SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 9868 [formerly CBD Case No.

05-1617], April 22, 2015 ]
ATTY. ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS.
ATTYS. E. HANS A. SANTOS AND AGNES H. MARANAN,
RESPONDENTS.

```````DECISION

BRION, J.:

For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint[1] filed by Atty.

Alfredo L. Villamor, Jr. (complainant) against Attys. E. Hans A. Santos and
Agnes H. Maranan (respondents) for committing an unethical act in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Factual Background

In his complaint, the complainant related that the respondents initiated Civil
Case No. 70251 for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City (RTC Pasig) and used a deceptive ploy to prevent the payment of the
proper docket fees. Knowing that the complaint was actually one for
damages, the respondents allegedly disguised the complaint as an action for
specific performance and injunction (where the amount involved is incapable
of pecuniary estimation) and deliberately omitted to specify the damages
prayed for amounting to P68,000,000.00 in the prayer of the complaint in
order to avoid paying the proper docket fees. According to the complainant,
this intentional omission to specify the amount of damages was specifically
declared by the Court in Manchester Development Corporation, et al. v.
Court of Appeals[2] as grossly unethical, and thus constitutes a valid ground
for disbarment.[3]

The respondents denied that they deceived the court in Civil Case No. 70251
by making it appear that the case was an action for specific performance and
injunction. They claimed that at the time the complaint in Civil Case No.
70251 was filed on January 13, 2005, twelve (12) out of fifteen (15) checks
were not yet due and demandable, clearly indicating that the complaint was
really an action for specific performance and injunction, rather than an action
for sum of money or damages.[4]

The respondents also claimed that the Manchester doctrine the complainant
invoked was modified less than two (2) years after it was announced. [5]

The Investigating Commissioner's Findings

In his Report and Recommendation dated October 29, 2008, IBP

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes found that the respondents did not
commit any violation of the code of professional ethics.

According to Commissioner Reyes, there is no showing that the Clerk of

Court had been deceived when she assessed the filing fees due on the
complaint in Civil Case No. 70251. A reading of the prayer in Civil Case No.
70251 shows that there were clear and unequivocal references to paragraph
2.27 of the complaint, which detailed the amounts of the postdated checks.
There was also a specific reference in the prayer to the amount of P9.5
Million representing the value of the checks that had become due.

Moreover, there is no showing that the Clerk of Court had made any mistake
in the assessment of the docket fees since the court never issued an order
for reassessment or payment of higher docket fees.

Commissioner Reyes recommended that the disbarment case be dismissed

for lack of merit.

The IBP Board of Governors' Findings

In a resolution[6] dated December 11, 2008, the Board of Governors of the

IBP resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on
record, and by the applicable laws and rules.

The complainant moved to reconsider the resolution but the IBP Board of
Governors denied his motion in a resolution[7] dated January 3, 2013.

On April 5, 2013, the complainant filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari

assailing the IBP's findings. The complainant reiterated that:

(1) The respondents' omission to state, in the prayer of the complaint, the
amount claimed in the action is an "unethical practice";

(2) The case filed by the respondents in Civil Case No. 70251 is one for the
collection of a sum of money; and

(3) The respondents violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,

specifically, Canon 1, Rule 1.01; and Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02, and
10.03.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents' omission of the

specification of the amount of damages in the prayer of the complaint is
unethical, and thereby violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Court's Ruling

After a careful study of the record, we agree with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The complainant argued that the Investigating Commissioner's Report and

Recommendation is contrary to the Court's pronouncement in Manchester
Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals.[8] The material portions
of the Manchester doctrine provide:
"The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it
frowns at the practice of counsel v/ho filed the original complaint in this case
of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer
although the amount of over Seventy-Eight Million Pesos (P78,000,000.00) is
alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other
purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead
the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee."

"The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of
this unethical practice."
In that case, the Court observed that the lawyer's act of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer of the complaint,
although the amount was alleged in its body, "was clearly intended for no
other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to
mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee." [9] It noted the
lawyer's fraudulent act of avoiding payment of the required docket fees, and
declared the said act as unethical. Following this pronouncement, the Court
required lawyers filing an original complaint to specify the amount of
damages prayed for not only in the body of the pleading, but also in the
prayer.

After a careful study of the import of the Manchester doctrine and the
arguments of the parties, we find as the Investigating Commissioner did
-that the respondents did not commit any violation of the Code of
Professional Conduct.

We stress that the main issue in disbarment cases is whether or not a lawyer
has committed serious professional misconduct sufficient to cause
disbarment. The test is whether the lawyer's conduct shows him or her to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor; or whether
it renders him or her unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. [10] The
burden of proof rests upon the complainant; and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint with
clearly preponderant evidence.[11]

In the present case, the respondents' administrative liability would depend on

the resolution of the following sub-issues: (1) whether the respondents
employed a deceptive ploy to avoid payment of the docket fees; (2) whether
the respondents' failure to specify the amount of damages in the prayer of
the complaint constitutes an unethical practice; and ultimately; (3) whether
the respondents violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Liability.

We agree with the respondents that they did not deceive the court in Civil
Case No. 70251 in its assessment of the correct docket fees. Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Liability provide:
"CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES

xxx
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
On the other hand, Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 provide:
"CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court, nor shall he misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the

contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or
the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not been proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."
Contrary to the complainant's allegation that the respondents had defrauded
the court, the element of "deceitful conduct" or "deceit" was not present in
this case.

First, the prayer in the complaint clearly showed that there was a clear and
express reference to paragraph 2.27 of the complaint, which listed and
described in detail the date of the checks, the check numbers, and their
corresponding amounts.

Second, there was also an express mention in the prayer of the amount of
P9.5 Million representing the value of the checks that had already become
due. Thus, we find unmeritorious the complainant's claim that the
respondents intentionally and deceptively omitted to specify the amount of
damages in the prayer.

Third, despite the complainant's move for the dismissal of Case No. 70251
on the ground that the proper docket fees were not paid, the RTC Pasig Clerk
of Court neither reassessed the filing fees, nor required the plaintiff in that
case to pay additional filing fees.

Fourth, even as of this date, the Court in Civil Case No. 70251 has not
issued an order requiring the reassessment, recomputation, and/or payment
of additional docket fees, signifying that the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court did not
make any mistake in the assessment of the docket fees.

Fifth, an examination of the allegations of the complaint and the prayer in

Civil Case No. 70251 shows that the case is really an action for specific
performance and injunction. The complaint sought to judicially require the
complainant to deliver the actual and physical checks enumerated in
paragraph 2.27 of the complaint; to compel him to account for the checks
that he may have had already encashed; and to restrain him from
negotiating, transacting, and encashing the checks in his possession. Clearly,
the complaint was an action for specific performance, rather than for a sum
of money.
Even assuming that the respondents' mere reference to paragraph 2.27 of
the complaint does not fully comply with the Manchester doctrine, this Court
still finds that it is not a sufficient ground for disbarment. As discussed
above, there is no clear showing that the respondents defrauded or misled
the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court. Neither was there any proof that the
respondents have maliciously disguised their complaint as an action for
specific performance and injunction so as to evade the payment of the proper
docket fees. Clearly, the complainant's allegation is merely anchored on
speculation and conjecture, and hence insufficient to justify the imposition of
the administrative penalty of disbarment.

We are likewise not convinced that the respondents violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The record of the case do not show that
the respondents had committed misconduct, dishonesty, falsehood, or had
misused the rules of procedure. In the absence of such proof, the
presumption of innocence of the lawyer remains and the complaint against
him must be dismissed.[12] Viewed in these lights, the disbarment complaint
against the respondents Attys. E. Hans A. Santos and Agnes H. Maranan
should be dismissed for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for

review for lack of merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the IBP Governors' (1)
Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-602 dated December 11, 2008; and (2)
Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-09 dated January 3, 2013.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-12.

[2]
149 SCRA 564.

[3]
Rollo, p. 7.

[4]
Id. at 120.

[5]
Id. at 126.

[6]
Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-602

[7]
Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-09.

[8]
Supra note 2.

[9]
Id.

[10]
Tan, Jr. v. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 527.
[11]
Joven v. Cruz, A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013, 702 SCRA 545.

[12]
Atty. Dela Cruz v. Atty. Diesmos, 528 Phil. 927, 928-929 (2006).
 THIRD DIVISION

[ A.C. NO. 6501 (CBD CASE NOS. 03-1076, 03-1108, 03-1109, 03-1125),
August 31, 2006 ]

ATTY. LEON L. ASA AND ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY.
PABLITO M. CASTILLO AND ATTY. GINGER ANNE CASTILLO, RESPONDENTS.

ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS,

RESPONDENT.

ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LEON L. ASA,

RESPONDENT.

ATTY. LEON L. ASA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Subject of the present Decision are four administrative cases, docketed by

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) Case Nos. 03-1076,03-1108,03-1109, and 03-1125.

I. CBD Case No. 03-1076

In 1996, Atty. Pablito M. Castillo (Castillo), then an associate of the Laurel

Law Offices of which Attorneys Leon L. Asa (Asa) and Jose A. Oliveros
(Oliveros) are partners, endorsed to the law firm a guardianship case, Special
Proceeding No. 5222, "In re: Guardianship of the Minors Honeylyn,
Alexandra and Jerill Nonan," which was pending before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59. Castillo appeared as counsel of
record for the therein petitioner, Dr. Salvador H. Laurel, guardian ad litem of
the minors Nonan who appear to have inherited a sizeable amount of US
dollars.

A misunderstanding later occurred between Asa and Castillo as regards their

sharing in the attorney's fees in the guardianship case.

On page 6 of a pleading entitled "Reply to Petitioner-Guardian's

Comment/Opposition,[1] ETC." dated July 19, 2002 filed before Branch 59 of
the Angeles RTC and signed by Castillo's daughter Ginger Anne Castillo
(Ginger Anne) as "counsel" for Castillo who filed a Notice Ad Cautelam, it was
alleged that, inter alia, "Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for
his services in providing coffee and opening doors whenever there is a
conference at the Laurel Law Offices."[2]

Finding the above statement of Castillo and Ginger Anne to be a brazen

falsehood concocted to besmirch Asa's reputation, Asa and Oliveros filed
before IBP an administrative complaint[3] against Castillo and Ginger Anne,
for gross violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1076.
In their complaint, Asa and Oliveros also charged Castillo with machinations
and deceit arising from the following alleged incidents:

In a conference held at the Laurel Law Offices prior to January 20, 2000
attended by Dr. Laurel, the Nonan minors' counsel abroad Atty. Benjamin
Cassiday III (Cassiday), Asa and Castillo, it was agreed that the amount to
be received by Dr. Laurel in trust for the Nonan heirs would be deposited at
the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis Square
Branch, Pasig City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250-00043-0. Castillo,
however, proposed that the funds be deposited instead at the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), he explaining that he knew an employee there who
could facilitate "the transaction." Dr. Laurel rejected this proposition and
instead instructed Castillo to file the appropriate motion to have the funds
deposited at the RCBC.[4]

Without showing to Dr. Laurel the motion he was instructed to prepare,

Castillo filed the same with the Angeles trial court. Dr. Laurel subsequently
received a copy of a March 2, 2000 RTC Order[5] signed by the then trial
Judge Eliezer R. De los Santos granting his motion and accordingly directing
that the funds to be held in trust for the Nonan children be deposited at the
Trust Department of the UCPB Head Office. Dr. Laurel, Cassiday and Asa thus
filed with the Angeles City trial court an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration [6]
of the March 2, 2000 Angeles RTC Order in order to have the funds deposited
at the RCBC transferred to the RTC, as previously agreed upon. This motion
was granted.
Still in the same complaint, Asa and Oliveros alleged that in a "Reply to
Answer"[7] dated June 25, 2001 filed by Castillo with the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 01-506, "Atty. P.M. Castillo v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, Lorenzo V. Tan and Angelica S. Hernandez," Castillo again
committed a clear falsehood when he therein stated that:
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who
personally knew the plaintiff [Castillo] was also profuse in extolling his
academic credentials and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer as follows:

Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo?

A: Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers of the Laurel Law
Offices,[8] (Underscoring supplied),
he knowing that retired Justice Kalalo had never been at any time a lawyer at
the Laurel Law Offices. In support of this allegation, they appended to the
complaint a certified true copy of the Service Record[9] of Justice Kalalo which
does not show that he was ever connected with the Laurel Law Office.

In their Answer[10] to the complaint, Castillo and Ginger Anne declared:

There is nothing wrong or objectionable to the statement that Asa's services

in the guardianship case consisted in providing coffee and opening doors
whenever there was a conference at the Laurel Law Offices, as this was in
fact the truth, the comportment being "strictly in accordance with long
cherished Filipino hospitality," and "he [Castillo] would have done the same
with his own visitors."[11] In any event, they claim that the assailed factual
narration was material and relevant to Castillo's question why Asa was given
the lion's share of attorney's fees when he had not rendered any known
material service which redounded to the benefit of the Nonan children.

Moreover, the Castillos declared that the deposit of the Nonan funds at the
UCPB was not attended with malice or bad faith, nor was it intended to
benefit them as the funds could only be withdrawn by Dr. Laurel who had
exclusive access to all the information pertaining to the interest and benefits
accruing thereto.

As regards the assailed June 25, 2001 "Reply to Answer" filed with the Makati
RTC in Civil Case No. 01-506, the Castillos asserted that Castillo had no
control nor influence over the voluntary and spontaneous testimony of retired
Justice Kalalo in his favor during the proceedings adverted to.[12]

II. CBD Case No. 03-1108

Castillo subsequently filed a complaint[13] against Oliveros before the IBP,

docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1108, for gross violation of lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Castillo alleged that: (1) Oliveros assisted Cassiday in embezzling US

$950,000 representing the share adjudicated to the Nonan heirs; (2) in
conspiracy with Dr. Laurel and a certain Atty. Douglas Cushnie, Oliveros
resorted to forum shopping to undermine and defeat the jurisdiction of the
Philippine court in the guardianship proceedings; (3) Oliveros, along with
Asa, Dr. Laurel and Cassiday, perpetuated other acts of fraud in the
guardianship proceedings; and (4) Oliveros, together with Asa, deliberately
and maliciously filed a groundless administrative complaint against him and
Ginger Anne.

In his Answer[14] to the Complaint in CBD Case No. 03-1108, Oliveros,

decrying the allegations against him as patently false, baseless and
malicious, claimed that the complaint was Castillo's way of retaliating against
him for having joined Asa in filing the administrative complaint against him
and Ginger Anne (CBD Case No. 03-1076).

III. CBD Case No. 03-1109

Castillo also filed an administrative complaint[15] against Asa before the

IBP, charging him with embezzlement, dishonesty, betrayal of trust, grave
abuse of confidence and violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1109.

Castillo alleged that (1) Asa, Cassiday and Dr. Laurel scandalously
mismanaged the estate of the Nonan heirs, the bulk of which they
indiscriminately pocketed; (2) Asa and Oliveros filed a groundless
administrative complaint against him and Ginger Anne to compel him to
withdraw his claim for attorney's fees against Dr. Laurel and his bid to
replace the latter as guardian of the Nonan heirs; (3) despite an
Agreement[16] dated February 16, 2000 between him and Asa that the latter
would receive only 25% of whatever he (Castillo) would receive as attorney's
fees, Asa secretly pocketed the amounts of $24,500 and $160,500 from the
guardianship case on April 18, 2000; (4) Asa refused to account for and turn
over the amount of $130,000 in attorney's fees which belonged to him
(Castillo); and (5) Asa embarked on a scheme to force him into resigning as
counsel for Dr. Laurel to enable them to exercise absolute control over the
guardianship case and appropriate for themselves the attorney's fees
allocated for him.

In his Answer to the Complaint[17] in CBD Case No. 03-1109, Asa alleged as
follows: It was in fact Castillo who reneged on their February 16, 2000
Agreement as the latter had earlier bluntly told him that he changed his mind
and that he would not give him (Asa) any share in the attorney's fees he
would receive from the guardianship case, Castillo reasoning that he was the
therein counsel of record and had endorsed the case to the Laurel Law
Offices. He thus reported the matter to Dr. Laurel and informed him that he
"would likewise not give Castillo's share in the attorney's fees he [Asa] might
receive because [Castillo] has no word of honor."[18]

As regards the $24,500 that he allegedly secretly pocketed, Asa explained

that several days prior to April 18, 2000, Dr. Laurel and Atty. Cassiday fixed
the attorney's fees of both Castillo and Asa at $100,000 each, based on the
amount to be paid by the four heirs or $25,000 per heir. When the first heir
Merceditas Feliciano (Merceditas) paid $1,150,000 on April 18, 2000, he
deposited $24,500 of this amount in his and his wife's joint Dollar Account
No. 247-702-9275 at the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Ortigas Branch as
his share in the attorney's fees, while he opened a new account in the name
of Dr. Laurel to which he deposited the amount of $160,500.

Asa went on to declare that Castillo received his own $25,000 plus interest
amounting to $25,023.13 representing full payment of his attorney's fees
from Merceditas, as evidenced by a Receipt[19] dated May 2, 2000 signed by
Castillo.

Continuing, Asa declared that of the $160,500 belonging to Dr. Laurel,

$100,000 represented partial payment for his consenting to be the guardian
ad litem of the Nonan heirs and $60,000 represented reimbursement for
expenses incurred over several years by Dr. Laurel, the total of which was
placed temporarily on April 18, 2000 in his (Asa's) Dollar Account No. 8-250-
00047-3 in RCBC. Dr. Laurel, however, withdrew $160,000.00 the following
day from RCBC and placed it in his own Dollar Time Deposit Account for
which $500.00 was spent for the purpose. A Certification [20] to this effect,
issued by RCBC Ortigas Business Center Manager Dolores L. Del Valle, was
appended to Asa's Answer.

Finally, Asa declared that Castillo's claim for $130,000 in attorney's fees is
baseless and unconscionable, and that Castillo filed the complaint merely to
harass him in retaliation for the complaint he and Oliveros priorly filed
against him and Ginger Anne.

IV. CBD Case No. 03-1125

On August 25, 2003, Asa filed yet another administrative complaint,[21]

against Castillo before the IBP, for disbarment/suspension, docketed as
CBD Case No. 03-1125, charging him with deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct in office, immoral conduct, violation of the lawyer's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility in light of his baseless, malicious and
derogatory allegations in CBD Case No. 03-1109 which were founded on
deceit and deliberate falsehood, and of promoting a groundless, false and
unlawful suit.

IBP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:

By Report and Recommendation[22] of February 27, 2004, the IBP CBD,

through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the
dismissal of the consolidated cases in this wise.

From the facts and evidence presented, what have been shown by the
counsels are mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive
personalities between brother lawyers which detract from the dignity of the
legal profession and do not deserve the attention of the Commission. The
voluminous case record contains but personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies
hurled by the counsels against each other which constitute highly
unprofessional conduct. A great part of man's comfort, as well as of his
success at the bar, depends upon his relations with his professional brethren.
With them he is in daily necessary intercourse, and he must have their
respect and confidence, if he wishes to sail along in smooth waters. Hence,
the parties are advised to conduct themselves honorably, fairly and candidly
toward each other and try to maintain the dignity of the legal profession.[23]
(Underscoring supplied)

By Resolution[24] of April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted
and approved the February 27, 2004 Report and Recommendation and
dismissed the consolidated cases for lack of merit.

The records of the cases were then forwarded for final action to this Court.

Asa filed with this Court an August 2, 2004 a Motion for Reconsideration [25] in
CBD Case No. 03-1125. He too, together with Oliveros, filed on August 3,
2004 a Motion for Reconsideration[26] in CBD Case No. 03-1076.

Castillo likewise filed with this Court a Consolidated Omnibus Motion for
Partial Reconsideration[27] dated August 9, 2004 in CBD Case No. 03-1108
and CBD Case No. 03-1109.

On January 12, 2005, Asa filed his Comment[28] on Castillo's Consolidated

Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration in CBD Case No. 03-1109 while
also Oliveros filed his Comment on the same motion on February 28, 2005.

On March 16, 2005, Castillo filed his Consolidated Reply to the Comments of
Asa and Oliveros, with Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner.[29]

THIS COURT'S RULING

In his questioned "Reply to Petitioner-Guardian's Comment/Opposition,"

Castillo's statement reads:
x x x Atty. Leon Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for his
services in providing coffee and opening the doors whenever there is a
conference at the Laurel Law Offices. He also conveniently provides himself
with the Nonan expediente to give assistance to the parties during their so-
called conferences. Worse, his express reluctance to appear before this
Honorable Court was repeatedly announced by Atty. Jose Oliveros because of
his so-called failing health x x x[30]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer
shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. Rule 8.01 of the same Canon mandates that a lawyer shall not, in
his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

That a member of the bar is enjoined to observe honorable, candid and

courteous dealing with other lawyers[31] and employ respectful and restrained
language is in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. [32] It is through
a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best
demonstrates his observance or respect due to the courts and judicial
officers.[33]

In the case at bar, Castillo and Ginger Anne's choice of words manifestly falls
short of this criterion. Their disparaging statements in the pleading referred
to above belie their proffered good intention and exceed the bounds of civility
and propriety.

Castillo's claim that the statement about Asa's services is relevant and
pertinent to the claim for attorney's fees and was, for all legal intents and
purposes, a "privileged communication"[34] deserves short shrift. Indulging in
offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings constitutes
unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication
thereof is privileged.[35]
x x x this Court will not be inhibited from exercising its supervisory authority
over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of
them as members of the Bar. Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged
communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal
liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the member
of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising
from any speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in any committee
thereof, but nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the
legislature for said speech or debate, a lawyer equally remains subject to this
Court's supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of
his duty as a member of the legal profession.[36] (Underscoring supplied)
Castillo and Ginger Anne are thus admonished to exercise greater care and
circumspection in the preparation of their pleadings and refrain from using
offensive or otherwise improper language.

In support of Asa and Oliveros' allegation that Castillo employed deceit and
falsehood in attempting to change the depositary bank for the funds to be
held in trust by Dr. Laurel for the Nonan heirs, they presented the March 2,
2000 RTC Order directing Dr. Laurel and his principal counsel Castillo to
deposit the balance of the proceeds of the settlement with any and all of the
adjudicated heirs with UCPB and the March 14, 2000 RTC Order directing the
deposit of the settlement proceeds with the RCBC.

A perusal of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated March 8, 2000

signed by Dr. Laurel, however, fails to establish any wrongdoing on the part
of Castillo in having filed the Motion to deposit the funds at UCPB. It simply
stated that:
Considering the present raging controversy arising from the P50 Billion
coconut levy funds, the stability of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Head Office at Makati, may be seriously affected x x x

The Petitioner-Guardian can best protect the deposits of the Nonan children if
the proceeds of the settlement will be deposited with a solvent and more
conservative bank like the RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION
(RCBC) x x x[37]

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is

clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. Moreover, an administrative case against a lawyer must show
the dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof.[38] In
the case at bar, Asa and Oliveros failed to present clear and preponderant
evidence to show that Castillo willfully and deliberately resorted to deceit and
falsehood in filing the Motion to have the funds deposited at UCPB.

Respecting Castillo's June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer in the Makati RTC Civil
Case No. 01-506, he therein alleged:
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who
personally knew the plaintiff, was also profuse in extolling his academic
credentials and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer, as follows:
Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo?

A: Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers at the Laurel
Law Offices.

Q: How could you characterize and rate the trial competency,

performance and expertise of Atty. P.M. Castillo?

A: He is highly competent, low key, aggressive and very brilliant in the

conduct of trial, as well as, in the formulation of courtroom
strategies. His pleadings are also very well written, direct to the
point, convincing, scholarly and exhaustive. To be sure, he is one of
the popular trial lawyers of our firm (The Laurel Law Offices), not
only because he came from an exclusive school, but also because of
his scholastic records at Ateneo de Manila was also impressive. That
is why he was taken in by former VP Salvador H. Laurel even before
the release of the 1964 bar where he was also No. 2 among the
Ateneo bar candidates for the year. He was No. 15 among the bar
topnotchers. This is not to mention his impressive and highly (sic)
batting average of winning about 80% to 90% of his load cases and
work. He was also one of the busy lawyers of our office, until he went
on private practice and excelled as one of the more successful and
respected trial practitioners. [39] (Underscoring supplied)
To Asa, by the foregoing allegation, Castillo committed clear falsehood for
Justice Kalalo had never been a lawyer at any time at the Laurel Law Offices.

Castillo explained, however, that he "can only say that he has no control, nor
influence on the voluntary and spontaneous declaration and testimony of
Retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals in his favor during the
highly adversarial proceedings."[40]

Castillo's explanation does not impress, however. The records show that the
above-quoted statements attributed by Castillo to Justice Kalalo were lifted
from an unsigned and unsubscribed affidavit entitled "Question and Answer
Format in Lieu of Direct Testimony of Justice Felipe Kalalo"[41] dated January
21, 1993. This affidavit was earlier filed by Castillo with the Pasig RTC,
Branch 154 in connection with his claim for attorney's fees in Civil Cases Nos.
43049 and 56637 which affidavit was subsequently withdrawn, [42] however,
as it was unsigned and unsubscribed.

Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer

owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts. Rule 10.01 of said Canon
specifically commands that a member of the bar shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 of the same Canon provides
that a member of the bar shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

And Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court directs that a lawyer must
employ such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never
seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false
statement of fact or law.[43]

Complete candor or honesty is thus expected from lawyers, particularly when

they appear and plead before the courts. [44] They have an obligation to the
court as well as to the opposing party to make only truthful statements in
their pleadings.[45] The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it
could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will
have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted
could easily be imagined.[46]

In light of the above findings reflecting Castillo's administrative culpability,

his charge against Asa and Oliveros of filing groundless disbarment cases
against him and Ginger Anne necessarily fails.

As regards Castillo's claim that Asa secretly pocketed $24,500 and $160,500,
the undated certification issued by RCBC Branch Operation Head Dolores del
Valle reading:
This is to certify that on April 18, 2000, Mr. Leon L. Asa opened a Dollar
Savings Account at our Business Center. A credit was made to his assigned
Dollar Savings Account Number 8-250-00047-3 in the amount of US Dollars:
One Hundred Sixty Thousand Five Hundred (USD: 160,500.00) as initial
transaction. We further certify that on April 19, 2000, there was a debit made
for said account in the amount of US Dollars: One Hundred Sixty Thousand
(USD: 160,000.00) and that same amount was placed in the Dollar Time
Deposit Account of Salvador H. Laurel. Mr. Leon Asa left the amount of USD:
Five Hundred in his account to serve as the maintaining balance requirement.
Subject Dollar Savings Account had closed already,[47]
and Dr. Laurel Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian [48] dated
February 13, 2002 filed with the Angeles City RTC, Branch 59 in Sp. Proc. No.
5222 stating that:

3. On April 18, 2000, Guardian Ad Litem Salvador H. Laurel and his

Principal Foreign Legal Counsel, Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III received
by way of settlement from one of the duly adjudicated heirs of Larry
Lee Hillblom, Mercedita Feliciano, by and through her Guardian Ad
Litem, Milagros Feliciano, the amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$1,150,000.00) which was
deposited with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), St.
Francis Square Branch, Ortigas Center, Pasig City under Dollar Savings
Account No. 8-250-000430-ABA. Routing No. RCBC PH MM in the
name of "Salvador H. Laurel, in trust for Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jeril
Nonan", in compliance with the Order of this Honorable Court dated
April 26, 2000;

4. Pursuant to the above-stated Orders of this Honorable Court, the

Guardian Ad Litem and Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III disbursed the
following amounts for the purposes indicated:

A. ATTORNEY'S FEES & OTHER NECESSARY LEGAL EXPENSES:

xxxx

(7) Partial payment of the fee of Salvador H. Laurel for consenting to be the
guardian ad litem of the Nonan children and accepting all responsibilities
attached to said position .......US$100,000.00

(8) Reimbursement to Salvador H. Laurel for expenses incurred during the

last six (6) years for airfare, car rentals, overseas calls, and representation
and other incidental expenses while in the various states in the United States
in order to pursue the claim of the Nonan children against the Hillblom estate
.........US$60,000.00

x x x x[49] (Underscoring supplied),

validate Asa's explanation that the amount of $160,500 belonged to Dr.
Laurel but was merely temporarily placed in his (Asa's) account.

The Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian shows that $12,500
was received by Asa as attorney's fees for assisting Dr. Laurel and Castillo
from 1996 to 2000.[50] Confirming such disbursement is a Receipt[51] dated
April 18, 2000 signed by Asa. The remaining $12,500 of the $25,000
attorney's fees of Asa per heir (as priorly agreed upon by Dr. Laurel and
Cassiday) were remitted by Asa to the Laurel Law Offices as Official Receipt
No. 1766[52] issued by the treasurer/cashier of the Laurel Law Offices dated
April 19, 2000 shows:
RECEIVED from Atty. Leon L. Asa the sum of Twelve thousand five hundred
US Dollars US$12,500.00 as fifty percent (50%) share of LLO [Laurel Law
Offices] in attorney's fees of US$25,000 of Atty. Asa in SP Proc. 5222 of RTC
Angeles City, Br. 59.
Cash.........US$12,500-

By: Sgd.
Treasurer/Cashier
On Asa's alleged unjust refusal to turn over Castillo's attorney's fees: It
appears that Asa and Castillo each received $25,000 as attorney's fees but
pursuant to their February 2000 Agreement, the aggregate amount of
$50,000 would be divided between them, and Castillo would receive 75%
thereof or $37,500, while Asa would receive 25% or $12,500. The records
show that Asa kept only $12,500 for himself, he having remitted, as reflected
above, the remaining $12,500 to the Laurel Law Offices.

Dr. Laurel eventually gave Castillo $10,000 out of the $12,500 which Asa
remitted to the Laurel Law Offices, as reflected in the Partial Inventory,
Account and Report of Guardian.[53]

Respecting Castillo's claim that, in violation of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, Asa and Oliveros "embarked on another sinister strategy to
spite, insult and provoke him to ostracize him and make him feel unwanted
to continue as [Dr. Laurel's] lawyer in furtherance of their conspiracy to force
him into resignation for them to replace him and have absolute control over
the guardianship case, the funds of the estate and the attorney's fees," the
same is unsubstantiated, hence, deserves no further consideration.

As to Castillo's charge against Asa and Oliveros of embezzlement due to

alleged scandalous mismanagement of the estate of the Nonan heirs,
premised on the October 13, 2003 RTC Order [54] in SP No. 5222, this Court
finds the evidence presented insufficient to warrant the imposition of
sanctions against them.

Finally, on Castillo's Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner, the matters

raised therein[55] being entirely inappropriate, to say the least, for
consideration in these administrative proceedings, the same is denied.

A final word. The spectacle of members of the bar being engaged in bickering
and recrimination is far from edifying. Mutual bickerings and unjustified
recriminations between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal
profession and will not receive any sympathy from this Court. [56] Personal
colloquies between counsels which promote unseemly wrangling should thus
be carefully avoided.[57]

It appears that Castillo had previously been suspended for Six (6) Months by
this Court in CBD Case No. 176, Bongalonta v. Castillo,[58] for committing
falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He was then warned that commission of the same or similar
offense in the future would call for the imposition of a more severe penalty.
This Court thus imposes upon him a penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of One (1) year.

WHEREFORE, the administrative cases filed against Atty. Leon L. Asa and
Atty. Jose A. Oliveros are DISMISSED.
Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo is found GUILTY of breach of Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is hereby admonished to refrain from using
offensive and improper language in her pleadings.

Atty. Pablito M. Castillo is likewise found GUILTY of breach of Canons 8, as

well as Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of One (1) Year, effective
upon receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the respective personal records of

Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo and of Atty. Pablito M. Castillo in the Office of the
Bar Confidant. Let copies too be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 16-28.

[2]
Id. at 21.

[3]
Id. at 1-15.

[4]
Id. at 7-8.

[5]
Id. at 122-123.

[6]
Id. at 375-378.

[7]
Id. at 126-135.

[8]
Id. at 128.

[9]
Id. at 136.

[10]
Id. at 173-205.

[11]
Id. at 184.

[12]
Id. at 188.

[13]
Id. at 1077-1088.

[14]
Id. at 1094-1114.

[15]
Id. at 456-469.

[16]
Id. at 472.

[17]
Id. at 478-513.
[18]
Id. at 488.

[19]
Id. at 541.

[20]
Id. at 527.

[21]
Id. at 1173-1224.

[22]
Id. at 687-698.

[23]
Id. at 697-698.

[24]
Id. at 685-686.

[25]
Id. at 739-753.

[26]
Id. at 719-737.

[27]
Id. at 700-712.

[28]
Id. at 807-878.

[29]
Id. at 1025-1047.

[30]
Id. at 21.

Ricafort v. Bansil, A.C. No. 6298, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 194, 201
[31]

(2004) (citation omitted).

Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA
[32]

645, 656 (citation omitted).

[33]
Lubiano v. Gordolla, A.C. No. 2343, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 459, 461.

[34]
Rollo, p. 360.

[35]
Tolentino v. Baylosis, 110 Phil. 1010, 1016 (1961).

[36]
Supra note 33 at 462-463 (citations omitted).

[37]
Rollo, pp. 375-376.

Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho, A.C. No. 6403, August 31,

[38]

2004, 437 SCRA 202, 208 (citation omitted).

[39]
Rollo, p. 128.

[40]
Id. at 188.

[41]
Id. at 262-269.
[42]
Id. at 272-273.

Bautista v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 151,
[43]

163.

Silva Vda. de Fajardo v. Bugaring, A.C. No. 5113, October 7, 2004, 440
[44]

SCRA 160, 171-172.

[45]
Tolentino v. Judge Cabral, 385 Phil. 631, 652 (2000).

[46]
Muoz v. People, 152 Phil. 570, 575-576 (1973).

[47]
Rollo, p. 527.

[48]
Id. at 528-536.

[49]
Id. at 529-531.

[50]
Id. at 530.

[51]

Pasig City, Metro Manila

18 April 2000

RECEIPT

US$12,500.00 Received from Dr. Salvador H. Laurel, Guardian Ad Litem for

the Nonan Heirs, and Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III, Principal Foreign Legal
Counsel for the said Guardian, the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED US DOLLARS (US$12,500.00) as full payment of my attorney's
fees corresponding to the settlement agreement entered into with one of the
four heirs, Mercedita Feliciano through her Guardian Ad Litem Milagros
Feliciano, relative to Special Proceedings No. 5222 of the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City, Branch 59 entitled "In Re: Guardianship of the Minors
Honelyn, Alexandra and Jeril, all surnamed Nonan, Salvador H. Laurel,
Petitioner."

Sgd.
LEON L. ASA
Partner and Assisting Counsel
to the Guardian Dr. Salvador H. Laurel

[52]
Rollo, p. 543.

[53]
Id. at 530.

[54]
Id. at 713-718.

(1) to investigate and determine the liability of Angeles City RTC judges,
[55]

prosecutors and lawyers who facilitated the escape of Benjamin Cassiday III
from the Philippines, despite the existence of a hold departure order and the
pendency of the embezzlement case against him involving the estate funds of
$950,000; (2) to rein and keep in tow the different RTC judges of Angeles
City to observe strict fidelity to their oath and to attend with dispatch the
welfare and well being of the Nonan children by appointing a respectable and
credible guardian and in disposing the various long pending incidents of the
guardianship case; (3) to rescue the Nonan children who have no house and
lot of their own despite their enormous wealth and whose health and welfare
are also being neglected and taken for granted by the newly appointed
guardian and the guardianship court, (4) to compel the substitution of the
heirs of the late guardian to guarantee the restitution of the missing estate
funds and (5) to compel the new guardian to post a bond and repatriate
expeditiously the remaining estate funds of $1,541,122.57 to the Philippines
to enable the guardianship court to control and exercise jurisdiction over the
same.

Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr., 453 Phil. 100, 106 (2003) (citations
[56]

omitted), People v. Atty. Sesbreno, 215 Phil. 411, 418 (1984) (citation
omitted), Narido v. Atty. Linsangan, 157 Phil. 87, 91 (1974).

[57]
Canon 17, Canons of Professional Ethics.

[58]
310 Phil. 320 (1995).
 THIRD DIVISION

[ A.C. NO. 5395, September 19, 2006 ]

ORLANDO ANGELO A. SANTOS, COMPLAINANT, VS.ATTY. MA. VIVIANE

CACHO-CALICDAN, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed by

Orlando Angelo A. Santos (complainant) on 28 December 2000 for
disbarment against Atty. Ma. Viviane Cacho-Calicdan (respondent).

Estifanio Biasura (Biasura) filed criminal and administrative cases against

complainant, a Land Management Officer IV of the Regional Office No. 1 of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Said cases
were assigned to respondent, a Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of
the Ombudsman, who acted as the hearing officer in the administrative case
against complainant. Complainant was eventually found guilty by the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon on 5 October 2000 of violating Section
7, par. (d) in relation to Section 3, par. (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 [2]
and meted a penalty of six (6) months' suspension without pay.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleges several irregularities against

respondent committed in the course of the hearing of his complaint.
Complainant claims that while he was in the process of conducting his cross-
examination on Biasura during the formal investigation of the administrative
complaint, respondent uttered to complainant, "You concentrate in proving
your innocence." The utterance allegedly manifested respondent's partiality
to Biasura.

Complainant further accuses respondent of falsifying court records.

Complainant alleges that respondent, in collusion with the court
stenographer, altered the transcript of proceedings taken on 25 June 1998 by
deleting what exactly transpired during the hearing. Complainant avers that
during the hearing, respondent suspended the cross-examination then being
conducted by complainant on Biasura, only to be postponed later but on
condition that complainant would be allowed to continue his unfinished cross-
examination. However, the transcript instead stated that the hearing of 25
June 1998 was merely reset to 5 August, omitting mention of the stipulation
that complainant would be allowed to resume his cross-examination.

At the next scheduled hearing on 5 August 1998, complainant failed to

appear and instead filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that a criminal
complaint based on violation of R.A. No. 6713 was then pending before the
Sandiganbayan. In an Order[3] dated 27 August 1998, respondent denied the
motion to dismiss. However, the same order also stated that complainant had
already waived his right to further cross-examine Biasura. This order is being
cited by complainant to bolster his claim that respondent committed the
falsification earlier adverted to.
Complainant moved for reconsideration of the Order of 27 August 1998,
contending that he never manifested that he was waiving his right to further
cross-examine Biasura and that the order denied him of his constitutional
right to confront his accuser. In his motion for reconsideration, complainant
expressed his desire to continue with the cross-examination on certain
material points, to wit: (1) Biasura's testimony on the circumstances when
the alleged demands were made; (2) Biasura's claim that he was
granted/awarded by the DENR Regional Office No. 1 an approved survey plan
of Lot No. 20206, San Fabian Cadastre; (3) Biasura's claim that complainant
blatantly refused to give copies of a Decision dated 21 April 1993 and a
report related thereto; and (4) glaring inconsistencies in Biasura's accounts
during the direct examination and those made in his Complaint-Affidavit and
Reply/Comment.[4]

In an Order[5] dated 24 September 1998, respondent granted complainant's

motion. He was however advised to limit his cross-examination to the facts
stated by Biasura. In the same order, respondent nonetheless found it
necessary to stress the following points:
(a) That herein respondent (complainant) already subjected complainant
(Biasura) to cross-examination with respect to point (1) of his Motion for
Reconsideration.
(b) Points (2) and (3) are not covered by complainant's direct examination.
(c) Point (4). The inconsistencies, if ever there is (sic), between the
testimony of complainant during the direct examination and his complaint
affidavit and Reply-Comment in the criminal complaint as already explained,
during the last hearing is not within the scope of the administrative hearing.
The direct examination of the complainant, as the transcript showed, only
covered the allegations with respect to herein respondent Santos, that he
made solicitations from the complainant in the form of money and piece of
land in exchange for a favorable decision and when respondent's demand
was not fully given, the Decision dated April 21, 1993 in favor of complainant
was subsequently reversed.[6]

Complainant takes issue with the foregoing conclusions of respondent. In

particular, he argues that points (2) and (3) were actually covered by the
direct examination according to the transcript of stenographic notes.

In addition, complainant avers that on the day of the hearing on his motion
for reconsideration, respondent did not take action on the motion and instead
left the office early. Complaint further asserts that the 24 September 1998
order was issued despite knowledge of the existence of the motion for
respondent to inhibit from the case.[7]

Mention must be made that on 30 September 1998, complainant filed a

motion for respondent to inhibit herself from conducting the administrative
proceedings. The motion was granted and the case was re- assigned to Graft
Investigation Officer Joaquin F. Salazar (Salazar).

In her Comment,[8] respondent submits that the statements she allegedly

uttered neither convey bias or partiality to Biasura. She asserts that in the
course of complainant's cross-examination, the questions propounded by the
latter dealt with the alleged activities of Biasura which were not at issue in
the case and were moreover not testified to during the direct examination. [9]

On the issue of falsification, respondent insists there was no false declaration

or falsification committed. She explains that the proposal to set aside the
hearing adverted to by complainant was made off-record; hence, it was not
incorporated in the transcript of stenographic notes.

Respondent denies having belatedly acted on complainant's motion for

reconsideration. She contends that as of the date of the hearing on the
motion for reconsideration, she has yet to receive a copy of the motion from
the Records Division and the other parties have yet to file their respective
comments.

At this point, it is noteworthy to mention that prior to the filing of the present
disbarment complaint, complainant lodged a complaint before the Civil
Service Commission on 19 July 1999 charging respondent, together with her
stenographer, Joel Barja Ativo, and Salazar for falsification of records and
grave misconduct. The complaint was referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman.

In a Fact-Finding Report[10] dated 31 August 1999, the Deputy Ombudsman

for Luzon dismissed the case for lack of merit. Dealing extensively with the
issues raised by complainant, the Report advanced the following
observations:
The alleged alterations in the transcripts are likewise unfounded, since they
are plain and simple typographical errors which would only highlight the real
issues in this case which is the act of soliciting money in exchange for a
favorable decision. Evidently, this was done by herein-complainant in his
naked attempt to evade the real issues against him and to delay the
administration of justice. Moreover, all the points raised by the complainant
are entirely baseless and tainted with malice. The records and the actions of
respondent hearing officer are regular and in accordance with established
rules of procedure. It appears from the evaluation of the undersigned that
this complaint was designed to harass herein respondents in order to derail
the proceedings against him and this proves to be beneficial to his interest
and advantage. As it is, complainant is up [sic] to set a dangerous trend that
whoever hearing officer that will not take his side will end up a victim of a
complaint before any other forum. Lastly, the entire proceedings were all set
aside by the new hearing officer and an entirely new proceeding is now on-
going.

In view of the foregoing, there was no falsification that we can speak of and
neither are respondents liable for Grave Misconduct as the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established
rules are not manifested.[11]
The Report was approved by then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto on 1 October
1999.

The complaint in the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation. In its Order dated 7 March 2002, three
areas of concern were identified to be the subject of the administrative
complaint, namely: (1) Order of 24 September 1998, (2) utterances made by
respondent during the hearings, and (3) alleged intervention of respondent in
the preparation of the transcript of stenographic notes of the 25 June 1998
hearing.[12] Thereafter, the IBP, in its Investigation Report[13] dated 28
February 2003, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit. The IBP ruled, thus:
A careful scrutiny of the assailed Order dated September 24, 1998 contains
guidelines issued by Respondent Calicdan, consistent with her functions as
Hearing Officer/Ombudsman Investigator. In issuing the same, Respondent
Calicdan acted without malice and criminal intent. Good faith is evident on
her part, considering that the subject Order was mainly for the orderly
conduct of the administrative case she was presiding over.

The Fact-Finding Report dated August 31, 1999 of the Ombudsman in the
administrative complaint filed by Complainant Santos against Respondent
Calicdan, on the very same matters subject of this disbarment case, is
comprehensive, and clearly point to the innocence of Respondent Calicdan
with respect to the charge for falsification.[14]
Upon review of the records, the Court is in full accord with the findings and
conclusion of the IBP.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended from practice for any deceit,

malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, violation of the lawyer's oath, willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or willful and
unauthorized appearance for a party to a case, as specified in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A deceitful act, in particular, constitutes a
violation of Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. [15] In
disbarment proceedings, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof, the burden of which
rests upon the complainant.[16] Only a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and as a member of the bar will warrant disbarment.[17]

In the instant case, complainant failed to substantiate his charges of

falsification, to establish the basis of respondent's disbarment. He claimed
that during the hearing on 25 June 1998, respondent merely suspended the
cross-examination being conducted by the former on Biasura. Complainant
accused respondent of altering the transcript of proceedings by making it
appear that the hearing was reset to 5 August and complainant was required
to submit his position paper. [18] The complainant, in questioning the veracity
of the transcript of the proceedings, failed to present evidence that the said
transcript has been altered. Against his bare allegations, the presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed prevails. Otherwise stated, it
is presumed that a public official properly and regularly discharges his duties,
or performs act required by law; in accordance with the law and the authority
conferred on him; and that he will not do any act contrary to his official duty
or omit to do anything which such duty may require.[19] Accordingly, we
uphold the assailed transcript of proceedings as the faithful and accurate
recording of all matters that transpired during the 25 June 1998 hearing.

The alleged omissions in the said transcript were reflected in the 27 August
1998 Order, the integrity of which complainant also assails in his Complaint-
Affidavit. It appears that the IBP did not dwell on the 27 August 1998 Order,
focusing instead on the validity of the 24 September 1998 Order. This
notwithstanding, we can conclude with comfort that no irregularity attaches
to the 27 August 1998 Order, as well. The statement therein that
complainant had waived his right to further cross-examine Biasura and that
the parties were to submit their respective position papers does not
contradict the transcript which, absent any evidence disputing its veracity,
stands as the official record of what had transpired during the hearing.

Even assuming that there is a grain of truth in complainant's allegations

regarding the transcript of the hearing and the 27 August 1998 Order, it
should be noted that the alleged irregularities ultimately did not work to
complainant's prejudice. This was because in the 24 September 1998 Order,
respondent affirmed the right of the complainant to continue his cross-
examination of Biasura, the very right which complainant purports to have
been infringed upon by reason of the transcript and the 27 August 1998
Order.

We now turn to the remaining issues as identified by the IBP in its March
2002 Order - whether the alleged utterances by respondent to complainant
warrant administrative sanction against her, and whether any irregularity
attaches to the 24 September 1998 Order.

Complainant has accused respondent of unduly favoring Biasura when the

latter made the following remark: "You concentrate in proving your
innocence." There is no evidence on record that respondent unduly favored
Biasura. Respondent, in her Comment, averred that the aforesaid
statements, if ever uttered, neither convey bias nor partiality. She explained
that the cross-examination questions propounded by him did not deal with
the issue in the said case, as they did not address the matter subject of
Biasura's testimony on direct examination. It bears noting that complainant,
a layman, was not assisted by a lawyer during the proceedings before the
Deputy Ombudsman. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that complainant is not
versed with rules of procedure. It could be said that respondent was merely
guiding complainant on how to pose the proper questions, in no way
exhibiting bias against his cause. In fact, in the Order[20] of 24 September
1998, respondent reminded complainant to limit his cross-examination only
to the facts testified to by Biasura.

Finally, we see no taint of irregularity in the Order of 24 September 1998. It

should be recalled that almost all of complainant's questions in the cross-
examination before the Ombudsman were objected to by the counsel for the
opposing party; thus, respondent deemed it fair to give leeway to
complainant by proposing to suspend the proceedings. The Order of 24
September 1998 did allow complainant to continue his cross-examination of
Biasura, but advised him to limit his cross-examination to the facts testified
to by Biasura. The four points stressed by respondent in the 24 September
1998 Order are merely reflective of this concern. We agree with the IBP that
the questioned order only manifests respondent's good faith in the
performance of her duties as a hearing officer. The assailed guidelines were
precisely issued to ensure the orderly conduct of the proceedings.

We agree with the finding of the Ombudsman, shared by the IBP, that bad
faith and malice had attended the filing of the present complaint. In view of
his suspicion of bias on the part of respondent, the filing of the motion to
inhibit would have sufficed. And yet, despite respondent's inhibiting herself
from further conducting the administrative proceedings against him,
complainant still proceeded to file an administrative case before the Civil
Service Commission against respondent and, subsequently, the disbarment
complaint before this Court.

Based on the foregoing, complainant failed to establish by substantial

evidence that respondent committed the imputed acts to justify
administrative sanction.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio Morales, and Velasco, Jr., JJ.,

concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 5-7.

Entitled "An Act Establishing a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
[2]

Officials and Employees."

[3]
Rollo, pp. 8-9.

[4]
Id. at 36.

[5]
Id. at 41-42.

[6]
Id. at 41.

[7]
Id. at 230-231.

[8]
Id. at 52-56.

[9]
Id. at 54.

[10]
Id. at 277-285.

[11]
Id. at 283.

[12]
Id. at 408.

[13]
Id. at 485-488.
[14]
Id. at 487.

Ramos v. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210, 9 December 2004, 445 SCRA 529;
[15]

Santiago v. Rafanan, A. C. No. 6252, 5 October 2004, 440 SCRA 91.

Berbano v. Barcelona, A.C. No. 6084, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 258,
[16]

264, citing Concepcion v. Fandio, Jr., 334 SCRA 136, 142 (2000).

Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, 22 September 2004, 438 SCRA 582,
[17]

590.

[18]
Rollo, pp. 5-6.

[19]
Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law VI, 1999 ed., citing 31 C.J.S. 798.

[20]
Supra note 4.
 SECOND DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014 ]
CAROLINE CASTAEDA JIMENEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board
of Governors (IBP-BOG), dated January 3, 2013[1] and March 22, 2014,[2]
adopting and approving the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) which found Atty. Edgar B. Francisco (Atty. Francisco) administratively
liable for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the
practice of law.

On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007, [3]
filed by Caroline Castaeda Jimenez (complainant) against Atty. Francisco for
multiple violations of the CPR. On October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his
Answer.[4] On June 26, 2009, the mandatory conference was held and
terminated. Only the counsel for Atty. Francisco appeared. The notice of the
said conference addressed to complainant was returned with the notation
unknown at the given address. No new address was provided by the
complainant. Both parties were required to submit their respective position
papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco adopted his Answer.

The Antecedents

Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint

for estafa against complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel
Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel
Gonzalez.[5] The said complaint was docketed as IS No. 074314 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. Jimenez alleged that he was the
true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and
Development Corporation (Clarion), which was incorporated specifically for
the purpose of purchasing a residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati
City (Forbes property). The incorporators and original stockholders of Clarion
were as follows:

Thomas K.
- P500,000.00
Chua
Teresita C.
- P500,000.00
Alsua
Myla
- P249,998.00
Villanueva
Edgar B.
- P1.00
Francisco
Soledad
Gamat - P1.00

Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarions Articles of Incorporation, the

above-named stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a
deed of assignment of their respective shares in favor of complainant, who
was then Jimenezs common-law partner. Clarions total capitalization was
only P5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve its purpose of purchasing the
Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in the
amount of P80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes
property in the amount of P117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To
effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said amount which was funded
entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed of sale,
it was made to appear that the Forbes property was purchased for
P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was not
reflected in the books of Clarion.

On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in
Clarion to Jimenez by virtue of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Mylas
249,997 shares were transferred to complainant based on a deed of
assignment. The remaining one (1) share was transferred to Ma. Carolina C.
Crespo. These transactions appeared in Clarions General Information Sheet
(GIS) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Resultantly,
the subscribed shares of Clarion were as follows:

Mark
- P 500,000.00
Jimenez
Caroline
- P 749,997.00
Jimenez
Ma.
Carolina C. - P 1.00
Crespo
Edgar B.
- P 1.00
Francisco
Soledad
Gamat - P 1.00

On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by

another deed of assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares
amounting to P1,249,997.00.

According to Jimenezs complaint, while he was in prison in the United States

in 2004, he learned from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel),
approached the complainant and threatened her, claiming that the United
States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was about to go after their properties.
Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant to transfer her nominal shares
in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of assignment. Again,
this was reflected in Clarions GIS for the year 2004.

Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent

means, complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put the
Forbes property for sale sometime in August 2004. The said property was
eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro) for the
amount of P118,000,000.00 without Jimenezs knowledge. This sale was
again undervalued at P78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco
relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for the
sale of the Forbes property and that he handed all the proceeds thereof to
Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.

Jimenezs complaint for estafa was based on complainants alleged

participation in the fraudulent means in selling the Forbes property which was
acquired by Clarion with Jimenezs money. Complainant was duty-bound to
remit all the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the true and beneficial owner.
Complainant and her co-respondents, however, misappropriated and
converted the funds for their personal use and benefit.

In support of Jimenezs complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an

affidavit reiterating its factual averments.[6] A perusal of this affidavit likewise
would show the following claims and admissions, among other things, of Atty.
Francisco:

1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for

assistance in the documentation of the sale of the Forbes property
owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco asked her if she had secured
permission from Mark Jimenez and complainant answered in the
affirmative.

2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing

him to negotiate the sale of the property.

3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security

Bank, San Francisco Del Monte branch. When the cash payment
was deposited, he withdrew the amount and handed the same to
Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.

4. All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The

transfer taxes, however, were paid.

5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to

confirm that the sale of the Forbes property was without his
knowledge and approval. The proceeds of the sale had already
been farmed out to different corporations established by
complainant and her sister.

6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order

to steal the money of Mark Jimenez.

The Complaint

Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for
estafa filed by Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she
read the affidavit of Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal
lawyer and Clarions corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This
prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for
representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred
with Atty. Francisco regarding the legal implications of Clarions transactions.
More significantly, the principal documents relative to the sale and transfer of
Clarions property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the
members of his law office.[7] Atty. Francisco was the one who actively
participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property.
Without admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant
argued that its execution clearly betrayed the trust and confidence she
reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

The Respondents Position

In his Answer,[8] Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his
services in 1998 for the incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of
purchasing a residential house in Forbes Park, where he intended to live with
his long-time partner, the complainant; that the original incorporators and
stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares in trust for Jimenez; that
the subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also
pursuant to Jimenezs orders; and that as the corporate secretary and legal
counsel of Clarion, he prepared all the legal documentation to give effect to
the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of the Forbes property.

Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was

imprisoned in the United States for excessive contributions to the Democratic
Party; that during this time, Jimenezs son, Marcel, and the complainant,
asked him again to change the ownership of Clarion shares in order to avoid
the attachment of Jimenezs properties in a tax evasion case; that he
acceded to the request on the belief that this was in accordance with
Jimenezs wishes; and that as a result, almost 100% of Clarions ownership
was transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio.

Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk
to prospective buyers and to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it
was sold for P118,000,000.00; that Marcel and complainant led him to
believe that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as they were in constant
communication with him; that all these representations, however, turned out
to be false when Jimenez returned to the Philippines and discovered that the
proceeds of the sale were coursed through other corporations set up by
complainant and her sister; that Jimenez likewise learned of the successive
sale of his other properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the
members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the estafa case
against the complainant and the others. As a witness to the fraud committed
against Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and
circumstances surrounding the said transactions.

Atty. Francisco mainly argued that he violated neither the rule on disclosures
of privileged communication nor the proscription against representing
conflicting interests, on the ground that complainant was not his client. He
was the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never of the
complainant. He might have assisted her in some matters, but these were all
under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to do so. Further,
though he acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship
between him and complainant was formed, as a corporation has a separate
and distinct personality from its shareholders. While he admitted that the
legal documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes
property were prepared by him and notarized by the members of his law
firm, he averred that these acts were performed in his capacity as the
corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, and not as a lawyer of
complainant. Therefore, he served no conflicting interests because it was not
a former client and a subsequent client who were the opposing parties in
litigation.

He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on
privileged communication does not apply to his case. Here, complainant
failed to allege, much less prove, the requisites for the application of the
privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied being her lawyer, the complainant
should have established, by clear and convincing evidence, that a lawyer-
client relationship indeed existed between them. Complainant failed to do
this.

Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a
truthful narration of facts by a witness, Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v.
Caete,[9] where the Court ruled that the fact that one of the witnesses for
the defendant had been formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this suit was
no ground for rejecting his testimony. In this case, he merely attested to the
fraudulent acts of complainant, in the course of which, he defended and
served Jimenez as a client. This was likewise pursuant to the rule that
unlawful and illegal motives and purposes were not covered by the privilege.
It was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of complainant.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

In the Commissioners Report,[10] dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating

Commissioner, Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),
found Atty. Francisco guilty of violations of the CPR and recommended that
he be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law.

Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the subsequent affidavit

of desistance executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did not affect the
investigation conducted by the CBD as it was not an ordinary court which
accepted compromises or withdrawals of cases. After weighing on the claims
of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing in the
records would show that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty.
Francisco and Jimenez.[11] The circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco
was an original incorporator and shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal
counsel and corporate secretary of the said corporation, the articles of
incorporation of which did not include Jimenez as an original incorporator. He
became a stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez acquired shares from
Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenezs participation in Clarion affairs
again stopped when he assigned the entirety of his shares in favor of
complainant.

Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty.

Francisco, the report stated that it would appear that the latter permitted
misrepresentations as to Clarions ownership to be reported to the SEC
through its GIS. The Investigating Commissioner also pointed out Atty.
Franciscos clear admission that the transfer of shares within Clarion were
without any consideration, ran counter to the deeds of assignment that he
again admittedly executed as corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco
admitted to have simulated the loan and undervalued the consideration of
the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR.
Further, when he executed the affidavit containing allegations against the
interest of Clarion and complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that
Atty. Francisco violated the rule on privileged communication and engaged in
an act that constituted representation of conflicting interests in violation of
Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.

In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,[12] the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in

toto, the findings and recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.

The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and
moved for its reconsideration.[13]

Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out

that the penalty of suspension of one (1) year is too severe considering that
in his more than three decades of practice, he had never been involved in
any act that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action upon him. It
was only in 2007, when his client, Jimenez, experienced a difficult crisis
involving his children and common-law partner that he experienced a major
upheaval in his professional life. He apologized for his not being too
circumspect in dealing with the relatives of Jimenez.

As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation
in the execution of the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes
property were all connected to his capacity as Clarions corporate secretary
and legal counsel, not to mention his ties with his client and friend, Jimenez.
He admitted that he owed fidelity to Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that
this duty extended to the incorporators and shareholders of Clarion. Thus,
when complainant sought advice in her capacity as a shareholder in Clarion,
no fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own words, Atty. Francisco insisted
that Carol is not Clarion and vice versa.[14]

Attached to Atty. Franciscos motion for reconsideration was an affidavit

executed by Jimenez, stating that he had retained the legal services of Atty.
Francisco since 1999. Espousing Atty. Franciscos defenses, Jimenez asserted
that Atty. Franciscos law firm was in charge of all the companies he owned in
the Philippines. He directed Atty. Francisco to execute all the documentation
to show his ownership of these companies, including Clarion. These
documents were in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When
Jimenez ran for Congress in 2001, Atty. Francisco personally assisted him in
the filing of his certificate of candidacy and the proceedings before the
electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the United States, it was Atty.
Francisco who visited and told him that his children, Myla and Marcel, were
then facilitating the sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc.,
without his knowledge. He asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his
childrens betrayal and to wait until he could go home. When he filed the
criminal cases against his children and complainant, the latter even filed a
frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco. According to Jimenez, the
people who committed crimes against him were now exhausting all possible
means to keep Atty. Francisco silent and to prevent the latter from
performing his duties as a lawyer.

In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,[15] the IBP-BOG denied the respondents
motion for reconsideration.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The Courts Ruling

Violations of Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR and the Lawyers Oath

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.0 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal
processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide
by the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A
lawyers personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it
also inspires respect and obedience to the law, on the part of the public. Rule
1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all
lawyers.

Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in

defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful. Unlawful
conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the
concept is broad enough to include such element. [16] To be dishonest means
the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking
in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and
straightforwardness[17] while conduct that is deceitful means the proclivity
for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used
upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage
of the party imposed upon.[18]

Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not
only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers
should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal
profession.[19] To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the
law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be
overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers
are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by
the law.[20]

When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to obey
the laws, do no falsehood, and conduct himself as a lawyer according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion.[21]

In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons
and his sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct when he admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to
actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters regarding its
corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate shareholdings. In the
documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the
GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of these
transfers of shares, making it appear that these were done for consideration
when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged
orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing
out that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he executed as
corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe
to assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts,
corporation law and the rules enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of
Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register valid transfers of stocks.
Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his clientele with patent
disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have
simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property. He permitted this
fraudulent ruse to cheat the government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore,
Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave legal infractions and was
content to have granted the requests of the persons involved.

Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenezs wishes, or

pursuant to complainants misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind
eye on Atty. Franciscos act of drafting, or at the very least, permitting
untruthful statements to be embodied in public documents. If the Court
allows this highly irregular practice for the specious reason that lawyers are
constrained to obey their clients flawed scheming and machinations, the
Court would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine
the role of lawyers as officers of the court.

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the
cause of their clients should never be attained at the expense of truth and
justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be
emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the
expense of truth and justice, and must be held within the bounds of reason
and common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the interests of
his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions.[22]

In the same vein, Atty. Franciscos admissions show that he lacks candor
regarding his dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR provides that, [a] lawyer owes
candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of
the CPR provides that a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by
an artifice. Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system,
protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to act
with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court.[23]
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer
embodied in the CPR, namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule
1.01, Canon 1) and to act with candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01,
Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his solemn oath not to do any
falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same.

Rule on Conflicting Interests and Disclosure of Privileged

Communication

With respect to Atty. Franciscos alleged representation of conflicting interests

and disclosure of privileged communication, the Court deviates from the
findings of the IBP-BOG.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, [a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.[24] The relationship between a
lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of
trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail
to promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to
his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them.
Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her
lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the
lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests[25]
Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a
lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger a
violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,[26] the Court discussed the application of the rule on

conflict of interest in this wise:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when,
in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires them to oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have
particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyers conduct lies
within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight
for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose
that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has
to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new

relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether
the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former
client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.

The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a

situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or
in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the
other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two
actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one
case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or
conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect
the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests
presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely
to protect the fiduciary nature of the ties between an attorney and his client.
Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from accepting and representing
other clients on the ground of conflict of interests, if the lawyer-client
relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the first place.

In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of

interests, a scrutiny of the parties submissions with the IBP reveals that the
complainant failed to establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.

First, complainants claim of being Atty. Franciscos client remains

unsubstantiated, considering its detailed refutation. All that the complaint
alleged was that Atty. Francisco was Clarions legal counsel and that
complainant sought advice and requested documentation of several transfers
of shares and the sale of the Forbes property. This was only successful in
showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted the documents pertaining to the
transaction and that he was retained as legal counsel of Clarion. There was
no detailed explanation as to how she supposedly engaged the services of
Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what and how she
communicated with the latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With
the complaint lacking in this regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty.
Francisco, accompanied with a detailed narrative of his engagement as
counsel of Jimenez and Clarion, would have to prevail.

Second, there is a stark disparity in the amount of narrative details

presented by the parties. Atty. Franciscos claim that he was the counsel of
Clarion and Jimenez, and not of the complainant, was clearly established in a
sworn statement executed by Jimenez himself. Complainants evidence pales
in comparison with her claims of being the client of Atty. Francisco couched in
general terms that lacked particularity of circumstances.

Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to
Atty. Franciscos answer. This could have given her opportunity to present
evidence showing their professional relationship. She also failed to appear
during the mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD without even updating
her residential address on record. Her participation in the investigation of the
case apparently ended at its filing.

In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of

innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly
prove the allegations in the complaint by preponderant evidence.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is,
as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court
may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case;
(b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of
the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and
(d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance
is necessarily with the greater number.[27]

Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this
fiasco among the members of Jimenezs family by taking an upfront and
candid stance in dealing with Jimenezs children and complainant. He could
have been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks were performed in
his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty.
Franciscos indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that the
totality of evidence presented by the complainant miserably failed to
discharge the burden of proving that Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At most,
he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the affirmation
presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish that
Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.

Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado

v. Vitriolo,[28] the Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the
existence of the said privilege, viz:

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship
that the client made the communication.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule

on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not
thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The
reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he
wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be
divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain
information from the prospective client.

xxx

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption
of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be
confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary

act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means
which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third
person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a

compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of
his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for
settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his
professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his
professional capacity.

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for
mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his
attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been
transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal
advice.

If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance,

and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication
disclosed for such purpose.

[Emphases supplied]
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the
evidence on record fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As
discussed, the complainant failed to establish the professional relationship
between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any
indication that the advice regarding the sale of the Forbes property was
given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of
what she had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances
under which the confidential communication was relayed. All that complaint
alleged in her complainant was that she sought legal advice from
respondent in various occasions.[29] Considering that complainant failed to
attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific
confidential information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her
consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to determine if there was
any violation of the rule on privileged communication. As held in Mercado,
such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the
rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not
enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.[30] It cannot be gainsaid
then that complainant, who has the burden of proving that the privilege
applies, failed in this regard.

The Penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from

his office as an attorney, for violating of the lawyers oath and/or for
breaching the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR, [31] for
the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of
which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character.[32] The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. [33]
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the
Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly
immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5)
violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without
authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.

While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and
disclosure of privileged communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively
and passively allowing Clarion to make untruthful representations to the SEC
and in other public documents, still constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension from the practice
of law for six (6) months is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation

of Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B.
Francisco and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the
Philippines, for their information and guidance.

Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of
this Decision so that the Court can determine the reckoning point when his
suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta,* Del Castillo, (Acting Chairperson), Villarama, Jr.,** and Leonen, JJ.,
concur.

*
Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio,
who inhibited himself, as a member of his staff is closely related to a party,
per Raffle dated December 9, 2014.

**
Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per
Special Order No. 1888, dated November 28, 2014.

[1]
Rollo, p. 278.

[2]
Id. at 309.

[3]
Id. at 2-7.
[4]
Id. at 115-140.

[5]
Id. at 141-149.

[6]
Id. at 100-104.

1) Deed of Assignment dated November 5, 2002 notarized by Atty. Pastor

[7]

M. Reyes, Jr.; 2) General Information Sheet dated November 5, 2002

prepared by Atty. Francisco; 3) Deed of Assignment dated August 10, 2004
notarized by Atty. Pastor M. Reyes, Jr.; 4) General Information Sheet dated
September 9, 2004 prepared by Atty. Francisco and notarized by Atty. Pastor
M. Reyes, Jr.; 5) Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 15, 2005 between Clarion
and Philmetro covering the Forbes property signed by Atty. Francisco on
behalf of Clarion; and 6) Board Resolution dated March 28, 2005 signed by
Atty. Francisco.

[8]
Rollo, pp. 115- 140.

[9]
3 Phil. 394, 397 (1904).

[10]
Rollo, pp. 279-288.

Jimenez was represented by the Law Office of Chavez Miranda Aseoche in

[11]

the estafa case he filed against the complainant.

[12]
Rollo, p. 278.

[13]
Id. at 289-304.

[14]
Id. at 294.

[15]
Id. at 309.

[16]
Blacks Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 1538.

[17]
Blacks Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 468.

[18]
Blacks Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 405.

[19]
Rivera v. Corral, 433 Phil. 331, 342 (2002).

Resurreccion v. Sayson, 360 Phil. 313, 315 (1998), citing Ex parte Wall,
[20]

107 U.S. 265; cited in Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 214.

[21]
The Lawyers Oath states in full:
I, _______ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or
give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
[22]
Plus Builders, Inc. v. Revilla, Jr., 533 Phil. 250, 261 (2006), citing Choa v.
Chiongson 329 Phil. 270 (1996).

Id., citing Ting-Dumali v. Torres, 471 Phil. 1, 9 (2004); Radjaie v.

[23]

Alovera, 392 Phil. 1, 17 (2000); Ziga v. Arejola, 486 Phil. 37, 49 (2004);
Berbano v. Barcelona, 457 Phil. 331, 345 (2003); Radjaie v. Alovera, supra;
Busios v. Ricafort, 347 Phil. 687, 692 (1997).

[24]
Anion v. Sabitsana, Jr., A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 76, 81.

[25]
Id. at 80-81.

[26]
505 Phil. 126, 134-135 (2005).

[27]
Rodica v. Lazaro, A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 1, 9-10,
citing Aba Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011,
662 SCRA 361, 372.

[28]
498 Phil. 49, 58-60 (2005).

[29]
Rollo, p. 3.

[30]
Supra note 28, at 61.

[31]
Catu v. Rellosa, 569 Phil. 539, 550 (2008).

[32]
Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot, 74 Phil. 579, 581 (1944).

[33]
Lim-Santiago v. Saguico, 520 Phil. 538, 552 (2006).