Facts of the case

During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars

suggested that the draft was a monstrous wrong motivated by the capitalist
system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only
peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck
was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to
cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment.

Question
Are Schenck's actions (words, expression) protected by the free speech
clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion
Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded that Schenck is not
protected in this situation. The character of every act depends on the
circumstances. "The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent." During wartime, utterances tolerable in peacetime
can be punished.

Facts of the case

Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a vitriolic
speech in which he criticized various political and racial groups and viciously
condemned the protesting crowd that had gathered outside the auditorium.
Policemen assigned to the event were unable to prevent several
disturbances by the "angry and turbulent" crowd. The police arrested
Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried and convicted for his
central role in inciting a riot.

Question
Did the Chicago ordinance violate Terminiello's right of free expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment?
Conclusion
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance
unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "[t]he
vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free
discussion," the Court held that speech could be restricted only in the event
that it was "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest." Justice Douglas wrote that "a function of free speech under our
system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to anger."

People v. Perez Case Digest

People v. Perez, G.R. No. 122764, September 24, 1998

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged for rape. The information alleged that the victim was his stepdaughter but did not

allege that the victim was only 13 years old at the time of the rape.

During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the accusation against him. During trial it was proved that the

victim was the stepdaughter of the accused and was in fact 13 years old at the time the crime of rape was committed.

Accused was then convicted of qualified rape and was meted out the penalty of death.

ISSUE: WON an accused may be convicted of qualified rape when the information alleged only simple rape?

HELD: NO. Citing People vs. Garcia, the court held that it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be

informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple

rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable by death, although the attendant circumstance

qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was

arraigned. Procedurally, then, while the minority of Maribel and the relationship of appellant and his victim were

established during the trial, appellant can only be convicted of simple rape because he cannot be punished for a

graver offense than that with which he was charged.

Under the rules of criminal procedure, a qualifying circumstance to be considered as such must be so alleged in

the information, which is not required of aggravating circumstances.

The requirement for complete allegations on the particulars of the indictment is based on the right of the accused to

be fully informed of the nature of the charge against him, so that be may adequately prepare for this defense pursuant

to the due process clause of the Constitution.