1

Brazils Foreign Policy and South American Integration

Paulo Fagundes Vizentini*

O Brasil e a Amrica do Sul tm passado por uma transformao marcante nos anos
recentes. O impacto da crise financeira internacional sobre os mercados emergentes no final
dos anos 1990, as dificuldades econmicas decorrentes da abertura externa, os elevados
custos sociais dos ajustes neoliberais e as conseqentes crises de governabilidade que
atingiram vrios paises da regio, propiciaram a ascenso de governos criticados como
nacionalistas-populistas e de uma nova dimenso de integrao regional. Em 1998 Hugo
Chvez foi eleito presidente da Venezuela, em 2002 Luiz Incio Lula da Silva vence no
Brasil, em 2003 Lcio Gutierrez e Nstor Kirchner triunfam no Equador e na Argentina,
respectivamente, em 2005 Tabar Vzquez chega ao poder no Uruguai, e em 2006 o
boliviano Evo Morales, a chilena Michelle Bachelet e o equatoriano assumem a presidncia
de seus paises. Neste mesmo ano Lula e Chvez so reeleitos, enquanto Kirchner
apontado como favorito para as eleies presidenciais de 2007. Trata-se, realmente, de uma
guinada esquerda, com ameaa democracia? Como se comporta a economia, a
integrao regional e a insero global das naes sul-americanas na nova conjuntura?

Lulas Foreign Policy (2003-2006):

An Affirmative Agenda

Lulas election and the actions of his new government caused a great deal of
apprehension inside and outside Brazil. Most expected an ideological international behavior
and an unprepared president. However, diplomacy based on a strategic and tactical sense
and a long range vision, which elements are going to be discussed, were noticed. As seen,
although the present course of Brazilian foreign policy started in the second half of FHCs
mandate, there were no qualitative changes at that moment. The former President had not
possessed the will or political basis to implement modifications that could go far beyond
timid critic rhetoric. Lulas inauguration has transformed this situation and, in the
beginning of his government, Brazilian foreign policy has known a remarkable
development and leadership that is surpassing many expectations.
To fulfill his strategy, Lulas government International Relations is characterized by
three dimensions: an economic diplomacy, a political one, and a social agenda. The first
dimension is a realist one, the second aimed at offering resistance and assertiveness,
whereas the third is a propositive one. They represent a project that was being matured for
more than a decade that is consistent with the balance of forces present in the country and
the world, and not a headstrong policy.
Considering the first point of view, it is necessary to keep the channels of First
World talks open, gaining resources such as investments and technology, also negotiating
our foreign debt and giving indication that the government is willing to fulfill its
international commitments, without any sudden break. For its turn, the political diplomacy

*
History Professor and Coordinator of the Center of International Studies at Rio Grande do Sul Federal
University NERINT/UFRGS. Guest Scholar at graduate courses at FAPA. Attended a post-doctoral
International Relations programme at the London School of Economics.
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represents a field for the reinforcement of national interests and of a true protagonism in
International Relations, with the clear intent of developing an active and affirmative
diplomacy, ending a phase of relative stagnation and emptiness. Lulas government put
Itamaraty back on its former strategic position of formulating and implementing Brazilian
foreign policy.
Finally, Lulas internal governmental project also has a significant international
impact, since its social projects are an answer to the need for and agenda that seeks to deal
with the asymmetries brought by the globalization based only in free trade and investments.
The campaign against hunger has a symbolical meaning that indicates the built of an
alternative social-economic model in response to the neoliberal globalization crisis. Such
actions as the stimulus to the internal market and savings, of internal production and the
reform of domestic components that impede a more qualified international action (for
instance, social inequality, unemployment, crime, weakness and administrative disorder
and fiscal chaos), represent the development of this project. The combination of social,
energy, urban, agrarian, and productive policies showed a real political will. At the same
time, the presidents charisma seemed to have merged in his open and ordinary personality
the characteristics that the world most admires in Brazil. This has allowed Lula to sustain
an intense international agenda as the speaker of this project.
In practical terms, the Brazilian government has surpassed the inertia of its
predecessor and searched for alliances outside the hemisphere as a means to improve its
sphere of influence in the international arena, from the standpoint of an active and
pragmatic attitude. The rebuilt of Mercosur and South American integration, creating room
for Brazilian leadership are the main priorities. Moreover, the solidarity towards Africa is
also fundamental, linking ethical values and the national interest. The purpose of deepening
relations (and creating a strategic partnership) with emerging powers such as China,
India, Russia and South Africa, among others, as well as constructing a Mercosur-EU
association and the appreciation of international organizations (mainly the UN), added to
economic advantages, indicates the will to contribute to the consolidation of a multipolar
international order. The democratization of International Relations as a principle was
clearly stated.
Considering South American and Mercosur integration, defined both as priorities,
Brazil offers its neighbors a most needed partnership to regain their economic growth, an
indispensable condition to make integration a concrete, not a virtual reality, and to create
the chance of a global strategic action that reverts the growing marginalization that the
region is undergoing. Good governance and development for all South America can only be
guaranteed by regional integration, which is also an indispensable asset in FTAA talks.
This new reality has helped to reinforce the policy launched by South American
countries to develop the physical infrastructure (transport, communication and energy) as a
means to re-start the integration process. President Toledo from Peru proposed that the
international creditors of the countries from the region destined 20% of their loan
repayments to these infrastructure works. On the other hand, Presidents Lula Brazil views
this initiative as an important strategic matter, advancing in substance, policies put forward
by FHCs government in its closure. Therefore, BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) has
already started to finance the works of South American integration.
For his turn, President Kirchner made clear Argentinas will to change the path of
the countrys economic policies followed in the last fourteen years, pushing neoliberalism
aside and searching for a model sustained by public investments and the fight of poverty.
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Whereas considering the international arena, the new president showed his intention of
creating a strategic alliance with Brazil, rescue Mercosur and to actively cooperate for the
deepening of South American cooperation. Ones attention is called by the evolution of
these new policies, from the era of flesh relations (relaciones carnales) with the US to
a posture of balanced distance towards this nation. For the White House, this movement
was a cause of concern since it might represent an autonomous Brazil-Argentina power
pole.
It is worth mentioning that in December 2004, these initiatives gained momentum
once more with a Mercosur-Andean Community free trade treaty that was presented by the
Brazilian government as a relevant step towards the consolidation of the South American
Community of Nations (CASA, or Home). In addition, Brazilian diplomacy also
continued to exercise an important role as a broker in the region, helping its South
American neighbors to face their own internal crisis. Bolivia, Equator and the already cited
Venezuelan tensions are some examples of these stabilization actions.
Whereas considering Brazils stance in multilateralism, the 2003/2006 period was
characterized by several initiatives. In the first year of Lulas presidency, one outstanding
feature was his participation in the G8 Meeting in Evian, France. Addressing the reunion as
a representative of South America, the President exposed his plan to fight hunger and a
proposal to convert 20% of the payment of our foreign debt interest in resources destined to
the financing of infrastructure works and development. Lula also presented the well-known
criticism towards the protectionism of rich countries and the need to reform multilateral
institutions to better address the new realities of power of the post-Cold War world.
Faced by these difficulties, in order to preserve its advanced position and deal with
the absence of attention by the rich countries in regards to the needs and demands of Third
World nations, Brazil deepened high level diplomatic talks and managed to create the
Group of 3 (G-3) with India and South Africa, also know as IBSA (India, Brazil and South
Africa Dialogue Forum). Chancellors Celso Amorim, Yashwant Sinh and Nkosazana
Dlamini-Zuma made a pronouncement stating that the group will promote trilateral
cooperation, mutual trade liberalization and a convergence and strengthening of agendas in
multilateral forums. The talks will involve Mercosur, South African Customs Union
(SACU) and possibly South Asia Area of Regional Cooperation (SAAR). Also, these
participants stressed their willingness to attract Russia and China to the Group in the long
run, creating a G-5 (if this scenario becomes a reality, the Group will represent the sum of
almost half of the worlds population and of its production, which might significantly affect
multilateral talks). G-3 creation represented an opportune initiative, answering the need to
mobilize South countries to put forward their demands and change the course of the present
international agenda.
Another additional example of the ongoing power of Brazilian governments
diplomacy was the built of another alliance of variable design (geometria varivel), G-
20. G-20 has effectively taken part at the WTO Meeting in Cancun (that was preceded by
Presidents Bush phone call to Lula, which was revealing). Friendly, but defiant, Brazilian
diplomacy has created its alliance with developing countries that are affected by First
Worlds protectionism and agricultural subsidies. The so-called G-20 ignited rich countries
wrath and the Souths discontent was heard in the grand closure of the meeting. In spite of
G-20 success, its links to G-90 and other groups, countries and institutions, since Cancun
some difficulties are being faced by this alliance due to external pressures from developed
countries and attitudes from some members of the alliance.
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Even though, Brazilian diplomacy is being able to face these crossroads. Therefore,
although several obstacles remain, there is a trend towards the alignment of South
American nations and other significant powers (not exactly forming a bloc) that might
strengthen the formerly known axis of peace (Paris-Berlin-Moscow) in order to
counterbalance North American stand in international affairs. At the same time, this might
help the built of a multipolar world governed by the United Nations system. In this sense,
the reform of UNSC is viewed as a priority by Brazilian foreign policy, and, alongside G3,
the country is also part of G4. Composed of Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, G4 defends
the widening of UNSC to increase its legitimacy and openness, in accordance with the new
power balance originated by the end of the Cold War. Brazils command of Haitis UN
peacekeeping mission is also part of our diplomatic efforts in order to ascend to a
permanent seat at UNSC. However, this reform is a highly sensitive issue and some
setbacks are bound to happen, such as the opposition from Argentine and Mexico to
Brazils claim and other regional tensions regarding Japan, India and Germany.
Other initiatives that were part of Brazilian agenda during 2003/2005 and are worth
mentioning were Lulas trips to the Arab countries of the Middle East such as Libya and
Syria, and a rapprochement with Africa. The presidential tour that took place in the first
week of November to Sao Tome and Principe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South
Africa, covered the Southern part of Africa and two of Brazilian main partners in the
region, as promised. Moreover, the tour was also important not only to the general scope of
Brazilian-African relations, but also to advance the creation of an institutional link among
Mercosur and the South African Development Community (SADC), that has South Africa
at its core in the Southern part of the continent (South Africa is a country that also is a
member of G3 and a partner in other multilateral alliances and talks of our diplomacy).
Another outstanding result of these initiatives was the first South American and Arab
Countries Summit that took place in Brasilia in 2005 and represented the consolidation of
the political, strategic and economic links of the two regions.
Lulas government started to exercise a strong hand in the defense of Brazilian
economic interests. As a global trader, the nations whishes to keep its relations with
different areas of the world, also giving priority to Mercosur and South American
integration. After reversing North American expectations that the government was going to
be guided by leftist policies, Lula, instead, has gained Washingtons admiration. It is
important to notice that as soon as Brazilian diplomacy started to contest some guidelines
of US hegemonic power and stress its autonomy, a certain amount of leverage was created.
Therefore, it was possible to call attention to our social-economic demands and
infrastructure projects with neighboring nations. On the other hand, Brazils diplomacy
properly prepared itself to face this unavoidable and tough dialogue among opposites, by
strengthening its stance in the world and in South America.
Summing up, Brazil developed an autonomous diplomacy, in accordance with the
demands of globalization and its development project. Alliances of variable design such
as G-3, G-4 and G-20 enabled the nation to exercise a worldwide presence and deepen its
influence. Instead of an ideological diplomacy, Brazil built an active and pragmatic agenda
that gained several allies in different arenas and that allowed the country to present its
demands towards developed countries in a confident, but not confrontational manner. At
the same time, Brazil respected, without fully supporting some problematic nations such as
Cuba, Syria and Venezuela, showing considerable flexibility.
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Lulas foreign policy represents the boldest field of action of the government and its
success rests on the fact that it is run by Itamaraty, which regained its place and due to the
support of governmental agencies that are concerned with the national issue, such as
BNDES and the Armed Forces. However, these diplomatic initiatives generate some
problems, leading to extreme high expectations. Internal and external adjustments were
taken into effect, but international variables remain important since the country still
depends on a highly unstable world to try to make these projects work. The absence of
growth, which slows down the creation of jobs, will not allow the country to consolidate its
advances in South America, which is the basis of our international insertion..
Nevertheless, Brazils North-South coalitions and South-South alliances are
enabling the country and its partners to fill a power vacuum in the international field in an
effective and fast manner. In this context, it will also be relevant to examine the actions of
other significant regional medium powers and its disputes- or talks- with the main
representatives of these areas. Considering these power balances, it is worth mentioning the
possible obstacles that Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Argentine and Mexico will create to India,
South Africa and Brazils claim for a permanent seat at the UNSC. For instance, G-3 has a
double impact for its members, strengthening their stance towards developed countries and
possible regional adversaries too. Even G-20 suffers restrictions from poorer countries and
its agenda is facing some resistance from the African bloc in WTOs agricultural talks.
Therefore, in order to continue to achieve its goals, Brazilian diplomacy will need to
further increase its political capabilities to articulate alliances of variable design
answering to the demands, challenges and contradictions of North-South relations. Most of
all, Brazilian diplomacy must continue to exercise a positive and stabilizing role in South
America, deepening its political, economical and strategic integration, projecting the
country and its partners in the international arena with renewed confidence and strength.

Amrica do Sul: economia, poltica e integrao regional (2005-2006)

As economias sul-americanas vm apresentando um crescimento regular. O Brasil,

que manteve um estrito padro liberal, apresenta um crescimento mais moderado, que deve
aumentar ao longo do segundo mandato de Lula (2007-2010), devido ao equilbrio das
contas pblicas, estabilidade macroeconmica, s reserves acumuladas e anunciada
inflexo da poltica econmica para um rumo menos ortodoxo e mais desenvolvimentista.
O pais recuperou posio na economia mundial, depois de haver caido para 15a posio no
governo anterior, tendo batido record de exportaes, especialmente para as regies que
passaram a ser priorizadas pela diplomacia brasileira. A Companhia Vale do Rio Doce
passou a ser a maior empresa da Amrica Latina, com um patrimnio de 40 bilhes de
dlares.
A Argentina se recupera rapidamente, na base de uma poltica econmica
heterodoxa e no recente apoio da Venezuela, que adquiriu ttulos da dvida argentina. A
Venezuela, beneficiada pelo elevado preo do petrleo, tem crescido a ritmos elevados e
materializado os projetos sociais e econmicos do governo Chvez, al de apoiar os demais
paises da regio, especialmente agora que esta nao ingressou no Mercosul como membro
pleno. O Chile vem mantendo seu ritmo elevado de crescimento, embora Bachelet tenha de
promover certas alteraes no modelo, tanto para recuperar os investimentos sociais como
pelo fato do mesmo haver atingido seu limite. J a Bolvia, com a nacionalizao do gs, se
vencer a instabilidade poltica interna poder apresentar um crescimento positivo.
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Paraguai e Uruguai dependem dos vizinhos para, atravs do Mercosul, voltar a

crescer. O Equador, o Peru e a Colmbia, por sua vez, beneficiados pelo preo do petrleo,
tambm apresentam perspectives positivas, apesar dos problemas politicos internos e do
deficit social. 44 % da populao latino-americana vivem em favelas ou habitaes
insatisfatrias, sendo que as desigualdades sociais creceram acentuadamente durante o
decnio neoliberal. A Guiana e o Suriname, por sua vez, vm incrementando sua
participao no comrcio regional, com perspectivas de crescimento econmico. A
crescente presena da China como investidora e compradora de produtos agrcolas,
matrias primas e petrleo tem sido um fator positivo para a economia sul-americana.
Chvez pretende triplicar a venda de petrleo China nos prximos cinco anos.
No plano politico, a vitria de vrios candidatos de esquerda e/ou nacionalistas no
representa, como muitos avaliam, uma guinada esquerdista e uma tendncia formao de
um bloco anti-americano ou a emergencia de um padro neopopulista. Trata-se de lideres
populares (e no populistas), eleitos no quadro de democraciais liberais, e sua atrao se
deve s plataformas de polticas sociais e de retomada do crescimento, bem como ao
desgaste das polticas neoliberais na regio. Tambm h que diferenciar pases de forte
institucionalidade democrtica como Brasil, Uruguai, Argentina e Chile, dos pases
andinos, onde a democracia ainda est em processo de consolidao.
Alm disso, apesar da inegavel liderana brasileira, h disputas polticas entre os
novos governos e rivalidades histricas, como entre a Bolvia e o Chile, por exemplo, ou
recentes como entre a Venezuela e a Colmbia e o Peru (motivadas pelas diferentes
perspectivas na relao com os EUA) e entre Uruguai e Argentina (devido disputa em
torno das fbricas de celulose). A reeleio de lvaro Uribe na Colmbia, apesar da agenda
pr-Washington e da adoo do Plano Colmbia de combate ao narcotrfico, no significou
maiores antagonismos na regio, uma vez que a cooperao bilateral com o Brasil tem sido
positiva. H, em todos os paises, a busca de estabilidade politica. Mas a presena de
pequenos contingents militares norte-americanos em todos os paises, com exceo do
Brasil, um motivo de preocupao. Brasilia promove a cooperao entre as forces
armadas sul-americanas e cogita propor, em 2007, a criao de um organismo de defesa
regional para reforar a capacidade de dissuaso. O novo governo do Equador j anunciou
que solicitar o fechamento da base militar de Manta em 2009, quando expira o acordo
bilateral que a implantou.
Assim, o caminho da integrao regional, embora facilitado pela agenda adotada
pelos novos governantes, ainda um caminho longo e complexo. Mas os avanos, embora
discretos, so concretos. O Mercosul se recuperou gradativamente, tanto por fatores
politicos (a agenda dos novos governos) como econmicos (a recuperao argentina e a
estabilidade brasileira). A adeso plena da Venezuela est dando um novo impulso
integrao, alm da possvel adeso plena da Bolvia e do Equador a mdio prazo. Alm
disso, os demais Estados j so associadas e, no caso do Peru e do Chile, demonstraram
desejo de incrementar a cooperao com o Mercosul. A nova posio do Chile de
particular importncia, demonstrando uma alterao de perspectiva, sendo que o pais se
associou tambm Comunidade Andina de Naes (CAN), da qual a Venezuela se havia
afastado. No Peru, o recm eleito governo Alain Garcia, mesmo tendo derrotado o
candidato militar nacionalista Humala Ollanta, adotou uma poltica pr-integrao e o
desejo de cooperar com o Brasil, especialmente com a concluso de uma rodovia
interocenica.
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A associao commercial entre o Mercosul e a CAN e a criao da CASA, em 2004,

representam as bases da integrao sul-americana, que avana no campo das obras de infra-
estrutura. Est em marcha um conjunto de iniciativas de conexo das redes de energia,
telecomunicaes, transporte rodo-hidro-ferrovirio, alm de oleodutos e gasodutos. Uma
srie de projetos bilaterais, criando joint ventures, est igualmente em marcha nas areas de
siderurgia, extrao e refinamento de petrleo e minerao (apesar do desgaste causado
pela nacionalizao boliviana). A integrao do Mercosul e da Amrica do Sul tem atraido
a ateno de atores importantes como a Unio Europia, a SACU, a ndia e a China, a
primeira negociando um (complicado) acordo entre os dois blocos, as duas seguintes tendo
assinado acordos de cooperao comercial e a ltima por uma forte e crescente presena na
regio. Inclusive Cuba firmou um acordo de cooperao commercial com o Mercosul em
2006. Merecem destaque tambm as reunies de Cpula da Amrica do Sul com os Paises
rabes e com os Paises Africanos, iniciativas inditas na diplomacia regional.
Mas h tambm iniciativas mais de carter politico, como a Altenativa Bolivariana
para as Amricas (ALBA), lanada pelo presidente Hugo Chvez como contraponto
ALCA, bem como o Tratado Comercial dos Povos, firmado entre Cuba, Venezuela e
Bolvia. Trata-se de iniciativas voluntaristas, com o objetivo de apoiar-se mutuamente e a
mostrar alternatives aos Tratados de Livre Comrcio (TLC) com os Estados Unidos
firmados pelo Peru e pela Colmbia. Sua viabilidade depende dos petrodlares
venezuelanos, aportados pelos prprios Estados Unidos, principal comprador do petrleo
venezuelano. Mas a estratgia de Caracas d resultados, pois Chvez logrou evitar que o
Uruguai firmasse um TLC com os EUA, ao oferecer ajuda econmica ao pas. Mas nisto
tudo h, igualmente, muito pragmatismo, numa poca em que a ateno da potncia
hegemnica est voltada para o Oriente Mdio e sia central, e existe espao para a auto-
organizao sul-americana.

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insero internacional do Brasil. Porto Alegre: L&PM Editores, 2004.
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Paulo: Alfa - mega, 1996.
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Journals

Contexto Internacional, Rio de Janeiro: IRI/ PUC- RJ.

Diplomacy, Strategy and Politics, Braslia: Funag/MRE.
Poltica Externa, So Paulo: Paz e Terra.
Revista Brasileira de Poltica Internacional, Braslia: IBRI.

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the main trends and changes of Brazilian foreign policy by
examining the actions and paradigmatic approache of Luiz Incio Lula da Silvas
government. In an international context characterized by the crisis of the neoliberal
globalization models, the article investigates Brazilian external and internal responses and
its possibilities, presenting the countrys global and regional profile, especially towards
South America and the FTAA.

Key words

South American Integration, Lulas Foreign Policy, Brazils International Relations