial court. Upon finality of this decision, interest at 12% per annum, in Her Official Capacity as Carpio Morales, and
in lieu of 6% per annum, is due on the amount of damages adjudged by the trial court
Presiding Judge of the Garcia, JJ
until full payment.
Regional Trial Court of
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition for review. The Resolution dated 21
October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its Quezon City, Branch 104;
Resolution dated 20 January 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount due shall earn legal interest PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; Promulgated:
at 6% per annum computed from 30 May 1995, the date of the trial courts decision.
Upon finality of this decision, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per annum, in and GLADYS NOCOM,
lieu of 6% per annum, until full payment.
Respondents. July 29, 2005
SO ORDERED.
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- x

15
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
filing of the information that the civil liability arising from the crime
has been or would be separately prosecuted and that she should
DECISION therefore be required to pay the legal fees pursuant to Section 20 of
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

Considering that the prosecution under B.P. 22 is without


PANGANIBAN, J.: prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised
Penal Code (BP 22, Sec. 5), the civil action for the recovery of the
civil liability arising from the estafa cases pending before this Court
is deemed instituted with the criminal action (Rule 111, Sec. 1 [a]).
S The offended party may thus intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense (Rule 110. Sec. 16).
ettled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two
distinct criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). WHEREFORE, the appearance of a private prosecutor
The Rules of Court allow the offended party to intervene via a private prosecutor in each shall be allowed upon payment of the legal fees for these estafa cases
of these two penal proceedings. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising pending before this Court pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the
from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in Rules of Court, as amended.[4]
__________________

* On official leave. The Facts


either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal The undisputed facts are narrated by petitioner as follows:
action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it
authorizes recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes arise from a single set of On 10 December 2001, the Honorable Assistant City Prosecutor
facts, only one civil liability attaches to it. Rossana S. Morales-Montojo of Quezon City Prosecutors Office
issued her Resolution in I.S. No. 01-15902, the dispositive portion of
The Case which reads as follows:

Premises considered, there being PROBABLE


[1] CAUSE to charge respondent for ESTAFA under
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as amended by PD 818
reverse the July 27, 2002 Order[2] of the Regional Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch and for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, it is
104) in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-106256 to Q-01-106259. Also assailed is the August
respectfully recommended that the attached
16, 2002 Order[3] of the RTC denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The first Information be approved and filed in Court.
assailed Order is quoted in full as follows:
As a consequence thereof, separate informations were separately filed
For consideration is the opposition of the accused, through against herein [p]etitioner before proper [c]ourts, for Estafa and
counsel, to the formal entry of appearance of private prosecutor.
[v]iolation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Accused, through counsel, contends that the private Upon payment of the assessed and required docket fees by the
prosecutor is barred from appearing before this Court as his
[p]rivate [c]omplainant, the informations for [v]iolation of Batas
appearance is limited to the civil aspect which must be presented and Pambansa Blg. 22 against herein [p]etitioner were filed and raffled to
asserted in B.P. 22 cases pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 42, docketed as
of Quezon City. Criminal Cases Nos. 0108033 to 36.
The private prosecutor submitted comment stating that the
On the other hand, the informations for [e]stafa cases against herein
offended party did not manifest within fifteen (15) days following the [p]etitioner were likewise filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court
16
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
of Quezon City, Branch 104, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01- the issuance of the checks involved which is also subject mater of the
106256 to 59. pending B.P. 22 cases.[7]

On 17 June 2002, petitioner through counsel filed in open court


before the [p]ublic [r]espondent an Opposition to the Formal Entry of
Appearance of the Private Prosecutor dated 14 June 2002.

The [p]ublic [r]espondent court during the said hearing noted the The Courts Ruling
Formal Entry of Appearance of Atty. Felix R. Solomon as [p]rivate
[p]rosecutor as well as the Opposition filed thereto by herein The Petition has no merit.
[p]etitioner. x x x.

As ordered by the Court, [p]rivate [c]omplainant through counsel


filed her Comment to the Opposition of herein [p]etitioner. Sole Issue:

On 27 June 2002, the [p]ublic [r]espondent court issued the first Civil Action in BP 22 Case Not a Bar
assailed Order allowing the appearance of the [p]rivate [p]rosecutor
in the above-entitled criminal cases upon payment of the legal fees to Civil Action in Estafa Case
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

On 31 July 2002, [a]ccused through counsel filed a Motion for


Petitioner theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising from the criminal
Reconsideration dated 26 July 2002.
case pending before the MTC for violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the
On 16 August 2002, the [p]ublic [r]espondent court issued the second corresponding civil action in the criminal case for estafa now pending before the RTC.
assailed Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration of herein She hinges her theory on the following provisions of Rules 110 and 111 of the Rules of
[p]etitioner.[5] Court:

SECTION 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal


action. -- Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
Ruling of the Trial Court
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended
Noting petitioners opposition to the private prosecutors entry of appearance, the RTC party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
held that the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -- (a) When a
charged is deemed instituted, unless the offended party (1) waives the civil action, (2)
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
reserves the right to institute it separately, or (3) institutes the civil action prior to the
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
criminal action. Considering that the offended party had paid the corresponding filing
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
fee for the estafa cases prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
Court (MeTC), the RTC allowed the private prosecutor to appear and intervene in the
action prior to the criminal action.
proceedings.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action
Hence, this Petition.[6]
shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence
Issues and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
Petitioner raises this sole issue for the Courts consideration:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
Whether or not a [p]rivate [p]rosecutor can be allowed to intervene accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages
and participate in the proceedings of the above-entitled [e]stafa cases without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or
for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from
17
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated;
judgment awarding such damages. and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right,
honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged
xxxxxxxxx by the same punishable act or omission. However, this rather broad
and general provision is among the most complex and controversial
topics in criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its implications
especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a separate
be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation civil action to proceed independently of the course of the criminal
to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many legal
scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally accepted
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the notion that the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or omission is felonious
the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise
offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of
therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by
are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently,
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal
liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and
not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action
proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the
upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also
civil and criminal actions.
causes material damage to another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on
Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).
Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may intervene in the prosecution
of a crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and
the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended
party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing
indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the
right to do so or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these instances, the BP 22 violation prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111
private complainants interest in the case disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the of the Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically in the present case, the
sole function of the public prosecutor.[8] None of these exceptions apply to the instant case. institution of a civil action without need of election by the offended party. As both
Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the estafa suit. remedies are simultaneously available to this party, there can be no forum shopping. [11]
True, each of the overt acts in these instances may give rise to two criminal liabilities -- Hence, this Court cannot agree with what petitioner ultimately espouses. At the
one for estafa and another for violation of BP 22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing check present stage, no judgment on the civil liability has been rendered in either criminal
involves only one civil liability for the offended party, who has sustained only a single injury. case. There is as yet no call for the offended party to elect remedies and, after choosing
[9]
This is the import of Banal v. Tadeo,[10] which we quote in part as follows: one of them, be considered barred from others available to her.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the Election of Remedies
fundamental postulate of our law that Every man criminally liable is
also civilly liable (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this Petitioner is actually raising the doctrine of election of remedies. In its broad
legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a sense, election of remedies refers to the choice by a party to an action of one of two or
crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives more coexisting remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of the same facts,
18
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
but the term has been generally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent the dockets of the courts were clogged with such litigations; creditors were using the courts
remedial rights, the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to, or a repudiation of, as collectors. While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for actual damages in criminal
the other.[12] In its more restricted and technical sense, the election of remedies is the cases, the rule on the necessary inclusion of a civil action with the payment of filing fees
adoption of one of two or more coexisting ones, with the effect of precluding a resort to based on the face value of the check involved was laid down to prevent the practice
the others.[13] ofcreditors of using the threat of a criminal prosecution to collect on their credit free of
charge.[21]
The Court further elucidates in Mellon Bank v. Magsino[14] as follows:
Clearly, it was not the intent of the special rule to preclude the prosecution of
As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose of the doctrine of the civil action that corresponds to the estafa case, should the latter also be filed. The
election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22 are different and distinct from each other. There
prevent double redress for a single wrong. [15] It is regarded as an is no identity of offenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in one case may be invoked
application of the law of estoppel, upon the theory that a party in the other. The offenses charged in the informations are perfectly distinct from each
cannot, in the assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions other in point of law, however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. [22]
which form the basis of his respective remedies. However, when a
certain state of facts under the law entitles a party to alternative What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court prohibits is the reservation to file the
remedies, both founded upon the identical state of facts, these corresponding civil action. The criminal action shall be deemed to include the
remedies are not considered inconsistent remedies. In such case, the corresponding civil action. [U]nless a separate civil action has been filed before the
invocation of one remedy is not an election which will bar the institution of the criminal action, no such civil action can be instituted after the criminal
other, unless the suit upon the remedy first invoked shall reach the action has been filed as the same has been included therein. [23] In the instant case, the
stage of final adjudication or unless by the invocation of the criminal action for estafa was admittedly filed prior to the criminal case for violation of
remedy first sought to be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained BP 22, with the corresponding filing fees for the inclusion of the corresponding civil
an advantage thereby or caused detriment or change of situation to action paid accordingly.[24]
the other.[16] It must be pointed out that ordinarily, election of
remedies is not made until the judicial proceedings has gone to Furthermore, the fact that the Rules do not allow the reservation of civil
judgment on the merits.[17] actions in BP 22 cases cannot deprive private complainant of the right to protect her
interests in the criminal action for estafa. Nothing in the current law or rules on BP 22
Consonant with these rulings, this Court, through Justice J.B.L. vests the jurisdiction of the corresponding civil case exclusively in the court trying the
Reyes, opined that while some American authorities hold that the BP 22 criminal case.[25]
mere initiation of proceedings constitutes a binding choice of
remedies that precludes pursuit of alternative courses, the better In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not intend to leave the offended
rule is that no binding election occurs before a decision on the parties without any remedy to protect their interests in estafa cases. Its power to
merits is had or a detriment to the other party supervenes. [18] This is promulgate the Rules of Court is limited in the sense that rules shall not diminish,
because the principle of election of remedies is discordant with the increase or modify substantive rights.[26] Private complainants intervention in the
modern procedural concepts embodied in the Code of Civil prosecution of estafa is justified not only for the prosecution of her interests, but also for
Procedure which permits a party to seek inconsistent remedies in the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the Constitution. [27]
his claim for relief without being required to elect between them at
the pleading stage of the litigation.[19] The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the private prosecutor
may intervene before the RTC in the proceedings for estafa, despite the necessary
In the present cases before us, the institution of the civil actions with the inclusion of the corresponding civil action in the proceedings for violation of BP 22
estafa cases and the inclusion of another set of civil actions with the BP 22 cases are pending before the MTC. A recovery by the offended party under one remedy, however,
not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the Rules signifies necessarily bars that under the other. Obviously stemming from the fundamental rule
that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal case for violation of the against unjust enrichment,[28] this is in essence the rationale for the proscription in our
Bouncing Checks Law[20] precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding law against double recovery for the same act or omission.
civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed
The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by Justice Florenz D. Order AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Regalado (ret.), former chairman of the committee tasked with the revision of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. He clarified that the special rule on BP 22 cases was added, because SO ORDERED.
19
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
[G.R. No. 163597. July 29, 2005]

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP., petitioner, vs. ASIA


DYNAMIC ELECTRIX CORP. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
8, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71467 and its resolution dated May 14, 2004. The assailed
decision and resolution reversed the order dated December 10, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 210 in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 denying
the motion to dismiss filed by herein respondent, Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation.
On April 4, 2001, petitioner Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City a complaint for recovery of sum of
money against respondent Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation. The complaint alleged
that respondent purchased from petitioner various electrical conduits and fittings
amounting P1,622,467.14. Respondent issued several checks in favor of petitioner as
payment. The checks, however, were dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of
insufficient funds/account closed. The complaint further alleged that respondent failed to
pay despite demand. It prayed that respondent be ordered to pay the amount of purchase,
plus interest and attorneys fees.[1]
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the civil
action was deemed included in the criminal actions for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) previously filed by petitioner against the officers of
respondent corporation; (2) Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure prohibits the filing of a separate civil action in B.P. 22 cases; and (3)
respondent was guilty of forum shopping and unjust enrichment. [2]
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in its order dated December 10, 2001.
It ruled that since the act complained of arose from the alleged non-payment of the
petitioner of its contractual debt, and not the issuance of checks with insufficient funds,
in accordance with Article 31 of the Civil Code, the civil action could proceed
independently of the criminal actions. It said that Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply to the obligation in this case, it
being ex-contractu and not ex-delicto.[3]
Respondent questioned said order before the Court of Appeals in a petition
for certiorari. The appellate court, in its decision dated October 8, 2003, reversed the
order of the trial court. It held that the civil actions deemed instituted with the filing of
the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 and Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 are of the
same nature, i.e., for sum of money between the same parties for the same transaction.
Considering that the courts where the two criminal cases were pending acquired
20
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
jurisdiction over the civil actions, which were deemed instituted therein, the respondent Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay
court could no longer acquire jurisdiction over the same case.[4] in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
Appeals in its resolution dated May 14, 2004.[5] offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If
Hence, this petition raising the following arguments: the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by
the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
1. There is no identity of interests, causes of action, and reliefs in Civil Case No. MC
01-1493 before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City and the criminal
complaints for violation of BP Blg. 22 filed against Gil Santillan and Juanito Pamatmat Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City docketed as I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying
I.S. No. 00-01-00300. the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions.
2. Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping.
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It
3. Petitioner did not violate Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to
Procedure when it filed the complaint in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493. [6] include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the
filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are
The petition is unmeritorious. required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints
for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of
It appears that prior to the filing of the case for recovery of sum of money before
the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, petitioner had already filed separate
B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no
criminal complaints for violation of B.P. 22 against the officers of respondent
filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating
corporation, Gil Santillan and Juanito Pamatmat. They were docketed as I.S. No. 00-01-
effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid,
00304[7] and I.S. No. 00-01-00300,[8]respectively, and were both pending before the
the trial court is not even informed thereof. [10] The inclusion of the civil action in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. These cases involve the same checks which are
criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the
the subjects of Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 before the Regional Trial Court of
courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the
Mandaluyong City.
disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the
cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The
checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can
on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only
of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of
file a separate civil action is no longer needed.[9] The Rules provide: the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and
criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose
of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly,
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final
disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners
(a) x x x rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. [11] In view of this special
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code [12] cited by
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.
shall be allowed.
The pendency of the civil action before the court trying the criminal case bars the
filing of another civil action in another court on the ground of litis pendentia. The
elements of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal of an action are: (1) identity of
21
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) the judicial process, plays havoc with the rules on orderly procedure, and is vexatious
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same and unfair to the other parties of the case.[19]
facts; and (3) the identity, with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases,
is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in the
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[13] assailed decision and resolution.

We reject petitioners assertion that there is no identity of parties and causes of IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.
action between the civil case, Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, and the criminal cases, I.S. SO ORDERED.
No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300.
First, the parties in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 represent the same interests as the
parties in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300. I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S.
No. 00-01-00300 were filed against the officers of respondent corporation who signed
the checks as agents thereof. The records indicate that the checks were in fact drawn in
the account of respondent corporation. It has not been alleged in the suit that said
officers acted beyond their authority in signing the checks, hence, their acts may also be
binding on respondent corporation, depending on the outcome of the proceedings.
Second, Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 and I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-
00300 seek to obtain the same relief. With the implied institution of the civil liability in
the criminal actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, the two actions
are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the
civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform
or rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The purpose, meanwhile, of
the civil action is for the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused.[14] Hence, the relief sought in the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-
01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 is the same as that sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-
1493, that is, the recovery of the amount of the checks, which, according to petitioner,
represents the amount to be paid by respondent for its purchases. To allow petitioner to
proceed with Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 despite the filing of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and
I.S. No. 00-01-00300 might result to a double payment of its claim.
Petitioner contends that there is no identity of causes of action in the civil and
criminal cases as the amount claimed in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 is greater than the
total amount of the checks involved in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300.
We are not persuaded. We find that the inclusion of additional checks in Civil Case No.
MC 01-1493 is an attempt to circumvent the rule against forum shopping, to make it
appear that the objects of the civil and criminal proceedings are different. It is clear from
the records that the checks involved in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 [15] and I.S. No. 00-01-
00300[16] are the same checks cited by petitioner in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493. [17] The
Court will certainly not allow petitioner to recover a sum of money twice based on the
same set of checks. Neither will the Court allow it to proceed with two actions based on
the same set of checks to increase its chances of obtaining a favorable ruling. Such runs
counter to the Courts policy against forum shopping which is a deplorable practice of
litigants in resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. [18] It is a practice that ridicules

22
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
PAJARILLO,

Petitioners,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.*

YNARES-SANTIAGO, (Working Chairperson)

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO,

VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN

LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE

TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO

and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, Promulgated:

Respondents. December 14, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

FIRST DIVISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

SAFEGUARD SECURITY G.R. NO. 165732

AGENCY, INC., and ADMER

23
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and AdmerPajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against
Decision[1] dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated October 20, 2004 issued by defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally,
the following:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m.,
Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, KatipunanBranch, Quezon City,
to renew her time deposit per advise of the banks cashier as she would sign a specimen
card.Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the 1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN
same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY
outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual damages
safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in
the abdomen instantly causing her death. 2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
death indemnity;

3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as


Lauro Tangco, Evangelines husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) moral damages;
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide
against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its
Decision dated January 19, 2000.[3] On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed 5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00),
with modification as to the penalty in a Decision [4] dated July 31, 2000. Entry of as attorneys fees; and
Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
6. costs of suit.

Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch


273, Marikina City, a complaint[5] for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting For lack of merit, defendants counterclaim is hereby
Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of DISMISSED.
a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for
actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED. [8]

In their Answer,[6] petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint


and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It
selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangelines death was not due
rejected Pajarillos claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence
to Pajarillos negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a
to Pajarillos bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the
compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorneys fees.
shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the
police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation
demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly;
[7]
the dispositive portion of which reads: that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806;
and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.

24
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following
severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had assignment of errors, to wit:
perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there
was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguards evidence simply
showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the
supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance
of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding
the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of damages
regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with. and other money claims.

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA
issued its assailed Decision, thedispositive portion of which reads:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner
Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed payment of damages and other money claims.
decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard
Security Agency, Inc.s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary
under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to
costs.[9] The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find
that petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, hence,
should be excused from any liability.[10]

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the
applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in
on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages
Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final awarded to respondents.
and executoryjudgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be
adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based
since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176[11]of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is
conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established that it had
is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be
liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed exonerated from civil liability.
does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of
diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees
is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a
103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil
separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising
liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as employer under
Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code [12] is subsidiary and the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.

25
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from
the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit: that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or
under both causes.[13]

It is important to determine the nature of respondents cause of action. The


nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action. [14] The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
When a argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for therecovery of civil [15]

liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the


offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or assigned and posted in the Ecology
omission of the accused. Bank Katipunan Branch,Quezon City, who was employed and under
employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence there is
employer-employee relationship between co-defendants.

Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed
the same on January 14, 1998.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.

The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime
of homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof,
thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code. 8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing
Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly
without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with
the use of his shotgun, fired and burstbullets upon Evangeline
We do not agree. M. Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate xxxx
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not
arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under 16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are
Articles 32 and 34, and culpaaquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) jointly and severally liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.[16]

26
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal
liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-
Thus, a reading of respondents complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime. [18] The
recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act
caused by Pajarillos act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil or omission punishable by law.
Code which provides:

In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,[19] where the issue involved was whether the


ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes civil action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a
crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the
criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the
court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which
assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident
are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case
of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept
of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto,
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial
(e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded court is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is xxxx
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from
the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party
punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied) chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the
negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action
for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants
reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent
27
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason
action for quasi-delict.[20] (Emphasis supplied) for us to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that
petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.

Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of


Homicide is already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance Respondents evidence established that Evangelines purpose in going to the
to this case.[21] It would have been entirely different if respondents cause of action was bank was to renew her time deposit. [25] On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that
for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting
to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. [22] instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.

As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents cause of Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of
action is based on quasi-delict.Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is about one meter or one arms length[26] he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his
caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law gun and shot her.[27] It is however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make
that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the selection such movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement could
of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.
liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on
his mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim
is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters away from the
Evangeline. bank[28] and saw her talking to a man thereat; [29] that she left the man under the fly-over,
crossed the street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare testimony
of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the
vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the banks branch
not is a question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to the police authorities
review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
[23]
Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was
grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the bank [30] manning the
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she would
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions robbery all by herself without a back-up.In fact, she would have known, after surveying
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as there
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly were guards manning the entrance door.
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the
CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record. [24] Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the
truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and
28
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside
judicial cognizance.[31]
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately
shown that it had exercised the diligence required in the selection and supervision of its
employees. It claims that it had required the guards to undergo the necessary training
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and and to submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which even the RTC found to
was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the
petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it
petitioners petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline approached the conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned
bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was to routinely check the activities of the security guards which include among others,
suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the whether or not they are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as
deceased out of pure instinct; [32] that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act, regular evaluations of the employees performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his
regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo; firearm contrary to Safeguards operating procedure is not sufficient basis to say that
[33]
that the fear that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it was likewise error to say that
Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not
merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.[34] properly implemented by reason ofone unfortunate event.

Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is We are not convinced.
absent, Pajarillos claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such claim
was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his testimony which
was even doubtful. Pajarillos apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a
bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
robbery was just a figment of Pajarillosimagination which caused such unfounded
unlawful aggression on his part.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is


demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Although she was a licensed firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in
such establishment where people would react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had
Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and
did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that xxxx
she should not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the
act as hold up or robbery.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
We are not persuaded. assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that


Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously xxxx
prior to the shooting incident. Evangelines death was merely due toPajarillos negligence
in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.

29
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when instructors during classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the same,[42] the records do not show that Pajarillohad attended such classroom instructions.
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and
continuous evaluation of the security guards performance. Pajarillo had only attended an
in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was
the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the established that the concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be
selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law.This presumption may be guarded and protection of the life of the employees.[43]
overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its
employee.
It had not been established that after Pajarillos training in Toyota, Safeguard
had ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a
bank which has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty in a
them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. [35] On the other hand, due factory since a bank is a very sensitive area. [44]
diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has
relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangelines act of just depositing her
measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no
performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.
this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with
said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable
supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions. [36] To establish
these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors
concrete proof, including documentary evidence. who go around the bank two times a day to see the daily performance of the security
guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of such daily inspections. In
fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline
could have been taken noticed and reported.
We agree with the RTCs finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in
the selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological
and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no
psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual
course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances. damages in the amount P157,430.00which were the expenses incurred by respondents in
connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order.

The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required
in the supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard
presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that
of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
Assigned To Banks,[37] Weapons Training,[38] Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
Training Lesson Plan,[39] Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,[40] it had also been deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
established during Cameros cross-examination thatPajarillo was not aware of such rules diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
and regulations.[41] Notwithstanding Cameros clarification on his re-direct examination undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration,
that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the

30
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
suffering inflicted.[45] The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim
is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever
with the wealth or means of the offender.[46]

In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by


Evangelines death was so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother
to six children who were all minors at the time of her death. In People v.Teehankee, Jr.,
[47]
we awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old
girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[48] we
likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a
third year high school student and who was also their youngest child who died in a
vehicular accident since the girls death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the
respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million pesos as Evangelines death
left a void in the lives of her husband and minor children as they were deprived of her
love and care by her untimely demise.

We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount


of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.[49] It is awarded as a deterrent to socially
deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.[50]

Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered
when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the
award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July
16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil
liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
isSOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

31
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.

B. EFFECTS The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the
appellate court, showed that:
G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio decided
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, to catch shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased
vs. who told him that they (should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA Manantan who is also from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford
NICOLAS, respondents. Fiera butsaid that the accused also wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal
Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan Technical
QUISUMBING, J.: School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm using the
Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they consumed one (more) case of
beer. At about 12:00 o'clock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of
o'clock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tagangin and (Ruben) Nicolas
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
and the accused returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They
of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan
cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of beer. They ate and
was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a
drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go
ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal
bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the
Case No. 066, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered
accused who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at
him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00
Mabini, Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While
representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of
waiting for a vacant alley they drank one beer each. After waiting for about 40
P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused invited his companions to
go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some lady partners at the
The facts of this case are as follows: LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and proceeded to a nearby store where
they ate arroz caldoand then they decided to go home. Again the accused
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the
Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased
follows: immediately behind the accused. The accused was driving at a speed of about
40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago,
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although according to Charles
Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge [the] wrong lane of the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle)
of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove when they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The accused
and operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from
in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the
due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the two vehicles collided with each other at the center of the road.
necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property,
causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile xxx
driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No.
918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at
turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said the side of the highway immediately at the approach of the street going to the
automobile. Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved across the road so that one half front
portion landed on the lane of the car while the back half portion was at its right
CONTRARY TO LAW.1 lane five meters away from the point of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit
"A") prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the Police Headquarters
32
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for
regained consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his belly with the the death of Ruben Nicolas,
deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he
was pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was still SO ORDERED.5
unconscious was pulled out from the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the
deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident
(Exhibit "B") while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and
occurred, Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed "all in all,
legs.2
a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beerbetween 9 a.m. and 11 p.m." 6 It found that
petitioner's act of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)7 and pursuant to Article 2185 of
of the prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan the Civil Code,8 a statutory presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioner's
did not drink beer that night. As to the accident, the defense claimed that: act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself "because the mishap, which
occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation." 9
The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from
the center of the road at about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August
at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright 24, 1992 denied the motion.
lights which was coming from the opposite direction and running very fast
suddenly swerve(d) to the car's lane and bumped the car which turned turtle
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for
twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while the jeep stopped
our consideration:
across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident
(Exhibit "1") and a sketch (Exhibit "3") drawn by the accused during his
rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on the driver's side. As a result of the FIRST THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE
collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where they were all brought for RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER INQUIRY
treatment.3 ON THE ACCUSED'S (PETITIONER'S) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN "DOUBLE
JEOPARDY" AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court
PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.
decided Criminal Case No. 066 in petitioner's favor, thus:

SECOND THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION


WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
TO AWARD DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE
accused NOT GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him.
RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-DECLARATION OF
ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL
SO ORDERED.4 TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT
WITH THE PETITIONER'S ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL
the trial court's judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL
Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and that appellee be ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE
ordered to pay indemnity and damages. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.

On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the THIRD THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
Nicolas spouses, thus: TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240
ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant- GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE
appellee is hereby held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE
driving his car which was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING

33
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the
THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE. lower court's judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor
did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same offense.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are: Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of
having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of
Appeals as to his negligence or reckless imprudence? Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the
act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not
person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and
extinguish his civil liability?
can never be held liable for such act or omission.13 There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the instituted must be based on grounds other than the delictcomplained of. This is the
Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240? situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.14 The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
the findings of the trial court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.15 This is the situation
guise of determining his civil liability. He argues that the trial court's finding that he was contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,16 where the civil action for damages is "for
neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters
He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However,
only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in "double jeopardy." the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to
establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not omission.17 The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily,
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's
that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not
acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless
cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review imprudence.
the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity
and damages.1wphi1.nt On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was
neither criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is
Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding predicated on the criminal offense, he argues that when the latter is not proved, civil
indemnity placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.
"no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows that the
another prosecution for the same act."10 When a person is charged with an offense and judgment of acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of
the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without petitioner's negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal must be
the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into
offense.11 This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements play.
must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the
offense as the first.12 In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by conclusion of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt;
the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. hence, petitioner's civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial
The judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was court's declaration that did not discount the possibility that "the accused was really
elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal negligent." However, it found that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the
Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a accused presented itself before the Court" and since said "hypothesis is consistent with
second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no the recordthe Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction." 18 The foregoing
34
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the
had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based time private respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the
on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies. court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies
retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding
damages and indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the
fees for their claims for damages when the civil case was impliedly instituted with the actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the
criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages
the claim for damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. such as moral, nominal, temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint
Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the
24, 1988.19 He avers that since Manchester held that "The Court acquires jurisdiction judgment.21 Recall that the information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific
over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees," the appellate court was allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively
without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment,
and damages. the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal
action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or
Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant information. We therefore find no basis for petitioner's allegations that the filing fees
case. They ask us to note that the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.
instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchesterrequirements as to docket and
filing fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31,
did not allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioner's motion
legally required that the civil damages sought be stated in the information, the trial court for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1wphi1.nt
had no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover,
assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, SO ORDERED.
the filing fees for the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is
no violation of the Manchester doctrine to speak of.

At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil
actions with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of
Court.20 As correctly pointed out by private respondents, under said rule, it was not
required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or
information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the
amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a
resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now required that:
G.R. No. 155309 November 15, 2005
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for JOSEPHINE M. SANCHEZ, Petitioner,
such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the vs.
judgment except in an award for actual damages. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,1 Respondent.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the DECISION
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

35
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
t bottom, the resolution of this case hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and their "[Petitioner supposedly] employed three modes in the said fraudulent transactions,
testimonies. Since the factual findings of the lower courts are disparate, this Court namely:
painstakingly
reviewed the records. It found no sufficient reason to disbelieve the well-explained "In the First Mode, [petitioner] caused the issuance of a cashiers check payable to
findings and equally logical conclusions of the trial court. The evidence proffered by bearer with number 461390, dated September 29, 1992, in the sum of P250,040.86.
respondent even corroborated relevant portions of those of petitioner. Thus, the evidence This is the subject of Crim. Case No. 93-126175. She presented a forged letter of
supported the ruling of the trial court that the acquittal of petitioner was based on its confirmation bearing the forged signature of Chin addressed to Beatriz Bagsit, Cash
reasonable finding that she had not committed the crime imputed to her. Consequently, Department Head of FEBTC. This check was paid pursuant to the said confirmation.
she incurred no civil liability for the alleged offense. [Petitioner] immediately deposited this check to her FEBTC Savings Account No. 0101-
39109-9 and on September 30, 1992, she withdrewP200,040.86.
The Case
"Under the Second Mode, [petitioner] filed applications forms to purchase cashiers
Before us is a Petition for Review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to checks payable to her, [with] Chin as the supposed purchaser. Said applications were
reverse the July 31, 2001 Decision3 and the August 30, 2002 Resolution4 of the Court of accompanied by a forged memorandum of Chin confirming [petitioner] as the payee-
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 53715. The challenged Decision disposed as follows: beneficiary. After the approval by Bagsit of the applications and memoranda, checks
were issued, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed order is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. [Petitioner]
JOSEPHINE SANCHEZ is hereby ordered to pay [Respondent] Far East Bank and Trust Check No. Date Amount Exhibit
Company, the amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty Seven Thousand Five
Hundred Thirty Pesos and Eighty Six Centavos (P1,187,530.86) as actual damages. This 461739 10/22/92 P489,450.00 F
is without prejudice to [petitioner]s recourse of reimbursement from the other persons
who participated in the transactions."5
461963 04/11/92 160,550.00 G
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
464801 05/24/93 180,090.00 H
The Facts
465405 06/30/93 107,400.00 I
The antecedents of the case are related by the CA as follows:
"In compliance with bank procedures [petitioner] signs the checks twice, one as an
endorsement and two as proof of receipt of the proceeds which she then deposited to her
"It is undisputed that Kai J. Chin was the director and representative of Chemical Bank. FEBTC account.
Its subsidiary, the Chemical International Finance Limited (CIFL), was an investor in
[Respondent] Far East Bank and Trust [C]ompany (FEBTC), x x x. In representing the
"The Third Mode, was frequently used which involved checks payable to Chin.
interest of CIFL in FEBTC, Chin was made a director and sr. vice president of FEBTC.
[Petitioner] Josephine Sanchez was, in turn, assigned as secretary of Chin. CIFL also
maintained a checking account (CA# 0009-04212-1) in FEBTCs investment arm, the "[Petitioner] was designated as Chins representative to purchase cashiers checks using
Far East Bank Investment, Inc. (FEBII). Chin was one of the authorized signatories in applications which bore forged signatures of Chin as a purchaser and the payee.
the said current and money market accounts.
"After Bagsit has approved the application and has checked the authenticity of Chins
"According to [respondent], [petitioner] made unauthorized withdrawals from the signatures, a cashiers check is issued. Then [petitioner] claimed the check, left then
account of CIFL in FEBTC through the use of forged or falsified applications for came back soon to encash it. The check when presented for encashment already had two
cashiers checks which were deposited to her personal accounts. Once credited to her signatures of Chin on its dorsal side, both signatures being forged. The first forged
account, she withdrew the amounts and misappropriated, misapplied and converted them signature represents Chins endorsement of the check as payee and the second, Chins
to her personal benefit and advantage, to the damage of FEBTC. purported receipt of the checks proceeds. The teller pays the value of the check only if
initialed by Bagsit.

36
Check No. Date Amount Exhibit
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
"In this mode, 16 checks were issued, to wit:

461417 10/13/92 P100,000.00 K

"[Petitioner allegedly] confessed to Chin that she tampered with the CIFL account. Chin
referred the matter to the FEBTCs audit division for further investigation. All the
461488 10/20/92 150,000.00 L
cashiers checks, funded by an unauthorized debit against the CIFL account, as well as
the corresponding applications for their issuance were examined at the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory. All of Chins signatures borne on all the checks and
462197 11/17/92 50,000.00 M applications were found to have been good forgeries. With the damage done, FEBTC
had to reimburse the CIFL account and ultimately suffered the total misappropriated
amount of P3,787,530.86."6

461318 11/26/92 190,000.00 N The main defense of petitioner consisted of a denial of the forgeries. She asserted that
she had deposited the checks to her account, under the authority and instructions of Kai
Chin. Afterwards, petitioner withdrew the amounts and gave them to him. 7
462420 12/09/92 200,400.00 O
Kai Chin denied that he had given that authority to her, and insisted that she had signed
the subject documents. However, he did not rebut her testimony that she had turned over
the proceeds of the checks to him.
462482 12/12/92 220,000.00 P
Ruling of the Trial Court

462717 01/04/93 210,000.00 Q The Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not find Kai Chin to be a credible witness.
According to the RTC, FEBTCs records showed that, contrary to his testimony, he had
expressly authorized petitioner to transact matters concerning Chemical Banks account. 8
462946 01/18/93 200,000.00 R
The trial judge doubted the integrity of the findings and the report of the PNP
handwriting expert. He noted the nonuse during the handwriting analysis of Kai Chins
contemporaneous signatures. Besides, the examination was initiated unilaterally by
463241 02/01/93 180,000.00 S FEBTC officials, who had submitted sample signatures of their own choice. 9

The RTC added that the allegedly fraudulent transactions had occurred from September
463606 02/26/93 180,000.00 T 1992 to June 1993, with the use of
documents bearing the signatures of other officials and employees of respondent. In
other words, all the questioned transactions had been approved and allowed by the bank
officials concerned, despite apparent procedural infirmities.10 Yet, only petitioner was
463776 03/08/93 200,000.00 U indicted.

Thus, the RTC disposed as follows:


463850 03/19/93 200,000.00 V
"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds and so holds that
the prosecution failed to prove the culpability of the accused in any of these cases with
moral certainty, and consequently acquits her from all the charges, with costs de oficio.
464108 04/01/93 150,000.00 W
37

464329 04/20/93 100,000.00 X


[TORTS and DAMAGES]
Her bail bonds are released and the hold departure order as well as the order of "(2) Whether an appeal on the civil aspect may be made from a decision in a criminal
attachment are lifted."11 case acquitting the accused for being not the author of the crime?

Subsequently, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the civil aspect of the "(3) Whether a separate civil action is necessary to be instituted after the accused is
RTC Decision. In an Order12dated March 20, 1996, the trial court denied acquitted in a criminal case based on reasonable doubt?
reconsideration. Quoting portions of its Decision, the RTC said in its Order that the
acquittal of the accused "was not exactly on the ground of reasonable doubt, but that "(4) Whether the civil aspect of the criminal offenses where the accused was acquitted
she was not the author of the frauds allegedly perfpetrated (sic)." Thus, it held that "no may be pursued by a party other than the offended parties? Otherwise stated, whether the
civil liability against her may properly be made." civil liability may be pursued by a party which is not a real party in interest after the
acquittal of the accused of the offenses charged?"19

The Courts Ruling


Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Petition is meritorious.
Granting respondents appeal, the appellate court ruled that the trial courts judgment of
acquittal did not preclude recovery of civil indemnity based on a quasi delict. 13 The CA First Issue:
held that the outcome of the criminal case, whether conviction or acquittal, was
inconsequential in adjudging civil liability arising from the same act that could also be
Timeliness of the
considered a quasi delict. Moreover, FEBTC did not have to reserve its right to file a
separate civil action for damages, because the law had already made that reservation on
respondents behalf.14 Motion for Reconsideration

The CA further held that, contrary to the trial courts clarifications in its March 20, 1996 Because the RTC Decision had been promulgated on December 15, 1995, and
Order, petitioner had been acquitted merely on reasonable doubt arising from respondents Motion for Reconsideration was filed two months after, on February 14,
insufficiency of evidence to establish her identity as perpetrator of the crime. Her 1996, petitioner instantly concludes that the Motion was filed out of time.
acquittal was not due to the nonexistence of the crime for which civil liability could
arise.15Although it agreed with the RTC that forgery Respondent, however, contends that the time for filing the Motion should be counted
had not been satisfactorily proven by FEBTC, the CA nonetheless found petitioner liable from February 1, 1996 -- when it received
for her failure to turn over to respondent the proceeds of the checks. The failure the trial courts Decision -- not from the date of notice to the public prosecutor.20 To
supposedly constituted an actionable fraud.16 determine the period for filing from the latter date would undermine the dual aspects of
a criminal litigation, in which the right of the offended party to appeal the civil aspect is
Thus, the appellate court ordered petitioner to pay respondent P1,187,530.86 as actual independent of the decision of the accused on whether or not to appeal the case. 21
damages, representing the value of the checks that had been paid in her name and to her
account.17 We uphold respondent on this issue. Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court states
as follows:
Hence, this Petition.18
"SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
The Issues from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial
or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run." 22
"(1) Whether the judgment of conviction had already become final at the time the
Clearly, the period available to the accused for filing an appeal is fifteen (15) days from
motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect was filed by the complainant-appellant?
the promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. As
early as Landicho v. Tan,23 the Court has held that one who desires a review of a criminal
38
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
case must appeal within fifteen days from the date the decision or judgment was Arguing on the assumption that she was acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt,
announced in open court in the presence of the accused, or was promulgated in the petitioner explains that the appellate court was nevertheless precluded from taking
manner set forth in Section 6 of Rule 116 (now Section 624 of Rule 120) of the Rules of cognizance of the civil aspect of the case, as a separate civil action should have been
Court. This ruling was reiterated in People v. Tamani,25 in which the Court has further filed after the judgment of acquittal. She contends that Article 29 of the Civil Code,
clarified that the word promulgation in the old provision should be construed as which mandates the courts to make a finding on the civil liability in case of an acquittal
referring to "judgment;" and notice, to "order."26 based on reasonable ground, applies only to situations when a crime has been committed
but the accused is exempt from criminal liability under the instances enumerated in
The above ruling, however, is relevant and applicable to the accused who appeals. In the Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).32
present case, we are confronted with the Motion filed by the private offended party for
reconsideration of the civil aspect of the RTC judgment. It should also be noted that she Petitioner finally argues that the real party-in-interest is not respondent, but Chemical
was not required to be present during the promulgation of the judgment. Bank and/or Kai Chin, the owners of the accounts from which the withdrawals were
made.33
In a long line of cases27 as far back as People v. Ursua,28 this Court has ruled that the
appeal period accorded to the accused should also be available to the offended party who Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that the offended party may appeal the civil
seeks redress of the civil aspect of a decision. Similarly, courts may apply this ruling to aspect of the criminal proceeding despite the judgment of acquittal. 34
the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a judgment. For them to do so will be
consistent with this Courts policy of giving lower tribunals a chance to rectify their Civil Action Deemed Instituted
possible errors29 and thereby promote the speedy and just disposition of controversies.
in the Criminal Proceeding
The relevant question is, when should the period for the filing of a motion by a private
offended party begin? InNeplum v. Orbeso,30 this Court explained that the period begins
Article 100 of the RPC states that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
to toll upon service of the notice of judgment upon the offended party. Thus:
civilly liable. This rule holds true, except in instances when no actual damage results
from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country,
"Indeed, the rules governing the period of appeal in a purely civil action should be the and crime against popular representation.35
same as those covering the civil aspects of criminal judgments. If these rules are not
completely identical, the former may be suppletory to the latter. x x x. Being akin to a
Clearly, the extinction of the penal liability does not always carry with it the extinction
civil action, the present appeal may be guided by the Rules on Civil Procedure." 31
of the civil.36 According to Article 29 of the Civil Code, if the acquittal is made on the
ground that the guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused may be
In the case before us, respondent undisputedly claims that petitioner received notice of held civilly liable for damages arising from the same act or omission constituting the
the RTC Decision only on February 1, 1996. Records show that FEBTC filed its Motion offense. As in any ordinary civil case, the liability may be established by a mere
for Reconsideration on February 14, 1996. The Motion was thus filed within the preponderance of evidence.
reglementary period.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, the prevailing law during the trial of
Second, Third and Fourth Issues: this case below,37 provided the consequences of acts that produced both civil and
criminal liabilities, as follows:
Civil Liability in Case of Acquittal
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
Being interrelated, the second, third and fourth issues will be discussed together. instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
Petitioner contends that her acquittal was not based merely on reasonable doubt, but on waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
the determination that she was not the author of the imputed felonies. She reiterates the action prior to the criminal action.
trial courts ruling in its March 20, 1996 Order that she could not be held civilly liable,
because she was not responsible for the crimes charged. "Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
39
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
x x x x x x x x x." which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is for
Clearly, under the foregoing 1985 rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising the same act or omission. x x x."
from an offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1)
there is an express waiver of the civil action, or (2) there is a reservation to institute a In Salazar v. People,41 the Court further expounded thus:
separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint.
"The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect
For this purpose, the offended parties are allowed to intervene in the criminal of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
proceedings, but solely to enforce their right to claim indemnification for damages preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of
arising from the criminal act.38 In Roa v. De la Cruz,39 in which the offended party failed the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from
to submit evidence of damages despite having participated in the criminal proceedings, or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil
we had the occasion to rule in this wise: action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
"x x x. For such failure, she has only herself or her counsel to blame. Of course, she exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
could have still filed a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to rectify the error. But
this she failed to do, thus allowing the decision to become final and executory. Under the "If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the
principle of res judicata, that judgment is conclusive as to future proceedings at law not civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain the claim or demand, acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party,
but as to any other admissible matter that could have been offered for that purpose." the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil
aspect of the case within the period therefor."
In the present case, the original action involved a prosecution for estafa or swindling
through falsification of commercial documents, an offense defined under the RPC. Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is settled that the private offended party may
Records do not show -- and respondent does not claim -- the presence of any of the three appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. But this
instances precluding the automatic institution of the civil action together with the recourse may prosper only if the nature of the trial courts judgment falls under any of
criminal complaint. Ineluctably, respondents right to damages, if any, was deemed the three categories stated in Salazar.
prosecuted in the criminal proceeding. Thus, a separate civil action may no longer be
instituted. Acquittal of Petitioner Due to the

Appeal of the Civil Aspect of the Noncommission of the Imputed Acts

Decision Acquitting the Accused A close scrutiny of the RTC Decision and Order leads us to the conclusion that petitioner
did not commit the crime imputed to her. Hence, her acquittal likewise extinguished the
The consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the accused are discussed by action for her civil liability.
the Court in Manantan v. CA40 in this wise:
In support of this conclusion, we initially quote at length these findings of the trial court:
"Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the "Re: Crim. Cases No. 93-126175. This case involves the bearer check for the amount
act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a of P250,040.86[.] This is the earliest questionable transaction allegedly committed by
person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and the accused as it happened on 29 September 1992. According to FEBTC records, this
can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex was the initial transaction concerning the Chemical account wherein a cashiers check
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must payable to Chemical (CIF) was used by the accused to purchase another cashiers check
be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation payable to bearer which was later deposited to the account of accused. During the
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal investigation by the banks Investigation Committee, Mrs. Bagsit averred that she
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of confirmed the transaction with Kai Chin and which was later on supported by an
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability authorization letter from Kai Chin. (p. 11, Exh. 1).
40
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
"There is no dispute that the check was deposited to the personal account of the accused otherwise, she should have been made to sign, as what was done in the case of the check
(Exhs. C, C-1 and D) and part of the amount thereof was subsequently withdrawn by her marked as Exh. Q-1."42
(Exh. E), but accused asserted that the deposit of said check to her account and the
subsequent withdrawal of its amount were upon the authority and instructions of Kai As can be clearly gleaned from the above, petitioner consistently claimed that she had
Chin, and that the withdrawn amount was actually given by her to Kai Chin. acted merely upon the instructions and authority of her superior, Kai Chin. While
admitting that she had deposited the proceeds of some of the checks to her personal
"Although Kai Chin denied having signed the confirmation memorandum (Exh. B), account, she firmly insisted that she subsequently withdrew the cash proceeds and
there is absolutely no evidence on record that the money was never turned over to Kai turned them over to him. She denied -- and the records do not show -- that she had ever
Chin. Kai Chin did not testify, on direct evidence or on rebuttal, concerning this aspect appropriated those moneys for her personal gain.
of the case. x x x.
On the other hand, as the trial judge clearly noted, Kai Chin did not even bother to rebut
"Re: Crim. Cases Nos. 93-126172, 93-126178, 93-126189 and 93-126190. -- These four the statement of petitioner that she had turned over the proceeds of the checks to
cases involve the Cashiers Checks applied for and made payable to the accused (Exhs. him.43 All he asserted was that he had neither signed the applications for the purchase of
G-1, F-2, H-2 and I-2). Exhs. G-1 and F-2 were encashed by the accused because they the checks nor endorsed those checks. His credibility was assessed by the judge thus:
bear at their back two signatures of hers, and according to the witnesses for the
prosecution the first of such signatures constitutes the indorsement while the second "Credibility of Kai Chin. It must be noticed that, with the exception of the bearer
signifies receipt of the proceeds of the payment thereof. On the other hand, Exhs. H-2 check involved in Crim. Case No. 93-126175, the value of the Cashiers Checks
and I-2 were deposited by her in her personal account. According to the accused the involve[d] were debited from the Chemical account. Kai Chin is undisputably one of the
drawing of the checks in her name and their encashments and deposit to her account authorized signatories to the Chemical account, and under ordinary course of things, he
were upon the authority and instructions of Kai Chin, and that the values thereof were all must be the payee and/or beneficiary of the checks.
turned over to Kai Chin.
"Initially, Kai Chin sweepingly testified as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: In her capacity as your secretary, when she was your secretary did Josephine
"Re: Crim. Case No. 93-126171. This case involves a Cashiers Check applied for and Sanchez have anything to do with the Chemical International Finance account?
made payable to Kai Chin, signed twice at the back but accused nonetheless signed for
the receipt of the payment thereof. x x x While Kai Chin denied on direct evidence that
A: No, sir. (tsn, p. 9, 8 Nov 1994)
he signed the application for the purchase of this check and also the back of the check
itself, there is also no showing that the value thereof did not reach him. Accused asserted
that this check was applied for and encashed upon the authority and instruction of Kai "The records of the bank and FEBII, however, show otherwise. Thus, as early as April,
Chin, and that the value thereof was turned over to the latter. 1992, Kai Chin had already authorized the accused to transact matters concerning the
Chemical account, through a memorandum he sent to Mrs. Beatriz Bagsit and one Ms.
Enriquez, reading as follows:
xxxxxxxxx

This is to request for the following:


"Re: the rest of the other criminal cases. -- The remaining fifteen other cases involve
checks applied for and drawn in the name of Kai Chin and twice signed at the back. As
intimated earlier, the first signature at the back of the check constitutes the indorsement 1) Ms. Enriquez to partially terminate the amount of P250,000.00 from the
thereof while the second signifies receipt of the payment of the value. CIFs placement (P3M) and credit the same to SA#0101-58459-8 maintained at
Intramuros Branch.
"The only intervention of the accused concerning these checks, as appearing in the
documentary exhibits, was her being named as the representative of the purchaser and 2) Ms. Bagsit to debit SA#0101-58459-8 for P290,000.00 and entrust the same to my
she must have picked up the checks for and in behalf of the purchaser. (See Exhs. P, N, Secretary, Ms. Jo Sanchez for proper disposition.
O, K, L, S, T, M, U, V, W, X, Y and Z). There is no indication, at least from the
documents of the prosecution, that accused had a hand in the encashments of the checks,

41
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
In view of my home leave/business trip scheduled on April 29-June 8, 1992, the above furthermore, her testimony had been "corroborated by the Peoples exhibits
requests will be confirmed by Ms. Sanchez upon my instructions before the end of May, themselves."47 Indeed, her claim that she had prior authorization from Kai Chin to
1992. (Memo [dated] 28 April 1992, attached as Annex B to Exh. 2.) undertake the questioned transactions was supported by no less than the prosecution
evidence.
"Kai Chin never denied his signature on this document, either on direct evidence or on
rebuttal (as he was not presented as a rebuttal witness)." 44 Thus, the trial court emphatically concluded that petitioner "was not the author of the
frauds allegedly perfpetrated [sic],"48 if any. The Court of Appeals concurred in that
The authority conferred by Kai Chin upon petitioner was also borne out by the reports of conclusion when it categorically held thus: "We rule out the issue of forgery as this was
the FEBTC Investigating Committee, pertinent parts of which were quoted in the RTC not satisfactorily proved x x x."49
Decision as follows:
Under Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, a finding in a final
"4. Initial interview with the officers of FEBII disclosed the following: judgment that the fact from which civil liability may arise does not exist carries with it
the extinction of the liability. Thus, the critical issue in the present appeal is this: was the
civil liability of petitioner duly established by the evidence?
4.1 In January, 1992, Mr. Kai Chin personally went to the office of MS. URSULA A.
ALANO, Vice President of FEBII and allegedly informed the latter that he will directly
manage the CIF [also referred to as CIFL or Chemical] account. Mr. Chin informed MS Answering in the affirmative, the CA explained that a single act or omission may
ALANO that instructions concerning the account will either originate from his or his produce two forms of civil liability: one is for ex delicto or that which arises from a
representative, MS. J. M. SANCHEZ; crime under our penal statutes; and the other is for a quasi delict orculpa extra-
contractual. In the present case, civil liability ex delicto was foreclosed by the acquittal.
Nonetheless, "[a]lthough the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist
Based on Mr. Chins instructions, placements /preterminations/payments of the account
due to [petitioners] acquittal, [respondents] cause of action makes out a case of quasi
were transacted by Mr. Chin himself or his authorized representative, J. SANCHEZ. (p.
delict."50
9, Exh. 1, underscoring supplied; see also p. 11 of the same exhibit.)
Contrary to the trial court, the CA disbelieved petitioners assertions that she had turned
over the proceeds of the checks to Kai Chin. Granting that she was authorized to encash
the checks, she supposedly had no like authority to deposit the proceeds to her personal
"These facts were recited in the Memorandum of Ms. U.A. Ulano, attached as Annex B bank account. The appellate court concluded that, in breach of Article 33 51 of the Civil
to Exh. 1, which reads as follows: Code, "she abused the confidence reposed in her by [respondent] in the performance of
her duty."52 Thus, the CA ordered her to pay respondent the amount of P1,187,530.86 as
Facts: Due to the transfer of Mr. Kai Chin to FEBTC Head Office in Intramuros last actual damages, representing the total value of five checks paid in her name and to her
January 1992, he personally went to see me in my office to inform me that he was account.53
directly managing the CIF account. He also informed me thatinstructions concerning the
account will either originate from him or his authorized representative, Ms. J. M. In view of the conflicting findings of the lower courts as regards the credibility of the
Sanchez. witnesses, we invoke the time-honored rule that "the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and their
Based on the given instructions of Mr. Kai Chin, placements/preterminations/payments testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
of the account weretransacted by Mr. Kai Chin himself or his authorized representative, opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and
Ms. J. M. Sanchez. [Underscoring by the RTC.]"45 attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating
the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
The above evidence led the trial court to conclude that "Kai Chin, definitely, was less testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can
candid to the [c]ourt when he testified"46 that petitioner had nothing to do with the CIFL be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and
account. which witness to disbelieve."54

As regards petitioners testimony, the trial judge observed that she had firmly and Barring arbitrariness and oversight of facts that might affect the result of the case
straightforwardly echoed the material allegations in her Counter-Affidavit; and that, otherwise, the RTCs assessment of the witnesses and their testimonies in this case binds

42
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
even this Court.55 In any event, we scoured the records and, unlike the CA, we found no
sufficient reason to reject the trial courts assessment. There was no arbitrariness or
oversight of any fact or circumstance of weight and influence to justify a different
conclusion.

Moreover, the CA based its imposition of civil liability upon petitioner on her supposed
abuse of her employers confidence. Granting for the sake of argument that she indeed
forged the checks and misappropriated the proceeds to her personal benefit, it must be
recalled that it was Kai Chins signatures that she purportedly forged; and CIFLs
account that she, in effect, misappropriated. Be it remembered that respondents own
documentary evidence unequivocally concurred in the assertion of petitioner that Kai
Chin had given her express authority to transact CIFLs account on his behalf.
Consequently, it was his, not respondents, confidence that she had exploited. In other
words, the factual premises of the CA did not support its conclusion.

In sum, we hold that petitioners acquittal was based on the fact that she had not
committed the offense imputed to her. Consequently, she cannot be held civilly liable. In
concluding that she, as well as her testimony, was credible, the trial court cannot be
faulted with arbitrariness or negligence. Tellingly, her testimony that she turned over the
proceeds of the subject checks to Kai Chin stands unrebutted.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed CA Decision and
Resolution SET ASIDE. The December 15, 1995 Decision and the March 20, 1996
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, are hereby REINSTATED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES,


INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909
which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and
attorneys fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.

43
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
The factual antecedents are as follows: 6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although
there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into.3
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate
number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza. Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil
case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan,
together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad
his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the
Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work.
Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her husband went to his hometown in
the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to her husbands
damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision. hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net

Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the
treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the
the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans testimonies of respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said
Memorial Medical Center. case, together with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch
Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent
Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage documents he had brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and
to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the
on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said
Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D- TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in
the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos. For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The
TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following: No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground
that he was already dead.
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well
as the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved; Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs 10 of
the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal
Case No. 684-M-89.
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the
resolute in saying it was the former who caused the smash up.
existence of the medical certificate;
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being
ahead of the bus;
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took
place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60
44
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the
Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was I
still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the
testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took
THE TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE
place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff
TSNs AND OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also
overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the
jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine II
Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not
moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine THE TRIAL COURTS RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON
Rabbit bus from behind. HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.

Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit III
Bus bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine
Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony THE TRIAL COURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs
before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND
[Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation
of their respective vehicles.]11
IV
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
Manliclic. THE TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEE.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan
and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with
reads: this Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife,
Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita
Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan. 15
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount
of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a
used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and Decision16 of the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge 17 of
another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, including Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching
appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay costs. 12 thereto a photocopy thereof.

Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. 13 On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be
admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.14

45
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the
witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process
the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos
witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. 22 to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S.
684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite
criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs therein petitioners assertion that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN,
employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule
that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was
employees.23 belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object based on said
ground.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been
PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility. admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to
"testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said section
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former
document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part
since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given
to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled. 29
provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic
be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 24 Hearsay as to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondents version. They anchor
evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of
made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
deserves.25 Physical Injuries.

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the case.
criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising
petitioners.26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing
from, or based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or
the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that
reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its
the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should not be
failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its
admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban
employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its
cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of
the adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist "4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board
that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the
disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila together with
MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;

46
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the xxxx
above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a
Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for
being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined
was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently lost in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32
control of his vehicle;
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the
vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules
where it fell on its drivers side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the of Criminal Procedure which reads:
above-described motor vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist.
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries
which compounded plaintiffs frail physical condition and required his
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The
hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the
afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and
medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part
not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil
hereof;
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111],
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above- whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. 33
Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without
due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with
a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and
the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence
its drivers; x x x"31 causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code,
or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. 34 It
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not
notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. 35
negligence on his part?
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said: civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
"when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil
of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or
jeep"; x x x delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a
civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
We do not agree.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that
The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was
accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
beyond the control of accused-appellant.
47
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he should
not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine
Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep.
In his testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to Court, he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep
disregard that of respondents. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the when the collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and
process of overtaking respondents jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep
to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the and the bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true that in the
collision. statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it
was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking
another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual
took place. But the fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding
after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should not escape attention. The one-day
and conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not
difference between the giving of the two statements would be significant enough to
allow a review thereof unless:
entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before giving his
statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the statement of Manliclic
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10,
(2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) 1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of
conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep when the collision between the jeep in
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts
xxxx
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his
record.39 conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to
the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have
been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would
should have fallen on the road itself rather than having been forced off the road. Useless,
warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial
likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was
Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.40
negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving
credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up,
there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was
by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under Article
correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the
218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
operation of their respective vehicle.
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article
given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore,
took place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of
was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. 43
Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a product of an

48
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a
required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as
petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that follows:
petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of
due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a
investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles.
due diligence in the supervision of its employees. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There
has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should
their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody
employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while
and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.44 been negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its
employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 45 it was explained that:
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough
whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should
necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner
of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one
acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory manual is being lent to all the drivers?
functions.
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily
may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.
of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of
the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount
the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the
employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the towing and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages,
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial
decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption. court as moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. 49 The amount awarded by
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the the trial court must, likewise, be lowered toP50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for
formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51
complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from
negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the
efficiency and safety were followed." x x x. MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00;
and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against
petitioners.

49
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
SO ORDERED. RICARDO QUIAMBAO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA
BERNARDO, and FELIPE GAZA, respondents-appellees, LAND
AUTHORITY, intervenor-appellant.

FERNAN, J.:

This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals as one involving pure questions of
law pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The antecedents are as follows:

In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private respondents Zenaida Gaza
Buensucero, Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner Ricardo
Quiambao before the then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal, docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 2526, it was alleged that private respondents were the legitimate possessors of
a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of the Longos Estate
situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of the Agreement to Sell No. 3482
executed in their favor by the former Land Tenure Administration [which later became
the Land Authority, then the Department of Agrarian Reform]; that under cover of
darkness, petitioner surreptitiously and by force, intimidation, strategy and stealth,
entered into a 400 sq. m. portion thereof, placed bamboo posts "staka" over said portion
and thereafter began the construction of a house thereon; and that these acts of
petitioner, which were unlawful per se, entitled private respondents to a writ of
preliminary injunction and to the ejectment of petitioner from the lot in question.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and upon denial thereof, filed his
Answer to the complaint, specifically denying the material allegations therein and
averring that the Agreement upon which private respondents base their prior possession
over the questioned lot had already been cancelled by the Land Authority in an Order
signed by its Governor, Conrado Estrella. By way of affirmative defense and as a ground
for dismissing the case, petitioner alleged the pendency of L.A. Case No. 968, an
administrative case before the Office of the Land Authority between the same parties
and involving the same piece of land. In said administrative case, petitioner disputed
private respondents' right of possession over the property in question by reason of the
latter's default in the installment payments for the purchase of said lot. Petitioner
asserted that his administrative case was determinative of private respondents' right to
eject petitioner from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a
judicial action until after its termination.

After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss contained in petitioner's
C. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION affirmative defenses. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue involved in the case was the
recovery of physical possession, the court had jurisdiction to try and hear the case.
G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988

50
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in
Rizal, Branch XII, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-1576 a petition for certiorari with character, it is obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of.
injunction against public respondent Judge Adriano Osorio of the Municipal Court of Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2] proceedings,
Malabon and private respondents, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the
injunction ordering respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment case until disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case.
after the resolution of said petition. As prayed for, the then CFI of Rizal issued a For while it may be true that private respondents had prior possession of the lot in
restraining order enjoining further proceedings in the ejectment case. question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession had
been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land
In his answer, respondent municipal judge submitted himself to the sound discretion of Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not private
the CFI in the disposition of the petition for certiorari. Private respondents, on the other respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is but a necessary, logical
hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition, maintaining that the administrative case did consequence of the issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing the
not constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the question of ownership, unlike the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the
ejectment case which involved merely the question of possession. disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the
subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private respondents would have every
right to eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of
Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil
possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.
Case No. C-1576 alleging the pendency of an administrative case between the same
parties on the same subject matter in L.A. Case No. 968 and praying that the petition for
certiorari be granted, the ejectment complaint be dismissed and the Office of the Land Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to have
Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively. taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the
administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such
move. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's
Finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of prior possession, the CFI
right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to needlessly
dismissed the petition for certiorari and lifted the restraining order previously issued.
require not only the parties but the court as well to expend time, effort and money in
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, adopted in toto by
what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:
Intervenor Land Authority was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal filed by
petitioner Quiambao and intervenor Land Authority with the Court of Appeals, and
certified to Us as aforesaid. The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action,
hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending
The instant controversy boils down to the sole question of whether or not the
in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the
administrative case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of the
same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the
ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said
disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort
ejectment case.
for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to the
second action cannot be properly determined until the questions
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the raised in the first action are settled the second action should be
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the stayed. 2
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 1 The doctrine of prejudicial question
comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and
While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions, the
the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be
existence in the instant case of the same considerations of Identity of parties and issues,
pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the
economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need
existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause
to resolve the parties' right of possession before the ejectment case may be properly
the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the former.
determined, justifies the rule's analogous application to the case at bar.

The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of
Fortich-Celdran, et al. vs. Celdran, et al., 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogous
the Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or
situation. In sustaining the assailed order of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis
intimately related to the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue
Oriental ordering the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public document
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
against several persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane until the
51
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
civil case involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged document shall
have been decided, this Court cited as a reason therefor its own action on the
administrative charges against said Santiago Catane, as follows:

It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in


this Court against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by
Us in abeyance, thus:

"As it appears that the genuineness of the


document allegedly forged by respondent
attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 [Richard
Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.] is
necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of
the Cebu Court of First Instance, action on the
herein complaint is withheld until that litigation
has finally been decided. Complainant Celdran
shall inform the Court about such decision." 3

If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial question to


an administrative case, We see no reason why the reverse may not be so considered in
the proper case, such as in the petition at bar. Finally, events occuring during the
pendency of this petition attest to the wisdom of the conclusion herein reached. For in
the Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner, it was stated that the intervenor Land
Authority which later became the Department of Agrarian Reform had promulgated a
decision in the administrative case, L.A. Case No. 968 affiriming the cancellation of
Agreement to Sell No. 3482 issued in favor of private respondents. With this
development, the folly of allowing the ejectment case to proceed is too evident to need
further elaboration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the
then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

52
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and
Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. 1 On the
same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City. 2

After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa
against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato,
presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.

On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu
proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that:

. . . after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant, Juliana


P. Yap and of the respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the
Court holds and maintained (sic) that there is a prejudicial question
to a civil action, which must be ventilated in the proper civil court. In
the case of Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the Supreme Court had
already made a pronouncement that "a criminal action for Estafa for
alleged double sale of property is a prejudicial question to a civil
action for nullity of the alleged Deed of Sale and defense of the
alleged vendors of forgeries of their signatures to the Deed." 3

The Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April 30, 1990. She then
came to this Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari.
GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992
The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of Appeals, which has
JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner, concurrent jurisdiction under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view of
vs. the peculiar circumstances involved.
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of
Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, respondents. The petitioner's contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case, the
criminal action may not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this suspension
CRUZ, J.: may not be done motu proprio by the judge trying the criminal case but only upon
petition of the defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also stressed that a
This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a piece of property they reversal of the order of dismissal would not bar the prosecution of the accused under the
inherited from their parents. The case is complicated by the circumstance that the private double jeopardy rule because he has not yet been arraigned.
respondent's counsel in this petition is the son of the judge, the other respondent, whose
action is being questioned. The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras who filed the comment in
his behalf is the son and namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is
Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent Martin Paras.* employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He has made it of record that he was not the
counsel of Paras at the time the questioned order of dismissal was issued by his father.
He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias against his father.
On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate estate
for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, on
May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may have been a basis for the
was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. order in view of the alleged double sale of the property which was being litigated in the
regional trial court. He concedes, however, that the order may have been premature and
53
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
that it could not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that double jeopardy would We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
not attach because of the lack of arraignment, he asks that his Comment be considered a cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action,
motion for the suspension of the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question. it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil
The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent judge did indeed action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused". 6
commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal.
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by this Court action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.
on July 7, 1988, provides as follows:
The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order does not appear anywhere in
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for the decision of Ras v. Rasul.7 Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but also
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a wrongly applied it. The facts of that case are not analogous to those in the case at bar.
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which he later also sold to
criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend Martin. Pichel brought a civil action for nullification of the second sale and asked that
shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the the sale made by Ras in his favor be declared valid. Ras's defense was that he never sold
prosecution rests. the property to Pichel and his purported signatures appearing in the first deed of sale
were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was filed against Ras based on the same
Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, in light of the clear double sale that was the subject of the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for Suspension of
provision of the above-quoted rule. The rule is not even new, being only a rewording of Action" (that is, the criminal case), claiming that the resolution of the issues in the civil
the original provision in the Rules of Court before they were amended. It plainly says case would necessarily be determinative of his guilt or innocence.
that the suspension may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge
alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal. One also wonders if the person Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court ruled that a suspension of
who notarized the disputed second sale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might be the criminal action was in order because:
related to the respondent judge.
On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases
But more important than the preceding considerations is the trial judge's against petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a
misapprehension of the concept of a prejudicial question. prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question
in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras' defense
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides: (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the
alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil
case and complaining witnesses in the criminal case) is based on the
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential
very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an
petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the
the criminal action may proceed.
offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed
to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the
a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of which pertains alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious.
to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the
court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court
xxx xxx xxx
or tribunal. 4 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 5
The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in
Civil Case No. 73 that he had never sold the property in litigation to

54
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in the alleged deed
of sale and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is,
therefore, necessary that the truth or falsity of such claim be first
determined because if his claim is true, then he did not sell his
property twice and no estafa was committed. The question of nullity
of the sale is distinct and separate from the crime of estafa (alleged
double sale) but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the criminal action.

In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that the
defense in the civil case forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale had to be
threshed out first. Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for
suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge had not been
informed of the defense Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not
have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action would determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a
prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must
involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal
action and its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.

The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension in accordance
with Rule 111, Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, and
even without the accused indicating his defense in the civil case for the annulment of the
second sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of the
respondent judge.

Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code of Judicial
Conduct, "a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence"
and "should administer justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for his
questionable conduct in the case at bar, with the warning that commission of similar acts
in the future will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by Judge Alfredo D.


Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the
Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for further
proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.

SO ORDERED.

55
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
the defendants religiously paid the rentals until 1967; that thereafter, the defendants
refused to pay the rentals; that the incumbent mayor discovered that the defendants filed
a "Cadastral Answer" over said lot; that the defendants refused to vacate the place
despite efforts of the municipality; that the national government had alloted an
appropriation for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza but
the said construction which was already started could not continue because of the
presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants; that the appropriation for the
construction of the gymnasium might be reverted back to the national government which
would result to "irreparable damage, injury and prejudice" to the municipality and its
people who are expected to derive benefit from the accomplishment of the project.

The complaint prayed:


G.R. No. 97477 May 8, 1992
1. That a restraining order shall be issued immediately after the filing
RTC JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
of this case;
23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur and the MUNICIPALITY OF DUMINGAG,
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR; represented by MAYOR DOMICIANO E.
REAL, petitioners, 2. That after due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory
vs. injunction shall be issued against the herein defendants for them (sic)
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE MEDINA and FORTUNATA form further occupying the leased portion to them (sic), and/or that a
ROSELLON, respondents. Writ of Possession be immediately issued to preserve the rights of the
herein plaintiff;

3. That judgment should be entered against the herein defendants to


vacate the premises of the leased portion given to them. (CA Rollo,
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
pp. 11-12)

The present petition seeks to annul and set aside the decision and resolution dated On the same day, September 24, 1990, the petitioner Judge issued an order setting the
January 21, 1991 and February 20, 1991, respectively of the Court of Appeals which
preliminary hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
declared as null and void the October 10, 1991 order of the petitioner Judge in a civil and/or writ of possession on October 10, 1990.
case "for ejectment with preliminary injunction and damages" filed by petitioner
municipality against the private respondents granting the petitioner municipality's
motion for a writ of possession and the writ issued pursuant to it. Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court, since the complaint is for illegal detainer which is within
the original jurisdiction of the municipal court and the pendency of a cadastral case
On September 24, 1990, petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Domiciano E. (Cadastral Case No. N-10, LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-108, Lot 9481 [Pls-61] TS-218)
Real filed with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, Molave,
between the parties over the ownership of the same parcel of land.
presided by the petitioner Judge, a complaint denominated as "Ejectment with
Preliminary Injunction and Damages" against respondents Vicente Medina and
Fortunata Rosellon. On October 10, 1990, the petitioner Judge issued two (2) orders. The first order denied
the motion to dismiss. The second order granted the petitioner municipality's motion for
a writ of possession "with the ancillary writ of demolition to place in possession the
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff (petitioner municipality herein) is the owner of a
plaintiff on the land subject of this case, to the end that the public construction thereon
parcel of residential land located at Poblacion, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur with an will not be jeopardized." (CA Rollo, p. 22)
area of 5,894 square meters more or less; that the parcel of land was reserved for public
plaza under Presidential Proclamation No. 365 dated March 15, 1968; that during the
incumbency of the late Mayor Isidoro E. Real, Sr. or in 1958, the municipality leased an In denying the motion to dismiss, the petitioner Judge said:
Area of 1,350 square meters to the defendants (respondents herein) subject to the
condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes; that xxx xxx xxx
56
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
2. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is claiming Before the petitioner Judge could further act on the case, the private respondents filed a
ownership over the land which was previously rented to defendant by petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the October 10 and October
the plaintiff municipality. This action is, therefore, clearly anaccion 19, 1990 orders of the petitioner Judge.
de reivindicacion, a real action within the jurisdiction of this court.
In a resolution dated November 14, 1990, the petition was given due course and a
3. As the complaint is for recovery of ownership of the land not to temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the petitioner Judge from proceeding
enforce the contract, the Statute of Fraud does not apply. with the hearing of the case and from enforcing the October 10, and 19, 1990 orders.

4. The land subject of this case is covered by P.D. No. 365, On January 21, 1990, the appellate court rendered the questioned decision. A motion for
withdrawing this land from sale of settlement and reserving the same reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated February 20, 1991.
for school site purposes under the administration of the Director of
Public School and public plaza under the administration of the Hence, this petition.
Municipality of Dumingag, therefore the Cadastral court has no
jurisdiction over the land involved in this case. (CA Rollo, p. 20)
In a resolution dated November 26, 1991, we gave due course to the petition.
The petitioner Judge justified his granting the motion for a writ of possession with the
The appellate court rightfully upheld the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the
ancillary writ of demolition by applying the rule an eminent domain (Rule 67 of the
case based on the allegations in the complaint. The allegations and not the title control
Revised Rules of Court, erroneously referred to as Rule 68) in analogy in that under this
the cause of action of the complaint. (Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191
Rule the complainant is given the right to the writ of possession in order that public
SCRA 195 [1990]).
construction and projects will not be delayed. According to the petitioner Judge, the
necessity of a writ of possession is greater in the instant case considering that the parcel
of land is covered by a Presidential Proclamation and the on-going construction thereon The Court said:
is being endangered to be left unfinished on account of the buildings standing on the
parcel of land because the appropriation for the construction might be reverted back to First, Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction over the case
the national treasury. brought by the Municipality of Dimangag? As already noted, the gist
of the complaint below is that the land in question is part of the
The private respondents filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration with motion to set public domain which the President of the Philippines, under
aside order and to quash writ of possession and demolition but this was denied in an Proclamation No. 365, dated March 25, (should be 15) 1968, reserved
order dated October 19, 1990. for school site and public plaza in the Municipality of Dumingag and
that the petitioners, to whom the former town mayor had leased a part
of the land, refused to vacate and to pay rents. If this is the theory on
On October 19, 1990, the petitioner municipality implemented the writ of possession
which the complaint is based, then the action may really be
and ancillary writ of demolition issued by the petitioner Judge resulting in the
considered one for recovery of possession. For though a lease is
dispossession of the private respondents from the parcel of land and the demolition of
alleged, the lease would be void and the municipality could recover
structures and buildings thereon owned by the respondents.
the possession of the land. This is the teaching of the leading case
ofMunicipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602 [1915] in which it was
On October 23, 1990, the private respondents filed their answer to the complaint held that the lease by a municipal corporation of a public plaza is null
alleging therein that the subject parcel of land has been owned, occupied and possess by and void because land for public use is outside the commerce of man
respondent Vicente Medina since 1947 when he bought the subject parcel from a and, therefore, the lessee must restore possession of the land by
Subanan native; that the other respondent Fortunata Rosellon leased from Medina a vacating it. As in this case, in the Rojas case the action was for
portion of the parcel of land; that the respondents were never lessees of the petitioner recovery of possession instituted in the Court of First Instance, the
municipality; that Proclamation No-365 issued on March 15, 1968 recognized "private counterpart of which at present is the Regional Trial Court. We,
rights"; and, that a case is pending before the Cadastral court between respondent therefore, hold that the respondent judge has jurisdiction of the case
Medina and petitioner municipality as regards the ownership of the subject parcel of brought against petitioners for recovery of possession of what is
land. alleged to be land for public use of the respondent municipality.
(CA Rollo, pp. 53-54)

57
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
Prescinding from the finding that the complaint is for recovery of possession the The petitioners now contend that the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of
appellate court concluded that the trial court did not have authority to issue a writ of action for abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code. On the
possession and a writ of demolition citing the case of Mabale v.Apalisok (88 SCRA 234 basis of this proposition, the petitioners assert that petitioner municipality is entitled to
[1979]), to wit: the writ of possession and writ of demolition.

In that connection, it should be borne in mind that the law specifies Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as follows:
when a writ of possession may be issued. That writ is available (1) in
a land registration proceeding, which is a proceeding in rem (Sec. 17, Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business,
Act No. 496; Estipona v. Navarro, 69 SCRA 285, 291); (2) in an condition of property or anything else which:
extra-judicial foreclosure of a realty mortgage (Sec. 7, Act No. 3135);
(3) in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage, a quasi in
xxx xxx xxx
rem proceeding,provided that the mortgagor is in possession of the
mortgaged realty and no third person, not party to the foreclosure
suit, had intervened (Rivera v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
and Rupac, 61 Phil. 201; Ramos v. Maalac and Lopez, 89 Phil. 270,
275) and (4) in execution sales (last par. of sec. 35, Rule 39, Rules of while Article 695 provides:
Court).
Art. 695 Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance
The appellate court also ruled that the trial court committed an error when it applied by affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of
analogy the rule on eminent domain (Rule 67, Revised Rules of Court) to justify the persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage
issuance of the writ of possession and writ of demolition. The appellate court pointed upon individuals may be unequal. . . .
out that under this rule:
Applying these criteria, we agree with the petitioners that the complaint alleges factual
xxx xxx xxx circumstances of a complaint for abatement of public nuisance. Thus, the complaint
states: that petitioner municipality is the owner of a parcel of land covered by
. . . (i) There is clear statutory authority for the taking of possession Presidential Proclamation No 365 which is reserved for a public plaza; that the private
by the government and (ii) The authority is premised on the respondents by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the former mayor occupied a
government depositing the value of the land to be taken. For unless portion of the parcel of land constructing buildings thereon; that the private respondents
the taking of the land is done under these conditions, the taking refused to vacate the premises despite demands; that the municipality is constructing a
would constitute deprivation of property without due process of law municipal gymnasium in the area financed by appropriations provided by the national
which the Constitution prohibits. (See Manila Railroad Co. v. government; and that the appropriations are in danger of being reverted to the national
Paredes, 31 Phil. 118 [1915]) (CA Rollo, p. 55) treasury because the construction had to be stopped in view of the refusal of the private
respondents to vacate the area.
The appellate court then stated:
The issue, however, is not the nature of the cause of action alleged in the complaint. The
more important question is whether or not the petitioner municipality is entitled to a writ
In the case at bar, there is neither statutory authority for the trial
of possession and a writ of demolition even before the trial of the case starts.
court's action nor bond given to compensate the petitioners for the
deprivation of their possession and the destruction of their houses if it
turns out that the land belongs to them. For this reason, we think the Article 699 of the Civil Code provides for the following remedies against a public
trial courts order is arbitrary and void. For the fact is that petitioners nuisance:
claim ownership of the land in question and until that question is
resolved either in the case pending before the respondent judge or in (1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or
the cadastral proceeding, it would be unjust to deprive petitioners of
its possession. (CA Rollo, pp. (2) A civil action; or
55-56)

58
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings. intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality
of San Fernando, conformably to the aforementioned orders from the
The petitioner municipality had three remedies from which to select its cause of action. court and the council. It is, therefore, not correct to say that he had
It chose to file a civil action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in issuing his
by the private respondents. Obviously, petitioner municipality was aware that under the order.
then Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an
ordinance before the municipality may summarily abate a public nuisance. (Sec. 149(z) xxx xxx xxx
(ee).
The Court observes that even without such investigatiom and
On the premise that the parcel of land forms part of a public plaza, the petitioners now recommendation, the respondent mayor was justified in ordering the
contend that the Judge was justified in issuing the writ of possession and writ of area cleared on the strength alone of its status as a public plaza as
demolition. declared by the judicial and legislative authorities. . . .

A public plaza is outside the commerce of man and constructions thereon can be abated If, therefore, the allegations in the complaint are true and that the parcel of land being
summarily by the municipality. We ruled in the case of Villanueva v. Castaeda, Jr. (154 occupied by the private respondents is indeed a public plaza, then the writ of possession
SCRA 142 [1987]): and writ of demolition would have been justified. In fact, under such circumstances,
there would have been no need for a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner
Exactly in point is Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, (102 municipality since the private respondents' occupation over the subject parcel of land
Phil. 869-870) where the Supreme Court declared: can not be recognized by any law. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to
eject the private respondents.
There is absolutely no question that the town plaza
cannot be used for the construction of market However, not only did the municipality avoid the use of abatement without judicial
stalls, specially of residences, and that such proceedings, but the status of the subject parcel of land has yet to be decided.
structures constitute a nuisance subject to
abatement according to law. Town plazas are We have to consider the fact that Proclamation No. 365 dated March 15, 1968
properties of public dominion, to be devoted to recognizes private rights which may have been vested on other persons, to wit:
public use and to be made available to the public
in general. They are outside the commerce of man BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the PROCLAMATION NO. 365
municipality to private parties.
RESERVING FOR SCHOOL SITE, PUBLIC PLAZA AND
Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that petitioners had no PLAYGROUND PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF
right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease DUMINGAG, PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, ISLAND
contracts. They should have realized and accepted this earlier, OF MINDANAO.
considering that even before Civil Case No. 2040 was decided, the
municipal council of San Fernando had already adopted Resolution
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
No. 29, series of 1964, declaring this area as the parking place and
Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I
public plaza of the municipality.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and under the
It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said resolution of the administration of the Director of Public Schools administration of the
municipal council of San Fernando that respondent Macalino was Municipal Government of Dumingag, subject to private rights, if any
seeking to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the stalls there be, certain parcels of land of the public domain situated in the
constructed in the disputed area. As officer-in-charge of the office of Municipality of Dumingag, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Island of
the mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its Mindanao, . . . (CA Rollo, pp. 41-A 42) (Emphasis supplied).
59
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
It is to be noted that even before the Proclamation, the parcel of land was the subject of The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and
cadastral proceedings before another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga administrative in character, it is obvious that technically, there is no
del Sur. At the time of the filing of the instant case, the cadastral proceedings intended to prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is the
settle the ownership over the questioned portion of the parcel of land under intimate correlation between said two [2] proceedings, stemming
Proclamation No. 365 were still pending. One of the claimants in the cadastral from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner
proceedings is private respondent Vicente Medina who traced his ownership over the from the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the
subject parcel of land as far back as 1947 when he allegedly bought the same from a pending administrative case. For while it may be true that private
Subanan native. respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of
the institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession had
Under the cadastral system, the government through the Director of Lands initiates the been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by
proceedings by filing a petition in court after which all owners or claimants are the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their favor.
compelled to act and present their answers otherwise they lose their right to their own Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their
property. The purpose is to serve the public interests by requiring that the titles to any right of possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the
lands "be settled and adjudicated." (Section 1 Cadastral Act [No. 22593] Government of issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing the
the Philippine Islands v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996 [1919]. It is a proceeding in rem somewhat validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the
akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree. (Director of subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If the
Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120 [1920]) cancellation of the agreement, to Sell and the subsequent award to
petitioner are voided, then private respondent's right of possession is
lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.
Considering therefore, the nature and purpose of the Cadastral proceedings, the outcome
of said proceedings becomes a prejudicial question which must be addressed in the
resolution of the instant case. We apply by analogy the ruling in the case of Quiambao Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the
v. Osorio (158 SCRA 674 [1988]), to wit: trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in
abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case.
Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such
The instant controversy boils down to the sole question of whether or
move. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the
not the administrative case between the private parties involving the
possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the
lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial
pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the
question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.
parties but the court as well to expend time, effort in what may turn
out to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in tells us:
a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another
The court in which an action is pending may, in
tribunal. (Zapanta v. Montesa, 4 SCRA 510 [1962]; People v. Aragon,
the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
50 O.G. No. 10, 4863) The doctrine of prejudicial question comes as
application for a stay of that action, hold the action
in to play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are
in abeyance to abide the outcome of another
pending and the issues involved in bath cases are similar or so
pending in another court, especially where the
closely-related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the
parties and the issues are the same, for there is
civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence
power inherent in every court to control the
it a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case
disposition of causes an its dockets with economy
to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of
of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
the former.
litigants. Where the rights of parties in the record
action cannot be properly determined until the
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under questions raised in the first action are settled the
Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court area: [a] the civil second action should be stayed.
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in
the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
60
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] for just compensation to which the private respondents may be entitled in case the
court actions, the existence in the instant case of the same demolition of their buildings is adjudged to be illegal.
considerations of identity of parties and issues, economy of time and
effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to Moreover, the appellate court correctly ruled this Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
resolve the parties' right of possession before the ejectment case may on eminent domain can not be made a subterfuge to justify the petitioner Judge's
be properly determined, justifies the rule's analogous application to issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner municipality. In the recent case
the case at bar. of National Power Corporation v. Hon. Enrique T. Jocson, et al. (G.R. No. 94193-99,
February 25, 1992) we said:
Technically, a prejudicial question shall not rise in the instant case since the two actions
involved are both civil in nature. However, we have to consider the fact that the In Municipality of Bian v. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al. (180 SCRA
cadastral proceedings will ultimately settle the real owner/s of the disputed parcel of 576 [1989]) this Court ruled that there are two (2) stages in every
land. In case respondent Vicente Medina is adjudged the real owner of the parcel of land, action of expropriation:
then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would necessarily be null and void.
Not only that. The demolition of the constructions in the parcel of land would prove
The first is concerned with the determination of
truly unjust to the private respondents.
the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
Parenthetically, the issuance of the writ of possession and writ of demolition by the in the content of the facts involved in the suit.
petitioner Judge in the ejectment proceedings was premature. What the petitioner should (Citing Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 67 of the Rules
have done was to stop the proceedings in the instant case and wait for the final outcome of Court.) It ends with an order, if not of dismissal
of the cadastral proceedings. of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
At any rate, affirmative relief based an the above discussions is no longer possible. The sought to be condemned, for the public use or
demolition of the buildings owned by the private respondents is now a fait accompli. purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as
In the case of Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals (199 SCRA 595 [1991] of the date of the filing of the complaint." (Citing
we awarded just compensation the amount of which was for the trial court to determine Section 4, Rule 67; Nieto v. Isip, 97 Phil. 31;
in favor of the petitioner whose building was demolished by the municipality even Benguet Consolidated v. Republic, 143 SCRA
before a proper tribunal could decide whether or not the building constituted a nuisance 466.)An order of dismissal, if this be ordained,
in law. Our ruling was premised on the ground that the owner of the building was in would be a final one, of course, since it finally
lawful possession of the lot and the building by virtue of the permit from the authorized disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to
government agency when the demolition was effected. be done by the Court on the merits.
(Citing Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 147 SCRA 334) So, too, would an order of
We cannot, however, apply this ruling to the present case. The legality of the occupation
condemnation on be a final one, for thereafter as
by the private respondents of the subject parcel of land is still to be resolved in the
the rules expressly state, in the proceedings before
cadastral proceedings. In the event that respondent Vicente Medina is declared owner of
the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the
the subject parcel of land, necessarily, the private respondents would be entitled to just
right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof)
compensation for the precipitate demolition of their buildings. On the other hand, if
shall be filed or heard.
private respondent Medina is declared to have no rights over the subject parcel of land
then, the private respondents would not be entitle to any compensation for the
demolition of their buildings. In such a case the private respondents are considered The second phase of the eminent domain action is
squatters and therefore, the demolition of their buildings would turnout to have been concerned with the determination to the Court of
justified. "the just compensation in for the property sought
to be taken." This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3)
Faced with these alternative possibilities, and in the interest of justice, we rule that the
commissioners (Citing Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of
petitioner municipality must put up a bond to be determined by the trial court to answer
the Rules of Court) The order fixing the just
61
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, We do not, however, have jurisdiction over petitioners' claim for
and findings of, the commissioners would be final, damages. This must be pursued in an appropriate action instituted in
too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the Regional Trial Court. (Rollo, p. 26)
the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the
Court regarding the issue. . . . Moreover, the dispositive portion of the decision does not mention any personal liability
for damages against the petitioners. The apprehension of the petitioners lacks factual
However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, basis.
the petitioner has the right to take enter upon the possession of the
property involved upon compliance with P.D. No. 42 which requires WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and
the petitioner, after due notice to the defendant, to deposit with the resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The trial court is ordered to require
Philippine National Bank in its main office or any of its branches or the petitioner municipality to put up a bond to be determined by the court after hearing
agencies, "an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property to answer, for just compensation due the private respondents in case the demolition of
for purposes of taxation." This assessed value is that indicated in the their buildings is adjudged to be illegal. The "Motion to Declare in Contempt" filed by
tax declaration. petitioner Judge is referred to the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 18 in
Civil Case No. 3156 for appropriate action.
Hence, even if we concede that Rule 67 is applicable to the instant case and that
petitioner municipality had the lawful right to eject the private respondents from the SO ORDERED.
subject parcel of land the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner
municipality would still not be legal if the petitioner municipality really owns the land.
The Judge did not require petitioner municipality to deposit an amount equivalent to the
just compensation due the private respondents as provided for under Presidential Decree
42. It is only after the deposit of the just compensation that petitioner municipality
would be entitled to a writ of possession.

Another point raised by the petitioners questions the alleged ruling of the appellate court
"that the petitioners are personally liable for damages to the private respondents for the
abatement of public nuisance." (Rollo, p. 50)
G.R. No. 147902 March 17, 2006
The petitioners misread the appellate court's decision. The records show Chat the private
respondents prayed for, in their petition for certiorari filed with the appellate court, SPOUSES VICENTE YU AND DEMETRIA LEE-YU, Petitioners,
among others: vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
It is likewise, prayed that respondents be ordered to pay jointly and
severally the value of the house illegally demolished in the amount of DECISION
P1,000.00 00, attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in
the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs, . . . AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

xxx xxx xxx Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 dated November
14, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58982 and the CA Resolution
dated April 26, 2001, which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
(CA Rollo, p. 6)
The factual background of the case is as follows:
In response to this prayer, however, the appellate court stated:

62
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
Under a Real Estate Mortgage dated August 15, 19942 and Amendments of Real Estate On February 24, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, further arguing
Mortgage dated April 4, 19953 and December 4, 1995,4 spouses Vicente Yu and that the pendency of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D in RTC Branch 44 is a prejudicial issue
Demetria Lee-Yu (petitioners) and spouses Ramon T. Yu and Virginia A. Tiu, or Yu Tian to Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D in RTC Branch 43, the resolution of which is
Hock aka Victorino/Vicente Yu, mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over determinative on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession. 15
several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the
Philippine Commercial International Bank (respondent) as security for the payment of a On May 8, 2000, RTC Branch 43 denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,
loan in the amount of P9,000,000.00.5 holding that the principle of prejudicial question is not applicable because the case
pending before RTC Branch 44 is also a civil case and not a criminal case. 16
As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest, and the penalties due thereon,
respondent filed on July 21, 1998 with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio On June 1, 2000, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. 17 On November
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City a Petition for Extra-Judicial 14, 2000, the CA dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari on the grounds that
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage on the Dagupan City properties. 6 On August 3, petitioners violated Section 8 of Act No. 3135 and disregarded the rule against
1998, the City Sheriff issued a Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale scheduling the auction sale multiplicity of suits in filing Civil Case No. 99-03169-D in RTC Branch 44 despite full
on September 10, 1998 at 10:00 oclock in the morning or soon thereafter in front of the knowledge of the pendency of Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D in RTC Branch 43; that
Justice Hall, Bonuan, Tondaligan, Dagupan City.7 since the one-year period of redemption has already lapsed, the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of respondent becomes a ministerial duty of the trial court; that the
At the auction sale on September 10, 1998, respondent emerged as the highest issues in Civil Case No. 99-03169-D are not prejudicial questions to Spec. Proc. No. 99-
bidder.8 On September 14, 1998, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of 00988-D because: (a) the special proceeding is already fait accompli, (b) Civil Case No.
respondent.9 On October 1, 1998, the sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of 99-03169-D is deemed not filed for being contrary to Section 8 of Act No. 3135, (c) the
Dagupan City. filing of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D is an afterthought and dilatory in nature, and (d)
legally speaking what seems to exist is litis pendentia and not prejudicial question. 18
About two months before the expiration of the redemption period, or on August 20,
1999, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of Possession before the Regional Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration19 but it was denied by the CA on April 26,
Trial Court of Dagupan City, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 99-00988-D and 2001.20
raffled to Branch 43 (RTC Branch 43).10 Hearing was conducted on September 14, 1999
and respondent presented its evidence ex-parte. 11 The testimony of Rodante Manuel was Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
admitted ex-parte and thereafter the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.
Petitioners pose two issues for resolution, to wit:
On September 30, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Strike Out
Testimony of Rodante Manuel stating that the Certificate of Sale dated September 14,
A. Whether or not a real estate mortgage over several properties located in
1998 is void because respondent violated Article 2089 of the Civil Code on the
different locality [sic] can be separately foreclosed in different places.
indivisibility of the mortgaged by conducting two separate foreclosure proceedings on
the mortgage properties in Dagupan City and Quezon City and indicating in the two
notices of extra-judicial sale that petitioners obligation is P10,437,015.2012 as of March B. Whether or not the pendency of a prejudicial issue renders the issues in
31, 1998, when petitioners are not indebted for the total amount of P20,874,031.56.13 Special Proceedings No. 99-00988-D as [sic] moot and academic. 21

In the meantime, petitioners filed a complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that since a real estate mortgage is indivisible,
before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-03169- the mortgaged properties in Dagupan City and Quezon City cannot be separately
D and raffled to Branch 44 (RTC Branch 44). foreclosed. Petitioners further point out that two notices of extra-judicial sale indicated
that petitioners obligation is P10,437,015.2022 each as of March 31, 1998 or a total
ofP20,874,030.40,23 yet their own computation yields only P9,957,508.90 as of February
On February 14, 2000, RTC Branch 43 denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and to
27, 1998.
Strike Out Testimony of Rodante Manuel, ruling that the filing of a motion to dismiss is
not allowed in petitions for issuance of writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No.
3135.14 As to the second issue, petitioners posit that the pendency of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D
is a prejudicial issue, the resolution of which will render the issues in Spec. Proc. No.
99-00988-D moot and academic. Petitioners further aver that they did not violate
63
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
Section 8 of Act No. 3135 in filing a separate case to annul the certificate of sale since From these provisions is excepted the case in which, there being several things given in
the use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that they have the option to seek mortgage or pledge, each one of them guarantees only a determinate portion of the
relief of filing a petition to annul the certificate of sale in the proceeding involving the credit.
application for a writ of possession or in a separate proceeding.
The debtor, in this case, shall have a right to the extinguishment of the pledge or
Respondent contends24 that, with respect to the first issue, the filing of two separate mortgage as the portion of the debt for which each thing is specially answerable is
foreclosure proceedings did not violate Article 2089 of the Civil Code on the satisfied.
indivisibility of a real estate mortgage since Section 2 of Act No. 3135 expressly
provides that extra-judicial foreclosure may only be made in the province or This rule presupposes several heirs of the debtor or creditor 25 and therefore not
municipality where the property is situated. Respondent further submits that the filing of applicable to the present case. Furthermore, what the law proscribes is the foreclosure of
separate applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage involving several only a portion of the property or a number of the several properties mortgaged
properties in different locations is allowed by A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, the Procedure on corresponding to the unpaid portion of the debt where, before foreclosure proceedings,
Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, as further amended on August 7, 2001. partial payment was made by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation. This
also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release of any portion of the mortgaged
As to the second issue, respondent maintains that there is no prejudicial question property or of one or some of the several lots mortgaged unless and until the loan thus
between Civil Case No. 99-03169-D and Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D since the secured has been fully paid, notwithstanding the fact that there has been partial
pendency of a civil action questioning the validity of the mortgage and the extra-judicial fulfillment of the obligation. Hence, it is provided that the debtor who has paid a part of
foreclosure thereof does not bar the issuance of a writ of possession. Respondent also the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the mortgage as long as the
insists that petitioners should have filed their Petition to Annul the Certificate of Sale in debt is not completely satisfied.26 In essence, indivisibility means that the mortgage
the same case where possession is being sought, that is, in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D, obligation cannot be divided among the different lots,27 that is, each and every parcel
and not in a separate proceeding (Civil Case No. 99-01369-D) because the venue of the under mortgage answers for the totality of the debt.28
action to question the validity of the foreclosure is not discretionary since the use of the
word "may" in Section 8 of Act No. 3135 refers to the filing of the petition or action On the other hand, the venue of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is the place
itself and not to the venue. Respondent further argues that even if petitioners filed the where each of the mortgaged property is located, as prescribed by Section 2 of Act No.
Petition to Annul the Certificate of Sale in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D, the writ of 3135,29 to wit:
possession must still be issued because issuance of the writ in favor of the purchaser is a
ministerial act of the trial court and the one-year period of redemption has already
SECTION 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the
lapsed.
property sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in which the sale is
to be made is subject to stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the
Anent the first issue, the Court finds that petitioners have a mistaken notion that the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated.
indivisibility of a real estate mortgage relates to the venue of extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings. The rule on indivisibility of a real estate mortgage is provided for in Article
A.M. No. 99-10-05-0,30 the Procedure on Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, lays
2089 of the Civil Code, which provides:
down the guidelines for extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties
located in different provinces. It provides that the venue of the extra-judicial foreclosure
Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though the debt may be divided proceedings is the place where each of the mortgaged property is located. Relevant
among the successors in interest of the debtor or of the creditor. portion thereof provides:

Therefore, the debtors heir who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the Where the application concerns the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages of real estates
proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as the debt is not completely and/or chattels in different locations covering one indebtedness, only one filing fee
satisfied. corresponding to such indebtedness shall be collected. The collecting Clerk of Court
shall, apart from the official receipt of the fees, issue a certificate of payment indicating
Neither can the creditors heir who received his share of the debt return the pledge or the amount of indebtedness, the filing fees collected, the mortgages sought to be
cancel the mortgage, to the prejudice of the other heirs who have not been paid. foreclosed, the real estates and/or chattels mortgaged and their respective
locations, which certificate shall serve the purpose of having the application
docketed with the Clerks of Court of the places where the other properties are

64
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
located and of allowing the extrajudicial foreclosures to proceed thereat. (Emphasis respondent and the sale of their properties at public auction are null and void, whereas,
supplied) the issue in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D is whether the respondent is entitled to a writ of
possession of the foreclosed properties. Clearly, no prejudicial question can arise from
The indivisibility of the real estate mortgage is not violated by conducting two separate the existence of the two actions. The two cases can proceed separately and take their
foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties located in different provinces as long own direction independently of each other.
as each parcel of land is answerable for the entire debt. Petitioners assumption that their
total obligation is P20,874,030.40 because the two notices of extra-judicial sale Nevertheless, there is a need to correct the CAs view that petitioners violated Section 8
indicated that petitioners obligation is P10,437,015.2031 each, is therefore flawed. of Act No. 3135 and disregarded the proscription on multiplicity of suits by instituting a
Considering the indivisibility of a real estate mortgage, the mortgaged properties in separate civil suit for annulment of the certificate of sale while there is a pending
Dagupan City and Quezon City are made to answer for the entire debt petition for issuance of the writ of possession in a special proceeding.
of P10,437,015.29.32
Section 8 of Act No. 3135 provides:
As to the second issue, that is, whether a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale
is a prejudicial question to a petition for issuance of a writ of possession, this issue is far Sec. 8. Setting aside of sale and writ of possession. The debtor may, in the proceedings
from novel and, in fact, not without precedence. In Pahang v. Vestil, 33 the Court said: in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was
given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled,
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take
tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it
resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 1avvph!l.net Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during
the pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale
is a civil action and the respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Under the provision above cited, the mortgagor may file a petition to set aside the sale
Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07-021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land and for the cancellation of a writ of possession with the trial court which issued the writ
registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of of possession within 30 days after the purchaser mortgagee was given possession. It
the two actions. A similar issue was raised in Manalo v. Court of Appeals, where we held provides the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in opposing the issuance of a writ of
that: possession.35 Thus, this provision presupposes that the trial court already issued a writ of
possession. In Sps. Ong v. Court of Appeals,36 the Court elucidated:
At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case No. 98-0868 must
be considered determinative of Case No. 9011. The basic issue in the former is whether The law is clear that the purchaser must first be placed in possession of the mortgaged
the respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, may be property pending proceedings assailing the issuance of the writ of possession. If the trial
compelled to have the property repurchased or resold to a mortgagors successor-in- court later finds merit in the petition to set aside the writ of possession, it shall dispose in
interest (petitioner); while that in the latter is merely whether the respondent, as the favor of the mortgagor the bond furnished by the purchaser. Thereafter, either party may
purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, is entitled to a writ of possession appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with Section 14 of Act 496, which
after the statutory period for redemption has expired. The two cases, assuming both are provides that "every order, decision, and decree of the Court of Land Registration may
pending, can proceed separately and take their own direction independent of each be reviewedin the same manner as an order, decision, decree or judgment of a Court
other.34 of First Instance (RTC) might be reviewed." The rationale for the mandate is to allow the
purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession
In the present case, Civil Case No. 99-01369-D and Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D are being founded on his right of ownership.37
both civil in nature. The issue in Civil Case No. 99-01369-D is whether the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the petitioners in favor of the

65
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
Accordingly, Section 8 of Act No. 3135 is not applicable to the present case since at the SO ORDERED.
time of the filing of the separate civil suit for annulment of the certificate of sale in RTC
Branch 44, no writ of possession was yet issued by RTC Branch 43.

Similarly, the Court rejects the CAs application of the principle of litis pendentia to
Civil Case No. 99-03169-D in relation to Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D. Litis
pendentia refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of actions and that the second action becomes unnecessary
and vexatious. For litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.38 IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
Applying the foregoing criteria in the instant case, litis pendentia does not obtain in this ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
case because of the absence of the second and third requisites. The issuance of the writ
of possession being a ministerial function, andsummary in nature, it cannot be said to be YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
a judgment on the merits, but simply an incident in the transfer of title. Hence, a separate
case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis
pendentia or res judicata.39 Thus, insofar as Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D and Civil Case On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B.
No. 99-03169-D pending before different branches of RTC Dagupan City are concerned, Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same
there is no litis pendentia. respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on
January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against
To sum up, the Court holds that the rule on indivisibility of the real estate mortgage respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611
cannot be equated with the venue of foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent
located in different provinces since these are two unrelated concepts. Also, no initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage
prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a
certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending
proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
take their own direction independently of each other. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated
December 29, 1998.1 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
Furthermore, since the one-year period to redeem the foreclosed properties lapsed on denied.
October 1, 1999, title to the foreclosed properties had already been consolidated under
the name of the respondent. As the owner of the properties, respondent is entitled to its Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should
possession as a matter of right.40 The issuance of a writ of possession over the properties have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering
by the trial court is merely a ministerial function. As such, the trial court neither into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying
exercises its official discretion nor judgment.41 Any question regarding the validity of suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the
the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a Family Code.2
writ of possession.42 Regardless of the pending suit for annulment of the certificate of
sale, respondent is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the
eventual outcome of said case.43 The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action
for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

66
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:10
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.4 It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon (P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration
civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. 5 Consequently, the of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who
defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may bigamy.
proceed.6 Its two essential elements are:7
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent
raised in the criminal action; and was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner
claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. 11 The issue in this case is
may proceed. limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve
the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the Civil Code,
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of law or
accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds." 12 []
sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only
crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. 13 No matter how
case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts
question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non- must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final
criminal suit. judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled inLandicho v. Relova,14 he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a
before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties,
civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. 15 This ruling
particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. 8 Whether
applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because
there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully
provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a invoked as an excuse.16The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of
subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal
the material time of the first marriage.9 impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.17 The legality of a marriage
is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not
obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his
his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense
adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second
of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a marriage was contracted rests upon the defense,18 but that is a matter that can be raised
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every
67
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the
suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the
criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact
that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he
was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of
D. SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY
nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely
resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of
frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, this G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989
cannot be done.1awphi1
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained vs.
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV, Zamboanga City)
entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE,respondents.
needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the
second marriage will also be void.19 The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of
its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent
was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he PARAS, J.:
contracted his second marriage with petitioner.20 Against this legal backdrop, any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the Before us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the Municipal Trial Court
civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not of Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied petitioner's motion for subsidiary writ of
a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own execution against the owner-operator of the vehicle which figured in the accident.
malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.21
The facts of the case are undisputed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a
the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98- passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio
75611. Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered
from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained
SO ORDERED. injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3) three months.

An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was


filed against Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch
IV. On January 14, 1987, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and
was accordingly convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical
Injuries under an amended information punishable under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision handed down on May 27, 1987 reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a principal


beyond reasonable doubt of the Amended Information to which he voluntarily pleaded
guilty and appreciating this mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of One (1) month and One (1) day to Two (2) months of Arresto
Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the
complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00 representing the value of the 1/2
can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant paid to the Zamboanga
68
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
General Hospital, to pay complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 as attorney's fees and to It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly held subsidiarily
pay the cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo) liable for the following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of subsidiary liability was not
raised on appeal; (b) contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation. the complainant did not arise from the so-called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-
aquiliana"; (c) the judgments of appellate courts may not be altered, modified, or
changed by the court of origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party to the
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to present
criminal proceedings.
evidence to establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or the owner-operator
of the vehicle. Accused's counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle
to afford the latter a day in court, on the ground that the accused is not only indigent but Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the subsidiary liability of
also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil liability that may be imposed upon him by the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver
the court. The private prosecutor, however, did not move for the appearance of Eduardo where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.
Toribio.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the private prosecutor to Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:
the Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in the
amount of P 10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established
5,000.00. The appellate court, on January 20, 1988, modified the trial court's decision, in the next preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
granting the appellant moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants,
5,000.00), while affirming all other civil liabilities. pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be applied to the present
but was, however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by case, the former being an action involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being one
the sheriffs return. Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against of culpa-aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103
the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was denied by the should be distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual
trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of the appellate court made no mention in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability
of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on
"culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual." A motion for reconsideration of the said culpa-aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-
order was disallowed for the reason that complainant having failed to raise the matter of aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its decision which has under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a civil
become final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code,
decision. i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana.

Hence, the instant petition. In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil
liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275, which in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of
enunciates that "the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the judgment, his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156).
because if a case were to be filed against said operator, the court called upon to act The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the
thereto has no other function than to render a decision based on the indemnity award in employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso
the criminal case without power to amend or modify it even if in his opinion an error has facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's
been committed in the decision." Petitioner maintains that the tenor of the aforesaid insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these requirements.
decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in
the same proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in order to avoid undue Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day
delay, notwithstanding the fact that said employer was not made a party in the criminal in court, because the case before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a primary
action. liability under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to
and dependent upon his employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced.

69
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ
substance and in effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the employer's subsidiary of execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the
liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger
proceedings against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. jitney. Costs against private respondent.
Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability
may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in SO ORDERED.
which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings
on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which
rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution,
and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which
may be involved in the execution."

The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the
matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate
court's decision made no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As
already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of
subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision against
the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary
liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already
implied from the appellate court's decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v.
Seneris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following pronouncement: "A
judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the
absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive
upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability not
only with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its amount." This being the
case, this Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court has no other
function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case
and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been
committed in the decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary
and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."

Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for
subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has already
become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay
on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment
because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as
earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without
need of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in
the same case where the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of
amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for
subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon
conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the
employee's insolvency.

70
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
Crispin Vallejo appeals from a decision rendered in Civil Case No. 5422 of the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Negros, sentencing him to pay to Vicente Bantoto and
Florita Lanceta, parents of the late Damiana Bantoto, civil indemnity in the sum of
P3,000.00, plus P1,000.00 exemplary damages and the further sum of P500.00 attorneys'
fees, without pronouncement as to costs.

The basic facts are not controverted. Appellant Crispin Vallejo was the registered owner
of a "jeepney" named "Jovil 11", with plate TPU-20948, that was operated by him in
Bacolod City through driver Salvador Bobis. On 24 October 1948, through the driver's
negligence, the "jeepney" struck a 3-year old girl, Damiana Bantoto, a daughter of
appellees, inflicting serious injuries that led to her death a few days later. The City Fiscal
of Bacolod filed an information charging Bobis with homicide through reckless
imprudence, to which Bobis pleaded guilty. He was, accordingly, sentenced to 2 months
and 1 day of arresto mayor and to indemnify the deceased girl's heirs (appellees herein)
in the sum of P3,000.00.

By amended complaint of 8 October 1959, appellees Vicente Bantoto and Florita


Lanceta, for themselves and their other children, instituted the present action against
Salvador Bobis, Juan Maceda (later absolved) and Crispin Vallejo in the court of first
instance, pleading the foregoing facts and seeking to have the three defendants declared
solidarily responsible for damages, consisting of the civil indemnity required of the
driver Bobis in the judgment of conviction, plus moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys' fees and costs.

Vallejo moved to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action against him,
for the reason that the amended complaint did not aver that the driver, Bobis, was
insolvent. The court overruled the motion to dismiss, and on 20 February 1960 Vallejo
answered the complaint, setting up denials and affirmative defenses, specifically
averring that the brothers and sisters of the deceased were not real parties in interest; that
the complaint stated no cause of action against Vallejo; that his liability was only
subsidiary; that the action was barred by prior judgment; and that the liability had been
satisfied. Bobis was declared in default.

At the trial, the court of origin (overruling Vallejo's objections) admitted as Exhibit "A"
for plaintiffs the writ of execution against the driver, Salvador Bobis, issued in the
criminal case, and as Exhibit "B" the sheriff's return nulla bona. Vallejo presented no
evidence. Wherefore, the court absolved defendant Maceda and rendered judgment
against Crispin Vallejo in the terms described at the start of this opinion.
G.R. No. L-18966 November 22, 1966
Vallejo appealed directly to this Supreme Court, assigning three errors:
VICENTE BANTOTO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SALVADOR BOBIS, ET AL., defendants. I The trial Court erred in not dismissing the complaint for lack of a cause of
CRISPIN VALLEJO, defendant-appellant. action.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:


71
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
II The trial Court erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits "A" and "B" of the It should be noted that in said stipulation, there is a provision appearing in
appellees. paragraph 3 thereof, which reads as follows:

III The trial Court erred in condemning the defendant-appellant to pay to "That the defendant Bernardo Castillo was not riding in the car at the time of
the appellees the sum of P3,000.00 as indemnity, P1,000.00 as moral damages, the accident, and he did not know that his car was taken by the chauffeur
P1,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P500.00 as attorney's fee. Mariano Capulong."

The first alleged error, predicated upon the lack of allegation in the complaint that driver This fact decides the question because it clearly shows that the accident did not
Bobis was insolvent, is without merit. The master's liability, under the Revised Penal occur in the course of the performance of the duties or service for which said
Code, for the crimes committed by his servants and employees in the discharge of their chauffeur Mariano Capulong had been hired. The defendant did not hire him to
duties, is not predicated upon the insolvency of the latter. Article 103 of the Penal Code do as he pleased, using the defendant's car as if it were his own. His duties and
prescribes that: service were confined to driving his master's car as the latter ordered him, and
the accident did not take place under said circumstances.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employees, As to the second error assigned, the same is non-prejudicial, if at all committed.
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies Supposing, in gratia argumenti, that Exhibits "A" and "B", the execution and the
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the sheriff's return, in the criminal case were not admissible at the trial of the case against
discharge of their duties. the master, they would certainly be material and admissible when issuance of a writ of
execution of the appealed judgment is demanded. It is well to move here that this Court
The insolvency of the servant or employee is nowhere mentioned in said article as a has ruled that in the absence of collusion the judgment convicting and sentencing the
condition precedent. In truth, such insolvency is required only when the liability of the servant to pay indemnity is conclusive in an action to enforce the subsidiary liability of
master is being made effective by execution levy, but not for the rendition of judgment the master or employer (Martinez vs. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1). Anyway, since Bobis, the
against the master. The subsidiary character of the employer's responsibility merely driver, was also a defendant, the writ of execution issued in the criminal case to enforce
imports that the latter's property is not be seized without first exhausting that of the the civil indemnity, and its return without satisfaction, are not irrelevant evidence in the
servant. And by analogy to a regular guarantor (who is the prototype of persons action against him and his employer.
subsidiarily responsible), the master may not demand prior exhaustion of the servant's
(principal obligor's) properties if he can not "point out to the creditor available property Anent the third error, we agree with appellant, that, as the case was predicated upon the
of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt" (Cf. sentence of conviction in the criminal case, the award of exemplary damages was
Civil Code, Article 1060). This rule is logical, for as between the offended party (as improper. No such damages were imposed on the driver, and the master, as person
creditor) and the culprit's master or employer, it is the latter who is in a better position to subsidiarily liable, can not incur greater civil liability than his convicted employee, any
determine the resources and solvency of the servant or employee. more than a guarantor can be held responsible for more than the principal debtor
(Cf. Civil Code, Article 2064).
Appellant invokes the following passage in our decision in Marquez vs. Castillo, 68
Phil. 571: But we do not agree that the award of attorney's fees should be disallowed. Appellant
had reason to know that his driver could not pay the P3,000.00 indemnity imposed in the
The subsidiary liability of the master, according to the provisions of Article criminal case, because if he could, or if he had money or leviable property worth that
103 of the Revised Penal Code, arises and takes place only when the servant, much, Bobis would be operating his own jeepney instead of another's. In fact, Article
subordinate, or employee commits a punishable criminal act while in the actual 2208, paragraph 9, authorizes the award of counsel's fees "in a separate civil action to
performance of his ordinary duties and service, and he is insolvent thereby recover the civil liability arising from a crime."
rendering him incapable of satisfying by himself his own civil liability.
As in awarding only P500.00 attorney's fees the court below could envisage only the
The underlined passage is, however, mere obiter because the part immediately preceding services of counsel up to the date of its judgment, and it could not know then that the
the quotation shows that the ratio decidendi of the case was that the accident involved, decision would be appealed, we are of the opinion that counsel fees should now be at
unlike in the case at bar, did not occur in the performance of the driver's assigned duties. least doubled.

72
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
For the foregoing reasons, the decision under appeal is modified by eliminating the In Criminal Case No. 01106-L, Elmer Ouano was charged with the crime of "Reckless
award of P1,000.00 exemplary damages and doubling the award for counsel fees, with Imprudence Resulting in Homicide" in an information which averred
the result that appellant shall pay the indemnity of P3,000.00, with interest at 6% from
the filing of the complaint, plus P1,000.00 attorney's fees. In all other respects, said That on April 14, 1990, at or about 11:45 A.M. in Basak, Lapulapu
decision is affirmed. No costs. City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw sporting Plate
No. GCX-237 duly registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and
owned by EK SEA Products, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously maneuver and operate it in a negligent and reckless
manner, without taking the necessary precaution to avoid injuries to
person and damage to property, as a result thereof the motor vehicle
he was then driving bumped and hit Hector Caete, which caused the
latter's instantaneous death, due to the multiple severe traumatic
injuries at different parts of his body. 2

When arraigned, the accused pleaded "guilty" and, on 09 March 1992, the trial court
pronounced its judgment

Finding therefore the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the


offense charged against him and taking into account the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty which the
prosecuting fiscal readily accepted, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to suffer and undergo an imprisonment of 1 year and 1 day to
1 year and 8 months and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
P50,000.00 for the death of the victim; P30,000.00 for actual
damages incurred in connection with the burial and the nightly prayer
of the deceased victim and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. 3

G.R. No. 112346 March 29, 1996 On 27 April 1992, a writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary
award. In his Return of Service, dated 07 May 1992, the MTCC Deputy City Sheriff
EVELYN YONAHA, petitioner, stated that he had served the writ on accused Elmer Ouano but that the latter had
vs. manifested his inability to pay the money obligation.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF HECTOR CAETE, respondents.
Forthwith, private respondents presented a "motion for subsidiary execution" with
neither a notice of hearing nor notice to petitioner. Acting on the motion, nevertheless,
the trial court issued an order, dated 29 May 1992, directing the issuance of a writ of
subsidiary execution. The sheriff went to petitioner's residence to enforce the writ, and it
VITUG, J.:p
was then, allegedly for the first time, that petitioner was informed of Ouano's conviction.
Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution principally
From the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing for lack of merit the petition anchored on the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employer's liability
for certiorari, with prayer for preliminary injunction, filed by Evelyn Yonaha against an had yet to be established. Private respondents opposed the motion.
order, dated 29 May 1992, of the Regional Trial Court 1which had granted private
respondent motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution, the instant appeal
On 24 August 1992, the trial court denied petitioner's motion. On 23 September 1992,
was taken.
petitioner's plea for reconsideration of the denial was likewise rejected.

73
[TORTS and DAMAGES]
Petitioner promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP No. 29116) course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to
for review. The appellate court initially restrained the implementation of the assailed determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability
orders and issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond. and propriety of the employer's liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it
Ultimately, however, the appellate court, in its decision of 28 September 1993, appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied.
dismissed the petition for lack of merit and thereby lifted the writ of preliminary The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in the employ of
injunction. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated: the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee
has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his
We are not unmindful of the ruling in the aforecited case of Lucia duties as such; and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of
Pajarito vs. Seeris, supra. that enforcement of the secondary or insolvency. 7
subsidiary liability of employer maybe done by motion in the same
criminal case, a recourse which presupposes a hearing. But even The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts in
assuming that issuance of writ of subsidiary execution requires notice her "motion to stay and recall," as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which could
and hearing, we believe a hearing in the present case would be sheer save her from liability; a hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable.
rigmarole, an unnecessary formality, because, as employer, petitioner The employer must be given his full day in court.
became subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of her accused driver,
Elmer Ouano, and proof of the latter's insolvency. And if she had any To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
defense to free herself from such subsidiary liability, she could have Code requires (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the
ventilated and substantiated the same in connection with her employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty
(petitioner's) motion to stay and recall the writ of subsidiary of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
execution in question. But from her said motion, it can be gleaned duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties);
that except for the protestation of violation of due process, and and (d) that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of
absence of notice to her of the motion for issuance of a writ of course, concludes the employer 8 and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the
subsidiary execution, petitioner intimated no defense which could same criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and
absolve her of subsidiary liability under the premises. Then, too, after decide that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by law. 9
the denial of her motion to stay and recall subject writ, petitioner
moved for reconsideration but in her motion for reconsideration, she
WHEREFORE, finding the order, dated 29 May 1992, as well as the order of 24 August
averred no exculpatory facts which could save her from subsidiary
1992 to have been improvidently issued, said orders are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner
liability, as employer of the convicted Elmer Ouano. 4
shall be given the right to a hearing on the motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary
execution filed by private respondents, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for
In the instant appeal, petitioner additionally reminds the Court that Ouano's conviction further proceedings conformably with our foregoing opinion. No costs.
was not the result of a finding of proof beyond reasonable doubt but from his
spontaneous plea of guilt.

We find merit in the petition.

The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. 5 This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary
liability in the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, 6 on
the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of
the judgment. But, execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of

74

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