4/22/2017 ReyesvsCA:111682:February6,1997:J.

Mendoza:SecondDivision

SECONDDIVISION

[G.R.No.111682.February6,1997]

ZENAIDAREYES,petitioner,vs.COURTOFAPPEALSandthePEOPLEOFTHE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.

RESOLUTION
MENDOZA,J.:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution, dated November 29, 1995, of the Court,
denyingthepetitionforreviewofthedecision,datedMay28,1993,andtheresolution,datedAugust
30,1993,oftheCourtofAppeals[1]inCAG.R.CR.No.08410,affirmingtheconvictionofpetitioner
Zenaida P. Reyes of falsification of public document. Petitioners motion is based on her contention
that because of her counsels unexplained absences at the trial she was prevented from presenting
evidenceinherdefenseandthereforedeniedthedueprocessoflaw.
Thefactsareasfollows:

InaninformationfiledonApril7,1986withtheRegionalTrialCourtofBulacanandlaterassignedtoBranch
22thereofasCriminalCaseNo.9252M,petitionerZenaidaReyeswasaccusedoffalsifyingadeedofsaleof
four(4)parcelsoflandbyfeigningandsigningthenameofPabloFloro,whocouldnotaffixhissignature
anymoreduetoageinfirmity,onthesaiddocumentassellerandcausingittoappearthatsaidPabloFloro[had]
participatedintheexecutionofthesaiddocumentwhenintruthandinfact,assaidaccusedwellknew,said
deedofsalewasnotexecutedandsignedbythesaidPabloFloro,nordidheeverappearbeforeanynotary
publicforthepurposeofacknowledgingthedeedabovementioned.[2]

Uponbeingarraigned,petitionerpleadednotguilty.Trialonthemeritsthenfollowed.Aftertheprosecutionhad
resteditscase,thepresentationofthedefenseevidencewasscheduledonFebruary6,1989,which,however,
wasresetforthelasttimetoMarch10,1989duetopetitionersillness.[3]ThehearingonMarch10,1989was,
however,cancelledalsobecauseoftheabsenceofboththeprivateprosecutoranddefensecounsel,Atty.Analuz
CristalTenorio.ThenewschedulewasApril12,1989.[4]However,Atty.TenoriowasagainabsentonApril12,
1989.Petitionerwasalsoabsent,butherhusbandappearedandsubmittedtothecourtamedicalcertificatethat
shewassick.ThehearingonthatdatewasthereforepostponedtoMay17,1989[f]orthelasttime.[5]

OnMay11,1989,Atty.TenoriomovedforthepostponementofthehearingfromMay17,1989to
June 5, 1989, allegedly because she had to leave for Malaybalay, Bukidnon to assist in the
prosecution of her brotherinlaws killers. The trial court, while noting that the hearing on May 17,
1989wasintransferrableincharacter,nonethelessgrantedAtty.Tenoriosmotionandpostponedthe
hearingtoJune5,1989overtheobjectionoftheprivateprosecutor.Petitionerwaswarnedthatifshe
didnotpresentherevidenceonthatdate,shewouldbeconsideredtohavewaivedherrighttodoso.
[6]
But the hearing on June 5, 1989 had to berescheduled again because petitioners counsel, Atty.
Tenorio,wasabsent.[7]
OnJuly10,1989,thenewdateofhearing,bothpetitionerandAtty.Tenoriowereabsent,sothat
onmotionofprivateprosecutor,thecourtdeclaredpetitionertohavewaivedtherighttopresenther
evidence.[8]Fourdayslater(onJuly14,1989),petitionergaveamedicalcertificate[9]statingthatshe
was suffering from hypertension and rheumatism which required bed rest for at least 57 days. The
court merely noted the medical certificate but maintained its previous order, on the ground that the
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sameisnotamotionand[as]counselwasalsonotinCourtduringthelasthearing,theOrderofthe
Court dated July 10, 1989 to the effect that the presentation of defense evidence is considered
waived,stands.[10]
Petitionerbyherselfmovedforreconsideration,allegingthatshefailedtoappearincourtonJuly
10,1989becauseshewasindisposedandhadbeenunabletocontactAtty.Tenorio.Sheaskedfor
permission to present her evidence. Her motion, however, was denied by the court in its order of
August29,1989[11]inwhichitalsoscheduledthepromulgationofjudgmentonSeptember29,1989.
OnSeptember29,1989,thecourtrendereditsdecision[12]findingpetitionerguiltyoffalsification
and sentencing her to 4 months of arrestomayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional,asmaximum,andtopayafineofP5,000.00.
Petitionerthroughanewcounsel,Atty.RonolfoS.Pasamba,filedanoticeofappeal.[13]OnMay9,
1990,petitionerbyherselffiledamotionintheCourtofAppealsforextensionof30daystofileher
briefasappellant.[14] About the same time Atty. Pasamba also filed a motion for an extension of 45
daysforthesamepurpose,butlateraskedtoberelievedaspetitionerscounselonthegroundthat
despitehisrequest,petitionerdidnotgivehimtherecordsofthecaseandconferwithhimbutinstead
actedasherowncounselbyfilingherownmotionfortimetofilebrief.
TheCourtofAppealsgrantedAtty.Pasambasmotionandrequiredpetitionertosubmitthename
andaddressofhernewcounselwithinten(10)daysfromnotice.Petitionerinsteadfiledamotionfor
newtrialinlieuofappellantsbrief,claimingthatbecauseofthenegligenceofhercounsel,shehad
beendeprivedofherrighttopresentevidenceonherbehalfinthetrialcourt.
AftertheSolicitorGeneralfiledhiscomment,theCourtofAppealsinitsresolutiondatedJanuary
15, 1992 denied petitioners motion for new trial and gave her 30 days within which to file her
appellantsbrief.[15]Theappellatecourtheld:
Allthatappellantisinvokingasgroundfornewtrialisthepolicyofliberalityintheapplicationof
therulesandtheallegednegligenceofhercounsel.
Appellant, who has, in fact, prepared the motion herself, without the assistance of counsel, is
probablyamemberoftheBar.Ifsheisnot,shemusthavegonethroughlawschoolasherhandiwork
iswritteninforensicstyleandisevenbetterthanthepleadingsofsomelicensedadvocateswhoare
handlingappealedcasesororiginalspecialcivilactionsbeforethisCourt.
UndertheRulesthegroundsfornewtrialare
(a)Thaterrorsoflaworirregularitieshavebeencommittedduringthetrialprejudicialtothesubstantial
rightsoftheaccusedand
(b)Thatnewandmaterialevidencehasbeendiscoveredwhichtheaccusedcouldnotwithreasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if introduced and admitted, would
probablychangethejudgment.(Rule121,Section2)
Thereisnotevenaweebitofahintaboutthesecondground.
So,ineffect,whattheaccusedwouldwantofUsistobendoverbackwardsandinagestureof
liberality consider as an error of law or as an irregularity the trial courts conclusion that she was
deemedtohavewaivedherrighttopresentevidenceinherdefense.Inconnectionwiththiscourseof
actionshealreadyfiledbeforethetrialcourtamotionforreconsideration:thiswasdenied,whereupon
thetrialcourtproceededtorenditionofthejudgmentappealedfrombytheaccusedtothiscourt.
Wehavemeticulouslygoneovertheentirerecord,andWefindthataccusedappellantwasnotat
alldeprivedofherdayincourtordenieddueprocess.Shewasaffordedampleopportunitytopresent
evidenceinherdefense.
Regardless of the nature of the offense charged, a criminal case, even if it involves only a light
offense, the penalty for which might be mere censure, is a serious matter that deserves equally

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seriousattentionbytheoneaccused.Theappellant,itseemsnevergavetothiscasewhileitwasstill
atthelowercourttheseriousattentionthatitdeserves.Forgoodreasonrepeatedabsencesofthe
accusedandhercounselthetrialcourtwaseventuallyconstrainedtoconsidertheaccusedtohave
waived the presentation of evidence in her defense. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, it is
settled in our jurisprudence that dilatory moves by the accused that tend to defeat the expeditious
terminationofacriminalcaseistantamounttotriflingwiththeadministrationofjusticethatcertainly
cannotandshouldnotbecondoned.(PPvs.Angco,103Phil.33PPvs.Dichoso,96SCRA957)
Petitioner filed a very urgent motion for 90 days from February 22, 1992 to secure services of
counseltofileherappellantsbrief.TheCourtofAppealsgavepetitioner15daysfromFebruary22,
1992, the last day of the extension previously granted her. The Court of Appeals stated that it had
givenpetitionernoticetofilebriefasearlyasMarch27,1990,butpetitionerhasbeentriflingwithour
judicialprocesseslongenough.
OnMarch6,1992,withouttheassistanceofcounsel,accusedappellantfiledanappellantsbrief.
ThereaftertheSolicitorGeneralfiledtheappelleesbrieftowhichpetitionerfiledareplybrief.OnMay
28,1993,theCourtofAppealsrendereditsdecision,affirmingthetrialcourtsruling.On August 30,
1993itdeniedreconsideration.
Petitionerfiledthiscaseforreviewoncertiorari,claimingthatherconvictionbythetrialcourtwas
voidbecauseshewasdenieddueprocess,sinceshewasdeniedtheopportunitytopresentevidence
inherbehalf.TheSolicitorGeneralfiledhiscommenttowhichpetitionerfiledareply.OnNovember
29,1995thisCourtdeniedthepetitionforlackofmerit.Hencethismotionforreconsideration.
Afterdueconsiderationofthemotionanditssupplementandtheseparatecommentstheretoby
the respondents as well as petitioners replies and private respondents consolidated rejoinder, the
Courtnowresolvestograntpetitionersmotionforreconsideration.
First.Theissueinthiscaseiswhetherthetrialcourtproperlyheldpetitionertohavewaivedthe
righttopresentevidencebecauseofherfailuretoproceeddespiteseveralpostponementsgrantedto
her.Tobesure,thepostponementofthetrialofacasetoallowthepresentationofevidenceofaparty
isamatterwhichliesinthediscretionofthetrialcourt,butitisadiscretionwhichmustbeexercised
wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with a view to doing
substantialjustice.[16]Inthecaseatbar,hearingswerescheduledforthepresentationofpetitioners
evidenceonsixdifferentdates,towit:(1)February6,1989(2)March10,1989(3)April12,1989(4)
May17,1989(5)June5,1989and(6)July10,1989.Petitionerwasabsentthrice,i.e.,onFebruary
6,1989,April12,1989,andJuly10,1989.Onthefirstdate,petitionercouldnotcomebecauseshe
wassickandhercounselsoinformedthecourt.ShewasabsentalsoonJune5,1989andJuly10,
1989 because of illness (hypertension and rheumatism). Thus, while petitioners absences were
explained, those of her counsel were not. Atty. Tenorio simply disappeared without a trace, despite
warning to counsel that her failure to present evidence for her client on June 5, 1989 would be
considered a waiver of the latters right to present her evidence. But counsel failed to heed the
warning. Petitioner had to soldier on and, by herself, had to plead with the court for a chance to
presentherevidence.Contrarytowhattheappellatecourtthoughtinaffirmingpetitionersconviction,
this was not the case of a woman who treated the criminal proceedings against her with cavalier
disdain.Indeed,wedonotthinkthatpetitionersabsencesweresomany,capricious,oregregiousas
to indubitably indicate an attempt to stall the proceedings of the criminal case as was the case in
People v. Angco[17] and People v. Dichoso.[18] Petitioner might have tried to delay the filing of her
appellantsbrief,buthereffortcanbeattributedtoanunderstandabledesiretobeallowedtopresent
herevidence.Hence,thefilingofamotionfornewtrial.EveninherpresentpetitionbeforethisCourt
petitioners prayer is not that she be exonerated but only that she be given the chance to prove her
innocencebybeingallowedtopresentherevidence.
RespondentPeopleandthecounselfortheprivaterespondentopposepetitionersmotion. They
pointoutthat,unlikethecases[19]whichpetitionercitesinsupportofhermotion,petitionerherselfwas
negligent. They contend that she could not have been unaware of the absences of her lawyer but

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despite that she did nothing to protect her interests. Private respondent argues that if granted a
second chance to present her side, nothing will stop the petitioner from once again engaging the
servicesofhererstwhileabsenteecounsel.Anyway,afteranother10yearsoflitigation,shecaneasily
sound her reliable refrain: I was denied due process! I was ready to present my evidence, but my
lawyerwasabsentforfiveconsecutivetimes....
Privaterespondentscontentionisexaggerated.Ofcoursethereisalimittopetitionerscredibility
shouldsherepeatwhathadhappenedherejustfordelay,nottomentionthatshewouldbetakinga
big risk of losing her defense. As for the private respondents argument that petitioner should have
gottenanotherlawyer,onlywiththebenefitofhindsightdoesthiscourseappeartobetheonlytenable
onetotake.Petitionermighthavethoughtthathercounselwouldbemoresedulousinherbehalf.Or
perhapspetitionertriedtogetanothercounsel,butfailedand,leftwithnochoice,stuckitoutwithAtty.
Tenorioandsimplyhopedforthebestratherthanbeleftwithoutacounsel.Inanycase,thefactthat
onMay17,1989andJune5,1989petitionerwaspresentevenwhencounselwasabsenttendsto
negateanintentiontodelaythecriminalproceedings.
ItwasAtty.Tenoriosabsences,then,ratherthanpetitioners,whichappeartobethecauseforthe
defensesfailuretopresentitsevidence.Atty.Tenoriosnegligencedidnotconsistinerrorofprocedure
orevenalapseinstrategybutsomethingasbasicasfailingtoappearincourtdespiteclearwarning
thatsuchfailurewouldamounttowaiverofherclientsrighttopresentevidenceinherdefense.
Keepinginmindthatthiscaseinvolvespersonalliberty,thenegligenceofcounselwascertainly
so gross that it should not be allowed to prejudice petitioners constitutional right to be heard. The
judicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the
prosecution just because the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality.
Rigid application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice where justice is due to
securetoeveryindividualallpossiblelegalmeanstoprovehisinnocenceofacrimewithwhichheor
shemightbecharged.[20]
Onlylastyear,thisCourtsetasideitsdecisionafterfindingthattherightoftheaccusedtodue
process had been violated. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[21] this Court set aside its decision
affirmingpetitionersconvictionbytheSandiganbayananditsresolutiondenyingreconsideration,after
being shown that petitioners conviction had been brought about by his counsels gross ignorance of
lawandprocedure.TheCourtheld:

Petitionerspresentdilemmaiscertainlynotsomethingreducibletopesosandcentavos.Nolessthanhisliberty
isatstakehere.Andheisjustabouttoloseitsimplybecausehisformerlawyerspursuedacarelesslycontrived
proceduralstrategyofinsistingonwhathasalreadybecomeanimprudentremedy,whichthusforbadepetitioner
fromofferinghisevidenceallthewhileavailableforpresentationbeforetheSandiganbayan.Underthe
circumstances,higherinterestsofjusticeandequitydemandthatpetitionerbenotpenalizedforthecostly
importuningsofhispreviouslawyersbasedonthesameprincipleswhythisCourthad,onmanyoccasions
whereitgrantednewtrial,excusedpartiesfromthenegligenceormistakesofcounsel.Toclingtothegeneral
ruleinthiscaseisonlytocondoneratherthanrectifyaseriousinjusticetopetitionerswhoseonlyfaultwasto
reposehisfaithandentrusthisinnocencetohispreviouslawyers....

TheCourtremandedthecasetotheSandiganbayanforreceptionandappreciationofpetitioners
evidence.
Inanothercase,Peoplev.DelMundo,[22]inwhichtheaccusedwasconvictedofrapeinsixcases
andsentencedtoreclusionperpetuaonfiveofthemandtodeathonthesixth,thisCourtordereda
newtrialafteritwasshownthatcomplainanthadexecutedpriortoaccusedsconvictionanaffidavitof
desistance, while an NBI medicolegal report given after such conviction found that complainants
physicalvirginitypreserved.The report belied the contrary finding of the city health officer on which
the trial court relied in convicting the accused. Although the NBI report did not constitute newly
discoveredevidence,anewtrialwasnonethelessorderedonthebroadergroundofsubstantialjustice
[as]theruleforgrantingamotionfornewtrial,amongothers,shouldbeliberallyconstruedtoassist
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the parties in obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. . . . Court litigations are
primarily for the search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are
giventhefullestopportunitytoadduceproofsisthebestwaytoferretoutsuchtruth.
Reconsiderationoftheresolutioninthiscaseiscompelledbytheseprecedents.Indeed,todeny
petitionertheopportunity to present her evidence on the merest chancethatshemightbeinnocent
wouldbetodisregardthewisdomthatitisbettertoacquittenguiltyindividualsthantoconvictone
innocentperson.TheCourtisasawareasanyoneoftheneedforthespeedydispositionofcases.At
thesametime,however,ithaseverbeenmindfulofitsresponsibilityasthehighesttribunalofjustice
to see to it that the paramount interests of justice are not sacrificed for the sake of speed and
efficiency.AsJusticeTeehankeewrote:[23]

TheCourthasconsistentlymaintainedthatalthoughaspeedydeterminationofanactionimpliesaspeedytrial,
speedisnotthechiefobjectiveofatrial.Carefulanddeliberateconsiderationfortheadministrationofjustice,a
genuinerespectfortherightsofallpartiesandtherequirementsofproceduraldueprocessandanadherenceto
theCourtsstandingadmonitionthatthediscretiongrantedjudgesinthegrantingordenialofmotionsfor
postponementandthesettingasideofdenialorderspreviouslyissuedshouldalwaysbepredicatedonthe
considerationthatmorethanthemereconvenienceofthecourtsorofthepartiesinthecase,theendsofjustice
andfairnesswouldbeservedtherebyaremoreimportantthanaracetoendthetrial.

Second.In denying petitioners plea for a chance to present her evidence, the Court of Appeals
observed that petitioner has more than a laymans acquaintance with the law, having been able to
prepareandfileherownmotionfornewtrialandappellantsbrief,tobegiventhebenefitofthedoubt.
But even lawyers, who are parties in a case, need the guiding hand of counsel. Skill in drafting
pleadings(whichispracticallytheonlylawyerlythingpetitionerdid)isvastlydifferentfromskillneeded
inthecourtroom.Preparingpleadingscanbedoneatleisurewiththeluxuryofconsultation,eitherof
books or of people.Trial work, however, demands more.It requires the ability to think fast on ones
feetandthepsychologistsfeelforthewitnessmoodandmotive.AsthenChiefJusticeMoransaidfor
theCourtinPeoplev.Holgado:[24]

Eventhemostintelligentoreducatedmanmayhavenoskillinthescienceofthelaw,particularlyinthe
rulesofprocedure,and,withoutcounsel,hemaybeconvictednotbecauseheisguiltybutbecausehedoes
notknowhowtoestablishhisinnocence.

It is entirely probable that, forced to be her own lawyer, petitioner nonetheless felt some
inadequacy and experienced some moments of doubt whether she could go through the ordeal of
presentingherevidencebyherlonesome,andthatcouldbethereasonwhyshehesitatedfromdoing
sowhenshefoundherselfwithouttheassistanceofcounselandnotbecausepetitionertriedtodelay
theproceedingsandobstructthecourseofjustice.
In sum, it is better to allow petitioner another chance to present her evidence than to let her
convictionstandbasedsolelyontheevidenceoftheprosecution.InaccordancewithRule121,6,[25]
theevidenceoftheprosecutionshallbeunderstoodpreserved,subjecttotherightoftheprosecution
tosupplementitand/ortorebuttheevidencewhichpetitionermaypresent.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of November 29, 1995 is
GRANTEDandthedecisiondatedMay28,1993oftheCourtofAppealsandthatoftheRegionalTrial
CourtofBulacan,Branch22datedSeptember29,1989inCriminalCaseNo.9252MareSETASIDE
andthiscaseisREMANDEDtotheRegionalTrialCourtofBulacanforanewtrialforthepurposeof
allowingpetitionertopresentevidenceinherdefensewithdirectivetothecourtthereaftertodecide
thecasewithalldeliberatespeed.
SOORDERED.
Regalado,(Chairman),Romero,Puno,andTorres,Jr.,JJ.,concur.

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[1](Tenth Division) per Justice Regina G. OrdoezBenitezand concurred in by Justices Arturo B. Buena and Eduardo G.
Montenegro.
[2]Vol.IofRecords,p.1.

[3]RTCOrderofFebruary6,1989,id.,p.276.

[4]RTCOrderofMarch10,1989,id.,p.281.

[5]RTCOrderofApril12,1989,id.,p.286.

[6]RTCOrderofMay17,1989,id.,p.293

[7]RTCOrderofJune5,1989,id.,p.297.

[8]RTCOrderofJuly10,1989,id.,p.300.

[9]Id.,p.301.

[10]RTCOrderofJuly17,1989,id.,p.303.

[11]Id.,p.314.

[12]Id.,pp.326334.

[13]Id.,p.338.

[14]CARollo,p.14.

[15](Special Eleventh Division) per Justice Fortunato A. Vailoces and concurred in by Justices Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr.
andLuisA.Victor,CARollo,pp.6971.
[16]Piedadv.Batuyong,55SCRA763(1974)Peoplev.Martinez,105Phil.200(1959)UnitedStatesv.Ramirez,39Phil.
738(1919).
[17]103Phil.33(1953).

[18]96SCRA957(1980).

[19]Thecasesare(1)AceyorkAguilarv.CourtofAppeals,250SCRA371(1995)wheretheCourtsetasidethedismissalof
petitioners appeal for failure to file the appellants brief on time, it appearing that petitioners former counsel had
abandonedhimandcouldnotbecontacteddespiteearnestefforts(2)Legardav.CourtofAppeals,195SCRA418
(1991)wheretheCourtfoundpetitionerscounselsnegligenceinallowingpetitionertobedeclaredindefaultandthe
ensuing judgment against her to lapse in finality resulting in the loss of her property worth millions so gross and
inexcusableastowarrantreinstatinghertitletotheproperty(3)Escuderov.Dulay,158SCRA69(1988)wherethe
Court set aside the decision of the trial court against the petitioner, the same being due to their trial counsels
blunderinprocedureandgrossignoranceofexistingjurisprudenceand(4)PeoplesHomesiteandHousingCorp.v.
Tiongco,12SCRA471(1964)wheretheCourtheldthatapetitionforreliefalthoughfiledoutsidethereglementary
period of 60 days was nonetheless seasonably filed because the delay was attributed to the negligence of
petitionerscounsel.
[20]Peoplev.Jose,70SCRA257(1976).

[21]G.R.No.103276,April11,1996.

[22]G.R.Nos.11996469,September20,1996.

[23]Ambertiv.CourtofAppeals,89SCRA240,249250(1979).

[24]85Phil.752,756(1959).

[25]
Rule121,6:Effectsofgrantinganewtrialorreconsideration.Theeffectsofgrantinganewtrialorreconsiderationare
thefollowing:
(a)Whenanewtrialisgrantedonthegroundoferrorsoflaworirregularitiescommittedduringthetrial,alltheproceedings
andevidencenotaffectedbythecommissionofsucherrorsandirregularitiesshallstand,butthoseaffectedthereby
shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional
evidence.

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....
(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall be set aside and a new
judgmentrenderedaccordingly.(Emphasisadded)

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