CASE 11

SOBERANO vs PEOPLE

Facts
The prominent Public relations practitioner, Salvador Dacer, together with his
driver was abducted along ZobelRoxas St. Manila. They were killed by
strangulation and their charred remains were later found in Cavite.
An information was filed by the prosecutors charging a number of accused
some of whom are public officers of double murder.
The prosecution filed a motion to admit amended information which was
granted and admitted by the trial court.
The Amended information read:
xxx ,abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO at the
corner of Osmea Highway (formerly South Super Highway) and ZobelRoxas
Street in Manila, and later brought them to Indang, Cavite
Meanwhile, Villanueva filed a motion for reinvestigation asserting that he
was mistakenly identified as a participant in the double murder. This was
granted.
A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information [13] dated 17
September 2001 was filed by the prosecution. The Amended Information ---
(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and
Glen Dumlao as they are now witnesses for the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt.
CezarMancao II and P/Sr. Supt. TeofiloVia.
ISSUE:
the fundamental issue that must be resolved concerns the duty of a trial
court judge when confronted with a motion to admit amended information
excluding some of the accused named in the original information for
utilization as witnesses for the State.
RULING:
The key lies in the correct interpretation of two pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., Section 14 of Rule 110 on
amendment of information and Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of
an accused as state witness.
Section 14, Rule 110 states
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused
 However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature
of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons
in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
On the other hand, Section 17, Rule 119 provides:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two
or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense,
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct
one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they
may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at
a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated
in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part
of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as
state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary
an amendment of an information to exclude some accused and that the
same is made before plea. Thus, at the very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is
applicable which means that the amendment should be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. What seems to complicate the situation is that the exclusion of the
accused is specifically sought for the purpose of discharging them as
witnesses for the State. The consequential question is, should the
requirements for discharge of an accused as state witness as set forth in
Section 17, Rule 119 be made as additional requirements (i.e., Section 14,
Rule 110 and Section 17, Rule 119) or should only one provision apply as
ruled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110
or Section 17, Rule 119)?
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or
one of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with
Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for
the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force
when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause,
or when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or
on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the
need for the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of
each state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come
into play. This is because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
the determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially
an executive function, not a judicial one. [29] The prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department of government whose principal
power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to
prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a
wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to
charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which
are best appreciated by prosecutors. [30] By virtue of the trial court having
granted the prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed
to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the
Government.[31] Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the
prosecution is thus equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching
regarding the disposition thereof.
Thus, as in almost all things, the prosecutions discretion is not boundless or
infinite. The prosecution must satisfy for itself that an accused excluded
from the information for purposes of utilizing him as state witness is
qualified therefor.
The situation is different in cases when an accused is retained in the
information but his discharge as state witness is sought thereafter by the
prosecution before it rests its case, in which event, the procedural (in
addition to the substantive) requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 apply.
Otherwise stated, when no amendment to the information is involved as a
by-product of reinvestigation and trial proceeds thereafter, the discharge of
the accused falls squarely and solely within the ambit of Section 17, Rule
119.
CASE 12

CRESPO VS. MOGUL

FACTS:

1. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of
the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in
the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.

2. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to
defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information.

3. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario

L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was
denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to
August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the
appellate court.

4. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ
of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an order of
August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from
proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the
Court.

5. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended

that the petition be given due course.

6. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals

granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his
threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

7. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino

Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate
dismissal of the information filed against the accused.

8. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the

Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a
copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2,
1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.
9. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the
arraignment, stating that the motions trust being to induce this Court to
resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that
adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only
disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Courts
independence and integrity.

10. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition
and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals.

11. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until
further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23,
1979.

12. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was
denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980.

13. Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private
respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to
dismiss the information.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case
filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to
whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and
insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits?

RULING: YES.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in

Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with
the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of
the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the

Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed
in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without

pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
CASE 13

DIMATULAC VS. VILLON

Facts:

On or about November 2, 2005 all the accused under the leadership of

Mayor Santiago Yabut went to the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Some of
the accused positioned themselves around the house while the others stood
by the truck and the mayor stayed in the truck with the body guard. Accused
Billy YAbut, Kati YAbut & Franncisco Yambao went inside the house strongly
suggested to go down to see the mayor outside and ask for sorry. As
Dimatulac went down to the house and he was shot to kill as a consequence
he died. The assistant prosecutor Alfonso Flores found that the Yabuts were
in company with one another that the offense committed was only homicide
not murder and hereby subject to bail P 20,000.00 for each of the accused.
The herein petitioner appealed the resolution of Alfonso Flores to the
Secretary of Justice. Pending appeal to the DOJ, Judge Roura hastily set the
case for arraignment.

Issue:

Whether or not arraignment to lesser penalty oh homicide is proper while

the case is pending in the DOJ subject for Review.

Held:

In the case it is not proper. Indubitably then, there was on the part of the
public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of information of homicide ,he
should have ask the petitioner as regards to the status of the appeal or
warned them that the DOJ would not decide the appeal within the certain
period. It is indubitable that petitioner had the right to appeal to the
Secretary of Justice. Section 4 of Rule 112 of the rules of court provides that
If upon petition by the proper party the secretary of Justice reverses the
resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall
direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without
conducting any preliminary investigation to investigate or to dismiss or move
for the dismissal of the complaint or information. There is nothing that
forecloses the power of authority of the secretary of justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite information already
having been filed in court. The secretary of justice is only enjoined to refrain
far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
action of the prosecutor once the complaint or information is filed in court.
In Any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file
after the secretary of justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to
the discretion of the court. We do not hesitate to rule that court committed
grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the Yabuts on the
assailed information for homicide. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly,
joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment. So must it be where
the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void.
CASE 14

SANTOS VS. PIZARDO

FACTS:

In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan

(Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with
a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven
by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the
lives of the van's driver and three (3) of its passengers, including
a two- month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of
the van's passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate
civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the
municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on
December 17, 1998.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages
against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio
Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial Court: dismissed the complaint on the principal ground
that the cause of action had already prescribed. According to the
trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed
petitioners' cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from
the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the
fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil
action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
(2) CA: dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of
appeal

ISSUE:
Has the action prescribed?

RULING:

No.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are
consistent with petitioners' claim that the action was brought to
recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are
allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit,
such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a
cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time
of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto
had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the
offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil
liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an
action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.

WHEN PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION EX DELICTO WILL OPERATE AS A

BAR TO AN ACTION TO ENFORCE INDEPENDENT CIVIL LIABILITY;
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. At the time of the filing of the
complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can
pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so
because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not
operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising
from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved. The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company was
decided upon a similar set of facts. . . . We held that the dismissal
of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the
enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there
is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in
the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling
force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being
deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee. Seen in this light, the trial court should
not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription,
but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be
prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners' allegations in
their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the
action was to recover civil liability arising from crime. This does
not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a
separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale
behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the
same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the
offender. However, since the stale action for damages based on
quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more
occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private
respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue
damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the
bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.

CASE 15

Maccay vs Spouses Nobela

OSCAR MACCAY and ADELAIDA POTENCIANO OSCAR MACCAY and

ADELAIDA POTENCIANO, p e titio n e r s,

SPOUSES PRUDENCIO NOBELA and SERLINA NOBELA SPOUSES PRUDENCIO

NOBELA and SERLINA NOBELA, r e s p o n d e n t s .

Topic: Rule 111

Facts:

This petition for review seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals' Decision dated
25 September 2000 and its Resolution dated 7 November 2000 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 49822. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 ("trial court"), dated 26 January 1995,
dismissing the case for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents filed
by petitioner Oscar Maccay ("Maccay") against respondent spouses
PrudencioNobela ("Prudencio") and SerlinaNobela ("Serlina") in Criminal
Case No. 85961.

Petitioner Maccay filed the criminal complaint against respondent spouses for
Estafa through Falsification of Public Document before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed the
Information for Estafa with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 85961. After trial, the trial court found
respondent spouses innocent and ordered petitioners to reimburse
respondent spouses P300,000 and to pay damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioners appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court denied petitioners' appeal and affirmed the trial court's
Decision. The appellate court also denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

The trial court acquitted respondent spouses and found that petitioners
swindled respondent spouses. The trial court declared that petitioner Maccay
filed the Estafa charge against respondent spouses to turn the tables on
respondent spouses, the victims of the swindling. The trial court ordered
petitioners to pay respondent spouses P390,000 as damages.

The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court
reasoned that the award of damages was justified because it was "in the
nature of a counterclaim and as the very defense put up by the accused
[respondents] in the criminal proceedings . . .."

Issue:

1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RULE ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF

COMPLAINANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE CIVIL ACTION WAS NOT
RESERVED OR FILED SEPARATELY; (NO)

2. WHETHER A WITNESS, WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE, MAY BE HELD

LIABLE FOR DAMAGES (NO)

Held:

Petition Granted

A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused.
The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused
and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the proper
proceedings to determine the private complainant's civil liability, if any.
IDTcHa The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and
prosecution witness Potenciano, as part of the judgment in the criminal case,
to reimburse the P300,000 and pay damages to the accused respondent
spouses.

This Court ruled in C a b a e r o v. H o n. C a n t o s that a court trying a

criminal case should limit itself to the criminal and civil liability of the
accused, thus:

[Thus,] the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and
the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime.
The counterclaim (and crossclaim or third-party complaint, if any) should be
set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate
proceedings at the proper time.

The Court recently reiterated this ruling in C a s u p a n a n v. L a r o y a

and R e p u b lic v. C o u r t o f A p p e als . The appellate court erred in
affirming the trial court's award of damages by justifying it as a
counterclaim. Nothing in the records shows that respondent spouses filed or
attempted to file a counterclaim. The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
prohibit counterclaims in criminal cases. Section 1 of Rule 111 provides:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) . . . No

counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

This paragraph addresses the lacuna mentioned in C a b a e r o on the

"absence of clear cut rules governing the prosecution of impliedly instituted
civil action and the necessary consequences and implications thereof." In the
present case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling respondent
spouses and for maliciously filing a baseless suit must be litigated in a
separate proceeding.

The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner

Potenciano, together with complainant petitioner Maccay, liable for damages
to respondent spouses. A judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties
to the action. A decision of a court cannot operate to divest the rights of a
person who is not a party to the case. The records clearly show that
petitioner Potenciano is not a party to this case. The Information filed by the
prosecutor had only petitioner Maccay as its complainant. The Verification
attached to the Information had only petitioner Maccay signing as
complainant. Nothing in the records shows that petitioner Potenciano played
a role other than being a witness for the prosecution. To rule otherwise
would violate petitioner Potenciano's constitutional right to due process.

Petitioners admit that title to the lot is now in the name of respondent
spouses. Petitioners admit the validity of the cancellation of TCT No. 473584
and the issuance of TCT No. 188289 in favor of respondent spouses.
Petitioners argue that since respondent spouses already acquired the lot in
exchange for P300,000, there is no basis for the order requiring petitioners
to reimburse respondent spouses the P300,000. 13 13

However, petitioners also argue that respondent spouses acquired their title
through fraud. Petitioners must decide which version they want to advance.
Petitioners cannot argue that the title of respondent spouses is valid to avoid
reimbursing respondent spouses, at the same time claim that respondent
spouses acquired their title through fraud to turn the tables on respondent
spouses who might sue petitioners for swindling. Petitioners' inconsistent
arguments reveal their dishonesty even to the courts. Petitioners should not
forget that the trial and appellate courts found that petitioners perpetrated a
vicious scam on respondent spouses who are clearly the hapless victims
here.

Respondent spouses have suffered enough. Respondent Prudencio died while

trying to defend their property. Respondent Serlina is ailing and suffering
from severe complications due to the strain of litigation. While this Court is
constrained to grant the instant petition due to the trial court's procedural
error, we stress that the trial court adjudicated correctly the substantive
matter of the case. Petitioners unconscionably used their intelligence and
position to swindle the respondent spouses of their life savings, abusing their
hospitality and kindness in the process. Petitioners have the temerity to turn
the tables on the poor couple by abusing the legal processes. This Court will
not allow the legal processes to serve as tool for swindlers. We promulgate
this Decision without prejudice to the filing by respondent Serlina of a claim
for damages against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 dated 26 January 1995 in Criminal Case No.
85961 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. The order to reimburse the P300,000 to respondent spouses

Prudencio and SerlinaNobela is deleted;

2. The award of P50,000 as moral damages and the award of P40,000

as attorney's fees are likewise deleted.

CASE 16

CASE 17

Catiis vs. CA
G.R. NO. 153979 February 6, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner filed a letter-complaint dated May 28, 2001 against private

respondents Reynaldo A. Patacsil, Enrico D. Lopez, Luzviminda A. Portuguez
and a certain Margielyn Tafalla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, for violation of Art. 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689 (syndicated estafa) and other
related offenses. Private respondents, except for Tafalla, filed their joint
counter-affidavits denying the charges against them. On October 10, 2001,
Assistant City Prosecutor Alessandro D. Jurado issued a Resolution finding
the existence of a probable cause for syndicated Estafa against private
respondents and Tafalla with no bail recommended. The Resolution was
approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano. An Information was filed on
the same day by Prosecutor Jurado against private respondents and Tafalla
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and raffled off to the sala of
Honorable Judge Lucas Bersamin. That on or about the 3rd week of January
2000 or subsequent thereto in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another in a
syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons through
corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, with intent to gain
and by means of fraud and deceit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud REGINO SY CATIIS and several other persons in the
following manner, to wit: by falsely or fraudulently pretending or
representing, in a transaction or series of transactions, which they made
with the Complainant and the public in general to the effect that they were
in a legitimate business of foreign exchange trading successively or
simultaneously operating under the following name and style of Asia Profits
Philippines, Incorporation, Winggold Management Philippines Incorporated,
Belkin Management Consultancy, Inc. and/or Belkin Profits Limited or other
unregistered foreign entities induced and succeeded in inducing complainant
and several other persons to give and deliver and in fact, the latter and said
persons gave and delivered to said accused the amount of at least US$
123,461.14 or its equivalent in Philippine Pesos on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, the accused knowing fully well that the
above-named corporations registered with the SEC and/or those
unregistered foreign entities are not licensed nor authorized to engage in
foreign exchange trading corporations and that such manifestations and
representations to transact in foreign exchange were false and fraudulent
that resulted to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant and other persons and that the defraudation pertains to funds
solicited from the public in general by such corporations/associations. On
November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin issued an Order finding
probable cause against all the accused and approved the recommendation of
the City Prosecutor that the charge be non-bailable. The corresponding
warrants of arrest were issued. A return on the warrant of arrest was made
by PO3 Joselito M. Coronel, PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, with the information that except for Margielyn
Tafalla, who remained at large, all other accused were already detained at
the Makati City Jail. On November 12, 2001, a notice of hearing was issued
by Judge Bersamin setting the case for arraignment on November 20, 2001.
Private respondents on the same day filed an urgent motion to fix bail. On
November 20, 2001, private respondents, when arraigned, entered pleas of
not guilty. The Prosecution was required to file their comment/opposition on
private respondents motion to fix bail which they did through the
Private Prosecutor with the conformity of Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur O.
Malabaguio. On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order
reconsidering his earlier Order of November 7, 2001 by declaring that the
offense charged is bailable. In finding that the accused are entitled to bail.

Issue:
Whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding that the crime charged is
bailable despite that the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal
to reclusion perpetua?

Held:

The Court held that since the crime charged was not committed by a
syndicate as defined under the law, the penalty of life imprisonment to death
cannot be imposed on private respondents. Judge Bersamin is correct when
he ruled that private respondents could only be punished with reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua in case of conviction since the amount of the
fraud exceeds P100,000.00. The Court further held that Sections 8 and 9 of
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, provide: Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The
complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. The acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment. Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as
the qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the
complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial
court in their judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial. A
reading of the Information shows that there was no allegation of any
aggravating circumstance, thus Judge Bersamin is correct when he found
that the lesser penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal, is imposable in case of
conviction
CASE 18

People v. Larraaga, GR Nos. 138874-75, January 31, 2006

Facts:
On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed
to come home on the expected time. Twodays after, a young woman was
found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised
up to herbreast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were
covered with masking tape and attached to her left wristwas a handcuff. The
woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson
Rusia surfaced andadmitted before the police having participated in the
abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco JuanLarraaga,
Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony
Uy, and James Andrew Uyasco-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided
the following before the trial court:

1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman
and told him to ride with them in a white car.Following them were Larraaga,
James Anthony and James Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped
the white carin front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and
Jacqueline were standing and forced them to ride the car.Rusia taped their
mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly.
2) That after stopping by a safe house, the group thereafter headed to the
South Bus Terminal where they met Albertoand Ariel, and hired the white
van driven by the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving
the red car atthe South Bus Terminal.
3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a
pot session. Later, they started to rape Marijoyinside the vehicle, and
thereafter raped Jaqueline.
4) That Josman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and
push her into the ravine.

The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged

as an accused and became a state witness.Still, the body of Jacqueline was
never found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes
ofkidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to
suffer the penalties of two (2) reclusionperpetua. The appellants assailed the
said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there
wasconspiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old
when the crimes were committed.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the correct penalty.

Ruling:
Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority,
the imposable penalty to the offender isone degree lower than the statutory
penalty. James Anthony was only 16 years old when the crimes
were committed. Aspenalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with homicide and rape is death, thecorrect penalty
to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty
for simple kidnapping andserious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to
death. One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal.There
being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be
imposed on him should be reclusiontemporal in its medium period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the
penaltyof twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporalin its medium
period, as maximum. With regard to the rest of the appellants, the statutory
penalty as provided aboveshould be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in
merely imposing two (2) reclusion perpetua.

CASE 19

CASE 20

LANIER VS PEOPLE
Facts:

The police operatives conducted a test-buy at petitioners residence in

Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island where they were able to purchase
P5,000.00 worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth of marijuana from
petitioners. On the basis of the test-buy operation, they were able to secure
a search warrant from the RTC of Aklan.

A Receipt for Property Seized was prepared by SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan, but
petitioners refused to sign the same. Thereafter, petitioners were placed
under arrest. The assistant prosecutor of Kalibo filed an Information
charging the petitioners. The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the
Information before the RTC of Kalibo but the RTC denied the motion and
remanded the case to the provincial prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
The prosecutor upheld the Information and directed the return of the records
to the RTC for disposition.

Petitioners filed a petition for review before the DOJ. The Sec. of Justice
favored the petitioner on the belief that the evidences seized were planted.
The secretary, in a Resolution, directed the prosecutor to withdraw the
Information before the RTC. RTC then granted the Motion to Withdraw
Information by the prosecutor.

OSG filed to the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the Resolution of
the DOJ. The CA found probable cause to sustain the petitioners indictment
and reinstated the Information against the petitioners. CA nullified and set
aside the DOJ Resolution and the Order of the RTC.

Issues:

WoN the CA erred in reversing the DOJ resolution which nullified the
prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioners for illegal
possession of prohibited drugs and the RTC Order granting the Motion to
Withdraw the Information.

Ruling:

No. The CA did not commit any reversible error.

In Crespo v Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal Complaint or

Information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, dismissal, acquittal
or conviction rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court. The rule applies to a Motion of the public
prosecutor to dismiss the case even before or after the arraignment of the
accused.

When the Secretary of Justice made a determination and concluded that the
evidences were planted, he went into the merits of the defense and
exceeded his jurisdiction.

On the part of the RTC, it having acquired jurisdiction over the case, is not
bound by the Resolution of the DOJ but is required to evaluate it before
proceeding further with the trial. While the Secretarys ruling is persuasive, it
is not binding on courts.

CASE 21