ElectionWatch #3

ElectionWatch Report #3
GATEWAY TO THE BALLOT

BOX
InformAction March 2017
with Kura Yangu, Sauti Yangu
1
Summary
Kenya concluded its final mass voter registration (MVR) drive in a politically charged
environment, amid shaky public confidence.
President Uhuru Kenyatta had authorized a series of controversial amendments to the

electoral law just one week before the MVR, which allowed for manual registration and
results transmission. The reintroduction of manual systems immediately sparked outrage
and suspicion, given the history of violence around electoral manipulation.
Specifically, the new regulations allow the Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission (IEBC) to use "a complementary mechanism for identification of voters and
transmission of elections results" in case the electronic systems fail. The opposition,
however, insists use of manual systems will open the door to rigging. The lead up to the
reforms was marked by dramatic scenes in parliament, including fistfights between MPs and
a walk out by the opposition.
Public trust remained precarious despite a brand new set of IEBC Commissioners, appointed
after opposition-led protests against the former commissioners, who had been plagued by
allegations of corruption and partisan favoritism. The IEBC has notably failed to reach its
targets. In addition to the legal and political battles, Kenya has also been hit by an upsurge of
insecurity and banditry, including sub-national inter-ethnic violence around border areas.
ElectionWatch #3 presents field observations and photo evidence from the countrywide
mass voter registration drive, and provides an overall analysis of voter registration in Kenya.
Key Findings
* Politicians and their agents are behaving like ethnic warlords, using coercive tactics to
secure maximum votes. This includes using criminal gangs to restrict access to public places
and services for citizens who cannot produce a voter registration card.
* Registration notebooks have appeared in some registration centers, alongside Biometric

Voter Registration (BVR), and are being used without apparent uniformity.
* Thousands of people have discovered they share the same registration numbers; yet
neither the IEBC nor the National Registration of Persons have succeeded in reassuring the
public this can be properly remedied in a manner that will not affect the integrity of the
election.
* Voter registration for the August 2017 election has already been marked by technological
errors and failures.
2
Methodology
InformAction is accredited with media and election observer status. It utilizes seven field
teams embedded in Kericho (South Rift), Maralal (Northern Kenya), Kisii (Western Nyanza),
Kisumu (Nyanza), Nyeri (Central), Isiolo (Eastern Kenya) and Mombasa (Coastal Region), and
a mobile observer team from the support base in Nairobi. The teams use a combination of
systematic and spot-checking observations, including video documentation and
photography.
Observers use qualitative methods based on interviews, observations and document

analysis, using stratified and random sampling, monitoring the experiences and actions of
voters, election officials and security personnel, as well as any other actors or participants
involved in the electoral process, during the pre-election, election and post-election periods.
During monitoring, teams use social media internally to coordinate movements and relay
and compare findings. Legal advice and research services are available to the observers at all
times. The field teams also benefit from their extensive local knowledge and networks in the
counties (see www.information.tv).
InformAction observers witness and document the application of constitutional standards

and election regulations.
The filming, participation and consultation of individuals in this report was done with their
full cooperation and consent. To prevent unauthorised access, maintain responsible data
usage, and ensure the correct use of information, InformAction has obscured or removed
images and evidence relating to personal identification details.
3
Background
Voter registration is the gateway to the ballot box. The process is critical to determining
what happens on polling day.
In Kenya, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) is responsible for
voter registration. Having completed two mass registration drives, as well as procedures for
the registration of prisoners and Kenyans who reside in Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi
and South Africa, the IEBC is now cleaning the register. A draft register will be published and
made available for public verification on 10 May 2017.
It is already apparent the IEBC has significantly failed to meet its stated targets. It has as yet
to explain why. In the last phase of voter registration, the Commission targeted 67 percent
of the 6,117,280 Kenyans who had the requisite national identity card (ID) but were not
registered. By the end of the final MVR drive, the IEBC reported that it had had managed to
register approximately 3.7 million new voters, or 62 percent of the targeted total.1 Voter
education was also extremely low, typically with few personnel covering large constituencies
and geographical areas.
Voter Registration in Kenya
Although the Kenyan constitution calls for continuous registration,2 IEBC uses quasi-periodic
mass voter registration drives in specific intervals leading up to elections. While these MVR
exercises build on previous voters lists and do not require voters who previously registered
to register afresh, it is not possible to easily register outside of these times. The IEBC held
two such MVR processes: 15 February 15 March 2016 (MVR I), and 17 January 19
February 2017 (MVR II).
Kenyas use of active registration (as opposed to passive registration), which requires
citizens to actively apply for registration, is fairly common in Africa. Most African countries
use active registration, mainly because national registration systems are not always existent.
Where they are, they do not consistently include current residential address data.3 In one
study of eight African countries, only one (South Africa) used continuous registration. The
remaining seven countries used a periodic registration process. In addition, many African
countries - recognizing that large parts of the population live in rural areas with minimal
infrastructure, and suffer from poverty - embrace open and broad ID options. Kenya is one
1 Jeremiah Wakaya. 2017. 3.7mn new voters registered against 6mm IEBC target. Captial News. Available at
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2017/02/3-7mn-new-voters-registered-6mn-iebc-target/.
2
See Article 82(1)(c) of the Constitution of Kenya.
3
Evrensel, 22.
4
of only six African countries to insist exclusively on a national ID card and national passport
for registration.4
The Political Stakes of Registration
In Kenya, voter registration has long been contentious, mainly because the stakes of winning
elections are so high. Kenyan society has become deeply divided along ethnic and class lines.
Unresolved, historical grievances between groups provide easy fodder for politically
motivated fear mongering in the lead-up to elections. This is apparent in the pre-election
period, which has already had its share of hate speech around voter registration. One of the
most prominent examples is Aden Duale, National Assembly Majority Leader, who allegedly
told his supporters to prevent members of the Kamba community from registering to vote.5
It is easy for registration to spark inter-ethnic animosity and tension, because perceived
disenfranchisement of certain communities can reflect long-standing grievances about which
communities have disproportionate access to power, and which communities have been
denied.
As the gateway to the ballot box, it is clear why voter registration can be such a high-stakes
political activity, especially in divided societies with winner-take-all electoral systems.
Indeed, targeted registration suppression is increasingly used to disenfranchise significant
parts of the population. Civil society organizations in Zimbabwe described the unequal
conduct of registration activities in urban versus rural areas and unequal treatment of voters
who were perceived to be opposition supporters.6 In the United States, analysts found that
state-sanctioned purges of the voters rolls disproportionately targeted young, black,
Hispanic and Asian-American voters, all of whom tend to be supporters of the Democratic
Party.7
It is important to note that voter registration is never perfect; there will never be an
absolutely accurate register, even in the most developed countries, because the population
is always changing. There is a constant stream of newly eligible voters, voters who have died,
and voters who have changed residence. But, given Kenyas history, it is essential to
establish minimum acceptable standards before the poll, rather than resort to the never
perfect defense in the face of significant flaws and low pubic confidence.
4
Tova Wang. Voter Identification Requirements and Public International Law: An Examination of Africa and
Latin America, page 15. Available at
<https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/des/voter-identification-requirements.pdf>.
5 Nation Team. 2016. Aden Duale under fire for hate speech clip. Daily Nation. Available at
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Leaders-want-Duale-arrested-for-incitement-/1064-3508916-
13p5ly5z/.
6 Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN). 2013. Report on the 31 July 2013 Harmonised Elections,
29.
7 Greg Palast. 2016. The GOPs Stealth War Against Voters. Rolling Stone. Available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/the-gops-stealth-war-against-voters-w435890.
5
Voter Registration Explained
Voter registration is the process of creating a list of all eligible voters within a specified
geographic location, and is the single most expensive activity in the electoral cycle.8 It is at
the heart of democratic elections, and a defining democratic process. Voter registration
facilitates the realization of universal suffrage, providing a basic human right the right to
vote.
There are three principle types of voter registries, each of which entails different
administrative capabilities and resources. Periodic registration results in a periodic list, which
is established for a particular election. Continuous registration results in a continuous list,
which is regularly updated and maintained to reflect newly eligible voters, deaths and
changes of residence. Both the periodic and continuous registration systems are known as
active systems because they require eligible voters to take action themselves to be
registered. The third type of voters registry is one that comes directly from a countrys civil
registry. The latter method, and any other method that relies on state databases to populate
a voters registry, is also known as passive registration, meaning that it does not require
input from voters. Instead, the state compiles the voters roll and then informs citizens of
their registration status.
The voters registry is a critical document. It can be used to verify voters eligibility, augment
controls on fraud, and aid in voter education. In this way, voter registration is critical for the
legitimacy of the voting process:
The role of voter registration is especially important when it comes to emerging

democracies: it can make or break an election. The quality of the process and the
product that is, the voters roll can determine the outcome of an election and
consequently the stability of the democratic institutions in a country.9
The voters list is also a valuable reference document, containing necessary information for
determining the number of people per polling station, drawing equitable boundaries, and
serving as the basis of calculations of voter turnout.10
Voter Registration in the 2017 Electoral Cycle
Unfortunately, the current voter registration cycle has suffered from many of the
problematic issues that have characterized previous elections.
8
Evrensel, 1.
9
Astrid Evrensel, ed. 2010. Voter Registration in Africa. A Comparative Analysis. Johannesburg, South Africa:
EISA, 1.
10
Evrensel, 9-10.
6
As early as 2002, the former electoral management body, known as the Electoral
Commission of Kenya (ECK), was citing the costly nature of registration and recommending a
review of the process.11 After the election-related crisis of 2007-8, the Independent Review
Commission also known as the Kriegler Commission identified many key areas for urgent
reform. It echoed the ECKs earlier finding, describing voter registration as overly expensive
and inefficient. It highlighted the fact that marginalized communities encounter difficulties
getting the prerequisite national identity cards, and emphasized the need for national
commitment to the inalienable franchise rights of Kenyan citizens:
The voter register, as it stands today, has a low and biased coverage, as women and
youth are heavily underrepresented. The registration system is outrageously
expensive and has very low productivity.12
In 2013, voter registration was again an issue, and analysts found multiple problems and
errors. Some of the most grievous problems included:
The existence of several voters registers in circulation, each with different totals,
Unexplained, significant changes in parties strongholds between the publishing of
the provisional and final registers, and
The IEBCs insistence that the manual list of voters, known (then) as the Green
Book, was the true and final register.
These problems, and a host of other questions, were never sufficiently addressed in the
aftermath of the 2013 election. It is unsurprising, then, that the current voter registration
process was carried out in the shadow of these unresolved issues.
The most debated issue in the current electoral cycle has been that of manual versus
technological procedures, results transmission and vote counting. On January 9th, 2017, Mr.
Kenyatta signed the contentious 2016 Election Laws (Amendment) Bill into law, allowing the
IEBC to use complementary mechanisms of voter registration, voter identification, and
results transmission in case the electronic systems fail. The law affects several other parts of
the electoral process, but a clause regarding complementary mechanisms has been the
cause of much discontent, because of the assumption that it refers to manual systems. The
opposition denounced the law, claiming it would be used as a way for incumbents to
manipulate the process and the results.13
11
Independent Review Commission. 2008. Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General
Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007. Section 3.8 page 45.
12
Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007. Section 5.3, page 80.
13
Patrick Langat. 22 December 2016. Kenya MPs pass contentious election law as opposition keeps off. The
East African. Available at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Kenyan-MPs-pass-contentious-election-laws-
as-Cord-keeps-off/2558-3494942-a7tldk/index.html.
7
The use of the manual registration even only as complementary to technological methods -
comes with serious problems, related to pre-2008 systems. The Independent Review
Commission pointedly criticized the use of notebooks, known in 2008 as Black Books:
IREC recommends that the use of Black Books be discontinued (their destruction
should be seriously considered) and that the ECK consider the use of tendered ballots
in the case of persons who cannot find their names in the voters lists.14
The Technology Option
Technology does not guarantee credibility15; but in Kenya the deep distrust for manual
systems relates to a fearful history of election violence and illegality.
However, technology used in the 2013 Kenyan election suffered from massive, widespread
failures.16 It included biometric registration, electronic voter identification kits and
electronic results transmission systems. Such failures have marred elections in much of the
rest of the African continent as well.17
Like manual systems, technology has potential transparency and manipulation issues. The
use of technology places critical components of the process in a black box. Cleaning
operations are done by computers, and advanced computerization understood by only a
handful of specialists make it difficult for electoral stakeholders to observe and assess
registration properly.18 In fact, the backbone of the legal argument put up by government
lawyers in 2013 against a necessary examination of the electronic logs of the failed election
server was that it was too complicated and time consuming.19 However, so great are the
vulnerabilities of manual registration and results transmission in Kenyas recent history that
technology has widely been considered the preferable option.
It is noted that voter registration for the August 2017 election has already been marked by
technological problems and failures.
14
Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007, page 112.
15 Netherlands, for example, decided against using technology in the March 14, 2017, General Election,
because of concerns over hacking

16
Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice. 2013. Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath. Available at
<http://kptj.africog.org/election-day-2013-and-its-aftermath/>.
17
Christine Mungai. 2015. Dirty hands: Why biometric voting fails in Africa - and it doesnt matter in the end.
Mail & Guardian Africa. Available at <http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-03-30-why-biometric-voting-fails-in-
africa-and-why-it-doesnt-matter>.
18
Evrensel, 3.
19 Supreme Court petition challenging election process, March 2013; shown in Kenya; A Guidebook to
Impunity, a film by InformAction
8
What the Numbers Say
As is clear in the tables below, registration rates have not dramatically increased. At the
national level, the register has grown by 37 percent since 2013. 17 counties rates increased
by less than one-third, and only two counties rates increased by more than 50 percent. In
fact, the IEBC only met or exceeded its target in three counties: Narok, Kajiado and Mandera.
It is also worth noting that IEBCs target was based on the number of Kenyans who
possessed IDs but were not registered. By failing to include all Kenyans who are eligible
(those with and without IDs), the figures are skewed to reflect only a portion of the entire
voting age population.
Table 1: Changes in National Voter Registration in Kenya (March 2013-February 2017)
March 2013 December 2016 January 2017

Total Number of 14,388,781 15,961,627 (10.9% 19,743,716 (23.7%
Registered Voters increase since 2013) increase since 2016;
37.2% increase since
2013)
Source: IEBC Data and Judie Kaberia. 2017. Half of 19mm Kenyan voters are from Rift Valley, Eastern and Central.
Capital News. Available at <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2017/02/half-of-19mn-kenyan-voters-are-from-rift-
valley-eastern-and-central/>.
Table 2: Changes in Registration at the County Level (by identity of 2013 victory)
JUBILEE won more than 50% in CORD won more than 50% in Neither coalition won more
2013 2013 than 50% in 2013
COUNTY % CHANGE IN COUNTY % CHANGE IN COUNTY % CHANGE IN
REGISTRATION REGISTRATION REGISTRATION
Bomet 29 Tana River 21 Narok 32
Nyeri 29 Nyamira 27 Vihiga 32
Murang'a 30 Samburu 30 Wajir 32
Baringo 31 Kakamega 31 Nairobi 33
Kericho 31 Kisii 32 Marsabit 36
Nyandarua 31 Lamu 34 Trans Nzoia 39
Elgeyo-Marakwet 32 Bungoma 36 Garissa 41
Kirinyaga 32 Migori 37
Nandi 32 Taita-Taveta 37
Isiolo 33 Busia 38
Kajiado 33 Turkana 40
Kiambu 36 Machakos 41
Nakuru 36 Makueni 41
Uasin Gishu 36 Kisumu 42
Laikipia 38 Siaya 43
Embu 39 Mombasa 44
Mandera 39 Homa Bay 46
Tharaka-Nithi 39 Kitui 47
Meru 46 Kilifi 52
West Pokot 48 Kwale 61
In Table 2, it is possible to graphically see how counties registration rates changed and to
match those figures against which party won the county. Overall, eight of the ten counties
9
that experienced the largest increases in registration since 2013 were won by CORD in the
last election. Six of the ten counties that experienced the smallest increases in registration
since 2013 were won by the Jubilee coalition. Notably, swing districts or those in which
neither coalition carried a clear majority did not benefit from strong increases in
registration.
Figure 1: Approximate Changes in County Voter Registration between 2013 General Election and End of MVRI (March 2013-
February 2017)
Source: IEBC Data
Coercive Political Practices
The second phase of mass voter registration in Kenya was characterized by a variety of
coercive practices. Politicians were intimately involved in mobilization drives, traversing the
country to maximize registration of voters. Mobilization sometimes became forceful,
interfering with basic freedoms and rights. While it is noted that such behavior is frequently
considered a norm in Kenyan elections, it is very dangerous to accept such behavior as
normal. Politicians who force people to register and vote are acting as ethnic warlords,
which is entirely different from democratic election mobilising and education. Since the
post-election violence of 2007-8, successive elections have continued the balkanization of
the country and entrenched, rather than addressed, ethnic mobilization and constituencies.
During the MVR, InformAction observers also witnessed people transferring their
10
registration and voting stations out of fear, and some minority groups being told they would
not be allowed to vote in certain areas. Kenyas many criminal gangs, including Mungiki
notorious for its role in the 2007-8 election-related violence have been used by politicians
to creative a coercive environment around voter registration. These incidents can be a
precursor to political and ethnic violence.
Mr. William Ruto, deputy president, encouraged women to reject male suitors who could
not prove that they had registered as voters. At a public event, Ruto said, I see many
beautiful women in Nyamira... Do not let a man not registered as a voter disturb and ask you
on a date. Ask them to show you their voters cards first. If they do not have the cards, tell
them to get lost This is because you never know what else somebody not listed as a voter
lacks. I am asking you all to get registered.20 Linking sexuality and gender to political and
ethnic loyalty can also be a precursor to violence. Gender-based violence, including rape and
mutilation, was widespread and systematic during the 2007-8 conflict. Politically mobilized
gangs used it to punish people, targeted by virtue of their ethnicity, for the way they were
perceived or assumed to have voted.
In all regions covered, IFA observers were also concerned to personally observe and hear
anecdotes of service providers demanding proof of voter registration, as a sign of political
loyalty within ethnic constituencies. In some parts of the country, political leaders were
involved in organizing for service providers to withhold services to those who were not
registered. In Mombasa, Governor Joho ordered boda boda and tuk tuks motorcycle taxis
and other transport drivers, to refuse to carry passengers who did not have voters cards.
The governor also gave instructions to all county departments to refuse services to Kenyans
without voters cards. Mvita MP Abdulswamad Nassir supported Johos announcement.21
Similar restrictions on access to transport and market places were observed nationwide.
There were instances of faith-based organizations requiring their congregations to show

proof of registration. In Embu, Rev. Isaiah Njagi, an Anglican clergyman, threatened to deny
the Holy Eucharist to his congregation unless they were registered to vote. He also planned
to extend the rule such that members of his congregation will have to prove they voted to
receive Communion.22 Public pressure to register was also evident on social media, where
conversations sometimes took on coercive and intimidating tones. On Twitter, for example,
20
Nancy Agutu. 1 February 2017. Do not date men not listed as voters, Ruto tells beautiful Nyamira women.
The Star. Available at <http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/02/01/do-not-date-men-not-listed-as-voters-
ruto-tells-beautiful-nyamira_c1498290>.
21
Daniel Tsuma Nyassy. 20 January 2017. Mombasa matatus reject Joho call to demand voter cards. The
Daily Nation. Available at http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/mombasa/matatus-reject-Joho-call/1954178-
3620316-bxrido/.
22
Jill Craig. 17 January 2017. Kiss the Bride, Mourn the Dead, Register to Vote in Kenya. Voice of America.
Available at http://www.voanews.com/a/kiss-the-bride-mourn-the-dead-register-to-vote-in-
kenya/3681344.html.
11
@chiefcwangai tweeted, MVR kicks off today 16th to Feb 14th. Those who will not register as
voters will never see God.23
Kenyan media have also reported that political elites have paid certain chiefs, especially in
Jubilee stronghold areas, to ensure that all eligible voters are registered. Elites have allegedly
also supplied chiefs with lists of who is and is not registered so that chiefs can target
potential registrants.24
An angry Job Kirira said a Mr Chris Mwema, who identified himself as Githima chief,
called him. The chief wanted to know why he had not registered and even offered to
pay for his fare to the nearest registration centre. I was surprised how he got my
number and also questioned him if it was his business whether I was registered. I
used my passport not the ID to register and that is why they cant find my data with
IEBC, said an angry Kirira.25
While voting is a civic duty in any democracy, it is not mandatory in Kenya. Withholding
services based on lack of voter registration is illegal and contrary to the constitution, which
outlaws discrimination (Article 27) and enshrines the right to fair administrative action
(Article 47).
IFA field teams observed and noted the following
Some boda boda drivers said they encouraged each other to register: it was not
clear whether this included enforced consequences for non-registration. In East Gem
23
Charles Wangai. 15 January 2017. Twitter. Available at
https://twitter.com/chiefcwangai/status/820861691189661696.
24
Fred Ngige. 2017. Revealed: Inside Jubilees vote machine to beat Raila Odinga. Standard Digital. Available
at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001228175/revealed-inside-jubilee-s-vote-machine-to-beat-
raila-odinga.
25
Fred Ngige. 2017. Revealed: Inside Jubilees vote machine to beat Raila Odinga. Standard Digital. Available
at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001228175/revealed-inside-jubilee-s-vote-machine-to-beat-
raila-odinga.
12
Ward in Homa Bay County, boda boda drivers told IFA observers that no one in the
group should be without a voters card.26
In Kisumu County, voter registration was marred by the use of criminal gangs,
including American and 42 Brothers, preventing people from entering certain
areas without proof of registration. These gangs were also involved in setting fires at
roadblocks, intimidating and coercing citizens to register.27
Voter Bribery
Kenyan law bans voter bribery, but the exchange of money and/or goods for votes is
commonplace. In a recent survey commissioned by the Centre for Multiparty Democracy, 56
percent of respondents said they had received a bribe from a political party or candidate.
The majority of respondents also revealed that they do not mind voting for candidates who
pay bribes. Many respondents, however, acknowledge that voter bribery is a form of
corruption. They explain it is a norm: many candidates engage in the practice and do not
face consequences.28
IFA field teams observed the following incidents related to voter bribery
At Isiolo Stadium, IFA field teams saw a parked car with politically affiliated agents.
The agents were seen paying people to register. The agents recorded the individuals
names in a notebook.29
In Bomet County, an open meeting was called at Fair Hills Hotel by Bomet County
Commissioner. The press was excluded. During the meeting, which included local
chiefs, a local official and local politician offered Ksh 5,000 to any elder who could
register at least 100 voters.30
At one registration centre in Samburu County, there were maize bags next to IEBC
clerks. No explanation was forthcoming. 31
26
IFA Observers Notes, Homa Bay County. 23 January 2017.
27
IFA Observers Notes, Kisumu County. 13 February 2017.
28
Daily Nation. 2017. Aspirants hope to recoup campaign cash through graft. Available at
http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/politics/3126390-3819886-xt7rp4/index.html.
29
IFA Observers Notes Isiolo County. 23 January 2017.
30
IFA Observers Notes, Bomet County. 26 January 2017.
31
IFA Observers Notes. Samburu County 8 February 2017.
13
Other Issues 1 - An IEBC clerk seated next to a bale of ugali packets
Security Concerns
The 2017 election cycle has already been marred by serious security breaches. These have
ranged from intimidating hate speech to targeted attacks on registration centers. In mid-
2016, eight politicians from both main political coalitions were arrested for allegedly
engaging in hate speech. In early February 2017, MPs Ferdinand Waititu and Moses Kuria,
who both allegedly advocated in support of physical injury to or death of CORD leader, Raila
Odinga, were acquitted. A magistrates court cleared the pair, citing insufficient evidence.32
Tobiko called the ruling strange and deemed it a severe setback in the fight against hate
speech.33 Following the ruling, DPP Keriako Tobiko said he would appeal the decision. There
have also been physically violent incidents. In Baringo North and Marakwet East, 14 people,
including a chief, died in ten days.34 This violence reflects similar border disputes in several
other parts of the country.35 In addition to these incidents, parts of the Rift Valley have
experienced rising levels of pre-election violence.
32
Daily Nation. 2017. Moses Kuria, Ferdinand Waititu acquitted of hate speech charges. Daily Nation.
Available at http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Moses-Kuria-Waititu-acquitted-of-hate-speech-
charges/1064-3820342-epjrg2z/.
33
The Star. 2017. DPP to appeal Moses Kuria, Ferdinand Waititu acquittal in incitement case. The Star.
Available at <http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/02/20/dpp-to-appeal-moses-kuria-ferdinand-waititu-
acquittal-in-incitement_c1510269>.
34
Stephen Rutto. 2017. End Baringo clashes now, Gideon tells Uhuru. The Star. Available at <http://www.the-
star.co.ke/news/2017/02/27/end-baringo-clashes-now-gideon-tells-uhuru_c1513993>.
35
See forthcoming IFA report on pre-election violence.
14
InformAction Observer Findings
This section shows the principle findings in the second and final Mass Voter Registration,
conducted from January 16 February 19, 2017. The findings have been organized into the
following sections:
1. National Identification (ID) Process

ID applications and delay
Uncollected ID cards
ID and registration Errors
Transfer Applications
2. Equipment Error and Failure

Biometric Voter Registration (BVR)
3. Manual Notebooks
Black, Green, White, and ECK notebooks
Irregular data collection
4. IEBC Field Performance

Organisation of registration centers
Conduct
Handling of Observers
15
Section 1: National Identification Cards
Kenya has struggled to create and implement a functional, efficient ID processing system
since Independence. Citizens who apply for IDs must wait several months sometimes years
to receive IDs, as covered extensively in ElectionWatch#2.36 The lack of a national ID is a
significant problem because the ID is required for employment, for medical services and for
a host of other services. Kenyans lacking an ID are penalized, and sometimes criminalized,
for not having one. Since national IDs are also required for voter registration, the states
inefficiency potentially disenfranchises a significant portion of the population, especially
those categorized as border communities.
In 2002, the ECK recommended that voter registration be merged with the national ID
application process. According to the ECK, combining the two processes would significantly
reduce costs and improve efficiency.37 In 2008, the Independent Review Commission again
recommended that voter registration be based on the civil registry.
The difficulties faced by this office in registering and issuing identity cards to all
eligible Kenyans have negatively affected the ECKs ability to capture the entire mass
of Kenyans who have the legal right to register as voters. Proposals to rationalise the
efforts of both agencies are already under consideration, with the aim of
enfranchising as many as possible of those eligible to vote. This deserves priority
attention38
To date, the two processes remain separate and Kenyans continue to struggle to ascertain
IDs.
During the current pre-election phase, the problem with obtaining IDs has again been a
significant issue. In order to address the problem, and as the IEBC struggled to meet its
targets, some political leaders attempted to loosen identity restrictions around registration.
President Kenyatta made several promises, including an expedited, three-day identity card
processing time39, telling citizens they could use waiting cards instead of identity cards to
register.40 But this did not translate into reality; as detailed below, it was rarely carried out in
36 See ElectionWatch#2 http://www.informaction.tv/index.php/news-from-the-field/item/564-election-

watch-report-2
37
Independent Review Commission. 2008.
38
Independent Review Commission. 2008, p. 25.
39
William Mwangi. 20 January 2017. IDs out in three days, Uhuru says in push for voter listing. The Star.
Available at <http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/01/20/ids-out-in-three-days-uhuru-says-in-push-for-voter-
listing_c1491212>.
40
Francis Mureithi. 10 February 2017. Uhuru: Sign up to vote or forever hold your peace. Daily Nation.
Available at http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/CAST-YOUT-VOTE-uhuru-says/1064-3808564-d261cr/.
16
practice. In fact, the IEBC announced that waiting cards are NOT accepted for the purposes
of registration.41
In some cases, there were attempts by local officials to reduce the waiting time. In Bomet,
the IFA team noted that Cabinet Secretary Charles Keter told chiefs not to ask for birth
certificates from those who were attempting to register. In Kabianga, Kericho County, the
Deputy President, William Ruto, ordered chiefs to issue IDs to youth without asking for birth
certificates or baptismal cards.42 However, lack of policy compounds the problem rather
than solves it, opening the door to fraud and error.
The pre-election cycle has been marred by other ID-related problems. One of the most
troubling issues has been that of shared ID numbers.
Shared ID numbers
In February 2017, the IEBC confirmed that 128,926 registered voters share their ID or
passport numbers with others, including 107,777 who had the same ID numbers but
different names, and 53,671 whose details were shared by more than one other person.43
Those affected included prominent politicians, former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, Wiper
Party leader Kalonzo Musyoka, and former presidents Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki,
whose IDs were used to register other voters.4445
In response, the IEBC notified affected Kenyans that they had ten days to report to IEBC
constituency offices to correct the problem. It said those who failed to do so risked being
purged from the voters roll.46 However, IEBC has no jurisdiction over ID numbers, which is
the responsibility of the Registrar of Persons. IFA teams reported that in some field offices
the IEBC claimed that the problem of shared ID numbers would not prevent eligible voters
from casting ballots because the Commission issues unique numbers to all voters. According
to the IEBC, this number can be used as an identifying number on Election Day. The
approach is confusing and has raised many unanswered questions: namely, how does the
unique number from IEBC relate to the national ID?
41
Isaac Ongiri. 12 February 2017. Leaders in a sprint to convince potential voters ahead of Tuesday deadline.
Daily Nation. Available at <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Leaders-sprint-convince-voters-ahead--
deadline----/1064-3809602-11df6hgz/index.html>.
42
IFA Observers Notes. 20 January 2017.
43
Felix Olick. 2017. Cord sets high bar, demands rigorous audit of voter register. The Star. Available at
http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/01/27/cord-sets-high-bar-demands-rigorous-audit-of-voter-
register_c1495309.
44
Rawlings Otieno. 2017. Railas ID in yet another double voter registration. Standard Digital. Available at
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000231124/raila-s-id-in-yet-another-double-voter-registration.
45
Protus Onyango. 2017. IEBC gives notice to voters with shared ID numbers. Standard Digital. Available at
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001228613/iebc-gives-notice-to-voters-with-shared-id-numbers.
46
Protus Onyango. 2017. IEBC gives notice to voters with shared ID numbers. Standard Digital. Available at
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001228613/iebc-gives-notice-to-voters-with-shared-id-numbers.
17
When the story first broke Jan 24,th the IEBC said there were 128,000 shared ID numbers. On
Feb 4,th it published a list of 78,000 voters who share IDs. There have since been a number of
different lists of those sharing numbers and names.
It should be noted that in Kapmaso Registration Centre in Kabianga Ward, Kericho County,
the clerks told IFA observers that they got an average of three cases a day regarding shared
ID numbers.
IFA field teams observations on ID-related issues
Many of these observations concern deviation from process and delay, which are most
frequently explained as opportunities for corruption or as opportunities for obstructing the
participation of minority groups.
Denis Maigah went to the Assistant Chief of Machango, Kericho Town, to request a
confirmation letter, which was necessary for him to apply for an ID card. He was told
that he needed to produce a title deed or land purchase agreement to confirm that
he was in fact a resident of the area. When beginning the application, he had
presented his mothers ID, which showed her as being resident in Nandi County,
North Rift. The chief knew, however, that she had bought land and lived in
Machango, Kericho, for ten years. Denis then moved to a neighbouring area
(Keongo), where he was finally able to get a letter from the local Assistant Chief.47
This is typical of unnecessary and unpredictable demands from local officials who, it
must be assumed, know the correct procedure.
IDs 1 - Denis Maigah with letter from Keongos assistant chief
IFA observers witnessed Kenyans queuing for collection of ID cards nationwide. In

many instances, field registration offices told waiting crowds that the delay was the
47
IFA Observers Note, Kericho County 30 January 2017.
18
fault of the Nairobi offices of the Registrar of Persons, which was not expediting the
processing.
At Kiplokyi Market, Bomet, Rift Valley, over 300 youth and adults gathered outside
the Registration of Persons office. An area chief later told them that the exercise had
been adjourned. Youth threatened to protest in response.48 This indicates the level
of inefficiency and frustration typical in attempting to acquire an ID in many regions.
IDs 2 - Waiting for IDs in Bomet County (left) and waiting for IDs in Kisii County (right)49
Kevin Otieno of Rongo, Migori County, Nyanza, applied for an ID on 22 January 2016.
He followed up throughout the year but no card has been issued. He has now been
advised to register again. On Jan 24, the Rongo District Registrar of Persons claimed
Kevins form was sent to Nairobi on 22 Feb 2016. He blamed the National Registrar of
Persons for the delay and problems.50
IDs 3 - Kevin Otieno, Rongo, Migori County
48
IFA Observers Notes, Bomet County. 6 February 2017.
49
IFA Observers Notes. Kisii County 23 January 2017.
50
IFA Observers Notes, Migori County. 23 January 2017.
19
In Changamwe constituency, Mombasa County, a young man (below) shows his
Waiting Card and reports that he was told he would have to wait for two months
after the MVR to receive his ID.51 As the IEBC announced that the register would be
closed on Feb 19,th this person will not be allowed to vote.
IDs 4 - In Changamwe, Mombasa County
Uncollected ID Cards
IFA observers noted the many uncollected ID cards in various offices around the country. It is
unclear why such backlogs exist, but there is a clear and concerning gap between the
experience of the citizens who are waiting for IDs, and the attitude of the government
offices that refuse to take responsibility for the delays.
In Ainamoi sub county office in Kericho County, Rift Valley, observers noted over
2500 uncollected IDs.52
51
IFA Observers Notes, Mombasa County. 25 January 2017
52
IFA Observers Kericho County. 20 January 2017.
20
IDs 5 - Uncollected IDs in Ainamoi in Kericho County
The Office of the Registrar of Persons in Ainamoi has over 2000 new, uncollected IDs.
It is also in possession of lost ID cards that have yet to be collected.53
There was an entire box of uncollected IDs in the Sotik Registration of Persons office
in Bomet County, Rift Valley.54
At Isiolo Central Office, there are many uncollected IDs as well as duplicate IDs. Isiolo
Commissioner George Natembeya told IFA observers that quick processing of ID
applications is only possible in Nairobi. Isiolo is classified as a border community,
and suffers from protracted vetting processes.55
IDs 6 - Uncollected IDs in Isiolo County (left) and 203 uncollected IDS in Kisii County (right)
53
IFA Observers Kericho County. 20 January 2017.
54
55
IFA Observers Notes, Isiolo County. 24 January 2017.
21
A boda boda rider displays uncollected ID cards in Ciombo Registration Centre in
Muranga County, Central Region, on February 7. ID cards are given to boda boda
riders after being collected from Huduma Centre by area chiefs. Boda Boda riders
were meant to trace owners and call them to register as voters. 56
IDs 7 - Uncollected IDs in Muranga County
In Igembe North constituency in Meru County, local residents blame the Assistant
Chief for holding ID cards. Some were processed as far back as 2012, but never
received. Subsequently, the documents were, according to observers, dumped at
the IEBC registration centre in Kawiru so that locals could access the cards. People
are also allowed to collect ID cards on behalf of others, to expedite the process; but
this is open to abuse.57
56
IFA Observers Notes Muranga County. 7 February 2017.
57
IFA Observers Notes, Meru County. 7 February 2017.
22
IDs 8 - ID cards in Igembe North, Meru County
ID Cards with Errors
People demonstrated errors on their ID cards. In one case in Nyeri County, Central
Region, a woman explained that the details on the card were correct but the photo of
her was that of another person (photo 1). In another case, a woman received two ID
cards, each with a different photo (Photo 2).58
IDs 9 - ID with errors
58
IFA Observers Notes, Nyeri County. 7 February 2017.
23
IDs 10 - Christopher Mesta Lemaletian, Samburu County, with an ID and his particulars, but the picture is not his.
IFA field teams noted the following cases of citizens who found that they shared their ID
numbers with others
A man in Mvita Constituency, Mombasa County, said he was discovered he shared his
ID number with one other person.59
At Kapkesosio Centre, Nyongores Ward, Chepalungu Constituency, Bomet County,

IFA observers learnt there were 81 people with the same ID number.60
In Nyeri County a man found that he shared his national ID number with someone
else. The names of those who share the same ID are Hussein Guruma Mahamud and
Simon Gichuru Munyeri.61
a
IDs 11 - Shared ID numbers in Mvita, Mombasa County
59
IFA Observers Notes, Mombasa County. 17 January 2017.
60
61
IFA Observers Notes, Nyeri County. 19 January 2017.
24
In Kapmaso Registration Centre in Kabianga Ward, Kericho County, Kipkemoi Arap
Barusei shares his ID number with Sargoi Ruth Chelangat. The IEBC has given them
unique numbers to allow them to vote. The clerks at Kabianga Ward said that they
get an average of three such cases a day. These are recorded in a book and given to
the IEBC to correct.
In Marsabit, however, IFA observers were told that people who have shared ID
numbers are sent to the Registrar of Persons.62
Mama Sahale of Bombolulu Workshop for the Physically Handicapped shares her ID
number with two other Kenyans.63
IDs 12 - Mama Sahale
Single-digit ID numbers
Single digit ID numbers indicate error it is impossible in Kenya to have a single digit number
for an ID.
The screen in Isiolo County showed the following individuals with the same single-
digit ID.64
62
IFA Observers Marasbit County. 1 February 2017.
63
IFA Observers Mombasa County. 20 January 2017.
64
IFA Observers Notes, Isiolo County. 5 February 2017.
25
IDs 13 - Single Digit IDs, in Isiolo County
At Kotieno Primary School, Homa Bay County, Nyanza, many individuals had the
same one-digit ID number.65
IDs 14 - Single Digit IDs, Homa Bay County
There were also several other examples of single-digit ID numbers around the country. In
some places, IFA saw double-digit ID numbers.66
Upsurge of Applications for Transfer of Polling Stations
One of the most concerning issues in this election cycle is registration transfers, wherein
citizens change the location of the centers where they were originally registered and where
they will eventually cast their ballots. In some instances, IEBC clerks have noted more
applicants for transfers than for registration.
During MVR 1, the IEBC received 700,000 transfer applications.67 In the first week of MVR II,
the IEBC noted that 40 percent of those Kenyans turning out were actually applying to
transfer their polling stations.68
65
IFA Observers Homa Bay County. 7 February 2017.
66
IFA Observers Notes, Mombasa and Maralal Counties . 20 February 2017.
26
IFA field observers noted citizens making strategic decisions about where to register to vote,
based on perceived levels of safety for particular ethnic groups. For example, Kisiis in Migori
say they were told they could register but that they will not be allowed to vote. Some people
said they were afraid of being blamed for election results. 69 Some are moving from urban
polling centres to rural areas. For example in Kisumu, people are reported to be transferring
to register in rural areas they consider less likely to be affected by election-related political
violence.
The IEBC has also responded to the upsurge in transfers, raising concerns that politicians
were organizing the transfers in an attempt to boost their potential vote share. For example,
the bodyguard of Teso South MP Mary Emase was arrested for reportedly trying to register
Ugandans as Kenyan voters.70 In Nyeri, the IEBC was investigating MP Esther Murugi over
claims that she was bribing voters from Tetu, Othaya and Kieni to transfer to Nyeri Town.71
There were also suspicions raised about transfers relating to the Gubernatorial race in
Nairobi.
In an attempt to prevent dubious transfer applications, the IEBC announced that it is no

longer possible to apply for transfers at the ward level. Instead, applicants have to submit
their transfer requests at IEBCs constituency offices. It seems, however, the new rule had
limited impact. The IEBC announced that 1,001,819 individuals applied for transfers.72
IFA field team observations related to transfers
At the Isiolo North Constituency Office of IEBC, the IFA team noticed that most
transfer applicants were from Tigania West Constituency, Meru County.73
In Ainamoi Constituency, Kericho County, people say they wished to move from
village polling stations to working town polling stations for the sake of convenience
67
Collins Omulo. 2017. Voter transfer to be done at constituency level, IEBC says. Daily Nation. Available at
<http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Voter-transfer-to-be-done-at-constituency-level/1064-3514246-
3y1wnp>.
68
Isaac Ongiri and Moses Odhiambo. 2017. IEBC alarmed by huge voter transfers. Daily Nation. Available at
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/IEBC-alarmed-by-huge-voter-transfers/1056-3091572-12py2b3z/index.html.
69
IFA Field Report. IFA Retreat 13-14 February 2017.
70
Cyrus Ombati. 2017. Kenyan MP escapes, bodyguard detained in Uganda over voter fraud claims. Standard
Digital. Available at <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001227770/kenyan-mp-escapes-bodyguard-
detained-in-uganda-over-voter-fraud-claims>.
71
Trizah Wangui. 2017. Nyeri residents threaten to call for demonstrations over mass voter transfer.
Standard Media. Available at <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ureport/story/2001228087/nyeri-residents-
threaten-to-call-for-demonstrations-over-mass-voter-transfer>.
72
Moses Nyamori. 2017. Kenyas destiny lies in the hands of 19m voters. Standard Digital. Available at
<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001230263/kenya-s-destiny-lies-in-the-hands-of-19m-voters>.
73
IFA Observers Notes, Isiolo County. 23 January 2017.
27
and ease. At the same time, it was noted aspirants were trying to engineer such
transfers for their own benefit.
There were 12 people gathered outside Soin/Sigowet Constituency office, Kericho

County, waiting for transfers. They complained about the length of time they had
been kept waiting.74
In Laikipia North Constituency, Laikipia County, clerks were observed filling in voters
transfer forms.75
74
IFA Observers Notes, Kericho County. 31 January 2017.
75
IFA Observers Notes, Laikipia County. 6 February 2017.
28
Section 2: Equipment Error
When MVR II began, the process was severely compromised by technical problems at
individual registration centers. Common problems included dysfunctional and/or
nonfunctional biometric voter registration (BVR) kits; first-time registrants who found their
names already on the register, and names that were missing from the register. In Nyando
Constituency, alone, in Kisumu, more than 180 names were missing.76 In Bomet, Rift Valley,
IFA field teams received a printout of the names of 64 people who had various problems
with registration. They were told to report to the constituency office for the resolution of
the issues.77 Such occurrences affect the confidence of the public and raise serious doubts to
the validity of the entire register, especially as the same issues were evident in 2013.
IFA field teams noted dysfunctional and/or nonfunctional BVR machines in the following
areas
The registration kit failed at Little Theatre Club Polling Station, Mvita Constituency,
Mombasa County
Serious errors at Chebirirbea Tea Center Polling Station, Kabianga Ward, Belgut
Constituency, Kericho County. The MVR kit failed to start until 12pm. An ICT expert
eventually arrived, but people in line were told to leave and come back later.
At Chumani Primary, Mombasa, the MVR kit had a battery problem and the password
for the BVR kit failed registration had not started as of noon, 10 February.78
IFA field teams noted the following cases of citizens who went to register to vote for the
first time but found that they were already in the register
At Mikindani Social hall in Jomvu Constituency, Mombasa County, a man told IFA
observers that although he had never registered before, he found his details in the
BVR machine.79
76
Kepher Otieno. 2017. Raila Odingas double registration corrected as woman traced. Standard Digital.
Available at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000231026/raila-odinga-s-double-registration-
corrected-as-woman-traced.
77
IFA Observers Kericho County. 6 February 2017.
78
IFA Observers Mombasa County. 10 February 2017.
79
29
Technical Problems 1 - Mikindani Social Hall
At St Marys Registration Centre in Kisii County, Mary Obaga said that her name was
already in the register, despite the fact that she had never previously registered. She
was sent to the IEBCs constituency office to follow up.80
IFA field teams also noted cases of citizens who had registered previously, but found they
were no longer in the register
In Mombasa, one man demonstrated that he had registered for the 2013 election by
showing his previous voters card. He was not found in the current register.81
Two women at Kipsing Primary School, Isiolo County, voted in 2013 but their names
were not found in either the BVR kit or the manual Green Book (see below). The
clerks at this centre said they had come across five such cases. They also said there
had been three cases in which names had been missing in the BVR kit but had been
found in the Green Book.82
Technical Problems 2 - Kipsing Primary School, Isiolo
80
IFA Observers Kisii County 10 February 2017.
81
82
IFA Observers Isiolo County. 21 January 2017.
30
Issues with Names
Simon Onti Thomas went to register at Oldonyiro Primary School, Isiolo North
Constituency, Isiolo County, but he found that his ID number was listed under the
name Simon Onti Locale.83
Technical Problems 3 - Thomas at Oldonyiro Primary School
Section 3: Manual Notebooks

Use of Notebooks (aka Green Books/Black Books/White Books/ECK Books) for Manual
Recording of Registered Voters
According to the newest amendments to the Kenyan electoral law, the IEBC is permitted to
use non-technological voter registration methods that are complementary to technological
processes.
During the course of MVR II, IFA observers witnessed widespread use of notebooks,
commonly known as Black Books, as used by the pre-2010 election commission, the ECK.
IEBC personnel recorded registration details in these notebooks. The understanding is that
these manually created lists will be used in an unspecified manner as backups in case
technology fails.
The potential problems with this manual system are numerous, they include:
the lack of one, comprehensive register
the inability to check the phenomenon of multiple voting in different polling stations
the length of time required to find names in the notebooks on election day
serious difficulty in providing security for thousands of such books.
83
IFA Observers Isiolo County. 21 January 2017.
31
The IEBC has failed to convince the public so far that this is anything more than a shadowy
and disorganised parallel manual system, and there is significant concern about how the
register is organized.
At this time, IFA understands that there could be a minimum of three registration lists
1. The list that is created electronically through the BVR
2. The list that is hand written in the notebooks
3. The list that is transcribed from the handwritten notebooks on to a computer that is
then printed out
This raises questions. If there is a print out of the Black Book on voting day, why do the
original Black Books also have to be present? Its a system that appears to be obviously
vulnerable to manipulation additional names could be added to the Black Book while
claiming they were an error.
IFA field teams observed the IEBC using Black/Green/White books in
Kirua Ward, Meru County

Burai Ward, Isiolo North Constituency
Mvita Constituency, Mombasa County
Shanzu, Mombasa County
Kaaga Primary School, Meru County
Bobaracho Registration Center, Kisii County
Homa Bay town in Homa Bay County
Mtwapa Kilifi County
Kipsegon Primary, Nyongores Ward, Chepalungu Constituency, Bomet County
Maralal, Samburu County
Laisamis Constituency, Marsabit County
Nyeri County
Kirimiri, Makuyu Ward, Muranga County
Nyongores Ward, Chepalungu Constituency, Bomet County
Magarini Constituency, Kilifi County
Kunyak Ward, Kericho County
Lenguruma Primary School, Isiolo North Constituency
32
Manual Registration 1 - Kaaga Primary School, Meru County (left), Laisamis Constituency (middle) and Interior of Green
Book, Laisamis Constituency (right)
Manual Registration 2 - Kirua Ward (left), Mtwapa Shimo la Tewa Constituency (middle), Mvita Constituency (right)
Manual Registration 3 - Shanzu
IFA field teams also observed some registration centers in Homa Bay and Muranga
using books with ECK labels on them (ECK Black Book).
Manual Registration 4 - Use of the ECK Black Book (left) and use of the ECK Black Book in Muranga (right)
33
IFA field teams did not observe manual registration by notebook in the following locations:
The use of notebooks shows worrying inconsistency. The IEBC seems intent on using a
complementary manual system, but it is not evident everywhere.
Kiamuturia Registration Centre, Kirinyaga County84

Ngarengiro, Laikipia County85
In Laikipia North Constituency Laikipia County, no Green Books had arrived.
In some areas of Marsabit County Green Book arrived in the third week of the MVR
At Kasimba Primary School in Homa Bay County, the clerks said they have not been
told anything about using Green Books. They used a different manual system: the
clerks use questions from Form A (used when applying for an ID or passport) and
record the answers in a note pad.86
IFA field teams observed irregular use of green books/manual registration in the following
locations
In Nyeri County, the Green Book was a Counter book. It was actually a notebook
with names of people who want to transfer; people brought to register by boda boda
drivers; and, people missing from the register. There were many of these books. The
application forms were not in all places. Also, in the places where there were
applications, they were not all signed those registering. In some places, staff were
not filling in the forms as required.87
In Samburu East Constituency, the books had 4 columns name; ID; serial number;
and signature. Some people used thumbprints. In other books, they were putting
voter slip serial numbers in that same column.88
In PandPier registration centre in Kisumu Central Constituency, Kisumu County,

observers saw Forms A being used but did not see Green Books.89
In Kasimba Primary School, Homa Bay County, and in Isiolo County, the
Black/Green/White books were seen, but they were not being filled in during
registration. Instead, clerks said that people had to fill in Forms A, which would then
be transferred to the books. IFA field teams noted, however, that there was a column
in the Black/Green/White books that required signatures from potential voters.90
84
IFA Observers Notes, Kirinyaga County. 23 January 2017.
85
IFA Observers Notes, Laikipia County. 6 February 2017.
86
IFA Observers Notes, Homa Bay County. 7 February 2017.
87
IFA Field Report. IFA Retreat. 13 February 2017.
88
IFA Field Report, Samburu County. 13 February 2017.
89
IFA Observers Notes, Kisumu County. 5 February 2017.
90
IFA Observers Notes, Homa Bay County. 30 January 2017; 7 February 2017 and 13 February 2017.
34
Manual Registration 5 - Notebooks and Forms A in Homa Bay
At Lenguruma Primary School, Isiolo North Constituency, Isiolo County, there were
pages of the Green Book, which had been cancelled/crossed out. The clerk did not
understand why he had been given such a book. When the BVR kit was searched,
some of the names that were crossed out in the Green Book were found in the BVR.91
Manual Registration 6 - Lenguruma Primary School
At Kotetni Voter Registration Centre in Kunyak Ward, Kericho County, the Black Book
was labeled with the name of a different ward (Chilchila Ward).92
91
IFA Observers Notes, Homa Bay County and Isiolo County. 21 January 2017.
92
35
Manual Registration 7 - Gothetni Registration Centre (left), interior of black book in Gothetni Registration Centre
(middle) and interior of black book in Gothetni Registration Centre (right)
In Laisamis Constituency, Marsabit County, staff were using IEBC serial numbers to
register persons in the Green Book instead of signatures. Standard practice use of the
Green Book requires IEBC officials to use signatures of those registered as proof that
the entry is real and was taken with the owners consent.
Manual Registration 8- In Laisamis Constituency, a green book with a mix of signatures and thumbprints from
voters.
In PS 017, Kirimiri, Makuyu Ward, Muranga, IEBC was using ECK black books as
reference books.93
In Magarini Constituency, Kilifi County, Returning Officer Hellen Sidi said she was
telling her staff to cover the ECK book with the IEBC sticker.94
93
IFA Observers Notes, Muranga. 7 February 2017.
94
IFA Observers Notes, Kilifi County. 8 February 2017.
36
Section 4: IEBC Field Performance
Logistical Issues during MVR II
IEBC officials and registrants faced several logistical hurdles during MVR II. These varied,
ranging from inconsistent hours at registration centers to a lack of security around BVR kits.
IFA field teams notes several sites in which IEBC clerks and staff were not wearing IEBC
attire
At Suneka Baraza Hall, Bonchari Constituency, Kisii County the registration clerk was
not in IEBC attire.95
At Lugwe Registration Centre, Rabai Constituency, Kilifi County IEBC clerks were
working without the IEBC reflector jackets.96
In Kembu Ward, Bomet East Constituency, Bomet County the IEBC clerk had no
official jacket. One official was seated on the floor.97
In the chiefs office at Kaptien, Bomet County clerks were not in IEBC attire and there
was no banner to identify the location as a registration centre.98
Logistical Issues 1 - Kembu Ward in Bomet East Constituency, Bomet County
At Eronge Registration Centre, Kitutu Chache North Sub-County, Kisii County IEBC
clerks did not have IEBC-issued reflector jackets and the banner outside was not
labeled.99
95
IFA Observers Notes, Kisii County. 18 January 2017.
96
IFA Observers Notes Kilifi County. 21 January 2017.
97
IFA Observers Notes, Bomet County . 26 January 2017.
98
99
37
Logistical Issues 2 - Eronge Registration Centre
In Kotora Primary, Homa Bay County there was no clearly labeled IEBC banner.100
Once registration was extended beyond 14 February, it was common to see centers
without identifying banners around the country.101
At Sigor Primary, Bomet County, clerks did not have IEBC attire. Additionally, one
IEBC staff member was away for a protracted period around lunchtime.102
IEBC clerks at KPA Hall Mbaraki, Mvita Constituency, Mombasa County did not have
IEBC reflector jackets.103
IFA observed an unmanned registration desk in Samburu West Constituency,

Samburu County. A spot check by the field team found the Voter Registration Clerks
not at their desks during the registration exercise. The registration equipment was
not guarded securely during the entire voting exercise.
Logistical Issues 3- Unmanned voter registration desk in Samburu West Constituency
100
IFA Observers Notes, Homa Bay County. 23 January 2017.
101
102
103
38
In Kathutura polling station in Laikipia North Constituency, Laikipia County, the IFA
team came across IEBC officials using different kits to register members of Samburu
and Turkana community. The reason given was that it was being done separately to
keep the peace.
Logistical Issues 4- IEBC forced to register two warring tribes separately in Laikipia County.
At Kirish nursery polling station in Samburu East constituency, IEBC officials were
seated on the ground for the registration process.
Logistical Issues 5- IEBC officials working in harsh conditions in Samburu County.
IEBC did not consistently open and close registration centers on time
Most centers in Thika and Juja in Kiambu County opened in the afternoon, by which
time people had given up and gone home. Opening was initially delayed because of
BVR failure.104
IEBC clerks were late at KPA Hall Mbaraki, Mvita Constituency in Mombasa County.
The centre opened at 10:30am instead of 8:00am.105
At Bitare Registration Centre, Kisii, there was an obsolete IEBC poster with a voter
verification number (15872) and handwritten dates acting as notification of
registration times.106
IFA field teams noted other logistical irregularities
104
105
106
39
A failed BVR kit was transported in a Rickshaw taxi from the registration centre back
to the regional in Mombasa County. There was no visible security for the journey.107
Logistical Issues 6 - Moving BVR kits by tuktuk in Mombasa County
Suneka Baraza Hall in Kisii County was gazetted as a registration centre, but it is a
half- constructed building.108
Logistical Issues 7 - Suneka Baraza Hall in Kisii County
In other locations, where registration centers were set up in or near schools, curious
children were observed inspecting the technology, screens and books, potentially
disrupting registration activity and security.109
At Lodokejek Registration Centre in Samburu County, the IEBC used a wheelbarrow

as a table.110
107
108
109
IFA Observers Notes. 25 January 2017.
110
IFA Observers Notes, Samburu County. 30 January 2017.
40
Logistical Issues 8 - Lodokejek Registration Centre in Samburu County
At Iftin Registration Centre, Garissa County, there was no backdrop provided for
taking photos. IEBC used makeshift gray material, which had to be held up by
individual staff.111
Logistical Issues 9 - Makeshift backdrop in Garissa
111
IFA Observers Notes, Garissa County. 5 February 2017.
41
In Isiolo County, the IEBC used banners labeled with information from the Interim
Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC), which functioned from 2009-2011, at
registration centers.112
Lack of Transparency related to Observing
Although media and observers are permitted to witness and watch voter registration, IFA
observers faced obstacles in certain parts of the country, despite accreditation.
Obstruction of observers is of significant concern. When observers do not have access to the
process, it impedes transparency and accountability, potentially impacting the long-term
legitimacy of the election.
IFA field teams encountered significant resistance from IEBC clerks in Kericho. At
Kedowa Market, Kericho County, clerks were generally unwilling to talk and one clerk
stood up to insist that observers stop taking photos. At Kerenget Primary Kamwingi,
Kericho County, the clerk would not respond at all. Finally, he insisted that observers
go to the constituency office for information.113
In Mathira Constituency in Nyeri, at Registration Centre 0481, the clerk refused to

talk. He took photos of the IFA observers.114
At Chepseon in Kericho County, the supervisor at the registration centre told IFA to
go to the constituency office. The Constituency Coordinator, Mr Mutai, was
welcoming and participated in a meeting.115
At Kerenget Primary Kamwingi, Londiani in Kericho County, the registration clerk

(Mwangi) refused to talk to IFA observers.116
In Isiolo, the IFA team was denied permission to film at IEBCs Isiolo constituency
office, where voter transfers were taking place. The regional coordinator said that
filming would cause commotion and that filming could only occur in field offices.
112
IFA Field Team Report. IFA Retreat. 13 February 2017.
113
114
IFA Observers Notes, Nyeri County. 18 January 2017.
115
116
42
Security incidents
In Nyeri, IEBC field staff and clerks were responsible for arranging and overseeing
logistics for transporting kits, which sometimes included overnight stays with the kits.
No security was provided on these occasions.117
IFA observers witnessed Jubilee supporters burning tires to protest against the NASA
rally in Bomet County. The protest hindered registration activities while it was going
on118
Other concerns are a more general indication of the security environment in some of the
regions; or, projected election-related fears and misgivings. IFA noted that some citizens are
making strategic decisions about where to register to vote, based on perceived levels of
safety for particular ethnic groups. For instance, there are Kisiis in Migori County who were
told they can register but will not be allowed to vote locally. Some people say they are afraid
of being blamed for voting the wrong way. 119
In early February, militants attacked an army camp in Mandera and reportedly stole three
BVR kits. The state blames Al-Shabaab, but the group denied that it was involved. In
response, the IEBC claimed that the data on the kits had already been backed up and was
secure.120
IFA notes that the IEBC endeavored to keep aspirants away from registration centers
In Changamwe in Mombasa County, the IEBC made sure that parties, candidates and
agents should not be present at registration centers. There was a printed sign saying
that no aspirants or agents were allowed to be in the vicinity of voter registration
centers.121
117
Nyeri Field Report. IFA Retreat. 13 February 2017.
118
119
IFA Field Report, Migori County. IFA Retreat 13-14 February 2017.
120
Manase Otsialo. 2017. State maintains Al-Shabab stole BVR kits in Mandera. Daily Nation. Available at
http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/mandera/Shabaab-stole-BVR-Kits/1183298-3804898-4rufwa/.
121
IFA Observers Notes Mombasa County. 26 January 2017.
43
Public notices posted in English and Swahiii in Changamwe, Mombasa County, warning aspirants and agents to stay away
from registration centres (Kindly note that no aspirants or agents are allowed to stay within the voter registration centers)
In Nyeri, IEBC field staff and clerks were responsible for arranging and overseeing
logistics for transporting kits, which sometimes included overnight stays with the kits.
No security was provided on these occasions.122
IFA observers witnessed Jubilee supporters burning tires to protest against the NASA
rally in Bomet, Kericho County. 123

Some citizens are making strategic decisions about where to register to vote, based
on perceived levels of safety for particular ethnic groups. For instance, Kisiis in Migori
were told they could register but would not be allowed to vote locally. Some
minorities expressed fear of being blamed for voting choices. 124 (See also Transfer
Applications).
In early February, militants attacked an army camp in Mandera and reportedly stole three
BVR kits. The state blames Al-Shabaab, but the group denied that it was involved. In
response, the IEBC said that the data on the kits had already been backed up and was
secure.125
122
Nyeri Field Report. IFA Retreat. 13 February 2017.
123
IFA Observers Notes, Kericho, 4 February 2017.
124
IFA Field Reports, IFA Retreat 13-14 February 2017.
125
Manase Otsialo. 2017. State maintains Al-Shabab stole BVR kits in Mandera. Daily Nation. Available at
http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/mandera/Shabaab-stole-BVR-Kits/1183298-3804898-4rufwa/.
44
Conclusion
The MVRII process was significantly flawed, and risk the credibility of the remainder of this
electoral process.
One of the most urgent problems is the lack of access to national IDs. Without accessible,
efficient and reliable ID-processing procedures, significant portions of the eligible Kenyan
electorate remain disenfranchised. In the long term, the delays and problems associated
with obtaining a national ID can increase voter apathy and decrease turnout, and lead to a
loss of faith in democratic governance.
Other urgent problems include the lack of clarity around use of manual systems, the upsurge
in transfer applications, and opaque data security and back-up procedures. While it is clear
that technical systems can and do fail, the use of manual registration, voter identification
and results transmission systems must be accompanied by regular public explanations and
trusted, independent oversight of such procedures. In the Kenyan context, the involvement
of a trusted, third party could go a long way in creating and maintaining public trust.
Overall, it is of great concern that the pre-election period is heading into increasingly
dangerous political territory, with coercive and chauvinistic behavior accepted as a normal
part of the Kenyan election landscape
The IEBC is at a pivotal moment. If it can assertively and comprehensively address the issues
raised, there is still time to renew faith in the Kenyan electoral process.
45
Recommendations
Recommendations to the IEBC
Ensure transparency of the cleaning of the register by publicly explaining how the list will be
refined and revised. Additionally, develop an agreement for observation of the cleaning
process with an independent, third party who has the technical expertise and political
credibility to review and assess the process.
Partner with a reputable, recognised expert team or organization to conduct a holistic and
transparent audit of the voters register. This audit should cover the registration process and
make use of the Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) rules. It
should also cover the list of registered voters. This part of the audit should use the list to
voters and/or people to list methods.
Create and publicize technological back-up plans for cases in which the BVR and electronic
voter identification (EVID) kits do not work properly and/or fail to function. This should be
accompanied by public testing of the EVID and BVR kits so that citizens can understand how
the machines work and what to expect at the registration and polling centers.
Create and publicize procedures to deal with common problems, such as names missing
from the register and first-time registrants who find their names inexplicably existent in the
register. These procedures must prioritize voters rights and be as expedient and efficient as
possible so that eligible voters are not unfairly disenfranchised. Sufficient safeguards against
fraud must be in place and the IEBC must educate the public about the systems.
Urgently harmonize use and terminology of the notebooks used for manual collection of
registration data. Commit to election reforms that prioritize eliminating the so-called Black
Books completely in future elections.
Publicize the role of the Black Books in voter registration and for election day identification.
The new law allows for manual registration, voter identification and results transmission as
complementary to digital processes. Clarify exactly when voters should see and expect
manual processes and how those processes will work. Public explanations should include the
following details:
What data will be recorded,

Whose signatures are required,
How the data will be secured.
How discrepancies between manual and digital records will be reconciled.
46
The IEBC also must urgently explain how the issue of shared IDs will be treated in the so-
called Green Books:
Are cases of shared IDs recorded there, or not?

How can manual books keep track of such cases in different polling stations across
the country?
Provide and prioritize equitable resources, capacity and staff to all areas of the country, with
particular attention to marginalised areas. Survey, anticipate and address the lack of
services, electricity and infrastructure in locations where it is likely to interfere with the
rights of all citizens to register and vote satisfactorily.
Include the entire voting age population in calculations related to voter registration and
voter turnout. Given the widely acknowledged problems with obtaining national IDs in
Kenya, it is unfair to base registration calculations on only those citizens in possession of IDs.
Ensure that IEBC staff maintains professional consistency in all areas of the country. All staff
on duty must have uniforms and identification; centers must have clearly and accurately
labeled banners for location identification. Equipment used in IEBC processes should be
standard and uniform so that all voters are treated equally. Consistency necessarily includes
timing IEBC registration and polling centers must maintain requisite hours.
Security must be taken seriously. Equipment and data must be backed up and stored.
Moreover, it is important to secure all stations and centers such that voters can enter and
exit safely and securely. To achieve this, stakeholders should decide on whether or not to
station security and/or police forces at centers and stations.
Respect election observation, whether performed by local or international accredited

observers. The IEBC must inform all staff, at all levels, that accredited observers are
permitted to observe electoral processes. It is critical to a credible process that IEBC officials
and staff do not obstruct the work of such observers, and understand they do not have the
right to confiscate the observers materials and equipment in the course of their duties.
Voters must remain free to choose where they vote; and regulations must also be designed
to prevent politically manipulative transfers. IEBC staff need to be adequately trained to
recognize and respond to irregular behaviors related to transfers, such as an above average
amount of applications, or large groups of applicants arriving together.
Recommendations to the National Registrar of Persons and the IEBC
It is critical that the state addresses the serious problems related to processing and issuing of
national ID cards. Every Kenyan is entitled to fair and timely process in obtaining this vital
document. The state should seriously consider merging the application processes for
47
registration and IDs, to reduce the significant resources and costs required for registration;
and consider accepting identification other than national IDs so that eligible Kenyans without
IDs are not disenfranchised.
Restore public confidence by clarifying immediately how it is possible for multiple Kenyans
to share the same ID number. Create and publicize a plan to correct the issue. There is
urgent need for the IEBC to explain how it will ensure that eligible voters with the same ID
number can vote on election day.
IEBC must also address the anxiety without delay over its own system of unique ID numbers.
Specifically:
What purpose do these numbers serve, and why are they necessary if IDs are
required for registration anyway?
What safeguards are in place to ensure that these unique numbers are not misused
to inflate the register or to facilitate other types of fraud?
How will this issue be addressed in the upcoming cleaning of the register?
Recommendations to Politicians
Voting is not mandatory in Kenya, and Kenyans are free to register to vote or to abstain from
casting ballots. Political elites, community leaders and their agents must immediately cease
coercive practices, including intimidating speech, obstruction of services to non-registrants
and threats on social media. Such tactics infringe on basic fundamental rights.
Respect the confidentiality of citizens data. Sharing peoples information and registration
status for purposes of mobilization is illegal and breaches the law regarding the
confidentiality of such data.
Recommendations to the Director of Public Prosecutions
Investigate and prosecute without fear or favour those who engage in voter and registrant
bribery, or use coercive tactics to force citizens to register or vote. Such activities should not
be treated as a norm, as they fly in the face of democratic ideals and the law.
48
About InformAction
InformAction is a dynamic social justice organisation that uses film and community
discussions to encourage ordinary people to speak out and take action. We operate through
mobile field teams using a car, screen, projector and camera - to show social justice films
to thousands of people in the counties every week. Experienced activists lead community
discussions on justice and governance, and field videographers record the discussions and
local human rights abuses.
In an environment that has become increasingly hostile to civil society and freedom of
expression, we use our unique methodology to provide alternative sources of information
and leadership. We embrace diversity and equality, and reject all forms of economic, social
and political discrimination.
Our Vision: An informed and empowered society that speaks truth to power and demands
accountability and social justice.
Our Mission: To inform and empower communities in Kenya in order to catalyse public
debate and action for a just and accountable society.
InformAction is part of the Kura Yangu, Sauti Yangu (KYSY) citizen movement. KYSY is
spearheaded by a number of like-minded civil society organizations that have come together
to proactively support Kenyas preparations for the 2017 elections, with a view to ensuring
that the country minimizes the risks related to dysfunctional electoral systems and practices.
KYSY is also committed to promoting political dialogue across the country with the aim of
encouraging political consensus and increasing public confidence, making the process and
results more credible and legitimate.
Contact:
Waga Odongo, Press and Communications +254 752 702 320
Winnie Masai, Programmes Coordinator +254 736 512165
Tirop Kitur, Community Action Leader +254 725 881533
ElectionWatch updates are designed to inform Kenyans about the state of electoral readiness
in the lead-up to the 2017 general election, and prompt public debate and conversation about
the credibility of the electoral process. Contact info@informAction.tv
49
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ElectionWatch #3

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ElectionWatch Report #3

GATEWAY TO THE BALLOT

with Kura Yangu, Sauti Yangu

President Uhuru Kenyatta had authorized a series of controversial amendments to the

* Registration notebooks have appeared in some registration centers, alongside Biometric

Observers use qualitative methods based on interviews, observations and document

InformAction observers witness and document the application of constitutional standards

Voter Registration in Kenya

The Political Stakes of Registration

The role of voter registration is especially important when it comes to emerging

Voter Registration in the 2017 Electoral Cycle

The Technology Option

because of concerns over hacking

Impunity, a film by InformAction

Table 1: Changes in National Voter Registration in Kenya (March 2013-February 2017)

March 2013 December 2016 January 2017

Coercive Political Practices

There were instances of faith-based organizations requiring their congregations to show

IFA field teams observed and noted the following

1. National Identification (ID) Process

2. Equipment Error and Failure

4. IEBC Field Performance

36 See ElectionWatch#2 http://www.informaction.tv/index.php/news-from-the-field/item/564-election-

IFA field teams observations on ID-related issues

IDs 1 - Denis Maigah with letter from Keongos assistant chief

IFA observers witnessed Kenyans queuing for collection of ID cards nationwide. In

IDs 3 - Kevin Otieno, Rongo, Migori County

IDs 4 - In Changamwe, Mombasa County

IDs 7 - Uncollected IDs in Muranga County

ID Cards with Errors

IDs 9 - ID with errors

At Kapkesosio Centre, Nyongores Ward, Chepalungu Constituency, Bomet County,

IDs 12 - Mama Sahale

IDs 14 - Single Digit IDs, Homa Bay County

Upsurge of Applications for Transfer of Polling Stations

In an attempt to prevent dubious transfer applications, the IEBC announced that it is no

IFA field team observations related to transfers

There were 12 people gathered outside Soin/Sigowet Constituency office, Kericho

Technical Problems 2 - Kipsing Primary School, Isiolo

Technical Problems 3 - Thomas at Oldonyiro Primary School

Section 3: Manual Notebooks

IFA field teams observed the IEBC using Black/Green/White books in

Kirua Ward, Meru County

Manual Registration 3 - Shanzu

Kiamuturia Registration Centre, Kirinyaga County84

In PandPier registration centre in Kisumu Central Constituency, Kisumu County,

Manual Registration 6 - Lenguruma Primary School

Logistical Issues 1 - Kembu Ward in Bomet East Constituency, Bomet County

IFA observed an unmanned registration desk in Samburu West Constituency,

Logistical Issues 3- Unmanned voter registration desk in Samburu West Constituency

Logistical Issues 5- IEBC officials working in harsh conditions in Samburu County.

IFA field teams noted other logistical irregularities

Logistical Issues 6 - Moving BVR kits by tuktuk in Mombasa County

Logistical Issues 7 - Suneka Baraza Hall in Kisii County

At Lodokejek Registration Centre in Samburu County, the IEBC used a wheelbarrow

Logistical Issues 9 - Makeshift backdrop in Garissa

Lack of Transparency related to Observing

In Mathira Constituency in Nyeri, at Registration Centre 0481, the clerk refused to

At Kerenget Primary Kamwingi, Londiani in Kericho County, the registration clerk

Recommendations to the IEBC

What data will be recorded,

Are cases of shared IDs recorded there, or not?

Respect election observation, whether performed by local or international accredited

Recommendations to the National Registrar of Persons and the IEBC